CELEPS, BUTCHERS, AND THE SHEEP:
THE WORLDS OF MEAT IN ISTANBUL IN THE SIXTEENTH-SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

BY

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CELEPS, BUTCHERS, AND THE SHEEP:

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ABSTRACT

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Despite the considerable expansion of studies about the economic and social history of the
Ottoman Empire with special emphasis on urban problématiques, we are still far away from
understanding simple matters concerning Ottoman urban centers such as the ways in which
foodstuffs were brought to the city, or the mechanisms through which they were distributed to
urban consumers. By analyzing the meat sector in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries
Istanbul, this thesis aims to partially fulfill this gap. In addition to the supply and distribution
mechanisms, this study focuses on the meat consumption patterns of Ottoman Istanbulians and
on the consumption differentiations in a heterogeneous society. It seems that that such
heterogeneity mirrored the entire meat sphere in the urban center. Different agents in the
sector, which were the consumers, the butchers (the meat contractors), the livestock traders,
celeps, and the dynasty members, all with their different roles, reflect this heterogeneity. Such
a complex picture at the same time provides a huge opportunity for us in observing the effects
of the major economic and political transformations in the 16th and 17th centuries on the
different groups of the Ottoman Istanbulians. For this reason, this study also aims to trace the
patterns of the economic, social and political changes through one of the economic niches of
society, the meat sector, which produced a network of social and political relationships around
it.

In the first chapter of this study, the geographical provenance and the features of the
sheep delivered to the Ottoman capital is taken into consideration. In the second chapter, the
methods of the delivery of sheep to Istanbul are analyzed. The third chapter is devoted to the
analysis of the Istanbul butchers as the purchasers of delivered sheep. In the fourth chapter,
the meat consumption patterns of Ottoman Istanbulians are presented.
ÖZÖZET
CELEP, KASAP VE KOYUNLAR:
ONALTINCI VE ONYEDİNCİ YÜZİYL İSTANBUL’UNDA
ET DÜNYALARI
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İlk bölümde, Osmanlı başkentine gelen koyunların coğrafi dağılımları ve nitelikleri ele alınmaktadır. İkinci bölümde ise, bu koyunların İstanbul’a getirilme yöntemleriyle ilgilenilmiştir. Üçüncü bölüm, koyunların İstanbul’duki alcılıları olan kasapların incelenmesine ayrılmıştır. Son bölümde ise, Osmanlı İstanbulullarının et tüketim kalıpları sunulmuştur.
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Note on Transliteration
Modern Turkish transliterations of Ottoman Turkish words have been used throughout this thesis. Long vowels and the letter ‘ayn’ have been shown in the transliteration. During this thesis, the Ottoman Turkish words are italicized, while the names of the geographical zones and of the individuals are presented in the normal form. For the entire transliterations, Ferit Develioğlu’s Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lügat and TDK’s Güncel Türkçe Sözlük-Bilim ve Sanat Terimleri Ana Sözlüğü are utilized.

List of Abbreviations
BOA Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Prime Ministry Archives), Istanbul
MAD Maliyeden Müdevver Koleksiyonu (Registers of the Finance Ministry), Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul
MD Mühimme Defterleri (Book Records of the Imperial Assembly), Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul
TDK Türk Dil Kurumu (The Turkish Language Association)
INTRODUCTION

There has been a considerable growth in the number of studies about the economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire, with special emphasis on urban problématiques. Even so, we are still far from understanding simple matters concerning Ottoman urban centers such as the ways in which foodstuffs were brought to the city, or the mechanisms through which they were distributed to urban consumers. In the historiography of Ottoman urban supply, the central administration’s regulations of price and quantity have always held a special place. It is generally argued that providing foodstuffs to urban consumers on a daily basis at a “reasonable price” had been a significant concern of the central administration.\(^1\) If we come to the specific issue of feeding Istanbul, the tone of this concern is more pronounced: “because the sultan perceived feeding Ottoman Istanbuliots as his personal responsibility and authority, the central administration’s control over prices, quantity and quality greatly increased in the Ottoman capital.”\(^2\) This is clearly reflected in the tendency of historians, to view the issue of feeding a “giant city”\(^3\) from the perspective of the central administration’s regulations imposed on the urban guilds and on the special supply mechanisms. No doubt, the meat supply of the city had always been an important part of this discourse.

Although Ahmet Refik does not specially focus on the supply-distribution mechanisms of foodstuffs, he is the first researcher interested in meat supply within the context of Istanbul.\(^4\) He has published various mühimme orders [imperial orders], in which the special concern of the central administration over the foodstuff can be easily seen. As a natural result of the utilization of mühimme orders, he presents a picture that the central administration

\(^1\) Halil İnalcık & Donald Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: Volume I: 1300-1600*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 179-180.
\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 179.
\(^3\) Ibid., pp. 179-180.
strictly controlled meat supply and distribution through the *celepkeşan* registrations\(^5\) and butcher appointments to the Ottoman capital. *Celepkeşans* were individuals who were obliged to deliver a specific amount of sheep to Istanbul per annum. Within the framework of the *celepkeşan* system, the central administration expected an annual sheep delivery from *celepkeşans* throughout the sixteenth century.\(^6\) In addition to this, the central administration seems to have been interested in the appointment of wealthy individuals to the butchery service in Istanbul.\(^7\) In Refik’s publications, we frequently encounter butcher appointments from individuals of a wealthy background to the Ottoman capital. The central administration seems to have monitored these individuals and then appointed them as Istanbul butchers. This entire picture suggests that the control of the central apparatus was omnipresent in the meat sector and that these controls concerned the continuous meat inflow to Istanbul markets at a fixed price [*narh*]. This picture is also supported by other scholars such as Mustafa Akdağ, Robert Mantran, and Ömer Lütfi Barkan.

Mustafa Akdağ relates these butcher appointments to the negative attitude the Ottoman elites had towards usurers and money-lenders, who gained enormous profits through speculative high interest rates.\(^8\) According to his analysis, the central administration would investigate wealthy individuals and then appoint them to the non-profit butchery service in Istanbul. Akdağ argues that since the central administration imposed *narh* [fixed prices] on butchers, who were also obliged to sell mutton to the state-dependants at a lower price, being a butcher brought about automatic “bankruptcy” to these individuals. Barkan also interprets the butcher appointments in a similar way.\(^9\) Without focusing on market operations, he reaches the conclusion that the central administration utilized wealthy individuals, especially

\(^5\) For example, see Ahmet Refik Altunay, *Onaltinci Asrarda Istanbul Hayatı* (1553-1591), (İstanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1935), pp. 84.

\(^6\) For a detailed analysis on the *celepkeşan* system, see Chapter II.

\(^7\) Ahmet Refik Altunay, *Onaltinci Asrarda Istanbul Hayatı* (1553-1591), (İstanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1935), pp. 94.


usurers or moneylenders, as “milk cows” by appointing them to the Istanbul butchery service. In his analysis, butcher appointments are depicted as a form of sürgün [exile].

Similarly, Robert Mantran emphasizes strict state control of the guilds. According to him, government supervision over the guilds restricted their profits and market activities in a way that benefited the state. Undoubtedly, the butcher’s guild was also subjected to this rigid control mechanism and the central administration was able to intervene in guild matters, butchers’ activities and profit margins. Although Mantran does not underestimate the potential profits of the livestock traders, he interprets this phenomenon within the framework of the central administration’s concern for feeding the Ottoman capital. His analysis of the meat sector is two-tiered: on the one hand, like other guilds, butchers were under the strict control of the central administration. On the other hand, the central administration supported the livestock merchants. Such an interpretation clearly reflects the fact that Mantran views the meat supply mechanism in the framework of the state’s concern to provide mutton to the urban consumers at lower prices. Like Mantran, Cvetkova also approaches the meat sector from the central administration’s perspective and suggests that celepkeşans were wealthy livestock traders in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In three articles, by focusing on celepkeşans in the Bulgarian lands, Cvetkova shows that they were generally selected from the upper strata of the Balkan provinces and that the celepkeşan service was not totally unprofitable for individuals. However, in these studies, Cvetkova does not emphasize the

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10 Ibid., pp. 39.
12 Ibid., pp. 165-167.
economic conditions of Istanbul butchers and tends to see the celepkeşan system as a
reflection of the state supervision over mutton supply.  

We should admit that the main watershed of Ottoman historiography in approaching
the Istanbul meat sector emerges with Suraiya Faroqhi’s study on Istanbul butchers.  
By combining Barkan’s and Mantran’s interpretations, she views the butchery service as non-
profitable in Istanbul. She suggests that in order to provide mutton to Ottoman Istanbul
butchers at lower prices, the central administration directed the financial assets of wealthy
individuals to the butchery service and, in this way, utilized these assets as a “public service.” She
argues that with the general shortage in mutton supply by the sixteenth century, the central
administration both increased butcher appointments and criticized butchers for their illegal
activities such as engaging in livestock trade and speculating in mutton prices.  
According to this picture, she reaches the conclusion that the Istanbul butchers were both the “milk cows”
and “scapegoats” of the central administration.  This interpretation brought about an
understanding that these butchers were accepting the inevitable bankruptcy after their
appointments to Istanbul due to the strict control mechanism of the central administration.

The “scapegoat-milk cow” analysis presented in Ottoman historiography another
“strong” argument about the economic mentality of Ottoman elites. As proposed by Mehmet
Genç, “provisioning” is one of the three cornerstone of this mentality.  Genç argues that
according to the provisioning mentality, the Ottoman elite placed importance on increasing
consumer surplus and always tried to provide foodstuffs to the urban consumers at lower
prices. Through this mechanism, the losses resulting from lower prices were transferred to the

14 Bistra Cvetkova, “Les celep et leur rôle dans la vie économique des Balkans a l’époque Ottomane (XV-
XVIII.),” Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. Michael Cook, (London: Oxford University
16 Ibid., pp. 280-285.
18 Mehmet Genç, “Osmanlı İktisadi Dünyası Görüşünün İlkeleri,” İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi
Sosyoloji Dergisi, No: III, 1989, pp. 175-185. See also, Mehmet Genç, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Devlet ve
Ekonomi, (İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2000), pp. 43-52.
producers and merchants. It is clear that Genç’s analysis combines Barkan’s and Akdağ’s interpretations arguing that the Ottoman elite did not approve of the accumulation of capital by merchants and suggests that the losses due to lower consumer prices were transferred to them and producers. It seems that both Faroqhi’s analysis and Genç’s suggestions served as the basis for further research done on meat supply.

As a matter of fact, Anthony Greenwood’s study on Istanbul’s meat supply clearly reflects this phenomenon.¹⁹ Through a detailed study of mühimme orders and celepkeşan registers, Greenwood suggests that at its inception, the celepkeşanlık was not an economically efficient service and the financial burden on the celepkeşans was very high.²⁰ As a result of this inefficiency, he suggests that this service was transformed into a different form by the seventeenth century. According to him, by then the structure of the meat sectors had dramatically changed.²¹ In the sixteenth century, the celepkeşan service dominated the meat supply and this service was based on the in-kind obligations of celepkeşans. In other words, celepkeşans had to deliver a specific amount of sheep to the Ottoman capital during a specific time period. However, by the seventeenth century, this service had become monetized and the celepkaşans’ obligation had become transformed into monetary forms. In addition to the inefficiency of the celepkeşan service in the sixteenth century, Greenwood also suggests that financing the mutton supply was the responsibility of butchers and that this service was also non-profitable due to sales to the Janissaries and state dependants at lower prices.²² Like Cvetkova, Greenwood shows that the meat supply of the Ottoman capital depended on the inflow of sheep from the Balkans. Despite his categorization of various Balkan sheep types,

²⁰ Ibid., Chapter III.
²¹ For a detailed analysis, see Chapter II.
²² Anthony Greenwood, op cit., Chapter IV.
Greenwood does not try to analyze the rationale behind this dependency or the selection of specific types for delivery to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{23}

On the topic of foodstuff supply, however, we should also admit some exceptions within the existing historiography. For instance, although his interest is mainly limited to the grain supply of the Ottoman capital, Rhoads Murphey argues that despite the central administration’s control mechanisms, merchants’ initiatives and operations played a significant role in Istanbul’s grain supply.\textsuperscript{24} In fact, before Rhoads Murphey, Lütfi Göçer clearly shows this phenomenon and suggests that the grain supply of the Ottoman capital nearly depended on the merchants’ deliveries.\textsuperscript{25} Both Göçer and Murphey present a complex picture of the foodstuff supply of the Ottoman capital which is not dominated by the central administration’s policies. Nonetheless, these interpretations have not become widespread in Ottoman studies. For instance, in Ahmet Uzun’s study on the ondalık ağnam system [one-tenth sheep system] in the first half of the nineteenth century, he also continues to approach the issue within the framework of urban “provisioning” and to place special emphasis on the central administration’s strict control mechanisms over the meat sector.\textsuperscript{26} Again, in the study on celepkeşans, Halime Doğru interprets the meat supply of the Ottoman capital in the framework of the central administration initiatives and celepkeşan system without paying attention to free merchants’ deliveries.\textsuperscript{27}

Existing historiography on the meat supply in the Ottoman Empire paints a picture that is no different than other foodstuffs during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – they were under the strict control of the central administration. Within the framework of the provisioning mentality, the central administration provided this control through the formation

\textsuperscript{23} See Anthony Greenwood, op cit, Chapter I-II.
of the *celepkeşan* system, butcher appointments and price regulations. As a result of these controls, both the *celepkeşan* and butchery services brought about high financial burdens on individuals.\textsuperscript{28} Given this economic background, historians have reached the conclusion that under the special provisioning system and controls of the central administration, Ottoman Istanbuliots must have eaten more mutton than their European counterparts. Robert Mantran suggests that the total livestock supply of Istanbul in 1674, including sheep, goat, cattle, and probably pork, exceeded 7,000,000.\textsuperscript{29} Moreover, Greenwood estimates that about 600,000-1,500,000 sheep arrived in the city per annum in the seventeenth century. All of these numbers point to a high level of mutton consumption among Ottoman Istanbuliots.

Within this context, this study aims to discuss this static picture of Istanbul’s meat sector in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is clear that the existing interpretations mostly ignore the concept of “time” in approaching the worlds of meat in Istanbul. In fact, the economic parameters and the networks of this meat world experienced a continuous transformation throughout the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. In addition to this, the consumption patterns of Ottoman Istanbuliots in terms of mutton dramatically changed by the final decades of the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, the above-mentioned picture undervalues the production relations underlying the meat world. Still, the increasing tendency of investments in the meat trade placed into stock breeding, leasing pasture lands or shops affiliated with animal sectors clearly appeared as an undeniable phenomenon in the vicinity of Istanbul by the sixteenth century. The engine of this structural change is undoubtedly the rise in aggregate domestic meat demand. To what extent this trend diffused into the sub-categories of the meat trade remains unknown, but we do know that in other cities, for instance in


\textsuperscript{30} See Chapter IV.
Edirne, the ‘askerî and capital owners also made significant investments in stock breeding and livestock trade.\textsuperscript{31} In fact, the extent of these investments and their effects on the meat sector compared to European landscape in the sixteenth century presents us with the dynamics of the meat sector’s evolution throughout the sixteenth century. In addition to this, the success of both the central administration and livestock merchants in integrating economically with international markets, especially those in Walachia and Moldavia, determined the development of the meat world in Istanbul. The livestock merchants and butchers efficiently utilized the political tools of the state apparatus in supply competition and by the middle of the sixteenth century, nearly succeeded in crowding out other competitors, especially German and Polish livestock merchants, from these two important markets. Starting from the last quarter of the sixteenth century, the supply and delivery from these regions came to be closely attached to financial circles in the Ottoman capital. The most striking feature of this political and financial control was the engagement of the meat contractors (butchers) in the appointment of \textit{voyvodos}.\textsuperscript{32} It is clear that the Istanbul meat market presented a dynamic portrait throughout the sixteenth century and experienced a continuous transformation.

These dynamic responses of market agents are surprising for historians who have had a strong tendency to perceive the Istanbul butchers as the ‘‘scapegoats’’ and ‘‘milk cows’’ of the Ottoman command economy.\textsuperscript{33} This ‘‘scapegoat-milk cow’’ analysis totally undervalues the economic rationing of these individuals under the strict control of the ‘‘monster’’ Ottoman central administration. However, my research points to the fact that these people behaved with rational strategies in their business, and were actively engaged in livestock trade and credit


markets. There is no doubt that via this strategy they spread their risk ratios to various sectors. They made serious investments in animal by-product sectors, especially candle and soap making. Considering the well-known fragility of the long-distance trade in the early modern world, such risk reduction strategies of the butchers becomes meaningful. In other words, the risky business of the butchers always contained the probability of bankruptcy despite the distribution of their investments over various niches. In addition, the low level of specialization and of overall standardization in this business might have accelerated these risks. However, the engagement in the meat trade seems to have been profitable for the individuals at any cost and they were as politically-economically strong as the central administration was obliged to subsidize their costs from the sale to state-dependants in Istanbul through the formation of special waqfs. Contrary to their static portrait in the existing historiography, it seems that butchers were very active in the meat market and their activities in related sectors were not ad-hoc. This makes us think that the central administration could not control and regulate each operation in the animal by-product sectors. As a matter of fact, studies by both Eunjeong Yi and Edhem Eldem show that the central administration did not have an extensive control capacity over the market operations in the 16th-17th centuries. We can easily trace this phenomenon in the meat sector. It is understood

34 For the butchers’ integration into credit markets, see Chapter II. And, for their engagement in livestock trade see Chapter III.
As it can be understood from the intensive engagement of ‘askerî class into meat contracts, there was no clear spatial-technical-economic standardization and specialization in this trade. I must emphasize that the engagement in this trade did not necessarily bring practical operation. Through controlling tax farms, licences and leasing opportunities, the Ottoman polity was deeply engaged in this profitable trade. Women also placed themselves into various niches in the meat business. See, Chapter II-III.
37 See Chapter III.
that despite the endeavors of the central administration in controlling and regulating their operations, the integration of butchers with other sectors seems to have continued throughout the sixteenth century and accelerated by the seventeenth century. Similar limited regulation and surveillance can be also seen in the butcher appointments throughout the sixteenth century.

Although it is true that the central administration regulated the meat market through butcher appointments in the sixteenth century and utilized the financial assets of butchers, these appointments were intensively applied during a very short term in the 16th century. These were mostly due to financial need of the central treasury after the outbreak of war against the Safawids in 1577. That is not to say that before then the Ottoman central administration did not make these appointments. Even before the mid-16th century, the central administration had applied the appointment strategy, but about 90 per cent of these appointments had been practiced by 1577. Assuming it was not coincidental, such a phenomenon leads us to think that the central treasury might have consciously applied this strategy in order to direct capital for the financial needs of the Ottoman war machine during the last two decades of the sixteenth century. Thus, we cannot ascribe these appointments to the whole of the sixteenth century. Related to this, we are unable to draw the conclusion that throughout the sixteenth century the central administration utilized wealthy individuals as ‘‘milk cows’’ in the butchery service.

It is also quite noteworthy to note that some state regulations are not always restrictive for market agents. Under pre-modern trade conditions the central administration’s regulations over price and quantity provided the tools for the reduction of asymmetric-

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39 For detailed analysis, see Chapter III.
information problems in the markets.\textsuperscript{40} Undoubtedly, knowing the quantity and price beforehand gave merchants an economic advantage, which protected them from unexpected price-quality vacillations. Moreover, even in modern economics, market operations are utilized through the various regulatory agencies whose main task is the increase of consumer surplus and market efficiency. However, these institutions never keep companies from maximizing profits.

I do not argue that the Ottoman economic mentality was very advanced or that they understood the importance of market efficiency in pre-modern conditions. But, within the framework of the meat supply, I suggest that the term “provisioning” is too abstract a term with which either the real economic perceptions of the Ottoman elite or market dynamics can be understood. The term “provisioning” is still used in modern economics and its usage shows us the need for a deeper analysis of the operational realities of “provisionist” policies.\textsuperscript{41} Interestingly, when we analyze the features of the meat supply in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries, we can argue that if a system of provisioning existed, it applied only to state-dependants, not the all urban consumers in the Ottoman capital. Accordingly, the meat price quotes in the purchases for the Janissaries had been lower than the narh [fixed price] level by the 1560s.\textsuperscript{42} Moreover, even this special “provisioning” mechanism never crowded-out free entrepreneurs from the markets. Even at first glance, the share of the quantities of celepkeşan sheep and merchant-sheep in the sixteenth-seventeenth century clarifies this point. Namely,


\textsuperscript{41} In modern sense, the term of \textit{iâše} is frequently used in various contacts for the provisioning of the foodstuffs to municipal institutions and jail kitchens. No doubt, \textit{iâše} in this case refers to the system covering all (sub) contractors with enabling market profits. If this term applied also Ottoman economic structures, how could we perceive the practical operations of this term? Was it applied through the private capital or state enterprises? Without analyzing the real side of this term, the term of provisioning led us to the anachronism.

\textsuperscript{42} On the differentiation of meat prices within Istanbul, see Chapter III and IV.
the meat supply from free sheep traders reached nearly 50 per cent of Istanbul’s total supply.43 Such a market structure is totally compatible with Lütfi Göçer’s findings on the grain supply to Istanbul. He clearly shows that even in the mid-15th century, 92 per cent of the grain supply to Istanbul was organized by private entrepreneurs.44 Contrary to the centralization efforts of the state in the economic arena by the nineteenth century, the realities in previous centuries were totally different.

In this way, this thesis aims to show that the existing historiography, with some exceptions, misinterprets the structure of the Istanbul’s meat supply in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This supply mechanism did not include only sheep delivery into the city, but also its distribution to various agents in Istanbul. Contrary to the static picture, this study tries to show that the whole structure of the meat sector experienced a continuous transformation during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the market agent responded to this transformation in dynamic ways. The agents in the sector were the consumers, the butchers (the meat contractors), the livestock traders, celeps, and the dynasty members, each with their own distinct roles. Such a complex picture at the same time provides a great opportunity for us to observe the effects of the major economic and political transformations on different groups among Ottoman Istanbulliots.

Although some of their interpretations on the meat sector are criticized in this study, Cvetkova’s, Greenwood’s and Halime Doğru’s studies were extensively utilized. In addition to these secondary sources, the accounting registers of the imperial kitchens are the main sources in analyzing the mutton distribution within the city and the consumption of state-dependants. Some of these accounting registers are already published, but most of them have


It is clear that the supplied quantity of celepeşan köyünü was barely above the merchants’ supply in the nineteenth century. With the kurban sheep, the merchants’ quantity was also very close to celepeşan sheep in the sixteenth century.

not been studied yet.\textsuperscript{45} The mutton consumption in these registers is recorded as \textit{bahâ-i gûst}, \textit{bahâ-i ağnam}, and \textit{bahâ-i bere}.\textsuperscript{46} As part of the accounting registers of the imperial kitchens, \textit{kassâbbaşı registers} standing in the collections of \textit{Kâmil Kepeçi} and \textit{Bâb-ı Defter-i Baş Muhasabe Kalemi} are valuable sources for the monitoring of general meat consumption and allocation of meat to dignitaries, royalty and also Janissaries in seventeenth-century-Istanbul. For the sixteenth century, despite their silence on the distribution mechanism of mutton, the \textit{mühimme} orders and \textit{celepkeşan} registers\textsuperscript{47} are the main sources for tracing the meat supply of the Ottoman capital. Furthermore, in order to analyze the butchers’ economic activities, which can not be seen through \textit{mühimme} orders or accounting registers, this study utilizes some of the \textit{şer’iyye registers} of Eyüp, Tophane and Üsküdar \textit{kadi} courts in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Within this framework, the first chapter focuses on the geographical provenance and the features of sheep delivered to the Ottoman capital in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. It also tries to show that the mutton supply for Ottoman Istanbul, mainly relying upon the various Balkan sheep types, including \textit{Tsigai, Kivrıcik, Zackel} and \textit{Ruda}. Contrary to the single categorization of Balkan sheep, this chapter discusses the physical and qualitative differentiations among sheep types together with their significance for the diets of Istanbulliots. I place special emphasis on the terminology of the Ottoman central administration in designating sheep types in Anatolia and the Balkans. Such an ethno-linguistic analysis presents the connection between the geographical distribution of the sheep types and of the communities (especially transhumant and nomadic) in the Ottoman landscape. Within the framework of physical differences among sheep types, the chapter also


\textsuperscript{47} Anthony Greenwood, op cit, Appendix A-B-C.
discusses the mutton productivities of the various sheep types and tries to highlight the point that strong dependence of Ottoman Istanbul on Balkan sheep existed, as well as increased supply difficulties in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries.

The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of sheep supply in the sixteenth century Istanbul. In this chapter, I try to show that the supply mechanism was not the same throughout this century. The increase in the population of state-dependents and the rising competition among Ottoman cities over livestock reserves caused the central administration to develop a special supply mechanism under the name of the *celepkeşan* system. In addition to the formation of this system, the meat traders in Istanbul began to integrate with the Walachian and Moldavian markets in order to direct the livestock reserves to the Ottoman capital. In the framework of the integration into these markets, I intend to show that the supply mechanism for mutton did not depend on the policies of the central administration. Unlike the monopolistic depiction of the *celepkeşan* system, the merchants’ operations played an important role in Istanbul’s meat supply during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This chapter also discusses the efficiency of *celepkeşan* system by the middle of the sixteenth century and focuses on the economic parameters of this system. Contrary to Anthony Greenwood’s depiction, this chapter suggests that the *celepkeşan* service was not non-profitable for *celepkeşans* and that the continuous transformation in the system by the 1560s can not be interpreted as the inefficiency of the system which caused economic losses for *celepkeşans*. At this moment, I discuss the reasons behind the massive *celepkeşan* registrations by the 1560s and the transformation of the system from the in-kind obligations to the cash-based responsibilities of the *celepkeşans*. I try to show that these phenomena are closely related to the wide-scale political-economic changes in the Ottoman Empire which had become visible by the 1560s.

The third chapter deals with the economic activities of Istanbul butchers in the sixteenth century and their roles in the transformation of the meat sector during the final decades of the sixteenth century. This chapter critically analyzes the “scapegoat-milk cow” theories about Istanbul butchers and tries to show that being a butcher in Ottoman Istanbul did not mean bankruptcy for butchers in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. Contrary to their static depiction within the “scapegoat-milk cow” analyses, this chapter argues that some of Istanbul butchers were attached to the livestock and leather trades and spread their capital into various sectors in order to reduce their risks from one economic activity. In the framework of their extensive mercantile activities in animal by-product sectors, the chapter also focuses on their role in the monetization process of the celepkeșan system and their political-economic power vis-à-vis the central administration. With the structural change in the meat trade by the end of the sixteenth century, I also try to show that the new structure of the meat sector created significant opportunities for Istanbul butchers in the first half of the seventeenth century.

The fourth and final chapter focuses on the meat consumption in Ottoman Istanbul with reference to the significant changes in Istanbulliots’ diets. Here, I try to show that Ottoman Istanbulliots dramatically reduced their mutton consumption by the seventeenth century. The chapter also focuses on the reasons behind alteration in meat consumption and tries to present not only the change of economic parameters, but also the demographic structure of the Ottoman capital being responsible for the transformation in meat consumption. Related to this, I discuss the established cliché that mutton consumption in Ottoman Istanbul was excessively higher than its European counterparts. In light of this, I reach the conclusion that the level of mutton consumption in the Ottoman capital was not higher than that in contemporary European urban centers in the sixteenth-seventeenth

centuries. In the conclusion, I pose several questions for further research about meat worlds and their reflections on both Ottoman Istanbul’s topography and Istanbullots’ daily life.

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50 As an example, see Robert Mantran, XVI-XVII. Yüzyılda İstanbul’da Gündelik Hayat, (İstanbul: Eren, 1991), pp. 143.
CHAPTER I

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SHEEP FLOCKS FOR ISTANBUL

“Aşağıdan Gelyor Türkmen Koyunu Aman Aman
Selviye Benzettim Yarın Boyunu Amanın Yandım”¹

In the absence of massive crossbreeding technologies in the pre-industrial period, it
might be expected that the Ottomans should exalt the huge sheep reservoir in the Asia Minor
Plateau – just as other Anatolian boys or local aristocratic strata did the Türkmen sheep in
terms of şölen koyunları [banquet sheep]². But, this was not the case. Contrary to the attempts
at a “mythification of Anatolian richness” in the Republican era, which are echoed in the verses
like the one above, Ottoman Istanbulluots in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries, at least
persons who were affiliated with the state apparatus, had a clear classification in their minds
concerning which sheep breeds were desirable. Türkmen or Red sheep³ always occupied a

¹ İrfan Kurt, “Halk Kültüründe Hiciv ve Manda Yuva Yapmış Söğüt Dalına Gerçeği,” Müzikte Temsil &
Müziksel Temsil, İstanbul, 6-7-8 October 2005. Online version of this presentation is available at

² These famous verses, in fact, do not exist in the original version of the folk song “Manda Yuva Yapmış Söğüt
Dalına.” These two verses were invented and added to the original song in the frame of TRT repertoire.

³ See Aziz B. Erdeşir-I Esterabadi, Bezm u Rezm, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990), pp. 275. In this account,
“Toy için gönderilen koyun” refers to the banquet sheep (gusfend-i şilân).

