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MUGHAL-OTTOMAN RELATIONS: A STUDY OF POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN MUGHAL INDIA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1556-1748

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submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin-Madison in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Naimur Rahman Farooqi

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MUGHAL-OTTOMAN RELATIONS: A STUDY OF POLITICAL AND
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by
NAIMUR RAHMAN FAROOQI

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
(History)

at the
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON
1986
ABBREVIATIONS


J.P.H.S. Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, Lahore.


Munsha'at Munshaat-us-Salatin by Ahmed Feridun Bey. Istanbul, 1848-49.
P.I.H.C. Proceedings of the Indian History Congress.
P.I.H.R.C. Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission.
T.S.M.A. Topkapi Saray Muzesi Arsivi.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All praise belong to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds, the Benificent, the Merciful, the Master of the Day of Judgement. May His eternal blessing be upon His Messenger, the Prophet Muhammad, upon members of his household, and upon his Companions.

Reflecting upon the past years, I find so many people who have in some way become part of this educational experience. First and foremost I wish to express my gratitude to my advisor, Professor Robert E. Frykenberg. His thoughtful criticisms, useful suggestions, and willingness to help as well as constant support throughout my research and writing have been most rewarding and encouraging. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Professor Kemal H. Karpat for the assistance he has given me throughout my graduate career. Professor Karpat not only suggested that I should undertake the study of Mughal-Ottoman relations but also arranged for my visit to Istanbul which enabled me to consult Turkish archives and libraries. I also wish to thank Professor Stephen Humphreys for his keen interest in my work, invaluable suggestions, and support.

I am grateful to the directors and staff of the Basvekalet Arsivi, Istanbul, the Topkapi Saray Muzesi Arsivi, Istanbul, the National Archives of India, New Delhi, the Maharashtra State Archives, Bombay, the Historical Archives of Goa, Panajim, and the Research Library of the Centre of Advanced Study in History, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh for allowing me to use their collections
of documents and manuscripts. My thanks are also due to the staff of the Inter Library Loan Department of the Memorial Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison, for cheerfully tracking down many sources that have immensely enriched this study.

I wish to record my gratitude to many individuals who have helped me in various ways while I was in Turkey. Mr. Ahmet Aydin Bolak, Director of the Turk Petrol, Istanbul, Mehmet Ali Ataizi, Necmettin Tan, and Nizamettin went out of their way to make my sojourn in Istanbul comfortable. I shall always cherish their acquaintance. I should also express my thanks to all of my friends in Madison. They encouraged me and helped me in times of need and made my stay in Madison memorable.

My research in India was supported by a grant from the American Institute of Indian Studies. I am thankful to the administrators of this organization both in Chicago and in New Delhi. Thanks are also due to the Fulbright-Hays Foundation and to the United States Educational Foundation in India, New Delhi for awarding me the junior Fulbright fellowship which supported my first two semesters at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I would be failing in my duty if I do not record my gratitude to the authorities of the University of Allahabad, India for having allowed me to proceed to U.S.A. for higher studies.

My deepest gratitude and sincere love go to my mother, brothers, and sisters for their inspiration, affection and support. In
particular the blessings of my mother, who have long waited to see the fruits of my labour, have enabled me to successfully complete my endeavour. I owe much to the patience, devotion, understanding, and above all, love of my wife Nilofer. Indeed, without her unfailing support and encouragement this study would not have been possible. The presence of my sons, Tipu and Khurram, was always a source of joy and pleasure. They made our stay in Madison worthwhile. I also thank Carla Anderson for her excellent typing of this dissertation.

My success has been truly a reaffirmation of my faith in Allah's boundless mercy and compassion. I conclude by quoting the Holy Quran: "Thou exaltest whom Thou wilt and Thou abasest whom Thou wilt. In Thy hand is the good. Lo! Thou art able to do all things (III, 26)."
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Dedicated to the loving memory of my revered father
INTRODUCTION

Writing in the second half of the sixteenth century, Abul Fazl, the dean of Mughal chroniclers, observed that "it is an old custom that powerful potentates should, for the sake of gathering spiritual and temporal blessings and for accomplishing spiritual and temporal objects, seek to associate with fortunate princes, and that if owing to a God-given destiny, a connection has already been established, they exert themselves to strengthen the pillars thereof and finish off the thread of their own fortune with this wondrous ornament."\(^1\) Abul Fazl was indeed not the first Muslim statesman to appreciate the value of friendly relations between contemporary states. The art of conducting negotiations with foreign countries as a substitute for war was known to early Muslims. The Prophet Muhammad had sent emissaries to Byzantium, Egypt, Persia, and Ethiopia.\(^2\) However, the intent of these missions was purely religious; the rulers of these countries were invited by the Prophet to embrace Islam. The Umayyads had frequently exchanged embassies with the Byzantine empire for negotiating peace treaties. The Abbasids went a step further. They sought friendly relations with the Frankish empire of Europe. The exchange of embassies between Pippin III and Khalifa al-Mansur and the diplomatic intercourse between Charlemagne and Khalifa Harun al-Rashid are well known. According to Professor Buckler, the purpose of these missions was "an
alliance with Harunur-Rashid, involving mutual cooperation, Charles against Spain and Harun against the Byzantine Empire... an alliance with the Abbasids, may well have been the object of Pippin's mission also, as the political situation had not fundamentally changed. 3 The Abbasids also maintained diplomatic relations with their contemporary Muslim monarchs. The arrival of an embassy from a rival power was always an occasion of great fanfare in Baghdad; the brilliant reception accorded to the Byzantine ambassador in 918 bears testimony to the elaborate diplomatic protocol observed by the Abbasids. 4 The successor states of the Abbasid empire continued this practice and frequently exchanged envoys with each other. The hectic diplomatic activity carried on by the monarch of Darul Islam in the fourteenth and fifteenth century is evident from the mass of epistolary literature available in the collections of diplomatic correspondence as well as in the contemporary chronicles.

In India, however, the situation was entirely different. Apart from maintaining sporadic contacts with the Abbasid Khalifas of Baghdad and Egypt, the Muslim rulers of North India seem to have remained in almost total isolation from the rest of the Islamic world. There is no record of the exchange of diplomatic missions between the early Turkish Sultans of Delhi and the rulers of Darul Islam. Sultan Iltutmish's (1210-1236) refusal to grant asylum to Jalaluddin Mankbarni, the Sultan of Khwarizm, is well known. Iltutmish is also reported to have rebuffed the diplomatic overtures
of Berke Khan, the Khan of the Golden Horde. Among his successors, only Muhammad Tughlaq (1325-1351), the enigmatic monarch of the Tughlaq dynasty, is known to have established diplomatic relations with foreign potentates. His friendship with the Muslim sovereigns of Egypt, Persia, and Central Asia has prompted a modern scholar to observe that the Sultan was "the first pan-Islamist in India, who believed in the world of Islam as a composite totality, at the centre of which was the authority of the Abbasid Caliph."

Though the Bahmani Kingdom (1347-1527) and the Sultanate of Gujarat (1401-1572), offshoots of the Delhi Sultanate, also maintained intermittent diplomatic contacts with the Ottomans and the Safavids, India continued to remain virtually aloof from the happenings in the world of Islam.

It was not until the foundation of the Mughal empire in the early sixteenth century that India was able to break this self-imposed isolation from the outside world. Several factors were responsible for this momentous development. First, never before in its long and checkered history had the subcontinent been governed by a powerful and dynamic ruling house like that of the Mughals. The prosperity, peace, and tranquility which India achieved during the Mughal regime enhanced her prestige in the family of nations and increased her influence in international affairs. Consequently, the leading foreign potentates, Muslim as well as non-Muslim, desired to establish political and diplomatic relations with the Mughals.
Second, having once ruled over Persia and Central Asia, the Mughals were far more aware than their royal predecessors, of the value of friendly relations with the sister states. Third, unlike the Sultans of Delhi, the Mughals also controlled Afghanistan; common borders with Safavid Persia and Uzbek Central Asia obliged the Mughals to keep themselves in touch with the developments in these states. Maintenance of political and diplomatic relations with the outside world was therefore in the best interest of the Mughals.

The external relations of the Mughal empire have not received the scholarly attention they deserve. This is especially true of the Mughal relations with the most powerful Muslim state of the time: the Ottoman empire. No modern account of these relations is available. In his book *Foreign Policy of the Great Mughals* (1967), R.C. Verma has devoted only a few perfunctory remarks to Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic relations. Moreover, these observations betray the author's lack of awareness as to the information available on this subject in the Mughal and Ottoman sources. Standard monographs on individual Mughal Emperors are also available. These, while narrating Mughal relations with Persia and Central Asia in detail, have almost totally ignored the Mughal-Ottoman relations. For instance, Professor B.P. Saksena in his excellent study of Emperor Shahjahan (1932) has devoted only three pages to the Emperor's diplomatic relations with Istanbul. In his monumental *History of Aurangzeb* (in five volumes, 1912-24) Sir J.N. Sarkar has
likewise spared barely two pages for Mughal-Ottoman relations.

The situation is no better in Ottoman historiography. Professor Karpat's observation that "Ottoman history is the stepchild of historical studies"\textsuperscript{9} is especially applicable to the studies of the Ottoman empire's relations with her contemporary Muslim states. Only two short monographs on Ottoman-Persian relations are available;\textsuperscript{10} these cover barely 43 years of the more than four centuries of contacts between the two states. Notwithstanding the abundance of material in Turkish archives on Ottoman relations with the Uzbeks and with the Khans of Crimea, historians to date have sketched only the barest outlines of these relationships. Needless to say, Ottoman-Indian relations, for which enough source material is not forthcoming, have also been neglected by Ottoman historians. Professor Hikmet Bayur's \textit{Hindistan Tarihi} (two volumes, Ankara, 1947-1950) has devoted only a few cursory remarks to Ottoman-Mughal relations. Standard works on Ottoman history, such as Professor Uzunçarşıli's \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi} (6 vols., Ankara, 1947-1959) and Ismail Danismend's \textit{Izhali Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi} (4 vols., Instabul, 1947-55), likewise, contain very little information on the subject under review.

The present study is, therefore, a pioneering effort. It seeks to fill a gap in the Indian and Ottoman historical literature. Besides exploring Mughal India's political and diplomatic relations with the Ottoman empire, this study also focuses on such important
issues as the Mughal attitude towards the Ottoman claim to the
Khilafat of Islam and the problem of Haj traffic in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. Mughal relations with the Sharifs of Mecca,
the leading Ottoman dignitaries of the time, have also been examined
in detail. Three fundamental questions guide this study. First,
what factors determined Mughal policy towards the Ottoman empire?
Was it guided by the interests of the Mughal state? Or was it
governed by the whims, passions, and prejudices of the Mughal
Emperors? Second, did Mughal relations with the Safavids, the
Uzbeks, and the Sharifs of Mecca have any bearing on Mughal-Ottoman
relations? Third, did religion exercise any influence on the
relationship between the Mughal and the Ottoman states?
Ottoman-Persian hostility, based on their doctrinal differences, is
well known. Professor Arnold Toynbee has characterised this feud as
"probably the most important single factor in the debacles of three
Islamic Great Powers . . ."11 Since the Mughal Emperors and the
Ottoman Sultans belonged to the same Sunni sect, an alliance between
them against the Persian 'heretics' would have seemed to be a logical
and natural outcome of the contemporary situation. One often finds
in Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic correspondence the proposal of an
alliance, based on the identity of sect, against Persia. Did the
alliance materialize? If not, what factors prevented its fruition?
What, in sum, were the factors conducive to amity and to conflict
between the Mughals and the Ottomans?
It is necessary here to define the chronological limits of this study. The paucity of source material dictated that I take my evidence from a very long period, roughly 1556-1748. Nevertheless, these dates have importance of their own. The year 1556 marks the beginning of the diplomatic relation between the Mughal and the Ottoman states, when Emperor Humayun (1530-1556) wrote his first, and also his last, letter to the Ottoman Sultan. The year 1748, on the other hand, marks the termination of Mughal-Ottoman relations. It was in this year that the last Ottoman embassy to the Mughal court left Shahjahanbad, the Mughal capital, on its homeward journey to Istanbul. After 1748 there is no record of any exchange of diplomatic missions between the two sides. The background for the intercourse of the Mughal Emperors, Humayun to Muhammad Shah, with their contemporary Ottoman Sultans, is provided by examining the attitude of Babur (1526-1530), the founder of the Mughal empire in India, towards the Ottomans. This has also been done to highlight the continuity or the change in Mughal policy towards the Ottomans after Babur's death.

The basic sources used in this study may be classified under four headings: official documents of the Ottoman government, chronicles of the Ottoman empire, court histories and private chronicles of the Mughal empire, and collections of letters and diplomatic correspondence. The first category includes those documents, mainly *farmsans* (decrees) of the imperial Ottoman
government, which provide information on Ottoman-Indian relations. These decrees are recorded in a kind of official letter-book called Mühimme Defteri (Register of Important Affairs). It contains copies of the dispatches from the Ottoman Sultans and occasionally from the Grand Wazir and Sheikh al-Islam to provincial, military and religious officials in all parts of the empire. The importance of Mühimme Defteri, located in the Başvekalet Arşivi in Istanbul, for the study of Ottoman history cannot be overemphasized. Professor Heyd has aptly remarked that "no similar wealth of documents has come down to us from any other state of the Muslim Near and Middle East, and even among the treasures of the Ottoman archives with their millions of documents this Register occupies a central place."  

Another set of documents which have proved very fruitful for this study are the Name Humayun Defteri (Register of Imperial Correspondence). Preserved in the Başvekalet Arşivi, these registers contain copies of the Ottoman Sultan's letters addressed to foreign potentates and dignitaries; letters received from foreign monarchs and dignitaries are also recorded in these registers. The epistles exchanged between the Ottoman Sultans and their Mughal counterparts in the eighteenth century, hitherto unknown to the scholars of Mughal history, are copied in these registers. Several other Ottoman documents preserved in the Başvekalet Arşivi and the Topkapi Saray Arşivi in Istanbul have been used for this study.

The second category includes the chronicles of the Ottoman
empire written by contemporary or near-contemporary Ottoman historians; these chronicles provide supplementary information on the diplomatic exchanges between the courts of Shahjahanabad and Istanbul. Almost all the major chronicles have been used. But two chroniclers in particular, because of their interest in Indian affairs, have been relied upon extensively: Mustafa Naima and Suleiman Ibn Khalil Izzi. Naima, the first occupant of the office of Vakanûvislik (official court chronicler) was the author of Revzat al-Hûsaeyn fi Hulasat Ahbar al-Hafekeyn. This work, popularly known as Tarih-i-Naima and described by Professor Shaw as "a landmark in Ottoman historiography,"\(^\text{14}\) covers the period 1591-1660. Naima's account of the diplomatic relations between India and the Ottoman empire during the reign of Shahjahan is very valuable. It is through Naima alone that we come to know about the arrival of the Mughal prince Baisanghar in Istanbul to seek Ottoman aid against Shahjahan. For this study, the text edited by Zuhûrî Danisman (6 vols., Istanbul, 1967-1969) has been used.

Suleiman Izzi, who served as Vukanûvis from 1743-1745 and again from 1746-1753, was the author of Tarih-i-Izzi. The period covered by this chronicle extends from 1744 to 1752. It provides firsthand information on the diplomatic exchanges between Sultan Mahmud I (1730-1754) and the Emperor Muhammad Shah (1719-1748). Izzi has copied the text of the letters exchanged between the two monarchs; the chronicler has also reproduced the petitions sent by the Mughal
wazir Nizam ul-mulk Asaf Jah I and his son Nasir Jung to the Ottoman Sultan. These letters and petitions are almost exact copies of the originals recorded in the Name Humayun Defteri. However, Izzi has not copied the confidential letter sent by Nizam ul-mulk to Mamud I, exhorting the Sultan to invade Persia. This indicates that contrary to the observation of modern scholars the official Ottoman chronicler did not have access to all the state documents. For the present study, the manuscript preserved in the British Museum (B.M. Or. 9318, transcribed in 1769) has been used.

Most of the major Mughal chronicles, official as well as private, are available in print. Many of these, especially those dealing with the reigns of Humayun and Akbar (1556-1605), have also been translated into English. Sheikh Abul Fazl's Akbar Nama is an authentic history of Akbar's reign. Though not very helpful for assessing Akbar's attitude towards the Ottoman, the chronicle does provide reliable information on the Emperor's relations with the Sharifs of Mecca. Abul Fazl's account of the Ottoman dynasty is inaccurate. This probably indicates the chronicler's lack of interest in Ottoman affairs. The chronicles of Shahjahan's reign are, however, very useful for reconstructing Mughal-Ottoman relations; Abdul Hamid Lahori's Badshah Nama and the Aml-i-Salih of Muhammad Salih Kanbu, published in the Bibliotheca Indica series, have been mainly used for this study. The latest edition of Aml-i-Salih, revised by Dr. Waheed Qureshi (3 vols., Lahore,
1967-72), has also been used. Khafi Khan's Muntakhab-ul-Lubab is the best known private chronicle of the Mughal empire. Compiled in 1731, this work provides additional information on the diplomatic exchanges between the Mughals and the Ottomans. Khafi Khan's account of European piracy against Indian pilgrim and merchant ships during the reign of Aurangzeb is very useful in examining the Mughal attitude towards the problem of Haj traffic. My references are to the Persian text published in the Bibliotheca Indica series.

Extensive use has been made of the diplomatic correspondence of the period. In all, almost sixty dispatches have been consulted; many of these are preserved in collections of correspondence. For the present study Munshaat-us-Salatin has proved to be very helpful. Compiled by Ahmad Feridun Bey, Secretary to the Grand Wazir Sokullu Muhammad Pasha, it contains almost all the letters exchanged between the Mughals and the Ottomans in the seventeenth century. The text published from Istanbul in 1848-49 has been used. On the Mughal side, the most well known collection of letters is Maktubat-i-Allami of Sheikh Abul Fazl. It contains letters written by the Sheikh to foreign potentates in the name of Emperor Akbar as well as the Sheikh's own dispatches to Mughal dignitaries. The imperial epistles sent to the Uzbek monarch Abdullah Khan Uzbek are very useful for reconstructing Akbar's attitude towards the Ottomans. The text published from Lucknow in 1863 has been used. The unique collection of Emperor Aurangzeb's Hasbul Hukms (decrees), dictated to
his secretary Inayatullah Khan Kashmiri (ed. S.M. Azizuddin Husain, Delhi, 1982), has also been consulted. Known as *Kalimat-i Taiyibat*, the work contains several dispatches to the Governors of Gujarat and to the Port officers of Surat; these decrees are very useful in assessing the Emperor's policy towards the problem of Haj traffic during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

In addition to the aforementioned primary sources, several unpublished English and Portuguese documents have also been used. For a consolidated list of all the primary sources used in this study, see the bibliography.

The research for this study was carried out at the Başvekalet Arşivi, Istanbul; the Topkapi Saray Müzesi Arşivi, Istanbul; the Maharashtra State Archives, Bombay; the Historical Archives of Goa, Panajim; and the National Archives of India, New Delhi. In addition the following libraries also provided material; the Topkapi Saray Müzesi Kutuphane, Istanbul; the Suleimaniye Kutuphane, Istanbul; the University of Chicago Library; and the Research Library of the Centre of Advanced Study in History, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, India.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter explores the Mughal empire's political and diplomatic relations with Istanbul from its beginning in 1556 to Emperor Shahjahan's deposition in 1658. The contacts of the pre-Mughal Muslim states of the subcontinent with the Ottomans as well as Babur's attitude towards
them have been briefly outlined to provide proper background to the policies of Babur's successors. The influence exercised by the events in the neighbouring Safavid and Uzbek empires and also of the personal whims and passions of the Mughal monarchs on the over-all Mughal-Ottoman relations have been examined. The efforts made by the Ottomans to maintain friendly relations with the Mughals and the kaleidoscopic attitude of the Mughals, together with its causes, have been highlighted. The second chapter carries the story of the Mughal-Ottoman relations from the accession of Aurangzeb in 1658 to the death of Muhammad Shah in 1748. The change in the pattern of the Mughal-Ottoman relationship, which occurred in this period, has been reviewed and the factors responsible for this change have been analyzed. The downfall of the Safavid dynasty and the rise of Nadir Shah in Persia have been briefly discussed. The impact of these events on the fortunes of the Mughal and the Ottoman states and their effects on Mughal-Ottoman relations have also been appraised.

The third chapter surveys Mughal relations with the Sharifs of Mecca. "The Sharifs," observes a modern Arab scholar "were not merely Arab princes living in the shadow of Turkish Valis [Governors]; on the contrary, the Turkish Valis were for most of the time living in the shadows of the Sharifs. Hijaz, therefore, was not a vilayet as the other vilayets, but a state within a state. . . "16 The influence of the Sharifs was not confined to the Hijaz alone; because of their lineage from the Prophet Muhammad they
also wielded considerable influence in the rest of the Islamic world. It is therefore hardly surprising that all the Muslim rulers of the time desired to maintain cordial relations with the Sharifs. The Mughals were no exception to this rule. The chapter examines the nature of Mughal-Sharifian relations and analyzes the influence of this relationship on Mughal-Ottoman relations.

Chapter four briefly surveys the problems of Indian Muslims going to Mecca on pilgrimage during the period under review. The major hurdle was the Portuguese blockade of the sea route to the Holy Land. The pilgrims going by the land route via Persia had to suffer the sectarian hostility of the Safavid government. In the sixteenth century the Muslims of South East Asia, who were also victims of Portuguese aggression, petitioned the Ottoman Sultan to relieve them from the Portuguese yoke. At about the same time the rulers of Central Asia requested the Porte to help them against Russian aggression. They complained that the Russian conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan had blocked the only land route to Mecca available to Central Asian pilgrims. The chapter reviews the response of the Mughal and the Ottoman governments to this problem and examines the outcome of the measures taken by these governments to alleviate the situation.

Chapter five probes the Mughal attitude towards the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat of Islam. Proud of their own power and prestige, most of the Mughal Emperors refused to acknowledge the
Ottoman Khilafat and advanced their own claim to the Khilafat within their domains. Numismatic and epigraphic evidence has been extensively used to support this theory. The effect of the rival claim to the Khilafat on over-all Mughal-Ottoman relations has been examined. The concluding chapter reviews the diplomatic protocol observed by the Mughals and the Ottomans. The factors conducive to amity and to conflict between the Mughals and Ottomans have been examined. The causes of the lack of intimate relations between these two premier ruling houses of Islam have also been analyzed.

For the conversion of dates from the Islamic to the Christian era, the author has followed the Taqvim-i-Hijri wa Isawi (Calender of Hijri and Christian dates), compiled by A.M. Khalidi and revised by Maulvi Mahmood Ahmad Khan (Anjumani Taraqqi-i urdu, Karachi, 1974). The work is based on Eduard Mahler's Wustenfeld-Mahler'sche vergleichungs-Tabellen der Mohammedanischen und Christlichen Zeitrechnung (Leipzig, 1926).
NOTES

1 Abul Fazl, Akbar Nama (henceforth A.N.), English tr. H. Beveridge, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1897-1921, reprint: Rare Books, Delhi, 1972, vol. II, p. 262.


3 F.W. Buckler, Harunu'l Rashid and Charles the Great, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1931, p. 22.


Ibid., p. 8.


8 See for example, L.F. Rushbrooke-Williams, An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century, Longmans, 1918; Radhey Shyam, Babur.


13Ibid., pxv.

14Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern*

15 See for example the following observation of Professor Stanford Shaw: "The vakani,vislik was established as a separate division of the chancery of the Imperial Council, so that the court chronicler would have direct, immediate and continuous access to the Muhimme registers of Council decisions as well as other state papers, and he could set them down or summarize them before they were lost or scattered." Ibid., p. 288.

CHAPTER ONE

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: THE FIRST PHASE

It is not hidden from Your Majesty's ingenious intellect and hairsplitting reason that since our accession to the throne, all thorns here and there have been removed by our irresistible might, and our opponents have been brought to book by our impetuous cohorts. We are determined to exterminate the erring sect and for this reason we have sent our victorious troops against Shah Abbas -- the most insolent of men. If Your Majesty, on your side, attacks them too, their kingdom will soon be destroyed and, from both sides, the glory of the soldiers of Islam will be proclaimed (Sultan Murad IV to Emperor Jahangir).

Peace and order having been restored in the Deccan, and nothing remaining to be achieved in the other Indian Provinces, our intention now is to repel the redheads, the base sectarians and innovators. Our immediate object is the conquest of Qandahar, which is on the frontier of this empire; after which, God willing, that of Khurasan will follow. It is incumbent on all Muslim monarchs, who reinforce and invigorate the illustrious faith, to extirpate these heretics. It, therefore, behooves Your Majesty to expel them from Arabian Iraq, especially Baghdad . . . (Emperor Shahjahan to Sultan Murad IV).

On the twenty-third of April, 1526, Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566) left Istanbul at the head of a strong force for the Hungarian campaign; the expedition ended in the conquest and annexation of Hungary to the Ottoman empire. Precisely two days before the Sultan's departure from Istanbul another great Turk, Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur, the direct descendant of Timur and Chingiz Khan, defeated the levies of the Afghan king, Ibrahim Lodi, at the
battle of Panipat and founded the Mughal empire in India — "one of the most spectacular triumphs of Islam in the sixteenth century."4

The Ottoman influence had, however, preceded the Mughals in India, particularly in the Deccan and along the Western coast of the subcontinent. Ottoman adventurers and soldiers of fortune abounded in India; they were reputed to be expert gunners and musketeers and were generally employed as artillerymen. Several Ottoman Turks held positions of considerable power and influence in the Sultanate of Gujarat; prominent among them were Rumi Khan, Safar Khudawand Khan and his son, Rajab Khudawand Khan. Rumi Khan, who later served Mughal Emperor Humayun as Superintendent of Artillery, held the fiefs of Ranir, Surat, Mahim and Diu.5 Safar Khudawand Khan governed the town of Surat with singular distinction for many years. According to Farishta, he built the castle of Surat and fortified it in the Turkish fashion.6 His son Rajab Khan became the Governor of Surat in 1546 and retained this post till his death in 1560. The rousing reception which Sidi Ali Reis, the Ottoman admiral, received in Surat and in other parts of Gujarat bear witness to the strong position and influence enjoyed by the Ottoman Turks in this Muslim state of the subcontinent.7 In 1572, when the kingdom of Gujarat finally collapsed, there were still more than three hundred Turks in the Gujarati army.8

Sultan Muhammad Shah Bahmani III (1463–1482) was the first among the rulers of the subcontinent to exchange diplomatic missions
with the Ottomans. In his letter to Ottoman Sultan Muhammad II, he paid tribute to the Sultan "as the one deserving to be the Khalifa" and requested him to build a firm relationship between the two states. In his reply, sent through Maulana Afzaluddin Oglu Muhammad Chelabi, the Ottoman Sultan expressed similar sentiments of friendship and solidarity. The return embassy of the Bahmanids carried a very conciliatory letter and valuable gifts for the Sultan. According to the Ottoman chronicler Tursun Beg, when the Bahmanid envoy, accompanied by the Maulana, landed at Jidda the news of Sultan Muhammad’s death and the accession of Sultan Bayazid II (1481–1512) had reached Arabia. The Mamluk Sultan of Egypt detained the two ambassadors and confiscated their baggage. Although the Sultan of Egypt later apologized for his rash conduct and returned the seized goods, Bayazid did not accept his apologies. In fact, this incident contributed significantly to the subsequent Ottoman–Mamluk war (1485–1491). The next Ottoman embassy to the Bahmanids was led by Syed Muhammad. In his letter, Sultan Bayazid II acknowledged with pleasure the letter of his Bahmani counterpart. He appreciated the services of Bahmani Wazir Khwaja Mahmud Gawan in establishing friendship between the Ottoman and the Bahmani states, and requested the Bahamani Sultan to keep the channel of correspondence open to increase their mutual amity and concord. In his reply, sent through Mulla Niamatullah, Mahmud Shah Bahmani (1482–1518) informed Bayazid of the anti-state activities of Mahmud
Gawan, and the eventual execution of the Khwaja. He assured the 
Ottoman Sultan that despite the death of Mahmud Gawan the gates of 
correspondence between the two sides would remain open; friendship 
between the two states would, emphasized Mahmud Shah, continue to 
fLOUR and prosper.14 The Bahmani kingdom collapsed in 1527; 
there is no evidence that any of its successor states ever maintained 
diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. The kingdom of Bijapur is, 
however, reported to have adopted the Turkish 'national' symbol, the 
Crescent, as its royal emblem; this insignia was engraved on all 
public buildings in Bijapur.15

The Bahmanids were followed by the Muzaffarids of Gujarat in 
establishing diplomatic contacts with the Ottomans. Several 
embassies seem to have been exchanged between Muzaffar Shah II 
(1511-1526) and Sultan Selim I (1512-1520). Muzaffar Shah's letter 
to the Sultan, dated October 15, 1518, acknowledges the Sultan's 
elloquent letter "heralding the glad tidings of the victories" brought 
by the Ottoman envoy Amir Husain. He congratulates the Sultan on his 
brilliant victory in Iraq, and enumerates at great length his own 
victories in Malwa against the Rajputs.16 Selim is said to have 
sent another embassy to Gujarat under Mahmud Zaid. In his letter, 
sent through Mahmud, the Ottoman Sultan gives an exhaustive account 
of his recent victories in Syria and Egypt. Selim refers to his firm 
determination of expelling the Portuguese infidels from the shores of 
Arabia, and expresses his desire to continue the mutual exchange of
embassies without interruption. Malik Ayaz, one of the leading nobles of the Sultanate of Gujarat, was also in correspondence with Selim. In his letter to the Sultan, dated November 23, 1518, he addresses the Sultan as "Khalifa on earth" and congratulates him on his victories in Syria and Egypt. Malik Ayza sent, along with his letter, a detailed report of the Portuguese activities in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. In this report Malik Ayaz noted the compelling necessity of a joint Ottoman-Gujarat offensive against the Portuguese.

Babur, the first Mughal, whom Toynbee styles "the most centrally placed and most intelligent observer . . . among notable non-westerners" of his age may not have been unaware of the Portuguese menace to the world of Islam or of the Gujarati endeavour to form an anti-Portuguese alliance with the Ottomans. Sultan Selim's conquest of Syria and Egypt may certainly not have escaped his attention. Babur's memoirs have been preserved in a fragmentary form; there is a gap of nearly eleven years (1508-1519) in the extant text. It is possible that the Emperor may have deliberated, in some lost passage, upon the growing power of the Ottomans. His memoirs, however, do contain numerous, though indirect, references to the Ottomans. He has referred to the Ottoman device of chaining carts together and placing matchlock-men behind these carts, a tactic which he himself used brilliantly and with great effect in the decisive battle of Panipat (1526). In his next important engagement,
against the Rajputs, Babur again adopted the same tactics. He arranged the carts "in the Ottoman way" and imitated the "ghazis of Rum" (Ottomans) by posting the tufangchian (Matchlock-men) and radadazan (cannoneers) along the line of carts. 23 Again he came out victorious.

Several Ottoman Turks seem to have been in Babur's service. One of his chief artillery officers was Mustafa Rumi, an Ottoman Turk. 24 Mustafa served Babur with great distinction in all his combats, and earned his deep appreciation. 25 Babur has also recorded the services rendered by an Ottoman physician who applied on the Emperor "a remedy which had recently been discovered in Rum (Turkey)." 26

Nonetheless, Babur made no attempt to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. The Emperor's indifference towards the Ottomans was hardly surprising. He was obsessed with the conquest of Mawara-an-Nahr (Central Asia); ruled by the Uzbeks, Mawara-an-Nahr had once been a part of Timur's empire. Being the head of the Timurid family, Babur claimed Central Asia as his rightful patrimony; the conquest of Balkh, Bokhara, and Samarqand had always fired his imagination. The desire for the acquisition of these "delightful and wonderfully beautiful regions" had not deterred him from sacrificing even his religious conscience and suffering the ignominy of vassalage to Shah Ismail I (1501-1524) of Persia. 27 As late as November, 1528, two years before his death, Babur was
planning to invade Central Asia. Though hounded out of Samarqand on at least three occasions by the Uzbeks, the Emperor was yet willing to seize any opportunity to get hold of his ancestral domains. Babur was thus a staunch enemy of the Uzbeks; he regarded them as the only obstacle in the way of the fulfillment of his cherished dreams. The Ottomans, on the other hand, were closely allied with the Uzbeks. Deeply committed to the survival of Uzbek rule in Central Asia, they desired to maintain the territorial integrity of the Sunni Uzbek empire as a bulwark against the expansion of the Safavid (Shii) influence in that region. The Ottoman-Uzbek concord, as well as the clash of Mughal-Ottoman interests in Central Asia seem to have raised suspicions in Babur's mind regarding the utility of an alliance with the Ottomans. Hence he made no attempt to enter into friendly communication with them.

On the death of Babur in December 1530, his eldest son Prince Muhammad Humayun (1530-1556) succeeded to the throne of Delhi. Among the problems which Babur had left, one that demanded Humayun's immediate attention was that of the Afghans. Determined to re-establish their hegemony in India, the Afghans were looking out for any opportunity to recover their lost domains. Burhan Lodi, uncle of Sultan Ibrahím Lodi (1517-1526), was one of these Afghans. In 1536, he took refuge in Istanbul; his mission was to seek military aid against the Mughals. But probably the power struggle and infighting among the Muslim states of India was a matter too remote
to arouse Suleiman's interest; realising that any campaign against
the Mughals would require a large navy and would entail enormous
expenses, the Sultan refused.\footnote{31} At about the same time, Bahadur
Shah of Gujarat sent an embassy to Istanbul; he solicited Ottoman aid
against Humayun's aggression.\footnote{32} Humayun may not have been
unaware of these developments, but at this juncture he did not show
any inclination to cultivate friendly relations with the Ottomans.
In 1540, Sher Shah, the leader of the Afghan resistance against the
Mughals, forced Humayun out of India. The Emperor did not solicit
aid from the Ottoman Sultan, his Sunni compeer; instead, he went into
exile in the Shia stronghold of Safavid Persia. Nevertheless,
Humayun did not lose any opportunity to show his friendliness towards
the Ottomans. While Humayun was in Tabriz, we are told by the
chronicler Jauhar Aftabchi, he met two Ottoman Turks. He chatted
with them in Turkish and sent, through them, his compliment to the
Sultan.\footnote{33}

Through his spies and agents the Sultan seems to have kept
himself informed about the affairs of Humayun. A succinct Ottoman
report, issued probably in 1546, apprised the Porte of Humayun's
defeat at the hands of Sher Shah, the perfidy and callousness of his
brothers, the Emperor's arrival in Persia, and his conquest of
Qandahar with the military assistance provided by Shah Tahmasp. The
report also informed the Porte of the capture of Mirza Askari,
Humayun's brother, the flight of Mirza Kamran, another brother of
Humayun, from Kabul and the desertion of Kamran's troops to Humayun. It concluded with an account of Humayun’s conquest of Kabul and Badakhshan. The Porte's reaction to this report is not known. In any case, the report, besides providing new evidence for this troubled and stormy phase of Humayun's career, also demonstrates the Ottoman interest in Mughal affairs.

Humayun is alleged to have written a letter to Sultan Suleiman in October 1548. The letter proscribed Shah Tahmasp in strong terms for his villainy and proposed a joint Mughal-Ottoman invasion of Persia. The authenticity of this letter, however, is doubtful. First, no Ottoman and Mughal chronicler or compiler of diplomatic correspondence (Insha Literature) has taken notice of a letter of such consequence. Second, Humayun's relations with Shah Tahmasp, during his sojourn in Persia, though at times tense and unpleasant, were on the whole cordial and friendly; after Humayun's return to Kabul the Mughal-Persian relations had further improved. Subsequently several embassies of good will were exchanged between the two kings. Even in October 1548, Humayun is reported to have sent Khwaja Jalaluddin Mahmud as his envoy to Shah Tahmasp. Third, in 1548, Humayun was still busy putting his house in order. According to Abul Fazl, "He [Humayun] was constantly engaged in plans for strengthening the Khilafat and for improving the affairs of the state ... " In August, 1548, he had quelled a rebellion of Mirza Kamran and had returned to Kabul after an arduous
campaign. With his brothers in revolt and with his position at Kabul still precarious, Humayun was in no position to challenge Shah Tahmasp or to invite the Ottoman Sultan to join hands in an invasion of Persia. The letter, therefore, appears to be spurious. In all probability it seems to be the work of an oriental epistolographist, who drafted this letter by way of literary exercise.

In 1555, shortly before his death, Humayun got an opportunity to establish formal relations with the Ottomans. This was provided by the arrival of Sidi Ali Reis, the Ottoman admiral. The Sidi, after being shipwrecked in the Persian Gulf and abandoning his battered fleet in Gujarat, reached Delhi on his way back to Istanbul. The admiral was accorded a brilliant reception at the Mughal capital. No less a person than Khan-i-Khanan Baimam Khan, the Prime Minister, along with four hundred elephants and one thousand men, was sent by Humayun to receive him. The Sidi was offered a jagir and the governorship of a district; this he politely refused. During his stay in Delhi, the admiral strove to impress upon Humayun and his courtiers the superiority and primacy of his master, the Ottoman Sultan, among the Muslim monarchs. He related an episode with gusto that the Chinese emperor, though an unbeliever, had permitted the Turkish merchants residing in China, to read the khutba in the Sultan's name. Humayun reacted favourably to the Sidi's assertions. He observed, we are told by the admiral, that the Ottoman sovereign was the only Muslim potentate worthy to bear the title of Padshah.
Sidi Ali Reis was the bearer of Humayun's letter to Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. Joseph Von Hammer and several other modern scholars have attributed the authorship of this letter to Akbar, Humayun's successor.\textsuperscript{42} Hammer's source for this letter, 'Journal of Suleimans campaign,' is obscure and untraceable. But numerous collections of Insha Literature, available in Istanbul's libraries, have preserved this letter in Humayun's name.\textsuperscript{43} Two modern collections of Persian documents also refer to Humayun as the author of this letter.\textsuperscript{44} Sidi Ali's testimony too is in favour of its being written by Humayun.\textsuperscript{45} The contents of the letter, namely the reference to the recent conquest of Hind and Sind by the writer, also testify to the authenticity of Humayun's authorship.

The letter begins with eulogies and compliments. Humayun addresses the Sultan as the "Khalifa of the highest qualities," quotes the Quranic verse "He [God] has sent thee as the Khalifa on earth," and prays for the eternal perpetuation of Suleiman's Khilafat. The Emperor refers to his recent conquest of Hind and Sind and observes that "the exalted virtues of the Sultan have always excited the wish of mutual correspondence." The arrival of Sidi Ali Kapudan, writes Humayun, has provided the opportunity of fulfilling this long cherished desire; this letter is therefore being sent as a proof of sincerity and devotion. The letter concludes in the following words: "It is hoped and expected, that also on your part
the gates of mutual communication will be opened by the keys of attachment, and that the channels of mutual correspondence will not be closed; and that in this manner the foundation of the towering fabric of union will be strengthened and kept free from decay."\textsuperscript{46}

Humayun's sudden death in 1556, before his letter could reach its destination, considerably reduced the chances of a Mughal-Ottoman rapprochement. The new Mughal Emperor, Jalaluddin Akbar, was not as favourably disposed as his father was to cultivate friendly relations with the Ottomans. Moreover in 1556, Akbar was hardly in a position to take new initiatives to establish diplomatic ties with Istanbul. His first priority was to consolidate the unwieldly empire which he had inherited from his father. Akbar's own position was far from secure; surrounded by enemies from all sides, he was dependent on the support of his nobles for his survival. The Emperor had even acquiesced to surrender the coveted fort of Qandahar to the Persians.\textsuperscript{47} No less discouraging was the response of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. He neither acknowledged Humayun's letter nor sent a diplomatic mission to Akbar's court. This was bound to have a chilling effect on Mughal-Ottoman relations. The Mughal-Ottoman entente was stillborn.

Though the Sultan did not strive to improve diplomatic relations with the Mughals, he was not indifferent to the developments in the subcontinent. The arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian waters, their domination of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and the
threat posed by them to the Holy Cities were known to him (see Chapter Four for details). The reports of the Portuguese atrocities against the Indian Muslims going on pilgrimage to Mecca had already reached the Sultan. The Muslims of Sumatra had also petitioned the Sultan to protect them against the Portuguese aggression. In the 1560's, the Sultan took several steps to alleviate the situation. Farmans were issued to provincial governors and local officials directing them to immediately prepare an imperial fleet; the fleet was to be deployed against the Portuguese. Suleiman's successor Selim II (1566-1574) was equally committed to eliminate the Portuguese threat to the merchants and pilgrims coming to the Ottoman territories from India. In an extraordinary farman to the Governor of Egypt, Selim II stressed the need of protecting the Muslims coming from India for Haj and for commerce. He declared that for the exigency of expelling the Portuguese from India, an imperial fleet had been equipped and was ready to sail. He proposed that, for easier maneuvering of the imperial fleet in the Red Sea, a water channel should be carved out between the Mediterranean and the Suez. The Sultan commissioned the Governor to send architects and engineers to investigate the matter and to inform him immediately regarding the practicability of the proposed project.

Had this project been completed, writes a modern Turkish historian, it would have brought great changes in the world economy. But the plan either seems to have been abandoned or
to have been stillborn, for later Ottoman records do not mention it. Perhaps like the Don-Volga canal project which the Ottoman government took up in 1569, partly for the sake of protecting the Central Asian pilgrims from the Russian menace, the Suez canal project was also foredoomed. 52 Certainly, in the technical conditions of the sixteenth century it was almost impossible to build such a canal. Nevertheless, the very plan itself serves to indicate the Ottoman Sultan's interest in Indian affairs.

The Ottoman records mention the arrival of an ambassador from India in 1568. In a farman to the Governor of Egypt, the Sultan itemized a list of provisions to be supplied to the returning Indian ambassador. 53 The envoy's name and the king, whom he represented, are not mentioned. The term "Hind elçiisi," which occurs in the imperial decree, is too vague to communicate any definite identity. In 1568, besides the Mughal empire several other independent kingdoms flourished in India; the ambassador could have been the representative of any of these states. The Ottoman documents and chronicles of the seventeenth century have, however, freely used the word "Hind elçisi" or "elçiye-Hind" to denote Mughal ambassadors. Could Akbar have sent this embassy? It is difficult to know. Between 1564 and 1572, Akbar seems to have concentrated all of his energies on domestic affairs; there is no record of his having exchanged diplomatic missions either with the Safavids or with the Uzbeks in this period. 54 The intent of this embassy is also not
known. None of the Mughal chroniclers have referred to it. Probably the embassy was sent to congratulate Selim II on his accession to the throne.

In the early 1580's, Akbar got involved in a serious dispute with the Ottomans over the activities of Indian pilgrims in Mecca and Medina. Akbar's conquest of Gujarat in 1573 had opened the sea route to the Holy Cities for his Muslim subjects. Several ladies of his household, including his aunt Gulbadan Begum and his wife Salima Sultan Begum, had expressed their desire to go on pilgrimage. 55 The Emperor himself, we are told by Abul Fazl, wanted to go for Haj. But his officers persuaded him to give up his resolve in view of the necessity of his presence for the well-being of the empire. 56 In October 1575, the royal ladies left Fatehpur Sikri, the Mughal capital, for the Holy Land. 57 Numerous other Muslims accompanied the royal ladies; their expenses were paid by the state. Sultan Khwaja Naqshbandi was appointed as the Mir Haj (Leader of the pilgrims). The royal caravan had to stay at Surat for one year for want of a Portuguese passport. Eventually in October 1576, the royal entourage set sail in a Turkish ship; the pilgrims reached Jidda the following year. 58 Akbar's ladies and their companions stayed in the Hijaz for the next four years; they performed the Haj four times and returned to India in 1581 59 (for further details see Chapter Three).

The prolonged stay of these pilgrims, and of many others who
followed them in succeeding years, as well as the activities of these people was bound to have serious repercussions. In 1578, it was reported to the Sultan that a multitude of people who had accompanied the Mughal caravan of 1577 and 1578 had not returned to their country, that their protracted stay had created overcrowding and scarcity of provisions in the Sacred Cities, and that these pilgrims had become a constant source of distress and anxiety to the natives. The Sultan ordered the Governor of Mecca to take immediate action. He was to restrain the Indians from staying in the Holy Cities after performing the Hajj and to arrange for their immediate return to their own country. Similar *farmans* were issued in the name of the Governor and Qazi of Medina. Two years later, the pasha of Egypt communicated to the Porte that the *sadagat* (alms) sent by the king of India, Jalaluddin Akbar, were being distributed in the Harem Sharif, that ladies of Akbar's household and their numerous followers were still staying in the Holy Cities, and that these people were indulging in certain *namešru* (not ordained by the *shariat*) activities. The Sultan reacted sharply. He sent two *farmans* to the Sharif of Mecca in quick succession. He commanded the Sharif strictly to curb the activities contrary to the *shariat* in the vicinity of the two cities and to prevent the ladies and their fellow pilgrims from residing in these cities after performing the Hajj. The Sharif was also instructed to expedite the return journey of the Indians and to stop the distribution of alms transmitted by Akbar
without any delay. Identical farmans were dispatched to the Governors of Medina and Jidda and to the Qazi of Mecca. A few months later the Porte sent another farman to the Sharif of Mecca with a parallel set of instructions.

The Sultan's proscription of the Sadagat sent by Akbar was hardly surprising. The Emperor's anti-Islamic activities were probably responsible for this momentous decision. According to the contemporary chronicler Badauni, Akbar had taken several steps to harm the Faith and the Faithful. The Emperor's order to exclude the name of the Prophet Muhammad from Friday sermons and his decree abolishing the public prayer and the azan (call for prayer) in the vicinity of the royal abode had considerably irritated his Muslim subjects. Not content with this, the Emperor had contrived, through the machinations of a few ulama, to acquire the power of the interpretation of Islamic law. In 1581, he had even promulgated a new sect. Known as Din-i Ilahi (Divine Faith), the sect was a curious amalgam of Islam, Christianity, Jainism, and other elements. Akbar's religious eccentricities seem to have scandalized the whole world of Islam. Abdullah Khan Uzbek, the ruler of Central Asia, was reported to have sent a leading alim of his court to India to investigate the charges against the Emperor. Such reports must have also reached the Ottoman court. Sheikh Abdun Nabi and Mulla Abdullah Sultanpuri, two distinguished ulama of Akbar's court, whom the Emperor had banished to Mecca for their opposition to his
religious policies, were also said to have spread the stories of Akbar's deviation from orthodoxy in the Hijaz. 69 It was indeed improper to accept alms from a person known for anti-Islamic activities. This consideration seems to have prompted the Sultan to stop the distribution of the charities sent by Akbar.

The proscription of his alms coupled with the Sultan's orders to expell the ladies of his household from the Holy Land seems to have annoyed Akbar considerably. The royal ladies, who returned to Fatehpur Sikri in April 1582, may also have related to the Emperor their tales of woe and humiliation. All the Indian sources are silent about this episode. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain Akbar's reaction to this affair. 70 But the Emperor's subsequent actions betray his hostility towards the Ottomans. After 1582 he stopped sending charities and Haj caravans to the Hijaz. Relations with the Sharifs of Mecca were also suspended.

In 1582, Akbar seriously contemplated an anti-Ottoman alliance with the Portuguese. He even expressed willingness to finance a joint Mughal-Portuguese campaign against the Ottomans. 71 A diplomatic mission, consisting of Sayyid Muzaffer, Abdullah Khan, and the Jesuit missionary Father Monserrate, was also dispatched to Lisbon. In his letter to Philip II, Akbar pointed out the importance of international alliances for "establishing peace and harmony on earth." For this very purpose, asserted the Emperor, the Mughal ambassador was being sent. He requested the Spanish king to have
faith in the oral messages entrusted to the ambassador. The letter concluded with a prayer to "keep the portal of correspondence open without interruption." The embassy left the Mughal capital in the summer of 1582. But on the way to Goa, Sayyid Muzaffer, who according to Monserrate had been forced into the expedition against his will, deserted and fled to the Deccan. Abdullah Khan and Father Monserrate managed to reach Goa; however, for reasons unknown they could not sail to Lisbon and ultimately returned to the court. Thus, Akbar's first attempt to organize an anti-Ottoman offensive proved abortive.

Akbar's treatment of the diplomatic mission sent by the Ottoman Governor of Yemen also bears testimony to his hostility towards the Ottomans. He not only rejected the proposal brought by the envoys but also chained and banished the leader of the mission to Lahore. "The reason for this," observes Monserrate, "is said to have been his [Akbar's] resentment at the arrogance both of the ambassadors themselves and of the king who sent them, and the endeavour which they made to persuade him to wage war against the King of Spain and Portugal." This was not all. The Emperor also turned down Abdullah Khan Uzbek's proposal of a joint Mughal-Uzbek-Ottoman invasion of Persia. He accused the Ottoman Sultan of violation of treaties made with Persia by his predecessors and offered a counter-proposal of a triple alliance of the Mughals, the Uzbeks, and the Safavids against the Ottomans. "At present," Akbar wrote to the
Uzbek monarch, "when the Sultan of Turkey, regarding the treaties and agreements made by his father and grandfather as non-existent, has looked to the ostensibly feeble conditions of Persia, and has, several times, sent troops there, we shall, passing over the circumstance of deviation from the highway of sunnism (Sunnat-u-Jamaat) and looking only to the relationship to that dynasty [Safavid] with the family of the Prophet, proceed thither and help them . . . It befits our sublime spirit that we should fling out the reins of interest towards Iraq and Khurasan . . . You also should proceed from your dominion to that country, so that it may become a meeting of two seas of glory . . ." 76 Akbar's proposal was not considered seriously by the Khan. The traditional Ottoman-Uzbek alliance and concord was strong enough to resist such temptations. The Uzbek ruler simply ignored Akbar's scheme.

In 1587, Akbar made yet another attempt to form an anti-Ottoman alliance with the Portuguese. That year the Governor of Yemen reported to the Porte that Ottoman spies in India had informed that Jalaluddin Akbar, the king of India, had concluded an alliance with the Portuguese, and that the allies were preparing a fleet to invade the ports of Yemen. He requested the Porte for immediate reinforcements. The Sultan responded quickly. In his farman to the Governor he informed that firm orders had been issued to the Governors of Egypt and Basra to immediately send fifteen and five galleys, respectively, to Yemen. The Sultan urged the Pasha to
remain vigilant and to take every possible measure to defend the ports of Yemen. There is evidence that in his period Akbar was actively corresponding with the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa. A Mughal ambassador had also been in permanent residence in Goa since October 1584. The unusually long stay of the Mughal envoy in Goa seem to have generated the rumours about a possible Mughal-Portuguese alliance against the Ottomans. These rumours were duly reported by the Ottoman spies to the authorities at home. Mughal chroniclers have not taken notice of this episode. Even later Ottoman documents do not provide any clue to the subsequent development in this affair. The alliance does not seem to have materialized and the projected invasion never did take place.

Nevertheless, Akbar's interest in the Ottoman affairs remained undiminished. He issued instructions to the Mughal officials posted in the frontier provinces to collect information about the Ottoman empire and other neighboring states. In 1591, one such report was actually sent by Faizi, the poet laureate of Akbar, from the Deccan.

The Ottoman documents also allude to the arrival of an embassy from India in 1595-96. In a farman the Sultan directed the Governor of Egypt to provide every possible assistance and protection to Sayyid Muhammad, the returning ambassador of India, and his retinue. According to the farman, the ambassador had gone to Istanbul to discuss certain important matters with the Ottoman authorities.
The farman neither gives any hint regarding the matters the ambassador discussed with the Ottoman authorities nor does it indicate whom he represented. Did Sayyid Muhammad represent Akbar? If so, it would certainly indicate a change in Akbar's policy towards the Ottomans. But in the absence of any concrete evidence we can only speculate. Presumably, the Sayyid was dispatched either by Akbar or by some other potentate of India to congratulate Sultan Muhammad III (1595-1603) on his accession to the throne.

In 1602 an Ottoman embassy arrived at Akbar's court; the purpose of the mission was to seek trading privileges in the Mughal territories. 81 Akbar's response to this embassy as well as the fate of the mission is not known. Neither Mughal nor Ottoman sources have mentioned anything about this embassy. Akbar died in 1605. Throughout his reign he had maintained a lukewarm attitude towards the Ottomans. He left behind him a legacy of mistrust, hostility, and indifference in Mughal relations with the Ottoman empire.

Selim, who succeeded Akbar in 1605, made no attempts to improve bilateral relations. Soon after his accession, he changed his name to Jahangir because his own name "resembled that of the emperors of Rum [Turkey]." 82 He cherished the memory of Timur's triumph over Sultan Bayazid Yildrim (1389-1403). In his autobiography Jahangir has proudly recalled his ancestor's generosity in having restored Bayazid's son Musa Chelebi to the domains of his vanquished father. He considered the Ottomans to be under moral obligation to the
Mughals for this munificence of Timur. Notwithstanding such favours, complained the Emperor, the Ottomans had not maintained cordial relations with his family. 83 Jahangir's indifference towards the Ottomans is therefore hardly surprising.

On the other hand, the Ottomans, expecting a change in the Mughal policy with the accession of the new Emperor, promptly sent an embassy to India. The Ottoman ambassador arrived in 1608. He was, however, accorded a cold reception at the Mughal court. The envoy's wretched condition and uncouth appearance coupled with the fact that the letter brought by him was composed in an unfamiliar language raised the suspicions of the Mughal authorities regarding his credentials. "Looking to his [ambassador's] circumstances and proceedings," observed Jahangir, "none of the servants of the court believed in his being an ambassador . . . no one could bear witness to the accuracy of his claim." 84 His credentials therefore were rejected and he was expelled from the court. On his part the Emperor showed no inclination to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. In 1613, he sent a diamond merchant Muhammad Hussain Chelebi on a purchasing mission to Istanbul. The Chelebi was directed to go via Persia. Though he was entrusted with a letter of introduction for the Shah of Persia, no such credentials were given to him for the Ottoman court. 85 Nothing could reveal better the Emperor's nonchalance towards the Ottomans.

The next Ottoman embassy to India, which arrived in 1615, also
proved abortive. The purpose of this mission, we are told by Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador to Jahangir's court, was to dissuade the Emperor from assisting the Safavid monarch in his anti-Ottoman designs. The Ottoman envoy was insulted and was forced to prostrate himself before the Emperor in the Mughal fashion. Needless to say that the proposal brought by him was turned down. No return embassy to Istanbul was dispatched either.

Jahangir's extremely genial relations with Shah Abbas I (1587-1629) of Persia were primarily responsible for his unfriendly attitude towards the Ottomans. He had established cordial relations with the Shah during his father's lifetime and the Shah had already started sending him letters and gifts. After 1605, both monarchs had vied with each other in expressing their mutual friendship and affection. They addressed each other as "biradar ba jan barabar" (Brother as dear as life) and frequently exchanged expensive and novel presents. Shah Abbas, a staunch enemy of the Ottomans, kept Jahangir posted on Ottoman affairs; the Shah also sent him detailed reports of his war and peace with the Ottomans. From time to time Jahangir also provided the Shah with monetary support in his war against Ottomans. Sir Thomas Roe has observed that the primary objective of the Persian embassy of 1616 was to procure "mony for ayd against the Turke, in which kind he findes often liberall supplyes and succors."

Jahangir's pro-Persian policy was not destined to last long;
Shah Abbas's conquest of Qandahar in 1622 brought it to an abrupt end. Qandahar, a military and commercial outpost of considerable importance on the north-west frontier of the Mughal empire, had long been a bone of contention between Mughals and Safavids. Indeed, it had changed masters several times. Babur had captured it in 1522 but Shah Tahmasp had seized it back in 1558, during the period of anarchy and pandemonium which followed Humayun's death. Akbar had recovered the fort by diplomatic means in 1595; since then Shah Abbas had been eager to recapture it. In 1599 he had requested Akbar to surrender Qandahar but the Emperor had ignored his request. In 1607 the Shah had even made an abortive attempt to seize Qandahar by force. Determined to recover it at any cost, the Shah resorted to stratagem. By extraordinary professions of friendship, frequent dispatch of envoys, and exchange of costly presents, he succeeded in disarming the Emperor's suspicions regarding his designs against Qandahar. Jahangir neglected Qandahar's defenses and the Shah, who was biding for his time, made a surprise attack on the fort and captured it by storm.

The fall of Qandahar exposed the weak foundations upon which Jahangir had built the edifice of his foreign policy and obliged him to look for new allies. He now contemplated an alliance of Sunni powers against the Persians. Negotiations for such an alliance began with efforts to restore diplomatic relations with the Uzbeks. Afraid of the increasing might of Shah Abbas, the Uzbek monarch,
responded eagerly. Exchanges of several embassies between the Mughals and the Uzbeks followed. In his letter to Imam Quli Khan, the Khan of the Uzbeks, Jahangir displays a deep hatred of Shiism and avowed strong fealty to the Sunni creed. Asserting that the destruction of Shah Abbas would automatically obliterate Shiism, the Emperor urged Imam Quli Khan to "stand by his pledge to join him in a campaign against Shiism (i.e., the Safavids) . . ." In reply to this letter the Uzbek ruler sent a major embassy led by Abdur Rahim Khwaja, a leading divine of Central Asia. Jahangir received the ambassador warmly and showered unusual favours upon him. The letter brought by the envoy recalled the Mughal-Uzbek alliance against the Persians in the time of Akbar and Abdullah Khan Uzbek. Jahangir was requested to follow in the footsteps of his father and to collaborate with the Uzbeks in the "holy war" against the Persian heretics.

Imam Quli Khan also invited Sultan Murad IV (1623-1640) to join the proposed Mughal-Uzbek league against Shah Abbas. The Sultan, still chafing from the Shah's conquest of Baghdad in 1624, welcomed the proposal. He also wrote a very friendly letter to Jahangir. The letter began with lofty titles and superlative compliments for the Emperor. Avowing his sincerity and affection for Jahangir, the Sultan declared that the letter was being sent to renew old bonds of friendship. Referring to his efforts to exterminate his opponents, especially the Shias, Murad apprised the Emperor of the dispatch of
the "victorious Ottoman armies" against the wicked Shah Abbas. He asked Jahangir to launch an attack on Persia from his side immediately. "In this way," concluded the Sultan, "his [Abbas's] kingdom will soon be destroyed and from both sides the glory of the soldiers of Islam will be proclaimed."\(^98\) Jahangir probably received this letter at a time when his own empire was being torn by the revolt of Prince Khurram and the court intrigues. The Emperor's death in 1627 doomed the first attempt to organize a united front of Mughals, Uzbeks, and Ottomans, based upon Sunni solidarity, against Persia.

Shahjahan (1627-1658) who succeeded Jahangir was one of the most ambitious and capable sovereigns of his house. A man of strong will and great fortitude, he had already proved his mettle as a general and administrator. He had two basic objectives in foreign policy: the restoration of Mughal authority over Qandahar and the conquest of his ancestral domain in Central Asia. The attainment of the former required moral, if not military, support of the Ottomans, while the pursuit of the latter was bound to strain relations with them. Shahjahan had, therefore, to play his cards carefully. An orthodox Sunni as he was, the idea of a Sunni alliance against Persia seemed very attractive to him. This was also likely to be viewed with favour by the Ottomans and the Uzbeks and had great potential for success. He kept this idea of Sunni solidarity in reserve and whenever an opportunity arose, used it as a trump card to further his
ends.

In his relations with the Ottoman empire, Shahjahan's reign opened on a friendly note. In 1632, Prince Baisunghur, a cousin of Shahjahan and pretender to the Mughal throne, arrived in Istanbul. His mission was to seek military assistance against Shahjahan. Mughal chroniclers are unanimous in their opinion that after Shahjahan's accession Prince Baisunghur had fled to Kalaus and had died there; the person who had repaired to Istanbul, they assert, was an imposter. The prince created a bad impression at the Ottoman court. According to Naima, "He [Baisunghur] was not aware of the etiquette required in the royal presence, and boasting of his lineage and descent, his pride displeased the Padishah . . . This stupid and uncouth behavior was the cause that the Sultan gave up rising on the prince's arrival and had no desire what ever to see any more of him." Since the Sultan's relations with Shahjahan, observed Naima, were very cordial, he refused to oblige the prince. Baisanghar ultimately returned to India. There he was eventually arrested and later executed at Shahjahan's order.

