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GENDER AND POWER

IN

SAFAVID AND QAJAR IRAN

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A Dissertation

Submitted to

The Temple University Graduate Board

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in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirement for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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by

Sima Fahid

August, 1997
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ABSTRACT

GENDER AND POWER
IN
SAFAVID AND QAJAR IRAN

by Sima Fahid
Doctor of Philosophy
Temple University, 1997

Major Advisor: Dr. Peter Gran

This work examines the transition in the "private" lives of women from the Safavid to the Qajar eras. It traces the impact of the history of the articulation of the modern Iranian state that informs the "private" sphere of women's lives. It follows the impact of the different systems of organizations and of their ideological articulation that affected and transformed women's lives. Finally, it suggests that transition in the structure and ideology of the society transformed both gender and power and created new women and men.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Oceans apart and across many years I discovered two great teachers, Dr. Amir Hosain Aryan Pour and Dr. Peter Gran, who shared similar visions about history and history writing. Dr. Aryan Pour, inspired in me the love for history, and Dr. Gran, nurtured my enthusiasm in studying history. They taught me to go beyond the empiricist outlook on history and to search for encompassing issues such as philosophy of history and historical sociology. They believed in the importance of all domains of knowledge, including literature, philosophy and folklore in writing history, and emphasized how vital it is to search for the pulse of history in the lives of the common people. The support of Dr. Aryan Pour and Dr. Gran made difficult times easy and their patience and sense of humor made learning a pleasant experience. Their intellectual courage, the creativity of their ideas, and their knowledge about philosophy, literature, sociology, economy and world issues made it a pleasure to spend weeks, months, and years in their presence. I take my hat off for their immense intellectual knowledge, freedom and prowess.

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My sister Maryam, and my brother Mehdi have stood beside me throughout the school years; I thank them for their love and support. The enthusiasm of my father, Baqer, for our education was a source of encouragement from very early on, and the vigilant presence of my mother, Nahideh, gave me the utmost moral support. It is to her that I dedicate this work.
PREFACE

Studying the relations between public and private spheres of people's lives in Qajar and Safavid Iran, requires taking into account the dynamic nature and historicity of each domain, and the dialectical relations between the two. As in each historical epoch, the essence of these different areas of life is transformed, so is their relationship. Through constant interaction between human productive activities and social and private relations, what the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci calls a "circular movement within an organic whole,"(1) not only is each area transformed, but the relations between them also change. In the process of these historical transitions, power, which is also fluid and historically specific, changes. Consequently, notions of subjectivity and always with it, of gender identity, are constructed, produced and mediated historically.

My dissertation, entitled Gender and Power in Safavid and Qajar Iran, seeks to demonstrate the historical construction of gender identity in Safavid and Qajar Iran. Choosing the Safavid and the Qajar periods for such a study, is due to the fact that during the Safavids, the state was in the process of being formed, while during the Qajars the modern Iranian state takes shape. These different eras, therefore, present an occasion for examining the dynamics between the state and the private lives of the people.
I have chosen to write on the relation between the articulation of the modern Iranian state and the issue of sexuality. There has been research on politics, economy and the social issues during both the Safavid and the Qajar eras, whereas the study of sexuality in Iranian history still remains a new frontier. My aim is to show that along with the economy, politics and culture, sexuality changes from the Safavid to the Qajar era, and this change is concomitant with the transformation of gender and power.

In chapter one, I make an overview of the sources. I attempt to show that the relationship between the sexes is historically specific, and should be examined this way. My aim is also to demonstrate that in the field of the Middle Eastern studies many scholars have opposed the notions of "presentism" and "progress" in history, and the idea that Islam represents the whole culture. Without being "ultramodern" about the past, by using old manuscripts and other sources, these scholars have argued that women were less restrictive, had more control over their lives, and enjoyed rights at a period when such rights were absent from the lives of European women.(2) By using these sources, scholars have also demonstrated that Islam was not static, and that in each period, according to the requirements of the time, its application took a different form.

By studying people and cultures in their own context, scholars have also succeeded in unraveling important aspects
of women's lives in both the public and private domains. By examining laws pertaining to property rights, as well as those related to contraception and sexual matters, scholars argue that women were not the voiceless victims, an image that often gets portrayed about the Muslim women. In addition, historians have also shown that Islam constituted only one part of the culture, that there were other dimensions that affected people's life as well.

In analyzing different types of works, my intention was to show how historians, through using variety of texts, could demonstrate women's transgression of societal boundaries. Scholars have shown up to now how women have done this through adhering to gnostic orders, such as Sufism, using dramatic games, biography writings, and other means. By using old prescriptive treatise, and with a different reading of these texts, historians have succeeded in decoding the hidden facts about women's lives. They have shown that women did not heed the rulings of religious authorities in matters related to their lives, or used them for their own benefit. By studying the legal documents, they have shown how Islamic law (Shari'a), actually operated in women's lives as opposed to the prescription of legal manuals. Scholars have used sources such as biographical dictionaries to illustrate the economic, social and political status of women. And, through using Shari'a court documents, they have demonstrated that women were actively involved in litigation, sued people and were
sued by them, and that they even sued their husbands and brothers. Through studying institutions such as the harem, historians have stressed that it was not oppressive to women, and that through it women developed strengths, and skills that would perhaps take centuries to develop again.

In the section on theoretical considerations, I discuss my reasons for choosing socialist feminism as the epistemology over liberal feminism, traditional Marxism, and radical feminism. My intention in choosing it is that in traditional Marxism, the private domain of human existence is excluded from scrutiny, while radical feminism tends towards biologism and universalization of women's experiences. Socialist feminism, however, reconceptualizes the reality from the standpoint of women and avoids ahistorical and biologicistic views of women's experience. Socialist feminism, therefore, which is grounded in the historical understanding of women's experience offered the most convenient framework for historicizing women's lives in Iran.

In the second chapter, my aim is to illustrate the connection between the rise of the state as a general point and the status of women. I show how gender and class differentiation, development of commodity production, and the appearance of a "census-tax-conscription" system, were concomitant with the rise of the state in human communities. (3) I also show how the interconnection between class formation and gender hierarchy, facilitated through the rise
of commodity production, through change in gender relations and in the split between public/ private domains, entailed women's loss of power. With the development of public/private dichotomy, women work was relegated to the private sphere and its value was diminished. Women became the service workers in the household and the husbands occupied the position of the head of the family.

By distinguishing between the sphere of production and that of reproduction, the formation of the modern state creates systematic gender hierarchy. Therefore state and class formation, entail change in the meaning of gender and women's status. Change in women's position is not secondary or prior to economic hierarchy, but at the core of and concomitant with the development of exchange and of its division of labor.

The loss of women's status in the emerging modern state is also related to the replacement of subsistence production with commodity production and cash crops. The cultivation of cash crops, i.e. market-oriented crops, created surplus value but also entailed the alienation of land and of its private appropriation. In turn this change, brought about a transformation in the social relations of production and reproduction, and in the gendered division of labor, and this in turn caused women's lower participation in external work.

The lower status of women also correlates with the development of wage labor. Even though capitalist development affected both men and women, its impact on women was more
severe. With the replacement of large farmers by small farmers, women, who relied on their household plots for subsistence production, were deprived of their essential source of livelihood and therefore became dependent on men and their wages. Women's oppression, according to many scholars is therefore, rooted in the development of the state, which entails both class and gender hierarchy.

In the third chapter, I compare social formations, that is, social, economic and cultural/ideological characteristics during the Safavid and Qajar eras and their various impacts on women's lives. I point out that Iran was self-sufficient politically and economically during the Safavids but that it lost both its political and economic independence during the reign of the Qajars. In what was a pre-capitalist economy of the Safavid era, I note that women of certain classes were involved in subsistence production. They worked in the fields, were engaged in animal husbandry and produced manufactured goods. As a result, they enjoyed some economic power and were viewed as valuable members of the community, in villages, tribes and cities.

With the wide-range changes in the politics and the economy in the 19th century, Iran lost both its political and economic self-sufficiency as I noted. During this period, the economy was commercialized and cash cropping became the dominant form of production. While men became involved in the production of cash crops, women continued the subsistence
production. During this period, domestic and foreign capital created new opportunities for men while women were denied access to them. Policies which pressured men to enter wage economy, through taxation, gradually pushed women out of the public work place and confined them to the house. The cash crop economy increased the value of wage labor, which was predominantly performed by men, and therefore unpaid domestic labor, lost its previous value.

The rise of large landownership during this period, which itself was a by-product of the growth of cash crops, also worked against women of certain classes because they were gradually deprived of their own small plots for the cultivation of subsistence crop. The concentration of land in fewer hands during the Safavids and especially the Qajars, made the peasants dependent on the landlords, and women dependent on men. During the reign of the Qajars, therefore, rigidification of class structure made gender hierarchy more accentuated than before.

With these changes in the economy of Iran, women experienced the loss of their economic independence and the valued position they held in the pre-capitalist society of Iran. Part of the loss of women's autonomy was also due to the fact that the old village organization was broken down in the course of the twentieth century. As a result women were gradually deprived of the communal support that village communes provided for them.
In the third chapter, I also demonstrate that changes in the ideological domain were in part responsible for the lower status of women during the reign of the Qajars. The rich milieu of the Safavid era, which allowed the existence of various religious and Sufi tendencies, was not only conducive to the growth of great philosophers, but also generated more tolerance towards heretic tendencies, a phenomena that became less evident in the Qajar period as the Shi'a clerical body claimed to hold the monolithic truth. Sufi and mystical traditions, were sources of attraction for the less privileged classes and strata of the society, such as peasants, tribal people, artisans and women. Women, like other marginalized people were prone to Sufism and esoteric knowledge. During the reign of the Safavids and afterwards, heterodox tendencies, in which intuition played a major role, created a space for women through which they could affirm their spiritual authority and extend it to their daily lives. During the reign of the Qajars, however, with the increasing power of the ulama and with the suppression of Sufi tendencies, women became deprived of an important source for expressing their views and therefore exercising power.

In the fourth chapter, I examine the manuscripts belonging to the Safavid and the Qajar eras which bear on gender. I demonstrate that patriarchy as the ideological foundation of pre-capitalist Safavid era, was different than the masculinist power structure, which was the ideological
backbone of the capitalist Qajar. During the Safavid era, even though women lived under a patriarchal system, they enjoyed considerable power in many areas of their lives, and acted less restrictively. The reflection of their attitude is evident in the writings of men about women in this period. The picture of the powerful women, however, is absent in the Qajar period. It is in this period that masculinist power gets constructed around women's bodies. The portrayal of women as passive partners in sexual liaison is an essential part of the collection of satirical manuscripts.

The historical specificity of gender in these two periods relates to the historicity of power. The shift from the Safavid times, a time when sexual issues and experiences are discussed freely among women, and it is women who provide advice to each other, to the Qajars, when men define the rules for sexual etiquette, is a shift in the terms of power. As sexual matters become "taboo", and silence becomes the norm, (4) the "fields of force" (5) are transformed. "Taboos", in essence, are the means through which the masculinist power structure of the Qajars establishes its rule over women's bodies.

I have used different sets of writings for contextualizing women's lives during the Safavid and the Qajar periods. For the Safavid period I have used a manuscript that in its own way unravels the dynamics of power in relation to women. In this manuscript, through the eye of a religious
authority, the extent of women's power, and of their indifference towards religious rules and regulations become evident. By creating imaginary women faqīhs (Shi'a Jurists), this well known mulla of the time, describes the religious edicts these women faqīhs would prescribe for their followers. In this book, this mulla attacked women, who did not heed the official faqīhs rulings, and instead relied on a network of women for acquiring advice in matters related to their lives.

In the manuscripts from the Qajar era written about sexual rules and regulations, however, a different picture appears. In manuscripts with satirical approach, women are portrayed as voiceless partners in the sexual act. Description of desirable and undesirable bodily characteristics in terms of the size and age are portrayed in minute details and women with undesirable attributes are declared to be worthless. Women's bodies, in addition, get ridiculed and this again is done in relation to the specific bodily properties.

From both the Safavid and the Qajar eras there remains manuscripts called "Bah", "Bakhieh" and "Khergeh" which are about sexual rules and regulations. These rules which are mainly about the sexual conducts of men towards women, manifest not only men's insecurity in relation to women, but in those parts where the importance of women's pleasure is discussed, show women's influence in their creation. Women's agency therefore remains an important element in both the Safavid and the Qajar periods that allows women to challenge
men's authority and to create spaces for themselves. The use of original sources shows this.
ENDNOTES


CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:
HISTORIOGRAPHIC AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Throughout history Iranian women have experienced change within the continuum of an over-arching patriarchy in the pre-capitalist era and a masculinist power structure in the capitalist era. Iran's transformation into a capitalist system and the concomitant ideological changes created transitions in women's lives that were at times conspicuous and at times less so, but the resemblance of issues related to women's, in a patriarchal system and those of a masculinist society, created the belief in the permanency of issues in all areas of women's existence. Each system of economic organization and its ideological articulation affected and transformed women's lives in a variety of ways. The organization of the pre-capitalist economic system and its ideological basis, patriarchy, on the one hand, and the capitalist organization with its ideological backbone, the masculinist power structure, on the other hand, each had a unique impact on women's lives. One of the areas in which this impact manifested itself was in the domain of sexuality. This transformation was prompted by transitions in the social sphere; it reflected the impact of wider arenas of life in
people's intimate encounters. The present work demonstrates such a change in Iranian history from the Safavid (1500-1722) to the Qajar era (1795-1925), during the process of transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist Iran.

The discourse of sexuality is one lens through which to examine more closely the kinds of transformations that inform the history of the articulation of the modern Iranian state. Choosing manuscripts from 16th to 19th centuries with sexual issues as their main theme from among many manuscripts that deal with various topics, recognizes the importance of the issue of sexuality for studying women's lives. These texts manifest changes from one era to the next, and at the same time they reveal continuity in the way in which one segment of the society, men, viewed and objectified the "other" section, women. Studying these texts in the context of their historical period is a promising endeavor in historicizing women's "private" lives in the span of a few centuries. An important aspect of women's oppression which was in the males control of women's bodies, that is their sexuality and fertility, continued from one era to the next. As such, these social practices, sexual activity, childbearing and childrearing, which embodied power relations, call for political analysis. (2)

Women's oppression, however, did not happen only through their sexuality and reproductivity. Women were also exploited in non-sexual and non procreative ways. (3) In other words
women's bodies had other parts as well, that they were not just "vaginas and wombs on legs". (4) In the urban, rural and tribal communities, all the household duties and childrearing were performed by women. Women carried out much of the heavy farming while they were also engaged in producing crafts and manufacturing goods. The proceeds of women's labor in all these areas was extracted by a non-producing elite and also their husbands and they were provided only maintenance in return. (5) Women, in addition, toiled in sweatshops and factories and through their labor, male owners amassed wealth. Therefore women were not only imprisoned at home, but in the work places as well and were exploited in both spheres. (6)

Acknowledging women's oppression to be a multifaceted phenomenon, I chose to do research in the area of sexuality. The reason for this choice was that despite the fact that women were engaged in a variety of work, they were defined "primarily by their sexual and procreative labor as 'sex objects' and as 'mothers'." (7) Of course viewing women as primarily sexual beings and/or mothers was an ideological mystification which concealed the fact that women did other types of work as well. (8) Choosing sexuality as a topic for research had also to do with the fact that more than any other area, sexuality has been considered to be a 'forbidden zone' and a 'taboo' (silenced), a taboo which has been created by masculinist discourse in order to keep men in control of
women's bodies. Being a forbidden zone, sexuality has not been given proper attention in the field of Iranian Studies. Whereas there has been some research on the economic and social aspects of women's adversity, there are very few publications that deal with the sexual and reproductive aspects of their oppression.

The issue of sexuality and procreation of course varied for women belonging to different classes. A comprehensive understanding of women's oppression requires taking into account "the endless variety" as well as "monotonous similarity" in women's experience. Conceding the existence of "endless variety", I do stress "the monotonous similarity" in women's experience of sexuality across classes because all women shared a certain fundamental common reality, regardless of differences in their social standing. This is not to say that women in certain classes did not come across special forms of oppression but my focus here is similarities in women's experiences throughout the society. Also, as far as these manuscripts which expand from the 16th to the 19th centuries are concerned, they were written by men from different classes and with different ideologies, with audiences from among all ranks and stratum and therefore they were relevant to women from all levels of the social order.

Trying to extract information about women's sexuality from these manuscripts and to unravel the nature and extent of change from one era to the next required looking beyond the
surface, and deducing not only from what was written but also reading from in between the lines and what continued to remain unwritten. Since the historical context changed from a patriarchal to a masculinist discourse, and from one era to the next, it was important to look for historical variations in this seemingly monotonous theme. It was essential to see how patriarchy, the ideological regulator of the precapitalist era, was replaced by a masculinist ideology in the capitalist era. It was also important to observe the way in which transformations in the economic and ideological terrains affected women's intimate lives. Looking into the productive and ideological domains was then imperative for a greater understanding of the impact of historical transformations in Iran upon women's lives.

The historical variation in women's situation had repercussions on the issue of women as the "other". Women were considered "other" throughout the history of patriarchy and masculinism in Iran but this "otherness" was not uniform and with historical transformation its extent and make up was changed. The duality present in patriarchal and masculinist power on the one hand, and women's agency, on the other hand, called for an attentive reading of the manuscripts and a searching for women's active presence and voice even when it was absent in the writings. In Iran, like anywhere else, the issues in women's history were not black and white. Patriarchy and masculinism were not the omnipotent power that did
whatever they wished to a voiceless, passive group of women without confronting any opposition. Women challenged men and their rule, and therefore their "otherness" was transformed depending on the degree of the failure or success of their struggle.

Manuscripts that deal with sexual issues and also matters related to women's and men's bodies come in many forms. Some manuscripts deal with various types of marriage, that is permanent and temporary and rules governing both types. Diverse forms of love and sexuality are discussed in yet another set of manuscripts, while others pick up issues such as menstruation, women's personal maintenance and prostitution. There are also a set of manuscripts that deal with sexual issues in a satirical format. A different category of manuscripts called "Bah", "Bakhieh", and "Khergeh" concentrate on giving medical advice on the issue of sexuality. They refer to advice in relation to virility and femininity in the sexual domain. They deal with issues such as copulation, rules governing it and its variation. They refer to women's diverse facial and bodily features and the connection of these to their sexual appetite or desirability and also the rules for abstinence from certain types of women.

The manuscripts which mainly deal with sexual matters were written by the clergy of higher importance (Faqih), and mullahs of lower ranks. The clergy presented members of various classes and therefore recommended various versions of
sexual etiquette and performance. The Fiqh interpreted and elaborated upon Quranic rules relevant to male and female's sexuality. The minor clergy absorbed the essence of the Fiqh writings, wrote their own comments, those that they deemed relevant to their community, and presented it in a less formal manner. The audience for these regulations and dogmas were men from among all classes because those prescribing it pervaded in all levels of the society. The sexual satire was written by the laymen from upper and middle classes. They used their versions of sexual description which mostly had a satirical nature. These manuscripts did not originate from the state archives but even though they were free from state's bureaucratic limitations on their contents, they were not free from the masculinist discourse that imbued their content.

Overview of the Sources

In the field of Middle Eastern women's history, one might note the existence of a variety of texts on the issue of sexuality, both archival and non archival, which have been used to bring into light this still obscure area of life. In Afaf Lutfi Al-Sayyid Marsot's edited collection of essays, diverse sources including Sufi and popular literature are used.(11) Fadwa Malti Douglas uses classical or medieval Arabic literature such as The Thousand And One Nights, Ibn al-Batanuni's Kitab al-'Unwan fi Makayid al-Niswan, an adab
collection, Ibn Tufayl's Hayy ibn Yaqzan, and modern literature such as Nawal al-Sa'dawi's Hidden Face Of Eve, to examine women's voices in Arabo-Islamic discourse.(12) Fatna Sabbah uses The Koran, Imam Malik's Al-Muwatta, Imam Bukhari's Al-Sahih, Imam Muslim's Al-Sahih, Tarmidi's Al-Sunan, and Imam Ghazzali's Ihya'ulum al-din, to shed light on the legal Islamic discourse on women's sexuality.(13) Basim Musallam utilizes various sources such as Razi's Kitab al-Hawi, and Kitab al-tibb al-Mansuri, Abu 'Ali Ibn Sina's Qanun, Nafzawi's The perfumed Garden, Ibn al-Jawzi's Kitab iltiqat al-manafi' and many other texts to deduce information on contraceptive methods.(14) Farah Madelain's translation of Abu Hamid al-Ghazzali's Book On The Etiquette of Marriage From The Ihya, provides rules governing a marriage including sexual issues. Madelain herself gives an account of marriage and sexuality in pre-Islamic Arabia.(15)

Donna Lee Bowen examines jurist's opinions to find out about women's status in the case of 'azl'(coitus interruptus). She uses works such as Al-Ghazzali's 'Ihya 'ulum al-din, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's Zad al-ma'ad, Muhyi al-Din Abu Zakariya al-Nawawi's Al-Majmu', Ibn Dawyan's Kitab mana al-sabil fi sharh al-dalil, and other sources to examine the relation between 'Azl' and women's property rights and concludes that women's rights to sexual fulfillment and women's property rights were both entwined and at odds.(16) Leila Ahmed examines two different perspectives in Arab culture in regards
to women's sexuality and women's bodies and illustrates the
difference between them. The two texts used for this purpose
are Sa'dawi's *The Hidden Face of Eve*, and Alifa Rifaat's
*Distant View Of a Minaret and Other Stories*. Leila Ahmed
believes that while Sa'dawi's views towards women's bodies are
negative, Rifaat gives expression to 'female centered
eroticism' which are rooted in medieval thought and writing.
(17) Nawal al-Sa'dawi uses her own life experiences as a woman
and a doctor to illustrate the impact of patriarchy on sexual
issues in Egypt.(18)

Mervet Hatem utilizes historical data on the economy,
society and politics to show the impact of these factors on
the issue of sexuality in the context of patriarchal system in
18th and 19th century Egypt.(19) Farah Azari explores the
issue of sexuality under patriarchy in Iran,(20)and Fatima
Mernissi examines the relation between virginity and
patriarchy in Morocco.(21) Annemarie Schimmel surveys
sexuality in sufi literature and life,(22) Valerie Hoffman
looks at its sites among sufis, mystics and saints,(23)and M.
E. Combs-Schilling examines its place in sacred performances
and sacrifice.(24) Kaveh Safa-Isfahani looks at sexuality in
dramatic games and concludes that through these games women
transcended the "features of the engulfing male centered
society," and expressed their sexuality, power and active
identity.(25)
James Bellamy searches for sexuality in popular literature, (26) and S. D. Goitein examines common peoples' sexual mores. (27) The place of sexuality in early Islam is inspected by J. C. Burgel, (28) and Franz Rosenthal depicts the role of sexuality in medieval Muslim society. (29) Noel Coulson analyzes the regulation of sexuality under traditional Islamic law, (30) Evelyne Accad surmises a relation between sexuality and war, (31) and Arno Schmitt and Jehoeda Sofer in a collected work survey the site of sexuality among men in Muslim societies. (32) The subject of the female body in endogamous societies is examined by Khalil Lamrani, (33) and Leila Ahmed, (34) and Abdelwahab Bouhdiba. (35) Scrutinize sexuality in Islamic context in general. Deniz Kandiyoti looks at the Turkish novel between 1839 and 1923 to show the relation between the emancipatory measures for women, specifically unveiling, and the sexual repression that followed as compensatory symbolism, (36) and Afsaneh Najmabadi demonstrates that once Iranian women were unveiled, their traditionally free bodily and vocal expression gave way to disciplined posture and language. (37)

Sexuality is one area among many that has been adopted by scholars to demonstrate the complexity involved in studying women's lives in the context of the duality existing in patriarchal sovereignty and women's agency. These scholars try to show that while women were oppressed living under the patriarchy, they were not silenced and were vocal in all areas
of life. To bring to light women's active presence in other spheres of life, diverse kinds of materials have been utilized in imaginative fashions enhancing the knowledge about women in Middle Eastern societies.

Huda Lutfi examines a four volume prescriptive treatise *al-Madhkhal* by Ibn al-Hajj, a Muslim scholar of the mid-fourteenth century in Egyptian Mamluk society, and shows that contrary to common belief, women did not heed "faqihs" rulings on matters related to their lives.(38) In another essay she chooses six documents from the Haram collection of medieval Arabic documents, to examine a particular type of private legal documents, namely the *Iqrar* (an acknowledgement of a deed), which were issued on behalf of women. Through such surveys she sheds light on the institution of *waqf*, *wasi*, *wakil*, *shahid* and the *qadi* in relation to women. Lutfi maintains that while literary sources such as legal manuals "discuss how the Shari'a should regulate the daily lives of the Muslims,...documents show us how the Shari'a actually operated in everyday life..."(39) In yet another article she uses Al-Sakhawi's *Kitab Al-Nisa*`, a biographical dictionary, in order to portray the status of women economically, socially and politically on issues related to family, education and inheritance. Lutfi cites Al-Sakhawi in reference to wealthy women's involvement in philanthropic works and asserts that "The building of ribats to help out widows was a well recognized form of medieval charity...These ribats and
exclusive female gatherings may have helped create an integrated social atmosphere where women are seen as helping out each other in times of difficulties, and where they are seen to be enjoying each others company away from the male world."(40)

A number of authors have used state archives to exhibit women's active role in economic and social spheres of life. These surveys indicate that women from all classes were actively involved in pursuing their economic interest. Judith Tucker examines the records of Shari'a courts in Egypt and shows that women from all classes and particularly peasant women used their legal rights and were actively involved in litigations.(41) S. Allam surveys Demotic material and concludes that women in ancient Egypt owned private property and administered related rights. He shows that in addition to real estate women owned serfs and cattle and other kinds of chattels and received the proceeds from chapels, tombs and offices, that they could buy and sell, borrow or lend, act as mortgagors and mortgagees, lessors and lessees and creditors and debtors.(42)

Gabriel Baer demonstrates that women were founders of evkaf in sixteenth century Istanbul and therefore property holders. He maintains that they founded evkaf to guard their property and its income from the intervention of their husbands, their husband's relatives and their male guardians. Baer explains, however, that the property which women
inherited was eventually transferred to male beneficiaries or male managers and "thus the wagf in fact weakened the economic position of women as a group."(43)

Haim Gerber uses the court records of seventeenth century Anatolia Bursa to shed light on both legal and socioeconomic aspects of women's lives. Like Huda Lutfi, he acknowledges "the tension between the theoretical Shari'a, the Islamic law of the book, and the law implicit in the kadi's records, that is, 'the practice of the courts'."(44) Through the court records Baer illustrates that women did in fact inherit, that they appeared in court and pleaded their cases freely, that they not only sold property to family members but also bought property from them and also "freely and openly sue[d] them."(45) He mentions that buying properties was a sign of "real merchandise interests."(46) He demonstrates that a lot of women owned houses, shops, workshops, orchards, vineyards, and mills which they either managed themselves or rented them out,(47) and that they also owned agricultural lands and administered them.(48) He adds that some women had agricultural properties that were separate from their husbands' properties.(49) He shows that women took loans from wagfs and individuals and supplied their husbands with credit.(50) He asserts that women were involved in trade and were also engaged in artisanship,(51) mainly in cottage industry, and were appointed as guardian(wasi), and as administrators of the wagf.(52) He mentions, however, that women
were not equal to men in terms of owning property, or being involved in trade and artisanship or in personal life, where men could freely divorce their wives, but he emphasizes that women's active role in all areas of economic life shows that the situation "was not as one-sided as was always supposed to be." (53)

Ronald Jennings examines the Ottoman judicial records of the shari'a court of Anatolian Kayseri dated from 1600 to 1625. He shows that women owned property and were involved in transactions of properties, that they appeared in court and sued people and were sued by them and at times they even sued their husbands and brothers. Jennings also shows that women were engaged, although marginally, in the artisanal and mercantile activities of the city. (54) Jennings mentions that on occasions when the wife took residence with another man due to her husband's long term absence, the "husband might be anxious to recover his 'wife' despite the fact that she had been living with another man since he went away; moreover, the husband might find it prudent, or necessary, to seek a remedy at court, rather than relying on force." (55) He then cites "[t]wo fetvas from Ebussuud [which] refer to legal attempts by 'husbands' to recover 'wives' who had taken up legal residence with new 'husbands.'" (56) Jennings then refers to the observations of Paul Stirling: "Even more striking, women are sometimes remarried when their husbands have not divorced them at all. In other words, de facto, a woman can leave her
husband as easily as he can turn her out, if, but only if, her natal household, or some other will take her in. She can then remarry without stigma or public disapproval."(57)

Abraham Marcus picks up the issue of real estate and by examining the records (sigill) of the Allepo's Shari'a court in 18th century shows that women were property owners and were active buyers of real property.(58) He maintains that despite the fact that most women were not employed outside the house, "they were by no means isolated from the mainstream of commercial life."(59) He demonstrates that women were involved in the trading in houses,(60) and in intra-family trading, the majority of women were buyers while men were sellers. This he asserts, shows women's interest in owning properties especially their own dwellings.(61) He also shows that women invested in properties including commercial properties such as shops and bought and sold gardens and orchards.(62) Marcus concludes that women were "major actor(s) in the urban real estate market," and even though they "inherited, purchased and owned less than men,...[t]heir cumulative capital assets... represented a considerable economic value."(63)

Dror Ze'evi examines the travel literature and the records of shari'a courts of Jerusalem in 17th century for unraveling women's position. He concludes that travellers accounts of Middle Eastern societies were prejudiced, and therefore court records portray a more accurate picture of reality of women's lives.(64) Ze'evi maintains that for
travellers from the West, the position of women in their own society was the only yardstick by which they measured the status of women in the Middle East. Comparing the relative freedom of western women who could move between public and private spheres with the restricted position of Middle Eastern women, these travellers came to believe that the latter situation presented "blatant discrimination against women." (65) Ze'evi disputes this outlook and contends that this was "an inaccurate view of a culture that refused to present itself openly to the outsider." He emphasizes that "these women were part of a separate social, economic, and cultural network, at times richer and offering more opportunity than that of their female contemporaries in the west." (66) He adds that "[i]n the travellers' world, separation was a negative value,...[b]ut although 'separate' was clearly not 'equal' and in many respects women were still marginalized, this separation actually tended to reduce oppression...This segregation also allowed [women] to maintain their private property, to conduct business, and to represent their own interests in court." (67)

Ze'evi suggests that, ironically, it could have been the influence of western social norms in Middle Eastern societies in mid-19th century that undermined women's position in later centuries. (68) In order to adapt to western cultural norms, he asserts, Middle Eastern women lost freedom within their own network. He believes that prescribing for women what Judy
Mabro calls "the idea of refinement," curtailed women's previous access to economic and social privileges. (69) He mentions that the concept of Western Christian marriage "as a sacred institution, rather than as a business contract between partners," limited women's access to courts for dissolving the marriage. He also adds that with the secularization of education in the 19th century, women's knowledge of Islamic law was reduced, which in turn lessened their capacity in pursuing divorce. (70) Ze'evi concludes: "It is no doubt true that, all things considered, women's status in the district of Jerusalem in 17th century was considerably lower than that of men of the same social stratum. But the normative system was not entirely asymmetrical; women were not condemned to a life of seclusion and marginality while men went about their business. Both sides were part of a restrictive system based on the separation of the sexes. This system provided women a certain leeway, a relative measure of freedom to act in their separate network, provided they kept their distance." (71)

The economic sphere and public life are not the only areas chosen by the scholars in order to demonstrate women's role. They have also shown that even within the harem women were not the voiceless victims that have been portrayed by the Orientalists. Leila Ahmed stresses that the harem was not as oppressive to women, that it was a form of women commune that allowed women to develop "strengths, skills and analytical and imaginative resources that would perhaps take centuries to
develop again." (72) She adds that "The very word 'harem' is a variant of the word 'haram' which means 'forbidden' (and also holy), which suggests ... that it was women who were doing the forbidding, excluding men from their society, and that it was therefore women who developed the model of strict segregation in the first place. Here, women share living time and space, exchange experience and information, and critically analyze—often through jokes, stories, or plays—the world of men." (73) Leila Ahmad then cites Carla Makhlouf-Obermeyer who describes "the Yemeni custom of women gathering together every afternoon, often packing forty or fifty in a room, to smoke, chew qat (a mildly narcotic leaf), tell stories, play music, dance, and perform plays. The general tone of these regular afternoon women's gatherings-called tafritas—is one of satire, ridicule, and disrespect for males and the ideals of the male world." (74)

Among recent works on the harem one can cite Leslie Peirce who looks at the harem life in Ottoman Empire, (75) Malek Alloula who concentrates on the images of women in 19th century in Orientalists' postcards and photographs, (76) and Billie Melman who reviews the harem in the context of the encounter of English women with the Orient. (77)

Billie Melman uses travel writings for analyzing English women's view on the harem in the period between 1763 and 1914, and discusses three inter-related, although not consecutive, developments in these writings. First was the Augustan model
of writing on harems in which writers such as Lady Mary Wortley Montagu and Lady Elizabeth Craven replaced the idea of
universalism with a sense of "relativeness of sexual morals and manners." (78) Lady Mary Montagu's concept of "sexual
liberty", "was the basis for [this] cultural relativism and
tolerance towards the sexual mores of the 'other'." (79) Melman
mentions that the idea of "liberty in bondage", (80) noted by
Robert Halsband, Montagu's biographer and editor, was used by
Lady Montagu to portray the complexity of women's issues in
the Middle East. In this context Melman contends, the veil
presented itself not as a symbol of subjection but as a sign
of liberty which was used by women to do as they pleased
without the danger of being recognized. (81)

Melman also talks about Lady Elizabeth Craven who
demonstrated the concept of "freedom from sex" in "the custom
of putting slippers on the threshold of the haremlik, to
signify the wish for privacy." (82) Melman emphasizes that this
showed "married women's right to privacy" and "freedom from
cohabitation in marriage" and possibly "physical coercion and
the sexual tyranny of their husbands." (83) Melman summarizes
Lady Montagu and Lady Craven as follows: "For both Montagu and
Craven 'liberty' signifies women's sexual freedom which...has
two distinct meanings. The first is 'freedom for', in this
context the ability of women to practice extra-marital sex,
and is symbolized in the veil, the symbol of female chastity
which Montagu uses in an inverted way. The second freedom is
'freedom from' sex, exemplified in the metaphor of slippers."