I found no glorified reference for Türkmen koyunları in Ottoman sources. The Ottoman central administration’s
negative orientation towards Türkmen sheep is clear in various sources. In 1732, the central administration made
a purchase of nearly 150,000 sheep in consideration of merhamet (out of pity) from Anatolian shepherds. This
amount was the highest (also remained as the highest until the middle of the nineteenth century) of the sheep
purchases from Anatolia. See, Anthony Greenwood, “İstanbul’s Meat Provisioning: A Study of Celepkeşan

The discourse of merhamet reflects the central administration’s negative viewpoint to Anatolian sheep. In fact,
the date of 1730s is not coincidental if we consider Rhoads Murphey’s interpretation on Pozsarevác (Pasaroşca)
Agreement in 1718. According to Murphey, this agreement symbolizes the rise of Ottoman’s economic and
political isolation from European circles and by this way the central administration began to give more
importance to Anatolian stocks. Like the supply of grain, above-mentioned sheep purchases should be analyzed
in Murphey’s interpretation. Probably, it does not aim to protect the re’âyâ’s economic conditions despite the
order kept this discourse. See, Rhoads Murphey, ‘‘Provisioning Istanbul: The State and the Subsistence in the

³ See, Ahmet Refik, Onaltinci Asrda İstanbul Hayattı (1553-1591), (İstanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1935), pp. 90
The term of Red sheep (Kızıl koyun) is clearly referring the Red Karaman or Mor Karaman in local terminology.
The geographical distribution of this breed is northeastern and eastern zones of Anatolia. It also spread into the
Iranian landscape. It is understood that nomadic-transhumant Türkmens owning the flocks of this type sheep
spread the geographical distribution of Kızıl Karaman. The flocks of type also exist in Southern (and
southeastern) zones of Asia Minor. The type of Kızıl Karaman is known as Kızıl, Gezel or Ghezel around Iranian
subsidiary position in this classification until the mid-19th century. The question of why the Ottomans mobilized a significant amount of manpower and capital in order to direct Balkan sheep flocks to the Ottoman capital despite the existing opportunity to utilize Anatolian breeds attracts the attention of many Ottomanists to this matter. About the dominancy of Balkan sheep in the share of supplying Istanbul’s meat consumption, Halime Doğru suggests that the relatively developed transportation network in the Balkan Peninsula played a key role in sustaining the continuous inflow of the sheep (also goat and cattle). However, although the geographical distribution of the sheep supply pool betrays the transportation costs for reasons of fatigue, disease, and of the difficulty of transportation in winter, this argument is not sufficient to explain why Ottoman central administration continuously tried to channel sheep and lambs from distant regions such as Shumen or Upper Danubian Principalities, while attempting not to resort to central Anatolian sheep flocks. Given the shares of fiscal contributions of the provinces to central imperial budget and the geographical concentration of dynastic waqfs-mülks in Aegean part of Asia Minor and Balkans, Tülay Artan touches on the phenomenon of the relatively early Ottoman colonization in Balkan zones compared to Anatolia. She argues that this may have had a major impact on the formation of the economic mind of the Ottoman elite, whose dual perspective concerning Anatolia and the Balkans.

For the geographical distribution of Kızıl köyun, see also Suraiya Faroqhi, Osmanlı’da Kentler ve Kentiler, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993), pp. 273-274
The name of Kızıl köyun still used for a neighborhood name in Urfa. Selaheddin Gürer also suggests that a tribe carried the name of Kızıl köyun from Badili clan and settled in 1691-99 around Urfa. See, Selaheddin Gürer, Osmanlı’da Konar Göcer Aşiretleri: Urfa’da Kızılıkoyun ve Lekler Mahallesi, in column of Abuzerakbyik-Şanlıurfa Sitesi.
6 See Chapter II.
It is quite noteworthy to note that the sheep delivery from the principalities had not been regulated under the çelepkeşan system. The delivery from these regions were channeled through Muslim or non-Muslim merchants to Istanbul.
tended to view the latter as much more valuable. Needless to say, such a conceptualization, together with the agricultural fertility of the Balkan zones, partially clarifies the economic and mental background of the relatively close integration of the Ottoman capital with the western parts of the Ottoman landscape. This phenomenon, to some extent, corresponds to Istanbul’s dependence on Balkan sheep. But, there remain several unknowns. For example, such a scheme makes it unclear as to why fertile Aegean plains such as Bakırçay [Caicus River Basin], Gediz [Hermus River Basin], Menderes [Maeander River] and the Greek mainland below the line of Yanya [Ioannina]–Selanik [Thessalonica] never became important sheep supply regions for the Ottoman capital. For the time being, I suggest that quality played an important role in the selection of specific sheep types of various geographical regions for the delivery to Ottoman capital and that the taste of the meat was always a significant criterion in this selection process. It is understood that Ottoman Istanbull Elis did not prefer the fat-tailed sheep types, whether from the Balkans or Anatolia. Since the sheep types in Anatolia were mostly fat-tails, whose mutton was not the kind preferred in terms of flavor or digestibility, the central administration preferred to demand specific sheep types from the Balkans.

Most importantly, the existence of such an ostentatious consumption affiliated with a special terminology for sheep breeds presents us valuable information about the geographical distribution of sheep types in the sixteenth century in the Ottoman landscape. Although in the tahrir registers, officers did not record types of sheep in a given location and were mostly silent on the geographical distribution of sheep breeds with some classifications, various

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8 See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit, Appendix A. I must emphasize that these regions had been never mentioned as sheep supply poles for Istanbul. We could understand the position of Aegean regions in this matter. With the exception of coastal zones, the Aegean region (in modern terms) contained the type of Dağiç sheep which could be transferred to the capital via nearer regions such as Kütahya or Abyon.
9 In tahrir registers, the sheep types or the animal grazing methods are rarely mentioned. But, we encounter some exceptions. For the beylik koyunları, a classification, though it was not mentioned on the sheep types,
mühimme and celepeșan registers suggest that the Ottoman ruling apparatus was aware of this richness and variety.

Although there has been a tendency in Ottoman historiography to emphasize the duality among Balkan and Anatolian sheep, these two groups did not consist of homogeneous types sheep breeds. The type of Karaman sheep, also known as Ak Karaman in modern Turkey, was probably the largest breed type in Asia Minor, even in the sixteenth century, and their general reference in Ottoman sources as Türkmen koyunları suggests that most White Karaman were under the control of nomadic groups. In fact, by using the survey carried out in 1540, Murphey estimates the size of the flock of Boz-Ulus and Zulkadriye as 2 million in total. Parallel to this figure, the principal tribes of Yeni-İl possessed over two million sheep in 1605. Despite this huge reserve, it is noteworthy that with the exception of the delivery from Ankara in 1490-91, I cannot find any Ottoman official document on the probable delivery of White-Red Karaman sheep to imperial kitchens, Matbah-i ‘Āmire, in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. With some exceptions, Ottoman Istanbullards did not prefer eating the mutton from these regions. These exemptions were surely related to the shortage of supply from the Balkans and the Feast of Sacrifices. But this is not to say that mutton of White-Red

among made, öge, koç, kоеÇ, toklu and bere is practiced. See, Ömer Lütţi Barkan, Hiiadenvigăr Livası Tahrir Defterleri I, (Ankara: TTK, 1988), pp. 120.

As an animal grazing method, the most detailed account can be seen in the Limnos kamınname of 1489. Regarding the sheep dues, the kamınname points to the fact that contrary to the local practices in Limnos, the mating season was arranged in Ottoman landscape in the direction that the lambs were not born in the winter. If we accept the gestation of the sheep as five months in average and the general reference of the celepeșan registers to lambing period as April and May, we must estimate that the mating period was beginning from September and ended roughly in December. See Heath W. Lowry, Studies in Defterology: Ottoman Studies in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1992), pp. 206.


BOA, KK 7094, pp. 1.

But the tribe of Şikakî in Diyarbakır was providing 1,000 sheep per year to imperial kitchens on the basis of special contract. These were probably utilized for kurban sheep. See BOA, MAD 7528, pp. 107.

For the deliveries at the shortages, see BOA, MD 5, No: 1258, MD 7, pp. 146; MD 73, No: 964.

In these orders, we encounter small numbers of sheep delivery from Anatolia. In 1564, 2,800 sheep were ordered from Zulkadriye, in 1566 and 1567 50,000 sheep were delivered from Anatolia. In 1596, 200,000 sheep were ordered from Karaman. These deliveries most probably consisted of the White or Red Karaman sheep types. In
Karaman had never been consumed by Istanbullıots or by the various parts of the state apparatus. During the Anatolian and Iranian campaigns, the central administration had recourse to nomadic groups in the framework of military requirements and made significant amount of direct sheep purchases. For example, during the Tebriz campaign under Kuyucu Murad Paşa, 87,194 sheep, most of which were White or Red Karaman, were supplied from nomadic groups. Again, Nasuh Paşa distributed nearly 12,914 sheep to Türkmenş and Ekrâds in order to graze on the behalf of the Ottoman army.\(^{15}\) Their share in Istanbullıots’ consumption points to the fact that the delivery of Karaman sheep was not dispensable for Istanbul meat consumption. The celepkeşan system was never applied to this type of sheep in Asia Minor. However, it is also significant to note that although the central administration used the term of Türkmen koyunları for Karaman type sheep in Asia Minor, the term of Karaman sheep was directly applied for designating sheep flocks in the Balkans.\(^{16}\) This type usage may have delivered from the eventuality that Ottomans could apply this term to one of the fat-tailed sheep types in the Balkans which were similar to Anatolian Türkmen koyunu. However, up until now, I have not been able to find any indigenous fat-tailed sheep in the Balkan Peninsula and such a possibility seems to be unfounded. Most probably, by developing a terminology of Karaman sheep for the specific Balkan sheep flocks, Ottoman central administration attributed sheep types of nomadic communities (Karamanlıds in Central

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\(^{16}\) For one of the examples, see Ahmet Refik, Onaltinci Asırdı İstanbul Hayatı (1553-1591), (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1935), pp. 83.
Anatolia) that were transferred from Anatolia during the reign of Mehmed II. The extensive usage of Türkmen, Yörük or Arman koyunu in the Ottoman terminology suggests that Ottoman central administration perceived the sheep types with their community names and this phenomenon may have applied to the Balkan Karaman type sheep. In this way, it makes sense that the Karaman sheep in the Balkan regions could either be fat-tailed sheep, which were probably transferred from Asia Minor plateau during sürgün process, or the sheep types under the possession of nomadic communities in the Balkans. The first possibility was supported by the Ottoman kanûnnâmes regarding the settlement of nomadic communities. As one law code of the sürgünler zeameti shows, the forced-transfer of population also included transfer of their sheep flocks to new settlements. These forced populations could keep their animal flocks, which consisted most probably of Dağlıç or White-Red Karaman. But, it is also quite possible these population transfers could stimulate natural cross-breeding in the Balkan regions among various sheep types and this may have occurred through the Karaman-type sheep breeds. This suggestion sounds rational to me and leads us to the second possibility in naming Karaman sheep. Recent genetic studies on the Argos sheep presents us the fact that a fat-tailed sheep (here Argos) could originate from a cross between fat-tailed sheep from Turkey or Chios and the indigenous Zackel. If this was the case, it is again clear that the Karaman type kept its fat-tail in the new sheep breed and the Ottomans continued to call such new types Karaman koyunu. An anthropological survey in Greece shows an interesting support for this argument. Greek shepherds in the Morea still call the Argos sheep

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Karamaniko because of its fat tail.\textsuperscript{20} We may reach the conclusion that despite the overlapping between transferred Yörüks and the fat-tailed sheep under their control in some cases, throughout years of natural cross-breeding, these Yörüks began to graze the Zackel type or other possible cross-breed types. But, in Ottoman terminology their sheep may retain the name Karaman. In the law code of Silistre, which was compiled during the reign of Selim I, a special emphasis was given to the clear separation of sürgün communities from other nomadic communities.\textsuperscript{21} This special position of these communities may contribute to the classification of their sheep types in Ottomans’ minds. Although the geographical border of the Karaman type sheep is not so certain even in modern times, it is quite clear that the central-west provinces of Asia Minor formed a locality for another sheep type, the Dağlıç.\textsuperscript{22} This breed, with its medium-fat tail and median groove hoof, is intermediate between the fat-tailed Karaman and the thin-tailed Kivircik. For this reason, the general false impression is that its origin is based on a recent cross between the Kivircik and the Karaman. The main breeding area of this type, which lies between geographical zones of the Kivircik and the Karaman, also strengthens this belief. In fact, as Mason shows, there is genetically no such possibility that a cross between these types created an intermediate fat-tailed sheep.\textsuperscript{23} What is more, recent research has reached the conclusion that the Dağlıç is breed indigenous to the central-west zones of Anatolia covering Afyon, Eskişehir, Kütahya, Uşak, Burdur, Isparta, Bilecik and Bolu in modern Turkey.\textsuperscript{24} The Dağlıç was probably indigenous to these zones before the introduction of the Kivircik from Thrace. The Ottoman central administration seems to be aware of the Dağlıç breed, whose meat was probably considered as more pleasant than the

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., Part-G: Fat-Tailed Sheep, 1-Argos.
\textsuperscript{21} BOA, Tapu Tahrir Dcteri, No 370, pp. 380. It is also published in: Ömer Lütfi Barkan, \textit{XV. ve XVI. Asirlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu"nda Ziraat Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları Kanunları}, (İstanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi, 1943), pp.274.
\textsuperscript{22} See, B.C. Yalçın, op cit., pp. 39.
\textsuperscript{24} See, B.C. Yalçın, op cit., pp. 39.
Karaman because of its flavor and digestibility.\(^{25}\) In 1559, for the military campaign of Şehzâde Selim against his brother Bayezid, the regions of Sultanönü, Bolu, Kütahya and Bursa were obliged to deliver a significant amount of \(bucaga yarar\) sheep.\(^{26}\) The sheep demanded was probably the Dağlıç. Again, in 1566-1567, 100,000 sheep were demanded for Istanbul’s daily consumption from a similar region, Eskişehir and Bolu.\(^{27}\) Regarding the Dağlıç type, the Ottoman central administration had not developed a certain usage; but in \(hükms\) the term \(Yörük\) koyunu for sheep obtained from these regions had been generally emphasized and this terminology can be easily traced in both the \(tahrir\) and \(waqf\) registers compiled during different time periods.\(^{28}\)

In fact, the Ottoman terminology of Türkmen or Yörük sheep points to the fact that both types, which were extensively bred by nomadic tribes, can survive under extreme climatic conditions and are well suited to the lengthy winter sessions of the Anatolian plateau due to the fat reserves in their tails. This also explains why another type of Anatolian sheep, namely, the thin fat-tailed \(Kıvırçık\), could be acclimated only in the north-western regions of Anatolia.\(^{29}\) The \(Kıvırçık\) had been noted for the fatty quality of its meat by Ottoman Istanbullıots and Ottoman elites generally consumed mutton of the \(Kıvırçık\) type.\(^{30}\) Although there are some taxonomical confusions about the origins in the framework of relationships of the \(Kıvırçık\) and the \(Tsígai\) group of breeds in the Balkans, Ryder and Sephenson suggest that the \(Tsígai\) breed originated in the \(Kıvırçık\).\(^{31}\) Brooke and Ryder also show evidence from

\(^{25}\) This is my observation in sheep markets of Istanbul, Izmir and Manisa at the feast of Sacrifice 1-3 January 2007. The price of the Dağlıç was much lower (an average of 250 YTL) than the \(Kıvırçık\) (350-450 YTL) and \(Sâkz\) (250-350 YTL). Most of the consumers in these markets did not prefer this type because its meat had a bad odor.

\(^{26}\) See BOA, MD 3, No: 25, 74, 100, 109, 142, and 221. The rationale behind the selection of these supply regions could be the easy and safe delivery compared to Central Asian regions which were close to Şehzade Beyazid’s control.

\(^{27}\) BOA, MD 5, No: 1258 and MD 7, pp. 456.


\(^{29}\) See, B.C. Yalçın, op cit., pp. 49-53.

\(^{30}\) Halime Doğru, \(Lehistan’da bir Osmanlı Sultanı:IV.Mehmed’in Kamaniçe-Hotin Seferleri ve Bir Masraf Defteri\), (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005), pp. 99.

\(^{31}\) B.C. Yalçın, op cit., pp. 35.
medieval sources indicating that a breed called *Kivircik* existed before the *Tsigai* in Bulgaria.\(^{32}\) But it seems quite clear that the *Tsigai* type of sheep, under different names, in most Balkan regions originated from Romanian *Tsigai* through the dispersion from the Carpathian Bend of Walachia by long distance transhumance shepherds.\(^{33}\) Based on genetic evidence on *Kivrcik* (*Thraki* in Greek), *Karnabat* (sometimes called as *Karnobad* or *Karnobat*), Romanian *Tsigai* (*Tigaie* in Romanian) and *Cigaja* of most Balkan countries, which were grouped into the *Tsigai* type, Drăgănescu shows the fact that all of these breeds were closely related to each other and the factor of the recessive-dominant gene distributions determines some morpho-phisiological differences.\(^{34}\) The *Karnabat* type from Bulgaria is mostly black while the *Kivrcik* and the Romanian *Tsigai* are mostly black or white with brown, reddish, white or spotted face and legs. However, all types have long-thin tails with a minimum fat, which influences the quality of their meat.\(^{35}\) Therefore, it is very easy to get confused when trying to determine specific breed types.\(^{36}\) For instance, a black-colored sheep with brown face could be identified as belonging to any one of these three breeds. The Ottomans resolved this confusion practically by categorizing the three types under the taxonomy of *Kivrcik* sheep. The geographical distribution of the *hükms* directing the delivery of *Kivrcik* sheep is quite compatible with the historical and geographical dispersion of local *Tsigai* and *Kivrcik* type breeds.\(^{37}\) The first zone of this concentration formed an arch between Yenişehir and Edirne, peaking around Manastir, in the west, and along the southern slope of

\(^{32}\) B.C. Yalçın, op cit., pp. 50-51.

\(^{33}\) C. Drăgănescu, *Tsigai Breeds*, prepared for a Breed Encyclopedia, printed in Romanian strategy for a sustainable management of Farm AnGR, 2003, pp. 73-75.

\(^{34}\) C. Drăgănescu, *Tsigai Breeds*, prepared for a Breed Encyclopedia, printed in Romanian strategy for a sustainable management of Farm AnGR, 2003, pp. 73-75.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., pp. 74.

\(^{36}\) See, C. Drăgănescu, op cit., pp. 75. Although a cross-comparative analysis for meat quality is quite impossible among these types due to the rapid disappearance of pure breeds, it is usually asserted that the mutton of the *Karnobat* is more tasteful.


*Tsigai* type breeds include various local sheep types. In Albania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia, it is known as *Cigaja*. In Romania, it carries probably the original name as *Tigaie*. In Greece, it is well known as *Thraki* or *Kivrcik*.
Rhodope Mountains, in the north, covering the hinterlands of Selanik, Avrethasari, Seres, Drama, Filorina and Yenice-i Karasu. The second concentrated sector embraced the eastern belt, ranging from Yambol to Burgaz, with a concentration of the Karnobat, and the western belt, stretching from Filibe to Skopje, with a concentration of the Tsigai. Needless to say, the third zone covered Walachia and Moldavia. In 1717, Dimitrie Cantemir wrote in his *Descripție a Moldovei* (Beschreibung der Moldau-Leipzig 1771) “each year, the Greek animal merchants carry, over 60,000 of such sheep denominated in Turkish Chivirgin for the sultan cuhnia (kitchen).” Cvetkova estimates that Ottoman Rumelia supplied nearly 300,000 sheep to Istanbul in the last decade of the sixteenth century. However, it is also reasonable to consider that these figures from Ottoman Bulgaria, Walachia and Moldavia included not only Tsigai (also local Tsigai), Karnobat or Kivrıcik (Thraki) but also Romanian Blackhead Ruda,

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38 See Anthony Greenwood, “Istanbul’s Meat Provisioning: A Study of Çelebiş–a System,” *Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation*, University of Chicago, 1988, pp. 122-123, Appendix A. Greenwood stresses only this region as source of the Kivrıcik sheep. He refers to this region as Bahar Kolu and the sheep from it was always the Kivrıcik. But, he does not discuss the geographical limits of the Kivrıcik type. It is impossible that such an extensive region was inhabited only by Kivrıcik type of sheep. His argument is mainly based on the records of MAD: 301 which mention only 9 kazas in Western Thrace as ganem-i kivrıcik-i mevâsim-i bahar.

But various mühimme records point to a wider regional distribution of Kivrıcik sheep in the Balkans. See, for example, BOA, MD 6, No: 72: “Filibe ve Iştib ve Üsküb ve Ustrumca ve Tikveş ve Selanik ve Siroz ve Timürhâsun ve Drama ve Yenice-i Karasu ve Tatarbâzân ve Serifce ve Filorina ve Köprüli ve Fener ve Çatalca ve Yenişehir ve Kirçoğa ve Manastır ve Avrethasari kâdîlîrına hüküm ki: Her birini otu that-i kazâsından mahruße-i İstanbul zahhâresiyyi in irsâl olunan ânmânın tokuz yüz yetmiş bir senesinde irsâl olunan kivrıcik ânmâni mevûsiminden bâkî kalân yedi bin yüz elli ânmâm... (F i 21 Muharrem, Sene 972).”

See also Ahmet Refik, *Onaltnci Asrlda İstanbul Hayâtı* (1553-1591), (İstanbul: Devlet Basmevi, 1935), p. 80: “Mehmûsin İstanbul’dan Eflak ve Buğdan’a varınca yol üzerinde vakti kâdim ehem ki Vilâiye Eflak ve Buğdandan gönülüle celeb tâyiﬁsîe mehruze mezbûre yokuﬂu getûrûlerek akhamu şerîfe yazulu celebîdîr gönülüle celeb yazilmaz deyû siz ki kâdîhîsiz men eyler inmişiz. İndi mehruze mezbûre yokuﬂu ve yazulu kuyun getûren celebîlere asla ve kat’a bir ferd manı olmak cayiz değişidir. Mehruze Istanbul’dâ et babanda ziyade muzayeka olmayın buyurdum ki hünkâm şerîfîmle yokuﬂun emînim vusul buldukadı bu hususa herbirîniz bizzat mukayyed olub tahtı k zamanında eğer yazulu ve eğer gönülüle celeb tâyiﬁsîdîr asla men eleyemeyip ve kasabalırnın daíî ellerinde bulunan bâçaça yarar kivrıcik ve arman koyunu nedenli var ise herbirine yarar âdemler koştürdürül mehruze mezbûre yulaçhası... (F i 11, Zilkade 967)”.

39 *Personal Interview* with C. Prof. C. Drăgănescu, 11.04.2007.


Cvetkova estimates that 300,000 was the probably greatest number of sheep delivered to Istanbul. She documents 7,931 sheep drovers (celep), with each drover supplying an average of 36 sheep. With this figure, she reaches the quantity of 285,000 sheep per year.
which the peasants called *Karabash* (Pleven *Blackhead* in Bulgaria).\(^41\) Being considered as *Tsigai* variety, the large-sized feature makes this type easily distinguishable from medium-sized *Tsigai* types - the *Karnobat* and *Kivrčak*.\(^42\) Both historical and contemporary data show the concentrated locality of this type as the Deliorman County, situated on the both sides of Danube. In this way, I interpret that the Ottoman usage of *Deliorman* and *Dobruca* probably referred to *Blackhead Ruda*.\(^43\) Considering its large size, it is not coincidental that Dobruca migrants in modern Turkey still remembered this locality’s sheep as large as steer.\(^44\)

Contrary to the singular categorization of Balkan sheep, all of this information shows the rich variety of this region. This assertion becomes more meaningful when considering the Balkan *Zackel* type breeds, which are located in nearly all Balkan areas.\(^45\) Its scientific terminology, e.g., *Walachian* or *Zackel*, refers both to their origins and herding methods. In fact, in German dialect, *Zackel* means ‘mountain peasants’ and their sheep, respectively, *Vlach* and *Vlachian* sheep.\(^46\) But, not all the *Zackel*-type breeds are *Vlach*. The *Zackel* type of sheep consists of various sub-types, including both mountain breeds such as the Bulgarian

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\(^41\) See, C. Drăgănescu, ‘*Blackhead Ruda*, *Lucrări Științifice Seria Zootehnie*, Vol: 47-9, pp. 1-2. The original version of the paper is published under the title “Ruda (Tigiaie) Cu Cap Negru De Teleorman –În Perspectiva Integrării României În Uniunea Europeană.” *Pleven Blackhead* in Bulgaria is located on the southern side of the Danube around the coastal regions of Black Sea. This region, known as *Sag Kol* in Ottoman terminology, was an important supply pole for the capital. There are various *hiııms* in *mühimme registers* referring to both *Deliorman* and *Sag Kol* sheep. See, BOA, MD 36, No: 268, MD 43, No: 53, MD 67, No: 526 & 528.


\(^43\) For the usage of *Deliorman* and *Sag Kol koyunu* sheep in *mühimme orders*, see, BOA, MD 36, No: 268, MD 43, No: 53, MD 67, No: 526 & 528.

\(^44\) As a result of my interviews with the Deliorman immigrants in Turkey, this type of remembrance is very common. In the diaries of these immigrants, the special features of the sheep in this region are evident. From the diary of Patme (Fatma) Atlı:


Karakachan, the Romanian Tsurcana, and the Greek Zackel, Sarakatsan, Drama, Vlach (sometimes called as Vlakhiko) and lowland types embracing mostly Greek Karagouniko. On the whole, their appearance is very variable: horned and polled animals, black, white and grey fleeces, speckled faces and legs, and a moderate or long, thin tail. Most importantly, these common sheep are active, hardy, and resistant to extremes of climate and disease. All of these physical-morphological features point to the fact that they are well-suited to the mountainous and semi-mountainous breeding types found among the transhumant and nomadic communities as the Yörüks, Vlachs, and Sarakatsani-Karakachans. Although the origins of these communities are still one of the most contentious topics among historians, it is significant to note that they coexisted in adjacent regions and intensively intermingled with each other. It is quite clear that if the Yörüks came into touch with the Vlachs and other nomadic groups, people who, due to their pastoral and transhumant life style, were not dissimilar to them, their sheep flocks also mixed with each other. It is also interesting that the Sarakatsani or Karakachans are referred to by the name the Ottomans gave them, which means “depar ters” or “black fugitives.” Similarly, the Ottoman central administration used the term Haymana koyunu, which means sheep of “depar ters,” to designate the sheep of various territories. The same phenomenon also exists for the label Árman koyunu. The term Árman

49 On the origins, the mixture and the mode of the subsistence of Yörüks, Karakachans, Vlach and Sarakatsanis, see Patrick Leigh Fermor, Roumeli: Travels in Northern Greece, (London: John Murray Travel Classics, 1966), pp. 5-6; John Nandris, The Aromanis: Approaches to the Evidence, (Hamburg: 1987), pp.38-39; A. Beermann, „Formen der Fernweiderwirtschaft (Transhumanz-Ahmwirtschaft-Nomadismus)“, Verhandl. D. Deutschen Geographentages, Vol: 32, 1960, pp. 277-90. The common feature in these accounts is their emphasis on the similarities of lifestyles of Vlachs, Yörüks, Karakachan-Sarakatsanis in Balkans. They were usually nomads or transhumant and actively engaged in livestock grazing in various regions especially in Carpathian Mountains, the Epirus Region and Rhodope Mountains.
50 For Haymane or Haymana sheep, see BOA, MD 3, No: 1638; Ahmet Refik, Onaltuncu Asrarda İstanbul Hayatı (1553-1591), (İstanbul: Devlet Basmevi, 1935), pp. 95. In Ottoman sources, the term of Karakachan was not used in designating one type of sheep. As kaninnames show, the term Haymane or Haymana clearly refers to “depar ters” and not peculiarly to the Balkans. In the KaramanVilayeti Kaninnamesi, we encounter one of these references. See Omer Lütfi Barkan, XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ziraat Ekonomisinin Hukuk ve Mali Esasları: Kamunlar, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1943), pp. 41:
refers to the Aromanian-Vlach nomadic and transhumant communities. Both the terms Ārman and Haymana were used for designating sheep from various areas such as Thrace, the eastern belt of Bulgaria, Thessaly and the right bank of the Danube, so this varied usage over a large area strengthens the supposition that the terms Ārman and Haymana did correspond to the sheep of the different transhumant and nomadic communities, respectively Vlachian, Karakachan-Sarakatsanis or Yörüks.51 But, this is not to say that these terms were used by Ottomans to designate the specific Vlach and Sarakatsani-Karakachani sheep breed now referred to in modern taxonomical studies. It is quite clear that the Ottomans used the terms Haymana and Ārman in a broad sense to simultaneously refer to various sub-groups made up of transhumant and mountain Balkan breeds having very similar physical and herding characteristics.52 Moreover, since Ottoman central administration usually recorded the sheep types within the framework of communities, it is plausible that the sheep referred to as Ārmans and Haymenes (or Haymanas) contained Karagounniko, Vlach, Karakachan or Florina sub-types. What is clear from this usage is that the sheep of these communities mostly belonged to the common Zackel type. It is also plausible to suggest that the mızâyaka [scarcity] sheep, which came to Istanbul in the fall and winter, were more likely to be designated as Zackel-type sheep.53 When the geographical distribution of the orders for

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51 For some examples about this distribution of Ārman and Haymana, see BOA, MD 3, No: 1638; Ahmet Refik, 
52 See Department of Animal Breeding and Genetics-EAAP Animal Genetic Data Bank:
53 For the mızâyaka term, see BOA, MD 36: No: 268, MD 42, No: 404.
For Istanbul meat supply, the majority of sheep arrived in the city during the mızâyaka term, referring to the fall and winter. The critical time period for the city supply was evasit-i erbain and ruz-i kasm. The distribution of the sheep types according to the seasons shows interesting phenomena. For example, the Kivircık or Dobruca
Map 1.1. Geographical Distribution of Sheep Types in the Ottoman Balkans

(Deliorman) sheep never arrived around mızâyaka. This means that the Zachel arrived in the city after the supply of sheep vulnerable to winter conditions did. See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 121-128.