In 1637, when Shahjahan's plans for the occupation of Qandahar were in an advanced stage, he sent his first embassy to Istanbul. The professed purpose of this embassy, led by Mir Zarif, was the purchase of horses for the royal stable from Arabia and Turkey. The Mir, a connoisseur of horses, had earlier been sent to Iraq to buy horses. But the horses he had brought, we are told by the chronicler
Abdul Hamid Lahori, had not come up to the Emperor's expectations. At his own request, he was again sent on the same errand to resuscitate his credit and prestige. The Mir was entrusted with a friendly letter, drafted by the Mughal wazir, and a priceless girdle set with diamonds for Sultan Murad Khan. As Mir Zarif intended to go via Hijaz, the Portuguese were requested to grant a free passage to him.

Mughal chroniclers have paid special attention to Zarif's embassy. Supplementary information about this mission is also available in the English Factory Records. According to these sources, the Mir left Agra on November 9, 1637. Embarking on an English ship the "Michaell" at Lahori Bander (Sindh) on February 13, 1638, he reached Mokha (Yemen) on the 6th of June, 1638. From Mokha the envoy went to Jidda, performed his religious obligations in the Holy Cities, and eventually reached Egypt. Received and magnificently entertained by the Governor of Egypt, the Mir travelled, at the Sultan's instructions, to Mosul. Admitted into audience almost immediately after his arrival at Mosul, the ambassador presented his credentials and the golden casket containing the jewelled girdle. As the Sultan was about to depart for the Baghdad campaign, he considered the girdle as a good omen. The following day Zarif presented on his own behalf one thousand pieces of choice Indian cloth. The Sultan discussed with him the armour worn by the Indians on such delicate and expensive clothes. The
ambassador responded by displaying numerous kinds of weapons; he also presented the Sultan a shield which he had brought with him. Pleased with the envoy's conduct, the Sultan gave him twenty thousand rupees and promised to send a return embassy, after the conquest of Baghdad, to establish bonds of friendship. 107

Mughal chroniclers assert that the sole intent of Mir Zarif's mission was the purchase of Arabian horses for the royal stud. On the contrary, Naima, the official Ottoman chronicler, suggests that the real object of the Mughal embassy was to inform the Porte "that on the report of the Sultan's march to Baghdad, the Shah of India had put himself in progress towards Candahar ... "n108 Shahjahan's letter, carried by Mir Zarif, substantiates Naima's account. An analysis of this letter therefore seems pertinent.

The letter begins with usual encomiums and commendations. The Sultan is addressed as the "khaqan of Muslim kings," as the "keeper of two Sanctuaries," as the "occupier of the station of Alexander and the throne of Solomon," and so forth. Mughal victories in the Deccan are enumerated in detail and an account of the enormous booty captured by imperial arms is given. The letter points out the exigency of exterminating the Persian "heretics" and emphasizes the urgency of liberating Baghdad, the resting place of some of the greatest saints of Islam, from their hands. Shahjahan chides the Sultan for being remiss in his duty of destroying the Persians and promises to invade Qandahar and Khurasan as the first step in this
direction. The Emperor advises Murad to advance against Persia with
great speed and with ample provisions, to stay on the frontier for
two or three years, and to exert pressure upon Iraq and Azerbaijan.
The rulers of Mawara-an-nahr, informs Shahjahan, have also agreed to
advance against Persia from their side. In this manner, concludes
the Emperor, this erring and wayward nation [Persia] will taste the
fruit of annihilation and the Sultan will acquire a glorious name in
this world and great recompense in the hereafter. 109

The imperial missive thus dispels the true object of the Mughal
mission. It aimed at the formation of a united front of the Sunni
powers — Mughals, Ottomans, and Uzbeks — against Persia. This is
amply corroborated by the testimony of European traders. English
agents reported that the purpose of this Mughal legation was to
secure a Mughal-Ottoman alliance against Persia. 110 The
Portuguese viceroy of Goa reported to his master that the object of
the embassy was to stir up the Turks against the Persians. 111
Since Zarif's mission was of great importance and as the Mughals
wanted to deceive the Persians, the fiction of purchase of horses was
created to conceal the real object of the embassy. This would also
serve to explain the Mughal chronicler's insistence that Zarif's only
mission was to bring better quality horses from Arabia and Turkey.

After the conquest of Baghdad Sultan Murad IV sent a return
embassy to India. Led by Kapici Basi (Chamberlain) Arsalan Agha, the
mission carried a royal letter and some presents for Shahjahan.
Among the presents were a horse from the royal stable, with bejeweled saddle and caparison, and a Turkish cloak decorated with pearls. Mir Zarif was also allowed to depart with due honours. Travelling together and stopping in Basra on the way, the two envoys landed at Thatta. Shahjahan was in Kashmir when he received the news of their arrival. He immediately sent a farman and robes of honour for Arsalan Agha. Farmans were also dispatched to the imperial officials along the ambassador's route, ordering them to entertain him lavishly. Khwas Khan, the Governor of Thatta, was instructed to present to Arsalan Agha a purse of ten thousand rupees on Shahjahan's behalf and another purse of six thousand rupees on his own behalf. The Governor of Multan and the Faujgars of Sivistan and Bakkar were also directed to give cash presents to the envoy.

Leaving the Agha at Multan, Zarif travelled post haste to the court. Pleased with his services, the Emperor conferred upon him a robe of honour, the title of Fidai Khan, the office of Akhta Begi (Master of Horse), and the rank of 1000 zat, 200 sawar. Muhammad Husain Saldoz was appointed as the official mehmander (host) of the Ottoman ambassador. He was rewarded with a robe and two thousand rupees and was directed to bring the ambassador to Kashmir from Lahore.

On June 1, 1640, Arsalan Agha presented his credentials. Shahjahan received him graciously and conferred on him a splendid robe of honour, a jewelled girdle, a dagger set with diamonds, and fifteen thousand rupees. The envoy was also invited to attend
all the court ceremonies, banquets, and pleasure gathering. On the eve of the festival of Shabe-barat, the Emperor again presented him a robe of honour and fifteen thousand rupees. Shahjahan was, however, displeased with the royal letter brought by Arsalan Agha. Incensed at the Emperor's egoistic letter, sent through Mir Zarif, and piqued by its indirect references to his military ineffectiveness against the Persians, Sultan Murad had apparently sent a discourteous reply. The Sultan is also reported to have objected to the Emperor's title of Shahjahan (King of the World), when he was only the ruler of India. The text of this letter is not extent.

While Arsalan Agha was still at the court, the news of Sultan Murad's death and the accession of Sultan Ibrahim (1640-1648), reached the Mughal court. The envoy was, therefore, dismissed with due honour and handsome provisions. But as a mark of Shahjahan's displeasure, neither a return embassy nor any letter or presents were sent to the new Sultan. Instead, Arsalan carried an epistle of the Mughal Wazir to his Ottoman counterpart, expressing umbrage over the lack of courtesy in the Sultan's letter.

The Wazir's epistle designates Shahjahan as the "successor of four Khalifas," the "Emperor of the monarchs of the time," and the "Shadow of God on Earth." The Wazir acknowledges the letter brought by Arsalan Agha and points out its brusque and impolite tone. "When the letter," wrote the Wazir, "was presented for the inspection of the secretaries of state, it appeared that amongst the servants of
your gracious court, and amongst its secretaries, there was nobody acquainted with the ceremonials of the ancient sultans, and the mode of cultivating the friendship of great monarchs. . ." Enumerating the extensive territories of the Mughal empire and referring to the size and strength of the Mughal armies, the Wazir complains that while addressing such a mighty king, the Ottoman secretaries had ignored the common protocol and rules of diplomatic correspondence. On account of such discourtesy, concludes the Wazir, neither an envoy nor a royal letter is being sent. 121

Shortly after the departure of Arsalan Agha, Shahjahan received a letter of Sultan Ibrahim. Mughal chroniclers have not taken notice of Ibrahim's letter. Hence its bearer is not known. The letter recounts Sultan Murad's conquest of Baghdad, his services to Islam, and his subsequent death in January 1640. Announcing his elevation to the throne of Khilafat, the Sultan proclaims himself as the "Refuge and Asylum of the Monarchs of the World." All of these sovereigns, the Sultan asserts, have turned to him for aid and support. Ibrahim avows his determination to wage war against the Safavids and exhorts Shahjahan to declare jihad against them. Reiterating the friendship and amity between Mughal and Ottoman realms, the Sultan requests Shahjahan to keep channels of correspondence open. 122 The lofty tone of Ibrahim's letter, evident in his claim to the khilafat and in his being asylum of the monarchs of the world, seems to have further irritated the proud and
arrogant Mughal. He, therefore, ignored this letter. There is no record of any acknowledgement or answer to the Sultan's letter by Shahjahan.

Although Shahjahan did not send a return embassy to Istanbul, his eldest son Prince Dara Shikoh did send Mulla Shauqi as his personal representative in company of Arsalan Agha. The prince entrusted Mulla Shauqi with a letter for the Ottoman Grand Wazir Mustafa Pasha; the Mulla also carried oblations for the shrines of Imam Abu Hanifa and Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani, situated in Baghdad. Hammer has suggested that the object of Mulla Shauqi's mission was to elicit the Ottoman Sultan's support for Dara Shikoh in the impending war of succession. 123 This view is untenable for the simple reason that the contest for Shahjahan's throne between Dara and his brothers did not begin until 1657, sixteen years after the departure of Mulla Shauqi. Moreover, it is not probable that the prince could have anticipated this event at such an early stage of his career. 124 Dara Shikoh's devotion to Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani, the founder of the Qadiri sect, was well known; he himself was a follower of this sect. It is plausible that Shauqi was sent merely to deliver the prince's oblations at the mausoleum of his spiritual master and that the letter for Mustafa Pasha was given to him to facilitate his mission. Dara's letter provides no clue to the purpose of Shauqi's mission. It does not even mention the presents sent for the holy shrines. It refers only to the verbal message
carried by the Mulla, and concludes with a promise to send his agents again to cement the friendship between the two sides. 125

Mustafa Pasha's reply to Dara Shikoh is equally vague. It gives no hint about the intent of the Mulla's mission. It acknowledges the letter of the "prince of Highest Renown" (Dara Shikoh), informs him that the offerings brought by the Mulla for the holy shrines have been forwarded to their destination, and that the Mulla has been sent in the company of highly trusted imperial servants to accomplish his mission. He assures the prince that the imperial commands have been issued to the governors of Baghdad, Basra, and Lahsa ordering them to give the Mulla all kinds of assistance and not to detain him after the accomplishment of his assignment. The letter concludes with a request to keep the gates of correspondence open. 126

Mulla Shauqi was also perhaps the bearer of Mustafa Pasha's reply to the Mughal Wazir's epistle. The Pasha's letter is apologetic as well as audacious. Apologizing for the alleged discourtesies in Sultan Murad's letter to Shahjahan, the Grand Wazir emphasizes the identity of faith and affinity of belief between the two monarchs and assures the Mughal Wazir of Ottoman Sultan's affection and brotherly love for the Emperor of India. The Pasha censures the Wazir for not observing in his letter the respect due to the great Sultan, and also for not sending customary embassy on the death of Sultan Murad and the accession of Sultan Ibrahim. Referring to the extensive Mughal territories, recounted in the Wazir's letter,
the Pasha proudly observes that the three holiest cities of Islam, Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, are situated within the boundaries of the Ottoman empire. He further asserts that "if the numerous provinces of the mighty Ottoman empire were here to be enumerated, their list would not be contained within the boundaries of this letter." But, God the Almighty, opines the Pasha, judges the monarchs not by the extent of their empire but by their righteousness and rectitude. The letter ends with a prayer for a continuous exchange of embassies. 127

Mustafa Pasha's letter remained unacknowledged. Diplomatic relations between the Mughal and the Ottoman states remained suspended for the next ten years. In fact, from Shahjahan's point of view, exchanges of embassies between Shahjahanabad and Istanbul were hardly called for. With the capture of Qandhar in February 1639, the immediate objective of Zarif's mission had been accomplished. The demise of Shah Safi in 1642, and the accession of the minor Shah Abbas II (1642-1666) had left Persia weak, faction-ridden, and unstable. Persia therefore posed no threat, at least for the time being, to the Mughal empire. Moreover, Shahjahan's next project, the conquest of his ancestral domain in Central Asia, was bound to displease the Ottomans. A campaign against Central Asia also required the neutrality of Persia. For this a semblance of discord and animosity towards the Ottomans was necessary. Shahjahan's decision to suspend diplomatic relations with Istanbul was, thus, not
influenced by the impudence of Sultan Murad's letter. It was rather the result of a deliberate policy aimed at neutralizing Persia to facilitate the projected Mughal conquest of Central Asia.

The Ottomans took the lead in resuming the diplomatic relations with Shahjahanabad. In April 1649, Sultan Muhammad IV (1648-87) sent Sayyid Muhiuddin as his envoy to the court of Shahjahan. As soon as the Emperor received the news of the arrival of the Ottoman envoy, he sent a royal messenger with a farman and a robe of honour for the ambassador. Elaborate arrangements were made for the reception of the plenipotentiary. The governors of Surat, Burhanpur, Malwa, Mandu, and Delhi entertained him lavishly; each presented him a purse of ten thousand rupees. Admitted to the audience on September 22, 1651, the envoy presented the Sultan's letter and gifts. The Sayyid also presented five horses on his own behalf. Shahjahan invested him with a robe of honour, a horse, a dagger, and a purse of fifteen thousand rupees. The major purpose of the Ottoman embassy was to enlist Shahjahan's support in restoring peace and tranquility in Central Asia. A bloody civil war was in progress there. The Sultan also wanted Shahjahan to use his good offices in bringing about an amicable settlement between Nazr Muhammad Khan, the Khan of the Uzbekts, and his son Abdul Aziz Khan.

In his letter, the Sultan pointed out the importance of amity and harmony between the Muslim sovereigns for the well being of the mankind in general and the Muslims in particular. Referring to the
distress and disorder in the Uzbek land caused by the bloody strife between Nazr Muhammad Khan and his son, the Sultan informed Shahjahan that two letters full of wise counsels and agreeable exhortations had already been sent to them, as an effort to unfasten the knot of enmity between the father and the son. He urged Shahjahan to protect the Muslims of Central Asia and to pacify the contending parties with wise counsels and admonitions. By doing so, concluded the Sultan, the Emperor would fulfill his religious duty.  

As a mark of special favour, the Ottoman envoy was given conge (formal permission to depart) within two months of his admittance to the court. Haji Ahmad Saeed, Mir Adl (Chief Judge) of the imperial army, was appointed as the Mughal envoy to the Sublime Porte. He was given a royal letter and presents worth 100,000 rupees for the Sultan.

The change in Shahjahan's attitude towards the Ottomans needs little explanation. During the last decade (1641-1651) many significant events had taken place and, much to the chagrin of Shahjahan, the situation had changed considerably. His campaign against Central Asia (1646-47) had ended in a fiasco; consequently the Mughal power and prestige had suffered immeasurably. The Mughal campaign against the Uzbekhs had been viewed by the Ottomans as an attempt to undermine the stronghold of Sunni faith in Central Asia. Sultan Ibrahim was so annoyed with Shahjahan that he was reported to have given his blessings to Shah Abbas II's campaign
against Qandahar. Encouraged by the Ottoman neutrality, Shah Abbas had personally led the attack upon Qandahar and had taken it by storm in 1649. Shahjahan's failure to recover Qandahar in May 1649 had further exposed the myth of the invincibility of the Mughal armies. At the beginning of the second half of the 17th century, therefore, Shahjahan found himself totally isolated within the world of Islam. With the prestige of the Mughal empire at its lowest ebb and with his foreign policy in shambles, Shahjahan had no alternative but to fall back upon the old theme of Sunni solidarity against the Shia peril. The arrival of Sayyid Muhiuddin provided Shahjahan with a God-sent opportunity to renew the Mughal-Ottoman 'entente cordiale' against Persia; he did not hesitate to seize this opportunity. The events of the past decade had, thus, prepared the way for the resumption of the Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic relations.

Haji Ahmad Saeed reached Istanbul in June, 1653. He presented his credentials and the royal gifts on June 9, 1653. Naima has taken special notice of three gifts: a Sorguc (crest), the chief diamond of which was bigger than that worn by the Sultan, a dagger, and a sword. The total value of these gifts was estimated to be 300,000 piastres. Shahjahan's epistle acknowledged the Sultan's letter. It informed the Sultan that even before the arrival of the Ottoman envoy, the business of Nazr Muhammad Khan had been taken care of and that he had been restored to his dominions. The letter detailed the affair of the Khan, his quarrel with the Uzbek
nobles, and their subsequent revolt under the leadership of the Khan's son, Abdul Aziz Khan. Shahjahan justified his intervention in Central Asia on the plea of protecting the innocent and oppressed Muslims of that region; they had been cruelly persecuted, asserted the Emperor, by the wicked and spiteful Almans at the behest of the rebels. The letter concluded with a request for early dismissal of the Mughal ambassador. 138

Haji Ahmad Saeed was an eminent and erudite scholar. By his wit and learning he left a very favourable impression on the Ottoman court. 139 Numerous banquets and receptions were given in his honour by the Ottoman dignitaries. Naima has remarked that "there were never heard of so much veneration and attention being paid to any other ambassador." 140 Much impressed by the erudition of the Haji and observing that "the ambassadors are the honour of the kings," 141 the Sultan ordered that an equally learned and capable man should be nominated the ambassador to India. But on account of court intrigues, wrote Naima, the rich but idiotic Zulfiqar Agha, brother of a former Grand Wazir Saleh Pasha, was chosen to lead the Ottoman embassy. In July, 1653, the Mughal envoy was given conge, and was handsomely provided for. A royal letter and several presents for Shahjahan, including an emerald hilted dagger, "twenty maidens of extraordinary beauty," and a horse, the comparison of which itself was worth 45,000 piastres, were given to Zulfiqar Agha. 142 The two ambassadors travelled together as far as Hijaz. There they
parted company. Haji Ahmad Saeed proceeded to Yeman and Zulfiqar Agha left for India via Basra.

Zulfiqar Agha reached Surat in December 1653. After receiving the news of his arrival, Shahjahan immediately sent a him a farman and an elegant robe of honour. He also sent a special messenger to Surat, to conduct the envoy to the court honourably. All along the way to Shahjahanabad the envoy was feted and entertained by the provincial governors and local officials; from them he received a total amount of 49,000 rupees for his expenses. When the envoy reached the environs of the Mughal capital, Shahjahan sent second Bakshi Lashkar Khan along with other nobles to welcome him. Admitted to the royal audience on March 27, 1654, he presented the royal letter and gifts. The Emperor welcomed him cordially, and personally took from his hands the Sultan's letter. This was indeed a special favour. Lodged in one of the government houses, the envoy received many personal favours from Shahjahan. The envoy was also entertained by the leading members of the royal family as well as by the Mughal wazir Sadullah Khan. From each, he received lavish gifts.

The royal letter brought by Zulfiqa Agha recalled the laudable services of the Ottoman dynasty in resuscitating and restoring the canonical law of Islam and in helping the weak and the downtrodden. It dealt with the disorder in Central Asia and the consequent commotions among the Uzbeks. It alluded to the deceased Nazr
Muhammad Khan's request for the Sultan's help in cutting off the roots of contention and dispute, and to the Sultan's subsequent letter to the Emperor for his assistance in this matter. The Sultan thanked Shahjahan for making the facts clear in his letter. Alluding to Shahjahan's unwarranted military intervention in Central Asia, the Sultan observed that "however mighty and wealthy monarchs may be, it is also incumbent on the kings to assume and cultivate moral faculties and virtues. He, who gets a share from that storehouse of felicity embraces in himself material as well as spiritual sovereignty, and is endowed with divine beatitude and spiritual bliss." In conclusion the Sultan expressed hope that with further exchanges of embassies and royal letters, "our mutual love and confidence will continue to grow." 148

Zulfiqar Agha was detained at the court for about six months. He was ceremoniously dismissed in August 1654. A splendid robe of honour, a horse with gold trappings, a shield and a sword inlaid with gold, and 30,000 rupees were given to him. In all, he received 275,000 rupees in cash, besides numerous other gifts. 149 Qaim Beg, the Kotwal (Prefect) of the imperial army, was chosen to lead the return embassy to Istanbul; his mansab was raised at the time of his appointment. He carried a royal letter and gifts for the Sultan worth 250,000 rupees. 150

Shahjahan seems to have taken serious exception to the overbearing tone of the Sultan's letter and the sneer inherent in his
remarks. The Emperor's pique is clearly reflected in his reply. The letter begins with a discourse on the sublime duties of the kings. "The just king," observes Shahjahan, "who is the embodiment of excellent virtues and sources of perfect moral qualities, putting the crown of Zillilah (Shadow of God) on the head, reforms the people with excellent and rare expedients, illuminates the world with his sagacity and mental perception, and showers mercy and compassion upon mankind." He commends the Sultan's desire for continuation of friendly exchanges in the following words: "Your desire to continue without interruption the channel of correspondence between the two sides was brought to my notice and stuffed my nostrils with the aroma of concord and unanimity." At the same time Shahjahan chides the Sultan for not observing the customary protocols of diplomatic correspondence in his letter. Attributing the lack of courtesy in the Sultan's letter to his youth and to the ignorance of his councillors, the Emperor advises him to read the "book of knowledge," explaining the appropriate modes for correspondence between kings, which he had earlier sent to the late Sultan Murad Khan. The letter ends with a request for the early dismissal of the Mughal envoy. 151

Qaim Beg reached Scutari, the suburb of Istanbul, on May 3, 1656. 152 He reached the capital the next day. Welcomed by the imperial officials, he was lodged in the palace of Siawush Pasha. The following day, May 5, 1656, the envoy presented his credentials
and gifts at the court. According to Hammer, the ambassador asked for three favours: First, Ottoman military aid in the campaign against Qandahar; second, permission for the building of a mosque in Mecca for Indian pilgrims; third, services of an Ottoman architect to help construct the tomb of Noor Mahal at Ahmadabad. Of the three proposals, only the last one was approved and an architect was sent to India. Qaim Beg stayed in Istanbul for about four months. He was allowed to depart in September 1656. Manzada Husain Agha, son of the Duruz Prince Fakhruddin Man of Lebanon, was nominated by the Sultan to lead the returning Ottoman embassy. A highly conciliatory royal letter and several gorgeous presents were handed over to him.

The Sultan's letter begins with a fairly long discourse in the praise of God and an essay on the duties of the kings. Addressing Shahjahan as the "Founder of the Edifice of Islam," the "Refuge of the Kings," and so forth, the Sultan acknowledges the letter brought by the Indian envoy in the following words: "The esteemed and eloquent letter delivered by the honourable Qaim Beg was read at the court and with its aromatic message made the atmosphere fragrant. The exquisite text expressing friendship and sincerity made the royal pavilion, which is equal to the garden of paradise, scented with ambergris." The letter expresses penitence at the discourtesies of diction in the letter sent through Zulfiqar Agha. Declaring that the Emperor is beyond approbation, the Sultan observes that "it is
difficult even for an expert diver to reach the bottom of the ocean of Your Majesty's praiseworthy qualities." The letter ends with a request for an early conge for the Ottoman envoy.\textsuperscript{156}

On his way back to India, Qaim Beg was murdered by the Governor of Aleppo, Murtuza Pasha; Husain Agha proceeded to India alone.\textsuperscript{157} The Agha landed at Surat sometime after November 1657. By this time Prince Murad, the Governor of Gujarat, had already declared himself the Emperor of India. The famous war of succession among the sons of Shahjahn was about to begin.\textsuperscript{158} The envoy did not wait for the conclusion of this war. Presenting his credentials and the royal gifts to Prince Murad Baksh, the Agha returned to Turkey in 1659.\textsuperscript{159} According to the Ottoman chronicler Silahdar, Prince Murad had entrusted Husain Agha with a letter for the Ottoman Sultan and some precious gifts. These included a crest set with a diamond of 46 carats.\textsuperscript{160} Whether or not Prince Murad also dispatched a return embassy to Istanbul is not known. Manzade Husain Agha's report of his experiences in India is not available.\textsuperscript{161} No Mughal chronicler has mentioned the Agha's embassy either.

\textbf{SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION}

The departure of Manzade Husain Agha from India marks the end of the first phase of the Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic and political
relations. It was a phase of mutual indifference, occasional outbursts of concord and harmony, and spasmodic hostility. Babur, the first Mughal, was steeped in Turkish culture. He spoke and wrote beautiful Turkish. The Emperor also admired and utilized Ottoman military tactics and methods. Yet, he remained indifferent towards the Ottomans. A staunch enemy of the Uzbeks, Babur considered the Ottoman-Uzbek friendship as damaging to his aims and interests in Central Asia; consequently he did not attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. Humayun, Babur's successor, exhibited great respect for the Ottomans. He considered the Ottoman Sultan as the only sovereign in the world worthy to bear the title of Padshah, and displayed a genuine desire to establish contacts with the Ottomans on a permanent basis.

Akbar, who followed Humayun, not only reversed this policy, but even demonstrated outright hostility towards the Ottomans. It has been suggested that Akbar's foreign policy was based on "real-politik." However, in his dealing with the Ottomans Akbar revealed his lack of political pragmatism and diplomatic acumen. He failed to realize the utility and efficacy of an alliance with the Ottomans. He did not perceive that the Ottoman puissance, especially their naval power, could be effectively used against the recurring Portuguese menace. A joint Mughal-Ottoman operation — a combination of Ottoman navy and Mughal army — could have posed serious problems for the Portuguese. Indeed, it could have curtailed,
if not ended, the Portuguese degradations on Indian commerce and Haj traffic. Akbar, by ignoring the potential of such a collaboration, missed a good opportunity to fulfill his oft-repeated promise of declaring jihad against the Firangis (Europeans), and thereby clearing the sea route to the Holy Cities of the Portuguese. 164

Jahangir's diplomacy was based on friendship and, to some extent, even dependence on Safavid Persia. This was at the expense of cordial relations with the Uzbeks and the Ottomans. He recognized the inexpediency of this policy towards the end of his reign and had to fall back upon Uzbek and Ottoman support against the Safavids. But for the Emperor's death in 1627, Mughal-Ottoman relations would have certainly improved. Shahjahan, early in his reign, revived his father's idea of an association of Sunni powers against Persia. He was also the first Mughal to establish full-fledged diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. But the Emperor's overweening ambition and arrogance coupled with his obsession with the idea of conquest of his ancestral domains wrecked his plans as well as his prestige. Shahjahan's military intervention in Central Asia left him isolated in the world of Islam. The Ottoman initiative in 1649 restored suspended diplomatic relations. At the time of Shahjahan's deposition in 1658, the Mughal-Ottoman relations had improved considerably.

Safavid Persia played an important role in shaping the Mughal-Ottoman relations. Whenever the Mughals felt threatened by Persia, they turned towards Turkey for political and moral support.
Babur and Humayun had maintained cordial relations with Persia. In the time of Akbar, Persia was not strong enough, as it subsequently became during the reigns of Abbas I and Abbas II, to pose any serious threat to the Mughals. Akbar, therefore, never felt obliged to court the Ottomans. But Jahangir and Shahjahan did feel imperiled by Persia and toyed with the idea of a Sunni alliance against the Safavids. The Mughals, however, remained wedded to this policy as long as it served their immediate interest; they abandoned it when it fulfilled its primary objective and ceased to offer any dividends. Shahjahan, for example, relinquished the policy of Sunni solidarity after the capture of Qandahar, unilaterally suspending diplomatic relations with the Ottomans.

The Ottoman attitude towards the Mughals was largely governed by their desire to encircle Shia Persia by a ring of Sunni powers and squeeze her out of existence. They were also committed to the policy of the containment of Shiism within the borders of Persia. In the fulfillment of both these objectives they needed Mughal support. Their predilection for maintaining the territorial integrity of the Uzbek empire also constrained them to woo the Mughals. The Ottomans seem to have been genuinely interested and sincere in their wish to befriend the Mughals. Shahjahan's acerbity and over-sensitiveness at minor discourtesies of diction in the Ottoman imperial epistles, the Ottoman moderation and large-heartedness in acknowledging their own faults graciously as well as their conciliatory messages and their
desire to continue the exchange of embassies without interruption demonstrate their positive approach, ardor, and probity.

What transpired in the time of Aurangzeb (1658-1707) and his successors? Did the steady decline of the Mughal and the Ottoman empires in the late 18th century change the pattern of Mughal-Ottoman relationship? Did the collapse of the Safavid dynasty bring about any change in their priorities and strategies or in their attitude towards one another? These are the themes which will be addressed in the following chapter.
NOTES


The name of the Bahmani envoy according to Ottoman Sultan's reply (see Note 10) was Khwaja Abdul Mannan. For the Bahmani Sultans of Deccan see H.K. Sherwani, *The Bahmanis of the Deccan: An Objective Study*, Hyderabad, 1953.


*Tarihi-i-Abul Fatah*, Folio 167 b-168 a.


Hyderabad, 1974, p. 74.


17. Abdulla Effendi, *Munshaat-i-Farsi*, Süleymanie Library, Istanbul, pp. 107-110, quoted by Nizamuddin Magrebi, "The Ottoman-Gujarat Relations," *Professor Sherwani Felicitation Volume*, (ed.), P.M. Joshi, Hyderabad, 1975, pp. 186-187. However, Mr. Magrebi's observation that Muzaffar Shah II sent a congratulatory mission to the Porte after Sultan Selim's conquest of Syria and Egypt and that in reply to this mission, the Sultan sent a return embassy in April 1517 under Mahmud Zaid (p. 186) is not true. The Sultan conquered Egypt in January/February 1517 (G.W.F. Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs*, Urbana, 1942, pp. 54-55). Keeping in view the distance between India and Egypt, it is almost impossible that in just two months (February 1517-April 1517) a Gujarati mission could have arrived at the Ottoman court to congratulate the Sultan on his conquest of Egypt. Muzaffar Shah, in fact, sent a congratulatory embassy to the Sultan after his victory in the battle of Chaldiran (1514). Dr. Bernard Lewis, whom Mr. Magrebi quotes in support of his argument, also says that Muzaffar's mission was in response to Selim's victories in Iran. See Bernard Lewis, "The
Mughals and the Ottomans," Pakistan Quarterly, vol. viii, No. 2, 1958, p. 5. The embassy in question seems to have been an independent one, sent by the Ottoman Sultan to communicate his victories to a friendly power.

18 Munshaat, vol. 1, p. 397. A Russian renegade, Malik Ayaz was a slave of Sultan Mahmud Begarha of Gujarat. He was an accomplished general and governed the port town of Diu for a number of years.

19 Maghrebi, p. 187.


21 Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur, Baburnama, Eng. tr., A.S. Beveridge, London, 1922, reprint: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, p. 469. According to R.B. Merriman it was originally a Bohemian device developed in the fifteenth century. (Merriman, Suleiman the Magnificent, p. 90). If Merriman's observation is correct, it could be surmised that the Ottoman had picked up this device during their wars in Eastern Europe.

22 Baburnama, p. 550.

23 Baburnama, p. 564.

24 He should not be confused with Mustafa Runi Khan who was in the service of Sultan Bahadur Shah of Gujarat.

26 Baburnama, p. 657, 660.

27 Abdur Rahim, Mughal Relations with Persia and Central Asia, Department of History, Muslim University, Aligarh (Reprinted from Islamic Culture vols., III and IX, 1934–35), No date, p. 67; Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations: A Study of the Political and Diplomatic Relations Between The Mughul Empire and Iran, Tehran, 1970, pp. 102–195. Dr. Islam quotes historical and numismatic evidence to support his observations. In return of Ismail's help, Babur had agreed to accept the Shia creed, read Khutba, and issue coins in the Shah's name.

28 Baburnama, Babur's letter to Humayun, pp. 624–625.


3, pt. II, p. 263. The identity of Burhan Beg is shrouded in mystery. None of the Afghan princes of Delhi, including Sikandar Lodi's sons, bore this name. S.A. Rashid, "Ottoman-Mughal Relations During the Seventeenth Century," Proceedings of Indian History Congree (henceforth P.I.H.C.), 1961, p. 127, is of the opinion that Burhan may have been one of the numerous princes who were driven out of Gujarat by Humayun in 1536.


34 Topkapi Saray Müzesi Arşivi (henceforth TSMA), Istanbul No. E 9661. This is an undated document. Its upper part is damaged. N. Ahmat Asrar (kanuni Sultan, p. 175) has surprisingly referred to this document as the letter of the Uzbek monarch Abdul Latif Khan to the Ottoman Sultan. It is, however, written in too informal a style to be characterized as a letter. According to Mughal chroniclers, Humayun captured Qandhar in September 1545, Kabul in November 1545, and Badakhshan in March 1546. (Gulbadan Begum, Humayun-Nama, Eng. tr. A.S. Beveridge, London, 1902, pp. 175-178;
A.F., vol. 1, pp. 467-480; Jauhar, pp. 78-84). As the report enumerates Humayun's conquest of these cities, it could be surmised that it may have been issued sometime in or after March 1546.


38 Jauhar, pp. 89-94; Gulbadan Begum, pp. 186-187.


40 Mirat, p. 93. Asrar's remark that Humayun offered a ministerial appointment to the Sidi (p. 332) is not true.

41 Mirat, p. 107. For Sidi's experiences in North India and Kabul see Mirat, pp. 89-125.


43 See for example, Sari Abdullah Effendi, Dastur-al-Insha,

46 Charles Schefer, Christomathic ..., Vol. 2, pp. 207-209; Abdul Husain Nawai, Asnad wa Maktubat-i-Tarikh-i-Iran; Shah Tahmasp Safawi, Tehran, 1350 A.H., pp. 306-308; Mirat, Persian tr. pp. 201-104.

45 Schefer, vol. 2, French Text, p. 222. Schefer has quoted from the original Turkish version of the Mirat. It clearly says that the Humayun permitted him to leave, gave him a horse, a robe of honour, letters of safe conduct and, also a letter for His Majesty the Padshah. Surprisingly the last item, the reference to Humayun's letter has been omitted by both the English and Persian translators of the Mirat.


47 A.H., vol. II, p. 121. The fort was surrendered in 1558.

48 T.S.M.A., E 8009.

49 Basvekalet: Arsivi, Istanbul, Divan-i-Humayun Mühimme Defterleri, (henceforth M.D.) (In all references to the M.D. the first number shows the volume, the second the page, the third the farman number, the fourth the date of issue, and the fifth the receiving authority), 6, 128, 270 17 Rabi ulevvel 972; Governor of Yemen; 6,122,256, 13 R.E., 972, Governor of Egypt; 6,122,257, 13 R.E. 972, Governor of Yemen; 6,123,258, 13 R.E. 972, Governor of Jidda;
6,127,265, 15 R.E. 972; Rhodos Bey; 6,201,433, 26 Rabıul akhir 972,
Governor of Egypt.

50 M.D., 7,258,721, 12 Rajab 975/12 Jan. 1568.


52 W.E.D. Allen, Problems of Turkish Power in the Sixteenth
33-38; For the best modern account of the Don-Volga canal see Halil
İnalçık, "The Origin of Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga

53 M.D., 7, 242, 1363, May 5, 1568.

54 Islam, Indo-Persian . . . , pp. 50-52.


56 Quoted by R.C. Verma, Foreign Policy of the Mughals
Agra, 1976, p. 206. Also see Gulbadan Begum, p. 69.

57 A.H., vol. 3, p. 206; Abdul Qadir Badaoni,
Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, (henceforth M.T.), Eng. translation, A.H.


72. The Emperor dispatched Haj caravans to Mecca in 1577, 1578,
1579. Also see Nizamuddin Ahmad, Tabaqat-i-Akbari (henceforth T.A.),
216-17, 246; A.N., III, pp. 410-12.

59 A.N., III, pp. 569-70.

60 M.D., 35, 292, 740, 27, Rajab, 986; Sep. 29, 1578.
According to the Mughal Chroniclers, Akbar had sent through Khwaja Sultan Naqshbandi, 600,000 rupees and 12,000 dresses of honour for distribution among deserving people of Mecca and Medina. See for example, Arif Qandhari, Tarikh-i-Akbari, (ed.) Haji Muinuddin Nadwi, et al., Rampur, 1962, p. 242, 395.


This was the famous 'Infallibility Decree' of 1579. See M.T. vol. II, p. 279; F.W. Buckler, "A new interpretation of Akbar's decree of 1579" J.R.A.S., 1924, pp. 590-608; Smith, Akbar, pp. 127-129.

69 A.N., III, pp. 572-573, Note 1.

70 It is indeed surprising that even Badauni, who is generally critical of Akbar and his policies, glosses over this affair. Abul Fazl (A.N., vol. III, pp. 568-569) has remarked that the royal ladies were reluctant to leave the Holy Cities but Khwaja Yahiya, in accordance with the Emperor's earnest wish, persuaded them to return. It was not, however, Akbar's desire, as this new evidence suggests, but the Sultan's order, which compelled the ladies to leave these cities in the year 1580.


73 Monserrate, pp. 184, 191.

74 Even if Akbar's embassy had reached its destination, the chances of its success were very remote. In February 1581 Philip II

75 Monserrate, Commentary, p. 205.

76 A.N., III, p. 758; Abul Fazl Maktubat-i-Allami, Lucknow, 1863, pp. 23-24. The Maktubat Version of this letter is slightly different from that given in the Akbar Nama. For example, it does not refer to the deviation from the highway of Sunnism. Instead, it mentions the reported dispatch, by the Shah of Persia, of Sultan Ali Quli Hamdan Oglu as his ambassador to India (p. 23, last line). The letter was sent through the Mughal ambassador Mir Humam. Akbar's reference to the Ottoman invasion of Persia was in the context of Ottoman-Safavid war of 1579-1590, (Shaw, History, vol. I, pp. 182-183).


79 Islam, Calendar, vol. 1, p. 117. Also see Muhammad Husain Azad, Darbar-i-Akbari, Lahore, 1910 (reprint), pp. 412-413.

80 M.D., 74, 128, 358.

82 Nuruddin Muhammad Jahangir, Tuzuk-iJahangiri, Eng. tr., Alexander Rogers and Henry Beveridge, Delhi (Second edition), 1968, vol. 1, p.2. Two Sultans of Turkey bore the name of Salim before Jahangir, i.e., Salim I (1512-1520), and Salim II (1566-1574).

83 Tuzuk, I, p. 145.
84 Tuzuk, I, p. 145.
85 Tuzuk, I, pp. 237-238; Islam, Calendar I, pp. 178, 179, 186, 187. The Chelebi was sent to buy rarities and curiosities for the Emperor.


88 Islam. Calendar, I, p. 148, 221.

90 Roe, Embassy, Vol. II, p. 311, 296, 357. Also see vol. I, p. 113 where Roe says that in 1615 after the dismissal of the Turkish ambassador Jahangir sent ten lakhs rupees to the Persians.

91 For the strategic and commercial importance of Qandahar, Beni Prasad, History of Jahangir, pp. 135-136; Samuel Purchas,

92 Tuzuk, I, pp. 70-71, 85-86.


95 Islam, Indo-Persian, p. 89; Tawarikh-i-Badaia, quoted by Aziz Ahmad, Studies, p. 35.


97 Maasir-i-Jahangiri, pp. 469-473, and 528-529.

98 Munshaat, II, pp. 142-143. For Sultan's letter to Imam Quli Khan see Munshaat, II, pp. 144-145.


Abdul Hamid Lahori, Badshah Nama (henceforth B.N.), ed. Maulvi Kabiruddin Abdur Rahim, Calcutta, 1867, vol. 1, Book 2, p. 206; Muhammad Salih Kanbu, Aml-i-Salih (henceforth A.S.), ed. Dr. Ghulam Yazdani, revised, Dr. Waheed Qureshi, Lahore, 1967, p. 167; Mirza Aminai Qazvini, Padshah nama, British Museum (or. 173), f. 387, quoted by Saksema, Shahjahan, p. 125; Samsamuddaula Shahnawaz Khan, Maasir-ul-Umra (henceforth M.U.), ed. Mirza Ashraf Ali, Calcutta, vol. II, p. 26. Baisanghar was the son of Prince Daniyal and grandson of Akbar. He was alleged to have been converted to Christianity by Jahangir's order in 1610, but later on renounced his new faith. (Early Travels in India, ed. W. Foster, Delhi, 1968 (reprint), pp. 86, 116, 147-148). After Jahangir's death, Baisanghar supported the cause of Prince Shahryar, who appointed him Commander-in-Chief of his troops. After Shahryar's defeat and his subsequent execution along with the sons of Prince Daniyal and Prince Khusrau, Baisanghar managed to escape and fled to Kalaus, where he is said to have died. There is disagreement among the chroniclers regarding the situation of Kalaus. Kanbu says that Kalaus was situated in Golkanda, while Lahori describes it to be in Badakhshan. It should be mentioned here that Uzunçarşıli's observation that after Jahangir, Shahryar had ascended the throne and was subsequently deposed by Baisanghar, and that Baisanghar, in turn, was ousted by
Shahjahan (vol. 3, pt. II, p. 264, Note 2) is incorrect.

101 Naima, 3, p. 1263, Hammer, Memoirs, p. 465;


102 Naima, 3, p. 1264. Naima's observation that Shahjahan had sent one or two embassies prior to the arrival of Baisanghar in Istanbul is inaccurate. All the Mughal chroniclers are of the opinion that Shahjahan sent his first embassy to Istanbul in 1637.


104 B.N., II, p. 184; A.S., II, 266; Muhammad Hashim Khafi Khan, Muntakhab-ul-Lubab, (henceforth, M.L.), ed. Maulvi Kabiruddin Ahmad and Maulvi Ghulam Qadir, Caslcutta, 1869, vol. I, p. 574. According to Lahori, Zarif had gone to Iraq in company of Mir Baraka, the Mughal ambassador to Iran. Khafi Khan says that he had gone along with the Persian ambassador in 1636, and Kanbu suggests that Zarif had gone to Iraq (Persia) alone on his own initiative.

105 Assentos Do Conselho Do Estado, ed. P.S.S.


106 English Factories in India 1637-1641, President Frelman and Council to Surat to Company, June 4, 1639, pp. 101-102. The date of Zarif's departure is disputed. Lahori and Kanbu mention that he left the capital on 30 Jamadiussani, 1046 (Nov. 18, 1636), but the letter which Zarif carried with him describes the events of 18 Shaban 1046 (Jan. 5, 1637). The testimony of the English Factory
Records proves that the date given by the Mughal chroniclers is wrong. The free passage from the Portuguese was requested in March 1637 (see Note 116). The ship 'Michaell' on which Zarif travelled was sent to Lahori Bander towards the end of 1637, where it was requisitioned by the Mir, who left the port on February 13, 1638 (E.F.I. 1637-1641, pp. x, 33). The Dutch and Portuguese had also informed their respective superiors, at home, about the departure of the Mughal ambassador in November 1637. (Ibid., p. 33, Note 1). In the light of this evidence, the present writer suggests that Lahori, Kanbu, and Khafi Khan have erroneously placed Zarif's embassy in Shahjahan's 10th regnal year (A.H. 1046). The embassy was actually sent in the 11th regnal year and Zarif left the capital on 30th Jamadiuissani 1047 (Nov. 9, 1637). This will also explain the description of the events of Shaban 1046 (Jan. 1637) in Shahjahan's letter to Sultan Murad IV.

107 Naima, 3, p. 1402; Hammer, History II, p. 219-20; B.N., II, 185-186; A.S., II, p. 266; M.L., I, 574; M.U., vol. 3, pp. 10-11; Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı, vol. 3, II, p. 265. Naima estimated the value of the girdle at 15,000 Kurush (Piastres). The shield which Zarif presented to the Sultan was made of elephant's ear and rhinoceros hide. According to Naima, Zarif claimed that the shield could not be penetrated either by sword or by musket, whereupon the sultan, eager to show his strength pierced it with one blow of his javelin. Kanbu (p. 266) refers to the perforation of the
shield by the sultan but according to Maasirul Umra (vol. 3, p. 11), the Sultan could not pierce it.

108 Naima, 3, p. 1402.


110 The English Factores in India 1637-1641, p. x. Also see the letter subsequently sent by Shahjahan's Wazir to Mustafa Pasha, the Ottoman Grand Wazir, where it is stated clearly that one of the objects of Zarif's mission was to propose a joint Mughal-Ottoman attack on Persia, Munshaat, II, p. 64.


113 B.N., II, p. 187; A.S., II, p. 267; M.L., I, p. 575. At Shahjahan's order, the English ship 'Michael' has escorted them to safety. They reached Thatta in December 1639 (E.F.I. 1637-1641, p. 229).

114 B.N., II, p. 187; A.S., II, p. 267; M.L., I, p. 575. The Governor of Multan was ordered to present to Arsalan Agha, six thousand rupees and the Faujders of Sivistan and Bhakkar four thousand rupees each.

115 M.U., III, p. 12. According to Khafi Khan he was
given a mansab of 800/100.

117 B.N., II, p. 216; A.S., II, p. 277. According to A.S. (p. 271) a robe of honour and an ornamented plume were also given to Arsalan Agha on the Emperor's birthday.


120 B.N., II, p. 218; A.S. II, p. 277; Uzunçarşıli, Osmanlı, III, pt. II, p. 265. Uzunçarşıli's statement that Arsalan Agha also carried a letter of Shahjahan for the Sultan, is incorrect. The news of Sultan Murad's demise was communicated to Shahjahan by the reporters of Qandahar, Sind, Gujarat, Lahori Bandar, Surat and Cambay. (Munshaat, II, p. 64). Arsalan Agha was presented with a robe, a shield decorated with gold, one gold and one silver coin of one hundred tola each, and twenty Turkish horses. In all he received from Shahjahan, 60,000 rupees in cash besides numerous other gifts. Shahjahan also gave a robe of honour and one thousand rupees to Umar Chalebi, the envoy of Muhammad Pasha, the Ottoman Governor of Lashwa. He sent 10,000 rupees for the Pasha and 5000 rupees for the Pasha's brother as well.
121 Munshaat, II, pp. 62-65; Hammer, Memoir, pp. 480-482. It should be mentioned here that Hammer has mistranslated the last five lines of p. 63 and the first sixteen lines of p. 64, of the Munshaat's text. (p. 481 of Hammer article). For example, whereas Shahjahan is styled in the letter as the successor of the four Khalifas, Hammer has attributed this title to the Sultan. Again, while the letter actually means that on account of the identity of faith and sect, the envoy (Mir Zarif) was sent on such a long and hazardous journey (to Turkey), Hammer has translated it in the following words, "it has been intimated that with respect to great distance another envoy should be sent to transact business." He has also misread Khanbayat with Qannauj. It is surprising that subsequent scholars quoting Hammer have overlooked these mistakes in translation. See for example, Aziz Ahmad, Studies, p. 38.

122 Munshaat, II, pp. 275-76.

123 Hammer, Memoirs, p. 469. The date of Shauqi's mission is not certain. But since the addressee, Mustafa Pasha, remained Grand Wazir between 1639-1643, it is certain that the mission must have taken place in this period. As Arsalan Agha left Lahore in January 1641, it seems probable that Mulla Shauqi went along with him.

124 The real struggle for the peacock throne seems to have begun in 1652, eleven years after the dispatch of Dara's letter. This year Princes Shah Shuja, Aurangzeb, and Murad are said to have
entered into an informal alliance against Dara Shikoh. See I.A. Ghauri, *War of Succession Between the sons of Shahjahan 1657-1658* Lahore, 1964, p. 108. According to the English Factory Records, Dara Shikoh sent another embassy to Istanbul in 1650 (*E.F.I.* 1646–1650, vol. 8, 1914, p. 318). No Mughal or Ottoman chronicler has referred to this embassy. The intent of this mission as well as its fate is unknown.


126 *Munshaat*, II, pp. 61-62; Hammer, *Memoirs*, pp. 485-486. Both these letters have not been recorded by the Mughal chroniclers.


132 The envoy was given *conge* in November 1651. He was received on September 22, 1651. Haji Ahmad Saeed was nominated as
Mughal ambassador on November 5, 1651, and Shahjahan's letter to Sultan Muhammad IV is dated November 12, 1651. The two envoys must have left after this date. (A.S., III, pp. 99-100).

A.S., III, pp. 100-101; M.L., I, p. 708. At the time of his departure, the Ottoman was given a robe of honour, a horse with gold trappings, and 15,000 rupees. In all he received from Shahjahan 84,000 rupees in cash, besides other gifts. At the time of his appointment, Haji Ahmad's mansab was raised. He was given 12,000 rupees for his expenses. (Kewal Ram, Tazkirat-ul-Umra, ed. S. Moinul Haq & Ansar Zahid Khan, Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, xxix, III, July 1981, p. 193).

For Shahjahan's Central Asian Campaign see Saksena, Shahjahan, pp. 182-209; Verma, Foreign, pp. 80-98; A. Rahim, Mughal Relations, pp. 89-98.

E.F.I. 1646-1650, Thomas Lewis etc. at Gombroon, to the President and Council at Surat, October 19, 1648, pp. 217-18. According to the English factors, the Sultan had not only wished Shah Abbas success in his campaign against Qandahar but had also enquired whether or not he intends to proceed beyond Qandahar. The Sultan, thus, seems to have assented to a full-fledged Persian invasion on India.

Naima, vol. 5, p. 2371. Abid Pasha Nishanji, cited by Hammer (p. 469), mentions 7th June, 1653 as the date of the Haji's audience with the Sultan. Naima's testimony is, however, more
reliable. *Munshaat*, vol. II, p. 70, gives the month and the year of the Haji's audience, but not the day.

137 *Naima*, vol. 5, p. 2371.


140 *Naima*, vol. 5, p. 2371; *Naima* (1863 ed.), vol. 5, p. 337.

141 *Naima*, vol. 5, p. 2372.

142 *Naima*, vol. 5, p. 2371; Hammer, *History*, II, p. 267; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı*, III, II, p. 266. The Indian chroniclers have not recorded the arrival of female slaves as presents from the Sultan. The Mughal ambassador was awarded 6,000 gold coins, a fur coat, and a horse. Naima has shown unmitigated contempt for Zulfiqar Agha, Ottoman envoy designate. He calls him 'Bosnian ass' and says that since he was willing to pay the expenses of the embassy from his own pocket, he was nominated for this position. The claims of many eminent men of learning and culture, Naima complains, were disregarded. Naima has also given an interesting account of the
banquet given by Zulfiqar Agha in the honour of Haji Ahmad saeed, where he committed many follies. According to Naima, the learned Mughal ambassador was so much disappointed by the ignorance and charlatantry of the Agha that he politely refused to travel in his company. The Haji was, however, persuaded by the Ottoman authorities to accompany him at least as far as Hijaz (Naima, vol. 5, pp. 2371-75).

143 A.S., III, p. 136.
145 Munshat, II, p. 66; M.L., I, p. 730; A.S., III, p. 141. According to Mughal chroniclers, the Sultan's presents included two horses with gold and pearl decorated trappings, a girdle, a dagger, and a mace all set with diamonds. Zulfiqar Agha also presented nine Arabian horses and other miscellaneous gifts on his own behalf.

146 According to Manucci, "It was an ancient practice from Akbar's days that Mughal kings accord seats to no one, and do not take a letter direct from the hand of any man. Letters are delivered to the wazir, and he reads them to the king." See Niccolao Manucci, Storia Do Mogor, Eng. tr., W. Irvine, Calcutta, 1966 (reprint), II, p. 43.

147 A.S., III, pp. 142-43; M.L., I, p. 730. On the day of his first audience, Shahjahan gave the Agha a robe, a jewelled dagger, and 30,000 rupees. On the following day when the envoy
presented gifts on his own behalf, a robe, and several other gifts were conferred upon him. On the anniversary of Shahjahan's accession (April 1654), he was further awarded 30,000 rupees, and a Turkish horse with gold trappings. Prince Dara Shikoh gave Zulfiqar a robe, a decorated plume, two horses with silver trapping, and 20,000 rupees. Prince Suleiman Shikoh gave him 5,000 rupees. Jahan Ara Begum presented him a robe and 15,000 rupees, and Sadullah Khan gave him 15,000 rupees. On another occasion, Shahjahan gave him a gold and a silver muhar of 400 tolas each. On the eve of Eid-ul-fitr, the Emperor again presented him 5,000 rupees.

149 A.S., III, p. 145; M.L., I, p. 731; Muhammad Waris, Padshah Nama, Rotograph copy, Aligarh Muslim University, p. 277.
Khafi Khan says that the envoy got a total of 300,000 rupees.
Waris gives an exaggerated figure of one million rupees as the value of the presents for the Sultan. The presents were: a dagger and a girdle both set with diamonds and rubies; a tassel made of pearl and emerald, 2000 pieces of Indian cloth of the finest quality, and 50 tolas of Jahangiri perfume. According to Kanbu, at the time of Zulfiqar's departure the news arrived that Istanbul was in the grip of plague. Shahjahan sent to the Sultan, as a gesture of friendship, a piece of pure Zahrmohra (antidote for poison) which he used to tie on his arms, to combat the pestilence.

Başvекалат Arşivi, Istanbul, Ali Emiri Tasnifi, No. 10491. The document gives an interesting information that 79,000 akce were spent on the estables and drinks of the Indian ambassador between 14-19 Rajab, 1066 A.H. Naima (vol. 6, p. 2670) says that the envoy reached Scutari on the 17th Rajab, which in the light of the above documentary evidence is incorrect.

Naima, vol. 6, pp. 2670-71; Silahdar Fındıklili Mehmet Agha, Silahdar Tarihi, ed. Ahmet Refiğ bey, Istanbul, 1928, vol. 1, pp. 41-42; Hammer, History, II, p. 273. According to Naima the presents, which included a jewelled sword and a dagger set with diamonds, the principal stone of which shone in great blaze, were carried by two hundred and fifty porters.

Hammer, II, p. 273; Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı, III, II, pp. 266-267, p. 267 (Note 1). It is noteworthy that none of the Mughal chroniclers have alluded to these proposals presented by Qaim Beg. By the time of the departure of Qaim Beg, 1654, the tomb of Mumtaz Mahal whom Hammer calls Noor Mahal, had already been completed at Agra (not at Ahmadabad as Hammer puts it). The request of an architect for the construction of this tomb, thus, seems illogical. Hammer has not cited his source for this piece of information. Uzunçarşılı's observation that in return for Shah Tahmasp's help Humayun had ceded Qandahar to Tahmasp and that it remained a part of the Safavid empire for nearly one hundred years is not based on facts.
Uzunçarşili, III, II, p. 267. The presents included a crest set with emeralds and four horses of purest breed. The saddles and stirrups of the horses were made of gold and pearl.

156. Munshaat, II, pp. 276-79.

157. A.S., III, pp. 200-201; Sadiq Matlabi Anbalvi, Adab-i-Alamgiri, ed. Abdul Ghafoor Chaudhry, Lahore, 1971, vol. II, p. 984. According to these sources Qaim Beg had fallen in love with one of the slave girls of Murtuza Pasha. The Pasha in a fit of rage ordered his servants to kill him. They accordingly killed the envoy by mixing poison in his drink. Qaim Beg's son-in-law Muhammad Husain and a friend Haji Muhammad Quli Sharaf were also killed in the same manner.

158. Ghauri, War, p. 111.


163. I.H. Qureshi, Akbar, pp. 122-127. Qureshi's remark that Akbar was responsible for the downfall of the Mughal empire as well as for the enslavement of the Muslim world at the hands of the Europeans (p. 127) is, however, far-fetched and devoid of logic.

164. Akbar's letter to Abdullah Khan Uzbek, Maktubat-i-Allami
pp. 17-27; Abul Fazl's letter to Hakim Human, Maktubat, pp. 196-98. That such a collaboration between Indian and extra Indian powers against the Portuguese was not altogether inconceivable, is evident by the joint Mamluk-Gujarat naval expedition of 1508 and the Ottoman naval expedition of 1538.

The Safavid pressure on the North West frontier of the Mughal empire was very strong in 1622 and 1649.
CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: THE SECOND PHASE

Many Christian nations, holders of crucifix and icons, have impertinently combined against us. Like rooks and ravens they have dared to extend their filthy hands and brazen arms towards the garden of the land of Islam. For extirpating the thorns of heresy from the domain of the Believers, for guarding the abodes of the Faithful and for protecting the life and property of the Muslims, we have turned to God for succor. . . . It is reckoned that Your Majesty, with the blessings of the pious, the ulama and the mashaikhs, will also endeavour in every way to display your zeal for Din-i-Ahmedi and will strive to protect the pure shariat of the Prophet. You will, in this manner, obtain the recompense of Jihad. (Sultan Suleiman II to Emperor Aurangzeb).

Glory be to God! Due to the prowess and felicity of the exalted Khalifa, the accursed tyrant [Nadir Shah] received a merited retribution and mankind finally attained deliverance from his tyranny. The dominion of Persia is now unoccupied. If the victorious Ottoman armies, under the command of experienced captains, be dispatched against Persia, the entire country, by the grace of the Almighty, will come under Your Majesty's possession. Then Shiism, which has held sway in that region for ages, will perish and the rites of orthodoxy and the Hanafi sect will again be restored. The Sultan will, thus, acquire a glorious name both in this world and the next. (Nizam ul-mulk Asafjah I to Sultan Mahmud I).

Of the four combatants for the Peacock Throne in the recent war of succession, Prince Muhammad Aurangzeb was undoubtedly the ablest. He was well known for his bravery, grit, and fearlessness. He had also earned a phenomenal reputation as an administrator and as a man of letters. Shahjahan had great confidence in Aurangzeb's
talents and had frequently sent him on arduous military campaigns and difficult administrative assignments. It, therefore, came to nobody's surprise when Aurangzeb emerged successful from this struggle. He ascended the throne on July 21, 1658.

Once the din and dust of the war of succession had subsided and Aurangzeb was firmly settled on the throne, embassies came from far and wide to congratulate the new Emperor on his accession. Aurangzeb was indeed in need of such recognition from foreign powers, especially from Persia and the Ottoman empire, to establish the legitimacy of his rule. His accession had taken place under exceptionally abnormal circumstances. He had not only waded through the blood of his brothers to reach the Peacock Throne but had also deposed and imprisoned his father, the erstwhile Emperor, to secure the coveted throne. On the eve of his formal coronation, in May, 1659, the Qazi-ul-quzat (Chief Justice) of the empire had refused to read khutba (a formal sermon proclaiming the name of the ruling prince) in Aurangzeb's name. The Qazi had justified his action with the plea that, "In the lifetime of the father the reading of the Khutba in the name of his son is not permissible in the Shariyat." A subordinate gazi ultimately performed the ceremony on the specious justification that since Shahjahan was too weak and sick to govern the empire, "The reading of the khutba in the name of the son who is capable of kingship (sultanat) and ruling over the kingdom, is permissible, according to the shariyat."
This political imbroglio at home was followed by another embarrassing episode abroad. According to Manucci, the Sharif of Mecca had declined to accept the gifts sent by Aurangzeb, shortly after his accession to throne, on the same ground. Under these circumstances the arrival of foreign congratulatory missions, bringing letters of recognition, was more than welcome to Aurangzeb. He held elaborate and pompous ceremonies at the time of the arrival and departure of these embassies. He gave lavish presents, in cash as well as in kind, to the ambassadors and their masters. It was indeed a deliberate policy on the part of the Emperor to induce other minor Muslim sovereigns to send congratulatory missions to Shahjahanabad. He is even said to have laboured hard to get an embassy of recognition from Persia.

Subhan Quli Khan, the Uzbek ruler of Balkh, was the first Muslim sovereign to send a diplomatic mission to Aurangzeb. In January 1661, Qilich Beg arrived with 27 horses and Balkhi fruits for the Emperor. He was suitably rewarded. The regular embassy led by Ibrahim Beg reached Shahjahanabad a little later. The envoy was admitted into audience on February 16, 1661; he presented the Khan's letter and gifts. Aurangzeb gave him an elegant robe of honour, a belt studded with jewels, and 15,000 rupees for his expenses. A comfortable house was also assigned to the ambassador and his staff. On March 23, 1661, Aurangzeb again presented him with a jeweled baton and a gold and silver sequin of 200 Tola
(one Tola is equal to 180 grains) each. A few days later the Uzbek mission was ceremoniously dismissed with suitable rewards and several expensive gifts for the Khan.

Shah Abbas II of Persia was the second major Muslim monarch to recognize Aurangzeb. In 1661, he sent a grand embassy led by Tufangchi Aqasi (Chief of Musketeers) Budaq Beg. News of the arrival of the Persian envoy in Thatta reached Shahjahanabad in February, 1661. On his way to the court, the envoy was magnificently entertained by the governors of Multan and Lahore. Aurangzeb, conscious of the importance of the embassy and eager to prove the legitimacy of his rule to the populace of Delhi, made special arrangements for the ambassadors' reception in the capital. According to Manucci, "Aurangzeb gave orders for soldiers to be posted on both sides of the street, a league in length, through which the ambassador would pass. The principal streets were decorated with rich stuffs, both in the shops and the windows, and the ambassador was brought through them, escorted by a number of officers, with music, drums, pipes, and trumpets." Aurangzeb received the envoy on May 22, 1661. He showered upon him and his staff unusual favours. Four days later the envoy presented the gifts and royal letter. He was ceremoniously dismissed after two months. In all 500,000 rupees were bestowed upon the ambassador and another 35,000 rupees on his staff.

