VAKA-YI SELIMIYYE OR THE SELIMIYYE INCIDENT:
A STUDY OF THE MAY 1807 REBELLION

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SABANCI UNIVERSITY
JANUARY 2008
VAKA-YI SELIMIYYE OR THE SELIMIYYE INCIDENT:
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History
in the Institute of Social Sciences

Sabancı University
2008
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A STUDY OF THE MAY 1807 REBELLION

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DATE OF APPROVAL: 11 January 2008
ABSTRACT

VAKA-YI SELIMIYYE OR THE SELIMIYYE INCIDENT:
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Yıldız, Aysel
Ph.D., History
Supervisor: Selçuk Akşin Somel
January, 2008, xvii + 913 pages

This dissertation is a study of the May 1807 Rebellion, a military uprising which ended with the dethronement of Selim III and the accession of Mustafa IV to the Ottoman throne. It endeavors to study the uprising within the broader context of the early nineteenth century Ottoman history. One particular concern is to underline the complexity of the Rebellion in terms of causation and to argue that it is difficult to explain the Rebellion within a single paradigm. Consequently, we will try to show that there were many incidents or factors such as the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms, the Revolt of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha, the Edirne Incident, the Russo-Ottoman War and the British Naval Expedition all of which played a role in the outbreak of the Rebellion. With textual criticism and comparative analysis of the archival documents, contemporary narratives and the foreign documentary materials, we also aim to establish a basic chronology and factography of the Rebellion. This approach is helpful for questioning certain points taken-for-granted by conventional historiography. Looking at the available data and speaking historically, it is almost certain that the center did not take any attempt to make the yamaks to wear the Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms. Instead, it was the attempt to station the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers in the fortresses that triggered the Rebellion. The present study also argues that the May 1807 Rebellion cannot simply be defined as a fight between the reformists and the anti-reformists, but it rather lies at the core of a struggle for the throne, the Eastern Question and a complex web of socio-economic and religious problems of the Empire.

Keywords: Selim III, Nizam-ı Cedid, Mustafa IV, reform, uprising
ÖZET

SELİMİYYE VAKASI: MAYIS 1807 İSYANI ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA

Yıldız, Aysel

Doktora, Tarih

Danışman: Selçuk Akşin Somel

Ocak 2008, xvii + 913 sayfa


Anahtar Kelimeler: Selim III, Nizam-ı Cedid, Mustafa IV, reform, isyan
Sevgili anne ve babama; Yaşar’a ve Elif Mina’ya
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people helped and encouraged me during long years of this study. I am indebted to all.

I would like to express my special gratitude to Selçuk Akşin Somel, my dissertation advisor, for his patience and encouragement. I recognize an immeasurable debt to his scholarly insights and constructive criticism from which I greatly benefited during every phase of my study. He gave a great deal of his time for reading, correcting the dissertation and discussing the related issues with me. He was always available and ready to help me and provided me emotional support whenever I needed. Special thanks to my dissertation committee members, Edhem Eldem, Hakan Erdem, Tülay Artan and Sabri Sayar for reading and commenting on my dissertation.

I would also like to thank Prof. Kemal Beydilli who showed genuine interest in my work and spent hours generously sharing his profound intellectual knowledge with me. He never got tired of my continuous questions and was so kind as to encourage me.

I would like to thank all faculty members of Sabancı University who contributed my learning and teaching process for long years. I owe special thanks to Halil Berktay and Tülay Artan who have always provided me with emotional and intellectual support during the years I spent at the University. Hülya Canbakal and Metin Kunt were also very encouraging and helpful during my research.

The administrators and staff of various libraries and archives made my research less painful. In this regard, I would like to express my gratitude to the staff of Sabancı University Information Center. I am greatly indebted to Mehmet Manyas who miraculously made available many books and articles I needed. The staff of İSAM (İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi) as well as that of the Prime Ministrial Archives greatly facilitated my research.

My friends at the Sabancı University, particularly Zeynep Nevin Yelçe and Selçuk Dursun were always kind and helpful to me. I would like to thank Zeynep for her encouragement and valuable comments. Without Selçuk’s wonderful solutions in technical issues, my research would be more harder and tiresome.
I owe a lot to my friends, particularly to Cengiz Fedakar, Hacer Çelebi, Merve Çakır, Süheyla, Yenidünya, Mehmet Sait Türkhan, Fatih Akyüz, Mert Sunar and Mustafa Altunbay who made my long research enjoyable and fruitful at Prime Ministrial Archives. They never refrained to share their knowledge and provided me every kind of support whenever I needed. My special thanks to Adalet Çakır and Cengiz Fedakar for their intellectual and emotional support. I would like to thank my friend Stefania Costache for providing me with fragments from the Callimaki Collection and also helping me to read some texts in French. My dear friend Murat Dağlı also helped me to decipher some complicated French texts and was kind enough to encourage me during my research. My friends Selim David Sayers, Sema Göksel, Mehmet Savan, Sinan Ciddi and Zehra Savan really spent efforts and spared time to read my work. I would like to thank their patience and encouraging feedback. Particularly Zehra and Mehmet Savan spent many hours for helping me. I am indebted to both, particularly Mehmet for the English translation of the quotations and poems.

My special thanks are to my family particularly to my father Murat Danacı and my deceased mother Güllü Danacı. All the members of my family were very patient and encouraged to me during my research. My partner, Yaşar Yıldız, and my lovely daughter, Elif Mina, always supported me and they have been my greatest source of encouragement. I apologize to Elif Mina for raising her with a Ph.D. Dissertation.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of Institutions, Books, and Documents

A. DVN. Bab-ı Asafı Divan-ı Hümayun Kalemi
A. DVN. KLB. Bab-ı Asafı Divan-ı Hümayun Kalebendlik Kalemi (dos.)
A. E. Ali Emiri
A. AMD. Bab-ı Asafı Amedi Kalemi (dos.)
A. SKT. Bab-ı Asafı Sadaret Kethüdası Kalemi (dos.)
B.O.A. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
C. AS. Cevdet Askeriye
C. BH. Cevdet Bahriye
C. DH. Cevdet Dahiliyye
C. ZB. Cevdet Zabtiyye
D. DRB. MH. Darbhane-i Amire Evrakı Muhasebe Kalemi (dos.)
D. DRB. THR. Darbhane-i Amire Evrakı Tahrirat Kalemi (dos.)
D. PYM. Bab-ı Deftari Piyade Mukabelesi Kalemi Evrakı
F.O. Foreign Office
HAT Hattı hümayun
P.R.O. Public Record Office
T.O.E.M. Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası
T.Y. Tarih Yazmaları

Abbreviations of Hicrî and Rumî Months and Days

M Muharrem
S Safer
Ra Rebiyyü’l-evvel
R Rebiyyü’l-ahir
Ca Cumade’l-ula
C Cumade’l-ahir
B Receb
Ş Şaban
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

I used modern Turkish orthography to transliterate Ottoman Turkish words, regardless of their origin. Diacritical marks are used to indicate long vowels, *ayns* (‘) and *hemzes* (‘). For some well-known place names, English versions are used in spellings (such as ‘Aleppo’ ‘Egypt’) and the like, though there are exceptions to the usage. For the names of institutions, titles, and concepts both the English and Ottoman Turkish equivalents are given.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was shaken by the Rebellion of May 1807. It was the sixth and the last military uprising that ended with the dethronement of the reigning sultan, in this case Selim III (r. 1789-1807). During the course of the Rebellion, the Sultan yielded to the pressure of the rebels, declared the abolition of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* (the New Order) army and allowed the execution of eleven statesmen demanded by the rebels. The rebels were still not satisfied and began to cry out for the accession of Selim III’s cousin, Mustafa IV (r. 1807-1808) to the Ottoman throne. While his Empire was thrown into a period of unrest and turmoil, Selim III was forced to live in confinement for nearly one year during the reign of Mustafa IV. It was an *ayan*, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha (d. 1808), who marched to the capital to save Selim III from the royal “cage” and secure his reaccession to the throne. However, Selim III tragically died at the hands of the confidants of Mustafa IV. Consequently, Mahmud II (r.1808-1839) was enthroned, while Mustafa IV replaced the deceased Sultan in confinement. The May 1807 Rebellion prepared the ground for the rise of an *ayan*, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, to the highest position, the grand vizierate, where he prepared the 1808 “Deed of Agreement” ("*Sened-i İttifak*") , a document that put the Ottoman dynasty at the mercy of the local magnates. In terms of the state-Janissary relations, another importance of the Rebellion is the fact that it prepared the ground for the eventual dissolution of the Janissary corps by Mahmud II in 1826. The Rebellion of May 1807 seems to have been used as a pretext by Mahmud II for the dissolution of the Janissary troops. The Janissaries had won a battle in 1807 but lost the one in 1826.

Though the May 1807 Rebellion is one the most important and most famous upheavals in Ottoman history, it is one of least studied topics. Satisfactory factual and chronological information, a sophisticated discussion and evaluation of the Rebellion drawing on a comparative analysis of the documentary evidence and contemporary narratives are still not available. The primary concern of the mainstream historiography has
been to produce models, inspired by the notion of modernization, to explain the available information, and thus there has been very limited interest in the factography of the Rebellion and no incentive to understand what really took place during it. Consequently, the Rebellion remained as a frozen incident, as the rebels and the statesmen directly or indirectly related to it became ghosts, devoid of any social, political and cultural connections of their period. Today, some are condemned along with the uprising itself as “anti-reformist” evil figures, while others, among them Selim III, are celebrated as the heroes of enlightenment and progress even 200 years after the Rebellion.

Though there are a good number of contemporary accounts on the Rebellion, the subsequent interest by the later historians has not been productive enough. Three works were written which are devoted solely to the history of the Rebellion. One is the work of Ahmed Refik, titled Kabakçı Mustafa İsyam (1331/1912-13), which is mostly a repetition of the information provided by some chroniclers, assembled with the aim of proving what kind of a hindrance the rebels and their collaborators constituted in the modernization process of the Empire. The second book, Reşad Ekrem Koçu’s Kabakçı Mustafa: Bir Serserinin Romanlaştırılmış Hikayesi (1968), is a fictionalized version of the Rebellion written for a general audience rather than for academic circles. The final one is an M.A. Thesis by Musa Kılıç, submitted to Ankara University in 2003.

This work aims at not only to revise some taken-for-granted assumptions about the Rebellion, but also to establish a basic chronology of it and to present the available data. This concern also shaped the main outline of the available work: It is divided into six chapters. The first part deals with a survey of the representations of the Rebellion compiled by the contemporary and later historians. The second and third chapters try to place the Rebellion in its internal and international context. The subsequent two chapters are devoted to the chronology of the Rebellion, while the last one deals with its structural evaluation. Following certain broad questions, each part will further attempt to revise the available information and arguments in each part of this work.

In the first part, we will try to follow the traces of the various representations of the Rebellion from the time of its occurrence to the present day. In general, modern studies
treat the May 1807 Rebellion as the final stage of Selim III’s reign and within the context of the reactions to his reforms, especially to that of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army. Since the reform attempts of Selim III are regarded as constituting one of the first full-fledged reform periods with the aim of arresting the decline of the Empire, the Rebellion is inevitably treated as a reaction of the anti-reformist or conservative elements in society, especially by the Janissaries. In a more general context, it becomes a stage in the long story of modernization or Westernization process of the Empire, the beginnings of which are usually traced back to the Tulip Era (1718-1730) or even earlier. Though some of the contemporary authors also criticize the rebels, their emphasis is on the consequences of the May 1807 Rebellion which caused the abolition of an army established to retaliate against the aggressions of rival states. Another related problem is the position that the historians of the late Ottoman as well as Republican eras take their evaluation of the Rebellion. Depending on personal opinion or evaluation of the process of modernization/Westernization and reforms, value judgments are made at every turn. The already centralist and dynastic tone of the later Ottoman historians becomes even harsher with the centralist, etatist and secularist perspective of the Republican Ottomanists assume in their study of the May 1807 Rebellion. Those who approve the reforms or modernization take the side of the reformists and condemn the reactionary groups. The problem here, of course, is not which side is being taken, but the very fact that a certain party is being advocated in an historical analysis. Needless to say, such a reductionist and ahistorical approach prevents the historian from understanding the complexity and actual dynamics of a historical event.

The second and third chapters might be considered as a study of the causes of the Rebellion of May 1807. A proper study of the Rebellion should cover some earlier but important incidents, such as the establishment of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army, the revolt of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha (1805), the Edirne Incident (1806), the developments that led to the declaration of war against Russia (1806) and also the British Naval Expedition to the Dardanelles (1807). The study of these incidents taking place in the international and internal arenas is important not only for the sake of factography, but also to obtain a
panoramic view of the Empire on the eve of the Rebellion of May 1807. Thus, a study of internal conditions of the Empire, particularly in relation to the Nizam-ı Cedid issue, will be our main concern in the second chapter. This part also aims to find out whether the Rebellion can be considered as having merely been a response to the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms. The third chapter deals with the international problems and tries to find establish the effects of these events on the Ottoman populace; and to what extent they contributed to the outbreak of the Rebellion. One further concern will be to detect the possible involvement of foreign powers in the Rebellion.

One gets the sense that at a certain point, the imperial image of Selim III lost its legitimacy. This loss might be a gradual process that can perhaps be traced through the stages of the Wahhabi sacking of the Holy land in 1803 and prevention of the pilgrimage, the invasion of Muslim Egypt by the “infidel” French in 1798, the subsequent alliance with the Russians and the British against the French, the military defeats at the hands of the Russians (1806-1807), the British fleet anchoring off the shores of Princes’ islands (1807), the Sultan’s apparent ineffectiveness in solving economic problems and establishing stability in external and internal affairs, and finally his failure to produce an offspring. But on the whole, the Edirne Incident seems to have had the greatest impact on the public opinion, leading to a popular antipathy towards the rule of Selim III. Moreover, there seems to have been a major discrepancy between the expectations of the subjects and the policies that Selim III followed.

It is true that the political unrest, scale of violence and social chaos reached their climax in May 1807. However, a proper study of the revolt should cover the events of 1807 and the incidents of 1808 – including a conflict among commanders of the army during the Russian campaign (1806-1812), the continuing power struggles during the reign of Mustafa IV and the murder of Selim III. The primary aim in widening the scope of the Rebellion is to show that the Rebellion in fact contained a series of individual rebellious acts, and that the incident of 1807 was only an episode in this series. The fourth chapter is a detailed account of the five days of the Rebellion, beginning with the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi on Monday, 17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807 and ending with the accession of Mustafa IV.
on Friday, 21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807. The underlying concern of this part of study is to establish whether the immediate incident triggering the Rebellion was in fact the attempt of the Selim III to make the yamaks on the forts to wear the Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms, as it is claimed in the traditional historiography. A comparative analysis of the contemporary sources, together with the available documentary evidence, produces interesting details in this regard. Another concern is to understand the organization of the rebellious crowds and, more importantly, the role of the ulema and some civilian statesmen during the course of the Rebellion. The second part of the chronology, the fifth chapter, is devoted to the study of some major events, such as the preparation of the Legal Document (“Hüccet-i Şer’iyye”), the scandalous dismissal and reinstatement of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, the revolt in the army and the Çardak Incident, which took place during the reign of Mustafa IV. This turbulent period, a direct consequence of the Rebellion, almost paralyzed the administrative mechanism. We should not forget that most of the individuals and factions that played a role in the uprising were still alive during this period, at least until the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the capital.

The sixth, and the last chapter, mainly deals with the individuals and factions of the Selimian era. The revolt was not an uprising of a limited number of yamaks, but a much more complicated and multi-layered phenomenon. Consequently, a great part of this chapter is an endeavor to establish the factions which played important roles during the reign of Selim III. Such an inquiry leads us to question the validity of broad categorization of factions of the period into “reformists” and “anti-reformists”. It will also help us to understand the dynamics and nature of the political struggles of the period. An extension of the same discussion will provide interesting details about the imperial image and the dynastic legitimation of Selim III. We also aim to dwell upon the image Selim III as a “soft”, “peaceful”, “compassionate” and “indecisive” ruler, supposedly being open to the manipulation of his confidants as well as his mother. Particular attention will be paid to the comparison of chronicles written during the Rebellion, the reign of Mustafa IV, and that of Mahmud II. Tracing the changes in the representations of Selim III’s image, we will try to understand whether there was a distortion of the facts for the political concerns of the
subsequent years. One contribution of such a study will be to show whether there was an attempt to prepare the ground for the abolition of the Janissaries by Mahmud II, by painting a picture of backward, unruly and corrupt Janissaries revolting against the reforms, reformists and a good-intentional and tolerant Selim III. One of the most intriguing questions that the traditional historiography does not provide a satisfactory answer for is the issue of the “inability” of Selim III to repress the Rebellion even though he had the Nizam-ı Cedid troops at his disposal. The usual explanations point to his well-meaning and tolerant nature which made him wish to prevent further chaos in the Empire, or due to manipulation of some “wicked” statesmen, such as Köse Musa Pasha and Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi. Moreover, in traditional accounts Selim III is depicted as a ruler lacking the prerequisites for a charismatic leadership, not even able to control his own men and thus prone to becoming a tool in the hands of various interest groups. In brief, we may argue that there is a negative “myth” constructed about Selim III, and one of the purposes of this study will be to go beyond this myth.

The remaining part of the same chapter is devoted to establishing some basic characteristics of the May 1807 Rebellion. The comparison with the 1730 Patrona Halil Rebellion will be very helpful in this regard. Though the May Rebellion was basically a military uprising, we will try to look at the social and economic grievances of the rebels with the purpose of finding some further clues as to whether 1807 uprising was purely a military rebellion or did in fact some cultural and social aspects as well. Inspired by Butrus Abu-Manneh’s suggestions, there will be an attempt to analyze whether the Rebellion was a socio-religious conflict between the lower layers of Istanbul with the Bektashi affiliations and the ruling elite with Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi affiliations.

There are some important questions that will guide us throughout the study: The basic question is whether we are dealing with a pre-organized rebellion or a spontaneous outburst? Also, if there was a plot or conspiracy who was involved in it? We will also question the idea that it was a purely Janissary revolt. Indeed, the issue that the outburst of the Rebellion occurred while the main body of Janissary troops was away due to Russian war may be a significant fact. Again if we are talking about a planned action, we should ask
a further question about the aims of the rebels: Was their aim, from the beginning, to depose Selim III or just to abolish the Nizam-ı Cedid troops?

In terms of sources there is a serious problem. Most of the later historians use the representations of the Rebellion given by the contemporary authors without examining them critically, and take their assertions for granted. Thus, we are left with a series of narratives repeating the same details and sources. Especially for the historians of the Republican period, the History of Cevdet Pasha, actually a secondary source, seems to be the basic source. If we take into consideration what a limited number of works have been written on the reign of Selim III, the problem appears serious indeed. In order to avoid falling into the same trap, we tried to rely heavily on primary sources as much as possible, and to review all available data. Apart from the chronicles, the reports of the ambassadors in the Public Record Office in London, the archival materials in the Ottoman Archives of the Prime Ministry, the Archive of the Topkapı Palace Museum, and the court registers of Galata will be our basic sources. It is clear that further investigation and research in the Russian and French archives, combined with a discussion of the material in the Turkey, will provide an even better picture of the Rebellion and other dynamics of Selim III’s reign.

We refrained from calling the uprising the “Kabakçı Mustafa Rebellion”, as it is usually referred to in conventional historiography, but rather called it the May 1807 Rebellion. The former name places undue emphasis on Kabakçı Mustafa (d. 1808) who in fact was only one of the chiefs of the rebels, though not the least important one. However, later historiography gave Kabakçı’s name to this rebellion. In most of the contemporary chronicles, the Rebellion is referred to as the Vaka-yı Selimiyye (the Selimiyye Incident). Moreover, Kabakçı Mustafa is not frequently mentioned by name in the contemporary accounts and does not seem to have played as important role as the later historians usually ascribe to him.1 Giving the Rebellion the name of Kabakçı Mustafa certainly distorts the picture originally presented by the contemporary narratives.

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1 One exception to it may be Câbi’s History. Even Câbi does not give him a crucial role in the course of the events but yet mentions him more frequently than the other sources. Among foreign observers Saint-Denys gives important role to Kabakçı Mustafa.
As will be noticed easily from the subsequent chapters, we have tried to focus on how certain issues were perceived by people who lived through them. For instance, instead of making a definition of the Nizam-ı Cedid reform package in terms of its contents and aims, we have preferred to find out how the people of period conceived of it and which aspects of the reform package dissatisfied them. To give another example, while discussing the rule of Selim III or Mustafa IV, we spent an effort to see the imperial image of these rulers through the eyes of their contemporary people. The results of such an attempt may be observed in most parts of this study. Since it is a study of a rebellion, we find it crucial to find an answer to the question of why certain people regarded certain issues as crucial and reacted to them.

This work cannot and does not claim to clarify all the issues related to Rebellion of May 1807 and to the Selimian era. Throughout, we have preferred to offer some tentative suggestions rather than clear-cut answers. This approach is a result not only of the fact that available sources stop us from reaching clear-cut conclusions, but also of the wish not to offer a single explanation for the Rebellion. Rather, this study makes a conscious effort to underline the complexity of the issues surrounding the Rebellion.

However, as we will try to show in the first chapter, this source has some problems in this regard.
CHAPTER 1
HISTORIANS AND THE MAY 1807 REBELLION

1.1. Introduction

The May 1807 Rebellion occupied an important position in the contemporary and later accounts of the historians. Particularly its connections with the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms were the most important issue that intrigues these historians. Attempts to explain the causes and the results of the uprising produced a good number of works in the early half of the nineteenth century. The later historians, benefiting from the data and the comments offered by contemporary historians, tried to put the Rebellion into a broader context of reactions to the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire.

This chapter is an endeavor to make a short survey of the available literature on the May 1807 Rebellion. The aim is to examine varying historiographical positions about the Rebellion, the rebels and the causes of the Rebellion, beginning with the contemporary narratives and proceeding to the present day. Special attention is paid to the contemporary

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2 Quoted from Özek, Çetin, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de Gerici Akımlar, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yaynevi, 1968), p. 17.
narratives, since a proper inventory of contemporary sources has not been done yet. Therefore, the first section is devoted to a detailed study of the contemporary narratives in terms of their approach to the Rebellion. The remaining part studies the accounts of the later historians. For the sake of convenience this section is divided into two different parts. The first one deals with the historical accounts of the late Ottoman period, while the second one deals with the works produced during the Republican period. The underlying purpose is to find out how the historiographical discourse concerning the Rebellion has changed throughout the different periods, which in turn will enable us to comprehend the main historiographical problems of the May 1807 Rebellion.

1.2. The Contemporary Narratives

The aim of this section is not only to introduce the available narratives on the May 1807 Rebellion, but also to evaluate their discourse concerning this event. These accounts are very rich in terms of the factual data they present and the comments they offer. However, it is not always easy to categorize them according to their approaches to the Rebellion. The main problem in this regard seems to stem from the fact that we have very limited information on the identities of most of these contemporary historians, hence we are not always able understand the cause of some of their comments on certain aspects of the Rebellion. Moreover, most of them do not offer a well formulated discourse on the Rebellion and contrary to most of the later historians they do not have a ready package in terms of their approach to the uprising. For instance, while most of the later historians approach the movement within the context of the reactions to the modernization efforts of

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Selim III and his reformist elite, the contemporary sources do not offer such a clear picture. Thus it becomes difficult to pinpoint their approach to the Rebellion from the scattered clues. Consequently, it seems better to categorize contemporary studies within the framework of whether they approve the Rebellion or not, which is not always parallel to their approach to the modernization process initiated during the reign of Selim III.

The contemporary collection called *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni* seems to be a good starting point, since the work contains two different discourses by two different authors. It is one of the most important and interesting works on the May 1807 Rebellion. Even though the narrative is catalogued under this title, it was written by three different authors and therefore it seems to be a collection of “essays” rather than an independent history book: The prologue and epilogue parts belong to an unknown author, while the main text covering the events from 1806 to 1807 is written by a certain Lokmacı Matrûş Ebubekir Efendi. Finally, the author of the postscript is Dihkanizâde Ubeydullah Kuşmâni. In the prologue, the unknown author makes a brief introduction by stating that the various “strange” events that took place during the years between 1806 and 1807 will be clarified by the writings of “erbab-i dirayet”. This is followed by the essay of Ebubekir Efendi, who starts by briefly mentioning the Russo-Ottoman relations on the eve of the 1806 War and records a copy of an imperial edict, dated 5 January 1807 which was addressed to the European powers, aiming at the justification of the declaration of war against Russia. After that Ebubekir Efendi narrates the British Naval Expedition to the Capital. This part continues with the narration of the causes as well as the break of the May 1807 Rebellion, the fall of Selim III from power, the enthronement of Mustafa IV, the murder of statesmen in the execution list, various dismissals and appointments and finally ends with the exile of Şeyh Selami Efendi to İzmir. Then, the epilogue begins whereby the unknown author

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4 Dihkanizâde Ubeydullah Kuşmâni, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, (Bayezid Devlet Kütüphanesi, Veliyüddün Efendi, no. 3372-75). Throughout the Thesis, in order to specify the parts that are written by Ebubekir Efendi and Dihkanizâde Ubeydullah Kuşmâni, we specified the authors under the same book title, i.e. Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni* or Kuşmâni, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*. For a transcribed copy of the same work see Ubeydullah Kuşmâni, Ebubekir Efendi, *Asiler ve Gaziler: Kabakçı Mustafa Risalesi*, Aysel Danacı Yıldız (ed.), (İstanbul: Kitapyayinevi, Ekim 2007).
informs the reader that the author of the “above” part was Ebubekir Efendi. Thanks to this brief but important part we get this crucial information. After making some comments about Ebubekir Efendi, the author makes an introduction for the postscript of Kuşmâni with the following words: “people’s limitless sufferings will be made clear in the Risale of the reasonable and just [erbâb-ı hakkâniyet ve insâf] person that will be added to addendum of the epilogue”.5 In this final part, Kuşmâni makes some comments on various events that took place between the years 1806 and 1808. Some clues provided in this part make it clear that the author wrote the text some time after the rise of Mahmud II and before the Alemdar Incident. Different from the account of Ebubekir Efendi, the latter text has a more sermon-like style, aiming at giving lessons for future generations rather than providing historical information. Yet, from his comments on some incidents, it is possible to get some idea on his perception of the May 1807 Rebellion, the murder of Selim III, the rise of Mahmud II and the execution of the palace servants who were held responsible for the murder of Selim III. On the whole, the work, known as Fezleke covers the period from 1806 to 1808.6

The most important detail about Ebubekir Efendi’s text is the fact that he wrote some parts as an eyewitness. For instance, he was at the famous Et Meydanı (the Meat Square)7 during the Rebellion. He seems to be activated by his own curiosity and reflects the feeling that he was witnessing a great incident. As an eyewitness, he narrates some incidents such

5 Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 24b.

6 For more information on the work see the introduction part of Ubeydullah Kuşmâni, Ebubekir Efendi, Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 7-23.

7 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 15b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 117: “... ol hemgâmda benden gayri Et Meydâni’nda bulunanlardan katı çok kimesnelerin şuhûdları olmuşdur.”
as the murder of İbrahim Nesim Efendi⁸, and the rumour of a possible attack of the Nizam-i Cedid soldiers to the Square and also the general mood there in great detail.⁹

A comparison of the texts written by Ebubekir Efendi and Kuşmâni reveals very important clues about the approach of these two authors to the Rebellion. Ebubekir Efendi does not condemn the uprising; instead he celebrates it with the following words:

As from the year 1143 A.H., such a massive congregation and joyful occasion for the unfortunate people could take place only once in 79 years. I believe though some immature infants shall have the chance to see such a similar occasion, my life will not allow to witness that.¹⁰

Another interesting point is the words he uses in describing the rebels, and the Janissaries in particular. He frequently depicts them as “warrior” (“guzât”) and sometimes “warriors of the East (“guzât-i Şarkiyye”), meaning warriors for the championship of Islam, while those murdered on various stages of the Rebellion are described by as being perished (“helâk”), an unusual term to describe the death of a Muslim.¹¹ According to Ebubekir Efendi, the murder of each of the statesmen by the rebels was equal to annihilation of a Russian troop.¹² He refers to Kabakçı Mustafa as the “sergerde” or chief of a band, usually of irregulars. It might be interesting to note that while he uses very rude terms for those murdered during the Rebellion; he refrains from using such words for Kabakçı Mustafa or for his companions. Ebubekir Efendi is also careful to note that the chiefs of the yamaks

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⁸ İbrahim Nesim Efendi (d. 1222/1807) was an important bureaucrat of the Selimian era. He was became rikabı kethüda on 8 S 1218/30 May 1803 and was dismissed on 13 R 1221/30 June 1806. For a long time, he also served as the kethüda (steward) of Beyhan Sultan, sister of Selim III. He was murdered during the rebellion. For more details see Appendix I.

⁹ Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 15a-15b; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp.117-8.

¹⁰ Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 15b, Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 117-8: “kirk üç tarihinden bu vakte gelince böyle bir divân-ı alem ve meserret-i umûm-ı ahâlîyi felek gücü yetmiş dokuz senede bir kere ika‘ etmiş olub bundan böyle mislini idrâke ba‘zi etfâl-I hûrde salın ömrü müsâid ise de benim nakdine-i ömr ve evkâtım vefâ etmeyeceği..”

¹¹ For instance historian Vasif uses the term “Muslim warriors” (“guzât-i Müslimîn”) while describing the Muslim soldiers, Vasif, Tarih-i Sultan Selim, p. 53. See also Ubeydullah Kuşmâni, Ebubekir Efendi, Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 27.

¹² Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.114.
had agreed not to oppress any people, not to plunder their goods and more importantly they made it obligatory not to drink alcoholic beverages and to perform their daily prayers regularly. On every opportunity he blames the Nizam-ı Cedid elite, and celebrates the murder of those statesmen killed during the uprising. Even though he does not make a detailed analysis of the long-term causes of the event, he emphasizes that the triggering event for the outbreak of the Rebellion was the stationing of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers in the fortresses. However, he disregards the idea that Selim III ordered Hasan Şakir Bey and Mahmud Raif Efendi to force the yamaks to wear the Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms as rumour rather than as a historical reality.

On the other hand, Kuşmâni adopts an opposite view. For him, the May 1807 Rebellion was a terrible event causing not only the deposition – and later “martyrdom” - of his beloved Selim III, but also the murder of innocent state officials. It was a great crime since both the Sultan and his officials were striving hard for the well-being of the Empire and to gain victory against the foreign powers. He considers the Rebellion as a final stage of the struggle between those who were trying to revive the Empire on the principle of reprisal (“mukabele-i bi’l-misl”) and those who opposed them. The antagonists, for him, included all types of ignorant people but especially the Janissaries and those who opposed

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13 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 114.
14 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 12b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 112.
15 Hasan Şakir Bey (d. 1222/1807) started his career as hassa haseki and rose to the position of karakulak and haseki ağa. He became the Bostancıbaşı on 3 B 1221/16 September 1806. He was in the execution list of the rebels and was murdered. For more details, see Appendix I.
16 Mahmud Raif Efendi’s (d. 1222/1807) career started with the offices of tahvil kalemi and mektubi-i sadr-i ali. He accompanied Yusuf Ağah Efendi, the Turkish ambassador to London, as his chief scribe (“sirkatibi”). Raif Efendi became reisülküttab in Ra 1215/August 1800. After his dismissal on 8 Ca 1220/4 August 1805, he was appointed as the Boğaz naziri. He was murdered by the yamaks during the rebellion. For more details see Appendix I.
17 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 113.
18 Kuşmâni, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 25b, 27b; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp.137, 140.
19 Kuşmâni, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 26a-26b; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 137-8.
the revival of the Empire due to their egoistic concerns. The antagonist group gained new strength with the appointment of Köse Musa Pasha\textsuperscript{20} as the deputy of the Grand Vizier ("rikâb-i hûmayun kaimmakam").\textsuperscript{21} Apart from Musa Pasha, Kuşmâni also blames Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi\textsuperscript{22} as for their involvement in the Rebellion, especially at the deposition of Selim III.\textsuperscript{23} While Ebubekir Efendi, the first author, celebrates the Rebellion as a rejoicing incident, Kuşmâni is so much against the Rebellion that he is not able to bear the idea that it was a smooth Rebellion that ended without harming anyone except those in the execution list.\textsuperscript{24} His only consolation seems to be the fact that with the help of the "glorious" Alemdar Mustafa Pasha\textsuperscript{25} and the rise of Mahmud II, the rebels and their supporters were not able to collect the harvests of their success.\textsuperscript{26} They revenged themselves upon those who had murdered Selim III and plundered the possessions of the murdered officials.\textsuperscript{27}

In the \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, there are two different evaluations concerning the same incident. One reflects some arguments of the rebels, while the other is an ardent

\textsuperscript{20} Köse Musa Pasha (d. 1223/1808) became the governor of Tripoli in 1 R 1209/29 October 1794 with the rank of vizier. After a period of exile he was appointed as the governor of Silistria and later became the \textit{rikâb kaimmakam} (9 M 1222/19 March 1807). For more details, see Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{21} Kuşmâni, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 26a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p.137.

\textsuperscript{22} Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi (d. 1226/1811) was one of the most famous \textit{ulema} of the period. After various positions in the ilmiye, he became the kazasker of Rumeli 1 Ş 1219/5 November 1804. Ataullah Efendi was appointed as şeyhülislam on 1 B 1221/14 September 1806. For more details, see Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{23} Kuşmâni, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 26a, 29b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, pp.137, 144.

\textsuperscript{24} Kuşmâni, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 26b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p.138.

\textsuperscript{25} Alemdar Mustafa Pasha (d. 1223/1808) served Tirsinikli İsmail Ağâ, the \textit{ayan} of Rusuk, as his bayrakdar. After the death of Tirsiniklioğlu (1806), he became the \textit{ayan} of Hezargrad and also the governor of Silistria (1806). On 25 Za 1221/4 February 1807, Mustafa Ağâ became the serasker of Tuna with the rank of vizier. For more details see Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{26} Kuşmâni, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 28b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{27} Kuşmâni, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 29a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 144.
propagandist of the *Nizam-i Cedid* reforms and condemns the Rebellion. At this point we should probably ask whether these two approaches reflect only the personal opinions of these two authors or whether they were spokesmen of the different fractions of their period. Since we have very limited information about the lives of these authors it is very difficult to make some clear-cut assertions. Yet there are some clues that help us to make some suggestions. Kuşmâni describes himself as a wandering dervish traveling for the study of sciences.28 He left the capital for a journey shortly after the accession of Selim III to the throne and returned five years later (1794-1795).29 Depending on the information provided by him, we can say that he was taken captive in Russia sometime before 1806.30 He stayed in İstanbul between 1803 and 1805 and was once imprisoned on the grounds that he was a spy of Tayyar Mahmud Pasha31, but was released by Selim III.32 He then presented his work called *Zebîre*33 to the Sultan.34 We have very limited information concerning his later years. Yet, it seems that he made an effort to preach and write in order to explain the benefits of disciplined armies, secretly during the reign of Mustafa IV and more freely during the early years of Mahmud II and Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. It is Kethüda Said who narrates an incident about him. The incident took place at the Fatih Mosque where Kuşmâni

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30 Kuşmâni, *Zebîre*, Bayezid 9430, p. 17b; İşbilir, *Zebîre*, p. IX.

31 Mahmud Tayyar Pasha (d. 1223/1808) was the last representative of the Caniklîzâde family in the northern Black Sea region. For more details on his life and the revolt, see the related section in the next chapter and also Appendix I.

32 Kuşmâni, *Zebîre*, Bayezid 9430, p. 18a; İşbilir, *Zebîre*, p. IX.

33 Dihkanîzâde Ubeydullah Kuşmâni, *Zebîre-i Kuşmâni Fi Tarîf-i İlhâmî*, Bayezid Devlet Kütüphanesi, Veliyüddin Efendi no. 9430. A transcription of the same work, based on the copy at the İstanbul Archeological Museum (no. 375) is published by Ömer İşbilir. See Dihkanîzâde Ubeydullah Kuşmâni, *Zebîre-i Kuşmâni Fi Tarîf-i İlhâmî*, Ömer İşbilir (ed.), (Ankara, TTK, 2006), Thereafter, the copy I used is referred as Kuşmâni, *Zebîre*, Bayezid 9430, and the other one as İşbilir, *Zebîre*.

34 Kuşmâni, *Zebîre*, Bayezid 9430, p. 67b; İşbilir, *Zebîre*, p. IX.
talked boldly on the benefits of the disciplined soldiers and encouraged the young people to enroll it. However, he did not hesitate to criticize the Janissaries. Consequently, he found himself in a quarrel with a chief master of the barracks room (“odabası”) in the same mosque. It seems that he was exiled a short time after the incident.

It appears that Kuşmâni was a well-educated person and well-acquainted with the religious sciences. Especially in his Zebîre, he makes frequent references to the traditions of the Prophet, and to verses from the Quran in order to support his claims, while enriching his work with various poems. Looking at his style, he usually prefers to write as if he is delivering sermons. Especially in the Zebîre, we observe an author who is a great admirer of Selim III and a great supporter of his reforms. Throughout this propaganda-like pamphlet, he tries very hard to prove that these reforms are not against the spirit of Islam and criticizes the Janissaries and some members of the ulema class for not understanding them and preventing their successful application. Indeed, he wrote his treatise with the encouragement of Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha, a supporter of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms.

In the postscript of the Fezleke, he laments the sad fate of the Sultan and his military reforms.

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37 Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha (d. 1808) was originally a judge. In L 1217/February 1803, Selim III ordered the inclusion of the provinces of Anatolia and Karaman to the Nizam-ı Cedid recruitment zone. In order to benefit from his services in this regard Abdurrahman Pasha was also appointed as the mutasarrif of Alanya with the rank of beylerbey of Rumelia and commender for the enrollment of soldiers for the Levend and Üsküdar regiments. Upon his willingness and success in these tasks he was appointed as the governor of Karaman (7 Ca 1218/25 August 1803). In 1804 he was delegated the duty of the suppression of the Mountainers, with the Nizam-ı Cedid army. Thanks to his success in this duty he was granted the malikane of Konya and Akşehir, with the rank of vizier (1804). For more details see Appendix I.

38 İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 2.
Though he does not declare explicitly, Kuşmâni seems to be affiliated with the Naqshbendi religious order. We get this idea from the epilogue of his Zebire where he prays for Ebu-tevfik Şeyy Esseyid İbrahim Efendi en-Nakşibendi, who was the sheik of the Naqshbendi tekke in Eyüp established by Şeyhülislam Samanizâde Ömer Hulusi Efendi. Kuşmâni mentions this sheik with great respect and appreciates his auspices and zeal. On the other hand, Ebubekir Efendi does not seem to have Naqshbendi affiliations. On the contrary, he is very hostile at least towards one Naqshbendi sheik called Şeyh Selami Efendi, the sheik of another Naqshbendi tekke, again around Eyüb. He accuses Şeyh Selami Efendi of being a superstitious, greedy and evil-minded person, who abused his connections with the elite of the period, particularly İbrahim Nesim Efendi who established the above-mentioned tekke for Selami Efendi. Even if we admit that there might have been a personal conflict between him and Şeyh Selami Efendi, it is possible to say that Ebubekir Efendi was not a great admirer of the Naqshbendis.

A related issue is the well expressed hatred of Ebubekir Efendi towards the state officials murdered during the Rebellion, while Kuşmâni and the unknown author portray them as innocent and dignified functionaries working for the benefit of the Empire. No one except for Ahmed Safi Efendi is immune to Ebubekir’s severe criticism, including Feyzullah Efendi, İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi, Yusuf Ağa, Mahmud Raif Efendi, Ahmed Safi Efendi (d. 1222/1807) started his career as a scribe in the divan kalemi (the office of imperial chancery presided over by beylikçi). In 1214/1800, he was appointed as the head of the government chancery office (“beylikçi”). He became deputy to reisülküttab (“reisülküttab vekili”) on 24 L 1221/4 January 1807. See also Appendix I.

Ahmed Safi Efendi (d. 1222/1807) was appointed as the director of the İrad-i Cedid in 13 Ra 1220/11 June 1805 and was dismissed in 3 B 1220/27 September 1807. He

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39 Samanizâde Ömer Hulusi Efendi (b.1140 /1727-d.1227/1812): He was the son of Hasan Efendi, an ilmiye member. He became şeyhülislam on 18 S 1215/11 July 1800 and remained in the office for three years. His second appointment as the şeyhülislam was on 7 Ca 1222/13 July 1807, but was dismissed on the following day. For more details see Appendix I.

40 İşbilir, Zebire, p. 84. This information is not provided in the Bayezid copy.

41 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 23b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.133.

42 Kuşmâni, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 24b, 27b; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 135, 140.

43 Ahmed Safi Efendi (d. 1222/1807) started his career as a scribe in the divan kalemi (the office of imperial chancery presided over by beylikçi). In 1214/1800, he was appointed as the head of the government chancery office (“beylikçi”). He became deputy to reisülküttab (“reisülküttab vekili”) on 24 L 1221/4 January 1807. See also Appendix I.

44 Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi (d. 1222/1807) was appointed as the director of the İrad-i Cedid in 13 Ra 1220/11 June 1805 and was dismissed in 3 B 1220/27 September 1807.
İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Hacı İbrahim Efendi, Sirkatibi Ahmed Efendi, the members of the so-called the *Nizam-ı Cedid* elite. It must be stated that most contemporary and later historians also criticize the influential people around Selim III for being greedy, luxurious and not dealing with the state’s problems seriously, for taking bribes and oppressing innocent people. But his severe criticisms are almost exclusively directed against the ruling elite of the Selimian era. Moreover, a careful study of his account makes it clear that Ebubekir Efendi’s problem was not with the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms. He celebrates the Rebellion not because it was against the *Nizam-ı Cedid* but rather because it eliminated the ruling elite. The most important point for our purposes is the suspicious silence on the was executed due to his failure in the British Naval Expedition. For more information see Appendix I.

45 İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi (d. 1221/1806) participated in the negotiations of Svishtov (Ziştov) with the title of second delegate (“murahhas-ı sani”), holding the Mecca rank (“paye”) in C 1205/February 1791 and was awarded with the İstanbul paye thanks to his success. On Z 1207/July-August, he became İstanbul judge but later was exiled to Bursa. In M 1212/June-July 1797, he was promoted to the Anadolu paye. He obtained the Rumeli paye and in 1213/1798-99, then became the kazasker of Rumelia. On 3 B 1221/16 September 1806, he became *nakibül-eşraf*. For more details, see Appendix I.

46 Yusuf Ağa (d. 1222/1807) served as the kethüda of Esma Sultan and finally as the director of the Imperial Mint, he was appointed as the Valide Sultan Kethüda on 18 S 1205/27 October 1789. He was in the execution list and demanded by the rebels. For more information, see Appendix I.

47 Elhac İbrahim Reşid Efendi (d. 1222/1807) was a bureaucrat and served in various positions of the Porte. He was appointed as sadaret kethüda (25 M 1207/12 September 1792-23 Ş 1207/5 April 1793). After being employed in various duties, he became *İrâd-ı Cedid defterdar* (8 Za 1213/13 April 1799). He was bahriye nazırı at the time of the rebellion. İbrahim Efendi was murdered during the rebellion. For more details, see Appendix I.

48 Sirkatibi Ahmed Efendi (d. 1222/1807) was one of the most influential figures of Selim III’s era. For a long time he served as the confidential secretary (“sirkatibi”) of Selim III. He was in the execution list demanded by the rebels and was murdered during the rebellion. For more information see Appendix I.

49 For instance, he argues that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers were waiting eagerly for an order to move against the rebels and if they had been against the rebels, the rebellion would have been easily suppressed. He gives this information in a tone that reveals that he would have preferred their use against the rebels. See Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, pp. 15b-16a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 118. We should also add that there is no criticism of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reform program.
role of the Kaimmakam Kösä Musa Pasha and Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi before and after the Rebellion. Even though the author does not hesitate to accuse and criticize the leading figures of the period, and especially those murdered during the Rebellion, he does not make such accusations for these two figures. One more point that should be underlined is the fact that he notes the appointment of Halet Efendi as the deputy to reisülküttab (“rikab reisi”) with the following expression “the office of the presidency is now occupied by a competent person” From these clues we might claim that he was a supporter of the rebels and was in opposition to the so-called Nizam-i Cedid elite.