54 Compiled by the author, for details see the text of this chapter.
müzâyaka sheep is analyzed, it can be easily seen that the sheep during this period came from large area covering the whole of Thrace, southeastern Macedonia and central and western Bulgaria. Most of the mountain Zackel type was to be found in these regions.\(^{55}\) It is also noteworthy that there is no reference to the Kivrak during the mûzâyaka period. In fact, these two phenomena overlap each other. Due to the early mating time of Kivrak and its fragility to winter conditions, this type of sheep arrived in the Ottoman capital earlier than other types under the label of bahar or mevsim koyunu.\(^{56}\) Contrary to this, with its strong resistance to extreme climatic conditions, the Zackel could travel in the mûzâyaka period and provided the mutton supply for Istanbuliots.\(^{57}\) Although the Ottoman sources and ecological data help us in clarifying sheep types arriving in the Ottoman capital, they also create uncertainties, as it can be seen in the case of the Kircan sheep. Up until now, I had not been able to find a clear etymological relationship between the Kircan and any sheep breed in Balkans. In the Ottoman sources, the term Kircan referred to a region near Silistre and this may lead us to consider this type as an indigenous breed of Northern Bulgaria or Southern Romania.\(^{58}\) However, both celepkeşan and mühimme registers included many orders for Kircan koyunu, especially from Thessaly, Southeastern Macedonia and Niğbolu.\(^{59}\) The concentration of orders from these two regions brings to mind the locality of Karagouniko-type breed. But, this type and its physically or genetically related kin have not been located in Northern Bulgaria or Southern

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56 B.C. Yalçın, op cit., p. 35. Despite local differences, the mating season of the Kivrak is much earlier compared to other sheep types in Western Anatolia-Marmara Region-Thrace. While this season was July-August in Thrace, in southern zone of the Marmara, it was mostly June-July. See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 122-127.
59 For the orders of Kircan sheep, see BOA, MD 61, No: 54, MD 64, No: 597, MD 36, No: 240. As it is understood from these hûkms, Kircan sheep also widely spread in the Balkans. Filibe, Iştib, Uşküb, Ustrumca, Tikveş, Selanik, Siroz, Timürhisâr, Drama, Yenice-i Karasu, Tatarbâzâr, Serfice, Filorina, Köprülü, Fener, Çatalca, Yenişehir, Kırçova, Manastır, Avrethisâr, Niğbolu are referred in the orders.
Romania.\textsuperscript{60} In addition to this, there does not seem to be an etymological relationship between the \textit{Kircan} and the \textit{Karagouniko}, translated as “black cloak.”\textsuperscript{61} There are also no ethnolinguistic linkages between the \textit{Kircan} and other indigenous breeds in Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. As a result, the term \textit{Kircan} remained enigmatic.

Although the sheep is a multi-purpose animal in terms of milk, wool and meat supply, the mutton productivity of all these sheep types is the most serious concern for the pre-modern societies. The Ottomans confronted a dilemma when it came to this matter. Due to the fact that pork and cattle were consumed on a limited basis, the Ottomans mostly depended on mutton for their meat consumption. The difference in the average carcass weight of sheep and pork illustrates this problematic dependency for Ottoman Istanbulluiots. Today, given modern fattening and rearing techniques, the average carcass weights of sheep and pork in the United States are around 30 kg and 90 kg, respectively.\textsuperscript{62} In modern Turkey, the fattening performance of sheep types is much lower\textsuperscript{63}, with and average carcass weight per sheep having reached only 14.3 kg in 1996.\textsuperscript{64} Needless to say, these figures in regards to meat

\textsuperscript{60} The term \textit{Kircan} probably originated from the stockbreeding or tanning terminology, which may be related the existence of a significant number of individuals in tanning industry having such surnames as \textit{kir}, \textit{kirca}, \textit{kirc} in current times. However, my interviews with some of these people did not enable me to draw any clear conclusions with respect to this issue. Most of the people I interviewed could not remember or did not know the origins of their surname.


For pork, see, Glenn Grimes & Ron Plain, “U.S. Hog Marketing Contract Study,” \textit{Department of Agricultural Economics Working Paper}, No: AEWP 2005-01, 2005, pp. 4. Carcass weight is the weight of the slaughtered animal’s cold body after having been bled, skinned and eviscerated, and after removal of the head (severed at the atlanto-occipital joint), of the feet (severed at the carpo-metacarpal or tarso-metatarsal joints), of the tail (severed between the sixth and seventh caudal vertebrae) and of the genital organs (including udder).


The ratio of average carcass weight to live weight differed according to the fattening performance, the genetic characteristics of the sheep type and the sheep’s age. Latest researches on \textit{Kivircik} and \textit{Merino} clarified that this ratio was very close 50 per cent for these types.

productivity in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries are far less. At Smithfield Market in 1710, the average weight of sheep was only 12.6 kg.\textsuperscript{65} If we assume that 65 per cent of a carcass consists of lean separable meat,\textsuperscript{66} this translates into roughly 4 kg. It is clear that this figure is not different for the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. In fact, in 1510 the average weight of live sheep was 20 kg in Holland; this means nearly 7 kg lean meat per sheep.\textsuperscript{67} Even in the late-eighteenth century, the average carcass weight for sheep became 13 kg in Scotland.\textsuperscript{68} Up until now, Ottoman historians studying this issue seem to have made dissimilar assumptions. While estimating the figure of total meat consumption in the Ottoman military campaigns, Rhoads Murphey takes the average weight of edible meat from sheep as 12 \textit{okkas}, approximately 15.3 kg.\textsuperscript{69} In the light of Braudel’s estimation of average sheep supplying 12 kg meat, Arif Bilgin, as well as Ahmet Uzun, and Greenwood make their calculations based on this figure.\textsuperscript{70} Unfortunately, we do not have adequate data to create continuous series for mutton and sheep prices in the estimation of average meat productivity per sheep for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But, with the help of \textit{çaşni} records from the 19th century, we can reach some conclusions. In 1843, the expected mutton from \textit{Bahar Kolu} sheep was described as 10 \textit{kayyes} (12.8 kg) per sheep.\textsuperscript{71} Again, in 1803 the average mutton from \textit{Kivircik} sheep of \textit{Bahar Kolu} was expected to be 7.86 \textit{okkas} (nearly 10 kg), while this quantity was 16.2 kg (12.7 \textit{okkas}) for \textit{Walachian} sheep. It is also clear that


As Gibson suggests, the composition of carcass for the pre-improvement sheep is 66 per cent edible meat, 12 per cent edible fat, 4 per cent tallow fat, 18 per cent bone of the cold carcass for the sheep.


\textsuperscript{70} Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 191-192; Ahmet Uzun, op cit., pp. 27; Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 286-287. All three authors share the average mutton of the sheep as 10 \textit{okkas}, as nearly 12.5-12.8 kg.

\textsuperscript{71} Ahmet Uzun, op cit., pp. 84.
Anatolian sheep supplied greater amounts, reaching as much as 12-15 okkas.\textsuperscript{72} The physician of Sinan Paşa during the reign of Suleiman-I refers to the average weight of sheep as being 10 okkas.\textsuperscript{73} But, all these average weights should not be interpreted as the actual mutton available from each sheep. These calculations produce an average carcass weight of around 18 kg, which seems implausible considering contemporary European figures and those putting average carcass weight in Turkey at 14.3 kg. Probably, these figures represent the average carcass weights of sheep.\textsuperscript{74}

Table 1.1. Average Carcass Weights & Separable Mutton per Carcass in the 16-17th Centuries\textsuperscript{75}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average carcass weight</th>
<th>Average separable meat</th>
<th>Type of Consumer /Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1489-1490</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>15.41</td>
<td>Court Kitchen (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573-1574</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Court Kitchen (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1638-1640</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Amy during the Baghdad Campaign(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1669-1670</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>15.38</td>
<td>Vizier, Kadiasker, Sergi-i Hümayun in Istanbul(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1671</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Vüzeri, Kadiasker and Şeyhüllislam during the Kamanıça Campaign(e)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even regarding these weights as carcass quantities, it gives the impression that the average carcass weight of Anatolian and Walachian sheep was much higher than European

\textsuperscript{72} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 286-287.
\textsuperscript{73} Fuad Çarm, \textit{Pedro’nun Zorunlu İstanbul Seyahati}, (İstanbul: 1995), pp. 178.
\textsuperscript{74} See Seyyid Vehbi, \textit{Surname-i Vehbi: A Miniature Illustrated Manuscript of an 18th Century Festival in Ottoman İstanbul}, ed. Stephane Yerasimos, Doğan Kurban, Mertol Tulum, Robert Bragner, (Bern: 2001), No: 77-B. As a matter, the butcher shop in this Surname-iVehbi is depicted with the hanging carcass of the sheep and such a description tended us to think that the butchers purchased or received the slaughtered sheep in the form of cold carcass.
\textsuperscript{75} Mutton prices obtained from Şevket Pamuk, “İstanbul’da Et Fiyatları,” \textit{Unpublished Data}.
For (a), see Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 195.
For (b), see Ibid., p. 195.
For (d-e), see Mehmet İnbaşi, \textit{Ukrayna’da Osmanlılar: Kamanıçe Seferi ve Organizasyonu} (1672), (İstanbul:Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2004), pp. 265-272.
For the mutton-offal-tail-prices, see Ahmet Uzun, op cit., pp. 32-33.
The calculation is utilized via the prices of sheep and mutton at a specific time period. For the price distribution of sheep, I consider the price mechanism which is given in the record of İradele-Dahiliye, No: 2364 at the date of 1841 (Ahmet Uzun, op cit., pp. 32-33.)
In this account, the prices for the tail, offal, and mutton were simultaneously determined. According to this account, the price of tail was 190 pares, of the offal was 80 pares, and mutton was 90 pares. For the sheep skin, I take 20 pares per Kivircik skin of the year 1835-36 into consideration. In the frame of this structure, the ratio between the prices of other usable parts to the mutton per sheep is determined as about 3. For (a), the mutton price is considered as 1.4 akçes, while 3 akçes is regarded for (b). In (c), the mutton price is regarded as 12 akçes. In (d), it is 11 akçes. Finally, for (e) the price is considered as 10 akçes.
counterparts. But, the weight of *Kivircik* was very close to European sheep at that time. In light of the discontinuous data represented in Table 1.1., it is noteworthy that the average carcass weights dramatically varied across different regions. This seems to be totally compatible with the *çaşni records* in the nineteenth century. These compared figures point out that the carcass weight of Anatolian sheep was remarkably higher than Balkan sheep, especially for the *Kivircik*. The figure in 1489-1490 must not confuse us, however, since the delivery at this period was partially made in the form of Anatolian sheep from Sultanönü.

In fact, Table 1.1. represents the dilemma confronted by the Ottoman central administration: the sheep most in demand supplied nearly the lowest quantity of mutton. How could the Ottoman polity respond to this problem? The answer to this forms the basis to the next chapter.
CHAPTER II

MEAT SUPPLY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY OTTOMAN ISTANBUL

As a common tendency in Ottoman studies, many historians emphasize that the Ottoman central administration considered the supply of foodstuffs with low prices as an important symbol for the sultans’ image of sovereignty in general.¹ However, this critical perception is so abstract that it avoids the complexity of economic mentality and property relations behind any supply chain. In fact, the meat chain involved various intermingling and interdependent supply channels which prevent the overly easy assumption that the central administration had a total control on the meat supply of Istanbul through the regulations over the quantity and prices. Istanbul meat and livestock markets, for example, always kept their operational importance throughout the sixteenth century with close connection to the allocation mechanism [ta’yiınät] for state-dependent individuals.² Starting from the reign of Mehmed II, Matbah-ı ʿÂmire had made its sheep or mutton purchases from the Istanbul market via butchers and these purchases were recorded as el-mübaaya’ât in the imperial kitchen’s accounting registers.³ Together with this, imperial kitchens also attempted to conduct direct supply lines from Anatolian nomadic communities.⁴ Although imperial waqfs had a share in the ta’yiınät, they created their own supply channels extending from Walachia and Moldavia.⁵ Both the surplus sheep from the allocation process and the delivery of entrepreneurs enabled the flourishing of urban meat markets serving normal Istanbullıots or non-state dependents.⁶ The heterogeneity of meat markets can be easily traced via the significant divergence in mutton prices paid by various institutions. For instance, while the

² See Chapter III and IV.
⁴ See BOA, MAD 7528, pp. 107. This contract between the central administration and Şikâki tribe in Diyarbakır contains the delivery of 1.000 sheep per year from Diyarbakır.
⁵ BOA, MD 3, No: 130.
⁶ See Chapter IV.
ceiling mutton price was 8.8 akçes in 1589, the average mutton price paid by urban waqfs was only 3.9 akçes.\textsuperscript{7} Such a picture points to the fact that the supply mechanism of mutton was far from a homogenous structure of a command economy.

Moreover, the complex supply mechanisms also make possible a better understanding of the \textit{celepkeşan} system\textsuperscript{8} which was designed as a form of the creation of privileged \textit{re’âyâ}, who were obliged to bring specific amount of sheep to Istanbul. The Ottoman sources sometimes refer to a distinction between \textit{yazılı} and \textit{gönlüle celep} \textsuperscript{9} and such a distinction shows that the term \textit{celep} had been used as the more common term covering merchants who bring and sell livestock to the Istanbul butchers.\textsuperscript{10} No matter how the \textit{celeps} are categorized, they had been major agents in the wholesaling activity of sheep delivery from the last decade of the fifteenth century up until the end of the sixteenth century. But, this is not to say that the role and the business features of these \textit{celeps} remained static for more than one century. The rising population in the hinterland zones of Istanbul and the emergence of agricultural Balkan towns\textsuperscript{11} formed the main factors behind the change of their business activities, and also of the supply side of meat economics. In the light of this, the 1550s represents a clear watershed in terms of market controls, the operational development of \textit{celepkeşan} system, and the structural adaptation of market agents to a new situation. In this chapter, the features of Istanbul’s meat supply are analyzed into two time periods: the period of hinterland formation

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[7] Şevket Pamuk, ‘İstanbul’da Et Fiyatları’, \textit{Unpublished Data}.
This data cover the meat prices of palace kitchens and waqfs in different columns. In addition to these, the \textit{narh} level for the lamb and sheep is given. See, next pages in this chapter and Chapter IV.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
up to the 1550s and of increasing administrative surveillance until the 1590s. The last decade of this century inhabited the embryonic development of a new system in the meat supply which became effective throughout the 17th century.

I- Formation of Hinterland: 1473 (?) - 1550

Doubtlessly, the proclamation of Constantinople as the new Ottoman capital means the establishment of a new urban center at a location between two important Ottoman cities, namely Bursa and Edirne, and brings about a hinterland competition among these three urban centers. Contrary to the Byzantine Constantinople, when we analyze the orders for the Coast Customs of Istanbul in this period, we do not discover any entry on the regulation of live animal customs. These hükm [imperial orders] were indented to determine the custom rates for the wheat, flour, oil, barley, honey, millet; but not for livestock. As a matter, the custom orders related to the animal supply can be found in the hükm of the land customs. As an exact reflection of this process, Ottoman administration tried to block the supply inflow from the Balkans to Bithynia region, including İz尼克 (Nicæa) and Bursa. For this reason, the custom rate on the sheep transfer at Gelibolu, which was the main gate of this inflow, increased to four akçes from one akçe. The rationale behind these policies was directing sheep flows of Balkan regions into the capital and limiting the supply inflow to Anatolian

15 On the spelling Bitynya, I utilize the Webstors Dictionary’s spelling system. But, in various sources, it is recorded as Bitinia, or Bitinya.
towns. However, the main competitor for the new capital was not Bursa; it was Edirne. It is understood that this competition became tougher and the new capital could not succeed in the full integration with its hinterland during the reign of Mehmed II. In fact, the Istanbul tariff had been removed for live animals and animal by-products in 1476. Parallel to this development, the new tannery and slaughterhouse complex was built around Yedikule probably after 1472, while the slaughterhouses at Porta Cynegon continued their operations.

All of these policies reflected the endeavors of the Ottoman polity in order to create the peculiar livestock hinterland for the capital. However, most importantly, the rising population of courtiers and the establishment of Janissaries with the general increase in urban population stimulated the central administration to conduct a special supply mechanism for sheep delivery and allocation. The earliest evidence for the regulation of *celepkeşan* system was an order to *Sidrekapsı kafırs* and can be dated to the end of Mehmed II reign or to the beginning of reign of Bayezid II. Related to this development, many historians repeat a mythical discourse as a historical reality that Mehmed II also created a special meat allocation system to Janissaries through which the mutton was distributed at the unchangeable price of 3 *akçes*. In order to compensate the loss from this ceiling price, 24,000 *akçes* were also left to the discretion of the *mütevellis* of the butchers’ waqf (butchers’ fund). Such a discourse comes from the *Kavânîn-i Yeniçeriyyân-ı Dergâh-ı Âlî’s* account written in the first half of the seventeenth century. However, I interpret this story as a glorification of the reign of

19 Porta Cynegon is mentioned in the texts as *Kungöz, Kângöz, Kângöz Kapısı*. It is understood that the slaughterhouse complex at this zone continued its operations throughout the sixteenth century.
21 Robert Anhagger & Halil İnalcık, op cit., pp 67.
Mehmed II by the later chroniclers. First of all, the mutton prices given by Kavânin-i Yeniçeriyan-i Dergâh-i Ali seem to be much higher when we consider the mutton prices in the second half of the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth century. Even in 1524, the narh level was around 1.3 and climbed to 3 akçes around the 1570s. Furthermore, until the 1560s, we can not see any reference to the mentioned butcher fund in the Ottoman sources. The earliest references to this fund began during the 1560s. Most probably, the author of Kavânîn-i Yeniçeriyan transferred such a noticeable development in the meat market into the glorious period of Mehmed II. Moreover, the operational weight of celekteşan system also remained narrow up until the 1550s. Thus, for the mentioned period we can not find a detailed celekteşan register and the only detailed sources referring to celeps or celepteşans were the court records. Moreover, in the various mufassal defters covering both Sol and Orta Kol’s districts in this period we do not encounter the existence of celeps as a privileged re’âyâ group. This observation is quite significant, because these two branches had embraced the regions of the high concentration of celeps by the middle of the sixteenth century. For instance, in both the mufassal registers of 1516 and 1525 and one icmâl register of 1530, we can not see any celeps in Filibe and Tatar Pazarcık. Similarly, 167 Numarali Defter-i Muhâsabe-i Vilayet-i Rum-İli dated 1530 does not contain any reference to celeps in the Sol

26 See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 69.
27 Greenwood makes a short analysis of five hûkms in the Kadi Court of Istanbul dated 1540-1541. In all cases, the celepteşans are named as ‘mahmiyê-yi Kostantiniye celepteşânîlarî.’
Kol of Paşa Sancak. However, the limited capacity of the celepkeşan operations and of the central administration’s control mechanism does not mean that the upper echelons of the Ottoman polity were unconcerned about the urban meat trade. The Upper echelons’ involvement in meat trade clearly became weighty by the reign of Bayezid II. While Hadice Sultan, a daughter of Bayezid II, endowed butcher shops in a new developing area, Edirnekapi, Ali Paşa also endowed various shops in this neighborhood, or do you mean text? The integration of dignitaries into this chain through economic and political means, on the other hand, can not be interpreted as a stimulus to increase market controls and competition. In this period, the silent feature of market controls can be traced through the limited development of the guild solidarity and the non-integrative features of market agents. The information on this matter can be gleaned from the waqfs’ relations to the meat market. When we analyze the laboring persons of the imârets in minor and major waqfs, it can be seen that the imarets did not need to create their own mutton supply channels. Major waqfs purveyed their mutton demand through urban butchers and deployed only meat carriers (et taşıyıcılar-hammallari) instead of butchers in their organizations. Parallel to this, the trade groups’ reflexes for the formation of its own solidarity and for preventing outsiders’ integration into the meat trade seemed to remain very weak. Even the butchers of the Meat Square [Et Meydani], who were in charge of the mutton supply for the Janissaries and presented one of the cohesive trade group in later periods, did not seem to introduce the

30 See Footnote 27.
entrance and exist mechanisms to their business. In real terms, during the reign of Suleiman I, the butchers of the Et Meydani engaged in the arrangement of a tomruk, which had turned to the business license from the tool of trade in the later periods. Why the butchers necessitated introducing such a embryonic form of the gedik and how the government’s surveillance mechanism via the celepkeşan system transformed into more controlled form are related to the emergence of new market structures by the 1530s. This transformation at this period, in fact, is a general feature in most of European urban centers and emerged as a result of the demand side pressure on the existing livestock reserves.

II-1530-1590: Development of Tight Surveillance over Meat Markets

In his pioneering work, Braudel writes that by the beginning of the sixteenth century mutton had slowly disappeared from urban diets. This development can be easily seen in Central-Southeastern Europe. However, despite the fact that in Istanbul as well people began to supplement mutton with other types of meat, mutton had never disappeared in Istanbul completely. Starting from the 1530s, and intensified by the middle of the century, the central administration extended the operational weight of surveillance mechanism through the celepkeşan system, various narh arrangements and the intensive integration with the Walachia-Moldavia markets. Clearly, the market agents also responded to these changes.

36 In most sources, the term Et Meydani (Meat Square) is used together with the “Janissary Square.”
through various ways. For instance, major waqf *imârets* began to employ their own butchers in order to provide sustainable meat flow.\(^{40}\) Moreover, the sharp rise of conflicts over the share of sheep hides and mutton became common in this period and the rhetoric of these conflicts was emerging in the form of *kadimden beri* or *yapılageldiği üzere.*\(^{41}\) Behind the rationale of this discourse is the fact that the agents in the meat market mostly tested their reflexes against the disruption of their business instead of their traditionalism. The symptoms of this era, however, clearly found its echoes in the price trends of mutton. As it can be seen in Table 2.1., the mutton prices jumped into a new threshold in the first three decades of the sixteenth century and the rising trend continued up until the 1580s. Albeit possibly the low value due to *narh* regulations, the price series of mutton point that the mutton price nearly doubled in the 1530s and nonlinearly climbed up from this new peak. For the momentous changes in European meat markets, historians suggest that in the conditions of the population growth, pastoral bases had been contracted in order to expand arable land for cultivation.\(^ {42}\) As a result of this process, the dwindling of animal numbers and the rise of prices simultaneously occurred so that this transformation triggered a supply shortage for urban dwellers. In the Ottoman case, the population growth both in Istanbul and other Balkan centers by the beginning of the sixteenth century is well known and seemed to cause increment to the demand pressure on the existing meat supply by the 1530s.\(^ {43}\)

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\(^{40}\) For the waqfs’ integration into meat trade, see BOA, MD 3, No: 130. It is unclear from what date the major waqfs employed their own butchers; but by the mid-16th century these new agents in the market became an established phenomenon.

\(^{41}\) For various petitions of both Üsküdar and Yedikule tanners, see BOA, MD 85, No: 291; MD 93, No: 223. The persistence of the Yedikule tanners to the new competitors can be easily traced via *mihimme* registers. At the beginning, the Yedikule tanners seem to take monopoly over hides with the support of *Aya Sofya* Endowment. Utilizing the *miitevelli* of this waqf was one of the tactics of the Yedikule tanners. But, it is understood that the situation revolutionary changed by the establishment of new slaughterhouse-tannery complex in Üsküdar under the patronage of Nurbanu Sultan, the mother of Murad III. The competition over the hides increased throughout the second half of the sixteenth century and continued even in 17th century. In this competition, the Yedikule tanners developed a discourse of traditionalism against Üsküdar tanners. They usually argued that the hides from slaughtered sheep in Istanbul were under the control of their institutions since Mehmed the Conqueror.

\(^{42}\) Ian Blanchard, op cit., pp. 431, 447-448.

\(^{43}\) See Omer Lütfi Barkan, ‘Türkiye’de İmparatorluk Devirlerinin Büyük Nüfus ve Arazi Tahrirleri ve Hakana Mahsus İstatistik Defterleri’, *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, No: 2-1,1940, pp. 20-59; Michael
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Istanbul</th>
<th>Augsburg</th>
<th>Vienna</th>
<th>Wroclaw</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
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<td>Mutton</td>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>Beef</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unit</td>
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<td>silver per metric unit</td>
<td>hundred pounds-brabant groats</td>
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<td>1.55</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>337.5</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>12.01</td>
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<td>18.65</td>
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<td>1564</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>408.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>423</td>
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<td>1579</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, this phenomenon does not mean that like European counterparts, the animal numbers declined in the Istanbul’s livestock hinterland and other regions of the empire in this time. For instance, while the sheep stock increased 56 per cent between 1541 and 1572 in the Sancak of Çirmen, it declined in the region of Lâzikyeye (Denizli) from 15.298 to 13.107 circa same period. The number of sheep also rose 6 per cent in Sarajevo in the period of 1530-1542, while in Manisa it remained nearly static and rose only as 0.04 per cent between 1531 and 1575. It should be admitted that these districts simultaneously experienced significant demographic jumps. For example, unlike the low increase in the sheep stock, the population of Manisa rose by 39.16 per cent during the same term. Again, while the population in Akşehir nearly doubled between the second half of Suleiman I’s reign and 1584, the increase of sheep numbers remained at the level of 2.5 per cent. For an understanding of population growth, Todorov suggests that the average number of households of about 100 Balkan cities nearly doubled in the first half of the sixteenth century and about trebled in the second half. Again, Barkan estimates that the population in Anatolia nearly doubled during the sixteenth century. Albeit incomplete, Table 2.2. suggests to us that despite an endemic supply, shortage did not appear in all Anatolian and Balkan regions, the hinterland competition among urban centers should have accelerated due to the rise of consumption

49 Ibid, pp. 55.
50 See Suraiya Faroqhi, Osmanlı’da Kentler ve Kentliler, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993), Table 20-21.

The given figures represent the population of re’âyā, in Akşehir countryside. Via these figures, we reach 100 per cent increase in the population. Regarding the urban population in Akşehir, her estimations in Table 1 show 75 per cent population increase in the mentioned period.
groups in their bodies. As Epstein shows for the sixteenth-seventeenth century European network, the rise of coercive urban centers against the countryside tightened the competition over surplus extraction in terms of raw material, consumption goods and labor services. Undoubtedly, such a development became apparent in the meat supply of the Ottoman capital, especially by the middle of the sixteenth century.

Table 2.2. Changes in Sheep Stock and Population in the Sixteenth Century Ottoman Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town / City or Region</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Change in Sheep Stock %</th>
<th>Change in Population %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akşehir</td>
<td>II.Half of Suleiman Reign-1584</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya</td>
<td>II.Half of Suleiman Reign-1584</td>
<td>17.22</td>
<td>80.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çirmen</td>
<td>1541-1572</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabzon</td>
<td>1554-1583</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>68.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denizi (Lazkiye)</td>
<td>1520-30-1571</td>
<td>-14.4</td>
<td>89.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>1520-30-1571-1580</td>
<td>264.3</td>
<td>202.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manisa</td>
<td>1531-1575</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>39.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzincan</td>
<td>1530-1591</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemah</td>
<td>1530-1568</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td>1530-1542</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ottoman central administration was aware of this phenomenon and seemed to tighten the control over Istanbul’s meat supply channels through various ways. One, a price rationing

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55 For Akşehir and Konya, see Suraiya Faroqhi, Osmanlı’da Kentler ve Kentliler, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1993), Table I, 20, 21.


For Trabzon, see M. Hanebi Bostan, XV-XVI. Asırlarda Trabzon Sancağında Sosyal ve İktisadi Hayat, (Ankara: TTK, 2002), pp. 102, 518.


For Bursa’s figures, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, ‘Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Surveys’, Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M.A. Cook, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 168-169 and Ömer Lütfi Barkan, Hüdavendigar Livasi Tahir Değerleri, (Ankara: TTK, 1988). In the calculation of the sheep numbers for Bursa, the conducted data is reflecting the sheep numbers in the kazâ’s of İnegöl, Bursa, Yarhisar, Ermeni-Pazar, Domanç, Yenişehir, Söğüd, Gö, Geyve, Akyazı, Göynük, Beğ-Pazar. Therefore, the sheep number in this table represents a wide countryside of Bursa. Probably, the same kazâ’s were also in the hinterland of other urban centers such as İznik, İznikmit and Kütahya.


For Sarajevo, see Mehmet Emin Yardumci, 15. ve 16. Yüzyıllarda Bir Osmanlı Livası: Bosna, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), pp. 41, 106.
policy among various towns, was applied through determination of lower official price for meat [narh] among other towns, which were located near the main sheep routes of the capital. This policy had been frequently affirmed in administrative instructions by the second half of the sixteenth century. In addition to this, Ottoman central authority repeated the order for the ban on sheep slaughtering in the Balkan provinces.