Ambassadors also came, with congratulatory letters and presents,
from the Khan of Bokhara, the Sharif of Mecca, the ruler of
Hedramaut, the Imam of Yemen, and the Christian King of
Ethiopia. They were cordially welcomed, graciously treated,
and lavishly rewarded. The envoy of Bokhara received from the
Emperor a cash award of 1,20,000 rupees. The ambassador of the
Sharif of Mecca was given two robes of honour, a horse, a gold and
silver coin of 100 Tola each, and 13,000 rupees. The Ethiopian envoy
got 4,500 rupees for himself and 12,000 rupees for his master. The
envoy of Hadramaut was presented with a robe, a horse, and 3,000
rupees. A cash award of 7,000 rupees was sent for his master.

Embassies, thus, came from practically every nook and corner of
the Muslim world to wish Aurangzeb well on his accession to the
throne. None, however, came from Istanbul. The Ottoman impassivity
and indifference towards Aurangzeb is difficult to explain.
Contemporary chronicles, Mughal as well as Ottoman, are silent on
this issue. Manzade Husain Agha, the last Ottoman ambassador to
India, had not presented his credentials to Aurangzeb. He was,
therefore, not duty bound to send a return embassy to Istanbul.
Sultan Muhammad IV's relations with Shahjahan had been quite warm and
affable. He probably did not relish Shahjahan's deposition;
Aurangzeb's consequent treatment of his father may have further
displeased the Sultan. The feeble plea on which Aurangzeb had
justified his accession to the throne does not seem to have been
accepted by the Sultan; Aurangzeb probably remained in his eyes a
usurper. Being the premier Muslim sovereign of the day, the Ottoman Sultan was not likely to be impressed by the pomp and splendour of Aurangzeb’s court. The Emperor’s lavish display of wealth and his bestowal of expensive presents upon the envoys and their royal masters does not seem to have captured the Sultan’s imagination. He, therefore, withheld recognition from Aurangzeb.

On the other hand, Ottoman lukewarmness and insouciance must have been gall to Aurangzeb. He did not attempt either to resume diplomatic relations with them or to negotiate, as he had done in the case of Persia, an embassy of recognition from the Ottoman Sultan. In fact he hardly needed that. His relations with the Safavids and the Uzbeks were cordial. Persian recognition had given ample credence to his rule and had eliminated the last hope of his opponents who were anticipating foreign intervention on their behalf.24 The rumour that Prince Shah Shuja, Aurangzeb’s brother, had taken asylum in Istanbul and that he had obtained huge financial assistance from the Ottomans for his projected invasion of Kabul, had also proved baseless, following the confirmation of the Prince’s death in Arakan.25 Aurangzeb was also not interested in recovering Qandahar, which had throughout been a bone of contention between the Mughals and the Safavids, from Persia. Having personally led two unsuccessful campaigns against Qandahar in 1649 and 1652, he knew the futility of such an exercise. Aurangzeb had thus no reason, at least for the time being, to curry favour with the Ottomans.
The Ottoman Governor of Basra was, nonetheless, one of the earliest foreign dignitaries to send a diplomatic mission to Shahjahanbad. In January 1661, Aurangzeb received the news of the arrival of Basra's envoy. He instructed the Mutassadi (Officer in charge of the Port) of Surat to present Qasim Aqa, the envoy, with a purse of 4,000 rupees for his expenses and send him to the Court. In May 1661, Qasim Aqa presented his credentials and five Arab horses as a peshkash (offering) from his master Husain Pasha; on his own behalf the envoy presented a few Arab horses and a Georgian slave. He was graced with a robe of honour and was rewarded 5,000 rupees. The chief object of the embassy," writes Manucci, "was the sending of other Arab horses for sale, and to buy cloth and piece goods without having to pay dues either on entry or export, which is the usual liberty allowed to the ambassadors." The Aqa was allowed to depart in October, 1661. An elegant robe of honour and 12,000 rupees were given to him. A sword set with diamonds was sent for Husain Pasha. Aurangzeb also dispatched a return embassy to Basra.

In 1665, another diplomatic mission came from Basra. The ambassador brought Husain Pasha's arzdasht (petition) and nine Arab horses as the Pasha's Peshkash. He received a robe, a dagger set with jewels, and a purse of 9,000 rupees. Neither the Pasha's petition is extant nor the intent of his mission is known. There is, nevertheless, considerable evidence that Husain Pasha, who had
succeeded to the hereditary governorship of Basra in 1650, had not been in the good books of the Porte.\textsuperscript{32} In 1654, the Ottoman Governor of Baghdad, with the Porte’s connivance, had expelled Husain Pasha from Basra. The Pasha was forced to take refuge in Persia. But he had soon managed to recover Basra with the help of its populace.\textsuperscript{33} Since then Husain Pasha’s relations with the Sublime Porte had been tense and strained. The rumour that the Pasha had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Shah of Persia\textsuperscript{34} must have further damaged the relationship between Basra and Istanbul. The Pasha had, thus, no qualms about the Porte’s designs against him. Under these circumstances, accord with the powerful monarch of India was likely to strengthen his position at home and abroad. It is also probable that at this time the Pasha was planning to take shelter in India eventually. These considerations seem to have obliged Husain Pasha to propitiate Aurangzeb. Subsequent developments in Pasha’s career confirm this hypothesis (see below).

In 1666, Aurangzeb’s relations with Persia received a setback. His embassy to Persia, sent in 1662, had miscarried.\textsuperscript{35} Shah Abbas II’s conduct towards the Mughal ambassador had been highly objectionable and inappropriate. He had derided the envoy and had made insulting remarks about Aurangzeb in his presence. The Shah had even threatened to invade India.\textsuperscript{36} In his letter to Aurangzeb, sent through the Mughal ambassador, the Shah had scoffed at the Emperor’s title of Alamgir (World Conqueror), had accused him of
usurping his father's throne, and had cast aspersion on his administrative ability. He wrote, "Recently we have learnt from comers and goers that at many places in Hindustan refractory and seditious people, considering that Solomon-like monarch [Aurangzeb] to be impotent and resourceless, have raised the dust of disturbance, and having taken possession of some parts of the country are giving trouble to the inhabitants and travellers of that kingdom." 37

Reports of the mobilization of a large Persian army with heavy artillery on the Khurasan frontier also reached Aurangzeb at the same time. 38 The empire was placed in a state of alert. A large army was sent, under Prince Muhammad Muazzam, to Kabul to guard the frontier. To meet the Persian threat, Aurangzeb decided to march in person to Punjab. 39

It was in this period that Aurangzeb contemplated sending a diplomatic mission to Istanbul. He nominated Shah Khwaja to lead the Mughal legation. 40 Aurangzeb's decision to resume diplomatic relations with the Ottomans needs little explanation. With the hazard of Persian invasion on India imminent, Aurangzeb needed, more than ever, external support to confront this problem. In his correspondence with the Uzbeks, Aurangzeb had always underscored the idea of Sunni solidarity against the Persians. 41 He seems to have realized then the efficacy of an alliance with the Ottomans also on similar grounds. Ottoman political or moral support, even an Ottoman diversionary attack on the western frontier of Persia, would
have helped Aurangzeb a great deal in meeting the Persian challenge.

While the Mughals were getting ready for the impending war with Persia, the news of the death of Shah Abbas II reached the court on December 12, 1666. Orders were issued for the suspension of military preparations; Prince Muazzam was directed not to move beyond Lahore. Contemporary chronicles do not refer to the dispatch of the Mughal embassy to the Porte. The later issues of Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mualla (News reports of the Imperial Court), which is our only source of information for Aurangzeb's projected embassy to Istanbul, do not mention it. Shah Abbas II's death had eliminated the immediate danger of a Persian invasion on India. The new Persian King, Shah Suleiman (1666-1694), was a weak and incompetent ruler. During his rule Persia was not likely to pose any threat to the Mughal empire. Hence, the need for an Ottoman alliance against Persia had become extraneous and irrelevant. Aurangzeb thus seems to have abandoned the idea of sending his proposed diplomatic mission to Istanbul.

In July 1669, Husain Pasha arrived in India to take refuge at Aurangzeb's court. Since his assumption of the Governorship of Basra, the Pasha had not been keeping cordial relations with the Porte (see above). He had not only encouraged anti-Ottoman activities in Basra but had also been deficient in the payment of annual tribute to Istanbul. Consequently, in 1666 the Ottoman army had captured Basra but had later withdrawn after the Pasha had
apologized and cleared his account.45 Apparently Husain Pasha had not given up his anti-Ottoman posture. In 1667 he was dismissed from his post and was expelled from Basra. He burnt the town in disgust and fled to Persia.46 When the Ottomans exerted pressure on the Shah of Persia to surrender the fugitive, he escaped with his train and treasure to India.47

In India, Husain Pasha received a grand welcome. Aurangzeb readily acceded to his request to join the Mughal service. He also sent an imperial courier with a robe, a palanquin, and an elephant to meet the Pasha in Sarhind and to conduct him to the capital. When he reached Shahjahanabad, Aurangzeb sent the Bakshi-ul-Mulk (Paymaster General) Asad Khan and Sadr-us-Sudur (Minister in charge of Religious Affairs) to receive him at Lahore gate. On July 15, 1669, the Pasha was introduced into the royal presence. The Emperor greeted him kindly and graciously stroked his back — a rare and unusual honour. He presented a ruby worth 20,000 rupees and ten Arabian horses; his sons, Afrasiyab Beg and Ali Beg, presented 5,000 rupees each. Aurangzeb conferred on Husain Pasha the high mansab of 5000/5000 and the imposing title of Islam Khan.48 His sons were also given mansabs of 2000 and 1500 respectively. A government mansion was assigned for his residence.49 This was not all. Within one month of the Pasha's arrival at the court, he was promoted to the rank of 6000. He was also given cash salary for ten months and was exempted from the payment of certain imperial dues. Similar
concessions were granted to his sons. On the eve of the celebration of his birthday, Aurangzeb again presented him with 100 pieces of gold embroidery.

Husain Pasha was not destined to enjoy the imperial favour for long. By 1671, he seems to have fallen into disgrace. He was dismissed from his mansab and was denied the audience of the Emperor. Through intervention of Bahadur Khan, the viceroy of Deccan, he was pardoned in the ensuing year and was re-instated to his rank. Subsequently, the Pasha was also appointed Governor of Malwa. In 1676, he was killed in the Bijapur Campaign. Aurangzeb expressed his disappointment at the Pasha's death and favoured his sons with promotions in the military hierarchy.

Husain Pasha's family continued to serve the Mughal empire with distinction. His son Afrasiyab Khan was appointed Faujdar (Chief Executive and Military Officer of a Division) of Dhamoni and Muradabad. In 1682, Mukhtar Beg, another son of Husain Pasha, was given the title of Nawazish Khan; six years later he was promoted to the Faujdar of Mandsor. In 1695, he became Faujdar of Muradabad; later on he was also posted in the same capacity in Mandu and Elichpur. In 1705, he got the highly important assignment of the Governorship of Kashmir. Nawazish Khan retained his position of eminence in the time of Aurangzeb's successors as well. Bahadur Shah I (1707-1712) bestowed upon him several honours. The Emperor also appointed him as the Governor of Kashmir again.
In August 1671, Yahiya Pasha, another Ottoman Governor of Basra arrived in India to take asylum at the Mughal court. He was Husain Pasha's brother-in-law and had succeeded him in the Governorship of Basra. Aurangzeb welcomed him cordially. He bestowed upon the Pasha a special robe with buttons of gold thread, a sword set with diamonds, a dagger, and 10,000 rupees. He was enrolled in the Mughal service and was elevated to the mansab of 1500. In March 1672, he was deputed, along with other imperial officials, to chastise the rebellious Satnamis. He impressed the Emperor with his heroic deeds in the battle against the rebels, and was promoted in the state service. The subsequent career of Yahiya Pasha is not known. No further mention of the Pasha is found in the Mughal chronicles.

The next fifteen years (1672-1687) were fraught with internal troubles in the Mughal empire. In this period a series of uprisings took place in various parts of the empire. This period also coincided with intensive Mughal campaigns in the Deccan, which culminated in Aurangzeb's conquest of Bijapur and Golkunda in 1687. Consequently there was little diplomatic activity during these fifteen years. Between 1670 and 1685, Aurangzeb received only two foreign embassies; both were from Bukhara. He himself sent only one diplomatic mission to Central Asia. Since 1667, Mughal-Persian relations had remained suspended. After his alleged attempt to send an embassy to Istanbul, Aurangzeb had made no overtures with the Ottomans also, either for recognition or for friendship.
In breaking the Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic deadlock, the initiative came from the Ottomans. In 1689, Sultan Suleiman II (1687-1691) sent Ahmad Aqa as his envoy to Aurangzeb's court.\textsuperscript{61} The Ottoman resolve to recognize Aurangzeb, three decades after his accession to the throne, and to resume diplomatic relations with Mughals is hardly surprising. In 1689, the Ottoman empire was passing through a period of external and internal crisis. Ottoman failure to capture Vienna in September 1683 had exposed the military weakness of the Ottoman Empire. It had encouraged other European states, Poland, Tuscany, Venice, Malta, the Vatican, and even Russia, to join hands with Austria in an anti-Ottoman league. A major Austrian offensive in Ottoman Europe had begun.\textsuperscript{62} Buda had fallen to Austria in June 1686, while the Venetians had captured Athens in September 1687.\textsuperscript{63} Disaster abroad had been followed by crisis at home. The drain on the state exchequer to finance the military campaigns, coupled with a bad crop had proved calamitous for Ottoman economy. The empire was on the brink of bankruptcy. According to the Ottoman chronicler Silahdar, "Throughout 1687 thousands in Anatolia were forced to survive by eating grass, oaknuts, and walnut shells. Thousands more starved to death."\textsuperscript{64}

Several steps were taken by the Ottoman authorities to ameliorate the situation. Sultan Muhammad IV was deposed, Jihad was declared against the enemies, and currency was devalued. None seemed to work. The Austrians conquered Belgrade in September 1688.
Rejecting Ottoman proposals for peace, they moved into Bosnia. Many Balkan provinces fell to Austria during July and November of the year 1689. Shortly after that, Ottoman dependencies of Wallachia and Transylvania also acknowledged Austrian suzerainty. Ottoman rule in Europe seemed to be on the verge of collapse. 65

It was in this period, when the empire was in deep distress, that the Ottomans began to look for support in Asia. There, the Sultan could invoke the succour of his Sunni compeers, the Uzbeks and the Mughals. By 1689, the Mughal empire had reached the apogee of its power. Alliance with the powerful Mughal Emperor was expected to pay some dividends. The deposition of Sultan Muhammad IV in 1687, who had so far withheld recognition from Aurangzeb, and the accession of a new Sultan, also seems to have contributed to the change in Ottoman attitude towards the Mughals. Resumption of the long suspended Mughal-Ottoman relations was, thus, the natural outcome of these developments. 66

Aurangzeb was in the Deccan when he received the news of the arrival of the Ottoman envoy. Elaborate arrangements were made for the reception of the ambassador. "The Subedar (Governors) of the provinces" writes Mughal Chronicler Ishwar Das Nagar, "were instructed that they should accord him a warm welcome, treat him with due respect and honour and escort him safely through their respective territories." 67 Ahmad Aqa reached the imperial camp on July 29, 1960. 68 Admitted to royal audience, probably the same day, the
envoy presented the royal letter and gifts; he was lavishly rewarded. His retinue was also the recipient of similar regal favours. 69

The letter brought by the Ottoman envoy is verbose. Replete with quotations from the Quran and the Hadith (Prophetic Tradition), it is full of references to the Sultan as the Khalifa. In fact, it is perhaps the only letter from an Ottoman Sultan to a Mughal Emperor in which such a strong exposition to the Ottoman claim to khilafat has been made. This letter is in contrast to the last Ottoman imperial missive sent by Sultan Muhammad IV, through Manzade Husin Agha, to Shahjahan (see chapter one).

In this letter, which began with a doxology and praise of the Prophet and the Orthodox Khalifas, the Sultan emphasized the need for a righteous sovereign for the proper management of the affairs of Islam, for the removal of innovation and evil usages, and for demolishing the precepts of heresy and disbelief. He proclaimed that God had chosen him to take up this responsibility and that for this purpose He had elevated him to the throne of khilafat. After apprising Aurangzeb about the conspiracy of the Christian powers to ravage the lands of Islam, the Sultan recounted the efforts he had made to repel the invaders and to protect the life and property of the Muslims. Citing the Quranic verse, "Allah hath conferred on those who strive (in His way) with their lives and wealth a rank above the sedentary." 70 the Sultan exhorted the Emperor to assist him, at least with prayers and orisons, and to do his utmost to
protect the pure shariat of the Prophet. "In this manner," wrote the Sultan, "Your Majesty will also obtain the recompense of Jihad." The letter concluded with a plea to remain united and firm in the raison d'être of annihilating the enemies of faith, and with a prayer for perpetual exchange of letters and messages between the two states.  

This is the first Ottoman imperial epistle to a Mughal Emperor which does not dwell upon the Persian menace to orthodox Islam and which does not seek to form a Sunni alliance against Shia Persia. By this time, the Safavid empire was well on its way to decline; internal strife and inept administration had sapped its strength. As early as 1668 the English factors in Persia had perceived the declining fortunes of the Safavids and had reported, "Thus you may perceive the present posture of this kingdom [Persia], which was never in a poorer condition to defend itself, having neither men nor moneys . . ." Thus, Persia had no longer remained a threat either to Ottomans or to Mughals. The intent of the Ottoman mission was to solicit Aurangzeb's support and aid, not against the Persians, but against the Christian foes of the Ottoman empire.

But what kind of aid could Aurangzeb provide to the Ottomans? Obviously, he was not expected to send military aid to Istanbul. In any case the Ottoman artillery and navy were superior to those of the Mughals. It is probable that the Ottoman mission sought financial aid from the Mughals. This, in view of the impoverished Ottoman
economy, in this period, does not seem to be implausible. We have the testimony of the contemporary European traveller Manucci to this effect. Manucci says that the main purpose of the Ottoman mission was to seek monetary assistance from Aurangzeb. "In the year one thousand six hundred and eighty-nine," he observes, "there came an ambassador from the Grand Seignor (Ottoman Sultan) to ask help in money from Aurangzeb, explaining to him the danger to which his King was exposed from the armies of the Christians. Aurangzeb sent him nine lakhs (nine hundred thousand) of rupees, making excuses for giving no greater help. For he, too, was occupied against the infidels." Whether or not the Sultan sought and received pecuniary aid from Aurangzeb is a moot point, for there is no other evidence to corroborate Manucci's testimony. Nevertheless, it certainly indicates a change in the pattern of the Mughal-Ottoman relationship. It also evinces a shift in Ottoman strategy. The focus of attention was now diverted from the Shias to the Christians, against whom the Ottoman Sultan solicited Mughal support.

Professor Hikmet Bayur has observed that the Ottoman envoy was poorly received at the Mughal court. He says that in comparison to the grand reception meted out to the Persian ambassador, and even to the envoys of Ottoman dependencies, Basra and Mecca, the reception accorded to the envoy of the Ottoman Sultan — the most powerful Muslim potentate of the time — was lukewarm at best. Bayur's observation is based on the notices taken by the author of
Maasir-i-Alamgiri, a Mughal chronicle, of the arrival and departure of foreign embassies at Aurangzeb's court. He writes that the Basra embassy of 1661 is mentioned in this chronicle on three occasions (pp. 34, 35–6 and 37). The gifts brought by the ambassador as well as the presents given to him are also minutely enumerated. But the Ottoman mission is mentioned only once (p. 337) and that too in a cursory manner.  

Professor Bayur's conclusions are not tenable for three reasons. First, Aurangzeb at the outset of his reign was eager to get recognition from foreign potentates and dignitaries. The arrival and departure of envoys of even minor rulers and notables was, in that period, an occasion of great fanfare and display. These embassies have likewise been recorded in the chronicles in the same manner. Second, the advent and return of the embassies from Bokhara and Kashghar, with whom Aurangzeb had cordial and intimate relations, are recorded in Maasir-i-Alamgiri along with the Ottoman mission, on the same page (p. 337). This indicates that no injustice was done to the Ottoman embassy by the Mughal Chronicler. Third, Ishwar Das Nagar, another contemporary Mughal chronicler, has mentioned that, at Aurangzeb's orders elaborate arrangements were made for the reception of the Ottoman envoy (also see above). There seems to be little justification, therefore, for Professor Bayur's assumption that the Ottoman envoy was not given the honour due to him as the representative of the most powerful Muslim monarch of the day.
Ahmad Aqa was detained at the court for some time and then ceremoniously dismissed. Aurangzeb bestowed upon him and his staff various gifts and presents, in cash as well as in kind. A royal letter and several precious gifts, which included jewels, choice Indian fabrics, and other rarities, were sent to the Sultan. 77 Aurangzeb, however, did not send a return embassy to Istanbul. Even his reply has not been copied in the Ottoman Name Humayun Defteri (Register of Imperial Correspondence), preserved in the Prime Minister's Archives, Istanbul. As far as Aurangzeb was concerned, there was hardly any need to maintain diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. At this time he was at the height of his power, while the common Mughal-Ottoman foe, the Safavid empire, was struggling for survival. Thus, the basic reason for instituting the Mughal-Ottoman axis was no longer in existence. The imperious tone of the Sultan's epistle, his frequent reference to himself as the Khalifa of Islam, and his exhortation to Aurangzeb for Jihad seems to have incensed the Emperor. The Ottoman failure to send a congratulatory embassy on his accession, and their holding back recognition from him for thirty-two years also seems to have contributed to Aurangzeb's indifferent attitude towards the Ottomans. He lost a good opportunity to resume diplomatic relations with them. At the time of his death, the Mughal empire was practically isolated in the Islamic world.

Bahadur Shah I (1707-1712), who succeeded Aurangzeb, made little effort to break the diplomatic isolation of the Mughal empire.
During his reign of five years, he neither received a foreign diplomatic mission nor dispatched any embassy abroad. 78 His attitude towards Persia was cordial and friendly. He was also favourably inclined to revive diplomatic relations with that country. 79 Towards the Ottomans, however, Bahadur Shah seems to have continued his father's policy of apathy and unconcern. There is no evidence to suggest that he ever attempted to enter into friendly communication with them. When he died in 1712, virtually no change had taken place on the Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic front. Mughal India had to remain content for some time with political and diplomatic isolation in the Islamic world.

Jahandar Shah (1712-1713), Bahadur Shah's successor, was a weakling. Lacking in political skill and steeped in sensual pleasure, he was utterly unfit to rule the extensive empire he had inherited from his father. His accession marks not only the beginning of the end of Mughal grandeur, awesomeness, and pomp, but even the collapse of the empire itself. The Emperor disregarded the training he had received from his father and grandfather and paid no heed to the problems of the empire. 80 He was eventually defeated and later executed by his nephew Farrukhsiyar. 81 His reign was too short to herald any change in the state policy. In his regime the Mughal-Ottoman relations had remained suspended.

It was Farrukhsiyar (1713-1719) who broke this self-imposed spell of political and diplomatic isolation of the Mughal empire. He
exchanged embassies with the major Muslim sovereigns of his day. Very early in his reign, he took the initiative of renewing long suspended Mughal-Ottoman relations. In October, 1713 he sent Haji Niaz Beg Khan as his envoy to Istanbul. The plenipotentiary carried a royal letter and gifts for Sultan Ahmad III (1703-1730). 82

Farrukhsiyar had sound reasons for bringing about this change in Mughal attitude towards the Ottomans. First, his accession, like that of Aurangzeb, had taken place under unusual circumstances. Never before in Mughal history, had a pretender to the throne defeated the ruling prince in a contest for the throne. Never in the past had a Mughal Emperor been executed. Hence, in the eyes of the people, the legality of Farrukhsiyar's rule was as questionable as that of Aurangzeb. Farrukhsiyar, therefore, seems to have been very eager and sedulous to prove his legitimacy as a de-jure ruler. He could do so by getting recognition from foreign potentates. Second, Farrukhsiyar's position in 1713 was far from secure. The power and authority of his ministers, the Sayyid brothers, had assumed dangerous proportions. The first breach in his relations with the Sayyids had already occurred. 83 This continued to widen during the next six years and ultimately led to the Emperor's deposition and murder at the hands of the Sayyids. The support of the Ottoman Sultan was likely to strengthen Farrukhsiyar's position at home and abroad. Third, shortly after his succession to the throne, Farrukhsiyar had received two diplomatic missions from Persia in
quick succession. He had rewarded them profusely and had sent a return embassy, led by Rashid Khan, to restore diplomatic relations with Persia. Recognition from the Shah of Persia seem to have also encouraged Farrukhsiyar to seek a similar endorsement of his rule from the Ottoman Sultan. Hence, the change in Mughal attitude towards the Ottomans.

Farrukhsiyar's letter begins with a short treatise on the theme of friendship and amity among the rulers of the world. "The affection and friendship which the monarchs of the world show to one another," observes the Emperor, "is the cause of the orderly arrangement of the business of the universe and the harmony which emanates from this bond of friendship is the source of the safety and tranquility of mankind." Recalling the age-old accord between the two illustrious dynasties, Farrukhsiyar says that the rules of friendship require them to communicate to each other the special events which occur in their respective realms. It is followed by an account of disturbances in the provinces of Deccan and Bengal, of the appointment of Farrukhsiyar by his father, to put these provinces in order, of the crisis and rebellion in the empire after the death of his father, and the defeat of Jahandar Shah at the hands of the rebels. The letter gives a graphic description of Farrukhsiyar's dispatch of an army, under Sayyid Abdullah Khan, to punish the miscreants, his own advance with a force to help the Sayyid, his victory in the battle of Akbarabad (Agra), his appointment of
Jahandar Shah as the governor of that city, his capture of Shahjahanabad by storm, his accession to the throne on 7 Rabiulakhir, 1124 (May 3, 1712), and the striking of coins and recital of Khutba in Farrukhsiyar's name in the territories of Hindustan, Bengal, Deccan and Kashghar. Farrukhsiyar requests the Sultan to trust the verbal messages sent through the ambassador. The letter ends with a prayer for the envoy's early dismissal with an imperial epistle. 85

The letter is replete with false and inaccurate information. The narrative of a rebellion against the Mughals, of Jahandar Shah's unsuccessful encounter with the rebels, of the appointment of Jahandar Shah as the Governor of Agra, of Farrukhsiyar's storming the citadel of Shahjahanabad etc., is nothing but a pack of fabrications. Indeed, it is the only letter in the Mughal-Ottoman correspondence which gives so many deceptive and fraudulent facts. Is the letter spurious? It does not seem so. It is recorded in the Ottoman Name Humayun Defteri, preserved in the Prime Minister's Archives of Istanbul. Sultan Ahmad III's reply to this letter is also appended to it. Further, Tarikh-i-Rashidi, a contemporary Ottoman chronicle, also mentions the letter brought by an envoy from India in 1717. The chronicler has, however, hinted that the letter of the Indian Emperor was deficient in diplomatic courtesy and decorum. 86 Apparently, there is nothing in Farrukhsiyar's letter to which the Ottoman chronicler could have taken exception, barring
the misrepresentation of facts.

Why did Farrukhsiyar indulge in prevarication? What purpose did it serve? This is not hard to determine. Farrukhsiyar was himself guilty of a rebellion, though a successful one, and had occupied the throne after murdering his uncle — the reigning Emperor. He was also anxious to secure Ottoman recognition for his government. Little wonder that Farrukhsiyar had to take recourse to subterfuge to achieve his goal. This strange behaviour of the Emperor was in harmony with his character. Contemporary as well as non-contemporary Mughal chroniclers have portrayed him as low-spirited, cowardly, intriguing and unscrupulous, one who could do any thing to fulfill his ambitions. 87 Farrukhsiyar's resort to falsehood is, therefore, hardly surprising.

Haji Niaz Beg Khan reached Istanbul at a time when Ottoman empire was in the throes of a war with Austria and Venice, and the Sultan had moved to Edirne. 88 The envoy was welcomed by the acting Grand Wazir, who advised him to stay in the capital for some time to get over the fatigue of the long and hazardous journey. He also informed the Sultan about the arrival of the ambassador. Upon receiving the Sultan's permission, the Wazir made arrangements for the Haji's journey to Edirne. The envoy reached Edirne, in company of the official host, and was lodged in a government mansion. 89 According to the Ottoman historiographer Rashid, "The coming of an embassy from the Emperor of India was a rare and unusual occurrence;
special attention was paid to find out the purpose of Mughal mission and no stone was left unturned to show honour and respect to the envoy. The Porte was not satisfied with the royal letter and gifts brought by the Indian envoy. These were wanting in diplomatic finesse. Yet, writes Rashid, the decorum and rectitude of the Ottoman state was maintained and extraordinary care was taken to keep the envoy happy and contented. He was feted and entertained by the ministers, each of whom gave him a present. After sometime arrangements were made for the envoy's homeward journey and he was allowed to depart with the Sultan's reply.

Neither Rashid nor the Sultan's letter to Farrukhshiyar mention the dispatch of a return embassy to Shahjahanabad. This was quite unusual and contrary to the traditional Ottoman policy towards the Mughals. In the past, the Ottomans had always taken care to send a return embassy to India with conciliatory letters. They had even initiated, on two occasions, the process of the resumption of diplomatic ties with the Mughals. The misrepresentation of facts in Farrukhshiyar's letter seems to have annoyed the Ottomans considerably. Evidently, they were aware of the true state of affairs in India. For example, whereas Farrukhshiyar's letter alludes to his father, Prince Azimushshan, as the deceased Emperor and omits the death of his grandfather, the Emperor Bahadur Shah, the Sultan's epistle pointedly refers to the latter's demise and does not mention the former at all. Moreover, by 1717, the Safavid dynasty in
Persia had begun to show unmistakable signs of decay. Petrovich Volynsky, the Russian ambassador to Isfahan, had already predicted the speedy fall of the Safavid empire. In Istanbul, on the other hand, Grand Wazir Damad Ibrahim Paşa (1717-1730) had come to power. His regime was "Far more interested in living pleasantly and amassing riches than in extending the boundaries of the empire." With the threat on the eastern frontier of the empire almost non-existent and with the political life in Istanbul so indulgent, perhaps there was no need to cultivate relations with the Mughals on a permanent basis. These two factors seem to have been responsible for the departure from the traditional Ottoman policy towards the Mughals.

The Sultan's letter begins with an elaborate doxology and praise for the Prophet and the four pious Khalifas. It points out the significance of friendship between Muslim monarchs and quotes the Hadith: "For Allah we are brothers to each other." It acknowledges Farrukhsiyar's epistle and condoes the death of his grandfather, the Emperor Shah Alam (Bahadur Shah). A summary of Farrukhsiyar's letter follows which ends with a mention of his accession to the throne. The Sultan reminds Farrukhsiyar of the existing threat from the Christian powers to the Islamic world and takes special notice of the Austro-Venetian alliance against the Ottomans. Informing Farrukhsiyar about the temporary transfer of the capital from Istanbul to Edirne for proper supervision of military operations, the
Sultan announces that in order to meet the Christian challenge, the Ottoman forces are ready to move by land and by sea. Citing the Hadith: "Supplications of a just king are accepted," the Sultan enjoins Farrukhsiyar to support and help the armies of Islam with a host of prayers and supplications. The letter concludes with a word of praise for Haji Niaz Beg Khan, "who is being permitted to return with a friendly and agreeable royal letter." \(^95\)

This is one of those few Ottoman letters which does not allude to Safavid Persia and her menace to the Orthodox Islam. The declining fortunes of the Safavid empire as well as the Ottoman preoccupation in Eastern Europe had definitely diverted their attention from the problems of the East to that of the West. It is noteworthy that though the Sultan enjoined Farrukhsiyar to support the cause of the armies of Islam against his enemies, he did not seek any kind of aid from him. He only urged Farrukhsiyar to pray for the success of the Ottomans and to strive for the defense of the Prophet's Shariat. Probably the Ottomans were aware of the helpless posture of the Emperor and did not expect any assistance from him.

It is worth noting that the aforementioned letter, especially its first two pages, is almost identical, with slight modifications and changes, to the letter written by Sultan Suleiman II to Aurangzeb about three decades ago. Even the titles used for Aurangzeb and Farrukhsiyar are nearly the same. \(^96\) This phenomenon provides us
an insight into the working of the Ottoman chancery and the procedure for drafting of important imperial letters. It suggests that generally a standard draft was prepared for diplomatic correspondence. This draft was then utilized, from time to time, for various royal letters sent to foreign potentates. Additions and subtractions were, however, made in accordance with the status of the addressee and the circumstances in which the letter was dispatched. This is further corroborated by the fact that the letter sent by Sultan Mahmud I (1730–1754) to Emperor Muhammad Shah (1719–1848) in 1744 resembles closely, with such changes as were necessitated, the one mentioned above.⁹⁷ The same draft seems to have been used again, at least for the introductory part of the letter, for the epistle written by Sultan Mustafa III (1757–1774) to Ahmad Shah Abdali (1747–1772), the ruler of Afghanistan, in 1762.⁹⁸ Professor Piazzul Islam has cited several examples in the context of Safavid epistolography, when on special occasions a standard draft was used for writing letters to different persons.⁹⁹ But the utilization of the same draft on a number of occasions and over such a long period of time, certainly seems to be unparalleled and unprecedented in the history of Islamic diplomacy.

Farrukhsiyyar's reaction to the Sultan's letter is not known. Mughal chroniclers have not recorded Haji Niaz Beg Khan's mission to Istanbul. Rashid has described the departure of the Mughal ambassador in his narrative of the events of the year 1129 A.H.
(December 1716-November 1717). An Ottoman document dated 18 Safar, 1129 (January 21, 1717) enumerates the horses provided by the Porte as well as expense incurred on it for, the return journey of the Indian envoy and his entourage. If the ambassador left Istanbul in January 1717, he should have reached Shahjahanabad sometime either in late 1717 or early 1718. By that time Farrukhsiyar had already lost much of his power and influence in the affairs of the empire. Hence, no follow up action seems to have been taken to further strengthen the Mughal-Ottoman relations. No Mughal or Ottoman chronicler has reported any other exchange of diplomatic missions between the two sides during the rest of Farrukhsiyar's reign.

Muhammad Shah (1719-1748) got an opportunity, early in his reign, to re-open correspondence with the Ottomans. This was provided by the arrival, in 1723, of Allah Verdi Bey, the envoy of Bukhara. After performing his ambassadorial duties, the envoy expressed a desire to visit the Holy Cities for pilgrimage and solicited the Emperor to write for him a letter of introduction to the Ottoman Sultan. This was a good chance for Muhammad Shah to revive diplomatic ties with the Ottomans. He acceded to the envoy's request. The ambassador was given a royal letter for Sultan Ahmad III and was ceremoniously dismissed on October 26, 1723.

Muhammad Shah's letter styles the Sultan the 'asylum of the greatest Sultans', the 'protector of the most honoured kings',
the 'adorner of the exalted throne of khilafat', and the 'spreader of the precepts of Shariat'. It prays for the long life of the Sultan and for the perpetuation of his khilafat. The Emperor announces his accession to the throne in these words: "It is not concealed from your noble and luminous mind that recently this supplicant, on account of the blessings of the Almighty and in accordance with the Quranic injunction, 'We have sent thee as khalifa on earth', and by token of the divine command, 'And We have raised him to high station,' has ascended the throne of khilafat and sovereignty." Referring to the arrival of Allah Verdi Bey as envoy from Bukhara for strengthening mutual friendship and concord between the two sides, Muhammad Shah alludes to the desire of the envoy to go on pilgrimage. The Emperor quotes the Quranic verse: "Perform the Haj and Umra for God's sake" and strongly recommends him to the Sultan. The letter ends with these words: "It is expected that the sparkling sun of kindness of the shadow of God [Sultan] that illuminates the far and the near, and by whose light the stationary and the mobile remain radiant will also cast the light of his grace on the aforementioned [Allah Verdi Bey]. May the shadow of the empire be lengthened and may your Khilafat remain immortal."103

In contrast to the standard Mughal style of epistolography, the present letter is brief as well as succinct. It does not open with the usual praises for God, the holy Prophet, the pious khilifas, and is completely devoid of platitudes and moral observations. This
idiom, however, seems to have been the vogue in India in the time of Muhammad Shah. Two more letters of the Emperor to Sultan Mahmud I are extant.\(^{104}\) In both these letters very little space has been devoted to formalities and banalities. Short, simple, straightforward and to the point, these letters, nonetheless, proved quite effective and generated warm response and positive action from the Ottomans.

It was through another native of Bukhara, Sayyid Ataullah, that the Sultan sent his reply to Muhammad Shah. According to the Ottoman historiographer Izzi, Sayyid Ataullah had left Bukhara in the year 1135 A.H. (1722-1723), with the intention of going on pilgrimage. He first went to Shahjahanabad, whence he travelled to Mecca by sea. After performing the Haj, he went to Istanbul and met the Grand Wazir Ibrahim Pasa. Through him the Grand Wazir sent a friendly letter to the Itimaduddaulah (Prime Minister) of India.\(^{105}\) Izzi was, perhaps, not aware of the letter which Sultan Ahmad III had given to the Sayyid for Muhammad Shah. He has not mentioned it in his narrative. The letter itself is not extant. But we do get some idea of its contents from Muhammad Shah's next epistle to Sultan Mahmud I. It was, according to the Emperor, a friendly letter, congratulating him on his accession to the throne.\(^{106}\) In Shahjahanabad, Sayyid Ataullah was greatly honoured by the Emperor. Because of his proficiency in Ottoman language, he was enrolled in the state service.\(^{107}\) Since the Sayyid was only the bearer of
the Sultan's letter and not a formally accredited Ottoman ambassador, no return Mughal embassy seems to have been sent to Istanbul. Mughal-Ottoman relations remained dormant for some more time.

The events of the 1730's constrained both Mughals and Ottomans to resume full-fledged diplomatic relations with one another. The collapse of the Safavid dynasty in 1736, the rise of Nadir Shah Afshar (1736-1747), and the rapid consolidation of his power in Persia had given birth to new and unforeseen problems for both empires. From the very beginning, Nadir Shah's relations with the Ottomans had been far from friendly. In 1733, he had compelled them to sign a treaty of peace on his own terms. Shortly after his accession to the throne, Nadir had informed the Porte that the Persians had abjured the Shia faith and had agreed to embrace Sunni Islam. He had, at the same time, demanded that the Jafari school of jurisprudence, founded by Imam Jafar as-sadiq, be recognized as the fifth school of Sunni law and that the Persians be formally acknowledged as the fifth sect of the Sunni faith. The Porte had rejected these proposals as dangerous innovations in the law of Islam.

In 1738, Nadir Shah picked a quarrel with the Mughals over the affair of the Afghan rebels of Qandahar. The Afghans had been in rebellion for almost thirty years; between 1722 and 1729 they had even occupied Persia. Nadir Shah was determined to crush the Afghan power in its stronghold, Qandahar, where the Ghilzais still held sway. Before embarking on his Qandahar campaign, Nadir had sent
several embassies to the Mughal court, announcing the projected invasion of Qandahar and requesting the Emperor to close his frontiers to all Afghan fugitives. Muhammad Shah had only made vague promises of compliance of Nadir’s request. He had, much to the chagrin of Nadir Shah, also maintained secret correspondence with the Afghans of Qandahar. While the siege of Qandahar was in progress, the hollowness of these promises became known to Nadir Shah. He sent a fresh embassy to Shahjahanabad, expressing his concern over the Mughal failure to close the frontiers to the Afghan fugitives. The ambassador was given strict orders not to stay at the Mughal Court for more than forty days and to promptly return with the Emperor’s reply. The ambassador was, however, detained by the Mughals for about a year. Unwilling to take any action and unsure about the outcome of the siege of Qandahar, the Mughals deferred sending a reply to Nadir Shah on one pretext or another. "The envoy being arrived at the capital," observes an eighteenth century Indian chronicler, "delivered his letter and message, and was desired to wait a little, but with no positive answer, although he insisted upon his departure. The ministers disputed amongst themselves, some times about the purport of the answer, and some times about what style was to be used and what title should be given to Nadyr Shah. They went so far as to think it a piece of good policy to delay the ambassador’s return, and they waited to see whether the Afghan Hussein Khan, after having ruined Nadyr Shah’s
forces, would not so far weaken that Prince as to reduce him to nothing; after which there would not be any occasion to write an answer at all."\textsuperscript{113}

Nothing could reveal better the pusillanimity of Muhammad Shah and his ministers. They themselves gave to Nadir Shah a sound pretext to invade India. He crossed the Indian frontier on the pretense of chastising the Afghan escapees, and went on to defeat the Mughal armies, led personally by Muhammad Shah, in the Battle of Karnal on February 24, 1739. He carried away an immense booty from India.\textsuperscript{114}

On his way back to Persia, Nadir Shah sent a grand embassy to Istanbul with a very placatory letter and several costly gifts. In his letter, Nadir addressed the Ottoman Sultan at the khalifa of Islam and as the shadow of God on earth. He accused Muhammad Shah of defiance of the established customs and conventions of sovereigns for detaining the Persian ambassador and for not replying to his letters. He described his victory over the Mughals in grandiloquent terms. The letter concluded with the customary prayer for keeping the gates of correspondence open.\textsuperscript{115} Through his envoy, Nadir again broached the religious proposal he had made in 1736. This time he also demanded an equal share in the right to rule and maintain the Holy Cities.\textsuperscript{116} But the Porte's view on this issue had remained unchanged. Nadir's proposals were, therefore, again rejected. The Shah had already been meditating on war against Ottomans.\textsuperscript{117} He
now found a ready excuse to declare war on them. The Sultan also ordered the mobilization of an army against Persia. The Ottoman-Persian war (1743-1746) had begun.\textsuperscript{118}

It was in this background of grievances against Persia, when both Mughals and Ottomans were eager to settle scores with Nadir Shah, that Muhammad Shah decided to resume diplomatic relations with Istanbul. In 1744, he sent Sayyid Ataullah as his envoy to the court of Sultan Mahmud I.\textsuperscript{119} The ambassador carried a royal letter and letters of the Mughal Prime Minister, Nizam ul-mulk (the viceroy of Deccan), and other Indian notables.\textsuperscript{120} Izzi has taken special notice of the arrival of the Mughal envoy. He writes that on account of the identity of faith and sect, there had long been friendship between Mughal empire and Ottoman state. This bond of unity had further been strengthened by the exchange of letters and ambassadors. But the recent vicissitudes in Iran, which had occurred due to the motion of time, had made it difficult for the envoys of either states to travel to the other by land or by sea. Moreover, Nadir Shah, while withdrawing from India, had commanded the Emperor of India to cut off relations and correspondence with the Ottoman empire. However, the tyrannies and cruelties of Nadir Shah had considerably annoyed Muhammad Shah and the people of India. In order to take revenge on the Shah, they now opened the long shut doors of correspondence. For this purpose Sayyid Ataullah was chosen to proceed as envoy for reviving the friendly ties between the two
Muhammad Shah's letter opens with a short eulogy for God and a panegyric for the Prophet. It uses high sounding and superlative titles for Sultan Mahmud I. Muhammad Shah recalls the esteemed letter of Sultan Ahmad Khan, sent through Sayyid Ataullah, on his accession to the throne. He pays compliments to Sultan Ahmad's letter in the following words: "It [the letter] reached during the happy and auspicious days when the outpouring of God's grace coupled with the gentle breeze of divine benefaction had sprouted flowers of hundred leaves (cabbage rose) in the garden of joy and happiness, and was honourably received." It refers to the news of the accession of the exalted Sultan [Mahmud I] which "brought the greatest of pleasure and happiness." For this reason, writes Muhammad Shah, the aforementioned envoy is "being sent to your court again." The letter ends with a desire for the observance of the laudable usages of friendship and unity and with a request for keeping the portals of correspondence open.

The letters of Mughal nobles are not extant. But we get an idea of the contents of these letters from Izzi's narrative. He says that the letters of Indian ministers and notables expressed their desire to take revenge on Nadir Shah and their craving for the reconquest of Indian territories ceded to the Persain monarch. They also stressed the need for an offensive alliance against Persia.

Sayyid Ataullah travelled by sea to Basra, from where he went to
Baghdad. Since the Mughals wanted to disguise the true purpose of their mission from the Persians, the embassy of Ataullah was deliberately given a low profile and was, presumably, not fitted with all the paraphernalia of an imperial mission. Hence, the envoy's uncouth and unkept appearance seems to have raised the suspicions of Baghdad authorities regarding his credentials. They communicated their reservations about the plenipotentiary to the Porte. He was detained at Baghdad pending the arrival of royal permission from Istanbul. But his written statement which outlined the purpose of his mission was sent to the court. 124

The ambassador's report is reproduced verbatim in the Ottoman Name Defteri. It gave explicit evidence of Nadir Shah's animosity and of Mughal goodwill towards the Ottomans. It recalled the arrival of an ambassador from Persia, 125 in April 1741, for the purpose of purchasing all the available ships in India and the sale of eight large ships to him. But when it became known that these ships were being procured for the purpose of invading Rum (Turkey), further sale of ships was immediately stopped. 126 The report also drew the attention of the Ottomans towards Nadir Shah's hectic ship building activities in the port of Bushahar. 127 As an additional proof of Nadir's hostility towards the Ottomans the report disclosed that a trustworthy Indian spy had informed the Mughal Government that the Shah was planning to conclude a counterfeit treaty with the Ottomans. 128 Then, after taking care of the defense of the
frontiers of Persia, he would go with speed to India and collect ships from all the ports which lay between Bengal and Sindh. After boarding soldiers, artillery, military gear, and necessary provisions on these ships, he would sail to the port of Suez. From there, he would conquer the cities of Mecca and Medina and the dominions of Egypt and Syria. He was also planning to dispatch from Surat ships, laden with artillery and military hardware, for the seizure of the port of Basra and its adjacent territories. The report concludes with a warning to the Ottomans that they should not be misled by Nadir's overtures of peace. The treaties made by him, it asserted, were unreliable, for he had already defied a treaty, concluded with the Indians, earlier.

The ambassador's report seems to have made a favourable impression in Istanbul. He was allowed to present himself at the court; he reached Scutari on September 14, 1744. He was accorded a ceremonious welcome and was conducted to the capital in a European galley. To avoid any further delay, the Sultan ordered the envoy to present the letters, brought by him, to the Diwan (Council of State). Accordingly, he delivered to the Grand Wazir, the letters of the Mughal Prime Minister, the Nizam ul-mulk, and other Indian notables. The Grand Wazir conferred on him a woolen cloak and an Ermine fur. He also gave robes to the envoy's attendants. The Sultan summoned Sayyid Ataullah to audience on September 27, 1744. He presented the royal letter personally to the Sultan and received an Ermine fur.
The Sultan expressed his resentment over Nadir Shah's aggression against India. He concurred with the sentiments articulated in the letters and indicated his approval of the Indian proposals. On the Sultan's order, the nobles and the learned entertained the envoy; they also honoured him with gifts and presents.\(^{131}\)

In an interview with Teshrifat Effendi (Master of Ceremonies),\(^{132}\) Sayyid Ataullah expressed his gratitude and pleasure for the Sultan's goodwill and harmony towards the king and people of India. He thanked the Ottoman government for the appointment of an ambassador to India. The envoy stressed the need for his early return to India. He observed that if a ship was not available, at the port of Jidda, for his return journey to India, it would be improper and unwise to wait another year for a ship. He requested that, if such a situation arose an imperial edict ought to be issued to the Governor of Jidda, directing him to arrange, by any means, a ship for his quick return to Surat.\(^{133}\)

The Mughal envoy was detained at the court for only one month; on October 28, 1744, he was ceremoniously dismissed. The Grand Wazir entrusted to him letters for Nizam ul-mulk and Mir Qamaruddin, the Mughal Prime Minister. He also gave him a purse of money, a garment of fur, a diamond studded sword, and a fully equipped horse. Letters to Muhammad Shah, from the Grand Wazir, the Sheikul Islam, the Commander of Janissary corps, and the Chief black eunuch of the Imperial palace, were also entrusted to him. On his farewell
audience with the Sultan, Sayyid Ataullah received a royal letter, a fully equipped and caparisoned horse, and a garment of pure fur. His attendants also received elegant robes from the Sultan.  

Muhammad Salim Effendi, a high official of the Finance department, was chosen to lead the return embassy to Shahjahanabad. Ali Agha, former Chief of the imperial palace guards, was appointed to accompany Salim Effendi as secretary. Another royal letter was entrusted to the Ottoman envoy. Both ambassadors, Mughal and Ottoman, left Istanbul, on October 29, 1744, to join a caravan of Syrian pilgrims proceeding to Jidda. Farman were issued to the Judges, Mayors, Deputy Governors, and notables of all the towns between Scutari and Damascus, ordering them to provide all possible assistance to the envoys and their retinues, and to conduct them safely through their respective jurisdictions. They were also directed to supply, at every outpost, 35 post horses to Sayyid Ataullah and his entourage and 50 post horses to Salim Effendi and his staff. Similar farmans were sent to the Governor of Syria and the Ottoman Amir-i-Haj (Leader of the Pilgrim Caravan).  
The Sultan's letter, carried by Sayyid Ataullah, opens with customary doxology and praise for the Prophet, the four Khalifas and the Companions. It reflects upon the theme of sublime nature of monarchy and denotes the value of accord and friendship between the Muslim rulers. It acknowledges the letter of the Emperor which arrived at the time of a great victory over the wretched
enemy,\textsuperscript{137} and observes that the arrival of the letter at such a providential hour is a proof of the Emperor's sincerity and goodwill. The Sultan expresses his agreement with the message in the imperial epistle. The letter concludes with a word of praise for the envoy and a mention of the royal letter given to him for the Emperor.\textsuperscript{138}

Sultan Mahmud I's other letter, sent through Salim Effendi, is somewhat more elaborate than the previous one. It commences with the usual praise for God, the Prophet, and the pious Caliphs. It is followed by standard moral observations and platitudes. It recalls the traditional accord between the Caliphal [Ottoman] family and the illustrious Mughal dynasty. Expressing his delight at the resumption of diplomatic ties, after a long interval, between the two states, the Sultan observes: "Now the meadow of friendship, with the aid of the water of divine bounty, is blooming again. The rosebush of success, with the help of the gentle breeze of celestial benefaction, is fullblown and in a state of tranquility and repose." He assures Muhammad Shah that henceforth these friendly ties will be maintained without interruption, and opines that his Caliphal letter will serve to further augment and strengthen these relations. Referring to the oral messages entrusted to the ambassador, the Sultan requests Muhammad Shah to give serious consideration to them. He reiterates the need for perpetual exchange of letters and ambassadors between the two sides. This he remarks, is imperative
for subjugating the enemies of faith. The letter concludes with these words: "From now on the eternal sun of amity and harmony will continue to diffuse the light of accord and sincerity on the sky of mutual confidence and reliance."\textsuperscript{139}

This was the first occasion in the long history of Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic relations that an Ottoman Sultan had sent two letters simultaneously to his Mughal counterpart. The Mughal envoy was given audience, by the Sultan and his Grand Wazir, almost immediately after his arrival in the capital. He was allowed to return within a month of his arrival. A return embassy was also arranged in that short time. Such favours and distinctions were rare, and were seldom conferred on any representative of a foreign potentate.

This warm Ottoman response to the Mughal diplomatic mission is hardly surprising. The rise of Nadir Shah in Persia had turned out to be very ominous for the Ottomans. His open hostility towards them, his anti-Ottoman alliance with Russia, and his demand to surrender Persian territories in Iraq had considerably menaced the Porte.\textsuperscript{140} Nadir's public proclamation to embrace Sunni Islam was also likely to arouse popular support for him in Ottoman territories. The memories of the religious propaganda unleashed by Shah Ashraf (1725-1729), the Sunni Afghan ruler of Persia, and the popular discontent which it had aroused in the empire against the Porte's policy towards Ashraf was still fresh in the mind of the
Ottomans. Nadir's outward submission to the Sunni creed, though probably hypocritical, had filled the Ottomans with apprehension about his real intentions. His call for a share in the governance of the Holy Cities was seen by them as a deliberate move to diminish their own authority. Thus Nadir was a source of constant anxiety to the Ottomans. The Porte was looking for allies to curb the growing power of Nadir and cut him to size. Muhammad Shah's proposal for an anti-Persian alliance, however ineffective and inefficacious it might be, was, therefore, welcomed by the Ottomans. They profusely honoured the Indian ambassador and willingly resumed diplomatic relations with India.

Sayyid Ataullah and Salim Effendi travelled from Syria to Jidda, from where they boarded a ship bound for India. They landed at Surat. The Sayyid probably went straight to the court but Salim Effendi and his retinue decided to proceed via Aurangabad; they left Surat on December 23, 1745. On the way to Aurangabad the principal Ottoman envoy fell ill; he died after reaching there. Haji Yusuf Agha now took charge of the Ottoman mission. He first went to Balenda, where he met Nizam ul-mulk, the Viceroy of Deccan, and delivered to him the Sultan's message and the Grand Wazir's letter. He then left for Shahjahanabad. The date of his arrival in the Mughal capital is not known. No Mughal account is available about his reception at the court. According to Izzi, the Agha personally (from hand to hand) handed over the Sultan's letter to
Muhammad Shah. This was indeed a special favour. The duration of the Agha's stay at the court and the time of his departure from Shahjahanabad are also unknown. But since the envoy is reported to have reached Surat, on his way back to Istanbul, on May 6, 1748, it appears that he stayed at the court for about two years. He was probably dismissed in early 1748. He carried with him a royal letter and a host of gifts for the Sultan. Nizam ul-mulk also entrusted to him two letters addressed to the Sultan. For some unknown reasons the royal letter was later withdrawn and replaced by a fresh one. Sayyid Ataullah was probably recommissioned to lead the return Mughal embassy to Istanbul.

Muhammad Shah's letter acknowledged the two royal letters, one delivered by the acting Ottoman envoy Haji Yusuf Agha and the other by Sayyid Ataullah. "These letters," wrote Muhammad Shah, "which are bouquets of the meadow of friendship and which contain the odor of affection and unanimity diffused the aroma of unity, and by the gentle breeze of their felicitious contents opened the bud of my heart." He observed that the distance between the two states should not obstruct the establishment of close and cordial relations between them. Pointing out the importance of concord between Muslim monarchs, the Emperor suggested that the friendship between them be publicly proclaimed. The letter ended with an appeal for a continuous exchange of messages and ambassadors between the two sides.
Nizam ul-mulk's ariza (petition) acknowledges the kind message of the 'great and exalted Sultan,' delivered by Haji Yusuf Agha. It takes notice of the Ottoman victories (over the Persians), "which brought boundless joy and which made the entire world happy and elated." The Nizam refers to the Sultan's proclamation, issued in consultation with great and revered doctors of law, against the Shia Sect and equates it with divine revelation. He alludes to the Sultan's instructions regarding 'certain important matters' and affirms his loyalty and obedience to Emperor Muhammad Shah. The Nizam assures the Sultan that he will give due consideration to the Sultan's command and that he will never be remiss in displaying his devotion and fealty to the Emperor. He implores the Sultan to trust the oral messages entrusted to Haji Yusuf Agha and Sayyid Attaullah. In conclusion, the Nizam prays for the eternal perpetuation of Sultan's rule and power.

Why did the Sultan advise Nizam ul-mulk to remain loyal to Muhammad Shah? Was Nizam's loyalty doubtful? The Nizam was alleged to have been guilty of inviting Nadir Shah to invade India. Several contemporary Indian and non Indian observers have made this allegation against him. There is hardly any evidence to substantiate these charges, yet the propaganda against the Nizam seems to have been very effective and well organized. Rumours of his guilt and treason had travelled abroad. In Ottoman empire the Sobriquet 'Nizam ul-mulk' had become synonymous with treachery and
disloyalty. Thus, Ahmed Pasha, the Governor of Baghdad, who was alleged to have been in league with Nadir Shah, was characterized as the 'Nizam ul-mulk' of the Ottoman empire. Probably the Ottoman Sultan had heard about these accusations against the Nizam. It has also been suggested that Muhammad Shah himself had complained to Sultan Mahmud, through Sayyid Ataullah, regarding Nizam ul-mulk's disobedience. Given the fact that since 1724 Nizam ul-mulk had been functioning as a practically independent potentate in the Deccan, this suggestion does not seem to be very far-fetched. Whatever might have been the source of Sultan's information about Nizam ul-mulk's insubordination, the Sultan's admonition to the Nizam to remain loyal and submissive to Muhammad Shah indicates his interest in the affairs of the Mughal empire.

Nizam ul-mulk's other ariza was, perhaps, confidential; the message contained in it testifies to its secrecy. Hence it was not copied by Ottoman chronicler Izzi in his book. The petition styles the Sultan the 'guardian of the land of the faithful,' the 'obliterator of the vestiges of infidelity,' the 'defender of the Shariat,' and the 'Succorcer of the Muslims.' The Nizam mentions the death of Nadir Shah, points out the internal disarray in Persia, proposes an Ottoman invasion of that country, and asserts that the "victorious Ottoman armies" could easily conquer Persia. "This," observes the Nizam, "will lead to the annihilation of Shiism and the re-establishment of Orthodox Islam in that region." The petition ends
with a prayer for the everlasting glory and grandeur of the Ottoman empire.\footnote{152}

Nasir Jung (1748-1751), son and successor of Nizam ul-mulk, had also sent an aliz to Sultan Mahmud I. The petition addresses the Sultan as the 'khalifa of the Holy Prophet' and as the 'founder of the edifice of Islam.' It affirms the eternity of the Ottoman State and avows that even the Holy Quran is expressive of the greatness of the Ottoman dynasty, because it has been blessed with the majesty of khilafat and the felicity of custodianship of the Holy Cities. Nasir Jung observes that it is the duty of the Muslim sovereigns, especially the khalifa, who is the asylum of the monarchs of the world, to wage jihad against infidelity and tyranny. Asserting that he is striving his utmost to achieve these goals, he seeks the Sultan's aid for fulfilling his objectives. The petition ends with a prayer for the continual glory of the Ottoman empire.\footnote{153}

While in Surat, waiting for the sailing season to commence, Haji Yusuf Agha seems to have run into serious financial problems. Due to bureaucratic wrangling as well as troubles in Surat, the daily allowance and travel expenses usually provided to the foreign envoys from the treasury of Surat, was denied to him. His problems were aggravated by the villainy of an Armenian merchant, who embezzled a large sum of money which the envoy had earlier deposited with him. He filed a suit against the Armenian in the imperial court. The case was decided in his favour and the Emperor ordered the Surat officials
to recover the money from the Armenian and satisfy the envoy's
claims. But the corrupt Surat officials demanded a bribe from him
for implementing the imperial orders. The Haji wrote numerous
letters to Nasir Jung and to several other Mughal officials,
entreaty them for their help in redressing his grievances. But his
prayers seem to have fallen on deaf ears. The death of Muhammad Shah
on April 15, 1748, while the envoy was still in Surat, created
another problem for him. It was improper to present the letter of
the deceased Emperor to the Sultan. His diplomatic duties now
obliged him to obtain a letter from the new Emperor also.
Presumably, the Haji's efforts in this direction proved fruitless for
he ultimately presented to the Sultan, Muhammad Shah's letter only.
But Nasir Jung did give him an ariza for the Sultan, which he
delivered along with the two arizas of the deceased Nizam
ul-mulk. 154

Haji Yusuf Agha stayed in Surat for about five months. In
October 1748, he boarded a ship bound for Jidda; he reached Istanbul
on March 4, 1750. 155 Given audience, almost immediately after
his arrival in the capital, the Haji delivered the gifts and letters
brought by him. 156 The gifts included a Sorguc (crest) set with
diamonds, rubies, and emeralds, a jade hilted dagger, ornamented with
patterns of gold and decorated with rubies and emeralds, 241 pieces
of cotton and silken fabric, embroidered as well as plain, and
several bottles of choice Indian perfumes. 157
Did Sayyid Ataullah accompany Yusuf Agha to Istanbul? This is hard to determine. Apart from a reference to this effect in Nizam ul-mulk's ariza to Sultan Mahmud I, there is no other evidence that the Sayyid was sent to Istanbul again. Neither Muhammad Shah, in his letter to the Sultan, nor Izzi, in his narrative, has alluded to the return Mughal embassy to the Porte. There is no mention of Sayyid Ataullah in Haji Yusuf Agha's extensive correspondence from Surat as well. Whether or not he was actually sent to Istanbul is a matter of conjecture.