(84) Second was the development of Victorian and Edwardian model of writing in the process of which "the haremlik, the locus sensualis of the imaginary Orient was divested of its sexuality,"(85) and a "major shift, from an emphasis on 'sexual freedom' towards 'freedom from sex'" took place. Along with this the image of the "Physical woman" was replaced by the image of motherhood and wifehood, and the portrayal of women through their sexual functions gave way to the description of female autonomy within their own domain.(86) Melman explains that desexualization paved the way for a historical analysis of the harem, by taking into account elements such as class, place and time. Marriage, divorce, polygamy and concubinage were reinterpreted in the historical context, and harem was presented "as a self-ruling female community, rather than a patriarchal construct."(87)

A third development in the writings on the harem according to Melman, was the emergence of a sense of gender solidarity as cultural, religious, racial and political differences were transcended and left their impressions on the writings in this period.(88) Instead of portraying women as idle creatures, there was much emphasis on their work within the harem in tending to the housework and taking care of children.(89) This "emphasis on domesticity and housewifery" in turn helped to replace the exotic and mysterious view of
the orient with an "industrious and rather monotonous" picture of life. (90)

In writing about the Victorian period Melman cites Lucy Duff Gordon: "Thus Lucy Duff Gordon commented in 1864 that husbands of the fellahin class tolerated infidelities on the part of their harem and that they were more liberal-minded towards their women-folk than the English. '... I believe that very forgiving husbands are more commoner here than everywhere [sic]'... In other words, according to Duff Gordon, there was no double, masculine and feminine, standard for sexual mores in Egyptian peasant society..." (91) Melman also cites Mrs. Ramsay who remarked in 1897 that "outside the Westernized cities... women enjoyed various degrees of freedom. In the inland small towns and villages seclusion could be as rare as the veil... Even in those households where seclusion is practiced, the inmates of the haremlik are much freer than their counterparts among the English poorer classes." (92) Melman adds that "Muslim women were considered freer than their western sisters because the former (according to our travellers), had legal rights and could hold property and appear before the law-courts." (93)

Elizabeth Warnock Fernea also writes about Lady Mary Wortley Montagu and describes her as an "unbiased ethnographer", "with remarkable openness to the values and ideas of another culture, an openness rare in any century, including our own... and remarkably free of ethnocentrism." (94)
She cites Lady Montagu in a letter addressed to Alexander Pope to demonstrate how she viewed and understood cultures within their own context. "I have frequent disputes with (Echmet Bey) concerning the differences of our customs, particularly the confinement of women. He assures me there is nothing at all in it; only, says he, we have the advantage that when our wives cheat us, nobody knows it." (95) Fernea also explains that Lady Montagu "found the fact that women owned property in their own right particularly striking, given the situation of English women in the eighteenth century." (96)

Reaching the opposite conclusion, Malika Mehdid examines both Malek Alloula's *The Colonial Harem* and Edward Said's *Orientalism* and concludes that none has decoded "the imperialist masculinist message inscribed on the female body."

She is more critical of Alloula's work which she describes as phallocentric where Arabo-Muslim women becomes "the female subject of a discursive power visual or written." She criticizes the fact that women remain "the object of a permanent gaze and a constant prying" traditionally under male western eyes and presently under male Algerian view." She condemns the latter gaze to be as "equally voyeuristic and no less possessive and stultifying in its nature and impact as it focuses on the naked body of the women as a field for writing/reading the world, investing it in the process with paradigms of the masculine principle." (97)
Travel literature of the 18th and 19th century present yet another area to which scholars turn to in order to surmise information about women's participation in economic and political life of the society at the time. Except for a handful of cases, however, scholars have demonstrated that travellers' knowledge about societies was of its surface and that they remained blind to women's contributions to social life. Despite this fact travellers' accounts unwittingly display aspects of Middle Eastern society that otherwise would have remained unknown.

Judy Mabro maintains that "Victorian travellers were inclined to believe that if the life of a middle-class European, Christian woman was at one end of a continuum, then the life of the equivalent Oriental, Muslim woman was at the other. Given that the life of the latter was not the dolce far niente that they described and that of the former was under considerable restraint until the end of the century, they were not as far apart as people liked to stress. Poor women in both countries worked hard inside and outside the home, and the fact that one wore a veil did not necessarily make her a greater 'drudge'. Women were no more passive victims in one society than they were in the other." (98)

Mabro criticizes traveller's accounts because, according to her, they adopted a global view of these societies (99) and in their generalization not only ignored varieties in town and rural life (100) but also differences in social norms and
attitudes of the well to do and poor people. (101) In addition, she mentions that, whenever they were confronted with a woman who did not conform to their preconceived idea of "submissive Oriental woman", they called her an exception. Citing an example from the letters of M. Michaud and M. Poujoulat she writes: "Entering a village home, a fellah(peasant)woman was heard shouting in a rage at her husband, and this voice of authority in a Muslim woman was considered most surprising, since the Koran says that women must be obedient! However, the interpreter was reassuring, stating that this 'was not the rule but the exception to the rule; Egyptian women in general are as submissive as slaves."(102) Through traveller's accounts Mabro also talks about the views of Egyptian men towards Englishmen, "She[Lucie Duff Gordon] discovered that what most shocked Egyptian men about the English was their treatment of women. Not because they allowed them too much freedom, but because of the way Englishmen talked about women among themselves, their hard and unkind treatment of their wives and of women in general."(103)

Carroll Pastner examines three Englishmen's views on Arabia and comes to the conclusion that they "used their images of Arab women to comment upon English society," that they attributed a superior morality to Victorian women, and by comparing the veiled and therefore "unredeemed" Arab women they celebrated the "'civilized' nature of Victorian society". According to these travellers "veiled woman could not be
modest because she was unredeemed." Pastner adds that by relying on a "model of dichotomous private and public domains in Middle Eastern social system" they created "theoretical bias toward a 'bounded' society."(104)

Judith Tucker examines two English women who travelled to Egypt and Palestine in 19th century. She shows the difference between Mary Eliza Rogers who "seems to teeter at the edge of an abyss of otherness" and Lucie Duff Gordon who "argues, at times, for a sort of cultural relativism." In the case of Gordon she adds that "[t]o her credit, she had discovered early on that Islam had been overplayed as a social determinant by scholars and travellers who preceded her."(105) Despite citing references such as these, Tucker concludes that these travellers overlooked women's share in building the economic and political life of the society and the dramatic upheavals of the 19th century.(106)

Memoirs, autobiography and biography are other sources that have been appropriated by scholars in order to epitomize women's awareness of political and social issues and their active role in shaping historical events. In her memoirs Halide Edip talks about her part in not only the social awakening of Turkey but also the emancipation of women.(107) The memoirs of Huda Sha'rawi shows that women in the Cairo harem salon of the 1890's conducted debates on Islam and veiling. It also illustrates the hurdles women were faced with in advancing women's cause in 20th century Egypt and how they
overcame it. (108) Cynthia Nelson uses Doria Shafiq's memoirs as well as her five volumes of poetry, to illuminate her life and activities as a feminist in 20th century Egypt. (109) Marilyn Booth examines Mayy Ziyada's biography of three feminists Arab women writers and concludes that in writing these biographies Ziyada found a platform to expound her own views on women's issues. Rose Ghorayeb, in a short biographical sketch of Ziyada, in addition to an essay and a story, tries to reveal the essence of Ziyada's thinking on women's oppression, her views on women's work and women's emancipation. (110) The issue of women's autobiographies in Iran has been dealt with by Farzaneh Milani, (111) and the life of Qurrat al-'Ayn and her transgression of social boundaries is portrayed by various authors and from different angels. (112) The memoirs and life story of a Persian princess, Taj al-Saltaneh demonstrate that it was possible to transcend the harem life and cultivate independent thinking, (113) and the memoirs of an Egyptian princess written by her governess, illuminate aspects of gender relations in this society in 19th century. (114)

By examining a different set of materials, namely women's writings, scholars illustrate how women's voices transgressed societal limits and imposed silence. Margot Badran and Miriam Cook look at a century of Arab feminist writings, (115) and Farzaneh Milani by using veil as a "conceptual framework" (116) demonstrates its connection to literary expression and
women's challenge for visibility. (117) Scholars also use press
to demonstrate women's active role as social agents. (118)

Theoretical Considerations

Among various epistemologies that deal with women's
issues such as liberal feminism, traditional Marxism, radical
feminism and socialist feminism, I have chosen socialist
feminism for analyzing women's oppression in the 18th and 19th
century Iran. (119) This is because other theories such as
liberal feminism and Marxism either do not accentuate the
unique position of women in society and the distinct
oppression they endure, or like radical feminism place too
much emphasis on one aspect of women's oppression and discount
other aspects.

Liberal feminism was the first attempt to present reality
from women's standpoint, but it still holds to the conceptual
framework of traditional liberal theory. Liberal feminist
theory minimizes the importance of class, sex, and color and
by placing emphasis on the human values, conceals the conflict
of interest between members of different classes and between
men and women. Liberal feminist theory also places rigid
distinction between private and public sphere of human lives
and excludes the "private sphere", where women have been
relegated historically from public scrutiny. By accepting this
distinction, liberal feminism perpetuates men's domination of women. (120)

Traditional Marxism holds some of the same assumption as liberalism even though in many ways it differs from liberalism. Marxism assumes that the private realm, in which sexual activity and procreation takes place, is more "natural" and therefore less "human" than public sphere. It therefore excludes the "private realm" from political scrutiny by excluding it from the domain of political economy. Traditional Marxism is gender-neutral and discounts men's domination of women. (121)

Radical feminism is the first theory to acknowledge the necessity of viewing reality from women's standpoint. It shows that the dualism used in traditional political theory justifies women's subordination. By adopting the slogan "the personal is political" it attempts to include the private sphere of human life. Radical feminism, however, tends towards biologism and universalization of women's experience. The impact of class, race, and nationality are therefore minimized on women's lives. (122)

Socialist feminism reconceptualizes reality from the standpoint of women and avoids ahistorical and biologistic views of women's experience. Therefore socialist feminism is grounded in a historical and materialist understanding of women's experience. (123)
**Liberal Feminism**

By way of contrast, liberal feminism, following in the footsteps of the liberal tradition, appropriates a moral and political philosophy that holds some positivist or neo-positivist assumptions. (124) These assumptions are objectivity and neutrality in scientific research. Objectivity which is in essence unbiased value judgments means that a philosopher should disengage herself or himself from properties such as class, sex, or race and the values, interests and emotions that are produced by these properties. Many aspects of human intellectual and cultural activities are excluded from the realm of knowledge by the narrow positivist paradigm. (125)

Liberal feminism, which uses the revitalized liberal/positivist tradition, distinguishes between empirical and normative aspects of the theory. By relying on the normative or non-empirical aspect of the theory, liberal feminists place emphasis on values that are supposed to be universal human values and therefore do not reflect the special interests of a specific group. And by relying on the empirical angle of the theory, they discount women's mystical notions in their relation to nature and concepts like alienation which they assume to be a logically unclear phenomena. Liberal feminists also assert that they do not request special privileges for women; that they only demand equal rights for all without discrimination on the basis of sex. (126) Liberal feminists
believe that their view reflect the "impartial perspective of the rational detached observer." (127)

Liberal tradition distinguishes between economic theory and political philosophy. Economic theory is used to describe how the economy works, and political theory is used to prescribe how the political system should work. The public and private distinction exist both in economic theory and political philosophy but they operate differently in each area. (128)

Liberal economics assumes a distinction between "the public 'economic' world of the market and the private 'non-economic' sphere of the home." (129) This distinction was a reflection of the development of industrialization and commodity production which transformed many traditional forms of production out of the home and into the factory. The public arena, the world of commerce and industry, came to be known the world of men, and the home was defined as "women"s' place. This public/private distinction was normative and in the 19th century rationalized the exploitation of women.

Liberal political theory, here to continue, assumes the public realm to be those areas of life that are subject to government regulation and the private realm to be the areas that should be exempt from such regulations. Despite disagreement among liberal philosophers over the limits of each realm, they all agree that the family belongs to the
private realm and should be exempted from government regulations and scrutiny of law. (130)

**Traditional Marxism**

Marxist tradition is different from the liberal tradition in its notion of the connection between economics and politics. (131) Marxist believe that economics cannot be separated from politics, and, therefore, instead of distinguishing between economic theory and political philosophy they concentrate on the study of political economy. Marxists believe that for understanding women's oppression it is necessary to build a political economy of women's oppression. (132)

Traditional Marxists use a public/private distinction in their analysis of women's oppression. Engels for example, maintains that with the collapse of primitive communities, household management lost its public character and became a private service, and the wife, as a result, became excluded from all participation in social production. Engels then views women's work outside the market not as real work since women were "estranged from all real work." Engels thus regards "private" production to be less important than the "public" production. Therefore, women in the household are seen as "excluded from the main action of history, passively absorbing the impact of 'economic' changes in 'social production.'" (133)
Marxists, like liberals, believe that sexuality and reproduction are within the private sphere, but even though they do not view the private sphere to be completely outside the sphere of politics, they think that it is "less central, politically, than the economic realm." (134)

In the traditional Marxist interpretation, "labor" is used to define the work in producing human "material needs" which are understood essentially as food, shelter and clothing. Even though Marx and Engels state specifically that there are two aspects to the production of life, "both of one's own in labor and of fresh life in procreation," (135) they mostly refer to "production" as the production of food, shelter and clothing. The "economy" of a society is the way it organizes "production", and changes in the "economic system" or "mode of production" ultimately determines changes in the "noneconomic" sphere or social organization of procreation and therefore constitutes the "material base" or economic foundation of the society. (136)

In traditional Marxist interpretation, therefore, childbearing and childrearing practices are assumed to be part of noneconomic or "superstructure" sphere. (137) As a result, Marxists view reproduction as being of secondary importance in shaping society. This is partly due to the fact that they assume procreative activities to be "naturally" and "biologically" determined. As a result their emphasis on human needs for food, shelter and clothing on the one hand and
sexuality and procreation on the other hand is not uniform. While they see human needs for food, clothing and shelter changing, historically paving the way for new social organizations, they view human procreation as more "natural" and less open to historical transformation. (138) In traditional Marxism, therefore, there is a positivist bias, a residual biologism of Marxist categories, a "tendency to take biological facts as 'given' and to set fixed limits to social possibility." (139)

Traditional Marxism analyzes contemporary society into two opposing classes, the bourgeoisie and proletariat. The economic and power relations between classes are defined by the relationship to the means of production. It accentuates commonalities between women and men of the same class and stresses differences between women of different classes. (140) The Marxist tradition does not allow women an independent class position and therefore denies them their distinct epistemological standpoint, which is specifically a feminist standpoint. (141)

**Radical Feminism**

Radical feminism, as noted before, is the first theory to acknowledge the need for reconceptualizing reality from the standpoint of women. (142) Radical feminists believe that because of different female and male experience, every society
has two cultures, "the visible national, or male culture and the invisible, universal female culture." (143) What seems to be the national culture is in fact male culture which has come to prominence through subordinating female culture. The politics, economy, government, army, religion, and family along with sciences, technology, arts and philosophy are defined as the national culture which in effect are male interests and outlooks. Radical feminists emphasize that "the concepts, habits, skills, art, and instruments of women in any period have been different from men's and have been ridiculed and/or suppressed by them." (144)

Radical feminists believe that other than class dominance or legal privileges, there are many other institutionalized relations of domination. In analyzing women's oppression, they focus on gender domination in intimate relations and consider reorganization of the private realm to be more important than the public realm for social change. Radical feminists view patriarchy to be a system of domination. By calling women stupid, lazy, emotional, sly, greedy and childish, men find justification for women's domination. In a patriarchy, women's main function is to gratify male sexual desire and bear and raise children. (145)

Radical feminism attempts to disclose the relations of domination that are concealed or legitimized by patriarchal ideology. While patriarchy defines women as natural mothers and sex objects, radical feminists claim that women are forced
to be mothers and sexual slaves. Women, according to radical feminists, have been identified with motherhood throughout centuries. This is due to the fact that besides giving birth to children, women have been appointed to the task of caring for children. Therefore, motherhood has come to be viewed not only as a biological relationship, but also as a social relationship that exists between mothers and children. By claiming that women possess a "maternal instinct or some innate capacity for nurturance," (146) patriarchal ideology justifies the view that women are suitable for childrearing.

Women are forced to be mothers, because in the past there were not many reliable methods through which women could prevent their pregnancies, and at present there is not adequate contraceptive information or reliable contraceptives. Forced motherhood is also the result of intense and unremitting pressure on the part of men to engage women in sexual relations. Forced motherhood is also due to economic forces. Inconvenient conditions and low salaries in most jobs push women into marriage and into having children. Patriarchal ideology also impels women into motherhood by promoting the idea that women can find real fulfillment through motherhood. Those women who cannot bear children are pitied, and those that do not want children are considered to be "unnatural, unfeminine, immature, or selfish." (147)

Patriarchy does not stop at forcing women into becoming mothers, it also outlines the terms of their motherhood. It
places men at the head of the family and authorizes them to have the last say in disciplining children. In the absence of the father, patriarchy continues to map out for women the standards and values of childrearing. Radical feminists believe that one of the sources of women’s oppression is the way mothering is structured under patriarchy. They state that under patriarchy it is forced labor. Men decide the conditions and terms of childrearing and "women have responsibility only for the daily details of a process whose totality is male controlled." (148)

According to radical feminism, sexual slavery is another condition for women’s existence under patriarchy which is in fact a prerequisite to forced motherhood. Despite the interdependent nature of these two aspects of women’s existence, that is sexuality and motherhood, patriarchal ideology portrays them as two opposing poles. While women as mothers are placed on a pedestal, women as sexual beings are treated with contempt and indignity. This artificial division of course discounts the fact that mothers in their relation to their husbands are sexual beings and are still forced to exploit their sexuality. (149)

Radical feminists maintain that the diversified experience of women under patriarchy as virgins, wives, mothers, prostitutes and raped women is only superficial and that women’s sexuality in all these categories is controlled and used for male pleasure. Having defined women’s situation
in patriarchy as sexual slaves, radical feminists characterize women's relation to men as that of rape. Rape, which is a direct physical coercion, is a distinct factor of patriarchy. (150) "Rape...is an effective political device. It is not an arbitrary act of violence by one individual on another; it is a political act of oppression...exercised by members of a powerful class on members of the powerless class..." (151) The occurrence of rape in a patriarchy is due to the fact that, under patriarchy, women's bodies are assumed to belong to men. Radical feminists point to the patriarchal inseparability of violence and sexuality, and they find that this behavior "to be motivated by fear/awe/envy/hatred of women." (152)

Another form of rape according to radical feminists is prostitution. The existence of prostitution is due to the fact that patriarchy identifies women as valuable commodities, essentially for their sexuality. Not only does patriarchal ideology fail to acknowledge that prostitutes are forced by men, it views them as seducers and exploiters of men. Patriarchy also places "dishonorable" prostitute women at the opposing pole from "honorable" wives and mothers, and in this way conceals the fact that women in both categories are disadvantaged members in a patriarchal society. (153)

Radical feminists also maintain that patriarchal ideology portrays heterosexuality as normal and homosexuality as abnormal. Living in a culture that condemns lesbian women as sick, abnormal and even criminal, women are forced into
heterosexuality before they even recognize that there are other aspects to their sexuality. Because of these factors, radical feminists claim that under patriarchy, heterosexuality is oppressive to women. (154)

According to radical feminists, the root of women's oppression in a patriarchy lies in the fact that women's sexuality and reproductivity is controlled by men. Radical feminists believe that control of these two aspects of women's existence creates male dominance. Male control of women's bodies, that is of their sexual and procreative capabilities, is the center of the radical feminists' view of social reality which is opposite to male theory and construct. (155) Catherine MacKinnon sums up the radical feminists analysis of women's oppression:

Sexuality is to feminism what work is to Marxism: that which is most one's own, yet most taken away...the molding, direction and expression of sexuality organizes society into two sexes-women and men-which division underlines the totality of social relations...As the organized expropriation of the work of some for the benefit of others define a class-workers-the organized expropriation of the sexuality of some for the use of others defines the sex, women. Heterosexuality is its structure, gender and family its congealed forms, sex roles its qualities generalized to social persona, reproduction a consequence, and control its issue. (156)

The shared agreement among radical feminists is that patriarchy is a total system of male dominance which allows men to control women's bodies and forces women into being sexual slaves and mothers. (157)
Socialist Feminism

Socialist feminism is the more comprehensive theory for analyzing the basis of women's subordination because it takes into account class, gender, and sex and treats these phenomena historically. (158) Socialist feminists, like radical feminists, believe in the inefficiency of the old "linear" "male" style of traditional political theories for analyzing women's oppression, and the need for new economic and political theory. They share with radical feminists the belief that the new theory must conceptualize both the public and the private sphere of human life. It should construct sexuality, and procreativity in political and economic terms. Unlike radical feminists, however, socialist feminists believe that these activities should be conceptualized historically and not universally and biologically. (159)

Socialist feminists claim that in the struggle for social, economic and political justices, giving priority to either class struggle or women's liberation would not lead to successful results. They assert that capitalism, male dominance, racism and imperialism are all part of the same system and indivisible, and therefore the elimination of any one of them necessitates putting an end to all of them. Socialist feminists maintain that to understand the capitalist system, one needs to know how it is structured by male
dominance, and to understand male dominance, one needs to know how it is structured by the capitalist division of labor. (160)

Socialist feminism attempts to understand the differences between women and men through the examination of the sexual division of labor. In order to do this, it examines different types of work that men and women perform and the way in which this difference in the type of work leads to the construction of sex and gender. They attempt to show that different types of work which are defined by gender norms are the outcome of the relationship between sex and society. (161)

Socialist feminists criticize traditional Marxist assumptions in regards to women. They claim that traditional Marxism does not account for the commonalities in the experience of women, that traditional Marxism acknowledges only the differences of class and fails to acknowledge that gender categories are as important as class categories. According to socialist feminists, traditional Marxism presents the world view of men. They believe that women's labor outside the market is not recognized by traditional Marxism, while the gender-defined nature of women's work within the market is disregarded by them and, therefore, the domination of women by men remain concealed.

Both radical and social feminists assert that it is not only the ruling class but also men who determine women's lives. They maintain that men of all classes gain advantage from women's labor and that women's domestic services frees
men from attending house chores. They assert that while women rear children, men appropriate their children either by using their labor or by giving them their own name. Male capitalists and male workers both benefit from women's low paid wage labor although in different ways. According to socialist feminists, male dominance prevails in every area of life, "yet it is little more than a footnote to Marxist political economy." (162)

Traditional Marxists claim that the "economic base" of the society determines the cultural realm of a society. The "economic base" or the prevailing system of production is defined by Marxists in such a way that excludes sexuality and procreation. Socialist feminists believe that the economic foundation of the society distinctively defines sexual division of labor including a distinct system of organizing procreation. They believe that the culture of a society, that is its "legal, political, religious, aesthetic and philosophic forms..."(163) is highly influenced by the system of procreation, and that the sexual division of labor both in procreation and in the market ultimately influences the ideological sexism in all cultural aspects of a society.

Socialist feminists assert that the most apparent manifestation of the division of labor is the division between public and private spheres of human life. The boundaries of these two spheres have changed historically, but sexuality and procreation have always been relegated to the private realm.
Socialist feminists believe that these practices are not biologically determined but change historically. Moreover, in contrast to traditional Marxism, socialist feminists emphasize the social determination of sexual, childbearing, and childrearing needs. They emphasize that as procreative practices change historically, so do these needs. By acknowledging this dialectical relationship, socialist feminists are ready to subject sexual and procreative practices to political analysis. (164) Socialist feminists also criticize radical feminists. They claim that radical feminism does not account for the differences in women's experiences; it tends to recognize only the differences of gender, and fails to recognize that humans in contemporary society belong not only to a specific gender but also to a specific class, race, or nationality. (165) Radical feminists believe that contemporary society is a single system which they call patriarchy and assume that the most significant division in a patriarchy is that of gender. Socialist feminists criticize this view by claiming that it is ahistorical and does not take into account differences in class, race or ethnicity of women belonging to the same society or differences between women from different societies. Socialist feminists assert that accepting universalism in women's situation leads to acceptance of a transhistorical and biologicist view of male motivation for power. Socialist feminists believe that the relation between men and women change historically with the
changes in the mode of production, and, therefore, a theory of women's subordination should take into account the specific social and economic relations and their impact on the relations of men and women. (166)

Radical feminists view procreation as universal, cross cultural and biologically determined. For radical feminists women's subordination in all societies is rooted in the fact that they are childbearers, childrears and sexual servants to men. They believe that men control women's bodies by forcing them to be sexually available and to bear children. Since radical feminists believe that male dominance is the most fundamental feature of contemporary society and women's sexuality and procreativity is the material basis of male dominance, they conclude that sexuality and procreation constitute the material base of the society which ultimately determines all the other social phenomena. Radical feminists claim that in all patriarchal societies the power of patriarchy is rooted in men's control of women's sexuality and procreation and therefore "[w]hat Marxists call 'economic systems' or 'modes of prediction' are simply manifestations of a more basic and universal 'mode of reproduction'". (167)

Socialist feminists agree with radical feminists that referring to the domain of sexuality and procreation is essential for explaining women's subordination, but they emphasize that it is not only within this domain that women's domination takes place. Moreover, socialist feminists do not
believe in the universal and cross-cultural nature of male dominance. They maintain that male dominance is manifested through different ways in different societies and can not be explained by cross-cultural institutions. Socialist feminists also believe that viewing women primarily as sexual servants and as mothers discounts women's labor in nonsexual and nonprocreative areas, a view that also exists in male dominant ideology. Socialist feminists claim that "[a] full understanding of women's oppression must examine the sexual division of labor outside as well as within procreation and between procreation and 'production'."(168) Socialist feminists charge that radical feminists only account for the commonalities between women, whereas women's oppression is through their gender, class, race and nationality. An adequate theory of women's oppression, they believe, should take into account these different types of oppression and the relation between them.(169)

In viewing women's oppression exclusively in terms of sexual slavery and forced motherhood, radical feminists ignore the fact that, under patriarchy, men control women's bodies in non-sexual and non-procreative ways.(170) In placing emphasis on sexual and procreative aspects of women's existence, radical feminists accept the patriarchal definition of women as procreative and as sexual beings. Sexual activity and procreation involve women's bodies in intimate ways, but
women's bodies are also intimately involved when they are tending to farm labor or to dangerous machines. (171)

In reference to Marx and Engels and their categories of human "material needs" which they view to be primarily as food, shelter and clothing, etc., socialist feminists maintain that as important as these "material needs" are, there are also human needs for bearing and rearing children and for sexual satisfaction. Since producing these needs entails human labor, the system that produces them is a system of production.

Socialist feminists claim that, as human needs for food, shelter and clothing have changed historically, their need for children and sexual satisfaction has also been transformed historically. They believe that humans satisfy these necessities not only through their labor, but they also have created institutions, such as marriage and prostitution, which through distribution and exchange have gratified such needs. Therefore, they claim the system for fulfilling these needs is an economic system, or part of one, despite the fact that money is not always used as the currency of exchange. As a result, they conclude that sexuality and procreation are part of the domain of political economy.

In that part of the economy which includes sexuality and procreation, socialist feminists believe, men have controlled the labor of women. They have forced women, as a subordinate group to do sexual and procreative labor for them, have
defined the nature and the rules for their labor, and have gained enormously from such labor. Men's control of women's work does not always result in extracting surplus value or profit, but it is still a form of exploitation in the Marxist sense. Socialist feminists maintain that the relation between men and women as the dominant and subordinate groups is a class relation. However, since "class" has a well defined and a limited meaning in Marxist theory, socialist feminists, do not always use "class" in describing the relations between men and women, but emphasize that while men control women's work and profit from it, they are a group or class that exploit women as a group or class.