In addition to the demand side pressure, we should also think about the possible supply-side effects on the transformation of the structure and the controls of the meat markets. Though a significant amount of investments on livestock grazing of askerî class became apparent at this period, it is difficult to determine the extent of this development. Most importantly, we are far away from answering to what extent or how these capital investments stimulated a transformation in the property relations over pasture lands and the animals. However, it seems that the production relations-structure did not fundamentally change in the

57 BOA, MD 6, No: 363:
58 BOA, MD 7, No: 1996:
60 The askerî integration into livestock grazing seems to be a widespread issue by the sixteenth century. In one adâletname dated 1609, the intervention of the askerî class into this economic niche is clear. See Ömer Lütfi Barkan, ‘Edirne Askerî Kassamı’na Ait Tereke Deftlerleri (1545-1659)’, Türk Tarih Kurumu Belgeleri, Cilt III, Sayı: 5-6, (Ankara: TTK, 1993), pp. 58-147: “Ba’zi Beğler-Beğler ve Beğler ve kuzât ve müderrisindeki ve müteferrika ve çavuş ve Bölük halkı ve yeniçeri ve kapucu vesâyir kul tâifesinden ve eshâb-i timar ve vilâyet halkından sahib-i kudret olanlar, ol asil re’âyâsı firar eylemiş karyelere mülk-i mevruşları gibi mutasarrîf olub, murâd eyledikleri yerde evler ve ahurlar binâ idüp çiftler ve kurlar ve hizmetkarlar ve köyun ve şişir getirüp mustakîl çiftlik edinmekle anların havfinden re’âyâsî yerli yerlerine varmağa kaďır olmayıp...”
countryside as a response to increasing demand. Istanbul’s meat supply continued to depend on the nomadic or semi-nomadic and peasantry pasturage.\textsuperscript{60} Contrary to European developments such as the increase in the arable husbandry and average weights of cattle, the shifting to intensive type breeding seems to have remained embryonic in the Ottoman case. As a matter of fact, we don’t see, for example, the increment of the sheep carcass weights in Istanbul’s hinterlands and the low average weight continued to dominate the features of the sheep delivery to the capital even until the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{61}

It can be also suggested that the central policies towards the nomadic communities (especially \textit{Türkmens} and \textit{Yörüks}) may have affected the livestock reserves of these communities. It is true that by Bayezid II, the central administration gradually increased the tax burden on the nomadic communities through different ways.\textsuperscript{62} The most striking of these arrangements is the changes in the \textit{ağnâm vergisi} [sheep tax]. While in the reign of Mehmet II, the sheep tax was applied as one \textit{akçe} per three sheep, the tax was increased to one \textit{akçe} per two sheep.\textsuperscript{63} The lambs began to be accounted in the frame of the sheep tax which also started to be registered after the lambing period.\textsuperscript{64} Contrary to the previous applications, the sheep owners began to pay this sheep tax for their lamb too. In addition to the changes in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[61] Even throughout the nineteenth century, the central administration carried out negotiations with the tribes in Anatolia for sheep delivery to Istanbul. An interesting example on this matter is the situation of \textit{Cihanbeyli Tribe} in Karaman. The demanded sheep from this tribe continuously increased from 80,000 to 120,000 up to the middle of nineteenth century. Similarly, the central administration tried to conduct the sheep contracts with nomadic tribes in Bozok or Erzurum in same period. This clarifies that the nomadic livestock grazing kept its importance throughout the long term. The situation is also not so different in the Balkan Peninsula in the nineteenth century.
\item[62] See Chapter I.
\item[63] In the late eighteenth and the beginnings of the nineteenth century, the average carcass weights were very low compared to European counterparts. As an average carcass, the sheep delivered to Istanbul weighed 12-13 kg in this period. For most of the sheep flocks, especially for \textit{Kivircik}, this amount declined to 10 kg. However, Anatolian and Walachian sheep weighted much heavier in carcass.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
existing sheep tax, the central administration began to tax these communities through introducing new taxes related to animal breeding.\textsuperscript{65}

Lindner interprets these arrangements as the forced applications of the Ottoman polity in order to settle the nomadic communities.\textsuperscript{66} However, we are far away from determining the settlement ratios and the effects of these taxes on their livestock reserves in the Balkans and Anatolia. In terms of the \textit{Yörük} population, we know that in the period 1520-1530, their numbers in all Anatolian population increased by 2-3 per cent.\textsuperscript{67} In the Balkans, their numbers also increased until the end of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{68} In other words, up to the seventeenth century, we witness the rise of \textit{Yörük} population in Balkans and Anatolia despite the unknown settlement rates. But, even if we accept Lindner’s hypothesis, it does not mean that the settlement of the \textit{Yörüks} brought about the decrease in their sheep flocks. In fact, under the \textit{celepkeshan} system, \textit{cemâats} and Turkish nomadic communities (settled-non-settled or transshumant) supplied a considerably high number of sheep to Istanbul.\textsuperscript{69} For instance, between 1577-78, the nomadic population formed 7.5 per cent of all \textit{celepkeshan} in 24 kazâ’s [districts] of the \textit{Left Kol}. Especially in three kazâ’s, Selanik, Serez, Avrethisarı, their portion climbed to 17 percentages.\textsuperscript{70} The most striking feature of their appearance in the \textit{celepkeshan} system is that their average \textit{celepkeshan} sheep as above 100 was enormously higher than the general average (34).\textsuperscript{71} This picture indicates that despite of the increasing tax burden, the nomadic communities continue keeping a significant amount of sheep reserves. We also know

\textsuperscript{66} Ağıl vergisi and otlak resmi were introduced as new taxes. Although the tax rate of ağıl vergisi was changing in different times and places, in the kanınnâme of Bayezid II it was determined as two akçes per flock. And then, during the reign of Selim I, it was increased to 3 akçes. Otlak resmi, or köşlak resmi, resmi meral, yatak resmi, was extended into Yöruks via the same kanınnâme.
\textsuperscript{70} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 78-79.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid, pp. 79.
\textsuperscript{71} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 78-79.
that the tribal militia in Rumelia tried to enter into tax exempted services positions such as that of falconeers, bridge-keepers, and mountain guards in the sixteenth century in order to avoid military service.\textsuperscript{72} No doubt, the service of 	extit{celepkeşanlık} was providing one of the options for the nomadic 	extit{cemâats}, and they directed their financial assets to this system in the form of sheep delivery. This entire picture makes us think that neither intensive type husbandry was stimulated or spread over Istanbul’s hinterlands nor any dramatic change occurred on the side of the mutton productivity. Moreover, there was no general decline due to shifting pastoral lands into agricultural zones due to the settlements policies towards nomadic communities. Agents in Istanbul meat supply responded to the increasing demand through the extensive type strategies of the polity and entrepreneurs. It was not a weakness or a traditionalism of the polity and market agents in catching the changes in European meat markets. In fact, these responses for the surveillance and the control in meat supply reflect the rational choice and the success of the Ottoman merchants in the international markets. Namely, they came into existence through two significant phenomena: the close integration into the Walachia and Moldavian markets and the extension of 	extit{celepkeşan} system mechanism.

II-A: Ottomans in International Markets: Walachia and Moldavia

Although Walachia and Moldavia were the vassals of the Ottoman state throughout the sixteenth century\textsuperscript{73}, the Ottomans could not establish the economic integration with two principalities overnight. In the first half of the sixteenth century, both Walachia and Moldavia became important international markets in the livestock trade for the European urban centers.\textsuperscript{74} As a response to the rising aggregate meat consumption, European urban centers shifted their supply pools from the domestic producers to the international markets by the

\textsuperscript{72} Hülya Canbakal, Status Usurpation and the Ottoman State (1500-1700), forthcoming.

\textsuperscript{73} Peter Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule: 1354-1804, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), pp. 113-126.

\textsuperscript{74} Ian Blanchard, op cit., pp. 437-439.
sixteenth century. This structural change can not be generalized over all European centers, but its impact was felt by the mid-16th century in central-northwestern European urban centers. As a result of this process, Hungarian, Polish, Bulgarian, Transylvanian, Walachian, and Russian livestock markets began to direct their surplus to these urban centers. Clearly, one of these urban centers was Istanbul. Although the factors of the Ottoman military campaigns against Eflâk (Walachia) and Boğdan (Moldavia) by the reign of Mehmed II are only evaluated within the framework of the political events, it is clear that the Ottoman polity’s economic interest was one of the major rationales behind these campaigns. As Mihai Maxim points out, the Ottoman central administration applied a complex policy towards the two Danubian principalities throughout the sixteenth century under the category of haraçgızarlık (tributary states) and the main element in this process was not a direct political-military penetration, but a cautious economic integration. Especially on the issue of the meat supply, the main agents were the creditors, butchers, meat contractors in the Ottoman capital and their sub-contractors in Walachia and Moldavia. Even such a feature conceived the heterogeneity, at least in the agents, on the mechanism of the sheep delivery from these regions. Various groups of the Ottoman polity were deeply engaged in this delivery process. For instance, from 1592 to 1593, the Janissary leaders supported Alexandru- III for his succession to the Voyvodalık of Eflâk. In return for this support, Alexandru stipulated about 72,000 Kivircik sheep delivery to Janissaries per annum. There is no doubt that such a significant quantity brought about a huge profit to these Janissary leaders. In fact, the creditors and sheep merchants in Istanbul were the critical supporters of voyvodas in terms of their economic and political lobby operations on the circles of compact cliques in Ottoman polity. We encounter this phenomenon

75 Ibid, pp. 429-433.
79 Ibid, pp. 566.
especially at the times of the repayment problems of the credits. The sheep merchants (including the butchers and other meat contractors in the city) put pressure on the voyvodas through utilizing the apparatus of the state. In various mühimme orders, the debts of voyvodas were reminded and ordered for the payment of the credits or loans.\footnote{For related orders, see BOA, MD 42, No: 593, 594, 897, 971, 972; MD 46, No: 212, 267, 619; MD 47, No: 483, 512.} The amount of these credits was enormous: during the reign of Iancu Sasul as a prince of Moldavia in 1579-1582, the total amount of his debts to the sheep merchants in Istanbul was about 4.5-7.5 million akçes.\footnote{It is understood that the meat contractors intensively supported the central administration’s intervention into this issue. Most interesting phenomenon in this intervention is the intermediary role of the centre in bargaining the amount and the time of repayment between voyvoda and merchants in Istanbul.} However, the principalities’ relations with the Ottoman capital was not monopolistic or one sided. As Peter Sugar quotes in the story of Pervana, one of the celeps in Moldavia, the livestock merchants could make important profit through this trade.\footnote{Peter F. Sugar, ‘Major Changes in the Life of the Slav Peasantry under Ottoman Rule’, \textit{International Journal of Middle East Studies}, Vol: 9, No: 3, 1978, pp. 300.} In this case, Pervana received 9.000 sheep in return for 420.000 akçes from the son of the prince in 1598. If we consider the narh in Istanbul at 8 akçes and Walachian sheep supplied about 11 kg mutton, his direct revenue from this sheep delivery must have been 792.000 akçes.\footnote{For the calculation, see Chapter I and Ahmet Uzun, op cit., pp. 90-91:} Even if we take the expenditures such as the bribe, the loss of weight during the travel, and the cost of drovers into consideration, the amount undoubtedly left a significant profit margin to Pervana. As this example demonstrates, the mutual economic interests in the meat trade were probably the

\footnote{\hspace{1em}}
main factors behind the success of Ottoman integration with the Principalities. In fact, by the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottomans could succeed in shifting the direction of international meat trade of these principalities into Ottoman capital, and this situation had been maintained until the 19th century.\(^\text{84}\) However, this integration did not occur through either a sudden military strike or as a result of the activities of the creditors overnight. It seems that the earliest endeavors of the Ottoman polity for this integration began as far back as 1544.\(^\text{85}\) In this year, a 100.000 sheep delivery was determined as the responsibility of the Eflâk voyvoda. However, next year this amount decreased to 50.000.\(^\text{86}\) Parallel to this obligation, the central administration put an export ban on the sheep and cattle from Walachia-Moldavia to Poland.\(^\text{87}\) During the reign of Alxandru Lâpușneanu, the voyvoda of Moldavia was obliged to send 12.000 cattle to Istanbul per year.\(^\text{88}\) It is understood that the sheep delivery continuously increased until the last decade of the sixteenth century. In 1579, the Voyvoda of Moldavia reported that 180.000 sheep crossed the Danube for delivery to Istanbul.\(^\text{89}\) In 1584, the expected quantity of sheep purchase from Moldavia was 300.000.\(^\text{90}\) But, we should cautiously approach this quantity, since many sheep merchants exchanged their akçes with local currencies instead of engaging in the sheep purchasing in this region.\(^\text{91}\) The supply quantity from these regions was not restricted to the mercantile delivery. Under the pișkeș, voyvodas also sent a significant amount of sheep to the capital. For instance, Mihaı


\(^{85}\) Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: Volume I: 1300-1600*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 294-295.

\(^{86}\) Ibid, pp. 294-295.

\(^{87}\) Ian Blanchard, op cit., pp. 440.

\(^{88}\) See, BOA, MD 58, No: 580.

\(^{89}\) Alxandru Lâpușneanu was the prince of Moldavia in two periods: September 1552- November 1561 and March 1564 - March 1568. This export ban seems to activate during his second reign. See, J.Nistor, *Handel und Wandel in der Moldau bis zum Ende des 16 Jahrhundert*, (Czernovitz: 1912), pp 158-159.

\(^{90}\) BOA, MD 39, No: 157.

\(^{91}\) BOA, MD 53, No: 294.

For these merchant activities, see BOA, MD 53, No: 294.
Viteazul sent annually 20,000 sheep to the *celep* as a *pişkeş* form.\(^{92}\) Unfortunately, inadequate information is available on the *pişkeş* amount for other *voyvodas*; but together with the merchant delivery, around 200.00 sheep delivery from Walachia and Moldavia at the end of the sixteenth century seems to be plausible.

**II-B: Development of Celepkeşan System**\(^ {93}\)

Despite of the uncertainty of its origins, it is clear that the *celepkeşan* system developed in its scale after the mid-sixteenth century. It is understood that as a response to the increasing aggregate demand the central administration gave more importance to the issue of the initial recording of *celeps* (*Celep Yazımı*).\(^ {94}\) In reality, the ordinary process for the *celep* registration had been repeated by the Ottoman state in many *hükms* after the 1560s.\(^ {95}\) The terms of *celepkeş* or *celepkeşan* clearly refer to the individuals who are obliged to deliver a specific amount of the sheep to the city in a pre-determined period. For this reason, they differed from the celeps who are also described as merchants in the Ottoman terminology. In return for this obligation, a *celepkeş* was exempted from extraordinary levies, ‘avârîz-i dîvânîyê’.\(^ {96}\) The *celepkeşan* system did not cover all Balkan regions. Although its geographical borders covered the south of Danube in the north, Skopje in the West, and the line of Epirus to Thessaly, the main concentration was Central-Northwestern Bulgaria and Southeastern Macedonia.\(^ {97}\) As a matter of course, the regions with the most *celepkeşan* sheep


\(^ {93}\) In this part, special emphasis was given on the operational dynamics of the *celepeşan*. For the quantitative analysis of the *celepeşan* sheep, see Chapter IV.


\(^ {95}\) As an instance, see Ahmet Refik Altunay, *On Altunca Asrîda İstanbul Hayatı (1553-1591)*, (İstanbul:Devlet Basimevi, 1935), pp. 84.


\(^ {97}\) See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit., Appendix A.
generally located in these regions. However, it is understood that the regions with *celepkeşan* sheep were regularly distributed to the three *Kols* of Rumelia. In the period 1580-83, while the *Left Kol* contained 208.621 sheep, the *Middle Kol* had 209.028 *celepkeşan* sheep. The *Right Kol’s* sheep reserve was always high in this system and reached to 233.460 in the mentioned time period. In the *mühimme* records, the *celepkeşans* in these three *Kols* were selected according to their wealth. However, as to determining the minimum level of wealth as the *celepkeşan* selection criterion, the *hükms* do not give a clear picture. Although the central administration emphasized the importance of the possessed capital for the candidates and described these individuals as *mün‘im, maldar* or *mütemevvilt* [men of means], we are far away from understanding the investigation process for these candidates’ financial capability. Again, the minimum initial capital for the appointment as *celepkeş* was not clearly described in the *mühimme* orders. However, we can deduct the result that the appointment of the butcher required higher initial capital than the *celepkeşan* appointment. For instance, in the case of Turgut Oğlu Debbâğ Mahmud’s appointment, he complained that his financial capability was inadequate to start a butchery business in Istanbul. As a result of the investigation, his total assets were determined as 100.000 *akçes* and he was appointed as *celepkeşan* with 200 sheep. In fact, Debbâğ Mahmud’s situation is not unique; the central administration did not fix a minimum level for the *celepkeşan* appointment. Contrary to the butcher appointment in which 200.000 *akçes* was repeated as minimum level of individual wealth, the *celepkeşans* seemed to possess lower individual assets.

The most striking feature of this financial capability of *celepkeşans* is that although a positive correlation existed between the wealth of a *celepkeşan* and the number of registered sheep, there is no direct overlapping between these parameters. It is not uncommon that while

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98 Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 94-96.
100 BOA, MD 55, No: 259 and MD 42, No: 270.
101 For the requirements of the butcher and *celep* appointments, see BOA, MD 28, No: 571; MD 30, No: 117.
102 See BOA, MD 31, No: 255; MD 33, No: 623; MD 35, No: 443.
a celepkeşan with 100,000 financial assets was obliged to deliver 150 sheep, in other case another celepkeşan with the same amount of the capital was required to supply 200 sheep.\textsuperscript{103} Even this case shows the complex picture in the determination of individuals as celepkeşan. In many times, ‘the would-be celepkeşan’ were accused by some ‘evil-disposed’ people who exaggerates their total assets.\textsuperscript{104} Unfortunately, we do not have adequate data for who these people were or why they exaggerated the candidates’ financial assets. However, the appointment of the individuals as celeps was investigated on the basis of both official and unofficial information exchange. Such a situation causes us to think that these candidates were generally usurers or made their capital accumulation through illegal ways.\textsuperscript{105} However, Cvetkova’s analysis on the profession of 222 celepkeşans points a different picture.\textsuperscript{106} She shows that only seven individuals were described as usurers, and most of the celepkeşan capital, furthermore, seemed to be accumulated through commercial and craft activities. The leading sector in this area was tanning (38), then tailors (28), goldsmiths (25), grocers (20), butter merchants (19), and finally shepherds (16). Such a distribution may be associated with the phenomenon that the market competitors in the commerce and the urban industries utilized the tool of celepkeşan appointment in order to crowd out their competitors from the market. However, if it were the case, the financial burden of the celepkeşlik must have been heavy for the individuals. However was it really the case for the celepkeşans?

On this matter, Greenwood estimates on the basis of initial required capital for the celepkeşan operation and the individual total assets.\textsuperscript{107} Emphasizing the situation of the wealthiest strata among the celepkeşans, he reaches the result that celepkeşans could fulfill this obligation with the initial capital as 6-8 per cent of their total assets. Thus, the

\textsuperscript{103} See BOA, MD 30, No: 477; MD 31, No: 782.
\textsuperscript{104} See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 81.
\textsuperscript{105} The negative tendency towards to the usurers (ribâ-horlar) is obvious in some hûkms. See for instance, BOA, MD 33, No: 547.
\textsuperscript{107} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 82-83.
allocated small quantity of their wealth to this obligation. This small allocation was a direct result of the low level of registered sheep per celepkeşan. Even the wealthiest individuals were generally obliged to deliver 150-200 sheep to Istanbul per annum.108 Considering the fact that the average registered sheep per celepkeş was around 30, the argument that the market agents aimed to decrease of the competitors’ real business capital through the improper-speculative information seems to be not reasonable.109 It is clear that if an individual lost all initial operation capital during this service, this loss did not cause a dramatic effect on its total assets.110 Up until now, we have approached the celepkeşans’ obligations with the acceptance that they could lose their initial capital. However, in fact, did they lose all their capital? In other words, is this service not at all profitable for these individuals?

In the celepkeşan registers covering 10 kazâ’s of Niğbolu in the period 1565/66-1572/73, we see that only eight percent of old celepkeşans had bankrupted.111 Parallel to this situation, the registers for the 24 kazâ’s of the Left Kol in 1577/78 point to the fact that the

108 Ibid, pp. 79. During my research, the highest figure in the orders and celepkeşan registers with that I have encountered is 350 sheep. See BOA, MD 30, No: 117. The number of the celepkeşan sheep for an individual is generally low.
109 Ibid, pp. 79. By utilizing the celepkeşan registers of 101 kazâ’s in 1580-83, Greenwood reaches this average result. This is lower than my findings (39) in the celepkeşan registers due to the fact that I could conduct only the registers for Varna, Filibe, Serez, Kili and Selanik. These kazâ’s inhabited the highest celepkeşan sheep in the registers. Not surprisingly, through analyzing the regions with the highest sheep number, Halime Doğru also reaches nearly 41 as an average quantity. See Halime Doğru, ‘Rumeli’de Celepkeşanlar’, XIII. Tarih Kongresi, Cilt:III,(Ankara: TTK, 1999), pp. 15-16.
110 See, BOA, MD 3, No: 1363 and Ahmet Refik Altnay, On Altinci Asırda İstanbul Hayatı (1553-1591), (İstanbul: Devlet Basimevi, 1935), pp. 84-85.
müflisân celepkeşan [bankrupted celepkeşan] formed only 6 percent of âtik celepkeşans [celepkeşans registered in the old celepkeşan registers].\textsuperscript{112} By adding the shares of girihtîgân [escapee celepkeşans] and of tahîfîân celepkeşans [celepkeşans who consulted for the reduction of their obligation], these ratios were increasing.\textsuperscript{113} Even we make this addition, the bankrupted-escapee celepkeşan ratios were at a sustainable level for the system (See Table 2.3. and 2.4.). The most striking feature of the tables is that the celepkeşan sheep registered on them were considerably higher than average. If the celepkeşan registration was conducted with the consideration of wealth level of the individuals and a positive correlation existed between the total assets and the number of registered sheep, the girihtîgân-müflisân celepkeşan in these tables must have been from the wealthy strata of the celepkeşans.

| Table 2.3. Müflisân Celepkeşans in Some Regions\textsuperscript{114} |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Parameter/Region            | Rusçuk      | Ziştovi     | Tîrnovo     | Lofçça      | Nîgbulu     | Izladi      | Plevne      |
| Sheep                       | 735         | 985         | 1745        | 520         | 420         | 330         | 310         |
| Celepkeşan                  | 16          | 18          | 37          | 15          | 9           | 6           | 7           |
| Average                     | 46          | 55          | 47          | 35          | 47          | 55          | 44          |

| Table 2.4. Girihtîgân Celepkeşans in Some Regions\textsuperscript{115} |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Parameter/Region            | Rusçuk      | Ziştovi     | Tîrnovo     | Lofçça      | Nîgbulu     | Izladi      | Plevne      |
| Sheep                       | 730         | ?           | 630         | ?           | 215         | 205         | 250         |
| Celepkeşan                  | 12          | ?           | 11          | ?           | 5           | 4           | 5           |
| Average                     | 61          | ?           | 57          | ?           | 43          | 51          | 50          |

Why do these wealthy individuals seem to be listed as bankrupt or fled in the registers? Can we interpret this situation as an increasing burden of these individuals due to the large scale of their operations?

Unfortunately, adequate information about the reasons of celepkeşans’ bankruptcy was rarely cited from both celepkeşan registers and mühimme orders. Most importantly, we have no clear data on the price differentiation between the local regions and Istanbul either.\textsuperscript{116} Greenwood interprets the bankruptcy of celepkeşans as a natural result of the operational

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, pp. 145-147.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, pp. 144-147.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, pp. 14-15
\textsuperscript{116} For the existing data, see Table 2.1.

58
costs of this system. In his analysis, the differentiation between official and market prices led to *celepkeşans* or drovers to purchase livestock at high prices from sheep-owners and sell them at relatively lower prices.\(^{117}\) However, Greenwood’s hypothesis is totally based on the evidence from the last two decades of the sixteenth century in that *celepkeşan* system transformed itself into a new phase. After the 1580s, the *celepkeşan* obligations were significantly turned into monetary transfer from in kind sheep delivery.\(^{118}\) It is also clear that starting by the 1580s, the meat, with the sheep prices, entered into an inflationist cycle, and the gap between official-market prices widened. (See Table 2.5.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Official Sheep Price</th>
<th>Market Sheep Price</th>
<th>Mutton Price in Istanbul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1567-1568</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1577-1578</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580-1581</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589-1590</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590-1591</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1592-1593</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 2.5. illustrates, such a gap was not so big as in previous times. This situation was clearly stated in the order dated 1590-91 which described that in the past the drovers could buy their sheep at prices around 20-32 *akçes* and sell to Istanbul butchers for 40 *akçes*. However, for the past six or seven years, the drovers paid about 60 *akçes* for the sheep and in the last two years this value jumped to 100 *akçes*.\(^{120}\) The amounts mentioned in this order are totally compatible with the given prices in previous *mühimme* orders. The order also pointed to a profit margin in previous terms, approximately before 1583 and about 8-10 *akçes* profit seemed to be considerably high. However, we should also take into account the cost of *celepkeşans* in driving the sheep to Istanbul. It is not uncommon that most of *celepkeşans* did

\(^{117}\) Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 140-143.

\(^{118}\) For a detailed description of this process, see Chapter III.

\(^{119}\) BOA, MD 30, No: 340; MD 42, No: 404, 850, 970, 971; MD 46, No: 329; MD 47, No: 512, MD 67, No: 494; Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 142; Şevket Pamuk, “İstanbul’da Et Fiyatları”, *Unpublished Data.* For the period 1567-68, the mutton price (2.4 *akçes*) is assumed equal to the level of 1564. For the period of 1577-78, the 1570’s price is used. The mutton prices seemed fluctuate 3-3.5 *akçes* in 1580-1584. For 1589-90, while we have an average mutton price of *waqf* *imdiaret* as 3.9 *akçes*, I make the calculation through the *narh* level.

\(^{120}\) See, BOA, MD 67, No: 494.
not deliver the sheep themselves; instead of this difficult delivery, they choose to make payment to the sheep drovers.\textsuperscript{121} At this moment, the amount of akçe for the delivery paid to the drovers became important in clarifying the financial burden of celepkeşan activities. Again, on this issue, both mühimme orders and the celepkeşan registers kept their silence. The only evidence referring to drovers’ payment came from 1580-81.\textsuperscript{122} In this year, celepkeşan paid seven akçes per sheep for the delivery of their total 3,170 sheep to Istanbul. If we subtract this value (7 akçes) from the initial profit (10 or 8 akçes), we reach the result that the celepkeşans’ lost-profit balance in this business is near zero. When we take into consideration their gain from the tax exemption (the ‘avârıצ levies), this service seemed not to carry a heavy economic burden before the 1580s to the celepkeşans. If the reverse was true, we should have come across the less wealthy celepkeşans as bankrupted-fled in the registers. Moreover, if this system was so inefficient in economic terms for the celepkeşans, we must not have seen the continuous endeavors of other social groups to enter into the system during the 1550s-1560s.\textsuperscript{123} At this moment, I suggest that the main fragility of the celepkeşan system did not result from the economic parameters of the system until the big debasement of akçe value in the 1580s. In fact, starting from the 1560s, the structure of this system had internally transformed into new phase independently from the economic problems of the system which became visible by the 1580s.\textsuperscript{124}

Before these acute economic fluctuations, the transformation in the celepkeşan system was proceeding with the wide scale changes in the whole meat supply, covering its financiers and market actors. This process was not continuously linear and experienced ziggzags, but its

\textsuperscript{122} BOA, MD 71, No: 312.
\textsuperscript{123} For such cases, see BOA, MD 3, No: 1434; MD 6, No: 1346. The most eager group in these endeavors is the Yörük. But, the central administration usually rejected and dropped their cepkeşan status. The central administration frequently reminded Yörük the inability in escaping their Yörük status-obligations. But, the frequency of the orders tends to think that Yörük were intensively participating into celepkeşan system. As a matter, the central administration accepted this situation. See, Ahmet Refik Altıny, Anadolu da Türkmen Asiretleri, (İstanbul:Türkiye Enstitüsü, 1930), No: 67.
\textsuperscript{124} For the economic problems of celepkeşan after 1580’s, see Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 141-145.
direction seems to point two important trends in itself. In the first dimension, by the 1560s, the financial obligations of the wealthy *celepkeşans* were directed to the new individuals through the massive *celepkeşan* appointments.\textsuperscript{125} Even if the old *celepkeşans* remained in the system, their obligations lessened. As a clear reflection of this process, in the period of 1565-1575, we encounter the rapid decline of the average sheep per *celepkeşan* in all regions (See Table 2.6.). The main factor for this decline was the rapid increase of the registered *celepkeşans* while the quantity of the *celepkeşan* sheep incremented according to the slow tempo.\textsuperscript{126}

**Table 2.6. Decline in Average of Registered Sheep per *Celepkeşan*\textsuperscript{127}**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Sheep Change</th>
<th>Celepkeşan Change</th>
<th>Average Sheep Change per Celepkeşan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Niğbolu</td>
<td>1565/66-1580/82</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Thrace</td>
<td>1577/78-1589/90</td>
<td>-9.30%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>-28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern Bulgaria</td>
<td>1565/66-1588/90</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>-43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobruca</td>
<td>1565/66-1573-74</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>-39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such a sharp decline also means the central administration began to connect the meat supply of the capital with the new-less wealthy or less-obliged *celepkeşans*. We clearly catch this change at the renewal of the *celepkeşan* registers. When the replacement of old-much obliged *celepkeşans* with the new actors was practiced, the sheep obligation of one *celepkeşan* began to be spread to many new *celepkeşans*.\textsuperscript{128}

Why did such a change occur in the system? The attention of the central administration seems to direct mostly to amount of the supplying sheep\textsuperscript{129} and at this period I found no order for the conscious declining of average *celepkeşan* sheep and massive *celepkeşan* registration. As various orders show, the central administration repeated the

\textsuperscript{125} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 100-104.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid, pp. 102-103.
\textsuperscript{127} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 100-104 and 146-147.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, pp. 103-104.
\textsuperscript{129} As an instance of the tendency of the central administration, see BOA, MD 6, No: 1018 and Ahmet Refik Altunay, *On Altinci Asrda İstanbıl Hayati (1553-1591)*, (İstanbul: Devlet Basmevi, 1935), pp. 84-85.
classic type of order on replacement and registration. Therefore, such a change seems not to be controlled by the central administration. At most, the central polity accepted the celepkeşan claims and the emerging situation. It is understood that the main transformation occurred in local levels. One significant reason for the massive participation to celepkeşan system and the declining average sheep quantities for the celepkeşan was the increasing financial burden over re’âyâ through the extraordinary taxes. It is clear that the celepkeşlik offered circumvention from the extraordinary taxes levied, and there seems to have been a rapid rush to this service emerged by the 1560s. Unfortunately, we are deprived of an adequate local picture for how the competition over this service was practiced. However, from the mühimme orders about the muşfiyyet status of re’âyâ for the celepkeş service, we learn that the celepkeşlik was probably the last option of individuals in avoiding ‘avârız taxes. In fact, while the candidates of this service were increasing, at the same time some individuals also claimed from the exemption of celepkeşan service through arguing that they had been awarded with timar. Whether the existing wealthy celepkeşans consciously managed the massive registrations or not, the result pointed the fact by the replacements their obligations were mostly transferred to the excessive number of individuals.