It should be asked as to why Ebubekir Efendi and Kuşmâni adopted such opposing discourses concerning the Rebellion. Some part of the answer seems to lie in the personal/social relations of the authors. From the postscript in Fezleke, we learn that Ebubekir Efendi also had some connections with the murdered elite, frequented their meetings (“meclis”); however, due to his “bad nature” he was excluded by them, after which he apparently sought some connections with the new elite during Mustafa IV’s rule. Even though the unknown author of the postscript admits that Ebubekir was a well-educated and famous person, he accuses him of being “bad-natured” and of later turning against the elite of Selim III. Yet, Ebubekir Efendi’s accusation that Selami Efendi, the above-mentioned Naqshbendi sheik, was able to enter the circles of İbrahim Nesim Efendi through his magical powers, gives the reader an impression of the disappointment and frustration of Ebubekir Efendi who lost his place to Selami Efendi. Due to our insufficient knowledge about Ebubekir Efendi, it is difficult to make some generalizations on the nature of the relations of Ebubekir Efendi and the murdered elite. His titles of “Lokmacı” and

50 Mehmed Said Halet Efendi (ö.1238/1822) served as mühürdar yamak to Reisülküttab Mehmed Raşid Efendi and kapi kethüda of Ohrili Ahmed Pasha and Ebubekir Semi Pasha. In the year 1217/1802, Halet Efendi went Paris to as the Ottoman ambassador (1802-1806). He was appointed as the reis vekili on 20 Ra 1222/28 May 1807. For more details, see Appendix I.

51 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 19b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.126:“makam-i riyaset tamam ehlini buldu”.

52 Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 24a-24b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.134. This part is written by the unknown author.
“Matrûş” and his whole attitude towards the Janissaries in his account make one think that he might have had some kind of affiliation with the Bektashis. However, it is very difficult to reach a final conclusion in this regard. Yet, the above points might illuminate the point as to why he was against the ruling elite but not to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms. On the other hand, as we shall see in the following chapters, most of the ruling elite who were murdered during the Rebellion had Naqshbendi affiliations. Since Kuşmânî also seems to have been closer to the Naqshbendis, it might be reasonable to consider that he supported the *Nizam-ı Cedid* elite.

From the two approaches, it was the discourse of Kuşmânî that became the prevalent one reaching our period. He was the one who conceived the May 1807 Rebellion as a final stage of the struggle between those who tried to reform the Empire and those who opposed it. As might be understood, there does not exist any gray zone in his treatise in terms of political groupings. On the other hand, Ebubekir Efendi’s arguments are also crucial since his text shows us the problems of the period and makes us aware that the Rebellion did not revolve only around the *Nizam-ı Cedid* issue. He also helps us to see how the identity of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* elite was conceived by some contemporary people, as real human beings with their own weaknesses, personal concerns and interests, rather than a frozen and ideal reformist prototypes that will become prevalent in the subsequent historiography.

Another contemporary historian is Kethûda Said Efendi. Like the above two authors, we have very little information about him. He was the steward (“kethûda”) of Veliefendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi, who was an influential kazasker.\(^\text{53}\) Even though we know that Kethûda Said served as a judge, it is not clear whether he acted as a judge during the life time of Mehmed Emin Efendi or after the death of his master. In his master’s thesis about the *History* of Kethûda Said Efendi, Ahmed Özcan suggests that Said Efendi might

\(^{53}\) Veliefendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi (d.1220/1805) was the son of Şeyhülislam Veliyüddin Efendi. He became the judge of Üsküdar (1181/1767-68) and obtained Mecca (1188/1774), then İstanbul paye (§ 1200/June 1786). He became the Anadolu kazasker in 14 Ca 1203/10 February 1789 and three times served as the Rumeli kazasker. For more details see Appendix I.
be Müsahib Said Efendi, a palace official.\textsuperscript{54} Even though it is difficult to refute his suggestion with the limited knowledge at hand, we may suggest that they were not the same. Our assumption depends on some details: First of all, they had very different careers; one was from the \textit{ilmiye} class and the other from the palace. And if we think that the Ottoman sources were careful enough to mention the position of people they talked about, if Müsahib Said Efendi – the more famous one-, and Kethüda Said Efendi were the same, they would certainly mention it. Moreover, even though Özcan says that he was not able to come across any details about Kethüda Said Efendi, there is a record in the records of the Bostancıbaşı (“Bostancıbaşı Defteri”) of the year 1217/1802-1803, from which we learn that he had a residence around Kandilli. It is a short entry, confirming that he was the \textit{kethüda} of Veliefendizâde and a judge.\textsuperscript{55}

We have little information about Said Efendi’s life after the death of his master (1805). However, thanks to the influence of his master, Said Efendi seems to have had access to a wide network of relationships which helped him to gain information about some governmental issues. There is a record where there is a very short reference to Kethüda Said Efendi, dating four years after the death of his master. It is a record related to the probate estate (“\textit{muhallefat}”) of deceased Yusuf Ağâ, the Valide Sultan kethüda. It reads that “\textit{Mehmed Said Efendi, the steward of the late Veliefendizâde presented a petition, saying that he had purchased a one-volume dictionary from among the books and possessions of the late steward of Valide Sultan which was seized and sold by the public treasury.”\textsuperscript{56} The remaining part is about the bureaucratic procedures necessary for the


\textsuperscript{56} B.O.A. MAD 7926, p. 9 (25 Ra 1224/10 May 1809): “\textit{Veli Efendizâde merhûmun kethüdâsî Mehmed Said Efendi’ nin takdim eylediği arzuhal mefhûmunda Valide Sultan kethüdâsî müteveffî Ağa’nın canib-i mirîden zabî ve sûrüht olunan eşyası kitâblarından mûmâileyhin dört yüz eelli gurusûluk kıymet ile istirá eylediliği bir cild kamûs lügati sudûr-i kirâmdan Ízzet Bey zide fazlahunun istirá eylediliği eşyası ... hızîne-i âmirîye nakl olunmuş olunduğunu mirî kâtibi Efendi tarafından lede’l-tahkik zikr olunan kitâbın mûmâileyhe
delivery of the dictionary in question to Said Efendi. This short information is important since it suggests that – in 1224/1809 - Said Efendi probably continued to serve as the steward of the Veliefendizade family or since he did not have any other occupation he was still referred to by the same occupational title. It also shows that he participated in the auction of the possessions of famous Valide Sultan Kethüda Yusuf Ağá and bought a dictionary for himself. Another detail is also provided by him. While talking about Kuşmânî’s sermon at the Fatih Mosque and the subsequent events a few days before the Alemdar Incident, he says that some representatives of the state came to his presence at the same mosque and there he warned them that the inconsiderate sermons and acts of Kuşmânî might cause some further problems. The author laments that nobody paid attention to his warnings and on the 27th of N 1223/16 November 1808, the Janissaries began to rebel.57 Unfortunately he does not say anything about the reason of his presence at the Fatih Mosque, but the coming of some statesmen to his presence suggests that he was an influential and respected person.

As for his works, there are two books attributed to Kethüda Said Efendi. The first one, his History, begins with the Russian modernization during the age of Peter the Great (r.1682-1725) and ends in the year 1810.58 The first part of the book is more like an analysis of the Ottoman foreign relations - especially the Russo-Ottoman relations - from the 1770s to the first years of the reign of Selim III. A limited part of the book is related to the conditions of the Ottoman army and the navy where he criticizes the undisciplined Janissaries. The second part might be summarized as a survey of the reign of Selim III, concentrating mostly on the reform movements. There he talks about these reforms in more official language and mostly provides us with the regulations of different regiments of the army. The third part is devoted to the May 1807 Rebellion, or in his words the “Vaka-yı reddi içerisinde kayd olunub hazinedârbaşı ağá tarafına ilm ü haberî habînînda ... sâdîr olan fermân-i ali mücibînî kitab-i mezârûn mümâileyhe reddi içûn hazinedârbaşı ağaya ilm ü haber kaîmesî verildi. 25 Ra 1224[10 May 1809]”


58 It ends with the murder of Hacı Ahmetoğlu and Süleyman Ağá on 5 S 1225/31 March 1810.
- the Selimiye Incident. The fourth part is on the reign of Mustafa IV, and the final part, about the coalitions of the so-called *Ruscuk Yârânı* (the Comrades of Ruscuk) and the early reign of Mahmud II. A limited part of his *History* was translated into English. The text in English starts with the efforts of *Ruscuk Yârânı* to restore Selim III to the throne and ends with the arrival of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha at the Porte on 4 C 1223/28 July 1808 and the dismissal of Grand Vizier Çelebi Mustafa Pasha.

A limited part of his History is reproduced in a manuscript called *Neticetü'l-Vekayi*. The book in question has two different authors. The first one is Kethûda Said and the other author is a certain Yahya or Peçe. Kethûda Said Efendi’s account occupies one “chapter” in the whole manuscript. The author briefly introduces Said Efendi at the beginning and the end of his text, however does not give any information about himself. The only clue is a brief note that “*Tarih-i Yahya/Peçe has come to end, friends reading it [should] make necessary corrections...Year 1234 11 C Monday [7 April 1819]***, thanks to which we only

59 *A Short History of the Secret Motives of Which Induced the Deceased Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and the leaders of the Imperial Camp, to March from the City of Adrianople to Constantinople, with the Stratagems They Employed in Order to Depose Sultan Mustafa and Restore to the Throne Sultan Selim the Martyr, in the Year (of the Hijra) 1222. AD 1807*, in Miscellaneous Translations from the Oriental Languages, vol. I, London 1831[British Library, no. 14003.d.5]. It was translated from Turkish by Colonel Thomas Gordon, acting chief of the staff of the Royal Greek Army. I would like to thank my friend Zeynep Nevin Yelçe for providing a copy of the work. Hereafter, it is cited as Kethûda Said Efendi, *A Short History of*.

60 The translated part corresponds to pp. 114- 130a of Kethûda Said Efendi, *Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis*, Bayezid 3367. Çelebi Mustafa Pasha became grand vizier on 18 June 1807 and was dismissed on 28 July 1808. For more information see Appendix I.


62 Unfortunately I am not sure about whether it is Peçe or Yahya and I did not come accross a historian with either of these names. Bursali Mehmed Tahir Bey notes that the name of the second author is unknown. See Bursali Mehmed Tahir Bey, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, 3 vols., (İstanbul: Meral Yaymevi, 1972-75), vol. III, p. 91.
learn his name. The work is divided into three broad sections: the first section, written by the above-mentioned Yahya/Peçe, starts with the Edirne Incident (1806) and ends with the dismissals of certain state officials after the British Naval Expedition to İstanbul (1807). This is followed by a brief explanation that hitherto he had recorded the events and the subsequent events were written by “Kethüda Said Efendi, a judge, and the steward of the house of late Veliyüddin Efendizâde Mehmed Efendi, the former Rumeli kazasker.” Following this brief introduction, the account of Kethüda Said Efendi starts. This part covers the events of the year 1807 until the re-appointment of Ataullah Efendi as the şeyhülislam. It ends with another expression of the same author, saying that “the incidents down to the banishment of Seyyidâ Efendi were recorded down by Said Efendi and from now on we will continue to record.” Then, the author commences the narration of the events from where Kethüda Said left off. The main body of his text ends with the appointment and arrival of Yusuf Ziya Pasha to the capital on 8 Ra 1224/23 April 1809. However, after that there is an additional short text discussing the Wahhabis and Mehmed Ali Pasha. It seems that the author finished his work in 1224/1809 and later included the additional notes for the year 1819.

To turn back to the History of Kethüda Said Efendi, the author does not accuse any group or person as being responsible for the outbreak of the May 1807 Rebellion and in a way tries to give a well-balanced account of the Rebellion. As opposed to Ebubekir Efendi, he does not make negative comments about the statesmen murdered during the Rebellion,

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63 *Neticetü'l-Vekayi*, p. 54. We should also note that it is the second author who names the book as *Neticetü'l-Vekayi (Consequences of the Events)*.

64 *Neticetü'l-Vekayi*, p. 13.


66 Yusuf Ziya Pasha (Kör) (d.1234/1819) became vizier in 1207/1792-3 and was employed in the governorships of Diyarbakır (1208/1793-4), Erzurum and Çıldır (1211/1796-7) and then of Trabzon (1212/1797-8). On 18 Ra 1213/30 August 1798, he was appointed as Grand Vizier. He remained in the office until 24 M 1220/24 April 1805 and then became the governor of Trabzon. On M 1222/March 1807, he was appointed as the governor of Erzurum and Şark serasker. For more details see Appendix I.
except for Şırkatibi Ahmed Efendi. Yet, we should also note that he has an apologetic tone about the Rebellion. One good example in this regard is the author’s comments on the Rebellion that “ended in twenty-four hours”. He argues that the Rebellion was a success in terms of cooling down without harming anyone except those demanded by the rebels and ending without creating a major disorder in the city. For him, it was a miraculous event and a rare incident in world history. Another example which confirms his apologetic tone towards the rebels can be seen in his narration of the murder of İbrahim Nesim Efendi. Accordingly, during the capture and execution of İbrahim Nesim Efendi, his guard (“mehterbaşı”) tried to protect his master from the attacks of the rebels by covering his master’s body by lying over him. However, since the rebels, the author says, had promised not to kill anybody other than those in their execution list, they tried to get rid of him, yet when they were not successful, his murder became “inevitable and necessary”. The author also has a very balanced and respectful approach to members of the ulema, who were usually accused of being involved in the Rebellion. He never claims an active role for the ulema, including Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi. In fact he does not even attribute a passive role to them. Due to these clues one suspects whether Kethüda Said Efendi had sympathy for the Janissaries and the ulema who were accused to be active in the Rebellion.

Despite the fact that he borrows a huge quotation from Kethüda Said Efendi, the second author of Neticetü’l-Vekayi criticizes him severely, apparently for his approach to the Rebellion. According to him, the account of Kethüda Said Efendi on the Rebellion was not a trustworthy narration of the events; he reported the events according to the constraints of the period. In order to flatter, Kethüda Said narrated subjectively and unfairly. We clearly understand that he finds in the account of Kethüda Said a conscious effort to


70 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 13: “...Said Efendi’nin kaleme aldığı risâle olub ancak hakikat-i hâl üzere olmayub vakt göre müdâhene ederek ve reh-i rastdan ayrılb egni yola giderek telîfi olan risâledir.”
represent the subjectively or at least to conceal the truth. But, why does an author devote one chapter of his book to the text of another author whom he finds not trustworthy? It might be possible to argue that the second author did not have direct information on the period written by Kethüda Said. But as might be recalled, he wrote the events of the previous year himself. Moreover, if he is able to underline that the truth is not as it is explained by Said Efendi, it means that he knows what the truth is. Yet, there is not a single correction of Kethüda Said’s explanation or arguments or a further reference to the same issue in the parts written by himself. However, even if there were no critique of Said’s explanations, we would be able to easily understand the difference between the approach of the two authors to the May 1807 Rebellion and some other related issues.

To begin with their style, Yahya/Peçe has an official chronicler’s style and tries to narrate the events almost day by day. Moreover, while Kethüda Said’s account is more like an analysis of the events of the year 1807, concentrating mostly on the events pertaining to the Rebellion, the second author registers different events ranging from the dismissals and appointments at the palace, foreign relations, and the condition of the Ottoman navy to various official ceremonies. It is important to note that the second author seems to be more acquainted with the cadres of the palace and the Naval Arsenal (“Tersane-i Amire”). The more striking difference is in their approaches to the events. In order to avoid repetition, it would be enough to underline that Kethüda Said tries to be objective in the evaluation of the Rebellion, but remains meaningfully silent concerning the role of the ulema and sometimes even about the rebels. At one occasion he even asserts that the Nizam-ı Cedid army was the real cause of the problems. Our second author, on the other hand, appears to have more clear cut ideas about the causes of the Rebellion and accuses certain individuals of being responsible for its outbreak. His main targets are the kaimmakam and şeyhülislam of the rebellious period: namely Köse Musa Pasha and Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi.

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72 *Neticetü’l-Vekayi*, pp. 31, 35, 38.
Besides these, Yahya/Peçe introduces a “martyr” image of Selim III who suffered and lost his life for the well being of his people and country. He was the “commander of the martyrs”. Another adjective he uses for the Sultan is “Hafiz-ı Kuran”, praising his religiosity. He was also an ethical person, being a poet and a noble figure. He had worked during his reign to improve the conditions of his domains, and was ready to resist the foreign enemies, and had established the Nizam-ı Cedid corps for that purpose. However, the Janissaries, jealous of the importance given by the Sultan to the Nizam-ı Cedid army and afraid of their own survival, collaborated with Köse Musa Pasha to dethrone this “perfect” ruler and annihilate the new army. Moreover, after achieving their purpose, they became very proud of themselves and became real oppressors (“zorba”). Needless to say, Yahya/Peçe also severely criticizes and rejoices for the murder of the leading members of the palace who are accused of the murder of Selim III. With the very limited knowledge at hand about the career and life of these two authors it is very difficult to explain the above differences. The second author seems to be very devoted to Mahmud II and he has a very clear cut explanation for the cause of the May 1807 Rebellion. It was plot planned against the Nizam-ı Cedid due to the instigation of Köse Musa Pasha who later collaborated with the Janissaries and probably with the participation of the Şeyhülislam against the Nizam-ı Cedid army. It was also a rebellion which aimed at the dethronement of Selim III.

Kethüda Said Efendi should be considered as one of the most important historians of the period. Even though the most famous historian of the period is Asım, we will argue that it is Kethüda Said Efendi’s text which constituted the backbone of our historical knowledge on contemporary and later historians, including Asım. Hammer also underlines the importance of Kethüda Said’s work and notes that his book was used by Saint-Denys, Andreossi and some other people while they were writing their diplomatic

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73 *Nietecetül-Vekayi*, pp. 34a-34.
74 *Nietecetül-Vekayi*, p. 41a-41.
75 *Nietecetül-Vekayi*, p. 41a.
76 *Nietecetül-Vekayi*, pp. 32-33.
correspondences. As we shall try to explain in the following passages, he was one of the basic sources of Asım as well. To give one example, the story of the efforts of the *Ruscuk Yarânı*, convincing Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to help the rise of deposed Selim III, belongs to him and was repeated by Asım and later by Cevdet Pasha. For our purposes, one of his greatest contributions seems to be to allow us to have an idea about the general atmosphere of the capital during the Rebellion. Another contribution of his account is to provide us with a panorama of the history of the period under study without sticking to a single factor or issue.

Ahmed Asım’s *History* is the most well-known source for Selim III’s reign. His *History* consists of two volumes. The first volume starts with the Ottoman-Russian relations in the late 1780s and ends with the revolt of Tayyar Pasha (1805). It is the second volume which is mainly devoted to the May 1807 Rebellion and its aftermath. It starts with some comments on Selim III and ends with the murder of Hacı Ahmedoğlu in the year 1808. Ahmed Asım Efendi (1755?-1819) was from an old and leading family of Ayıntab [present-day Gaziantep]. What we know about his life is mostly from the details he mentions in his *History*. In his native city, he served as the secretary to the court of justice of Ayıntab and later to the council (“divan”) of Battal Paşazâde Mehmed Nuri Pasha, the ayan of the city of that period. However, when the Pasha got into trouble with the center, leading to a major turmoil in the city, Asım moved to İstanbul in 1204/1789-90. After suffering some financial problems in the capital, Asım enjoyed the patronage of Tatarcı Abdullah Molla, one of the most influential *ulema* of Selim III’s period. Through his

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80 Tatarcı Abdullah Molla (d. 1211/1795-6) became tezkireci to Vassafzâde Esad Efendi. After a short period of exile in Limni, he was appointed as Haremeyn müfettiş. He became *molla* of Jerusalem (1185/1771), Egypt (1186/1772), Medina (1186/1173),
mediation he received a diploma of müderris, probably after presenting work called Burhan-ı Kati, to the Sultan in 1796.\textsuperscript{81} Though he was able to overcome his financial problems thanks to the benevolence of the Sultan, Asım argues that the ulema of the period assigned him a daily salary of 50 or 60 guruş, much less than the amount ordered by the Sultan. Moreover, Asım was assigned the town of Pravadi in Ruscuk [present-day northeastern Bulgaria] as his pension (“arpalık”). Asım was not pleased with the choice of place of his arpalık, either, since Pravadi was under the control of Tirsiniklioğlu, the ayan of Ruscuk, and Asım’s deputy (“naib”) was not even able to enter the town.\textsuperscript{82} However, Asım hesitated to express his feeling that he was betrayed by the ulema.\textsuperscript{83} In 1222/1807, he was appointed as the official historian after the death of Amiri.\textsuperscript{84} Asım’s life was deeply affected by the turmoil of the May 1807 Rebellion and the fall of Selim III, his protector. Probably due to the fact that he was known as the “man” of Selim III, he fell into disgrace during the reign of Mustafa IV. Once he gave lecture classes on the Quran (“huzur dersi”) to the Sultan and was granted some amount of money.\textsuperscript{85} But his financial situation continued to be a problem. He had to sell his books and borrow money from the merchants obtained İstanbul and then Anadolu paye (1202/1787-8) and became the judge-advocate of the amry (“ordu kadısı”). On 9 L 1204/22 June 1790, he was appointed as Anadolu kazasker and Rumeli kazasker in the same year (Z/August). On M 1209/August 1794, he was exiled to Güzelhisar and after his release became the Rumeli kazasker for a second time (1210/1795-96). For more details, see Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{81} Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, “Asım”, İslâm Ansiklopedisi, (Eskişehir: MEB, 2001), p. 666. Asım notes that he presented the work by the mediation (“bi’l-vassta”) and it might be thanks to mediation of Tatarci Abdullah Molla. Selim III, in return, awarded him to be employed in his capacity either as an ambassador or official historian. Consequently, he was also allowed to reside in İstanbul, was assigned a house and a salary of 300-400 guruş. The Sultan also gave him a good amount of gifts so that he would be able to bring his family from Ayıntab. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 216.

\textsuperscript{82} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 334.

\textsuperscript{83} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 334. Again the gifts of the Sultan saved him from more serious financial problems. For instance, when his house was burnt in a fire, Selim III sent him money. Then he went to Hejaz and brought his family to İstanbul.

\textsuperscript{84} Köprülü, “Asım”, p. 667. Asım served as the official historian until his death in 1819.

of Ayntab and Aleppo.\(^{86}\) Only after the accession of Mahmud II to the throne, he began to enjoy a more comfortable life. He was provided with a house and salary, needless to mention the gifts of Mahmud II. During his reign, he became \textit{müderris} of Süleymaniye.\(^{87}\) Asım died in 1235/1819.\(^{88}\)

The difficulties he faced during his life are clearly reflected in his narrative. A sense of frustration and hatred towards certain people flows from his nervous pen. The clearest example of his frustration and resulting anger is observable in his approach to the established \textit{ulema} of the period. It seems that even though he considered himself as a member of the \textit{ulema} class, he felt excluded and was not able to get the position and fame he deserved for a long time, at least until the rise of Mahmud II. As a result, the sense of frustration caused a deep resentment towards the established \textit{ulema} of his period, especially towards Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and Münib Efendi.\(^{89}\) Indeed, he puts forward that Ataullah Efendi was very hostile to the \textit{ilmiye} members coming from the countryside and therefore both Ataullah Efendi and his tutor, Münib Efendi, were not pleased with Selim III’s favourable attitude towards him.\(^{90}\) According to Asım, as in the case of the \textit{arpalık} of Pravadi, they tried to prevent his receiving even a decent income and professional success. Another example, again mentioned by the author, occurred during the reign of Mustafa IV. A friend of Asım pledged Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi to appoint Asım Efendi to a certain vacant judgeship in return for Pravadi, but Ataullah Efendi opposed the idea on the grounds


\(^89\) Münib Mehmed Efendi (d. 1238/1823) was an important member of the \textit{ulema} of the early nineteenth century. He became \textit{müderris} and tutor to Ataullah Efendi (1189/1775). After obtaining several \textit{ilmiye} ranks, he became delegate for the negotiations (M 1222/March 1807). He was exiled after the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, first to Ankara and later to Ayntab (23 Ca 1227/4 June 1812). For more details see Appendix I.

that it was against established custom. We cannot be sure whether there were some other reasons for Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi’s “hostility” towards Asım Efendi. But it is clear that Asım took it very personally. Asım Efendi provides a long list of the members of the ulema class whom he criticizes as being “ignorant” and “greedy” in various parts of the History.

It appears that Asım’s resentment secured him ability of being skeptical in general and he acquired a critical approach to the events happening around himself and also in the Empire. Thanks to his critical analysis, his narration acquired richness in description and explanation far from the dry language and dull factography of an official historian. A good example in this regard is his critical approach to Selim III. Even though he repeats his gratitude and love for the Sultan on every occasion, he does not refrain from criticizing the Sultan. Interestingly enough, even in the passages where he praises the Sultan, it is not difficult to notice that, according to Asım, Selim III lacked the necessary qualities for being a good ruler, a point we will study in the later chapters. The ruling elite – members of the court and also the bureaucracy- is his target group, a point bringing him closer to the above mentioned Ebubekir Efendi. Like the latter, his problem is not with the Nizam-ı Cedid program, but with the ruling elite who run the program. In very general terms, Asım acknowledges the necessity of reviving the Empire so that it will become stronger against the enemies. Yet, he criticizes the Sultan that who, even though had initiated the Nizam-ı Cedid program for that purpose, was not able to prevent the oppression, injustices and the abuses of the ruling elite in the name of the İtrad-ı Cedid (The New Treasury). He accuses these people for not striving for the interests of the Empire, but on the contrary for working for their selfish benefits.

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Asım portrays an Empire with serious problems, especially on the eve of the May 1807 Rebellion. As might be clear from the above explanations, he does not consider the Nizam-i Cedid attempt as the sole reason of the Rebellion. His long and detailed list on the causes helps us to put the Rebellion into a wider internal and international context. As to the role of the individuals, his foremost candidate is Kaimmakam Musa Pasha. Despite his personal problems with the Şeyhülislam, he does not blame the latter. On the contrary, he praises Ataullah Efendi for preventing further chaos in the city during the course of the uprising. Being an official historian, he must have had access to most of the works of previous historians as well as official documents. In his narration of the Rebellion, Asım’s basic source seems to be Kethûda Said’s History. As might also be clear from the above mentioned brief explanation of his History, even the chronological structure of the book is very similar to that of Kethûda Said’s History. It begins with the same explanations on the Russo-Ottoman relations and ends with the same time period. He even sometimes makes direct quotations from Kethûda Said. For instance, his evaluation of the Rebellion is a good example, where the Rebellion is praised in a similar manner. Even though it is not an exact copy of Kethûda Said, and some words are different, the main arguments of Kethûda Said are there. Asım praises the Rebellion as unequaled in world history in terms of its smoothness; even though at the beginning the rebels were feared as “zorbas”, their disciplined behavior, and their not giving any damage to the population and not resorting to plunder made the people call the rebels “not human beings but a sacred group of angels sent by God in order to renew the religion.” This is an interesting example, since Asım

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does not employ an apologetic tone for the rebels, but directly borrows Kethüda Said’s comments.

One of the most interesting narratives of the period is Câbî Ömer Efendi’s *History*. Like most of the other historians of the period, we know very little about him and this limited knowledge, again, depends on what he says about himself in his work: He was the *câbi*\(^98\)* of Ayasofya-ı Kebir Mosque. On 7 S 1225/14 March 1810, he was exiled to the Island of Sakız [present-day Chios] due to a problem related to an endowed house in Ortaköy.\(^99\) He was released after a short period of time (86 days) and returned to the capital on 5 Ca 1225/8 June 1810. It was not the author’s first visit to the Island and he had been there one year before for an unknown reason.\(^100\) This all that we know about him. On the other hand, Mehmet Ali Beyhan attempted to make an analysis of his personality and education depending on the clues in Câbî’s narrative. According to him, Câbî Ömer Efendi did not have a good education, yet learned writing and reading through his own efforts, thus he made frequent grammatical and spelling mistakes throughout his long text.\(^101\) Yet, as explained by Beyhan, his brilliance and curiosity gave him a good advantage. Câbî seems to have had close connections with the bureaucratic milieu of the period, which should have served as a source of information.\(^102\) At the same time, as Câbî himself states, he narrated

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ta'birde ittifâk olunmuş iken bu vechile hareket ve insâfäne cünbüş ü gayretleri manzûr oldukda bunlar adem değil belki melek yahûd te'yid-i din ü devlet üçün min taraf-ullah Allah mürsel bir kavm-i mûbarekdir diyerek şâbâş u senâlara ilitzâm ve secdegüzâr-ı şûkr-i hazret-i mülkî ’l-alâm eylediler.\]

\(^98\) *Câbî* refers to the tax collectors of a pious foundation.
\(^99\) Câbî, *Câbî Tarihi*, vol. I, XVIII.
\(^100\) For further information, see Câbî, *Câbî Tarihi*, vol. I, pp. XV-XXXVII; Beyhan, Mehmed Ali, “Şânîzâde Tarihi’nin Kaynaklarından Câbî Tarihi”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları-Journal of Turkish Studies*, XV (İstanbul: 1995), pp. 239-283.
gossips circulating in the coffeehouses and various places in the city. All these facts secure Câbî Ömer Efendi’s History a privileged position in the historiography of the period. His History is a memoir-like unofficial account of the reigns of Selim III, Mustafa IV and Mahmud II. He seems to have been close both to the lower and higher levels of the society of the period and thus enables us both to read news from different angles and on a wide variety of topics. This makes his long narrative a rich and an enjoyable text. His other contribution is related to his career: since he was a câbi of an important mosque, he provided detailed information about various endowments (“vakıf”) within the Empire and also about the tax-farmers and mukataa owners. Thanks to this detailed information we are able to detect some of the economic connections of the leading personalities of the period under study.

One can say that these qualities turn the text into one of the most important contributions to the history of the period.

His History, Tarih-i Selîm-i Sâlis and Mahmûd-i Sânî, is a long narrative, covering the period from the enthronement of Selim III to the first five years of Mahmud II (1789-1814). The first volume includes the reigns of Selim III and Mustafa IV. Even though he does not give a well-organized body of information about the causes of the Rebellion, it is possible to get an idea from some clues. According to him, the Nizam-ı Cedid reform program was the underlying cause and the attempt of changing the uniforms of the yamaks triggered the Rebellion. Yet, one gets the sense that he did not conceive the Rebellion only within the framework of a reaction to the Nizam-ı Cedid. On several occasions, he argues that the decision-making process was under the monopoly of a limited number of bureaucrats, palace officials and ulema, and thus causing resentment among the excluded members of the ulema, the Janissaries, and others.


104 For some examples see Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, pp. 55-56, 71-72, 129, 149.

105 Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, pp. 100, 126, 144.

Another contemporary narrative was authored by Tüfengçibaşı Mehmed Arif Efendi.\(^{107}\) It starts with a summary of the reform program initiated by Selim III, concentrates on the Rebellion and ends a few months following the accession of Mustafa IV to the throne. It seems that the copy in the Topkapı Palace Museum was presented to Mustafa IV.\(^{108}\) As most of the other historians of the period, we have very limited information about his life and career. According to Fatin’s Tezkire, Arif Efendi was born in the year 1171/1757-1758, so he should have been around 50 years old when he wrote the narrative.\(^{109}\) We know that he received a palace education in İstanbul. Câbi mentions a certain Arif Efendi who left the palace service with the rank of tüfengçibaşı\(^{110}\) to become a müderris. If this is the same person, it seems that Arif Efendi served as vezir müfettiş\(^{111}\) for some time and appointed as şeyhülislam müfettiş\(^{112}\) on 17 B 1224/28 August 1809.\(^{113}\) In 1230/1816, he was promoted to the Yenişehir-i Fener rank (“mevleviyet”), followed by that of Edirne in 1232/1817, Mecca in 1239/1823-4 and finally İstanbul in 1242/1826-7. He died on 12 Ş 1245/27 April 1828.\(^{114}\)


\(^{109}\) Davud Fatin, Tezkire, (İstanbul: 1271), p. 271; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 379. Fatin informs that he was from İzmir.

\(^{110}\) Tüfengçibaşı were among the palace servants. They acted as the chiefs of the “tüfengçi yamaks”. Yamaks were responsible for the maintainence of the rifles in of the sultans and also those kept in the Revan kiosk. The repair of the other rifles in the palace was also their responsibility. For more details, see Pakalın, Mehmed Zeki, Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü, 3 vols. (İstanbul: MEB, 2004), vol. III, pp. 535-6.

\(^{111}\) Vezir müfettişi is the official responsible for the endowments under the surveillance of the grand viziers.

\(^{112}\) Şeyhülislam müfettişi refers to the official responsible for the surveillance of the endowments under the control of the şeyhülislams.


As most of the other contemporary historians, Arif Efendi perceives the Rebellion as the final stage of the tension between the soldiers of the new and the old army. Apart from a detailed chronology and rich information, Tüfengcibaşı Arif Efendi’s text includes points that make the work very valuable; he seems to have been an eyewitness to some of the phases of the Rebellion, and in particular to those incidents that took place at the Et Meydanı. The correctness of the information and his acquaintance with the things going on around him make one think that he had good connections to get information. For instance, when he narrates the talk between Hafız Derviş Mehmed Efendi, delegated to protect the princes during the Rebellion, and Selim III, his source of information is Derviş Mehmed Efendi himself. Throughout the book, the author seems quite respectful to the Janissary party. He gives credit to the leading figures of the Janissary army for having prevented the excesses of the soldiers, - especially the yamaks. In his narrative he does not accuse Musa Pasha or Ataullah Efendi. As we shall see later, he was well informed about the incidents taking place among the Janissaries, such as their gatherings for the reappointment of Şeyhülislam Efendi or the Çardak incident. Again as we shall see later, he seems to have been close to Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa.


116 Derviş Mehmed Efendi (d. 1231/1816) was appointed as the chief preacher to the Sultan (İmam-ı evvel-i şehriyari) (1195/1785). He was appointed as the kazasker of Rumelia in 1223/1808. For more details, see Appendix I.


119 Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa was a convert to Islam (“muhtedî”). He became the Sekbanbaşı, the second highest-ranking Janissary officer, on 8 Ra 1221/17 January 1807. He was dismissed and exiled to Bursa on 17 R 1222/24 June 1807 due to reasons we will mention in the next chapter. For more details see Appendix I.
Another short narrative covering the period of the establishment of the *Nizam-i Cedid* and ending in 1225/1810 was written by an anonymous author.\(^{120}\) In this narrative, the author does not give his name, but notes that he served as the prayer leader (“imam”) of the Aydınlı Kethüda Mosque in Yayla, a district in Topkapı.\(^ {121}\) Apart from this limited information given by the author, we just learn that on the opposite side of his Mosque was the house of Abdulkerim Efendi, a judge. Abdülkerim Efendi was a friend of Abdurrahman Ağa, the *kahvecibaşı* of the mother of Mustafa IV.\(^ {122}\) Even though our author does not make any implication in this regard, one might suppose that he was able to get some information from these figures or their men.

As most of the other authors, he begins his narrative with the implementation of the *Nizam-i Cedid*. Yet he is the only author that that quotes a talk between İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi to Selim III before the implementation of the program.\(^ {123}\) And thanks to this information we are able to get an idea concerning the figures that served as the leaders of the reform program. Though a minor figure of the period, he seems to have had access to very secret information. For instance, as we shall see in Chapter V, he is the only author who was able to declare that the Çardak Incident was triggered by Mahmud Tayyar Pasha.\(^ {124}\)

Since we do not have information about his life and views it is very difficult to make a suggestion about the faction he supported or from which point of view he wrote the narrative. His professional religious career does not automatically put him on the side of the supporters of the *ulema* class. For instance, when he talks about the stay of some *ulema* at

\(^{120}\) Derin, Fahri Çetin, “Yayla İmamı Risalesi”, *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 3 (İstanbul: 1973), pp. 213-272. For a simplified version of the same account see *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, Yavuz Senemoğlu, in *Vaka-ı Cedid: Yayla İmamı Tarihi ve Yeni Olaylar*, Yavuz Senemoğlu (ed.), (İstanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser).

\(^{121}\) *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 249.

\(^{122}\) *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 249. *Kahvecibaşı* was the official that prepared the coffee of the Sultan or a high dignitary.

\(^{123}\) *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, pp. 215-6.

\(^{124}\) *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 239.
the Et Meydani, he argues that they remained there not under the pressure of the rebels, but by their own will.\textsuperscript{125} One interesting fact is that he confuses the names of the \textit{seyhülislams} of the period, not to be expected from an \textit{imam}.\textsuperscript{126} He does not have a very negative attitude towards the reforms, but on some occasions he refers to them as “\textit{bi'dat}”, an innovation seen reprehensible in religious law. One gets the feeling that he did not like the figures murdered during the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{127} He also notes that the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} was the real cause of the Rebellion, but gives more credit to the manipulations by Musa Pasha.\textsuperscript{128} His usually cool and well-tempered narration of events suddenly changes when he deals with the period of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. From that point onwards his narration turns into a list of oppressions of the period. He describes it as a period of tyranny even though he reports that there was no popular reaction and people thought that order had returned to the city.\textsuperscript{129}

Another important narrative is Georg Oğulukyan’s \textit{Ruzname}.\textsuperscript{130} It is a chronicle dealing with Ottoman history from 1806 to 1810, particularly concentrating on the 1807 Rebellion, the fall of Mustafa IV and the Alemdar Incident. The author was a resident of Ortaköy and served in his capacity as the secretary of the Düzoğlu family in the Imperial Mint.\textsuperscript{131} Thanks to his position, he had access to a wide network of information, especially

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{125} \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, p. 228-9.
\item \textsuperscript{126} \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, p. 225.
\item \textsuperscript{127} \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, p. 228.
\item \textsuperscript{128} \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, pp. 223-4, 226.
\item \textsuperscript{129} \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, pp. 252-3.
\item \textsuperscript{130} The source is in Armenian. It was discovered in Mekhitar Monastery in Venice by Hrand D. Andreasyan. It was translated from Armenian into Turkish and was published by the same author. Georg Oğulukyan, \textit{Georg Oğulukyan’ın Ruznamesi, 1806-1810 İşyanları: III. Selim, IV. Mustafa, II. Mahmud ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, translated from the Armenian by Andreasyan, Hrand D., (İstanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fak. Yay., 1972).
\item \textsuperscript{131} It is an Armenian family. Between 1757 and 1880, the family controlled the position of superintendent of the Imperial Mint and also acted as the chief goldsmith. The family lost its position temporarily for thirteen years (1819-1832). For more details see Şahiner Araks, \textit{The Sarrafs of Istanbul: Financiers of the Empire}, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, (Boğaziçi University, 2000), pp. 93-94.
\end{enumerate}
in the upper layers of society.\textsuperscript{132} Öğuluşyan witnessed most of the events or narrated the remaining ones from the accounts of other people.\textsuperscript{133} He was an eyewitness to the coming of the rebellious \textit{yamaks} to Ortaköy during their march from Büyükdere to Ortaköy.\textsuperscript{134} In addition to this, the author seems to be a curious and careful observer of the events taking place around himself and thus offers us quite rich information on the conditions of the residents of the city- including the non-Muslims, their anxieties and sometimes how they evaluated the turmoil of the period.\textsuperscript{135} Though he did not witness some of the events, he nevertheless did some research, as in the case of the murder of Selim III.\textsuperscript{136} His career, identity and curiosity created a good combination to offer the reader a rich material in his \textit{Ruzname}.

One of Öğuluşyan’s contributions is to give us a chance to witness the turmoil that was especially dominant during the Rebellion and the reign of Mustafa IV and finally during the grand vizirate of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. We are also able to get insights into the economic and social problems of the period.\textsuperscript{137} As a non-Muslim Armenian he is also sensitive to the sufferings of the non-Muslims in the city.\textsuperscript{138} Like most of the other contemporary sources, Öğuluşyan underlines the attempt to impose the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} uniforms on the \textit{yamaks} as the most immediate cause of the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{139} However, for him, this was only a part of a secret plot that aimed at the deposition of Selim III. That is

\begin{itemize}
\item[]\textsuperscript{132} Öğuluşyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. VII.
\item[]\textsuperscript{133} Öğuluşyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. VIII.
\item[]\textsuperscript{134} Öğuluşyan, \textit{Ruzname}, pp. 4-5.
\item[]\textsuperscript{135} Öğuluşyan, \textit{Ruzname}, pp. 14, 22-23,
\item[]\textsuperscript{136} Öğuluşyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 31.
\item[]\textsuperscript{137} Öğuluşyan, \textit{Ruzname}, pp. 18-19, 20, 22, 38-9.
\item[]\textsuperscript{138} Öğuluşyan, \textit{Ruzname}, pp. 20, 23. He is the only author that mentions the attempts of the rebellious \textit{yamaks} to convert a Church into a mosque.
\item[]\textsuperscript{139} Öğuluşyan, \textit{Ruzname}, pp. 2-3.
\end{itemize}
why, for him, the rebels at the very beginning of the Rebellion, were crying for “cülûs”.

Behind the plot were Köse Musa Pasha, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa and some ulema who used the leading rebels, like Kabakçı Mustafa, Bakırcı Laz Mustafa and some others – in order to achieve their goals.

Mustafa Necib Efendi’s narrative constitutes another valuable source for our understanding of the Rebellion. According to available information, he was from İstanbul and served in various bureaucratic posts. After acting as a clerk in the office of the corresponding secretary (“mektubi sadaret halifesi”), he was promoted to the post of ser halife (chief scribe) at the Porte. In the year 1220/1805, he served as the purchasing agent of Rusçuk (“mubayaacı”). In L 1242/May 1824, he was appointed to the controller of the stores and payments bureau (“Mevkufatı”), then became the tax-farmer of the long term government bonds (“esham mukataacı”) and later served as the chief accountant (“muhasebe-i evvel”). His final post was ruzname-i evvel. Sometime after his dismissal from this post, he died in 1247/1831-2, in İstanbul.

Mustafa Necib’s History covers the period from 1803 to 1808. At the very beginning of the work he laments at the termination of the Nizam-i Cedid reforms with the Rebellion and also about the murder of Selim III. In the introduction part, he makes some general

140 Oğuluşyan, Ruzname, p. 4.

141 Oğuluşyan, Ruzname, p. 17.


143 Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakki, Meşhur Rumeli Âyanlarından Tırslınlı İsmail, Yîlık Oğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa), (Ankara, TTK, 1942), p. 17.

comments on the conditions of the Ottoman Janissary army. After explaining to the reader the necessity of the military reforms, he praises the reforms undertaken during the reign of Selim III, prepared on the principle of reprisal (“mukabele-i bi’l-misil”). The real body of the text starts with the description of the events during the Edirne Incident, the British Naval Expedition, and then moves on to the narration of the Rebellion. The History ends with the execution of those palace officials who were held responsible for the murder of Selim III.

Even though the Narrative seems to be a general evaluation of the period of Sultan Selim III, the focus is on the May 1807 Rebellion. Indeed, the work begins with a brief assessment of the interregnum (“fetret-i azîme”) due to the Rebellion.145 In this part, he is particularly sad for the murder of the statesmen during the course of the Rebellion.146 Mustafa Necib makes it explicit that his purpose is to talk about the real causes of the Rebellion and the sequence of events related to it. He also emphasizes that his aim is to narrate the results of the Rebellion, events happening in the imperial army and also at the Porte. In this regard, one gets the sense that, during the time he was writing his narrative, the blame for the outbreak of the Rebellion was put rather on the reformist elite murdered during the Rebellion, and Mustafa Necib felt responsible for explaining the fact that it was not their fault, but there were other causes for the Rebellion.