The Ottoman response to Nizam ul-mulk's proposal for the invasion of Persia is not known. They seem to have ignored it. The Ottoman attitude was hardly surprising. In September 1746, the Porte had already concluded a treaty with Nadir Shah. The preamble of this treaty had called the signatories to abstain "from those matters, which excite resentment and which are detrimental to the conclusion of peace." Nadir Shah had also given up his demand for the recognition of the Jafari sect, and had renounced his claim to the Ottoman territories in Iraq. Thus, all sources of Ottoman-Persian conflict had been eliminated. The Ottoman invasion of Persia was, therefore, no longer called for. The Ottomans seem to have been so satisfied by the terms of this treaty that they remained committed to it, even after the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747. Sultan Mahmud I, in fact, turned down the pleas of the Governors of Baghdad and Erzurum to take advantage of the situation in Persia, and
did not sanction an Ottoman invasion of that country. 161

The death of Muhammad Shah in 1748 marks the end of the second and final phase of the Mughal-Ottoman political and diplomatic relations. His demise put the last nail in the coffin of Mughal empire; after that it quickly crumbled into pieces. Muhammad Shah's successors had neither the will nor the resources to maintain diplomatic relations with foreign potentates. In the 110 years (1748-1857) that the Mughal empire survived after Muhammad Shah, though in a mutilated and truncated form, there is no record of any exchange of embassies between the courts of Shahjahanabad and Istanbul. 162

Muslim states of South India, nonetheless, continued this tradition and established diplomatic relations with Istanbul. The correspondence of Nizam ul-mulk and his son Nasir Jung with Sultan Mahmud I has already been described (see above). In 1779, the Bibi (Queen) of the Muslim principality of Cannanore, in Malabar, sent a diplomatic mission to the court of Sultan Abdul Hamid I (1774-1789). 163 In her letter, the Bibi petitioned the khalifa to protect her against the aggression of the English East India Company. The Sultan, in his reply, assured the queen of his sympathy to her cause, and informed her that through the English ambassador in Istanbul, "It was requested of the king of England that orders ought to be forwarded to authorities in India directing them to treat you favourably." 164
In 1786, Tipu Sultan of Mysore (1772–1799) also sent an embassy to Istanbul. The mission had three main objectives: First, to seek Ottoman military assistance against the English. Second, to secure for Tipu Sultan a letter of investiture from the Ottoman khalifa. Third, to conclude a commercial treaty with the Ottoman empire. In his letter to Sultan Abdul Hamid I, Tipu delineated the atrocities of the English in India, who had illegally occupied the Muslim lands, had turned the mosques into churches, and had forcibly converted about 10,000 Muslims to Christianity. The Sultan sent a graceful reply and conferred on Tipu the letter of investiture. But he ignored Tipu’s other proposals. In 1798, Sultan Selim III (1789–1808) sent a letter to Tipu through Lord Wellesley, the English Governor-General of India. In this letter, the Sultan referred to Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt, declared the French as an envoy of faith, and advised Tipu to co-operate with the British against the French. In his reply, Tipu agreed with the Sultan regarding the French menace to Islam. But he ignored the Sultan’s advice and continued his armed resistance against the British. In 1799, he died fighting them. With the rise of British paramountcy in India in the nineteenth century, the last vestiges of the diplomatic and political relations between the Muslim states of the subcontinent and the Ottoman empire ceased to exist.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The last 90 years (1658-1748) of Mughal-Ottoman relations were marked by many vicissitudes. Throughout his long reign of almost fifty years, Aurangzeb had remained indifferent towards the Ottomans. His response to the Ottoman diplomatic initiative of 1690 was too lukewarm to resume friendly relations with them. The steady decline of the Safavid power, after the death of Shah Abbas II in 1666, had eased the pressure on the north-west frontier of the Mughal empire. On the other hand, the annexation of Bijapur and Golkunda by 1687 and the execution of the Maratha ruler Shambhaji in 1689 had considerably strengthened Aurangzeb's position. Practically the entire subcontinent was now under his sway. He had never seriously entertained the idea of the reconquest of Qandahar from the Persians and, therefore, did not need Ottoman assistance on that account. The Ottomans were also guilty, from Aurangzeb's point of view, of not giving recognition to him when he needed it the most. All these factors seem to have guided Aurangzeb's attitude towards the Ottomans. Nonetheless, the responsibility of suspending Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic and political relations seems to lie upon Aurangzeb's shoulders. He had also stopped the exchange of embassies with Persia. "The state of diplomatic isolation" aptly remarks Professor Riazul Islam, "in which Aurangzeb left the Mughal empire was by no means enviable." 170

Farrukhsiyar attempted to break this diplomatic isolation of the
Mughal empire. He sent embassies to Istanbul and Isfahan. However, his efforts to revive the long suspended Mughal-Ottoman relations met with little success. His letter to Sultan Ahmad III did not create a favorable impression on the Ottoman court. In this period, the Ottomans were also preoccupied with protecting their European territories from the Austrian threat. Moreover, by 1716, when the Mughal ambassador arrived in Istanbul, the downfall of the Safavid dynasty had become an established fact. Hence, the Ottomans did not feel obliged to foster close relations with the Mughals. Ahmad III, therefore, did not send a return embassy to Istanbul. He remained content with a friendly reply to Farrukhsiyar's letter.

Farrukhsiyar's death in 1719 doomed any chance of further cultivation of Mughal-Ottoman relations.

Early in his reign, Muhammad Shah exchanged epistles with Sultan Ahmad III. But the real incentive for the establishment of closer ties came with the rise of Nadir Shah in Persia, who was destined to prove equally perilous to both Mughals and Ottomans. Both exhibited profound concern and anxiety to eliminate the new Persian peril. Hence, Muhammad Shah's overtures for a Mughal-Ottoman alliance against Persia was welcomed by the Ottomans. Several embassies and epistles were exchanged between the two sides. Shahjahanabad-Istanbul axis had come into existence. Muhammad Shah had, thus, the satisfaction of bringing the Mughal empire back into the mainstream of the Islamic world; by the time of his death, Mughal-Ottoman
relations had improved considerably. This, however, was the last  
flicker of the lamp; after 1748, these relations abruptly came to a  
standstill. As far as the Ottomans were concerned, for all practical  
purposes, the Mughal empire had passed into history.

The second phase of Mughal-Ottoman relations was also marked by  
a change in the pattern of their relationship. This change was trig-  
gerated by the decline of the Safavid dynasty in Persia and increasing  
pressure of European powers on the western frontier of the Ottoman  
empire. The focus of Ottoman strategies had now shifted from the  
Shia menace to Islam to the threat posed by the Christian powers.  
Suleiman II's letter to Aurangzeb and Ahmad III's epistle to  
Farrukhsiyyar does not dwell upon the Shia peril at all. They focus  
mainly on the theme of protecting the 'land of the Faithful' from the  
aggression of the Christian powers. Suleiman II even solicited  
Aurangzeb's support against the Christians and urged him to wage holy  
war against them. Farrukhsiyyar's letter to Ahmad III, likewise, is  
conspicuous by its omission of any reference to Persia.

Persia, nevertheless, came back to play an important role in  
shaping the Mughal-Ottoman relations. Nadir Shah's invasion of India  
and his aggressive designs against Ottoman empire made her an object  
of fear, suspicion, and hostility in the eyes of Mughals and Ottomans  
alike. Ambassadors began to travel between Shahjahanabad and  
Istanbul; highly conciliatory and friendly letters were exchanged.  
In these, the ancient accord between the two houses was recalled;
sectarian unity and the identity of faith were asserted time and again. Both sides also pledged to undertake Jihad against Kufr (infidelity) and tyranny. The Ottoman-Persian treaty of 1746, the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747, and the death of Muhammad Shah in the following year, put an end to this frantic diplomatic activity. Emperor Ahmad Shah (1748-1754) did not care to send a letter, through Haji Yusuf Agha, to the Ottoman Sultan. There is no record of any Ottoman congratulatory mission on the accession of Ahmad Shah either. Diplomatic exchanges between Mughal India and the Ottoman empire had reached a dead end.

One noteworthy development in this period was the exchange of letters between ministers and other notables of the two empires. This was by no means an unprecedented phenomenon. Letters had earlier been exchanged between Shahjahan’s Wazir and his Ottoman counterpart in the 1640s. But the tenor of these letters had been, on the whole, unfriendly. The epistles exchanged between the ministers of Muhammad Shah and Sultan Mahmud I, on the other hand, were friendly and cordial. High grandees of both empires wrote letters to each other’s sovereigns as well. Besides the Grand Wazir, the Ottoman Sheikhu-Islam, the Chief of Jannisaries, and the Chief Eunuch of the imperial palace sent letters to Muhammad Shah. On the Mughal side the Muluk-I-Mająśia (Magi? or Hindu Chieftains), the Mughal Wazir and the Viceroy of Deccan wrote letters to Sultan Mahmud I. Diplomatic activity on such a large scale had no
precedent in almost two hundred years of Mughal-Ottoman relations. Had the Mughal empire not disintegrated after Muhammad Shah's death, this phenomenon might have contributed to a further strengthening of relations between the two states.

Mughal relations with the Sharifs of Mecca, the nature of this relationship, and its influence, if any, on the Mughal-Ottoman relations will be discussed in the following chapter.
NOTES


2. *Name Humayun ...*, vol. 8, p. 292.


4. Manucci, *Storia*, vol. 1, p. 179; Ghauri, *War of ...*, p. 41. Shahjahan had, for example, sent Aurangzeb as commander of the Mughal forces in the military operations against Central Asia, Bijapur, Golkunda and Qandahar. He had also served as Governor of the problem provinces of Deccan, Gujarat, and Multan.


8. Manucci, vol II, pp. 1, 106. In 1659, Aurangzeb had deputed Mir Ibrahim to carry gifts worth 6,30,000 rupees for the Sharif of
Mecca and the inhabitants of the Holy Cities. (M.A., p. 28; Alamgir Nama, p. 627; Mirat . . . , vol. II, p. 175). It was probably these gifts which the Sharif had refused to accept and had thereby rejected the legitimacy of Aurangzeb's rule.


11. Jean-Baptist Tavernier, Travels in India, Eng. tr. V. Ball, Oxford University Press, 1925, vol. I, p. 296; Bernier, pp. 116-123; A. Rahim, p. 99. Bernier's observation that the major purpose of the Uzbek embassy was to placate Aurangzeb lest he might not invade Central Asia is not supported by available evidence.


14. Alamgir Nama, p. 608. One Tola is also equal to 11.664 grams.

15. Ibid., p. 608. According to Bernier, who was present at the departure ceremony, the gifts for the Khan included, "very handsome seraphas, a large number of richest and most
exquisitely wrought brocades, a quantity of fine linens, alachas or silk stuffs interwoven with gold and silver, a few carpets, and two daggers set with precious stones." (p. 121). Manucci (p. 39) has given a similar list.


18. Manucci, II, p. 145. For another eye witness account see Bernier, p. 147.

19. Alamgir Nama, pp. 616, 621-623, 627-628; M.L., II, p. 127; Mirat, . . . p. 227, p. 229; Bernier, pp. 146-151; Manucci, II, pp. 43-49. According to Khafi Khan, 50,000 rupees were given to the attendants of Budaq Beg.


22. Ibid., pp. 49-50; Alamgir Nama, pp. 883-884; Mirat, I, p. 315. Bernier writes that Aurangzeb's presents to the king of Ethiopia included: "An extremely rich sera-pah, two large cornets or trumpets of silver gilt, two silver kettle drums, a poniard studded with rubies, and gold and silver roupias to the amount of about 20,000 francs." (p. 139).

23. See chapter one, pp.

25. Bernier, pp. 109, 112-113; Manucci, I, pp. 349-358; Tavernier, I, p. 292. Tavernier, however, writes that Shuja intended to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca and thence to travel to Persia to seek asylum with the Shah.

26. Alamgir Nama, p. 606; M.A., p.34; M.L., II, p. 124; Mirat ... , I, p. 221.

27. Alamgir Nama, p. 619; M.A., p. 36; Mirat ... , I, p. 227; M.U., I, p. 243; Bernier, p.133; Tavernier, II, p. 297; E.F.I 1661-1664, P. 81. According to the E.F.I Qasim Aqa held the position of Master of Horses at the Pasha's court.

28. Manucci, II, p. 107. Unfortunately, owing to the nonavailability of relevant records, it is difficult to assess the authenticity of Manucci's observation.


30. E.F.I. 1661-1664, p. 101, Also see Note 1 on the same page. Surprisingly none of the Mughal chroniclers have mentioned the dispatch of a return Mughal embassy to Basra.

31. Alamgir Nama, p. 887.


34. E.F.I. 1651-1654, p. 297.

36. Futuhat . . ., p. 84; Alamgir Nama, p. 974; Mirat . . ., p. 344; E.F.I. 1665-1667, p. 264. Mughal ambassador's name was Tarbiyat Khan. He had earlier served as Governor of Multan.


38. Mirat . . ., I, p. 344.


43. M.A., p. 58; Mirat . . ., I, p. 351.

44. R. Islam, Indo-Persian . . ., p. 130.

Manucci has, however, erroneously placed the arrival of Husain Pasha in India in 1673. Also see *Selections of Papers Received From India Office*, Maharashtra State Archives, Bombay, vol. I, p. 49 (April 4, 1666) and vol. II, p. 67 (August 31, 1666). These documents also refer to the war between the Pasha of Basra and the Grand Signior (Ottoman Sultan), resulting in the disruption of the channels of communication.

46. *M.A.*, p. 85; *M.U.*, p. 243; *M.L.*, p. 233; *E.F.I. 1665-1667*, pp. 265, 284-285; *E.F.I. 1668-1669*, p. 44. According to the English Factory Records, the Pasha had left Basra in February 1668 and that the town was burnt by his soldiers, apparently without his permission (*E.F.I. 1665-67*, p. 287, note 2).

47. *E.F.I. 1668-1669*, pp. 42, 44, 210 (Letters of August 14, 1668; November 26, 1668; March 2, 1669).


49. *M.A.*, p. 86; *M.U.*, I, p. 244.

50. Ibid., p. 88; *M.U.*, I, p. 244. Mughal mansabdars were generally given land assignments in lieu of their salary. The grant of cash salary to a mansabdar was, thus, considered to be
an unusual imperial favour. According to Saqi Mustaid Khan, Husain Pasha and his sons were exempted from the payment of the price of the cattle's food. This was an imperial tax, which was usually levied on the Mughal mansabdars.


52. Ibid., p. 121-122; M.U., I, p. 245.

53. Ibid., p. 151; M.U., I, p. 245; M.L., III, pp. 364-365; Tazkirat-ul-Umra, J.P.H.S., xxix, I, 1981, p. 52. Husain Pasha was killed, along with his son Ali Beg, due to an accident. According to the contemporary chroniclers, the Pasha was standing at a place where gunpowder was being distributed, which suddenly caught fire. Pasha's elephant being panic-stricken rushed blindly into the enemy's army. They surrounded him on all sides, and killed him and Ali Beg in cold blood. Manucci has given a cock and bull story that the Pasha had refused to marry his son to the daughter of Prince Murad Baksh. Aurangzeb, therefore, intrigued with Bahadur Khan, the Mughal commander in the Deccan, to abandon Husain Pasha in the battle field with his men only. Bahadur Khan complied with the Emperor's order. In this way the Pasha was killed (Manucci, II, 173-74).

54. M.U., I, p. 346; M.A., p. 152. Afrasiyab Beg was promoted to the mansab of 2500/1500. Mukhtar Beg was given the rank of 1000/400.


57. M.A., p. 110; Also see E.F.I. 1668-1669, pp. 42, 210, for the rebellion of the Arabs against Yahya Pasha’s government in 1669. The Arabs seem to have been an ever-recurring source of trouble for the Ottoman Governors of Basra. As late as 1725, the Arabs were creating trouble in Basra. See for example, Basra Factory Outward Letter Book, Maharashtra State Archives, Bombay, vol. 30 (1725), p. 3.

58. M.A., pp. 115-116; Also see Futuhat ..., p. 45.

59. For the uprisings of the Afghans, the Satnamis, the Rajputs, and the Sikhs, see Sarkar, History ..., vol. III, pp. 142-161, 193-246.

60. M.A., pp. 158, 216, 255; A. Rahim, Mughal Relations, pp. 102-105. Aurangzeb had also received one minor embassy from Urganj in this period.

   M.A., p. 207).


214-215.


66. Sultan Suleiman II had also sent a diplomatic mission, around 1689, to the court of Subhan Quli Khan, the ruler of Balkh and Bokhara. The mission sought the Khan's aid against the enemies of the Ottoman empire. (A. Rahim, *Mughal Relations* . . . , p. 105).


69. M.A., p. 337. The precise date of the composition of the Sultan's letter is not known. The date would have indicated the time of the departure of the envoy from Istanbul. The letter merely mentions 1100 A.H. (October 16, 1688 to October 4, 1689) as the date of its composition. Since it used to take between six and nine months to cover the distance between India and Turkey in the seventeenth century, and as the Ottoman envoy reached the court on July 29, 1690, it could be surmised that he must have left Istanbul sometime between October and December, 1689. It was in this period that the Austrians were on the rampage in the Balkans and the Ottoman dependencies had accepted Austrain suzerainty. This denotes the importance of Ottoman mission.
70. The Holy Quran, Surah Al-Nisa, Ayah (Verse) 95.

71. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 5, pp. 54-61.

72. E.F.I. 1668-1669, p. 45, Flower to the President and Council at Surat, November 26, 1668. Flower had also suggested that this was the best time for the Mughals to capture Qandahar. He writes, "Yett its doubtfull if this news encouradge them [Mughals] not to give them a new trouble and their late designe to goe against Candahar, which they could not undertake in a better conjunction." (Ibid., p. 44).

73. Manucci, II, p. 433. Manucci rejoices at the troubles of the Ottomans and comments that the arrival of the Ottoman envoy gave an idea of the strength of the Europeans, and convinced the Emperor and his courtiers that the Europeans were militarily superior to the Ottomans.


75. It should also be mentioned that Maasir-i-Alamat have taken very short notices of the arrival and departure of the ambassador of Bukhara (p. 397), of the envoy of Kashghar (p. 228), and of the agents of the Sharif of Mecca (p. 140, p. 271, pp. 285-86).


77. M.A., p. 337.
78. Towards the end of his reign Bahadur Shah had, however, received a minor embassy from Kashghar. According to Kamwar Khan, Abdur Rahim Beg, the envoy of Kashghar was admitted into audience on September 8, 1711. The Emperor personally read the letter, brought by the envoy, in a loud voice. He ordered that a reply should be written in Turkish. He conferred on the envoy an elegant robe of honour and gave to his three associates, a cash award of 7000 rupees. (Kamwar Khan, Tazkiratus ..., p. 131).

79. According to Khafi Khan, Bahadur Shah had contemplated sending a full-fledged embassy to Persia. (M.L., II, pp. 644-645). But Bahadur Shah's policy towards the Afghan rebellion against the Safavids was equivocal. He publicly endorsed the actions of Mir Uwais, the rebel Afghan chieftain, and conferred on him the mansab of 6000/6000, and the title of Ali Mardan Khan. He also gave the mansab of 4000/2000 to Mir Uwais's brother Haji Nur Muhammad Khan. (Kamwar Khan, Tazkiratus ..., pp. 121, 124-125, 131). According to Khafi Khan, the Emperor, at the same time, sent a secret message to the Shah of Persia condemning the Afghan rebellion and assuring the Shah that the rebels will not get any help from him. (M.L., II, p. 645). Kamwar Khan has not alluded to this secret imperial message to the Shah.

80. Most of the contemporary Mughal chroniclers have noted the metamorphosis in Jahandar Shah's character after becoming king.
See, for example, Kamwar Khan, *Tazkiratus* . . . , pp. 162-163; Mubarakullah Vazeh, *Tarikh* . . . , pp. 128-132.


Farrukhshiyar's letter, according to the date indicated in it, was composed on 5 Shawwal, 1124 (October 25, 1712). But this date seems to be incorrect. All the Mughal chroniclers have mentioned that Farrukhshiyar was formally enthroned on January 2, 1713 and that he entered Shahjahanabad on February 2, 1713. (See Kamwar Khan, *Tazkiratus* . . . , pp. 168, 171, 177; Vazeh, *Tarikh* . . . , pp. 153, 158, 162; Sayyid Ghulam Husin Tabatabai, *Seir-ul-Mutakhrin*, Eng. tr., Nota-manus, Lahore, 1975 (rerint), vol. 1, pp. 53, 58, 62). The letter must have been written after Farrukhshiyar's entry into Shahjahanabad, because this event is mentioned in his letter. After his accession to the throne, Farrukhshiyar had decreed that his reign should be dated from the day he had proclaimed himself Emperor in Patna, that is, March 28, 1712. If we consider March 28, 1712, when Farrukhshiyar was only a rebel and pretender to the throne, as the official date of the beginning of Farrukhshiyar's reign, then
October 25, 1712 as the date of this letter's composition would make sense. Unfortunately, this is not true. In the opinion of the present writer, the imperial epistle was probably written on 5 Shawwal, 1125 (October 14, 1713), instead of 5 Shawwal, 1124. The imperial secretary, who composed this letter, however, seems to have followed the official date of the advent of Farrukhisiyar's reign. Hence, the discrepancy in the date.


84. For the embassy of Mir Murtuza Khwaf, first Persian ambassador to Farrukhisiyar's court, see Kamwar Khan, *Tazkiratus* . . . pp. 185, 200-202; *M.L.*, II, pp. 736-737; *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, vol. II, pp. 3, 13, 18, 20. For the embassy of Mir Asbauddin, second Persian envoy to Shahjahanabad, see R. Islam, *Indo-Persian* . . . , p. 138. Professor Islam's observation that Farrukhisiyar had not sent a return embassy to Persia (Ibid., p. 138) is incorrect. The author of *Mirat-i-Ahmadi* has clearly mentioned that Farrukhisiyar had dispatched an embassy, under Rashid Khan, to Persia. He carried a letter and some jewels for the Shah of Persia (*Mirat* II, pp. 19-20).

85. *Name Humayun* . . . , vol. 6, pp. 391-394. Farrukhisiyar did not ascend the throne, as indicated in this letter, on 7
Rabiulakhir, 1124 (May 3, 1712). The Mughal chroniclers are of the opinion that Farrukhsiyar's formal enthronement took place on 14 Zilhaj, 1124 (January 2, 1713) and that he formally entered Shahjahanabad on 17 Muharram, 1125 (February 2, 1713). Kamwar Khan has, however, mentioned at one place that after entry into the capital, the coronation ceremony began on 7 Rabiulakhir, 1125 (April 22, 1713). The Emperor sat on the Peacock throne, conferred khilats (robes) and titles on the nobles, and received nazrs (Offerings) from them (Kamwar Khan, Tazkiratus . . . , p. 182). Farrukhsiyar's letter seems to be referring to these ceremonies. This further confirms the present writers theory that the letter in question was written in Shawwal, 1125 instead of Shawwal, 1124.

86. Tarikh-i-Rasidi, vol. 4, p. 322.


89. Tarikh-i-Rasidi, vol. 4, p. 321.

90. Ibid., pp. 321–322.

91. Ibid., p. 322.

92. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 6, p. 396.
93. Lawrence Lockhart, The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia, Cambridge, 1958, pp. 103-108. Three years later Durri Effendi, the Turkish envoy to Persia, made a similar prophecy. (Ibid., pp. 123-125).

94. Mary Lucille Shay, The Ottoman Empire From 1720 to 1734, Urbana, 1944, p. 17. Also see p. 11.

95. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 6, pp. 394-398.

96. For example, Name Humayun . . . , vol. 6, p. 394 (Lines 1-14) is identical, with changes of a few words here and there, to Name Humauyn . . . , vol. 5, p. 54 (Lines 1-3), p. 55 (Lines 1-14). N.H., 6, p. 394 (Lines 15-16) and p. 395 (Lines 1-24) are also identical to N.H., 5, p. 55 (line 17), p. 56 (Lines 1-17) and p. 58 (Lines 1-2).

97. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 8, pp. 142-143 (Lines 1-21 and Lines 1-19) are similar to Name Humauyn . . . , vol. 6, pp. 394-395 (Lines 1-16 and Lines 1-23).

98. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 8, pp. 485-487. The first page of this letter (p. 485) is almost similar to Name Humayun . . . , vol. 6, pp. 394-395.


100. Başvekalat Arşivi, Istanbul, İbnîl Emin Tesnifi, Harciye, No. 1380. Professor Hikmet Bayur has erroneously connected this document with the embassy of Ahmad Aqa to Aurangzeb in 1689. (Bayur, "Osmanlı . . . ," Belleten, 1950, p. 276). Professor
Bayur's conclusion is incorrect for two reasons. First, the document clearly refers to 'Hind elçi' (Indian ambassador) and not to Ottoman envoy. The name of Ahmad Aqa is also not mentioned in the document. Second, there seems to be no point in presenting, in 1717, the receipt of the expenses incurred on the horses provided for a mission which had taken place 28 years ago. The testimony of Mehmet Raşid, that the Indian envoy was allowed to return in 1129 A.H., further testifies to the present writers' suggestion that the aforementioned document refers to the embassy of Haji Niaz Beg Khan and not to that of Ahmad Aqa.

101. Muhammad Shah was preceded by Rafiuddarjat and Rafiuddaula. The duration of their reigns was very short. They died in quick succession without leaving any mark on Mughal history.

102. Kamwar Khan, Tazkiratus ..., p. 357. According to Kamwar Khan, the envoy's name was Bad Qashi, which does not make any sense. In Muhammad Shah's letter, his name is given as Qurchi Bashi (Chief of Royal Bodyguards) Allah Verdi. Bad Qashi seems to be a misnomer for Qurchi Bashi. It is more or less certain that the ambassador mentioned by the chronicler was none other than Allah Verdi Bey, because this is the only Bukharan mission which came to India during the early years of Muhammad Shah's reign. Another embassy from Bukhara had come probably in the time of Farrukhsiyyar and had departed in the time of
Rafiuddarjat (Ibid., p. 267). Kamwar Khan has also mentioned the arrival of an envoy from Balkh, who was allowed to leave on April 13, 1720 (p. 294).

103. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 6, pp. 453-453. The letter is undated. But, relying on the testimony of Kamwar Khan that Allah verdi was given cong on October 26, 1723, we can surmise that the letter was written sometime in October, 1723.


105. Suleiman b. Khalil Izzi, Tarikh-i-Izzi (henceforth Izzi), British Museum Oriental, No. 9318, Folio 14b.


107. Izzi, f 14b.


109. Lockhart, Nadir . . . , pp. 101-106, 121; Olson, The Siege . . . , pp. 100-104; Uzunsarşılı, IV, i, pp. 231-234; Hanway, The Revolutions . . . , pp. 125-135; Nadir Shah had also insisted upon the erection of a rukn (column) in the Ka'ba in the name of Imam Jafar. He had called for certain concessions for the Persian pilgrims to Mecca as well. The right of appointing annually a Persian Amir-l-Haj for conducting the Persian pilgrims to Mecca was one of them. The real motive of Nadir Shah's proposals is, however, a subject of
dispute among modern scholars. Lockhart opines that Nadir's outward acceptance of the Sunni faith was nothing but a political gimmick and that he really wanted to entice the Porte into conducting a temporary truce with him. Mohammad-Ali Hikmet believes that Nadir's real aim was to unite the Muslim world. He writes that had Porte accepted these proposals, it would have prevented the bloodshed of Muslims and their exploitation by foreign powers, especially Russia. (M.A. Hikmet, *Essai sur l'histoire des relations politiques Irano-Ottomanes de 1722 à 1747*, Paris, 1937, p. 230, quoted by Olsson, p. 101). Lockhart, has, on the other hand, concluded that Nadir's real motive in seeking to unite the Muslim world was to make himself its head and ultimately to wrest the khilafat from the Ottomans. (Lockhart, *Nadir* . . . pp. 100, 279).

110. Ibid., pp. 46-47, 63; Islam, *Indo-Persian* . . . , pp. 139-143.

115. Name Humayun ..., vol. 8, pp. 30-32.


118. The war was declared on Persia by the Ottoman Diwan (Council of State) on 4 Shaban, 1156 (September 12, 1743). See M.D., 150, p. 132, Evail Shaban 1156 (issued to the Commander of Janassiry Corps). Also see Hanway, iv, p. 237. Hanway writes that on 11th of June 1743 "The horfes tails were hung out of the feraglio at Constantinople as a signal of war."

119. Uzunsarşili, IV, i, pp. 300-302; Lockhart, Nadir ..., p. 248.

120. Izzi, ff 14b-15a.

121. Ibid., ff 14a-14b.

122. Name Humayun ..., vol. 8, p. 141; Izzi, ff 15b-16a. The genealogy of Muhammad Shah is also appended with this letter (Ibid, p. 142). It is noteworthy that Muhammad Shah has designated himself as Sahib-i-Qaran Sani, which was actually the title of Emperor Shahjahan (1627-1658).

123. Izzi, f 15a.

124. Ibid., f, 14b.
125. According to Professor Riazul Islam, Nadir Shah, before leaving Mashhad for Daghistan campaign, had dispatched Muzaffar Ali Khan Bayat Nishapuri as his envoy to India (Indo Persian — p. 155). Nadir Shah had left Mashhad on March 3, 1741 (Lockhart, Nadir . . . , p. 198). In all probability, it was this embassy about which Sayyid Ataullah had drawn the attention of the Ottomans in his report.

126. There is, however, evidence that as late as 1747, Nadir Shah's agents were purchasing ships from Surat. See Mirat-i-Ahmadi, II, p. 35.

127. Nadir Shah's ship building project at Bushahr had started in Summer 1741. The project was guided by the Shah's desire to get rid of the dependence on East India Company for the supply of ships and to make Persia self sufficient in ship building. According to Lockhart this project was abandoned in 1743 (Lockhart, Nadir . . . , p. 220). This, in the light of Sayyid Ataullah's report, is obviously incorrect. The Sayyid had reported in October 1744, that 500 skilled carpenters were working day and night, in Bushahar, to build ships. The project thus seems to have been abandoned after 1744, and not in August 1743.

128. This statement of the envoy seems to have some measure of truth in it. Lockhart has also suggested that Nadir Shah wanted to concluded a feigned treaty with the Porte. He writes: "It
seems probable that his [Nadir's] main object was merely to amuse the Porte and so gain time until the rising in the Northwest Persia had been suppressed, when he would fling his full weight against the Turks on the borders of Anatolia."

Nadir shah, p. 234).

129. These proposals were presented by Nadir Shah in 1743.

130. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 8, p. 604. For the Turkish translation of this report, see Ibid., pp. 604-605. Also see Hikmet Bayur, "Osmanlı Devletinin Nadir Şah Afsar'la barış yapmasını onlemek amacını bir Gurkanlı denemesi," Belleten xiii, 1949, pp. 91-97.


132. Teshrifat Effendi or Teshrifatci was one of the six Ottoman Under Secretaries of state. He was attached to the Kihya-bey, the deputy of the Grand Wazir. Kihya-bey was also in charge of the Department of Interior. See A.H. Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire In the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent Harvard University Press, 1913, pp. 182-184.

133. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 8, p. 605.

134. Izzi, f 15b.


136. Izzi, f 15a.

137. This probably refers to Nadir Shah's defeat in the Qars
campaign. After successive attempts to conquer the fort had failed, Nadir Shah raised the siege, after four months, and withdrew on October 9, 1744. The Mughal mission had reached Istanbul in the last week of September, 1744. Lockhart has also mentioned the arrival of Indian embassy while the siege of Qars was in progress. See his Nadir Shah, p. 248. Also see Note 8 on the same page.

138. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 8, pp. 144-145; Izzi, ff. 16a-17a.
139. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 8, pp. 142-143; Izzi, ff. 17a-18a.

The first one and half pages of this letter are almost identical to Name Humayun . . . , vol. 6, pp. 394-395. (Letter of Sultan Ahmad III to Emperor Farrukhsiyar).

140. For Nadir Shah's treaty with Russia (March 1735), see Lockhart, Nadir Shah, pp. 86, 92.

141. For details see Lockhart, Fall of Safavi . . . , pp. 282-295; Olson The Siege . . . , pp. 51-55; Hanway, vol. 3, pp. 233-239, 241-248, 251; Ibid., vol. 4, p. 234. In order to neutralize the growing support for Ashraf in Ottoman territories, the Porte had started a counter propaganda, declaring that Ashraf had embraced Shiism and, thus, had become a heretic. According to Stanyan, the British ambassador to Istanbul: "It was only a politick invention, to set the minds of their peoples against him [Ashraf], and to prevent their going over to him," Quoted by Lockhart, Fall of . . . , p. 291.
142. Topkapi Sarai Kütüphanesi, Istanbul, Untitled Persian Manuscript, no. H 1128 (henceforth TSK No. H 1128), ff 29b-30a. This manuscript consists of several letters written by Haji Yusuf Agha to Indian authorities and their replies. Also see Izzi, f 224b.

143. T.S.K. No. H 1128, f. 13 b (Haji Yusuf Agha's letter to Nizam ul-Mulk, where he gives the exact date of his arrival in Surat).

144. Ibid., ff 20b, 25b-26a.


146. Ibid., pp. 289-290; Izzi, ff 224b-225a.

147. This probably refers to the fatwa (a formal and official declaration or decision on a point of the canonical law of Islam), which legalized the killing or capturing of Persians. According to the fatwa, Shiism was contrary to Islam. See Lockhart, Nadir Shah, p. 229. For the text of these fatwas see M.D., 148, pp. 226, 243. These were issued on April 19, 1742.


have also levelled this charge against the Nizam (Lockhart, Nadir Shah, p. 124). For a modern refutation of his charge see Yusuf Husain Khan, The First Nizam, Asia Publishing House, 1963, pp. 186-187.


154. For details of these events, see T.S.K. H 1128, ff 12b-30a.

155. Izzi, f 224b.

156. It is indicated by the fact that the letters carried by him were copied in the Name Defteri on the very same day, that is, March 4, 1750.

157. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 8, p. 298. It is a unique document. It gives a detailed inventory of gifts, especially of fabrics, carried by the Ottoman envoy. The original inventory was in Persian. Its Turkish translation was recorded in the Name Defteri. Izzi has also copied its Turkish version in his work (See f 226). The perfumes sent by Muhammad shah for
Sultan Mahmud I were: 19.5 Tolas (one tola is equal to 180 grains of 11.664 grams) of perfume of Gul-l-shabbu (Wallflower or Cheiranthus), 27 Tolas of Malagir perfume, 26 Tolas, of perfume of Champa (Michelia Champaca), 28 Tolas of perfume of Mulsari (Mimuspos Elengi), and 26.5 Tolas of Sandal (Santalum album) perfume. In their autobiographies, both Babur and Jahangir have taken notice of the Champa flower. They have identified it as white Jasmine as distinguished from yellow or blue Jasmines. Babur writes: "The Yasmin (Jasmine) is another (flower); the white they call champa. It is larger and more strongly scented than our Yasmin flower" Baburnama, p. 515). According to Jahangir, "Champa is a flower of exceedingly sweet fragrance; it has the shape of the Saffron flower, but is yellow inclining to white . . when in flower, one tree will perfume a garden" (Tuzuk, vol. I, pp. 5-6). At another place Jahangir writes: "There are many blue Jessamines in the gardens, and the white Jessamines that the people of India call Chambili (Champa) are sweet scented." (Ibid., II, p. 145). Jahangir was also enchanted by Mulsari flower. He writes: "This tree [Mulsari] too is very graceful and symmetrical, and is shady. The scent of its flowers is very pleasant" (Ibid., I, p. 6).

158. Name Humauyn . . . , vol. 8, p. 91.

159. Lockhart, Nadirshah, p. 255.


162. Professor Aziz Ahmad’s observation that diplomatic exchanges between Mughals and Ottomans continued until the end of the eighteenth century and that Haji Yusuf Agha was one of the many Ottoman envoys, who came to Delhi between 1750–1799 is incorrect. See his Studies . . . , p. 45. Yusuf Agha had left India in 1748. His return to Istanbul has been described by Izzi in the events of 1750 (see above). It is probably to this embassy of Yusuf Agha that both Aziz Ahmad and Bernard Lewis ("The Mughals . . . ", p. 8) has referred.


164. Ibid., p. 108. The letter of Sultan Abdul Hamid was issued on 1st Shawwal 1194 (September 30, 1780). The letter reveals that prior to 1779, the House of Arakkal had dispatched at least one more, if not many, diplomatic missions to Istanbul.

165. Hukum Namah, Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal Ms. No. 1677, ff 10b–16a, quoted by Mohibbul Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan,
Calcutta, 1971 (second edition), pp. 128-130. Also see Waqa-i-Manazil-i-Rum, ed. Mohibbul Hasan, Asia Publishing House, 1968, pp. 1-2. This is the diary of Tipu's embassy to Turkey. It was maintained by Khwaja Abdul Qadir, the Secretary of this embassy.


168. Name Humayun . . . , vol. 9, pp. 360-362. Sultan Selim III had also contemplated sending an embassy to Tipu. A letter was drafted for this purpose on June 8, 1799 (See Ibid., pp. 388-389). Tipu had, however, already died on May 4, 1799 (History of . . . , pp. 317-318). Probably, the letter was never dispatched.


171. See chapter one, pp.

172. Izzi, f 15b.

173. Ibid., f 15a.
CHAPTER THREE
MUGHAL RELATIONS WITH THE SHARIFS OF MECCA

Our noble mind is disposed to keep mankind comfortable and contented, and to protect them from the tyrants and the oppressors, so that they may assiduously perform the rites of worship and obedience to their Creator. . . It is our sincere wish that the august inhabitants of the best of the towns [Mecca], especially those attached to that holy place [Ka'ba], where men and angels tread, and which is the object of the desire of the crowned heads, should also have a share of our munificence and largesse (Emperor Akbar to Sharif Abu Numay II).

"The Sharif of Mecca, having heard of the great wealth of India, sends an envoy every year for making his own gain. The money that I send there is meant for the poor and not for him. Devise some means by which it may reach them and the hands of this unrighteous exactor may not touch it. Ask of the [Arab] traders at Surat who have the best repute and substance, if they can convey my money to the poor of the Holy Cities in safety. If so, it will be sent through their agency. My object is to please the souls of the lovers of God and not to proclaim my charity (Emperor Aurangzeb to Inayatullah Khan)."

Among the Ottoman dignitaries, the Sharif of Mecca held a position of great honour and distinction. He ruled, under Ottoman suzerainty, over Mecca and Medina — the two of the holiest cities of Islam. The Sharif was also the chief custodian of the Ka'ba, described in the Holy Quran as: "The first sanctuary appointed for mankind . . . ; a blessed place, a guidance to the peoples,"
towards which Muslims around the world turn at each of their five daily prayers. In this capacity the Sharif supervised the religious ceremonies of the *Haj* (annual pilgrimage to Mecca) which the Quran enjoins all Muslims to perform at least once in their lifetime if their circumstances permit.\(^4\) Jidda, a port of considerable importance for international commerce and a premier mart of Indian goods, was also under the Sharif's jurisdiction; the customs revenue of the port was equally divided between him and the Ottoman Sultan.\(^5\) The religious alms, which came from every part of the Muslim world, as well as the gifts and stipends sent by the Muslim rulers passed through the Sharif's hands as well. Thus the Sharif of Mecca wielded considerable influence on the political, religious, and economic life of the Holy Cities; cordial relations with him were, for the Muslim states, a political necessity.

The origin of the term Sharif, as a title, is obscure. The literal meaning of 'Sharif' is noble, exalted or reverend. It suggests basically a free man, who can claim a high status in society because of his illustrious lineage.\(^6\) Muslim scholars tend to believe that this designation could be applied only to the *Ahl al-Bait* (Members of the Prophet's Household) and their descendants. But the identity of the *Ahl al-Bait* has itself been a subject of controversy. In the Quran this term is used for the wives of the Prophet.\(^7\) The Shias, however, include in this category, on the basis of a well known Prophetic tradition, only Fatima, the Prophet's
daughter, her husband Ali, and their sons, Hasan and Husain. The Sunnis on the other hand prefer a wider interpretation of this term and incorporate in this category, besides the above mentioned persons, other members of the Prophet's immediate family as well. Those who belonged to this select group were given the title of Sharif; kinship with the Prophet was, thus, an important prerequisite for this designation.

In the Abbasid period the descendants of Abbas bin Abdul Mutallib, Prophet's uncle, and Abu Talib, Prophet's another uncle and father of Ali, were included in this select group. This was probably done to justify the legitimacy of the Abbasids, who traced their descent from Abbas, as rulers of the Islamic Ummah (community). In Fatimid Egypt, however, the title of Sharif was reserved only for the progeny of Hasan and Husain. By the thirteenth century it was in accepted use as a title for the rulers of Mecca, who were the descendants of Hasan, and for the leading members of their clan. It was perhaps in this period that the offspring of Husain were designated as Sayyid. In the nineteenth century the appellation Sharif assumed a professional connotation. Those who were involved in government, politics, and war were called Sharif, but those who were engaged in the study of religion and law were known as Sayyid. In sum, the Sharifs could be called the 'nobility' of Islam: they enjoyed special privileges, were highly respected, by the people and the gentry alike, and received great favours and
patronage from the Muslim rulers around the world.¹²

Amir Jafar (961–980) was the first Sharif of Mecca. Taking advantage of the anarchy which prevailed in Arabia, after the decline of the Abbasid empire, he seized power in Mecca and laid the foundation of the Sharifate in the Hijaz. He was the direct descendant of Musa bin Abdullah, the great grandson of Hasan. The dynasty founded by him, the first of the three Sharifian dynasties, ruled over Hijaz under the nominal suzerainty of the Fatimids, for 100 years. In 1061 Sharif Shukr (1039–1061), the last of Jafar's successors, died without leaving a male progeny. In the scuffle that followed his death, the Sharifate was transferred to Abu Hashim Muhammad (1063–1094); he was the head of another Sharif family of Jafar's branch. The Hawashim dynasty was overthrown, in the year 1200, by Amir Abu Aziz Qatada (1200–1220). A scion of the same tribe, Sharif Qatada proved to be an able and dynamic ruler. He firmly established the power of his house in the Hijaz; the Sharifate was to remain in Qatada's family for the next seven centuries.

Sultan Selim I's conquest of Syria and Egypt, in 1517, brought no change in the fortunes of the Sharifate. Sharif Barkat II (1497–1525), a descendant of Qatada, promptly acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan and was duly confirmed in his position. The Sharif was given the honourary rank of a wazir in the Ottoman government; an annual salary of 25,000 kurush (a Turkish piastre) was also assigned to him.¹³ The Ottomans assumed the responsibility,
inherited from the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt, of providing subvention, in cash as well as in kind, for the upkeep of the Holy Cities. The obligation of ensuring the safety of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and keeping the pilgrim route secure also fell upon their shoulders. In return the Ottomans secured the coveted title of Khadim-al-Haramain (Servitor of the Holy Cities), the right of covering the Ka'ba annually, which signified sovereignty over the Holy Land, and the privilege of having their name inserted in the Khutba in the Hijaz. The Sharifs, on the other hand, were given a free hand to govern the Holy Cities; even the appointment of a new Sharif was left in the hands of the Sharifian family on the condition of the Sultan's approval. The only evidence of the Ottoman rule in the Hijaz was the presence of a Turkish Qazi in Mecca and a Turkish Governor in Jidda. But the Governor was not empowered to interfere in the affairs of the Sharifate. His main duty was the superintendence of the port of Jidda; he had to share the customs revenues of the port with the Sharif. The Sharifs, thus, ruled as practically independent potentates in the Hijaz, wielded considerable prestige outside the Holy Land, and maintained elaborate political and diplomatic relations with the Muslim sovereigns of their day.

The Bahmani Sultans of the Deccan were probably the first, among the Muslim sovereigns of India, to establish contacts with the Holy Cities. Alauddin Hasan Bahman Shah (1347-1358), the founder of the
Bahmani kingdom, is reported to have built, in 1354, a ribat (poor-house) at Mecca. Six years later his wife visited Mecca, with a retinue of nearly one thousand attendants, and dazzled the inhabitants of the Hijaz by her generosity and munificence. She is said to have arranged for the marriage of about four thousand poor Arab damsels, paying the expenses from her own pocket. Several Bahmani Sultans are on record to have sent subventions to Mecca and to have maintained contacts with the Sharif. Sultan Ahmad I (1422-1436) had even appointed Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Qutb, as his permanent representative in Mecca. He was responsible for the management of the hospice which the Sultan had built in Mecca, and for the proper disbursement of the money which he used to send to the Hijaz annually. Through this representative, the Sultan may have kept himself in constant communication with the Sharif. The Holy Cities also served as a place of refuge for some unfortunate members of the Bahmani royal family. Ilhamullah, the son of the last Bahmani Sultan Kalimullah (1526-1538), was one of them; he probably died in Mecca.

The Bahmanids were followed by the Sultans of Bengal in establishing friendly ties with the Sharifs of Mecca. Sultan Ghiyasuddin (died 1411) was a great patron of the Holy Land. In 1409, the Sultan dispatched an ambassador to Sharif Hasan I (1396-1426); the envoy carried a royal letter and costly presents for the Sharif. He sought permission, from the Sharif, for the
construction of a madrasa (school) in Mecca. The permission was granted and a madrasa was built. The Sultan also purchased some property in the vicinity of the madrasa and endowed it for the maintenance of this institution. The Sultan is also said to have sent a huge amount of money for the repair of the Arafat stream. Most of the money was, however, appropriated by the Sharif, who spent it on a different project. Another Sultan of Bengal, Jalaluddin (1414-1433), was an equally zealous patron of Mecca and Medina. He maintained cordial relations with the Sharif and sent him presents and robe of honour; with the Sharif's permission the Sultan also built a madrasa in Mecca. The Sultan obtained a letter of investiture, through the Sharif, from the Abbasid Caliph of Egypt.

The Muzaffarids of Gujarat did not lag behind their royal contemporaries in patronising the Sharifs of Mecca. According to Haji Ad-Dabir, the Sultans of Gujarat used to send 70,000 misqals (a gold coin, equal to one and a half drachm) annually for the residents of Mecca and Medina; out of this 25,000 misqals were given to the Sharif of Mecca. Several charitable institutions were built, in the Sacred Cities, by these Sultans. The hospice, to which a madrasa was also attached, built by Sultan Ahmad I (1410-1441), at Mecca, was one of such institutions. Gifts and cash bounties were sent by the Sultan every year to the inmates of the hospice and to the students of the school. Another great benefactor of the
Holy Land was Muzaffar Shah II (1511–1525). The ribat and the sabil (public waterplace) built by him at Mecca was a source of great blessing for the inhabitants of this city. The Sultan had also allotted a fixed sum for the poor of Mecca and Medina; he regularly remitted it every year. Occasionally he dispatched a shipload of costly cloth for distribution among the residents of these cities. His son Bahadur Shah (1526–1537) is reported to have sent to Mecca in 1536, his harem (seraglio) along with his treasure, consisting of 700 chests of gold and jewels, under the charge of his minister Abdul Aziz Khan. The minister stayed in Mecca for a decade, became a boon companion of the Sharif, and left a lasting impression on the Meccans of his learning, munificence, and patronage to scholars.

Bahadur's successor, Mahmud III (1537–1553), the last of the great Sultans of Gujarat, excelled his predecessors in displaying his benevolence to the natives of the Hijaz. He had sanctioned for them the income of Gandhara, a village near the port of Cambay. According to Haji Ad-Dabir, the income of this village was invested in indigo and textile. The merchandise was transported to Jidda on the royal boats and sold in Jidda market at considerable profit; its proceeds were distributed in the Holy Cities. He writes: "During his [Mahmud III's] regime, the residents of Mecca and Medina enjoyed extensive means of livelihood. They were free from debts. The Usmani (Ottoman) endowments came with the Egyptian Amir of Hajis to help
them at the time of Hajj and some months of the year; while the
Mahmudi endowment freed them from debt for the remaining
months.\textsuperscript{27} Two poor-houses were set up by the Sultan at Mecca.
In 1553 he sent 1000 sacks of indigo to Jidda for sale; the income
from this sale was to be spent for digging wells along the Medina
road.\textsuperscript{28}

The foundation of the Mughal empire in India marks the beginning
of a new chapter in India's relations with the Hijaz. Far more rich,
resourceful, and benevolent than their royal predecessors in the
Deccan, Bengal, and Gujarat, the Mughals were destined to stage a
lavish display of their bounty and generosity towards the Holy
Sanctuaries. The Mughals were drawn to the Hijaz by a combination of
religious, political, and economic factors. Religiously, they
desired, like all Muslim sovereigns, to represent themselves as
champions of Islam. This constrained the Mughals to establish close
contacts with the Sharifs of Mecca and to lavish rich gifts upon the
Holy Cities. Politically, they were ever eager to get recognition
for their rule from the Sharif of Mecca. The Sharif was the highest
placed descendant of the Prophet; his recognition was a vital factor
in establishing their legitimacy as rulers of an independent Muslim
state. The Sharif's refusal to do so was bound to prove embarrassing
to any Muslim monarch. Sharif Zaid's (1631-1666) rebuff to Aurangzeb
had proved highly disconcerting to the Emperor (see chapter 2).
Second, every year a large number of Indian Muslims used to go on
pilgrimage to Mecca; the Mughals also organized, off and on, annual Haj caravans to Mecca. The security and well-being of these Muslims, in the Hijaz, depended to a large extent on the Sharif's attitude towards them. This also obliged the Mughals to keep the Sharifs in good humour. Economically, the Mughals were interested in Mecca's trade. Mecca was a great center of international commerce. Here merchants from the far flung parts of the Islamic world thronged, during the pilgrimage season, to exchange goods. The Mughal involvement in this trade, however, stemmed not from any desire for personal profit but from charity. The Mughal Emperors invested huge amounts of money in the Indian merchandise for the Mecca market. These goods were sold at considerable profit; the proceeds were distributed among the denizens of Mecca and Medina.

Babur, the first Mughal, was aware of the value of friendly relations with the Sharif of Mecca. After the conquest of India, he sent nuzur (offering) to the holy men of Mecca and Medina; he also solicited them to pray for his well-being. Babur even sent a copy of the Quran, transcribed by himself in the Khatt-i-Baburi (Baburi Script), to Mecca. His successor, Humayun, was well known for his prodigious generosity. According to the Mughal chronicler Nizamuddin Ahmad, "For his [Humayun's] benefactions and offerings the whole of Hindustan was not sufficient." Unfortunately, of Humayun's donations to the Holy Sanctuaries we do not have any record. His relations with the Sharif of Mecca, if he
had any, have escaped the notice of the contemporary chroniclers. They have, however, noted Humayun’s intention, after his expulsion from India, to go on pilgrimage to Mecca.³² Of the Emperor’s contacts with the Holy Land during the rest of his life, no data is available.

With the accession of Akbar to the throne, the situation changed substantially. The new Emperor was to make serious efforts, though for a short while only, to establish full-fledged relations with the Sharif of Mecca. Akbar’s conquest of Gujarat in 1573 had added the port of Surat, known as the gateway to Mecca, to his dominions. This had facilitated the opening of the channels of communication with the Hijaz. The annexation of Gujarat also gave the Emperor an opportunity to display his zeal for the Holy Sanctuaries. He approved the continuance of the waqf (religious endowment) properties, dedicated to these Sanctuaries by Sultan Mahmud III; Akbar also added a few more villages to the waqf.³³ Sheikh Saeed Habshi, a prominent noble of Gujarat, was appointed the caretaker of the waqf. Haji Ad-Dabir, the celebrated author of the Zafar ul Walih Bi Muzaffar wa Alihi was deputed to carry the waqf money to Mecca and to distribute it among the deserving people.³⁴

Two years later Akbar permitted several inmates of his household to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. The royal entourage included such prominent personages as Gulbadan Begum, Akbar’s aunt, and Empress Salima Sultan Begum.³⁵ The Emperor himself, we are told by Abul
Fazl, was very keen to fulfill this religious obligation. But his advisers persuaded him to give up his resolve in view of the enormous responsibilities of his high office. 36 Akbar, nonetheless, decided to send every year one of his nobles as Mir Haj (leader of the pilgrims) to serve as his personal representative in the pilgrimage. He also resolved to dispatch every year a Haj caravan, like the caravans of Egypt and Syria, from India. 37 An imperial edict was issued proclaiming that, "the travelling expenses of anybody, who might intend to perform a pilgrimage to the sacred places, should be paid (from the State exchequer)." 38 Besides Indian Muslims, many Central Asians and Khurasanis were also given provisions and expenses of the journey from the public treasury. 39 A special royal ship, the "Ilahi," was arranged for carrying the pilgrims to their destination.

The first Mughal caravan left Agra in 1576. Sultan Khwaja Naqshbandi accompanied the caravan as Mir Haj. He carried 600,000 rupees in cash and 12,000 khilats (dresses of honour) for distribution among the deserving people of Mecca and Medina; the Emperor also gave him a substantial amount of money for the construction of a khanqah (dervesh convent) in Mecca. 40 The Mir Haj was instructed to prepare a list of the needy and the poor of the Sacred Cities and present it, on his return, to the Emperor. "The object of this holy thought," writes Abul Fazl, "was that an enlightened person of the court might be sent every year to that
country [Hijaz] so that abundant provisions might be made from the table of the Shahinshah's bounty for the needy of that country as for the necessitous of other climes.⁴¹ The Mir Haj, however, ran into a serious problem at Surat. The Portuguese, who controlled the sea route to Mecca, refused to grant the pilgrim ship cartaz (passport) for safe conduct. The problem was resolved by the timely action of the Governor of Surat; he secured, though the intercession of a Hindu merchant of Cambay, a satisfactory agreement with the Portuguese.⁴² The pilgrims eventually set sail in October 1576; they reached their destination the following year.

Shortly after the departure of the royal caravan, Rahman Quli Khan Qushbegi arrived from Mecca. He presented the letter of the Sharif and of other authorities of the Hijaz.⁴³ The identity of the Khan is obscure. It is not known whether he was a representative of the Sharif or was he one of Akbar's nobles who had earlier been sent to Mecca on a diplomatic assignment. Neither the Sharif's letter is extant nor Akbar's reply to it is available. Abul Fazl is the only Mughal chronicler who has taken notice of Rahman Quli's mission. But his account of the mission is too brief to establish its purpose. Probably Akbar's fame, after his conquest of Gujarat, had reached Mecca and the Sharif desired to institute friendly relations with the new Emperor of India. The Sharif may even have solicited the Emperor for pecuniary aid. We have the testimony of Haji Ad-Dabir that, in 1575, the Gujarati waqf, dedicated to the
Holy Land, was discontinued. It is also possible that the intent of Rahman Quli's mission was to lodge the Sharif's complaint against the termination of this waqf. 44

In 1577, Mir Abu Turab was appointed to lead the Mughal caravan of pilgrims. The Mir was one of the great Sayyids of Shiraz; his ancestors had for years served the Sultans of Gujarat honourably. He was entrusted with 500,000 rupees and 10,000 khilats for apportionment among the inhabitants of the Haramain (Holy Sanctuaries). For the Sharif of Mecca, "who had always sent representations, and the rarities of that land," 45 a cash award of 100,000 rupees and several splendid gifts were dispatched. 46 This lavish display of the imperial bounty did not go unheeded. Destitutes from all parts of Hijaz, Syria, and Asia Minor swarmed into the Holy Cities to share the alms sent by the Emperor of India. Akbar also received numerous letters of thanks from the natives of the two cities. 47 In 1578 Khwaja Yahaya, the great grandson of Khwaja Ahrar, the spiritual guide of Emperor Babur, was commissioned as Mir Haj. He carried sadagat worth 400,000 rupees. 48 The khwaja was also assigned the task of escorting the royal ladies, who had been living in the Hijaz since 1577, back home. 49

In the following year reports of the unfair disbursement of the money, sent to Mecca by Akbar in the previous years, reached the Emperor. Abul Fazl has given a vivid account of the rapaciousness and cupidity of the Hijaz authorities, who appropriated the bulk of
the money for their own use and denied the poor and the needy their due share in the imperial alms. The chronicler writes: "He [Akbar] became aware that the pushing and avaricious men of those shrines stirred up the dust of turbulence and did not make a proper division, and that no share came to the modest poor, or they only got a smaller portion, while the wicked and noisy took away large quantities by oppression. . . ."50 The Emperor reacted quickly. He ordered that, "In future his great bounties should not be proclaimed, and that the poor of that country [Hijaz] should, like those of every other country, receive their boons in secret."51 Akbar also resolved to appoint one of his courtiers as his permanent representative in Mecca; the proper disbursement of the royal sadaqat was to be the main duty of the imperial agent. Sheikh Abdun Nabi and Mulla Abdullah Sultanpuri, two leading ulama of the court, were chosen for this special assignment. The selection of these men was motivated by another consideration. They were leaders of the orthodox group at the court; due to their opposition to Akbar's religious aberrations, they had fallen from the imperial grace. The ulama had also incurred Akbar's wrath for publicly proclaiming the Mahzar (decree), which had declared Akbar as the Imam and had placed him above the authority of all the jurists, as illegal and false. The Emperor, therefore, wanted to expel them from India. Abul Fazl had even accused them of ignorance, avarice, and corruption.52 In 1579 Akbar jointly appointed Sheikh Abdun Nabi and Mulla Abdullah
to the office of Mir Haj. A large amount of money was given to
them for the needy and the deserving of Mecca and Medina. Numerous
other Muslims went along with them and performed the Haj at state
expense. 53

Hakimul Mulk Gilani, a distinguished physician and scholar, was
commissioned as the royal Mir Haj for the year 1580. The Hakim had
also incurred Akbar's displeasure for his outspoken criticism of the
Emperor's religious innovations; he was therefore conveniently exiled
to Mecca. He was entrusted with 500,000 rupees for disbursement, in
consultation with the Sheikhul Islam of Mecca, among the denizens of
the Haramain. Akbar also sent choice fabrics of Hindustan for the
Sharif and for other dignitaries of Mecca. 54

The Hakim was destined to be the last Mir Haj dispatched by
Akbar. He did contemplate sending a Mir Haj in 1581 but was
precluded from doing so by the rebellions in Bengal and Kabul. 55
After 1581, however, the Emperor lost interest in the affairs of
Hijaz altogether; he stopped sending the Haj caravan as well as annual
subventions. Why did Akbar suddenly suspend relations with the
Hijaz? It has not so far been properly investigated. Writing in
1595 the chronicler Badauni plaintively narrates Akbar's gradual
deviation, after 1578, from the path of orthodoxy and the consequent
decline in the fortunes of Islam in the Mughal realm. Of the many
examples cited by the chronicler to support his statements, one that
stands out from others is the Emperor's repugnance to the Islamic
rituals, including the Haj. Recalling the imperial decree, issued in 1576, which allowed a multitude of Muslims to go on pilgrimage at state expense, Badauni laments: "But the reverse is now the case, for he [Akbar] cannot now bear even the name of such a thing [Haj], and merely to ask leave to go on a pilgrimage is enough to make a man a malefactor worthy of death."56

Eighteen years later another Mughal chronicler, Niamatullah, the author of Tarikh-i-Khan-i-Jahani made a similar observation regarding Akbar's religious policies. He compared the situation prevailing in the time of Akbar and Jahangir in the following manner: "The Prophet's shariat, which like the red flower had withered by the autumn wind, blossomed afresh with the accession of the King of Islam [Jahangir]; and the mosques, Khanqahs and madrasas that had become for the last thirty years the abode of birds and beasts, while the call to Muslim prayers was heard by no one, were cleared up and became clean once again."57 There is no dearth of such sinister charges against Akbar in the contemporary literature. Yet none of these sources explain the causes of Akbar's total estrangement, after 1581, with the Hijaz.