Considering the elastic demand of meat, this new structure was more vulnerable to the unexpected market conditions. As the prices began to climb by the 1580s and the market became unstable in the inflationist environment, small operational capital became insolvent

130 BOA, MD 3, No: 938; See also BOA, MAD 1614, pp. 260-276.
In these orders, the central administration was tolerant to the celepkeşan claims and reduced their obligations.
131 Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 84-88.
The increase in the extraordinary taxes was dramatic throughout the sixteenth century. While Asâf Paşa described this value as 20 akçes per four-five years in the 1530s-1540s, its level climbed to 50 akçes in 1576. By the second half sixteenth century, both amount and frequency of the collection of ‘avârız taxes had increased.
133 Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 88.
134 See, BOA, MD 46, No: 83, 543; MD 55: No: 16.
135 For the elasticity of the meat-mutton, see Chapter IV.
and many celepeşans or drovers could not deliver their registered sheep to Istanbul. It is not coincidental that at that time the various hûkms were emphasizing the decline of the delivered sheep to the capital.\textsuperscript{136} However, the transformation of the celepeşan system was not limited to the quantitative changes in celepeşan or registered sheep numbers. The second impetus for this transformation, in fact, was more revolutionary on the system and more durable. As the financial burden on the central treasury became tougher by the 1580s\textsuperscript{137}, the central administration gradually eliminated the tax exemptions of celepeşans.\textsuperscript{138} For the first time in 1582, the celepeşan were ordered that if they did not deliver their registered sheep, they were liable for the ‘avârız tax.\textsuperscript{139} Parallel to this development the material responsibility of the celepeşans evolved into monetary obligation in the form of celepeşan bedel.\textsuperscript{140} From this time onwards, the celepeşans were not required to supply specific amount of sheep; instead they paid the value of the sheep to the central treasury.\textsuperscript{141} Such a monetization of the celepeşan service was not only a result of the change in the central administration policies. The mercantile activities of the major meat contractors (butchers) and of the livestock traders also formed the internal stimulus for this transformation.\textsuperscript{142} As various hûkms show, the meat contractors with a significant amount of capital usually had integrated into the heart of the celepeşan system and accelerated the monetization of the meat supply system for Istanbul.

The next chapter deals with the activities and economic situations of these meat contractors (butchers) in Istanbul.

\textsuperscript{136} BOA, MD 71, No: 312, MD 5, No: 341, 342, 343; MD 5, No: 337. The common tone in these hûkms is the intensive accusation of kâdir, madrâbâz, drovers or butchers due to the sheep arrears. Considering the figures of supplying sheep, Greenwood also finds a dramatic jump in sheep arrears after the 1580s. See Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 147.
\textsuperscript{138} Anthony Greenwood, op cit, pp. 149-154.
\textsuperscript{139} BOA, MD 42, No: 191.
\textsuperscript{140} BOA, MD 31, No: 489.
\textsuperscript{141} The shifting to cash based obligation did not come into existence suddenly. The embryonic form of this new system can be traced during the 1580s and by the 1590s it had dominated the whole structure of the meat market. But, still in the 1590s, some celepeşans made this obligation in kind.
\textsuperscript{142} BOA, MD 42, No: 403, MD 55, No: 75.
CHAPTER III

ISTANBUL BUTCHERS:

“AGENTS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE MEAT SECTOR”

“Siz fâhir libâslar geyp, ağîr gümüşlü buçaklar takınursüz”’1

When the Italian painter Bartolomeo Passarotti painted his Butcher Shop, he undoubtedly was referring to the rising importance of butchers in European urban markets at the dawn of Early Modernity. Contrary to his Fishmonger’s Shop, in which the old fishmonger is depicted has having an air of despair and innocence, the comfort and glee on the face of butchers is emphasized by the suspended bodies of buffalos and severed animal heads on the table. In contrast to this moralistic depiction of butchers in the European world, Istanbul butchers have been generally perceived as the “scapegoats and milk cows” of the Ottoman command-economy.2 In fact, however, it would be erroneous to make such a generalization. Above all else, the term “butchery” is one of the striking examples of the semantic transference which causes deep internal contradiction. Contrary to the modern understanding of butchers and their business, in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries, the Ottomans used this term in a very different context. It did not necessarily refer to a person who slaughtered or purged animals in slaughterhouses or butcher shops. In a more general sense, butchers were perceived as having a license to sell mutton in shops or having the right to use the slaughter complexes.3 Interestingly, we encounter the term of ḫanâdârlık (or kanadar) – which refers to the purging process in butcher shops4 - in the second half the

3 Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 47.
4 See BOA, MD 35, No: 707. But, I should emphasize that the term kanadar may have carried different meanings. Minna Rozen interprets this term in the framework of Hebrew terminology and suggests that this term probably originated from the combining of the words kan and dar. Kan refers to blood in Turkish and dar as Turkish-Iranian suffix refers to
sixteenth century. Kıznâdâr could be synonymously used with the butcher like the usage in Jewish terminology.\footnote{Minna Rozen, “A Pound of Flesh: The Meat Trade and Social Struggle in Jewish Istanbul, 1700-1923,” \textit{Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East: Fashioning the Individual in Muslim Mediterranean World}, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi & Randi Deguilhem, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 200, 206.} In addition to kıznâdâr, we have also encountered with the hired laborers of the butchers in the sixteenth century Istanbul.\footnote{See Eyüp Mahkemesi, E-1, No: 36b-6.} Either kıznâdâr or the laborer, such a complex terminology clearly designates a separation-stratification in the butchery business. In fact, it is little surprising that the appointed butcher from various sectors had not personally managed his shop.\footnote{See Anthony Greenwood, “Istanbul’s Meat Provisioning: A Study of Celepkeşan System,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1988, pp. 180.}

The complexity of the butchery business proceeded with the functions of sellâhs [slaughterers] in this sector. Despite the clear separation between butcher-shop [kassâb dükkanı] and slaughterhouse [selh-hâne] in Ottoman sources, there is no differentiation between sellâh and kassâb in 16th and 17th century Istanbul.\footnote{See Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 47-48.} Usually, kassâb seems to own a shop in the slaughterhouse.\footnote{Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 47.} Here, an interesting butcher portrait emerges: an individual who was engaged in slaughtering, purging, butchery, and business partnership and employer

\begin{quote}
"he who holds." And kanadar came to mean as “the who holds the blood.” Through this analysis, Rozen argues that among Jews, this term was used as kassâb, butcher. In fact, her study in the registers of the rabbinical court of Istanbul clearly points to this meaning. See Minna Rozen, “A Pound of Flesh: The Meat Trade and Social Struggle in Jewish Istanbul, 1700-1923,” \textit{Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East: Fashioning the Individual in Muslim Mediterranean Word}, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi & Randi Deguilhem, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 226. However, in şer’iyye registers (look for instance at the Istanbul Kâdiği 9:68a) the kanadar seems to be a business partner with butchers. As Yi points out, the term was used only for the butchery activities. Similar to this, I have not encountered with this word in designating other business or guilds. Yi suggests that the origin of this term came from the künü (a plural form of kıznâ) in Arabic world referring the profit or acquisition and reaches to the conclusion that the term kanadar refers to the business partners. See, Eunjeeong Yi, “The Istanbul Guilds in the Seventeenth Century: Leverage in Changing Times,” Ph.D Dissertation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University, 2000, pp. 129.

It is clear that the term kıznâdâr-kanadar was frequently used in designating the business partners in the seventeenth century. Not only in butchery activities, but also in other sectors the kanadar seems hold a business partner position (See Istanbul Kadiği 9:15a). But the evidence from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries designates these individuals as porger in butchery sectors (both in Turkish and Jewish usage). Therefore, at least in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries we might reach the result that the term kanadar refered to Jewish porgers in Istanbul. For Turkish terminology, it is clear that like butcher, kanadar was an individual who was not a one-dimensional man in his business activities. In some usages, kanadar became the business partners, while in some cases seems to be an individuals to engage butchery practices.
\end{quote}
activities. How can we place the butchers within this complex chain? I strongly favor the term
meat contractors (or meat traders) for Ottoman butchers in this context due to the fact these
people were engaged in various niches of animal by-product industries in different capacities.
Within this framework, it should not be surprising to see many individuals in the butchery
sector who at the same time were involved in other professions.\(^\text{10}\) As the butchers endeavored
to integrate into various industries, there was also a reverse trend that other professionals were
engaged in butchery activities.\(^\text{11}\) In Ottoman historiography, the first half of the seventeenth is
usually depicted as “esnâfization” of the Janissaries or “janissarization” of the esnâfs.\(^\text{12}\) For
the meat sector, we can trace a similar phenomenon. Individuals of military origin entered
parts of this business even in the sixteenth century.\(^\text{13}\) However, as to when this integration
became a widespread phenomenon is uncertain. What is understood is that meat trading and
its relevant businesses always had high rates of capital circulation and injection due to the
wide operational area of the animal by-product sectors and attracted the individuals of
different social groups.\(^\text{14}\) We have adequate evidence from the sixteenth century to lead us to
believe that the Ottoman butchers placed their financial capital into various niches of the

\(^{10}\) See Tophane Mahkemesi, T-7/45a, No: [4]-519; T-24-a, No: [2]-320; Üsküdar Mahkemesi, Ü-142, No: 79/25;
Eyüp Mahkemesi, E-1, No: 27/11.

\(^{11}\) Candle-soap making and tanning seem to be the most attractive sectors for butchers. It is also interesting that
their activities began to concentrate on the districts of Eyüp, Üsküdar and Galata. Such a geographical
concentration leads us to conclude that there may be two important reasons behind this development. Firstly,
butchers transferred their mercantile activities outside the city to avoid the control of the waqsfs and of the central
administration. Secondly, as Cohen shows in the case of Jerusalem, it may reflect the tendency to transfer the
animal by-product sector outside the urban center due to such factors as pollution and odor. See Ammon Cohen,

\(^{12}\) See Ahmet Refik, On Altunci Asrarda İstanbül Hayatı (1553-1591), (İstanbul: Devlet Basmevi, 1935), pp. 98:
“Istanbul kadastro hâkim ki Mahrusei mezburyeye..... içün davar getüren celeplerin davranışlarını yeniçeri ve cebeci
ve topci taiyesi bağılup ya kassablük idüp ve bazıları dahi kassab şakirdi namına gice ile...”


\(^{14}\) See Eyüp Mahkemesi, E-4, No: 57b-1; Ahmet Refik, On Altunci Asrarda İstanbul Hayatı (1553-1591),
(İstanbul: Devlet Basmevi, 1935), pp. 98.

In the first case, we see the existence of women in this sector. To what extent this phenomenon diffused into the
female members of the dynasty or of the palace population remains unknown to me. But, it is clear that state-
dependants made investments to meat contracting sector. The second case is an example covering hassa
şahincisi’s engagement into meat trade.

66
animal supply chain. Most importantly, these meat traders (butchers) made investments into direct animal supply for their own business. For instance, a Jewish butcher traded in oxen, which involved wholesale animal activities between Filibe (Plovdiv in current Bulgaria) and Istanbul during the second half of the sixteenth century. Such involvement seems to be an established phenomenon in the sector. In addition to such livestock investments, these meat traders were becoming active in the distribution of leathers, sheep heads and tripe and offal parts after slaughtering animals. Despite of the protests of the tanners and başçıs to the involvement of butchers in the distribution affairs, such involvement was not ad hoc and continued in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Since the başhanes’ and the tanners’ income were partly channeled into major waqfs, in all disputes between butchers and other parties, we can see intensive interference by the imperial waqfs, especially those of Aya Sofya. However, such support from the waqf mütevellis in favor of başhanes and tanners seems to have been ineffective in the sixteenth century. As a consequence, during the first half the seventeenth century, Yedikule tanners still complained about the shortage of leather supply even as başçıs were developing their own strict distribution mechanism.

Although information about the butchers’ economic activities can be obtained from the sources, we know very little about their daily operations, the tools they used in their shops

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15 See, Üsküdar Mahkemesi, Ü-23, Nö: 245; Tophane Mahkemesi, T-7, No: T24a-320, No: 7/45, 4[a]-519; Eyüp Mahkemesi, E-4, No: 78[b]-5, 57 [b]-1, 38[b]-4.
16 See Minna Rozen, op cit., pp. 202-206. I use this example since Jewish meat markets appear to have been more controlled than the Muslim-Christian meat markets. It is quite true that these controls had intensified by the seventeenth century and must have been more strictly controlled by the religious authorities of Jewish communities due to kashrut rules.
19 See Ahmet Refik Altunay, On Altincı Asırda İstanbul Hayatı (1553-1591), (İstanbul: Devlet Basmevi, 1935), pp 115; BOA, MD 93, No: 223, MD 85, No: 491.
For Yedikule tanners, the competition became tougher after the establishment of the slaughterhouse-tannery complex by Nurbani Sultan in Üsküdar. Joining forces with the butchers’ initiative to sell the hides to the other agents instead of Yedikule tanners, they developed a traditionalist discourse with the support of Aya Sofya Waqf.
or the structure of their guilds. Unfortunately, we have very little information about the relationship between apprentices and masters for the butchers’ guild.\(^{21}\) Nevertheless, the existence of official hükms for appointments of çirâğ (çırak) suggests that, to some extent, the central administration could intervene in the internal affairs of butcher guilds.\(^{22}\) A similar phenomenon also existed in the appointments of yamaks.\(^{23}\) Examining the account of Evliya Çelebi for the first half seventeenth century, yamaks seem to have been auxiliary guilds to the major guilds in the operational sphere.\(^{24}\) From Evliya’s account it is understood that, for example, while the cooks’ guild was a major guild, the kebab makers [kebapçı], köfte makers [köfteci] formed an auxiliary guild.\(^{25}\) We encounter the existence of yamaks to Istanbul butchers by the last decades of the sixteenth century.\(^{26}\) In what sense these yamaks formed auxiliary guilds to butchers remains unknown to me. They may have been able to integrate the operational affairs of butchers or to participate in the distribution mechanism between butchers and tanners, başçis or sakatatçis. Or they were perhaps even sharers of capital in the sector. However, what is certain is that the yamaks were appointed by the central administration, especially in between 1585-1595.\(^{27}\) The criterion for this appointment was the candidates’ wealth and this also suggests that the central administration utilized these


\(^{22}\) See, BOA, MD 3, No: 914.

I haven’t seen any reference to kalfa for the butcher guilds in sixteenth century. But, it doesn’t mean that the butcher guild had a two-tiered structure between apprentices and masters. We are far from understanding the roles of yamak, yamaşma (hired laborer) and kanadar in the butcher guild structure. What is certain thing with respect to this issue is that even in the sixteenth century the butcher guild contained a differentiation between çırak and usta.

\(^{23}\) For yamak appointments, see BOA, MD 35, No: 517; MD 67, No: 47.

In the TDK Dictionary, the term yamak is described as meaning assistants in one business. Ağa yamağı was defined as sergeant to Janissary Ağası. In the structure of the guilds, the meaning of yamak changed among the guilds.


\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 60.

\(^{26}\) Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 165-166.

\(^{27}\) Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 176.

Before the 1580s, there had been no reference in sultanic orders to yamak appointments. In most cases, they were uprooted from their localities.
individuals in order to obtain capital input for the butchers. But at this point we should be
careful about the time and space for these appointments. The appointments of yamaks did not
occur throughout the sixteenth century; as a matter, it emerged during the middle of the 1580s
and seems to have continued only until 1595. The selection criterion to this service and the
opposition of wealthy individuals to it is a well-known Ottoman phenomenon referred to by
Faroqhi as the “scapegoats and milk cows” of the Ottoman command economy.

The earliest reference to a butcher appointment to the capital is in 1544; in these orders
for sancak beys and kedis, the central administration asked for wealthy individuals in their
regions capable of serving in the butcher service in the capital. In these orders, the minimum
level of the wealth for this appointment was 500,000 akces. However, it is understood that
this minimum level decreased throughout the sixteenth century. For instance, while in 1544
the minimum level was set as 500,000 akces, various values between 200,000-500,000 akces
were commonly referred to in the butchery appointments between 1575 and 1595. Many
hükms also point to the fact that although there was a correlation between the appointments of
celep and butcher so that the institution of the butchery necessitated higher capital than
celeplik. The hükms related to these appointments do not give extensive information about
the process through which these individuals were selected; but some orders to kedis provide a

28 Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 165-166.
29 See BOA, MD 58, No: 532; MD 71, No: 555, 691; MD 74, No: 2; Anthony Greenwood, op cit., 176.
All the evidence in these mühimme orders points the fact that yamaks were designated as financial assistants to
the existing butchers. Like the butchers, the central administration usually ordered a total confiscation of their
possessions.
In these orders, wealth is a prerequisite for this appointment. In addition to this, other criteria were also applied.
For instance, the candidates should not be Jewish, old or infirm and askeri. Same order was repeated to the Bey
of Aydin.
31 Ibid., pp. 166-167.
32 See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit, Appendix C.
33 BOA, MD 35, No: 443-679.
When an investigation under kadih with the witnesses clearly shows that the candidate’s wealth was not suitable
for the appointment (say if their wealth was described as 100,000 akces), they were appointed as celeps instead
of the butchers.
general framework through which this can be analyzed. Although there was a specific emphasis on the usurers and their recruitment to the butchery service, the main criterion was unquestionably personal capital accumulation. As Table 3.1. suggests, the pragmatic vision of the central administration dominated the selection of the individuals so that usurers were kept to a minimum in comparison to wealthy merchants, craftsmen and livestock traders.

Table 3.1. The Professions of the Appointed Butchers in the 16th Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Merchants</th>
<th>Usurers</th>
<th>Livestock Business</th>
<th>Craftsmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The importance of the candidates’ wealth in this process can be clearly traced to the regions from which they were recruited. Extending into the boundaries of celep recruitment, these meat traders mainly came from core regions of the empire. (See Table 3.2.)

Table 3.2. Regional Distribution of Butcher Recruits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Number of Meat Traders (Butchers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marmara &amp; Western Anatolia</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern &amp; Central Anatolia</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea Region</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thessaly-Epirus &amp; Thrace</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morea</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such a geographical distribution differs from that in the celepkeşans’ operational area. For instance, in the butcher appointments, Central Anatolia and the Morea entered the picture with the significant number of individuals. However, as in the case of celepkeşan recruits, Bulgaria, Thessaly-Epirus region and Thrace retain a central position.

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34 The only thing that can be gotten from the sources about the investigation process is that it was organized as a response to the demands made by the central administration. Sometimes, the demands made of the kadıs were to find wealthy candidates for the appointments. It is not uncommon that the orders contained the names of the candidates and demanded an investigation from the kadıs. How this information channel was structured between the provinces and Istanbul remains unknown. But, what can be gathered is that a gossip mechanism with regard to this information operated. For instance, a registered butcher from a region would give the names of some wealthy individuals in his locality. As an example, see BOA, MD 36, No: 568.
36 Ibid., pp. 178-181.
37 Ibid., Appendix C.
38 Ibid., pp. 178.
39 See Chapter II.
At this point, we should ask why the central administration needed to apply such forced appointment, in Faroqi’s terminology, *sürgün*, within the context of delivering and financing the meat supply to the capital, and under what conditions these appointed meat traders operated in the Ottoman capital. Both Greenwood and Faroqi agree that butchery in Istanbul in the sixteenth century was not a profitable business due to the price regulations over mutton. By combining Mehmet Genç’s suggestion on the provisioning mentality of Ottoman elite, this appointment sounds like it brought about an automatic bankruptcy of butchers while at the same time maintaining a continuous flow of meat to Istanbuliots. There seems to be an agreement among historians that this negative situation was a result of the sales to state dependants below *narh*. Here, we should make a distinction between the sales made to palace kitchens and those to the Janissaries. Despite the lack of continuous price series for the palace kitchens, some scattered evidence suggests that the butchers did not sell mutton to the palace kitchens with significant loss. In 1555, while *narh* upon mutton was 2 *akçes*, that paid by the palace kitchens was an average of 1.9 *akçes*. In the accounting registers, we see a two-tiered system in these purchases. 66 per cent of these purchases were carried out with the price of 2 *akçes*, with the remainder being about 1.6 *akçes*. Fortunately, we have relatively continuous data for the seventeenth century and it shows that during the first half of the seventeenth century the palace made mutton purchases above or equal to *narh* level. In actual fact, when the complaints of these butchers are traced, it is found that the main reason for them was loss from meat supplied to the Janissaries. The *hükm* of 1597 states that the

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43 See Footnote 41.
44 Source: Şevket Pamuk, “İstanbul’da Et Fiyatları,” *Unpublished Data*.
46 Şevket Pamuk, “İstanbul’da Et Fiyatları,” *Unpublished Data*.
47 See Anthony Greenwood, op cit, pp. 184-197.
butchers’ losses mainly stemmed from the selling of meat to the Janissaries at a fixed price below narh.\textsuperscript{48} In addition to these, we also know that the butchers continuously appealed to the butchers’ waqf in order to have their losses incurred from sale to the Janissaries compensated.\textsuperscript{49} In 1585, the butchers supplying the Janissaries claimed that they had accumulated debts totaling 200,000 akçes to celeps over a period of five and half months.\textsuperscript{50} Again, in 1571, the waqf distributed 20,000 gold pieces among the butchers and the celeps due to their financial losses.\textsuperscript{51} The most detailed account of the losses of these meat traders comes from the record showing the butchers’ appeal for 200,000 akçes from the purchase of 23,500 sheep from celeps.\textsuperscript{52} These figures demonstrate that the requested subsidy per sheep was nearly 8 akçes. We also know that the price of mutton sold to the Janissaries at this date was 2.6 akçes while the market narh was 4 akçes.\textsuperscript{53} Within this framework, we reach the conclusion that the butcher could compensate their losses from the sale to the Janissaries through this subsidy.\textsuperscript{54} It is also noteworthy to note that in the mühimme registers the official

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\textsuperscript{48} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., Appendix D. In this hukm, it is mentioned that while the mutton price was 13-14 akçes in Istanbul markets, it was 2.6 akçes for Janissaries and 6 akçes for the palace-imârets. But, we know that at this date the imârets made their purchases at 14-15 akçes. Most importantly, this hukm reflects the situation only for the period between 1596-1600. It can not be generalized for all mutton purchases of the palaces in other periods. There is no clear evidence on the argument that the palace kitchens made their purchases below the narh. Contrary to this argument, the continuous series by the first half of the seventeenth century show that the imperial kitchens made their purchases at higher prices compared to narh. Source, Şevket Pamuk, “İstanbul’da Et Fiyatları,” Unpublished Data.

\textsuperscript{49} Anthony Greenwood, op cit, pp. 189-197.

\textsuperscript{50} BOA MD 46, No: 19; MD 58, No: 903, MD 64, No: 383.

\textsuperscript{51} BOA, MD 12, No: 704; MD 14, No: 74.

\textsuperscript{52} See, BOA, MD 58, No: 903.

\textsuperscript{53} Anthony Greenwood, op cit, pp. 196.

\textsuperscript{54} If we assume that the profit margin in narh is around 10 per cent, it means selling the mutton around 3.6 akçes makes the butchers neutral in these sales. Here, even if we assume that they sold all 23,500 sheep to Janissaries, they lost nearly one akçe per one okka mutton. If we assume that the carcass weight of the sheep as 12.5 kg, then the separable mutton from the carcass became nearly 8 kg, roughly 6.5 okkas. But, they received 8 akçes per sheep and 1.23 akçes per okka mutton respectively. It means they could not only compensate their losses, but also make profit from these sales. If we assume that some part of the sheep was distributed to imârets, their profit may increase due to the fact at that date imârets made their purchases around 3 akçes in average (above than Janissary price, but below than market narh).
price is shown as 3 akçes, in contrast to Pamuk’s finding of 4 akçes.\textsuperscript{55} If it is true that a 10 per cent profit margin existed in the narh system, the butchers’ profit increased tremendously.\textsuperscript{56} Contrary to “scapegoat and milk cow” assumptions, the most detailed account on the financial matters of the butchers does not show losses from their sales. As we have seen in this case, the existence of the butchers’ waqf\textsuperscript{57} is also an important indicator of the butchers’ negotiation power all on their own. If these appointments to the Et Meydani were sürgûn, as Greenwood and Faroqhi suggest,\textsuperscript{58} the emergence of such an institution was a clear paradox in the view of Ottoman central administration. But, the establishment of such a butcher waqf directly reflects both the central administration’s mentality towards the issue of meat supply and the butchers’ success in transferring some of their losses to the initiatives of upper echelons, which also had sought ways of tightening the surveillance over the meat supply by the 1530s.\textsuperscript{59}


There is a discrepancy here. Is it the narh level or the specific price for these sales? I interpret 3 akçes as peculiar price for these sales. It leads us to think that these sales were most likely made to waqf imârets, since around this date, the purchasing price of imârets was around 3 akçes.

\textsuperscript{56} Şevket Pamuk, “The Evolution of Factor Markets in the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800.” The Global Economic History Network Workshop on the Rise, Organization and Institutional Framework of Factor Markets, Utrecht, June 24-26, 2005, pp. 18. In the determination of narh, the profit margin was usually designated as 10 per cent.

\textsuperscript{57} The butchers’ fund was initially called sermâye-i kassâb and then kassâb akçesi.

\textsuperscript{58} See footnotes 40 and 41.

\textsuperscript{59} See Halil İnalcık, “Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire,” The Journal of Economic History, Vol: 29, No: 1,1969, pp. 138-139; Şevket Pamuk, “Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800,” Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, No: xxxv-2, 2004, pp. 228-230. Both İnalcık and Pamuk emphasize the dilemma the central administration faced with respect to the merchants and their activities. On the one hand, the Ottoman elite did not favor the huge accumulation of mercantile capital, which was perceived as a source of disruption to the social order. But on the other hand, the central treasury and the provisioning of the cities strongly depended on the mercantile inflow. Because of this, the central administration seems to have developed a deliberate policy towards the merchants so that they were generally supported through economic-political tools, while they were used to make contributions to public services and the central treasury.

Such a discourse can be easily seen in Selânîiki’s account on the repayment problem in 1594-95:

“... ve etraf u eknafi-i âlemden zahire ve me’külät taşyüp bin meşakete yiyecik getüren eli-i ticaret bu bazara râzi ve sâkir ola mı? Aşs sermâyesinden zarar iden bir dahi yiyecik mi getürür? Sebebi-i galâdur...”