Socialist feminists believe that sexuality and procreation are not determined by "the economy", that is, they are not part of the superstructure. They also believe that they do not construct the material base of the economy. They see them as part of the economic foundation that in some respects change "the economy" and in some respects are changed by it.

Socialist feminists believe that, historically, one of the significant productive resources of the society has been the procreative capacities of women. Therefore, the continuing struggle for controlling the productive resources of the society has always included the struggle for controlling the procreative capacities of women. This struggle has not only taken place between men of different classes but also between
men and women. Socialist feminists claim that as long as men and women's relation to the production and reproductive capacities of the society remains in opposition to each other, their struggle for gaining access to these resources is a class struggle.(172)

Socialist feminists, in trying to provide an account of women's subordination, look to those types of productive activities that are not considered economic and try to find a way to show that they should be viewed in economic terms. In trying to conceptualize the sphere of procreation, for example, socialist feminists make the claim that sexual and procreative activities are labor, with political and economic natures, and they are in a dialectical relation with so-called "production." They maintain that procreation and production are both part of the economic foundation of the society. They are "mutually determining but one is not a more 'ultimate' determinant than the other."(173)

Socialist feminists, therefore, see sexual and procreative practices as forms of human labor that change historically and are not biologically determined. They also assert that a Marxist functionalist account views women's subordination as one "question" within capitalism, whereas it is a structural feature of contemporary society which determines all aspects of life in an essential way.(174)

In regards to public/private distinction, socialist feminists charge that by recognizing a public/private
distinction, traditional Marxists are accepting male dominance, because such a distinction devalues women's labor at home. Socialist feminists assert that the public/private form an essential unity, and any distinction between these two spheres is artificial. They claim that even to think that there are two separate spheres would be misleading.

'Production' and 'reproduction', work and the family, far from being separate territories like the moon and the sun, or the kitchen and the shop, are really intimately related modes that reverberate upon one another and frequently occur in the same social, physical, and even psychic spaces... Not only do reproduction and kinship, or the family, have their own, historically determined, products, material techniques, modes or organization of power relationships, but reproduction and kinship are themselves integrally related to the social relations of production and the state; they reshape these relations all the time. (175)

Socialist feminists maintain that the distinction between "production" and "reproduction" is a vestige of the public/private distinction and is not real.

In their conceptualization of women's subordination, socialist feminists portray a dualistic view of women's lives: one in which women are exposed to exploitation in the capitalist system as genderless workers and the other in which they are exposed to men's exploitation in the patriarchal system. The reality, however, is that a distinction between market and family relations, between the production of things and the production of people and between class and gender domination does not exist. They all cut across each other. Women not only work at home but in the market as well and
experience exploitation in both places. Their class, however, defines the extent of exploitation they endure.(176)

Categories of production/reproduction, market/family, and class/gender, therefore, do not provide an adequate account of women's subordination. They obscure the fact that women's exploitation does not take place in a single sphere and that male domination exist everywhere in contemporary society.(177)

Socialist feminists believe that new categories of class should encompass different forms of domination, that is: class, gender and race domination. They believe that the development of new categories allows for a clear understanding of the way in which capitalist patriarchy accentuates some existing forms of gender and race domination, eliminates others, and creates new forms. Iris Young calls for a feminist political theory that would use class, sex and race within a unified conceptual framework for analyzing the subordination of women.

Our nascent historical research coupled with our feminist intuition tells us that the labor of women occupies a central place in any system of production, that gender division is a basic axis of social structuration in all hitherto existing social formations, and that gender hierarchy serves as a pivotal element in most systems of social domination. If traditional Marxism has no theoretical place for such hypothesis, then it is not merely an inadequate theory of women's oppression, it is an inadequate theory of social relations, relations of production and domination. We need not merely a synthesis of feminism with traditional Marxism, but a thoroughly feminist historical materialism, which regards the social relations of a particular historical social formation as one system in which gender differentiation is a core attribute.(178)
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 128.

3. Ibid., p. 266.

4. Ibid., p. 293.

5. Ibid., p. 158.

6. Ibid., p. 292.

7. Ibid., p. 128.

8. Ibid., p. 129.

9. Ibid., p. 139.

10. Ibid., p. 295.


42. S. Allam, "Women as Holders of Rights in Ancient Egypt (During the Late Period)," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 32 (February 1990): 32-33.


45. Ibid., p. 233.

46. Ibid., p. 236.

47. Ibid., p. 234.

48. Ibid., p. 235.

49. Ibid., p. 237.

50. Ibid., p. 234.
51. Ibid., p. 237.
52. Ibid., p. 238.
53. Ibid., p. 240.


55. Jennings, "Women...," p. 89.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.


59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., p. 144.
61. Ibid., p. 156.
62. Ibid., p. 146.
63. Ibid., pp. 146-47.


65. Ibid., p. 170.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., pp. 170-71.

73. Ibid., p. 529.

74. Ibid.


79. Ibid., p. 303.

80. Ibid., p. 309.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., p. 313.

84. Ibid., p. 310.

85. Ibid., p. 332.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid., p. 303.

88. Ibid., p. 303; 332.

89. Ibid., p. 324.

90. Ibid.

91. Ibid., p. 313.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid., p. 320.

95. Ibid., p. 334.

96. Ibid.


99. Ibid., p. 3.

100. Ibid., p. 13.

101. Ibid., pp. 13-14.


103. Ibid., pp. 24-25.


106. Ibid., p. 249.

107. For memoirs of Halide Edip, see:


108. For Huda Sha'rawi's memoirs review:


109. For works of Doria Shafiq's life look at:


110. For essays on Mayy Ziyada' see:


112. For works on Qurrat al-'Ayn's life see:


*Yadegar* 4 (1323/1944).

113. For Literature on Taj al-Saltanah see:


115. For literature on Women's Writings see:


120. Ibid., p. 388.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid., p. 126.

124. This part is based on Jaggar, *Feminist Politics...,* pp. 27-51; 173-207.

125. Ibid., p. 356.

126. Ibid., p. 357.

127. Ibid., p. 358.

128. Ibid., p. 143.

129. Ibid., p. 144.

130. Ibid.

131. This part is based on Jaggar, *Feminist Politics...,* pp. 51-83; 207-249.

132. Ibid., p. 145; 134.

133. Ibid., p. 145.

134. Ibid., p. 146.

135. Ibid., p. 134.
136. Ibid., p. 129; 134-135.

137. Ibid., p. 135.

138. Ibid., p. 129.

139. Ibid., p. 378.

140. Ibid., p. 362; 145; 153.

141. Ibid., p. 363.

142. This part is based on Jaggar, *Feminist Politics*..., pp. 83-123; 249-303.

143. Ibid., p. 249.

144. Ibid., p. 250.

145. Ibid., p. 254-55.

146. Ibid., p. 256.

147. Ibid., p. 256-57.


149. Ibid., p. 260.

150. Ibid., pp. 260-61.

151. Ibid., pp. 263.

152. Ibid., p. 269.

153. Ibid., pp. 263-64.

154. Ibid., p. 266.

155. Ibid., p. 267.

156. Ibid., p. 270.

157. Ibid.

158. This part is based on Jaggar, *Feminist Politics*..., pp. 123-69; 303-351.

159. Ibid., p. 124.

160. Ibid.
161. Ibid., p. 126.
162. Ibid., p. 137.
163. Ibid., p. 142.
164. Ibid., p. 129.
165. Ibid., p. 295.
166. Ibid., p. 160.
167. Ibid., p. 139.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid., pp. 133-34.
170. Ibid., p. 266.
171. Ibid., p. 293.
172. Ibid., p. 136.
173. Ibid., p. 141.
174. Ibid., p. 143.
175. Ibid., p. 146.
176. Ibid., p. 159.
177. Ibid., p. 160.
178. Ibid., p. 161.
CHAPTER 2

THE RISE OF THE STATE AND
THE STATUS OF WOMEN
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since the rise of the state in early human communities, this institution has changed with socio-political and economic transformations. The mechanisms responsible for the development of the early states, however, mechanisms which were intensified with the emergence of European mercantilism and conquest remain in existence in the present form of the state. Gender and class differentiation, development of commodity production, the appearance of a 'census-tax-conscription' system, and other such features emerged as the state came into existence, and even though some of these characteristics changed throughout time (such as the replacement of tax with tribute), the function of the state remains the same. With the state encroachment into human lives, the quality of life for both the individual and the community changed. This change however, was gradual and different in each historical epoch. Depending on the power of the state and the degree of its interference in various aspects of peoples' lives on the one hand, and the resistance of the population against such intervention on the other hand, people experienced lives of varying qualities. For women, this
also had to do with the loss of power they experienced as the kin group was replaced by the nuclear family and as men became the household heads. For men this was a trade-off with the state as they too had lost their authority when the kin was substituted by state.

State formation is an ongoing historical process; it entails a fundamental interconnection between class formation, and gender hierarchy. With the transformation of production of use to production for exchange, the rise of commodity production, change in gender relations, and split in public/private domains, women lose the positions they hold within the kin based societies. Due to their productive and reproductive capacities, women are considered important members of the kinship but with the emergence of the state they are deprived of their traditional authority.

The dynamics of class formation thus starts women's subordination within a stratified kinship system, and this subordination continues to intensify as the kin relations are reordered to facilitate the extraction of goods and services for a non-producing class. The existence of tendencies towards subordination even in tribal society creates preconditions for gender hierarchy and a male dominated state, otherwise femaleness instead of maleness might have become associated with social power in the emerging state. Among these tendencies are male ownership of land and increased male militarism. The restriction of use rights, commoditization,
tribal incorporation in the form of rent, labor service and tax, and gendered division of labor are also among factors that are responsible for systematic gender hierarchy and for a lower status of women.\(^{(6)}\)

State formation also entails the development of ethnicities or "culturally defined groups."\(^{(7)}\) In kin-based societies, people's social identities are defined by gender, age and skill in connection with special meanings that these categories assume within the kinship. With the emergence of the state, however, "biological differences or functions,"\(^{(8)}\) replace social identities and therefore ethnicity and its outcome, racism become the component features of state societies.\(^{(9)}\) Transformation within the kin, such as the alienation of the means of production and alienation of labor power, as well as other mechanisms such as conquest, annihilation, enslavement, dispersal and marginalization are all conducive to the absorption and subordination of people with different cultures and socioeconomic background.\(^{(10)}\) In a study of the decline of Anglo-Saxon and of Welsh tribal society and of the formation of the nation-state in England Viana Muller writes:

Men and women-and children-were denied by these altered productive relations the freedom and security to labor and reproduce for the common good, in a framework of collective responsibility. Likewise, they were denied the continuous and full creation of their culture which can only occur under conditions of autonomy and security.\(^{(11)}\)
As the tribal land and labor are alienated and kin relations are transformed, tribal people with "differing traditions,"(12) are incorporated into an "overarching tribute-taxation structure."(13) These people, along with captives or slaves are then identified not through their kin relations but through their productive capabilities, that is, as producers of both goods and people. Producers of crafts, construction workers, and other service workers, along with the rest of tribute paying people, are viewed as a "separate, physically distinctive and purportedly inferior humanity-the ethnic group or race."(14)

Reorganization of kin based communities for extracting surplus by a class of non producers is faced with resistance from the producers. Therefore in order to conceal their attempt in controlling production, and promoting it at the same time, institutions such as the census, taxation and conscription are invented.(15) Political domination of non producing classes is also exerted through institutions such as the military, religion and judicial structures. Therefore, whereas kin-based ideological reproductions and jural processes are at the service of kin relations, the new institutions are directed towards effective production, extraction and distribution of goods for supporting non producing classes.(16)

In the transformation of a kin-based commune to a class-based state and to a system of extraction of surplus for the
upkeep of the non-producing classes, domestic (kin-communal) and civil domains are gradually separated. The domestic realm becomes identified with kinship or communal mode of production and the relations that are linked with tribute, taxes or the use of labor and regulating class relations, which is partly done through the legal devices, are identified with the public or civil domain. (17)

The conflict between class and state formation, which requires the disintegration of kinship relations, and the struggle by kin communities to continue as an autonomous kin group and reproduce their own way of life, leads to the creation of "civil-kin conflict." (18) Kin-civil conflict is generated through the friction between legal codes and customary action. (19) The imposition of tribute or tax/rent mode of production, which entails kin-civil conflict, not only redefines kinship relations but also changes the meanings of women's productive and reproductive labor, and gradually productive and reproductive activities become separated. (20)

The loss of kinship authority and the emergence of exploitation happens through two sets of relationships. (21) First through the loss of kinship control over "the production process (i.e., production, exchange, distribution, and consumption)." (22) Second the development of public/private split in the economic and political life, as a result of which relations of dependency develops within the individual families when the individualized families come to be
identified as separate economic units rather than components of the kin community. (23)

As the production process changes, kin relations are also transformed. Production for exchange replaces production for use, labor becomes abstracted from concrete work and surplus generation comes to be the focus of the emerging elite. This elite then becomes capable of regulating and exploiting the productivity of the producers. (24)

With the development of the public/private dichotomy, women's work is relegated to the private sphere and its value is diminished. Women become the service workers in the household and husbands come to occupy the position of the head of the family. Women's unremunerated work within the family not only frees men from housework, which is not socially valued, but also facilitates the reproduction and maintenance of workers without any remuneration on the part of the elite. (25)

Through distinguishing the sphere of production and reproduction, state formation creates systematic gender hierarchy. State and class formation therefore entail change in the meaning of gender and of women's status. (26) Change in women's position is not secondary or prior to economic hierarchy, but at the core of, and concomitant with the development of exchange and division of labor. (27) Through reorganizing the relations which insure the maintenance and continuity of the kinship, that is production and social
reproduction, women lose the position they held within the kinship. In kin communities women not only are producers of subsistence goods but they also reproduce social relations. (28) By losing their position in these two spheres women more than non-elite people in general lose status. (29)

These developments entail transformation of gender identity. (30) In kin-based societies gender identity is not separate from social personhood while in class-based societies gender, age and skill are abstracted from kinship connections and meanings. Within the kinship, social identities are considered important factors but with gender differentiation, biological differences or functions come to be increasingly important. (31) State societies place emphasis on "biologically distinctive aspects of femaleness, particularly culturally-determined sexual characteristics and reproductive capacities." (32)

With state formation and with the rising importance in the acquisition of labor to provide for a non producing class, women become the particular focus for control because they "not only can work but also can produce new producers." (33)

The significance of women's childbearing ability is transformed by new social relations when they become the producers, not only of people as individuals, but also of what is becoming "abstract"-i.e., exploitable-labor. The origins of gender hierarchy, then are inextricably meshed with the origins of exploitation and class stratification. (34)

Women's capacity in bearing and rearing children which is celebrated and revered within the kinship, becomes a sign of
vulnerability within the state-based societies. With transformation of land as a collective property within the kin to private ownership within the state, the security that the kinship provided for rearing children is lost. The kin responsibility for rearing children is then transferred to the nuclear family, a task which kin never placed on individual or on the conjugal family. State formation, the development of private property and the rise of the nuclear family, therefore, entail change in the meaning of reproduction of kin group. (35)

The significance of women's work, which had been as social as men's in tribal society, shrank to a private context. This produced a gender-based change in the relations of power and prestige, for in the context of the destruction of the social unity of production and reproduction, the private-that is reproductive or family-sphere became subordinate to the public-that is productive, wealth-accumulating sphere. Thus, instead of production serving reproduction (of the social group) as in tribal society, the obverse occurred-reproduction was at the service of the production of wealth. (36)

The loss of women's status in the emerging state is also related to the replacement of subsistence production with commodity production and cash crop. Subsistence production (37) involves transferring "nature into needs." (38) Most of this production which is use-value oriented involves the reproduction of life and remains unremunerated. Producers of private use-value are typically women whereas men are responsible for the production of exchange value. (39) It is on the basis of this unpaid work that subsistence producers
create labor power that is used as wage labor.(40) In addition to housewives, subsistence producers also include pauperized people, small peasants and artisans and marginalized people (41)of urban and rural areas. The majority of rural and urban subsistence producers are women, and housework is also performed by women. The unpaid work of women, marginalized tribal population, agricultural laborers and artisans who constitute the economic foundation, become the basis on which capital accumulation starts.

The accumulation which is basically based on non-wage labor is referred to as the primitive accumulation while the accumulation which is grounded on the wage labor is called real accumulation. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the former must "necessarily be continual" whereas the latter "need not necessarily fulfill this condition."(42) It is because of the nature of this continuity that "'primitive accumulation' does not necessarily precede the process of capital accumulation. Rather, it is an ongoing process by which non-capitalist and structurally heterogeneous spheres are being tapped for the extraction of surplus labor and surplus product."(43)

The reanalysis of Rosa Luxemburg's work on capital accumulation has provided new insight on this issue. Luxemburg believes that capital accumulation requires the existence of non-capitalist(44) strata and regions. These according to her, are peasants and colonies, which could be "tapped in the
process of capital accumulation."(45) The recent scholarship however, has added the "areas of female labor both in the capitalist centers... and capitalist periphery."(46) According to this analysis "women form the basis for the process of ongoing primitive accumulation as the precondition for accumulation proper. Primitive accumulation presupposes an ongoing process of use value production..."(47) the producers of which are women. It is the unremunerated housework performed by women which "constitutes the hidden base on which the classical exploitation of wage labour by capital can take place."(48) In the capitalist centers the sphere for ongoing production for use value and primitive accumulation is the household whereas in capital peripheries tribal people, small peasants and small artisans as subsistence workers form the basis for the process of primitive accumulation.(49) Claudia von Werlhof writes:

What is defined here is simply a process of continuing 'original' accumulation as a logical and fundamental part of capital relations; the Third World and/or the agricultural areas—we would add: and the household-being locations for this process which has the purpose of facilitating accumulation in the First World or the urban areas.(50)

The process of capital accumulation was set in motion when commercial cropping replaced subsistence cropping.(51) The subsistence crops were not a source of surplus for domestic and foreign-commercial capital and also colonial states. Therefore there was active intervention on their part to force cultivation of crops that were market oriented, and
could create surplus value. This change entailed the alienation of land and its private appropriation either by landlords or colonial administrators. This in turn brought about transformation in the social relations of production and reproduction, and gendered division of labor, and caused women's lower participation in the field. Capitalist accumulation also created new forms of class stratification in rural areas "between rich peasants and capitalist farmers, on one hand, and poor peasants and landless laborers on the other."(52) The social process of accumulation, changes in gender relations and class formations were therefore interconnected.

"The process whereby 'goods' were transformed into 'commodities'"(53) and resulted in increasing social stratification, gendered division of labor and lower status of women, have been illustrated in a number of studies. Eleanor Leacock writing about the Montagnais-Naskapi shows how the principle of total sharing which was required in subsistence hunting was undermined by stockpiling of furs for trade with European goods.(54) Through the erosion of economic basis for corporation, reciprocity, generosity and respect for individual autonomy by fur trade, these characteristics which applied to relations between as well as within the sexes were undermined,(55) and in turn resulted in the changed status of women. Leacock maintains that the early accounts of Naskapi "refer to the considerable 'power' held by women", whereas the
"twentieth-century ethnographies, ...infer male 'authority'." (56) It is in this context that Leacock mentions the existence of female shamans in 17th century and the male shamans in twentieth century. According to Leacock it was also through fur trade that the economic basis for the multi-family groups that lived collectively and had links with parallel groups was undermined and the band collective was replaced by families as economic units.(57)

Mona Etienne in her work about cloth production in pre and post colonial Baule(Ivory Coast), demonstrates the consequences in the transformation of cloth from a subsistence product to a commodity.(58) In pre-colonial Baule, women who had the right to grow cotton, as an intercrop, were assisted by their husbands who prepared the plot for them. Since women "initiated, tended and took responsibility"(59)for the crop, they had ownership of the end product. Women themselves cleaned, carded and spun the cotton into thread and colored it. At this point the skeins were turned over to the husband who did the weaving and sewing. The men then turned over the final product to their wives and they gave them their share. In this subsistence model, cloth was used as a basic necessity which consolidated the relationship between wife and husband through their cooperative work.

With the colonial conquest and the penetration and the breaking down of production-distribution relationship, women lost their control over an essential and valuable product.
With the establishment of textile factory, men could purchase factory made thread, and free themselves from home production of cotton and from their dependency on their wives. Women's role in producing cloth and their control of the production process therefore, became inessential. The demand for increased cotton production was addressed to men by colonial administrators and agricultural experts who introduced new techniques to men and therefore "cash-crop cotton, like other cash crops, became the man's domain." (60)

The forced taxation imposed on the natives by the colonizers was also responsible for native men's control of "cash, cotton, and cloth." (61) For the payment of the heal tax which was assigned to the males as 'head of the family' not only cash became a necessity but also cotton, the product which acquired the necessary cash. The expanding commodity production also created the necessity of cash for purchasing the factory thread that had replaced the home spun thread. Women's production of cotton, which even though essential, has 'become invisible', (62) is responsible for women's changed status. This is due to the loss of control over both the production of cotton and of handwoven cloth.

The colonization and capitalist commodity exchange lead to the breakdown of pre-colonial subsistence modes and transformed the cloth as a subsistence product to a commodity. The result "has been the reversal of the relationship between women and cloth; once an object that women controlled because
it was their product, cloth has become, in a sense, an object that controls them."(63). Baule women who produce cash crop cotton for the textile factory, and are employed by the factory, are not only alienated from their own product but also "the very production process in which Baule women sell their labor to produce thread and cloth has been a key factor in destroying a production process in which they controlled the same product."(64) Women's motivation for selling their labor for wages is the need to obtain the cash necessary for acquiring the cloth. It is in this context that the wife-husband relationship of the pre-colonial period has become mediated by the commodity economy and therefore a constant source of conflict.

The replacement of subsistence production with commodity production as a result of Western penetration and the consequences for women in a ranked kinship organized society has been demonstrated in the case of the Tongan society.(65) In Tonga women as sisters outranked their brothers and this entailed "authority and deference"(66) among both chiefly and nonchiefly people. Women produced products that were necessary for subsistence and had access to subsistence resources. Kinship structures provided authority and autonomy for women while prevented the formation of gender hierarchy. The kinship structure in precontact Tonga also was arranged as to prevent the "focus solely on married couples and their descendants", and therefore did not allow women to "drop out".(67)
The commodity trade introduced by Europeans had a negative impact on women's production and prestige. In the process of the production of coconut oil chiefly people placed pressure on non-chiefly women for the intensification of their production of the oil. Oil was then sold to Europeans and the profit was used to obtain firearms. Firearms in turn were used by the chiefly people to command resources and labor of the nonchiefly people irrespective of kin considerations. When Europeans demand shifted to copra, which was a man's product women became "periodic, auxiliary laborers in a men's sphere." Furthermore, when the European cotton cloth replaced native clothing (tapa and ngatu), women, who used to control the raw material, were compelled to procure cloth mostly through men who had more access to cash. The spread of cotton had an impact on women's prestige as well. The tapa, which was considered valuable and reflected women's status, lost its importance and as a result the status of women who produced it was diminished.

Through the missionary influence, nonchiefly women also lost their authority as sisters and with the diminishing importance of sisterhood, women-especially nonchiefly women-became dependent on their husbands. Women's "fall out" of the kinship structure as sisters had also to do with missionaries discouragement of authority by sisters, since they viewed it as "detracting from the husband's authority."(69) By losing their status as sisters, which traditionally entailed social
authority and personal autonomy, women came to be viewed only as wives who held less authority within the kinship.

The jural changes in the middle and late 1800 and early 1900 in Tonga affected the kinship in general and women in particular. With the new laws which dealt with kin practices and customs, land, resources and labor, women specially nonchiefly women lost control over resources, occupations and traditional resources of authority and autonomy.

Land transformation from a source of community welfare to private holding and state ownership entailed changes for the kin as well. While within the kinship chiefly people, who were associated with the land, embodied group authority, the estate and landholders became devoid of responsibilities towards the people living on the land, and became liable to the state. The landholder then came to embody the power of "the state vis-a`-vis the group."(70) Transformation of land-use rights to a male head of household, who was later defined as a male taxpayer, caused further erosion of women's authority. Procuring the cash necessary for paying taxes intensified cash cropping, which in turn solidified men's power and authority.

The jural changes also affected the kinship through redefinition of the customs and practices that upheld the welfare of the community as its goal, as well as women who through these laws lost the material and political resources of their autonomy. "The transformation of custom into law has serious consequences for kinship groups generally..."
codification involves a notorious rigidity which is absent from kinship structure, a lessening of ambiguity which usually affects men and women differentially." (71)

Among still other factors responsible indirectly in societal stratification and state formation, with consequent impact on women's lives is trade. Mona Etienne and Eleanor Leacock state that "[b]oth ethnographic and archeological evidence reveal that the link between well-developed trade and social inequalities is a recurrent cross cultural pattern." (72) The dynamics of the emergence of social inequalities as a result of trade have been analyzed by Philip Kohl. In his study, "The Archeology of Trade." (73) he stresses the unity of the production, distribution and consumption of material goods. Kohl maintains that trade by its "social character" (74) is associated with relations of production, and therefore it is important to determine not only the nature of the product, whether raw materials or finished goods, but also the class position of the producers and those for whom the products were intended, and whether trade is between the elite or between all members of the participating society. Kohl believes that it is only through investigating the nature of trade, that it would be possible to analyze the underlying socioeconomic structure of each participating society in trading network. Through such analysis then, it would be possible to ascertain the societies which lose or the ones which gain in the course of the trade.
According to Kohl studies of the structure of luxury trade which have focused on the internal factors of a society, such as the desire of the elite to be distinguished from the common people, do not specify why trade in luxury goods was necessary for accomplishing such desire since other means could fulfill a similar function. He adds that these studies do not "relate the internal production, distribution, and consumption of material goods in each participating society to the more inclusive exchange network." (75) Kohl believes that studying these variables reveal that "the resultant class stratification within any participating society was both an internal and an external phenomenon." (76)

Through an analysis of the structure of long distance trade in Southwestern Asia Kohl demonstrates the interdependent development of internal and external factors. With the emergence of specialization in export products, these societies developed a need for commodities that they previously produced themselves. This in turn created classes of people who would oversee the production of commodities and traders who would benefit from the exchange value of the products involved. Kohl's analysis therefore shows that it is only through uncovering the underlying structure of production, distribution, and consumption of traded goods that "the dynamic class relationships within each society, or the socioeconomic 'structure' of these societies"(77) become visible.
In yet another study on long-distance trade and the formation of the state, Emanuel Terray places emphasis on the process of production rather than circulation. He maintains that long-distance trade does not create wealth but "gives wealth a concrete form which satisfies the requirements of reproduction." (78)

According to Christine Gailey long-distance trade made possible "the acquisition and use of captives for the production of items for exchange." (79) The surplus extracted from the captives was in turn used for the acquisition of more captives and arms. This process then made possible the reproduction of the social formation. (80) Long-distance trade therefore was responsible for turning slave relations of production into social formations, which previously were characterized by lineal modes of production and "these slave relations of production in turn brought about the formation of a state, as a necessary condition for their functioning and their reproduction." (81)

Terray also emphasizes that long-distance trade exerted not and "immediate and direct influence" over the structure of the state, but rather an indirect influence (82) that "acted upon the social formation and its political superstructures by transforming the relations of production which are at its basis." (83) By stressing the primacy of production over distribution for understanding the social reality, Terray makes it clear that the emergence of socioeconomic
inequalities in the process of the formation of the state are due to the transformation of relations of production.

The analysis of both Kohl and Terray emphasize the importance of the relations of production in long-distance trade. By emphasizing the process of relations of production, they unravel the dynamics through which social inequalities are created. The development of these inequalities have a direct impact on the position of women. The transformation of relations of production from use-value to exchange-value in the process of the replacement of subsistence production to commodity production and its impact on women's lives have been discussed in the previous pages. It is in the context of these changes in the relations of production that the development of trade on women's lives becomes clear. Trade, therefore, indirectly transforms the relations of production and this transformation in turn creates social stratification and sexual hierarchy.

According to Rayna Rapp "[t]o the extent that trade is implicated in the intensification of production for exchange, women as producers, reproducers, and traders must be implicated, too."(84) She adds that the emergence of polygyny for increasing the production of goods by wives, the use of sisters and daughters as pawns in trading alliances and the emergence of bridewealth, which illustrates increasing class divisions are manifestations of the impact of trade on women's lives.(85)
The organization of the kin-based communities was also transformed through "non-kin institutions (such as military or religious structures)."(86) Ruby Rohrlich in describing the early history of Sumer demonstrates that warfare not only intensified foreign oppression through the institution of slavery, but also the domination over women at home.(87) She states that with the expansion of long-distance trade, the development of commodity production, and the rise of the state, militarism and warfare, which were unknown in early Sumer's history became a necessity for subjugating people both at home and in the neighboring lands, and made women's subordination possible. Through the rise of military apparatus, women who economically and politically were important members of their clans, lost their position and became dependent on men.(88)

Viana Muller also believes that militarism along with trade, administrative functions, division of labor and the inclusion of foreign slaves diminished the homogeneity of the people and ruined the kinship structure in which women were valued for their productive and reproductive capabilities.(89) On the other hand, the relation between the development of militarism and the rise of the state, is viewed with doubt by Rayna Rapp. Rapp believes that the connection between male supremacy and warfare are overgeneralized because in some cases women's autonomy was increased as a result of the warfare. She suggests that a close observation of each
individual case is necessary in order to determine the impact of military organization and warfare on women. (90)

Yet another factor responsible for the lower status of women is the development of wage labor. Even though capitalist development affected both men and women, its impact on women was more severe. This has been demonstrated in the case of England by Heidi Hartman. (91) Hartman shows that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when large farmers replaced small farmers, women who relied on their household plots for subsistence production, became deprived of their essential sources of livelihood. (92) Men and their families as a whole suffered in this process but whereas men could depend on wage labor, it was more difficult for women to do so.

At the beginning of the industrialization however, when domestic industry was utilizing the labor of displaced peasant families at home, women could still be economically independent. Through the putting out system, the merchants provided materials to the families for spinning and weaving, but since this system did not give them total control over the laborers and the work process, or of the distribution and collection of the material, the spinning and weaving work was later transformed into factories, where work was organized in a much larger scale and with direct control over the workers. (93)

The factories mostly hired men, and it was assumed that through "the family wage" (94) women could be sustained too, an
assumption that resulted in the weakening position of women. In the process of an emerging industrial capitalism, the women who had lost control over their subsistence production, were also deprived of working in the family industry system and therefore became economically dependent on men. Women's economic dependence on men intensified the patriarchal family relations and women who were capable of supporting themselves "became the domestic servants of their husbands." (95)

The industrial capital responsible for creating such drastic changes in the lives of the English women, also displaced women's lives in other areas of the world, either through direct or indirect control of the economic process. In the previous pages it was demonstrated how in Baule (Ivory Coast), and Tonga the process of colonization propelled the commoditization of the production, which in turn spread through the cash economy and wage labor, and due to men's easier access to wage labor and cash economy women became economically dependent on them. In other areas of the world, where industrial capital indirectly affected the economy women experienced the same process and its outcome involved their diminished status.

Another related factor which distinguishes the transition from stateless societies to the ones in which state is the ultimate power is the transition from custom to law. (96) The evolution of the law, however, does not take place by "the simple passage of custom into law," (97) and from primitive to
civilized society. The passage rather takes place in archaic societies. It is in these societies that transition from kin-based communities to class-structured societies takes place.