Akbar's letter to Sharif Abu Numay II (1524-1584), written probably in early 1582, likewise, does not throw any light on this episode. The letter opens with a brief discourse on the Emperor's concern and solicitude for the welfare of the worshippers of the Almighty, especially the suppliants of Mecca and Medina. It recalls
the Emperor's resolve to send, every year, a *Mir Haj* with gifts, in
cash as well as in kind, for apportionment among the inhabitants of
the Holy Cities. Akbar regrets that because of his engagement in
suppressing the revolt in Kabul[^58] the annual subvention to Mecca
could not be sent the last year [1581]; the Emperor promises
uninterrupted dispatch of annual donations hereafter. The Emperor
refers to the money sent through Sheikh Abdun Nabi, Mulla Abdullah,
and Hakimulmulk, and requests that a detailed statement of the
distribution of this money, by the aforementioned persons, should be
sent to the court, affixed with the seals of the Sharif and the Qazi
of Mecca, for the Emperor's perusal. Akbar expresses his utter
indignation at the attempt of certain individuals in Mecca to cast
aspersions on the religious beliefs of Sheikh Muinuddin Shirazi, an
*alim* of Akbar's court and the author of a religious treatise
dedicated to the Emperor. This, the Emperor writes, is, actually an
attempt to malign him [Akbar] in the eyes of the Muslims at large.
The Emperor calls for the chastisement and for expulsion from the
Holy Land of those wicked and dissolute persons. The letter
concludes with a request to keep the Emperor informed of the events
and occurrences in Mecca, so that he may be able to pay his utmost
attention to the affairs of the *Haramain*.[^59]

The letter is undated. But the allusion to Akbar's successful
Kabul campaign to quell the rebellion of his brother Mirza Muhammad
Hakim and to the Emperor's return, in December 1581, from Kabul to
Agra, suggests that the letter was written not long after this date. In all probability it was penned in early 1582 (see below). Akbar's expression of his dismay for not having been able to send, because of the revolt, the annual Haj Caravan and the sadaqat to Mecca in 1581, and his promise of their uninterrupted continuation in the years to come indicate that the conflict with the Hijaz had not yet begun. The reference to the religious treatise authored by Sheikh Moinuddin, in which he was alleged to have made statements contrary to the Shariat, to the Sheikh's dedication of this treatise to Akbar, which was tantamount to Akbar's endorsement of those ideas, and the Emperor's emphatic denial of these charges (against the Sheikh), was obviously an attempt on Akbar's part to clarify his position and to refurbish his image in the Hijaz. This seems to be the major purpose of this letter.

Akbar's letter, thus, fails to explain his sudden suspension of relations with the Hijaz. It seems that some untoward episode had taken place after 1581 which, coupled with the Emperor's peregrination from the path of the Sunni orthodoxy, led to the abrupt break with the Holy Cities. What was this awkward episode? We get absolutely no hint, regarding this affair, in the Mughal chronicles.

The Ottoman documents, hitherto unknown to the scholars, unravel this mystery and dispel the reasons for Akbar's alienation with the Hijaz. We learn from these documents that the activities of the Indian pilgrims, in Mecca and Medina, had led to the development of
an acute antagonism between Mughals and the Ottomans. It appears that the ladies of Akbar's household, their numerous attendants as well as a multitude of people, who had gone on pilgrimage with the Mughal Haj caravans, had overextended their stay in the Holy Cities. Their protracted sojourn had created overcrowding and scarcity in the Sacred Cities; the Indian pilgrims had, thus, became a source of trouble and irritation to the local natives. They were also reported to have freely indulged in the activities contrary to the Shariat. In response to these reports, Sultan Murad III (1574-1595), had commanded the Sharif of Mecca and other Hijaz authorities to restrain the Indians, including Akbar's ladies, from staying in the Holy Cities after performing Haj and to arrange for their immediate return to their own country. The Hijaz authorities were directed to curb the activities not ordained by the Shariat in the vicinity of the Haramain. The Sultan had also instructed the Sharif to stop forthwith, the disbursement of the Sadaqat sent by Akbar.

These actions of the Ottoman Sultan seems to have annoyed Akbar considerably. The royal ladies were compelled to leave the Hijaz; later the ladies were also subjected to insults by the Ottoman Governor of Aden, during their sojourn in that city on their way back to India. After reaching Agra, in April 1582, the ladies may have related to the Emperor their tales of woe and humiliation. The absence of any reference to this episode in Akbar's letter to the
Sharif of Mecca, which was probably dispatched before the arrival of the ladies at Agra, also suggests that Akbar came to know about this affair through his ladies. Khwaja Yahya, the Mir Haj, who had returned to India along with the royal ladies, may have presented to the Emperor his own version of the events in the Hijaz. The report of the proscription of his Sadaqat in the Holy Santuraries seems to have incensed Akbar further. This was enough to provoke the proud and arrogant Mughal to suspend relations with the Hijaz.

Nevertheless, the problem of the Indian Muslims and of their wrong doings in the Holy Cities did not abate. Apparently some Indians had managed to evade the Sultan's decree for their expulsion from Mecca. Several others may have gone on pilgrimage after 1581. Their activities are the subject of a special report sent by the Sharif of Mecca to Sultan Murad III. The Sultan was informed that the people of India were still living in Mecca, that they had occupied the huts situated in the vicinity of the Haram Sharif, that they slept during the night in the Grand Mosque and indulged in unbecoming activities. These Indians, the Sharif concluded, had become a source of indignation and distress to the Muslims in general. The Sultan ordered the Governor of Jidda to take immediate action. He was to destroy the huts occupied by the Indians, to expel the Indians, and the other dwellers of the huts, and to put down indecorous activities in the Haram Sharif. The Governor was also directed to thoroughly purify and cleanse the
Haram and to prevent the entry of undesirable persons in its sacred precinct. 67

We are not aware of the subsequent developments in this affair; later Ottoman documents do not mention it. Was Akbar cognizant of it? If so, did he take any action? We do not know. As usual the Mughal chroniclers have glossed over this episode. Presumably, after 1585, the Indian pilgrims had managed to stay out of trouble; at least no fresh tiff over their activities in Mecca is reported in the Ottoman documents. Akbar's indifference towards the Holy Cities, however, remained firm and strong. As far as Akbar was concerned, the break with the Hijaz was total and final.

Jahangir, who succeeded Akbar, was by no means a champion of orthodoxy. Although Jahangir had secured the throne, with the support of an influential section of the nobility, on the condition of rehabilitating Islam in the Mughal dominions, 68 he generally continued his father's religious policy. The new Emperor did not show any inclination to resume relations with the Hijaz either.

On the other hand, Sharif Idris bin Hasan (1601-1624), anticipating a change in the Mughal policy with the accession of the Emperor, promptly sent an embassy to Jahangir's court. On December 3, 1607 the Sharifs' envoy was admitted into audience; he presented a very placatory letter and certain sacred relics as gifts. 69 The Sharif's letter is not extant; the intent of the embassy is also not known. Probably the object of the mission was to congratulate
Jahangir on his accession to the throne; the revival of friendly relations with the Mughal empire may also have been one of the mission’s main objectives. Jahangir received the envoy kindly, bestowed on him numerous favours, and gave him a cash award of 8,000 rupees. He also sent gifts worth 100,000 rupees for the Sharif. But the Emperor did not send a return embassy to Mecca. He did not resume the policy of dispatching a royal Mir Haj and organizing the annual Haj caravan to Mecca. Jahangir was a firm believer in his father's policy of Sulh-i-kul (peace with all or toleration for all religions). This implied no special concern for Islam; Jahangir’s insouciance towards Islam is, therefore, hardly surprising.

The Indian Muslims, nevertheless, continued to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca. There are many references in the English Factory Records to this effect. In 1612, for instance, the ship 'Rahimi,' owned by Jahangir's mother, carried as many as 1500 pilgrims to Jidda. Did Jahangir pay the travelling expense of these pilgrims? It is difficult to know. Empress Nur Jahan is, however, reported to have sent several Muslims on pilgrimage at her own expense every year. In 1619, Edward Terry, the chaplain of Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador to Jahangir's court, found a ship returning from Jidda with about 1700 Hajis (pilgrims). Two years earlier even the Emperor was reported to have been planning to send his sister on pilgrimage to Mecca.
Occasionally, Jahangir also sent donations to Mecca. In 1622, he sent 200,000 rupees to Cambay, a famous port of Gujarat. The money was to be invested in the Red Sea trade; its proceeds were to be distributed among the poor of Mecca. Notwithstanding this occasional outburst of generosity, Jahangir, on the whole, remained indifferent towards Mecca. After the abortive diplomatic mission of 1607, the Sharif of Mecca had also refrained from dispatching another embassy to Agra. Relations with the Hijaz had, thus, remained dormant during Jahangir's reign.

In contrast to his father and grandfather, Shahjahan, who became Emperor in 1628, was an orthodox Muslim. A zealous follower of the tenets of his faith, Shahjahan was calculated to maintain close ties with the Hijaz. Early in his reign he dispatched two of his trusted servants, Hakim Masihuzzaman and Khwaja Jahan, to Mecca. According to the Mughal chronicler Abdul Hamid Lahori, on the eve of his accession to the throne, the Emperor had pledged to send 500,000 rupees for the poor of Mecca and Medina. The Hakim and the Khwaja, writes the chronicler, were sent to fulfill this pledge. Khwaja Jahan was entrusted with merchandise worth 240,000 rupees. He was directed to sell these goods in Mecca and then to distribute the profit together with the capital, in consultation with the Hakim, among the destitutes of the Holy Land. In 1637, the Emperor sent Hakim Abul Qasim to Mecca. He was entrusted with 60,000 rupees to buy Gujarati goods. The merchandise was to be sold in the Mecca
market and the proceeds were to be apportioned among the needy of that city.\textsuperscript{78} Five years later another consignment of goods worth 100,000 rupees was sent to Mecca. Mir Ibrahim Safdar khani, the Superintendent of the Imperial Kitchen, was appointed to carry the imperial \textit{sadagat} to its destination.\textsuperscript{79}

In response to Shahjahan's friendly gestures, Sharif Zaid bin Muhsin (1631–1666) sent, in 1643, a diplomatic mission to India. This mission was led by Sheikh Abdus Samad Umoodi. Admitted to the royal audience on February 17, 1643, the envoy presented his credentials and the key of the ka'ba as the Sharifs' gift. The Emperor was overjoyed to receive such an auspicious present; he equated it with the "Key to the conquest of seven climes." The Sheikh was invested with a robe of honour and a purse of 40,000 rupees.\textsuperscript{80} On the eve of his birthday celebrations, the Emperor again presented him with a horse with silver trappings and an elephant.\textsuperscript{81} The ambassador was ceremoniously dismissed on October 7, 1643; an elegant robe of honour, a sword and a shield, both inlaid with gold, and 4,000 rupees were given to him. In all, he received 65,000 rupees in cash, besides several other gifts. The Sheikh was also recipient of favours and presents from the royal princes and the nobles.\textsuperscript{82}

In 1645, Shahjahan sent Sayyid Ahmad Saeed, Mufti (an official counsel who gives a canonical opinion to any applicant) of the imperial army to Mecca. He was entrusted with merchandise worth
100,000 rupees for the residents of Mecca and Medina; a cash grant of 50,000 rupees was also sent for the Sharif of Mecca. The Sayyid sold the goods in the Mecca market at one hundred percent profit and disbursed the entire amount, according to the imperial instructions, among the natives of the Holy Cities. He returned to the court in October 1647.

Three years later the Sayyid was again commissioned to carry alms and presents to the Sacred Cities. Among the gifts was a candlestick studded with diamonds; its value was estimated at 250,000 rupees. All the Mughal chroniclers have taken special notice of his gift. According to them the principal diamond of the candlestick weighed 100 carats. "As such a valuable diamond as this," writes Inayat Khan, the author of Shahjahan Nama, "had never been brought to the threshold, resembling the Elysian abode, since his accession to the throne, the pious monarch [Shahjahan], the bulwark of religion, with the best intention and the utmost sincerity of purpose, made a vow to send it to the pure sepulchre of the last of the Prophets (on whom be peace). Having therefore selected out of the amber candlesticks that he had amongst his private property, the largest of them all which weighed 700 tolas, and was worth 10,000 rupees, he commanded that it should be covered with a network of gold, ornamented on all sides with flowers, and studded with gems, among which that valuable diamond should also be included." The Sayyid was also given goods worth 160,000 rupees; out
of which he was directed to present commodities of the value of 50,000 rupees to Sharif Zaid bin Muhsin. The remainder was to be sold in the Mecca market; its proceeds, along with the profit, which was expected to be around 100 percent, were to be distributed among the deserving people of the Haramain. In appreciation of his distinguished services, the Sayyid was promoted to the mansab of 500 and was given a cash award of 12,000 rupees.

In 1650 Sheikh Abdus Samad, the former envoy of the Sharif of Mecca, arrived in India. The respect and wealth which he had received during his previous stay at the court seems to have made a very favourable impression on the Sheikh. Dazzled by the splendour of Shahjahan's court and impressed by the Emperor's generosity, he expressed a desire to join the Mughal service. Shahjahan welcomed him cordially; he bestowed on the Sheikh a robe of honour and a purse of 10,000 rupees. He was enrolled in the imperial service and was elevated to the mansab of 700/100. Next year he was promoted to the post of Mir Adl (Chief Justice) of the royal army. The subsequent career of the Sheikh Abdus Samad is not known. Muhammad Salih Kanbu, the author of Amal-i-salih, written around 1669, has placed him in the list of the mansabdars holding the rank of 700. No further mention of the Sheikh is found in the Mughal chronicles.

In August 1650 Shahjahan dispatched Farasat Khan, the Superintendent of the Royal Seraglio, to Mecca. Commodities worth
150,000 rupees were consigned to him. He was directed to sell the goods in the Mecca market; out of the proceeds, he was to present 100,000 rupees to the Sharif. The rest was to be distributed among the recluses, scholars, and the destitutes of Mecca and Medina. The following year Sayyid Ahmad Saeed was appointed ambassador to Istanbul. The Emperor ordered him to travel via Mecca; 100,000 rupees were given to him for distribution among the inhabitants of that city. Three years later, Shahjahan again sent 100,000 rupees for the Sharif and the destitutes of Mecca. An exquisite prayer carpet, especially prepared in the imperial karkhana (workshop) of Multan, was dispatched for the Prophet's mosque at Medina.

Shahjahan revived the policy of organizing an annual Haj caravan to Mecca. Every year two royal ships carried a multitude of people to Jidda; their expenses were paid by the state. The English Factory Records also testify to the considerable increase in the pilgrim traffic during Shahjahan's reign. In December 1640, for instance, President Freelman of the Surat factory reported that the prices in Gujarat had gone up owing to the investment, in Gujarati goods, of a large number of people going to Mecca for Haj. Shahjahan's devotion to Islam, his generous donations to Mecca, and his concern for the residents of the Holy Cities was bound to improve relations with the Sharifs of Mecca. The stage was now set for steady and cordial relationship between Mughal India and the Hijaz.
Aurangzeb, the last of the Great Mughals, was a devout Muslim. A staunch follower of the tenets of Islam, well known for his piety, and steadfast in enforcing the Shariat (Islamic canon law), he was styled by his contemporaries as zinda pir (living saint). His love and devotion for the Holy Land was boundless. "During his reign," writes Saqi Mustaid Khan, the author of Maa$ir-i-Alamgiri "he [Aurangzeb] used to send large amounts of money, for some years annually, at others once in two or three years, to the pious men living in retreat in those Holy Cities, and a large number of men in those Holy places were permanently employed by him on daily stipends to act as his deputies in walking round the Ka'ba, bowing to the Prophet's tomb, reading the two copies of the Quran written by this pious Emperor with his own hand and presented to Medina." The Emperor had also appointed a special officer to take care of the endowments sanctioned for the Holy Sanctuaries.

Besides his fealty to the Holy Land, Aurangzeb's desire to cultivate friendly relations with the Hijaz was motivated by another consideration. The circumstances under which he had ascended the throne had rendered the legality of his rule highly questionable in the eyes of the people (see chapter 2). The Sharif's recognition of his regime would have helped Aurangzeb a great deal in establishing his legitimacy as a de jure ruler. Hence in November 1659, shortly after his formal coronation, Aurangzeb sent Mir Ibrahim on a diplomatic mission to Mecca. He was entrusted with 630,000 rupees
for the Sharif families of Mecca and Medina. But Sharif Zaid refused to accept Aurangzeb's gifts; his plea was that the Emperor's dethronement of his father was tantamount to an open defiance of the Islamic law. No Mughal chronicler has mentioned this episode; they only refer to the death of the Mughal ambassador, in June 1661, in Mecca. Aurangzeb's first mission to the Hijaz had proved abortive.

Undaunted by this rebuff, Aurangzeb sent another mission to Mecca in 1662. Veteran diplomat Sayyid Ahmad Saeed was appointed to lead the mission; he was entrusted with presents worth 660,000 rupees. The Sayyid succeeded in his mission. The Sharif not only accepted Aurangzeb's gift but also dispatched a return embassy, led by Sayyid Yahya, to Shahjahanabad. The envoy reached Shahjahanabad, in company of Sayyid Ahmad, in March 1665. Given audience, soon after his arrival in the capital, the ambassador presented the Sharif's letter and gifts. The presents included three Arab horses and some sacred relics. Aurangzeb invested the envoy with a robe of honour and a purse of 6,000 rupees. According to Manucci the sacred relics included a broom that had been used to sweep the Prophet's tomb. He observes that the intent of the Sharif's mission was to congratulate Aurangzeb on his accession and also to persuade the Emperor to "renew the offering that he had before sent." The Emperor, asserts Manucci, paid no heed to the envoy's request. Whether or not the envoy made such a
request is a moot question, for there is no other evidence to substantiate Manucci's statement. Nevertheless, when the ambassador was dismissed, two months later, the Emperor bestowed upon him a robe of honour, a horse, a gold and silver coin of 100 Tola each, and 7,000 rupees.  

This was the prelude to the extremely genial Mughal-Hijaz relations which continued for the next three decades. Several missions, from Mecca, came to Aurangzeb's court during this period. In 1668, Sharif Saad bin Zaid (1666-1671) sent an embassy, led by Sayyid Usman, to Shahjahanabad. The ambassador was cordially welcomed; he was ceremoniously dismissed a few months later. As a parting gift he received a robe, a horse with silver trappings, and 9000 rupees. Three years later, Sharif Saad again dispatched Sayyid Usman to Shahjahanabad. The envoy presented on Sharif's behalf, a supplicatory letter, two Arab horses, a sword belt made of silver, and a falcon. The Emperor conferred on him a dagger studded with jewels, a gold and silver coin of 100 Tola each, and 10,000 rupees. A cash award of 20,000 rupees was sent for the Sharif. In 1674, a diplomatic mission arrived from Sharif Barkat bin Muhammad (1671-1682). The mission comprised of Sayyid Ali, the Sharif's chamberlain, and Muhammad Amin, the Master of Horses. Aurangzeb greeted them cordially and conferred many favours upon them. At the time of their departure, both received 5000 rupees each.
Embassies, from Mecca, continued to arrive at regular intervals. Those of 1686, 1690, and 1693 have been recorded by the contemporary Mughal chroniclers. The envoys, were cordially welcomed, graciously treated, and rewarded to their heart's content. Unfortunately the letters brought by the plenipotentiaries are not extant. Presumably, the major intent of these mission was to seek financial aid from Aurangzeb. The Sharifs were aware of the Emperor's devotion the Holy Land; his susceptibility to anything sacred or religious was also well known. Their periodic missions to Aurangzeb's court, carrying presents, consisting of the relics attached to the holy shrines, were aimed at taking maximum advantage of the Emperor's generosity and munificence. This is corroborated by the testimony of Bernier. He observes that the chief object of Sharif Zaid's embassy of 1665 was to obtain money in return of the presents which the ambassador had brought as well as to gain, "still more considerable sums by means of numerous horses, and different articles of merchandise which they [envoys] introduced into the kingdom free of duty, as property belonging to all ambassadors." This assessment also holds good for the embassies which arrived after 1665.

Aurangzeb also sent considerable amount of money, through his own agents, to Mecca. In 1666 Mir Aziz Badakhshi was sent to Mecca with alms and offerings; the Mir died at Mecca. In 1685 it was reported to the Emperor that, since his accession to the throne,
20,000 *ashrafis* (gold coins), 15,000 rupees' and goods worth several *lakhs* of rupees had already been sent to Mecca. The same year, a cash subsidy of 100,000 rupees was sent for the people of the *Haramain*.¹¹³ Six years later Haji Muhammad Anwar was dispatched to Mecca with several lakhs of rupees; the money was to be spent in charity in Mecca and Medina.¹¹⁴

The Emperor continued his father's policy of organizing an annual Haj caravan to Mecca. The royal ship 'Ganj-i-sawai' sailed every year for Jidda, carrying pilgrims and merchants.¹¹⁵ The state continued to bear the travel expense of the poor pilgrims. The Emperor also revived the practice of appointing a royal *Mir Haj* to lead the Indian pilgrims in the pilgrimage.¹¹⁶

By 1694, Aurangzeb's ardour for the Sharifs of Mecca had begun to wane; their greed and rapacity had thoroughly disillusioned the Emperor. In a note to his secretary, written in 1694, Aurangzeb expressed his disgust at the unethical behavior of the Sharif who appropriated all the money sent to the Hijaz for his own use, thus depriving the needy and the poor of their due share in the royal endowments.¹¹⁷ Two other imperial missives, dealing with this issue, are extant. Both depict Aurangzeb's repugnance for the Sharif's cupidity and the Emperor's concern for the famished and poverty-stricken inhabitants of Mecca.¹¹⁸ Thereafter, the Emperor resolved to send the money secretly to Mecca; the merchants of Surat, trading with Arabia, were ordered to carry the imperial
alms to its destination. This policy was calculated to eliminate the chances of the Sharif's defalcation of the royal subventions. It is noteworthy that no diplomatic mission from Mecca is reported to have arrived in the later years of Aurangzeb's reign. The last recorded Meccan embassy had left India in 1693. Perhaps, aware of Aurangzeb's displeasure and unsure of its outcome, the Sharif did not send any embassy to India after 1693. Relations with the Sharif of Mecca seem to have remained suspended during the rest of Aurangzeb's reign.

Friendly relations with the Hijaz were resumed after Aurangzeb's death. In November 1709, Emperor Bahadur Shah I sent gifts worth 500,000 rupees to Mecca and Medina. An annual subsidy of 100,000 rupees was also sanctioned for the Sharif. In 1717 Sharif Abdullah bin said (1716-1717 and 1723-1730) sent Haji Saleh as his envoy to Farrukhsiyar's court. The ambassador presented the Sharif's letter and 15 Arab horses as the Sharif's peshkash. The Sharif's letter informed the Emperor of the death of his father Sharif Said bin Saad (1687-1716) and his own elevation to the Sharifate of Mecca. The Sharif requested Farrukhsiyar to continue the annuity of 100,000 rupees paid to his father in his name. The Emperor acceded to the Sharif's request and ordered that the amount should be paid annually from the Surat treasury. He also instructed Haider Quli Khan, the Deputy Governor of Gujarat, that the Sharif's stipend for the year 1717 should be immediately handed over to his envoy;
orders for arranging the envoy's safe return to Mecca were also issued. A few months later, Farrukhsiyar dispatched Muhammad Hafiz Khan to Mecca; he was entrusted with 500,000 rupees for disbursement among the destitutes and recluses of the Haramain.

Relations with the Hijaz continued to prosper during the reign of Muhammad Shah. Shortly after Muhammad Shah's accession to the throne, Ahmad Alia, the envoy of Sharif Yahya bin Barakat (1717–1719 and 1721–1722) waited upon the Emperor with Sharif's letter and gifts; on his own behalf the envoy presented a book. Muhammad Shah received the envoy cordially and conferred on him a robe of honour, a dagger set with jewels, and 5000 rupees. Another diplomatic mission from Mecca, led by Sheikh Alan, is reported to have arrived in 1724. The envoy brought auspicious relics and presents for the Emperor. The Sharif also appointed his permanent representative in Surat. Probably the principal duty of the agent was to look after the Sharif's commercial interest in this premier port of the Mughal empire. He was also responsible for collecting the Sharif's annual subsidy, from the Surat treasury, and remitting it to Mecca.

In September 1725, Haji Ahmad Jalil arrived as the representative of Sharif Abdullah bin Said (1723–1730). A contemporary Mughal official has recorded the agent's activities in his diary Mirat-al-Haqaiq. He has narrated the problems
faced by the Haji in securing the Sharif's subsidy from Nawab Sohrab Khan, the Governor of Surat, the corrupt practices of the Governor, and the complaint lodged by the Haji, regarding this affair, at the imperial court. The Emperor's reaction to the Haji's petition is not known; the diarist has not mentioned it. In any case the imperial court had, by that time, degenerated into a hotbed of factional politics and sedition. Under the circumstances the complaint against a provincial Governor, as long as he had the means to buy powerful friends at the court, was not likely to generate an encouraging response. But the court intrigues did not impede friendly relations with the Hijaz. The Indian Muslims continued to go on pilgrimage to Mecca. Several Meccan dignitaries also came to join the Mughal service. At the time of Muhammad Shah's death, in 1748, relations with the Sharif of Mecca were cordial and stable.

The Mughals also used Mecca as a convenient place of exile for the political offenders. This policy was started by Emperor Humayun. He had exiled two of his own brothers, Mirza Kamran and Mirza Askari, to Mecca; the Mirzas had incurred the Emperor's displeasure for their treasonable conduct. Akbar's banishment of Sheikh Abdun Nabi and Mulla Abdullah Sultanpuri has already been mentioned (see above). They were directed to reside in Mecca permanently; the Emperor had also instructed the Hijaz authorities to keep an eye on them and to detain them in Mecca. In 1582 they returned to India, in
violation of imperial orders, and suffered the consequences. Akbar had also deported several other grandees of his court to the Holy Land; they were charged with opposing the Emperor's religious policies. On the other hand many leading nobles of Akbar had gone on voluntary exile to Mecca owing to their differences with the Emperor. Mirza Aziz Koka, Akbar's foster brother and the Governor of Gujarat, was one of them. The Mirza gave a considerable amount of money to the charitable organizations of the Holy Cities. He is also credited with having advanced to the Sharif of Mecca a sum equivalent to 50 years of the expenses of Mecca. Jahangir had deported Abdul Aziz Khan, the Governor of Qandahar, for having surrendered the coveted fort to Shah Abbas I of Persia. Sheikh Adam Bannoori, a leading divine of the seventeenth century was banished, along with his many followers, by Shahjahn; the Sheikh died at Medina in 1643. Aurangzeb had likewise expelled many undesirable persons to the Holy Land. This policy seems to have been abandoned by Aurangzeb's successors. Weak and incompetent as they were, the later Mughals did not have sufficient power and authority to enforce their will upon their subordinates. No recalcitrant noble was, therefore, deported to Mecca after Aurangzeb's death.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Mughal relations with the Sharifs of Mecca were marked by many vicissitudes. Babur, the first Mughal, was cognizant of the influence wielded by the Sharif of Mecca in the Islamic world. Hence he took care to propitiate the Sharif. He sent nuzur to Mecca after his victory in the battle of Panipat. Babur also displayed his zeal for the Holy Land by sending a copy of the Quran transcribed by himself. Of Humayun's contacts with the Sharifs of Mecca, during his stormy reign of sixteen years, we have no knowledge. He, however, deported two of his brothers to Mecca; the Emperor, thereby, became unconsciously responsible for setting up a dangerous precedent. Henceforth all of his successors sought to use Mecca as a convenient place for banishing political offenders. It was only in the eighteenth century, when the later Mughal Emperors no longer had the power to enforce their will on their unruly subordinates, that they gave up this practice.

Akbar began his reign by establishing close links with the Hijaz. He sent gorgeous gifts to the Sharif of Mecca. The Emperor initiated the policy of organizing an annual Haj caravan to Mecca. He also began to appoint a royal Mir Haj, every year, to represent him in the Haj. But Akbar soon got involved in an unfortunate broil with the Ottomans over the affairs of the Indian pilgrims. The disbursement of the sadaqat sent by the Emperor was banned. The
Sharif was ordered to expel the Indian pilgrims from Mecca, including the ladies of his household, after the Haj season. This, coupled with Akbar's own religious policies, led to a temporary breach in Mughal-Hijaz relations.

Jahangir made no attempt to break this deadlock. Sharif Idris's initiative in 1607 did not make any impression on him; the Emperor did not dispatch a return embassy to Mecca. Only twice in his long reign of 22 years did Jahangir send gifts to the Sharif of Mecca. The Emperor did not revive the practice of organizing annual Haj caravan to Mecca. Given Jahangir's lukewarmness to everything religious, his indifferent attitude towards the Sharif of Mecca is not surprising.

With the accession of Shahjahan to the throne the situation began to change. He regularly sent emissaries to the Holy Cities with splendid gifts in cash as well as in kind. Shahjahan started the practice of sending Indian merchandise to Mecca; the proceeds of these goods, along with the profit which accrued from this transaction, were distributed among the Sharif and the needy of the Holy Cities. The Emperor revived the organization of the annual Haj caravan to Mecca. He also enrolled a former envoy of the Sharif of Mecca, to his court, in the imperial service. By the time of Shahjahan's deposition in 1658 the Mughal-Sharifian relations had considerably improved.

During the first three decades of his reign, Aurangzeb
maintained cordial relations with Mecca. Several diplomatic missions arrived from Mecca; the Emperor reciprocated with equally warm and affable gestures. Imperial agents, carrying subventions for the Sharif and their inhabitants of the Holy Cities, visited Mecca at regular intervals. Haj caravans with royal Mir Haj continued to sail for Mecca for the annual pilgrimage. In the later years of his reign, however, Aurangzeb got disillusioned by the avarice of the Sharifs of Mecca. He stopped entertaining the Sharif's request for pecuniary aid and suspended official relations with Mecca altogether.

Relations were restored after Aurangzeb's death. Bahadur shah, Farrukhshiyar, and Muhammad Shah received embassies from Mecca. They also sent gifts to the Sharifs. Farrukhshiyar even sanctioned an annual subsidy of 100,000 rupees for the Sharif. During the reign of Muhammad Shah a permanent representative of the Sharif began to reside in Surat. At the time of Muhammad Shah's death in 1748 the Mughal-Sharifian relations were steady and stable.

Notwithstanding the religious prestige enjoyed by the Sharifs, the Mughals did not treat them as their equals. They never sent a full-fledged imperial mission to Mecca. This is the impression we get from the narrative of the Mughal chroniclers. While designating the messengers of the Sharifs as ambassadors, these chroniclers invariably describe the Mughal officials going to Mecca as imperial agents or emissaries. They style the letters of the Sharifs, brought either by Sharifian envoys or by the imperial agents, not as Murasla
or Maktub, terms which stand for correspondence between equals, but rather as arzdasht, which designates a letter addressed by an inferior to a superior. Akbar's letter to Sharif Abu Numay II is a good example of the air of superiority assumed by the Mughal Emperors, while addressing the Sharifs. The letter is authoritative in tone, assures the Sharif of the unlimited imperial favours, and commands him to carry out the royal instructions. The Sharifs, on the other hand, did not object to this unobtrusive treatment. They were willing to play the role of a subaltern as long as the Mughals were ready to grease their palm. Viewed from this perspective the Mughal-Sharifian relations could at best be described as a kind of patron-client relationship.

Relations with the Sharifs of Mecca did not exercise much influence in shaping the Mughal-Ottoman relations. Mughal policy towards the Ottoman empire was largely governed by the developments in Persia. In this the Sharifs of Mecca had hardly any say. Likewise, the Sharifs, though powerful in their own realm, could in no way influence decisions, whether in favour or against the Mughals, at the Ottoman court. Only once did the developments in Hijaz, have an adverse effect on the Mughal-Ottoman relations. This was the row over the activities of the Indian pilgrims in Mecca, during the reign of Akbar, which led to hostility between two sides. But this was solely Akbar's handiwork. He overreacted to a minor incident and blew it out of proportion. For this neither the Sharif of Mecca nor
the Ottoman Sultan could be held responsible. After this incident
the Indian pilgrims seem to have kept themselves out of trouble.
Henceforth the relations between these two premier Muslim States
followed its usual course.

The problem of Haj traffic during the period under review, the
response of the Mughal and the Ottoman governments to this problem,
and the outcome of the measures taken by these governments to meet
the situation will be discussed in the following chapter.
NOTES

1 Abul Fazl, Maktubat-i-Allami, Lucknow, 1863, pp. 34-35.


3 The Holy Quran, III, No. 96.

4 The Holy Quran, II, No. 158, 196; III, No. 97; V, No. 3; XXII, No. 27. One of the major ceremonies of the Haj, performed under the personal supervision of the Sharif, was the ceremonial clothing of the Ka'ba. The expense for this clothing, known as Kiswah, was borne by the premier Muslim ruler of the time and was considered to be the symbol of that monarch's sovereignty over the Hijaz. During the Ottoman domination over the Hijaz the Kiswah was manufactured, in Cairo, at the Sultan's expense. Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent is reported to have sanctioned the revenue of seven villages for this purpose. See Uzunçarşılı, Mekke-i-Mukerreme Emirleri, Ankara, 1972, p. 156; Richard F. Burton, Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah, New York, 1964 (reprint), vol. 2, p. 214; J.L. Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia London, 1829, pp. 140-141; W. Foster (ed.), The Red Sea and adjacent countries at the close of the Seventeenth century, Weisbaden, 1967


Uzunçarşılı, Mekke—, p. 5. Also see Guerald deGaury, Rulers of Mecca, London, 1952, p. 64.

7 The Holy Quran, XXXIII, Nos. 32, 33.

8 Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. IV, p. 235. This famous Prophetic tradition is known as Hadith-al-Kisa (tradition of the mantle).

9 Ibid., p. 325; Uzuncarsili, Mekke—, p. 5.

10 DeGaury, Rulers—, p. 64.


12 The Sharifs were exempted from all government taxes and dues, were appointed to important positions in the government, and were treated with great deference by the Muslim rulers. They were required to wear a green badge or a green turban to distinguish them from the common people. The Sharifs were usually under the authority of a Nakib al-ashraf (Marshal of nobility), whose special duty was to
look after the interest of the Sharifs, to keep them under control, and to restrain them from excesses. The Naqibs, appointed in large towns and cities, were under the over-all charge of a Naqib-al-Nucaba (grand marshall of nobles), who enjoyed certain judicial powers also. In the Ottoman empire the grand marshall was known as Naqib-ul-eshraf. He was required to stay permanently in the capital and to supervise the work of his deputies, called Kaymakam Nakibul eshraf. The reign of every Ottoman Sultan usually began with a ba‘iat (oath of allegiance) from the Nakibul eshraf. The Sultans used to receive them standing; special titles were given to them. See Uzuncarsili, Mekke—, pp. 6–12; Encyclopedia of Islam, III, p. 326; Burkhardt, p. 226; W. Foster, Red Sea—, p. 4.


14 At the time of his departure from Egypt, Sultan Selim I had given the following order to Khair bey, the Governor of Egypt: "I hope to serve the Prophet well. I have no desire for anything from Egypt. I have conquered only the title, 'the Servant of the Holy Cities' and I have left in trust (vaqf) to His Excellency the Prophet all the revenues of Egypt. Bear witness that from now on you are the agent of the Vaqf of God. So serve it well." Evliya Chelebi,
Sayahatname, vol. X, p. 125, quoted by S.J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt 1517–1798, Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 253. In 1517, Selim I is reported to have sent 200,000 gold coins, to Mecca and Medina, for distribution among the denizens of these cities. This was the beginning of the Surré, which was sent to the Holy Cities, from then on, by the Ottoman Sultans. The Surré was sent annually in the care of Amir-al-Haj and was distributed under his supervision. In 1533–34, the Surré sent to the Holy Cities amounted to 560,000 paras (a Turkish coin of the value of one fortieth of a piastre). On the other hand, in 1517, a sum of 450,000 paras was sanctioned for the Haj expenses. In 1595–96 the total expenditures for the Haj and the Holy Cities was estimated to be 4,358,025 paras; in 1798, it had further increased to 29,956,017 paras a year. See Shaw, The Fiancial—, pp. 239–271; Burkhardt, p. 156. According to the Ottoman records 6000 erdebs (one erdeb is equal to five English bushels; Burkhardt, however writes (p. 226) that one erdeb was equal to 15 bushels) of corn was sent to the Holy Cities in 1566 and 1569 M.D., vol. 9, p. 80; Ibid., vol. 14, --.p. 766). This amount had increased by 1101 A.H., to 19161 erdebs (M.D., vol. 108, p. 426). Also see Asrar, Kanuni Sultan Suleyman Deverinde----, pp. 215–218. For Ottoman relations with the Sharifs of Mecca before 1517, see Uzunçarşılı, Mekke——, p. 7; Nejat Goyunç, "Some documents---," p. 177.


17 Ibid., p. 87; Muhammad Kasim Farishta, *Tarikh-i-Farishta*, vol. 1, p. 287.


19 Sherwani, *The Bahmanis—*, p. 419. Earlier Sultan Shamsuddin Dawud II (June 1397–November 1397) was also banished, after losing the throne in a contest for succession, to Mecca. He is reported to have died at Medina in 1414. See *Ibid.*, p. 132.

20 Arafat is situated at a distance of 15 miles from Mecca. It is of considerable importance for the Haj ceremonies. *Wuquf* (staying in Arafat) on the 9th ZilHaj is the central event of the pilgrimage.


23 Haji Ad-Dabir, vol., 1, p. 309.

25 Haji Ad-Dabir, vol. 1, p. 117; Mirat-i-Sikandari, p. 219; Z.A. Desai, "Relations of India with Middle Eastern Countries during the 16th-17th Centuries," Journal of the Oriental Institute, vol. XXIII. 1973-74, pp. 98-99. Muzaffar II is also said to have sent, to the Holy Cities, two copies of the Quran written in gold water by himself. He had also appointed the Hanafi Imam of the grand mosque of Mecca to recite this Quran; the Imam was handsomely paid by the Sultan. See Mirat-i-Sikandari, pp. 214-215; Haji Ad-Dabir, vol. 1, p. 117.

26 Haji Ad-Dabir, vol. 1, pp. 279, 296, 307, 309. According to the Haji, "Every year, he [Asaf Khan] distributed one hundred and fifty boxes of gold, so much so that residents of Mekka and their women and servants were dressed in gold. He gave them sumptuous feasts on a very grand scale" (Ibid., p. 296). On his death, in Ahmadabad, in 1553, Maulana Izzuddin Abdul Aziz al-Zamazami, the Mufti of the Harem, is reported to have written an eulogy of 87 verses. For a detailed account of Asaf Khan see Haji Ad-Dabir, vol. 1, pp. 277-311; Mirat-i-Sikandari, pp. 361-363, 383. Also see Khwurshah bin Qubad Al-Husaini, Tarikh-i-Qutbi or Tarikh-i-Elchi-i-Nizam Shah, ed. S.M.H. Zaidi, New Delhi, 1965, p. 621. According to an Ottoman document Sultan Selim II had granted a daily allowance to Asaf Khan's wife, son, and two daughters. This document indicates that Asaf Khan, the Wazir of Sultan Bahadur, had died in Mecca around
1572. (M.D., vol. 19, p. 217, Farman No. 450, 10 Rabiulevvel 980 (July 21, 1572), Qazi of Mecca. The Indian sources, on the other hand, assert that Asaf Khan was killed by a rival Gujarati noble in 1553. See Mirat-i-Sikandari, p. 383.


28 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 259.


30 M.T., I, p. 450; T.A., II, p. 40. Khatt-i-Baburi was a new style of penmanship; Babur had invented it after his conquest of Kabul in 1505. He has mentioned this script, for the first time, in his narrative of the events of A.H. 910. See Baburnama, p. 228.


34 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 505, 526.

35 Gulbadan Begum, writes Abdul Fazl, had long ago made a vow to visit the Holy Cities but on account of the insecurity of pilgrimage routes and other engagements she could not fulfill her desire. After the Conquest of Gujarat, "When the masters of the European islands, who were a stumbling block in the way of the travellers to the Hijaz, had become submissive and obedient," the
Emperor gave her permission to depart. See A.N., III, pp. 205-206.

Ibid., III, p. 269. Abul Fazl has justified, in his characteristic style, Akbar's decision to give up his intention to go on pilgrimage. He writes: "There were other tasks for the great ones of the social world, and their worship was of another character. Especially was this so in the case of justice adminstering rulers, and most of all it was so in the case of such a World-Adorner who had taken the burden of mankind on his shoulders, and who, by his skilful projects, and flashing scimitar, had converted the territories of so many great princes into an abode of peace. How could such a form of worship be deemed suitable for him." A.N., III, p. 270.


According to Nizamuddin Ahmad, Akbar was the first Muslim ruler to send a caravan from Hindustan to Mecca. He writes: "Up to the time of the rising of the Sun of this Sovereign [Akbar], no other monarch had such an honour and grandeur, that he should send a caravan from Hindustan to Mecca the revered, and should remove the custom of need from the poor of that honoured place." T.A., II, p. 472.

T.A., II, p. 492. Also see M.T., II, p. 246.

T.A., II, P. 472.

According to Arif Qandhari, several years prior to 1576, the subventions from Hindustan had not been sent to Mecca. The identity of the subvention in question is, however, obscure. Haji-Ad-Dabir (vol. II, p. 519) has mentioned that the Gujarati waqf, dedicated to the Holy Sanctuaries, was terminated in 1575. Probably Arif Qandhari was referring to the discontinuation of the Gujarati waqf.

41 A.N., III p. 271.

42 A.N., III, pp. 275-277; T.A., II, pp. 496-497; M.T.

II, p. 249; Gulbadan Begum, Humayun Nama, p. 72. The number of ships, carrying the pilgrims to Jidda, is uncertain. According to Abul Fazl, the royal ladies, who accompanied the Haj caravan, sailed in the Turkish ship "Selimi" and that Sultan Khwaja, along with other pilgrims, made the voyage in the ship 'Ilahi' (A.N. III, pp. 276-77). The narratives of Badauni and Nizamuddin Ahmad, on the other hand, gives the impression that the royal caravan was transported in more than one ship. Abul Fazl was Akbar's court historian and had free access to the imperial archives; his testimony is, therefore, more reliable. Presumably Badauni and Ahmad considered both 'Selimi' and 'Ilahi' as royal ships and, thus, give the wrong impression that more than one ship was commissioned to carry the Pilgrims to Jidda.

43 A.N., III, p. 278.

44 According to Haji Ad-Dabir, the Gujarati waqf was worth
100,000 gold coins (Ibid., II, p. 519; vol. I, p. 259).

45 A.N., III, p. 306; also see M.T., II, p. 258;

Mirat-i-Ahmadi, I, p. 138.


47 A.N., III, p. 383.


49 A.N., III, p. 569; Gulbadan Begum, p. 74.

50 A.N., III, p. 405.

51 Ibid., III, p. 405.

52 A.N., III, pp. 405-406. For the careers of Sheikh Abdum Nabi and Mulla Abdullah, see Muhammad Husain Azad, Darbar-i-Akbari, Lahore, 1910 (reprint), pp. 311-327. Also see I.H. Qureshi, Akbar..., pp. 141-149.

53 A.N., III, p. 406; M.T., II, p. 275. According to Badauni, the two ulama were banished to Mecca in 1576 and that they were dispatched along with Khwaja Yahya. Both returned to India, in defiance of the Emperor's command, in 1582. Mulla Abdullah died a natural death, shortly after his return; the Sheikh died in
suspicious circumstances in 1584. About the Sheikh's death, Badauni writes: "...Then with a view to make him [Sheikh] settle his account of about 70,000 rupees, which the Emperor had given him when he set off for Mekkah, he was handed over as a prisoner to Raja Todar Mal, and for some time, like a defaulting tax-gatherer, they imprisoned him in the counting-house of the office; and one night a mob strangled him, and he went to God." Ibid., II, p. 321. Also see A.N., III, pp. 571-572 and Note 2 (pp. 572-573).

283, 293. The Hakim was one of the signatories of the Mahzar but had later disowned it. It is perhaps on account of this fact that Abul Fazl has remarked that the Hakim was "Given leave as a retribution for his vacillations." (A.N., III, p. 464). The author of Darbar-i-Akbari, on the other hand, is of the opinion that Akbar's religious innovations had forced the Hakim to go to Mecca in self-exile (pp. 758-759).

55. Maktubat-i-Allami, p. 35.
58. This is an obvious reference to the revolt of Mirza Muhammad Hakim, Akbar's brother and the Governor of Kabul. The Mirza had invaded Punjab at the instigation of some Mughal nobles who were
dissatisfied with Akbar's religious policies. The revolt was easily suppressed by Akbar, who marched in person to Kabul in 1581. For details see A.N., III, pp. 492-547; M.T., II, pp. 299-305; T.A., II, pp. 554-554; V. Smith, Akbar, pp. 136-145; Qureshi, Akbar, pp. 159-168.

59 Maktubat-i-Allami, pp. 34-39. Also see Darbar-i-Akbari, p. 325.

60 M.D. 35, p. 292, Farman No. 740, 27 Rajab, 986 (September 29, 1578); M.D. 35, p. 292, Farman No. 741, same date.


62 M.D., 39, p. 160, Farman No. 349; M.D., 39, p. 238, Farman No. 471, 19 Muharram, 988 (March 6, 1580); M.D., 43, p. 54, Farman No. 107, 19 Rajab, 988 (August 25, 1580). Earlier in 1576, the Sultan had sent almost similar farmanis to the Sharif of Mecca and to the Governor and Qazi of Medina (M.D., 35, p. 292, Farman No. 740; M.D., 35, p. 292, Farman No. 741).

63 M.D., 39 p. 160, Farman No. 349; M.D., 39, p. 238, Farman No. 471; M.D., 43, p. 54; Farman No. 107. Identical farmanis were also sent to the Governors of Jidda and Medina and to the Qazi of Mecca.

64 A.N., III, p. 570.

65 That the pilgrimage to Mecca had not stopped altogether after 1581 is evident by the testimony of the Jesuit missionaries at
Akbar's court. The third Jesuit mission, for instance, met a pilgrim
...caravan at Ahmadabad in March 1595. See DuJarric, Akbar and the

66. M.D., 58, p. 260, Farman No. 659, Evail Ramadan 993
(August 1585).

67. Ibid., p. 260, Farman No. 659.

did confirm the Suvurghal grants (revenue grants for religious
endowments), which had either been curtailed or revoked by Akbar.
For this act of generosity, Jahangir earned great commendation from
his contemporary chroniclers.

69. The gifts included the curtain of the door of the Ka'ba.
See Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, vol. I, p. 133. Also see Muhammad Muatmad
Khan, Iqbalnama-i-Jahangiri, Ed. Maulvi Muhammad Rafi, Allahabad,
1931, p. 33.

70. Tuzuk, I, p. 133; Iqbalnama, p. 33.

71. Tuzuk, I, pp. 37. 60-61.

72. Purchas His Pilgrims, vol. III, p. 193. For another
reference to a ship loaded with cotton wool and pilgrims, see Ibid.,
p. 287. Also see Jagdish Narain Sarkar, "Rape of Indian Ships in the
Indian Waters," Journal of Bihar Research Society, xxiv, Pt. III
and IV, 1949, pp. 199-212.


74. Purchas, vol. i9, p. 22. Also see William Foster


76 *E.F.I. 1622-1623*, pp. xx, 144, 171.

77 *B.N.*, vol. I, Part I, pp. 406-407; *A.S.*, I, pp. 384-385. According to Kanbu, goods worth 200,000 rupees were sent to Mecca. Also see *E.F.I. 1637-1641*, pp. 99-100. The English factor has referred to Hakim Masihuzzaman's voyage to Mecca. The Hakim is also reported to have secured, during his Governorship of Surat, the *Kiswa*, and presented it to Shahjahan (*Ibid.*, p. 104, Note 1). Lahori has given an account of the Hakim's return from Mecca in 1639 (*B.N.*, vol. I, Pt. II, p. 102).


80 *M.L.*, I, p. 596; *B.N.*, II, p. 331; *A.S.*, II, p. 320. Lahori and Kanbu has mentioned that the envoy was given a robe of honour and only 4,000 rupees.

81 *B.N.*, II, p. 336. During the celebration of *Nauroz* (Persian New Year) festival, Shahjahan had bestowed on him some
golden vessels and receptacles full of betel leaves and flowers


597. Kanbu has placed the departure of the Meccan envoy in September
1643.


607. According to Khafi Khan, Shahjahan sent 400,000 rupees for the
Sharif and 100,000 rupees for the inhabitants of the Holy Cities.

A.S., III, p. 6.

Muhammad Tahir Inayet Khan, Shahjahan Nama, tr., Elliot
and Dowson, History of India as told by its own Historians, New
York, 1968 (reprint), vol. 7, p. 84. Kanbu has estimated the value
of the candlestick at 350,000 rupees.

Shahjahan Nama, p. 25; A.S., III, p. 16; M.L., I,
pp. 679-680. Khafi Khan writes that the Sayyid carried goods worth
75,000 rupees and another 75,000 rupees in cash. He was directed to
present cash and goods worth 50,000 rupees to the Sharif.

A.S., III, p. 16; Shahjahan Nama, p. 65. It is worth
noting that the Sayyid could not accomplish his mission. The ship on
which he was traveling met with an accident and capsized in the sea;
but he managed to save the precious candlestick. The Emperor
directed him to deposit it in the Surat treasury and to return to the
court. See A.S., III, pp. 51-52. However, the same chronicler, in
his narrative of the events of 1651, mentions that the Sayyid had
gone to Medina and that he had offered the candlestick at the Prophet's tomb (Ibid., III, p. 100).

88 A.S., III, p. 86.
89 Ibid., III, p. 101.
90 Ibid., III, p. 375.
91 Ibid., III, p. 87; M.L., I, p. 702.
92 A.S., III, p. 100; M.L., I, p. 708. Khafi Khan is of the opinion that the Sayyid carried 200,000 rupees to Mecca. According to Kanbu, between 1628 and 1652, Shahjahan had sent to Mecca goods worth one million rupees (A.S., III, p. 101).

95 E.F.I. 1637-1641, p. 277.

97 Maasir-i-Alamgiri, tr., J.N. Sarkar, p. 313.

100 Manucci, II, pp. 1, 106.
101 Alamgir Name, p. 627; Mirat ..., I, p. 228.
J.N. Sarkar's observation that after Mir Ibrahím's death the charge of the Mughal mission was taken up by Sayyid Ahmad Saeed (History of Aurangzeb, vol. III, p. 67) is incorrect. All Mughal chroniclers have referred to the death of the Mir in Mecca but none has mentioned the transference of the charge of the mission to Sayyid Ahmad. According to these chroniclers the Sayyid was dispatched to Mecca in Aurangzeb's fourth regnal year. He was, thus, the leader of a separate mission.

Manucci, II, p. 106. According to Bernier the broom had been used to sweep the ka'ba.

Ibid., II, p. 107.

In 1686, Ahmad Aqa, the ambassador of Sharif Ahmad bin Zaid (1684-1687) received a robe and 2000 rupees on his first audience; at the time of his departure, he was again given a robe, a dagger, a horse, and 3000 rupees (M.A., pp. 271, 285). At the time of his departure Bahadur Beg, who led Sharif Said bin Saad's (1687-1716)
embassy in 1690, was awarded a robe, and 1500 rupees. Merchandise
worth 5000 rupees and 5000 rupees in cash were sent for the Sharif.
Muhammad Halabi, who arrived as the Sharif's envoy in 1693, was
awarded a dagger worth 200 rupees, a horse, a gold coin of 40 Tolas
, a silver coin of 50 Tolas, and 3000 rupees (Akhlq-i- Alamgiri
, pp. 53-054). The author has quoted Akhbarat and Waqai etc.,
preserved in Jaipur State Archives. For another Sharifian mission
led by Ali Aqa, see Futuhat, pp. 183-84.

111 Bernier, p. 134.

112 Alamgir Nama, p. 997; Mirat..., I, p. 346; Mirat-i-
Ahmadi, I, p. 265.

113 Akhlq-i-Alamgiri, p. 53.


115 Ibid., II, p. 421.

116 In 1675, for instance, Abid Khan was appointed Mir Haj.
That this was an annual practice is evident from the following
observation of Saqi Mustaid Khan: "This year [1675] Abid Khan was
appointed Mir Haj for carrying to Mecca and Medina the gift (nazar)
which used to be sent there every year." Maasir-i-Alamgiri, tr.,
J.N. Sarkar, p. 143.

117 Raqat-i-Alamgiri, p. 167.

118 Sarkar, History of Aurangzeb, III, p. 68.

119 Inayatulla Khan Kashmiri, Kalimat-i- Taiyibat, Ed., S.M.
Azizuddin Husain, Delhi, 1982, p. 41. The Kalimat is a collection of
Aurangzeb's orders compiled, after the Emperor's death, by his secretary Inayatullah Khan.

There is, however, evidence that Aurangzeb occasionally sent his own agents to Mecca. In 1904, for example, Nural Haq, the imperial censor of public morals at Ahmadabad, was appointed to carry the donation to Mecca. See Ashin Das Gupta, *Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, c. 1700-1750*, Wiesbaden, 1979, p. 128.

123. Ibid., II, p. 19.
124. Ibid., II, p. 19.
127. In the eighteenth century the Sharifs of Mecca were reported to have been actively engaged in trade with India. Sharif Ghalib (1828-1813) was wellknown for his interest in the India trade; he had employed two ships of 400 tons each in this trade. See Burkhardt, p. 21.

128. Itimad Ali Khan, *Mirat-al-Haqaiq*, M.S. Fraser, No. 24, Bodliyen Library, Oxford, Aligarh Muslim University Microfilm No. M.S. 92, p. 453. I am grateful to Professor Irfan Habib for drawing my attention to this valuable source.
129. Ibid., pp. 513-517, 30 Jamadiussani, 1132 (February 22, 1726).
For the corruption and factional intrigues of the Mughal officials at Surat see \textit{Mirat-i-Ahmadi}, II, pp. 103-109. Also see Ashin Das Gupta, \textit{Indian Merchants...}, pp. 208-209. 
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Mirat-al-Haqiq}, pp. 323, 392, 518, 522, 627, 625, 672, 677, 707, 708, 717. 
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{A.N.}, III, p. 572. Also see \textit{Mirat...}, II, pp. 422, 424. 
\textsuperscript{133} For example Hakimul Mulk, Faridun Khan, and Qazi Abdus Sami were deported in 1580, 1582, and 1584, respectively. See \textit{A.N.}, III, pp. 464, 554-55, 717. 
\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Maasir-i-Jahangiri}, p. 399. 
\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Mirat...}, II, P. 420; Ziauddin Desai, "India and Middle East . . . ," p. 96. 
\textsuperscript{137} In 1671, Mir Khan was deported to Mecca (\textit{Futuhat-i-Alam-giri}, p. 94). In 1694, Mustafa Khan was banished to Mecca (\textit{M.L. II}, pp. 440-443). Both the grandees had incurred Aurangzeb's displeasure due to their apparently anti-state activities.

This was by no means a new phenomenon. In the 11th and 12th centuries the Sharifs of Abu Hashim branch (1063-1200) played the Fatimid Caliphs and the Saljuqi Sultans against each other for securing maximum benefit from them; both claimed suzerainty over Mecca. The Sharifs read *Khatba* in the name of the Sovereign who gave them more pecuniary aid than the other. See C.M. Karstepeter, "A Source for the...," *Sources of the History of Arabia*, II, p. 229.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE PROBLEM OF HAJ TRAFFIC: MUGHAL RESPONSE AND OTTOMAN REACTION

In response to your overture for peace and amity, my felicitous imperial letter has already been dispatched to you. Recently, reports of your aggression against Muslim pilgrims and merchants coming from India to our territories have reached us. It is imperative that after receiving my exalted letter you should, in accordance with your desire for peace, immediately stop all atrocities on the Indian pilgrims and traders. If you continue to disturb peace in that region [India] then appropriate steps will be taken against you. Thereafter, it would be too late to negotiate peace (Suleiman the Magnificent to the King of Portugal). ¹

Shamsuddin Khan, the deceased, had reported that the ships cannot sail without the permit of the Firangis. The Muslim community has become so impuissant that even the imperial vessels are unable to cruise. For the last twenty years the ships of the Surat merchants and those destined for the Holy Land are being plundered on the high seas. Steps taken by the Fauidars of that place [Surat] to combat the problem have proved fruitless. Negligence, indolence, and indifference towards this matter are contrary to the Islamic sense of honour. . . . Concession and favour to the Firangis have been shown beyond measure. Moderation will not work. Severity and harshness are required (Emperor Aurangzeb to Prince Muhammad Azam). ²

Section One: The Mughal Response

One of the five fundamental arkan (pillars) of Islam, the Haj occupies an important place in the Islamic rites. The word Haj signifies the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. The Muslim mystics have often referred to the Haj as man's quest for God; it also
expresses "man's sentiment that he is but a wayfarer on earth wending
towards another and a nobler world." This probably accounts for
the belief that the greater the difficulties of the journey to Mecca
the higher will be the reward of the pilgrim. The Quran enjoins all
Muslims to perform Haj at least once in their lifetime if their
circumstances permit. Every year innumerable Muslims, from every
quarter of the globe, answer to the summons of God and gather in
Mecca, in the month of Zilhaj, for carrying out the sacred rites. In
this sense the Haj is also an expression of the universal brotherhood
of Islam.4

Since the inception of Islam in India, the contingent of Indian
pilgrims has been a regular feature of the Haj. The hazards of the
voyage to Mecca, which were quite considerable in the pre-modern age,
does not seem to have deterred the Muslims of the subcontinent from
complying with the command of God: "Perform the Haj and Umra for
Allah."5 In fact the Indian Haj caravan was considered to be
equal, in its magnitude and importance, to the caravans of Egypt and
Syria. In the fifteenth century the Indian caravan was regarded as
the star attraction of the Haj; several European travellers to the
Hijaz have testified to its importance for the economy of Mecca.6
By the turn of the next century, however, the situation had changed
substantially. New developments in the world history threatened to
block the pilgrim routes. The pilgrim traffic from India had come
under dark clouds.
The establishment of the Portuguese hegemony in the Indian seas was the most ominous of these developments. By 1515 the Portuguese had grabbed several strategic ports in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf; even the Holy Cities had become exposed to the Portuguese peril. The Portuguese seriously attempted to cut the ancient trade routes that ran from India north through the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea to the cities of the Levant. The Haj traffic from India was likewise gravely affected. The Indian merchant ships and pilgrim ships were coerced by the Portuguese to secure cartaz (pass) from them for safe conduct. Those who did not comply with this demand were plundered on the high seas. But a cartaz did not always guarantee the safety of a vessel; often the Portuguese attacked these ships, especially the pilgrim ships, on some pretext or another. Inferior to the Portuguese in naval technology, scientific knowledge, and firearms, the Indians were unable to cope with the Portuguese aggression. Time and again Sheikh Zainuddin, the author of Tuhfat-al-Mujahidin, laments that "they [Portuguese] prevented the Muslims from their journey, especially the pilgrimage to Mecca." Zainuddin's testimony is amply corroborated by the instructions King Dom Manuel (1495-1521) gave to the leaders of the Portuguese expeditions to India; they were directed freely to attack and destroy Muslim ships on the high seas.

The alternative passage to Mecca was the land route. This route, which passed through Persia, was not free from hazards as
well. The foundation of the Safavid empire in Persia, in 1501, and the consequent sporadic border conflicts between the Persians and the Ottomans had virtually blocked this road. The sectarian hostility of the Safavids towards the Sunnis had further jeopardized the free movement of the pilgrims by this route. In 1556 the pilgrim traffic from East received another serious blow. This year Ivan IV, the ruler of Russia conquered Astrakhan; one of his first acts was to cut off the pilgrim road which passed through Astrakhan. Thus all possible routes to Mecca, for the Muslims living outside the Ottoman territories, were either blocked or subjected to foreign control. The pilgrims had either to submit to religious persecution or to undertake the journey under the pain of the possible loss of their life as well as their property.

How did the Muslim rulers of the subcontinent react to the blockade of the pilgrim routes? What was their attitude towards the Portuguese depredation on the pilgrim traffic? Their initial response, at least of the rulers of the Western coast, was indifferent, unsympathetic, and even callous. We have the testimony of Sheikh Zainuddin to this effect. He notes the efforts made by the Sultans of Gujarat to expel the Portuguese, with the help of the Mamluks and the Ottomans, from the Indian waters, but observes that these attempts were rather half-hearted and perfunctory. They were insufficient to accomplish the task. On the other hand, the Sheikh extols the Samurai (Zamorin), the Hindu ruler of Calicut, for
his endeavours to stem the tide of the Portuguese and to protect the
life and property of the Muslims. He calls the Zamorin the friends
of the Muslims. Referring to the callous response of the Muslim
rulers to the Zamorin's proposal to make common cause against the
foreign aggressors, Zainuddin somberly observes: "He [the Zamorin]
secretly sent letters to the Muslim sovereigns urging them to make
preparation for war with the Portuguese. But the Samurai did not
find any Muslim king willing to engage himself in hostilities with
the enemy." 15 The propensity of the Muslim monarchs to seek
external aid against the Portuguese but their reluctance to join
hands with an indigenous power is not incomprehensible.
Collaboration with a foreign potentate, like the Ottoman Sultan, was
expected to bring prestige and power while alliance with a petty
Hindu king was probably deemed to be unworthy and even profane. 16

The data on the attitude of the Muslims rulers of Northern India
towards the problem of pilgrim traffic in the first half of the
sixteenth century are fragmentary. Only Sher Shah Sur (1540-1545),
the founder of the second Afghan empire in India, is known to have
given some consideration to this issue. In 1544 he contemplated
sending an embassy to Istanbul. Mir Sayyid Rafiuddin, a renowned
traditionist, was designated ambassador. The purpose of the mission
was to negotiate an alliance with the Ottoman Sultan against the
Qizilbash (Persians) who, "oppose the progress of the company of
pilgrims to the holy temple (of Makkah) and have given rise to
bigoted interference with the established religion." Sher Shah planned a combined Afghan-Ottoman attack on Persia. He was convinced that an effective combination of Afghan cavalry and Ottoman artillery would ensure the destruction of the Safavids; it would, in turn, open the land route to Mecca. The Afghan king also sought a share in the government of one of the two Holy Cities. But the plan did not materialize. Sher Shah suddenly died in the thick of the Kalinjar campaign in 1545; Mir Rafiuddin's embassy never sailed for its destination. Was Shershah's projected anti-Safavid entente with the Ottomans governed by his animosity towards Shah Tahmasp I or was it guided by a genuine desire to free the pilgrim route from the clutches of the Persians? The available evidence tends to support the former alternative. Nonetheless, the sixteenth century chronicler Badauni commends Sher Shah for his pious intentions and remarks that it would contribute to the king’s salvation from the hell fire on the fateful day of the Reckoning.