Selânîki’s position on the discount of the payment of the butchers and other merchants reflected the dependence of Istanbul to the long-distance merchants. See Selânîiki Mustafa Efendi, op cit., pp. 415.
Although later Ottoman sources date the establishment of this cash waqf designed to meet the needs of the butchers to the reign of Mehmet II, the creation of waqfs around 1565 seems to be much more likely. In 1565, 698,000 akçes were gathered from the mütevellis of the major waqfs and with the collection of 10,000 gold pieces from the wealthy persons of Muslim, Christian and Jewish communities, the initial capital reached nearly 3,100,000 akçes. According to the operational principle of this cash waqf, under the supervision of Koyun Emîni, the loans were distributed at market interest rates and then this interest revenue was distributed to the meat traders. In addition to these contributions, one akçe per sheep was kept from the celepkeşans for this fund. This was generally referred to as celep kesri. On account of this method, 235,000 akçes were collected in a five-month period in 1581. This time period covers the term until Ramaţân; and it should be expected that around 450,000-500,000 celepkeşan sheep arrived during this time. Considering the amount of celep kesri to be around 500,000 and the annual interest rate from the initial capital to be 310,000, it makes nearly 810,000 akçes available for the distribution to the butchers without


Here, again we face a mystification of Kavâni̇n-i Yeniçeriyyân-ı Dergâh-ı Âli. The author of Kavâni̇n argues that during Gerdik Ahmet Paşa’s vizierate, a special meat allocation for the Janissaries was established so thatÎn the was set as 3 akçes for them. But it is not compatible with existing data concerning mutton prices. The mentioned price level in Kavâni̇n can be seen only after the 1570s. During the reign of Mehmet II, it seems impossible that the mutton prices fluctuated around 3-4 akçes. The actual price level at this term was around 1-2 akçes. See also Chapter II.


[63] Ibid., pp. 87-88.


[65] See, BOA, MD 42, 193.

[66] The period mentioned is the term from Rebi-ül-âhir 988 to the beginning of Ramaţân of the same year (from May to October). We have adequate evidence that most sheep arrived in the city in this period. It should be remembered that this term was the delivery period for Kivrık and Deliorman, and that by September, other types were expected. We should add the factor of Ramaţân in interpreting this quantity. As it was understood from many orders, during Ramaţân, demand for mutton increased in Istanbul. (The allocation to state dependants probably increased. In the accounting registers of the imperial kitchens, we see Hur-ı Ramaţâniyye for the term of Ramaţân. But, it is not clear that the amount and contents of this special allotment). Accordingly, the figure of 450,000-500,000 celepkeşan sheep seems to be plausible from this account.
having to utilize the initial capital.\textsuperscript{67} If we accept the losses of the butchers from the sales to Janissaries to be one \textit{akçe} per \textit{okka} (as was the case in 1585), the available sum could subsidize 810,000 \textit{okkas} of mutton sold to the Janissaries. As \textit{kassâbbaçi registers} show, the total amount of Janissary consumption fluctuated around 800,000-900,000 \textit{okkas} of mutton per annum in the second half of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{68} We also know that around 1574 the Janissary number in Istanbul was around 14,000, while in the second half of 17\textsuperscript{th} century their numbers nearly tripled to 40,000.\textsuperscript{69} In this way, it could be extrapolated that 250,000-300,000 \textit{okkas} of mutton per annum was consumed by the Janissaries in the 1570s. This picture leads us to consider that even if we accept the relatively high mutton consumption rates for Janissaries, the available amount in butchers’ funds seems to be quite adequate for the compensation of the butchers’ loses. After considering this whole picture, it is quite interesting to see that in the 1570s, the central administration calculated the annual amount for the distribution as 300,000 \textit{akçes}.\textsuperscript{70} This figure is completely compatible to our calculation of the Janissary consumption and, most importantly, shows the power of the waqf’s financial position in the 1560s and 1570s. In fact, all evidence shows that until the 1580s the operational efficiency of the butchers’ waqf concerning the payments to the butchers was quite successful.\textsuperscript{71} Moreover, later sources criticize the depletion of initial capital while glorifying the period between the 1565s to the 1580s in terms of how well it functioned.\textsuperscript{72}

Despite such a glorification, however, the cash waqfs suffered from the vulnerability of its asset side. Both the problems concerning the repayment ratios of the loans and the embezzlement of capital and inefficient distribution of the capital had become a major source

\textsuperscript{67} In this calculation, I did not take the interest rate factor on the \textit{celep kesri} into consideration. I regarded it as circulating capital.

\textsuperscript{68} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., Appendix F.


\textsuperscript{70} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 192-193.

\textsuperscript{71} Until 1578, I did not encounter any payment problem to the butchers from the waqf. The main concern in the orders of this term was the inefficient management of the fund. See the following pages in this chapter.

of criticism against the administration of the waqf during this period.\textsuperscript{73} Before the massive debasement in \textit{akçe} from 1584 to 1586,\textsuperscript{74} the dwindling of the principal was clearly visible and decreased to 1,200,000 \textit{akçe}s.\textsuperscript{75} This is a clear indication of a lack of correlation, at least not a strong one, between the debasement of \textit{akçe} and the dwindling of the waqf capital, at least up until 1585.\textsuperscript{76} However, even if we accept the abuses of the \textit{mütevellis} of the waqf, such a sharp decrease seems to be impossible when we analyze the economic parameters of the waqf’s operations. Considering the amount of the principal to be 1,200,000 \textit{akçe}s in 1585, we can calculate the average annual loss of this principal for the period between 1565 and 1585. An initial capital of 3.1 million \textit{akçe}s could have provided about 300,000 \textit{akçe}s in interest revenue between 1565-1566. Using this line of reasoning, it is clear that the principal fell to around 2.7 million \textit{akçe}s until the introduction of \textit{celep kesri} in 1567.\textsuperscript{77} However, with the introduction of \textit{celep kesri}, the situation must have changed.\textsuperscript{78} Even if we do not take the interest revenue from the \textit{celep kesri} into consideration, this fund would have been able to

\textsuperscript{73} See, BOA, MD 26, No: 122; MD 30, No: 367; MD 33, No: 20. The abuses of \textit{mütevellis} were the general concern of many \textit{hûkms} by 1570’s. It seems that such accusations began by the end of \textit{Mütevellî Ali}’s period. In 1574, it is told that there were risky loans made by the waqf which seemed to have been collected with great difficulty. Again in 1577, it was shown that 112,300 \textit{akçe}s were kept in \textit{Ali}’s own account. After this date, the orders on the abuses of \textit{mütevellis} were frequently issued by the central administration. See, BOA, MD 42, No: 496; MD 73, No: 274.


\textsuperscript{75} See, BOA, MD 58, No: 529. This amount was dedicated before the debasement in \textit{akçe}’s value.


\textsuperscript{77} If we consider the butchers’ capital request to be 500,000 and the interest revenue of the waqf capital to be around 300,000 \textit{akçe}s, an additional 200,000 \textit{akçe}s must have been distributed from the principal. With this distribution, the amount of the principal reduced to 2,900,000 \textit{akçe}s. The next year, this principal provided 290,000 \textit{akçe}s in interest revenue. The additional loss could have been 210,000 \textit{akçe}s, with the principal declining to 2,690,000 \textit{akçe}s.

\textsuperscript{78} After 1567, the lost capital was made up for through an injection from the following year’s \textit{celep kesri}. That year, the principal provided about 280,000 \textit{akçe}s in interest revenue. But, with the additional 500,000 \textit{akçe}s as \textit{celep kesri}, an additional net 220,000 \textit{akçe}s were injected to the principal. In this way, the principal rose to 2,998,000 \textit{akçe}s. With the interest rate, this gives about 300,000 \textit{akçe}s the subsequent year. Again, with the requested amount of 500,000 \textit{akçe}s, 200,000 \textit{akçe}s were distributed from the principal. 500,000 \textit{akçe}s came from the \textit{celep kesri} and provided 300,000 additional \textit{akçe}s to the principal. With this new capital placement, the principal rose to around 3,300,000 \textit{akçe}s. Using this line of reasoning, we understand that the principal must have increased during that period.
distribute all income from *celep kesri* (nearly 500,000 *akçes*) plus the interest rate from the principal (nearly 250,000 *akçes* if we consider the repayment problems). In total, this amount rose to around 750,000 *akçes*. This was quite a significant amount – one that was much higher than the estimated losses of the butchers. But, we face a dramatic decrease even in the principal - from 3.2 million to 1.2 million *akçes*. This means nearly an additional 80,000 *akçes*-distribution to butchers from the initial capital per annum.\(^79\) By combining all of these figures, we reach an 830,000-*akçe* distribution to the butchers in order to make up for the losses in the fund’s principal. But, even in the case of a 4-*akçe* *narh* level in 1585, the butchers requested an annual maximum of only 450,000 *akçes*.\(^80\) Needless to say, a loss of 900,000 *akçes* on the part of butchers seems to be implausible for the period under consideration if we also consider that the mutton consumption of the Janissaries was 300,000 *okkas* per annum in the 1570s.\(^81\) Moreover, the principal must have increased with the capital injection of Sokollu Mehmet Paşa totaling 60,000 *akçes* in 1572.\(^82\)

Here, we should ask why this decrease occurred in the butchers’ fund in the period 1565-1585. One possibility might be the abuses of the *mütevillis*. However, even during the most problematic *mütevelliş*hip of Ali, the abused value was mentioned to be around 110,000 *akçes*.\(^83\) Another possibility could be the butchers’ success in extracting cash from this waqf. This phenomenon stands out the most and, in fact, suits our picture well. In 1571, the *mütevillis* of the fund distributed around 1.2 million *akçes* to the butchers.\(^84\) The reasons and agents behind the enormous amount of capital injection to meat traders in 1571 remain unknown to me, but it is obvious that the meat traders clearly benefited from this significant

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\(^79\) If we take the initial capital to be around 3.1 million *akçes* and the principal amount at 1.2 million *akçes* in 1585, the total loss in the initial capital reaches 1.9 million *akçes*. Over a period of 20 years, this means average losses of around 80,000 *akçes*.

\(^80\) See also Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 196 and Appendix F.

\(^81\) See pages 73-74 in this chapter.


\(^83\) See BOA, MD 30, No: 267, MD 33, No: 20; Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 189.

\(^84\) See BOA, MD 12, No: 704; MD 14, No: 78; MD 17, No: 33.
capital injection. 85 Whether similar allocations were repeated or not, the amount in this case is so high that it is equal to nearly one-third of the whole initial capital. In addition to this, the third possibility is the possible intervention of the central administration in the waqf in order to direct cash to the central treasury needs. Despite the lack of clear evidence, there is an important reason to make us consider the possibility of the central administration’s intervention in the waqf’s financial sources. This reason can be easily seen in the strategic change of the butcher appointments by the end of the 1570s.

As Table 3.3. shows, in the period 1565-1577, only six meat traders were recruited to this service. However, by 1578 the situation sharply changed. Despite the small increase of the butchers’ losses in this period, the central administration dramatically accelerated the recruitment operations of the butchers.

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<th>Table 3.3. Butcher Appointments to Istanbul86</th>
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In my view, the central administration’s response to the outbreak of war with Iran in 1578 is the main factor behind this change. By this date, the treasury began to experience a general shortage of silver due to the high financial burden of the war 88 which also brought about a probable increase in the number of Janissaries. 89 As the effect of war against the Habsburgs was prominent; the increase of Janissaries in Istanbul was tremendous, nearly tripling between 1574 and 1600. 90 Although later chronicles blamed the poverty of contemporary butchers for the delays in repayments to celeps and the loss payments to the

85 Such a rapid loss from the principal also attracted the attention of the central administration and after this case, it was ordered that the distributed level could not reach 360,000 akçes. For the whole story, see BOA, MD 12, No: 704; MD 14, No: 78; MD 17, No: 33.
87 This term also inhabited massive yamak appointments. Therefore, the number included yamaks too. See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit, Appendix C.
90 Ibid., pp. 45.
butchers in the last decades of the 16th century, the financial capability of the appointed butchers in this period presents a reverse case. When the capital possessed by these meat traders is analyzed, we come across individuals whose wealth reached two or three million akçes, while the maximum wealth of the butchers in the previous term was 1,500,000-2,000,000 akçe. On an average, the appointed butchers in this term possessed more total assets compared to the previous term. For this reason, we can not say that the reason behind the increasing butcher appointment by the end of the 1570s is the limited financial capacity of the appointed butchers.

In this framework, I interpret the new developments in the sector such as the decrease in the principal of the butchers’ fund and the dramatic jump in the butcher appointments as a rational response of the central polity. The central administration probably perceived the recruitment of these wealthy individuals as an important source to be used to tackle the silver shortage of the central treasury. This process began independently of the debasement of akçe in 1585 and the continuing cash reserve of butcher’s waqfs at same time clarifies the motive behind these intensive recruitment policies. Here, later chroniclers are probably correct in arguing that the new appointments did not have adequate operational capital in the business due to this financial interference of the central administration.

The whole picture for the butchers (meat contractors) points to a complex picture for these individuals. On top of this, their activities cannot be limited to butchery activities in the sixteenth century. They were actively engaged in livestock, skin, fat and soap trade in Istanbul. All of the evidence shows that such an engagement was not ad hoc; but rather an established structure in the market. In addition to their widespread activities, they held significant negotiation power vis-à-vis the control apparatus of the state due to their critical

importance for feeding state dependants. In reality, the establishment of the butchers waqf should be analyzed in this context. This fund is itself a symbol of transferring financial burden to major waqfs and wealthy Istanbullots in general sense to the upper echelons of Ottoman polity. The scarce resources available on their economic operations indicate that they successfully utilized the butchers’ fund. Moreover, they could extract significant amounts of capital from the butchers’ fund through their close relationships with the polity members. A close scrutiny of the mühimme orders in this term reveals the situation where even if a butcher delivered mutton to the Janissaries with lower price than narh, they did not face any financial losses from these transactions. As the market structure changed after the 1580s, their power on the invisible side of the iceberg becomes clearer.

The dramatic policy change in the meat sector first became visible within the sphere of the financial obligations of the urban population. Within the similar context of ‘avâriż tax, the Muslim, Jewish and Christian communities were obliged to maintain their slaughterhouses according to their own financial ability.94 These obligations also covered their own butchers’ financial losses.95 Despite the various objections to collecting the shares among the members of communities, 2,500,000 akçes were accumulated in 1585.96 But by 1586, the continuous financial problems of the communities’ butcher waqfs resulting from the sharp rise in meat prices triggered new orders for a re-collection of the capital in order to compensate butchers’ losses.97 In 1597, the central administration took another step for the financing of the meat supply and transferred zarar-ı kassâb98 to zarar-ı kassâbiyye, which was collected from

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94 See Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 196-197.
95 Ibid., pp. 198-200.
96 Ibid., pp. 200.
Parallelling the introduction of the communal taxation, six slaughterhouses belonging to Armenian, Jewish, Orthodox, Levantine, Karamanlı and Muslim communities were built in Yedikule. In this new system, each slaughterhouse serviced only its community.
97 See BOA, MD 64, No: 383; MD 67, No: 403; MD 69, No: 264.
98 Here, we should make draw a distinction between butchers’ capital (kassâb sermâyesi) and butchers’ losses (kassâb zararı). In the provinces, the collection of these two funds was inter-correlated; but separate. However, in Istanbul kassâb zararı was actually interest revenue from kassâb sermâyesi. The idea of zarar-ı kassâb was not an invention of the 1590s. Even in 1579, an order sending kads to Rumelia touched upon the possibility of
customs.\textsuperscript{99} In addition to modifications in the financial sphere of the meat supply, a major change also occurred in the supply mechanism.

Parallel to the shifting from obligation in kind to monetary exaction in the whole sphere of \textquoteleft avarız\textquoteleft responsibility by the end of the sixteenth century,\textsuperscript{100} the central administration also transformed celepkešan obligations into monetary form.\textsuperscript{101} A critical result of this was the mass move by meat contractors into the supply pool of celepkešan sheep by the 1590s.\textsuperscript{102} In 1590, five rich celeps of Yenişehir and Fener petitioned to be appointed to supply the need for sheep of the Old Place on the condition that they could collect the cash values of celep sheep \textit{[celep koyunu bedeli]} in these regions.\textsuperscript{103} By 1595, the same mechanism was extended into all celepkešan regions of the Balkans.\textsuperscript{104} With some exceptions, as of this date, the imperial kitchens made its purchases directly from these meat traders not per sheep, but also per kiyye.\textsuperscript{105} Undoubtedly, the purchases for the state dependants and the Janissaries began to be carried out in a similar way. This phenomenon can be clearly seen in the accounting registers of both the imperial kitchens and kassābaşı defters.\textsuperscript{106} Up until the end of the sixteenth century, the accounting registers were kept, classifying purchases in terms of

\textsuperscript{99} See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit, pp. 214-215. The date 1596-97 represents a revolutionary change in financial structure of the meat supply to Istanbul. As a matter of fact, we cannot trace the butcher waqf after 1597. By the establishment of zarar-ı kassābiyye from the customs, the functions of the butchers’ waqf were transferred to zarar-ı kassābiyye.


\textsuperscript{101} The transformation of in kind obligations to monetary forms is not peculiar to the meat supply. In the supply of other foodstuffs to state dependants, many \textquoteleft avarız\textquoteright units were nominated as \textit{ocaklık} revenues for the imperial kitchens.

\textsuperscript{102} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp.218-219; BOA, MD 67, No: 428; MD 68, No: 53.


\textsuperscript{104} See, BOA, MD 73, No:489

\textsuperscript{105} BOA, MD 73, No: 489

\textsuperscript{106} Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 195.

Although imperial purchases were increasing made via the butchers, this is not to say that the butchers always supplied the mutton to state-dependents through the delivery of the sheep. During the first half the seventeenth century, some accounting registers show this phenomenon. For instance, in 1638, 1639 and 1643, the delivery was made through \textit{vüküye} mutton, not sheep. It seems by the end of the first half of this century, this trend became more visible. See, Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 195.

\textsuperscript{106} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., Appendix F.
units of sheep. By the seventeenth century, however, they had begun using the *kiyye* unit.\textsuperscript{107}

This is a clear indication of the rising importance of meat contractors in both wholesale and retail activities in this period. Until the middle of the seventeenth century, the economic role and the bargaining power of the butchers seem to have dramatically increased to a level whereby they could collectively determine the price of meat per *vükîyye* as 8 *akçes* in 1647.\textsuperscript{108}

At this point, we should ask what impacts these changes had on meat contractors, or the what roles these individuals had in shaping the new system.

The contract between the butchers and the central administration in 1595 shows the profit margins of the meat trader in a new system.\textsuperscript{109} According to this contract, the traders guaranteed the delivery of 70,000 sheep to the city on the condition that they had the right to collect 200,000 *celebek產* sheep in kind or *bedel* with regular monthly payments. This means that the central administration distributed the share of sheep supply among eight important butchers. Considering the market price was 6 *akçes* at that time,\textsuperscript{110} the profits transferred to the butchers were so enormous that a net 130,000 sheep were left to their initiative.

Considering the average separable mutton quantity of sheep carcass as 6.4 *okkas*, their gross profit reached nearly 5 million *akçes*. However, in reality, this value should have been much higher due to the fact that Selânik gives the price of mutton as 12 *akçes* during this period.\textsuperscript{111}

Given this market price, the profits of these meat traders were probably 10 million *akçes*. Even if we take into account the costs due to asymmetric information and transportation,\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{107} Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 195.
\textsuperscript{108} See Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 119.
\textsuperscript{109} This price level was collectively dedicated by the drovers, the butchers and the central authority. But, the pre-determination of the mutton prices before the delivery was not a phenomenon new to the 17th century. Even in 1595, the sheep price as pre-determined for the *imärêts* of waqfs and the imperial kitchens. See, BOA, MD 73, No: 40.
\textsuperscript{110} BOA, MD 73, No: 499, 660.
\textsuperscript{111} Şevket Pamuk, “Istanbul’da Et Fiyatları,” *Unpublished Data.*
\textsuperscript{112} Selânik Mustafa Efendi, op cit. pp. 593.
\textsuperscript{112} See, BOA, MD 73, No: 131, 489, 499; MD 74, No: 445, 454, and 578.

A condition of asymmetric information clearly reflects the situation for the butchers who had to depend on the existing old *celebek產 register* in the 1590s. This led to a gap between expected and actual profits from the livestock trading activity.
this value clearly represents the level of the capital accumulation of the butchers. This phenomenon was not peculiar to butchers supplying imperial kitchens; the butchers of *Et Meydanı* seem to have easily been able to compensate for their losses from *zarar-ı kassâbiyye*. In 1631, the butchers for the Janissaries received an 83-akçes subsidy per sheep.\(^{113}\) At this time, we encounter a *narh* level of 10 akçes,\(^{114}\) with a ceiling price for Janissaries of 3 akçes.\(^{115}\) This left a net 7-akçes subsidy. Since the average separable mutton from the sheep carcass sheep was around 8 kg, this subsidy not only meant a compensation covering losses, but also a net profit from these sales.\(^{116}\)

The new meat market structure also brought new financial resources to the central treasury. First, when we analyze the amount and the operational feature of *zarar-ı kassâbiyye*, what becomes clear is that the central administration could make profit after the repayment of losses to Janissary butchers. *Zarar akçesi* per sheep fluctuated around 83 to 100 akçes throughout the seventeenth century and remained nearly the same in the eighteenth century.\(^{117}\) In spite of data showing the clear value of *zarar-ı kassâbiyye*, the hükm dated 1597 indicates the expected annual income from this tax as 11,800,000 akçes.\(^{118}\) Even though we have considered declining trade trends in the first half seventeenth century, which may have reduced the custom taxes and also *zarar-ı kassâbiyye*,\(^ {119}\) the recovery of trade activities in most cities the second half of same century might have resulted in the central administration acquiring an important financial source through the meat supply. In addition to the direct cash

\(^{113}\) Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 215-216.

\(^{114}\) Şevket Pamuk, “İstanbul’da Et Fiyatları,” *Unpublished Data*.

\(^{115}\) Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 215-216.

\(^{116}\) In this case, unfortunately we can’t learn how the offal, the skin and the sheep heads were distributed after slaughtering. Were they under the control of the butchers? Or were they sold separately from the mutton by other agents? If we assume the butchers continued the trade in these by-products, the profit rate from this compensation probably increased.

\(^{117}\) See, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “1079-1080 (1669-1670) Mâli Yıllara Ait Bir Osmanlı Bütçesi ve Ekleri,” *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, No: XVII/1-4, (İstanbul: 1960), pp. 295. The budget published by Ömer Lütfi Barkan, which is dated 1669-1670, describes the *zarar-ı kassâbiyye* as 100 akçes per sheep. It is understood that the butchers received from 10-12.5 akçes per one kg mutton.

\(^{118}\) Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 212-214.

sources from the levy on customs, the central administration also initiated the iltizâm system on the contracts for the celepkeşan bedel on condition of a specific number of sheep to be delivered. Through the application of iltizâm in the meat supply, the imperial kitchens seem to have secured the supply network and transferred its financial obligations to the meat traders. From the imperial kitchens’ accounting registers, we see that the supply of meat was the earliest consumption good transferred into the ocaklı system. While in 1606 ocaklıs were regions in Rumelia from which flocks of sheep were delivered to imperial kitchens, the revenues of the ocaklıs were designated as the avârız and mukataa revenues of Midilli. In 1627, the operational weight presented a dramatic extension with respect to revenue in general. The number of sheep was about 100,000 per year while the revenues consisting of harâc and mukataa were bound to the delivery of these sheep. Through this system, the imperial kitchens designated the celepkeşan sheep of some regions as ocaklı and turned over the Koyun Emîni, who also farmed out the collection of celepkeşan bedel in these regions, to the meat traders. The meat traders became responsible for bringing the same number of sheep as they collected bedel for. By 1590s the farming out mechanism seems to have developed into two-tier system. First, for the celepkeşan sheep, which were farmed out by agents for the collection of their bedels, the traders had the responsibility to bring a specific number of sheep. Second, for other sheep there was no specific obligation pertaining to the delivery of sheep. The number of sheep was farmed out to the agents in order to collect the

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120 See, BOA, MD 74, No: 238.
121 See Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 136-137. The ocaklı system and also the iltizâm connected to it for the sheep was firstly created in 1606. Before this date, it seems that there is no clear indication of the presence of an ocaklı system. By this date, its operational weight seems to have increased.
122 Ibid., pp. 137.
123 Ibid., pp. 137.
124 See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 224-225; BOA, MD 74, No: 238.
bedel.\textsuperscript{126} In 1596, two zimmis took iltizâm rights of the collection of celep bedels of Tatar Pazari by paying 330,000 akçes.\textsuperscript{127} The evidence available from the end of sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century, clearly suggests that these contracts also created various sub-contracts and that the courtier or other state-dependants were intensively involved in this farming-out process. For instance, Süleyman Ağa, who farmed out the bedel of 2,500 sheep with the value of 75,000 akçes sold his rights to the drovers from the kazâ’ of Çatalca.\textsuperscript{128} After the collection of the bedel, Süleyman Ağa then distributed this money to the agents of the butchers of Old Palace in order to deliver the arranged 2,500 sheep to the capital. Again, the iltizâm of the some regions’ sheep bedel was attached to Janissary Ağas under the term ocaklık. In return for this bedel, these agas had to supply a specific number of sheep to the Et Meydan.\textsuperscript{129}

Needles to say, the connection of Janissary Ağas and the individuals affiliated with the state apparatus to the meat sector as the meat contractors, created an enormous space for the sub-contracts. Considering the whole transformation in the sector, it can be argued that this sub-contracting clearly reflects new elements of the new system. Some of the butchers who are the capital owners or the individuals of the state apparatus utilized the meat sector through sub-contracting or engaging livestock trade and achieved significant capital accumulation. The changing and visible position of these meat contractors was echoed in social perception. It is not coincidental that the wealth of these meat traders created a reaction among various niches of society, even at the beginning of the new period. Selânikî narrates a story in 1595 that bostân oğlanlari criticized the kassâb oğlanlari for having ostentatious dress and expensive tools of their trade.\textsuperscript{130} The changing conditions of the meat sector in this period are still remembered in the popular discourse of modern Turkey. The issue of the

\textsuperscript{126} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 224-226.
\textsuperscript{127} BOA, MD 74, No: 238.
\textsuperscript{128} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 226.
\textsuperscript{129} BOA, MD 78, No: 1117.
\textsuperscript{130} Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, op cit., pp. 624-625.
expensiveness of mutton prices in modern Turkey is implicitly connected to the Ottoman seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{131} The narrative quoted from Na‘īmā, the “Ağalar Saltanatı,” gives an account of the mutton trade when it came under the control of \textit{Janissary Ağas}, especially Bektaş Ağa.\textsuperscript{132} The narrative states that when the Ottoman Istanbliots complained about the high price of the mutton, Bektaş Ağa replied that the city was the center of the wealthy and not of the poor and that if anyone could not buy mutton, s/he could always leave the city. The final chapter of this thesis is reserved to tell the story of the urban population that could not buy mutton, but did not leave the city, as well as the urban meat consumers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.


\textsuperscript{132} See, Ahmet Refik Altımay, \textit{Kadınlar Saltanatı II}, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000), pp. 123. Ahmet Refik describes the term after the murder of Sultan İbrahim I as \textit{Ağalar Saltanatı} in Ottoman history. Refik portrays this term with the hegemony of Kösem Sultan, Kara Murad Paşa, Kara Çavuş, Muslihiddin Ağa, Bektaş Ağa. With Kösem Sultan’s integration, the \textit{Janissary Ağas} established direct control over the urban trade by the mid-17th century. Of course, the meat trade, too, came under the control of this group.
CHAPTER IV
THE PLACE OF MUTTON IN MEAT CONSUMPTION: CHANGING DIETS

"Dobruca Ovası’ndan büyük yağlı çörekler,
Akkıran’ın yağından benzimiz hey ağ olsa...
Kande bir göl var ise badem paluze olup
Bir yanından dış vursan çevresi bol yağ olsa...
Cümlə cihan koyunun semiz yahni etseler
Biz yemeğe başlasak engeller irak olsa"1
Kaygusuz Abdul.