For our purposes, his account is very important in several regards; first of all, what makes his account different from most of the other contemporary narratives is the fact that he has a set purpose for writing the History and mentions events that are directly related to it. As we have told above, he has a well-defined story and a central theme and imposes this story on the details of the period. His aim is not to record down daily events that happened during the reigns of Selim III, Mustafa IV and Mahmud II, but rather to give details related to his topic. For instance, the information he provides on the era of Selim III concentrates more on the issue of the “renewal” of the army, the reform proposals, establishment of the...

145 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, pp. 2-5.
146 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 4.
The Nizam-ı Cedid army and the reactions of the Janissaries. In addition, the discussion of other events such as the Edirne Incident, and the British naval activities on the Bosphorean has the aim of giving the reader information on the internal and international context of the period. His second contribution is related to his approach to the Rebellion. He is among those authors who condemn the Rebellion. Contrary to Asım, Kethüda Said and Ebubekir Efendi, he does not praise any aspect of it. As we have remarked previously, the reaction to the Nizam-ı Cedid is one of his focuses. According to him, the attempt to change the uniforms was a misunderstanding rather than a historical reality.147 Yet, he gives more credit to the efforts of Prince Mustafa (later Mustafa IV) to usurp the throne. Mustafa and his men had formed certain coalitions in 1806 for this purpose, the result of which was the Edirne Incident.148 With the appointment of Musa Pasha, they had found a strong ally. With the collaboration of Ataullah Efendi; they were able to turn the dissatisfaction of the Janissaries and also of the yamaks into a serious Rebellion.149 Thus, according to his story, even though there were some tensions before the Rebellion, it was the manipulation of Prince Mustafa and his allies that was decisive in the outbreak of the Rebellion. Needless to say, according to him, from the beginning its ultimate aim was the fall of Selim III.150

His text is also among the rare sources of the period that pay major attention to the unrest within the army while on campaign during and immediately after the Rebellion. In these sections, Mustafa Necib benefited from the account of Ali Raif Efendi.151 Ali Raif Efendi was among the hülefa-yi mektubi-i sadr-i ali.152 He was appointed as historian on 4 L 1221/15 December 1806 and accompanied the imperial campaign of 1806 against the

150 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 52.
151 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 72.
152 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 82.
Russians. 

After returning to Edirne, he worked as the clerk who kept the accounts of the four cavalry troops of the Janissary army (“bölükat-ı erbaa katibi”) (B 1223/September 1808). Ali Raif’s presence in the army provided him an opportunity to record the incidents and conditions of the army. And thanks to the incorporation of Raif Efendi’s account into Mustafa Necib’s History, we are able to follow the important events that took place in the army. We should also mention the valuable information provided by Mustafa Necib concerning the lives of many of the leading figures of the period.

Finally, even though it is difficult to say a final word on to what extent each of the contemporary chronicles represented a certain class or political faction, it seems easier to put Mustafa Necib into a faction. He was a bureaucrat and he feels closer to the bureaucracy of Selim III’s period. Mustafa Necib has great respect for the ruling elite before the Rebellion, to whom he refers to as “atabekan-ı devlet”. He never accuses any members of the ruling elite, considering them as innocent people not responsible for the outbreak of the Rebellion. There is no mention of their accumulation of wealth, acts of superstition and oppression; emphasized by most of the contemporary historians. On the contrary, it was these dignitaries who were working hard for the welfare of the Empire and its population. Among the others, his great respect especially for İbrahim Nesim Efendi is very clear. He was apparently an enemy of the rebels and close to the so-called reformist group.

Ebudekir Efendi, the writer of the work called Vaka-yı Cedid, was one of the statesmen of the reign of Mahmud II. He was from Merzifon and the son of Merzifonlu...
Seyyid Mehmed Ağâ and nephew of Silahdar Abdullah Ağâ. He entered the Enderun, was appointed başkollukçu to the Imperial treasury and became chief orderly (“başçukadar”) in 1233/1818. Ten years later he was dismissed from this duty. In 1244/1828, Ebubekir Efendi became kahvecibaşı and one year later he was promoted to become the lieutenant of the imperial treasury (“kethûda-i hazine-i hümâyun”) and in the year 1847/1831-32 he became the Minister of Enderun. He died on N 1251/21 December-19 January 1836. Unfortunately, apart from these short biographical references we know almost nothing about his life. From the date he added at the end of his work, it seems that he finished his book on 7 Ca 1234/4 March 1818. Most probably he was at the post of başçukadar while he was writing his work.

Some authors argue that his short History covers the period from 1182/1768 to 1228/1813. Yet, the author does not begin his narrative from the year 1768, rather mentions this date as the beginning of the problems of the Janissary army. His point is to explain that from that date onwards, the Janissaries were not successful in the imperial campaigns due to their financial problems which forced them to deal with other professions, thus inevitably ignoring their real military duties. His underlying concern was to convince the reader of the necessity of the establishment of the Nizam-ı Cedid army. The main text starts with a short summary of the internal and external conditions of the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Selim III. He begins to narrate the events on a

157 Abdullah Ağâ (d.1210/1796) was educated at the Enderun. He became başçukadar and was appointed as rikabdar on 8 M 1204/28 September 1789 and on the following day he became silahdar. He was dismissed on C 1210/13 December 1795-11 January 1796 and died at the end of the same year. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. I, p. 56.


159 Mustafâ Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 38.

160 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 3; Babinger, Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları, p. 383.

161 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 10.

162 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, pp. 10-1.
chronological basis from the year 1806 onwards. Therefore, *Vaka-yı Cedid*, in fact, discusses mainly the period from 1806 to 1813.

The most important message one gets from his account is the idea that the rebels were not alone after the outset of the Rebellion. According to the account, Musa Pasha was the real figure behind the Rebellion in collaboration with the members of the *ulema*, particularly Münib Efendi. They were the ones who persuaded the rebels to demand the head of eleven leading statesmen of the period.\(^{163}\) Another important point is the fact that the rebels did not have in mind the issue of deposition until a certain point, yet he does not elaborate further on this point.\(^{164}\) As for his contribution, apart from Oğulukyan, he is the only one who argues that it was due the to efforts of the French ambassador, Sebastiani, that Alemdar Mustafa Pasha decided to march to İstanbul in order to enable the re-accession of Selim IV to the throne, a point we will dwell on to some extent in Chapter IV.\(^{165}\)

Another contemporary source is the *Ceride* (Memorandum Book)\(^{166}\) of Hafız Mehmed, the *imam* of the Soğanağa Cami in Divanyolu. It mainly contains brief notes about the people in his district, the appointments and dismissals of some of the leading state officials and finally the events in İstanbul, covering the reigns of Abdulhamid I, Selim III, Mustafa IV and Mahmud II. It starts with the British Expedition into the Dardanelles, and the latest record belongs to around 1815. However, it is not a chronological account in a strict sense. The author makes frequent flashbacks to earlier dates and events and most of the time it is quite repetitive. It is difficult to decide which events he witnessed personally, but compared to other works of the period, Hafiz Mehmed Efendi seems to have had less access to the ruling circles of his time and generally seems to have depended on hearsay information and thus makes some mistakes. Compared with the account of another *imam*,

\(^{163}\) Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-yı Cedid*, pp. 21.

\(^{164}\) Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-yı Cedid*, pp. 25.

\(^{165}\) Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-yı Cedid*, pp. 30-1.

\(^{166}\) Beydilli, Kemal, , *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İmamlar ve Bir İmamın Günlüğü*, (İstanbul: TATAV, 2001). Hereafter cited as Beydilli, *Bir İmamın Günlüğü*.  

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the author of *Yayla İmami Risalesi*, his source appears to be very weak and dry. Unfortunately, Hafız Mehmed Efendi does not make many comments about the events he recorded. For instance he just narrates the events leading to the dethronement of Selim III in a dull manner, so that one gets a limited sense of the turmoil of the period from his account.

From his brief account about the events leading to the outburst of the May 1807 Rebellion, one gets the sense that it was Selim III who considered the imperial army for the Russian campaign as an opportunity to change the remaining soldiers into the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps. Thus, after 40 days after the departure of the army, the Sultan ordered the preparation of about more than one thousand *Nizam-ı Cedid* uniforms and delivered them to the Bostancıbaşı, which resulted in the ensuing chaos. In his story there is no idea of a plot by the Şeyhülislam or the Kaimmakam of the period, or no excesses of the leading statesmen. Rather, it seems to be a wrong tactic, or better to say, a wrong calculation of Selim III, causing him his throne at the end. Even though the author does not make frequent comments about the *yamaks*, at one place he refers Kabakçı Mustafa as the mother of intrigue (“ümmü’l-fesad”). In very general terms, Hafız Mehmed Efendi’s *Ceride* is a record of the important dates of the residents of Soğanağa Mahalle. However, since it was a district where the elite of the society resided, these dates become very important. As Beydilli also underlines, it is a valuable source of information particularly in terms of providing details for the dates of dismissal, appointments, and also some particular events which are not always easy to detect.

Though he does not write a direct account on the Rebellion, it is necessary include Şanızâde Ataullah Efendi into this list of contemporary narratives. It is not only due to

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169 For a list of the residents, see Beydilli, *Bir İmamın Günlüğü*, pp. 76-82.

170 Beydilli, *Bir İmamın Günlüğü*, pp. 93, 97-98.

the fact that his *History* is a continuation of where Asım left off, but also because he is a contemporary figure of the period we are interested in. He was the son of Hacı Mehmed Sadık Efendi. 172 Şanizâde followed an *ilmiye* career and was also educated in the medical sciences. In 1816, he was appointed as judge to the Eyüp judicial court, and three years later he became the pious endowments inspector (“haremeyn evkaf müfettişi”). After the death of historian Asım, he became the official historian on 15 S 1235/3 December 1819. In 1821 he was granted the rank (“paye”)f Mecca. 173 At the same time he was a member of Beşiktaş İlimiye Cemiyeti. It was mainly composed of the members of the *ulema* who advocated that there could be a consensus between Islam and the West and they also argued that Western technology could be adopted and would make life easier. 174 It seems that due to some connections of the group members with the Bektashi religious order, the group faced problems after the closure of the Bektashi tekkes in the year 1826. Şanizâde was among those who were exiled. He was dismissed from his duty of official historian on 15 S 1241/29 September 1825 and banished to Tire in the following year where he died. 175

His long narrative is devoted to the years between 1223/1808 and 1236/1820. 176 The period we are concerned with is narrated in the first volume. It begins with a short introduction on historical methodology, continues with the enthronement of Sultan Mahmud II and immediately after provides some details on the execution of various people by the Sultan, who are accused of being involved in the murder of Selim III. After that point, he discusses Asım’s argument on the personality of Selim III, which we have

172 Mehmed Sadık Efendi was a member of the *ilmiye* class. He served as the Galata judge (1785) and was appointed as *ordu kadısı* with the rank of Mecca (1787). For more details about the Şanizâde family, see Aykurt, Çetin, *Şanizâde Mehmed Ataullah Efendi’nin Tarihçiliği*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, (Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 1992), pp. 24-16.

173 For more information on his life and career, see Aykurt, *Şanizâde*, pp. 26-31.

174 Aykurt, *Şanizâde*, p. 35.

175 Aykurt, *Şanizâde*, pp. 37,40-42 .

176 The first volume covers 1223/1808-1225/1810; second volume 1226/1811-1234/1818; third volume 1234/1818-1236/1820 and the final volume concentrates on the year 1236/1820.
referred to briefly above. Șanizâde objects to these arguments on two grounds: At the theoretical level, he underlines that there are some hidden and long-term causes of an historical event, and also some short-term and apparent causes. When an incident emerges people are not able conceive to its long-term reasons and accuse either the Sultan or the ruling elite for not acting according to the needs of the period. According to him, one of the main dynamics of the long-term causes of the Rebellion was the international conjecture: each state or empire seeks its own benefits and tries to weaken the rival states. This long-term cause is combined with short-term causes, as it happened during the reign of Selim III, when rival foreign powers managed to establish secret connections with the ruling elite. The rival state/s tried to persuade the ruling elite and to impose decisions that would be beneficial for their own interests. However, if a decision was taken against their interests, they would try to provoke the soldiers and the public by propagating that these decisions were taken against their interests as in the case of the declaration of a campaign against an enemy. The common people, Șanizâde argues, are generally inclined to uphold traditional customs and practices, therefore when there is a change some people willingly or unwillingly object to it. On the other hand, the ruling elite, ignoring all these problems, strive to increase their income and accumulate the tax-farms in their hands, thus worsening the situation. Șanizâde blames the corrupt members of the ruling elite for having undermined the basis of the state and for being unaware of the

182 Șanizâde, Tarih-i Șanizâde, vol. I, p. 27.
fact that their well-being is closely tied to the well-being or common good of the whole society.\textsuperscript{183}

Şanizâde is also aware of the importance of psychological warfare that could cause cleavages within society and harm the self-confidence whole populace. He provides a good example in this regard, the incident of the British Naval Expedition to the capital. According to him, it especially aimed to cause the demoralization of the residents of İstanbul and to direct the popular anger towards the rulers, thus forcing them to prevent a counter-attack against the British.\textsuperscript{184} Therefore, in Şanizâde’s explanations, we are able to find a highly sophisticated analysis of causes of the Rebellion. He is the only author who is able to place the rebellion in an international context. Apart from these general points, like Asım, Şanizâde accuses Kaimmakam Musa Pasha of being the figure behind the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{185}

There are also three short narratives on the Rebellion. The first one is an anonymous work entitled “\textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis’in Haline Dair Risale}” (A Pamphlet on the Dethronement of Sultan Selim III).\textsuperscript{186} It provides a detailed account of the Rebellion, narrating the incidents that took place within a week. It starts with the murder of Halil Haseki and Mahmud Raif Efendi by the rebels on 17 Ra/25 May 1807 and ends with the grant of some titles and offices to rebel leaders on 24 Ra/1 June 1807.\textsuperscript{187} In terms of style, the text has a theatrical style with a language which is always easy to understand. Moreover, the author decorates his text with frequent speeches. As for the author, we know nothing about his identity. According to the anonymous author, the main cause of the


\textsuperscript{184} Şanizâde, \textit{Tarih-i Şanizâde}, vol. I, p. 32.


\textsuperscript{187} In fact in the source, the beginning date of the rebellion is recorded as 18 Ra/24 May. But as we shall try show later in the thesis it started on 17 Ra/25 May. See Derin, “Kabakçi Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 99.
Rebellion was the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms. He admits that Selim III had initiated the program in order to be victorious against foreign enemies. But he argues that the attempt was not successful, by divine providence, since in some respects it was against Islamic rules.\(^{188}\) Therefore for him, whatever the good intentions of the Sultan were, the reform project was not in compliance with the *sharia*, therefore it was doomed to fail. Another clue that might be helpful to understand his position during the Rebellion is the fact that he provides very detailed information as to the sequences of the events leading to rebellion at the fortresses, as well as on the preparation of the draft of the execution list of the demanded statesmen.\(^{189}\)

In his narration of the Rebellion there are some important points that should be underlined. As some of the other contemporary authors, he also explains that the events in the fortresses started with the attempt to change the uniforms.\(^{190}\) For him, even though there were some previous tensions, the event was not a pre-planned plot. He employs an apologetic tone for the *yamak* and claims that Halil Haseki was responsible for the real outburst of events. Halil Haseki had treated the *yamak* very roughly and insulted them.\(^{191}\) After the murder of Halil Haseki, things got out of hand. In his narration there is no role attributed either to the Şeyhülislam or to the Kaimmakam of the period. In fact, he is quite respectful to both and in one case he implies that it was the Şeyhülislam who first tried to persuade the Janissaries not to depose Selim III and when unsuccessful tried to prevent his murder.\(^{192}\) The villain in his story is Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi for whom he feels a deep

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\(^{188}\) Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 109: “*Bu Nizâm-ı Cedid*’den pâdişâh-ı âlem-penâh’ın garaz[î] ancak düvel-i nasûrâya galibiyet içün idi. Lâkin takdîr-i ilâhi kuvvet-i bâzû ile dönmez mefhûmunca müşârûnîleyhin bazı husûsda hilaf-i şer-i şerîf olduğundan böyle münhezim oldu”. It is difficult to perceive whether it was the Sultan who acted against the Islamic laws or whether the *Nizam-ı Cedid* was against the Islamic principles. Yet, it seems very probable that some orders of Selim III related to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms were against Islamic rules.

\(^{189}\) Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, pp. 100, 104-5.

\(^{190}\) Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 92.

\(^{191}\) Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 92.

\(^{192}\) Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 106.
hatred.\textsuperscript{193} Other people he disliked are İbrahim Nesim Efendi and Elhac İbrahim Efendi.\textsuperscript{194} Depending on his own account, we can claim that the anonymous author stood closer to Ebubekir Efendi’s (the first author of Fezleke-i Kuşmâni), evaluation of the Rebellion. Like Ebubekir Efendi, he seems to have been against the oppressive ruling elite.\textsuperscript{195}

The second short account again belongs to another anonymous author.\textsuperscript{196} The account covers a short period of time, from the murder of Halil Haseki (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807) to the exile of Abdüllatif Efendi, the Grain Superintendent’s assistant (”kapan naibi”), first to Sinop and then to Bursa.\textsuperscript{197} Unfortunately again we do not know anything about the identity of the author except for some clues at the end of his account where he notes that he was not a man of influence. Yet, his complicated language and the text furnished with poems signal that he was not an ordinary man. Similar to the above account, he does not point to any person or group – apart from the Janissaries and the yamaks – as responsible for the break of the Rebellion and for the subsequent events. Like the above anonymous account there is an emphasis on the harsh treatment of Halil Haseki; however, it is not as apologetic as the former.\textsuperscript{198} Besides, there is no mention of the role played by the yamaks under the leadership of Kabakçı Mustafa. What he seems to be interested in his narration is

\textsuperscript{193} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, pp. 102, 107, 109.

\textsuperscript{194} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{195} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, pp. 102, 108.

\textsuperscript{196} Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsyanna Dair Yazılım Bir Tarihçe”, Belleten, VI/23-24 (1942), pp. 253-261. In the introduction of the publication, Uzunçarşılı informs us that he discovered the text in the uncatalogued documents in the Archives of the Prime Ministry.

\textsuperscript{197} In the source the date of murder of the Halil Haseki is given as 18 Ra/24 May. See Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsyanya...”, p. 255. Abdüllatif Efendi was a member of the ulema who served as the assistant to the grain superintendent’s assistant (“kapanı dakik naib”) before the Rebellion. He was included in the execution list. There is not a consensus on the date of his exile but as we shall see later, it was probably on 22 Ra/30 May. However, since he was a member of the ulema, he was exiled to Bursa. He was later promoted to the rank of mirimiran (military-governor) and executed on 24 R 1222/1 July 1807. For further information see Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{198} Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsyanya...”, p. 254.
the murder of the state officials demanded by the rebels, and he uses mostly negative attributes about them and sometimes one gets the impression that he was glad of these murders since the people were thus saved from their oppression. Another important point is the fact that he, reminding us Kethüda Said’s History, evaluates the Rebellion as a smooth one which inflicted no harm other than on the demanded statesmen and saved the people from oppression, in a very short period of time.

A very short account or rather a report of the Rebellion is found among the documents of the Topkapı Palace Museum Archive. The author of the account is not known, but from the text it is clear that he wrote the text during the reign of Mahmud II. One clue is that it was written after the Alemdar Incident (1808). Even though Tahsin Öz argues that the author was a figure close to Mahmud II’s retinue, there is no definite clue to support his suggestion. Yet it is clear that the author was an important figure, most probably from the palace circles, and seems to have had important connections and thus did have access to some unheard and secret information, such as the intrigues of both Prince Selim (III) and Mustafa (IV) to usurp the throne. This text, consisting of only four pages, is more like a treatise written for a certain purpose: to make a general evaluation of the turbulent years the author witnessed. It seems that it was written for a certain figure, probably for a certain sultan, rather than for a general audience. His account starts with the dilemma of Mahmud II to kill his own brother Mustafa IV. Then he discusses the intrigues of Prince Selim against his uncle Abdulhamid I and later Prince Mustafa’s efforts for the

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201 T.S.M.A, E. 2650 (undated). It was published by Tahsin Öz, together with some other documents. Öz, Tahsin, “Selim III, Mustafa IV ve Mahmud II Zamanlarına Ait Birkaç Vesika”, Tarih Vesikalari, I/1 (1941), pp. 20-29.


same purpose against Selim III, and finally relates Selim III’s strife to gain the throne again.\textsuperscript{204}

For our purposes this short account is very important since it draws our attention a little away from the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} issue and helps us to have a look at this chaotic period from the point of view of struggles for the throne and inner factions within the palace itself. For instance, the text mentions a letter of Prince Mustafa to one of his trusted men where he expressed his intention to dethrone Selim III.\textsuperscript{205} It depicts different images of the sultans of the period, especially of Selim III who established secret connections with sorcerers in order to usurp the throne and also provides some insights into Mustafa IV’s view of the events and his image among the Janissaries. Another important point is the implied connection between the struggle for the throne and the problems with the \textit{ayans} such as Tayyar Mahmud Pasha and Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey.\textsuperscript{206}

Among the contemporary sources, there are two foreign accounts which discuss the Rebellion. The first one is by Juchereau de Saint-Denys\textsuperscript{207} and the other one is by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{204} TSMA. E. 2650 (undated); Öz, “Selim III, Mustafa IV ve Mahmud II”, pp. 25-27.
\item \textsuperscript{205} T.S.M.A. E. 2650 (undated); Öz, “Selim III, Mustafa IV ve Mahmud II”, p. 25-6.
\item \textsuperscript{206} Cabbarzâde Süleyman Pasha (d. 1813) was one of the most influential members of the Cabbarzâde/Çapanoğlu family. He was appointed as the \textit{mutasarrif} of Bozok in 1782 and one year later became the \textit{voyvoda} of Yeni İl. As a reward for his participation into the campaign in Rumelia, he was granted the title of chief stable master (“Büyük Mirahor”) (25 Ra 1205/2 December 1790). Four years later he acquired the \textit{mütesellimlik} of Tarsus and became the director (“emin”) of the Bereketli and Bozkır mines (17 C 1219/28 December 1794). Süleyman Pasha sent soldiers for the campaign against Pasvandoğlu and then for the defense of Egypt against the French. Since he contributed to the establishment of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} regiments in Anatolia, he was appointed as the \textit{mütesellim} of Amasya. He was among the notables who signed the famous document known as \textit{Sened-i İttifak} (1808). Then, thanks to his participation into the imperial campaign against the Russians, he was granted the \textit{voyvodalik} of Kara Hisar-ı Şarkı in 1808. The following year he was appointed \textit{mütesellim} of Kayseri and one year later of Kırşehir. He died at the end of 1813. For further details, see Mert, Özcan, \textit{Çapanoğlu, VIII ve IX. Yüzyıllarda Çapanoğlu}, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1980); Uzuńcarşılu, İsmail Hakkı, “Çapanoğlu”, \textit{Belleten}, XXXVIII/150 (Ankara: 1974), pp. 235-247; B.O.A. C.ML. 19304 (1 B 1220/24 September 1805).
\end{itemize}
Schlechta-Wssehrd. Both of them are crucial in terms of presenting the observations of two informed foreigners on the conditions of the Empire they had lived in for a certain period of time. Saint-Denys was born in France. Following the death of his father, a colonel d’artillerie, he moved to England in 1793, and served as an artilleryman in the British army until the Treaty of Amiens (1802). In the year 1805 he entered the service of the Ottoman Empire as artillery officer and remained in the Empire until 1809. In 1807 he was employed as the inspecteur en chef du génie militaire Ottoman. After the declaration of war against Russia (1806), he was ordered by Selim III to prepare a report on the defensive systems of the Dardanelles and the capital in case of an attack by the Russian navy. He was also among the officials who took an active role in the preparation of the batteries during the British Expedition. As far as we learn from his accounts, he was generally treated generously by Selim III. The author apparently tried to remain independent from his political connections in England and as well as from other foreign powers while in the service of the Porte. Saint-Denys returned to France in 1809 and then was sent to Madrid and served in the French army during the Spanish wars.

In his two volume work, Saint-Denys narrates the turbulent years of Ottoman history between 1805 and 1809. The first volume starts with an introduction that compares the Russian ruler Peter the Great and Selim III. The remaining parts of this volume constitute a general survey of the Ottoman institutions, including the economic and social structures. It is the second volume that is devoted to the reign of Selim III, Mustafa IV and Mahmud II.

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208 Schlechta-Wssehrd, Die Revolutionen in Constantinople in den Jahren 1807 und 1808, Sitzungs-berichte de philisophisch-historischen Classe der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, C, (1882). Unfortunately due to an unexpected problem, I did not have a chance to study this source. Therefore, the text is not included in this survey.


particularly concentrating on the May 1807 Rebellion and the Alemdar Incident. His narration of the above events is quite detailed and it is one of the few sources that discusses the reign of Mustafa IV in some detail. Saint-Denys studies the two “revolutions” that created great turmoil in the Empire within the framework of the reactions to the process of modernization – especially in the military realm. This process of modernization was aimed at establishing a disciplined army like its European counterparts. That is why he begins his *History* with a comparison of the Russian modernization under Peter the Great with the reforms of Selim III, and at some point he comments on why the latter was unsuccessful.\(^{213}\) Throughout the book, he frequently underlines that the Ottoman *ulema* and the Janissaries were the real obstacles to the process of modernization. According to him, the animosity of the discontented *ulema* – represented by the Şeyhülislam of the period - and the reaction of the Janissaries were abused by Kaimmakam Musa Pasha and right from the beginning their plot was directed towards the deposition of the Sultan.\(^{214}\) However, we should add that he does not consider each of these two groups as compact bodies; for example, he emphasizes that there were some members of the *ulema*, as in the case of Veliefendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi, who were in a way the leaders of the reforms.\(^{215}\) He also underlines that the artillery corps hesitated to participate in the 1807 Rebellion.\(^{216}\) Probably being under the influence of the French Enlightenment, one gets the sense that Saint-Denys considered the turbulence in the Empire as a Manichaean struggle between “light” and “ignorance”, light representing the modernization movement, and ignorance standing for tradition. The importance of Saint-Denys lies in the fact that he served as the basic source for some later foreign historians, including Zinkeisen.\(^{217}\)

\(^{213}\) Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. II, p. 192


It is striking that Saint-Denys ascribes Kabakçı Mustafa a very active role. Even though most of the local narratives mention him and his role in the Rebellion, none of them focus on Kabakçı Mustafa as much as Saint-Denys. According to him, “Kabakçıoğlu” played an active political role before, as well as after the Rebellion. We see him at every phase of the Rebellion making long and romantic speeches. After reaching the city as the leader of the rebels, he invited the kalyoncu\textsuperscript{218} and artillersmen\textsuperscript{219}, giving long speeches to each of them. He had prepared the execution list and acted as the leader of the rebellious crowd at the Et Meydan.\textsuperscript{220} Again through a long speech, he paved the way for the accession of Mustafa IV.\textsuperscript{221} According to Saint-Denys, Kabakçı Mustafa was never interested in governmental affairs and obeyed all the orders sent to him. Yet, the absolute devotion of the yamaks bestowed him considerable power, therefore becoming attractive to the internal factions.\textsuperscript{222} Some time after the Rebellion, he seems to have remained indecisive between Ataullah Efendi and Musa Pasha, and finally preferring the former.\textsuperscript{223}

A final group of contemporary accounts of the Rebellion or its aftermath can be listed under the category of the \textit{Ruznames}.\textsuperscript{224} The \textit{Ruzname} of Selim III was kept by Sırkatibi

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{218} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 116-7.
\item\textsuperscript{219} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 118-20. According to him, the artillerymen who were also confused as which side to take part, were finally convinced by him.
\item\textsuperscript{220} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 122-3.
\item\textsuperscript{221} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 130-1.
\item\textsuperscript{222} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 147.
\item\textsuperscript{223} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 147
\item\textsuperscript{224} \textit{Rûznâmes} are the records of the lives and activities of the sultans which were kept by certain officials on a daily basis. The officials that keep them are called sırkatibi (confidential secretary). We see the emergence of the \textit{Ruznames} after the eighteenth century. For a summary of the list of the \textit{Ruznames} for the eighteenth nineteenth centuries, see Afyoncu, “Kronikler”, pp. 169-171. For a detailed explanation of the \textit{Ruznames} of the nineteenth century, see Mehmed Ali Beyhan, \textit{Saray Günlüğü} (1802-1809), (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2007), pp. 1-13. Hereafter cited as Beyhan, \textit{Saray Günlüğü}.
\end{itemize}
Ahmed Efendi. It covers approximately twelve years of the rule of Selim III, starting on 9 B 1205/14 March 1791, i.e. two years after the accession of Selim III to the throne, and it continues until N 1217/December 1802. Fortunately we have a compilation of all Ruznames, beginning from the reign of Selim III, even including the reigns of Mustafa IV and Mahmud II. It is found in the Archives of the Prime Ministry under the catalogue of Milli Emlak (no. 11). The text consists of 78 pages, which starts almost where the first Ruzname stopped (end of Ş 1217/25 December 1802) and continues until the first years of Sultan Mahmud II on 9 Z 1223/24 January 1809. The account of Milli Emlak seems to be a later compilation of different individual Ruznames belonging to the reigns of Selim III, Mustafa IV and Mahmud II. The first part, belonging to the time of Selim III, starts on 20 Ş 1217/25 December 1802 and ends on 11 Ca 1221/27 July 1806. This part was kept by Sirkatibi Ahmed Efendi. The second one, belonging to the reign of Mustafa IV, starts with 23 Z 1222/21 February 1808 and ends on 2 C 1223/26 July 1808. It was written by Sirkatibi Arif Muhit Bey. The final part belongs to the reign of Mahmud II which starts with the narration of events leading to the accession of Mahmud II on 4 C 1223/28 June


226 Hereafter cited as Ruzname, (Milli Emlak). It was published by Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü.

227 For more details, see Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 2.

228 See Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 1.

229 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), pp. 45-54; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, pp.205-228. A summary and simplified version of the Ruzname of Arif Bey was published by Midhad Sertoğlu, “III. Selim’in Öldürülsüne ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa Olayına Ait Bilinmeyen Bir Vekayiname”, Hayat Tarih Mecmuası, 2/8 (Eylül1973). For more information on this part of the Ruzname, see Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, pp. 2-4.

230 Sirkatibi Arif Muhit Bey, served as the sirkatibi for Mustafa IV. He was murdered on 6 C 1223/30 July 1223, on the grounds that he was involved in the murder of Selim III. See Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 35a; Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol I, p. 181; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.3.
1808 and ends on 7 Z 1223/24 January 1809. It was written by Feyzullah Efendi. However, there are some gaps between these periods. For instance, almost two years from the early reign and his last year is lacking from the reign of Selim III, and also the events leading to the accession of Mustafa IV. Moreover we do not have nine months from the fourteen months’ reign of Mustafa IV.233

Thanks to this compilation we are able to learn more about the details of the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the capital, as well as the murder of Selim III. Moreover, there are also some details of the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa and also of the fates of some other people who were directly or indirectly involved in the Rebellion. In terms of providing us with some important details for the most turbulent years of these three sultans, the Ruzname (Milli Emlak) becomes a very valuable source of information. A final word should be added that especially the one narrating the accession of Mahmud II and its aftermath provides relatively more factual detail and is in fact a text between a ruzname and a historical narrative.

The above sources are the main contemporary narratives on the May 1807 Rebellion. It appears that in terms of the causes of the Rebellion, there is a consensus on the role of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms, whether as a triggering factor or as a part of long-term causes. Due to the reasons we have underlined above it becomes difficult to form some arguments on

231 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), pp. 57-71; Beyhan, Saray Günülügü, pp.229-277-

232 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 57; Beyhan, Saray Günülügü, p. 231. According to the same source, Bülbül Hafiz Feyzullah Efendi served as surkatibi of Selim III. On 26 Ra 1222/3 June 1807, he was appointed a clerk to Darüssade Ağası and surkatibi. He was dismissed following the rise of Mustafa IV, but reappointed during the reign of Mahmud II 5 C 1223/29 July 1808. See Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 57. He died in 1225/1810. See Beyhan, Saray Günülügü, pp. 3, 11.

233 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), pp. 1-45. It means that the first two years (1203-1205) and about the last year (11 Ca 1221/27 July 1806-21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807) of the reign Selim III are missing. See Beyhan, Saray Günülügü, p. 1.

234 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), pp. 53-7; Beyhan, Saray Günülügü, pp.226-231.

235 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), pp. 57-8; Beyhan, Saray Günülügü, pp.231-3.

the positions of the authors in relation to certain aspects of the Rebellion. However, it
seems that there were two major discourses on the Rebellion. The first discourse, as in the
narratives of Ebubekir Efendi (*Fezleke-i Kuşmani*), and the authors of the short chronicle
and to some extent Kethûda Said Efendi, does not approve of the Rebellion as a reaction to
the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms but is sympathetic to it since it saved the people from the hands
of the tyrannical administrators. The villains in this discourse are the oppressive ruling elite
who inflicted more damage to the Empire than the rebels. The second approach, best
formulated by Kuşmâni and Mustafa Necib Efendi, is closer to the ruling elite and the
*Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms. For these authors the main problem was not oppressive elite but the
Janissaries and some state elite who opposed the reforms since they were against their
interests. For these authors, the Rebellion was for the abolition of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*
reforms. In this discourse, there is more of an emphasis on the role of individuals such as
Köse Musa Pasha and Ataullah Efendi in instigating the Rebellion. As we shall in the
following pages, it was the second discourse that was inherited by the later historians.

**1.3. Historiography of the Late Ottoman Decades**

The historiographical literature of the *Tanzimat* and the Hamidian periods evaluate
the Rebellion within the framework of the modernization process. Thus the May 1807
Rebellion emerges as an obstacle preventing rejuvenation and modernization. The
historians of these periods celebrate Mahmud II’s decision to abolish the Janissary army.
That is why we see in most of these narratives a conscious attempt to give in detail the
abuses and the undisciplinary acts of the Janissaries, and their damages they inflicted to the
survival of the Ottoman Empire. As we shall see below, the reform attempts of Selim III
and the May 1807 Rebellion serve as a major reference point for these historians. The
turmoil that ensued during and after the rebellion, the Alemdar Incident and finally the
murder of Selim III are generally used to prove the troublesome nature of the Janissary
army.
The “Auspicious Incident” (*Vaka-yı Hayriye*), the abolition of the Janissary army in 1826 signified an important shift in the outlook of many contemporary historians concerning the Janissaries and their troubles. Previous historians were also complaining about the undisciplined nature of the Janissaries and emphasizing the need to discipline them. However, during this period, the emphasis on the problems caused by the Janissaries became more and more pronounced. They finally became the main cause of the “decline” of the Empire, thus the inevitable need of their destruction in order to revive the Empire. In Ottoman sources, such as *Üss-ü Zafer* or *Gülzâr-ı Fütûhât*, both celebrating the *Vaka-yı Hayriye*, there is a conscious effort to justify the abolition of the Janissary troops by making references to their unruly actions. For instance, Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi justifies the abolition as a necessity since the Janissaries were always inclined towards disorder (“fitne”) and rebellion (“ihtilal”).

Moreover, they did not perform their duty of defending the borders of the Empire and thus the enemies were always victorious. During the reign of Selim III, the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army was established but was destroyed due to the reaction of the rebellious Janissaries. They were also ignorant people they were vulnerable to abuse by other groups. Thus, in his explanation, the Janissaries, who were put at the center of the causes of disorder, were also

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237 Sahaflar Şeyhizâde Mehmed Esad Efendi (b. 1201/1786-7- d.1264/1848), *Üss-ü Zafer*, second edition (İstanbul, 1294). The first edition is in 1243. Mehmed Esad Efendi was a müderris. He was appointed as the official historian on 15 S 1241/28 September 1825. After serving as ordu kadi in 1244/1828, he became the takvimhane nazırı in 1247/1831-2 following the publication of the *Takvim-i Vekayi* newspaper. Esad Efendi was then promoted to the rank of İstanbul (1248/1832-3) and became İstanbul judge on 1 Ca 1250/5 September 1834. In October 1834, he was sent to Persia as an envoy with the Anadolu paye. He then obtained the Rumeli paye (1254/1838) and became a member of Supreme Council for the Judicial Ordinances (“Meclis-i Vala”) in 1255/1839. In 1257/1841 he was appointed as nakibli-esraf and then Rumeli kazasker (1260/1844). Three years later, he became the director of the Directorate for the Public Schools (*Mekatib-i Umumiye Nezareti*). His final appointment was the membership of the Council of Education (“Meclis-i Maarif”). See Kütükoğlu, “Vekanüvis”, p. 282; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. II., pp. 492-3.

238 Şirvânli Fatih Efendi, *Gülzâr-ı Fütûhât: Bir Görgü Tanımın Kalemiyle Yeniçeri Ocağının Kaldırılması*, Mehmed Ali Beyhan (ed.), (İstanbul, Kitabevi, 2001). Fatih Efendi (d. 1250/1834-5) was from Şirvan. After coming to İstanbul, he entered *Divan-i Hümâyun* but later went to Egypt.
preventing any attempt at military reform that would provide a solution to the “decline” of the Empire.\textsuperscript{239} Esad Efendi gives a list of the reform attempts of previous Ottoman Sultans such as Mahmud I (r. 1730-1754), Mustafa III (r. 1754-1774), Abdülhamid I (r. 1774-1789) and Selim III in order to give a background information concerning the early reform attempts and thus also to glorify the success of Mahmud II.\textsuperscript{240} Esad Efendi underlines that during the reign of Selim III, the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army had been established, but the benefits of it were not properly understood by most of the upper and lower layers of the society under the influence of the spies who were opposed to the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} reforms.\textsuperscript{241}

The immediate reference to the May 1807 Rebellion in justification for the abolition of the Janissary crops is quite meaningful. The rebellion happened nineteen years before and ended with the enthronement and later death of a ruler. Besides, the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} attempt seems to have been considered as the closest attempt to that of the \textit{Asakir-ı Mansure} army, established by Mahmud II. For our purposes the important point is the depiction of the May 1807 Rebellion as one of most important reactions of the Janissaries to the idea of “reform” and its evaluation as a Janissary rebellion. Thus, the Janissaries were considered to be the enemy of the well-being of the state. Moreover, the idea that they were the believers in unorthodox or almost heretical creeds is also strongly emphasized. Thus their destruction together with everything related to them – like their barracks, the Bektashi \textit{tekkes} – is depicted as a final victory of the center against the “internal enemy” and as purging the most serious obstacle on the way to the revival of the Empire. In short, in this period the idea of rejuvenation or “reform” in spite of the Janissaries is emphasized and thus its abolition under the authority of Mahmud II is celebrated.

\textsuperscript{239} Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi, \textit{Gülzâr-ı Fütûhât}, pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{240} Esad Efendi, \textit{Üss-ü Zafer}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{241} Esad Efendi, \textit{Üss-ü Zafer}, p. 11.
The Tanzimat Era (1839-1908) came after the rule of Mahmud II.\textsuperscript{242} It started with the proclamation of the \textit{Tanzimat} Edict and ended with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. The western-oriented reforms began to be more radical during the Tanzimat era under the initiative of a group of statesmen. Besides, the centralization process of Mahmud II continued during this period. The \textit{Tanzimat} Era signaled the full-fledged modernization programme on the Western line, symbolized by the 1839 Tanzimat decree and the 1856 Reform decree. By the Paris Treaty, the Ottoman Empire was considered as a European state, accompanied by intensified commercial relations with the European countries. The legal, commercial, social and political reforms of the period were usually a top to down movement and not without tensions.

Cevdet Pasha (b.1822-d. 1895) was one of the most important historians of the late Ottoman period who studied the Rebellion in great detail, as a part of his Ottoman History, from 1774 to 1826.\textsuperscript{243} His \textit{History} is composed of twelve volumes and eighth volume is related to the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{244} As an official historian, Cevdet Pasha had access to many official documents and narratives of the previous chroniclers from which he seems to have benefited to a great extent. Cevdet Pasha’s account is unique in terms of the sources he used, since it is based on most of the contemporary accounts and some official documents. However, for the 1807 Incident he does not use archival material. As far as the period of Selim III is concerned, his \textit{History} provides a synthesis of the accounts of the previous historians we have already discussed. Thus, he served as a main source of information and


\textsuperscript{244} The eighth volume covers the period from 1219/1804 to 1223/1808.
as a reference point for the future Ottoman and also Republican historians. Due to this fact, one observes that most of the details or information provided by Cevdet Pasha was repeated by later historians.

A comparison of Cevdet Pasha’s text on the Rebellion with those of the previous historians shows that he benefited from the narratives of Kethüda Said, Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Şanizâde, Yayla İmami Risalesi, Mustafa Necib Efendi and particularly Asım’s *History*.245 On the basis of these sources, Cevdet Pasha encourages the reader to conceive the Rebellion within the context of an accumulation of various causes, but not as an instant outburst. According to him, the Edirne Incident, the arrival of the British navy, as well as the bad economic conditions of the period should be taken into account. This part is mainly a summary of Asım and Şanizâde’s accounts.246 For him, the triggering cause of the May 1807 Rebellion was the establishment of the Nizam-ı Cedid army.247 According to Cevdet Pasha, the establishment of a regular soldiery was not enough to solve the problems of the Empire, since the more serious corruption was in the administrative system. He summarizes his argument as follows: “*a corrupted political body could not administer a regular corps (heyet-i muntazama)*”.248 Like Şanizâde, Cevdet thinks that it was something natural to observe the rise of different opposition groups against “new” things.249 Thus, during the period of the initiation of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* program, different groups rose in opposition to it. However, the common denominator of these various groups was the opposition to the above program itself and they did not hesitate to collaborate with the Janissaries whose very existence and economic interests were being threatened by the newly established *Nizam-ı Cedid* army. Some of these groups were the so-called circle of “disgruntled people toward the state” (“*devlet küskünleri*”), especially those who were jealous of the ruling elite


246 Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih*, vol. VIII, pp. 139-150.


who rose to power thanks to the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} program. He also makes reference to the attempts of Prince Mustafa to collaborate with these antagonist groups against the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} reforms to ensure his enthronement.\textsuperscript{250}

As most of the contemporary historians, Cevdet Pasha also emphasizes that the luxurious life and the greediness of the ruling elite of the period had created a kind of animosity among the people of the period. The \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} had also created a kind of monopoly on decision-making and political power.\textsuperscript{251} Since Selim III was also fond of entertainment, the people around him also organized such entertainments in order to distract him from government affairs. This mood of the Sultan and the ruling elite was adopted by the residents of İstanbul. In this depiction of the atmosphere of the city, reminding us of the Tulip Era (1718-1730), there is an implicit criticism directed at the ruler, the ruling elite and the ruled for being busy with material pleasure when the Empire was facing critical problems and experimenting a serious program, a criticism that should be also valid for his period as well.\textsuperscript{252} Though he is not as critical as Asım of the personality of Selim III, Cevdet also portrays a Sultan who remained under the influence of the ruling elite and trusted the state affairs to this group. For him, the implementation of such a “\textit{mevâd-i cesime}” needed a strong and despotic (“\textit{kahhar}”) rulers like Mahmud II.\textsuperscript{253} Cevdet Pasha follows the argument that the final plot causing Rebellion became successful due to the treacherous nature of the Kaimmakam and the Şeyhülislam of the period.\textsuperscript{254}

Though in most respects Cevdet Pasha seems to have followed the arguments of the historians of the Selimian era, he was a product of the \textit{Tanzimat} Era. In some respects, he considered the \textit{Tanzimat} reforms as a continuation of the reform tradition of Selim III and

\textsuperscript{250} Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VIII, pp. 151, 164.


\textsuperscript{252} Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VIII, p. 143.


Mahmud II. However, he did not approve all the aspects of his period. For instance, Cevdet Pasha did not like the grant of equal rights to the non-Muslims of the Empire which according to him was against the principles of the Tanzimat. Moreover, he was worried about the increasing foreign debts and luxurious expenses and the priority of personal interests to the interests of the state. As might be noticed all these matters found its reflections in his evaluation of the May 1807 Rebellion. Moreover, Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876) was deposed and died following a period of confinement at the Feriye Palace (1876). This also provides a clue about Cevdet Pasha’s interest in the May 1807 Rebellion which ended with the dethronement of Selim III and his death after a year of confinement in the Palace.