Akbar was the first Mughal seriously to consider the problem of Haj traffic. The conquest of Gujarat, in 1573, had enabled him to watch the activities of the Portuguese from close quarters. It had also enabled the Emperor to realize the magnitude of the Portuguese menace to the pilgrim traffic. The desire of the ladies of his harem to go on pilgrimage seems to have further stimulated Akbar's interest in this matter. By this time the situation had become so desperate that a leading ali of Akbar's court issued a fatwa that the Haj was
no longer obligatory for the Indian Muslims. His plea was that the pilgrims going by land had to suffer persecution at the hands of the Persians, while those going by sea had to sustain Portuguese tyranny and cruelty. Immediate action to alleviate the situation was necessary. But what kind of action could Akbar take? He could hardly afford to assume a belligerent posture towards the Portuguese. He did not have a navy; and it was almost impossible to check the Portuguese depredation on pilgrim traffic by land action alone. The security of the Indian pilgrims and merchants was dependent, to a large extent, on the good will of the Portuguese. Peace with the Portuguese, at least for the time being, was the only alternative before the Emperor.

The treaty of peace was signed in 1573. The Mughals pledged not to shelter the Malabar corsairs, the inveterate enemy of the Portuguese. The Portuguese, in turn, agreed to give the free cartaz, for an imperial ship to sail to the Red Sea every year. The treaty betrays the impotence of the Mughals in the face of a superior naval power; it was tantamount to the Mughal surrender to the Portuguese supremacy in the Indian seas. "Nothing so damaging to his [Akbar's] dignity," writes M.N. Pearson, "was ever openly admitted by a Mughal emperor." Notwithstanding this insulting treaty, the problem of Haj traffic remained unabated. In 1575, Gulbadan Begum, Akbar's paternal aunt, had to cede the village of Butsar, situated in Gujarat, for securing a cartaz for her voyage to Mecca. She was
allowed to sail for her destination after one year.\textsuperscript{24} The next year the royal Haj caravan was detained in Surat. Abul Fazl writes that the pilgrims were so frightened by the Portuguese that they were unwilling to board the ship and that no amount of encouragement from the imperial officials comforted them. The panic was caused by the want of a proper cartaz. Timely actions of the Governor of Surat saved the situation and the pilgrims set sail, after a considerable delay, for Jidda.\textsuperscript{25} The Portuguese control of the sea route to Mecca was invincible.

Akbar, nevertheless, made several attempts to break the Portuguese monopoly of the pilgrim route. In 1577 the Emperor informed Abdullah Khan Uzbek of his plan to invade the Firangi (Portuguese) settlements in India. The invasion, asserted Akbar, was aimed at clearing the sea route to Mecca of the Portuguese menace.\textsuperscript{26} The plan was carried out three years later. In February 1580 Qutubuddin Khan was commissioned to capture the Firangi ports. The officials of Gujarat and Malwa were placed under his command. The rulers of Deccan were informed that, "the troops had been sent in that direction in order to remove the firangis who were a stumbling-block in the way of the pilgrims to the Hijaz."\textsuperscript{27} The Deccanis were directed to cooperate with the imperial army. But the expedition failed; Qutubuddin Khan had to withdraw with heavy losses.\textsuperscript{28} Undaunted, Akbar continued to harbour hostile designs against the Portuguese. In 1586, the Emperor again apprised the
Uzbek monarch of his earnest desire to annihilate the *Firangi* infidels who, "have lifted up the head of turblence, and stretched out the hand of oppression upon the pilgrims to the holy places." The following year Abul Fazl wrote an epistle to Hakin Humam, the Mughal ambassador to Bukhara. Besides several other urgent matters, the letter drew the ambassador's attention to Akbar's proposed scheme of the conquest of the *Jazair-i-firang* (Portuguese Islands). The plan was never carried out; no Mughal or Portuguese chronicler has mentioned it. The Emperor's desire to expel the Portuguese from India, however, remained undiminished. As late as 1601 he is reported to have observed that the conquest of the Deccan sultanates would facilitate the subjugation of the Portuguese territories in India.

Was Akbar's hostility towards the Portuguese solely due to their blockade of the pilgrim route. Viewed from the standpoint of the Emperor's deviation from the path of orthodoxy after 1581, his solicitude for opening the pilgrim route seems surprising. Political considerations appear to have played an equally important role in the formulation of Akbar's policy towards the Portuguese. He regarded them as aggressors; their domination of the Indian seas was damaging to his dignity and offensive to his pride. Pearson has observed that Akbar did not exert pressure on the Portuguese to end their system because he never considered this system as an infringement on his sovereignty. This statement is not
tenable. We have enough evidence to prove the contrary (see above). Akbar did regard the Portuguese system as an infringement on his authority. He planned more than once to expel them from India. But his hands were tied. In the absence of a powerful navy he could not carry out his schemes. The Emperor's dream remained unfulfilled.

Akbar never challenged the Persian blockade of the land route to Mecca. Twice did Abdullah Khan Uzbek urge him to unite against Persia for the liberation of the pilgrim route but on both occasions Akbar remained unmoved. He asserted, quite untruly, that the conquest of Gujarat had opened the sea route to Mecca and that all obstacles to the Haj had been removed. In reply to the Uzbek proposal of a triple alliance of the Sunni powers (Ottomans, Uzbeks, and Mughals) against Persia, Akbar offered a counter-proposal of helping Persia against the Ottomans. 33 This was not because of any feeling of friendship towards Persia; the plan was actuated by purely political reasons. The disintegration of Persia would have meant a considerable increase in the Uzbek power. This would, in turn, have exposed the Mughal territories in Afghanistan to the Uzbek threat. Maintenance of the territorial integrity of Persia was, therefore, in the best interest of the Mughal empire. The upshot of this policy was that the land route to Mecca remained virtually closed.

Jahangir's accession to the throne brought no change in the state of affairs. Only once did the Emperor make a serious attempt
to drive the Portuguese out of India. The Emperor's action was provoked by the Portuguese seizure of a pilgrim ship 'Rahimi' in 1613. The ship carried a large number of **Hajis** and a rich cargo of 100,000 Pound Sterling; the cargo was plundered and the **Hajis** were imprisoned. Jahangir ordered the apprehension all the Portuguese in the Mughal dominions. Their property was confiscated, the Jesuit churches were closed, public exercise of their religion was banned, the daily allowance given by the state to the Jesuit priests was withheld, and Jesuit father Jerome Xavier, a favourite of the Emperor, was deported to Surat in disgrace. A Mughal army under Muqarrab Khan, the Governor of Surat, attacked Daman. The Sultan of Ahmad Nagar, at Jahangir's instructions, laid siege to Bassien. Unsuccessful efforts were also made to enlist the support of the English and the Dutch fleet to destroy the advancing Portuguese naval squadron. But the expedition, like the one undertaken in 1580, failed. In 1615 a treaty of peace and friendship was concluded. Jahangir's plan to destroy the Portuguese and ensure the security and freedom of the pilgrim route did not materialize.

Jahangir's extremely cordial relations with Shah Abbas I of Persia constrained him to ignore the persecution of the Indian Muslims going on pilgrimage through Persia. It was only after 1622, owing to the Persian conquest of Qandahar, that the Emperor began to devise plans to invade Persia. He revived diplomatic relations with the Uzbeks. The consequent Mughal-Uzbek correspondence accentuated
the need to liberate the pilgrim route from the Persians. 37

Jahangir also received a letter from Sultan Murad IV; it envisaged a joint Ottoman-Mughal campaign against Persia 38 (Also see chapter one). Determined to take revenge on Shah Abbas I, Jahangir must have given willing ears to these proposals. A triple alliance of the Sunni powers against Persia was in the offing. But the Emperior died in 1627; with his demise the projected campaign against Persia also perished.

Early in his reign Shahjahan showed a great deal of vigour for subjugating the Portuguese settlements in India. In a letter to the viceroy of Goa, the Emperor expressed his indignation over the Portuguese brigandage on the vessels of his subjects, demanded compensation for the damages sustained by the Indian shipping, and warned him of dire consequences in case of the non-compliance with his demands. 39 In 1628 the Emperor proposed a joint Mughal-English expedition against Daman and Diu. Richard Wylde, the President of the English Factory wrote to London that "the King [Shahjahan] intendeth to banish all Portugals out of his dominions, if with the help of your forces he maie prevaile against Diu, etc., which he purposeth to attempt." 40 In return of their services, the English were offered attractive commercial concessions in the Mughal dominions. But the company authorities rejected the proposal; President Wylde was recalled. His successor, Thomas Rastel, did not show any interest in the scheme and remained cool to fresh Mughal
proposals. The plan thus fizzled out.

In 1639, another unsuccessful attempt was made to conquer Daman. A proposal for a combined Mughal-Dutch operation against the Portuguese also met with little success; the Dutch refused to blockade Daman. Convinced that the fort could not be subdued by army action alone, Prince Aurangzeb, the Viceroy of Deccan, listened to the Portuguese overtures of peace. Mir Musa, the Governor of Surat, and William Frelmen, the President of the English Factory, also advised the Prince to conclude an honourable treaty with the Portuguese. A treaty of peace was accordingly signed. The Portuguese agreed to pay an annual tribute to the Mughals. Daman again escaped absorption in the Mughal empire. The pilgrim route remained open to the European depredation.

Shahjahan's relations with Persia were largely governed by his longing for Qandahar. He captured Qandahar in 1638 but lost it to the Persians again a decade later. The Emperor made no attempt to ensure the safe and free transit of the Indian pilgrims through Persia. The absence of any reference to the Haj problem in Shahjahan's correspondence with the Uzbeks and the Ottomans also bear testimony to the Emperor's indifference to this issue. The land route to Mecca was to remain under perpetual Persian domination.

By the time of Aurangzeb's accession to the throne, the situation had changed substantially. The Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf had waned. The English and the
Dutch had firmly established themselves in Western India. Although the Portuguese still claimed 'sovereignty of all the seas' and the Indian ships still carried their cartaz, the incidence of Portuguese depredation on Indian shipping had considerably lowered. The Portuguese were even anxious to maintain friendly relations with the Mughals. In 1667 they had actually helped the Mughals in a campaign against the Marathas. In 1702 the king of Portugal had advised the Viceroy of Goa to "leave no stone unturned to preserve his [Aurangzeb's] friendship with us whatever the cost to the state; for any expense incurred in this business will be fully justified; in as much as it will avert our ruin." 44

Though the Portuguese lion had been tamed, another sinister development, which threatened to disrupt the pilgrim traffic from India, had taken place. This was the advent of a new generation of European pirates in the Indian seas. European piracy in the Indian waters was a phenomenon of longstanding; it had begun with the arrival of Vasco da Gama at the end of the fifteenth century. The coming of the English, the Dutch, and the French, a hundred years later, had intensified the robbery on the high seas. The Indian trading and pilgrim vessels returning from Jidda and Mocha, with the proceeds of the sale of their valuable cargo, were the main target of these pirates. In 1612, for instance, three English captains had plundered several Indian ships in the Red Sea. The Dutch pirates had gone on a rampage in 1623. But it was in the reign of
Aurangzеб that the European piracy reached its most dreadful phase. Shortly after his accession to the throne, a pilgrim ship, returning from Mecca, was seized by the pirates near Surat; its cargo was ransacked and several highborn ladies on board the ship were dishonoured.47

Aurangzеб's solicitude for securing the freedom of the ocean highway to Mecca was boundless. Numerous Hasbul hukums (imperial commands) were issued to the Governor of Surat directing him "to exert himself to the utmost to secure the safety of the pilgrims and travellers to the holy land."48 The Mir Atish (Superintendent of Ordnance) was instructed to ask the "Firangis of the artillery department, how the pirates can be chastised and the sea route kept open for travellers to the Holy Cities and for traders, whether by friendliness and conciliation, or by force and battle."49

Aurangzеб also proposed to build a powerful fleet to punish the pirates. But the lack of expert sailors and navigators, writes Manucci, compelled the Emperor to abandon this project.50 In 1670 Sidi Yaquт Khan, an accomplished sea captain, was enrolled in the imperial service. The Sidi was instructed to protect the Muslim pilgrim and merchant ships on the high seas; in return for his services the Sidi was given an annual subsidy of 300,000 rupees.51 But the Sidi's fleet, though equipped with large vessels and heavy artillery, was no match to the squadron of ships commanded by the European pirates.52 The Sidi was, therefore,
unable to defend the Indian shipping.

Aurangzeb also took some coercive measures to contain the piracy on the high seas. In 1695 he compelled the European companies to provide regular escort by their warships for the pilgrim vessels.53 Four years later the Emperor forced the European companies to sign a Muchalka (bond) undertaking to suppress the piracy and to pay compensation to the shipowners in case of the plunder of their ships. According to the agreement the Dutch were to convoy the pilgrims to Jidda and to guard the entrance to the Red Sea, the English were responsible for the South Coast, and the French were to police the Persian Gulf.54 Even these strong measures did not have the desired effect. In 1701 and 1703 several Mughal ships were again waylaid and pillaged.

Desperate by the constant failure of his schemes to keep the sea route to Mecca safe, Aurangzeb sought succour from the Arab corsairs of Masqat. They were well-known for their naval power. In a Hasbul hukum, the Governor of Surat was enjoined to conclude an agreement with the Masqatese, to provide them with a few vessels of war, and to punish, with their help, the English and the Dutch robbers. The Governor was also asked to persuade the Masqatese to escort the Indian pilgrims safely to their destination.55 In another Hasbul hukum to Prince Muizuddin, Aurangzeb's grandson and the Governor of Multan, the Emperor referred to the naval puissance of Sheikh Noorullah, the chief of Musqat. The Prince was advised to send one
of his confidants to the Sheikh, to present him valuable gifts, and to induce him to fight against the Europeans. He was also instructed to "Persuade the ruler of Musqat to turn to this exalted court. He should give a hint that the Iranian king was intending to send a force to Musqat and assure him, in the best way possible, of the help and support he may get from here [India]." A farman advised a high imperial official to win over the ruler of Musqat and to persuade him to wage war against the Firangi robbers. Another farman addressed to Prince Muhammad Azam, Aurangzeb's son and the Governor of Gujarat, also suggested a possible alliance with the ruler of Musqat, on the basis of the identity of faith, for safeguarding the ships destined for the Holy Land.

Did Aurangzeb formally conclude an alliance with the ruler of Musqat? It does not seem so; no Mughal chronicler has mentioned it. Even Khafi khan, the author of Muntakhab-ul-Lubab, who has narrated the activities of the English pirates in the Indian Ocean, does not allude to the alliance. Probably the projected compact remained only an idea and never materialized. However, the very idea of seeking external support to combat an internal problem reveals the impotence of the mighty Mughal war machine in the face of the superior naval technology of the Europeans. It, nevertheless, indicates Aurangzeb's concern for the security of the pilgrim traffic from India. He tried his best to meet the situation but all his efforts were in vain. Handicapped by the nonexistence of a fleet to police the Indian
waters, the Emperor had to acquiesce to the European brigandage on his pilgrim ships. The Indin Muslims were destined to travel to Mecca under severe constraints for some more time to come.

Aurangzeb's weak successors were hardly competent to control the European peril on the sea. Emboldened by the decline of the Mughal empire, the Maratha inroads in Gujarat, and the internecine strife among the Mughal nobles for the control of Surat, the European companies openly bullied the Surat merchants and imposed restrictions on the Haj traffic. After 1705 the Dutch stopped escorting the pilgrim vessels. 59 In 1734 the warships of the English East India company blockaded Surat. All ocean bound vessels were detained and the pilgrim traffic was held up. After prolonged negotiations, the captain of the English fleet allowed a solitary pilgrim ship to sail. 60 The hazards associated with the pilgrimage seemed ever-lasting. The Indian Muslims had to wait, ironically, for the establishment of the British paramountcy in their native land to travel to Mecca, under the British flag, without any fear of brigandage and depredation.

SECTION TWO: THE OTTOMAN REACTION

Unlike their Indian counterparts the Ottomans did not have to labour hard to keep the roads to Mecca open for their subjects. All pilgrim routes, linking the Ottoman empire with Mecca, were under the
Ottoman control; the Haj caravans organized under the auspices of the Ottoman Sultan, therefore, journeyed to Mecca without any major hinderance or fear of persecution. On the contrary the Ottoman Sultans' position as the Khadim-al-Harmain (Servitor of the Holy Cities), which they zealously guarded and proudly proclaimed, as well as their claim to the Khilafat of the Islamic world, obliged them to facilitate the pilgrimage of the Muslims at large. This was indeed a task of gigantic dimensions. The available evidence indicates that the Ottomans were willing and did try, at least in the sixteenth century, to live up to the task. Their struggles with the Portuguese and the Persians provide ample proof for this contention.

The Ottomans were aware of the Portuguese menace to the pilgrim traffic from the East; the implications of the Portuguese presence in the Red Sea and their designs against the Holy Cities were also known to them. Sultan Bayazid II (1481-1512) had cooperated with the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt in his war against the Portuguese. After 1517 the Ottomans especially committed themselves to defend the Holy Cities. The task of keeping the Portuguese out of the Red Sea now became their major concern. "True to its ghazi tradition," writes A.C. Hess, "the Ottoman dynasty also became the Islamic champion for the besieged Muslim states and trading posts east of Suez upon which the Portuguese imperialism impinged." The loss of revenue from the India trade, as a result of the Portuguese blockade of the ancient trade routes, and the consequent economic
crisis in Egypt, in the Eastern Mediterranean nations, and even in the Ottoman empire, was an additional incentive to drive the Portuguese out of Indian waters. Sultan Selim I's correspondence with the Indian potentates testifies to the Ottoman resolve of breaking the Portuguese maritime hegemony in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. In 1518, the Sultan ordered the construction of a fleet of 50 ships; it was to be deployed against the Portuguese intruders. But Selim did not live long to see the completion of this project. He died in 1520.

Selim's successor Suleiman I was an equally zealous protector of the Muslims. In 1525 Selman Reis, the Ottoman admiral of the Red Sea, submitted a report to the Sultan. The report outlined the relative strength of the Portuguese and the Ottomans in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The admiral impressed upon the Sultan the need of intensifying the Ottoman operations in these seas. He assured Suleiman I that, with an Ottoman navy, "It is possible to capture and hold all the fortresses and ports in India which are under infidel domination." The Sultan also received repeated appeals from the Indian potentates for aid against the Portuguese. It was probably in response to these entreaties that the Sultan dispatched in 1538 a powerful fleet, under Khadim Suleiman Pasha, the Governor of Egypt, to India. The Pasha was directed to capture the Indian ports held by the Portuguese, to remove the Portuguese flag from the sea, and to open the way to Mecca and Medina. The
expedition, however, failed; none of the projected objectives were achieved. 67

The Sultan's interest in the affairs of the Indian Muslims did not diminish. He reacted sharply to the Sharif of Mecca's communique regarding the Portuguese depredation on the Indian pilgrim and merchant ships. In a farman to the Governor of Egypt, the Sultan underscored the necessity of sending the imperial fleet to Aden to annihilate the Portuguese. He directed the Governor to prepare a fleet of ten galleys fitted with all essential equipments, gunners, and supplies. The auspicious fleet, proclaimed the Sultan, would destroy the enemy and would enable the Indian pilgrims and merchants to travel without any fear of brigandage on the high seas. 68

Farman were also sent to the Governor of Yemen and the Bey of Jidda to arrange for the provisions and supplies needed for the imperial fleet. 69 The Bey of Rhodes was commanded to dispatch one of his galley's to Aden to help the fleet accomplish its tasks. 70

The Sultan also wrote a strong letter to Dom Sebastiao (1557-1578), the king of Portugal. The letter drew the attention of the Dom to the Portuguese aggression against the Muslim pilgrims and merchants coming, to Ottoman territories, from India. Recalling the Portuguese monarch's recent overture for peace, the Sultan declared that if the Dom really desires to remain at peace with the Ottoman empire, he should immediately stop all atrocities on the Indian pilgrims and traders. "If you continue to disturb peace in that
region (India)," warned the Sultan, "then appropriate measures would be taken against you." 71

The Sultan's warning to Dom Sebastio seems to have fallen on deaf ears. The Portuguese continued to prey upon the Muslim shipping. This is corroborated by the Ottoman documents as well. A farman to the Governor of Egypt, dispatched on January 12, 1568, drew a vivid picture of the Portuguese atrocities on the Indian Muslims. It took notice of the Portuguese usurpation of the Indian ports, their blockade of the sea route to Mecca, and the consequent problems faced by the Muslim Zaireen (pilgrims) from India. Declaring it improper to leave those regions [India] under the control of the infidels, the Sultan disclosed that for the exigency of expelling the Portuguese from India, an imperial fleet had been equipped. He proposed that for transporting the fleet from the Mediterranean to the Suez, a canal should be carved out between the two seas. The Sultan commanded the Governor to inform him immediately regarding the practicability of this project. 72

The project was aimed at facilitating the operation of the imperial Mediterranean fleet in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. This would, in turn, have enabled the Ottomans to strike decisively at the Portuguese bases in the Indian Ocean. But the plan either seems to have been abandoned or to have been stillborn, for the later Ottoman records do not mention it. Nevertheless, the very idea of the construction of a canal linking Mediterranean with the Suez was
unique and ahead of its time. What is more interesting is that the
plan was devised for driving the Portuguese out of India and for
facilitating the pilgrimage of the Indian Muslims. It serves to
indicate the Ottoman solicitude for securing the freedom of the
pilgrim routes.

In the second half of the sixteenth century Istanbul received
appeals for help from different quarters of the Islamic world. The
appellants petitioned the Sultan to rescue them from the oppression
of the firangis and to open the road to the Holy Cities. Sultan
Alauddin Riyat Shah al-Qahar (1537–1571), the ruler of Achin
(Sumatra) was one of these appellants. In 1566 he sent a petition to
Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. This unique document is being
brought to light by the present author for the first time. It
addresses the Sultan as the Khalifa of Islam, the successor of the
pious Khalifas, the asylum of mankind and so forth. Next, the
miserable plight of Muslim pilgrims and merchants, travelling to
Mecca and other Arabian ports, in the face of the firangi aggressors,
is presented. The Sultan is repeatedly begged in the name of Islam,
to come to their rescue quickly, to send men and munitions for their
deliverance from the firangi menace, and to declare jihad against the
infidels. The petition informs the Sultan that the Muslims of
Calicut and Ceylon read khutba in his name and that the infidel
rulers of these states are willing to fight the firangis under the
Sultan's banner. "If Your Majesty's aid is not forthcoming," laments
the petitioner, "the wretched unbelievers will continue to massacre
the innocent Muslims." The petition ends with a prayer for the long
life of the Sultan and for his perpetual happiness and glory.73

Moved by the contents of the petition, Selim II, who had
succeeded Suleiman in 1566, took immediate action. He decided to
send a fleet of fifteen galleys and two barks, equipped with cannons,
muskets, and other military hardware, to Sumatra. A host of
janissaries, and seven master gunners, along with the imperial
Master-General of artillery, were ordered to join the expedition.
Several carpenters, miners, blacksmiths, and painters were also
directed to accompany the fleet. Khizr Kurtoglu, the Captain of the
Alexandria fleet, was nominated to lead the expedition.74 The
Captain was instructed to help the king of Sumatra destroy the
infidels and to capture their forts.75 Orders were given to the
provincial governors and other imperial officials to cooperate with
the commander designate and to supply him all the necessary
equipments and provisions.76 In his letter to the king of
Sumatra, the Sultan proclaimed his commitment to jihad against the
enemies of the true faith. He declared that the fleet is being
dispatched to expurgate Sumatra of the evils of infidelity, to clear
the route to the Holy Land of all obstacles and hazards, and to make
the Muslims of Sumatra happy.77

The fleet never sailed for its destination; the rebellion in
Yemen precluded its departure. In January 1568 the Sumatran envoy
was notified that the flotilla prepared for Sumatra had been diverted to Yemen. The Sultan assured the ambassador of his unflagging support for Sumatra and promised to dispatch the fleet in the following year. The promised expedition did not materialize; Ottoman documents do not mention it. The Portuguese and Jesuit sources, however, suggest that the Ottoman military aid did reach Sumatra. A Sumatran source also maintains that two ships laden with soldiers, craftsmen, and guns were transmitted by the Ottoman Khalifa for Sumatra's aid. Whether or not the Ottoman aid reached Sumatra is a moot question. But the projected expedition serves to indicate that the Ottoman Sultans did take their duty of facilitating the pilgrimage of the Muslims around the world seriously and that they were willing to fulfill this moral obligation whenever the need arose.

Appeals for help also came from Central Asia. The Russian occupation of Astrakhan had blocked the only Haj route available to the Muslims of this region. Several reports of the Russian persecution of the Muslim pilgrims and merchants going through the Astrakhan road had already reached Istanbul. In 1568 Haji Muhammad Khan (1560-1603), the ruler of Khwarizm, sent a special ambassador to Istanbul. The letter, brought by the envoy, informed the Sultan of the maltreatment of the Khwarizmi pilgrims at the hands of the Shah of Persia. The Khan implored the Sultan to re-open the alternative pilgrim route passing though Astrakhan.
for the conquest of Astrakhan and Kazan also came from the Uzbeks of Bukhara and Samaraqand. 83

The Ottomans were aware of the Russia problem; the Russian penetration into the lower Volga basin had considerably alarmed them. In fact, the imperial council was already debating the feasibility of an expedition against Astrakhan. The appeals of the central Asian Muslims convinced the Sultan to take immediate action. In 1568 he sent a farman to the Governor of Kaffa. Referring to the Russian persecution of the Central Asian pilgrims and merchants going through Astrakhan, the Sultan disclosed his decision to conquer Astrakhan for liberating the pilgrim route from the Russians. The Sultan directed the Governor to inform him of the most appropriate time for the invasion of Astrakhan. 84 Three weeks later a similar farman, declaring the Sultan's intention to liberate the Astrakhan road for the pilgrims and merchants of Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khwarizm, was sent to Devlet Gerey (1551-1577), the Khan of Crimea. 85 Another farman to the Khan advised him to get the provisions and supplies, needed for the campaign, ready. 86

Linked with the Astrakhan campaign was another project. This was the construction of a canal between the rivers Don and the Volga. The canal was to facilitate the operation of the Ottoman fleet, carrying cannons, provisions, and ammunition needed for the campaign, in the Volga river. The fleet was to be deployed to stop the movement of the Russian men and supplies into Astrakhan along the
Volga as well. Launched in May 1569, the expedition immediately ran into problems. The canal project was based on inaccurate topographical and technological information. The Ottomans soon found out that the enterprise was impracticable and had to give it up in sheer disgust. Without the aid of their heavy guns the Ottomans were hardly expected to make any impression on the defenses of the Astrakhan fortress. After several unsuccessful attempts to capture the fortress by storm, the Ottomans were obliged to retreat. The Astrakhan expedition ended in a disaster. Astrakhan and the pilgrim route which connected Astrakhan with Ottoman Azak were destined to remain under perpetual Russian control.

The expedition had, nonetheless, one positive result. In 1570, Ivan IV (1533–1584), the ruler of Russia, sent an ambassador to Istanbul with a letter assuring the Sultan of his sympathy for the Muslims of Astrakhan and Kazan and expressing his desire to remain at peace with the Ottoman empire. In reply to this letter the Sultan wrote that he was willing to restore cordial relations with Russia provided Ivan open the Astrakhan road and guarantee the safety of the Muslim pilgrims and merchants passing though that road. Ivan accepted these terms and peace with Russia was restored. Czar Theodor (1584–1598), Ivan's successor, reiterated, in 1585 and 1595, his father's pledge to preserve the religious liberty of the Muslims of Astrakhan and Kazan. In sum, though the Ottomans had to acquiesce to the Russian domination of two traditionally Muslim
provinces, yet they were able to force the Russians to respect, at
least for the time being, the religious sentiment of the Muslims of
these regions. This was by no means a mean achievement.

The expedition was destined to be the last attempt made by the
Ottomans to wrest the control of a pilgrim route from the non-Muslim
powers. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Ottomans
continued to organize annual Haj caravans from Cairo and Damascus
with great fanfare. They spent huge amounts of money for protecting
the pilgrims and the pilgrim roads and sent, to Hijaz, generous
stipends of money and grain for the upkeep of the Holy Cities. The
existence of literally hundreds of documents, dealing with the Haj
and diverse problems related to it, in the Baş Vekalat Arşivi,
İstanbul, bear testimony to the Ottoman government's concern for the
pilgrimage. But the empire's heavy involvement in the European
wars, coupled with all the maladies of a declining empire, which had
begun to emerge simultaneously, left no room for crusading
activities. There is hardly any evidence that the Ottomans ever
attempted, after the sixteenth century, to protect the Muslim
pilgrims and pilgrim routes that were outside their own area of
influence; at least the Ottomans documents do not mention it. It was
not until the nineteenth century, when the revolution in the means of
communication removed the obstacles of long distance travel, that the
Muslims around the world were able to undertake the coveted journey
to Mecca without any constraint.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

One problem which perpetually plagued the Mughals was the threat to the life and property of the Indian Muslims going on pilgrimage to Mecca. Both the land and sea routes to Mecca were under the control of the foreign powers. The generally amicable Mughal-Persian relations, coupled with the political exigency to keep Persia strong, precluded the Mughals from taking any aggressive action against that country for liberating the land route to Mecca. Abdullah Khan Uzbek's proposal for a joint invasion of Persia, for freeing the Haj route from the 'heretics,' was cold shouldered by Akbar. Towards the end of his reign Jahangir did agree to an Uzbek scheme of a triple offensive of the Sunni powers against Persia; the professed purpose of the project was to liberate the Haj route. Jahangir's favourable disposition to this plan was, however, more due to his animosity towards Shah Abbas I than owing to a genuine yearning for freeing the pilgrim road. It is indeed surprising that inspite of the frequent exchange of embassies and epistles between the Mughals and the Safavids, during the reigns of Akbar and Jahangir, the problem of Haj traffic through Persia was never raised. Shahjahan only indulged in rhetorics and did nothing tangible to achieve his goal. Aurangzeb, likewise, never did seriously plan an offensive against Persia. His unworthy successors were in no position to take any positive action in this direction. On the whole, the Mughals probably considered the
Persian domination of the land route to Mecca as a fait accompli and were content with the status quo.

On the high seas the life and property of the Indian pilgrims was imperiled by the activities of the European freebooters. The Portuguese were the first to blockade the sea route to Mecca. Akbar's attempt to annihilate the Portuguese were foiled by the absence of a powerful navy. It was not possible to capture the Portuguese settlement by land action alone. An alliance with the Ottomans might have helped Akbar in achieving his objective. But his hostility towards the Ottomans prevented him from making any efforts in this direction. The attempts made by Jahangir and Shahjahan to drive the Portuguese out of India, likewise, were in vain.

Aurangzeb had to contend with the menace of the European pirates. He tried many devices to overcome this problem. European companies were forced to protect the pilgrim ships on the high seas. The Sidis of Jingira were commissioned into the imperial service. Even an alliance with the corsairs of Musqat was contemplated. None worked. The hazards of the journey to Mecca remained unabated. Aurangzeb's successors did not have a ghost of a chance to succeed where their mighty predecessors had failed.

Though the problem of the Indian pilgrims did not concern the Ottomans directly, yet their status as the Khadim-al-Haramein obliged them to protect the pilgrim routes and the pilgrims around the world. In the sixteenth century, when the Ottomans were at the height of
their power, they did try to meet the challenge. Attempts were made to wrest the control of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf from the Portuguese. A plan for building 'Suez Canal' was envisaged to help the Indian Muslims. Military hardware was sent to Sumatra. Astrakhan was invaded to liberate the pilgrim road from the Russians. In the seventeenth century the Ottoman power began to diminish; the empire's own internal and external problems multiplied. Henceforth the Ottomans could no longer attempt to help their less fortunate brethren in Asia. In the eighteenth century the Ottoman Sultans had to remain content with the title of Khalifa which entailed a symbolic religious, not temporal, leadership of the Islamic world.

The Ottoman claim to the Khilafat of Islam and the Mughal attitude towards this claim would be discussed in the following chapter.
NOTES

M.D., vol. 6, p. 166. Addressed to Dom Sebastiao (1557-1578), the letter was written on 6 Rabiulevelvel, 973 (October 1, 1565).


3 Burton, Personal Narrative..., vol. II, p. 279.


5 The Holy Quran, II, 196.


7 In 1514, for example, Albuquerque, the Viceroy of the Portuguese territories in India, had devised a plan to invade Mecca. In a letter to King Don Manuel, dated October 20, 1514, he wrote:
"our first step should be to make ourselves secure at Massouah, in order to be assured of provisions and supplies, as Massouah is the chief trading port in the dominions of the Prester John. When these things are accomplished it will be time to think of Jedda, Mecca, and Suez, and, as there are plenty of horses in the Prester John's territories, it would be an easy matter for 500 Portuguese horsemen, in some good taforeas and caravels, to land near Jedda, and proceed from thence to Mecca (one day journey) and reduce the town to ashes."; quoted by F.C. Danvers, The Portuguese in India, London, vol. I, p. 305. Albuquerque's other letter, written on October 25, 1514, reveals similar sinister plan against Mecca. See Ibid., I, p. 306. Also see Strippling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, p. 30.

For an excellent modern account of the Cartaz system see M.N. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers of Gujarat, California University Press, 1976, pp. 39-52. For a contemporary account of this system see Sheikh Zainuddin, Tuhfat-al-Mujahidin, tr., S.M. H. Nainar, Madras, 1942, p. 56. For the Portuguese brutality against Muslim shipping see Ibid., pp. 54, 60, 61, 70, 74, 92. I am grateful to Professor Frykenberg for allowing me to consult his copy of this valuable and rare book.

Zainuddin, p. 82; pearson, p. 41.

Zainuddin, p. 60.

The justification for the Portuguese depredation against
Muslim shipping is found in the work of the official Portuguese chronicler. He asserts: "The Portuguese as lords of the sea, by the strength of their fleet are justified in compelling all Moors and Gentiles to take out safe conduct under pain of confiscation and death. The Moors and the Gentiles are outside the law of Jesus Christ, which is the true law that every one has to keep under pain of damnation to eternal fire. ..." Joao de Barros, *Da Asia*, Libson, 1945-46, vol. I, Pt. VI, page 1, quoted by R.S. Witeway, *The Rise of the Portuguese Power in India 1497-1550*, New York, 1967 (reprint), p. 21. Also see Pearson, pp. 40-41.

12 For a vivid description of the sectarian hostility evinced by the Safavids towards the Sunnis, passing through Persia, in the sixteenth century, see Sidi Ali Reis, *Mirat-al-Mamalik*, English tr., pp. 84-103.


14 Zainuddin, pp. 56-58, 75, 87, 88.

15 Ibid., p. 63. The following observation of the chronicler is also worth noting: "The Muslim Sultans and Amirs (May Allah exalt their allies) never cared to take any interest in the affairs of the Muslims of Malabar, although Jihad was an obligatory duty upon them" (Ibid., p. 22). Zainuddin's observation concurs with M.N. Pearson's assessment of the attitude of the Sultans of Gujarat towards the Portuguese depredation on Gujarati commerce. He suggests that the
Sultans of Gujarat had excellent chances of exterminating the Portuguese peril but they did not want to do so because, "they [Sultans] did not care what merchants did" (Merchants and Rulers of Gujarat, p. 2).

16 Later in the sixteenth century the Muslim rulers seem to have re-assessed their policy towards the ruler of Calicut. In 1570, Sultan of Bijapur and Ali Raja of Cannanore did conclude an alliance with the Zamorin against the Portuguese. Their combined effort to dislodge the Portuguese from Goa was sabotaged by the treachery of the Sultan of Ahmad Nagar (Zainuddin, pp. 84–87).

17 M.T., I, p. 480.


19 According to Hasan Ali Khan, a contemporary of Sher Shah and the author of Tawarikh-i-Daulat-i-Shershahi, the Afghan King had sent an ambassador to Shah Tahmasp asking him to expell Humayun from his dominions. The Shah not only rejected Sher Shah's request but also had the envoy's ear and nose cut off. In retaliation Sher Shah got several Persians in India mutilated. He also decreed the expulsion of all Persians from his Kingdom. (Quoted by R. Islam, Indo-Persian, p. 202). It was probably after this incident that Sher Shah planned to conclude an alliance with the Ottomans. Sher Shah's projected offensive against Persia was thus largely governed by his antagonism towards Shah Tahmasp.
The fatwa was issued by Mulla Abdullah Sultanpuri Makhdumul Mulk. See, M.T., II, p. 206; Aziz Ahmad, Islamic culture..., pp. 29-30. Aziz Ahmad's statement that Mulla Abdullah was Akbar's Sheikh-ul-Islam is not correct. He never held this position during Akbar's reign. According to Badauni, the title Makhdumul Mulk and Sheikh-ul-Islam was granted to the Mulla by Humayun. For a short biography of Mulla Abdullah, see M.T., III, pp. 113-118. For the institution of Sheikhul-Islam in the Mughal period see Rafat M. Bilgrami, Religious and Quasi-Religious Departments of the Mughal Period: 1556-1707 A.D., Munshiram Manoharlal, 1984, pp. 1-58. According to Dr. S.A.A. Rizri, "The fatwa amounted to opposition to Akbar's policy of encouragement of pilgrimage" (Religious and Intellectual History of the Muslims in Akbar's Reign, Munshiram Manoharlal, 1975, p. 118). Dr. Rizvi's observation is not tenable for the following reasons. First, the date of the issuance of this decree is obscure. Second, it is well known that Akbar had started the policy of sending annual Haj caravan to Mecca in 1576. By that time Mulla Abdullah had already fallen from Akbar's grace. Third, Badauni writes that the Emperor used to summon the Mulla in the Ibadat Khana, which had started functioning in late 1575, to harass him. It was in these discussions that the fatwa in question was debated. Badauni has referred to Abul Fazl's presence in this debate and calls him a newcomer. Abul Fazl was introduced to Akbar's court
in 1574. It, thus, appears that fatwa was issued earlier and that it has nothing to do with Akbar’s Haj policy.

22 Pearson, Merchants and Rulers..., p. 83; Danvers, The Portuguese..., vol. II, p. 4.

23 Pearson, Merchants and Rulers..., p. 84.

24 M.T., II, p. 216; V. Smith, Akbar the Great, p. 145; Monserrate, p. 166; Commentary, Gulbadan Begum, p. 72.


26 R. Islam, Indo-Persian..., p. 53. The letter was sent through the Mughal ambassador Mirza Faulad.


28 According to Monserrate, the Mughal general advanced against Daman with a strong army of 15,000, ravaged the countryside, but was repulsed by the Governor of Daman (Commentary, pp. 168–169). According to F.C. Danvers, Qutubuddin Khan withdrew without attacking Daman (The Portuguese..., II, pp. 42–43). Also see M.S. Commissariat, History of Gujarat, Vol. III, Ahmadabad, 1980, pp. 65–70; V. Smith, Akbar the Great, pp. 145–146.

29 A.N., III, p. 758; Maktubat-i-Allami, p. 23.


32 Pearson, Merchants and Rulers..., p. 84.

33 A.N., III, p. 758; Maktubat-i-Allami, pp. 23–24. It
should be mentioned here that during the short regime of Shah Ismail II (1576-1578), who was a Sunni, the land route to Mecca was opened for the Sunni pilgrims. In a letter to Mirza Hakim, Shah Ismail informed that the route was open. The Shah assured the Mirza of the safety and freedom of the pilgrims passing through Persia and urged him to encourage the pilgrims to set out. See R. Islam, Calender I, p. 100.

34 Letters Received by the East India Company..., Vol. II, pp. 96, 213, 247, 251. Later the cargo, carried by the 'Rahimi,' was estimated to be worth 130,000 Pounds Sterling (Ibid., p. 251). In September 1614, another Surat ship was plundered by the Portuguese (Ibid., p. 104). Jahangir has mentioned that as many as four ships were captured by them. He writes: "In the same month news came that the Franks of Goa had, contrary to the treaty, plundered four cargo vessels that frequented the port of Surat in the neighbourhood of that port, and making prisoners a large number of Musalmans, had taken possession of the goods and chattels that were in those ships." (Tuzuk, I, p. 255).

35 Letters Received..., II, pp. 96, 97, 107, 149-150, 171, 213, 246; Tuzuk, I, p. 255. Commissariat, History..., III, pp. 70-71; Danvers, The Portuguese..., II, pp. 166-168.


According to the terms of the treaty, the Portuguese were obliged to
pay compensation for the plunder of the 'Rahimi.' They also agreed
to grant for two years, extra passes for two Mughal ships to go to
Mecca. This was in addition to the pass given annually to one Mughal
vessel for this purpose. For the cartaz requested and secured by
Jahangir during 1618-1623, see Historical Archives of Goa, Consultas
cartaz were requested, on behalf of the Emperor, by Shivaji Parekh,
the agent of the Governor of Surat.

37 See for example Iman Quli Khan's letter to Jahangir Maasir-
i-Jahangiri, pp. 469-73, 528-529)
38 Munshat-us-Salatin, II, pp. 142-143.
39 Hague Transcripts, Series 1, vol. ix, No. 296, quoted by
40 E.F.I., 1624-1629, pp. 326-327, 328, 336. Also see
41 E.F.I. 1637-1641, pp. 124-125, 216, 316, 281. For the
Mughal invasion on Daman see Ibid., pp. 123, 124, 214, 240.
42 According to the English Factory Record, the Portuguese,
after the Mughal invasion of Daman, had imposed an embargo on the
Surat ships sailing for Cambay. They had also refused to give the
usual passes to the ships sailing from the Mughal ports.
Consequently, the trade at Surat had suffered a great deal; the
custom revenue had declined. The Governor of Surat, who had farmed
the Surat revenue at a considerable amount of money, was gravely
alarmed. On the other hand, the English were deeply apprehensive of a Mughal-Dutch agreement. It would have placed them in a very disadvantageous position in the highly competitive market of Gujarat. Peace with the Portuguese would have made an agreement with the Dutch unnecessary. Both the Governor of Surat and the President of the English Factory, therefore, favoured peace with the Portuguese. See E.F.I. 1637-1641, pp. 123-125; Commissariat, III, pp. 80-86.


44. Quoted by Commissariat, III, p. 436. For a Mughal campaign against the Portuguese in 1691 and the Portuguese Viceroy's solicitude for Mughal friendship, see M.L., II, pp. 400-403.

45. Khafi Khan has given a vivid description of the strategy of the English pirates. He writes: "When the ships are proceeding to the ports of Mocha and Jidda laden with goods of Hindustan; they do not interfere with them; but when they return bringing gold and silver and Ibrahimi and rial, their spies have found out which ship bears the richest burden and they attack it." M.L., II, p. 427, quoted from Elliot and Dowson, History of India..., vol. vii, p. 354.

46. They were Henry Middelton, Nicholas Downtown, and John Saris. See Jagdish N. Sarkar, "The Rape of Indian Ships in Indian Waters, 1612," Journal of Bihar Research Society, xxiv, 1949, pp. 199-212.
Manucci, II, p. 41.


Manucci, II, pp. 40-42.

Sidi Yaqut Khan, an Abyssiniyan, was the slave of Fath Khan, the Bijapuri Governor of Konkan. According to Khafi Khan, when Fath Khan decided to surrender the fort of Jazira (Jinjira) to Shivaji, Sidi Yaqut and his two other fellow slaves, Sambol and Khairiat, opposed the Khan, imprisoned him, captured the fort, elected Sambol as their leader, and acknowledged the Mughal Suzerainty. After Sambol's death Yaqut became master of the fort. He recovered Danda-Rajpuri from Shivaji and conquered seven other Maratha forts. For these achievements, Aurangzeb raised Yaqut's mansab, gave him the title of Khan, and officially appointed him as the Mughal Faujdar of Danda-Rajpuri. He was also appointed to guard the sea route to Mecca. For this service, according to Mirat-i-Ahmadi, he was given an annual subsidy of 150,000 rupees. However, from the English factory records we learn that the subsidy was 400,000 rupees. For

52 Arnold Wright, p. 130.

53 This step was taken in retaliation of the plunder of the imperial pilgrim ship 'Ganj-i- Sawai' by the English pirates in 1695. According to Khafi Khan, the ship was returning from Jidda with 52 lakhs of rupees in gold and silver. The treasure was confiscated, the pilgrims were insulted, and the ladies on board the ship were dishonoured. M.L., II, p 421-424. Also see Arnold Wright, pp. 162-189; Sarkar, History..., Vol. 5, pp. 261-263; Commissariat, III, pp. 448-449.

54 This punitive action was taken in retaliation for the activities of the English and the Dutch pirates in 1698. See Sarkar, History..., Vol. 5, pp. 267-268; Arnold Wright, pp. 190-207. Also see Maharashtra State Archives, Presidency Record: Secretariat Outward Letter Book, No. 6, 1697-1699, pp. 229-230. For the plight of the Dutch captains convoying the Mughal pilgrim ships see Ashin Das Gupta, "Gujarati Merchants and the Red Sea


56. Ibid., quoted by Askari, "Mughal Naval...", p. 7.

57. Kalimat-i-Taiyibat, p. 95.

58. Ibid., pp. 139-140. Also see Mirat-i-Ahmadi, I, pp. 353-354.

59. For the agreement between the Mughal Governor of Surat and the Dutch, cancelling the Muchalka binding the Dutch to escort the pilgrim ship, see, Maharashtra State Archives, Surat Factory Diary No. 3, 1701-1704, p. 129. For the decline of Surat and the breakdown of Mughal administration in Gujarat in the post Aurangzeb period, see Mirat-i-Ahmadi, I, pp. 392-410; II, pp. 5-369. Also see Ashin Das Gupta, "Trade and ...", pp. 181-214.

60. Commissariat, III, pp. 558-559.

61. Michel M. Mazzou, "Global Policies of Sultan Selim, 1512-1520," Essays on Islamic Civilization, Ed. Donald P. Little, E.J. Brill, 1976, p. 235; Stripling, The Ottoman Turks..., p. 32. Bayazid II had helped the Egyptians build a fleet which was to be deployed against the Portuguese.


66 K.M. Panikkar, India and..., p. 46.


68 M.D., 6, p. 122. Farman No. 256, 13 Rabiulevelvel, 972 (October, 1564).

69 M.D., 6, p. 122, Farman No. 257, 13 Rabi I, 972, Governor of Yemen; Ibid., p. 123, Farman No. 258, same date, Bey of Jidda.

70 M.D., 6, p. 127., Farman No. 265, 15 Rabiulevelvel, 972 (October 21, 1564).

71 M.D., 6, p. 166, 6 Rabiulevelvel, 973 (October 1, 1565).
Also see Uzuncarsili, III, Pt. 1, pp. 331-332; Asrar, Kanuni Devri..., pp. 335-336. For another imperial letter, dispatched on August 26, 1565, to the Portuguese King, see M.D., 5, p. 70, No. 161.

72 M.D., 7, p. 258, No. 721.

73 Hindistan Musulmanin bir Arizasi, T.S.M.A., E 8009, Middle of the month of Jamadiussani, 973 A.H. (January 1566).

Although the title of the petition suggests that the petitioners were Indian Muslims, the internal evidence proves that it was dispatched by the Sultan of Sumatra. In fact, numerous other Ottoman documents designates the Sumatrans as Hindi (Indian). Besides other informations, this petition indicates that relations between Sumatra and the Ottoman empire existed before 1565. The ruler of Sumatra, for instance, informs the Sultan, of the safe arrival of eight gunners, sent by the Sultan previously. Also see Anthony Reid, "Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia," Journal of South East Asian History, x, 1969, p. 405. Reid cites several Portuguese and Venetian sources for the existence of military alliance between the two States before 1565, but he is not sure of the authenticity of his sources. This petition, however, proves beyond any doubt that the Sumatran-Ottoman relations had commenced before 1565. But Reid's observation that the Sumatran embassy stayed in Istanbul between 1565-1568 is incorrect, for the petition itself was written in January 1566. It must have been dispatched after this
date.

76 M.D., 7, pp. 90-92; No. 244, 16 Rabiullevvel 975
(September 20, 1567); Ibid., p. 89, No. 238, September 17, 1567;
Ibid., p. 311, No. 887, 17 Shaban 975.

76 M.D., 7, p. 88, No. 236, September 17, 1567.

76 M.D., 7, p. 87, No. 234, Governor of Egypt; Ibid., 7,
87, No. 237, Governor of Yemen; Ibid., 89, No. 234, Governor of
Egypt; Ibid., 90, No. 242, Sharif of Mecca; Ibid., 90, No. 243;
Governor of Egypt; Ibid., 177, No. 474, Governor of Egypt, Ibid.,
179, No. 481, Lord Admiral; Ibid., 182, No. 491, Lord Admiral; Ibid.,
211, No. 583; Governor of Egypt; Ibid., 212, No. 586, Captain of
Suez; Ibid., 219, No. 610, Piyale Pasha, the Lord Admiral.

77 M.D., 7, pp. 90-92, No. 244, September 20, 1567. Also
see Safvet Bey, "Bir Osmani Filosinin Sumatra Seferi," Tarih
Osmanî Encumân Mecmuası, (henceforth T.O.E.M.), No. 10, 1329 A.H.,
pp. 604-614; Ibid., T.O.E.M., 11, 1329 A.H., pp. 672-683; Safvet
Bey, "Sharq Londleri: Osmani Bahra-i-Ahmar Filosinin Sumatra Seferi

78 M.D., 7, p. 255, No. 708, 15 Rajab 975 (January 5,
1568). Also see M.D., 7, p. 216, No. 597, 29 Jamadiullevvel, 975;
Ibid., 23, 614, same date; Ibid., 224, No. 616, same date (The farman
was addressed to Khizr Bey. It directed him to proceed with his
fleet to Yemen and help Wazir Mustafa Pasha, the Commander of the
Ottoman army, suppress the revolt); Ibid., 311, No. 887, 17 Shaban

Safvet Bey, "Bir Osmani...," pp. 682-683.

For example several Nogai notables, descendants of the Khans of Golden Horde, had sent letters to the Sultan complaining of the Russian persecution of the Muslim pilgrims and merchants in Astrakhan. See, A.N. Kurat, "The Turkish Expedition to Astrakhan and the Problem of the Don-Volga Canal," The Slavonic and East European Review, December 1961, p. 13.

Letter to Selim II to the Khan of Khwarizm, M.D., 7, p. 985, No. 2723. Also see Halil Inalcik, "The Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal," Annales del' Universite d' Ankara, I, 1946-47, p. 68. Inalcik's translation of the letter is incorrect. Where as the letter says that the Shah of Persia had arrested several Khwarizmi pilgrims, when they enter Persian territory, on their way back to Mecca and that the Sultan should open the Astrakhan road for the benefit of the Muslim pilgrims and merchants, Inalcik writes: "The Shah of Persia was arresting every Pilgrim coming from Turkestan as soon as he entered Persia, and that Moscow, after the conquest of Astrakhan, did not permit the transit of pilgrims and merchants and cause all sorts of difficulties," (Ibid., p. 68). The discrepancy in Inalcik's translation is evident.

A. Refik, "Bahr-i-Hazer-Karadeniz Kanal ve Ejderhan Seferi,
"T.O.E.M., 43, 1333 A.H., p. 4 (Reference to the appeal from Bukhara and Samarqand is found in Selim II's letter to the Khan of Crimea). For Abdul Latif Khan's, ruler of Bukhara, letter to Sultan Suleiman, written in 1554, beseeching him to conquer Persia for opening the Pilgrim road, see Schefer, Chrestomathie Persane, vol. II, pp. 228–230.

84 Quoted by A. Refik, "Bahr...," p. 4. The farman was dispatched on 15 Shaban 975 (February 14, 1568).

85 Ibid., pp. 4–5. The farman was issued on 5 Ramzan 975 (March 4, 1568).

86 Ibid., pp. 5–6. Issued on 4 Muharram 976 (June 29, 1568).

87 Kurat, "The Turkish...," p. 18.


90 Inalcik, "The Origin...," pp. 94–97.

Ibid., p. 744, No. 2037; Ibid., p. 748, No. 2048; Ibid., p. 525, Nos. 1505, 1506; M.D., 9, p. 1, No. 3; Ibid., p. 10, No. 26; M.D., 12, p. 70, No. 34; Ibid., p. 351, No. 710; Ibid., p. 426, No. 827; Ibid., p. 445, No. 862; Ibid., p. 449, No. 868; Ibid., p. 467, No. 896; Ibid., p. 478, No. 918; M.D., 15, p. 100, No. 871, etc.
CHAPTER FIVE

MUGHAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE OTTOMAN KHILAFAT

Gifts of sincere wishes are offered to your exalted Majesty, the possessor of the dignity of Khilafat, the pole of the sky of greatness and fortune, the consolidator of the foundations of Islam . . . Your name is engraved on the seal of greatness, and in your time the Khilafat has been carried to perfection . . . may your Khilafat be perpetuated. God be praised that the gates of victory are opened by the keys of His inspiration and by His dispensation the seat of the Sultanate and the throne of the Khilafat of the realms of Hind and Sind is once again graced by a monarch [Humayun] whose magnificence is equal to that of Solomon (Emperor Humayun to Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent)."2

Let it be known that the augest Mir Zarif, after being dismissed from [the court of] the 'glory of the Caesars of Rum,' conducted the honourable ambassador Arsalan Agha [to India] in the most distinguished manner. As his Majesty the Khalifa [Shahjahan], the shadow of God, was relaxing in Kashmir, Arsalan Agha was honoured with the favour of kissing the threshold there; he delivered the letter of the 'pride of the family of Caesars'. . . What his Majesty, the Successor of the pious Khalifas [Shahjahan] has done for the exaltation of the standard of Islam and for strengthening the illustrious faith deserves the blessings of God (Mughal Wazir Ismail Khan to the Ottoman Grand Wazir Mustafa Pasha).2

While the problem of Haj traffic promised to evoke at least some degree of solidarity between the Mughals and the Ottomans, another issue, which also concerned the Muslims around the world, was destined to have an altogether different effect on their mutual relationship. This was the question of Khilafat. Since the Khalifa, the holder of Khilafat, had an inherent claim to the leadership of
the ummah, every Muslim monarch coveted this position. As the premier Muslim potentates of their time, both Mughal and Ottoman sovereigns laid their claim to the Khilafat. This naturally generated a sense of rivalry between them and retarded the growth of a steady and stable relationship between these two principal ruling houses of Islam. Before we come to the core of the problem, a brief description of the institution of Khilafat and the influence it has exercised on the course of Islamic history seems pertinent.

Muslim jurists and political thinkers assert that Khilafat is a divinely ordained institution. They profess that the Quran, the revealed word of God, attests to its divine origin. Two Quranic passages are often invoked in support of this argument; each refers to a distinguished Prophet as the Khalifa (Vicegerent) of God.\(^3\) Khalafat is thus esteemed to be originally related to prophethood and is visualized as a God-inspired function.\(^4\) In early Islam, however, Khilafat was devised not as the vicegerency of God but rather as the vicegerency of the Prophet Muhammad. Abu Bakr (632-634), the first Khalifa, is in fact reported to have rejected the title of Khalifat Allah (Deputy of God). He had adopted the more modest title of Khalifat rasul Allah (Successor of the Prophet of God).\(^5\) The principal function of the prophets, Muslim canonists believe, is to establish justice and equity on earth and to "cause the mass to act in accordance with the religious laws in all their affairs touching both this world and the other world."\(^6\) It was
to this function of the Prophet Muhammad that Abu Bakr had succeeded in 632 A.D.; the prophet's spiritual function was believed to have ceased with him. "The Khilafat," writes Ibn Khaldun, "is in essence the vicegerency of the lawgiver [Prophet Muhammad] in order to defend the faith and to govern the world with its help."  

The holder of the Khilafat, the Khalifa, was the temporal head of the orthodox Muslim community. His religious function was confined to conducting the public worship of the Faithful. In this capacity the Khalifa was designated as Imam. Addressed by his subjects as Amiral-Muminin (Commander of the Faithful), revered as the Zillilah fil arz (Shadow of God on earth), the Khalifa was the symbol of the unity of the ummah and the supremacy of the Sharia. He was considered to be necessary for the very existence of the community itself. Obeisance to the Khalifa was regarded a religious duty; it was equated with obedience to the Almighty. The right of khutba and sikka (coinage), which later came to be regarded as the two major symbols of a Muslim monarch's independence and sovereignty, were the distinct privilege of the Khalifa. The source of all authority and fountain of all honour, only the Khalifa had the right to grant these prerogatives to Muslim potentates. In later times a diploma of investiture from the Khalifa was considered essential for establishing the legitimacy of an independent ruler. A title of honour conferred by the Khalifa was regarded a great honour and was deemed to have added to the dignity
and prestige of a ruler.

Great as was the authority of the Khalifa, so were his responsibilities varied and vast. Defense of the faith, implementation of Sharia, and the execution of justice were his principal functions. As the Commander of the Faithful, the Khalifa was charged with the protection of the territory of Islam, with the waging of Jihad against the unbelievers, and with converting the Darul Harb (land of war) into the Darul Islam (land of peace). As the head of the state, the Khalifa was responsible for the maintenance of law and order, for the organization and collection of taxes, and for appointing efficient deputies to carry out the administration of the empire. He was also obliged to promote education, protect the pilgrim routes, organize annual Haj caravans, and appoint a Mir Haj every year. The Khalifa was also duty bound to lead the Faithful in public worship; Ibn Khaldun calls this the highest of all Caliphal functions. Finally, the Khalifa was constrained to be subservient to the Sharia; he could not alter, modify, or make the law. Not a Muitahid (interpreter of the law) himself, the Khalifa was bound to accept the interpretation of the doctors of law. This limitation was the most important check upon his authority.

Theoretically, only persons with exceptionally high qualifications were eligible for the lofty office of the Khalifa. Muslim jurists recommended that the Khalifa should be an adult male,
sound of mind and limb, capable of exercising his authority in all circumstances, and independent of outside control. He was expected to be a man of probity, vitality, and foresight; sagacity, valour, and firm determination were also considered to be essential attributes of the Khalifa. He was required to be just and to be well-versed in the law in order to dispense efficient and impartial justice. Not only was he to be knowledgeable but he was also desired to have the power to make independent decisions and pass judgments on the finer points of law. As the person responsible for the defense of the Darul Islam, the Khalifa was obliged to be a competent military general; he was to lead the Muslim armies personally in wars against enemies of the faith. He was to be pious, was expected to follow the rites of Islam and the Sunna (practice of the Prophet) faithfully and was expected to set an example by his praiseworthy conduct and deeds. The Khalifa was also required to be a descendant of the Quraish, the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad.