In the earlier phases of these societies called proto-states "law and custom exist side by side,"(98) but gradually the passage from customary forms of order to the legal order occurs. The sovereign, bureaucratic elements and the rest of the elite, who are not direct producers of goods issue "a series of edicts,"(99) which makes the extraction of surplus goods and labor possible. In the proto-state, however, the political institutions are not strong because nonpolitical elements such as kin are still considered important for social cohesion. The maintenance of authority on the part of the kin is also due to the fact that the central power relies on the kin economy for the management of the society.

In stateless societies custom practiced by the cohesive group is not compulsory but is observed as if through consensus. Custom or "social morality"(100) is followed because it embodies the interest of the group and is not externally imposed. As property is privatized, laws become necessary to enforce the protection of owners and the property. By their anti-communal nature, the application of these laws require organized force. The laws therefore,
arise in opposition to the customary order... they represent a new set of social goals pursued by a new and unanticipated power in society. These goals can be reduced to a single complex imperative: the imposition of the census-tax-conscription system. The territorial thrust of the early state, along with its vertical social entrenchment, demanded conscription of labor, the mustering of an army, the levying of taxes and tribute, the maintenance of a bureaucracy and the assessment of the extent, location and numbers of the population being subjected. These were the major direct or indirect occasions for the development of civil law.(101)

In the "proto-state" therefore, the "quintessential struggle was over the lives and labor of the people,"(102) and imposed laws did not entail justice for the people since their ultimate purpose was the support of sovereign, bureaucracy and of the elite through the census-tax-conscription system. "the relation between custom and law" then was "basically one of contradiction, not continuity."(103)

With the transformation of societies to states the content and the role of cosmology also changes—this too affects gender. Single deities are transmuted to dualities, (104) the deities of agriculture are replaced by patrons of war, (105) and female or androgynous gods are substituted by male gods. (106) Rayna Rapp maintains that "Cosmologies have histories; by pealing away their layers we may learn about how the ascendant state legitimated itself. Cosmological changes are ideological precipitates of structural tensions; it is clear that their form and content have a great deal to tell us about class and gender."(107)
Ruby Rohrlich demonstrates direct association between myths and social structure in the history of Sumer. She believes that the "[S]umerian mythology is based in history," (108) and cites Jacobson, who states that "[i]n the domain of the gods we have a reflection of older forms of the terrestrial Mesopotamian state as it was in prehistoric times." (109) In the early history of Sumer, according to Rohrlich, women as well as men participated in democratic assembly and this was reflected in the assembly of gods, which was composed of both goddesses and gods. With the erosion of egalitarian kinship structure and with the consolidation of the state women lost their place not only in the assemblies but also as esteemed goddesses, and came to play minor roles as "consorts to the male deities, reflecting "the masculine, cosmic, political nature of the occasion." (110)

In mythological tales there are even attempts to "wrest from the female deity the principal role in procreation." (111) Female deities, who used to be "the creators of all life" (112) and were distinguished by "intelligence, profundity, and knowledge," came to be characterized as "greedy, ambitious and cruel," (113) and features such as "activity and order," were replaced by "inertia, chaos and anarchy." (114)

Irene Silverblatt shows that when the Incas dominated the other Andean people they changed not only their political system, but also their cultural systems. (115) Gender parallelism, which allowed both women and men to participate
in societal affairs, is reflected in a diagram on the top of which an androgynous divinity resided. This was then followed by a parallel chain of goddesses and gods and engendered men and women as their descendants. The parallel representation of both genders, the masculine represented by the sun and the feminine by the moon, reflected the equality of female and male in society which was eroded by the Incas and later the Spanish.

The belief in close connection between myth and structural changes is not shared by Christine Gailey and yet she believes that myths do reflect conflicting interests. She maintains that "utilizing myths and legends is particularly problematic, since changes over time in myth do not directly mirror societal changes, yet the myths do speak to social contradictions." (116) In describing Tongan society Gailey asserts that "Tongan deities were female, male and androgynous, but the configuration did not mirror the secular stratification." (117) Gailey emphasizes that dichotomization of deities, which occur when they are "incorporated into state pantheons," (118) is similar to the emphasis on dualities in the domain of civil and religious ideologies. (119) Here women's role in sexual reproduction is taken to be the most important factor in determining their social identity and not their role in production. Gailey maintains that even though these ideologies consider female deities' sexual and reproductive
capacities as powerful, they view sexuality as dangerous and in need of control.(120)

State and state-building, despite their devastating effect on women's lives and on the life of the marginalized people, is viewed positively by some anthropologists, historians, economists and sociologists. By looking at societies from the viewpoint of the elite and considering state building a 'historical progress',(121)these scholars tend to dismiss the fact that the elite became elite only because a class of non-elite was created in the process of state building, a process which entailed the repression and exploitation of the non-elite people.(122) According to Gailey in such scholarship,

suppression of local rebellions is viewed as positive feedback. The scholar becomes an apologist for the state. In a sense, administrative control is admired. The appearance of scientific neutrality, by virtue of the focus on "necessity" and "efficiency" in defence of a hierarchical status quo, parallels the conservatism of the state functionary.(123)

Gailey applies this criticism directly to the work of Henry Wright and Grey Johnson on the early state formation in Iran:
The shift from local, dispersed craft production...to centralized, mass commodity production is analyzed only with regard to exigencies and difficulties of coordination and allocation. Nowhere are the circumstances which led to such a shift, nor the political consequences of the changes, a concern for research...It is significant that the imposition of a new division of labor is referred to as a reorganization of crafts (not craftworkers) and that conquest is referred to as control over regions (not other peoples)...The political repression necessary to implement craft/tribute production is not linked by Wright to the development of methods to ensure that goods will be made available for elite disposition. Rebellions, where they are mentioned, become instances of "negative feedback" that encourage the refinement of regulation mechanisms. Resistance becomes a piece of information to be processed, and then only if such resistance is overt. (124)

The scholars who praise the progress of the state, and the rise of the elite, and believe in the inherent progressive nature of history, find the best articulation of their ideas in modernization theories that became prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s. Modernization approach which is based on a linear progression of history from "backwardness to modernity," (125) holds the experiences of Western countries to be the ideal paradigm for Third World countries, and capitalist development beneficial for people living there. Modernization theorists ignore the dynamics of private appropriation of land and the process of capitalist accumulation which were set in motion during the colonial era and periods of Western influence and disregard the changes in class relations and the impact of capitalism on the lives of subsistence producers in general and women in particular. (126) Christine Gailey calls modernization, "the culture of capitalism," (127) and Eleanor
Leacock maintains: "Indeed there is almost a kind of racism involved, an assumption that the cultures of Third World people have virtually stood still until destroyed by the recent mushrooming of urban industrialization."(128) Mona Etienne and Eleanor Leacock also assert that: "The traditional/modern dichotomy also contains an implicit value judgment, not only by suggesting that 'traditional' means 'static', but by suggesting that 'modern' is somehow better. The distinction makes Western society the ideal and is not far removed from nineteenth-century ideas of 'progress.'"(129)

In response to modernization theories, world system theory emerged in the 1970s. This theory analyzes the process through which the entire globe is incorporated in capitalist organization. The process involves the commodification of production and labor, the growth of cash crops, and the decline of indigenous industries, the growth of wage labor and the transformation of farmers and artisans into wage laborers. Women are included in this theory only through their household, and their labor is viewed as subsistence production for use value and the reproduction of wage laborers. Women's work, therefore is not included in the capitalist relations of production but rather relegated to the domain of precapitalist economy.(130)

The assumption of women's incorporation in the global economy through the household does not take into consideration the centrality of women's labor in the world system and does
not pay attention to the changes that the development of cash crop creates in women's lives which eventually marginalizes them. Through imposing male definitions of labor on women's work, wage labor becomes the model for work and women's activities in the informal sector and household are considered nonproductive. Different gender participation and experiences in formal and informal sectors therefore, is ignored. Furthermore, by considering families as units with the existence of a uniform interest between women and men, this theory disregards the existence of divergent interests and inequality between women and men within the household.

World system theory also fails to acknowledge the continued persistence and resiliency of precapitalist forms of labor within the informal labor and household. By concentrating on exchange and accumulation, world system theory disregards the interconnectedness of women's formal and informal sector and housework, and the impact of women's nonwaged labor and housework on their waged labor. As heads of the households, comprised from one third to one half of the population in different countries, women mostly work in the informal sector and when they are in the formal sector, are paid less on the assumption that their wage is a subsidiary to their husband's wage. By not taking into account the gendered nature of production, the connectedness of the formal and informal sector and housework, and women's role as
producers with socioeconomic contributions, world system fails to be a comprehensive theory for analyzing women's role for the economy. (135)

World system is not the only theory that has been subject to criticism in regards to the manner in which it has incorporated women in theoretical analysis. Other international theories of political economy, such as development literature, dependency theories and modes of production discussion have also been criticized in regards to their approach to women's work and the work of other subsistence producers. Claudia von Werlhof who directs her criticism towards mode of production approach writes:

...a characterization and typification of the logic of various modes of production in history is not possible without reference to the division of labour based on sex...because unless the 'women's question is seen as fundamental, the understanding of the development of non-European societies and the relationship to Europe since the end of the Middle Ages (and later to the USA and other countries of the so-called center) has to remain superficial. (136)

von Werlhof belief in the essentiality of 'women's question and other subsistence producers is that according to her capitalist accumulation is possible through the work of this majority of the population. She questions:

But who are these 'non'-capitalist producers, these people who do not produce commodities for a wage? They are the majority: housewives throughout the world, peasants of both sexes, mainly in the Third World producing for their own subsistence, and the army male and female so-called 'marginalized' people, most of whom also live in the Third world... (137)
In believing the state to be the root of women's oppression, von Werlhof shares with anthropologists the belief that women's autonomy depends in doing away with this institution. In contemplating a vision for the future, anthropologists have come to believe that such a vision lies in the past. By negating the idea that Western society presents an ideal model for human life, and by suggesting that yesterday could hold a blueprint for tomorrow, Eleanor Leacock writes: "[d]espite caveats to the contrary, history is thereby implied to be unilineal and teleological, with Western society as its ultimate purpose and measure. Alternatives for the future are obscured by the implication that there was no real alternative in the past." (138)

According to Karen Sacks the separation of family and society, the distinction between use-value and exchange-value, and the creation of distinct spheres of production and reproduction, undermined the unity of interdependence of these areas of life, causing women's exclusion from social sphere and as a result their lower status. (139) As to rectifying the situation she suggests:

For full social equality, men's and women's work must be of the same kind: the production of social use values. For this to happen, family and society cannot remain separate economic spheres of life. Production, consumption, child-rearing, and economic decision-making all need take place in a single social sphere—something analogous to the Iroquois gens as described by Engels, or to the production brigades of China during the Great Leap Forward. What is now private family work must become public work for women to become fully social adults. (140)
Lourdes Beneria and Gita Sen share the opinion with Karen Sacks that women carry a double burden of wage work and domestic work. This they emphasize is a direct result of the existence of gender hierarchies. They believe for this to be altered what is needed is "the elimination of class and sex hierarchies through a radical transformation of society, a struggle that requires not only an analysis of class and of accumulation, but a recognition of the importance of reproduction at all levels. They stress women "can no longer ignore the questions of what goes on within household, nor the interweaving of gender relations and class relations." (141)

Maria Mies by believing that women along with other subsistence workers carry the burden of the capitalist economy writes: "Capital accumulation, particularly in its present phase, produces and ever-increasing mass of marginalized population, above all women." (142)if "this marginal mass forms the hidden base for extra-profits, then it is inadequate to dismiss these subsistence reproducers as lumpen proletarians and expect all structural change only from the classical wage labourers." (143)

Redressing the situation, according to Mies, requires that the struggle against sexism and class rule become intertwined and that family as the basic unit of analysis and strategy be done away with. The reason for this Mies asserts is that the economic status of women within the household is lower than that of men's, and therefore men's higher status
should not be taken as the women's real status. Mies suggests that analysis should be based on individuals rather than the family. By basing the analysis on "sex-specific lines, the relationship between sex-and class-polarization would become clearer."(144)

The vision of the future for Claudia von Werlhof rests on the disappearance of housework and along with it other forms of exploitation of the marginalized population of the world. von Werlhof assigns a central role to the housework not only within the whole economy but also the world economy and considers the women's question to be the most important social question which contains all other questions. The reason for this she believes lies in the fact that in the new phase of capitalist development which is "the logical continuation of the existing system,"(145) free wage labour and along with it proletariat is disappearing and is being replaced by "unfree 'femalized' forms of wage labour."(146) She further maintains that since free wage labour is too costly, the dream of capitalists is "[n]ot the generalization of wage labour, but the generalization of housework,"(147) and therefore in this new phase "housework, not wage labour, is the 'model' of work in capitalism."(148) The dream of capitalists according to von Werlhof therefore, is the extension of the principles of the organization of the housework to the rest of the economy, which also includes the white-collar worker and in the process of which "the West's economy will become 'femalized',
'marginalized' 'naturalized' or 'housewifized' - but never proletarianized." (149) von Werlhof believes that eighty to ninety per cent of world population consists of women, peasants, artisans and petty traders, who are unfree and non-wage laborers. (150) It is the labour of this marginalized population, the real producers of wealth, according to von Werlhof, that creates the capital accumulation but these workers themselves are impoverished and exploited.

By looking at the pre-capitalist era, von Werlhof tries to demonstrate the negative impact of capitalist transformation on people's lives in general and women's lives in particular, and therefore comes to question the validity of the assumption that 'present' is equal to the progress.

This devaluation of women's work and, with it, of women's life and the female sex, this rigid subordination of women, operative throughout the world and effective in all spheres of life, initiated and maintained by men, was unknown in pre-capitalist forms of sexual division of labour, including the exploitative ones. This is important, because in the West both women and men believe that they are now better off than in earlier times... They believe this because they are also victims of the suppression of history. Three-hundred years of witch-hunting, running parallel with the colonization of the world, were necessary to snatch from the women-as from Third World people-their power, their economy and their knowledge, and to 'socialize' them into becoming what they are today: housewives and 'the underdeveloped'. The housewife-and with her the 'underdeveloped'- is the artificial product, resulting from unimaginably violent development, upon which our whole economy, law, state, science, art and politics, the family, private property and all modern institutions have been built. (151)
According to all these scholars the ongoing process that began a millennia ago within the gens and resulted in the class differentiation, gender hierarchy, the rise of nuclear family and the formation of the state, was neither beneficial to women nor to the masses of the population. That is why the vision of the future for these scholars is in the past vista, a time when gender, class, and authority in the forms we know them today was absent. It is also by questioning the so called progressive nature of present day economy, culture and the make-up of life in general, that these scholars search the historic past to find a solution for future.

An alternative is possible only if we all, men and women, succeed in recapturing, once and for all, not simply the wage, but more than that—the means of production: our bodies and children, our houses and land, our knowledge and creativity, and the results of our labour. We want all this without continuing, like puppets, to depend on 'central powers', so that we can work for our own, autonomous existence. For that, however, not only do we need no proletarians, but also no housewives. (152)


5. Gailey and Patterson, Ibid., p. 7; Rayna Rapp, Ibid., p. 310.


9. Ibid., p. 81.

10. Gailey and Patterson, Ibid., pp. 8-9; Gaily, Ibid., 81, 85; Muller, Ibid., 7, 10, 13, 15. Muller states that "the primitive groups were pushed into marginal, undesirable habitats by aggressive chiefdoms, where not conquered or socially destroyed." Muller, Ibid., p. 10.


13. Ibid.


17. Ibid., p. 82.

18. Gailey and Patterson, Ibid., p. 8; Gaily, Ibid., p. 81.


21. This section is based on Eleanor Leacock "Interpreting the Origins of...," pp. 268-270.

22. Ibid., p. 268.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 260, 270.

27. Leacock, Ibid., p. 270.

28. Gailey and Patterson, Ibid., pp. 9-10; Gailey, Ibid., p. 81.


30. Gailey maintains that gender should not be viewed as an abstract but rather a process. Gailey, Ibid., p. 78.

31. Ibid., p. 79.

32. Ibid., p. 80.

33. Leacock cited in Gailey, Ibid., p. 81; also see p. 80.

34. Leacock, Ibid., p. 269.

35. Muller, Ibid., p. 18.

36. Ibid.

37. Subsistence production "involves a variety of human activities ranging from pregnancy, the birth of children, to production, processing, and preparation of food, clothing, making a home, cleaning, as well as the satisfaction of emotional and sexual needs." Maria Mies, "Capitalist Development and Subsistence Production: Rural women in India," in Women: The Last Colony, ed. Maria Mies, Veronika Bennholdt-Thomesen and Claudia von Werlhof(London and New Jersey: Zed, 1988), pp. 27-28. Mies adds that "subsistence production covers a wider range of human activity than unpaid household work in the capitalist centers. Statistically, housewives in the capitalist centers form only a small percentage of the world's subsistence producers. The majority of these subsistence producers are small peasants and artisans both men and women, living in the capitalist peripheries in Asia, Africa and Latin America." Ibid., p. 28.

38. Ibid.


41. "The concept of marginality and marginalization was developed in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America in the context of the dependency theory...[S]everal authors have defined the large masses of pauperized peasants and urban poor in peripheral countries as marginalized or a marginalized pool." Mies, Ibid., p. 28.

42. Schiel cited by von Werlhof, Ibid., p. 18.

43. Mies, Ibid., p. 43.

44. Maria Mies maintains: "It is misleading to call these forms of subsistence production non-capitalist (as R. Luxemburg did) or Pre-capitalist as is often done in the discussion on the mode of production. Capital accumulation thus takes place on the ruins of these economies. Capital has always used the same tactics in its attack on the subsistence economies. It first destroys the means of production of the producers or robs them, cheats them, etc. Then it recruits the 'freed' labourers as wage labourers and makes them dependent at the same time on the commodity market for their subsistence." Mies, Ibid., p. 49.

45. Mies, Ibid., p. 43.

46. Ibid.

47. Mies, citing von Werlhof, Ibid., p. 43.

48. Mies, Ibid., p. 44.

49. Ibid.

50. von Werlhof, Ibid., p. 15.


52. Ibid., p. 288.


55. Ibid., p. 40.

56. Leacock, "Class, Commodity...," p. 191.
57. Ibid., p. 192.

58. This section is based on Mona Etienne, "Women and Men, Cloth and Colonization: The Transformation of Production-Distribution Relations Among the Baule (Ivory Coast)," in *Women and Colonization*..., pp. 222-230.

59. Ibid., p. 222.

60. Ibid., p. 227.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid., p. 226.

63. Ibid., p. 230.

64. Ibid.


66. Ibid., p. 304.

67. Ibid., p. 300.

68. Ibid., p. 311.

69. Ibid., p. 315.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.


74. Ibid., p. 45.

75. Ibid., p. 47.

76. Ibid., p. 48.

77. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid., p. 312.

81. Ibid., p. 315.

82. Terray criticizes Samir Amin for overestimating the role of long-distance trade by indicating a "direct causal link" between trade and the emergence of the state, and studying the role of long-distance trade in separation from the relation of production. Terray, Ibid., 314, 316.

83. Ibid., p. 315.

84. Rapp, Ibid., p. 312.

85. Ibid.


88. Ibid., pp. 79-84.


90. Rapp, Ibid., pp. 312-313.

91. Hartman, Ibid., pp. 137-139.

92. Ibid., p. 148.

93. Ibid.

94. According to Hartman "The history of the emergence of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution clearly shows that the 'family wage' is a recent phenomenon. Before the late 1800, it was expected that working class (and earlier, middle and upper-class) married women would support themselves." Hartman, Ibid., p. 156.


96. Diamond, Ibid., p. 96.

97. Ibid., p. 260.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.
100. Ibid., p. 257.
101. Ibid., p. 265.
102. Ibid., p. 274.
103. Ibid., p. 257.
104. Gailey, "The State of the State...," p. 82.
105. Rohrlich, Ibid., p. 83.
106. Rapp, Ibid., p. 311.
107. Ibid.
108. Rohrlich, Ibid., p. 94.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid., p. 96.
111. Ibid., p. 86.
112. Ibid., p. 85.
113. Ibid., p. 94.
114. Ibid., p. 96.
115. Irene Silverblatt, Moon, Sun, and Witches.
117. Ibid., p. 301.
118. Gailey, "The State of the State...," P. 82.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid., p. 70.

122. The indispensable existence of the opposites is demonstrated by Claudia von Werlhof. She writes: "Whether priest, development expert, entrepreneur, minister or husband, none of them would like to be reminded that he is just that: priest etc. only because his 'partner'- as they are called today- are heathens, underdeveloped, exploited and subjected people and women." von Werlhof, "The Proletarian is Dead: Long Live the Housewife!" in Women: The Last Colony, p. 173.

124. Ibid., pp. 70-71.


126. Among other criticisms against Boserup's work, Beneria and Sen also criticize her for adopting modernization theory with capitalist characteristics, as a model for development. In addition they believe that Boserup's work is "empirical and descriptive" with neoclassical tendencies and lacks a well defined theoretical framework, and that she does not present a feminist analysis of women's subordination. Ibid., p. 283.


128. Leacock, "Class, Commodity...," p. 189.

129. Etienne and Leacock, Ibid., p. 5.


131. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

132. Ibid., 49, 53.

133. Ibid., p. 53.

134. Ibid., pp. 52-54.

135. Ibid., p. 55.


138. Leacock, "Interpreting the Origins...," p. 266.

139. Karen Sacks maintains that despite Engels' belief that private ownership of land is the basis of male's supremacy, it was rather women's exclusion from public sphere that was responsible for their subordination. Sacks, Ibid., pp. 211-234.

140. Ibid., p. 234.

141. Beneria and Sen, Ibid., p. 298.

142. Maria Mies, Ibid., p. 43.
144. Ibid.


146. Ibid., p. 169.

147. Ibid., p. 179.

148. Ibid., p. 176.

149. Ibid., p. 174.

150. Ibid., p. 171.

151. Ibid., p. 177.

152. Ibid., p. 181.
CHAPTER 3

STATE AND WOMEN

IN

SAFAVID AND QAJAR ERAS—IN GENERAL

The economy of Iran throughout the Safavid period up to 1800 consisted of three modes of production: a pastoral nomadic mode of production in the rural tribal sector, which comprised 33-40 per cent of the economy; a "peasant crop-sharing" mode of production in the agricultural economy through which 45-55 per cent of the economic activity took place; and a petty commodity mode of production in urban areas which included 10-15 per cent of the economy. (1) In the pastoral nomadic mode tribal chief controlled the production and appropriated the surplus from the pastoralists who were a dominated class and flockless tribespeople who were underclass. Tribesmen also served in the military as soldiers and in this position were considered an intermediate dominated class. (2) In the "peasant crop-sharing" (3) mode of production surplus was appropriated in the form of "a share of the crop" by the Shah, private landlords, tiyul-holders or vaqf administrators. In the middle, there were small-holding peasants, who belonged to an intermediate dominated class, below them peasants with tenancy in the dominated classes, and at the bottom landless peasants, who were from under-classes.
(4) The urban sector, which was based on petty-commodity craft production was divided into two sections and the Shah controlled both of them. Besides operating his own royal workshop, the Shah was also in control of a "private sector." Official ulama, appointed by the Shah and along with him were on the top of this sector. Below them were the merchants, who belonged to and intermediate class. The guild masters were in the intermediate dominated class, which even though were considered independent, were subordinate to both the state by paying taxes and to the merchants, who acted as mediators in marketing their products. They, however, were better off than the artisan-journeymen, and day-laborers, who worked for them. On the lowest level were the urban marginal classes which belonged to an under-class.(5)

Iranian economy during the Safavid period was gradually drawn into an international market. Safavid Iran went through two periods of economic change.(6) During the first period, that is between 1500 to 1630, the Safavids economy reached its peak and from 1630 to 1722 experienced a period of a long decline. During the first period Iran was "engaged in roughly egalitarian patterns of trade with the European core countries."(7) Despite the limited success of these European countries, their accomplishment in opening up the trade "heralded the emergence in embryo of a world-system of markets."(8) During the first period, Iran had contact with Italy, Spain, Portugal, England, Holland, France, India,
Ottoman Empire, Russia and the Uzbeks. Iran's basic export during this period was raw and finished silk, cotton, textiles, wool, carpets, tobacco and other manufactures like porcelain and leather goods and also precious stones. On both side of the trade manufactured goods and raw materials were exchanged and there existed a "favorable balance for Iran in terms of an inflow of silver bullion."(9)

Seventeenth-century Iran, according to Wallerstein then, "would be classified as 'a world-empire in the external arena.' A World-empire is a world-system(i. e., 'a unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural system'), with a common political system."(10) Around 1630, that is the end of the first period, the Iranian Empire was in "the external arena of the emerging capitalist world system,"(11) and was "an essentially self-sufficient political and economic unit both agriculturally and industrially."(12) Safavid Iran at its zenith under 'Abbass was moving, like the European core states, towards bureaucratization, raising a standing army and homogenizing the culture.(13)

During the second period from 1630 to 1722, Iran continued her relations with the European countries. Holland and England in this period had the largest volume of trade with Iran while France despite its efforts failed to have similar commercial relations with Iran. The trade with Russia, the Ottoman Empire, the Mughal empire, the Uzbeks and the Asian countries was also not as extensive or as continuous
as the trade with England or Holland. The main item exported from Iran continued to be the silk but Kermani wool, or Kermani goat's hair wool (kurk) also occupied an important place among the export items. Iranian silk trade, however, due to the production of cheaper silk in Bengal began to decline by 1670, at a time when it had reached its peak. Despite the continued usage by Armenian middlemen of the overland routes, the fall of prices in Europe, caused them to lose the ability to sell Iran's silk in the Levant. As a result Iran's balance of payment became increasingly unfavorable as the export of silk was reduced and wool's export was not enough to make up the difference. Such economic failure put its impact on the fall of the Safavids. During this second period even though Iran did not experience any dependency on the West, "the long period in the external arena did herald the beginning of a gradual, relative decline vis-a-vis an expanding Europe." (14)

The Safavid fall had other reasons as well. In the centralization process of the 17th century one of the key elements was the conversion of state provinces (mamalik) into crown provinces (khassa). Mamalik were administered by the tribal chiefs, who in exchange of tax revenues provided the central government with necessary troops. The tribal chiefs, who acted as the provincial governors were concerned about the prosperity of the provinces, and did not need to raise taxes in order to remain governors. Khassa, on the other hand, entailed more exploitation because the officials from the
central bureaucracy "had to 'buy' their appointment, then increase revenue to keep them." (15) With the weakening of the central government in the later Safavid period these lands known as tiyul (state grants of rights to the land revenue) (16) and suyurghal (outright grants of any kind, but usually of land, and exemption from taxation) (17) were gradually converted into private property.

Conversion of land from the state to crown provinces was associated with the fiscal crisis of the Safavid political economy and was designed to raise revenue for the state. (18) It also had to do with "sweeping changes" in the structure of the Safavid society. (19) The provincial governors during the early Safavids were qizilbash officers, who were considered "the political and social elite" of the Safavids. (20) Safavid kings, however, in order to maintain their sovereignty, reduced the power of the qizilbash and uymag (the Turkoman tribes). (21) The four expeditions to Georgia between 1540-51 and 1553-54 provided captives, mainly women and children, for the Safavids (22) and the offspring of these Georgian and Circassian women constituted a new element in Persian society. (23) The Caucasian element was not only used in the new army, but was also appointed by amirs of tribal contingents so as to grant them tiyuls of "the deposed Turkoman amirs. In addition, they were appointed to high offices which formerly were occupied by the Turkoman amirs. (24) The transfer of state lands to crown lands also thus served to generate funds to
pay these non-tribal 'slaves' or royal slaves (ghulams). These ghulams were also appointed as governors to the Khassa provinces. (25) Minorsky believes that turning land from the state and adding to the crown lands was one of the main causes of the Safavid decline. (26)

During the reign of the Safavids the amount of land which was transferred into owqaf for charitable purposes, especially for the benefit of Shia shrines also increased. This was done partly by the Safavid rulers through assigning their private property into owqaf (27) and partly by the private landowners against the threat of confiscation of their lands by authorities. The vaqf was run by the custodian (mutavalli), and administrator (mutassadi). The office of mutavallies, was highly profitable and was generally concentrated in the hands of a few. These mutavallies generally made these lands into their own private property and therefore eminent families among the ulama came to be important elements in the landowning classes. Lambton believes that the entry of the ulama into the ranks of great landlords "was the most notable change in the composition of the land-owning class in Safavid times." (28)

The transfer of mamalik (state provinces) to khassa (crown provinces), and also vaqf, tiyul, and suyurghal to private property, had severe consequences for the peasants because it "put the peasantry more directly in contact with the holders of the rights to the agrarian surplus." (29) The landlords,
including the Shah, the private landholders and the ulama rented the lands to the peasants on a share-cropping basis, according to which the bulk of the agricultural produce remained in the hands of the landlords and therefore the peasants lived at a subsistence level. The main burden of taxation, directly or indirectly, also fell on the peasantry.

This transformation changed "the status of the peasants from a 'communal man' to a 'man subordinated to a privileged man who had acquired the right to possess the revenue from the lands.' In the post-Safavid era this would lead to a further breakdown of the communal village and would lay the basis for private owners and landlords. Rather than the governors or bureaucrats, it was "less autonomous and less powerful people, mainly city dwellers, who were highly controlled by the central government,[who] were to become the landowners."(30)

Tribal people also had to pay taxes even though in smaller amounts. These taxes were assessed on the number of their flocks and fell on the tribesmen and not the tribal khans. The surplus produced by the lower ranks of the tribes were extracted by the chiefs and the state and therefore the majority of the tribal people, like peasants, lived at a subsistence level. Tribal pastoralists had a hierarchical structure in which the chieftains who owned the largest numbers of flocks resided on the top and the laborers who worked as shepards, were at the bottom. In the middle there were independent flockowners who composed tribe's main body.
Some chieftain held military posts in the provincial government and a number of tribesmen served in the provincial army. The living standard of these tribal troops was higher than other tribesmen. The land used for the pasture was owned collectively by the tribe and the chiefs assigned various plots of land to different families each year.

The relationship between the chiefs and the tribesmen was defined by class position and not by "contractual agreement." (31) Despite the existence of opposite class interests, however, there were "bonds of solidarity between members of exploiting and exploited classes." (32) The existence of "the dichotomy of conflict/consent" in the relations of khans and tribal people meant that such relationship was "neither conflict ridden nor yet consensual" (33) and as long as the contradictions remained "at a preconscious and underdeveloped level" (34) they continued to exist.