Cevdet Pasha’s History should be considered as a turning point in several regards. The centralist and “statist” tone of Cevdet Pasha can be observed in most of the Ottomanists. The need for a total rejuvenation or modernization of the Empire rather than one restricted in military aspects, the idea that Selim III lacked the necessary qualities for the implementation of a serious reform program, the need to wait for a stronger ruler like Mahmud II, and the motif of ignorant statesmen which are emphasized strongly in his book, will be repeatedly discussed by later historians. His other contribution, as we have discussed above, is his extensive use of contemporary sources. It seems that most of the later historians thought it satisfactory to base their discussions on the information provided by Cevdet Pasha. However, as Christoph Neumann also underlines, his was a selective use of the related contemporary sources that even disregarded some of those which did not fit into his model of explanation. This later historiographical attitude might be the reason of the limited knowledge on contemporary sources, particularly during the Republican period. Apparently Cevdet Pasha is the first historian to call the May 1807 Rebellion as the “Kabakçı Vakası” (“The Kabakçı Incident”). The previous historians refer to it either as

255 Neumann, Araç Tarih, Amaç Tanzimat, p. 220.

256 Neumann, Araç Tarih, Amaç Tanzimat, pp. 106-9. It is a good analysis of the sources used by Cevdet Pasha for his section on the May 1807 Rebellion.

“1222 Vakası” (the 1222 Incident) or “Vaka-yı Selimiye” (the Selimiyye Incident). Therefore, his other legacy for late Ottoman and Republican Turkish historiography has been the coining of this Rebellion as the “Kabakçı Vakası”.

Most historians of the period under scrutiny followed similar arguments with the basic concern of justifying the abolition of the Janissary army. With the aim to complete some details that were not discussed by Cevdet Pasha, Ahmed Rifat Efendi wrote a history, covering the period from 1808 to 1813, titled *Mecmûa-yı Vekâyi-i Asr-i Mahmud Han-ı Sani*.

Even though the account concentrates on the early years of the reign of Mahmud II, there are some comments on the Rebellion and its aftermath. Since the primary aim of the book was to celebrate the achievements of Sultan Mahmud II, Ahmed Rifat begins his work by mentioning the unruly and undisciplinary actions of the Janissaries and discusses their fate in 1826 as an example of the punishment of those who disobeyed the sultans and showed ingratitude. Mahmud II had taken his revenge on those who played a role in the incident of the murder of Selim III and more importantly from Köse Musa Pasha whom Ahmed Rifat criticizes severely. For him, it was Köse Musa Pasha and Hafız İsmail Pasha who prepared the Rebellion and caused the dethronement of Selim III. Yet, the main cause of the May 1807 Rebellion in his *History* was the Janissaries’ hatred to the newly established *Nizam-ı Cedid* army. The role of Ataullah Efendi and Köse Musa Pasha is turned into a cliché in the works of Cevdet Pasha and Ahmed Rifat. Without their secret help there would be no uprising even within the military class. Therefore they deny

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258 It was transcribed by İlmihan Sağlamdemir. See *Mecmûa-yı Vekâyi-i Asr-i Mahmûd Hân-ı Adlî*, İlmihan Sağlamdemir, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, (Marmara Üniversitesi, 1994), pp. 5-6. Hereafter cited as Ahmet Rifat, *Mecmuayi Vekayi*. Ahmed Rifat Efendi (d.1293/1876) was the son of a customs official. He was appointed as the accountant of the customs (“rûsumat muhasebecisi” in 1280/1863 and later became Bursa defterdar. For his life and works see the same thesis, pp. XI-XII.


an active and independent role to the military classes in general and common people in particular. This denial was related to a certain extent to the policies of the *Tanzimat* period. This era witnessed top down reform policies while the opposition was being suppressed by the center. According to the *Tanzimat* intellectuals, the popular movements were obstacles to the reforms. That is why Cevdet Pasha and others criticizes Selim III and the ruling elite for not taking prompt and decisive measures to suppress the uprising.\(^{263}\)

Mustafa Nuri Pasha is also among the late Ottoman historians who studied the May 1807 Rebellion in some detail in his book called *Netâyicü'l-Vukuât*.\(^{264}\) For him, too, the real cause of the Rebellion was the establishment of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army. However, in his account, there is blame directed at Selim III for having caused the rise of the internal tension resulting in a rebellion. He argues that even though the ruling elite around Selim III had it in mind to abolish the Janissary army completely, the indecisive and timid policy of trying to satisfy both sides prevented the realization of this aim.\(^{265}\) Moreover, there is an emphasis on the character of Selim III, echoing the description of Asım, that even though the Sultan had good personality he lacked the necessary qualities to be a good ruler.\(^{266}\)

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\(^{263}\) Neumann, *Araç Tarih, Amaç Tanzimat*, p.115.

\(^{264}\) Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü'l-Vukuat*, second edition, 4 vols., (İstanbul: 1327). A simplified version of it has been edited by Neşet Çağatay. See Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü'l-Vukuat: Kurumları ve Örgütleriyle Osmanlı Tarihi*, Neşet Çağatay (ed.), 2 vols., (Ankara: TTK, 1992). The first edition of the book was in 1294/1877 (vol. I), and in 1296/1879 (vol. II). Mustafa Nuri Paşa (b.1238/1824-d.1307/1890) was the son of a notable from İzmir. After moving to İstanbul, he entered Turkish Correspondance Office (“Mektubi-i Hariciyye”) and later became chief scribe at at the *Tanzimat* Council. He was appointed as the chief scribe of the *Tanzimat* Council (1275/1859), Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances (“Meclis-i Vala”) (1277/1860), and of the Adjucation Office (“Muhakemat Dairesi”) (1277/1860). On 15 Ra 1280/30 August 1863, he was promoted to the post of beyliği, and the supervisor of Judicial Affairs (“deavai naziri”) within the same year. One year later he was appointed as a member of the Supreme Council of the Judicial Ordinances (“Meclis-i Vala”), and the head of the Board of Audit (“Divan-i Muhasebat reisi”) (1286/1869). In the year 1289/1872 he was promoted to the office undersecretary of the Grand Vizier (“sadarei müsteşar”) and but dismissed three years later. Mustafa Nuri was granted the rank of Pasha in 1299/1882. In the same year he served as the Minister of Education (“Maarif Naziri”) and then became the Minister of Pious Foundations (“Evkaf Naziri”) in 1303/1886. See Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. IV, pp. 1275-6.

\(^{265}\) Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü'l-Vukuat*, vol. IV, pp. 41, 43.

\(^{266}\) Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü'l-Vukuat*, vol. IV, p. 46.
understanding of the tension leading to the May 1807 Rebellion is very similar to the analysis of Cevdet Pasha.267

Tayyarzâde Ahmed Ata Efendi’s268 History constitutes another source for our period. He accuses Köse Musa Pasha and Ataullah Efendi together with some ulema for being responsible for the outbreak of the Rebellion and the already accelerating tension between the Nizam-ı Cedid army and the Janissary corps.269 Even though there are similar accusations directed against Ataullah Efendi in some of the contemporary and later sources, Ata Efendi uses a particularly harsh and almost “rude” tone towards the former şeyhülislam. He usually refers to him as “Topal Ata”, a kind of an attribute rather unbecoming a şeyhülislam.270 He asserts that he was responsible for an event that was about to cause the fall of the Empire.271 He also deals with the problem of why the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers were not used at the beginning of the Rebellion and asserts that it was due to the tempered nature of Sultan Selim who did not want to cause bloodshed.272 Thanks to his connections with the Enderun, he is able to provide some details on the execution of the


268 Tayyarzâde Ahmed Ataullah Bey (b. 1225/1810-d. 1297/1880), was the son of Tayyar Efendi, a servant in the Enderun. After receiving an education in the Enderun, he served as a scribe in the Consultative Assembly of the Sublime Porte (“Dar-ı Şura katibi”), scribe of Giritli Naili Mustafa Pasha, later scribe of the corresponding secretary of the Ministry of War (“mektubi-i seraskeri katibi”), corresponding secretary of the Ministry of War (“serasker mektupçosu”) (1260/1844), a member of the Consultative Assembly (“Dar-ı Şura azası”), the head of finance office of Adana (mal müdürü), and Aleppo (1263/1847), İstanbul muhasebecisi (1266/1849-50). In Ca 1276/January 1860, he became the mutasarrıf of Cezayir-i Bahr-i Sefid and was dismissed in 1279/1863. He was later appointed as mutasarrıf of Karahisar-i Sahib, then of Kütahya (1291/1874), Karasi and was finally appointed as Harem-i Şerif Müdürü (1293/1876). He died there. See Babinger, Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları, pp. 397-8; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. I, pp. 330-1.


people that were held responsible for the murder of Selim III. Another important point is the fact that, similar to Şanizâde, Ata Efendi criticizes Asım for his comments concerning the character of Selim III.

As might be noticed from the brief discussion of the above sources belonging to the Tanzimat Era, the overall evaluation of the Selim III’s period is not completely different from the contemporary narratives. Like most of the contemporary sources, they talk about the necessity of the establishing of a new army in the face of numerous defeats and cite the Nizam-ı Cedid issue as the main reason of the Rebellion. Like the previous works, they explain that the Janissaries allied with some the members of the ulema and statesmen, but attribute their collaboration with the Janissaries mostly to personal reasons. They, too, think that there were some problems with the ruling elite of the period, yet at the same time are less critical of the reformist circles. During this period, there was more discussion on the administrative efficiency of Selim III. Another common concern of these historians seems to answer the question as to why the Nizam-ı Cedid corps were not used against the rebels. In general, we can say that a state-centered or rather dynastic outlook on historical events remained dominant.

The second half of the nineteenth century signified the development of modern public education in the Ottoman Empire and it was during this period that school textbooks began to be produced in a systematic way. The earliest history textbooks were compiled by Ahmed Vefik Pasha and Selim Sabit Efendi in the period of 1870-1881. In his evaluation of the history textbooks of the late Ottoman period, S. Akşin Somel detects that there was a “moderate degree of censorship” of the murder and dethronement of Ottoman sultans in the period between 1870 and 1881. Events pertaining to the murder of the sultans could be found in the textbooks published during this period and he gives as examples that of A. Vefik Pasha and S. Sabit Efendi. However, during the Hamidian era, the degree of

censorship increased and he gives the example of primary school textbooks compiled by Ali Nazima as the most typical example of this practice.\textsuperscript{276} Indeed, there was no mention of the dethronement or murder of the Ottoman sultans, including that of the cases of Selim III and Mustafa IV. The author just mentions that Selim III died in the year 1222/1807\textsuperscript{277} after a brief mention of the arrival of the British navy at the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{278} There is no reference nor any mention of the May 1807 Rebellion. However, he notes the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa by saying that “during his reign, a peace treaty was concluded with Russia. Furthermore the state had to tackle with the Janissaries resenting the Nizam-i Cedit army, and Bayrakdar Mustafa Pasha banished the wicked Kabakçı, who was the main figure behind the provocation of unrest.”\textsuperscript{279}

In the rüşdiyye-level textbooks, it is possible to come across some information on the murder of some Ottoman sultans, but these were usually referred to as “martyrdom”.\textsuperscript{280} In Selim Sabit, Ali Reşad and Ali Cevad’s accounts there are some very brief references to the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{281} It is presented as a reaction against progress (“terakki”), the reaction of the Janissary army- and the yamaks – to the Nizam-i Cedit army. It was also claimed that the Janissaries were jealous of the latter.\textsuperscript{282} For the idadi levels, Somel observes that there were only minor cases of censorship and gives the example of Abdurahman Şeref’s book.

\textsuperscript{276} Somel, Modernization of Public Education, p. 196.

\textsuperscript{277} In fact Selim III died in 1223/1808.

\textsuperscript{278} Ali Nazîmâ, Tarih-i Nazîmâ: Küçük Tarih-i Osmanî, (İstanbul: 1313/1895), p. 58.

\textsuperscript{279} Nazîmâ, Tarih-i Nazîmâ, p. 59: “devr-i saltanatlarinda Rusya ile mütâreke olunub Nizam-i Cedit askerini çekemeyen yeniçerilerle uğrasılmış ve Bayrakdar Mustafa Paşa tarafından gürültü çıkarmaya sebeb olan Kabakçı me’lînu te’dib olunmuşdur”

\textsuperscript{280} Somel, Modernization of Public Education, p. 196.

\textsuperscript{281} Selim Sabit Efendi, Muhtasar Tarih-i Osman, (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Amire, 1297/1880); pp. 31-2; Ali Reşad, Muhtasar Osmanlı Tarihi, Rüşdiye Kısımı, (İstanbul: Artin Asuriyan Matbaası, 1309), pp. 105-109; Toptaşı ve Paşa Kapısı Askeri Rüştiyeleri Muallimlerinden Kol Ağası Ali Cevad, Tarih-i İslâm, (İstanbul: 1308/1890), pp. 183-185.

\textsuperscript{282} Ali Cevad, Tarih-i İslâm, pp. 184-5; Selim Sabit, Muhtasar Osmanlı, p. 31; Ali Reşad, Muhtasar Osmanlı Tarihi, p. 109. Reşad briefly mentions that Kaimmakam Musa Pasha among the enemies of “terakkiyât ve teceddüdlâf”.

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According to Abdurrahman Şeref, Selim III was an innovator and a progressive ("müceddid ve terakkiperver") who initiated a general "reform" program. Since the main symptoms of the decline of the Empire were manifested in the series of military defeats and the consequent territorial losses, the reform program concentrated on the military field. However, the program faced the opposition of the conservatives ("efkar-ı atika sahipler") and also of those seeking their personal interests.

Even though Abdurrahman Şeref depended on information provided by previous historians, it is possible to observe a striking change in the language he employed to describe the incidents we are interested in. In his textbook, even though the issue is again territorial losses and the establishment of the Nizam-ı Cedid corps, he understands its establishment as a sign of modernization and progress in the Western line under the imperative of a progressive and reformist Sultan. The May 1807 Rebellion is considered as an obstacle hindering modernization and a struggle between the reformists or the progressivist groups and the conservatives. The Rebellion is thus cursed for delaying or preventing the road towards Westernization. However, it was an unlucky situation since the Sultan was mild in character, and most members of his ruling elite were not yet aware of the benefits of progress. In addition, he argues that the subjects were not yet prepared for progress and "ala franga" ways. There was a need for a strong and decisive sultan who would be able to suppress the reactions coming from below and also from among the elite of the period. He criticizes Selim III on the grounds that his personality caused the loss of

283 Abdurrahman Şeref, Tarih-i Devlet-i Osmaniyye, (Mekatib-i Aliyyede tedris olunmak üzere iki cild olarak tertib olunmuştur), 2 vols., (İstanbul: 1312/1894), vol I, p. 284. Abdurrahman Şef (b. 1269/1853-d. 1343/1925), became the director of School of Civil Administration ("Mekteb-i Mülkiye") in 1294/1877, and was employed as history teacher at Galatasaray Lycee for 42 years. After the 1908 Revolution he became a senator ("ayan aza") and twice the Minister Education ("Maarif Naziri"). After the rise of Mehmed V he became vakanüvis and remained in the office until 1922. In 1918, he became Evkaf Nazir, and then the Minister of Education (November 1919). See Babinger, Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları, pp. 439-40. Apart from his history, he wrote history books titled Abdüllahamid-i Sa’i’ye Dair, (İstanbul: 1918), Tarih Musâhebeleri (İstanbul: Maarif, 1340/1921) and Özdemir Osman Paşa, (İstanbul: 1330/1914).


forty or fifty years on the road to progress.\textsuperscript{286} Despite these harsh criticisms, Abdurrahman Şeref gives Selim III a special place in Ottoman history as being the very first sultan to notice the necessity of modernization and to attempt to realize it. Finally, Şeref notes that the progressive ideas were transmitted by Selim III to Mahmud II, who was able to continue the modernization project where Selim had left off.\textsuperscript{287}

Another account, by Mehmed Tevfik Pasha, puts forward arguments which are similar to those of Abdurrahman Şeref.\textsuperscript{288} He also considers the Rebellion as the manifestation of the tension between the reformists and the conservatives.\textsuperscript{289} Again we see Selim III as transmitting his “enlightened ideas” to Mahmud II. Like Abdurrahman Şeref, he presents Selim III as the Sultan who sacrificed his life/body to bring Western civilization to his country.\textsuperscript{290} It is also important to note that according to him, when progress (“teceddüdâd”) and reforms (“inkılabât”) arrive at a country, this usually triggers the revolt of the people against the ruler and the administrators.\textsuperscript{291}

The Hamidian period (1878-1908) ended with the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the Second Constitutional period (1908-1918) started when the Union and Progress Party (İttihat ve Terakki) came to power. During this period the modernization and Westernization process of the Empire continued. Main intellectual debates of the period centered on the backwardness of the Empire. Ahmed Reşid Efendi\textsuperscript{292} presented Selim III as the third sultan – after Ahmed III and Mustafâ III – who initiated a serious program of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{286} Abdurrahman Şeref, \textit{Tarih}, vol. I, pp. 305-6. According to the auhtor, Selim III did not have the will (“cebr”) even that of his father, Mustafâ III.
\item \textsuperscript{287} Abdurrahman Şeref, \textit{Tarih}, vol. I, pp. 306-7.
\item \textsuperscript{288} Mehmed Tevfik Paşa, \textit{Telhîs-i Tarih-i Osmani}, (İstanbul: 1302). Mehmed Tevfik Paşa (d. 4 December 1915) followed a military career. He was appointed as attaché, in Paris and Brussels. After return he was employed as the inspector of military schools.
\item \textsuperscript{289} Mehmed Tevfik Paşa, \textit{Telhis}, p. 188.
\item \textsuperscript{290} Mehmed Tevfik Paşa, \textit{Telhis}, p. 192.
\item \textsuperscript{291} Mehmed Tevfik Paşa, \textit{Telhis}, p. 192.
\item \textsuperscript{292} Ahmed Reşid, \textit{Haritalı ve Resimli Mükemmel Tarih-i Osmani}, 2 vols., (İstanbul: 1328).
\end{itemize}
reform/development (“teceddüd”) to serve for the progress (“terakkiyât”) of the Empire. However, these reforms were against the interests of the groups who were the parasitic plotters living on salaries (“beyhude ulufe-hor erbâb-ı fesâd”). Since he considers this period as an era of progress, he studies the May 1807 Rebellion under the title of Reactionary Incident (“Vaka-yı İrtica”). At the background of the mutiny, he sees the dissatisfaction of the Janissaries, who were always ready to rebel. In addition to that, the factions supporting Prince Mustafa were also being involved in the intrigues against Selim III. Even though the Rebellion could be suppressed easily with the use of Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers, the mildness of Sultan Selim prevented this action and thus there remained no obstacle for the rebels. The author perceives the Rebellion as a fight between “terakki” and “ırtica”, the result of which was a major setback on the way to progress due to the worldly ambitions of the antagonist party.

The only independent work on the May 1807 Rebellion was written by Ahmed Refik and was titled Kabakçı Mustafa İsyanı. The author begins with an almost orientalist discourse stating that

Nations wating their lives in a chronic state of blindness and ignorance, failing to pursue the ways to improve their intellectual conditions and social lives, and to transform their environment through learning, intellectual development and the fruits of civilization.

Within this framework, he argues that the Kabakçı and the Patrona Halil (1730) uprisings are very similar in terms of the participants and motivations. For him, the

occurrence of similar rebellions proves the fact that there was no improvement in the social level of the people to save them from this vicious cycle.\textsuperscript{300} The participants of the May 1807 Rebellion were all corrupted people seeking their own personal interests rather than the interests of their state and were the tools of the corrupted \textit{ulema} class.\textsuperscript{301} According to Refik’s understanding, the evil nature of the \textit{ulema} and the Janissaries were the main cause of the Rebellion and a basic obstacle on the way of the reform efforts. On the other hand, even though Selim III was a reformist and good-intentioned person he lacked the necessary qualities to deal with the evil plans of his enemies.\textsuperscript{302}

A crucial point in A. Refik’s analysis is the central role attributed to Kabakçı Mustafa. He emerges as a major character leading the ignorant people, having an active part during the Rebellion, and establishing direct contacts with the statesmen during and after the Rebellion. Even though it is a rather negative role and character attributed to Kabakçı Mustafa and his men, one does sense a strange “fascination” with Kabakçı Mustafa, and he emerges in Refik’ writings as a “negative hero”. In the Ottoman tradition, according to Ahmed Refik, despite belonging to the lowest levels of society, such men were able to lead large segments of the society and thus had a say in the fate of the Empire.\textsuperscript{303} For him, the rebels were able to lead the people since the rather low educational and cultural level of the society provided suitable conditions for this purpose. He adds that their influence on common people is worth studying, since most of the social calamities originated from the activities of such people. For Refik, Kabakçı Mustafa is one of the most noteworthy of these rebels.\textsuperscript{304} Interestingly enough, in his explanations we see that even though he explicitly notes that the common people and rebel leaders share the “same language”, he discusses as to why the people were so ignorant and why they were easily persuaded by the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{300} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{301} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, p. 20. He argues that in every uprising the \textit{ulema} played a leading role.
\item \textsuperscript{302} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, p. 38.
\item \textsuperscript{303} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, pp. 4, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{304} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, p. 4.
\end{itemize}
rebels. In these comments it seems to be possible to see a major dilemma of the nineteenth, and also later, intellectuals. As we have seen some glimpses even during the era of Selim III, the history of the modernization of the Empire, including the Republican period, the intelligentsia had always difficulty to reach an understanding with the masses. Though they considered that the reforms were done on behalf of the common people, they usually faced the passive or open resistance of the people and, as in the case Ahmed Refik, became disappointed when an “ignorant” person like Kabakçı Mustafa was able to mobilize the masses better than the reformers.

Ahmed Refik contradicts himself by stating that this Rebellion was not a social movement.\textsuperscript{305} At another point he says that Kabakçı Mustafa was representing the “public will” (\textit{arzu-yi milli}).\textsuperscript{306} Another accusation was that both the Kabakçı and the participants were not thinking in terms of the interests of the fatherland, Ottomanism, and were rejecting the Western civilization.\textsuperscript{307} Like some other figures – the kaimmakam, the şeyhülislam or the Janissaries – the rebels are blamed for their lack of patriotism for being conservatist and greedy. Their only purpose was to burn, damage and plunder.\textsuperscript{308} With these fatal ideas in mind they killed the ruling elite that aimed at the establishment of order and the introduction of civilization to the Empire, while the Sultan was striving hard for these purposes.\textsuperscript{309} For instance, Ahmed Refik comments that that the ulema and the Janissaries immediately collaborated against the reforms as soon as they saw the “light of knowledge”.\textsuperscript{310} According to him, Ataullah Efendi and other religious figures constituted a serious obstacle on the way to modernization.\textsuperscript{311} Not surprisingly, the reign of Mustafa IV

\textsuperscript{305}Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, pp. 117-22, 134.
\textsuperscript{306} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, p. 94.
\textsuperscript{307} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{308} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, pp. 4, 12.
\textsuperscript{309} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{310} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, pp. 14, 70.
\textsuperscript{311} Ahmed Refik, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, p. 20.
is considered as a period of utmost chaos where the ignorant and reactionary forces were in power. According to this discourse, the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha brought the “light” to back İstanbul. Ahmed Refik even praises Alemdar and Ruscuk Yârânı as the “saviors of the patrie” (“halaskaran-ı vatan”).

The historiography of the Tanzimat, the Hamidian and the Young Turks eras have major similarities. First of all, though the interest in the era of Selim III and the Rebellion continued, it was apparently to see the roots of the initial process of modernization and the opposition to it. This might also account for the lack of interest in the factual data concerning these periods. However, the evaluation of the Rebellion as an anti-reform movement was elaborated and the danger of the corrupt ulema and statesmen and the unruly Janissaries became more emphasized from the Tanzimat historians onwards. The dull repetition of the same details over and over again also show the common concern of the historians of these periods, namely the success and failure of modernization/Westernization attempts during their own period. They repeatedly justified the abolition of the Janissary army for the elimination of one group on the way to modernization. The image of Selim III was another common concern of the historians of the above periods. They celebrated him as a reformist and hardworking Sultan, but criticized his indecisiveness and loose imperial rule for allowing the emergence of the uprising. There is a common simplification of the history of the period which sees it as a period of struggle between the new and the old or modernists and conservatives, ignoring the complexity of the power politics and, different factions observable in contemporary narratives. What they omit is as important as what they talk about. One good example is the tendency to see the Ottoman history during Selim III’s period as the initial period of modernization, a process during which the face of the Empire is turned towards the West.

313 Ahmed Refik, Kabakçı Mustafa, p. 138.
As concluded by Somel, we can say that there was a general approach of “state- and sultan-centrism” in the books of the period.314

1.4. The Republican Period

Republican regime was established in 1923. A nation-state was built characterized by a centralized administration, fed by a secularist and nationalist ideology. Although it envisaged a break with the Ottoman past, in terms of the modernization/Westernization programme the Republican historians found the roots again in the eighteenth and nineteenth century developments. As we shall see below though some brought the modernization movement to earlier periods, the Nizam-ı Cedid reform programme is usually celebrated as the most serious modernization attempt in the history of the Empire and as the background for the secularist and centralized Republican regime. According to the Republican historians, despite some setbacks, the reforms of Mahmud II, the Tanzimat Era, Constitutional periods were the important cornerstones in the development of the Republican regime. In short, the Republican historians tried to detect the “descendants” of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and also his rivals in the Ottoman history. For the early nineteenth century the candidates were very clear.

This idea of an ongoing reformist policies of certain viziers or sultans to save the Empire from an inevitable collapse and the reactions from below seems to have been best formulated in Enver Ziya Karal (1906-1982)’s publications. For the historian, prior to the Tanzimat Era there were some other conscious efforts for “Garplılaşma” (Westernization) - such as the Tulip Era (1718-1730), the military reforms of Mahmud I, Mustafa III, Abdulhamid I, the Nizam-ı Cedid and finally the reforms of Mahmud II.315 According to


Karal, the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms were not restricted to the military realm but envisaged a wider range of reforms.\(^{316}\) However, he argues that since the subjects and the Muslim elite were not ready for such a program, it was destined for failure until the Tanzimat Era.\(^{317}\) *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi* similarly asserts that the reforming attempts in the Empire dated back to the reign of Ahmed III and the Tulip Era.\(^{318}\) Zuhuri Danışman, on the other hand, carries the date back to the attempts of Osman II (r. 1618-1622) as a starting point. Like Karal, Danışman thinks that it was Selim III who initiated a modernization process that embraced all the institutions of the Empire.\(^{319}\) Yılmaz Öztuna also puts the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reform into the category of “radical” reforms, referring to its total nature. Thus, in this respect the Rebellion was more serious and dangerous for the interests of the Empire when compared to the previous rebellions.\(^{320}\)

Even though there is not such an understanding or emphasis in this regard in the contemporary sources, the Republican authors very explicitly equalize the modernization process with Westernization. It might be illuminating to keep in mind that in the 1940s Turkey was closer to the orbit of West due to the Soviet factor. In the contemporary sources, however, one meets mainly an emphasis on the principle of “*mukabele-i bi‘l-misil*”. In the view of the mainstream of Republican historiography, the high spirit of renovation came from Europe, and the East had no chance other than to adapt itself in order to survive. Since it meant a movement from an inferior to a superior status and values, it was also a story of progress, i.e. development (“*terakki*”). This historiographical view,

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\(^{317}\) Karal, “Garphlaştırma”, p. 17.


implicitly or explicitly, denies that the Ottoman Empire was capable of reviving or reforming itself through an internal spirit.

In terms of the treatment of our topic, there seems to be imposition of nationalist, republicanist and secularist discourses, in compliance with the Republican ideology, upon the existing knowledge on the Rebellion. Due to the lack of real historical questions we do not observe in-depth researches on the sources of the period, but a dependence mostly on the accounts of easily available sources such as Asım, Şanızade and mostly Cevdet Pasha.321 We might claim that most of the other sources were either forgotten or ignored during the early the Republican period. This created a rather weak historiography composed of an ideological superimposition over the available sources without any serious historical criticism. In fact, the Republican authors repeated the earlier explanations, employing a Republicanist view.

Despite the fact that the Republican regime distanced itself from the Ottoman political past for a long time, the state-centered tone of the Ottoman chronicles was kept, while the dynastic tone was left aside. Since there is a parallel attitude between Ottoman central political authority and the state centrism of the Republican period, the revolts even against the Ottoman sultans were usually condemned by early Republican historians. According to the Republican viewpoint, Republican Turkey represents a cornerstone in the development of modern and secular Turkey, and they find the roots of this progress in the reforms of Ottoman sultans like Selim III. In other words, if there were no the reactionary movements such as the May 1807 Rebellion, the linear development towards the modern and secular Turkey would not have been interrupted and would have been much smoother. Within this framework, any oppositionary movement against these early attempts of reform is condemned as being against the interests of the Ottoman state, and in fact, its heir

321 Karal himself acknowledges that he wrote his book, Osmanlı Tarihi, depending on available monographs and material. See Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. V, p XII. For the reign of Selim III, Karal published a series of archival materials in two volumes: The first one is Selim III’un Hatt-ı Hümayunları: Nizam-ı Cedid and the second one is a more general study on the Selimin era. See Karal, Enver Ziya, Selim III’ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları, (Ankara: TTK, 1999). The first edition is in 1942. Yet, in these books there is no archival material concerning the Rebellion.
Republican Turkey. Thus, late Ottoman history has been interpreted as a total war between the reformers and the reactionaries. Needless to say, from their centralist standpoint the Rebellion of May 1807 was a betrayal of state interests, thus giving the Republican historians the right to make very frequent and negative value judgments against the antagonists. Such an attitude however, leads to a simplification of the complexity of the issue and leads to the thought that it was a war between the old and the new, progress and reaction, revival and corruption, and they project this dichotomy to their understanding of the events too.

If we look at more closely at the historiographical approach of the Republican historians, it appears that two groups, namely the Janissaries and *ulema*, seem to be the primary targets of Republican historical criticism. The main reason for the former group is their supposedly degenerate and ignorant attitude. If we take into consideration that the primary symptom of the Ottoman “decline” was considered to be territorial losses, it is very natural that the inefficient Janissaries were held responsible for the “illness”. They, during the reign of Selim III, turned into a rebellious, ignorant rabble, oppressing the civilian population instead of defending the Empire. The Janissaries acted “cowardly” vis-à-vis the external enemies while being “lions” to the ordinary people. Above all they are condemned for not noticing their mistakes and rejecting discipline and opposing any kind of military reform. Besides, they dared to take actions in the forms of rebellions or “*huruc ales-sultan*”. Thus, the Janissaries were the strongest conservative and indeed a reactionary element in the society.\(^{322}\)

The Republican dislike of the *ulema*, on the other hand, apparently is related to the influence of the secularist Republican ideology which created a kind of animosity or dislike towards the members of this class. It might be sufficient to recall the Menemen Incident of 1925. The image of corrupt and degenerated *ulema* is often represented through the famous figures such as Feyzullah Efendi or Cinci Hoca for the earlier periods. While discussing the

Rebellion of May 1807, Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi is considered to be the representative of the conservative and backward ulema. This is an important shift since even though these three figures have been criticized by earlier historiography for having been motivated by their personal concerns; they were turned into the spokesmen of larger groups by the historiography of the Republican period. In the minds of most of the authors of this period the issue seems to be quite clear. The result is depicted as the victory of the conservatism (‘irticaın zaferi”) and Ataullah Efendi as a “hypocrite reactionary” (“iki yüzü mürteci”).

Republican historiography went as far as considering the ulema as a “harmful (‘muzur”) social group rejoicing in shedding the blood of innocent people and seeing no problem in supporting the rebels. Rıza Nur, in his History of Turkey, even says that

This class of şeyhülislams and the religious ulema was always involved in each and every disaster that befell the state and the people. In all events that have happened so far, we have seen their calamitous influence and shall continue to see those hereafter.

A similar comment is also made by an earlier historian, Ahmed Refik, who says that this group was involved in almost every rebellion. Rıza Nur seems to have a well-defined ulema class that should deal with strictly religious matters in his mind. He apparently did not pay attention to the historical fact that especially the high-ranking members of the ulema class was a traditional part of the decision-making process of the Empire. But he remarks angrily “iște biilmediikleri işlere burunlarını sokarak devleti böyle felaketten felakete atıp bu hale getirmişlerdir.” In a similar way, Ahmed Rasim condemns the


324 Danişmend, İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. IV, p. 87.


326 Ahmed Refik, Kabakçı Mustafa, p. 20.

327 Rıza Nur, Türkiye Tarihi, vol. III, p. 279. Öztuna is not that critical of the ulema, and he was puzzled by the involvement of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, coming from a
religious class by claiming that they abused religion, that they were ignorant and strove only for their own selfish benefits.\textsuperscript{328} As to the character of Köse Musa Pasha, the Republican historians find in his personality the best depiction of a corrupt statesman working for his personal interests, rather than that of those of the state.\textsuperscript{329} It is interesting to note that even though a satisfactory explanation about the involvement of Köse Musa Pasha is nonexistent, there are very frequent accusations against his personality and his collaboration with the Şeyhülislam.\textsuperscript{330}

As for the imperial image of Selim III, there exist contradictions in the Republican image-making for this Sultan. On the one hand he is celebrated as a reformer, noticing the problems of the Empire even while he was a prince.\textsuperscript{331} He was among the first Ottoman sultans to appreciate the value of European civilization and initiated a process to attain it.\textsuperscript{332} However, there is a serious accusation against Selim III of having been unable to behave decisively and a standing firmly against the reactions.\textsuperscript{333} In fact, Republican historians have been very much occupied with the question of why Selim III retreated after the Edirne

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\textsuperscript{331} Karal, Selim III’in Hatt-ı Hümayunları, p. 11; Akçura, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Dağılma Devri, p. 156-9.


\textsuperscript{333} Ahmed Rasim ve Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. 5, p. 1609, 1628-9, 1672. This part seems to be inspired by Cevdet ve Asım’s accounts.
Incident and why he did not use the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps against the rebels in 1807.\textsuperscript{334} Finally most of them decided that the main problem was with the character of Selim III, echoing the arguments of Asım.\textsuperscript{335} As discussed previously, there was a similar discussion among some of the contemporary historians, yet now the tone of these accusations has become more severe.\textsuperscript{336} In short, the Republican historiography held Selim III responsible for not being a charismatic and determined leader and for not crushing down anything on the way to modernization and progress and therefore causing the Empire to lose time in this process.\textsuperscript{337} According to this depiction, Mustafa IV is presented as “aklen zaif” sultan, but also possessing a blind ambition to become a sultan, and thus not hesitating to involve himself in treacherous plots against Selim III while he was in the royal “cage” (“kafes”).\textsuperscript{338} He is represented as a negative counterpart of Selim III, being a “dark force” (“kara kuvvet”), while Selim III was a “force of light” (“nurani kuvvet”). However, the Rebellion helped the victory of darkness over the light.\textsuperscript{339}

Yusuf Akçura, though sharing most of the characteristics of the accounts of the Republican period, nevertheless made certain contributions to the research on the May 1807 Rebellion. In his book, the most important underlying issue is the evaluation of the history of the beginning of nineteenth century Ottoman Empire as a fight between Eastern and


\textsuperscript{336}For instance Rıza Nur blames the Sultan by the following words: “Selim Han böyle halim ve teredüdlü padişah olmasaydı bu işi mutlaka başarırdı. Hilmi adeta eşek hilmi olmuştur”. See *Türk Tarihi*, vol. III, p. 283; see also Koçu, *Kabakçı Mustafa*, pp. 33, 39, 41.


\textsuperscript{339}Danişmend, *İzahî Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. IV, p. 87.
Western civilizations which also found its reflections in internal politics. This struggle divided the ruling elite and the society vertically into two camps: those upholding the Westernization process and those sticking firmly to traditional Eastern values. According to the author, the Rebellion represented the victory of the latter camp, which seems to have had the support of most sections of society. The 1807 Rebellion showed that most of the society was still firmly attached, psychologically and materially, to Eastern civilization.

This general historical perspective allowed Akçura to have a critical attitude towards most of the Ottoman institutions, such as the palace or the “confinement system” ("kafes"). He says, for instance, that the system could not produce decisive and strong sultans. In addition to that, he is also critical of the narrative sources which emphasize role of the individuals in the failure of the Nizam-ı Cedid program. He comments that in such incidents the chronicles usually depict the Sultan and most of the other segments of society as innocent and perfect and put all the blame on a limited group of people. Thus he seems not to be convinced by such traditional explanations and suggests that there was a major breakdown in the legitimacy of Selim III’s rule, due to which most of the ulema, the ruling elite and the residents of İstanbul turned against him. He in particular notes that with the available information it is difficult to give a clear-cut answer about the role of the Şeyhülislam in the Rebellion. He says that

Kaimmakam Musa Pasha who aimed to take revenge for the injustices done unto his person – all of which happened simply because of his depravity- , the hypocrite Ataullah Efendi, who descended from an ominous lineage, and the resentful Kadi Murad Efendi are held responsible for the deposition of Selim III.

340 Akçura, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Dağılma Devri, p. 154.

341 Akçura, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Dağılma Devri, p. 163.

342 Akçura, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Dağılma Devri, p. 152: “Selim III’in hal’inde dahi surf ahlikın fenalığından dolayı şahsına vaki olmuş haksızlıklardan ölç almak isteyen Kaymakam Musa Paşa ile uğursuz bir aileden gelen riyakar Ataullah Efendi ve nihayet muğber bulunan Kadi Murad Efendi’yi mesul gösterirler”. Yet, he still continued to follow the the traditional explanations, pp. 143, 152.
Finally, he makes an interesting comment, saying that the dethronement of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876 and of Selim were in fact very similar; however those who caused the fall of the former sultan were never criticized nor blamed by the Ottoman historians.

Despite the Republican interest in the Selimian era, there are no prolific monographs on the Rebellion itself. The only published monograph is a romanticized work rather than an academic study, Reşad Ekrem Koçu’s work titled Kabakçı Mustafa: Bir Serserî'nin Romanlaştırılmış Hikayesi. Koçu’s book has most of the elements of Republican historiography: dichotomy between progress and conservatism, the emphasis on the role of individuals, the imperial image of Selim III, frequent value judgments and especially the imposition Republican ideology over the available sources. Koçu was a student of Ahmed Refik and his perception of the Rebellion is similar to that of Ahmed Refik. For him, it was military revolt of the yamaks – and the Janissaries – against the military reforms of Selim III. Here again we see Selim III as a weak and indecisive ruler who is not able to resolve internal and external problems. For him, too, the blame should be placed on the kaimmakam and Şeyhülislam who were the planners and directors of the Rebellion behind the scene. Yet, compared to Refik’s explanation, Koçu’s account has the merit of depicting the complexity of the events and of conveying the socio-cultural milieu not only of the rebellious days but also of the whole reign of Selim III. His main contribution lies in his attempt to look at the events not only from the eyes of the palace or the reformist group but also from the perspective of the rebels. He makes a sincere effort to understand the motives of the rebels and their outlook. His other contribution is his ability to give at least some idea about the atmosphere and the public opinion of the time through coffeehouses where the gossip floated about the reforms, the luxurious lives of the ruling elite as well as the deeds of Kabakçı Mustafa before and after the Rebellion. Yet, probably due to his romanticized narration of events, as well as his Republican attitude, his book suffers the lack of a well-balanced analysis of events. On the whole his basic treatment of the subject becomes a struggle between the ignorant and corrupted rebels and the reformists.

Like Ahmed Refik, Koçu pays particular attention to the leadership of Kabakçı Mustafa. Presumably his emphasis on the role of Kabakçı Mustafa is related to the
information he found in the notes of Aşık Razi, a source used by Koçu. Aşık Razi, according to information provided by Koçu, was the grandson of Uzun Ali Ağā, the ayan of Pınarhisar who executed Kabakçı Mustafa. Aşık Razi recorded the memoirs of his father, the son of Uzun Ali Ağā. As we may notice from some anecdotes and poems quoted by Koçu from this source, there apparently existed an oral tradition among the common people on the uprising, which gave major importance, negatively or positively, to Kabakçı Mustafa as a political figure.

Though belonging to different periods, both Ahmed Refik and Koçu’s monographs on the May 1807 Rebellion were popular books addressing the common reader rather than academic circles, and thus were written in a style and language easy to follow and understand. Their preference of a popular audience brings to mind what messages they were in fact trying to convey to people. Both books depict a very corrupt Ottoman society, all segments included. We may claim that by underlining the corruption and ignorance of the Ottoman people, both authors implicitly conveyed the message that the reforms in a society were required. One of their concerns was also to educate the common people of their period. Indeed, Ahmed Refik underlines that commoners are devoid of moral and intellectual virtues. Therefore, he thinks that education as well as the elevation of the social and cultural level of the population will prevent the people from following rebellious figures like Kabakçı Mustafa.

Even though İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı did not write an independent book on the Rebellion, from his various writings it is possible to get some idea concerning his understanding of the issue. Like other historians of the Republican period, the author considers military defeats and territorial losses as the most significant signs of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the local magnates in Anatolia and the Balkans as the most significant symptom of the weakening of the central authority, the result of which was

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343 Koçu, Kabakçı Mustafa, pp. 57, 173.
344 Ahmed Refik, Kabakçı Mustafa, p. 5.
the urgent need for internal reform. 345 Since the symptoms of internal and external decline had reached an unignorable degree, Selim III had decided to implement his famous reform program. However, the supporters of his program were few in number and Selim III was not strong enough to realize it. The situation became complicated due to the accelerating despotism of the Nizam-ı Cedid elite, not to mention the intrigues of Prince Mustafa and the dissatisfaction of the Janissaries. 346 Together with the efforts of Köse Musa Pasha and Ataullah Efendi, the road to depose Selim III was opened. 347 According to the author, the enthronement of Mustafa IV was a fatal mistake, since he was a very greedy (“haris”) and ignorant ruler trying just to survive on the throne and thus throwing the empire into ultimate terror.

The main contribution of Uzunçarşılı comes from his wide use of archival documents from the Prime Ministry Archives and the Topkapı Palace Museum- including some parts of the Ruzname found in the Milli Evrak catalogue of the former Archive. Apparently, he is the first historian to use the two documents related to the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa. 348 His other contribution is the publication of a series of articles mostly based on archival material about different aspects of Selim III’s reign, ranging from some political issues to the biographies of some leading figures. 349 Thanks to these articles, rich materials have been offered to the students of this period.