The question of the Khalifa's descent from the Quraish was, however, a subject of dispute among the Muslim jurists. Those who insisted on this condition asserted that the Prophet himself had laid down this principle. Others argued that insistence on this stipulation was not called for. The avowed object of adding this prerequisite, they affirmed, was to challenge the Shia theory that the Khilafat was the exclusive monopoly of the house of Ali. Another purpose was "to bring the first three caliphs, and the Ommeyyade and
the Abbasid Caliphs, into the circle of legitimate Imams.\textsuperscript{16}

Perhaps the most adequate explanation of this controversy is given by Ibn Khaldun. Accepting the authenticity of the traditions quoted in support of the stipulation concerned, he suggests that the doctrine derived from these traditions displays the spirit of the time. In the lifetime of the prophet, argues the jurist, the Quraish, because of its strong \textit{Asabiya} (Corporate sense common to a family, clan or tribe), was the most powerful tribe in peninsula Arabia. A Quraishite Khalifa was, therefore, expected to defend the territory of Islam and maintain the unity of the community. Once the \textit{Asabiya} of the Quraish enervated, the principle also ceased to be effective. Those who reject the Quraishite descent as a necessary qualification for the office of Khalifa, concludes Ibn Khaldun, were responding to the exigencies of their time.\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, the doctrine came back to play an important role in the fortunes of the Khilafat; in the nineteenth century the opponents of the Ottoman Sultan were to use it as their most effective tool in challenging the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat.\textsuperscript{18}

The history of the Khilafat is too well-known to require detailed narration here. After the death of the Prophet in 632 A.D., Abu Bakr, one of the Prophet's close confidants, was elevated to the leadership of the Muslim community by the unanimous choice of the Faithful. Abu Bakr was succeeded by three of his fellow companions — Umar, Usman, and Ali; each elected to the office by the consensus
of the community. Known as Khulfa-i-Rashidin (the right-guided Khalifas), the first four holders of the Khilafat are universally acclaimed as the epitomes of virtue and piety; their reign is regarded as the golden age of Islam. After the death of Ali in 661 A.D., the Khilafat was seized by Muawiyah. A Quraishite by descant, Muawiyah laid the foundation of the Umayyad dynasty — the first monarchical family in Islam. Based as it was on the principal of hereditary succession to the throne, the Umayyad dynasty also heralded the inception of the Khilafat-i-Muluki (Monarchical khilafat), as distinguished from the Khilafat-i-Rashida of the first four Khalifas. The Umayyads were the first to assume the title of Khalifat Allah; probably this appellation was assumed to underscore the divine origin of the Umayyad authority.19 During the Umayyad regime the Islamic empire reached its greatest territorial extent. From his capital at Damascus, the Khalifa ruled over an intercontinental empire stretching from India and the borders of China to the shores of the Atlantic and North Africa.20 This empire was indeed one of the most remarkable achievements of the Umayyads.

In 749, the opponents of the Umayyad regime staged a successful coup d'etat. Khalifa Marwan II (744-750) was slain, his dynasty was overthrown, and Abu al-Abbas, a descendant of Abbas bin Abdul Muttalib, was chosen as Khalifa. This marks the foundation of the celebrated Abbasid dynasty. The Abbasids were destined to retain the
Khilafat till 1517. The Abbasid era opened on a grand note. Law and order were restored, a highly centralized government was organized, and a splendid court was maintained. Generous patronage was extended to the Ulama, education and learning were promoted, the much-needed assimilation of all the members of the Muslim community, described by a modern scholar as the internationalization of Islam, was initiated, and steps were taken for the intellectual and moral unification of the Muslim world. The glory and grandeur of the Abbasids, however, proved to be short lived; their failure to produce a stable political structure backed by viable institutions germinated the seeds of the empire's destruction. Before long the vast empire of the Abbasids began to disintegrate. Several independent principalities sprang up in different parts of the empire. Even the Khalifa's position as the head of the Muslim world was compromised after the establishment of rival Khilafats in Egypt and Spain. By the end of the tenth century, Baghdad, the Abbasid capital, had degenerated into a cockpit of contending claimants for paramountcy. The Khalifa himself had by that time become a mere puppet in the hands of his Buyid overlord. An interlude of revived political power under Khalifa al-Nasir (1180-1225) failed to heal the wounds inflicted, during the past two centuries, upon the Abbasid body politic. The Mongol invasion of 1258 put the last nail into the coffin of the most celebrated dynasty of Islam. The Baghdad Khilafat had passed into history.
The Abbasid dynasty, however, managed to survive the shock of the Mongol havoc; three years later it was re-instituted in Egypt. Abul Qasim Ahmad, the Uncle of the last Abbasid Khalifa of Baghdad, was installed as Khalifa in Cairo by the Mamluk Sultan al-Zahir Baybars (1260-1277). The primary motive of the Sultan's magnanimity was to use the Khalifa as an instrument to legitimate his own position as ruler of Egypt. For the next two and a half centuries, the Cairene Khalifas performed this function faithfully; apart from this purely ceremonial dignity, the Khalifa had no authority whatsoever. Even the traditional privileges of sikka and khutba were denied to them. With the fall of the Mamluk kingdom in 1517, this shadow-Khilafat finally came to an end. Khalifa al-Mutawakkil, the last of the Abbasids, was deposed and exiled to Istanbul. Henceforth the Abbasid Khilafat stood abolished.

Long before the collapse of the Baghdad Khilafat, the Muslim jurists, perturbed by the progressive decline of the Khalifa's authority, were seeking to restate the nature of the institution of Khilafat. One of the earliest to do so was al-Mawardi (991-1058). His treatise al-Ahkam as-Sultaniya is regarded as the most authoritative exposition of the Sunni Islamic political theory. Aimed at asserting the supremacy of the Abbasid Khalifa against his Buyid tormentors, the tract attempts to "maintain the theoretical validity of the Caliph's authority and his delegation of this in spite of the actual usurpation of his powers by others."
Al-Mawardi postulated a concordat between the Khalifa and those who had established independent principalities within the Khalifa's domains. For the sake of the unity of the ummah, urged the jurist, the Khalifa should acknowledge the independance of these potentates. The potentates concerned, in turn, should recognize the paramountcy of the Khalifa and undertake to govern according to the Sharia. In this way the supremacy of the Sharia was preserved and the fiction of the Khalifa as the source of all authority was maintained.

The jurists who followed al-Mawardi did not attempt to perpetuate this fiction. Writing towards the end of the eleventh century, theologian al-Ghazali (1058-1111) observed that "Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the possessor of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the Caliph." Ghazali's theory, though much closer to the actual state of affairs, still envisaged a role for the Khalifa; his presence was necessary to legitimate the rights acquired by force.

The downfall of the Baghdad Khilafat emboldened the jurists to dispense with even this exigency. In the fourteenth century an Egyptian gazi declared that the rights acquired by force were legitimate in themselves; Khilafat could thus be assumed by any person who established his authority by his might and his armies. No matter how oppressive such a Khalifa may have been, the subjects were
advised to render unconditional obedience to him. His tyranny and even his ineligibility were not deemed to be valid grounds for rebellion against him. 'Tyranny is better than anarchy' was the quintessence of the qazi's thought. 30

This startling doctrine, antithesis of the classical theory of Khilafat as it was, did not find favour with the theologians and political thinkers. Need was felt to preserve the dignity of the Khilafat, at least in theory, so that every usurper could not style himself Khalifa. As a way out of this dilemma, it was declared that the Khilafat in the real sense had ceased to exist after the death of Ali; the Umayyad and the Abbasid Khilafats were pronounced illegitimate. 31 Distinction was drawn between khilafat and Mulukiat (monarchy). The government based on revealed law, a government striving for both the temporal and spiritual welfare of its subjects, was defined as Khilafat. On the other hand, the government, based on the norms devised by the human beings, caring only for the worldly interests of its people was designated as Mulukiat. 32 But it was not till the fifteenth century that a theory of Khilafat, acceptable to all, was systematized. Formulated by Jalaluddin al-Dawwani (1427-1501), a distinguished Shafii jurist, the doctrine gives utmost importance to the Sharia as the guiding light of a Muslim state. Drawing a distinction between secular kingship and Khilafat, it declared that the monarch who governs with justice and who directs the affairs of the state in accordance with
the *Sharia* was entitled to hold the dignity of Khilafat.\(^{33}\) The theory also permitted, *ipso facto*, the existence of more than one Khalifa simultaneously.\(^{34}\) Though not original in any sense of the term, the doctrine quickly became the standard exposition of the institution of Khilafat. It is, in fact, this theory which "underlies the use of the term Khalifa and Imam in both the Ottoman and Mughal empires."\(^{35}\)

Al-Dawwani's denial of the theory of the indivisibility of the Khilafat was a reaction to the political circumstances of his time; it was simply an attempt to recognize the contemporary situation. Since the downfall of the Baghdad Khilafat, Muslim monarchs, irrespective of their power and prestige, had started the practice of usurping the caliphal titles. One of the earliest to do so was Abu Abdullah Muhammād (1249-1277), the ruler of Tunis. He had assumed the title of Khalifa to proclaim his independence from his Almohad overlord.\(^{36}\) He was followed by the Marinids of Morocco, the Saljuqs of Rum, and the Ak-qoyunlus of Persia and Iraq. The epithets *Darul Khilafat* (seat of the Khilafat) and *Mustaqqarul Khilafat* (abode of the Khilafat), which had been reserved exclusively for Baghdad, were freely used by all the Muslim sovereigns to describe their capital cities. In the early fifteenth century, the Timurid monarch Mirza Shah Rukh (1405-1447) also assumed the title of Khalifa. However, Shah Rukh's attempt to get himself recognized as the temporal leader of the Muslim world met with no success. The Mirza's
principal rivals rejected his demand with contempt.\textsuperscript{37}

The Ottoman Sultans also joined their royal contemporaries in the race for the exalted title of Khalifa. Assumed initially by Sultan Murad I (1362–1389), the appellation was adopted by all of his successors. In their diplomatic correspondence and official documents, these Sultans frequently referred to the seat of their government as 'abode of the Khilafat,' alluded to the business of their state as 'affairs of the Khilafat,' and addressed their male children as 'light of the pupil of the eye of Khilafat' or 'light of the garden of Khilafat.' The oft-quoted Quranic verse 'we have sent thee as a Khalifa in earth' was freely invoked to reinforce their claim to the caliphal titles.\textsuperscript{38} The Ottoman chroniclers likewise made use of the Quranic verses to assert that their patron had ascended the throne with the will of the Almighty and repeatedly referred to the Sultans as "Khilafat Panahi" (refuge of the Khilafat).\textsuperscript{39} The contemporaries of the Ottomans, impressed by their brilliant victories and military exploits in Europe, also lavished upon them the august title coveted by all Muslim sovereigns. Murad I, for instance, after his conquest of Adrianople in 1362, was greeted by the ruler of Karamania as the 'chosen Khalifa of the Supreme Being,' and the 'shadow of God upon earth.'\textsuperscript{40} Thirteen years later the same monarch described the Sultan as the 'ornament of the throne of Khilafat' and prayed for the immortality of the Sultan's Khilafat.\textsuperscript{41} Muhammad II (1451–1481) was also hailed by
his fellow monarchs, after his conquest of Constantinople, as the 'one deserving to be the Khalifa.' During the reign of his successor Bayazid II, even the royal princes were addressed as the 'right hand of the Khilafat'; by that time this designation seems to have become an integral component of the titles of the Ottoman Sultans.

Sultan Selim I's conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1517, followed by the acknowledgement of the Ottoman suzerainty by the Sharif of Mecca, considerably bolstered the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat. Selim's predecessors had claimed the title of Khalifa on the basis of their great ghazi tradition. Ottoman chroniclers had repeatedly argued that as "afzal al-ghuzat wa'l-mujahidin" (the best of ghazis and of fighters in the Holy War), the sovereigns of the house of Osman deserved to succeed the Prophet and the pious Khalifas. Now, the establishment of the Ottoman rule in Mecca and Medina, a coveted possession for any Muslim ruler, and his assumption of the title of Khadim al-Harmain wa'l Sharifain provided Selim I with a new and far more solid ground for demanding the leadership of the Muslim world. In a letter to the ruler of Shirwan, written shortly after the conquest of Egypt, Selim proudly proclaimed the establishment of his hegemony in the Holy Cities. Recalling the Mamluk failure to protect the pilgrim routes from the pillage of highway robbers, the Sultan declared that God had now entrusted him with this responsibility. The noble charge of organizing the Haj caravan and
sending the Mahmal (the sacred litter which carried the Mamluk Sultan's annual offerings for the Holy Cities), declared Selim, had thus fallen on his shoulders. The letter concluded with a call for the acceptance of Selim's Khilafat-i-aliya (exalted Khilafat) and for the insertion of the Sultan's name in the khutba.

It is noteworthy that the legend, popularized by the Swedish scholar Mouradega d'Ohsson, that in 1517 Khalifa al-Mutawakkil had willingly relinquished the office of Khilafat in favour of Selim I and his descendants, finds no mention in the Sultan's letter. The claim to Khilafat is based on entirely different grounds. D'ohsson's source for this episode is obscure; later scholars, including several modern Turkish historians, have accepted his version without testing the authenticity of his statements.

There is no documentary evidence to support this legend. Contemporary chroniclers are also silent on this issue. For instance, Ibn Iyas, the author of Baadai'al-zuhur fi Waqai'al-duhur, who has left an eyewitness account of the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt, has not alluded to the transference of the caliphal office to Selim I. Mufakahat al-khillan, another contemporary account of the Sultan's campaign against the Mamluks, written by the distinguished chronicler Ibn Tulun, does not refer to this transaction either. Sultan Selim's letter to Prince Suleiman, dispatched from Cairo, is also conspicuous by its omission of any reference to this affair. Moreover, al-Mutawakkil is
reported to have retained his office till his death in 1543; in 1523 he had even conferred the diploma of investiture on Ahmad Pasha, the rebel Governor of Egypt.\textsuperscript{52} Thus all available evidence indicates that the story of the alleged transfer of the Khilafat from the Abbasid family to the house of Osman is nothing but a figment of D'ohsson's imagination.

This does not in any way mean that the Ottomans did not seek the Khilafat after 1517. Professor Arnold's observation that the Ottomans did not claim the universal Khilafat until 1774\textsuperscript{53} is based on unsound reasons. There is enough evidence to prove that the Ottoman claim to this coveted position was a phenomenon of longstanding. The aforementioned letter of Selim I to the Shah of Shirwan, asserting the Sultans's paramountcy over all Muslim monarchs on the ground of his having assumed the responsibility of defending the Holy Cities and protecting the pilgrim routes, leaves little doubt that the Sultan aspired to take over the leadership of the Muslim world. Khalifa al-Mutawakkil's deposition and his consequent deportation to Istanbul also points to this conclusion. Suleiman the Magnificent, Selim's successor, was an equally zealous claimant of the Khilafat. The Sultan's letters to the Sharif of Mecca and the Khan of Crimea, written shortly after his accession to the throne, proclaim his elevation to the throne of Khilafat.\textsuperscript{54} In his correspondence with the rulers of India and Central Asia the Sultan repeatedly impressed upon them the fact that God had granted him the
dignity of 'Khalifa of the Face of the Earth.' Even the letters dispatched to the European dignitaries propounded Suleiman's claim to the leadership of the Muslim world. For instance, in the epistles to the Doge of Venice, the Sultan is generally referred as "Khalifat Allah bain al-mashrigain w'al maghribain" (Khalifa of God in the East and the West) and "Khalifat al-jawanibain" (Khalifa of the whole world).56

The state documents of the Ottomans also attest to their claim to the universal Khilafat. For example, the Qanun-name (Legal Edict) of Budin describes Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent as the 'Emperor of the world, the Khalifa of the Prophet of God, the occupier of the Grand Imamate, and the inheritor of the Great Khilafat.'57 Another qanun-name, drawn up in 1568, uses identical titles for Selim II.58 The Qanun-name of Midili cezire, codified 141 years later, proclaims Sultan Ahmad III as the 'Khalifa of the Face of the Earth' and prays for the eternal perpetuation of the Sultan's Khilafat.59

Evidence in support of the longstanding Ottoman claim to the Khilafat of Islam is not lacking in the contemporary Turkish and Arabic literature, particularly of the sixteenth century. Ibn Zunbul, a contemporary of Selim I and the author of a book on the Ottoman campaign in Egypt, repeatedly refers to the Sultan as the 'Khalifa of God upon Earth.'60 Mufti Abu Saud, who composed an elegy on Suleiman the Magnificent, calls the Sultan the 'Khalifa of Allah in
the far ends of the earth. Mufti Qutbuddin an-Nahrawali, an Indian immigrant to the Hijaz and the author of the celebrated history of Mecca, Styles Selim I the 'best of the successors of the pious Khalifas; he also describes Selim II and Murad III as the 'Khalifa of God upon His Earth,' the 'Khalifa of the age,' and the 'Khalifa of God for all of mankind.' In another of his books, Al-barq al-Yamani fi al-Fath al-Usmani, the Mufti styles Murad III the "possessor of the Grand Imamate," and the "inheritor of the Great Khilafat." The chronicler even designates the Ottoman Sultans as Amir al-Muminin. Another Indian chronicler, Haji ad-Dabir, calls Suleiman the Magnificent the 'Emperor of Islam' and the 'Khalifa of Allah in the whole world.' The scholar admiral, Sidi Ali Reis, on the other hand, asserts in his travelogue that only the Ottoman Sultan could have the power to grant the right of khutba and coinage, a prerogative of the Abbasid Khalifas, to other Muslim sovereigns. It is obligatory for every Muslim, asseverates the Sidi, to pray for the well-being of the Ottoman Sultan.

The testimony of Grand Wazir Lutfi Pasha (1539-1541) substantiates the evidence available in the contemporary literature. In a treatise, written in 1554 to examine the thesis of the distinguished jurist Omar an-Nasafi (1068-1141) that "The Imam is of the Quraish and may not be of other than Quraish," the Pasha presents a cogent argument on behalf of the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat of
Islam. Condemning Nasafi's theory, on the basis of several Prophetic traditions as well as on the fatwas of numerous leading legists, as bida (innovation), the ex-Grand Wazir proclaims that the Ottoman Sultan by virtue of his power and position is "the Imam of the age in fulfillment of the relevant stipulations to the maintenance of the Faith and guardianship of the lands of al-Islam . . . he is the lieutenant of the Apostle in maintaining the Faith in the requisite manner over all the peoples subject to him." "Those who hereafter deny," concludes the Pasha, "the application of the name of Imam and Khalifa to the Sultan of the Nations [the Ottoman Sultan] are required to present the evidence, from Sharia tradition and not by intellectual argument." 67

Another treatise, written almost two centuries later, proffers almost identical arguments to vindicate the Ottoman claim to the universal Khilafat. Authored by an eminent scholar Musa al-Qudsi al-Khilvetti, a contemporary of Sultan Mahmud I (1730-1754), and entitled Khilafetin Al-i-Osmana Intiqali (Transfer of the Khilafat to the House of Osman), the tract does not recount the formal transfer of the Khilafat from the Abbasids to the Ottomans. On the contrary it argues that the Ottomans, because of their enormous power and prestige, were the natural heirs of the Abbasids. The author quotes Quranic verses, Prophetic traditions, and juridical opinions to corroborate his thesis; all these sources, he asserts, in some way or the other prognosticated the elevation of the Ottomans to the
leadership of the *Ummah* after the downfall of the Abbasids. The tract is undoubtedly a propagandist argument on behalf of the Ottoman dynasty. It nevertheless reflects that the "belief about the Ottomans taking over the Khilafat had already become strong in the first half of the eighteenth century."  

These two treatises serve to indicate that not only did the Ottomans claim the universal Khilafat after 1517 but also that a systematic effort was made to defend this claim. The observation of Professor Arnold that the Ottomans advanced their claim to the universal Khilafat for the first time in 1774 thus stands contradicted.

The Ottoman claim to the Khilafat was by no means unjustified; it was based on sound considerations. First, according to the standard doctrine of the Khilafat, every Muslim monarch who governed with justice and enforced *Sharia* as state law was entitled to declare himself Khalifa within his own domains. The Ottomans were no exception to this rule. Second, the Ottoman Sultans possessed most of the qualifications prescribed by the jurists for the holders of the Caliphal office. They ruled over the largest and the most powerful Muslim state in the world. Most of the Sultans, especially those who were at the helm of affairs in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were known for their personal bravery and valour. They were eminently capable of defending the faith and the Faithful – the principal qualification recommended for the Khalifa.
The only condition which made the Ottoman claim somewhat questionable was that they did not belong to the Quraish. But the obligatory nature of the Quraishite descent of the Khalifa was, as shown above, a disputed point among the early Muslim legists. It was also argued that the Quraishite descent for the Khalifa was recommended not by the Prophet but by Abu Bakr; thus, the indispensable nature of this condition was denied. "So it was possible," aptly remarks A. C. Niemeijer, "to treat this requirement as a "technicality" which could not be a serious objection to the [Ottoman] Sultan's claim [to the Khilafat]." Third, the Ottoman suzerainty over Mecca and Medina, the jewels in the Ottoman crown, further strengthened their claim to the leadership of the Ummah. It was on this ground that Abdullah Ibn Zubayr had exacted supremacy over Muawiyah during the early days of the Umayyad rule. Later, the Abbasids were to claim primacy over the Umayyads of Spain and the Fatimids of Egypt on the same consideration. The Ottoman claim to the Khilafat on the basis of their domination of the Holy Cities was therefore hardly surprising. Fourth, the Ottoman willingness to help the Muslims living outside their dominions and their efforts to defend the Muslim pilgrims around the world (See chapter Four) had added considerably to their prestige in the world of Islam. By their words as well as their deeds the Ottomans had demonstrated that they deserved the coveted position of Khalifa more than any of their contemporaries.
Several Muslim dignitaries and potentates are known to have acknowledged the Ottoman Khilafat. The Sharifs of Mecca usually addressed the Ottoman Sultans as 'Khalifa of the Messenger of God' and 'holder of the Great Khilafat'. The Uzbeks of Central Asia, the Khans of Crimea, and the Muslim chieftains of South East Asia, especially the Sultans of Sumatra, also acknowledged the Ottoman Sultans as their temporal leader. In the nineteenth century the ruler of Kashghar was reported to have issued coins in the name of the Ottoman Sultan. Even two rulers of Persia, the traditional rival of Turkey, are on record as having accepted the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat. Shah Ashraf, the founder of the short lived Afghan dynasty in Persia, was the first of these two monarchs. In 1727 he publicly acclaimed the Ottoman Sultan as the head of the Muslim world and the true successor of the pious Khalifas. Ashraf also agreed to read the Khutba in the Sultan's name. Fourteen years later another Shah of Persia, Nadir Shah, described Sultan Mahmud I as the "illuminating sun of the sky of Khilafat" and prayed for the strengthening of the pillars of the Sultan's Great Khilafat'. Shortly after this, Nadir Shah openly recognized the Sultan as the Khalifa of Islam. The Muslims of Calicut, Ceylon, China, and Java are also reported to have accepted the Ottoman Sultan as their Imam.

Among the Muslim rulers of India the tradition of acknowledging the legal supremacy of the Khalifa was strong and of long standing.
Iltutmish (1210-1236) was the first Sultan of Delhi to seek and obtain a letter of investiture from the Khalifa of Baghdad. He also received the title of *Nasir Amir al-Muminin* (Helper of the Commander of Faithful). The Sultan exultantly proclaimed his new title, along with the name of the Khalifa, on his coins and inscriptions; in the Badaun and Gangarampur inscriptions, the Sultan is also designated as *Yamin Khalifat Allah* (Right Hand of the Vicegerent of God). Iltutmish's successors continued to read *Khutba* and issue coins in the name of the Khalifas of Baghdad. Even after the collapse of the Baghdad Khilafat the myth of the caliphal supremacy was maintained. Sultan Balban (1266-1286), though powerful and domineering, found it advisable to submit to the theoretical sovereignty of the Abbasid Khalifa. In an inscription dated 1268, he called himself *Nasir Amir al-Muminin* a Khalifa who did not need his help any longer for he had long been dead. The Khaljis, who overthrew Balban's dynasty in 1290, preserved the Khalifa's name on their coins. Alaeddin Khalji (1296-1316), the greatest Sultan of Delhi, styled himself *Yamin al-Khilafat* and *Nasir Amir al-Muminin* on his coins and inscriptions. His son Mubarak Khalji (1316-1320), however, broke this self-imposed spell of Caliphal supremacy over the Sultanate of Delhi. He assumed the titles of the 'Khalifa of God', 'Khalifa on the Face of Earth', the 'Great Imam', as well as the pseudo-Abbasid name al-Wasiqbillah; Mubarak also designated the seat of his government *Darul khilafat*. 
The Tughlaqs, who supplanted the Khaljis, restored the theoretical supremacy of the Abbasid Khalifa. Muhammad bin Tughlaq's (1325-1351) devotion to the Khalifa was proverbial. He believed that no king or prince could exercise regal power without confirmation of his authority by the Khalifa; those who had reigned in India without the Caliphal investiture, the Sultan declared, were usurpers. Muhammad Tughlaq was the first Sultan of Delhi to apply for the diploma of investiture from the Cairene Khalifa. The Sultan received the Khalifa's envoy, bringing the required diploma with great fan-fare. He placed the Khalifa's letter on his head, kissed the envoy's feet, and walked before him barefoot for some distance. The Sultan's reverence for the Khalifa, remarks the contemporary chronicler Barni, cannot be reduced to writing. 88 His successor Firuz Tughlaq (1351-1388) was equally devoted to the Khalifa. In 1356 Khalifa al-Mutazid (1352-1362) bestowed upon him the diploma of rulership and the title of Sayyid-us-Salatin (Leader of the Sultans). Firuz was overwhelmed with joy. "The greatest and the best of honours that I obtained through God's mercy," wrote the Sultan, "was that by my obedience and piety, and friendliness and submission to the Khalifa, the representative of the Prophet, my authority was confirmed."89 Firuz's unworthy descendants continued to pay homage to the Abbasid Khalifas of Egypt. 90

The monarchs of the Sayyid dynasty (1414-1451) and the Lodi Afghans (1451-1526), retained on their coins Caliphal legends,
indicative of their submission to the Abbasids. With the advent of Babur, the myth of the legal supremacy of the Abbasid Khalifa over the rulers of Delhi finally ceased to exist.

Sultan Ghiasuddin Khalji of Bengal, a contemporary of Iltutamish, was the first among the rulers of the provincial kingdoms to recognize the hegemony of the Khalifa of Baghdad; he was also the recipient of the Caliphal investiture. Subsequent monarchs of Bengal, with the exception of a few who arrogated to themselves the title of the Khalifa of God in their inscriptions, retained the Khalifa's name in the sikka and Khutba. The founder of the Bahmani kingdom, Alauddin Bahman Shah (1347–1358) inscribed the standard Caliphal legend Yamin al-Khilafat and Nasir Amir al-Muminin on his coins. His successor Muhammad I was formally confirmed in his kingdom by Khalifa al-Mutazid. The Khalifa is also reported to have advised Sultan Firuz Tughlaq to refrain from invading the Bahmani Kingdom. The Sharqis of Jaunpur and the Khaljis of Malwa also styled themselves 'deputy of the Commander of Faithful' and 'heir to the Khalifa of the age'. The Sultans of Gujarat, Ahmad Shah II and Mahmud Shah, likewise submitted to the theoretical supremacy of the Abbasid Khalifas.

The advent of the Mughals in India coincided with Sultan Selim's assumption of the dignity of the Khilafat. But the Mughals, descendants of Timur and Chingiz Khan as they were, were not disposed to tolerate the supremacy of any earthly institution or person. They
were extremely conscious of the achievements of Timur, claimed Central Asia and even Rum (Turkey) as their patrimony, and believed that "no power or law was superior to theirs on earth and they submitted only to God." Timur's triumph over Sultan Bayazid I always fired their imagination. The claim of Bayazid's descendants to the Khilafat, which entailed Ottoman hegemony over all Sunni monarchs, was, therefore, not likely to be acknowledged by the Mughals. Indeed, Timur had himself laid claim to the dignity of Khalifa; the Khutba is also reported to have been read in Timur's name in the Hijaz. He not only read Khutba in his own name after the fashion of the Abbasids but even considered himself equal to such illustrious Khalifas as Umar bin Abdul Aziz and al-Mamoon.

A firm believer in his family's right to rule and a staunch opponent of the Ottomans, Babur was not willing to accept the Ottoman Khalifa as his suzerain. As early as 1507, nineteen years before his conquest of India, Babur had assumed the high-sounding title of Padshah (Emperor). He had adopted this title for two reasons. It was calculated to establish his own position as the head of the house of Timur and to assert the equality, if not the supremacy, of the Timurids in relation to the contemporary ruling houses of Islam. Babur's coins and inscriptions bear testimony to his attitude towards the Ottoman Khilafat. He inscribed the name of the pious Khalifas, along with his own, on his coins, had the Khutba read in him name,
and designated Agra, his capital city, as Darul Khilafat. One of Babur's inscriptions style him Khalifa; the Emperor was also addressed by a contemporary divine as the Imam-i-zaman (Imam of the age) and Imam-i-Jahan (Imam of the world).

Like his predecessors, Humayun too was obsessed with the idea of the superiority of his family. That he also cherished the memory of Timur's triumph over Bayazid I is evident from his letter to Sultan Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. The letter notes the humiliation and ignominy suffered by Bayazid at the hands of Timur because of the Sultan's stubbornness and refusal to comply with Timur's demands, and warns Bahadur Shah of dire consequences in case of his failure to come to terms with the Emperor.

Described by the Mughal chroniclers as the "most glorious of all Kings of the world" and the "exalter of the throne of the Great Khilafat", Humayun regarded the monarchs of Rum, Persia, and Central Asia as his auxiliaries. He was convinced that God had endowed him with supernatural qualities and that he received his inspiration and intuition directly from God. He was even reported to have represented himself as being a manifestation of the Supreme Being; Abul Fazl has in fact dubbed Humayun "Insan-i-kamil" (Perfect man). A man as opinionated as Humayun was not likely to recognize the paramountcy of any person, much less of the Ottoman Sultan whom, like many of his stock, he considered to be politically equal, if not inferior.
Humayun's letter to Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, dispatched in 1556, displays a similar sentiment of equality. The letter begins with a short doxology for God and a polite reminder to the addressee that "victory dwelleth but in God." It styles the Sultan the "adorner of the throne of Khilafat," the "Khalifa of high qualities," and the "one in whose glorious reign the Khilafat as reached its perfection." Humayun quotes the familiar Quranic verse "He [God] has sent thee as the Khalifa on earth," and prays for the immortality of Suleiman's Khilafat. The Emperor at the same time reminds the Sultan that, after his recent victories, he has also assumed the Khilafat in India and that his magnificence is equal to that of Solomon.108

The letter is of great importance in comprehending the Mughal attitude towards the Ottoman claim to the universal Khilafat. It placed the Ottoman Sultan and the Mughal Emperor on the same footing. The then prevailing doctrine of Khilafat that every independent monarch was Khalifa within his own dominions also finds a vindication in this letter. Humayun acknowledged the Sultan's claim to Khilafat within his own territories but asserted that he was entitled to hold the coveted position in India. Subsequent Mughal Emperors endorsed (though not without modification) Humayun's stand on the Khilafat; in fact, it became the cornerstone of the future Mughal policy towards Ottoman pretensions to the universal Khilafat.

Numismatic and epigraphic evidence substantiates the Emperor's stand on the Khilafat. He followed his father's policy of inscribing
on his coins the name of the pious Khalifas and designating the seat of his government as Darul Khilafat. 109 The Meham mosque inscription describes Humayun as 'the adorer of the throne of Khilafat.' 110 Several other inscriptions pray for the eternal perpetuation of Humayun's Khilafat. 111 Contemporary chroniclers usually refer to the Emperor as the 'Khalifa of the age.' No less a person than Shah Tahmasp of Persia is also known to have addressed Humayun as the "exalted full moon of the zenith of the Khilafat" and the "fruit of the tree of the Khilafat." 112

Akbar abandoned his father's compromising attitude toward the Ottoman claim to Khilafat. Eager to repeat the feats of Timur, he dreamed of nothing less than a universal empire; it is no coincidence that Abul Fazl has pointed out the close similarity between the horoscope of Akbar and that of his illustrious ancestor. 113 The doctrine of one world and one leader appealed to Akbar considerably. He regarded the subjugation of other countries for the fulfillment of his dream as the highest form of worship of the Almighty. "The justice-loving rulers," wrote Abul Fazl, "should not be satisfied with countries of which they are in possession, but should set their heart upon conquering other countries and regard this as a choice form of Divine worship ... The wise and judicious who understand the spirit of the age have said that if this civilized world, which has been split up owing to the inattention of great souls were under one able and just ruler of extensive capacity, the dust of dissension
would assuredly be laid and mortals find repose. Hence it is that
the Adorner of fortune's parterre in our age [Akbar] is continually
engaged in the conquest of other countries. 114

In a letter to Abdullah Khan Uzbek, Akbar outlined an elaborate
plan of conquest. Besides the conquest of the Deccan, the plan
included the subjugation of Central Asia, Iraq, and Persia. It
envisaged the subjection of Rum and Sham (Syria) as well. The
Emperor, however, proposed to restore these territories back to the
Ottoman Sultan. The letter also alluded to Akbar’s desire of having
the khutba read in his name in the sacred city of Mashhad and the
establishment of Mughal suzerainty over Mecca and Medina. 115 In
this grandiose scheme of conquest, there was obviously no room for
any political authority equal or superior to Akbar. It is not
surprising that the Emperor paid no heed to the Ottoman claim to the
universal Khilafat.

Akbar’s theory of kingship, as narrated by Abul Fazl in Akbar
Nama and Ain-i-Akbari, also demonstrates his disregard for the
Ottoman Khilafat. "Kingship is a gift of God" and "no dignity is
higher in the eyes of God than royalty" was his motto. 116 He
believed the king to be the direct representative of God and was
convinced that it was through God alone, not through any mundane
authority like the Khalifa, that the king derives his power and
authority. "Royalty," observed Abul Fazl, "is a light emanating from
God, and a ray from the sun ... It is communicated by God to the
kings without the intermediate assistance of anyone. 

The chronicler then proceeds to distinguish between a "true" and a "selfish king." The true sovereign sees things in the right perspective while "the superficial considers secular world as opposed to and exclusive of the spiritual." Abul Fazl deplored this tendency to differentiate between secular and religious affairs and pronounced it to be the root cause of the disorder and strife in the world. He therefore stressed the need of uniting the temporal and the spiritual authority in a single monarch. Only a monarch born with a special destiny, affirmed Abul Fazl, could shoulder this responsibility. Asserting that God bestows this high office upon only one monarch in every age, the chronicler advanced the claim of the 'Lord of the Age' [Akbar] to this dignity. In plain language this theory meant that Akbar's destiny was not shared by his contemporary sovereign and that he alone deserved to occupy the pre-eminent position among the monarchs of his age. This was a clear denial of the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat.

Akbar also made a systematic effort to get himself recognized as Khalifa. From the very beginning of his reign he had started assuming Caliphal titles. One of his early inscriptions described the Caesar, a title generally attributed by the Mughals to the Ottoman Sultan, as the Emperor's servant. He continued his predecessor's policy of designating the seat of his government as Darul Khilafat; one of his gold coins bore the legend As-Sultan-i-
ali al-Khalifat-al-mutali (the great Sultan, the supreme Khalifa). In 1576 Akbar began the policy of organizing annual Haj caravans to Mecca — a duty assigned by the Muslim jurists to the Khalifa. According to the chronicler Nizamuddin Ahmad, this policy was instituted in imitation of the Haj caravans of Egypt and Syria; these caravans were arranged under the auspices of the Ottoman Sultan.

Three years later the Emperor decided, after the fashion of the earlier Khalifas, to deliver the khutba on the Friday prayers. "It has been brought to the emperor's notice," wrote Nizamuddin Ahmad, "that His holiness the last of the Prophets, may the blessings and peace of God be on him! and the noble Caliphs . . . , used themselves always to lead the prayers on Fridays, and on the days of the two Ids, and each one of the Abbasid Caliphs also, keeping alive this correct practice read the public prayers in their own proper persons. After the Abbasid Caliphs, many enthroned Sultans, such as the Sahib-i-Qirani, Amir Timur Gurgan and Mirza Ulugh Beg . . . read the public prayers themselves, so the opinion, which pointed to the right course (of the emperor) came to this decision that he should on a Friday act in accordance with the practice of the Caliphs and of the guiding Imams . . . ." Accordingly on Friday, June 26, 1576, Akbar performed the duties of Imam in the grand mosque of Fatehpur Sikri and delivered the khutba. Mughal chroniclers are unanimous in their opinion that the khutba was short and different
from the usual ones given on Fridays. It nevertheless "reiterated
the theory that the Emperor derived his power from God — a virtual
concomitant of the theory that he was Khalifa of Allah."

In September 1579 Akbar took another step to reinforce his claim
to the Khilafat. He got a document prepared by a leading jurist of
his court and had it signed by the premier ulama of the empire.
Known as Mahzar, the document conferred on Akbar the power of
ijtihad (interpretation of law), a religious authority of great
consequence, in the event of a difference of opinion among the
jurists. It also pronounced the Emperor as Imam-i-Adil (the just
Imam) and Amir al-Muminin — an appellation which even the
Ottoman Sultans had not dared to assume publicly. The document
demonstrates Akbar's unwillingness to admit the legal supremacy of
the Ottoman Sultan and his abhorrence of the idea of the Ottoman
hegemony over his own Muslim subjects. It was indeed "a direct
challenge to the Ottoman pretensions to the leadership of the
Faithful."

Professor Rizvi's observation that the "Mahzar had no bearing on
Akbar's relations with Turkey" is not tenable. Akbar's
hostility towards the Ottomans was well known. He had made several
unsuccessful attempts to form an anti-Ottoman alliance with the
Portuguese and the Uzbeks. The Emperor is even reported to have
proposed to finance a joint Mughal-Portuguese campaign against the
Ottomans. He had also once entertained the idea of helping the Shah
of Persia against the Ottomans. Determined to assert himself as the supreme power in the world of Islam and realizing that the power and prestige enjoyed by the Ottomans was the only hurdle in the fulfillment of his dream, Akbar was always in search of measures to downgrade the Ottoman Sultan's position. The Mazhar by conferring upon the Emperor the lofty title of Amir al-Muminin formally proclaimed the establishment of an independent Mughal Khilafat in India. It probably impaired the prestige of the Ottomans in much the same way as the foundation of independent Khilafats in Spain and Egypt had damaged the reputation of the Abbasids.

Akbar's subsequent actions also indicate his resolve to assume the Khilafat in India. We have the testimony of the chronicler Arif Qandahari that in the Mughal dominions the khutba was read in the name of Akbar as Amir al-Muminin.129 Badauni has observed that after 1579 the Emperor had seriously considered introducing the formula "There is no God but God and Akbar is God's Khalifa." "But as this led to commotions," writes the chronicler, "he [Akbar] thought better of it, and restricted the use of the formula to a few people in the Harem."130 An inscription dated 1589 also styles the Emperor Imam al-Islam wa'l Muslimin (Imam of Islam and the Muslims).131 All the Mughal chroniclers including the orthodox Badauni, who is extremely critical of Akbar's religious policies, also refer to the Emperor as the "Khalifa of the age" and the "Khalifa of God."132
Akbar's claim to be Khalifa within his own realm was not illegal; the prevailing doctrine of Khilafat was enough to sustain his claim. The jurists were also not averse to the existence of two Khalifas simultaneously provided that oceans and unsurmountable mountains or deserts separated their territories. Moreover, Akbar had practically all the qualifications required for the Khalifa except that he did not belong to the Quraish. But the non-Quraishite descent was not considered to be, as shown above, a disqualification for the Caliphal office.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to agree with Professor Tripathi's observation that "From the historical point of view the claims of Akbar [to Khilafat] were probably higher and certainly not inferior to those of the Ottoman Sultans." First, the Ottomans ruled over an intercontinental empire. The territories controlled by the Ottomans, which also included the heartland of the traditional Caliphal empire (Hijaz, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq), were far more extensive than those of the Mughals. Naturally the prestige and standing of the Ottomans in the eyes of Muslims at large were also higher than those of the Mughals. Second, because of their incessant engagements in the ghazwat with the Christian states of Europe, the Ottomans had established a great reputation as the defenders of the Faith in the Muslim world. Akbar, on the other hand had no claim to such fame; he had even proposed to ally himself with a Christian power against the Ottomans. Third, the Ottoman hegemony over Mecca,
Medina, and Bait al-Muqaddas (Jerusalem) — three of the holiest cities of Islam — gave them a definite precedence over other Muslim monarchs of the day. The Mughals were no exception to this rule. Akbar's title to Khilafat, though not illegitimate, was certainly not higher nor even equal to those of the Ottoman Sultans.

Jahangir inherited Akbar's exaggerated notions of the superhuman attributes of the king. He also believed in the divine origin of the kingly office and observed that "sovereignty and world rule are not things to be arranged by the worthless endeavours of defective intellects. The just Creator bestows them on whom He considers fit for this glorious and exalted duty." The Emperor did not even object to being addressed as "visible God." A firm believer in his family's superiority over the contemporary ruling houses of Islam, Jahangir regarded the Ottomans as inferior to him. In his autobiography the Emperor has proudly recalled Timur's munificence in having restored Sultan Bayzaid's son Musa Chelebi to the domains of his vanquished father; he thus felt that the Ottomans owed a debt of obligation, if not allegiance, to the Mughals for this act of Timur's generosity. Jahangir's exceptionally cordial relations with Shah Abbas I of Persia also constrained him to ignore the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat. He was also reported to have rejected an Ottoman request to stop supporting the Shah of Persia in his anti-Ottoman designs.

Jahangir was, therefore, hardly expected to bring about any
change in his father's rigid and uncompromising stand on the Ottoman Khilafat. The khutba was as usual read in his name. In his inscriptions the Emperor was generally described as the 'asylum of the Khilafat' and the 'Khalifa of the age.'

Jahangir's coins, likewise, give no indication of his acknowledgment of the Ottoman claim; he had even given up his predecessor's practice of inscribing the name of the pious Khalifas on the coins.

The accession of Shahjahan brought no change in this state of affairs. Described by the author of Aml-i-salih as "superior to all the past and contemporary monarchs of the world" and as the "one deserving to hold the rank of Khilafat and nizabat (vicegerency) of God on earth," Shahjahan was praised by his contemporaries as the ideal Muslim king. The Emperor was styled the "pillar of the Sharia" and the "defender of the faith." Hailed as the Mujaddid of the century, he was credited with having given currency to the ordinances of the Prophet. Contemporary chroniclers also speak eloquently of Shahjahan's love for splendor and his passion for display. The Emperor's splendid architecture, including the universally acclaimed Taj Mahal, is a fitting memorial to the magnificence and grandeur of his reign. A monarch who was fond of ostentation, who was extremely conscious of his own power and greatness, and accustomed to the praise and flattery of his courtiers was most likely to crave the highest temporal rank in the world of Islam.
Shahjahan's inscriptions and coins bear testimony to his ambitions. The inscriptions on the arches of the grand mosque of Shahjahanabad pay glowing tributes to the piety of the Emperor and depict him as the "asylum of Kings" and the "Khalifa of God in both worlds". The mosque itself has been compared with the Ka'ba: "This mosque has become the ultimate pilgrimage of worship for the believers as is the sacred mosque of Kaaba on the day of Id al-azha ... its pulpit of white marble exemplifies a ladder through which the believers can have access to the court of heaven like the Rock of the mosque of Jerusalem ——".¹⁴² The inscription on the central arch of the grand mosque of Agra describes Shahjahan as the "noble Khalifa of Supreme Being"; it also proclaims the Emperor as the Amir al-Muminin.¹⁴³ On his coins Shahjahan restored the name of the pious Khalifas. Besides indicating his subordination to these distinguished companions of the Prophet, it also reveals the Emperor's unwillingness to acknowledge any other mundane authority. The title Sahib-i-Qiran Sani (Second Lord of Conjunctions), inscribed on the imperial coins,¹⁴⁴ further supports this theory.

The imperial epistles also convey, though indirectly, the official Mughal policy towards the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat. The earliest of these was dispatched to Sultan Murad IV in 1637. Though Shahjahan uses such superlative titles for Murad IV as the "pride of the Caesars", the "leader of the Ghazwat and Mujahidin", and the "Servitor of the Holy Cities", he does not address the Sultan as
the Khalifa; the Emperor reserves this august title for himself. The letter proclaims Shahjahan as the "one chosen by God for the exalted position of his own Khalifa". Shahjahan designates his family as the dudman-i-Khilafat (family of the Khalifas), but refers to the house of Osman simply as the "illustrious dynasty". The Emperor frequently applies the epithet "abode of the Khilafat" to Agra but characterizes Istanbul merely as the "seat of the Ottoman Sultanate". The epistle of Mughal Wazir Islam Khan to the Ottoman Grand Wazir Mustafa Pasha, dispatched a few years later, displays the same air of superiority assumed by the Mughals. Islam Khan depicts Shahjahan as the "successor of the pious Khalifas", refers to him as "his exalted Majesty the Khalifa", and takes umbrage over some minor discourtesies of diction in the Sultan's previous letter to the Emperor. The wazir, on the other hand, adverts to the Sultan simply as the "Emperor of Rum" and the "chosen of the family of the renowned Caesars". Shahjahan's other letters to Sultan Muhammad IV are, likewise, marked by a similar spirit of self-exaltation.

Aurangzeb, who seized the Peacock throne from Shahjahan, was equally unwilling to acknowledge the Ottoman claim to the Khalifat. Hostile towards the Ottomans, the Emperor took every opportunity to support the opponents of the Ottoman regime. He cordially welcomed two rebel Governors of Basra and gave them and their dependents high mansabs in the imperial service. Aurangzeb also did not respond to Sultan Suleiman II's friendly overtures. The suggestion of
superiority inherent in the Sultan's claim, in his letter, that "God has honoured him [the Sultan] with the custodianship of the entire Muslim world"\textsuperscript{148} was probably responsible for the Emperor's lukewarm attitude.

A paragon of virtues in the eyes of his subjects, Aurangzeb was extolled by his contemporary chroniclers, Muslim as well as non-Muslim, as the "Khalifa of the age", "Khalifa of God", and the "successor of the pious Khalifas".\textsuperscript{149} The high-sounding title \textit{Alamgir} (World Conqueror), which Aurangzeb assumed on the eve of his accession to the throne also indicates his unwillingness to accept any political authority higher than his own. He was probably the first Mughal Emperor to publicly use for himself the appellation \textit{Amir al-Muminin} on state documents; the imperial seal also bore this stamp.\textsuperscript{150} The Emperor's inscriptions, likewise, display his pretensions to the temporal leadership of the Faithful.\textsuperscript{151}

Aurangzeb was the only Mughal sovereign who was acclaimed as the "Commander of the Faithful" outside the Mughal dominions. The famous Ottoman jurist Sheikh Muhammad al-Muradi, chief Hanafite mufti of Damascus during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid I, was a great admirer of the Emperor. In his book \textit{Silkud-Durar}, the Sheikh described Aurangzeb as "the Commander and Imam of the Faithful, stay and support of the Muslims, and warrior on the path of God --- ."\textsuperscript{152} The Sheikh also lavishly praised Aurangzeb's services to Islam in India, his endeavours to extirpate the roots of infidelity
in the subcontinent, and his efforts to "make the cause of God to be uppermost." The jurist asserted that "He [Aurangzeb] has no equal among the kings of Islam in his age in uprightness of conduct, fear of God, and zeal in performance of religious duty." It is noteworthy that the Sheikh did not use the title Amir al-Muminin for his own patron, Sultan Abdul Hamid I.

Bahadur Shah, Jahandar Shah, and Farrukhsiyar continued Aurangzeb's policy towards the Ottoman Khilafat. The first two monarchs never exchanged letters and embassies with the Ottomans; their coins indicate their desire to be considered Khalifa within the Mughal domains. Farrukhsiyar did establish diplomatic relations with Istanbul but he did not accede to the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat. His letter to Sultan Ahmad III gives no hint of his having accepted the Sultan as the Khalifa. The legend "Badshah-i-Bahr-o-Bar" (Emperor of Sea and Land) inscribed on Farrukhsiyar's coins also displays the Emperor's wish to declare himself equal, if not superior, to the Ottoman Sultan, who was usually addressed as Sultan al-Barrain Wa al-Bahrain (Lord of the two continents and seas).

It was Muhammad Shah who modified his predecessors' rigid stand on the Ottoman Khilafat. He was the first Mughal Emperor, after Humayun, openly to acknowledge the Ottoman Sultan as Khalifa. In his letter to Sultan Ahmad III, written in 1723, Muhammad Shah styled the Sultan the "adorner of the throne of Khilafat" and prayed for the
immortality of the Ottoman Khilafat. In another letter, dispatched to Sultan Mahmud I, the Emperor expressed his pleasure at the accession of the Sultan to the throne of Khilafat. Muhammad Shah's ministers did not lag behind in recognizing the Ottoman Khilafat. Nizam ul-Mulk addressed Sultan Mahmud I as the "exalted Khalifa." Nasir Jung, Nizam's successor, also eulogized the Sultan as the "Khalifa of the Prophet", affirmed that the Ottoman dynasty had been blessed with the majesty of the Khilafat, and declared himself as the sincere servant of the Sultan.

The change in Mughal attitude towards the Ottoman Khilafat is hardly surprising. After the death of Aurangzeb the empire had fallen into deep distress; civil wars between the royal princes, dissension among different groups of nobles, and frequent regional revolts had sapped its strength. The Emperor's power and prestige had also diminished considerably. Muhammad Shah himself owed his position to a handful of nobles and was dependent on their continued support for his own survival. In external affairs, the situation was no better. The rise of Nadir Shah in Persia and his invasion of India in 1739 had wrecked the territorial unity of the empire and had exposed the vulnerability of the once mighty Mughal empire to powerful foreign invaders. The invasion had left the Mughals seething with anger and determined to take revenge on Nadir Shah. The situation demanded conciliatory policy calculated to establish
friendly relations with the Ottomans — the traditional enemies of Persia. An alliance with the Ottoman was expected to prevent future Persian aggression on India and also to further the Mughal desire to take revenge on Persia. Hence the Mughal acknowledgement of the Ottoman claim to the khilafat.

Muhammad Shah was the last Mughal Emperor to acknowledge the Ottoman khilafat. His successors, though mere puppets in the hands of their nobles, continued to flatter themselves with Caliphal titles; literary and numismatic evidence support this contention. Notwithstanding the fact that the authority of Shah Alam II (1759-1806) was not effective even within the walls of his own palace, he was eulogized by his courtiers as the Khalifa and shadow of God. However, it was during Shah Alam's reign that several Indian Muslim potentates acknowledged the Ottoman Sultan as the leader of the Faithful. The Bibi of Arakkal addressed the Sultan as Khalifa and sought his help against the highhandedness of the English East India Company. Sultan Tipu of Mysore also paid homage to the Ottoman Khalifa. He was the first Indian Muslim monarch to receive a letter of investiture from the Ottoman Khalifa (see chapter 2). There is evidence that after the demise of Shah Alam II the khutba was read in India in the name of the Ottoman Khalifa.

The deposition of Bahadur Shah II in 1857 proved to be a turning point in India's relations with the Ottoman Khilafat. Henceforth Indian Muslims looked towards the Ottoman Sultan for
sympathy and succour. The Deoband school, founded in 1867, also promoted pro-Ottoman sentiment among the Indian Muslims.\textsuperscript{162} During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 Muslims of India publicly condemned the anti-Turkish attitude of the British government. Muslim dignitaries contributed generously to the Turkish war fund. The letter of the Ottoman Grand Wazir, sent to the Begum of Bhopal in appreciation of her donation to the Turkish war fund, declaring Sultan Abdul Hamid II as the "august representative of the Prophet," was received in the state with great fanfare.\textsuperscript{163} By the turn of the twentieth century the tendency among Indian Muslims to look towards the Ottoman Sultan as their spiritual leader and as their well-wisher had become strong.\textsuperscript{164} The interest shown by them to preserve the Ottoman Khilafat through the Khilafat Movement is too well-known to be discussed here. Professor Niemeijer has aptly remarked that "in the Khilafat movement Indian Muslims played a more important role than any other Muslims outside Turkey."\textsuperscript{165} With the abolition of the Ottoman Khilafat in 1924, the last vestiges of the association of the Muslims of the subcontinent with the Ottoman Khilafat ceased to exist.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

The Mughal attitude towards the Ottoman Khilafat was essentially based on Jalaluddin Dawwani's doctrine of Khilafat; this permitted
every Muslim monarch, governing with justice and enforcing Sharia as the law of the community, to hold the office of Khalifa within his own domains. The exaggerated notion of superiority over the contemporary ruling houses of Islam — a notion based on lineage from Timur — also determined the Mughal attitude. Babur had initiated the policy of ignoring the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat. His assumption of the title of Padshah and his practice of issuing coins bearing the name of the pious Khalifas were steps calculated to assert his disregard for the Ottoman Khilafat. Humayun, though proud of his ancestry and power, did not hesitate to accept the greatness of the Ottoman Sultan. He addressed Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent as Khalifa and regarded him, if we are to believe Sidi Ali Reis, as the only Muslim sovereign worthy to bear the title of Padshah. Akbar abandoned Humayun's conciliatory policy altogether. He was suspicious of the Ottoman alliance with the Uzbeks and envied the Ottoman hegemony over the Holy Cities. Inspired by his political and military achievements and supported by a band of scholars who were willing to dance to his tunes, Akbar made a bold bid for the highest temporal position of the Muslim world. He assumed the title of Amir al-Muminin, which even the Ottoman Sultans had not adopted publicly.

Jahangir continued his father's uncompromising attitude towards the Ottoman claim to the leadership of the Muslim world. He considered the Ottomans to be under moral obligation to his family
for Timur's generosity towards them; the Emperor's repudiation of the
Ottoman Khilafat was, therefore, hardly surprising. Shahjahan was
willing more than his father and grandfather to establish friendly
relations with the Ottomans. But he did not acknowledge the Sultan
as Khalifa. Shahjahan's military exploits coupled with the general
prosperity of his reign seem to have convinced him of his own
greatness. He was the second Mughal Emperor to adopt the title of
Amir al-Muminin. Aurangzeb, during whose reign the Mughal empire
reached the apogee of its power, was equally conscious of his might
and prestige. Far from acknowledging the Ottoman Khilafat, he
advanced his own claim to this coveted position. He was the first
Mughal Emperor to style himself Amir al-Muminin on state documents
and on his official seal.

Muhammad Shah's reign marks the resumption of full-fledged
diplomatic relations between Shahjahanabad and Istanbul. The Emperor
also willingly acknowledged the Ottoman Khilafat. Though dictated by
exigencies of the circumstances, the change in the Mughal attitude
had the desired effect; it substantially contributed to the
improvement of Mughal-Ottoman relations. Muhammad Shah's successors
continued to claim Caliphal status within their own domains. As late
as 1857, Bahadur Shah II (1837-1857), the last Mughal Emperor, was
recognized as Khalifat Allah (Divine vicegerent). 166

The ecumenical titles assumed by the Mughal Emperors also evince
their attitude towards the Ottoman claim to paramountcy over the
Muslim monarchs. The apppellations, such as Jahangir (World Conqueror), Shahjahan (King of the World), Alamgir (Vanquisher of the World) and Shah Alam (Lord of the Universe), tend to reveal a claim to world sovereignty;\textsuperscript{167} this was tantamount to the Mughal claim to Khilafat. The Mughals also granted the Ottoman imperial title of 'Sultan' to their sons and grandsons. Started by Akbar, this practice was probably adopted to convey a subtle sense of Mughal superiority over the Ottomans. Mughal correspondence with the Ottomans also reflect a deliberate avowal of Mughal primacy. Seldom in their epistles did the Mughals address the Ottoman Sultan as Khalifa. On the other hand the Emperors often styled themselves the "successor of the pious Khalifas" and the "adorner of the throne of Khilafat." The Mughal court was characterized as the astan-i-Khilafat (the threshold of Khilafat), the royal children were called samar-i-Shajar-i-Khilafat (fruit of the tree of Khilafat), and the imperial officials were addressed as azd al-Khilafat-i-Kuba (pillar of the Great Khilafat).\textsuperscript{168} The Mughal Chroniclers, likewise, usually referred to their patrons as the 'Khalifa of the age'; but they invariably alluded to the Ottoman Sultans as Qaiser-i-Rum (Caesar of Rum), Khawandkar-i-Rum (Lord of Rum) or simply as Sultan-i-Rum (Sultan of Rum).\textsuperscript{169}

During approximately two hundred years of effective Mughal rule in India, only two Mughal Emperors, Humayun and Muhammad Shah, acknowledged the Ottoman Khilafat. In both cases the internal
condition of the empire coupled with the unstable position of the
monarchs themselves, rather than any genuine desire to accept Ottoman
paramountcy, seems to have been responsible for the change in the
Mughal stand on the Ottoman Khilafat. The Mughals had an exaggerated
idea of their importance as the descendants of Timur. This, combined
with their own power and the extensive territories which they
governed, prevented the Mughals from recognizing the Ottoman
Khilafat. But whenever the Mughals did so, they did not fail to
impress upon the Ottomans their right to Khilafat within their own
territories. This was exactly what Humayun and Muhammad Shah did, as
their epistles to the Ottoman Sultans clearly indicate.

The question of Khilafat exercised a good deal of influence in
shaping the Mughal-Ottoman relations. The Ottoman claim to Khilafat
and the counter claim made by the Mughals seems to have promoted a
sense of rivalry between these two premier ruling houses of Islam.
It is probable that the rivalry on this issue, in addition to other
factors, precluded Akbar and Jahangir from establishing formal
relations with Istanbul. The imperious tone of the letters of Sultan
Murad IV and Sultan Ibrahim to Shahjahan, with numerous references to
Ottoman Khilafat suggesting Ottoman hegemony over the Mughals, had
considerably displeased the Emperor; this had resulted in a temporary
breach in Mughal-Ottoman relations. The relations were resumed ten
years later at the Ottoman initiative. In the same manner Sultan
Suleiman II's letter to Aurangzeb, with its open assertion of Ottoman
primacy over all Muslim monarchs, had incensed the Emperor. Aurangzeb's refusal to send a return embassy to Istanbul is enough to indicate his displeasure. The decay of the Mughal empire in the eighteenth century seems to have diminished the pride of the Mughals; this, in turn, appears to have abated the Mughal-Ottoman rivalry on the issue of the Khilafat. Hence Muhammad Shah's ready acceptance of the Ottoman Khilafat and the improvement in Mughal-Ottoman relations.

The concluding remarks of this essay are the theme of the following chapter.
NOTES


3 The passages refer to the Prophets Adam and David, respectively. In the first, God informs the angels of His intention to create Adam: "And when thy Lord said unto the angels: Lo! I am about to place a Khalifa in the earth, they said: wilt thou place therein one who will do harm therein and will shed blood, while we, we hymn Thy praise and sanctify Thee?" (II, 30). In the other passage God admonishes David to establish justice on the earth: "O David! Lo! We have set thee as a Khalifa in the earth; so judge aright between mankind, and follow not deires that beguile thee from the way of Allah" (xxxviii, 26). The Muslim jurists' interpretation of the word "Khalifa" as the 'vicegerent,' 'substitute' or 'deputy of God on the earth' has been challenged by the modern scholars. Montgomery Watt, for instance, writes, "This review of the usage of he root [khlf] gives a basis for a conclusion about the original meaning of Khalifa in the two Quranic passages. As applied to David, the word would appear to mean 'a person exercising authority,' and to
have the slightest suggestion of succeeding someone else, or God, in this function. In the passage about Adam the matter is not so clear. On the whole it would seem that the meaning is that Adam was made a settler in the earth but also exercised some authority, namely, in instructing the angels. His activity on earth might be thought of as following on the activity of God in creating animals, plants, and angels; but succession is not emphasized. Neither is there any emphasis on his deputizing for God. If there is any suggestion of this, it is balanced by the implication that his activity and God's are different." W. Montogmery Watt "God's Caliph: Quranic interpretatons and Umayyad claims," Iran and Islam, in Memory of the late Vladimir Minorsky, ed. C.E. Bosworth, Edinburgh, 1971, p. 568. Also see D.S. Morgoliouth, "The sense of the title Khalifa," A volume of Oriental studies presented to E.G. Browne, ed. T.W. Arnold nd R.A. Nicholson, Amsterdam, 1973 (reprint), p. 323-328.

4 This is the view taken by Shah Waliullah. See Aziz Ahmad, "An Eighteenth Century theory of Caliphate," Studia Islamica, xxviii, 1968, p. 136.

Montgomery Watt, on the other hand, maintains that Abu Bakr was never asked to assume the title of Khalifat Allah. He believes that the story regarding the first Khalifa's refusal to adopt this title was fabricated later to discredit the Umayyads. See "God's Caliph . . .," pp. 568, 572. Also see Morgoliouth, "The sense of . . .," p. 327; T.W. Arnold, The Caliphate, 1965 (reprint), pp. 51-52.