Besides peasants and tribesmen, artisans also paid taxes and performed unpaid labor for the court. The tax was assessed annually for the guilds and was settled between the guild leaders and the state officials. The craft guilds (asnaf) had secret relations with the ayyars and futuwwa orders. Because of the danger that existed in such alliance the Safavid urban police closely watched the activities of the guilds. (35) During the late Safavids when Sufi orders came under attack, the state which was wary of Sufis and ayyars, encouraged the
Hadari and Nimati sectarian tendencies in the guilds and this weakened the solidarity between the guild members. (36)

Between 1800 and 1914, during the reign of the Qajars, the economy underwent qualitative and quantitative changes. (37) Qualitatively, a capitalist sector came into existence. In this sector British and Russian capitalists along with Iran's small capitalist class emerged as a dominant class and a working class came into existence as a dominated class. The other three modes of production that existed during the Safavids, continued to function during the Qajars too. Qualitatively, the proportion of pastoral nomads was reduced to half, while the number of petty commodity producers was increased to twice as many in the preceding centuries. In the peasant crop-sharing mode of production the number of peasants increased because there was a decrease in the number of pastoralists. After 1800 the land belonging to private landlords increased while the ownership of the state and of the small peasants was decreased. In the urban sector the royal workshop was replaced by the small factories under the control of the Shah and of the state. A small intelligentsia also emerged as an intermediate[dominated]class. "Taken all in all, Qajar Iran by the late nineteenth century had witnessed a major transition from the earlier Safavid era, changing the shape of Iran's class structure and altering somewhat the balance of forces within it." (38)
In the course of the 19th century, England and Russia competed with each other for control over Iran's trade, and by 1914 they dominated Iran's foreign trade, which entailed also political and military influence. (39) In two military confrontation between Iran and England, 1838 and 1857, Iran aimed to recapture former territories, but England prevailed making Afghanistan an "'independent' zone between Russia and India", (40) England's military capacity becoming conspicuous. Military superiority in turn led to the commercial preeminence of England in Iran by mid 19th century, and to the granting of special commercial privileges. England's trade with Iran increased drastically; by mid century it included more than 50 percent both of Iran's export and imports. British textile export to Iran between 1830s and 1840s represented 90 percent of total Iranian imports. In the second half of the century the British coerced Iran into granting them even more "concessions" which allowed for the exploitation of raw materials and of infrastructural developments. (41) During this period the British firms which had been established in the early 1870s imported silkworm eggs and exported carpets.

Russian trade with Iran was also facilitated through two wars fought in 1801 and 1828. These wars were fought over former Iranian territories in the Caucasus (Georgia and Armenia). Iran was defeated in both and was compelled to sign treaties that entailed not only the loss of these territories but of huge amount of war indemnity as well. In the first half
of the 19th century, the Iranian trade with Russia amounted to the import and export of both raw and manufactured goods on both sides. After 1850, Russia's power in Iran changed qualitatively and quantitatively. Increased power enabled Russia to secure concessions in banking, telegraphs, fisheries and roadbuilding, as well as to deter British access to the northern Iranian market. The Shah signed an agreement guaranteeing that no railroad would be built in Iran. Unlike in the first half of the century, in the second half the terms of the trade became negative for Iran because while it exported only raw materials, such as cotton and rice, Russia began to export industrial manufactured goods.

The composition of Iran's trade with Britain and Russia changed between 1800 and 1914. The pattern of export and import from the middle of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th century shows "the shift toward a classical 'colonial' pattern by the early twentieth century." (42) In Wallerstein's world-system theory Iran in 19th century became "the periphery of the world capitalist system." (43) The increasing export of raw materials combined with the import of manufactured goods and of European control of the terms of trade all testify to the growing dependence of Iran. Despite this dependence, Iran did not become directly colonized and this had to do with the British and Russian rivalry in Iran. This rivalry, however, prevented Iran from developing its infrastructural system. In addition, the forced concession of "most favored nation"
commercial status granted by Iran to the Europeans deterred the growth of the native manufacturing and handicraft sector.

The impact of the transition of the economy from the Safavids to the Qajar era was especially devastating to the small artisans. Textile establishments in cities such as Isfahan, Kashan, Yazd and Shiraz were thoroughly ruined as their markets were filled with British textile products. (44) Kashan, which for centuries produced silk and cotton was transformed from an industrial and commercial city to a dependent commercial center. "Flandin, who visited Kashan in 1840, reports that the import of British materials had destroyed the large factories of Kashan." (45) In Isfahan the collapse of handicraft production resulted in the steady reduction in the number of workers in the silk weavers guild. (46) Curzon visiting Isfahan in 1890s wrote that the city had become a consumer of "manufactured cotton goods, almost wholly from Manchester and Glasgow." (47) The drastic fall in the number of "weaver" factories in Shiraz, from 500 in 1800 to 10 in 1857 (48) affected many artisans, who as a result, had to resort to unskilled wage labor for their livelihood.

Until the middle of the 19th century, Iran was self sufficient economically by growing main crops such as wheat, barely and other cereals, and by exporting cereals to such an extent that it "constituted the second major agricultural export item." (49) Silk continued to be an important part of
the economy and the largest export item until it reached its peak in 1864. (50) The spread of silkworm disease from Europe in mid 1860s, however, caused the collapse of silk production. In the south in this period opium production rose to such an extent that by the 1880s it became the leading export. Other cash crops such as cotton and rice were also produced and exported. The extent of the cultivation of cash-cropping was such that it is believed that by the first decade of the 20th century one can "no longer characterize Iranian agriculture as subsistence farming. By then, it was well integrated into the national economy, and commercial relations were widespread." (51)

Opium cultivation was connected to the overall changes that were happening in the manufacturing sector of the economy as a result of Iran's integration into the global market. The rising volume of the cheap European manufactured goods caused the decline of the native handicraft manufactures, of the heretofore self-sufficient villages, which produced their own textile, became dependent upon foreign countries for such items. The imports, which during 19th century exceeded the exports, (52) was in part paid for by the export of silk, but after the silkworm disease, the silk industry never again regained its former productivity. (53) The imports were also paid for by the export of gold and silver, (54) but the impact of the drain of these metals, was felt by the early decades of the second half of the nineteenth century. (55) It was at this
conjuncture that opium production presented itself as the solution to the problem of trade deficit. Even though opium was an item of export in Isfahan since 1853, "it was not till after the collapse of silk production and trade in the mid-1860s that the poppy was at all widely cultivated." (56)

Opium cultivation, however, arose at the expense of both cotton production and food cultivation. With the decline in native handicraft, the demand for cotton decreased and therefore its production was limited as well. (57) In addition the impact of the cultivation of opium resulted in food shortage. In the summer of 1860 and the winter of 1861 in Tehran and throughout the northern provinces "the distress assumed the dimension of famine," (58) and bread riots broke out in Tehran, Qazvin and other cities. (59) The famine of 1869-72 and another food shortage at Bushire in 1887 were caused by the increase of opium cultivation and the decrease in food production. The shift to subsistence crops caused the fall of the prices, the shifting back to opium resulted in the occurrence of famine. This "constant disequilibrium" (60) therefore meant that "both subsistence and cash crops had their limits and limited each other." (61) The absence of a transportation system was also the cause of food shortage because in areas where there was food shortage, the peasants who were in possession of cash from producing opium were unable to acquire food in exchange. (62)
Peasants, who at first had responded favorably to the prospect of "short term cash profit"(63) became bitter as they experienced "the long-term effects" of opium cultivation.(64) These cultivators were transformed into virtual wage laborers, who were forced to buy food products that they themselves used to grow. The prices of these food products were high because most of the land was under poppy cultivation and the scarcity of the food supply caused the increase in its prices.(65) The report of Consul Ross from Bushire in 1882 shows the resistance of the peasants to opium cultivation: "During the panic caused by the recent continued drought a cry was raised by the populace in some towns against the cultivation of poppy and in few instances a poppy field was ploughed up and wheat sown instead." (66)

The peasantry was also affected by the depreciation of currency, itself a product of the fall of international prices of silver.(67) It "constituted a severe and indirect tax that hit the poor particularly...",(68) by raising the prices "which was not matched by an equal increase in wages."(69) In fact taxing the peasants had become easier with the decline of "regional self-sufficiency" and with the growth of the commercialization of agriculture, because the government was able to "extract taxes at points of exchange."(70)

Opium cultivation ultimately affected southern Iran more than any other area in the country. The impact of large-scale opium production was so extensive that it is believed it
changed "the economic, as well as the social and political structure of southern Iran during the nineteenth century."(71) The Qajars administered southern Iran through the application of tiyul system which was run by a "local gentry" class. The members of this class functioned as landowner, tribal leader, merchant, and tiyuldar and this gave them total control over the economic life of the area.(72)

In the south beside the "country trade" which was based on the surplus subsistence crops, found among towns and urban merchants, there was also the proper "commercial" trade of British East India Company, which had a monopoly of India's foreign trade and had considerable hold in Iran as well.(73) Trade with British India, which was more profitable, in time eclipsed the local trade.(74) The economy became centered on transit trade and was handled by the local Iranian merchants. Cities in southern Iran were capable of absorbing the volume of imports from Britain in the first three decades of the century, but between 1825 and 1870 British imports quadrupled, an amount that was not absorbable in these markets. Southern cities then appeared to be a desirable transit point for these products as well as a center of consumption.(75)

The increase of British trade faced the Iranian merchants with a balance of payments problem. If up to 1860 the silk trade had sufficed, it no longer did so. Other Persian products, which were demanded in Europe, were mostly produced in northern Iran and exported through the Tabriz-Trebizond
route or to Russia. The merchants in the south could not export to Europe because of the high cost of shipping around the Cape of Good Hope. To meet their expenses Iranian merchants turned to cash crops such as tobacco and especially opium as mentioned above. Merchants who got involved in opium cultivation became economically and politically powerful, while other merchants, who did not take part in it, went bankrupt or withdrew from trade.

The impact of British trade during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century changed the basis of social and political system of southern Iran. The trade allowed for a concentration of wealth in the hands of a small number of individuals. The rise in the price of tiyuls especially those involved with trade, and who had the right to collect customs, made local sheikhs unable to raise enough funds to obtain the right over such tiyuls. Gradually therefore fewer individuals came to control tiyuls. Larger areas of land were possessed by smaller number of people. On the other hand, the economic power of this small group of people gave them power over the rest of the population; and, it was the tiyul system that made the conversion of this economic power into political power possible. (76) As a result, those involved in the trade with England "eventually were able to extend their control over most of the southern Iranian economy." (77)

Even though British trade during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century altered the foundation of the social
and political system of southern Iran, "the system of agricultural production on which the region's economy was based remained relatively unaffected by those developments." (78) Subsistence cultivation through which the peasants produced their own food continued as in the preceding centuries even though surplus accumulation remained in fewer hands during this period. The opening of Suez Canal in 1869, however, drastically changed the agricultural economy of southern Iran. The rise in the British imports and the consequent deficit in the balance of payment necessitated large-scale opium cultivation. This, not only increased the wealth and status and as a result the political power of those involved in it, but also it brought about the impoverishment of peasants, who were no longer capable of even producing their own food.

During the reign of the Qajars the trend toward the concentration of land in fewer hands continued.(79) The basic difference from Safavid times, was the rise of Khaliseh(state-owned crown land)(80)and tiyuls, at the expense of vaqf.(81) After 1850, state lands and tiyuls were increasingly transformed into private property. The process through which this change took place was for the "Theoretically revocable" (82)tiyuls, to become hereditary and in time be converted into private property. Provincial governors, tribal chiefs, urban notables, bureaucrats, merchants and government officials, were thus transformed into landowners. The sale of the crown
lands during the 1870s, due to the Qajar fiscal crisis, also helped this process. The sale of these agricultural properties, coinciding with the boom in cash crops, was especially welcomed by the merchants. The transfer of landownership "out of the hands of the state and tiyul-holder into the hands of merchants, ulama, and officials in the second half of the nineteenth century and certainly by 1880, made the rise of "a new, more stable class of landowners" possible. This new emerging landowning class, which through its wealth could exercise political power, came to be the most powerful class during the Qajar period.

It was this land concentration in a few powerful hands during the Qajar period that also helped to strengthen the state. The political power of the landholders was intensified through British firearms which gave them supremacy over the unarmed poor. The state's power in turn solidified the landowner's control. During the Qajar era then, through mutual collaboration, the power of the central government and of the local elites, who were mainly from among landlords, increased. With the growth of large land ownership, the landlord's power vis-à-vis the peasants increased. The concentration of land ownership and subsequently wealth, resulted in peasants' loss of all their rights to the land.

The progressive deterioration of the peasants' status was also a result of the trend towards increased centralization of the administration. This was partly due to the fact that the
central government itself extracted the taxes and allocated it to the various provinces, (89) a process that was unlike the other one of assigning the collecting of the tiyuls for the provincial expenditures. The Zabit (the central revenue collector) was interested in extracting as much as he could, and he did not care about the economic well being of the province and its inhabitants. After all the function of the provincial administration was simply revenue collection and troop recruitment; peasants' lives were supposed to revolve around the fulfillment of these tasks.

The peasants' bad status was also affected by the encroachment of the state, exercised through the extension of the urf or customary law courts. The jurisdiction of the urf extended in this period to such matters as decisions on land and fell under the power of the landowners. (90) The fact that the same official was responsible for collecting the taxes and for executing justice meant that the peasants were denied even the chance of a fair trial. The existence of this unjust system, rooted as it was in the contradiction between the interest of the state and of the peasantry resulted in a constant struggle between the provincial governors and villages, the latter rarely paying their taxes voluntarily. (91)

During the reign of the Qajars, the central government increased its control over the nomads by using modern military equipments. Direct control, however, was not a requirement
for exploitation because even when the state did not directly control the tribes, it continued to exploit them anyway. (92) For example it incorporated them into the state apparatus. The most effective strategy for accomplishing this, was making the chiefs part of the ruling class. This was done by allowing them to own large landholdings, to become provincial governors and also beneficiaries of the mercantile economy. This of course entailed increased solidarity between tribal chiefs and other members of the ruling elite on the one hand, and it enhanced the contradiction between them and the tribesmen on the other hand. Another scheme was assigning a mullah to each tribe (93) in order to be able to control them ideologically. Qajar Shahs also moved tribal groups from one area of the country to the other because they considered them to be rebellious and in this way prevented their challenge to the central authorities. They also followed the policy of the sedentarization of some tribes thereby increasing the power of the central authority and enhancing the production of cash crops. (94) The government furthermore crushed tribal revolts. As a result, the second half of the 19th century witnessed fewer tribal revolts than did the first half. (95) From this period, state policies affected the size of tribal population. Tribes comprised one half of the population at the beginning of the 19th century, and only one fourth at the end of the century. (96)
By comparing the eyewitness accounts of travellers during the Safavid and the Qajar era, the deterioration of the peasant's position is clearly revealed. Indeed despite the existence of the share-cropping production, and of corvée labor in both periods, the peasants and tribes experienced a much more severe exploitation during the reign of the Qajars than they did under the Safavids. In the earlier period, the government was less centralized and thus lacked the huge administration, bureaucracy and military that came into existence during the Qajars, the burden of which fell directly on the people. Moreover, during the Safavids the villagers and tribes produced their own food, a phenomenon which became less possible as the growth of cash crops replaced the subsistence economy. Finally, due to the general economic prosperity of the Safavid era, the masses did not experience the harsh existence that they went through in the Qajar period. In short the deterioration in the status of peasants and tribes from the Safavids to the Qajar era is similar to the decline in their position from the beginning of the Qajar rule to the end of their dynasty.

This point could be better established if one turns to the struggle between tribes and the state, which was one of the main features of the Qajar era. In these struggles the tribes and the peasants formed alliances because they both suffered from state intrusion. Both suffered from encroachment, which usually took place through regional
integration of rural surpluses and reorientation of trade routes. (97) The reason for this was that regional integration was usually followed by increased taxation, military conscription, extended expropriation of herds and crops, needed for internal and external trade, changes in land utilization and a general intrusion of administration in peasants' lives. (98) Revolts usually originated in villages and in tribal areas which bordered on major trade routes and which were in the process of integration into the state. The main contradiction during the Qajar period, therefore, was not between nomads and peasants but between these two groups which produced the surplus value on the one hand, and the state which controlled and used this surplus, on the other hand.

The military capacities of the tribes was used to fight the state's domination, more than it was used to dominate the villages. (99) This was also the case when they fought against the domination of the outlying agricultural settlements and commercial centers because the pastoralists had less resources than these agricultural settlements for subjugating other communities. Besides "...the settled rural population was probably less self-sufficient than the nomadic tribes..." (100) Foran maintains: "Despite their own reputation as plunders, tribespeople were themselves sometimes badly abused by provincial authorities, as well as by the settled population with which they came into contact." (101) The raids against the caravan trade routes was yet another case of resistance
against the intrusion of the state. The nomads, therefore, unlike their usual portrayal by anthropologists, and historians were not warlike people with predatory predilections inimical to the sedentary life with civilized characteristics. They were struggling against the intervention of a state which threatened their way of life and livelihood. In this they were even more vulnerable than peasants because as pasturalists their means of subsistence could be more easily destroyed. (102)

The burden of state's expenditure also fell on the artisans. Artisans had to pay an annual state tax plus a bonicheh(quoton their workshop. (103) Artisans also had to perform corvee, construction work without the right to protest. In addition to direct taxes, there were indirect taxes which usually surpassed the direct ones.

Who were these artisans? Besides the free artisans there were other craftsmen who were exclusively at the service of either the court or the khans and landlords. These men could not belong to any guilds since they had to be constantly at the service of their masters. The corvee for the court was performed by them under the leadership of the chief of the royal household(nazir-i biyutat). This agent along with the overseer of markets and morals(muhtasib) and mustawfi also fixed the prices on goods for royal household. Even though guild leaders attended the meeting with these individuals the prices were fixed by them in the interest of the state(divan).
It is fair to say that the Qajar state treated the guilds as a corporate body for tax purposes. A quota was decided each year and was then assigned to each member. The decision on the quota was based on the negotiation between the guild leaders and the mayor (kalantar). Through the kalantar whose function was like that of government overseer (amin), the state controlled the guilds and the amount of taxes they paid. Therefore, even though guilds were supposedly free in running their own affairs, the government controlled them and meddled in their activities whenever it saw fit. And, despite the fact that the government had knowledge of guilds' internal affairs, government overseers would ignore changes within the guilds that affected artisans' ability to pay taxes. For example when the number of members were reduced, the tax quota, decided upon for the year, remained the same, a situation not dissimilar to the government's indifference to peasants' plea for tax breaks or reductions in cases of drought or famine. The government eventually deprived the guilds of the right to control prices and towards the end of the 19th century this function fell in the hands of darugha and muhtasib.

The artisans fought government's oppression by taking bast or seeking the support of some of the ulama. They also formed alliances with Sufi orders and dervishes. The craft guilds also associated with lutis and dashis, the successors of ayyars and of the futuwwa orders. The lutis protected the weak from the powerful. They challenged the
state authorities and were at the forefront of the bread riots. The lutis were also known as ahl-i lut, which implied the existence of homosexual relations between them. (108) Lutis, therefore, not only did not surrender to state's power, but also displayed freedom in choosing their own life style.

The government and along with it the landowners, who were fearful of the strong alliances between the artisans, lutis and dervish orders sought ways to interfere and break such associations. The Haydari-Nimati factional strife was a part of such interference, the state authorities and landowners nurtured it and used it to their own benefit. The dissention between Haydari and Nimati sects was rooted in the doctrinal disputes between the Shites and Sunnis. (109) The government authorities fostered these conflicts because their participants were from the lower classes, (110) and if they were not drawn into these strives they could be organized against the upper stratum of the society. The fact that such conflicts became more heated during the periods of popular unrest and defiance against the authorities is a manifestation of state's involvement in these conflicts. (111)

The state's efforts towards centralization manifested itself in changes in the judicial system as well. We have noted the replacement of the shar' by urf courts. The urf courts, however, were not the only authoritative organs emerging in this period. Through provincial governors, headmen of small towns, mayors (kalantars), city officials (kadkhudas),
as well as through agents for application of the law (farrash bashi), the state increasingly influenced the society. From checking on public morality to dealing with issues concerning violation against the state, such as rebellion, it increasingly took control of people's lives and actions. The state officials conducted the urf courts and the population were at their total mercy because the judge was at the same time the chief local executive and therefore was above the law rather than being checked by it. (112)

In villages, the urf courts enhanced the power of the landlord because most cases were dealt with by village chiefs (kadkhudas) or supervisors (mubashirs), who were appointed by the landlord. Meanwhile the landlord, had executive powers which gave him total control over peasants. More important cases in the villages were dealt with by the tax collector (zabit) or kalantar, who were of course more interested in the state's well being than that of the peasants. Only the tribes were somewhat immune from the state since they themselves dealt with their own problems. The tribal section chief (Kadkhuda) was in charge of minor cases while the mayor (kalantar) and the tribal chief (ilkhan) dealt with major issues. (113)

The interference of the state was not welcomed by the people and therefore they tried to resolve the problem by themselves without appealing to state authorities. This was the case for the village communities, tribal groups and the
guilds. If steps towards resolution were unsuccessful, they then resorted to courts and even then preferably to the shar' and not the urf courts. According to some sources, people themselves took care of all the judicial affairs, that is civil cases, without appealing to the state. (114)

Judicial reforms, which were directed towards the increased power of the state hit peasants the most, while workers and artisans were next in line. Of 2,006 complaints and petitions that had reached government in 1868, two thirds were from the peasants and the rest belonged to the workers and artisans. (115) Sending these petitions had repercussions for peasants because through their informers, the governors kept a watchful eye on the peasants and whoever sent a petition was punished afterwards. (116) The petitions that reached the government did not result in any effective measure in rendering the situation.

Besides the courts, some government agents such as the kalantar and the daruga had judicial powers which they used freely in dealing with the citizens and the artisans (the ra'aya and the kasaba). (117) To help in encounters with people, they appointed a city warden (kadkhuda) for each quarter of the city. In addition, the kalantar had a police force at his disposal (118) for dealing with major cases, and this was used by the kadkhuda in handling minor cases. In some cities, like Mashhad, the kalantar was also the chief of the court of
justice (the adliyya); so he was both the judge and the juror. (119)

The kalantar's most important task was that of tax collector of the town and of the guilds, and regulator of the quota. (120) In some places such as Fars, the kalantar was at the same time Shah's tax collector (the zabit). (121) To collect taxes the kalantar had to bring the populace legally and morally in line. The law and order that the kalantar upheld was the one that made, what in effect was extortion possible, and the morality that he implanted was induced its acceptance. After all the kalantar was the guardian of the interest of the government and of the local elite, and his authority extended over the lower classes in large towns. (122) Typically as well, the Kalantar himself was from among the local, powerful families, who continued to occupy the office for generations. It was a truism in Iran that the political, bureaucratic and financial support of these families strengthened the central government. (123)

Fixing prices and controlling the quality of commodities were also functions of the kalantar, lucrative ones, although these were actually carried out by the darugha and the muhtasib. (124) By using his power to intimidate and extort from the shopkeepers, by accepting bribes from guilds and shopkeepers for allowing them to fix their own prices, and by neglecting sanitary and quality rules, the kalantar used to amass fortunes. At times he even helped the wheat hoarders to
create artificial shortages and shared the profit with them. (125) However the kalantar's oppressive role was not hidden from foreign travellers, one noting "[s]o that what is done by the authorities for the provisioning of the people serves the exploitation of the people rather than their benefit and profit." (126)

As was noted, the kalantar was assisted by the bazar superintendent (darugha) in matters related to the city's main market. In Safavid times, this office was occupied by the muhtasib, but in the 19th century the duties were transferred to the darugha. (127) The darugha like the kalantar was not only in charge of issues related to regulating market affairs but he also checked on matters related to people's morality. In both these areas as with the kalantar, he was both the judge and the juror, offenders becoming a sources of income. The darugha's helpers were known as the farrash, the darugha shagerd, the (sar)gazma, and the ahdath, and these like their superiors abused their power. (128) These "servants" of the darugha and of the kalantar were accountable to them and not to the city or the quarter. (129)

The darugha made artisans and merchants register so that control i.e. extraction would be easier. At times when pressure became intolerable the latter closed the shop and took sanctuary (bast). (130) The result, however, was not usually effective as the governor and the Shah themselves were benefactors of the system. Levying taxes on the shops were
farmed out to the darugha, thus he too had an interest in preserving the political apparatus and its tax list- darugha-tax (Darughai), the darugha's votive (the Nazre-i darugha), and darugha's cloak (Pustin-i darugha). (131) The darugha like the kalantar was chosen from among leading families of the area and this was again another testimony to the strong relationship between the central government and local powerful families.

The district police was generally referred to as Farrash, but the name was different in various localities. In Tehran, by the middle of the 19th century, they were known as the gazma. (132) The gazma lived among the people, and since he did not wear any uniform, could not be differentiated from them. This made their task of reporting the "undesirable elements" to the government easier.

Another force was that of the garavuls, established in 1852. The garavuls were chosen from among the regiments posted in the cities. (133) They, like the gazma, lived among the people and became intimate with them. This gave them the chance to know their whereabouts and report dubious elements to the government. It seems that by the middle of the century the government was in control of the people, and their activities. The British traveller, Waring visiting Shiraz in 1802 writes: "The police of Sheeraz is admirably regulated; and I hardly think it possible for the middling classes of
people to harbour any design against the government which should not come to the immediate notice of the governor.(134)

Dominance was not only exercised through powerful agents of the government over the people at large, but was also applied by some groups over other groups residing in different parts of the country. One of the features of the Qajar era was the exploitation of the south by the northern part of the country.(135) During the reign of the Qajars, the center of trade was removed from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, and instead of southern cities, such as Isfahan and Shiraz, Tehran became the capital. The replacement of economy from southern to the northern regions also meant that "the sources of power for the ruling families would be in those respective regions."(136) The transfer of the power, economy and trade from the south to the north had consequences for the welfare of the peasants. Despite the overall destitution of the peasantry, this transfer, in the course of the 19th century, meant that the peasants of the north experienced a somewhat better living standard than the peasants of the south. Culturally too, Farsi, came to dominate the court, the bureaucracy and later on the Maktab(schools). This, of course, was at the expense of other languages spoken throughout Iran such as Kurdi, Luri, Azari...etc. The process of the domination of the southern provinces by the northern regions is described by Thomas Ricks:
By 1790, new internal forces such as the silk trade to the north, the increase of the cotton export trade from the Caspian and Khurasan regions, and the rise of the Qajars coincided with Russian interest in these same areas and a shift of the Erzerum-Aleppo trade to the Erzerum-Black Sea trade. The ascendancy of Northern Iran over Southern Iran was further insured by the decline in Persian Gulf trade and the rise of British interest in the Gulf...[F]irst Shiraz and then Tehran became the capital of the country as the political and economic shift in power moved from the south to the north; the trade routes within Iran moved away from the Gulf towards the provinces of Azerbaijan, the Caspian littoral, and Khurasan; those Armenians remaining in the southern region of Iran either moved on to India after the Zand's power collapsed or to the northern regions; greater village and town depopulation occurred in the south during this period while the villages and towns of the northern provinces grew (as in Azerbaijan); and finally, even the Zand administration, such as Haji Ibrahim Shirazi, were incorporated into the northern Qajar bureaucracy of Fath Ali Shah...(137)

Changes in the economic sphere from the Safavids to the Qajars were reflected in the cosmology, philosophy even the religious ideas of the time. Religious and ideological changes had started centuries before the rise of the Safavids to power. Annemarie Schimmel believes that Iran was host to many religious tendencies at the time of the Arab conquest. She asserts that Zoroastrianism was the official religion and that Christianity constituted the second strongest religion in Iran. Gnostic groups such as the Manicheans continued to exist "under the surface of all religions,"(138) and in the Eastern part of Iran traditional religions and "even relics of Buddhism" could be found.(139) When Ismailis, who had permeated the whole of Iran, faded away, they were replaced by the Sufi orders and a lot of their leaders became Sufi leaders
in post-Mongol Iran. Movements such as Hurufiya in which Shi'ism and Sufi tendencies were blended together, spread out from Iran even to Turkey and such ideas were echoed in the Turkish Bektashi. Other Sufi groupings such as Ni'matullahiya, Nurbakhshia, Zahabiya, Jalali, Khaksar, Ahl-i haqq, Hurufiya, Nugtaviya, Kaysaniya, Musha'shaiya, Naqshbandi and Bektashi existed either before and after the rise of the Safavids to power. After the Sunni-Shi'ite split during the Safavids, these groups became less outspoken. "The country, multicolored in its religious expression," wrote Annemarie Schimmel, "was predominantly Sunni, and the indigenous Persian tradition was reflected merely in some poetical topos and in mystical undercurrents." Hamid Algar too, believed that during the Safavids and the two centuries that preceded their reign, diverse religious "tendencies and aspirations" existed in Iran.

Over the centuries, following the Arab conquest, the Shi'i ulama, concentrated on the legal aspect of theology, such as law and jurisprudence, at the expense of esoteric dimension of religious knowledge. In the 17th century, however, Mulla Sadra, the Iranian philosopher, emphasized the metaphysical aspect of the religion, synthesizing the philosophical and theological heritage of the thousand years that preceded him. By insisting on the interpretation of the Imam's tradition (Akhbar), and on the role of the man in construing the universe, Mulla Sadra defied the theologians
who believed that knowledge had already been laid out in its entirety and there was no possibility to add more to it. (146)

Mulla Sadra belonged to the School of Isfahan, a powerful cultural movement in the first half of the seventeenth century that continued "rationalist theology, Avicennian philosophy, scholastic Sufism and Illuminationism..." (147) The founder of the School of Isfahan was Mir Damad; but it was Mulla Sadra, however, who combined all the diverse metaphysical and religious ideas into one system. Mulla Sadra and Mir Damad, along with other philosophers of the School of Isfahan, such as Baha' ad-Din al-'Amili and Mohsen Fayz Kashani, were the successors to Muslim philosophers of earlier times from "al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, Through Suhravardi and Nasir al-Din-Tusi to Ibn Turkah and Sayyid Hydar Amuli, who were the immediate predecessors of the Safavid Sages." (148)

During the 18th century, the Usuli and Akhbari controversy became dominant in the Shi'ite scholarly circles. Akhbari Shi'ism placed emphasis on the Book and the Traditions of the prophet and the Imam and by believing that they were complete in themselves rejected rational interpretation. The Usulis, in contrast to Akhbaris, gave priority to "deductive reasoning" (149) in using the Quran and the Shi'ite tradition. The Usuli scholars stressed the use of "deductive reasoning" because "[t]he major political changes at the time and the crisis of legitimacy in post-Safavid times demanded such a logical approach in order to give the 'ulama the necessary
means to play their part in the affairs of the temporal world."(150) "Usulism, in its essence facilitated the intervention of the religious authority in the affairs of the world, and hence provided a new outlook through which the 'ulama justified their increasingly noticeable presence in the society."(151)

The history of theology and theosophy during the 18th century, that is late Safavid Iran, and after the Afghan invasion in 1720 and throughout the rest of the century, is a matter of controversy among the historians. While some like Hossein Nasr, Said Amir Arjomand and Moojoan Momen believe in the suppression of philosophy and Sufism in the latter part of the Safavid era and in the course of the 18th century, others such as Juan Cole and Abbas Amanat conclude that The School of Isfahan, Sufi mysticism and other philosophical trends remained active throughout 18th century.