345 Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, pp. 2-3.
347 Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, p. 87.
348 Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, pp. 126.
Around the 1960s and 1970s, there was an increase in publications related to the uprising. Other publications of the archival material related to the era of Selim III have been realized by Enver Ziya Karal, Tahsin Öz, F.Ç. Derin, H.D. Andreasyan350, while authors such as Tahsin Ünal, Mitath Sertoğlu, H. Şehsvaroğlu and Münir Sirer published popularized versions of narratives and documents concerning the May 1807 Rebellion, especially in Hayat Tarih Mecmuası. Some of them were also publications of manuscripts they are translated to modern Turkish. These articles repeat the same details from

nationalist perspective common to most historians of the Republican period, yet in a more simplified and popular manner.\textsuperscript{351}

The introduction of the multi-party regime after 1945 enabled the opponents of the Republican regime to express themselves more freely. In 1970, the first openly Islamist political party was founded. However, a full-fledged Islamist history of the Ottoman Empire was not published until 1994, by Ziya Nur Aksun. Thus, we are able to get an Islamist glimpse about the Rebellion only at this date. Ziya Nur looks at the issue from a completely different perspective compared to the other historians of the Republican period. In fact, he uses almost same material and gives similar historical information, but his comments are radically different. According to him, the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} reform attempt was a mistake right from the beginning since the purpose was to abolish the Janissary army and to establish a new one on Western lines. In fact the origin of this assertion is directly related to his evaluation of the Janissary army. He holds that the Janissary army was not the cause of the “decline” of the Empire and especially of the territorial losses. It was not a body of unruly, undisciplined men yet “it was a long-established corps based on religious, national and spiritual principles, and besides a sacred regiment sticking its members through religious discipline.”\textsuperscript{352} Moreover, the new taxes imposed under the name of the \textit{İrâd-ı Cedid} had created great dissatisfaction which was among the main causes of the popular reaction against the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid}.\textsuperscript{353} That is why he considers the establishment of the


\textsuperscript{353} Ziya Nur, \textit{Gayri Resmi Tarihimiz}, p. 159.
Nizam-ı Cedid army to have been a grave mistake. For him, the better solution was to implement an internal reform within the Janissary army, just borrowing the military technology of the West.\footnote{Ziya Nur, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, vol. III, pp. 41-2.} According to Aksun, this mistake belongs to a few people whom he labels as “reformists” (“cedidci”) and who had managed to deceive the Sultan.\footnote{Ziya Nur, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, vol. III, pp. 42-3, 73.} Depending on some arguments made by Şanizâde, Ebubekir Efendi (the second author of the \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmânî}), Asım and Cevdet Pasha Ziya Nur severely criticize the reformist group.\footnote{[Aksun], Ziya Nur, \textit{Gayri Resmi Tarihimiz: Osmanlı Padişahlar}, (İstanbul: Marifet Yayınları, 1997) p. 158; Ziya Nur, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, vol. III, p. 73.} In radical contrast to Republican historiography, where the Janissaries, the \textit{ulema} and Köse Musa Pasha were attacked, Ziya Nur supports the opposite view. After declaring that both Ataullah Efendi and the members of the \textit{ulema} were well educated and dignified people coming from old families, he concludes that it is not possible to think that they were involved in the Rebellion for personal interests.\footnote{Ziya Nur, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, vol. III, p. 92.} Accordingly, Köse Musa Pasha was trying to resist the concentration of political power in the hands of the “cedidci” group, while Ataullah Efendi was trying to “save the rights of the \textit{ulema}.”\footnote{Ziya Nur, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, vol. III, pp. 92-93.} Aksun celebrates their involvement as a proof of the fact that the Rebellion was a common act where almost all segments of the society joined against the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} and “Sultan Selim was dethroned as common act of the Sublime Port, \textit{ulema}, army and the people.”\footnote{Ziya Nur, \textit{Osmanlı Tarihi}, vol. III, p. 93.} In Ziya Nur’s story, the villains are the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} elite. Even though, he portrays Selim III as a hardworking ruler striving hard to bring order to his Empire and refrains from criticizing his policies, he accuses the Sultan for being unable to select his ruling elite carefully, turning his reform project into a top to down movement that had no basis among the common people. On the other hand, he tries to be objective towards Mustafa IV and
rejects the comments that he was conservative and greedy.\footnote{Ziya Nur, Gayri Resmi Tarihimiz, p. 162: “Kendisinin haris ve mürteci olduguna dair görüşlerin hiçbir kymeti yoktur”.
} Ziya Nur gives credit to Sultan Mustafa IV as for trying to strengthen the central political authority by improving the Janissary army and laments his fall from power due to “ignorant” Alemdar Mustafa Pasha.\footnote{Ziya Nur, Gayri Resmi Tarihimiz, pp. 162-3.}

Being consistent in his views, Ziya Nur, rather than criticizing some anti-reformist reactions such as the Edirne Incident, evaluates them as a historical manifestation that the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} was mistake. As for the May 1807 Rebellion, the rebels (“\textit{kayamcılar”}) were not unruly vagrants, but disciplined people who swore to act to realize an ideal within legal limits and in a legitimate way. While the lack of plunder during the course of the Rebellion is almost never mentioned by the Republican authors, he emphasizes that it was a disciplined Rebellion, a point that was underlined by numerous of contemporary narratives.\footnote{Ziya Nur, Gayri Resmi Tarihimiz, p. 162.} Contrary to most of the Republican historians, he does not consider the Rebellion as an incident that was directed from above, not due to a plot engineered by any individual or group.\footnote{Ziya Nur, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. III, p. 88.} It was a popular movement, later became a general “rebellion” with the involvement of the \textit{ulema}, army and the people; indeed it was the manifestation of deep hatred directed towards the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} program and those individuals involved in it.\footnote{Ziya Nur, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. III, p. 88.}

Another Islamist book in this line is the one-volume survey book of Ottoman history by Ahmed Akgündüz and Said Öztürk.\footnote{Akgündüz, Ahmed and Öztürk, Said, 700. \textit{Yılında Bilinmeyen Osmanlı}, (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1999).} Rather than narrating the events, the authors follow a question and reply formula by discussing certain historical issues belonging to different periods of Ottoman history. For the May 1807 Rebellion the question posed is whether it was a “conservatist” (“irtica”) movement or not. Even though they give a
negative answer to the question, their explanations are not satisfactory enough to prove their point of view. Depending on Cevdet Pasha’s History and following the traditional explanations, they argue that Selim III had initiated the Nizam-ı Cedid program in order to save the Empire. During his reign “the decline of Ottoman Empire already ended and it was suffering from the impacts of dissolution.” Consequently, a reform program was required to save the Empire. However, what makes their account different from the nationalist historians is their understanding of the Nizam-ı Cedid program, a point which also directly influences their evaluation of the Rebellion. According to Akgündüz and Öztürk, it is a mistake to consider the Nizam-ı Cedid regulations - prepared on Western lines - as a total reform program aiming at the renewal of the whole Ottoman legal system. For them, its aim was just to change the secular laws, but not to interfere with the Islamic laws. They apparently try to argue that the Nizam-ı Cedid program was not related to the sharia laws, so it would be a mistake to label groups opposing the Nizam-ı Cedid laws as “mürteci”. Thus, from this point of view the reaction - as the Rebellion - to the program cannot be considered as a conservatist movement. Moreover, those involved in the Rebellion were not reacting against the Nizam-ı Cedid itself, but rather against the abuses of the elite who was related to the program. Akgündüz and Öztürk’s arguments concerning the images and policies of Selim III and Mustafa IV remind us of the traditional chronicles’ cliché images of the “good sultans” deceived by evil and corrupt state elites.

Even though at first glance Ziya Nur’s – and to some extent Akgündüz and Öztürk’s - comments on the Rebellion seem to be radically different from those of the Republican historians, a careful study makes it clear that the Islamist historical perception of the events or the Rebellion is not that different. They use the same discourse but take the opposite side. Like the others, Ziya Nur, for instance, argues that accelerating Ottoman decline in the eighteenth century brought a need for revival and caused some of the Ottoman elite to turn

366 Akgündüz and Öztürk, Bilinmeyen Osmanlı, p. 225.
367 Akgündüz and Öztürk, Bilinmeyen Osmanlı, pp. 230, 234.
368 Akgündüz and Öztürk, Bilinmeyen Osmanlı, p. 235.
to the West for a solution. The result was the division of the Ottoman elite as “conservatives” ("muhafazakar") and “reformists” ("inkilapçı"). So, his perception of the period as a struggle between two camps – thus the same story of bad guys versus good guys - is similar, but the point is that whereas the others defend the cause of the so-called “reformist” camp, he tries to defend the cause of the other camp. Interestingly enough, both groups of historians carry the political disputes of present-day Republican Turkey back to eighteenth and nineteenth century Ottoman history. The approach of Ziya Nur is very important in the sense that his view of the Westernization process also shapes his evaluation of Selim III’s era and the Rebellion. Among those who take the side of the Janissaries, we can also identify Abdullah Uçman. The problem is not which side they take, but the very issue of advocating a certain party in a historical analysis. Needless to say, such a partisan approach is ahistorical and prevents the historian from understanding the complexity and real dynamics of a historical incident. Like the nationalist historians, the Islamists evaluate matters from their political standpoint and unfortunately both sides use same clichés and frozen proto-types instead of critical discussion.

From the 1960s onwards, the Turkish Left also began to show a growing interest in certain aspects of Ottoman history, especially the social and political structure of the Empire. The debates of this period centered on the issue of whether Ottoman society and its economic structure should be defined as a Feudal Mode of Production or as an Asian Mode of Production. Niyazi Berkes, in his book titled *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, makes a survey of the last two centuries of the Empire, under the influence of the above

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370 In his introduction to *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risale*, edited by himself, Abdullah Uçman makes some interesting comments about the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms: “Bu hareketiyle III. Selim daha sonra karakteristik bir hal alacak olan ilk hatayı işler. Yani, prensipleri, askeri, ananeleri, milli ve İslami gayretleri ve halk nazarında görünüşüyle son derece mukaddes olan bu müesseseyi kendi kanunlarına dayanarak ıslah edip, düzene koyma ve kuvvetlendirme yoluna gitmez de buna karşılık köksüz ve kıyafetiyle bile sosyal bünüyeye yabancı bir ıçak kurma yoluna gider.” See Koca Sekbanbaşı, *Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi*, Abdullah Uçman (ed.), (İstanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser), pp. 9, 19.
debates. Trying to avoid the taken-for-granted assumptions of the earlier historians, he tries to bring some explanations to the problems of the Empire during these centuries. The period of relative peace following the Treaty of Passarowitz witnessed the initial stage of Western oriented-reform programs rather than traditional reform and also initiated the lasting conflict between “old” and “new” in Turkish history. The Nizam-ı Cedid reforms constituted the second stage of the modernization attempts and there emerged three potential oppositional groups whose interests were to be threatened by the Nizam-ı Cedid and especially by the İrād-ı Cedid reforms, namely the ayans and derebeys, the mültezims and finally a section of the ruling elite.

Thus evaluating the issue from a more sophisticated social, economic and political level, Berkes puts the rebellion into a more general context. Even though he does not go into the historical details of the 1807 Rebellion, he makes a valuable analysis, concentrating on various power groups rather than the individuals. Rejecting the favorite theme of the early Republican historians’ debates that the Janissaries represented the conservativist party frequently collaborating with the ulema, Berkes argues that the opposition of the Janissaries to the reforms had different roots. The Janissaries had become a political interest group in most of the cities and they had intermingled with the residents of the cities, as in İstanbul. Consequently, they had turned into a pressure group representing the lower levels of society rather than the interests of the ulema. Moreover, they were under the influence of the Bektashis who provided them an anti-statist ideology. He concludes that the real cause of the Rebellion was not religious, but political. Berkes’s other contribution is his discussion of the Janissaries as the holders of salaries (“ulufe”) and their pay tickets


373 Berkes, *Secularism*, p. 82.


(esames-papers) which had created a kind of new “market”. This market in fact had become quite attractive for the high elite and ulema as well as the other social groups. This fact turned the Janissaries into objects of manipulation and abuse by different interest groups, especially before the break of the Rebellion.376 In short, Berkes’s book is important in terms of his evaluation of the May 1807 Rebellion in an internal and international framework and also for inspiring us to question the taken-for-granted assumptions.

On the other hand two foreign scholars, Bernard Lewis and Stanford Shaw, study the 1807 Rebellion within the context of the reaction to “Westernization” paradigm.377 Shaw’s *Between Old and New* is a monograph on the reign of Selim III. The work benefits from a wide range of foreign and Turkish sources, including archival materials. He tries to put the Selimian era into a more international and political context and provides good and detailed factual knowledge for the reader. Yet, for the Rebellion, to which he devotes a short chapter, he uses comparatively limited sources and very few archival materials.378 Unfortunately, he seems not to be able to detach himself from the chronicles he benefited from and transmits the information provided by them without cross-checks and critical analysis. As we shall see in the following chapter, Shaw assumes that there was an immediate reaction following the establishment of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army and street fights broke out.379 Yet, as we shall try to show later, even though there seems to have been tension between the supporting and opponent groups, serious and open reaction did not materialize until the visit of Selim III to the Selimiyye Mosque (1805). However, Shaw should be credited for revealing to us the complexity of the factions, especially for the


378 His sources for “The Revolt” are Cevdet Pasha’s *History; Asım’s History; “Kabakçı İsyanına Dair Yazılım Bir Tarihe”,* edited by Uzunçarşılı; Mustafa Necib’s account; Saint-Denys’s book and one document (B.O.A. Ali Emiri 214).

previous events of Selim III’s reign. He is able to show the reader that the so-called “reformists” or the Nizam-ı Cedid elite did not form a uniform and stable group, but on the contrary were easily changing sides according to their own interests. On the other hand, as the title of the book also suggests, Lewis’s work is a general survey of the emergence of modern Turkey. For both authors, the Rebellion was a conservative, even a reactionary movement, realized through the coalition of the Janissaries and the conservative ulema.380

The period after the 1970s did not produce a new perspective about for the reign of Selim III or for the Rebellion. In the studies of the post-1970s, the Nizam-ı Cedid continues to be the favorite topic about the reign of Selim III.381 In these studies Selim’s reign is perceived as a turning point in the Ottoman reform adventure and the May 1807 Rebellion as a conservatist reaction. Moreover, the information they provide is usually a repetition of


the information of the former Republican historians. As for the Rebellion, except an M.A. thesis, there are no detailed studies or and it is usually studied within the framework of reactions to the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms or as a Rebellion ending Selim III’s reign. The M.A. thesis of Musa Kılıç is a general survey of the Rebellion depending on some of the contemporary sources and archival material. According to Kılıç, the Nizam-ı Cedid era was a transitional period from temporary and restricted reforms to the more general and stable developments of the Tanzimat period. The Rebellion, in this sense, was a typical part of the series of reforms and conservative reactions reaching down to the Republican period. Yet, whatever the reactions were, a window had been opened during the Tulip Era, which was widened by the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms, and secured the inevitable infiltration of modernization. For him, the Rebellion of May 1807 was again a struggle of reformists against the conservatives ("ulema"), reminding us of the struggle of a "few number of reformers of Republican Turkey against the traditional elements." After these initial comments, Kılıç narrates some social and political causes of the Rebellion and the sequence of events until the murder of Selim III. According to him, the Rebellion was a result of coalition of the high and low members of the ulema, some discontented statesmen, the Janissaries and finally the ayans who were against the centralization process of the Selimian

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384 Kılıç, Kabakçı Mustafa İsyani, p. II.

385 Kılıç, Kabakçı Mustafa İsyani, p. VII.

386 Kılıç, Kabakçı Mustafa İsyani, p. VII.
The thesis, in general, suffers from lack of an integral and critical analysis of the narratives, especially on the controversial issues. The author mostly depends on contemporary and later narratives as objective sources of information and seems not to be aware of the fact that these sources were themselves “spokesmen” of various factions. However, the thesis is the third monograph, after Koçu and Refik’s works, on the Rebellion and the first attempt to combine the archival sources and some of the contemporary narratives.

As this brief survey of the available secondary literature on the 1807 Rebellion shows, there exists a long list of historians beginning with Ahmed Refik, Koçu, Karal, Danişmend, Uzunçarşı, Shaw and Lewis who consider the Rebellion as a struggle between reformist and anti-reformist parties and study it through the Westernization paradigm. There are several problems that are common to all of these historians. First of all, since they study the reign of Selim III and the consequent May 1807 Rebellion from the narrow framework of the reform/Westernization paradigm, their understanding of the Rebellion inevitably becomes narrow. This leads to a reductionist treatment of the reign of Selim III and the Rebellion. However, it is a plain fact that in order to attain better understanding of the Rebellion we should ought to widen our scope of investigation and look at the social, economic and cultural causes of the Rebellion. For instance, instead of considering Selim III and his reforming party as the carriers of the flags of development and progress, we should attempt to analyze their social, political and cultural identity and the factors that differentiated them from the remaining upper and lower layers of society. The same is also true for the rebellious party. We should go beyond the cliché of the Janissaries -or the ulema - being backward people opposing every change in the Empire and try to illuminate their group identity in terms of status, interests and even ethnic origins.

Some inspiring works were produced on the history of the Janissaries and their role in the Ottoman history. The most important contribution of these studies is to bring different explanations on the historical agency of the Janissaries particularly in the revolts they instigated. These works were written around 1980s and all deny that the rebellions were

387 Kılıç, Kabakçı Mustafa İyani, pp. 121-4.
just struggles between the reformists and reactionaries and consider the Janissaries as power group having common interests with the masses and particularly the petty craftsmen. For instance, Cemal Kafadar studies in detail the relationship between the Janissaries and the craftsmen and its consequences in the political life. He also underlines that there was collaboration between the Janissaries, “lumpenesnaf” and the ulema.\textsuperscript{388} Moreover, he questions the idea that the Janissaries, corrupt and seeking only their selfish interests, were manipulated by some dignitaries in order to eliminate their own enemies. According to him, the Janissaries’ had a more sophisticated perception of their role in the political system and their allegiance to a certain sultan was contractual in nature, being of their rights and obligations.\textsuperscript{389} In this regard, he studies the \textit{Hüccet-i Şer’iyye}, signed after the May 1807 Rebellion, signaled that the Janissary army was willing to institutionalize its “share in political power”.\textsuperscript{390} Another important study of the same period was by Rıfaat Abou El-Haj on the uprising of 1703. The author considers the crisis created by the Rebellion as a good opportunity to understand the Ottoman political structure, studies the 1703 Incident in depth for this purpose. As if replying the traditional historians he insists that the Rebellion did not represent class or a “corporate” conflict but rather it was defined by the struggle between coalitions of various factions consisting people coming together for various purposes and consisting of people of various segments.\textsuperscript{391} According to him, the rebels were not irrational actors seeking violence; on the contrary, they were activated by their own rational interests. He also underlines that even in the revolts paralyzed the existing administrative system since various factions tried to get control of the government and to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{389} Kafadar, “Janissaries and Other Riffraff”, p. 129.
  \item \textsuperscript{390} Kafadar, “Janissaries and Other Riffraff”, pp. 130-1.
\end{itemize}
exclude the others. Şerif Mardin, as a sociologist, contributed the issue within the model of center-periphery relationship. According to him, with the 1730 Rebellion a new kind of estrangement of the urban masses from the rulers started. In his view, the masses representing the periphery frequently came into conflict with the official elite who embarked military and administrative reforms but also became alienated from the rest of society due their closeness to the Western values. In this struggle between center and urban periphery, the Janissaries turned into a power group thanks to which the periphery could resist some demands of the center. Mardin also invites us to look at the uprisings not as sheer acts of violence, but rather a crisis in the “tacit” social contract between the rulers and the ruled, and the popular revolts turned into a warning for the rulers. The military historian Virginia Aksan, in a very recent work, makes a survey of Ottoman military history of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries. In the pages devoted to the Rebellion, she draws her observations from Shaw and Saint-Denys and briefly repeats the traditional information concerning the Rebellion. However, she argues that studying events of the early nineteenth century as a struggle between Muslim reactionaries and secular reformists is to misrepresent the history of the period altogether.

Gabriel Piterberg, on the other hand, contributes to the available literature on the uprisings of Ottoman history by textual analysis. In his book called, *An Ottoman Tragedy*, the author studies the Tugi’s representation of 1622 Incident in terms of authorial intentions and speech/writing debate. Baki Tezcan is another historian who studied representations

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397 Piterberg, Gabriel, *An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play*, (Berkeley/Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2003); Piterberg, Gabriel,
of the 1622 Incident by the contemporary author and later historians and underlines that these representations were shaped by the concerns of the historians. He aptly explains that the deposition of Osman II was not a struggle between a progressive Sultan and reactionary forces as claimed by conventional historiography, rather a political struggle between the absolutists and their opponents, also motivated by economic concerns.398

In his Ph.D. thesis about the history of the Janissary corps from 1807 to 1826, Mert Sunar tries to combine the contributions of the above-mentioned scholars and argues that the process of the intermingling of the Janissaries with the civilian population had important results in the Ottoman political history. According to Sunar, especially the establishment of an organic connection between the Janissaries and the guilds turned the Janissaries into a pressure group that the center was sometimes forced to reckon with.399 He underlines that the revolts of 1807, 1807 and 1826 were social uprisings where the Janissaries became the spokesmen of the discontent urban groups against the centralization policies of the Porte which challenged their “traditional” rights or privileges.400 In this respect, he claims that basic characteristics of the early nineteenth century rebellions, including 1807, was the continued collaboration between the petty craftsmen and the Janissaries and they reflected socio-political demands from the center. Though he makes generalizations, depending on a number of limited sources, as in the case of the support of the craftsmen in the May 1807 Rebellion, his study is far from repeating the taken-for-granted assumptions and also underlying the social aspects of the uprisings he studied.


400 Sunar, *Cauldron of Dissent*, p. 98.
As already mentioned before, it is Niyazi Berkes who has been able to discuss the Rebellion of May 1807 independently from the paradigm of Westernization versus reaction, by considering various socio-economic as well cultural factors. Berkes has in fact suggested that the actual political struggle took place between the members of the Bektashi order from below and the politicians from above.\(^{401}\) A similar perspective has been offered by Butrus Abu-Manneh. In his collected essays on the late Ottoman history, titled *Studies On Islam and The Ottoman Empire In the 19th Century: 1826-1876,*\(^ {402}\) Manneh makes an analysis of nineteenth century Ottoman history. Though it is mainly about the history of a religious order, his attempt to put it within the general context of Ottoman history and his consideration of the order as one of the most important internal dynamics of late Ottoman history enlarges his scope of argument. Thus, several articles devoted to the adventure of the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi order from India to the Ottoman capital and its teachings, serve as a background for understanding his explanations in the articles related to nineteenth century Ottoman political and social history.

His main argument is the idea that since the late eighteenth century and particularly following the enthronement of Selim III, there was a growing tendency towards the strengthening of Orthodox Sunni Islam in Istanbul. He brings forth three basic “evidence” for this Sunni Islamic revivalism: The rise of Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi order, sultans and upper classes erecting many religious buildings, and the increase in the number of translations of Islamic classics.\(^{403}\) From this starting point, he tries to bring forth further explanations to the basic events of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, such as the era of Selim III and the 1807 Rebellion; the destruction of the Janissary corps by Mahmud II; the *Tanzimat* Edict and Reform Edict and the *Kuleli Affair*; and the Islamic roots of the Young Turks. Since most of these topics are also cornerstones of the Ottoman reform movement, we are able to detect his basic viewpoint about the Ottoman reforms.

\(^{401}\) Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, p. 75.

\(^{402}\) Abu-Manneh, Butrus, *Studies on Islam and the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876)*, (İstanbul: ISIS, 2001).

\(^{403}\) Abu-Manneh, *Studies on Islam*, p. 7
Manneh investigates the question of whether there was a connection between the expansion of the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi order and the establishment of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army. His assumptions in this regard are twofold: The force behind the reforms of Selim III was the followers of the Order. The teachings of the Order, on the other hand, mostly appealed to the higher strata of Ottoman society. Since it was a revivalist religious order with the mission of bringing regeneration to the "umma", and most of the reformers around the Sultan were followers of the Naqshbendi sheik Mehmed Emin, he finds a source of modernizing spirit in the teachings of the Order for the reformers of Selim III’s period. Thus, Abu-Manneh suggests a modernization process inspired by internal dynamics rather than the importation of external models or ideas. The importance of his second assumption lies in the fact that besides the factor of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms curbing the interests of the traditional military forces, the conflict was intensified by the rivalry between the Bektashi and the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi orders, representing the spiritual guidance of the Janissaries and the reformers respectively. Thus, the main targets of the insurgents were the followers of the Sheik, and nine of them were murdered by the rebels.  

Abu-Manneh makes a clear distinction between “modernization” and “westernization”. For him, the late Tanzimat period (especially the Crimean War and the Reform Edict) was the breaking point when a “Westernization” process in the real sense was initiated. Before that there was a modernization process initiated by the Ottoman reformers in close connection with the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi order. Until the late Tanzimat period, there was no contradiction between reform ideals and the teachings of the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi order. According to him, this was due to the peculiar character of the Order. The sheiks and disciples of that order wished to regenerate Muslim society and were endowed with a sense of mission ensuring the supremacy of the *Sharia*. Thus, the ideal of bringing regeneration to Muslim society helped them to support the modernization efforts of the Ottoman rulers or elite.  

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order were either the same staff or they worked in harmony. This is also important in explaining the conflicts of this period. The reformist-conservativist conflict paradigm of many modern historians turns, in the light of Abu-Manneh’s approach into a conflict in two different layers of society: among the upper elite a conflict between those who upheld the ideals of Orthodox Islam and those who were not advocates of such an ideal; on a more general scale a “class” conflict between the lower layers of society believing in the heterodox Bektashi teachings and the upper layers of society where the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi teaching found its audience. Thus religious convictions, according to Manneh, were crucial in determining the nature of factions in that period. It also helps us to understand why the Ottoman ulema was able to join forces with orders such as the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi and the Mevlevis. Since the aim of both the ulema and the disciples of the Naqshbendi order was to ensure the supremacy of the Sharia, they had no difficulty in advocating the same measures to save the Empire. Thus we see that in Abu-Manneh’s model, the source of conflict, until the Reform Edict, was not the antagonism between the “reformists” and the “conservatives”, but rather, a socio-religious conflict between the upholders of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy. Despite the possibility of this thesis of Abu-Manneh, there are not enough convincing clues to support this view.

An important assumption in Abu-Manneh’s work is the idea that the teachings of the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi order influenced some leading Ottoman officials and in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century changed their social and political outlook as well as their attitude towards the reform measures. That is why he tries to detect some officials who had connections with the order in question. This assumption depends on the idea that the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi tradition enjoined its sheiks to try to seek influence with rulers as a part of their mission. During the reign of Selim III, it was the Şeyh Mehmed Emin Efendi who gained numerous followers in Istanbul, among whom we see İbrahim Nesim Efendi, one of the main Nizam-ı Cedid personalities. Şeyh Ali Behçet, the influential Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi sheik in the early years of the rule of Mahmud II had prominent followers like Pertev Efendi (later Pasha), Halet Efendi and Hüsrev Pasha. So, in each period, even if the Sultan himself was not a member of the order, there were always some leading officials
connected to the order. The most striking example is that of Sultan Abdulmecid who was apparently exposed to the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi belief and Orthodox Islamic ideals, and many members of the upper classes of the era of Abdülmecid were affected by the teachings of the Order.\footnote{Abu-Manneh, \textit{Studies on Islam}, p. 83}

If we follow Abu-Manneh’s argumentation, the first outburst of hostility between the Naqshbendi order and the opponents of the regime erupted in 1807, after which the followers of Şeyh Mehmed Emin suffered harshly. The turning point, however, came with the destruction of the Janissaries and abolition of the Bektashi order, which meant a triumph for the Orthodox order. According to Abu-Manneh, the dissolution of the Janissaries was not a simple act of Mahmud II, but took its energy from the negative impact of the 1821 Greek Revolt on public opinion and the influence of the Naqshbendis on some leading state officials. In other words, both the public and political factions were ready for the destruction of the Janissaries. If we evaluate the May 1807 Rebellion in the light of this argument, it appears to have been a victory for the Janissary-Bektashi group. The main contribution of Abu-Manneh’s study is the revelation of the complexity of the history of late Ottoman period and the problems related to the attempts to explain the whole period simply as a Westernization process and the conflicts resulting from it. His research reminds us of the fact that internal factors were as crucial as external influences. Further research in the light of the arguments of Abu-Manneh might bring forth very fruitful results.

\textbf{1.5. Conclusion}

In this brief survey of the historiography concerning the era of Selim III and the Rebellion of May 1807, we tried to detect certain historiographical patterns and problems in the course of historical writing from 1807 to the present day. The main issue that seems not to have been solved during this period of 200 years is whether the Rebellion should really be defined as an anti-reformist movement \textit{vis-à-vis} the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} reform program. As
we have seen, there was a similar discussion even among the contemporary authors. Yet, we have tried to show that during this period there emerged two lines of explanations, one view represented best by Ebubekir Efendi, (the second author of *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*), who insisted that the Rebellion was a uprising against the Selimian elite who abused the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms for their own interests. On the other hand, another view, represented best by Mustafa Necib Efendi and Ubeydullah Kuşmâni, thought that the Rebellion was an outcome of the reaction of the Janissaries and some *ulema* to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms, and there was no problem with the ruling elite. Another point where there is still no consensus is the role of individuals like Musa Pasha and Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi in triggering the Rebellion. In this issue we may argue that those contemporary authors who expressed complaints about the *Nizam-ı Cedid* and also with the ruling elite but were sympathetic to the rebels were silent either about the role of Musa Pasha or Ataullah Efendi (Kethûda Said, Tüfengçibaşı) or both (Ebubekir Efendi in *Fezleke*). On the other hand, the authors who were antagonistic to the Rebellion and the rebels usually accused not only the Janissaries but also those two personalities.

Despite the interest in the May 1807 Rebellion in the course of the late Ottoman and Republican period down to the present time, very limited steps were taken to study it. In very general terms certain paradigms, such as Westernization, modernization and Republican or Islamist political views, were employed to explain the uprising. Therefore, one of the common problems of most works of the post-rebellion period seems to be accepting the contemporary sources as unquestionable data bases and choosing their information without a critical analysis of the approaches these contemporary authors produced. As we have remarked earlier, we do not have enough information on the social, cultural and political backgrounds of these writers or historians, but we should not forget that these figures were also parts of the interest groups of their period or had affiliations with certain individuals. At this point, cross-checks not only with the contemporary narratives but also with the available archival material is crucial. The Rebellion of 1807 was a historical event and a good evaluation requires compilation of factual data as the first
step of analysis. Unfortunately the only source that attempted it until our period, not with cross-checks but with limited archival material, is Musa Kılıç’s Thesis.
CHAPTER 2
AN EMPIRE ON THE EVE OF THE REBELLION

“A professor of Astronomy in London, in a view of the constellations, has observed an insurrection among the Janissaries, and the death of the Sultan”\(^{407}\)

2.1. Introduction

This chapter is an attempt to place the May 1807 Rebellion into a broader domestic context without which it is impossible to get an insight into the dynamics leading to the uprising. The underlying theme will be to show that a complex web of factors was influential in its outburst, and it is difficult to pinpoint only one factor as the real cause of the Rebellion. Thus, instead of listing a number of causes, we rather preferred to paint a broader picture of the Empire in terms of domestic conditions. Moreover, since the 1807 Rebellion was a movement caused by the dissatisfaction of a certain group of people with some parts of the existing system, particular attention has been paid to understand how this group evaluated the events occurring around it.

Since the available literature on the Rebellion, from the contemporary to the modern, finds a direct correlation between the reforms of Selim III and the May 1807 Rebellion, we will also focus on the Nizam-ı Cedid reform program. Therefore the bulk of the chapter is devoted to reforms and different phases of the reactions to them: the relatively peaceful first phase (1793-1805) and the second phase (1805-1807). The second phase is a more turbulent period marked by the Selimiye Mosque Incident (1805) in the capital, followed by

\(^{407}\) The Times, Monday, August 03, 1807, pg. 3, issue 7115; col. C (from The Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8).
two major events, the revolt of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha (1805) and the famous Edirne Incident (1806).

In assessing all these incidents, rather than following taken-for-granted assumptions, we will try to first establish the chronological information by consulting the relevant sources and then question various aspects of them. However, reactions to the reforms were not limited only to historical events; there was a serious struggle going at ideological/intellectual level as well. Therefore, one particular aim of this chapter is to examine the arguments in favour of the reforms and those who opposed it. As we shall see in this part of the study, the complaints of the opponents generally address the economic problems of the period. Therefore, by concentrating on the esame (muster rolls) issue and the problems related to the İrad-ı Cedid, we will endeavour to pinpoint some economic problems that influenced the lives of the military class and common people and created a serious channel of criticism that paved the way for the Rebellion.

Apart from the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms and the economic problems, one argument of this chapter puts forward is the idea that the imperial image of Selim III was greatly undermined during that period in question. Yet, the weakened legitimacy of the Sultan was not only related to the reforms but also there was also a gap between the expectations of the public and image of the Sultan. The final subsection of the chapter dwells on the question of whether the Rebellion was actually the result of a struggle for the throne between Prince Mustafa (IV) and Selim III.

2.2. “Nizam-ı Yeziid”: The Nizam-ı Cedid Reforms

It is a well-known story that Selim III ordered his leading officials to write down their opinions on how to save the Empire. No less than twenty-two memoranda were submitted, whereafter the Sultan embarked on the reform program known as the Nizam-ı Cedid. Even though there are some valuable modern studies on the beginnings Selim III’s reform

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policy, little attention has been paid to the perception of the reforms by the elite and common people of the period. Consequently, we have only limited idea as to the responses of different segments of the population to the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms, except for some general judgments usually imposed by the centralist-statist historians mentioned in the first chapter. Another important point in this regard is our limited information on the issue of whether the attitude towards the Nizam-ı Cedid, from its beginning to its end, was always reactionary, and if not, whether there were certain periods when the reaction intensified during these fifteen years of reform. Finding answers, or at least some signposts, to these difficult questions is crucial to understand what kind of problems or tensions were encountered in the domestic arena and how the reforms were defended or attacked by certain groups.

It is possible to make a tentative categorization of the development of the Nizam-ı Cedid program and the reactions to it, roughly dividing the whole period into two: The first period (1793-1805), extends from the starting year of the program to the establishment of the Üsküdar regiment. It can be considered as a period of consolidation for the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms. Collective reactions during this period were relatively insignificant. The second period of 1805-1807, on the other hand, was the period of the expansion of the Nizam-ı Cedid corps into Anatolia, with a further attempt to expand it into Rumelia. It corresponds to a period of acceleration of tensions culminating in two important uprisings, one in Anatolia and the other in Rumelia.

2.2.1. The First Phase of the Nizam-ı Cedid: 1793-1805

During the first phase, efforts were made to reorganize four artillery corps, the Cannon Corps ("Topçuyan"), the Cannon-Wagon Corps ("Top Arabaciyan"), the Miners

In addition to these efforts new army headquarters were set up Levend Chiftlik (April 1792), and later Üsküdar (1801). In order to finance the expenses of these reforms a new treasury called the İrad-ı Cedid, was established in March 1793.

According to Stanford Shaw, the Janissaries’ reaction was [...] violent. They rioted in the streets whenever any effort was made to reform them, they continually clashed with the modern Nizam-ı Cedid and the artillery men in the streets, and they eventually supplied the bulk of the force which overthrew Selim III and ended the reforms in 1807.410

Unfortunately, Shaw does not provide a date for the clashes between the members of the old and new army and gives a sense that there were street fights between the two groups from the beginning to the end of the reforms. However, the document he refers to in proving his point is dated 26 C 1212/15 December 1797 and concerns the expenditures involved in the transfer of cannons from the Fortress of Varna to the army.411 At the beginning of the Nizam-ı Cedid reform, there was an attempt to re-discipline the Janissaries by subjecting them to military exercises, yet this attempt did not last long due to their unwillingness.412 The contemporary chronicles sometimes mention the hatred of the Janissaries towards the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. Asım, for instance, notes that the Janissaries despised the soldiers of the new army.413 It is also possible to observe from some of the contemporary sources that the hostility of the Janissaries increased gradually and accelerated in correlation with the importance paid by the Sultan and the ruling elite to the new army and its increasing achievements in the tasks it took on.414 Yet there is no mention

409 For the codes of these corps see Halil Nuri Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye (Kavânîn-i Sultan Selim), Beyazıt Devlet Kütüphanesi, Velîyuddîn Efendi, no. 3369-72, pp. 149-231; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. pp. 34-60; Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VI, pp. 356-370; Beydilli-Şahîn, Mahmud Raif Efendi, pp. 42-83.

410 Shaw, “The Established Ottoman Army Corps”, p. 129.

411 B.O.A. C. AS. 17908 (26 C 1212/15 December 1797). There might be a confusion in the references.

412 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 353. Asım notes that Janissaries continued these drills only for two months.


of street fights between these two groups of soldiers. As far as we are able to detect, there were no serious reactions to the new army from any part of society, including the Janissaries, during the first phase of the reforms. While it was a period of consolidation of the new military system in the capital, there was a genuine attempt on the part of society to understand what the new situation meant and in what respects it would affect the social order. No doubt, the creation of a new order implied the abolishment of the old one sooner or later. Therefore, we might suspect that it was more an issue of worry to be discussed at home, and some public places like coffeehouses or barber shops and as well as, of course, within the Janissary barracks. Thus, gossips and rumours were circulating around in İstanbul, and probably in other parts of the Empire as well.

The role of some public places and especially that of the coffeehouses as the centers of political forum and oral information network has been underlined by some historians. It was from these locations that rumors on political issues spread. These in turn produced explanations and “truths” that the usually went on to shape “public opinion” often in a way that conflicted with “official” truths. F. Georgeon notes that, coffeehouses were the center of criticism against the reforms of Selim III. It is impossible to deny the high speed at which news circulated especially from the coffeehouses during this period. Considering the limits of available mass communication technology, the coffeehouses also served as the centers of information. Sometimes even the contemporary historians used the circulating rumours as sources of information. The historian Câbi, for instance, asserts that one of his most important sources of “information” were the rumors he heard from the frequenters of the coffeehouses. Probably due to this fact, we are able to see different


versions of the same story in different narratives. For our purposes, a very interesting case in point is the availability of various versions regarding the specific issue of changing the uniforms of the *yamaks* at the fortresses, a point we will return to in the following chapter.

It is difficult to find out what kind of rumours were circulating around after the establishment of the *Nizam-i Cedid*. But it is clear that the reform program was one of the favorite gossip topics. A document dated 3 N 1207/14 May 1793 informs the banishment of a certain Mehméd Efendi, a former resident of Tophane, to the Island of Rhodes. The reason for his exile was his offensive (“*taaruzâne*”) talk against the *Nizam-i Cedid* regulations which had been agreed upon by “unanimity of opinion” (“*ittifak-ı arâ*”). The scene of said talk was the barbershop of Berber Hacı İsmail in the district of Çavuşbaşı at Tophane. No other detail is provided by the document. We are not able to learn what kind of “offensive” opinions he uttered or, indeed, any more details on his identity. As far as his title “Efendi” suggests, he seems not to have belonged to the military class.419 Unfortunately, it is not possible to find any other documents explicitly stating criticisms of the *Nizam-i Cedid* as the cause of any kind of punishment. However, there are some documents which suggest the circulation of gossips and news about state policies. For instance, in the same year, a certain İbrahim, proprietor of a coffeeshop in the vicinity of Ayasofya, was accused of allowing people to gather in his shop and take part in conversations about and “circulating gossips” on state affairs. Consequently, he was exiled to Bozca Ada (Tenedos) together with Su Yolcu Seyyid Hüseyin.420 Another document, belonging to the same year, clearly establishes the identity of the accused. It had been one Mustafa, a member of the 33rd regiment (“*bölük*”) of the Janissaries, who had criticized the state in the coffeehouse run by another Janissary called Hacı İbrahim, a member of the 10th regiment. Not only Mustafa but also Hacı İbrahim were exiled to Bozca Ada. According to the document, the latter was punished by exile since he had not only not stopped Mustafa, but in fact given feigned approval (“*mümaşaat*”) to his ideas.421 Another imperial edict was

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419 B.O.A. C. DH. 7763 (22 L 1207/2 June 1793).  
420 B.O.A. C. ZB. 774 (Ca 1207/15 December 1792-13 January 1793). Su Yolcu literally means “man responsible for the maintenance of water conduits”.  
421 B.O.A. A.DVN. KLB 145/8 (10 Ş 1207/23 March 1793).
issued for the banishment of a former cannon-wagon carrier ("top arabacı") Süleyman Ağa and the scribe Halil Efendi for similar reasons in the same year.422 There are two important points that should be underlined here: The above examples suggest that there was a certain kind of critical discussion in certain locations of the city, especially around the popular gathering places like barbershops and coffeehouses. Except for our first example, we are not able to gain insight into what kind of rumours or criticisms were being circulated, but we might suspect that the newly implemented state policies were among the most hotly debated issues. Indeed, Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi notes that after the establishment of the Nizam-ı Cedid regiments in Levend Chiftlik and Üsküdar, conflicts between the members of the old and new army did occur and numerous gossips were making the rounds.423

The politicizing role especially of the coffeehouses was crucial since they were the starting points for the circulation of news and gossips on political issues. The central authority, in turn, tried to prevent political gossips since it was shaping the public opinion in opposition to the concerns and official ideology of the center.424 One can claim that coffeehouses as a social body put considerable pressure on the ruling elite, and were effective in influencing public opinion against the Nizam-ı Cedid. Since most of these coffeehouses were either owned or at least frequented by the Janissaries, this group was obviously very influential in the formation of public opinion.

The situation certainly constituted a threat to the future of the new military system the Porte was striving to stabilize and the authorities reacted. Koca Sekbanbaşı’s Treatise, for instance, was written upon the order of the Selim III in order to silence rumours and refute the arguments they were built upon.425 Thus, it was written as a counter-propaganda

422 B.O.A. A.DVN. KLB. 145/43 (6 L 1207/17 May 1793).


sponsored by the center. Koca Sekbanbaşı underlines that for some time the boatmen, fishermen, porters, and coffeeshop keepers, and grocers had been gathering in the coffeehouses, barber’s shops and taverns to talk on state affairs in an environment of great liberty. The author emphasizes that, during the time of Süleyman I (r. 1520-1566), news of such a gathering of ignorant people opposing the new system would have lead the Sultan to punish them severely in order to make an example of them.\footnote{Uçman, \textit{Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi}, pp. 31-2; Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of Principalities}, p. 219.} However, during the time of Selim III, the “force of necessity” refrains the government from the meting out punishment these people deserve.\footnote{Uçman, \textit{Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi}, p. 32; Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of Principalities}, pp. 220-1.} Instead, the Sultan orders the author to write a treatise in order to clarify some points. Therefore, as Hakan Erdem also notes, the author writes down the treatise on behalf of the Sultan in order to silence the circulating rumours, as a warning to the populace and, finally to shape the public opinion.\footnote{Erdem, “The Old Wise Man”, p. 164.} What the author meant by the phrase “force of necessity” is not clear, but frequent orders of the Sultan, the closure of some of these coffeehouses and punishments all signal that the rulers were not able to silence and stop the circulation of news and rumours contrary to their own “truths”. Indeed, reminding us strongly of the comments in Koca Sekbanbaşı Treatise, one document states that it was among the “desirable” (“mergûbe”) customs of the Empire to search for, discover, and finally punish the originators of gossip circulating among the people to make an example of them. Unfortunately, as the document tells us, this custom was abandoned for some time and consequently, all kinds of rumours were floating in the streets, bazaars and residences, especially regarding issues related to the Janissaries and the new army. The writer of the document states that two coffeehouses were closed specifically to stop the rumours.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 3701 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.} Apart from highlightening the inefficiency of the center in preventing the rumours, the document draws our attention from public places like coffeehouses to private residences and also streets where the exchange of rumours was taking place. It also reflects both the sheer amount of rumours which created serious pressure on the government and
the anxiety of many residents on the eve of the May 1807 Rebellion. Yet, we should underline that the diffusion of rumours was not restricted to the first phase of the *Nizam-i Cedid* reforms. After the Rebellion, the problem of the coffeehouses was to bother Mustafa IV as well. We know of several orders of this ruler which urged for the prevention of the discussion of stately matters in the coffeehouses, and punishment of the people who did not follow the restrictions.

Apart from diffusion of gossips, there might also have been other manifestations of protest against the center. For instance, Fikret Sarıcaoğlu underlines two forms of protests that became prevalent during the reign of Abdülhamid I, the first one being arson and the second the writing of notes. Fires were a chronic problem for İstanbul and it was sometimes attributed to the sabotage of the Janissaries. During the reign the Abdülhamid I more than fifty-five fires were observed within the course of eleven years. The author detects an increase in the frequency of the fires and, depending on available clues, concludes that most of them were due to arson, especially during the period from 1784 to 1785. For instance, on 5 Z 1199/9 September 1785, fires were started in fifteen different parts of the city. For the reign of Selim III, we have been able to detect about more than sixty incidents.

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430 B.O.A. HAT 3701 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). The *hatt* on the document belongs to Selim III. In the document itself there are some clues such as the dispatch of the army to Davudpaşa and the dismissal of Osman Pasha from vizierate. At the upper margin of the document, talks about the protection of Tekfur Dağı and Istranca. These probably indicate the events on the eve of the Edirne Incident.