While Kaygusuz Abdul was showing his intense appetite for ring rolls made with generic fats and mutton, his verses indicate the distinction in consumption between the elite and the common people. It is clear that such a difference became increasingly apparent throughout the sixteenth century.2 Due to the socio-economic changes that occurred in the second half of the sixteenth century and the nature of the state distribution mechanism of the Ottoman state, this chasm between the diets of the elite and the common man became wider by the second half the sixteenth century.3 Without doubt, meat consumption is an important element in this. Meat consumption in Ottoman Istanbul, different from its European counterparts,4 was dominated by mutton in contrast to beef or veal.5 Contrary to the

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3 Despite the glorification towards the first half of the sixteenth century, the indexes of the consumer prices and of the wages of skilled and unskilled labors depict a different picture for this period. While the average real wages in 1490 was 4.15 akçes, it increased to 5 akçes in 1544. Here, we face roughly a 25 per cent increase in wages in real terms. But, at the same time, the consumer price index rose with higher rates compared to the workers’ income. In fact, in 1490 the consumer price index was 1.09 akçes, whereas it was 1.5 akçes in 1555. This means about a 50 percent rise in the consumer price index occurred in the period mentioned. This led us to think that at least the purchasing power of some groups in Istanbul was declining even in the first half of the sixteenth century.
   Here, I must emphasize the regional differences in Europe in terms of meat consumption. In Southern Europe, the mutton consumption was higher than the other parts of Europe in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. For instance, in Venice and Lier in Brabant mutton played an important role in diets. However, in the central and northern regions of Europe, beef formed a major part of the meat consumption in the 15th-16th centuries. For instance, in Denmark, half of the meat consumption consisted of beef in between 1350-1520. But, these patterns also changed over time. For example, by the mid-sixteenth century, beef was increasingly predominant in European urban diets. The rising trend in continental cattle trend triggered this phenomenon.
assumptions on the general shortage of meat by the 1520s in European markets,\(^6\) the latest research points to the fact that the European metropolitan urban centers could sustain their high meat consumption after this date by shifting their supply pool from regional to international markets.\(^7\) The spread of beef consumption seems to have catalyzed this sustainability.\(^8\) Although we see an increasing trend in veal consumption, especially by the final decades of the sixteenth century, in Ottoman Istanbul, it never became a serious substitute to mutton in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\(^9\)

When we also look at cured and dried meats, which became increasingly important in European diets by the middle of the sixteenth century,\(^10\) we encounter pastrami (\textit{pastirma}) and sausage (\textit{sucuk}) in the diets of Ottoman Istanbulians.\(^11\) In contrast to \textit{sucuk}, pastrami seems to have become more widespread by the end of the sixteenth century.\(^12\) Despite the apparent lack

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7 Ian Blanchard, op cit., pp. 459.
8 Ibid., pp. 455-456.
10 As a significant symptom of the increasing consumption by the seventeenth century, the price of beef and veal first appeared in \textit{narh registers} of 1640. Not surprisingly, half of the prices listed were of mutton. Unfortunately, we do not have a continuous quantity series of cattle delivery to Istanbul available. Between 1563-1568, 12,000 cattle were sent from Moldavia to the Ottoman capital per annum. Quoting from Venetian sources, about 27,000 cattle were delivered annually to Istanbul at the end of the sixteenth century. See Mihai Maxim, “XVI. Asrın İkinci Yarısında Effâl-Buğdan’ın Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na Karşı İktisadi ve Mali Mükellefiyetleri Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler,” \textit{VII. Türk Tarih Kongresi}, Cilt: II, Ankara, 25-29 September 1970, pp. 561.
14 The references to \textit{sucuk} in the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century are very rare. Some of the mutton purchased by the imperial kitchens was utilized in the preparation of \textit{sucuk}. See Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 192.
15 However, in \textit{narh registers}, \textit{sucuk} was never mentioned until the seventeenth century. According to \textit{narh} register of the 1640s., the price of \textit{sucuk} was 10 \textit{akçe}s per \textit{kıyı}, higher than even yerli \textit{pastrıma}-9 \textit{akçe}s per \textit{kıyı}, Mübahat S. Kütküoğlu, op cit., pp. 93.
16 Albertus Bobovius counts \textit{sucuk} as one of the meat types consumed at Mehmed IV’s meals. See, Stefanos Yerasimos, \textit{Sultan Sofraları: 15. ve 16. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı Saray Mutfağı}, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002), pp. 32.
of data on urban consumption of pastrami-\textit{sucuk}, their entrance in the \textit{narh registers} shows that their consumption should have increased by the late sixteenth century. In elite circles, cured meat was also consumed.\textsuperscript{13} But, we should admit that while the consumption of beef and cured meats were not insignificant, they can be never regarded as having been critical parts of the diets of Ottoman Istanbulluots.\textsuperscript{14} A similar phenomenon can be also seen in fish or poultry consumption.\textsuperscript{15} Although by the middle of the sixteenth century, the imperial kitchens increased their poultry and fish purchases from the markets,\textsuperscript{16} it is clear that they never became important substitutes for mutton in Istanbulluots’ diets. In fact, the important change in their diets seems to have become apparent in the dramatic change of mutton consumption by the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Years} & \textbf{Skilled Wages’ Purchasing Power} & \textbf{Unskilled Wages’ Purchasing Power} \\
\hline
1490 & 1.0648383 & 0.964828597 \\
1543 & 0.855126609 & 0.917695473 \\
1556 & 0.699640921 & 0.74373559 \\
1569 & 0.639945965 & 0.55644055 \\
1573 & 0.705279199 & 0.629602382 \\
1579 & 0.700968126 & 0.643115363 \\
1587 & 0.661835976 & 0.467752835 \\
1597 & 0.442575093 & 0.406048195 \\
1600 & 0.754451702 & 0.692184752 \\
1629 & 0.848467845 & 0.571377136 \\
1649 & 0.788463638 & 0.841359191 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Purchasing Power Trends in Ottoman Istanbul\textsuperscript{18}}
\end{table}

However, with the exception to these references, the prevalence of \textit{sucuk} consumption in the 16-17th centuries maintained its enigmatic position. Most likely, Ottoman Istanbulluots did not prefer to eat mutton in \textit{sucuk} form but rather as \\textit{söğüş}, \textit{yahni} or \textit{kebab}, which were understood to be the most common form of consumption of mutton. For \textit{yahni} and \textit{kebab}, see Tülay Artan, “Aspects of the Ottoman Elite’s Food Consumption: Looking for “Staples,” “Luxuries,” and “Delicacies” in a Changing Century,” \textit{Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550-1922}, ed. Donald Quataert, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), pp. 135.


The first price regulation for pastrami seems to have appeared during the reign of Murad III under the name of \textit{kuru et} (dried meat) and was probably made of cow meat (beef). But, here the \textit{kuru et} and \textit{pastrma} seem to refer to different things. \\Mustafa ˘Ali, in his \textit{Mevâdiün-Nefâis \\Fi Kavâidîl-Meceleis}, makes a differentiation between dried meat (\textit{kuru et}) and \textit{pastrma}.

\textsuperscript{14} Tülay Artan, op cit, pp. 135.

\textsuperscript{15} Tülay Artan, op cit, pp. 140-142, 191.


\textsuperscript{17} See following pages of this chapter.

This change occurred mainly because of the reduction in the purchasing power of urban consumers, especially by the middle of the sixteenth century. Table 4.1. illustrates the continuous decrease in purchasing power for (un)skilled workers throughout the sixteenth century. The purchasing power of skilled workers experienced a sharper reduction compared to unskilled workers. Although there is some improvement in the figures up to the 1650s, “the changing period” appearing in the late sixteenth century seems to have left a permanent mark on mutton prices, which reached threshold levels. In the consumer goods basket, when we analyze the nominal and real prices of mutton over 150 years, we can clearly see the dramatic price increase of the mutton compared to other consumption goods (See Table 4.2.).

Table 4.2. Price Trends of the Selected Consumption Goods in Ottoman Istanbul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>Nominal Prices-Mutton</th>
<th>Nominal Prices-Bread</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>Nominal Prices-Wheat Flour</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1489</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1530</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>1489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1555</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1558</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>1528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1587</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>1556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1594</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>1587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1595</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td>1597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1598</td>
<td>112.1</td>
<td>1604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1595</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>1611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1596</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1601</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1597</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1604</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>1628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1598</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1599</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1609</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>1638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1631</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1632</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1611</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1637</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1621</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>1647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1638</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1625</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>1649</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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There seems to be a consensus among Ottoman historians that the transformation from the feudal entity to early modern structure and from timar-based distribution to cash-based collection, with their social-economic ramifications, surfaced in the period 1560-1600. Therefore, I prefer to use the term the “changing periods” for mentioned period.


Compared to the price changes of meat in European markets for the similar period, the rise was quite spectacular. For instance, during approximately the same period, the beef prices nearly quadrupled in Vienna, while the rise of veal price remained at 87 per cent in Florence. The closest case to the rising trend of Istanbul may be seen in Augsburg with the 650 percentage jump in the prices of veal in local currency. Undoubtedly, the increasing ratio of mutton price compared to the trends in wages and other consumption goods brought about a quantitative change in the diets of Istanbulıots characterized by a reduction in mutton consumption.

In addition to economic factors, the change in Istanbul’s demographic composition must have played an important role in the decrease in mutton consumption. Yerasimos calls attention to the demographic differences presented by the cizye registers of 1540-1544 and of 1690, where it appears that the Ottoman capital experienced an extensive inflow of Christians throughout this period. It is estimated that by the middle of the sixteenth century, the Christian population decreased to about 20,000, while the whole population of Istanbul increased to about 150,000-200,000. This means that the non-Muslim population formed roughly 10 per cent of Ottoman Istanbulıots in the mid-16th century. However, by the 1570s, and increasingly by the beginning of the 17th century, a significant number of Christians, mostly Greek, migrated to this city. The cizye register of 1690 shows that the non-Muslim population reached 200,000, while Istanbul’s total population was approximately 500,000 in the late-seventeenth century. Yerasimos emphasizes that the massive Greek inflow resulted in a transformation of the social-economic characteristics of the Ottoman city during the

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22 See page 44 in Chapter II.
24 See page 44 in Chapter II.
26 Ibid., pp. 13.
27 Ibid., pp. 15.
28 Ibid., pp. 15.
seventeenth century. This transformation also means that major changes occurred in the diets of Istanbulites in this period. Since the Greek population could spread its meat consumption over fish, pork, cattle and sheep and did not slaughter sheep for any religious belief, a significant migration of the Greek population into the city must have resulted in a decrease in per capita mutton consumption in Istanbul. It means that, because non-Muslims constituted about 40 per cent of the urban population in the late seventeenth century, despite a 65 per cent increase in the Muslim population after the 1550s, the mutton consumption per capita must have fallen by the seventeenth century. However, I must admit that due to the absence of data on meat consumption in the sixteenth century, we cannot determine with exactness the qualitative-quantitative reflections of this change. In fact, we do not have any data on cattle, fish or chicken sold in Istanbul markets. Hence, even the best estimation of meat consumption should include a statistical error for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the other hand, the discontinuous data, especially with respect to the supply of sheep, offers us room for to estimate the urban mutton consumption.

Kavânîn-i Osmaniyye from the 17th century provides the earliest sketchy data on the supply of sheep to the capital. The author of Kavânîn says that 6,000 sheep arrived daily to the city, but during times of scarcity [müzâyaka], it was 2,000. Considering the müzâyaka period from December through May, for 6 months, roughly 360,000 sheep arrived in the city according to Kavânîn’s account. During a good period, this number rose to nearly 1,080,000. Roughly, this means about 1,440,000 sheep per annum. By utilizing Kavânîn’s account, Greenwood interprets the müzâyaka term as five months and estimates the annual sheep

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29 Ibid., pp. 15-17.
supply to Istanbul as 1,586,000 in the mid-17th century. Greenwood also uses another input of Kavâni̇n-i Osmaniyye in which the annual sheep supply is presented as a range of 600,000 to 1,800,000. However, there is no doubt that the presentation by the Kavâni̇n-i Osmaniyye does not provide a definite time period and the upper limit of this range does not seem to be compatible to the more certain kassâbaşı records from the 17th to the mid-19th century. Again, my estimation based on the same account as 1,440,000 seems to be quite high. Even if we add the sheep delivery of the merchants to celepkeşan sheep of kassâbaşı’s numbers, the quantity of over one million seems to be implausible for the 16th or 17th centuries. In order to minimize the uncertainties of the quantities for the 16th and 17th century, we can utilize the more definite figures of sheep supply seen by the first half of the nineteenth century.

Table 4.3. Sheep Delivery to Istanbul in the First Half of the 19th Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>MERCANT DELIVERY</th>
<th>MIRI SHEEP (TA ‘YINÂT)</th>
<th>EXCESS MIRI SHEEP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td>276,858</td>
<td>373,085</td>
<td>133,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840-41</td>
<td>158,257</td>
<td>409,624</td>
<td>52,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841-42</td>
<td>135,876</td>
<td>389,894</td>
<td>60,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842-43</td>
<td>117,558</td>
<td>322,648</td>
<td>152,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845-46</td>
<td>264,267</td>
<td>245,245</td>
<td>69,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846-47</td>
<td>169,943</td>
<td>274,158</td>
<td>91,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847-48</td>
<td>157,681</td>
<td>331,450</td>
<td>61,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848-49</td>
<td>143,218</td>
<td>364,542</td>
<td>95,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849-50</td>
<td>149,194</td>
<td>416,006</td>
<td>88,046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 4.3. indicates, the total sheep supply fluctuated around 550,000-650,000 at this time; however, this figure should be evaluated with caution. It does not include the number of sheep delivered for the Feast of Sacrifice (Kurban Bayrami).

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33 Ibid., pp. 17.
34 See Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 16-19. Here, a discrepancy emerges with the former values given by the same source. From the Kavâni̇n-i Osmaniyye’s account, we achieve 1.4-1.5 million sheep per annum. But, in later account, the author draws the bottom limit as 600,000 and mentions a range 600,000-1.8 million.
35 See Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 271-272, 281-282, and Appendix F. Kassâbaşı accounts on celepkeşan sheep reflect the figure of celepkeşan bedel. From this account, we learn that the average celepkeşan sheep per annum in the seventeenth century was in the range 300,000-350,000. By the eighteenth century, this number had fluctuated within this range.
36 Ibid., pp. 281-282.
38 This surplus sheep after the allocation was distributed to urban butchers.
For the number of *kurban koyunu*, unfortunately, we do not have a clear data set for the sixteenth and seventeenth century, with the exception of the purchases made by the imperial kitchens.\textsuperscript{40} Therefore, I utilize 19\textsuperscript{th}-century data in order to extrapolate *kurban* sheep delivery to Istanbul in the 16\textsuperscript{th}-17\textsuperscript{th} centuries. If we assume that the number of sacrificed sheep is closely related to Muslim population in the city, such a backward estimation would be meaningful due to the fact that the religious composition of the nineteenth century Istanbul did not sharply differentiate from the late-seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{41} For the Feast in 1818, Istanbul received a total 147,000 sheep, while this number fell to 82,700 in 1847.\textsuperscript{42} For this reason, the estimation of *kurban* sheep as 100,000 head at maximum seems plausible for the first half of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. In this case, we face a decrease in the demand of *kurban koyunu* parallel to the increase of the mutton price (See Table 4.4.). This situation clearly reflects the price elasticity of the demand for *kurban koyunu* in Ottoman Istanbul. It means that the *kurbanlik* demand of Istanbulliots was sensible to the price fluctuations of mutton.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{YEARS} & \textbf{NOMINAL MUTTON PRICE (in akçe)} \\
\hline
1770 & 27.9 \\
1772 & 30 \\
1798 & 35 \\
1816 & 100 \\
1823 & 120 \\
1830 & 195 \\
1833 & 242 \\
1837 & 600 \\
1856 & 720 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Price Fluctuations of Mutton in Selected Years\textsuperscript{43}}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{40} See Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 192. From the imperial kitchens’ accounts, we learn that sheep was slaughtered in the Feast of Sacrifice. But, in the reign of Mehemet II, 20 cattle were also utilized. In 1547-48, 149 sheep were sacrificed, whereas in 1617-1618 3013 sheep were slaughtered.
\textsuperscript{42} Ahmet Uzun, op cit., pp. 26-27.
For the nineteenth century, my calculations give the price elasticity of the demand as roughly 1.007 for kurbân sheep.  

Combined with the income elasticity of the demand, we can extrapolate the arrival kurbân köyünü as around 100,000 for the late seventeenth century. Considering the Muslim population to be 140,000-190,000 in the mid-16th century, we can extrapolate nearly 53,000-80,000 kurbân sheep per year around the middle of the sixteenth

44 The price elasticity of demand is calculated with the formula of [% Change in Product Quantity / % Change in Product Price]. The simple form of this form can be written as (Q2-Q1) X (P2+P1)/(Q2+Q1) X (P2-P1). For the elasticity calculation of kurbân sheep, I take the quantities of 1818 and 1847 respectively 147,000 and 82,700. By this way, we can calculate the quantity change as – 44 per cent. For the prices of these selected years, I take 100 and 660 akçes into consideration respectively for prices in 1818 and 1847. Here, for 1847, I calculate the average of prices of the years 1837 and 1856 as 600 and 720 akçes. We calculate the price change as 660 per cent. But, when we adjust this figure with the change of silver grams in akçe, we reach the real price change as about 77 per cent through regarding 1527 as the base year in that silver gram in akçe was 0.66. I assume that silver gram in akçe was 0.0083 in 1847, whereas it was 0.031 in 1817. Here we reach the arc price elasticity demand as roughly 1.007. It means that the demand of kurbân sheep was relatively elastic to the price changes.


45 Unfortunately, we don’t have continuous quantity series for the first half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, I took the quantity 82,700 for the backward estimation for the seventeenth century. For this reason, I take the price as 660 akçes for this time. In the seventeenth century, we have the naph prices of the years 1693, 1694, 1695, and 1696 respectively 14.3, 14, 21, 15. As an average, we reach the average price level of the mutton as 16.1. At this period, the silver gram in akçe was 0.13. By this way, we can calculate the real price change as roughly 262 per cent. If we consider the quantity in 1847 82,700 and adopt it our elasticity figure 1.007, we reach the rough quantity ~218,000-220,000 for the late seventeenth century.


46 For the income level in 1818, I take the average real wages of (un)skilled workers for the period 1818-1819. By this way, I achieve 11.4 akçes as the daily wage. With the same method, we can calculate the average income figure in 1847 at 8.55 through utilizing the data of the period 1847-1848. In the calculation of real wages, 1490 is selected as the base year. With these figures; we can calculate that the income elasticity of the demand is nearly 1.9. At next step, I calculate the average real wages in the late seventeenth century through the average wages in the period 1680-1689. By this way, the average wages at this period is found as 5.71 akçes. Therefore, when we consider our income elasticity of demand (1.9) and utilize this figure to 82,700, we find 55 per cent change in the quantities while the price parameter remains constant. And, we reach the quantity as around 95,000-100,000 for the late seventeenth century with the consideration of the price factor. (If we regard the substitution effect as constant and make estimation through the income effect, at that time we could find similar quantity level around 100,000-120,000).


However, I must emphasize that without utilizing a regression model, my estimation is based on the independent factor analysis of price and income. Here, I have to use the independent proportional per cent changes in prices and income levels while other parameters are considered as constant. Here, the discrepancy emerges in our estimated values. My extrapolation is mainly based on the Slutsky Theorem which says Price effect = Income effect + Substitution effect. In the case of meat, the rise of the income causes to rise meat demand, while the rise of price led to the decrease of mutton demand. The effects in our case are opposite directions and this phenomenon increases our difficulty in interpreting the quantity in the seventeenth-sixteenth centuries. (The income and price levels in that time period were lower than the nineteenth century.)

century.\textsuperscript{48} For the last quarter of the same century, we are in a deadlock due to the absence of population data. We know that by the 1570s, the capital received a significant number of immigrants from the countryside\textsuperscript{49} and contemporary scholars estimate Istanbul’s population to have been around 250,000 at the beginning of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{50} What we know very precisely is the reduction in average wages and the rise of mutton prices due to the debasement in \textit{akçe} during the late sixteenth century. For example, during this period, the real average wages fell to 3 \textit{akçes} in 1588.\textsuperscript{51} Related to this, the mutton price climbed to around 15 \textit{akçes} in 1599, while it was only 3 \textit{akçes} in 1587.\textsuperscript{52} Undoubtedly, these factors must have played an important role in the decrease of the individual demand for \textit{kurbân} sheep at this time, but in an aggregate demand, this decrease could be compensated by the increase in population.\textsuperscript{53} It is also quite expected that consumer behavior should have been different compared to later periods. The debasement in \textit{akçe} and the dramatic rise of mutton prices\textsuperscript{54} were new phenomenon for the consumer during this period, and for this reason, their preferences may have been more rigid. In this way, the demand elasticity for this period is probably lower than our expected value of 1.007. In addition to this, our estimation method contains other problems. For instance, we are far from being able to calculate the relative

\textsuperscript{48} Considering the mutton price level as 1.9 \textit{akçes} in the mid-16th century, with 0.66 silver grams in \textit{akçe}, we calculate the real price change from the mid-16th century to late-17th century as 66 per cent. For the middle of the sixteenth century, we can calculate the average wages from the period 1554-1558. Utilizing our estimated price elasticity of demand 1.007 with the average wages in the mid-sixteenth century as 4.83 \textit{akçes}, we can estimate the quantity at the middle of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century as 115,000-120,000. However, as Yerasimos shows, at that time, the Muslim population in Istanbul is estimated to be 140,000-190,000. In the light of these figures, we make a proportional reduction from the last quantity range and found 53,000-80,000 sheep for this term.

For the data, see Şevket Pamuk, “Prices and Wages in Istanbul, 1469-1914,” \textit{International Institute of Social History}. Available at \textless http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/data.php\textgreater ; Şevket Pamuk, “İstanbul’da Et Fiyatları,” \textit{Unpublished Data}.


\textsuperscript{51} See, Şevket Pamuk, “Prices and Wages in Istanbul, 1469-1914,” \textit{The International Institute of Social History}. Available at \textless http://www.iisg.nl/hpw/data.php\textgreater ;

By 1596, the recovery in real wages can be traced. In 1596, it rose to 3.94 and in 1600 reached 5.5 \textit{akçes}.

\textsuperscript{52} Source: Şevket Pamuk, “İstanbul’da Et Fiyatları,” \textit{Unpublished Data}.


\textsuperscript{54} See Table 4.2. of this chapter.
impacts of the price-income changes on the *kurbânlık* demand. In my extrapolation, I take
these impacts with the simple proportions. In fact, a dynamic regression model should be
created in order to trace the relative proportional effects of these parameters, but the silence of
the Ottoman sources on *kurbân koyunu* prevents us from developing such a model. However,
even if we accept the problems of this method and quantities around 53,000-80,000 for the
middle of the sixteenth century seem to be very low compared to the nineteenth century
quantities at first glance, such a low level is not out of the question. In fact, throughout the
sixteenth century, the *kurbân* sheep purchases of the palace kitchens remained very low. For
instance, in 1547-1548, only 149 sheep were slaughtered for the Feast of the Sacrifice.\(^{55}\) The
increase in the slaughtering sheep for the Feast became visible by the beginning of the
seventeenth century. The number of sheep slaughtered rose to 3,017 in 1617, and to 3,626 in
1626-1628.\(^{56}\) It is understood that the demand of *kurbân* sheep increased throughout the
seventeenth century whether it was related to the increasing piety of Ottoman Istanbulluots or
not.\(^{57}\)

In addition to *kurbân* sheep, Ottoman Istanbul received flocks of sheep from meat
traders, especially those from the Balkans. Here, we should emphasize the sheep inflow from
Walachia and Moldavia.\(^{58}\) Although livestock merchants were engaged in *celepkeşan* zones in
the Balkans by the end of the sixteenth century, the volume of sheep trade from Walachia-
Moldavia had been always significantly higher than the merchant deliveries of other Balkan

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\(^{55}\) Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 192

\(^{56}\) Ibid., pp. 192.

\(^{57}\) The increasing demand for *kurbân* sheep could be related to the legitimacy problem of the Ottoman elite
especially in the first half of the seventeenth century. As a response to such a legitimacy question, Ottoman
dignitaries may have increased their demand for *kurbân koyunu*, which might be sacrificed as a symbolic ritual
in order to show their piety. For the reflections of the legitimacy question for the Ottoman polity in this period,
see Tülay Artan, “XVII. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Edirne Başkent Miydii?,” *Voyvoda Caddesi Toplantılar*, 16
April 2003.

Most probably, the Ottoman Istanbulluots did not slaughter too many sheep in the sixteenth century and the limited
quantity could not enter the registers.

\(^{58}\) The difference between the merchants’ sheep of Walachia-Moldavia and of the Balkans cannot be easily
distinguishable. Besides the *kurbân* sheep, the merchants’ delivery from both Anatolia and Balkans (covering
also Walachia and Moldavia) did not exceed 250,000 in the first half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, we
cannot understand whether the delivery from Walachia-Moldavia was supplied for the Feast or daily
consumption. See, Ahmet Uzun, op cit., pp. 21-27.
zones. The earliest reference to Moldavia and Walachia appeared in 1544 when the Ottoman central administration ordered the Ef lák prince to furnish 100,000 sheep to the capital. But one year later, this number was reduced to 50,000. Again, in 1579 the Voyvoda of Moldavia reported that 180,000 sheep were sent to the capital. It is understood that by the middle of the sixteenth century, the sheep from Walachia and Moldova assumed an increasingly critical component of the sheep supply. For this reason, by the sixteenth century, the sheep supply from this region was probably around 200,000. Romanian and Ottoman sources confirm that by the eighteenth century, these two regions annually supplied 200,000 sheep to the capital.

We can summarize the situation below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>WALLACHIA &amp; MOLDOVIA ESTIMATED DELIVERIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1545-1560</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1560-1580</td>
<td>100,000-200,000 &amp; 10,000-15,000 Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580-1600</td>
<td>200,000 &amp; 10,000-15,000 Cattle (?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we apply our extrapolation method to merchant delivery, a significant difference emerges between the amounts provided by Ottoman sources and our estimated quantities, especially in the estimation of merchant deliveries during the second half of the sixteenth century. In this calculation, undoubtedly, the price elasticity of mutton demand is lower.

60 Halil İnalcık & Donald Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: Volume I: 1300-1600, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 294-295.
61 Ibid., pp. 295.
62 See, BOA, MD 39, No: 157. Only five years later, it was expected that the same region provided 300,000 sheep to Istanbul. But we don’t know whether this quantity reached the capital or not. See Chapter II.
63 In addition to the merchant delivery, the piş kes of Voyvodos also contains a significant number of sheep. See Chapter II.
64 Personal Interview with Prof Dr Condrea Drăganescu on 11.04.2007.
Based on Venice sources, Mihai Maxim states that before 1595, Walachia and Moldavia exported more than 27,000 cattle to Istanbul. The first regulation of exported cattle from these two principalities occurred in the 1560s.
relative to the sheep for the Feast. This indicates the fact that consumers in the first half of the
nineteenth century could easily reduce their sheep consumption for sacrificial purpose, but not
mutton that was part of daily consumption. As a matter of fact, the price elasticity of daily
mutton demand is found to be 0.7 in the first half of the nineteenth century. After a similar
estimation method, the sheep delivery by merchants can be found as 360,000 for the late
seventeenth century. For the mid-16th century the estimation results give the amount
257,000-345,000. Although Ottoman sources may be missing certain quantities, such a
quantity as that estimated cannot be substantiated for this period. Even if we accept that the
capital received a regular annual supply from Anatolia during this period and that the highest
delivery 200,000 sheep in 1596 as part of this continuous inflow, our estimation still
remains enormous. In fact, for this period, I can find orders that include deliveries of small
numbers of sheep from Anatolia. For instance, 15,000 sheep were delivered from Anatolia in

67 See Ahmet Uzun, *İstanbul’un İlaçesinde Develtin Rolü: Ondalık Ağnaml Uygulaması (1783-1857)*, (Ankara:
TTK, 2006), pp. 27.
For the seventeenth century, we reach the average price level of mutton of 16.1. However, nineteenth-century
data are much more problematic and discontinuous. For this term, I utilize the average figure of the years 1832-
1833 and 1837 as 421.25 akçes. In these years, the silver gram in akçes was 0.0078. In 1836, the delivery by
merchants rose to 276,858. Unfortunately, we don’t have price data for this year. Therefore, I use the prices of
the years 1832-1833 and 1837 and reach 421.25 akçes as an average price in this calculation. Another data group
belongs to the period 1846-1849. For this period, we reach 155,000 sheep as an average quantity. For the
average price of this later period, we are bound to use the data of the years; 1851, 1855, 1856 and 1857. The
average price can be estimated as about 910 akçes. Considering the decrease in silver grams of akçe, we
calculate the real price change as 230 per cent, while the quantity change is – 44 per cent. It means 0.71 price
elasticity of demand for this period.
For the data, see Şevket Pamuk, “Prices and Wages in Istanbul, 1469-1914,” *The International Institute of Social
*Unpublished Data* and Ahmet Uzun, op. cit., pp. 27.
68 While the average wage level in the early nineteenth century was 6.29, the average level of a later period
(1846-1849) was 8.55. It means that these sketchy data give negative income elasticity of mutton demand in
terms of merchant delivery. As the mutton consumption cannot be categorized as inferior goods consumption,
this result is a clear reflection of our discrete data. Therefore, for the merchant delivery estimation, I don’t count
the income elasticity. With the similar method utilized in *kürban* sheep estimation, we reach the quantity around
360,000 for the late-seventeenth century.
For the data, see Şevket Pamuk, “Prices and Wages in Istanbul, 1469-1914,” *The International Institute of Social
*Unpublished Data* and Ahmet Uzun, op. cit., pp. 27.
15.
If we assume the population as 150,000-200,000 for the mid-16th century, we reach a merchant quantity of
257,000-345,000 per annum. No doubt, with the correction of the income difference, this estimation quantity
should decrease.
70 See BOA, MD 73, No: 964.
1560 and in 1566 the kadi of Eskişehir was ordered to send 50,000 sheep to the Ottoman capital.\textsuperscript{71} Therefore, the orders for Anatolian sheep delivery cannot explain our high estimated value for the mid-16\textsuperscript{th} century. At this time, Ottoman sources refer to sheep number from Walachia and Moldavia as 50,000-100,000.\textsuperscript{72} Our estimation remains very high in this case.\textsuperscript{73} However, keeping my reservation on the problems of my estimation due the lack of parallel series in prices and quantities, I interpret this high estimation figure to be primarily the result of the huge surplus from {	extit{celepkeşan}} sheep after the allocation to the imperial kitchens and Janissaries in the sixteenth century. It means that the quantity which I estimated through the merchant delivery based on nineteenth-century data might have been provided by the merchants’ delivery from the Balkans, Anatolia, and Walachia-Moldavia and also from the {	extit{celepkeşan}} pool in the sixteenth century. Within this framework, we can reach the conclusion that my estimated figure reflects the degree of consumption for Ottoman Istanbuliots and that this amount might have been supplied by supply channels other than those of merchant deliveries. Ottoman sources substantiate this. The most precise figure on {	extit{celepkeşen}} supply comes from the year 1581, when 450,000-500,000 {	extit{celepkeşan}} sheep arrived in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{74} In the light of this quantity, when we analyze the consumption figures of Janissaries and imperial kitchens, we obtain an enormous surplus in incoming {	extit{celepkeşan}} sheep.\textsuperscript{75} As Table 4.6. indicates, in the sixteenth century, the sheep consumption in imperial kitchens remained around 30,000-50,000, but by the seventeenth century, it had experienced a sharp increase.