According to Hossein Nasr the tradition of theosophy, which became powerful during the Safavid period, came under vehement attacks by the ulama and, as a result, towards the end of the Safavid period lost its vigor. Nasr maintains that this was due to the faith of many Sufi orders that were active in Iran at the beginning of the Safavid period, such as "Zahabis,...Qadris, Baktashis, Khaksars, Mawlavis and Ni'matullahis."(152) At the end of the Safavid period therefore, Nasr maintains there is a "complete polarity and opposition between the most powerful Shi'ite ulama and
organized Sufism..."(153) and Sufism could return to the centers of Shi'ite learning "only under the name of irfan or under the guise of hikmat-i ilahi."(154) "Both Sufism and hikmat-i ilahi...were finally forced into a form of marginal existence at the end of the reign of a dynasty of Sufi origin."(155)

Arjomand and Momen also believe that Akhbaris were dominant at the beginning of the 18th century while the latter part of the century witnessed the revival of the Usulis. According to Arjomand a tradition that nurtured mojtahids, who could also be philosophers, such as Baha'i and Mir Damad, came to an end in the Safavid period and Momen indicates that the School of Isfahan came under violent attack during the 18th century.

These views, however, are opposed by Juan Cole, who does not believes in the dominance of the Akhbaris at the beginning, and Usulis in the latter part of the 18th century. Cole maintains that during the course of the 18th century "scholars continued to cultivate the old Isfahani specialties of the philosophical sciences, theosophy, theology, and other rationalist branches of knowledge. Sufi mysticism left its mark even on the religious establishment..."(156) Cole emphasizes that gnostic-rationalist mojtahids of "post-Safavid Isfahan from Mohammad Ali Hazin Gilani to Bsmail Khaju'i and Mohammad Mehdi Niragi, kept alive the cosmopolitan religious
culture of the School of Isfahan throughout the eighteenth century..." (157)

Abbas Amanat also believes in the existence of Sufi tendencies towards the end of the 18th century. He maintains that "[f]rom 1770s onward, in spite of a general orientation of the 'ulama to consolidate the foundation of figh, examples of asceticism and mystical experiences were extant, often at peace with Shi'ite orthodoxy. Although at first glance these intuitive experiences seem to fall strictly within the lawful framework of Shari'a, upon closer examination they reveal traces of gnostic and even protomessianic trends." (158)

As a consequence of the continued oppression of esoteric tendencies by the emphasis on jurisprudence of the Usulis, Shaykism "emerged as the chief defender of theosophy and esoteric knowledge" in the middle of 18th century. (159) Shaykism in fact represented the reemergence of Akhbari aspirations which had been defeated by Usulis both in Iran and Iraq. In contrast to the Usulis, whose emphasis was on inquiry, Akhbaris had believed in intuition from the prophet and the Imam, and it was this mystical and esoteric aspect of Akhbarism that later manifested itself in the Shaykhi school.

In time Shaykism became a ground for the development of the Bab'i movement which was the radical expression of theosophical knowledge and "carried the tradition of religious dissent out of the mosque and madrseh(religious schools) into the streets." (160) Amanat believes that Babism had also
connection to other sectarian tendencies, such as the Ismailis, and this he asserts "suggests a realignment of the old millenarian aspirations in the new body of the Babi movement."(161)

The emergence of the Babi movement, therefore, was a testimony to the continuation of heterodox tendencies in different guises. This indicates that people did not easily give up their beliefs, and in each epoch supported those who could give a new meaning to their old beliefs. The growth of Babism in communities that had Ismaili, Shaykhi or other anti-orthodox tendencies, shows the survival of these tendencies over time. In describing the Babi movement Amanat maintains that "[o]ne definitely influential factor was the preexistence of numerous heterodox communities, both open and semisecret, on the highly diverse map of religious adherence."(162)

In the nineteenth century Ismailism was also revived in Iran. This revival took place among the Nizaris of Eastern Iran, a community which had "preserved some aspects of its crypto-Isma'ili heterodoxy"(163)in addition to Sufi tendencies. In this revival "past connections between the Ni'matullahis and Ismailis were further strengthened."(164) In addition to Ni'matullahis, the existence of Ahl-i haqq, Naqshbandi, Nurbakhshiya and other Sufi turoq shows the survival of anti-orthodox proclivities especially in the remote areas of Iran.
It should be emphasized that the sectarian tendencies and philosophical orientations in Iran were not separate from the economic changes that were happening in the country since the Safavid times. Akhbaris, for example, according to Comte de Gobineau had bourgeois aspirations, (165) and according to M. S. Ivanov, Babis in essence projected the dissatisfaction of "the rising bourgeoisie," the merchants, who wished to have more freedom to follow their own independent economic, social, and spiritual path. (166) Amanat also demonstrates the affiliation of Akhbaris to less privileged and Usulis to opulent classes of the society:

"The hazy picture of an escalating social polarity in Barfurush looms parallel to the rising fortune of the entrepreneurial merchant-landowners of the region. It is only fair to assume that Shari'atmadar[an Akhbari] was the representative of the indigenous population of peasants and small landowners with seminomadic kinship ties, while Sa'id al-Ulama[an Usuli] and his clerical allies aligned themselves with the more affluent groups. The growing tension in the city and its surroundings can thus to an extent be attributed to the efforts of the merchant-landowners to take fuller control of the economic market by exploiting sectarian loyalties. (167)

By mid nineteenth century the Babis were brutally suppressed by the Shi'a clerics with the help of central authorities. This was also the fate of other heterodox tendencies. Amanat maintains that "...during the early 1800s,...the growing power of the Usulis gradually eliminated most of the nonconformist elements and weakened the rival influences of the Sufis in Iran." (168) Elimination of the Babis was the culmination of more than a century of continued
struggle between *fugaha* who believed that the existence of a mujtahid is a necessity for the relation between man and God, and Sufis, who maintained that man can independently and without an intermediator have a connection with the supreme being. Amanat believes that despite systematic persecution of heterodox ideas by the ulama, in mid-nineteenth century, "Persian society was far less monolithic, less religiously homogenous, than often acknowledged. The network of heterodoxies—whether those that reemerged in post-Safavid era in the Sufi guise or those that survived in their original form—was still not conquered by the Twelver shi'ism of the Usuli ulama..."(169)

The struggle between different schools of thought in Iran was essentially the battle between people, who wished to have some degree of autonomy in interpreting issues in their lives and the religious authorities, who wanted to keep the right of interpretation for mujtahids. It was because of this reason that in the conflict between Usulis and Akhbaris, Usulis by claiming that only elite mujtahids were qualified to interpret religious issues lacked the "populist appeal" of the Akhbaris, who gave "lay believers" the right to make their own decisions.(170)

Despite the continuation of heterodox ideas and people's resistance against the orthodox shi'ism, the ulama gradually established their autonomy in post-Safavid Iran "as an orthodox institution less reliant on the patronage of the
state..."(171) By claiming to be the deputies of the imam, they legitimized their authority and by applying the Usuli Jurisprudence "broadened their judicial constituency and paved the way for a wider participation of the ulama in socio-political affairs."(172)

Shia jurists (fuqaha), who were mostly on the side of the rich and the feudal landlords, relied on fiqh (the codified Islamic law), and Aristotelian reasoning. As in other Islamic countries, there were, however, some jurists who were on the side of the poor and who used hadith (traditions of the Prophet and the Imams) to interpret the Islamic laws. Hadith in addition to the customary law was the base of people's power in decision-making. Customary law, the custom of the people of the village and tribal people, such as laws for grazing, which the Islamic law does not deal with, emphasized people's tradition, and hadith, the word of people, accentuated people's power in controlling their own world. Fiqh, on the other hand, was written by fuqaha in the in Madrasa. The fuqaha learned hadith according to fiqh so it would not oppose the orthodox law which was on the side of the rich.

Before the 19th century, given the populist character of Safavid society, the interpretation of Islamic law was done mostly through hadith'. It revealed a certain flexibility and freedom for the common people even giving them some power in interpretation. During the 19th century, with the rising power of the ulama, fiqh began to flourish and therefore the right
of interpretation was placed in the hands of a few faqih thus depriving the majority people from having a share. In fact one could interpret the rise in the number of Mujtahids in Iran as being in part due to efforts in centralizing the power of few authorities in relation to the population at large. The number of Mujtahids rose from only five throughout Iran at the turn of the century to one hundred all over Iran at the close of the century, five in Tabriz alone, attesting to the increased power of the Shiite clerical body. (173)

In the middle of the 19th century Amir Kabir gave precedence to the decision of a Shar' court in Tehran in regards to all Shar' courts throughout Iran. (174) By choosing as its president a well known faqih Shaykh Burujirdi, Amir Kabir endorsed the precedence of fiqh interpretation over hadith analysis and the power of fuqaha over that of the people's community. This of course can not be separated from the state's overall aim of controlling population. People nevertheless preferred Shar' courts over the Urf courts throughout the Qajar era. Their repugnance is reflected in the nick-naming of the adliyya (court of justice) the zulmiyya (court of injustice). (175) Since "[c]odification involves a notorious rigidity...[and] a lessening of ambiguity..." (176) the emergence of the Shar' court condemned people to rigid decisions of the court and it deprived them of the fluidity that resulted from the unexplained aspects of the law, commonly understood through hadith.
Increased power of the Shia clerics in judicial affairs was only one aspect of their overall dominance in social affairs. They also exerted authority in educational and executive functions. The increased power of the Shia clerics in the social affairs of the 19th century gradually diminished the diversity of ideas which the state would tolerate.

By comparing the religious milieu of the Safavid to that of the Qajar era, a remarkable change becomes apparent. The existence of various religious tendencies during the Safavid era was not only conducive to the growth of philosophers, such as Mulla Sadra and Mir Damad, but also to more tolerance towards the heretical tendencies, a phenomena that becomes less evident in the Qajar period when the Shi'i clerical body claimed to hold "the" truth.

In spite of the dominance of the Ulama, the anti-orthodox tradition of the philosophers did not disappear and in fact it re-emerged in the Constitutional Revolution. Historians whose writings reflect the modernization theory claim that the secular intellectuals of the Constitutional Revolution, such as Mirza Aga Khan Kermani, Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani, Abdul-Rahim Talebzadeh, and Mirza Fattali Akhundzadeh were projecting Western ideas. Such claims negate the existence of the intellectual heritage in Iran and of a long history of opposition towards the monolithic theocratic thinking of the Ulama. Those historians, however, familiar with the
antiorthodox sentiments in Iranian history, see in the ideas of these intellectuals "the tradition of Shi'i mystico philosophical thought,"(178) and the continuation of "urafa's tradition of opposition to the fugaha."(179)

An important aspect of Sufism and of the mystical tradition was the attraction of less privileged classes and strata of the society, such as peasants, tribal people, artisans and women towards them. Amanat believes that "[b]y the nineteenth century Ahl-i Hagg had become largely a peasant religion with a syncretic belief system that survived openly in Kurdish, Persianized Kurdish, and Azari communities of western and northwestern Iran,"(180) and that "Ahl-i Hagg's influence in western Iran, and to a less extent the Nagshbandis' influence on the eastern borders, kept the spirit of messianism alive in the rural and peripheral communities."(181) Amanat maintains that the inclination of peasant communities towards such ideas was due to the fact that "these millenarians" tended "to express a voice of protest and public discontent against secular authority."(182)

Women, like other marginalized people were prone to Sufism and esoteric knowledge. During the reign of the Safavids and afterwards, heterodox tendencies, in which intuition played a major role, created a space for women through which they could affirm their spiritual authority and extend it to their daily lives. Sufism, which did not require a mediator for establishing connection with the god, freed
women from the intervention of religious authorities in their connection with divinity. It also created a leeway for women in interpreting their intuitive and mystical experiences. This was the case for Qurrat al-'Ayn the leader of the Babi movement. According to Amanat "[a]ll the way back to Rabi'a al-Adawiya, the ninth-century Basran to whom Qurrat al-'Ayn probably looked for a role model, the heterodox movements were often a breeding ground for women of vision and talent. (183)

Another area through which women could express their views and inclinations, was hadith, which was considered an important pillar of the religion during the reign of the Safavids. Women's interpretation of hadith was done in such a way that their own interest would be taken into account. With the rise of the state and along with it increased power of the ulama, and the growth of jurisprudence during the Qajar dynasty, however, women lost the freedom they held in analyzing issues relevant to them. This was also the case with the dominance of the consensus (Ijma'), before the 19th century, and with the prevalence of legal judgment (Ijtihad), restricted to mujtahids, throughout 19th century. Ijma', which entailed the participation of people in decision-making encompassed the ideas and opinions of women, while Ijtihad as it came to be later understood, was confined to what the mujtahids deemed necessary for men and women to follow.

In addition to the growth of capitalism, the rise of global market economy, and the dominance of Shia clerics in
the ideological arena, other developments such as nationalism, along with the growth of bureaucratic and military structures were instrumental in changing women's lives in 19th century Iran. These changes in sum widened the gap between public and private and diminished the value of women's non-remunerated work. The process through which women were marginalized in Iran was thus similar to the experience of women in other societies.(184)

In Iran as elsewhere both capitalism and nationalism contributed to the wealth and legitimacy of the state, while remaining antagonistic to women's interests since they both worked to deepen the public-private split. In fact "the legitimacy of the state and its institutions relied on the distinction between public and private."(185) Nationalist ideology generated demands for a strong state, and was itself a product of state development. Nationalism legitimated the expansion of state policy into areas formerly regarded as private. So "state authority and nationalist legitimacy increased public demands on presumably private women," while depriving them of their previous rights.(186)

Bureaucratic development was intrinsic to the development of modern state and like nationalism and capitalism has negative consequences for women. Bureaucratization which lies at the heart of specialization reinforces "the distinction between the institutions, norms, language and rhythms of public and private life."(187) Through the process of
specialization "a world far from the traditional reality of the household" is created that was alien to women(188). Bureaucratic values, such as role specialization, "discipline, linear thought, preoccupation with technique, hierarchy,... and [their] linguistic justification"(189) which were foreign to women, contributed to the distinction between public and private, making the realm of work and family more distinct.

Like bureaucracy, militarism affected women negatively. State bureaucracies, both military and civilian were developed as a result of wars. Because of the army as a new mechanism of state policy new taxation was justified. Even though war existed before, "now the war system was integral to the nation state system."(190) The connection between "politics and military virtue or manhood" strengthened public-private split and delegitimized women's claims in the public sphere. Ironically militarization thus increasingly intruded "on the realm of family and household."(191)

Through state policies a public sphere was forged that was above "the lineage, clan and/or ethnic identity"(192)and was made a male sphere. Many of the activities that were formerly a family matter, came to be a public matter controlled by men; among these were marriage and divorce and control over surplus accumulation.(193) The process by which a public-private line was drawn by the state "gradually affected educational institutions, law and policy thus making its way into people's consciousness."(194) While a public-
private split had roots in the traditional society, the new Qajar state reinforced those distinctions and even created new ones. For example state policies changed the locus of education from home to schools where men became the primary teachers; hospitals run by men gradually replaced folk medicine which was administered by women. During 19th century, the legal system was also transformed and was made part of the public sphere. The state gradually defined and controlled the law, and since struggles were often mediated through law, state leverage was enhanced through this control. While previously conflicts were resolved through "negotiation, ordeal and/or compensation," they were now settled through "contrasting, precedent seeking and punitive measures."(196) Through this process women lost their power because whereas before women participated in the communal decision making, they were no longer part of it.

As boundaries between public and private sphere severed, the state increasingly vested men with control over female labor and sexuality. Even though patriarchy existed before, with these new developments, the state eliminated "options available to women to moderate or escape specific controls by men."(197) The state attempted to streamline the society into an "accumulation-oriented, bridewealth system"(198) because it facilitated commercialization and state stability. In this system, men held the upper hand and women came to be under their implicit control. Through such state policies, ownership
came to be increasingly a male right since properties were put in men's name. (199) In this process, women lost their previous sources of independence, such as property rights in favor of their male kin. With the growth of private property the kin-based control over resources was destroyed and "relatively autonomous women" (200) came to be dependent upon men. State policies penetrated the traditionally private spheres while state ideologies maintained private-public dichotomy, which justified the myth of women as private beings with little or no public importance. (201) The public-private distinction considered women's reproductive activities and family outside the politics while they were essential parts of it. (202) Not only women provided the state with cheap labor and soldiers, their unpaid housework allowed capital accumulation that was necessary for the development of capitalism.

Capitalism like nationalism was antagonistic to women's interests. The development of capitalism is materialized through surplus accumulation that is generated by women's subsistence production and unpaid housework, in addition to the work of other marginalized people, such as peasants, tribespeople and artisans. The nuclear household which is the dominant form of organizing domestic life, is differentiated by gender, age and kinship, crucial to the development of capitalism. Women's subsistence production reduces the need for goods from the market, prevents wages from rising too rapidly and therefore allows capital to accumulate at a fast
rate. (203) With the growth of the new capitalist economic system and with the "commodification of human labor, unpaid household work lost the recognition it had in precapitalist society" (204) and along with it women lost their former status.

In the course of the 19th century as cash crop production became the dominant form of production, men came to be increasingly involved in cash cropping, whereas women continued subsistence production. Men were also appointed in "large-scale social labor, such as corvee public works, conscription or collective labor." (205) In addition, domestic and foreign capital created new opportunities available only to men and deprived women of access to them. Policies which pressured men to enter wage economy, through taxation gradually pushed women out of the public work place and confined them to the house. By theoretically releasing women from the responsibility of paying taxes, the state increased the financial dependence of women on men. Even though men were forced to pay taxes, they complied with the state because in return the state granted them power over women. (206)

The cash crop economy increased the value of wage labor, which was predominantly performed by men; unpaid domestic labor carried out by women lost its previous value. The emphasis that cash crop economy placed on men at times reversed husband-wife control over the production process. (207) The important issue, however, was not so much the separation of the public and private (domestic) work, but their
ideological separation in the realm of thought and expression and the process which legitimated this separation. With economic and ideological transformation greater value was placed on "the production of things" than "the production of life." (208)

With the sweeping changes in the economy of Iran in 19th century, women experienced the loss of their economic independence and of the valued position they held in the pre-capitalist society of Iran. Before the dominance of cash crop economy in 19th century, and during the reign of the Safavids, Iranian women had a substantial role in the self-sufficient economy of Iran. Women were involved in the production of food and manufactured goods and were economically independent. Peasant women were active in the production of raw and finished silk, textiles and carpets. They also worked in the fields and produced cotton, tobacco and foodstuff, which were used internally and as export items. Tribal women were also engaged in animal husbandry and in the production of carpets and kelims, and artisan women worked as spinners, weavers, dyers, carders and bleachers. When Kermani goat's hair (kurk), and Kermani wool was added to the export items, women became involved in preparing it for export.

In the first half of the 19th century, during which Iran remained self-sufficient economically and industrially, women continued to be active in the fields in the production of wheat, barley and other cereals for domestic use as well as
for export. Women were also involved in the production of 
silk, which was the most important item up until 1864, when 
opium replaced it as an export item, as well as in the 
production of cotton, rice and dried fruits. Towards the end 
of the 19th century rice cultivation replaced silk production 
in northern Iran. Production of rice was mainly done by women 
who had been formerly engaged in silk production. Seyf 
believes that "to a large extent the labor force in the rice 
fields were those who were engaged in silk production in the 
period pre-1865."(209)

By the first decade of the 19th century, commercial 
farming had replaced subsistence production, but it was not 
until the collapse of the silk production in the 1860s, and 
the rise of the opium cultivation that commercial relations 
became widely spread, and peasants were transformed into wage 
laborers. As a result of these economic changes after 1850, 
through which Iran was deprived of both its agricultural and 
industrial self-sufficiency and became dependent on European 
countries, women lost their economic independence. The rise of 
the modern capitalist nation state was, therefore, responsible 
in bringing about these changes. The high volume of British 
imports to Iran not only ruined Persian manufacturing but "the 
gradual decline of native handicrafts reduced demand for 
cotton and thus affected its production."(210) The reduction 
in the production of raw cotton was also due to the increase 
in opium cultivation.(211) It has been suggested that "the
'poorer classes' and the average woman in Tabriz or even in Isfahan could purchase European made clothing more cheaply than Iranian-made products."(212)

The rise of the cash crop economy and the growth of wage labor affected women's position. Wage labor which was predominantly performed by men, pushed women out of the fields and confined them to the houses. Government taxation which was based on the male household, placed the responsibility on men and made women dependent on them. Changes in the economy facilitated this transformation. Nowshirvani maintains that "the expansion of commercial activity enhanced the taxing power of the government since the decline in regional self-sufficiency allowed the government to extract taxes at points of exchange."(213) Women, no longer were capable of growing even their own food became dependent on men and their wages for purchasing food items and for other necessary articles.

Besides the rise of the cash crop economy, other factors were responsible for the growth of centralization of the state and for the marginalization of women. Part of the loss of women's autonomy was due to the fact that the old village organization was broken down in the course of the twentieth century.(214) According to Lambton "the original village settlements were communal, but landlords had come to be superimposed on them from very early times."(215) The growth of large landownership during the Safavids and especially the Qajars, made the peasants dependent on the landlords, and
women dependent on men. During the reign of the Qajars, therefore, rigidification of class structure made gender hierarchy even more accentuated.

In the tribal settings, even though egalitarian kin-based relationships had been gradually eroded before the Safavids, remnants of it was still in effect during their reign. Throughout the reign of the Qajars, however, with the rising power of the state, and its effort at incorporating tribal people into an "overarching taxation structure"; class structure within the tribes rigidified to make the extraction of surplus for the non-producing classes easier.(216) Among the items produced in the villages and tribes over the centuries were carpets and kelimes, which were made by women and children. The profits from the sale of these carpets now was taken by the chiefs and urban merchants and hardly changed the economic status of those making the carpets. In the late 19th century, when the Persian carpet became an important export item, with European and American firms dominating the market, the "putting-out system on a contract basis was extended from the countryside to urban sites."(217) Later on, large workshops assembled workers in one place.(218) Such establishments were in effect an "alien form of organization introduced by foreign firms,"(219) being unlike "the customary household-based or medium-sized units, financially under the control of the big merchants."(220) Despite the fact that carpet export grew during this period, the situation of women
worsened since they were even deprived of their home setting environment. To repeat, the profits from the sale of the carpets during this period remained in the hands of native and foreign capitalists and women never reaped the benefit of their work.

As it was demonstrated in the previous chapter, trade by its very nature, requires the existence of the relations of production which allows the extraction of surplus by a class of non producers possible. By the time of the Safavids, this elite class was already in power, and the Persian trade in luxury items, such as silk and precious stones, was well developed. Trade in silk continued during the first half of the Qajar period and opium and carpets replaced it in the second half of their reign. In both eras, non producing classes, such as tribal chiefs and mediators benefitted from the work of women in producing these items, but as the state became more centralized and classes became more rigidified, during the Qajar period, the process and work conditions through which the production of these luxury items took place, became increasingly harsh.

Capital accumulation, during this period, not only materialized through the replacement of subsistence crops with commercial crops but also through "the ongoing process of use value production"(221)the producers of which were women. The unpaid work of women within the household, both in the urban and rural settings formed, in part, the basis of primitive
accumulation. In addition, commercial farming which entailed the alienation of land and of its private appropriation, changed the social relations of production and it gendered the division of labor due to women's lower participation in the fields.

The development of a huge bureaucracy during the reign of the Qajars, separated women and men's world, and justified their separation as well. The bureaucratic world which was alien to the women's world of the household accentuated the difference between the home and the society at large. In addition, the four wars during this period separated women and men's world even more. Despite the fact that women in many occasions were at the forefront of bread riots, militarism gave birth to the "claim of female inferiority and vulnerability and consequently, women's need for male protection." (223)

From the reign of the Safavids to the Qajars, Iranian society underwent a profound change. Economic, social, political, cultural and ideological developments transformed the somewhat independent artisans, and the communal peasantry and tribespeople into subordinate wage laborers, who were dependent on large landowners, tribal chiefs and wealthy merchants and capitalists for their livelihood. Rigidification of class structure, in this inter period, necessitated as well an unprecedented growth of government agents, who had to facilitate the extraction of surplus production. Part of the
function of these agents was also control of peoples' morality. In this, they were similar to the religious authorities, the faqihs, who come to control the actions of the people in this period through prescribing rules and regulations for their moral conduct. As class structure became more accentuated during the reign of the Qajars, gender hierarchy was intensified and women lost the status they held during the reign of the Safavids. The replacement of subsistence crops with cash crops, and the growth of wage labor drove women out of the fields and made them dependent on men's wages. In addition, the dominance of jurisprudence, in this period, reduced women's role in religious interpretation and made them vulnerable to the analysis of male faqihs. The development of militarism, bureaucracy and nationalism, moreover, created a world alien to traditional world of the household and widened the gap between public and the private life. Despite the fact that women's public life was diminished during this period, their unpaid domestic work produced capital accumulation and provided laborers and soldiers for the state, which remained alien to their interests. Women's unremunerated work, however created, the belief in their nonproductivity, and gradually they came to be viewed as feeble creatures who needed to be controlled. Transformations in the economic and ideological arenas affected the relationship of women and men, and this was materialized not
only in the visible areas of their lives but also in the most intimate aspects of their existence.

The debate about whether pre-capitalist Iran was feudal or not is an extensive one. I have chosen a different approach suggested by John Foran. He believes that pre-capitalist Iran can not be characterized as feudal due to "the obvious importance of both the tribal sector and urban craft production, while even in the agrarian sector of the economy one finds few characteristics of feudalism..." Foran, *Fragile Resistance*..., p. 40.

2. Ibid., P. 42.

3. John Foran uses "peasant crop-sharing" as an alternative for feudalism in the agrarian section of the economy. *Fragile Resistance*..., p. 42.

4. Ibid.


7. Ibid., p. 95.


10. In making the distinction between the periphery of a world economy and its external arena, Foran writes: "The periphery of a world-economy is that geographical sector of it wherein production is primarily of lower-ranking goods (that is, goods whose labor is less well rewarded) but which is an integral part of the overall system of the division of labor, because the commodities involved are essential for daily use. The external arena of a world economy consists of those other world-systems with which a given world-economy has some kind of trade relationship, based primarily on the exchange of
preciosities, what was sometimes called the 'rich trade'."
As it was demonstrated in the previous chapter, world
system theory does not take into consideration the centrality
of women's labor in the world system and the process of their
marginalization.

11. Ibid., p. 93.
12. Ibid., p. 94.
13. Ibid., p. 92.
15. John Foran, "The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving
Beyond the Standard Views," International Journal of Middle
16. John Foran, "The Concept of Dependent Development as a Key
to the Political Economy of Qajar Iran(1800-1925)," Iranian
17. Amin Banani, "Reflections on the Social and Economic
Structure of Safavid Persia at Its Zenith," Iranian Studies
20. Ibid., p. 195.
21. Foran maintains: "These tribal entities were composed of
groups of various sizes, with a number of families making up
a clan, a number of clans forming a tribe, and in some cases
at the top of the system a number of tribes joining into a
tribal confederation. In Safavid times this largest unit was
most commonly referred to as an uymag - a fluid grouping of
tribal military supporters, each ranked with respect to its
relative prestige and influence within the Safavid state." Foran, Fragile Resistance..., p. 25.
23. Ibid.
24. Viana Muller describes a similar situation in regards to
Anglo-Saxon tribes. She maintains that with the amalgamation
of small kingdoms, king's power was no longer in being the
representative of a particular tribe but rested in his
capacity, as a patron, to reward his clients with power and wealth. These clients, were mainly chosen from "the kings own lineage, ex-slaves, and 'strangers in blood' whose loyalties were not split between the king and their own kin groups," and were rewarded with the land and the labor of the peasants. Viana Muller, "The Formation of the State and the Oppression of Women: Some Theoretical Consideration and A Case Study in England and Wales," The Review of Radical Political Economies 9, 3 (Fall 1977):15-16.


31. In discussing Swat political organization Talal Asad argues against Fredrick Barth's description of the relationships between the landlords and the tribesmen. Barth maintains that these relations are defined by "contractual agreements" in which the individuals "driven by the individual motive to maximize" come into contact with each other. Asad, however, believes that individual's "opportunities and disabilities are structured by his class position." Asad's argument is valid for the relations within the tribes in Safavid and Qajar era. Talal Asad, "Market Models, Class Structures and Consent: A Reconsideration of Swat Political Organization," Man 7 (March 1972):90.


33. Ibid., p. 94.

34. Ibid.


37. This section is based on Foran, Fragile Resistance..., pp. 135-142.


39. Ibid., p. 9.

40. Ibid., p. 10.

41. Ibid., p. 11.

42. Ibid., p. 18.

43. Ibid., p. 22.

44. Foran, Fragile Resistance..., p. 734.


53. Ibid., p. 237.

54. Ibid., p. 235.

55. Ibid., p. 236.

56. Ibid., p. 240.

57. Ibid., p. 242.


59. Ibid.

60. Seyf, "Commercialization..." p. 239.

61. Foran, "The Concept...," p. 28.


64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.


68. Nowshirvani, citing Nikki Keddie, p. 552.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., p. 570.


72. Ibid., pp. 177-178.

73. Ibid., p. 179.

74. Ibid., p. 188.

75. Ibid., pp. 180-181.
76. Ibid., p. 182.
77. Ibid., p. 188.
78. Ibid., p. 183.
80. Foran, "The Concept...," p. 28.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid., p. 29.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid., Foran, citing Michel Pavlovitch.
85. Ibid.
87. Talal Asad suggests that there is a necessary connection between the concentration of landed power and the consolidation of the state. Talal Asad, "Market Models...," p. 90.
91. Ibid., p. 144.
92. Talal Asad distinguishes between "Economic exploitation" and "political incorporation." He maintain: "It is clear that states and empires can exploit autonomous population without having to incorporate them politically." Talal Asad, "Equality in Nomadic Social System?" *Critique of Anthropology* 3 (Spring 1978): 61.


98. Ibid.


100. Nowshirvani, p. 563.


102. Asad, "The Bedouin...", p. 70.


106. Lambton, Islamic Society..., p. 17 and p. 27.

107. The ayyar movement, futuwwa orders and dervish orders had connections to the craft guilds even before 19th century. "The ayyar and fata(Javanmard) were on the side of the poor and fought the extremities of the rich." Lambton, Ibid., p. 17.


110. Ibid., p. 145.

111. Ibid., p. 156.

113. Ibid.

114. Abdallah Mustwfi, Tarikh-i Idari va Iitimai-yi Dawra-yi Qajariyya va Sharh-i Zindigani-yi Man (The Bureaucratic and Social History of The Qajars or the Description of My Life), cited by Floor, Ibid., p. 117.

115. Floor, "Change and Development...," p. 122.

116. Ibid.


118. That is why kalantar has been described as "police magistrate", or chief police by European sources. Floor, Ibid., p. 258.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid., p. 259.

121. Ibid., p. 267.

122. Lambton, Islamic Society, p. 12.

123. Floor, "The Office of Kalantar...," p. 255.

124. Ibid., p. 260.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.


128. Ibid., pp. 216-218.


131. Ibid., p. 217.

133. Ibid., p. 297.

134. Scott Waring, *A Tour to Sheeraz by the Route of Kazeroon and Feerozabad etc.*, cited by Floor, "The Police..." p. 311.