431 B.O.A. HAT 1362/53732 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8); B.O.A. HAT 1363/53848 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8); B.O.A. HAT 53785 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8); B.O.A. HAT 53410 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8); B.O.A. HAT 53975 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8).


433 For a table showing the dates and places of different fires see the table in Sarıcaoğlu, *Sultan I. Abdülhamid*, pp. 235-6.

Figure 1: Frequency of Fires in İstanbul, 1789-1808.

Contrary to reign of Abdüllhamid I, where there was a good amount of evidence for sabotage, we have come across only one reference to the possibility of sabotage under the rule of Selim III. During one specific fire, dated 26 M 1207/13 September 1792, at Odun Kapısı, it seems that people suspected sabotage, but according to Edib Efendi, the calamity was accidental. Still even for the reign of Selim III, there is a good example which proves that arson was conceived as a kind of protest. According to Diş Ruzname, on 26 N 1206/18 May 1792, a note was found in the Hoca Paşa district, threatening to set fire to the whole city if Yusuf Pasha was not appointed as grand vizier. No doubt, the aim of the

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436 Uzunçarşılı, İ. H., “Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi 4819: Üçüncü Sultan Zamanında Yazılımı Diş Rüznamesinden 1206/1791 ve 1207/1792 Senelerine Ait Vekayi”, Belleten, XXXVII/148 (October 1973), p. 640: “Hoca Paşa semtinde bir mahalle Yusuf Paşa sadarete gelmez ise İstanbul’u yakarız deydi yazmışlar, cemaat alıp Paşa Kapısı na vermişler”. Koca Yusuf Pasha (d. 1215/1800) was a Georgian slave in the service of Hasan Kapdan, the harbour master of İstanbul (“liman reisi”). After manumission, he became coffeemaker and engaged in trade. At the beginning there was a commercial relationship between Yusuf Ağa and Cezayirli Hasan Pasha. After the appointment of the latter as the grand admiral, Yusuf Ağa served as his hazinedar and later kapı kethüda. Koca Yusuf
note was to protest Koca Yusuf Pasha’s deposition and secure his reappointment. In fact, the above example combines two forms of protest mentioned by Sarıcaoğlu, though there was only the threat of arson.437 Further, according to one letter in Hurmuzaki collection, notes were found which declared the current Sultan (Selim III) had become undesirable.438 These examples are important in that they prove that various forms of protests were known and used by the people during the reign of Selim III. On the other hand, neither the actual fires nor the note to protest the dismissal of Yusuf Pasha seems to offer a direct connection to the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms.

What could the reasons for the low level of reaction to the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms during the first phase be? One explanation might be the “boycott of the army” after the defeat of Machin (6 Z 1205/7 August 1791)439 and the insistence of the army commanders for urgent reforms. The army council asked Grand Vizier Yusuf Pasha to send a letter to Selim III and inform the Sultan on the reluctance of the Janissary army to continue war. This meant that the army and the commanders did not want to fight and were in favour of a peace with the Russians. However, when Yusuf Pasha hesitated to write such a letter to the Sultan, the members of the council themselves wrote the petition and sent it to the Sultan on 12 August 1791. In the petition, it was pointed out that the army was not successful

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437 According to Sarıcaoğlu, though there was an oral tradition of protests of various forms, the writing notes of protest is first encountered during the reign of Abdülhamid I. For more details on the issue see Sarıcaoğlu, Fikret, “Osmanlı Muhalefet Geleneğinde Yeni Bir Dönem: İlk Siyasi Bildiriler”, Belleten, LXI/241 (December 2001), pp. 900-20; Sarıcaoğlu, Sultan I. Abdülhamid, pp. 249-50.

438 Jorga, Hurmuzaki, Supplement, I 3, p. 509. The date of the letter is 6 June 1798.

439 During the Russo-Ottoman War (1787-1792), the Russians passed the Danube and defeated the Ottoman army.
against the disciplined army of the Russians. It was insisted that an immediate peace treaty should be signed, since their army could never be victorious unless the new military tactics of the enemies were adopted.\textsuperscript{440} Interestingly enough, it was the Janissary commanders who accepted the necessity of disciplined armies in order to achieve victory in war. The \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} reform package was embarked about two years later. Thus, we might assume that the disaster at Machin and the written admission of the incompetency of the old-style army might have led the Janissaries and their ağas to keep their peace for some time.\textsuperscript{441} The Koca Sekbanbaşı Treatise, too, reminds the reader of the admission of the Janissary commanders that they were not able to be victorious without adopting a new military technology.\textsuperscript{442}

The relatively low frequency of the reactions during the first period can also be related to an inclination on the part of the Janissaries or other segments of society to wait and observe the reform program. We would suggest that at the outset, even though some groups were not pleased by the establishment of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army and were suspicious of it, they may not have understood the real significance of the program. Later however, the gradual expansion and relative success of the new regiments would have increased anxiety and tensions. Apart from the increase in the number of the soldiers in the Üsküdar and Levend Chiftliks, new regiments were being established in Anatolia from 1802 onwards.\textsuperscript{443} Moreover, the employment of the new army regiments in the Egyptian campaign (1799) and the expedition against Dağlı Eşkiyası (the Mountaineers) (1804) seem to have frightened these groups opposed to the program. This does not mean that there was no reaction to the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} program, yet in light of the knowledge available to us, it

\textsuperscript{440} For a copy of the letter see Beydilli, Kemal, “Sekbanbaşı Risalesi’nin Müellifi Hakkında”, \textit{Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi}, 12 (2005), pp. 221-224.

\textsuperscript{441} I would like to thank Prof. Kemal Beydilli for drawing my attention to the importance of the “military boycott” following the Machin defeat.

\textsuperscript{442} Uçman, \textit{Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi}, pp. 61; Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of Principalities}, p. 272.

seems to have been remained at an individual level and generally have taken the form of rumours.

2.2.2. The second Phase of the Nizam-ı Cedid (1805-1807)

Even though hostile rumours were continuing to circulate and individual reactions occurred, a collective and serious opposition also began to emerge in Anatolia and the Balkans during the second phase. Looking at three notable cases will be useful in reflecting the reactions during this period: one in the capital, second in Anatolia and the final one in Rumelia.

2.2.2.1. İstanbul: The Selimiyye Mosque Incident

The Selimiyye Mosque was built in Üsküdar by Selim III. The construction started in 1216/1801 and was completed on Friday, 5 M 1220/5 April 1805.444 Since the only contemporary historian who narrates the incident in detail is the chronicler Asım, we will follow his account. Asım notes that as it was a custom for the Ottoman sultans to visit and perform the Friday prayer in the newly constructed mosque they had commissioned, Selim III had prepared himself to visit the mosque with his retinue. The Janissaries were also intending to pass to Üsküdar in order to take their place in the ceremony. However, when they heard the news of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers were to replace their position in the Friday Prayer (“Cuma Selamlık”), they immediately armed themselves and passed to Üsküdar. After reaching to Üsküdar, they opened fire at the officials and other people on the spot. Following a series of aggressive actions there, they decided to completely annihilate the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. However, some leading officials had noticed their intentions and thus the visit of the Sultan was postponed for two weeks. The Janissaries were also ensured that they would take their customary place at the selamlık ceremony and

the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers would not be allowed to leave their barracks during the day of the ceremony.\(^{445}\) The author of *Ceride* also confirms that the ceremony was delayed for one week due to tension (“niza”) between the Janissaries and the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers, but does not give further details.\(^{446}\) Another contemporary author mentions the delay in the visit of the Sultan, but claims that it was postponed due to unfavourable weather conditions.\(^{447}\)

This incident was probably the first recorded case of any collective protest of the Janissaries against the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps. Even though Asım evaluates the incident as a notorious action on the part of the Janissaries, proving how jealous they were of the new military system, there is a crucial point to be made in defense of the Janissaries’ action. Whether or not they had become a paramilitary class that had almost nothing to do with the military matters anymore, we should not forget that the Janissaries still considered themselves as part of the military class with certain privileges and prestige. Participating in certain ceremonies, like the *selamlık*, was a privilege bestowed to this military class. Consequently they must have considered their replacement in the ceremony to be a serious degrading act. The Janissaries might even have considered this action as the manifestation of the center to abolish the Janissary army. Indeed, on 16 June 1826, one day after the suppression of the Janissary uprising, no Janissary officer was allowed to take place in the Friday Ceremony at the Zeynep Sultan Mosque.\(^{448}\)

Though Asım notes that the issue of the replacement was just a rumour, we have good reason to suspect that the news was true. In fact, the Selimiyye Mosque was built within the Üsküdar barracks of the new corps, and it would have been natural for the Sultan to wish the new soldiers to be present at the ceremony.

As the Selimiye Incident suggests, the reaction of the Janissaries against the *Nizam-ı Cedid* began to accelerate as soon as there were some advances on their prestige and their privileges. Indeed, before mentioning the above incident, Asım records that the officers and soldiers of the Üsküdar regiment were given the duty of patrolling the vicinity of Üsküdar


\(^{447}\) *1220 Senesi Vekayı*, p. 7. According to the author, the Sultan went to the Friday prayer on 15 S 1220/14 May 1805, which means a delay of more than one month.

\(^{448}\) Şirin, Veli, *Asakir-i Mansure ve Seraskerlik*, (İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı, 2002), p. 36.
and the Bosphorous, and the Janissaries were becoming very angry at this.\textsuperscript{449} Probably through such “advances”, they began to feel the real threat of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} system to their existence. Another issue was the great care and importance given by the Sultan and his officials to the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} soldiers. This attitude could easily have created among the Janissaries the feeling of being ignored and neglected. Indeed, there is much documentary evidence proving that the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} soldiers were receiving great care of the center. They were frequently visited by either the Sultan or the statesmen and regular reports were sent to the Sultan particularly praising the excellence of the new soldiers in the military drills and perfect discipline.\textsuperscript{450}

### 2.2.2.2. Anatolia: The Revolt of Tayyar Pasha

The revolt of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha was the most important uprising in Anatolia after the establishment of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} regiments in the region. Tayyar Pasha was the last member of the Canikližâde dynasty, a local \textit{derebey} family controlling the Black Sea region in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. The dynasty had gained upper hand in the region during the time of Canikli Ali Pasha (d. 1785) especially around Canik [present-day Samsun], Trabzon, Amasya, Sivas, Erzurum, Kara Hisar-ı Şarki [present-day Bayburt] and Kastamonu.\textsuperscript{451} His son, Battal Hüseyin Pasha (d. 1801), was appointed as the deputy governor (“\textit{mütesellim}”) of Amasya in 1774, Canik in 1777 and the \textit{voyvoda}\textsuperscript{452} of Kara Hisar-ı Şarki in 1777-1778, and finally promoted to the rank of the “head of the palace door keepers” (“\textit{kapıçabası}”) in 1778. After being promoted to the rank of vizierate, he acquired the governorship of Trabzon (1787). During the Russo-Ottoman War (1787-1792), Battal Hüseyin Pasha and his son were ordered to defend the Caucasus and Anapa (a Black Sea port, in the east of


\textsuperscript{450} For some examples see T.S.M.A. E. 3759-3 (undated, catalogue date is 1215/1800); T.S.M.A. E. 3759-2 (undated, catalogue date is 1215/1800); T.S.M.A. 2757 (undated); T.S.M.A. E. 3786 (undated, reign of Selim III); B.O.A. HAT 13403 (undated, catalogue date is 1210/1795-6); B.O.A. HAT 14762 (undated, catalogue date is 1212/1797-8); B.O.A. HAT 56924 (undated, catalogue date is 1206/1791-2); B.O.A. HAT 55034 (undated, catalogue date is 1209/1794-5); B.O.A. HAT 4830 (undated).


\textsuperscript{452} \textit{Voyvoda} is an Ottoman provincial administrator of a large set of tax farms.
Straits of Kerch). However, they did not obey the orders of the Sultan, and were forced to flee to Russia where they stayed until 1799. With this flight and also the execution of other members of the family in Anatolia (1792), the period from 1792 to 1799 witnessed the weakening of the power of the Caniklizâdes. In Russia, Tayyar Pasha entered the service of the Russian general Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov (b. 1729-d.1800). However, he was imprisoned under the pretext that he had made a secret agreement with his own state to organize a rebellion of the Crimean Tatars against the Russians. In 1794, Tayyar Pasha escaped and came to Giresun and later to Moldavia (Boğdan). After the peace treaty with the Russians in 1799, both Tayyar Pasha and his father were pardoned by the Porte and Battal Hüseyin Pasha was reappointed as the governor of Trabzon. His son, on the other hand, was promoted to the rank of Master of the Horse (“Büyük Mirahor”). In June 1799, he again became the mütesellim of Amasya and Canik. On the condition of acting as the commander to the soldiers sent from Anatolia to Rumelia, he was granted the rank of vizierate and the governorship of Trabzon. After participation in the Egyptian campaign, Mahmud Tayyar Pasha came to İstanbul with his forces. And on 23 October 1800, he was given the duty of suppressing the Mountaineers causing disorder in Rumelia. Later the sub-province (“sancak”) of Çirmen was added to his realm of control. For a short period he acted as the governor of Diyarbakır (1801-2) and then Erzurum (September-October 1803). After that, again in 1803, Tayyar Pasha asked for the governorship of Sivas. It seems that Selim III preferred to limit his influence to the Black Sea coast, probably to

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455 B.O.A. C.DH. 13988 (17 R 1214/21 July 1799)


prevent an accumulation lands in his hands. The Sultan probably suspected that Mahmud Tayyar Pasha of having connections with the Russians.\footnote{Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 284.}

The problems leading to the uprising of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha probably started in the year 1804, while he was the governor of Trabzon and Canik. In that year the establishment of a \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} regiment in Amasya had been decided.\footnote{Sipahi Çataltepe notes that a barrack was established in Amasya. In 1806, there were 53 officers and 411 soldiers. See Çataltepe, \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid Ordusu}, pp. 193-94. For some information on the reactions of the residents of Amasya concerning the enrollments into the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army, see Abdızâde Amasya Tarihi, pp. 165-169. The author says that the residents were divided into those supporting the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} and others following the Janissaries. The second party was provoked by the letters sent from the ağas of the Janissaries to the field marshall of ("serdar") of Amasya, Hüseyin Bey. He narrates that one day, the reactionary group attacked the house of the judge and teared the list containing the names of those enrolled to \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} soldiery. After an investigation of the case, the \textit{serdar} was sent to exile.} As a part of the plan to increase the number of soldiers of Levend Chiftlik it was decided to establish 12 regiments each containing 100 soldiers in Amasya. This project also entailed the \textit{mütesellimlik} of Amasya being granted to Süleyman Bey who was also the district administrator ("muhasil") of Bozok and held the title of \textit{mirahor-ı evvel} and \textit{kapıcıbaşı}. Considering this an injustice, Mahmud Tayyar Pasha intended to attack Amasya and plunder the regions under the control of the Cabbarzâde family.\footnote{B.O.A. C. DH.14686 (evahir R 1220/18-28 July 1805); B.O.A \textit{Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri}, no.5, pp. 1-3/order no. 1(evahir Ra 1220/18-28 June 1805); \textit{1220 Senesi Vekayi}, p. 11.} He started spreading false rumours to the effect that the Sultan had given him the duty of executing Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey.\footnote{B.O.A. C. DH. 14686 (evahir R 1220/18-28 July 1805).} Tayyar’s forces captured Amasya, Turhal and Tokat thanks to the support of his uncle, Hasan Bey.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 4069 (undated, catalogue date is 1220/1805); B.O.A. HAT 4069.A (1 R 1220/28 June 1805); B.O.A. HAT 4063 (15 R 1220/9 September 1805).} After capturing Merzifon, Tayyar Pasha entered Süleyman Bey’s lands and came close to Zile.\footnote{Uzunçarşı, “Çapanoğulları”, p. 241.} In order not to cause further unrest in the region, the Porte decided to appoint neither Tayyar Pasha nor Süleyman Bey, as the \textit{mütesellim} of Amasya. Instead, the center sent Esad Efendi, a former \textit{mirahor-ı evvel}, to the region to appoint another person as the \textit{mütesellim} and also to warn and calm Tayyar
Pasha. From the reports of Esad Efendi, we learn that Tayyar Pasha tried to bargain and informed Esad Efendi that he would disobey unless he was pardoned by the Porte. Cabbarzâde Süleyman was dismissed from governorship of Sivas and this province (in addition to Trabzon) was placed under his own authority. He further demanded to be granted the mütesellimlik of the sancak of Kastamonu. If his demands were not accepted by the Porte, Esad Efendi states, Tayyar Pasha would continue his rebellious actions in the area. Esad Efendi was not able to dissuade him and a fetva from Salihzâde Ahmed Esad Efendi, the Şeyhülislam of the time, was issued approving the execution of Tayyar Pasha. Moreover, his title of vizier was taken back, which meant that Tayyar Pasha was declared a “rebel”. Yusuf Ziya Pasha, a former Grand Vizier and newly appointed governor of Erzurum was delegated the duty of Tayyar’s execution and the appropriation of Tayyar’s life-term tax-farms (“malikanes”) in Canik, Kara Hisar and Kaza-yı Erbaa (in Tokat). Cabbarzâde was also given the duty of suppression of the rebellion together with Yusuf Ziya Pasha. Süleyman Bey sent his son Abdülfettah to help Yusuf Ziya Pasha in the affair. The governor of Anatolia also sent 750 soldiers to contribute the fight against Tayyar Pasha. After being defeated twice in the fights by the forces of Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Tayyar Pasha and his men fled towards the east.

467 The author of 1220 Senesi Vekayi notes that Esad Efendi was imprisoned by Tayyar Pasha, yet the available imperial edicts and other related documents do not provide information supporting the claim. See 1220 Senesi Vekayi, p. 11.

468 B.O.A. HAT 4044.ı (7 R 1220/7 July 1805) According to the document Tayyar Pasha asked for the mütesellimlik of Kastamonu since he needed money.

469 B.O.A. HAT 4044.ı (7 R 1220/7 July 1805).

470 B.O.A. HAT 4056 (23 R 122020 July 1805)

471 Salihzâde Ahmed Esad Efendi (d. 1230/1815) became Şeyhülislam twice : first from 29 M 1218/21 May 1803 to 1 B 1221/14 September 1806 and the second time from 22 Ca 1223/16 July 1808 to 10 L 1223/29 November 1808. For more details, see Appendix I.

472 B.O.A. C. DH. 14686 (evahir R 1220/18-28 July 1805).

473 1220 Senesi Vekayi, p. 11; Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no.5, pp. 1-3/order no. 1 (evahir Ra 1220/18-28 June 1805).

474 For the details of these two fights and the consequent escape of Tayyar Pasha see B.O.A. HAT 4044.G (19 R 1220/6 July 1805); B.O.A. HAT 4046.C (11 Ca 1220/7 August 1805); B.O.A.HAT 4046.D (11 Ca 1220/7 August 1805); B.O.A. HAT 4046.E (undated, catalogue date is 1220/1805); B.O.A.HAT 4049 (undated, catalogue date is 1220/1805);
Following these defeats, Tayyar Pasha started his long time as a fugitive, which ended in the Crimea. It seems that he first intended to stay at the castle of Trabzon. Yet giving up this plan, he sought the protection of Ahmed Keleş Bey, the guardian of the castle of Sohum [Suhumi, in present-day Georgia]. From Sohum, he wrote petitions to the Porte asking for forgiveness. Keleş Ahmed Bey also wrote to the Porte in the hope of getting an amnesty for Tayyar Pasha. However, the Porte had no intention of forgiving him, and two ships were sent to besiege the castle and capture him. Upon the hearing the news of the siege plans, Tayyar Pasha passed to Crimea. Another reason of this escape was probably the pressure of the Porte on Keleş Ahmed Bey, who was ordered either to kill or deliver Tayyar Pasha. Thence, Tayyar Pasha went to Russia (Ca 1220/August 1805).

475 B.O.A. HAT 4071 (undated, catalogue date is 1220/1805)

476 B.O.A. HAT 4045.B (13 Ca 1221/29 July 1806), B.O.A: HAT 4045.C (18 Ca 1221/3 August 1806); B.O.A. 4072.B (15 S 1220/), reports sent from Mehmed Ağa, the mútesellim of Faş.


478 B.O.A. HAT 125/5185.F (11 Ca 1221/27 July 1806); B.O.A. HAT 4070 (7 B 1221/20 September 1806).

479 In a letter, Yusuf Ziya Pasha rebuked him for protecting a rebel whose execution was ordered by the Sultan. If he continued protecting the rebel, Sohum would be demolished. He was ordered to execute Tayyar Pasha, see B.O.A. HAT 125/5185.D (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806)

480 B.O.A. HAT 4045 (15 C 1221/30 August 1806); Two officials, Halil Ağa and Abdurrahman, were sent to Sohum to capture Tayyar Pasha in the Castle. See B.O.A. HAT 4045.D (23 Ca 1221/8 August 1806) There are detailed reports of these officials on the details of his escape to Crimea. From various reports it seems that Tayyar Pasha has passed to Crimea in evail-i Ca 1221/16-26 July 1806. For the details of his escape see B.O.A. HAT 4045 (15 C 1221/30 August 1806); B.O.A. HAT 4045.A (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806); B.O.A. HAT 4045.D (23 Ca 1221/8 August 1806); B.O.A. HAT 4045. E (11 Ca 1221/27 July 1806); B.O.A.HAT 4045.H (11 Ca 1221/27 July 1806); B.O.A. HAT 4045.İ (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806); B.O.A. HAT 4045.J (17 Ca 1221/2 August 1806); B.O.A. HAT 4045.K (3 Ca 1221/19 July 1806); B.O.A. HAT 4045.L (11 Ca 1221/27 July 1806); B.O.A.HAT 4054 (1221/1806); B.O.A. HAT 4070.A. (19 C 1221/3 September 1806); B.O.A. HAT 4070. D. (9 Ca 1221/25 July 1806). For the news of his
After his escape, Yusuf Ziya Pasha took pains to gain an upper hand in Canik. From contemporary reports we learn that the residents of Canik were still loyal to their former master.\(^{481}\) The suppression of Tayyar Mahmud Pasha’s revolt also included the persecution of his relatives and followers in the regions belonging to the dynasty. The possessions of various members of the family were seized by the center.\(^{482}\)

The Mahmud Tayyar Pasha revolt is usually considered as an uprising of a local magnate against the expansion of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps in Anatolia. It is also accepted that Tayyar Pasha was an enemy of the reforms.\(^{483}\) For instance, while Karal tries to explain that there was a coalition of the Janissaries and the *ulema* against the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, from its establishment to the end, he gives Tayyar Pasha as the best example of the governors refusing to collaborate with the center. According to Karal, Tayyar Pasha was the most dangerous one “among the pashas hostile to the *Nizam-ı Cedid*. He was provoking the people and the Janissaries in Anatolia and İstanbul.”\(^{484}\) In order to prove his claims, Karal quotes some of Tayyar’s “provoking” thoughts.\(^{485}\) It must be underlined that the source of these quotations is a series of notes by an anonymous writer, published by Necib Asım in the *TOEM*.\(^{486}\) In the introduction to the publication, Necib Asım, following some clues, suggests that the author of these notes might have been Mahmud Tayyar Pasha.\(^{487}\) Probably

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\(^{481}\) B.O.A. HAT 3335 (19 Ca 1221/4 August 1806).

\(^{482}\) B.O.A. C. ML. 2975 (17 N 1220/9 November 1805); B.O.A. C. ML. 3409 (5 S 1221/24 April 1221); B.O.A. C.ML. 19304 (1 B 1220/24 September 1805); B.O.A. 23951(2 M 1221/24 March 1806); B.O.A. C.ML. 31596 (11 B 1220/4 October 1805).


\(^{484}\) Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. V, p. 79.


\(^{486}\) Necib Asım, “Üçüncü Selim Devrine Ait Vesikalar”, *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası (TOEM)*, 11/ 88 (Eylül 1341/September 1922).
depending on this information, Karal studies the notes as belonging to Tayyar Pasha. Cevdet Pasha, too, attributes some notes to Tayyar Pasha and notes that he had a chance to see them. From Cevdet Pasha’s summary of these notes, it becomes clear that they are the ones published by Necib Asım.  

There are some hints in these notes suggesting that they might actually have belonged to Tayyar Pasha. The writer has a very hostile attitude towards Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey, and also to Selim III and some of the ruling elite. There is another clue in a note, dated 1220/1805-1806, where the author states that “since the thirteen-years-old son of Capanoğlu Süleyman has several times been granted the rank of vizier, he has preferred to retire.” In another note dated, 1220/1805-6, he prays to God not to die in a non-Muslim land. As Necib Asım also notes, Tayyar Pasha was in Russia in that year. However, a general reading of these notes makes one think that the author might have been also a member of the ilmiye class. Therefore, it is very difficult to reach a definite conclusion with very limited clues at hand.

Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey, Tayyar Pasha’s old rival and enemy, is usually presented as one of the main supporters of the Nizam-i Cedid reforms; and his contributions to the expansion of the new army in Anatolia are celebrated. Yet at this point it should be clarified that Cabbarzâde was not supporting the policies of the center just for the sake of the expansion of the Nizam-i Cedid in the region. It is clear that he was also guarding his political and economic interests. By having good relations with the Porte and shouldering the duty of the establishment of the Nizam-i Cedid units and barracks, he sought to enlarge his area of influence and to gain the Canik province. As we have mentioned above, in order not to increase the tension between Tayyar and Cabbarzâde, the recruitment of soldiers in Canik was delayed and the tax-farm of Canik was left to neither of them. However, Cabbarzâde does not seem to have been satisfied with this arrangement and tried to get the tax-farm of Canik after the elimination of Tayyar Pasha. However, now Canik was under

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491 Uzunçarşılı, “Çapanoğluulları”, p. 234; Shaw, Between Old and New; p. 283.
the rule of Yusuf Ziya Pasha. This time Süleyman Bey tried to get it from Yusuf Ziya Pasha. For instance, in one of his petitions he noted that when he arrived at Canik, the residents came to him and promised that they would not object to the enrollment of soldiers from their district. He expresses his own policy openly in two letters he sent to a certain official in the capital. In the first document one can clearly see his effort to obtain the tax-farm of Canik. In fact, one feels that Cabbarzâde aimed at to bargain with the Porte. On the one hand, he had the advantage of being militarily and economically dominant in Central Anatolia and knew that the Porte was dependent on his political power and influence in order to establish the Nizam-ı Cedid regiments in the region. On the other hand, Süleyman Bey needed an official approval to enlarge his area of influence, especially to gain control over Canik. Therefore, his letter frequently states that there were numerous young people in Canik and the place was thus very suitable for recruitment of soldiers for the Nizam-ı Cedid army. It was possible, he continues, to establish two regiments in the region. As the location of the barracks, he proposed the castle in a place called Kavak, built by Tayyar Pasha. He does not forget to remark frequently that he has no other aim than to serve the state and assures that he has no plans to gain control over the Canik.

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492 B.O.A. HAT 1358/53284 (undated). The document belongs to the reign of Mustafa IV and provides a good summary of the fate of the mukattaas in the sancaks of Karahisar-ı Şarki and Canik, after the flight of Tayyar Pasha. As far as it is noted in the document, after the escape of Tayyar Pasha, these mukattaas were transferred to the Imperial Shipyard (Tersane-i Amire). Thereafter, they were given to Yusuf Ziya Pasha as malikané, with the condition that their annual income of 68875,5 guruş was to be paid to the Tersane. After his return, Tayyar Pasha asked Mustafa IV to grant them to him again under the pretext that they were the lands of his old dynasty. Upon the approval of the Sultan, Canik and Karahisar-ı Şarki were granted him as malikané, again with the condition that its annual income was to be paid to Tersane.

493 T.S.M.A. E.1938-7 (25 R 1220/12 July 1805). The letter was written to Srkatibi Ahmed Efendi. It seems that Süleyman Bey was trying to convince Ahmed Efendi for the necessity to have Canik bestowed to himself.


495 T.S.M.A. E.8465 (25 M 1221/15 April 1806).

496 T.S.M.A. E. 8465 (25 M 1221/15 April 1806); T.S.M.A. E.1938-7 (25 R 1220/12 July 1805) As far as we understand from the document, Süleyman Bey wrote the letter after the appointment of a muhassil to the region by Yusuf Ziya Pasha. According to Süleyman Bey, the residents of Canik of were not happy with Yusuf Ziya Pasha and sent petitions to Süleyman Bey asking him to inform the center of their problems. Süleyman Bey states that they were ready for the recruitment into the Nizam-ı Cedid if a new muhassil was
Turning back to the revolt of Tayyar Pasha, it is not very clear what considerations really played a role in his actions. At this point we might ask why Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey rather than Tayyar Pasha was chosen for the task of enlisting soldiers. Another question is whether Tayyar Pasha had expressed dissatisfaction with the establishment of *Nizam-ı Cedid* regiments in the regions under his control from the beginning, leading to Cabbarzâde preferred. Apparently, Tayyar Pasha did not show any clear signs of hostility concerning the establishment of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* regiments in the region. On the contrary, in one petition from around 1800-01 he promises that he would render any services to the state if he is granted the administration of Amasya, Canik, Kara Hisar and, if possible, Kastamonu. He notes that his prestige would be increased by being appointed as the commander of the disciplined soldiers ("*muallem asker memur ünvani*).\(^497\) In the year 1804, he informed the center that he was striving to register about ten or fifteen thousand soldiers for the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps.\(^498\)

Following the granting of the Amasya tax-farm to Cabbarzâde Süleyman, Selim III became increasingly worried that tension between the two notable families could cause serious disorder in Anatolia, eventually preventing the conscription of *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers from among the Anatolian population. The Sultan’s anxiety is well expressed in his writings. At the beginning, he tried to satisfy both parties.\(^499\) For instance, he advised his officials that even though Cabbarzâde got tax-farm of Amasya, he should not register soldiers from Amasya and the regions close to Tayyar's lands in that same year (1220/1805). He was also trying to calm down Tayyar Pasha by ordering his men to express his good will to Tayyar Pasha.\(^500\) An attempt at a solution was made Beyhan Sultan\(^501\), who appointed. However, Süleyman Bey notes that this put him in a difficult position since if Yusuf Ziya Pasha heard that he had acted as mediator in the issue the governor would be annoyed. Since, he says, he knew that the Sultan was paying great attention to the increase of the number of the soldiers, keeping the problem secret would not be appropriate for a loyal servant like himself. In short, we can conclude that Süleyman Bey was going to create a new problem on the Canik province, this time with Yusuf Ziya Pasha.

\(^{497}\) B.O.A. HAT 129/5330 (undated, the catalogue date is 1215/1800-1).


\(^{499}\) B.O.A. HAT 3671 (undated, catalogue date is 1219/1804).

\(^{500}\) B.O.A. HAT 7535 (undated, catalogue date is 1220/1805). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4. HAT 3671 (undated, catalogue date is 1219/1804).

\(^{501}\) Beyhan Sultan was sister of Selim III.
was the *malikane* owner of Amasya, by withdrawing the tax-farm of Amasya from Cabbarzâde and the appointing a new *mütesellim* Ali Ağa owner of Amasya. Yet, when Tayyar Pasha did not consent and tensions began to mount, Selim III’s attitude changed and he ordered the enrollment of soldiers from Amasya by Cabbarzâde.

Looking at the developments, it becomes even more difficult to determine whether Tayyar Pasha was an enemy of the reforms of Selim III. In fact, that there are not many documents expressing the hostility of the Pasha to the *Nizam-ı Cedid*. Still, there are numerous texts accusing him to be an enemy of *Nizam-ı Cedid*. According to the news reported to the Porte, Tayyar Pasha proclaimed to his soldiers that “I was ordered to join the Üsküdar regiment and enroll soldiers. However, I do not find it permissible for you to join the Üsküdar regiment and to wear bad [fenâ] clothes, and I did not accept. Do you want to join the aforementioned corps and to wear bad clothes?” When the soldiers replied that they would not accept, he said “from now on, I will not allow anyone to join to the Üsküdar regiment and then asked will you collaborate with me?” When they promised to collaborate with him he said, “With your help I can do whatever I want.” In addition, Cabbarzâde alleged that following the establishment of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps in Sivas, Tayyar Pasha sent his men to Baghdad, Sivas, Diyarbakir, Amasya and Tokat to spread false news that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* had been abolished. Cabbarzâde also noted that Tayyar Pasha dispatched his agents to various provincial officials (in Viran Şehir, Erzurum, Çıldır, Muş, Bayburt, Kastamonu) in order to get support for his aims. Tayyar Pasha was also trying to provoke the residents of these places, appealing that “let’s not accept the *Nizam-ı Cedid* and not allow [them] to make our sons wear infidel [gavur] costumes”. In a letter to Hacı Ahmedoğlu İbrahim Efendi, the *voyvoda* of Viran Şehir, Tayyar Pasha tried to convince him that the jurisconsults (“müftü”) of Mecca and Madina issued *fetvas* on the incompatibility of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* with Islam. Tayyar Pasha also invited İbrahim Efendi to

502 B.O.A. HAT 4046 (11 Ca 1220/7 August 1805).

503 B.O.A. HAT 40460 (11 Ca 1220/7 August 1805). Selim III orders that “.....Müteallikâtının sergerdeleri defı olunub fimâ-ba’ad cihânda Canikli efrâdi kalmayınca say ve ikdâm olunsun.”

504 B.O.A. HAT 4048.G (3 R 1220/30 June 1805). This document is a letter from Cabbarzâde Süleyman to the center and the news he reported is based on the information of his spy coming from Samsun.

join him in his struggle. We also learn that he asked for help from Selim Pasha, the governor of Çıldır. However, Selim Pasha replied he would help Tayyar if the latter would be pardoned by the center.

Since the most of the accessible documents, which refer to the hostility of Tayyar Pasha to the Nizam-ı Cedid/İراد-ı Cedid, are in fact produced by his enemies it is difficult to discern Tayyar Mahmud Pasha’s actual opinion on the issue. The above-mentioned letters were written by Cabbarzâde, and it is understandable that he would accuse his enemy for being hostile to the reforms that the Sultan was struggling so hard to realize. There seems to be only one record written by a vizier to the Sultan, and noting that Tayyar Pasha was promising the people that he would abolish the Nizam-ı Cedid corps. Looking at the letters of Tayyar Pasha himself, there is not much mention of the Nizam-ı Cedid issue. But in one letter, probably sent while he was in Sohum, he remarks that he was accused by Cabbarzâde of being an enemy of the Nizam-ı Cedid corps.

According to Câbî Ömer Efendi, Tayyar Pasha considered the Nizam-ı Cedid to be “disgusting” (“kerih”) and adopted the interests of the Janissaries and the ulema. Then he attacked the regions where soldiers were recruited by Cabbarzâde. It is important to note that Câbî does not make any reference to Tayyar Pasha’s hostility toward Cabbarzâde and makes it seem that the sole reason for his uprising was his opposition to the Nizam-ı Cedid. The historian Mustafa Necib, on the other hand, notes that Tayyar Pasha had secretly collaborated with those functionaries who plotted the dethronement of Selim III and

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506 B.O.A. HAT 4048.İ (9 R 1220/6 July 1805)
507 B.O.A. HAT 125/5185 (11 Ca 1221/27 July 1806)
508 Some modern studies consider the letters of Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey to be the basis of representation Tayyar Pasha as hostile to the Nizam-ı Cedid. For instance, Canay Şahin says “He became the leader of the Janissaries, whom he convinced to be against recruitment for the new Üsküdar regiment.” See Şahin, The Caniklizâdes, p. 72) In fact the document (HAT 4048.G) she refers to a letter written by Cabbarzâde Süleyman himself.
509 B.O.A. HAT 4051 (undated, catalogue date is 1220/1805): “Ben Nizâm-ı Cedid’i kaldıracığım mezâlimi def’ edeceğim ve Cabbarzâde’nin dahî hakkından gelmeğe me’mûrum diyerek ulema ve yeniçeri bayrakları açıldığından ekser memleketer kendîye tâbi’ olmuş hatta Tokad ve Sivas’dan dahî Cabbarzâde’nin mütesellimini koğmuşlar”.
511 Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 96. He narrates that in the coffee houses of Istanbul gossips were circulating that “ulemâyi önięne katup, Padişah ile mürafa’a olacak imiş”.
rebelled for this cause. While the author does not give any clues about the identities of Tayyar’s collaborators, it is possible that he meant the future sultan Mustafa IV. Indeed, Cevdet Pasha says that Tayyar Pasha was supported by the Prince Mustafa (IV). In another report from the time of Mahmud II, it is stated that Prince Mustafa had supported Tayyar Pasha’s cause, so that if he had been victorious Mustafa’s way to the throne would have been open. It is very difficult to find evidence to such secret arrangements. However, the later relationship between the two suggests that there was some kind of understanding between the Tayyar Mahmud Pasha and Prince Mustafa (IV). About six months after the May 1807 Rebellion, Tayyar Pasha came to İstanbul (15 Ş 1222/18 October 1807). He was appointed as the kaimmakam after the dismissal of Musa Pasha. However, under the pressure of the grand vizier, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, and also Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, the governor of Silistria, he was deposed and sent into exile. As we shall see later, there was some pressure on Mustafa IV to execute of Tayyar Pasha rather than banishing him. However, Mustafa IV did not yield to pressure and ensured that Tayyar Pasha was safely sent into exile. It seems that there were rumours that the Sultan was protecting Tayyar Pasha, so that Mustafa IV felt the need to explain that his main concern for not permitting the execution of the Pasha was not his wish to protect the latter (“tesâhüb”) but the fact that Tayyar had previously revolted against the Nizam-ı Cedid and run away to Russia. The Sultan also notes that he did not want to give the supporters of Selim III a pretext for celebration. Even though this information does not precisely refer to collaboration between Prince Mustafa and Tayyar Pasha against Selim III, it suggests that the former harboured kindly feelings or at least some sympathy for Tayyar Pasha.

The uprising of Tayyar Pasha may also be evaluated as the final phase of the old rivalry between the two Anatolian magnates, for the control of over Sivas and Amasya. These regions had passed into the hands of the Canikli family in the 1770s, against the protests of the Cabbarzâdes. Later, Amasya became a malikane of Beyhan Sultan in

512 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 83.
514 T.S.M.A. E. 2650 (undated, catalogue date is 1202-3/1787-89).
515 T.S.M.A. E. 2446-6 (7 S 1223/4 April 1808). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.
516 T.S.M.A. E. 2446-6 (7 S 1223/4 April 1808).
One particular aim of Tayyar Pasha was to reestablish his dynasty’s authority over Amasya, Canik and Kastamonu that were taken back after the flight of Battal Hüseyin Pasha. As already mentioned, Tayyar Pasha wrote a petition to the Porte around 1215/1800-01, and asked for the granting of Amasya, Canik and Kara Hisar, and if possible also Kastamonu, to himself. In return, he promised to send as many soldiers as many as demanded by the center. During his governorship of Diyarbakır and Erzurum (1801-3), he participated in the capture of Gürcü Osman Pasha, the former governor of Rumelia, who revolted in Anatolia. While Tayyar Pasha was expecting the grant of Sivas as a reward for his services, Cabbarzâde Mehmed Cemaleddin Pasha was appointed as the governor of Sivas in 1804. Probably in order to prevent an increase in the power of the Canikli family, Selim III did not consent to the demands of Tayyar Pasha. Moreover, the mütesellimlik of Amasya was taken from Tayyar Pasha and granted to Süleyman Bey, on the condition of establishment of the Nizam-ı Cedid regiments in the region. No doubt, the loss of Amasya was a severe blow to Tayyar Pasha, who considered this region as among the domains of his dynasty. In a letter to expressing gratitude for the grant of Trabzon and the sancak of Çırmen, he states the importance of this sancak to the family in this way:

Since the sancak of Amasya, for a long time, has been [governed] by my family and inherited to him from my ancestors, the residents of the sancak and the members were the dynasty were like close relatives. Transfer of it to another individual would be a severe blow to my prestige.

Through rivalry, and to some extent, through the intrigues of Cabbarzâde, Tayyar Pasha seems to have been forced to take a side. And since Cabbarzâde represented the Nizam-ı Cedid party, he had no other choice than to represent the other side.

In short we can conclude that even if Tayyar Pasha’s uprising was against the Nizam-ı Cedid, the underlying causes of this revolt seem to include additional aspects such as economic and political rivalry with the Cabbarzâde dynasty. Therefore, as a conclusion,

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517 B.O.A. HAT 181/8242 (undated, catalogue date is 1203/1788-89)
518 B.O.A. HAT 129/5330 (undated, catalogue date is 1215/1800-01)
519 Mert, Čapanoğlu, s. 57.
520 B.O.A. HAT 3100-K (9 L 1215/23 February 1801)
521 B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume, 5, pp. 1-2 (evahir-i Ra 1220/19-28 June 1805) reads that “Bundan akdemce Amasya mütesellimliği’nin iltizâmi hasbe’l-iktizâ Trabzon valisi Tayyar Paşa’nın uhdesinden sarf ve tahvil ve dergâh-i muallâm kapucuhaşarından
we might say that as in most other cases we will discuss later, the *Nizam-i Cedid* was used as a pretext by different political parties in order to gain benefits for their own interests.

### 2.2.2.3. Rumelia: The Edirne Incident

The most serious collective reaction to the *Nizam-i Cedid* was experienced during the summer of 1806 in Rumelia. In that year, the center attempted to carry out the plan of expanding the *Nizam-i Cedid* corps to Rumelia, but encountered the serious reaction of the local magnates (“ayan”) and the residents of the region. The Edirne Incident was the most important collective resistance to the new army system. The failure on the part of the Porte meant not only a physical retreat from the Thracia but also a serious setback in the reform movement immediately before the Rebellion.

In his manuscript called *Nizamü'l-Atik* (The Old Order), Ömer Faik Efendi makes a list of solutions for the problems of the Empire.522 The treatise was written in 1219/1804 after a conversation in a gathering of higher functionaries on 10th July, 1804. During the conversation, *Sırkatibi* (Confidential Secretary) Ahmed Efendi asked Faik Efendi’s opinion on the *Nizam-i Cedid* reform policy. For Ömer Faik Efendi, even though the new army was well organized, its number needed to be increased. Most of these soldiers were stationed in the capital and some in Anatolia. Ömer Faik Efendi commented that their presence did not have any benefit for the fortresses on the borders where there was an urgent need for these disciplined soldiers. Therefore, it would be better if they were deployed at the fortresses such as Hotin (Khozim), Akkerman (Ankirman, Cetatea Alba), İbrail (Braila) and Bender.523 Ömer Faik seems to have considered that the new units as a standing army should also serve in other parts of the Empire, especially at strategically important points. Therefore, he criticizes their stationing in limited areas.

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523 Ömer Faik, *Nizamül-Atik*, p. 3b.
In fact the new soldiers were sent to Rumelia already before the Edirne Incident, yet only to suppress the disorder in the region. Under the command of Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha, they fought against the Mountaineers, who had come as far as Edirne and Çatalca in the summer of 1219/1804. During this expedition the Mountaineers were defeated around Malkara (Eastern Thrace) and escaped to the mountains. Following the imperial order, the cavalry forces of the Nizam-ı Cedid were stationed in Çorlu, while the infantry was temporarily left in Tekfur Daği (Tekirdağ), as a measure against the rebels. The second expedition of the Nizam-ı Cedid army into Rumelia took place in the year 1806. Once again, Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha was appointed as the commander of the expedition. He was invited in S 1221/April 1806 and about three months later he was in İstanbul, together with his Nizam-ı Cedid forces from Anatolia. After being received by the Sultan, Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha moved to Davudpaşa with approximately 24,000

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524 The Mountaineers constituted an endemic and serious problem for the Ottoman Balkan realms. Usually, reference is made the actions of common banditry performed by the bandits that emerged in the Balkans beginning with the second half of the 18th century. The name first emerged in the Kircali Mountains and from that time onwards it became a generic name for similar movements in the Balkans. The neglect of the Rumelia due to the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman and 1787-1792 Ottoman-Austrian wars is considered to be the main cause of the rise of this social banditry. For a long time, the Mountaineers were mostly active around Filibe (Plodiv), Western Thrace and north of the Balkans. Especially after the year 1206/1792, they became an endemic problem for the Ottoman rulers. Many powerful governors and local magnates were ordered frequently to suppress them, albeit with no efficient and permanent result. From 1218/1803 onwards, they began to infiltrate to Edirne and Çatalca. This development alarmed the center and Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha was sent to suppress it. The movement came to an end during the reign of Mahmud II. For further details, see Özkaya, Yücel, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Dağı Eşkiyaları, 1791-1808, (Ankara: DTCF Basımevi, 1983).