8 Khalifa Mamun Rashid (813-833) was the first to assume the title of Imam; his successors continued this practice.

9 Although this title was held by one or more persons earlier, Khalifa Umar bin al-Khattab (634-644) was the first head of the Islamic state to adopt this title. Contemporary observers give different explanations for the assumption of this title. While some say that Khalifa Umar himself invented this title, others assert that it was given to him by one of his followers. But all observers are unanimous in the contention that Umar's initial designation Khalifa-i-Khalifat rasul Allah was considered to be long and cumbersome. Therefore, the shorter title of Amir al-Muminin was adopted. See Mufaddimah, p. 180; Arnold, pp. 31-32; V.V. Bartold, "Caliph and Sultan," Islamic Quarterly, 1963, p. 119, Note 5;
Encyclopedia of Islam, lv, p. 947; Morgoliouth, "The sense of . . . ," pp. 323–324. Later, this appellation became the exclusive privilege of the Abbasids. According to Ibn Khaldun, "when the Abbasid dynasty reached its flowering and prime and another style of address gained currency, one that served to distinguish them from each other, in as much as the title of the Commander of the Faithful, was one they all had" (Mugaddimah, pp. 180–181). Very few Muslim rulers ever dared to arrogate this title to themselves. On the other hand, whenever a Muslim potentate decided to assume the dignity of Khalifa, he took this title. For instance, the Abd ar-Rahman III, the Umayyad ruler of Spain, decided to declare himself Khalifa in 928 A.D., he had himself called Amir al-Muminin.

10 Rosenthal, Political Thought . . ., p. 45; Mugaddimah, pp. 157, 166. Muslim jurists invoke the Quranic verse: "O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger and those of you who are in authority" (IV, 59) in support of this argument. For the Prophetic traditions quoted in support of this theory, see Arnold, Caliphate, pp. 46–49.


12 Justification for this statement could be drawn from the Quran (xxviii, 26), where God commands David that as His Khalifa on earth, he should establish justice between mankind.

13 Aziz Ahmad, "An Eighteenth . . .," p. 142.

14 Mugaddimah, p. 171. Abu Bakr’s appointment by the
Prophet as the leader of the prayer, argues Ibn Khaldun, had facilitated his elevation to the Khilafat. Jalaluddin as-Suyuti also makes the same observation. See his History of the Khalifas, tr. H.S. Jarrett, Amsterdam, 1970 (reprint), p. 70.

15 For the Prophetic tradition quoted in support of this tradition see Jalaluddin As-Suyuti, pp. 8-10.


17 Mughaddimah, p. 159. According to Ibn Khaldun, the companions of the Prophet, on the day of Abu Bakr's election to the Khilafat, had reached a consensus that Khalifa should belong to the Quraish. As-Suyuti does not refer to any such consensus. Also see Rosenthal, Political Thought . . . , pp. 29, 101. for a definition of Asabiya and its influence on the fortunes of dynasties and monarchies, see Mughaddimah, pp. 123-132. The kharijis, it should be mentioned here, had also rejected the Quraishite descent as a prerequisite for Khilafat. They believed that any Muslim, of any status or origin, was eligible for the Khilafat. He was required to be capable for the office and was to be chosen by "universal suffrage." See Bernard Lewis, "Politics and War," The Legacy of Islam, second edition, ed. Joseph Schacht and C.E. Bosworth, Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 164-165.

18 For instance, two leading Indian Muslims of the nineteenth century, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Maulana Shibli Numani, refuted the
Sultan's claim to the Khilafat on this ground. See Aziz Ahmad, *Studies*, p. 64.

19 The Umayyads also claimed their right to Khilafat on the basis of their kinship with Usman (644–656), the third Khalifa; the revenge of Usman's murder was the professed reason of Muawiyah's rebellion against Ali. Thus the Umayyad claim to the Khilafat was primarily based on the Arab idea of blood revenge. This was obviously insufficient to buttress their legitimacy as the ruler of the *Umma*, and ultimately became the main reason for their downfall. See, W.M. Watt, "God's Caliph . . . ," pp. 568–572. Also see *Encyclopedia of Islam*, IV, p. 938; As-Suyuti, p. 203.


22 Ibid., p. 1004.


the Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo," Bulletin the School of Oriental and
African Studies, XLVII, pt. 3, 1984, pp. 501–507; D. Ayalon,
"Studies on the transfer of the Abbasid Caliphate from Baghdad to
Cairo,"
  
26 H.A.R. Gibb, "Al-Mawardi's theory of Khalifa," Islamic
Culture, July 1937, p. 291.
  
27 A.K.S. Lambton, "Caliphate in Political theory,"
  
28 Gibb, "Al-Mawardi's . . . ," pp. 300–302; A.K.S. Lambton,
  
29 Quoted in Islamic Society and the West, ed. H.A.R. Gibb
31.
  
30 This theory was propounded by Ibn Jamaa (1241–1333). One
of the most distinguished jurists of his time, Ibn Jamaa twice served
as the chief Hanafite Qazi of Cairo from 1291–1294 and 1309–1327.
For a modern account of his doctrine see Franz Rosenthal, Political
Thought . . . , pp. 43–51.
  
31 H.A.R. Gibb, "Some considerations on the Sunni theory of
  
32 Muqaddimah, pp. 154–155. Ibn Khaldun's theory of
Khilafat is somewhat similar to Ibn al-Muqaffa's concept of kingship
based on religion. See A.K.S. Lambton, "Islamic Political Thought,"
33 Gibb, "Some considerations ...," p. 405; *Islamic Society and West*, I, pp. 33-34.

34 This was by no means a new theory. As early as eleventh century, al-Baghdadi (d1037) had spoken in favour of the co-existence of two Khalifas simultaneously on the condition that the Khalifas concerned must be far apart from one another. See Rosenthal, *Political Thought* ... , p. 32. Ibn Khaldun maintained that the theory of the indivisibility of the Khilafat applies only to two Imams in one locality. He writes: "When there are great distances and the Imam is unable to control the farther regions, it is permissible to set up another Imam there to take care of public interest."

*Mugaddimah*, p. 158.

35 Gibb, "Some considerations ...," p. 406. Professor Rosenthal, however finds it difficult to explain the popularity of al-Dawwani's theory. He asserts that al-Dawwani's position on Khilafat is not different from those of earlier Sunni jurists and that it was Nasiruddin Tusi's practical philosophy which al-Dawwani has popularised. He concludes: "If his (al-Dawwani's) influence surpassed that of the earlier jurists, and of philosophers like Tusi, it must be due to the spiritual climate, the political and social circumstances of his time and, not least, to his felicitous style."

this theory in his famous treatise, *Akhlq-i-Jalali*. For an English translation of this treatise, see W.F. Thompson, *Practical Philosophy of the Muhammadan People*, Lonon, 1839.

36 Arnold, p. 115. The Mamluk Sultan of Egypt was alleged to have acknowledged the Khilafat of Abu Abdallah. For a refutation of this theory, see D. Ayalon, "Transfer of . . . , " pp. 41–59.

37 Arnold, pp. 111-114. Shah Rukh's principal contemporaries were the Mamluk Sultan Barsbay and the Ottoman Sultan Murad II; both paid no heed to his demand. For a refutation of the observation of Farishta and Abul Fazl that Khizr Khan, the Sayyid Sultan of Delhi, read *khutba* and coined money in the name of Shah Rukh, see Edward Thomas, *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Dehli*, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1967 (reprint), pp. 328–329. For the text of the *khutba* alleged to have been read by Khizr Khan, see Arnold, pp. 113–114.

38 See for example, *Munsha'at us-Salatin*, Vol. I, p. 120. Bayazid I's (1389-1403) decree to the officials and *Oazis* of the state; *Ibid*, I, p. 144, Letter of Muhammad I (1413–1421) to Shah Rukh; *Ibid*, P. 151, Muhammad I's letter to Prince Mustafa; *Ibid*, I, p. 276, Muhammad II's letter to Prince Jem; *Ibid*, I, p 358, Selim I's letter to Prince Suleiman. Also see the decree issued by Sultan Bayazid II on the eve of his accession to the throne. It proclaimed that since the beginning of the creation, the office of the Khilafat of the world has been earmarked, from the Court of
Providence, for the chosen children of Adam. "The patent of sovereignty and majesty and the tablet of prosperity and dominion," continues the decree, "has been bestowed upon me [Bayazid II] by the Creator according to His decree, "We appointed you Khalifas in the earth," "and hath exalted some of you in rank above others." (Munsha'at, I, p. 294).

39 See for example Tursun Beg, Tarikh-i-Abul Fath, ff 28b, 162b, 164a, 164b. The Quranic verses used by the chronicler are iv/65 and xxxviii/26.

40 Munsha'at, I, p. 93.

41 Ibid, I, p. 100.

42 See for instance the letter of Bahmani Sultan Muhammad III (1463–1482) to Ottoman Sultan Muhammad II, Munsha'at, I, pp. 251–253.


45. The Mahmal signified political authority in the Hijaz. The right to dispatch it during the Haj was zealously guarded by the Mamluks and, after 1517, by the Ottomans. For the significance of Mahmal see C.M. Kortepeter, "A Source for the History of . . . ," Sources of the History of Arabia, II, pp. 234–235; Burckhardt, Travels in Arabia, p. 279; Uzunçarşılı, Mekka Mükreşme Emirleri, pp. 57–61.

46. Munsha'at, I, p. 440. Professor A.C. Hess has given a new interpretation of Selim's effort to have himself recognized as Khalifa. He observes that by the turn of the sixteenth century, Ottoman conflicts with Muslim states, namely Persia and Egypt, had created doubts about the credibility of the Ottomans as Champions of Islam. The great ghazi tradition around which the Ottomans had built their prestige in the Muslim world was no longer sufficient to sustain their image. They now needed a new political legitimation to justify their position as the rulers of the Islamic ummah. The conquest of Egypt and Syria, together with the occupation of Hijaz, provided Selim with the much sought after opportunity and he quickly acted to convert his newly acquired position of Khadim al-Harmain into a new source of legitimacy for the right of his family to rule over such a large empire. He writes: "To match their new strength with a new organizing principle the heirs of Osman sought a more universal position within the Muslim world than that of march
warriors. Entangled in the war of titles and in the question of whether or not Selim the Grim took the title of Caliph after the conquest of Egypt is the decision of the Ottomans to assume the political leadership of the entire Islamic community. Since Ottoman political unity would rest on the historically rooted sentiments among the Muslims for the unity of the Islamic community, the northern Turks strove to appropriate the symbols of universality: the protection of the Holy places, the defense of the pilgrimage and the support in whatever form it may have been, of the Caliphal institutions." A.C. Hess, "The Ottoman conquest of Egypt (1517) and the beginning of the sixteenth-century world war," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 1973, p. 70. For an almost identical interpretation see C.M. Kortepeter, "A Source for the History of . . .," p. 249.

47 The legend was related by D'ohsson in 1787 in his book Tableau general de l'Empire Othman. See Arnold, pp. 142-147; A.J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, London, vol. I, pp. 37-38. D'ohsson was, however, not the first to popularize this fiction. In the seventeenth century two other westerners Georgius Fabricius and Joannes Rosines had asserted that Selim I had coerced Khalifa al-Mutawakkil to resign his office. See G. Fabricius and J. Rosinus, Chronicon Saracenicum et Turcicum, quoted by Striling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, p. 56.

48 See for example I.H. Danishmand, Izahli Osmanli Tarihi
Kornologisi, Istanbul, 1947-65, vol. V, pp. 39-40; Fuad gucuyener,
Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Tarihi, II, p. 294. The opinion of these
scholars are also quoted in N. Ahmet Asrar, "The Myth about the
transfer of the Caliphate to the Ottoman Sultans," Journal of the
Regional Cultural Institute, v, 1972, pp. 111-120. Several other
Muslim scholars endorse the theory of the alleged transfer of
Khilafat to Selim I. See for example Syed Amir Ali, "The Caliphate:
highly prejudiced against Sultan Selim (See Badai'al-zuhur, Eng.
tr., p. 117 for the Egyptian chronicler's character assassination of
Selim I. Also see below). On this ground Amir Ali asserted that Ibn
Iyas had deliberately ignored to mention the transfer of the Caliphal
office to Selim I. See Survey of International Affairs, 1925, I,
p. 38, Note 2. Notwithstanding the bias of Ibn Iyas, the
authenticity of this episode is doubtful. Even the venue of the
conferral of the Khilafat on Selim is disputed (N. Ahmat Asrar, "the

49 The relevant pages of Badai'al-zuhur, dealing with
Selim's campaign, have been translated by W. H. Salmon. See, An
account of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in the year A.H. 922 (A.D.

50 P.M. Holt, "Some observations. . . ," p. 507.

51 Munsha'at, I, pp. 376-379.
52 Arnold, p. 142.


57 Omar Lutfi Barkan, xv ve xvi inci asirlarda Osmanlı Impar orlugunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları, Istanbul, 1943, p. 296. Also see Ibid, p. 251 where the Qanun-name of Sofya calls the Sultan as the refuge of the Khilafat and prays for the immortality of his Khilafat.


60 Arnold, p. 175.

61 Ibid, p. 158.


154.

67 H.A.R. Gibb, "Lutfi Pasha on the Ottoman Caliphate,"


70 That this doctrine was accepted universally is evident from the statement made by Abdul Aziz, the ambassador of Shah Ashraf, the Afghan ruler of Persia, to Istanbul. He declared that the government of Persia was willing to concede that the Sultan of Turkey was the Imam of his own people; at the same time the ambassador asserted that Ashraf is the Imam within his own territories. See L. Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi dynasty* . . . , p. 284.


72 *Ibid*, p. 46.

73 Political domination of the Holy Cities was one of the important pre-requisites for the Khilafat. See Bartold, "Caliph and Sultan," p. 125.

74 Halil Inalcik, "Rise of the Ottoman Empire," p. 321.
The Ottomans took great pride in having the Hijaz under their control. See for example the letter of Mustafa Pasha to the Mughal Wazir Islam khan. In this letter the Pasha proudly proclaims that "By God's grace the sanctity of the house of God (Mecca), the garden of the Prophet (Medina), the Holy City (Jerusalem), and both the birth and burying places of the greatest Prophets are situated within the boundaries of this [Ottoman] empire (Hammer, "Memoirs on . . .", p. 484). Also see Sultan Selim II's letter to the Governor of Egypt where he takes great pride in being the protector of the Holy Cities (M.D., 7, p. 258). Even the Europeans were aware of the importance of the Ottoman control of the Sacred Cities. As late as 1902 William Richards, the British consul at Damascus observed that "the Sultan would rather lose all the rest of the Empire put together than forfeit his right to the guardianship of the holy cities on which his claim to the title of Commander of Faithful (Emirul Mumenin) largely depended." Quoted by S.M. Al-amr, The Hijaz under Ottoman rule, p. 172.

See for example Sharif Barkat II's letter to Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (Munsha'at, I, p. 449). Also see Sharif Massad bin Said's (1750-1758, 1759-1770) letter to Sultan Mahmud I Name Humayun, vol. 8, p. 321). In 1729 Sharif Abdullah b Said addressed Sultan Ahmad III as the "resuscitator of the virtues of the pious Khalifas" (Name Humayun, vol. 7, p. 200). According to Uzunçarşılı, the Sharifs of Mecca generally addressed the Ottoman
Sultans as the "Khalifa of the Apostle of God" (Mekke Mükerrer Emirleri, p. 43).

77 See for example Borak khan's letter to Suleiman the Magnificent (Schafer, Chrestomathie Persane, vol. II, pp. 212–214). For the Sultan of Sumatra's petition to the Ottoman Sultan, addressing him as the Khalifa of God and the vicegerent of the pious Khalifas see T.S.M.A., E 8009.

78 James W. Redhouse, A vindication of . . . , p. 8.


80 Name Humayun, vol. 8, p. 30.


83 For Iltutmish's coins and inscriptions which bore the Khalifa's name and the Sultan's new titles, see Edward Thomas, Chronicles of the Pathan kings of Delhi, Delhi, 1967 (reprint), pp. 52, 78, 80. Also see Z.A. Desai, "Inscriptions of the Mamluk Sultans of Delhi," Epigraphia Indica: Persian and Arabic Supplement (henceforth E.I.), 1966, pp. 6–7.
84 Ibid. pp. 14-15. Also see A.H. Dani, Bibliography of
the Muslim Inscriptions of Bengal, Appendix, Journal of the Asiatic

In another inscription, dated 1283, Balban is styled the "Helper of
the Commander of the Faithful" (Edward Thomas, p. 136). For the
coins of Iltutmish's successors bearing the names of the Khalifas
Al-Mustansir and Al-Mustasim, see Ibid, pp. 81, 107, 118, 122, 127,
129, 1334, 141.

86 For the coins of Jalaluddin Khalji (1290-1296) and
Alaeddin Khalji and for Alaaddin's inscriptions on the arches of Qutb
Minar, see Ibid, pp. 155, 168, 173. Also see Z.A. Desai, "Khalji
and Tughlaq inscriptions from U.P.," E.T., 1964, p. 2; Desai,

87 For the coins of Mubarak Khalji bearing these titles, see
Edward Thomas, pp. 179, 180-183. For the inscriptions of the Sultan
see Desai, Khalji and Tughlaq inscriptions from Gujarat," E.T.,
1962, pp. 4-5 (The Inscription is dated April 8, 1318); Desai,
"Khalji and Tughlaq Inscriptions from Rajas-than," E.T., 1967, p. 8
(The Inscription is dated February/March 1320). It is noteworthy
that Mubarak Khalji seems to have assumed the Caliphal titles after
March 1318. His coins, issued prior to 1318, bore the standard
Caliphal legend Yamin al-Khilafat, etc. (Edward Thomas; p. 180).
Even one of his inscriptions, dated March 9, 1318, bear the same

88 Ziauddin Barni, Tarikh-i- Firuzshahi, History of India as told by its own Historians, ed. Elliot and Dowson, vol. III, p. 249. Also see Nadvi, "Khilafat our Hindustan," pp. 126-129. The author has quoted several qasidas of Badr Chach, Muhammad Tughlaq's poet laureate, which reflects the Sultan's devotion to the Khalifa. It must be mentioned here that during the early years of his reign Muhammad Tughlaq has assumed the titles of "Khalifa on the Face of earth" and "Khalifa of the Faith," etc., but he later returned to the old pattern of loyalty to the Abbasid Khalifa. See Mahdi Hasan, "Six inscriptions of Muhammad bin Tughlaq Shah," E.I., 1957-58, pp. 34, 37, 38, 39, 40 (these inscriptions are dated between 1329-1333).

89 Sultan Firuz Shah Tughlaq, Futuhat-i- Firuz Shahi, tr., Elliot and Dowson, vol. III, p. 387.


91 Ibid, pp. 333-340, 366, 376-378. The observation of Professor Aziz Ahmad that Khizr khan Sayyid (1414-1421) issued coins in the name of Timur and Shah Rukh instead of the Cairene Khalifa (Studies in Islamic Culture . . . , p. 10) is incorrect. Edward Thomas has pointed out that the statements of Farishta to this effect has erred several scholars into making this observation. Khizr Khan
never issued coins in his own name. Instead he continued to coin money in the name of the Tughlaq Sultans. See Edward Thomas, pp. 328-329.


98 Timur's plea for this claim was that like the Khalifas in question, he was also the *Mujaddid* (renovator) of Islam in his age. The title of *Majaddid*, writes Timur, was given to him by the distinguished scholar Mir Sayyid Sharif. In a letter to Timur the Sayyid observed that in every century God sends a propagator of the faith for the purpose of reviving Islam. According to the Sayyid,
God had already sent, in past seven centuries of Islam, seven such Mujaddids; these included Umar bin Abdul Aziz and Mamoon Rashid. The scholar pronounced, if we are to believe Timur, as the Mujaddid of the eighth century. The letter concludes in the following manner: "In this eighth century Amir Sahib-i-Quaran [Timur] is the supporter of our sacred religion; since he hath received and encouraged obedience to the holy laws in the different cities and nations of earth, hath protected and reverenced the posterity of the Prophet of God and with their assent and approbation hath assumed dominion over the empire of Muhammad." Tuzkat-i-Timuri, Eng. tr. Major William Davy, Tehran, 1342 A.H. (reprint), p. 195.

99 Babur Nama, p. 344. Also see note 2 (p. 344).


102 Mirat-i-Sikandari, pp. 298–299; A.N., I, p. 295;
R.S. Awasthy, Mughal Emperor Humayun, p. 142. The letter was written in 1532.

103 Chiyasuddin Khwandmir, Qunun-i-Humayuni, Eng. tr.,
Beni Prasad, Calcutta, 1940, p. 6.

104 A.N., I, p. 283.

105 Letter of Shah Tahmasp to Suleiman the Magnificent, Abdul Husain Nawai, Shah Tahmasp Safawi... pp. 203–237. On one more occasion Humayun had publicly declared himself superior to the Shah of Persia. For this episode and Shah Tahmasp's reaction to it, see Jauher Aftabchi, Tazkiratul Waqiat, p. 69. Also see S. Ray, Humayun in Persia, p. 28.

106 According to Badauni, during his sojourn in Bengal, Humayun used to "cast a veil over his crown, and when he removed it, the people used to say, Light has shined forth! He also washed his sword in the river and said 'upon whom shall I gird the sword'?") This eccentric behaviour, writes the chronicler, led the people to believe that Humayun considered himself to be a manifestation of God. He was even jeered by some Persians in Mashhad for his pretensions.

M.T., I, 573. Also see R.P. Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, Allahabad, 1959, p. 117. For Humayun's belief about his own supernatural qualities, see Khwandmir, pp. 24–25.

107 A.N., I, p. 283.

Whitehead, II, pp. 13, 14, 16, 17; H.N. Wright, II, pp. 5, 6, 8; Brown, pp. 407. Both Agra and Lahore are called Darul Khilafat on these coins.


Ibid., pp. 77, 80, 84.

A.N., I, p. 419. For references to Humayun as Khalifa, see Ibid., I, pp. 267, 283, 463, 481, 541, 621, 641, 658, 659, etc. Also see, Kh wandmir, pp. 6, 17.

A.N., I, p. 124.

Ibid., III, p. 122.


Ain-i-Akbari, I, p. 3.

A.N., III, p. 72; Ibid., II, pp. 197, 207. Also see Tripathi, Some Aspects . . . , p. 140.

Akbar's claim to both the temporal and spiritual authority of his realm is found scattered in the pages of Akbar Nama and Ain-i-Akbari. See for example, A.N., II, p. 421 where Abul Fazl makes the following observation: "Give all that thou hast, and purchase eyes, and behold the world-adorning qualities of our spiritual and temporal king [Akbar] so that thou mayest know what is


Phogat, Inscriptions, pp. 74-75.

Ain-i-Akbari, I, p. 28; S. Laneypool, The History of the Mughal Emperors of Hindustan illustrated by their Coins, London, 1892, p. IXIII.


Ibid, II, p. 520. Also see A.N., III, pp. 395-396; M.T., II, pp. 276-277. Abul Fazl's version is slightly different from those of Nizamuddin Ahmad and Badauni. While these two suggest that Akbar read the khutba only once, Abul Fazl writes that the Emperor presided over this ritual several times. Badauni has remarked contemptuously that while reading the khutba, Akbar got nervous and came down the pulpit without completing it. He writes: "Accordingly on the first Friday of Jumadal awwal of the year nine
hundred and eighty seven, in the chief mosque of Fathpur, which he
[Akbar] had built near the papaee, His Majesty began to read the
khutbah. But all at once he stammered and trembled, and though
assisted by others he could scarcely read three verses of a poem
which Sheikh Faizi had composed, but came down from the pulpit and
handed over the duties of the Imam to Hafiz Muhammad Amin, the court
Khatib" (M.T., II, pp. 276-77). Given the fact that Akbar was
illiterate, the probability of his becoming nervous during the
khutba cannot be ruled out. It is however, noteworthy that no other
Mughal chronicler has recorded this fact.

S.A.A. Rizvi, Religious and Intellectual History . . . ,
p. 146.

Badauni and Nizamuddin Ahmad has copied this document in
523-524. Also see A.N., III, pp. 390-400. The document was
prepared by Sheikh Mubarak, the father of Abul Fazl. It was signed
by Sheikh Mubarak, Mulla Abdullah Sultanpuri, Chief Sadr Sheikh Abdun
Nabi, Qazi Khan Badakhshi (a distinguished scholar), Chief Qazi,
Jalaluddin Multani, Chief Mufti Sadr Jahan, and Hakimul Mulk. For a
detailed analysis of the salient features of the Mahzar, see V.
Smith, Akbar the Great, pp. 127-129; Tripathi, Some Aspects . . . ,
Buckler, "A New Interpretation of Akbar's "infallibility" Decree of

128Rizvi, Religious and Intellectual . . ., p. 154.
129Muhammad Arif Qandahari, Tarikh-i-Akbari, p. 244. Also see Ibid, p. 243 where the chronicler describes Akbar as Amir al-Muminin and as 'Ka'ba-i-hajat,' 'Qibla-i-Umidvar,' and 'Ka'ba-i-karam,' etc.

130M.T., II, p. 281. Abul Fazl has mentioned that the use of this formula was seen by the people as an attempt on Akbar's part to pose as the Prophet of God and that it led to disturbances in the empire. He writes, "Bewildered hearts and shortsighted persons indulged in these thoughts and the spectacle of his reciting the khutba contrary to the custom and his mounting the pulpit for the guidance of mankind helped the delusion. Many from the acceptance of hearsay and belief in idle words came to believe this. Thus there was a splendid market for strife-mongering and fabrication." A.N. III, p. 398. Also see Ibid, pp. 396-397.


Mugaddimah, p. 158.

Tripathi, Some Aspects . . . , p. 143.


According to the chronicler, on the eve of his accession Jahangir had assumed the title of Khalifa-i-Ilahi.

Wright, II, pp. 64-95; Whitehead, II, pp. 119-172; Brown, II, pp. 98-157; M.K. Hussain, Catalogue of Coins of the Mughal Emperors, Bombay, 1968, pp. 6-10; Shamsuddin Ahmad, A Supplement to
Volume III of the Catalogue of Coins in the Indian Museum, Calcutta:
The Mughal Emperors of India, Delhi, 1939, pp. 30-39.

140 A.S., I, pp. 2, 6, 76.
141 Ibid., I, p. 2; B.N., I, p. 139.
For the translation of the inscription, see R. Nath, "Mughal concept . . . ," p. 97. The inscription on the Akbarabadi mosque of Delhi styles Shahjahan the 'Padshah of Isla'ma' and the "chosen Khalifa of God." See Asar-us Sanadid, p. 178.


144 Whitehead, II, pp. 173-213; Brown, II, pp. 158-218; Wriht, II, pp. 96-129; Hussain, pp. 11-38; Ahmad, pp. 40-47. Timur had assumed the title of Shib-i-Qi'ran. Shahjahan's itle of Sahib-i- Qiran Sani indxicate his deire to emphasize his ancestry from Timur.

145 Munshat II, pp. 67-69.

*Name Humayun*, vol. 5, p. 58.


See the documents number 3 and 4 printed by Rafat Bilgrami in her book *Religious and Quasi-religious Departments of the Mughal period*. the legend "Amir al-Muminim Zillillah Badshah Alamgir" is clearly visible on the seal stamped on the documents.

See for example, M.F. khan, "Three grants of the time of Aurangzeb from Kota district," *E.I.*, 1968, p. 70.


See for example, Whitehead, II, pp. 273-292; Wright, II, pp. 192-201; Brown, II, pp. 291-305; Hussain, pp. 120-126; Ahmad, pp. 132-141. On the coins of these monarchs Agra and Shahjahanabad are
invariably designated as 'abode of the Khilafat' and 'seat of the Khilafat.'


156 Name Humayun, vol. 6, pp. 453-454.
157 Ibid., vol. 8, p. 141; Izzi, Tarikh-i- Izzi, f 16a.
158 Ibid., vol. 8, pp. 292-293. It is noteworthy that in his letter to Ahmad III, Muhammad Shah had advanced his own claim to the Khilafat. Announcing his accession to the throne, Muhammad Shah made the following observation: 'It is not hidden from your noble and luminous mind that recently this supplicant, with the blessing of the Almighty and in accordance with the Quranic injunction: "We have sent thee as Khalifa on earth ... ' has ascended the throne of Khilafat." (Name Humayun, 6, p. 453). It is also noteworthy that during the reign of Muhammad Shah the Ottoman Ulama had publicly accepted the co-existence of two khalifas simultaneously. In a fatwa issued in 1726, the chief Mufti of the Ottoman empire declared that two Imams could reign simultaneously provided their territories were separated by some natural line of demarcation, such as the Indian Ocean (L. Lockhart, Fall of the Safavi dynasty ..., p. 285).

Since the Indian ocean seperated the Mughal and Ottoman territories from each other, the fatwa was presumed to have acknowledged the existence of an independent Khilafat in India. See H. Inalcik, "Rise of the Ottoman Empire," p. 323. Professor Inalcik has quoted the
Ottoman chronicler Kucuk Chelebizada Asim in support of his statement.

159 See for example, Whitehead, II, pp. 451-354; Brown, pp. 363-467; Wright, pp. 245-305.

160 Arnold, Caliphate, p. 162.

161 S.S. Nadvi, "Khilafat aur Hindustan," p. 175. Also see note 1.


According to the author the programme of the Deoband was to educate "Students in strict observance of Sunni orthodoxy of the Hanafi School and the seeking of closer relations with the Turkish Sultan-Caliph" (Ibid, p. 33)

163 S.S. Nadvi, "Khilafat aur Hindustan," p. 180. The author was quoted the excerpts of the Grand Wazir's letter. Earlier, during the Ottoman-Serbian War, the Indian Muslims had sent several petitions to the Queen of England, requesting her for continued British support for Turkey. In a confidential message to the Foreign office, the viceroy of India reported: "Important meetings have been held by Muhammadans at Bombay and Peshawar expressive of sympathy with Turkey. Bombay Muhammadans have drawn up a petition to the Queen thanking the English government for previous feeling [sic] requesting Her Majesty not to desert cause of Sultan. Similar meetings about to be held in Calcutta," (Great Britain, Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey (1841-1900), University of
Wisconsin—Madison, Microfilm, Series 424, Reel No. 44, p. 24,
Viceroy of India to Salisbury, October 2, 1876; 424/55, p. 246).
Also see N.R. Farooqi, "Pan Islamism in the Nineteenth Century,
Islamic Culture, October 1983, p. 286.

164 This is evident from the following remarks of Syed Amir
Ali made to Lord Morley in 1909: "Any injustice and any suspicion
that the British were unjust to Muhammadans in India would provoke a
serious and injurious reaction in Constantinople." Quoted by

165 Ibid., p. 47.

166 F.W. Buckler, "The Historical Antecedents of the Khilafat

167 These titles, it must be mentioned, did not go
unchallenged. Sultan Murad IV is reported to have objected to the
title of Shahjahan. Shah Abbas II is known to have ridiculed
Aurangzeb's title of Alamgir. See Maulvi Zafar Hasan, "Two

168 See for example Mirat, I, p. 300; Futuhat . . . , p.
71; Nadvi, "Hindu Kush Alamgir . . . ," p. 255; Abul Fath Qabil khan,
Adab-i-Alamgiri, II, pp. 1043, 1078, 1153, 1241, etc.

169 See for example, M.T., I, p. 480; A.S., II, pp. 266,
M.A., p. 337; Futuhat, p. 242, etc. Khwandkar or khunkar seems to
be a contraction from the Persian word *khudawandgar* meaning Sovereign or Lord. See J.W. Redhouse, *Turkish-English Lexicon*, Istanbul, 1978 (reprint), pp. 833, 867.
CONCLUSION

DIPLOMATIC USAGE

The Mughals as well as the Ottomans had no 'foreign service' with members permanently resident abroad. Diplomatic relations were maintained through the extraordinary ambassadors sent by either state on special occasions. Generally men of high status, learning, loyalty, and wit were chosen as ambassadors. Religious and sectarian considerations also played a part in the selection of envoys. Usually persons belonging to the same sect as the monarch to whom they were accredited, were designated as ambassadors; all the Mughal ambassadors to Istanbul were Sunni. Proficiency in Turkish and Arabic languages was also a major criterion in the selection of Mughal envoys to the Ottoman empire; Haji Ahmad Saeed, Qaim Beg, and Sayyid Ataullah were well versed in these languages. Haji Ahmad Saeed left a very favourable impression on the Ottoman court. Ottoman chronicler Naima was full of praise for the learning, erudition, and repartee of the Haji. "This ambassador [Haji Ahmad Saeed] being a learned man," observed Naima, "the Wazir, the Mufti, the Kadiaskers, and other dignitaries of the sublime Porte, gave him splendid entertainments, at which many learned men gifted with the power of speech, and able to carry on literary disputes and scientific discussion assisted . . . Indeed, there never were heard of distinctions and attentions more honourable, than those paid to
this learned ambassador.\textsuperscript{1}

The ambassadors were promoted to higher rank at the time of their appointment; they were also given their travel expenses in advance. According to the author of \textit{Aml-i-Salih Haji}, Ahmad was given 12,000 rupees for his expenses, while Qaim Beg received the staggering sum of 100,000 rupees. Special robes of honour, fully caparisoned horses, swords, and numerous other gifts were conferred on them. The envoys were attended by a large staff of officials and servants; members of the ambassador's family were also allowed to travel with them. A \textit{farman} of Sultan Muhammad III to the Governor of Egypt pointedly refers to the offspring and relatives of the returning Indian ambassador Syed Muhammad.\textsuperscript{2} Haji Yusuf Agha, the acting Ottoman ambassador to Muhammad Shah's court, was also accompanied by his son Muhammad Amin Pasha; the Pasha was later appointed Grand Wazir in 1769.\textsuperscript{3} On their return from abroad the ambassadors, if successful in their mission, were suitably rewarded; they were given cash awards, their \textit{mansab} was increased, and they were appointed to higher administrative assignments. For instance, Mir zarif, the Mughal envoy to the court of Sultan Murad IV, was given the title of Fidai Khan, the rank of 1000/200, and the office of Akhtahbegi (Master of Horses). A few months later he was promoted to the coveted post of the Governor of Lahori Bander.

Ottoman ambassadors were likewise chosen for their learning, piety, cultural accomplishment, and illustrious descent. According
to Naima, "only a man of affairs from among the ulama or the scribes or a man of eloquence from among the men of learning and refinement" was appointed as envoy. Occasionally, certain other considerations were also taken into account in the selection of an ambassador. For instance, in 1649, Sayyid Mohiuddin, a descendant of the celebrated saint Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani, was dispatched as Ottoman envoy to India. His mission was to persuade Emperor Shahjahan to withdraw his armies from Central Asia and to restore Nazr Muhammad Khan, the Khan of the Uzbeks, to his territories. The Sayyid's mission was indeed a delicate one. But the envoy was well known for his piety and learning. His ancestor Sheikh Abdul Qadir Jilani was highly revered in India. Crown prince Dara Shikoh, who had considerable influence on his father, was a dedicated follower of the Sheikh and a member of the Qadiri sect; in 1641 the prince had even sent oblations for the saint's shrine. A descendant of the saint was therefore expected to win the support of the crown prince in accomplishing his mission. Hence, the Sayyid's appointment as ambassador to India. Four years later, Zulfiqar Agha, whom Naima characterizes as 'rich but ignorant and uncultured,' was designated ambassador to India on the ground that he was ready to bear the expenses of the embassy. However, the Agha's appointment caused considerable resentment in Istanbul. "Is it decent" acidly remarks Naima, "to send such vulgar fellows on account of their wealth on embassies, when there is such an abundance of learned and polished
men to be found? Is it decent to commit in such a way the honour of
the empire?"\textsuperscript{5} The outcry over Zulfiqar Agha's appointment had
the desired effect: the next Ottoman ambassador to India, Manzade
Husain Agha, was an able man. Naima complimented the government for
"choosing a man quite fit for the job."\textsuperscript{6}

The envoys usually carried a royal letter and a large number of
gifts. Mughal imperial letters were drafted by the wazir or by the
leading munshi (scribe) attached to the wazirs' office; Shahjahan's
epistles to the Ottoman Sultans were penned by the wazirs Allami
Afzal khan and Allami Saadullah Khan. Ottoman royal letters, known
as Name-Humayun, were likewise drafted either by Reisul Kuttab
(Principal secretary of the Chancellery) or by the Defter Amini
(Commissioner of the Register); the epistles of Sultan Murad IV and
Sultan Ibrahim to Shahjahan were composed by the Defter Amini Sidqi
Efendi. The royal letters were written in a highly inflated,
flowery, and ornate style and the real message was usually hidden in
the mass of metaphors, similes, and rhetorical flourishes. "The
prudence which guides the pens of Persian and Indian secretaries of
State," aptly remarks Joseph De Hammer, "keeps within general
phrases; so that the true object of a mission or embassy can scarcely
ever be guessed by the mere credentials."\textsuperscript{7} The Mughals and the
Ottomans usually addressed each other by a string of titles, covering
from five to seven lines of the letter. Lack of proper address was
deemed to be insulting by the addressee; Shahjahan had taken grave
offense at the discourteisies of diction in the letters of Sultan Murad IV and Muhammad IV. Occasionally, the royal letters also described in minute details the writer's power, the extent of territories under his control, the might of his armies commanded by him, and his recent conquests and achievements. Farrukhsiyar's letter to Sultan Ahmad III is a good example of the ornate language used by the Mughal Emperors to extol their exploits and power. More often than not the envoys were entrusted with a secret oral message meant exclusively for the ears of the monarch to whom they were assigned.

The presents carried by the ambassadors were generally commensurate with the power and prosperity of their masters; the rarities of the countries the envoys represent, always formed a major part of these gifts. An inventory of gifts was also sent with the imperial letter. Presents from India included precious stones, girdles, daggers, and swords set with diamonds, Indian cloth of the finest quality, and a variety of perfumes. Gifts sent by the Ottoman Sultans, on the other hand, always consisted of Turkish horses of purest breed; Muhammad IV also once sent "twenty damsels of extra-ordinary beauty" to Shahjahan. In keeping with their passion for display, the Mughals usually sent exceptionally costly and precious gifts to the Ottomans. The presents carried by Qaim Beg for Sultan Muhammad IV were estimated at 250,000 rupees; according to Naima the gifts brought by the Beg were delivered to the Diwan by two
hundred and fifty porters.

The ambassadors were received, in the countries they were accredited, with great fanfare. Mughal chroniclers have left detailed accounts of the reception accorded to the Ottoman envoys in India. As soon as the news of the arrival of the envoy was received at the court, special arrangements were made for his welcome. An official mihmandar (host) was appointed; he was awarded with a robe of honour, money was advanced to him for his expenses, and he was directed to bring the plenipotentiary to the court. A robe of honour and a farman of welcome were also dispatched to the ambassador through a special imperial macebearer. Instructions were given to the Governors of the provinces and Faujdars of the towns through which the envoy was to pass, to entertain the ambassador and to give him travel expenses; Sayyid Mohiuddin and Zulfiqar Agha were given 50,000 rupees each before reaching the court. After the ambassador's arrival near the capital, high-ranking officials were sent to receive him at the outskirts of the city and to conduct him to the court; Sayyid Mohiuddin was welcomed by the Mir Tuzuk (Master of Ceremonies). A government mansion was assigned to the ambassador and his staff. According to the chronicler Salih Kanbu the house assigned for Zulfiqar Agha was furnished with elegant carpets, vessels of gold and silver, and other articles of daily use. Then envoy was also given thorough instruction in the court etiquette which he was required to follow at the time of his audience with the
Emperor.

The Ottoman envoys were given audience immediately after their arrival at the capital; this was indicative of good relations with the Ottoman empire. Special ceremonies were held at the time of audience; the envoys were required to present the royal letter and the gifts brought by them. Manucci observed that "it was an ancient practice from Akbar's days that Mughal kings . . . do not take a letter direct from the hand of any man. Letters were delivered to the wazir and he reads them to the king." However, an exception was made in the case of Ottoman and Persian ambassadors, and the Emperors used to receive letters directly from them. They were given an elegant robe of honour, a large purse of money as maintenance allowance, and a variety of gifts. On festive occasions, especially on the eve of Islamic festivals, the envoys were again given gifts in cash as well as kind. They were received by the members of the royal family and entertained by the eminent nobles of the empire. The Ottoman envoys were also invited to attend all the court ceremonies, banquets, and pleasure gatherings.

Mughal ambassadors were, likewise accorded a magnificent reception in the Ottoman empire; they were conducted from Scutari to Istanbul in a European galley meant only for the extra-ordinary envoys of friendly countries. On landing at Istanbul, they were received by the Chaush Bashi (Chief Persuivant) and his staff. The palace of a high imperial official was assigned for their
residence. The envoy's expenses during his stay in Ottoman territories were borne by the state; occasionally his food was supplied from the imperial kitchen. Mughal ambassadors were allowed to present the royal letter directly to the Sultan; they received robes of honour, made of pure fur, and other gifts. They were also received and rewarded by the Grand Wazir. Most of the Mughal envoys were also entertained, at the Sultan's instructions, by the leading Ottoman dignitaries.

There was no fixed period of stay for the ambassadors; it depended entirely on the will of the sovereign to whom they were accredited. "The Great Mogol," writes Bernier, "is in the habit of detaining all ambassadors as long as can be reasonably done, from an idea that is becoming his grandeur and power, to receive the homage of foreigners, and to number them among the attendants of his court." An early dismissal was a sign of friendly relation between two states. Shahjahan had, for instance, allowed Sayyid Mohiuddin to depart within two months of his arrival at the capital; Sayyid Ataullah was likewise dismissed by Sultan Mahmud I within a month. A return Ottoman embassy was also arranged in that short time; Ottoman chronicler Izzi has suggested that such favour and distinction were rare, and were seldom conferred on the representatives of a foreign potentate.

A date for the departure of the envoys was fixed in advance. On the date concerned a special ceremony was held at the court to bid
the ambassador adieu; robes of honour and gifts in cash and kind were conferred on them. They were also allowed to export valuable merchandise from India free of custom duty. In Istanbul, an extra-ordinary session of the Diwan-i-Humayun was arranged to grant farewell audience to the outgoing envoys; garments of fur, richly caparisoned Turkish horses and cash reward were given to them. In most cases a return embassy was dispatched with the retiring ambassador.

POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: A SUMMARY

Babur, the first Mughal, had his eyes fixed on Uzbek Central Asia, his ancestral domain, as an area of expansion. He, therefore, regarded Ottoman-Uzbek alliance as damaging to his aims and interests in that region. This made him a natural enemy of the Ottomans; hence the Emperor made no attempt to establish formal diplomatic relations with Istanbul. He also did not show any inclination to acknowledge the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat of Islam. During the early years of his reign, Humayun also remained indifferent towards the Ottomans. Elated by his conquest of Gujarat and Bengal, he regarded the Ottoman empire as an inferior power. During his days of exile, he did not seek Ottoman support against his Afghan adversary. But Humayun was not hostile to the Ottomans. After restoration to the Indian empire, the Emperor displayed a genuine desire to establish diplomatic
relations with the Ottomans on a permanent basis. He cordially welcomed the Ottoman admiral Sidi Ali Reis, complimented the admiral for his military and literary talents, and offered him a high position in the Mughal government. The Emperor wrote a very friendly letter to Suleiman the Magnificent. He also acknowledged the Sultan as Khalifa. But for the sudden death of Humayun in 1556, Mughal-Ottoman relations would have considerably improved.

Akbar abandoned Humayun's conciliatory policy altogether. Sultan Suleiman's failure to send a congratulatory embassy on his accession coupled with the Emperor's own military achievements and the rapid expansion of his empire were probably responsible for Akbar's lukewarm attitude towards the Ottomans. The row over the activities of the Indian pilgrims in Mecca in the late 1570's and early 1580's also produced considerable tension between Akbar and the Ottomans. The rise of the Uzbek power under Abdullah Khan Uzbek and the Ottoman support for the Khan's expansionist designs in Khurasan and Badakhshan also made the Emperor highly skeptical of a lasting Mughal-Ottoman rapprochment. Akbar even entertained the idea of invading Ottoman territories in collusion with the Portuguese. Far from acknowledging the Ottoman claim to Khilafat, the Emperor made a bold bid to get himself recognized as the temporal leader of his Muslim subjects. But Akbar's policy towards the Ottoman was unrealistic and unsound. Friendship with the Ottomans would have obliged the Uzbeks to give up the anti-Mughal propaganda which they
had unleashed in the north-western provinces of the Mughal empire. Mughal-Ottoman collaboration would have paid dividends in other areas of mutual interests. More than anything else, it would have saved the Indian Muslim pilgrims from the suffering and humiliation which they had to endure at the hands of the Portuguese freebooters.

Jahangir continued his father's unfriendly policy towards the Ottomans. Obsessed with his friendship with Shah Abbas I of Persia, he ignored the Ottomans. The Emperor is even reported to have given financial aid to the Shah in his war against the Ottomans. He was, therefore, deeply shocked at the Shah's attack on Qandahar. Determined to take revenge on the Shah, Jahangir approached the Uzbek and the Ottomans for a triple alliance of the Sunni powers against Persia. He also received a letter of Sultan Murad IV proposing a joint Mughal-Ottoman campaign against Persia. However, Jahangir's death in 1627 fizzled this proposal.

Shahjahan established full-fledged diplomatic relations with Istanbul. He also revived his father's idea of a Sunni alliance against Persia. But this alliance did not materialize; the Emperor's invasion of Central Asia wrecked the chances of its fruition. The invasion even led to the suspension of Mughal-Ottoman relations. Shahjahan also assumed the title of Amir al-Muminin, thereby showing his disregard for the Ottoman claim to Khilafat. Sultan Muhammad IV's initiative in 1649 broke the diplomatic deadlock and relations between Shahjahanabad and Istanbul were resumed.
Henceforth embassies were exchanged between the two sides at regular intervals. At the time of Shahjahan's deposition in 1658, Mughal-Ottoman relations had improved considerably.

Aurangzeb gave up his father's policy of friendly alliance with the Ottomans. During his long reign of almost half a century, he remained indifferent towards them. Sultan Suleiman II's effort to revive the Istanbul-Shahjahanabad axis made no impression on him. It is indeed surprising that though the Emperor contemplated an alliance with the Corsairs of Masqat for combating piracy in Indian waters, he did not seek the help of the Ottomans to deal with this problem. Like his great-grandfather, Aurangzeb failed to perceive that a joint Mughal-Ottoman campaign against the European freebooters would have curtailed, if not ended, the European brigandage against his pilgrim ships. The Emperor's policy towards the Ottomans, thus, leaves much to be desired.

Diplomatic relations with Istanbul were resumed after Aurangzeb's death. Farrukhsiyar sent a good will embassy to the court of Sultan Ahmad III. The Sultan responded with a friendly reply but did not dispatch a return embassy to Shahjahansbad. It was not until the rise of Nadir Shah, who had proved equally dangerous for both Mughals and Ottomans, in the 1730's that the real need for closer ties between the two states was felt. Several embassies were exchanged. Highly conciliatory letters, underscoring the necessity for making common cause against the Persian 'heretic,' were written.
Emperor Muhammad Shah also acknowledged the Ottoman Sultan as khalifa. It was, however, the last flicker of the lamp. The rapid disintegration of Mughal empire after Muhammad Shah's death made further advancement of Mughal-Ottoman relations practically impossible. After 1748 there is no record of any exchange of diplomatic missions between the two sides. The Shahjahanabad-Istanbul axis had passed into history.

FACTORS OF AMITY BETWEEN THE MUGHALS AND THE OTTOMANS

First and foremost was the community of faith and the identity of sect; both Mughals and Ottomans were Sunni. In their diplomatic correspondence the sovereigns of both houses vied with each other in displaying their sectarian prejudice and their enthusiasm for Sunni solidarity. Safavid Persia was the main target of this orthodox tirade. They condemned the Safavids as kafir and mulhid (one who swerves from the true path), ridiculed them as Redheads and Zindiqs (misbelieving hypocrites), and exhorted each other to "demolish the precepts of heresy and disbelief." They also styled each other "annihilator of mulhids and rafizis (schismatics)" and "supporter of the dominion of the Sunnis and breaker of the head of the Shias."

But, however vocal in their avowal to Sunni solidarity, the Mughals never used it as a guiding light of their policy towards the Ottomans. They invoked it at the time of their conflict with Persia
and abandoned it as soon as it had served its purpose. The theme of sectarian unity was thus used by the Mughals as a convenient tool calculated to serve their personal interests but not as an ideology. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the oft-repeated proposal of Sunni alliance against Persia could never materialize.

The Mughals and the Ottomans also shared a common racial and cultural identity; both were Turks. Babur was steeped in Turkish culture. He was an accomplished poet and prose writer of Turkish. The Emperor's autobiography, written in chaste Turkish, is a fitting memorial to his proficiency in the Turkish language. Humayun was equally well-versed in Turkish. He spoke it fluently and appreciated the Turkish ghazals (odes) composed by the Ottoman admiral Sidi Ali Reis. Humayun's minister Bairam Khan has even left a diwan (anthology) of Turkish poetry. Most of the Mughal Emperors knew Turkish fairly well; as late as the nineteenth century Turkish was an important part of the curriculum of the Mughal princes. They even corresponded with each other in Turkish. Though productive of a sense of solidarity between the two ruling houses, the racial and cultural affinity did not exercise much influence in shaping the Mughal-Ottoman relations.

Safavid Persia was a menace to the Mughals as well as to the Ottomans; both powers had a common defense problem against the Persians. In the seventeenth century Safavid designs against Qandahar and Baghdad had drawn the two sides closer. In the
following century Nadir Shah's invasion of India and his aggressive policies against the Ottoman empire made Persia an object of fear, suspicion, and hostility in the eyes of Mughals and Ottomans alike. Both exhibited equal concern and anxiety to eliminate the new Persian peril. Nevertheless, the Mughal-Ottoman accord on the Persian question exercised only a transient influence on Mughal-Ottoman relations. The Mughals remained wedded to the policy of friendly alliance with the Ottomans as long as Persia posed a threat to them. Once the Safavid power declined and the threat from Persia disappeared, the Mughals quickly abandoned their pro-Ottoman posture. From time to time they also maintained active and cordial relations with the Safavids.

Finally, there was no territorial incentive to conflict between the Mughals and the Ottomans. No Qandahar plagued the Mughal-Ottoman relations as it frequently disturbed the former's relations with Persia; no hostility over Samarkand and Bukhara, which clouded the Mughal-Uzbek relations, existed between the two states. Moreover, the geographical distance precluded any direct conflict between India and the Ottoman empire. The existence of Persia as a buffer state between the two empires further discouraged any direct action between them. The Mughals and the Ottomans never seriously contemplated invading each other's territories.

FACTORS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE MUGHALS AND THE OTTOMANS
Among the factors of conflict the foremost was Ottoman friendship with the Uzbeks, whom the Mughals considered as their principal foe. Mughal-Uzbek enmity was traditional. As the descendants of Timur, the Mughals claimed the territories ruled by the Uzbeks as their rightful patrimony and craved the recovery of their "ancestral domains." Even the easygoing Jahangir observed that "as I had made up my exalted mind to the conquest of Mawara-an-nahr, which was the hereditary kingdom of my ancestors, I desired to free the face of Hindustan from the rubbish of the factious and rebellious, and leaving one of my sons in that country, to go myself with a valiant army . . . to undertake the conquest of my ancestral dominions." Though Jahangir could not carry out his plans, one of his sons, Emperor Shahjahan, did invade Mawara-an-nahr; the invasion, however, turned out to be the greatest failure of Shahjahan's career. In addition to territorial rivalry, there were a few other areas of conflict between the Mughals and the Uzbeks. The Uzbek presence in the neighbourhood of the Mughal province of Kabul was a thorn in the Mughal flesh. In 1628 Nazr Muhammad Khan, the Uzbek ruler of Balkh, had in fact made an unsuccessful attempt to conquer Kabul. The Uzbeks had also spread anti-Mughal propaganda among the tribes inhabiting the north-west frontier regions of the Mughal empire. The suppression of these tribes had indeed proved to be an uphill task; even powerful monarchs like Akbar and Aurangzeb
had found it difficult to accomplish. The Uzbek designs against the principality of Badakhshan, ruled by a collateral branch of the Mughal family, was also a constant source of irritation to the Mughals.

The Ottomans, on the other hand, were closely allied with the Uzbeks. The success of the Ottoman policy of the containment of Shiism within the borders of Persia depended to a large extent on the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Uzbek empire. Shahjahan's invasion of Central Asia had considerably displeased Sultan Ibrahim; the Sultan had even tacitly approved Shah Abbas II's invasion of Qandahar in 1648. The Mughals were, therefore, deeply suspicious of the Ottoman-Uzbek concord. They considered it as an obstacle in the way of the fulfillment of their cherished dreams. It is no wonder that the Ottomans failed to draw the Mughals into an alliance of Sunni powers against Persia.

The rivalry over the question of Khilafat was another source of conflict between the two sides. The Ottoman claim to Khilafat was not acknowledged by most of the Mughal Emperors; in their correspondence with the Ottomans, they seldom addressed the Sultan as "khalifa." On the contrary, the Mughals frequently styled themselves "khalifa of the age." Akbar's ambition to get himself recognized as the khalifa, coupled with other grievances against the Ottomans, had prevented him from establishing diplomatic relations with Istanbul.

The egoistical tone of the Ottoman imperial epistles, asserting the
Ottoman claim to paramountcy over all Muslim monarchs, had irritated Shahjahan. In the same manner Sultan Suleiman II's letter to Aurangzeb, avowing Ottoman custodianship of the entire Muslim world, had ruined the chances of the resumption of the long suspended Mughal-Ottoman relations. It was not until the eighteenth century when the sovereigns of both houses acknowledged each other's claim to the title of khalifa within their respective domains, coupled with other factors, that the Mughal-Ottoman relations improved.

The Mughals were extremely conscious of their ancestry from Timur. Proud of the achievements of Timur, they considered all contemporary Muslim sovereigns, ruling in the erstwhile domains of Timur, as inferior to them. Jahangir believed that the Mughals had a claim upon Ottoman gratitude because of Timur's generosity in restoring Sultan Musa chelebi to the domains of his vanquished father. Even the fugitive Mughal prince Baisanghar, who had taken refuge in Istanbul in 1632, did not hesitate to brag about his illustrious descent. Naima has observed that the prince "was not aware of the ceremonial required in the royal presence . . . He even went so far as to boast, in the Sultan's presence, of his ancestor Taimur and to allude to him by the title of Saheb Kerani (lord of the auspicious conjunctions)."15 This notion of superior ancestry persistently clouded Mughal-Ottoman relationship; it was also partly responsible for the Mughal reluctance to acknowledge the Ottoman claim to the temporal leadership of the Muslim world. The Ottomans,
on the other hand, were proud of their own lineage and conscious of their ancestors' services to Islam. In their eyes Timur was nothing but an upstart. Ottoman chroniclers have generally adverted to Timur with great contempt;¹⁶ Naima has even denounced him as a usurper.¹⁷ This "war of lineage" was naturally very irritating to the sovereigns of both houses and often caused considerable unpleasantness between them.

LACK OF ACTIVE AND INTIMATE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MUGHALS AND THE OTTOMANS: AN EXPLANATION

The Mughals and the Ottomans were not neighboring powers. The geographical distance between them was too great to arouse considerable mutual interest, either as close allies or as rivals. The Ottomans were far more interested in Europe "first as an area of expansion, then as an area of danger, against which it was the principal concern of the Ottoman Sultans to protect themselves."¹⁸ Since the Mughals had no influence whatsoever in European affairs, close alliance with them was not calculated to be very fruitful for the Ottomans. The Mughals on their side were preoccupied with defending themselves against the Uzbeks and the Safavids. It was only in the event of a conflict with the latter that the Mughals turned towards Istanbul for political and moral support. Aurangzeb's decision to dispatch an embassy to Istanbul
after receiving reports of Shah Abbas II's projected invasion of India and his abandonment of this idea after the death of the Shah supports this hypothesis. In the same manner Shahjahn in the 1640's and Muhammad Shah almost a hundred years later had solicited Ottoman support in the face of Persian aggression. Professor Bernard Lewis has aptly remarked that "only one thing brought them [Mughals and Ottomans] together - the common threat, offered to both of them by the Shiite Empire of Iran. When the Turks were fighting near Baghdad, or the Mughals near Kandhar, their thoughts began to turn to a second front on the far side of their enemy's territory - and it was on these occasions that embassies began to travel by sea between the Ottoman and Indian ports."19

Second, the foreign nobility of the Mughal empire, which exercised considerable influence on Mughal politics, consisted primarily of the nobles of Irani (Persian) and Turani (Central Asian) origin. From the days of Babur and Humayun a steady stream of Persian and Central Asian soldiers, scholars, administrators and theologians had entered India. These nobles took an active interest in the affairs of their native land and threw their weight in favour of intimate and friendly relations with Persia and Central Asia.20 On the other hand there were very few nobles of the Ottoman-Turkish origin; consequently the influence wielded by them on the Mughal court was almost negligible. For instance, whereas there were 136 Irani and 62 Turani nobles out of a total number of 486
mansabdars holding the rank of 1000 and above, during the first twenty years of Aurangzeb's reign, only five Ottoman-Turkish mansabdars served the Emperor in this period. A large number of Ottoman gunners and musketeers were also employed by the Mughals, but their rank was too low to exercise any influence on the Mughal court. The absence of influential nobles of Turkish origin in India was bound to have an adverse effect on Mughal – Ottoman relations.

Finally, the Mughals and the Ottomans never entered into a formal trade agreement with each other. The potential of a commercial alliance to stabilize political and diplomatic relations was probably never realized by them. It is well known that the Ottoman – French commercial treaty of 1536, known as the "capitulation," was followed by a military alliance between the two states. In the same way diplomatic relations between England and the Ottoman empire were established through the good offices of the Levant company. Dr. A.D. Groot has likewise shown that the Dutch republic's decision to open diplomatic relations with Istanbul was guided by the desire to "gain freedom of trade for Dutchmen in the Ottoman Empire." It is indeed surprising that the Mughal government did not perceive the advantages of a commercial treaty with Istanbul. It is no secret that Indian goods were in considerable demand in the Ottoman markets and were sold in the Ottoman territories at the sellers' price. The merchandise sent by the Mughal Emperors for sale in Mecca market invariably earned one
hundred per cent profit. There is evidence that the Ottoman
government was very much concerned about the welfare of the Indian
merchants trading with Ottoman ports. But Mughal India did not
have a strong and integrated "middle class" of commercial magnates,
bankers, and merchants. There were no "joint stock companies" to
exert pressure on the government to extract commercial concessions
from the Ottomans. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the
Mughals never felt obliged to negotiate a full-fledged commercial
alliance with the Ottomans; its effect on the political and
diplomatic relations between the two states is too obvious to
mention.
NOTES


2 M.D., p. 128, farman No. 328.


8 See for example the inventory of gifts sent by Emperor Muhammad Shah to Sultan Mahmud I (Name Humayun Defteri, vol. 8, p. 298).


10 There was a clear gradation of diplomats in the Ottoman empire. Those who were not recognized as full-fledged ambassadors
were provided with a gondola instead of a galley for crossing the Bosphorous. See Lawrence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi dynasty* p. 283.


13 See for example, *Waqiat-i-Azfari*, Urdu tr. M.H. Mahvi Siddiqi, Oriental Research Institute, Madras University, 1937. The *Waqiat* is a travelogue cum autobiography of the Mughal prince Mirza Ali Bakht Bahadur Azfari (1758-1818). The prince has quoted his Turkish correspondence with other members of the royal family. He has also observed that Turkish was his mother tongue. See *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 81, 162, 165.


16 See for example *Ashiqpashazade Tarikhi*, pp. 74-80, 197.

17 *Naima*, III, p. 1260.


20 See for example the following observation of Manucci:

"Persians are famed for favouring their own nation in the Mogul
Empire, and the larger number of nobles are Persians." Manaucci, vol. 1, p. 171.

21 M. Athar Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, Asia Publishing House, 1966, pp. 18-20. For a consolidated list of all mansabdars during 1658-1678, see Ibid., pp. 175-215. According to Professor Athar Ali, there were 67 Turani mansabdars in the period under review. But he has also included the Ottoman mansabdars in the category of Turani nobles. The present writers has identified the following Ottoman nobles in the list given by Professor Ali: Hussain Pasha 6000/6000; Afrasiyab Beg 2500/1500; Yahya Pasha 1500/700; Ali Beg Khan 1500/500; Mukhtar Beg Nawazish Khan 1000/400. Thus the number of Turani nobles during the period 1658-1678 stands at 62 instead of 67. It would not be out of place to mention here that during the period 1679-1707, here were only two Ottoman nobles (Nawazish khan 2500/2500 and Afrasiyab Beg 2000/1000) out of a total number of 575 mansabdars holding the rank of 1000 and above. Ibid., pp. 216-271.


24 See for example, M.D., 71, p. 274, No. 527; Ibid., p. 295, No. 295. Also see Baş Vekalat Arşivi, Istanbul, ibnul Emir
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