135. Peter Gran describes this process in Russian history, and applies what he calls "the Russian Road" to Iraqi history, as an example of a Middle Eastern country. His analysis is applicable to the case of Iran. Peter Gran, *Beyond Eurocentrism, a New View of Modern History* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996).


137. Ibid., pp. 117-119.


139. Ibid., p. 90.

140. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

141. Ibid., pp. 107-108.

142. Ibid., p. 111.


150. Ibid., p. 36.

151. Ibid., p. 34.


153. Ibid., p. 280.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid., p. 279.


157. Ibid., p. 29.


159. Ibid., p. 103.


162. Ibid., p. 370.

163. Ibid., p. 83.

164. Ibid., pp. 83-84.


167. Ibid., p. 183.

168. Ibid., p. 64.

169. Ibid., p. 371.


172. Ibid., p. 103.
173. Floor, "Change and Development...," p. 113.

174. Ibid., p. 119.

175. Ibid., p. 132.


177. Amanat, Resurrection and Renewal..., p. 33.


179. Ibid., p. 49.


181. Ibid., p. 89.

182. Ibid., p. 104.

183. Ibid., p. 331.

184. The following section on the state, capitalism, nationalism, bureaucracy and militarism is based on different articles in Women, The State, and Development, ed. Sue Ellen M. Charlton, Jana Everett and Kathleen Staudt (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), which are applicable to 19th century Iran.


186. Ibid., p. 28.

187. Ibid., p. 30.

188. Ibid., p. 31.

189. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

190. Ibid., p. 32.

191. Ibid., p. 33.


193. Ibid.
194. Ibid., p. 84.

195. Sue Ellen Charlton, Jana Everett, and Kathleen Staudt, "Women, the State and Development," in Women, the State..., p. 17.

196. Staudt, "The State and Gender...," p. 79.

197. Charlton, Everett, Staudt, "Women, the State...," p. 17.

198. Staudt, "The State and Gender...," p. 68.

199. Ibid., p. 80.


201. Charlton, "Female Welfare...," p. 21.


204. Charlton, "Female Welfare...," p. 27.

205. Staudt, "The State and Gender...," p. 67.


207. Staudt, "The State and Gender...," p. 214, note no. 34.

208. Marshal, Engendering Modernity..., p. 50.


211. Ibid.


218. Ibid., p. 126.


220. Ibid.


223. Bourque, "Gender and the State...," p. 118.
CHAPTER 4

STATE IMPACT ON WOMEN'S
"PRIVATE" LIVES DURING
THE SAFAVID AND THE QAJAR ERAS

The existence of different social formations during the Safavids (1500-1722), and the Qajars (1785-1925), left its imprint on the construction of power, gender and sexuality in these eras. The simultaneous changes in the economic, social, political and cultural/ideological arenas were concomitant with the transformation of gender and power. The altered dynamics of power, between all members of the society in general, and women and men in particular, in turn, created change in the domain of sexuality. The prevalence of laxity in the sexual arena in pre-capitalist era, and its restraint during the capitalist era was therefore the outcome of the varied natures of life in these two periods.

In comparing two different eras in the history of European societies, and specifically the nature of sexuality in these two periods, Michel Foucault comes to believe that change in sexuality, was tied to the issue of power. (1) Foucault maintains that the relaxed codes for "regulating the coarse, the obscene, and the indecent...and the direct gestures, shameless discourse and open transgression" (2) in 17th century, had to do with the less intensive nature of
work, while the sexual repression, exercised through confining sexuality to home, and making silence the rule, was related to the intense nature of work in the 19th century and under capitalism. He writes: "...if sex is so rigorously repressed, this is because it is incompatible with a general and intensive work imperative. At a time when labor capacity was being systematically exploited, how could this capacity be allowed to dissipate itself in pleasurable pursuits, except in those-reduced to a minimum-that enabled it to reproduce itself?"(3)

The "imposed silence", and "muteness" about sexuality, a product of "modern prudishness", according to Foucault, was reflected in the language, and was used as a means of power. (4) The "policing of sex", prohibited talking about it.(5) Ironically, however, this was at a time when "agencies of power" encouraged people to talk more about sex through institutions such as confession. "The multiplication of discourses concerning sex", Foucault believes, had to do with the exercise of power.(6)

Foucault questions whether the benefit of this "genitally centered sexuality" is not "motivated by one basic concern: to ensure population, to reproduce labor capacity, to perpetuate the form of social relations: in short, to constitute a sexuality that is economically useful and politically conservative?"(7) Positing this question comes in relation to Foucault's observation about the multiplication and
strengthening of laws in relation to matrimony. By placing an emphasis on "the division between licit and illicit", he asserts, conjugal relations came to be considered the norm, while other sexual activities were viewed as abnormal. (8)

The impact of the binary opposition of "licit and illicit", (9) the ordering of sex through the law, and the establishment of rules in regard to the language, Foucault believes, were conducive to the exercise of power. Foucault, however, does not see power limited to "institutions and mechanisms" (10) but believes that it gets dispersed through different forms and channels among individuals. He writes: "Power is everywhere: not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere." (11) And he believes that "[i]t is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of power." (12)

Foucault's observations about laxity in the sexual domain in pre-capitalist era, and its restraint during the capitalist era, is applicable to the case of Iran. In Iran, during the reign of the Safavids, people in general, and women in particular enjoyed the existence of an atmosphere that allowed expression of sexual desires. Such a milieu contributed, or perhaps was the result of the existence of a language that made such expressions possible. Pleasure experienced in this area was "holistic", i.e., not confined to "the body." In writing about non-European countries in general, and Arabo-Muslim societies Foucault writes:
In the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a practice and accumulated as experience; pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute law of the permitted and the forbidden, nor by reference to a criterion of utility, but first and foremost in relation to itself; it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated in terms of its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the soul. (13)

In reviewing the literature of the Safavid era one is confronted with the prowess of women in seeking pleasure, and not paying much attention to repercussions. In folkloric stories which seem to belong to the pre-Safavid and Safavid era, one is reminded of the stories in the DeCameron by Giovanni Boccaccio. (14) In these stories, like those in the Decameron, women take lovers freely and advise each other to do so. The lover in many of these stories is called "happiness", and this shows the outlook of women on such matters.

In one of these stories a woman invites her lover to spend the night with her and covers him in a veil to hide his identity. When her husband comes home she tells him that her sister has come to visit and the husband encourages her to spend the night with her. In the morning after the husband leaves, the lover also sets out to leave when he is confronted, face to face, with the husband, who having forgotten something has come back. In an instant the woman brings the Quran and tells the husband that she has tried to convince her now visiting brother-in-law that her sister had spent the night there but he does not believe her. The husband
then assures the man and swears on the Quran that the claim is true. (15)

In another story, a man tells his wife that he has been longing for a goose soup (ash-i ghaz), and asks the wife to cook it. The wife tells him that it is no problem and that if he would buy the goose she will cook it for him. The man then buys the goose. Upon hearing this, the woman's lover, her "happiness", tells her that he wants her to eat the goose soup with him instead of the husband. The woman tells the lover that it will be easy and invites him for lunch the next day. That night, the husband comes home, looking forward to the goose soup only to be informed that "a cat" has stolen the goose. Next day while eating the goose soup with her, the lover tells the woman that if she could manage another trick for the second goose, he will know that she is truly a competent woman. The husband buys another goose. When he comes home to dinner this time, he finds out that the woman has only prepared goose's viscera for him. Upon questioning the wife, she tells him that while she had been cleaning the goose in the piscina (howz), "a vulture" had descended from the sky and had grabbed the goose. The next day the woman invites the lover and eats the goose soup with him. For the third time the husband buys a goose. This time the woman tells the husband that since he had not cut the goose's head, the goose had flown away. In the next two consequent days the husband again buys two more geese, but every time when he asks for the goose
she tells him that he has been dreaming, and that he has not brought any goose to the house. On the sixth day, the man buys a goose and this time hires a bunch of musicians, so that everybody in the community would know that he has brought home a goose. The woman then advises the lover to go to the mosque and sit on the right hand side of the husband. That night when the husband comes home to eat the goose soup, the woman tells him that since it is Friday, he has to go to the mosque for prayer. She then tells him that it would be a charitable deed if he would bring home to dinner whoever is sitting on his right hand side. When the lover goes to the mosque he finds out that a stranger is sitting on the husband's right hand side. After the prayer is over, the husband asks the stranger to go to his house for dinner. The man declines several times but upon the husband's insistence they leave for the house. When they reach the house, and the woman finds out that a mistake has taken place, she tells the husband that there is not enough bread for the dinner and that he should go out to get some more. When the husband leaves, she starts oiling a pestle, constantly exclaiming "poor guest". The man hearing this, asks the reason for such an exclamation. The woman tells him that each Friday night her husband brings someone home and applies this oiled pestle to him. When the man hears this he runs out of the house. The husband who has come back with the bread is then confronted with the wife who tells him that the guest has stolen the pot of the goose soup. The man thinking
that the stranger had the goose soup starts running after him, with a piece of bread in his hand, shouting "Brother, for god's sake let me just insert the tip of it," by which he meant, the bread, and the stranger, thinking that he is referring to the pestle shouts back at him saying, "Go apply it somewhere else." In the meanwhile the woman calls the lover and they eat the goose soup together. (16)

In another story, two sisters are married to two brothers who have the same type of occupation. One of the sisters has everything, all kinds of clothes and shoes, and the other one does not. (Apparently the woman with clothes and shoes was capable of putting aside a portion of the money that her husband used to leave her for the provisions.) The woman who is without the material things ask her sister the reason for her lack of such possessions. (In a different version, one of the sisters has a lover and the other one does not, and the inquiry is about this.) The sister responds that the reason is that she is competent, and tells her that it is important for her to find out first if she is competent before she sets out to do anything behind her husband's back. She then tells her to prepare an ash(soup) and eat it without the husband knowing about it. The woman follows the advice, cooks the soup, eats it, washes the dishes and puts them away. In the evening when the husband comes home and is taking off his shoes, the woman's shoe is turned over by accident. Stuck on the sole of the shoe is a piece of noodle. Upon seeing this the man asks
his wife if she had cooked any soup for lunch. When the woman replies negatively, the husband asks if the sister had cooked some soup and had brought it for her. The wife answers negatively to this question as well. The man then asks if she had left the house and the woman again says no. Upon hearing these answers, the man starts to beat his wife. The sister who hears the commotion runs to their house and when she hears the story from the brother in law, ask her sister why she has been shy to tell the truth? And then she turns to her brother in law and tells him that she had not been feeling well and therefore had cooked herself a little soup, and had sent the sister a small bowl of it, and since she had eaten it without leaving any for the husband she felt ashamed. The husband then asks the wife why she had not told him this sooner. When the husband leaves the house, the woman tells her sister that she had failed the test and is not competent enough to do things without her husband's knowledge.(17)

In yet another story a mulla is preaching in the mosque and his sermon is about the treatment of women by men. He says to the men that womankind is weak and helpless and under the man's authority, and so men ought to treat them nicely. He adds that women too are obliged to obey men. The mulla then asks all those men who are dissatisfied with their wives to get up. Upon hearing this all the men in the mosque, except one, stood up. The mulla says, "I think this man is satisfied with his wife, and that is why he did not get up." The man
turns to the mulla and announces that the reason why he did not get up was not because he was satisfied with his wife but that his wife had broken his leg in a quarrel. (18)

One of the most important manuscripts of the Safavid era is "Kitabi Kulsum Naneh" (The book of Kulsum Naneh), also called "Aqaid-i Nisvan" (The Belief of Women), believed to be written by Aqa Jamal Khansari, a highly respected religious authority. The picture portrayed of women, shows them to be uninhibited, resourceful, courageous and gay, enjoying the existence of a rich network of their counterparts. These women did not heed faqih's rules and regulations, and instead relied on other women for acquiring advice in matters related to their lives. The treatise was translated by James Atkinson in 1832 under the title of Custom and Manners of the Women of Persia and Their Domestic Superstitions. (19) Inside Iran too, the manuscript has been viewed as a collection of superstitions of the people of the time and especially of women. A different reading of "Kitab-i Kulsum Naneh", however, suggests its importance for understanding women's lives in this period. (20)

In "Kitab-i Kulsum Naneh", Aqa Jamal has created imaginary women faqih who provide advice to women in all areas of life. By choosing funny names for these women, and by ridiculing the advice they give women, Aqa Jamal attacks the conduct of the women of his age. What comes to the fore from the pages of "Kitab-i Kulsum Naneh", is that the religious
authorities, such as Aqa Jamal, were enraged that the women did not pay attention to them. Writing this book was then a device of getting back at women, who inattentive to the religious rules prescribed by faqihns, did whatever they deemed necessary in seeking pleasure and enjoying themselves.

In the preface of the translated version of the book it is obvious that Atkinson himself is aware of the importance of books such as "Kitab-i Kulsum-Naneh". The preface itself is an important piece of work. It shows how Atkinson was capable of evaluating cultures in their own context without comparing them to European cultures as the only valuable model for human existence. He writes:

This is a specimen of Persian humour, a Jeu d'esprit, founded upon female customs and superstitions. It pretends to be a grave work, and is in fact a circle of domestic observances, treated with the solemnity of a code of laws, by five matron law-givers, assisted by two others. The original manuscript is called Kitabi Kulsum Naneh, Kulsum Naneh being the name of the principle lady-judge whose rules and maxims are therein recorded, especially on the household rights and privileges, les petites morales, as the French call them, of Persian women.

The oriental scholar who is devoted to the more abstruse labours of the Persian sages, may look with disdain upon production like this of a less formidable calibre upon efforts of a light and sportive kind, and think them unworthy of notice; but literature, as well as nature, has its various aspects, and the annals of mankind afford abundant instances, both of littleness and grandeur in the multifarious shades of character which are constantly presented to the view of the moralist and the philosopher. In public life everything is, or ought to be, of high and imposing gravity; in private life, particularly in household details, everything is generally of a contrary description. Indeed the domestic customs and superstitions of every country are for the most part absurd or
trivial, and in the East often extremely ridiculous; but regarding them as features of the moral condition of society, as the freaks and resources of human nature, and forming part of the history of the human mind, in its social and moral bearings, they can not be totally uninteresting. The customs here described, puerile as they may be thought, shew the actual state of Persian life behind the curtain; and therefore the book may be considered curious as an expose of manners and habits, which are accurately enough described, notwithstanding the amusing turn often given to the descriptions. It presents a view of domestic life, not as it ought to be, considering human conduct with reference to perfect order, but as it is, and consequently deserving of attention.

For this is not a history, which displays
A comprehensive view of man and things;
'Tis not a picture of the Raphael school,
Or grand creation of old Angelo,
But a familiar portrait, such as Denner
Was wont to paint, or Gerard Dow, each hair,
Spot, mole, and wrinkle, faithfully depicted,
With microscopic power.

It must be confessed, however, that little is understood in England of the real situation of women in the East, beyond the impression of their being everywhere absolute slaves of their tyrant-husbands, and cooped up in a harem, which to them can be nothing better, it is supposed, than a prison! Like some enthusiasts, who fancy England the only land of liberty and happiness, because other countries do not act and feel in the same way, we think the women in Persia or India oppressed and degraded, because they do not possess and exercise exactly the same rights and privileges as our own.

'Tis very kind in them to feel for others,
Ten thousand miles off— but 'tis all misplaced;
Sweet souls there are, who think mankind are brothers,
And woman, not at liberty, disgraced;
Hence they are full of sympathy; another's
Distress to share, is generous, not a waste
Of human feeling; and with this persuasion,
They pity on without discrimination.
We have seen what a native Persian says respecting the power and liberty of his country-women; and it is quite clear that, whilst European generally think them treated in the most barbarous and monstrous manner, with regard to their liberty and rank in society, the Persians themselves look upon their women as virtually invested with more power and liberty, and greater privileges, than the women of Europe. But every nation has self-complacency and vanity enough to plume itself on its own exclusive advantages, and, in the same spirit of self-approbation, there is hardly an individual who would change, in all respects of mind, body, and pursuit, with his equally self-approving neighbour. Everyone has something about him, some valuable propensity or quality, not to be compared with any other that could be offered in exchange. Thus it is, happily, with the Persian women. They admit of no comparison with the women of other country, who boast of their freedom, and their habits of mixing in society without constraint, and unveiled. Their defence in these matters is not only put forth by themselves, but even the men advocate their rights, and descant pretty largely on their prescriptive privileges. Among the most zealous in their cause is Mirza Abu Taleb Khan, who visited England many years ago, and, after a good deal of experience, imagined himself fully qualified to appreciate the merits of the question under consideration. He ranks under eight heads what his countrywomen enjoy more than European wives, both by law and custom...(22)

Under the sixth head Mirza ranks, 'the greater reliance placed by Asiatic husbands on their wives' virtue, both from law and custom.' For as to the European ladies, although they can go out of doors and discourse with strangers, yet sleeping out all night is absolutely denied them contrary to the way of the Asiatic ladies, who, when they go to the house of a lady of their acquaintance, though their husbands be entire strangers, are not attended by any person of the husband's or father's and they spend not only one or two nights in that house, but even a whole week; and in such a house, although the master is prohibited entering the apartments where they are, yet the young men of fifteen, belonging to the family or relations, under the name of children, have free access, and eat with and enter into the amusements of their guests.(23)

...
But, seriously, this little book contains some highly characteristic points of domestic arrangement in a Persian family, and has not only novelty to boast of, but it is mainly valuable on account of its coming from the fountain-head, and offering, as it does, another proof, added to thousands, that human nature is every-where the same, and only modified, when it is modified by external circumstances.(24)

Proem

Through whom came knowledge, and the powers of mind?
Through whom but Eve, the mother of mankind!
And, though her sons have shone from age to age,
Blazoning with glory history's ample page,
In arms, in wisdom, and in arts renowned,
Yet has superior skill her daughters crowned;
Still they, pre-eminent, their sway retain
O'er life's home-joys, and learning's rich domain.
Still they preserve with undiminished pride,
Their ruling influence, either sex to guide;
And hence, our own best interests to befriend,
On woman's nobler genius we depend.
Hence social maxims flow with better grace
From those endowed with charms of form and face;
From ruby lips, with pearls divinely set,
From eyes of languid softness, dark as jet;
And hence domestic precepts, rules, and laws,
Pronounced by beauty, must command applause.

Here Persia's matrons, skilled in worldly lore
Assert the power their mothers held of yore:
In council deep, grave matters they debate,
And household cares, and mysterious too, relate;
Proudly in solemn conclave they unfold
By what nice conduct husbands are controlled;
Tell of the spells which check connubial strife,
And all the vagaries of a woman's life.
These moral laws the sex's homage claim,
And shed renown on Kulsum Naneh's name.(25)

In the introduction of the Kitab-i Kulsum Naneh Atkinson
writes:

This learned treatise was not written for the use of the lords of creation, but for the instruction and edification of the female sex; should any woman, therefore, remain in doubts as to the true mode of proceeding in household matters,
she has only to refer to the grave expounders of those laws and observances, which are deemed so highly important and necessary among women who aspire to conduct themselves with propriety, prudence, and decorum. These expounders of the laws are five accomplished females, peculiarly qualified by study, and a complete knowledge of the pursuits and habits of the sex, to settle every point of difficulty or embarrassment that may occur in the course of domestic life. Their names are

Kulsum Naneh, the senior matron,
Shahr-Banu Dadeh,
Dadeh-Bazm Ara,
Baji Yasmin and
Khala Gul-bari.

And there are two other functionaries, named Khala Jan Agha and Bibi Jan Afroz, who deliver their opinions with equal confidence, and who support or question the judgment of the other five on points of great importance, which naturally require the most careful consideration.

It is proper to remark that there are four degrees of obligation specified in this work, viz. wajib, necessary, expedient; mustahab, desirable; sunnat, according to the law and traditions of Mohammed; and sunnat mu'akkad, imperative or absolutely necessary. (26)

The names that Aqa Jamal chooses for the imaginary women faqih's have racist and elitist connotations. At the time of the Safavids there were slaves in Iran and they were used as home servants. A black man, who cared for children outside the house was called "Laleh", and a black woman, who did the same thing inside the house was called "Dadeh". Calling woman faqih "Dadeh", therefore, has connotations for their low status in society. The use of the word Baji, which means sister in Turkish, and also Naneh, meaning mother or nanny, and Khaleh, meaning aunt or aunty, and Bibi, meaning woman, is a way of attacking the bond of sisterhood among women. The rules that
Aqa Jamal refers to in the name of imaginary women *faqīhs* cover all areas of life; rules concerning the bath, those concerning prayers and fast-days, those in relation to singing and instrumental music, those in relation to nuptial night, those related to pregnancy, and child birth, rules in regard to the conduct of the wife to her husband, mother-in-law, and to other relations, rules related to the charms, and the means of destroying the effects of witchcraft, rules related to guests and visitors, and the lucky periods of their coming and departure, rules in connection to male and female gossips and intimates, and other rules related to food, fruits and flowers.

In the opening page of the manuscript Aqa Jamal not only ridicules the imaginary women *faqīhs* for providing advice which are favorable to the "softer sex", but also women's Sufi attitude towards life, considering it to be ephemeral, and tending towards living in the moment.

It is highly essential to urge that the institutions and ordinances described and explained in the following pages, under the authority and sanction of matrons of deep learning, equally versed in the mystery of averting misfortune, and the means of making mankind subservient to the will of the softer sex, should be most strictly attended to and enforced in every respect. Human life and human affairs only hang by a thread, success or failure depends on the nicest movement, and, therefore, to avoid the approach and pressure of calamity, no ceremony or prescribed observance ought to be, under any circumstances, omitted:
For what is life? a breath, a vapour,
A bubble, a still wasting taper;
Now scarcely seen, now dull—now bright,
And now it sheds a quivering light,
Then quickly fades away in night.(27)

Aqa Jamal knows that all religious rulings of the faqihs
in regards to the veiling, and those prohibiting women from
speaking loud, are to no avail when it comes to women's desire
for displaying themselves in front of the young men. The
following is therefore what he thinks the imaginary women
faqihs would prescribe for their followers:

Among other customs known to be of great
efficacy and power is the following: On the last
Friday of the blessed month of Ramazan the women
ought to dress superbly and perfume themselves, and
put on their best ornaments, and go to the porticos
of the mosques, because young men of cypress forms
with tulip cheeks and amorous demeanour, assemble
there in greater number than at other places. There
they must sit down, and stretch out their feet, and
every one must light twelve tapers, and in doing
this care must be taken to lift the hand high above
the head, so as to raise up the veil, as if by
accident, and thus display their beautiful faces.
Their crimson-tinted toes must also be exposed, in
order that the young men may see and admire them
with wounded hearts. But it would be an unlucky
omen if one of the tapers was left unlighted. Bibi
Jan and the rest of the learned conclave are
unanimous in this opinion. Further, it is not at
all necessary that in lighting the tapers silence
should be observed: on the contrary, lovely women
should always let their sweet voices be heard;

For there is nothing in the world more pleasing,
Than hearing strains of melting melody
From lips that shame the ruby.(28)

Should a favorable opportunity occur for the
beautiful young girls to remain with the young men
for a short time, and especially if their
intercourse arises from mutual affection, there can
be nothing wrong in the indulgence of their
attachments. Indeed it is a fortunate circumstance,
and, upon the whole, more satisfactory and
gratifying to them than fasting the whole year. And whenever the young women visit their female friends on that blessed day, for the purpose of meeting their lovers, they may be permitted, without any violations of decorum, to remain till a late hour. For every female ought to be her own master on that occasion; and if her husband presumes to ask where she has been, and why returned so late, it is highly reprehensible on his part, for through the sacred influence of that blessed day she stands acquitted of all impropriety.

Dadeh Bazm Ara, Baji Yasmin, and Shahr-Banu Dadeh are of opinion that when a woman applies the end of a taper to the tips of the toes of her right foot, and at the time of lighting it displays the beautiful shape of her leg, she will undoubtedly be in no danger of hell-fire.(29)

Aqa Jamal implies that the mentor of the imaginary women faqih is the devil(Iblis).

... Dadeh-Bazm Ara says, I have proved, from the instructions of my master Iblis, that the man who does not allow his wife to visit holy places and mosques, and the houses of her friends, male and female, with whom interviews may have been concerted, and who prohibits other innocent and agreeable proceedings, such as we have deemed proper and expedient for her own satisfaction and comfort,-that man, I say, will be condemned hereafter to severe and merited punishment. And in such case it is wajib that the relations of the wife should carry the husband before the Kazi and claim a divorce, or deed of separation, to the end that the wife may be released from her misery, and be furnished with a separate maintenance...(30)

Aqa Jamal is aware of women's desire in mingling with young men, even when they have a husband, and times and again he goes back to the same subject.

...It is again urged that moon-faced beauties are entitled to go where young men assemble, and whatever husband prevents his wife so doing, will be sure to have the seven women his enemies at the day of resurrection.(31)
Women *faqih*, according to Aqa Jamal, also recommend women's love for each other. This apparently shows that homosexual relations existed between women of his era. In the chapter under the title "Of Rules Concerning the Bath" he writes:

> ...and respecting the application of the nura, it is improper for any young girl to use that depilatory. When women wish to use the nura, they must request a female friend to rub it on; it is quite wrong to apply it with your own hands. It is wajib for them to sit in a circle, and apply the nura to each other reciprocally, conversing good-humouredly all the while. This is generally a mirthful meeting, and all kinds of tattle-tattle considered perfectly wajib...(32)

After enjoying themselves in the bath, women, according to female *faqih*, can take pleasure in flirting with men.

> ...others say that when women come out of the bath they ought to dress in gay apparel, and if they have any engagement, they must first proceed to the house of their friend or lover. And if they meet a handsome young man on their way, they must cunningly remove a little of the veil which covers their face, and draw it off gradually, pretending "It is very hot, how I perspire; my heart is wounded:" and talk in this manner, and stand a little, till the youth smells the perfume of ottar, (sic) and he looks captivated, and sends a message describing the enchanted and bewildered state of his mind. Again, it is wrong in men, when they see a woman come out of the bath or any private retreat, to ask her where she has been...(33)

Of what Aqa Jamal writes about women's conduct in regards to the prayer and fasts it is obvious that women were not concerned about practicing these rules properly. According to Aqa Jamal female *faqih* prescribe the following rules in regards to prayers:
...When females are engaged with their friends in pleasant conversation, and in the mutual communication of secrets and this happens at the time of prayer, it is not required that they should cease their agreeable intercourse on that account; prayers may be dispensed with. Kulsum Naneh says that when resting from a promenade in the garden or other amusements, prayer may be indulged in without any evil ensuing. Kulsum Naneh asked Shahr Banu Dadah to explain why, on hearing the sound of the drum and other instruments, prayer should be thought improper? Shahr Banu replied, "Is it not well established in law, that when two commands are considered wajib the one least liked is dispensed with, every true woman being allowed to follow the one most suitable to her fancy, and most soothing to her heart? Therefore, hearing the lively sound of the drum, the delightful tones of musical instruments, and discussing secrets with your dear friends, need not be interrupted by a less congenial mode of employing your leisure. (34)...

Whilst a bride enjoys the pleasures of life, and the passing hour is marked by all that can delight and enchant her senses, it is not necessary that she should embarrass herself with fasts and prayers; these, under such circumstances, are superfluous things. But it is still wajib for the husband to be assiduous in prayer and thanksgivings for benefits received...Further, when a woman is in the bath, and is amusing herself with her friends in cheerful conversation, or when she is listening to the fond protestation of a lover, and has not leisure for more serious calls on her thoughts, prayer is not required; nor is it necessary, when women have guests, or are guests, nor when they go to see a bride, nor when a husband goes on a journey, or arrives from a journey. But should a woman, whilst engaged in prayer, happen to discover her husband speaking to a strange damsel, it is wajib for her to pause and listen attentively to what passes between them, and if necessary, to put an end to their conversation. (35)

It seems that women, on the occasions of fasting, did it for a woman saint. Aqa Jamal by ridiculing this practice, is actually criticizing women for not resorting to male saints. By describing women's action on the fast days, that is
flirting with the men, he furthermore views the whole practice without any merit.

The most remarkable fasts pronounced by the conclave wajib and sunnat, are those of Bibi Hur and Bibi Nur. On those days the women wear their best ornaments and go abroad, and consider it peculiarly gratifying to walk amidst young men with tulip cheeks and cypress forms, and they never fail to sit down wherever they are to be found.(36)... Another fast is that of Hizrat Bibi, whose radiant soul is now shining in heaven.(37)

On the chapter on singing and instrumental music Aqa Jamal provides a colorful picture of the women of his time. Women according to Aqa Jamal used whatever instrument in the house to create a merry atmosphere.

And now of music and singing, two favourite amusements among women of Persia. A musical instrument of one kind or other should always be kept in the house, that neighbours, whilst visiting each other, may never be without the means of adding to the pleasure and sociability of their parties. If it so happen that neither a dyra hul-kadar, nor a sikdar is provided, the house ought at any rate to possess a brass dish and a mallet for that purpose. Every woman should be instructed in the art of playing upon the dyra, or tambourine, and she in turn must teach her daughters, that their time may be passed in joy and mirth; and the songs of Hafiz, above all others, must be remembered. It is also most agreeable and gratifying to have music whilst engaged at the banquet, and on all occasions of taking refreshments. No game or diversion has half its spirit when it is not accompanied by the thrilling sound of some sweet instrument. Even the pleasing exercise of the swing is rendered more delightful by the tinkling of a cymbal, or the dulcet notes of a kettle-drum.(38)

Throughout the manuscript, Aqa Jamal not only goes back to the issue of love between women and men, but between two women. As women faqihms, according to Aqa Jamal, prescribe for
women to have a lover in addition to their husbands, they also
deed it necessary for women to engage in pleasurable pursuits
with each other.

In the swing it is both mustahab and wajib for
two persons to sit together, one passing a leg
round the waist of the other. If one is a youth,
and his companion a girl, so much the better.
Kulsum Naneh says, when they are thus sitting in
the swing-rope, mutually embracing and vibrating to
and fro, nothing can be more graceful and charming,
and free from blame. Baji Yasmin is of opinion
that, whilst enjoying the swing, it is also wajib
to repeat the following lines:

Swing, swing from the tree, see how quickly we go!
Now high as the branches, now sweeping below;
Does a rival presume to supplant me? O, no;
If he did, in a moment his life-blood should flow.
Now we cut through the wind, up and down is our
flight,
My soul it drinks wine, and is wild with delight.
My heart's crimson current rolls only for thee,
Therefore be thou compassionate, sweet one, to me.
Swing, swing from the tree; swing, swing from the
tree;
I am thine-thine for ever, then clinging fast to me.
(39)

Aqa Jamal, expresses what women faqihs would recommend to
women on combining the bodily pleasures with the enjoyment of
listening to the music.

On the 13th of the month Saffar, and on a
Wednesday, it is wajib to enjoy the exercise of the
swing. Others say that whenever a person mounts the
swing without the music of the dyra, it is like
prayer without sincerity, and is of no use.(40)

The stern and stiff qualities of religious rules and
regulations were opposite to life's joyful nature. Women
therefore chose life over religious dogma. Aqa Jamal's
displeasure then is directed towards women's hedonism. Music
was an essential part of leading such a hedonistic way of
life, that is why Aqa Jamal lingers on criticizing women's use of it in every instance that they deem suitable using it for adding to their fun and happiness.