526 B.O.A. HAT 77/3181 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806). It is a report which gives some details about the presence of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers left in Tekfur Daği and Çorlu after the defeat of the Mountaineers and talks about the incident of the opposition of the residents of Tekirdağ. See also Uzunçarşılı, “Kâdi Abdurrahman Paşa”, p. 263; Çataltepe, Nizam-ı Cedid Orduyu, pp. 223-8.


528 He arrived at Üsküdar on 15 Ra 1221/2 June 1806. See B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 3; see also Uzunçarşılı, “Kâdi Abdurrahman Paşa”, pp. 271-72.
Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. In the mid R 1221/June 1806 he began his march towards Rumelia.

Before Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha’s arrival at Istanbul, there had already been some attempts for the expansion of the Nizam-ı Cedid in the region. In August 1804, an imperial edict was issued ordering the enrollment of young and willing men from the regions close to Istanbul for the Levent Chiftlik barracks. Seyyid Mustafa Efendi, the well-known advocate of the Nizam-ı Cedid, remarks in his treatise that after the establishment of barracks in various cities of Anatolia, Selim III planned to establish similar ones also in Rumelia. Thus it was decided to establish one in the vicinity of the Edirne Palace, and soldiers were stationed in the barracks built there. A half regiment (“nuf orta”) was established in Karışdran (in Tekirdağ) to be a branch of the Levent Chiftlik and Mehmed Emin Ağ, master (“usta”) of Karışdran, was appointed as the ağa of it. It was also decided to build barracks in other convenient places in the region. Therefore two barracks, one in Karışdran and one in Yapu Ağ (around Karışdran, Tekirdağ), were to be constructed. The military unit in Yapu Ağ was also to be connected to Levent Chiftlik, after being detached from the main body of Bostancı Ocağı (the corps of the imperial guards). Câbi Ömer Efendi states that a barrack was built in Karışdran and

529 Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha and the “asakir-i şahane” around Levent Chiftlik were observed by the Sultan on 10 R 1221/27 June 1806. See Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 43; Beyhan, Saray Günü, p.199.


531 B.O.A. C. AS. 6908 (evahir-i Z 1218/1 April- 30 August 1804); B.O.A. C. ZB. 4136 (10 Za 1218/20 February 1804). See also B.O.A C. AS. 3816 (17 Za 1218/28 February 1804); the second document is a petition written by the judge of Silivri, declaring that the imperial edict had been announced to the residents of the region.

532 The treatise was written in 1803. Therefore the establishment of barracks in Edirne must have taken place either in 1803 or before that time. See Beydilli, Kemal “İlk Mühendislerimizden Seyyid Mustafa ve Nizam-ı Cedid’e Dair Rısalesi”, Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, (XIII, 1983-87), p.440.


534 Küçük Çekmece, Terkos, Midye, Silivri, Ereğli and Çorlu around İstanbul and from the sancağ of Vize (Vize, Saray, Bergos, Baba-ı Atik), Mahmud Paşa, Pınar Hisarı, Hayra Bolu, Kırk Kilise. See B.O.A. A.AMD 42/30 (undated, catalogue date is 1213/1798-99).

535 B.O.A. A.AMD 42/30 (undated catalogue date is 1213/1798-99). There is no date on the document. It is found among the files of A.AMD, no. 42, which contains documents
three thousand soldiers were stationed there.\textsuperscript{536} According to Câbî, it was intended to build another barrack in Tekirdağ one year following the completion of the barracks in Karışdırın.\textsuperscript{537}

The first reaction to the expansion of \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army into the region was witnessed in Tekirdağ (1806). Agents (“mübaşir”) were sent to the local districts to enroll people for above-mentioned barracks and also to explain the need for the recruitment. Agents also carried a declaration which ensured leading figures of the administrative districts (“kaza”) that these arrangements were for the protection of their families from the Mountaineer bandits that appeared frequently in the region.\textsuperscript{538} The declaration claimed that these measures were also “proof of the compassion of the Sultan for them.” The same document about the developments in the region reports that the while the districts to the east of Çorlu had accepted the call and even an army major (“binbaşı”) has been appointed,\textsuperscript{539} those to the west of Çorlu waited the first reaction of the town of Tekfur Dağı. Apparently, the deputy judge (“naib”) of Tekfur Dağı was not happy with the stationing of the “disciplined soldiers” in the vicinity and was publicly talking against it.\textsuperscript{540} Thus, the naib in question was immediately dismissed and a more loyal one was appointed by the Şeyhülislam. The new naib, upon his arrival at Tekirdağ, read the imperial order about the registration of the soldiers. As a reaction to the imperial order, lower elements of the town attacked the court of justice, and the naib and his retinue were murdered.\textsuperscript{541}

of the year 1213/1798-99. However, historical data of the document (no.42) do not correspond this year. For instance, it begins with the explanation that “Levend Çiftliği ve Üsküdar Ocağı neferatının bi-tevfiği Teâlâ şimdiye kadar me’ mür oldukları mahallerde rû-nûmâ olan gayret ve metânetleri çımlenin mesmû’u ve meşhûru olub ...” As we already know the Üsküdar regiment was established in 1801 as the third regiment after the two in Levent Chiiftlik. Thus, the document in question should belong to a time after 1801.


\textsuperscript{537} Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, p. 62.

\textsuperscript{538} B.O.A. HAT 77/3181 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).

\textsuperscript{539} B.O.A. HAT 77/3181 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).

\textsuperscript{540} B.O.A. HAT 77/3181 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806). In the report it is noted that this information was retrieved from the despatches of commander of the soldiers “asker başbuğ”.

\textsuperscript{541} B.O.A. HAT 77/3181 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806. According to the report, the residents of the town asked two days to discuss the order among themselves.
From the above-mentioned report we learn that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers were temporarily lodged in the khans. Following the murder of the *naib* and his men, the local Janissary officer and some leading figures came the khan and asked the *Nizam-ı Cedid* officers to leave the town, explaining that any further disorder would not only harm innocent people but would also attract the anger of the Sultan. 542 To prevent further provocation and confrontation, the local *Nizam-ı Cedid* official, Binbaşı Bekir Ağa, took his soldiers out of the *kaza*, together with their cannons. Then they camped in a village, two hours from Tekfur Dağı. 543 After the news from Tekfur Dağı reached the residents of Çorlu, they seem to have suspected that the *ayan* and other notables were involved in these events, provoked the people and also secretly sent disruptive messages other kazas.

From the same report, it appears that the incident in Tekfur Dağı left the center faced with a dilemma: They had to either to give up enrolling soldiers from Tekfur Dağı, which would mean an admission of failure, or to use military force. If the application of force was chosen, the increase in the number of soldiers would trigger the rise of the number of the rebels. Since there were already about three thousand rebels ("*haşerat*") in Tekfur Dağı, a number which was rapidly increasing, the best solution appeared to be to keep the soldiers in their current locations. Then an imperial edict would be sent from the center that would explain that the Sultan was intending to establish two barracks between Edirne and İstanbul which aimed to protect the local population, from the bandits (i. e. the Mountaineers). The plan was to propagate that the previous pashas had been unsuccessful against the bandits that the salaries of the soldiers would be paid by the imperial treasury. This assurance was probably made with the aim of satisfying the Janissaries. Indeed, in one passage of the report it is noted that most of the rebels were "*claiming to be Janissaries*". Finally, individual punitive measures such as the execution and exile of some people would frighten and calm down the rest of the people. In the note added by Selim III to the report, he orders that "*our soldiers*" should move to Çorlu and Silivri. 544

However, the meeting ended without any decision being taken. Later, however, the lower elements of the town attacked the court of justice and killed the *naib*.

542 B.O.A. HAT 77/3181 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).

543 Hacı İbrahim Efendi was in Çorlu during that period. B.O.A. HAT 77/3181 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).

544 B.O.A. HAT 77/3181 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).
As an official report, the above document does not provide detailed information as to the causes of the events that led to this incident in Tekfur Dağı. On the other hand, one contemporary author gives some more details on the murder of the naib. According to him, the demand of the naib for an urgent reply concerning the recruitment was met with refusal by the residents of Tekfur Dağı who stated that

We do not want the presence of the Nizam-ı Cedid units here. News reached us that the people of Edirne are also reluctant concerning the establishment of barracks and the arrival of new soldiers in their city, and if the center attempts to enforce this they would not allow it.545

When the naib, not satisfied with this reply, argued that this attitude meant disobedience to the order of the Sultan, he was murdered by a group of rebels.546 We have a slightly different version of the events in the Yayla İmamı Risalesi, concerning the dialogue of the naib and his opponents. According to this version, the event took place on Friday, when the people, following the refusal of the Nizam-ı Cedid units, wanted to go Friday prayer. However, the naib insisted on an immediate reply and commented that putting the imperial into execution was more urgent and more necessary.547

There is one issue that should be clarified at this point, namely the identity of those who killed the naib or reacted against the order of the Sultan. Before the outburst of the events in Tekfur Dağı, the author of the Yayla İmamı Risalesi notes that no kaza of Rumelia wanted to accept the Nizam-ı Cedid units on the grounds that the inhabitants were all Janissaries since ancient times and would not accept the Nizam-ı Cedid.548 Dağdevirenoğlu,549 the local power holder of Edirne, was also provoking the Janissaries and palace gardeners (“bostancı”) of Edirne saying that “this Nizam-ı Cedid issue will gradually convert you into grocer apprentices and reaya”.550 Dağdevirenoğlu probably was trying to strengthen his party by persuading the Janissaries and the bostancı that if the

547 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 217.
548 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 217.
Nizam-ı Cedid army took root in the region, they would lose their privileges and turn into reaya. In the report, it is noted that the opponent groups claimed to be Janissaries. According to the Yayla İmamı Risalesi, the local leaders of Tekfur Dağı opposed the naib by arguing that “our fathers and grandfathers were Janissaries and we are also Janissaries. We do not accept the Nizam-ı Cedid.” The author of the booklet asserts that it was the Janissaries who murdered the naib. As far as reflected by the contemporary sources, from the very beginning of the expansion the Nizam-ı Cedid into Rumelia, the government faced the opposition of the Janissaries. One should remember that the author of the above report recommends the issue of an imperial edict which would stipulate that only those who did not have any dirlik, i.e., were not member of the military class, would be registered. This recommendation could be regarded as a political consideration of the center, calculated to break the opposition of the Janissaries.

Following the incident in Tekfur Dağı, the center decided to send an imperial edict to other places, explaining the benefits of the Nizam-ı Cedid, rather than employing harsh policies. Selim III at this point seems to have found it more reasonable not to enroll soldiers from Tekfur Dağı. In a related note, he commented that for some time it would not be possible to enroll soldiers from Tekfur Dağı and he did not want to accomplish enrollment by force. Thus, for him the best policy was to send orders to other locations in Thrace propagating the aims of the Nizam-ı Cedid reform and calming down local populations. However, the residents of Tekfur Dağı continued to oppose the central authority and refused deliver the culprits of the murder of the naib. As far as we are able to discern

551 B.O.A. HAT 77/3181 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).

552 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 217.


554 B.O.A. HAT 77/3180 (undated, the catalogue date is 1221/1806). At the upper margin of the document Selim III comments that “... biraz vakit bu havaliilerde ocak tertibi uymayacak. Şimdi Tekfur Dağ'ından başka asker matlûb olan kazâlara şu zeminde fermânlar gitse ki bu tertib ancak kendii emniyet ve rahatınz içün devlet esvâb ve yiyecek verüb hazîneler telef edecek id. Tekfur Dağı kabul eylememiş burda asker matlûb olmayub âfv olunmuştur denilse sârî kazâlar dahi kabahati Tekfur Dağı eyleldi biz kurtulduk deyü fesâda cesâret eylemezler. Nefsü’l-emr ben zorla asker istemem kendii gönnûleriyle isterim.” See also Uzunçarşılı, “Kadi Abdurrahman Paşa”, p. 280.

from the narrative of Câbî Ömer Efendi, a fetva was issued\(^{556}\) and two corvettes under the command by Rear-Admiral (Riyale) Hüseyin Bey were deployed in Ca 1221/July 1806.\(^{557}\) The residents, following these developments, sent petitions to the Ağâ of the Janissaries in İstanbul claiming that they were put under pressure by a few rebels among them. Thereupon, Pehlivan Ağâ, the keeper of the mastiffs (“samsoncubaşı”), was sent to the region in order to punish the culprits. Following the arrival of Pehlivan Ağâ in the region, most of the people apparently blamed Kara Ahmed, the ayan of Malkara, as the main figure behind the disorder.\(^{558}\) Consequently, Kara Ahmed was executed and the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers were able to enter the city.\(^{559}\)

While these events took place, the Janissaries in Edirne murdered Ahmed Ağâ, a former bostancıbaşı (commander of imperial guards) and the director (“emin”) of the Gümüşhane mines. He had been appointed as the bostancıbaşı of Edirne in Ra 1221/May 1806.\(^{560}\) However, his secret task was to establish a Nizam-ı Cedid unit under the name of “Bostani”.\(^{561}\) This led to a Janissary “uprising” in Edirne resulting in his murder, while the residents, protesting against the Nizam-ı Cedid closed their shops.\(^{562}\) During the incident in Tekfur Dağı, Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha was not in Rumelia. In the middle of R 1221/June 1806, he began his march towards Rumelia with the Nizam-ı Cedid army. News of his movement was received with hostility in Edirne. Despite the spread of information that the Pasha and his army were sent against Serbian rebels, the center seems to have been unable to convince the Thracian population.\(^{563}\) When Abdurrahman Pasha arrived at Silivri (Ca

\(^{556}\) The fetva probably was issued to bring about the execution of those who had murdered the naib. See Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 63.

\(^{557}\) B.OA. HAT 6241.A (21 C 1221/5 September 1806); Uzunçarşılı, “Kâdi Abdurrahman Paşa”, p. 280.

\(^{558}\) The culprits seem to have mostly been Janissaries since Pehlivan Ağâ was sent to Tekfur Dağı, so that the rebels would be executed by their commanders (“bu güne fesâda cesaret edenleri ocaklusu tarafindan idâm etmek üzere”). See Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 63.


\(^{563}\) Uzunçarşılı, “Kâdi Abdurrahman Paşa”, p. 281.
1221/July 1806), he faced an early resistance. After suppressing the disorder he passed to Çorlu. The residents of the latter, probably frightened by the suppression of the resistance at Silivri, did not show any resistance and the town was included to the recruitment-zone of the Nizam-ı Cedid corps.\(^{564}\) From that point onwards, however, Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha’s opponents followed a subtle policy of resistance. Instead of waging an open conflict, they began to weaken the army in terms of provisions. As a consequence, the issue of food supply became one of the most important problems that Kadi Pasha had to deal with. In Havsa, close to Edirne, this problem reached to the degree of famine among the Nizam-ı Cedid troops.\(^{565}\) Due to this pressing problem, Abdurrahman Pasha was forced to turn back. However, before doing so, he had to deal with the problem of the rebels in Baba-yı Atik (Baba Eski, in Tekirdağ). The “rebels” had decided to meet in Baba-yı Atik and block the roads whereby the provisions of the army were to pass. According to one report of Kadi Pasha, Ömer Ağa, the ayan of Baba-yı Atik, brought one thousand men from Edirne under the command of his deputy, Çavuşoğlu Ahmed. Ömer Ağa’s men captured and murdered Elhac Yusuf Ağa, the purchasing state agent (“mubayaaci”) of the Nizam-ı Cedid corps. They also seized considerable amounts of cash allocated for the purchasing of provisions. Moreover, couriers (“tatars”) of Abdurrahman Pasha were killed and the “treasure” and the official dispatches they were carrying were seized. The sergeant (“çavuş”) who was transporting the weapons was also murdered. Finally the “rebels” captured the camels and the horses used for the transport of provisions.\(^{566}\) The situation of Abdurrahman Pasha

\(^{564}\) Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrir Suretleri, İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi Tarih Yazmaları, no. 6975; pp. 31a-32 (undated); Uzunçarşılı, “Kadi Abdurrahman Paşa”, p. 281.

\(^{565}\) Uzunçarşılı, “Kadi Abdurrahman Paşa”, p. 281. For various dispatches on provisions and military equipments, see B.O.A. HAT 75/3110 (25 C 1221/9 September 1806); B.O.A. HAT 6422 (undated, the catalogue date is 1221/1806); B.O.A. HAT 152/6422.C(27 R 1221/14 July 1806); B.O.A. HAT 152/6422.D (1 Ca 1221/17 July 1806); B.O.A. HAT 77/3185 (7 C 1221/22 August 1806); B.O.A. HAT 76/3127.A (7 C 1221/22 August 1806); B.O.A. HAT 76/3127.B (7 C 1221/22 August 1806); B.O.A. HAT 3127.C (6 C 1221/21 August 1806); B.O.A. HAT 121/4901(undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).

\(^{566}\) Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrir Suretleri, TY 6975, pp. 30a-31(undated); B.O.A. HAT 49/2334 (19 Ca 1221/4 August 1806). The second document is a report by Abdurrahman Pasha, probably sent to the center. In the document it is not made clear whether the murders, captures of officials, and seizure of provisions, money and animals all took place during one incident or in a series of incidents at different times. Cevdet Pasha notes that the Edirne Bostancıbaşı was also killed during the fight. Ahmed Ağa was already in Baba-ı Atik and the tatar ağası was on the road to Belgrad, carrying the order that Abdurrahman Pasha was to move to Belgrad. See Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VIII, p. 63.
worsened since the neighboring kazas were also helping the “rebels”. After that point, Abdurrahman Pasha attacked Baba-yı Atik to cut off the connections of the town with its surroundings. Following the siege of this kaza the “rebels” succeeded in fleeing, mostly to Çorlu.\textsuperscript{567} Despite the fact that the forces of Abdurrahman Pasha were able to enter the city, Selim III ordered the army to return immediately to Çorlu.\textsuperscript{568}

While Abdurrahman Pasha was on the way to Çorlu, news arrived that a group three thousand rebels were about to attack the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers at three different points: one group from Kırklareli, another from Hayrebolu and the last one from the middle the under the leadership of Dağdevirenoğlu. Some of these rebels reached Elmalı Köy in Lüleburgaz, located on the route of Kadi Pasha to Çorlu. In the ensuing battle the forces of Kadi Pasha defeated the rebels.\textsuperscript{569} A substantial part of those who fled from Baba-yı Atik had come to Çorlu with the aim of prevent Kadi Pasha from entering the town. The Pasha reached to Çorlu on 5 C 1221/20 August 1806 and besieged the city. Selim III personally was demanding the capture of Çorlu and the expulsion of the rebels there.\textsuperscript{570} Moreover, the Sultan sent orders to different places in Anatolia for sending soldiers to help Kadi Pasha.\textsuperscript{571} Kadi Pasha ordered the construction of trenches (“tabya”) around the town. There seems to have been a serious attempt to capture the town. There is even a translation of a report of a foreign engineer called “Antuan” on the siege of Çorlu. The title of this short report is “Some Observations on the Reserves and Preparations Necessary for the Siege of Çorlu” (“Çorlu Muhâsarası İçin İhtiyâtât ve Tehiyyât-ı Lâzime Üzerine Müşahedât”). This interesting but undated document provides some important details. In the introduction, Antuan comments that reaching Silivri the Imperial Army (“ordu-yu şâhâne”) had given up the siege of Çorlu and entered Silivri instead. According to him, this was due to a lack of enough provisions rather than bad command. Then the author gives a series of technical details necessary for the success of the siege of Çorlu.\textsuperscript{572} This document shows how

\textsuperscript{567} B.O.A. HAT 81/3366 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).

\textsuperscript{568} B.O.A. HAT 49/2334 (19 Ca 1221/4 August 1806).

\textsuperscript{569} Uzunçarşılı, “Kadi Abdurrahman Paşa”, p. 285.

\textsuperscript{570} B.O.A. HAT 3209 (7 C 1221/22 August 1806).

\textsuperscript{571} For instance Hacı Ahmedzâde İbrahim, the voyvoda of Bolu, was ordered to protect the region from Istranca to Çatalca. See B.O.A. HAT 149/6305 (21 C 1211/5 September 1806); Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrir Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 29,

\textsuperscript{572} B.O.A. A.AMD. 45/24 (undated).
seriously the siege was taken and lists its difficulties. It seems that the siege of the town lasted more than five days. Probably due to the problems of provisioning Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha ordered the capture of the animals and seizure of the fields around Çorlu to feed the Nizam-ı Cedid units. 573

As we have remarked earlier, Tekfur Dağ was besieged by two corvettes, yet it was not possible to take control of the city without blockades from the land as well. Since the town was strategically important for the transportation of the provisions to Abdurrahman Pasha’s forces, he informed the center that he would attack the city also from the land. However, the center prohibited him to make such an attempt and the Pasha was ordered to return to Silivri. Thus, he decided to open fire on the town of Tekfur Dağ. Up to that time, even though the city was under blockage, no cannons were fired on it. Meanwhile Riyale Hüseyin Bey sent a letter, dated 19 C 1221/3 September 1806, to the center, stating that some representatives of Tekfur Dağ had come to him and presented petitions. 574 They argued that they did not have the power to expel the “rebels” from the city and prevent the influx of the new ones. They also added that the entrance of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers would double the disorder and resistance in the city and therefore asked for the delay of the transfer of the troops. At the same time, Hüseyin Bey also informed Abdurrahman Pasha (in Çorlu) on this matter. 575 The Pasha, in return, sent his secretary (“divan katibi”) to Hüseyin Bey and advised them to continue bombarding the town and “not to believe the lies of the residents.” At this point, we encounter a critical development in terms of the attitude of the capital vis-à-vis the suppression of the resistance in Tekfur Dağ. This development can be discerned from a marginal note in the same letter, where we learn that the petitions of the Tekfur Dağlıs, sent to the center via Hüseyin Bey, have been received with sympathy by the center and an imperial edict which underlined the tolerance of the Sultan towards the children and the women was issued. The navy in the region was also ordered to stop the bombardment. In the marginal note, it is also stated that Sirozi İsmail

573 B.O. A. HAT 152/6422.B (evahir R 1221/end of August 1806). It is an ilam of the judge of Çorlu.

574 In the letter, from Bekir Paşa the governor of the province of Anatolia, there is a clue that the some people from Tekfur Dağ had met with Hüseyin Bey on Tuesday. Since the date of the letter corresponds Wednesday, 19 C 1221/3 September 1806, the meeting should be on 18 C 1221/2 September 1221. See B.O.A. HAT 77/3176 (19 C 1221/3 September 1806).

575 He was dealing with the siege of Çorlu at that time.
Bey\textsuperscript{576} was given the duty of suppressing the rebellion. One of the recommendations that İsmail Bey made to the center was to prevent a naval attack on Tekfur Dağı.\textsuperscript{577}

There is still no historiographical consensus on the causes of the Edirne Incident. According to the second author of Neticetü'l-Vekayi, the aim of the Porte was not to expand the recruitment area of the Nizam-ı Cedid corps to Rumelia, but to increase the number of the military forces in the region due to the possibility of an immediate war with the Russians. However, the Thracian population supposed that the Nizam-ı Cedid forces under the command of Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha were present in order to recruit Nizam-ı Cedid regiments and thus they rebelled and even dared to fight against them.\textsuperscript{578} Similarly, Asım states that the real aim was to station disciplined military forces at locations close to the borders due to the possibility of warfare with the Russians, Austrians or the French.\textsuperscript{579} Another commentator argues that the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers were sent against the Serbian rebels.\textsuperscript{580} The historian-bureaucrat Mustafa Nuri Pasha asserts that after hearing the plan of dispatch of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers to Rumelia, the Thracian ayans decided to fight against them and then to attack İstanbul.\textsuperscript{581} Yet, most of the sources claim that the local population and the ayans were also to provoked by certain people from center, especially by Hafız İsmail Pasha,\textsuperscript{582} the Grand Vizier of the period.\textsuperscript{583} According to Asım, Hafiz

\textsuperscript{576} Sirozi İsmail Bey (d. 1228/1813) was a notable from Siroz (Serres). He became ayans in 1202/1787-88. İsmail Bey was among the ayans who signed the Sened-ı İtifak (1808). He was appointed as the mutasarrıf of Selanik in 1808 and died in 1228/1813. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. III, p. 815.

\textsuperscript{577} B.O.A. HAT 77/3176 (19 C 1221/3 September 1806). The record was sent by Bekir Pasha, the governor of Anatolia, to the center. In his report, Bekir Pasha gives a detailed summary of the events in Tekirdağ. The Pasha was ordered to reach Çatalca to protect the region. It was Ali Ağa, the kapı çukadari of Sirozi İsmail Bey, who carried the letter to the region. The letter mentions the delegation of the issue to Sirozi İsmail Bey.

\textsuperscript{578} Neticetü'l-Vekayi, pp. 1a-1.


\textsuperscript{580} Mustafa Nuri Paşa, Netayicü'l-Vukuat, vol. IV, pp. 42.

\textsuperscript{581} Mustafa Nuri Paşa, Netayicü'l-Vukuat, vol. IV, pp. 42-43

\textsuperscript{582} Hafız İsmail Pasha (d. 1222/1807) served as haseki, karakulak, tebdil haseki, bostancıbaşı and grand admiral (1219/1804). He was appointed as the Grand Vizier on 24 M 1220/24 April 1806 and dismissed on 1 B 1221/14 September 1806. For more details, see Appendix I.
İsmail Pasha sent officials to the region who provoked the local people, claiming that the Porte had decided to kill them. Another İstanbul power player who was apparently also involved in the intrigues is said to be Prince Mustafa (IV). In fact, according to Mustafa Necib, the two above-mentioned figures were in collaboration.

In looking at the background of the Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha’s move to Rumelia, it seems to be that İbrahim Nesim Efendi was the figure behind the project. The period, was witnessing the Serbian uprising and the attack of the French to Dubrovnik, and the forces in Bosnia had been sent against the Serbian rebels. Upon the demand of the Sultan, İbrahim Nesim Efendi presented a treatise concerning the betterment of the present conditions of Rumelia. His project was one amongst many presented to the Sultan. According İbrahim Nesim’s proposal, Abdurrahman Pasha, the governor of Karaman and commander of the disciplined soldiers (“müallem asker”) should be sent to Rumelia. An army of 40-50,000 soldiers would be stationed in Edirne or in Sofia. This army would outwardly (“zahiren”) be there to go to against the Serbian rebels. In case of an outbreak of a war, it would also serve as an army ready against the Russian incursions to the Ottoman fortresses. According to Mustafa Necib Efendi, Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha was called to Üsküdar following the approval of Selim III. Therefore, according to his plan the aim of sending the Nizam-ı Cedid forces was to station them in Edirne to assist İbrahim Pasha, who was

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586 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 13. See also Şen, Osmanlı’da Dönüm Noktasi, p. 100; Akçura, Osmanlı Devleti’nin Dağılma Devri, p. 136.

587 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 11.

588 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 12.
delegated the duty of suppressing the Serbian uprising. The expression “zahiren” implies that there might also have been some other considerations. In fact, the basic idea in İbrahim Nesim’s mind seems to have been to simply station a certain amount of Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers in Rumelia. After their stationing in the region they could be used for various purposes. As we have discussed already, preliminary steps in this regard were taken by the stationing some units in Tekirdağ and by attempts at the establishment of the barracks in Karışdırın.

Considering the situation in Rumelia and dangers such as the problems with Russia, the continuing Serbian uprising, the plague of Mountaineer bandits, and, finally the presence of the ayans, the project as a whole seems to have been a reasonable precautionary measure. We should not forget that the rebels or the Mountaineers were gradually moving closer and closer to the capital city of the Empire. Therefore, there was an urgent need to establish a well-guarded military zone around Edirne that would protect Istanbul itself. In Edirne there was already a regiment of the imperial guards, but it was no longer able to perform its original functions properly. According to Asım, besides losing its former discipline, its number had also decreased to a great extent. Therefore, there was no strong military force present to protect the vicinity of İstanbul. If we remember that in 1219/1804, the Mountaineers came as close as Çatalca, the critical need for the establishment of a military protection zone becomes clearer. Moreover, when there were problems in the region governors were appointed who also demanded extra taxes and

589 The Serbian uprising is divided into two periods: the first period was under the leadership of Kara George Petrovic who rebelled in the spring of 1804. In this period the Serbian leaders negotiated with the Porte, but their concern was not for independence, but rather the protection of autonomous rights of Serbia. In August 1805, Hafız Pasha, the governor of Niş, was sent to suppress the Rebellion, but the ensuing battle ended with the defeat of the Ottoman army. In November 1805, Smederevo fell to the rebels and Belgrade was captured in December 1806. After 1807, the rebellion gradually lost its momentum. At that period, a split occurred among the Serbian leadership. With both internal and external situation unfavourable to the Serbs, the Ottoman forces entered Belgrade (August 1809). In the Treaty of Bucharest (1812), the reoccupation of Serbia by the Ottomans was recognized, albeit with the promise of amnesty. The second period (1814) started as a local uprising under the leadership of Milos Obrenovic. After this, a semi-autonomous state was established. For more details, see The First Serbian Uprising, 1804-1813, Wayne S. Vucinich (ed.), (New York: Boulder, Social Sciences Monographs, 1982); Jelavich, Barbara, History of the Balkans, 2 vols., (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 193-203; Börekçi, M. Çetin, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Srp Meselesi, (İstanbul: Kutup Yaymları, 2001).

placed additional burdens to the residents of the region. Thus, naturally enough, rather entrusting the “undisciplined” Janissaries with the task, the “loyal” *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers, led by a loyal commander were chosen. In this way, the new military system would introduced into this problematic region and an efficient army would be ready face any problem there. So, various explanations as to whether the new army was passing into Rumelia for the expansion of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, or for any other purpose, do not necessarily contradict each other. Though it would serve more than one purpose, the settling *Nizam-ı Cedid* in the region could not be expressed explicitly in order not to cause reactions. And it seems that the Serbian uprising was the officially announced pretext for the redeployment of the soldiers.

Yet, the practical application of the project stands in contrast to the officially announced discourse, in that in practice, a major effort was made to station the new army in the region and enroll soldiers into it. Thus, when the forces of Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha fought to take control of the kazas in the region, the Porte had difficulties explaining the contradiction between the official discourse of marching to Serbia and the strategy of Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha. The situation became tense when news began to circulate that the real intention of the center in sending Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha was to enroll *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers from the region, which aggravated the anxiety of the local people. As a reaction against the arrival of the army, the residents of Edirne declared that Abdurrahman Pasha was not welcome in Edirne and he should either march further or turn back, depending on the result of his correspondences with the governor of Rumelia. Thus, the Porte was pressed to find answers to difficult accusations such as “You had sent edicts assuring us that Abdurrahman Pasha has no duty in the region, yet he began to attack Çorlu and Tekfur Daği.” As far as it is reflected in some of the documents, there seems to have been a gradual shift in the official discourse. Rather than stressing the Serbian uprising as an excuse, the Porte tried to convince the local people on two points: Firstly, that the

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592 B.O.A. HAT 3156 (16 Ca 1221/1 August 1806). At the lower margin of the document, we find the seal of a certain İbrahim. This was probably İbrahim Pasha, the governor of Rumelia. He was appointed as the governor in 1220/1805 and dismissed on B 1221/September-October 1806. See Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. III, p. 773.

593 B.O.A. HAT 1893 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).

594 B.O.A. A. AMD. 53/38 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).
stationing of the new forces was for their own benefit and they were lucky that the Porte decided to protect them by using funds from its own treasury without imposing any extra financial burden on the population.\textsuperscript{595} On the contrary, those enrolled to the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army would be provided with free clothes and food. The second argument was to invite the people to recall their sufferings they had undergone due to destruction inflicted by the Mountaineers and to ask why they had not done anything against the bandits, but were now reacting against the forces that had come to assist them under orders from the Sultan.\textsuperscript{596}

It is probable that those individuals who were accused of having been treacherous during the Edirne Incident were effective in alarming the Rumelian nobility about the contradiction between the official discourse and the reality. If the future Sultan Mustafa IV or Hafız İsmail Pasha were involved in some kind of an intrigue during the Edirne Incident, this probably consisted of supplying secret information to certain people on the stationing plans of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army. Indeed, Mustafa Necib accuses Hafız İsmail Pasha of having sent news to the \textit{ayan} Tirsiniklioğlu İsmail\textsuperscript{597} who in turn provoked the other Rumelian \textit{ayans}.\textsuperscript{598} Apparently, there was a considerable degree of worry about the \textit{Nizam-ı}

\textsuperscript{595} B.O.A. HAT 77/3180 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806): “.... Şimdi Tekfur Dağı'ndan başka asker matlûb olan kazâlara şu zemîne fertân gitsin ki, bu tertib ancak kendi emniyet ve rahatınız için. Devlet-i aliyye esvâb ve yiyecek veririp hazîneler telef edecek idi....”

\textsuperscript{596} B.O.A. AMD. 53/38 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

\textsuperscript{597} Tirsiniklioğlu/Tirsinikli-zâde İsmail Ağa (d. 1221/1806) was the famous \textit{ayan} of Ruscuk who controlled the regions of Nicopolis, Sistova, and Ruscuk. He was the brother of Tirsiniklioğlu Ömer Ağa, a local notable executed in 1791. Ismail managed to escape execution. Ismail Ağa’s rise to power started with his victory over the former \textit{ayan} of Ruscuk and governor of Silistria in 1795. In 1796, he became the \textit{ayan} of Ruscuk and within a year he brought a large area under his influence. His most important rival was Yılkząde Süleyman, another \textit{ayan} who controlled Silistria, and Deliorman He was killed by one of servants. For more details, see Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, pp. 8-32.

\textsuperscript{598} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekâyi}, p. 12. According to the author, Hafız İsmail Pasha was very fond of worldly pleasures. He disliked the influential elite of the period. In collaborating with Tirsinikli-zâde, his intention was to eliminate these influential figures and to reshape the government. For a similar argument, see Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VIII, p. 62. If the remarks of these authors are true, Hafız İsmail Pasha had a coup d’état in his mind. Thus, according to this account, the opposing party consisted of Hafız İsmail Pasha, the future Mustafa IV and \textit{ayans} of Rumelia headed by Tirsinikli-zâde İsmail Ağa. For similar assertions, see Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, p. 25; Şen, \textit{Osmanlı’da Dönüm Noktasi}, pp. 86-7. A slightly different argument is made by Çetin Börekçi. According to the author, the first Serbian uprising divided the Ottoman statesmen in terms of their attitudes toward the uprising. One group perceiving the rebels as bandits, and in order to annihilate them immediately, found it necessary to collaborate with the
Cedid system in the region, thus locals were already inclined to react strongly to provocations. In the case of Hafiz İsmail Pasha, the generally accepted explanation stresses his hostility to İbrahim Nesim Efendi. According to this story, Hafiz İsmail Pasha was jealous of İbrahim Nesim Efendi who had great political power and influence during this period. Therefore, he collaborated with the ayans in order to ruin İbrahim Nesim Efendi. From this point of view one may argue that if the figure behind the expansion of the Nizam-ı Cedid in the region was İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Hafiz İsmail Pasha might have tried to harm him by preventing the implementation of the project. However, one can find only one document written by Hafiz İsmail Pasha during the whole affair. It is a letter to an unidentified person, but most probably to Tepedenli Ali Pasha, to whom he addresses as “my friend”. In the letter, he explains that Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha has been sent to Rumelia against the Serbian rebels. However, the deployment had created anxiety and fear in Rumelia and some “treacherous” elements had dared to rebel. Thus in order not to cause any harm to women and children and to prevent bloodshed, the army had retreated to Silivri. Sirozi İsmail Bey, he continues, was given the task of suppressing the rebellion. Hafiz İsmail Pasha comments that some bloodthirsty people were secretly provoking the people and increasing the disorder in the region. It is quite clear that it is an official document, and if Hafiz İsmail Pasha had been involved in an intrigue against the interests of the Porte, he certainly would not have written it down in an official document. In another

Janissary dayis in the region. The other group of statesmen, on the other hand, considered the uprising a social movement due to the excesses of the Janissaries in the region. According to Börekçi, İsmail Pasha was among the statesmen who had sympathy for the Serbian rebels. The author concludes that Hafiz İsmail Pasha openly supported the rebels. His source of information is a letter (B.O.A. HAT 5398. B) Unfortunately the author does not make a connection between the opinion of Hafiz İsmail Pasha on the uprising and his reluctance in the Edirne Incident. See Börekçi, Surp İsyani, p. 54.

599 Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, p. 29; Uzunçarşılı, “Kadi Abdurrahman Paşa”, p. 275; Çevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VIII, p. 62; Cevat Eren, Selim III’iün Biyografiisi, p. 54-55; Çataltepe, Nizam-ı Cedid Ordusu, pp. 232, 234, 238...

600 According to author of the Yayla İmami Risalesi, Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha stayed in Silivri for 20 days. See Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 218.

601 B.O.A. D. DRB. THR. 36/38 (5 C 1221/20 August 1806). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.
document, he accused Tirsiniklizâde of being the originator of the disorder in the region.\textsuperscript{602} This contradictory data prevents us from developing a clear picture of the whole issue. Therefore, it is rather difficult to reach a definite conclusion.

Another historical problem centers on the question as to why the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} troops were withdrawn and why Selim III gave up his whole policy in Rumelia. This retreat has been conventionally explained with the mercifulness of Selim III and his inclination not to cause bloodshed and the suffering of innocent people.\textsuperscript{603} However, it seems to be more credible that the situation became deteriorated so badly that there was actually no chance of achieving the aims of the project.\textsuperscript{604} The minutes of an imperial council meeting of 1806 reveal us the major problems the center faced. The main point in the council discussion seems to have been the retreat of the army led by Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha. Indeed, it was not a decision easily taken. There seem to have been considerations that a forward march by Abdurrahman Pasha and his army would be rather infeasible since he was not backed by a loyal army which could have provided continuous manpower for the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} units.\textsuperscript{605} There were also concerns that the concentration of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army in Rumelia would leave İstanbul unprotected. Another problem was the approach of winter. As we have already noted, the army was facing chronic provisioning problems and with the coming of the winter it would be more difficult to transport provisions to Rumelia from other places. There was another dilemma that faced the participants of the council faced. They considered keeping the army passively at Çorlu to be a "\textit{reason of humiliation and the decay of the military zeal}".\textsuperscript{606} Therefore, keeping the army in the region for a long time was

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{602} The document in question was sent to Ahmed Efendi to Tirsiniklioğlu, who in turn forwarded it to the center. For the transcribed copy of the report, see Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, p. 268.


\textsuperscript{604} For a similar argument, see Eren, \textit{III. Selim}, pp. 56-7.

\textsuperscript{605} B.O.A. AMD. 53/38 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): ".... Kaldı ki Devlet-i Aliyye’nin asîl kuvvet-i kâllîyêsî bu ordu olmâgîla verâsında bir gayri kuvvetimiz dahi mevcud değil iken bunu ilerî vermek cây-i mûțâlaadır".

\textsuperscript{606} B.O.A. D. DRB. THR. 53/38 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): "mûcib-i züll ve himem-i askeri çûrûtmektir".
\end{footnotesize}
also regarded as out of question.\textsuperscript{607} In addition, Cevdet Pasha notes that there was an emerging unrest among the Janissaries of İstanbul around the same time.\textsuperscript{608} Saint-Denys confirms Cevdet Pasha by his remarks to the effect that the Janissaries were making preparations for a general uprising. They were threatening the officials and using insulting words for the Sultan, possible symptoms of future uprising. If this information was true, it is easier to understand why the ruling elite was afraid that the city left would be left unprotected in the case of a Janissary uprising. According to Saint-Denys, the Şeyhülislam was able to calm down the Janissaries in İstanbul by issuing fetvas.\textsuperscript{609}

An additional issue that seems to have played a role in the retreat of Kâdi Pasha and the Nizam-ı Cedid army was the difficulty of establishing full control over the kazas of Thrace. As has already been discussed, even though a kaza might be captured from the opponents, the rebels would immediately move to the next one. This situation might be comparable to a confrontation between regular army units and “irregular” forces which are more active, able to move easily between locations, and capable of hiding themselves among the local population. Besides all these problems, a factor that might have contributed to the retreat of Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha and the Nizam-ı Cedid army to İstanbul, we also encounter a news item in the British paper The Times to the effect that Kâdi Pasha was in fact betrayed by the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers.\textsuperscript{610} It is claimed that the event occurred at Baba-yı Atik where it is said that Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha would have gained a victory over the rebels, if some of his forces had not passed to the other side.

\textsuperscript{607} B.O.A. D. DRB. THR. 53/38 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

\textsuperscript{608} Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VIII, p. 63.


\textsuperscript{610} \textit{The Times}, Tuesday, 23 September 1806, p. 23, issue 6848, col. A, (from the French newspapers, 11 August 1806). It reads: “Tranquility is far from being re-established in Rumelia. The Porte having been informed of the insurrection of the city of Adrinople, sent thither Capdagi-Baschi, commissioned to use every possible means of conciliation, in order to induce the insurgents to return order. The negotiator was massacred, on his arrival in Adrinople, the rebels marched then against the Ottoman Army, which they came up with at Bobo-Eki and by the assistance of their partizans in the neighbouring districts, completely surrounded it. Cadri Pacha, who commanded this army found himself then obliged to come to an action. He attacked the rebels with impetuosity, and would perhaps have gained a signal victory, if he had not been abandoned by a great part of his army, who went over to the rebels. He was, however, able with the remainder to cut his way through, and retire to Silestria....”
According to the newspaper, this event had a decisive effect on the deterioration of the military conditions. After a stay in Silistria (should be Silivri) Kâdi Pasha was forced to return to İstanbul. The article implies that he was not defeated and was able to enter the kaza. This event, as reported in the article, might explain why Selim III ordered Kâdi Pasha immediately to return to Çorlu. There is no confirming information in the contemporary documents or chronicles to support the claim mentioned in *The Times*. Asım asserts that most of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers under the authority of Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha were not-enthusiastic ("gönülsüz") and thus would be very ineffective. Following this, İbrahim Pasha was given authority to negotiate with the Serbians. This permission given to İbrahim Pasha after the failure also indicates that the passing of *Nizam-ı Cedid* units into Rumelia was indeed connected with the plan of helping İbrahim Pasha against the Serbians.

The role of Sirozi İsmail Bey in the retreat of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* was also crucial. During these developments, he seems to have assumed a double role. While trying to calm down the people (or the rebels) in the region by declaring that the army would return and they would be pardoned by the Porte, he at the same time was assuring the center that there would be no more rebels in the region if the army would immediately return to İstanbul. Sirozi İsmail argued for the necessity of the retreat of the army and asked for the issue of an imperial order in this regard at every opportunity. He did his best to convince the Porte that there were no more “rebels” in Edirne, Tekfur Dağı and Çorlu and thus no need for the presence of Kâdi Pasha and his army. In order to prove that the people of Edirne, Çorlu and Tekfur Dağı were yearning for peace and that order was coming to these localities, he sent their petitions requesting a pardon to the center. In fact, Sirozi, rather than Selim III seems to have played the main role in preventing the bloodshed. For instance, he insisted

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611 Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. I, p. 112. After that assertion, he goes on to the abuses that occurred during their recruitment in Anatolia.

612 *The Times*, Tuesday, 23 September 1806, p. 23, issue 6848, col A.

613 B.O.A. HAT 42/2142 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806); B.O.A. HAT 46/2234 (undated, catalogue date is 1216/1801-2).