\textsuperscript{71} See BOA, MD 5, No: 1258; MD 7, No: 456. Here, I must emphasize that such sheep deliveries from Anatolian zones seem to be independent of the \textit{kurbân} sheep flow from these regions. As a matter of fact, the timing of the orders shows a non-correlation between these deliveries and the Feast of Sacrifice. Probably, the Feast created an automatic demand and supply equilibrium in the market without the need for the central administration’s intervention.

\textsuperscript{72} See Chapter II.

\textsuperscript{73} See BOA, MD 42, No: 193.

\textsuperscript{74} This figure is not the total registered {	extit{celepkeşan}} sheep at that time. For detailed analysis of this issue, see Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 140-149.
Table 4.6. Mutton Consumption of Imperial Kitchens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>Sheep Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1527-1528</td>
<td>21,131(^77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1569-1570</td>
<td>34,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573-1574</td>
<td>37,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1574-1575</td>
<td>37,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1606-1607</td>
<td>58,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1611-1612</td>
<td>81,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1613-1614</td>
<td>94,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1617-1618</td>
<td>88,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1620-1622</td>
<td>106,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1626-1628</td>
<td>138,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1638-1639</td>
<td>93,000(^78)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likewise, the only clear source on mutton consumption of the Janissaries in the sixteenth century is dated 1585 and specifies 23,500 sheep for the Janissaries over a period of five and a half months. This means nearly 50,000 sheep that year.\(^79\) From the kassâbbâşî registers, we learn that the total amount of Janissary consumption fluctuated around 800,000-900,000 okkas of mutton per annum in the second half the seventeenth century.\(^80\) We also know that the number of Janissaries in Istanbul was 14,000 in the 1570s, while in the second half of the 17th century their numbers rose to about 40,000.\(^81\) Hence, we can argue that about the figure of 40,000-50,000 sheep is plausible for Janissary consumption in the 1570s. When we sum up the consumption of Janissaries and imperial kitchens, we reach nearly 100,000 sheep for the second half of the sixteenth century. It means that about 350,000-400,000 sheep were distributed to the urban butchers for consumption by ordinary Istanbulians. When we combine all of these figures for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as dedicated Table 4.7., we can reach the result that despite the repeated mythical quantities of mutton consumption and supply, in both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the average levels are low in Ottoman Istanbul.

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\(^76\) See Arif Bilgin, op cit., pp. 195.

\(^77\) Ibid., pp. 195. I excluded the lamb quantity 469 from the total amount.

\(^78\) Ibid., pp. 195. The figure is given as 584,370 vukiyves plus 3,000 sheep. I make the calculation on the assumption that one sheep supplied 6.5 okkas separable meat from the carcass.

\(^79\) See Chapter III.


### Table 4.7. Estimated Figures for Mutton Consumption in Istanbul circa 1550-1700

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME PERIOD</th>
<th>CELEPKEŞAN SHEEP</th>
<th>MERCHANT DELIVERY (MOLDOVIA &amp; WALLACHIA)</th>
<th>MERCHANT DELIVERY</th>
<th>KURBAN SHEEP</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION</th>
<th>in kg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1545-1570</td>
<td>≈ 400,000-450,000</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>10,00-20,000</td>
<td>≈ 53,000-80,000</td>
<td>513,000-850,000</td>
<td>21-38.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1570-1600</td>
<td>≈ 450,000</td>
<td>≈ 200,000</td>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>≈ 53,000-80,000</td>
<td>753,000-830,000</td>
<td>25-34.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Half of 17th Century</td>
<td>320,000-330,000</td>
<td>≈ 200,000</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>≈ 100,000</td>
<td>620,000-830,000</td>
<td>10.3-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

My estimations seem to be close to the lower limit of Kâvânîn-i Osmaniyye’s account and of course, are lower than the given values given by Evliya Çelebi, Bulgaru, as well as Mantran. Robert Mantran suggests that the total livestock supply, including sheep, goats, cattle, and probably pork, of Istanbul in 1674 exceeded 7,000,000. Another high estimate is presented by Evliya Çelebi, who gives the total livestock supply as 13,700,000. No doubt, these figures are extremely high compared to my estimation. Another striking point of these consumption figures is that the average mutton consumption in Ottoman Istanbul, not meat, is also lower than its European counterparts (See Table 4.8.).

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82 For celepkeşan sheep, see Chapter II; Anthony Greenwood, op cit, Appendix B.

For merchant delivery, see Table V in this chapter; Mihat Maxim, “XVI. Asrın İkinci Yarısında Eflâk-Buğdan’ın Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na Karşı İkitisadi ve Mali Müzellefiyetleri Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler,” VII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Cilt: II, 1970, pp. 553-566; Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire: Volume I: 1300-1600, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 294-295; BOA, MD 39, No: 157; MD 53, No: 294. For Anatolian deliveries, see BOA, MD 5, No: 1258; MD 7, No: 456; MD 73, No: 964. For Kurban Sheep, see pages 96-99 in this chapter; Ahmet Uzun, op cit, pp. 26-27.

83 For the delivery from Anatolia, I count the highest quantities registered in mümimme orders with the exception of the delivery in 1596. At that time, due to the political-military conflict between the central administration and Danubian principalities, the central administration probably should have resorted to Anatolian reserves.

84 In the calculation of per-capita consumption, I consider the population figures of the mid-16th century, the late 16th century and the late of seventeenth century respectively as 150,000-200,000, 200,000-250,000, and 500,000. One Okka = 1.28 kg. The ratio of the separable meat to carcass is considered as 6.5 okkas. It is quite noteworthy to say that even if we assume the merchants’ delivery from the Balkans and the kurban sheep with the nineteenth-century figure, the average consumption level remain very low in Ottoman Istanbul.


Table 4.8. Meat Consumption in European Urban Centers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Average Meat Consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1514</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1520</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1548</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1600-1700</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For instance, in Nuremberg the average meat supply per capita was between 72 and 100 kg in the 1520s. Again, the meat consumption of Rome was around 40 kg per annum and then fell to 30 kg at the end of the seventeenth century. It is also quite noteworthy that these average consumption figures present a significant social stratification behind the quantitative values. The state-dependants, which consist of various groups, were the “privileged individuals,” who consumed enormous amounts of meat compared to ordinary Istanbulliots, especially in the seventeenth century. The first group of these state-dependants consisted of individuals fed by the various palace kitchens, including Topkapı, Galata, the Old Palace, and from the mid-16th century on, İbrahim Paşa Sarayı. This group is a significant part of the ruling elite covering, naturally, the sultan, the dynasty members, the individuals affiliated with them and also their servants (and also their sub-servants) such as pages, harem attendants and gatekeepers.

In order to calculate the average mutton consumption of this group, of course, the knowledge of their population is vital and unfortunately we can only approximate the population of this privileged group. Greenwood suggests 15,000 as a maximum level of this population at the end of the sixteenth century. But, this figure seems to be very high. From the estimation of the calorific minima as 3,000, Yerasimos calculates the number of individuals fed

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91 Ibid., pp. 608.
by the imperial kitchens as 8,000 in 1570, while this number increased to 11,000 around 1660.\textsuperscript{93} ‘Azîz Efendi also narrates that in the period from 1570 to 1609, the staff population of the palace rose from 7,000 to 11,000.\textsuperscript{94} Moreover, we know that Topkapı Palace alone was feeding around 5,000 people by the end of sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{95} In the light of these accounts, while the population fed by the palace kitchens was about 5,000-7,000 from 1550-1570, it may have reached a maximum of 10,000 by the end of the sixteenth century. Table 4.6. shows that the purchases of sheep purchases by the imperial kitchens continuously rose during the sixteenth century and climbed to its upper level in the middle of the seventeenth century. By this time, it seems to have fluctuated around 100,000.\textsuperscript{96} Combined with the population figure, we can extrapolate that while in 1570 the per-capita consumption of the privileged group was around 39-44 kg, it rose to around 48 kg at the beginning of the seventeenth century. By around 1630, the average consumption had climbed to nearly 85 kg.\textsuperscript{97}

It is understood that though it is partially explained by the rise of state-dependent population, the increase in mutton consumption within this group had been enormous by the end of the sixteenth century. However, these huge quantities were not so surprising given that the urban rich in Europe also consumed nearly 104 kg of meat per annum in the sixteenth


\textsuperscript{95} Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 11-16.

In fact, Greenwood does not seem to be sure about the number of state dependants. In the first analysis, he gives the account that at the end of the sixteenth century; the palace kitchens may have fed nearly 10,000 individuals. Then, combining this figure with the number of Janissaries, he comes up with the figure of 15,000 individuals. Finally, he derives the average consumption rate on the basis of this 15,000. However, the number of 15,000 seems to be very high for the late sixteenth century.

\textsuperscript{96} See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp. 13. The \textit{kassâbbaşi registers} show that mutton consumption had been around 100,000 per year by the mid-seventeenth century.

\textsuperscript{97} For the 1570s, the range is constituted according to a population of 7,000-8,000. The number of sheep is assumed to be 37,000. For the beginning of the seventeenth century, the population is regarded as 10,000. For the beginning of the seventeenth century, the calculation is made on the basis of 57,000 sheep. For the 1630s, 100,000 sheep is assumed.

In calculating mutton consumption, I regard 6.5 \textit{okkas} (one \textit{okka} = 1.28 kg) of separable mutton per sheep carcass.

104
The main factor behind this increase is undoubtedly the dramatic increase in the allotments of meat. It is quite noteworthy that while Mihrimah Sultan, for instance, received 26 kg meat per annum in the sixteenth century, Gevherhan Sultan, the wife of Vizier Cerrah Paşa, received an allotment amounting to nearly 1103 kg in 1604. A similar huge allotment was delivered to Ayşe Sultan, the wife of Ahmed Paşa, the same year and her meat ta’yinât was 735 kg. In fact, while a rise in meat allotments occurred for the individuals who were affiliated with the palace or sub-palaces, the Janissaries’ allotments also seemed to increase during the same period. Although the relatively clearest data we have on the Janissary population is for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it is difficult to document and interpret their levels of consumption. The only source pertaining to this consumption is dated 1585 and specifies a quantity of 23,500 sheep for the Janissaries over a five-and-a-half-month period. This averages out to nearly 50,000 sheep for that year. Considering the number of Janissaries to be about 20,000 at this time, we can estimate the per capita consumption for Janissaries to be around 20 kg. By the second half of the seventeenth century, the total mutton consumption of the Janissaries fluctuated around 800,000-900000 okkas per year. If we assume the number of Janissaries stood at about 40,000 in 1670s, the average consumption of this group can be estimated to be 26-29 kg for the second half of the seventeenth century. However, it is interesting to see that this consumption level is much lower than the values provided by Marsigli or Murgescu. For instance, Marsigli asserts that the daily mutton

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98 Ian Blanchard, op cit., pp. 460. The figures for the European counterparts include mutton, beef and veal.
99 Here, the allocated mutton quantity to Mihrimah Sultan seems to be very low to me and cannot be generalized for the whole period. For instance, in 1555-1556, Gülşün Hatun received nearly 2,500 okkas mutton allocation from the imperial kitchens. See, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “İstanbul Saraylarına ait Muhasebe Defterleri,” Türk Tarih Kurumu Belgeleri, Cilt: IX,Sayı: 13, (Ankara: TTK, 1979), pp. 12.
101 BOA, MD 46, No: 19 and especially MD 58, No: 903.
103 In calculating mutton consumption, I regard 6.5 okkas (one okka = 1.28 kg) of separable mutton per sheep carcass. The number of Janissaries in Istanbul is taken as 20,000, while their sheep consumption is estimated to be 50,000.
104 See, Anthony Greenwood, op cit., Appendix F.
allotment was 60 dirhems (185-192 grams) for the Janissaries, translating into an annual per capital consumption of meat of about 67-68 kg. For the provisioning of the army during the Kamaniçe (the name used for the region of Podolia and city of Kamjanec' that the Ottomans conquered in 1672) campaign, Murgescu presents the amount of the daily meat allotment of Janissaries as 260 gr. Again, the meat allotment during the defense of Van castle in 1611 is described as 160 gr. According to our estimation, such quantities seem to be excessively high for the consumption by the Janissaries, at least for those who stayed in the Ottoman capital.

When we look at the general picture on the meat consumption, we can argue that while the privileged group of the Ottoman polity dramatically increased its mutton consumption, the Janissaries could at least keep their less privileged status in meat consumption. However, at the same time a dramatic decrease of mutton consumption for ordinary Istanbulits appeared. This is not to say that the ordinary Istanbulits had easy access to mutton during the “golden times.” As I have tried to show, even in the first half of the sixteenth century, mutton prices increased dramatically in Ottoman Istanbul, a trend that was to accelerate in the second half of the sixteenth century. As a response to relatively higher increase in price vis-à-vis wages, Ottoman Istanbulits might have tended to consume mutton substitutes in their dishes. Such a process did not exclude the privileged in the city. Contrary depictions of their classical diet, this group also consumed pigeon, chicken, fish and cured meat. However, the dramatic change emerges with the decrease of mutton consumption for ordinary Istanbulits. On the other hand, an extensive form of consumerism had grown in elite circles by the late sixteenth century among the elite circles. Undoubtedly, the jumps in the mutton allotments reflect this phenomenon, echoing the changes in the distribution and legitimacy mechanism of the Ottoman polity by the late 16th century. As demonstrated in the cases offered by Gevherhan

106 Mehmet İnbaşı, *Ukrayna’da Osmanlılar: Kamaniçe Seferi ve Organizasyonu (1672)*, (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayını, 2004), pp. 266.
and Ayşe Sultan, these allotments carried a new type of power message to Ottoman Istanbulliots. This resulted in food distribution no longer being the monopoly of a single court; it spread to sub-courts, with more powerful legitimacy signaling. In this way, the old adage of ‘‘not to betray the door of whose bread one has eaten’’\textsuperscript{107} became relevant not only for the servants of the sultan, but also for the servants of the servants.

CONCLUSION

In this study, I tried to examine one of the social-economic niches in Ottoman Istanbul during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Contrary to the portrait of the central administration as a “monster” in the meat market,¹ my analysis shows that the central administration’s control over the mutton inflow to the Ottoman capital was far from being one of total surveillance throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although the central polity created a special supply and distribution mechanism for mutton in the sixteenth century under the celepkeşan system, this system did not crowd out other agents from the meat market. The celepkeşan system always existed along side the free meat merchants throughout the sixteenth century. For instance, at the end of the sixteenth century, while the number of celepkeşan sheep delivered was around 450,000 per annum, the number delivered by merchants reached 250,000-300,000 per year.² The importance of the delivery by merchants continued to increase throughout the seventeenth century, at the end of which such delivery grew to about half of the total sheep supply. Undoubtedly, the central administration seemed to be aware of the importance of the deliveries by merchants in addition to the celepkeşan system in the sixteenth century and for this reason continuously encouraged free merchant activities. It is clear that engaging in livestock trade brought significant profit to merchants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, this does not mean that only free merchants could profit from such activities, with the celepkeşans incurring significant financial losses due to state control.

It is also understood that contrary to Greenwood’s suggestion³ that the celepkeşan system was inefficient and fragile, it was actually economically efficient until the 1580s. Related to this, the celepkeşan service was not unprofitable for individuals in the second half

² See Chapter II-IV.
of the sixteenth century. Before the 1580s, without considering the payments to the sheep drovers, the profit margin of *celebesans* seems to have been around 8-10 *akçes* per sheep. Even if we add the drovers’ fees to this picture, it is clear that the *celebesans* would not face economic loss due to their obligations. Moreover, the *celebekşlik* system offered a way to circumvent extraordinary taxes. When we combine all the costs of the *celebesans*, we reach the conclusion that they were still able to make a profit from this service. Therefore, it is not coincidental that in the period mentioned, many individuals, especially the Yörüks, tried to enter the *celebesanlık* service. In fact, Anthony Greenwood misinterprets the economic parameters of the system and does not count the economic advantages obtained through the circumvention of extraordinary taxes.\(^4\) From this premise, he reaches the conclusion that due to financial losses, the *celebesan* service was transformed into monetary form from in-kind obligations. However, again, this analysis does not reflect the historical reality behind the transformation within the system. Although it is true that the obligations of the *celebesans* were turned into monetary forms in the latter sixteenth century, the main change in the system began independently from the economic problems by the 1560s. As of this time, the financial obligations of the wealthy *celebesans* were directed to new individuals through the massive *celebesan* appointments.\(^5\) Even if the old *celebesans* remained in the system, their obligations were lessened. As a clear reflection of this process, in the period 1565-1575, we encounter a rapid decline of the average sheep per *celebesan* in all regions. This transformation led to the rich strata of the *celebesans* extending some of their responsibilities to many individuals, with the result being that the central administration began to depend on sheep deliveries from less wealthy *celebesans*.\(^6\) Considering the price elasticity of mutton demand, these less wealthy *celebesans* could not deliver their specific amount of sheep to Istanbul under the inflationist conditions of the 1580s. It is not surprising to see that most of

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\(^4\) Anthony Greenwood, op cit, Chapter III.
\(^5\) Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp.100-104.
\(^6\) See Chapter II.
the *hiükms* pertaining to the sheep supply shortages were issued after the 1580s. As a result of this process, the central administration turned their in-kind obligations into monetary forms.

At this point, we should also consider the fact that the transformation in the *celepkeşan* system and the whole meat market in Istanbul were not peculiar to the late sixteenth century. It is understood that both the *celepkeşan* system and the whole meat sector continuously transformed themselves into more monetized and competitive structures throughout the sixteenth century. During the first half of the sixteenth century, the operational weight of the *celepkeşan* service was limited. Related to this, the market controls were weak and the meat market was not competitive. However, by the middle of the sixteenth century, market controls and the operational weight of *celepkeşan* system increased and market agents developed new strategies to deal with the new situation. In fact, such changes are not peculiar to the Ottoman capital. European urban meat markets also entered into this new stage with different forms. By the 1530s, the European meat markets had shifted their supply pools from regional to international markets. The reasons behind these changes are the population pressure on the existing supply and the increasing competition among urban centers on extracting sheep reserves from the hinterlands. Parallel to the developments in European meat markets, the Istanbul meat market also began to integrate with the international chain after the 1550s. However, the main actor in this integration was not the central administration, but Ottoman meat merchants. Livestock traders, butchers and *celepkeşans* tried to conduct special delivery contracts in international meat markets, namely Walachia and Moldavia. In this integration, Ottoman merchants were quite successful and crowded out international competitors from these two markets by the seventeenth century. As a result of the slow integration process, the livestock reserves of both Walachia and Moldavia became linked to the Ottoman capital and remained in this position until the nineteenth century. In this way, we can reach the result that the central administration did not develop control mechanisms over the agents in the meat
market by the beginning of the sixteenth century. The controls became apparent by the 1550s as a response to the increasing mutton demand and did not bring strict regulations to the meat agents. With respect to free merchant activities, the central administration supported them in international markets. On the other side, although the central administration regulated the celepkeşan service, these controls did not necessarily create a financial burden on the celepkeşans.

Such limited state control can also be seen in the Istanbul butchers’ activities. Although the central administration made butcher appointments by confiscating the financial assets of individuals, this policy was intensively applied for a very short period during the 16th century and it was mostly due to the financial need of the central treasury after the 1577 outbreak of war against the Safawids. Even before the mid-16th century, the central administration had applied the appointment strategy, but about 90 per cent of these appointments had been practiced by 1577. Such a phenomenon shows that the central treasury had applied this strategy in order to direct capital for the financial needs of the Ottoman war machine in the last two decades of the sixteenth century. Thus, we cannot ascribe these appointments to the whole of the sixteenth century. It is clear that the central administration did not perceive the butchers as ‘‘milk cows’’ who would supply mutton at lower prices.

As a matter of fact, although perceiving Istanbul butchers as the ‘‘scapegoats’’ and ‘‘milk cows’’ of the central administration has been a dominant theme in Ottoman studies, such a passive conceptualization of butchers is not adequate in describing their complex mercantile activities in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. Their activities cannot be restricted to butchery. They made investments in the livestock, skin, fat and soap trade in Istanbul. Most importantly, these engagements were not ad-hoc, but rather established

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7 For detailed analysis, see Chapter III.
phenomena in the market. Şer’iyye registers show that while some butchers in Eyüp, Üsküdar and Tophane intensively engaged into candle and soap-making, a significant number of butchers also make investments in livestock trade. In addition, the butchers were active in the credit markets so that they were the eager creditors for the voivodas of Walachia and Moldavia. When repayment problems became apparent, the butchers utilized their power in the circles of the Ottoman polity. The engagements of the butchers into other sectors were so important that candle-makers or tanners complained about the butchers’ activities and tried to gain support from the major waqfs and the dynasty members. In fact, my research shows that despite the limited modern meaning of butchery, Istanbul butchers behaved like meat traders in the meat market. In real terms, the Ottomans used the term butchers in a very different context, which did not necessarily refer to a person who slaughtered or purged the animals in the slaughterhouses or the butcher shops. In a more general sense, butchers were perceived as having a license to sell mutton in shops or having the right to use the slaughter complexes. Therefore, it is not surprising to us to see various butchers in other animal by-product sectors. This entire picture points to the fact that butchers were not waiting for unavoidable bankruptcy after their appointments as Istanbul butchers in the sixteenth century.

In addition to their active market operations, butchers seemed to make profit from their sales to Janissaries at lower prices. Although it is true that butchers lost some revenue due to these sales, they could compensate these losses by the capital injection of the butchers’ fund. In 1585, the butchers appealed for 200,000 akçes from the purchase of 23,500 sheep from celeps. These figures point out that the requested subsidy per sheep was nearly 8 akçes.

We also know that the price of mutton selling to Janissaries at this time was 2.6, while the

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9 For details, see Chapter III.
10 See Chapter II.
11 Anthony Greenwood, op cit., pp 47.
12 See, BOA, MD 58, No: 903.
market narh was 4 akçes.\textsuperscript{13} Their requested subsidy means that they could also make some profit from these sales. It is understood that through the special butcher’s waqf, they controlled a significant amount of economic power in the meat market. For instance, in 1571 they could receive 1.2 million akçes for their losses. But, at that time their losses must be much lower than this amount. In fact, the existence of this butchers’ waqf also shows the negotiation power vis-à-vis the control apparatus of the state. The butchers’ fund is itself a symbol of transferring financial burden to major waqfs and wealthy Istanbullıots in a general sense to the upper echelons of the Ottoman polity. The scarce resource on their economic operations indicates that butchers successfully utilized the butchers’ fund until the 1580s. Although the ‘‘scapegoat’’ and ‘‘milk cow’’ analyses interpret butchery in Istanbul as a non-profitable business, it seems that even if the butcher could deliver mutton to the Janissaries with a lower price than narh, they did not face any financial losses from these transactions.

When we combine the financial and political powers of the celepekenans and butchers, it can be easily argued that the mutton supply does not fit into the ‘‘provisionist’’ discourse. In the framework of the ‘‘provisioning’’ mentality, Genç suggests that the Ottoman elite gave importance to the increase in consumer surplus and always tried to provide foodstuffs to the urban consumers at lower prices.\textsuperscript{14} In this mechanism, the losses due to lower prices were transferred to the producers and merchants. However, my research shows that contrary to the ‘‘provisionist’’ discourse, the Ottoman elite gave special emphasis to the financial power of celepekenans, butchers and free merchants. It means that in the meat sector, the central administration continuously supported the merchants’ surplus in their activities. The activities of celepekenans and butchers did not bring financial losses to these individuals. Moreover, there was no provisioning system in mutton for all Ottoman Istanbullıots in the sixteenth and

\textsuperscript{13} Anthony Greenwood, op cit, pp. 196.

seventeenth centuries. Within this context, we should make a clear distinction between supply and distribution of mutton. Although the central polity created a special mutton supply mechanism under the celepkeşan system, it did not cover the distribution of mutton to Ottoman Istanbulliots at lower prices. A special distribution system was designed for the “privileged” state dependants, not for the whole of the urban population. Ottoman Istanbulliots bought mutton at official narh prices, which had provided a profit margin to butchers and celepkeşans.

As a clear result of this special distribution mechanism, Ottoman Istanbulliots could not easily gain access to mutton even in the sixteenth century and their consumption further declined in the seventeenth century. However, in Ottoman historiography, dealing with any topic related to the sixteenth century, brings about an automatic glorification of Ottoman “golden times.” Undoubtedly, one significant element of this glorification is the exaggeration of certain quantitative parameters. Related to this phenomenon, we also encounter an exaggeration in meat consumption. It is generally argued that Ottoman Istanbulliots’ meat consumption was considerably higher than their European counterparts. This glorification does not reflect a simple cliché. In fact, it is closely related to the social symbol of mutton consumption in Turkey and its connection to the perceptions of Ottoman “golden times.” In the mental nebula, the glory of the “Ottoman superiority” in the sixteenth century is easily extended from military to cultural superiority. Commensurate with this is the argument that if the Ottomans were superior during “golden times,” their consumption must have reflected their wealth. No doubt, meat consumption, perceived as a significant social status in Turkey is directly integrated into the “Ottoman Golden Age” through the discourse that Ottomans were significant meat eaters in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century. However, my analysis shows that this is another mythification of Ottoman “golden times.” In fact, the mutton consumption level in the

15 As an instance, see Halime Doğru, Bir Kadi Defterinin Işığında Rumeli’de Yaşam, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), pp. 152.
sixteenth-seventeenth-century Istanbul is no higher than that in European urban centers. While the average meat consumption was nearly 50 kg per annum in European centers in the sixteenth century, it was only approximately 30-35 kg in Ottoman Istanbul. Of course, the significant meat consumers in the Ottoman capital were the state dependants whose consumption dramatically increased throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, their meat consumption was again not high in comparison to the rich of European urban centers. In actual fact, while the European rich consumed nearly 100 kg mutton per annum in the seventeenth century, the state dependents who were fed by the imperial kitchens consumed nearly 85-90 kg mutton per year.16

Although this study aims to cover the worlds of meat in the Ottoman capital and tries to portray heterogeneity of these worlds, the complexity of this niche triggers many questions which could not be answered in this thesis. Firstly, this research mainly covers sheep and mutton consumption, but we know that lamb-mutton consumption also had an important place in the diet of Ottoman Istanbulis. In the eighteenth century, some merchants, balkancis, delivered lamb to the Ottoman capital.17 At this time period, there were special lamb çiftlik around Büyük Çekmece, Catalca and Terkos. However, in the case of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, I did not encounter such a phenomenon in the vicinity of Istanbul. It could be possible that the ‘askeri and the capital owners made investments in lamb çiftlik in the vicinity of Istanbul during the sixteenth century. But in order to present a clear picture of these çiftlik, a detailed study of şer’iyye registers is required. Secondly, as the sheep delivery to Istanbul decreases by the seventeenth century, it is expected that the central administration encouraged pork consumption by the city’s Christian population in order to ease demand pressure on mutton. Pig herds may have arrived in the city, but I did not encounter any references to the amount or the mode of pork consumption. In the framework of the mode of

16 For details, see Chapter IV.
meat consumption, we should also pay attention the places in that Ottoman Istanbulluots could
eat ready-to-eat meat dishes. The prevalence of this type of meat dishes in the urban cooks’
shops by the seventeenth century means the creation of new social institutions such as
meeting places. At the same time, the rise of the ready-to-eat dishes in social spaces created
and developed around a new consumption habit. Up until now, research on emerging social
spaces in the sixteenth and the seventeenth century remained mostly limited to coffee
houses.\(^{18}\) The analyses on various cooks’ shops and their diffusion into urban milieu could
provide new horizons for our understanding of urban sociability in Istanbul. Finally, it would
be interesting to see the effects of animal diseases on the sheep supply of Istanbul.
Unfortunately, I could not find any reference to such diseases in Ottoman sources. In the
accounting registers of the imperial kitchens, only the losses during the sheep delivery phase
to Istanbul are recorded. For instance, in 1489, the loss of sheep delivery occurred nearly as
one per cent of the total delivery.\(^{19}\) However, there is no mention of animal diseases in these
accounting and mühimme registers. Undoubtedly, only extensive inquiry into şer‘iyye and
tahrir registers could give answers to these rising questions.

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\(^{18}\) For the introduction of the coffee into the Ottoman world and the debate on the urban sociability through the
new public spaces, see Ralph S. Hattox, *Kahve ve Kahvehaneler: Bir Toplumsal İşteçeğin Yakın doğu'daki

\(^{19}\) See, Ömer Lütfü Barkan, ‘İstanbul Saraylarına ait Muhasebe Defterleri’, *Türk Tarih Kurumu Belgeler*, Cilt:
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