...Again, playing on the dyra and being joyful on six different occasions is wajib, viz. first, at the bridal feast; secondly, whilst enjoying the luxury of the bath; thirdly, on the arrival of friends from a journey; fourthly, at hospitable entertainments; fifthly, at childbirth, when a son is born; and sixthly, whilst enjoying the swing. If these appointed times of rejoicing are neglected, and unattended with music, what hope is there of heaven? It is mustahab for every person who has any taste for pleasure and luxurious indulgence to play on the drum, the dyra, and other instruments. Every house that can boast of music is blessed, and blesses others; and it is a great sin ever to be without the charm of harmonious sounds. Baji Yasmin says, that when a person returns from a journey, even if his wife should be at the moment giving birth to a child, let not music be omitted; and wherever the musicians are at work, women must assemble and listen to them with delight. Kulsum Naneh, Shahr-Banu Dadeh, and others, insist that if a woman at prayers suddenly hears the sound of music, she ought to start up instantly and listen to the songs of the minstrels. But Baji Yasmin, Bibi Jan Afroz, and Dadeh Bazm Ara, say, that if the woman at prayers is old and decrepit she may continue her devotions without listening to a single note: but whoever, possessing youth and beauty, hears sweet music and neglects to attend to it, continuing the occupation upon which he or she happens to be engaged, is guilty of improper conduct, and unworthy of either respect or consideration. And whenever a company of performers assemble, and their exhilarating music is heard, every one, far and near, must immediately run to the spot and listen to the last moment. If they fail to manifest this praiseworthy disposition, and shew themselves destitute of feeling and taste, they are not only to be pitied for their dullness and stupidity, but condemned for the neglect of an ancient custom. (41)

In a section of "Kitab-i Kulsum Naneh", Aqa Jamal talks about the women of different cities of Iran, and their
knowledge of the book. In this way he shows that women all over Iran were familiar with the recommendations of "Kitab-i Kulsum Naneh." He also displays, through the poetry, the power women hold in their relations with men. About the women of Shiraz he writes:

The lovely damsels of Shiraz,
Are skilled in Kulsum Naneh's laws,
Adding to charms that wisdom blind,
The richer treasures of the mind.(42)

... And what is better; wise and fair,
And more discreet than others are,
The lovely damsels of Shiraz
Are skilled in Kulsum Naneh's laws!(43)

About the Circassian women Aqa Jamal says:

... And they, in princely hall or bower,
With wedded dames have equal power;
For they have never failed to look
In Kulsum Naneh's matchless book,
And, studying there, obtained that blessing,
More than all others worth possessing.(44)

In respect to the Isfahani women, about whom, "Kitab-i Kulsum Naneh" has been written Aqa Jamal writes the following poem which shows these women's power in their relation to men, the power that Aqa Jamal attributes to their knowledge of the "Kitab-i Kulsum Naneh."

Daughters of Persia! still is yours
The art to charm, while life endures;
But search Bushir to Khorassan,
There's none like those of Isfahan!
For wit and pleasantry, and loving,
Ever the joys of life improving.
But they are jealous, and make man
Know who's supreme at Isfahan!
Since they, upholding woman's cause,
Her rights, and Kulsum Naneh's laws,
Have, heroine-like, the resolution
To put them well in execution.(45)
Woman of Tabriz, according to Aqa Jamal, are as powerful as the women of Isfahan.

What are the women of Tabriz?
Not beautiful, and yet they please.
Please? Yes, by heavens, and they command,
And always keep the upper-hand.
Their tempers, sharp as Damask sword,
Throw bitterness in every word;
Yet man, obsequious to their will,
controlled, and unresisting still,
Bends patiently beneath their sway,
Anxious to live as best he may:
Thus, whether beautiful or plain,
Woman asserts her lordly reign,
Which proves her intellectual power
For wisdom is the sex's dower!(46)

For the nuptial night Aqa Jamal says that the women faqıhs would prescribe the following device, which shows that from the very first night women were concerned about the issue of power.

...When the husband is introduced into the bridal-chamber, he is seated by her side. The right leg of the bride is placed upon the left leg of the husband, and her right hand is placed upon the hand of her husband, to shew that she ought always to have the upper hand of her spouse.(47)

About the music in the wedding night Aqa Jamal on behalf of the women faqıhs says:

Should there be no dyra hulkadar in the house, prayer in that house is of no avail. Shahr Banu Dadeh says it is indispensable to have a dyra sikdar; but Bibi Jan Afroz and the others contend, that if there is neither a dyra hulkadar nor sikdar, a dyra without a hulka or sik will be sufficient to drive misfortune away.(48)

Aqa Jamal shows his racist attitude towards the black slaves when he talks about the person who should prepare the bed for the bride and groom.
...It is wajib that a handsome woman should throw the sleeping apparel of the bride, that the husband may be constant and true to his wife; and it is lucky for both to sleep on one pillow. Special care must be taken that an ugly black woman does not throw the sleeping apparel, for according to Kulsum Naneh, it would be highly injurious to the wedded pair.(49)

Aqa Jamal was apparently aware that women talked about their sexual experiences among each other, and occasions such as a wedding night offered them opportunity for sharing what they had seen and heard with other women.

... Others are of opinion, that after the bride and bridegroom have retired to the nuptial chamber, those women who attended the bride from her mother's house to that of her husband should sit in a corner and listen to all that is said, and in the morning tell the gossip to their friends and acquaintances.(50)

Aqa Jamal believes that women faqihs will look at the failure to pray at the wedding night with indulgence, while they would emphasize the importance of the music for the next day.

Should there be no convenient opportunity for prayer on the nuptial night, the omission is not considered of any consequence. On the following day it is usual for the company to re-assemble, and play on the dyra, and dance. For the company to dance is wajib; for the bride, sunnat; though some think it only wajib.(51)

For the period of pregnancy Aqa Jamal believes that women faqihs will prescribe the following.

...Whatever the pregnant woman may long for, whether beef, or goat, or mutton, fruit, or apparel, or wine, the husband must provide and bring to her; for if he does not furnish that which she may have set her heart upon, the child's eyes will be green: this is sunnat.(52)...
...
Dadeh Bazm Ara says, that during the time the mother suckles her child no person ought to ruffle her feelings in any way, lest her milk should be soured; in short, she must not be questioned or contradicted, but kept in as perfect a state of tranquility in body and mind as possible: this is peculiarly wajib. (53)

In the chapter on "the conduct of the wife to her husband, mother-in-law, and to other relatives," Aqa Jamal ridicules women faqīhs' views in wishing for a woman to be the sole wife and wanting to be treated well.

...The man is to be praised who confines himself to one wife; for if he takes two it is wrong, and he will certainly repent of his folly. Thus say the seven wise women.

Be that man's life immersed in gloom
Who weds more wives than one,
With one his cheeks retain their bloom,
His voice a cheerful tone;
These speak his honest heart at rest,
And he and she are always blest;
But when with two he seeks for joy,
Together they his soul annoy;
With two no sun-beam of delight
Can make his day of misery bright.

That man, too, must possess an excellent disposition, who never fails to comply with his wife's wishes, since the hearts of women are gentle and tender, and harshness to them would be cruel. If he be angry with her, so great is her sensibility, that she loses her health and becomes weak and delicate...if her husband is continually angry with her, her colour fades, and her complexion becomes yellow as saffron. He should give her money without limit: God forbid that she should die of sorrow and disappointment! in which case her blood would be upon the head of her husband. (54)

From what Aqa Jamal says about the conduct of women to their mother-in-law, and other relations, it is obvious that women's authority was not looked upon favorably. Here like
Shakespeare's "Taming of the Shrew", autonomous women are seen as termagants. The manuscript, however, shows that such women existed, and women were not docile and meek.

...The conclave also declare that the husband's mother, and other relations, are invariably inimical to the wife: it is therefore wajib that she should maintain her authority when thwarted in her views, by at least once a day using her fists, her teeth, and kicking, and pulling their hair, till tears come into their eyes, and fear prevents further interference with her plans. Kulsum Naneh says that she must continue this indomitable spirit of independence until she has fully established her power, and on all occasions she must ring in her husband's ears the threat of a divorce. If he still resists, she must redouble all the vexation which she knows from experience irritate his mind, and day and night add to the bitterness and misery of his condition. (55)

In the section on witchcraft, Aqa Jamal elaborates on what women faqihis would think of a woman with only one husband.

...Kulsum Naneh says, she is astonished how a woman can live all her life with one husband in one house. Why should he deprive her of the full enjoyment of this world's comforts? Days and years roll on and are renewed, whilst a woman continues the same melancholy inmate, in the same melancholy house of her husband. She has no renewal of happiness, none.

The Seasons change and Spring
Renews the bloom of fruit and flower;
And birds, with fluttering wing,
Give life again to dell and bower.
But what is woman's lot?
No change her anxious heart to cheer;
Confined to one dull spot,
To one dull husband all the Year! (56)

In the chapter under "Guests and visitors, and the lucky periods of their coming and departure," Khansari describes
what the women faqihs would prescribe. Once again women's desire to engage in affairs is evident from these passages.

...And if your guest be a young man of noble presence and attractive manners, he is entitled to enjoy your hospitality for three days certain; after that, at his option, he may be permitted to lengthen his stay: and it is wajib for the young mistress of the house, in the mean time, unknown to her husband, to seek every convenient opportunity to converse with him and exchange vows of friendship, so dear and consoling to youthful hearts. And on any occasion, should her return home be delayed till a late hour, a ladder may be placed against the wall, that she may enter the house by the door on the terrace, unseen. (57)

And after such event, the women faqihs, according to Aqa Jamal would prescribe sharing the story with friends. This shows the existence of primary relation between women, and not between a man and a woman.

...And whatever passes between them she must relate to her familiar associates and friends, without omitting the smallest particular in the account. This is wajib. (58)

Here Aqa Jamal again cites rules in regards to the marriage and cites a poem which he says the attendant sing in a wedding.

The husband is saddled, the journey begun,  
And the beautiful bride her own race to run. (59)

Aqa Jamal then mentions that according to women faqihs the bride should do certain prayer at nuptial night.

...Kulsum Naneh says, that among the things of greatest importance to be observed by the bride on going to bed is a devout prayer, involving blessings especially on her own head. She may say in her heart:
Holy Prophet! grant, I pray,  
On this happy nuptial day,  
That my husband, and his mother,  
Cousin, uncle, sister, brother,  
May, from all suspicion free,  
Never be unkind to me;  
That from morn till night they may  
Never frown at what I say,  
What I want, or what I do;  
But, to all my interests true,  
Sanction, without stint or measure,  
Every thing that yields me pleasure.(60)

In the section titled "Of Male and Female Gossips and Intimates," Aqa Jamal describes, what the women faqihis would prescribe for women in their relations with each other. These advice show the strong bond of sisterhood among women.

For a woman to be without familiar friends of her own sex is reckoned a heavy misfortune, and there is no one so poor who does not struggle hard to avoid so great a curse. Kulsum Naneh and the other members of the learned conclave agree in thinking that a woman dying without friends or gossips has no chance of going to heaven; whereas happy is that woman whose whole life is passed in constant intercourse with kind associates, for she will assuredly go to heaven. What can equal the felicity of the woman whose daily employment is sauntering hand in hand with friends, amidst rosebowers and aromatic groves, and visiting every place calculated to expand and exhilarate the heart? That woman, at the day of resurrection, will be seen dancing with her old companions on earth, in the regions of bliss. Kulsum Naneh says, the very circumstance of living in such a state of social freedom and harmony always produces a forgiveness of sins. And Khala Jan Agha, Baji Yasmin, Shahr Banu Dadeh, and Bibi Jan Afroz concur in opinion, that if a damsel dies before she has established a circle of intimates, to whom she can communicate her most secret thoughts and actions, the other world can never be to her a scene of happiness and joy. But if she is more favourably circumstances, every supplication for pardon will have the effect of angel-prayers; and this is the reward of those who in this life cultivate social connexions, and are bond in the endearing ties of friendship.(61)...Kulsum Naneh again says, when two
women are strongly attached to each other, they must continue inseparable friends through good report and evil report, and be ever faithful to the last; and when one of them dies, the survivor, whether in her promenades in the rose-garden, visiting the bath, or assisting at the making of semnu, must keep her deceased favorite in remembrance, and in her devotions never forget to pray for her happiness in the next world. This is Sunnat. (62)

Besides the bonds of sisterhood, there is reference to events in "Kitab-i Kulsum Naneh", that indicates the existence of love affairs between women. In addition to what was cited in other chapters, in the section under the heading of "Fruits and Flowers, as symbols of feeling and passion", Aqa Jamal in the name of women faqihs prescribes the following:

One of the fancies of women, in which they frequently indulge, is making puppets, or dolls, called little brides. And it is proper that each puppet should have a partner, or companion, that the object in view may be fulfilled. Every person who is blessed with gossiping friends and associates makes one, and dresses it in rich attire, and places it on a tray with sweetmeats and green leaves, and gives it to a confidential domestic to be presented to her dear favourite. And it is proper for the woman who carries the puppet to say, "I have brought this offering for you from such a one." If that woman or damsel who receives the offering is partial to the sender, she kisses the puppet and rejoices, and gives it a khilat, with a suitable present to the bearer; but if she has little or no regard for the party, the puppet is dressed in black and returned. The observance of this rule is sunnat mu'akkad.

In those cases where the offering is accepted with satisfaction, a banquet takes place, with music and dancing.

Then does the sprightly heart rebound,
Arch smiles and laughing jokes go round,
The joyous dancers beat the ground,
And Anklet-bells with tinkling sound,
Betoken their delight.
And nosegays sweet, of brightest hue,
The crimson rose and violet blue,
Which in the Prophet's garden grew,
Refreshed by heaven's delicious dew,
Are interchanged by-lovers true,
On that inspiring night.

And amidst this gay scene, with infinite good-
humour, the wiser ones communicate to the less
informed whatever it may be necessary and proper
for them to learn and to know.(63)

Aqa Jamal closes "Kitab-i Kulsum Naneh" with the
following passage:

One word more. Those who willfully act in a
manner contrary to the spirit of Kulsum Naneh's
laws, must be looked upon as examples to be
shunned. It is thus that we learn goodness by
avoiding the practice of the wicked. Accordingly to
illustrate this maxi, a passage from the poet Sa'di
is quoted, in which he says:

Who, in Politeness, Lokman, was thy guide?
The Unpolite, the learned sage replied.(64)

Unlike the manuscripts of the Safavid era, those
belonging to the Qajar era are mostly on specific rules of the
sexual act. In the "genitally-oriented sexuality," of this
era, the masculinist power structure gets inscribed on women's
bodies. Women's bodies are described in minute details and men
are advised on the particularities of coitus, and what they
should do to women. In these manuscripts, which are written by
the upper and middle class laymen, sexual issues are described
in a satirical format. Since it is men who write this satire,
it is at the expense of women.

One of these manuscripts is "Risaleh-yi Fajurieh"
(Treatise of Debauchery),(65)written by Vali ibn-i Suhrab-i
Gurjestani, a Georgian elite residing in Iran, and one of
Nasered-din Shah's courtiers. It is by the order of Nasered-din Shah that he has written this treatise which is about his lechery. Throughout the manuscript he describes, in minute details, different women's sexual organs and different versions of copulation. He uses both prose and poetry for this purpose. Women, all throughout are acted upon. They remain an object not only in the act, but in whatever gets written about them afterwards. It is evident that the manuscript was used for laughter among male courtiers of Nasered-din Shah.

In "Dibacheh-yi Nuh Surakhieh" (The Preface to Nine Holes), (66) women again are the focus of the burlesque. In this manuscript which is written in the honor of Malikzadeh Sulyman Mirza, the author makes clear that it has been written as a source of entertainment for the libertines in their gatherings. Even though he does not specify who these "libertines" are, it is clear that they were men. In the opening page of the manuscript, there is a citation from the Quran, "al-Rijal al-Gavamuna Ala al-Nisa'" (Men are superior to women). This is then used to declare that men have authority over women's bodies. Women, in this manuscript, are viewed as "holes", that have to be conquered and made docile. The author downgrades women's sexual organs that do not meet his standard of sexiness, and makes fun of these characteristics. He also makes humiliating remarks about women who have aged, and are not sexually desirable anymore. In this manuscript as well,
both poetry and prose have been used to make it more fun to read.

In another manuscript, "Kitabcheh va Risalat al-Nisvan" (The Notebook and Treatise of Women), the author, Ibrahim al-Furui, first describes facial and bodily characteristics a woman should have in order to be considered beautiful and sexy, and makes a correlation between facial and genital characteristics. He then explains the rules for coitus, teaching men what they should do to women, and advising women to give in to men's desire, whatever it would be, even though it may not be enjoyable to them.

From both the Safavid and the Qajar era, there have remained manuscripts that deal with sexual issues from a medical point of view. These manuscripts are called "Bah", "Bakhieh" and "Khergeh". They are written by the clergy of higher importance and the mullas of lower ranks. These medical device on the sexual issues carry the values of a male dominated society, but they are not written to downgrade women on purpose and for the sake of entertainment.

An important issue that comes across in reading these manuscripts is the leisure people have had in paying attention to minute details in regards to the sexual act. The foods and potions that increase sexual pleasure, and the recipes for making them, the time and weather (different seasons, days of the week, time of the night and day) suitable for coitus, description of pills that should be placed in the mouth to
increase the sensation, and formulas for making them, ointments that should be used in between the toes for such purpose, and directions for preparing them are all described in details. A lot of attention is also paid to managing male and female sexual organs in such a way that the coitus becomes more enjoyable.

Another issue that is evident from these manuscripts is men's insecurities in regards to women. Many of the devices are aimed at making women attached to men in such a way that they can not engage in sexual intercourse with any other man. This shows that women did have other relations, or were prone in having them. The emphasis on women's satisfaction in coitus in many of these manuscripts is partly due to such fear. In some of these manuscripts there are prescriptions for potions to make women unconscious for the sexual act. This shows that women at times refused to be engaged in the sexual act.(68)

In "Lizzat al-'Aysh-i Naser Shahi"(Nasir Shahi's Pleasure), rules of coitus, consideration for time, season and quality of weather, the positions that are either good or harmful in sexual intercourse, the devices that men can use so that women can not be engaged with another man sexually, comparing facial and sexual characteristics, and the importance of abstaining from "old", "ugly", and "menstruating" women get described in details.(69)

In another manuscript called "Tarjumeh-yi Tibb al-Riza" (Translation of Riza's Medicine),(70)the author cites
religious sources and their advice in choosing women for the marriage. Upon citing these sources, he recommends that men should keep away from "wise old women." Such comments clearly shows men's apprehension of women's wisdom, a wisdom that was used to create spaces for women in a society in which rules of interaction between women and men were defined by men. In the same manuscript, in a section called "Risaleh dar Bareh-yi Nasl va Valad" (Treatise about Generations and Offsprings), the author mentions that for the sperm to coagulate, the man and the woman should have simultaneous orgasm, it is only in that case, he emphasizes that the sperm will not perish. The attention paid to the woman's orgasm then, is not for her sake but for the continuation of the generation. (71) In determining if a woman is pregnant with a girl or a boy, the author attributes all the negative signs to being pregnant with a girl, and the positive signs in carrying a boy. He claims that if woman's pulse is fast it is a boy, otherwise it is a girl. If the pregnant woman is always sad, sitting in the corner of the house, and does not enjoy promenade, it is the sign that the child is female. If, however, the woman is light while getting up, and walks with agility, the child is a male. (72) In this manuscript and others in this category, men are emphatically advised not to look at women's genitals during the intercourse. It is said that it is harmful for the eye and if it is repeated, the person will have eye disease and the
child will be blind. (73) The same thing, however, is not prescribed for women.

In another manuscript called "Asrar al-Nikah" (The Mysteries of Marriage), (74) the author, referring to Quran, talks about women as the fields for men's seeds, and emphasizes the importance of having women who can bear children. He claims that barren women are unauspicious, and cites a religious authority who has said that it is better to have a mat in the house than a woman who is barren. In this manuscript as well as in some others women are referred to as "awra", which means sexual parts. (75)

In part of an anthology called "Kherqeh-yi Murteza Bayk-i Shamlu," (Murteza Bayk-i Shamlu's Kherqeh), (76) the author mentions issues that are of great importance. In one of them the author advises men to make the woman satisfied in sexual intercourse, and adds that if she is not satisfied, he should get up and ask the black man (slave) to sleep with her. (77) A few pages after that the author talks about a potion that can be used in taming a women who is shrew. Such comments show that women were not silent spectators in the sexual act, and in other domains of life. It also shows the constant conflict between men and women in a sexually unequal society.

In "Favaid-i Bahieh" (Benefits of Bahieh), the author describes in details all the rules and regulations for copulation. He then enumerates the senses, among which is
coitus, and concludes that there is no sensation better than it.(78)

The contrast between the manuscripts of the Safavid and the Qajar era on the issue of sexuality, is due to the transformation of life from one era to the next. In the Safavid era, when people were more autonomous, and the state did not control them, they acted more freely in all areas of their lives, including the sexual domain. It should be emphasized that women living in the pre-capitalist traditional society of Iran did not have the same kind of freedom that modern period has provided for women of certain classes, and yet it seems that in comparison to the capitalist era, they enjoyed certain kinds of freedom that was restricted to most women living in the capitalist era. In the Qajar era, with the rising power of the state and the clergy, people were constricted in all of their activities and those related to their sexuality. Change in people's attitude is evident from the manuscripts of the time, and especially those related to women.

Transformation in the domain of sexuality therefore had an impact on how women were viewed. While from the Safavid era we hear men complaining about women's freedom and autonomy in expressing their sexual desires and acting on them, in the Qajar era we are faced with women who are subjects both in the sexual act and in what gets written about it afterwards. Men's control of women's bodies comes across in the way women are
portrayed. Women, and their bodies, and what is done to them in the sexual act become a source of burlesque for men's gatherings.

A comparative reading of the manuscripts in the category of "Bah", "Bakhieh", and "Khergeh" of both the Safavid and the Qajar period, would be a valuable contribution to understanding the impact of social, economic, and cultural/ideological factors in shaping their contents. In another words could it be ascertained that the medicinal prescriptions from the Safavid era were less male-focused than those belonging to the Qajar era?

**Conclusion**

Sexuality, like all other domains of human existence is transformed with the passage of time and with the influence of social, economic and cultural/ideological changes. Such transformation has been demonstrated in the case of European societies by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Foucault emphasized that sexuality is produced in historical context. He showed that in pre-capitalist Europe work was less intensive, and thereby people were able to pursue pleasure. He also illustrated that people were free in expressing their desires because language was not regulated. Foucault stressed that in the capitalist era, work became intensive and this deprived people from the leisure of seeking sexual enjoyment.
Repression of sexuality and the regulation of language which were concomitant, constricted people's sexual actions and expression. The silence about sex implied that people were not supposed to transgress what was considered the norm, both linguistically and literally. Foucault believed that this all had to do with the increased nature of state power, and therefore delineated the dynamic between sexuality and power.

Foucault's work is applicable to the case of Iran. By comparing the pre-capitalist to the capitalist Iran, changes in the domain of sexuality becomes apparent. While in the pre-capitalist era people enjoyed a milieu that allowed them to express and act on their sexuality, in the capitalist era the imposed morality prevented them from doing so. As in the case of the European societies "structural and ideological" factors were responsible for these changes.

Changes in the structure and ideology of the society, came simultaneously with the change in "the social organization of the relationship between the sexes" that is, "gender". The "structural and ideological" developments transformed the identities of women and men. These "subjective" identities had therefore, "exclusively social origins." With the transition of a historical era, women, men, and the relationship between them, (including their sexual relation), was transformed. With these changes, power too, which is historically specific changed. Joan Scott writes:
... Gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power. It might be better to say, gender is a primary field within which or by means of which power is articulated. Gender is not the only field, but it seems to have been a persistent and recurrent way of enabling the signification of power in the West, in Judeo-Christian as well as Islamic traditions. (83)

The structural change that occurred from the Safavid to the Qajar era was the transformation of the economy from subsistence to commodity production. The Safavid era enjoyed the existence of a self-sufficient economy. In this economy, people produced their own food, and women and men both worked on the land, took care of the animals and produced handicrafts. Women were valued members of the society and enjoyed relatively high status, despite the fact that the ideological basis of the society was patriarchal. The existence of Sufi sects in this era, allowed women to experience spiritual freedom, and to channel it to their daily lives.

During the Qajar era, with the growth of commodity production, and with the concentration of land in fewer hands, small peasants lost the lands they worked on for their subsistence. The production of opium as a commodity required the extensive use of the land, and new techniques for its increased output. Due to cultural factors, it was easier to teach these techniques to men rather than to women. In addition, placing the responsibility of paying taxes on the male head of the family further reduced women’s autonomy. Women became dependent on men since they were the ones who
worked on the farm and factories for wages. The rise of the Shia clerical body in this era, and the suppression of Sufi tendencies meant that women lost ground in the ideological arena as well. The masculinist power structure of the capitalist era furthermore, eroded the status, power and freedom of women.

Women were not only losing ground in the structural and ideological domains, but also in the sexual arena. The manuscripts belonging to these eras manifest these changes. While in the Safavid era women are pictured as free entities expressing their sexual desires and acting upon them, in the Qajar era, they are portrayed as objects that are acted upon. Their bodies are ridiculed and they become a source of burlesque in men's gatherings. It is during this era that masculinist power structure gets inscribed on women's bodies.

It is important to emphasize that this is a general view of the society in both Safavid and the Qajar era. Of course one should take into consideration that ideas remain as underturents in societies, and resurface in special times and occasions. That is why we have for example, a manuscript from the Qajar era called "Basat-i Neshat" (Provisions of Mirth), in which three kinds of love are described. The love of women and men, the love between men and the love between women.\(^{(84)}\) From the Qajar era we also have the folk story of a woman who was married to seven men simultaneously without their knowledge.\(^{(85)}\) A treatise called "Ma\'ayib al-rijal" (The Vice
of men), was also produced in this period. The author of this treatise is Bibi Khanum Astarabadi, and in this treatise she is responding to another treatise called "Ta'dib al-Nisvan" (Educating Women), written by a man. In this work Bibi Khanum rebuffs the men and criticizes their world. (86)

The existence of women such as Qurra'tul-A'yn, who became the leader of the Babi movement, one of the most important movements of the time, is another indication of the continuation of a tradition of struggle among women who were inclined to mysticism. Qurra'tul-A'yn did not exist in a vacuum. She was the representative of many women who thought like her, but she was the one who manifested those thoughts in her action.

These examples show that a tradition of resistance had remained alive from the Safavid era, one which surfaced when it was necessary. The existence of these undercurrents, however, could not and would not overcome the impact of the structural and ideological transformation that the Qajar society had undergone.

It should also be emphasized that women from among all classes of the society were exposed to the oppression of a male-dominated society, and even though the extent of such oppression was not the same among different classes, they were all subject to it. The fact Naser al-Din Shah's daughter, Taj al-Saltaneh, got syphilis at the age of eighteen, upon her marriage to a man she did not know, shows that in being a
woman, living in a society governed by the rule of men, her body was as much under the control of this society as the body of women from other classes.

A set of manuscripts called "Bah", "Bakhieh", and "Khergeh", from both the Safavid and the Qajar era, manifest a different outlook on women. These manuscripts, which are about medical devices on sexual issues and are written by men, manifest contradictory views on women. For example while they show prejudice about "old" and "ugly" women, they also emphatically emphasize the importance of women's sexual satisfaction. These manuscripts are rooted in a tradition that extends back to the Medieval times, and authors from Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd to Nafzawi have contributed to such a collection. The impact of the women's views on these texts is evident in those places where the focus of the text is on women's pleasure. The Iranian society in both the Safavid and the Qajar era therefore, was not exclusively men's domain and women through their resistance and struggle shaped its history.

As it was demonstrated in other chapters, transformation in the area of sexuality was informed by the articulation of the modern Iranian state. This change in turn put its imprint on the construction of gender and power. Consequently women and men and the relations between them were transformed from the Safavid to the Qajar era.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. Ibid., p. 6.

4. Ibid., p. 17.

5. Ibid., p. 25.

6. Ibid., p. 18.

7. Ibid., pp. 36-37.

8. Ibid., p. 37.

9. Ibid., p. 83.

10. Ibid., p. 92.

11. Ibid., p. 93.

12. Ibid., p. 97.

13. Ibid., p. 57.


   In the Preface of the book Marzolph mentions that since the Indologist Theodor Benfy in his "Indian Hypothesis" claimed that the root of most fables and stories existing in Europe should be sought in India, everybody knew that Iran should be considered as the potential rout for the possible passage of these stories from their origin India, to the West. Ibid., p. 13.

16. Ibid., pp. 152-159.

17. Ibid., pp. 402-405.

18. Ibid., p. 160.

20. I have adopted Huda Lutfi's view in reading old documents written by men, and extracting information about women's lives from them. Huda Lutfi, "Manners and Customs of Fourteen Century Cairene Women: Female Anarchy Versus Male Shar'i Order in Muslim Prescriptive Treatise," Paper presented at the Eighth Berkshire Conference, New Brunswick, N. J. June 1990. My approach in reading the manuscripts has been from the historical and sociological point of view rather than the literary aspect.


22. Ibid., pp. xi-xii.

23. Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv.

24. Ibid., pp. xv-xvi.

25. Ibid., pp. xvii-xviii.


27. Ibid., p. 3.

28. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

29. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

30. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

31. Ibid., p. 11.

32. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

33. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

34. Ibid., p. 22.

35. Ibid., pp. 24-25.


37. Ibid., p. 30.

38. Ibid., pp. 32-33.

39. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
40. Ibid., p. 34.
41. Ibid., pp. 34-36.
42. Ibid., p. 37.
43. Ibid., p. 39.
44. Ibid., p. 40.
45. Ibid., p. 41.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 43.
48. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
49. Ibid., p. 45.
50. Ibid., p. 45-46.
51. Ibid., p. 46.
52. Ibid., p. 47-48.
53. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
54. Ibid., p. 54-56.
55. Ibid., p. 59.
56. Ibid., p. 65-66.
57. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
58. Ibid., 69-70.
59. Ibid., p. 71.
60. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
61. Ibid., p. 74-75.
62. Ibid., p. 78.
63. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
64. Ibid., p. 93.
65. Vali-Ibn-i Suhrab-i Gurjestani, "Risaleh-yi Fajariruh," (Treatise on Debauchery), Melli Library, MS no. 1425/F.


68. "Lizzat al-'Ayshe-i Nasir Shahi," (Nasir Shahi's Pleasure), Mar'ashi Library, MS no. 7539, p. 98.

69. Ibid.


71. "Risaleh dar Bareh-yi Nasl va Valad," (Treatise about Generations and Offsprings), Majlis Library, MS no. 6271/13, p. 82.

72. Ibid., pp. 86-87.

73. Ibid., p. 104.

74. "Asrar al-Nikah," (The Mysteries of Marriage), Majlis Library, MS no. 335/1, p. 10.

75. Ibid.


77. Ibid., p. 62.


80. Ibid., p. 1053.

81. Ibid., p. 1068.

82. Ibid., p. 1056.

83. Ibid., p. 1069.


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