614 B.O.A. HAT 42/2159 (16 B 1221/29 September 1806); B.O.A. HAT 42/2145 (undated, 1221/1806); B.O.A. HAT 46/2234 (undated, catalogue date is 1216/1801-2); B.O.A. HAT 77/3176.C (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).

on stopping the cannon fires on Tekfur Dağ. He also insisted on the need to issue a general amnesty. He was in fact successful in securing an imperial edict which promised a general amnesty. Indeed, in one of his orders Selim III also emphasizes that due to Sirozi’s requests and also the petitions of the people; he granted the amnesty to the people and withdrew the soldiers. Although the Porte was suspicious of Sirozi’s involvement in the whole issue, interestingly enough this suspicion was not taken into consideration seriously in the council, where it was stated that his intrigues were behind the screen, without an active involvement in the events. The same argument was also used for the Tirsinikli. The participants of the meeting considered it wise to treat these men as loyal servants of the state. These statements are rather interesting since they constitute an official admission of role of the ayans like Tirsinikli or Sirozi Ismail in the Edirne Incident. At the same time, it seemed wise to the Porte to disregard their role due to their actions being mainly behind the scenes and to use them for its benefits. In fact, this was a policy that was applied especially in the case of Sirozi Ismail Bey. One possible

616 B.O.A. HAT 148/6241.A (21 C 1221/5 September 1806); B.O.A. HAT 148/6241 (23 C 1221/7 September 1806).

617 B.O.A. HAT 3101 (undated).

618 B.O.A. HAT 2645 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806); B.O.A. HAT 120/4895.E (1221/1806); B.O.A. HAT 152/6422.H (C 1221/16 August-14 September 1806).

619 B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 224, p. 151, order no. 423 (evahir-i B 1221/14-23 September 1806).


621 B.OA. AMD. 53/38 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

622 Asım accuses Tirsiniklizâde for the disorder in Rumelia. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 107. However, in a way similar to the discussions in the imperial council, Cemal Gökçe argues that Tirsiniklioğlu İsmail was not in Edirne during the events and that he did not want to have problems with the center. According to Gökçe, he was indirectly involved in the Incident by supporting Dağdevirenoğlu Mehmed Ağa who took an active part in the opposition in Edirne. See Gökçe, “Edirne Ayâni Dağdevirenoğlu Mehmed Ağa”, p. 99.

623 B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 223, p. 196/759 (evahir M 1221/10-20 April 1806). It is an order delegating Sirozi İsmail Bey for the task of joining the Nizam-ı Cedid army in Silivri.
explanation is the fact that the Porte had acknowledged its failure in the affair and decided to use an *ayan* to calm the region down.

It seems that the retreat of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops from Thrace was carried in an immediate and even hasty way. A record concerning the expenses of the transport of the equipments left by the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers in Silivri, Çatalca, and Çekmece-i Kebir gives us an idea about the nature of the retreat. The *Nizam-ı Cedid* units returned to İstanbul by the help of Ebubekir Pasha, the governor of Anatolia. Ebubekir Pasha notes that a prolonged stay of the army meant unnecessary wasteful expenditure and would cause further gossips. Therefore, it was necessary to transfer the soldiers to the Levent Chiftlik immediately. An imperial order dated 6 B 1221/19 September 1806, reached to him, demanding the urgent return of all forces. Two days later, the cavalry and infantry forces left Silivri, following the route of Çekmece-i Kebir and Sagir (Büyük Çekmece and Küçük Çekmece).

Apart from the failure in establish the *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops in Rumelia, the most important consequence of the Edirne Incident was to reveal that the Empire was no longer able to exert an ultimate authority in the region, a condition which prevailed at least until the reign of Mahmud II. The region was effectively divided among strong and petty *ayans*. Uzunçarşıli asserts that since these *ayans* had a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the center, they were against any state policy that would restrict their authority. Thus, according to his explanation, the reaction of the *ayans* was related to their hostility to the centralization process. If we consider that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps brought the state authority in its wake, this explanation seems to contain some truth. Yet we should also not forget that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers transferred to Thrace were not numerous enough to threaten the *ayans*’ authority, especially that of the strong ones. Yet if they had been successfully established

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624 B.O.A. C. AS. 37525 (10 Ş 1221/20 December 1806). In fact finding new details on the return of *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers and Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha might also explain whether the issue was abandoned, as most sources say, due to the consideration of Selim III’s wish to prevent bloodshed or they had to return for another reason.


626 B.O.A.HAT 77/3176 (8 B 1221/21 September 1221); B.O.A. HAT 3716.A (7 B 1221/20 September 1806); B.O.A. HAT 77/3176.B (8 B 1221/21 September 1221).


628 Approximately 24,000 soldiers were sent to Rumelia under the command of Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha.
in the region, they could have ultimately threatened the authority of the ayans. As we already remarked, Tirsinilikzâde is considered to be one of most active one the Edirne Incident. It is claimed that he was provoked by Hafız İsmail Pasha and then organized the reaction, already before the arrival of Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha at Thrace.\footnote{Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 347.}

The Incident of Edirne also poses the question as to why the establishment of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} corps in Anatolia was relatively more peaceful. It seems to be clear that most of the Anatolian ayans were closer to the Porte. Especially Cabbarzâde and Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha became the leaders of expansion of the new army in Anatolia. On the other hand, the ayans of Rumelia maintained weaker ties to the center. Among the Rumelian ayans who obviously played an active role in the Incident of Edirne was Dağdevirenoğlu, he had become the \textit{ayan} of Edirne in 1802. He was probably a Janissary at the beginning of his career.\footnote{Gökçe, “Edirne Ayanı Dağdevirenoğlu Mehmed Ağa”, p. 99.} Rather than entering into an open conflict with the forces of Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha, he preferred not obey the imperial edicts and succeeded in cutting the supply of Kâdi Pasha’s army with provisions. He also prevented the people of Edirne and its vicinity from selling provisions to the army.\footnote{Gökçe, “Edirne Ayanı Dağdevirenoğlu Mehmed Ağa”, p. 100} Another ayun of Rumelia, Alemdar Mustafa, also was among those who wished the return of the army as soon possible.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 152/6422. E (28 C 1221/12 September 1806).} We should also pay attention to the fact that these ayans were acting as military contractors and gaining significant material benefit from this function. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Porte benefited from the military forces of the ayans.\footnote{Mutafciyeva, V.P., “XVIII. Yüzyılın Son On Yılında Ayanlık Müessesesi”, \textit{Tarih Dergisi}, 28-31 (1974-78), pp. 180-1.} The establishment of a new military system might have rendered their position obsolete. Moreover, the establishment of a standing army in the Balkans would bring more state power to the region, causing centralization.\footnote{Berkes, \textit{Türkiye de Çağdaşlaşma}, p. 108.}

Even though the role of the Rumelian ayans, suspect activities of Hafiz İsmail Pasha and the intrigues of Prince Mustafa have been underlined both by contemporary and modern studies, little attention seems to have been paid to the reaction of the people in
Çorlu, Edirne, Tekfur Dağı. It appears that their reaction cannot be explained just through the intrigues of the above-mentioned individuals or groups. The official documents usually underline that the local people were not only afraid of being enrolled into the new army but also from Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha himself. In the documents we encounter the broad term of “rebels” (“haşerât”). This term includes everyone from the bandits to the men of certain ayans or from residents opposing army’s settlement to the Janissaries. As already discussed, most of the people who opposed the enlistment in the new corps in Tekfur Dağı argued that they were Janissaries and they would not accept the Nizam-ı Cedid army. Therefore, in order to soothe these groups the Porte did its best to convince them that those without any connections to the Janissaries would be enrolled in the new army.

In a report sent to the center, Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha states that the village of Ayvalı, attached to the kaza of Bergos, was besieged and the rebels defeated. Some of the “groups of rebels” were captured during the armed confrontation (“muharebe”) and sent to İstanbul. In the marginal note at his report, Kadi Pasha stated that if there were Janissaries amongst those captured; they should be executed by the Janissary ağa. Another report on Edirne underlined the fact that was not only disorder in Edirne, but the people of Edirne (“Edirnelü”) themselves were uprising, that henceforth it not was possible to trust them. As a proof, a letter of the ayan of Petric was quoted, stating that “disorder in this region will only settle down only and only if you execute Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha and abolish the Nizam-ı Cedid.” News from various sources was claiming that the real intention behind the troop movement was to add the region of Rumelia to the recruitment zone of the Nizam-ı Cedid army, which also caused the reaction and anxiety of Janissaries of the region.

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635 B.O.A. HAT 77/3181 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806); Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 217.


637 B.O.A. HAT 2335 (23 Ca 1221/8 August 1221).

638 B.O.A. AMD. 53/38 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). It is a takrir-i ali.

639 B.O.A. HAT 3156 (16 Ca 1221/1 August 1806).
Another issue was that Abdurrahman Pasha was rather harsh in his attitude and seemed to be merciless against the population of the revolting kazas.\textsuperscript{640} In a report prepared by Köse Ahmed, he is accused of having murdered innocent individuals in Çorlu, Silivri, and other places, and thus created great fear among the people. While attacking Çorlu, Kadi Pasha opened artillery fire on the whole kaza. Therefore, the writer of the report comments that Kadi Pasha must be urgently sent back to Anatolia.\textsuperscript{641} One should be cautious since the letter was written by Köse Ahmed, the steward of Tirsiniklizâde.\textsuperscript{642} Yet there is some degree of reality in the accusation that Abdurrahman Pasha was harsh. For instance, one of his letters to the center contains the following wording: “\textit{These guys do not want protection and justice ... what they all want is to rebel ... they should not be forgiven. The time of being merciful is over.}”\textsuperscript{643}

The worries concerning the actions of Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha acquire a new dimension when one looks at the petitions submitted by the notables and the judge of Edirne. From these we understand that the people of Edirne were frightened by Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha’s actions in Anatolia.\textsuperscript{644} They were probably referring to the Konya Incident which took place in 1803. Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha had been appointed on 7 Ca 1218/25 August 1803\textsuperscript{645} as the governor of Karaman, in addition to his malikane holding of Alanya and his function as the director of the Bozkır mines. When he moved Konya, the news the Pasha’s arrival at the city was not received well among some of the local residents. In fact, the “rebels” in the city united in order not to allow him to enter the Konya. Upon hearing this development, Abdurrahman Pasha encamped in the neighboring location of Sille. In order not to increase the tension, he entered the city with a small

\textsuperscript{640} B.O.A. AMD 53/38 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

\textsuperscript{641} B.O.A. 152/6422.H (C 1221/16 August-13 September 1806).

\textsuperscript{642} Köse Ahmed Ağâ was appointed the \textit{ayan} of Ahyolu Burgaz. During the Edirne Incident he was appointed to eliminate the disorder. After the death of Tirsiniklizâde, he became the \textit{kethüda} of Alemdar Mustafa. See Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{643} B.O.A. 49/2334(19 Ca 1221/4 August 1806) He wrote these words in his report on events that took place in Baba-yı Atik. See also B.O.A. HAT 31240 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806). This was sent by Sirozi İsmail Bey to the center.

\textsuperscript{644} B.O.A. HAT 1893.A (21 C 1221/5 September 1806); B.O.A. HAT 1893.D (21 C 1221/5 September1806); B.O.A. HAT 31240 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806).

\textsuperscript{645} In 15 Ş 1218/30 November 1803, he was also granted the \textit{sancak} of Akşehir.
percentage of retinue on 14 December 1803. Shortly afterwards, the governor’s palace was attacked. Since his military forces were outside Konya, Abdurrahman Pasha was forced by the armed groups to leave the city. After his departure, his possessions were looted by the residents in the city. However, Selim III was insisting that the Pasha should enter Konya. Meanwhile, the center ordered Çabbarzâde Süleyman Bey to provide support to Kâdi Pasha. Following these developments the reaction of the city was broken and Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha was able to enter Konya towards the end of Z 1218/April 1804. The echoes of the turmoil in Konya could have reached Thrace and provided a reason for the people to be frightened with the coming Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha in the region.

The Edirne Incident constitutes a turning point in the development of the events leading to the 1807 revolt. This incident led to the changes in the power constellation at the governmental level. Due to the failure of his attempts in Rumelia and following the advice of ulema, Selim III chose a more conciliatory attitude towards the rebels. We can observe drastic changes in the cabinet during mid-September, including the positions of the şeyhülislam and grand vizier. On 14 September 1806, Hafız İsmail Pasha was deposed and İbrahim Hilmi Pasha replaced him. Hafız İsmail was exiled to Sakız Island (Chios).

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646 T.S.M.A. E. 6998-2 (undated, catalogue date is 1218-1221/1803-1806); Uzunçarşılı, “Kâdi Abdurrahman Paşa”, p. 256.

647 T.S. M.A. E. 6998.2 (undated, catalogue date is 1218-1221/1803-1806).


650 Keçiboynuzu İbrahim Hilmi Pasha (d. 1240/1825) became the Ağası of the Janissaries in 12 Ca 1219/19 August 1804. He was promoted to the post of Grand Vizier on 1 B 1221/14 September 1806, and dismissed in 11 R 1222/18 June 1807. For more details see Appendix I.

This move has been considered intended to appease the Janissaries. One historian comments that the appointment implied that “no reforms in the army would be carried out and that reform corps would not be used at the front.” Şeyhülislam Salihzâde Ahmed Esad Efendi was dismissed from his post on 14 September 1806 in favour of Ataullah Efendi. Another important change was the dismissal of İbrahim Nesim Efendi who was dismissed from the position of sadaret kethüda (the steward of the grand vizier) on 13 R 1221/30 June 1806. Further, Galib Efendi was appointed as Reisülküttab and Morah Osman as the director of imperial treasury. Most of the new ministers appointed after the Incident were pro-French, which was interpreted by Sebastiani, the French ambassador, as a victory for France, a point that we will investigate in following chapters. The change in the cabinet is often depicted as the victory of the “conservatists” over the reformists and also a step in the path leading to the May Rebellion.

The Janissaries or at least the yamaks seem to have considered the Edirne Incident a crucial development which created a strong imprint on their memories. For instance, during the heyday of the Rebellion of May 1807, a young rebel rebuked Şeyhülislam of the time, Ataullah Efendi, as for having issued fetva in the Edirne Incident. The rebels’

652 Jouannin, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, p. 375.
655 He had previously served in the same post from 24 S 1213/8 August 1798 to Za 1213/April-May 1799. His second appointment was on 8 S 1218/30 May 1803. See Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdâlığı, p. 36. Asim, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 121
656 Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 375.
659 Tüfengcibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, pp. 8-9a; Derin, “Tüfengcibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 395. Unfortunately I was not able to determine the nature of the fetva.
interpretation was that innocent Muslims were killed unjustly during the Edirne Incident\(^{660}\) and they demanded the execution of those who were involved in it.\(^{661}\) Öğuluğyan states that that the former Şeyhülislam, Salihzade Ahmed Esad Efendi, was also among those whose execution was demanded by the rebels in 1807.\(^{662}\) From the explanations of Cevdet Pasha we get the idea that the Edirne Incident was a rebellion against the center in its own right. He claims that during that incident the rebels had demanded the heads of ten state officials and insisted not to give up the rebellion if these ten people were not executed. However, we do not have reliable source to prove the validity of these assertions. What it seems to be certain is that this incident constituted a severe blow to the legitimacy the rule of Selim III. According to Asım, the name of the Sultan was not mentioned at the mosques in the Rumelian towns during the Friday prayers and the rebels even wanted to march to the capital.\(^{663}\) During the 1807 Rebellion, the rebels asserted that they did not trust Selim III since he had not kept his earlier promise of abolishing the *Nizam-ı Cedid*.\(^{664}\)

From all this information we may conclude that the Edirne Incident contributed to the crystallization of the power groups in the Empire. For instance, Selim III was criticized by Hafız Derviş Mehmed Efendi for having dismissed Hafız Ismail Pasha after the Edirne Incident. Mehmed Efendi had been given the duty of accompanying the Princes Mustafa and Mahmud one night before the fall of Selim III. In conversation with the Sultan, he directly accused the latter for preferring İbrahim Nesim Efendi to a loyal grand vizier, Hafız İsmail Pasha. According to Mehmed Efendi, İsmail Pasha was a loyal servant of the Sultan, but the Sultan had trusted İbrahim Nesim who devastated the whole world.\(^{665}\)


\(^{661}\) Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması....”, p. 104.


2.2.3. Propaganda Activities in Favour of Nizam-ı Cedid Reforms: Last Attempts to Win Over the Public

It was during the second phase of the Nizam-ı Cedid reform that the reactions against it increased greatly. It is hardly a coincidence that many treaties were written during this period with the aim of defending the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms and convincing the people of their necessity. Kemal Beydilli categorized the works that were written on the Nizam-ı Cedid after its embarkment into the following types: 1. Treatises introducing the Nizam-ı Cedid to the European audience, as in the cases of Mahmud Raif Efendi’s Tableau des Nouveaux Reglements de l’Empire Ottoman and Seyyid Mustafa’s Diatribe sur l’état actuel de l’art militaire, du génie, et des sciences; 2. Those texts aiming to defend the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms and silence the reactions; Ubeydullah Kuşmânî’s Zebîre and the work known as Koca Sekbanıbaşı Risalesi can be classified within this category; 3. Ömer Faik’s treatise called Nizamü’l-Atik Fî Bahr-i Amîk, which discussed some problems in the application of the reforms, and 4. Mehmed Emin Behic Efendi’s Sevanihü’l-Levayih, which discusses what should be done regarding the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms. Since our purpose is to get an idea on the internal tensions during the application of the reforms we will concentrate mainly on the treatises in the second category.

The basic idea of the Nizam-ı Cedid reform policy was the formation of a professional and standing army, on the principle of reprisal (“mukabele-i bi’l-misil”). Even though we do not know for certain whether it was established to ultimately to replace the Janissary corps, it is for sure that the new army caused hot debates among the intellectuals of the period as well as among the public. Though it is difficult to follow these debates in their entirety, we may be able to trace them as they were reflected in some of the written sources of the period, especially the ones written for the purpose of internal propaganda, and also some written claims of the opponents. Such an attempt might also help us to get some idea on what the Nizam-ı Cedid meant or implied for different levels of the

şerrinden iki senedir Tokat arpalığına iltizâm edemedim, hemân sen ona teslîm-i zimâm-i mülk etdin, annn sözü ile Ismail Paşa gibi sâdik vezîri az kaldı ki idâm edecektin”.

population. In this way, we might be able to approximate an understanding of what these people were rising against.

The starting point for almost all of the authors mentioned above was the idea that the world was in a state of rapid change and those states that were not able to cope with this change were doomed to be conquered by their enemies. Thus, in order to survive in the severe and brutal conditions of international political arena, one had to always be watchful and ready against the incursions of other states. Therefore, the fates of the states were directly related to their ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the present day. This understanding of the international political arena is especially underlined in the treatise written by Koca Sekbanbaşı. The author provides frequent anecdotes and examples in order to prove that the enemies—particularly the Russians—were always preparing intrigues against the Ottomans and they were sending spies to the infiltrate the Janissary army. For instance, in the second part of the treatise, while explaining the need for the establishment of the Nizam-ı Cedid, Koca Sekbanbaşı gives the following example: After the conclusion of the peace with the Russians in the year 1206/1791, Şeremet, a former Ottoman non-Muslim subject, but usually employed by the Russians “a man extremely rich, and completely master of the art of deceit, acute and lively in speech, and devoid of any shame and modesty”, made a proposal to the Russian Empress that would enable an easy capture of the Ottoman capital. According to him, instead of long and tiresome wars with the Ottomans, it was possible to capture the capital of the Empire in two days by a single expedition from the Crimea that would occupy the water reservoirs of the city, which would throw the city into chaos, enabling the Russians to gradually approach and easily acquire control of it. They would not face any serious counter-attack, stated Şeremet, since there was no Ottoman army ready to defend the city and it would take at least one month for the Ottomans to gather troops in Anatolia. The military forces in the city, namely the Janissaries, were busy with their own trade and without any discipline. According to Koca Sekbanbaşı, the Sublime Porte, aware of the “evil designs of the enemy”, decided to have regular and well-disciplined troops in the capital to prevent such an attack of the enemy and thus “the exercise of the Nizam-ı Cedid was introduced.”

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667 Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, pp. 229-30; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi, pp. 37-43. For a comment on the project, see Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, pp. 93-94.

668 Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, pp. 235; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi, pp. 41.
For our purposes, the important point is the presentation of the case by the author: There is no doubt that a Muslim reader of the story would become worried about the prospect that the capital was under the great threat of an enemy attack, yet without any active and disciplined army to defend it. In fact, this seems to be the real intention of the author, namely to warn the readers that the enemy was always involved in designs against the Ottomans and even the capital was under constant threat, the following Turkish proverb is used as illustration: “Even water sleeps, but the enemy doesn’t.”669 His second aim appears to be to make his readers aware that until the establishment of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army, there did not exist any regular, stationary, and well-disciplined force even to protect the capital city of the Empire. As we will discuss later, Koca Sekbanbaşı underlines the intrigues of the enemies by frequent warnings about the efforts of the spies.

What were the chances of a state’s survive in the merciless international arena? Seyyid Mustafa seems to have provided the most sophisticated answer. Building his explanation upon the idea that the world is in a constant change, he remarks that many nations disappear and state systems change, yet arts and sciences (*ulûm u fûnûn*) are transmitted from one civilization to another, creating an accumulation of knowledge. Much scientific knowledge was thus transmitted to the Europeans from the ancient Romans and Greeks, which themselves had borrowed from the ancient Persian, Egyptian and Indian civilizations.670 The Ottomans were no exception to this rule. As Kemal Beydilli also underlines, we are able to detect an idea of universality of scientific knowledge in these explanations.671 There is a very good example provided by Koca Sekbanbaşı. According to the author, Süleyman I the Magnificent (r.1520-1566), upon a series of defeats against the Austrians, had decided to establish a regular and well-organized new army – the Janissary army. The European kings in return began to come together and discuss how to defeat the Ottomans, eventually developing regular troops and quick-firing artillery.672 As Hakan Erdem underlines, it is unthinkable that Koca Sekbanbaşı, not to know that the Janissary


army was not established by Süleyman I.\textsuperscript{673} Whatever the reality was the basic aim here seems to be the fact that even a great sultan could be defeated if he did not have a disciplined and regular army.

In Seyyid Mustafa’s above explanation, there is an explicit emphasis on the necessity of acquiring the military technology and knowledge of the period for a state to be successful. Those who were able to adapt themselves to the changing conditions of their time might even surpass the others in the long run- as happened in the case of Europe. It was time for the Ottomans to borrow military technology from Europe. However, the Ottomans, as opposed to the Europeans, were not mentally ready for such cross-cultural borrowing. They despised the military sciences and considered such a borrowing something against their religious convictions, and the result was the inevitable: endless military defeats. Finally, it was Selim III who noticed to the urgent need to renew the state and establish a new army by borrowing military technology from the Europeans. After this point in his argumentation, Seyyid Mustafa gives information on the military reforms undertaken during that period in question under the name of \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid}, painting a peaceful picture regarding the application of the reforms.\textsuperscript{674}

However, we know that the reality was different than the way in which it was represented by Seyyid Mustafa. This can be deduced from the fact that the Ottoman administration needed to resort internal propaganda to explain the reforms to the Muslim Ottoman audience, and to answer counter-arguments and also to silence the circulating rumours about the new army. Erdem remarks that the Sekbanbaşı Treatise is composed of a “series of imaginary or, at most, composite dialogues. The author ‘quotes’ criticisms of the policies of Selim whether pertaining to his new troops or to the New Revenue and then refutes them at his convenience”.\textsuperscript{675} Kuşmâni’s \textit{Zebîre} also follows a similar method of listing critiques of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} and providing his answers to them. Most probably, these dialogues were imaginary dialogues, yet the arguments of the authors tried to refute still deserve to be taken into consideration since they were probably the echoes of the rumours circulating around while the treaties were written.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{673} Erdem, “The Old Wise Man”, pp. 166-7. However, in his Ph. D. study on the abolition of the Janissaries, Mert Sunar argues that the ordinary Janissaries of the eighteenth and nineteenth century actually considered Süleyman I as the founder of their corps. For more details, see Sunar, \textit{Cauldron of Dissent}, p. 35-40.

\textsuperscript{674} Kemal Beydilli, “İlk Mühendislerimizden Seyyid Mustafa...”, p. 435.

\textsuperscript{675} Erdem, “The Old Wise Man”, p. 165.
\end{flushright}
While Koca Sekbanbaşı wrote his treatise on behalf of Selim III in order to silence the rumours, Kuşmâni seems to be a self-appointed propagandist of Selim III’s reform policy. In the petition submitted to Sultan in order to present his work, he asserts that his purpose is to silence the ignorant Muslims unable to differentiate between good and bad, men of a debauched nature (“erbâb-ı fisk ü fucûr”), yet bold enough to criticize the measures and reforms of the Sultan. According to him, there was an urgent need to silence these people. While Koca Sekbanbaşı writes as an old and wise man with great experience, Kuşmâni claims to have the right to get involved in these matters as a – probably Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi - dervish who has traveled long years in searching of science and thus has a degree of knowledge on the matter. He underlines that he has written the treatise as a Muslim with a degree of knowledge sufficient to know the difference between bad and good. He acknowledges that he was encouraged by Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha to write the treatise.

Since the audience of the latter treatises were the average Muslim subjects of the Empire, the language of these texts is simple and they usually prefer to present their points by giving striking examples from the past and also from their own days in order to ensure that their messages reach their audience more easily. Kuşmâni, in particular, makes frequent references to verses from the Quran and from the Prophetic Tradition to prove that there was no contradiction between the reforms and the Islamic religion.

Like other writers of the treaties, both Kuşmânî and Koca Sekbanbaşi try to impose the idea that the Empire is under constant threat by the enemies and is in urgent need of defense. Yet, the very method of this defense seems to be the core area of conflict. According to both, the newly established Nizâm-ı Cedid was best solution for combating the enemies. While they argued that there was a need for a standing, disciplined and professional army to defend the borders, those opposing it- especially the Janissaries- did not seem to be convinced of that point. As far as reflected in these treatises, the Janissaries seem to have thought that there was no need for the establishment of a new army, since there was already an army serving the Empire. It had conquered lands, gained victories against the enemy, and they (i.e. the Janissaries) were the most important agents in this

676 Kuşmâni, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, pp 72a-b.

677 Kuşmâni, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 72a.

678 İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 2.
success. They were brave and would say “let the enemy present himself and we will lay our hands on our sabres, and at single charge make piece-meal of them.” When sent to a war, they would fire their muskets and then charging with their swords, they would defeat the Russians. But now, The Nizam-i Cedid system had altered the order (i.e. traditional order) and caused a disorder in the Empire. For instance, the Nizam-i Cedid corps was the real reason of the disorder in Rumelia for the Janissaries.

Koca Sekbanbaş’s and Kuşmâni’s answers to these assertions bring us back to the notion of “change” asserted in all of the treaties. It was “change” that had made the old military system obsolete and created the need for a new army prepared to fight the advanced European troops of the period. Moreover, the Janissaries were no longer the well-disciplined army of the past and thus were not able to gain any success against the armies of the Europe, equipped with the advanced technology of the time and shaped by discipline. It was no more possible to fight these armies with old notions of war and individual heroic acts, since the “science of war” was an independent science with its own rules. The time of the old military system had passed. Now, the old enemies of the Empire had developed new armies depending on a new military system. They had developed an advanced war technology and a disciplined soldiery by prohibiting soldiers from engaging in commerce and subjecting them to make constant drills. Therefore the Ottomans found it impossible

to make use of their sabres among the infidels as they wished to do; for their regular troops keep in compact body, their feet together that their order of battle may not be broken; and their cannon ..., they load twelve times in a minute; and

679 Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, pp. 221-22; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi, p. 31; Kuşmâni, Zebire, p. 9a; İşbilir, Zebire, p. 43.
680 Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, p. 238; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi, p. 44.
681 Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, pp. 244-5; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi, pp. 47-48
682 Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, pp. 221-2; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi, pp. 31, 35.
683 Kuşmâni, Zebire, Bayezid 9430, p. 19b; İşbilir, Zebire, pp.30-1; Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, p. 253; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi, p. 55.
make the bullets rain like musket balls; thus they keep up an unintermitted discharge of artillery and small arms.\textsuperscript{685}

Thus, present-day wars were based on the art of war and the decisive factors in attaining victory were the application of technology, discipline, constant drills and strict hierarchical order of the rank-and-file. Being brave and performing individual heroic acts had now become meaningless.\textsuperscript{686}

The real problem, according to Koca Sekbanbaşi was that the Janissaries were guilty of not realizing that they no longer were the glorious soldiers of the old days and of resisting adaptation to the demands of the time. Contrary to the armies of the enemy, the “old system” Ottoman armies were composed of soldiers only in name but in fact mostly engaged in commerce and, being localized, not subject to any regular military exercises and order. Their opposition to the new army was analogous to the reaction of the sekban (irregular) troops to the newly established (Janissary) army during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent, where the sekbans ridiculed the clothes and dresses of the Janissaries.\textsuperscript{687}

The authors of the propaganda texts, after arguing for necessity of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army, blame the Janissaries for having rejected being transformed into a new army and for refusing the new military drills. Thus, had had left no choice for the Sultan other than the establishment of a new army.\textsuperscript{688} In other words, the whole situation was their fault since it was their resistance which had led to the foundation of the new army. If they had accepted adaptation to changes, there would have been no need for a new army and thus an extra financial burden would not have emerged.\textsuperscript{689} Yet, at this point one should become cautious of this line of argument, since even though Koca Sekbanbaşi places the blame for the establishment of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army on the Janissaries, he at the same time seems to be

\textsuperscript{685} Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of the Principalities}, p. 253; Uçman, \textit{Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi}, p. 48. See also İşbilir, \textit{Zebire}, pp. 34-35.

\textsuperscript{686} Kuşmâni, \textit{Zebire}, Bayezid 9430, p. 29a; İşbilir, \textit{Zebire}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{687} Kuşmâni, \textit{Zebire}, Bayezid 9430, pp. 17b, 24b, 35b; İşbilir, \textit{Zebire}, pp. 19, 24, 60; Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of the Principalities}, pp. 219-220; Uçman, \textit{Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi}, pp. 45-46. Kuşmâni’s example seems to have been borrowed from Koca Sekbanbaşi’s Treatise.


convinced that it would be impossible to establish a well-ordered and disciplined corps with the old army since its order was based on an old and different military logic.\textsuperscript{690} Therefore, even though he accuses the Janissaries of having rejected the new drills and new tactics, this argument mainly seems to be a discourse aimed at silencing them.

It appears that once the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army was established, it became subjected to the criticism of the Janissary circles. Koca Sekbanbaşi seems to have believed that even though there were many rumours circulating among the public, most people, and especially the Janissaries, were not aware what \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} actually meant. Thus, at the beginning of his treatise, Koca Sekbanbaşi poses the question “what is \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid}”, and he “quotes” the opposed party as answering that it was a “body of troops trained and exercised”.\textsuperscript{691} The opposed party seems to have considered the establishment of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} program an evil policy which caused most of the problems of the time. This argument seems to have concentrated on two issues, namely tradition and Islam. As far we are able to deduce from the treatises, the opponents considered the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} to be something that contradicted Islam and the established customs. This mindset might have been the reason why a man, when asked whether he would be recruited into the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid}, replied with horror “Heaven forbid, I could even become a Russian, but I’d never be a \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} soldier.”\textsuperscript{692}

It is time to pose the question as to what it was about the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} that made these people to oppose it in this way. As might be understood from the description of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} given previously, the Janissaries perceived it as an army based on exercise and training. From what emerges from the writings of the treatise authors, the Janissaries seem to have been unable to understand the preference of collective military exercises, over a reliance on individual heroism. This issue is not only related to the Janissaries’ involvement in commerce and their forming a paramilitary body of troops, even though both writers emphasized this point and underlined the tendency of the Janissaries to prefer leading a comfortable life. The issue was also related to the Janissaries’ understanding of war, i.e. their perception of warfare which was connected to their worldview. According to

\textsuperscript{690} Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of the Principalities}, p. 272; Uçman, \textit{Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi}, pp. 70-1.

\textsuperscript{691} Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of the Principalities}, p. 222; Uçman, \textit{Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi}, p. 33.


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Virginia Aksan, the Janissaries considered themselves as the “guardians of the traditional order and the keepers of the peace in the cities and towns.”\textsuperscript{693} The Janissaries also seemed to be more traditional in their outlook to the military issues, owing to the fact that their reference point were to the heroic deeds of the former Janissaries, regardless of later defeats at the hands of enemies. This traditional attitude was one of the central points of attacked by Koca Sekbanbaşi. In contrast, the discipline and daily drills in the European sense which were being tried to be imposed upon them, was utterly foreign. Koca Sekbanbaşi deems the Janissaries’ opposition to military drills and exercise to be a consequence of their laziness and undisciplined nature. However, we should admit that we have no access to the Janissaries’ counter-arguments on this respect. As we have noted above, the Janissary commanders actually admitted the superiority of the disciplined armies of the enemies over them, after the disaster of Machin. Therefore, why the Janissaries now began to object to discipline or which aspects of a disciplined army they actually objected, are unknown issues.

It is certain that the Janissaries were not accustomed to discipline and daily drills in the European sense. Even though we have right to suspect that the arguments of the Janissaries were represented in the Ottoman treatises in a caricaturized form, it still seems possible to detect some points. For instance, the idea of war does not seem to mean the same thing for Janissaries and the authors of the treatises. While the Janissaries clung to the traditional notions of war, dictated mostly by individual acts and heroic deeds, the authors of the treaties favour the modern notion of war, where the employment of advanced technology, collective discipline and constant military drills were more decisive in securing victory. According to Aksan, a new military system based on surrender of the individual to the discipline of the corps and orders of a command hierarchy increasingly based on merit rather than privilege challenged the notion of individual valor that underpinned the Janissaries’ code.\textsuperscript{694} In fact, a new military system based on harsh and continuous discipline and training had begun to be applied in Europe itself only one generation earlier, especially after the victory of Prussia during the Seven Years Wars (1756-63). This new army was described in the Prussian military codes as an “artificial machine”. Two or three decades

\textsuperscript{693} Aksan, Virginia, “Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott: Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760-1830”, Aksan, Virginia, Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts, (İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 2004), p. 129.

\textsuperscript{694} Aksan, “Spell of Baron de Tott”, p. 129.
after the war, this new military system had spread all over Europe and been developed by the French in a code dated 1791. With the development of the new disciplined armies in the old style began to be considered as clusters of obsolete and vagrant men. The machine-like military discipline required the mental and physical obedience of the soldiers with the aim of creating a coherent military body. Talking about the formation of modern army system in Egypt under the rule of Mehmed Ali Pasha in 1830s, Fahmy notes that

The orders were directed at manipulating very specific movements and gestures of the soldiers. The bravery and strength of the soldiers are done away with, and instead a minute and very fine adjustment of the soldiers’ bodies was conducted aiming at aggregating the isolated movements of soldiers into one, massive force, that of the battalion.

The soldiers were trained in how to perform these simple movements in a standard and unified way. Similar points are emphasized by Koca Sekbanbaşı too. “The whole body, consisting of many thousand men, observe attentively the signals given them by the two fuglemen who explain by signs the commands of the officiers, and no one dares so much as to turn his head.” One foreigner, Baron von Brentano, presented a reform proposal to the Porte, which suggested the need of basic military drills of “turn right, turn left”. Berkes, however, claims that the Janissaries were not against a military discipline in the modern sense but any kind of military discipline.

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697 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, p. 153.

698 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, pp. 154-5.


701 Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, p. 117.
In addition to the issue of military exercises and discipline, another problem which concerned the Janissaries, as far as it is reflected in the treatises, seems to have been economic in nature. For instance, Koca Sekbanbaşi makes reference to the anxiety of a certain person:

In the corps of Janissaries I receive twenty-five aspers; if these troops of the Nizam-ı Cedid should increase in number, and become serviceable, I am afraid that as the Janissaries will no longer enjoy any consideration, I shall not be able to draw my pay. If I knew for certain that no loss would accrue to me from it, I would say, God grant that all the people in the world may become Nizam-ı Cedid.\(^{702}\)

Even keeping in mind the propagandist aspect of the treatise, we may still think that issues such as the salary (“ulufe”) and the New Treasury (İrad-ı Cedid) were sources of serious concern, the former affecting the Janissary and the latter affecting some merchant groups as in the case of zecriye muhassili (collector of alcoholic beverage tax).\(^{703}\)

Apart from these issues of mentality and economics, opposition groups seem to have considered the new army system as something against the Islamic principles, since both authors strive hard to prove that there was nothing in this new system which went against the spirit of Islam. As far as reflected in the treatises, we can discern a clear discrepancy as to how the new system was perceived by different parties: while the opposition party seemed to consider the changes as an irreligious innovation “bid'at”, the authors of the treatises struggle to depict them as religious renewals based on the principle of reprisal (“mukabele-i bi’l-misl”). According to Kuşmâni, the new system was not “bid'at”. On the contrary, it was something that was already preached by Islam, and in addition it was a religious obligation (“farz”) of the Muslims to strengthen the forces.\(^{704}\) Kuşmâni also gives a detailed explanation to back his argument. Basing his arguments on the Quranic verse “If anyone commits aggression against you, attack him just he attacked you”\(^{705}\) and the


\(^{704}\) Kuşmâni, \textit{Zebîre}, Bayezid 9430, pp. 11a, 20b, 36b; İşbîlîr, \textit{Zebîre}, pp. 10, 27, 34.

\(^{705}\) Quran, II/194: “Fight during the sacred months if you are attacked: for a violation of sanctity is [subject to the law of] just retribution. Thus, if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him just as he as he has attacked you but remain conscious of God, and know that God is with those who are conscious of Him.”
Prophetic Tradition “al-harbu hidea”⁷⁰⁶, he underlines that “holy war” was the most preferable of all activities (“efdalü'l-amal”).⁷⁰⁷ Yet, holy war did not mean only to joining campaigns and fighting, but activities such as “education” (“maarif”) and upbringing (“terbiye”) were also religious obligations.⁷⁰⁸ According to the author, Selim III had established the new system based on the guidance of these Islamic principles.⁷⁰⁹ These details are important not only in terms of showing that the Sultan, as a good Muslim, was engaged in a holy war but also because they demonstrate the basis of the principle of reprisal. Therefore, the message Kuşmâni aims to get across is that the new army was being criticized by those who did not know Islam well enough.

Also, certain new military instruments and the uniforms worn by the new army seem to have aroused reaction. We learn from Kuşmâni that the following statement was made by the opponents:

Forasmuch as they imitate the dressing of the sinner heathen, play side drums and continually occupy themselves with the acts of those wicked, there remained no sign of Islam on their faces and no light of faith in their hearths anymore, and they all became virtually much like the Franks of bad character…Which of the military and manly clothes look like those of the dissolute blasphemers?…. Are the habiliments potur, barata, sîrh and kebûd exclusively peculiar to these victorious soldiers so that you denigrate them with these.⁷¹⁰

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⁷⁰⁶ “Harb hiledir”, “War is treachery”.

⁷⁰⁷ Kuşmânî, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 7a; İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 6.

⁷⁰⁸ Kuşmânî, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 37b; İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 46

⁷⁰⁹ Kuşmânî, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, pp. 7b-8a, 45a; İşbilir, Zebîre, pp. 22, 32.

⁷¹⁰ Kuşmânî, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, pp. 20a-21a; İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 24: “Zîrâ kefere-i fecerenin kıyafetine benzediib tranpete çalub dâima ol melain-i bed-kîrdärin ameliyle mesgul oldukları ecelden cehrelere eser-i İslam ve kalblerinde nur-i iman kalmayub cümlesi mecâzen ve hâkikaten freng-i-i bed-renge müsâbih olmuârîldar...Elbise-i harbâne ve kıyiýet-i merdânelerden kanksi kefere-i fecereye müsâbihdir ki... zîrâ potur ve barata ve sürh ve kebûd lebsi fakat ol asker-i nusret-esere mi mahuüs ki, bunlar ile ta'ân ediyorsunuz.”
In his argumentation, we are able to trace some details of the issue: It was the “potur” (full gathered knee-breeches worn with tight leggings), “barata” (berets) and the colours of red (“sürh”), blue (“kebûd”) worn by the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers which were considered to be resembling the clothing of the Europeans.\(^{711}\) According to Shaw, the soldiers of the Nizam-ı Cedid army were dressed in French manner, with blue berets, red breeches and jackets.\(^{712}\) On the other hand, Kuşmânî tries to convince his opponents that there was nothing which reflected non-Muslim customs in this uniform or military equipments and does his best to give practical reasons for the selection of these costumes. For instance, the residents of Rumelia were wearing “potur” since the time of their conversion to Islam. The wearing “barata” was “invented” by Süleyman the Magnificent and the “sürh” and “kebûd” were the colours generally preferred by both soldiers and common people.\(^{713}\) After noting that none of these types of clothes were worn by Europeans, he underlines that most of the present-day costumes of the Muslims were not identical with those of the time of the Prophet either.\(^{714}\) Kuşmânî accuses the Janissaries that they are usually open to wear different clothes during one day in order to please some vulgar figures, but of being reluctant to wear the military uniforms ordered by the Sultan.\(^{715}\) Moreover, Kuşmânî states that the dresses of the Janissaries were despised by the Europeans due to their impractical nature: “A Turk has got two hands, and whenever in trouble, he places one on his kavuk and the other one on his şalvar. Nobody knows how he will handle his other affairs.”\(^{716}\) His

\(^{711}\) Kuşmânî, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 21b; İşbilir, Zebîre, p.24.

\(^{712}\) Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 131. The first regiments were differentiated from each other with their blue and red garments. Later, the soldiers of the Levent Chiftlik wore red, while that of Üsküdar wore blue and the regiments in Anatolia wore green garments. According to Nureddin Sevin, the early Janissaries rather than those of the French military were taken as models. See Sevin, Nureddin, Onuç Asırlık Türk Kıyafet Tarihiine Bir Bakış, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990), pp. 111-4;

\(^{713}\) Kuşmânî, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 21a; İşbilir, Zebîre, p.24.

\(^{714}\) Kuşmânî, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 21b; İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 25

\(^{715}\) Kuşmânî, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 21b; İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 25

\(^{716}\) Kuşmânî, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 24b; İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 28: “Osmanlı'nın iki eli vardır ki mustarib olduğuya birini kavuğuna ve birini dahi şalvarına uruyor. Bilinmez ki umûr-ı säiresini ne ile görecektir.”
final conclusion on the issue is quite clear. Costumes or uniforms are not decisive factors in making a soldier.\footnote{Kuşmâni, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 38b; İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 49.}

Koca Sekbanbaşı, on the other hand, reminds that the attire and the titles of the Janissary army were also criticized by “a number of idle and ignorant vagabonds” (i.e. the sekbans).\footnote{Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, pp. 240-1; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi, pp. 45-46.} This means that previously the Janissaries were also considered strange and despised, just as they themselves were now acting towards the new soldiers. From a military point of view, Koca Sekbanbaşı argues that the issue of dress was crucial since together with the new strict rank and file system, it could prevent infiltration by spies out to cause the demoralization of the army. Pretending to be soldiers, these spies were easily able to deceive the “naive Turks” (“saf-dil Türkçegiz”) and provoke them against their officers and the government. For instance, they would say “Useless and destructive expeditions are only for the Russian infidels, let us leave it to their soldiers to feed upon dry biscuits, as for us we will return home and eat fine baklava”.\footnote{Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, p. 256; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi, p. 58.} According to Sekbanbaşı,

the soldiers of our ancient corps, are not at all clothed alike; from this diversity of garment, the following bad effect results, if in time of war, any of them should desert from the army, as they are no marks by which we can distinguish whether the deserters belong to the troops,

it would be very difficult to discover the deserters. The best solution was the uniformity and standardization of military uniforms.\footnote{Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, pp. 266-67; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi, p. 66.} Indeed, standardization of military uniforms was an integral part of the modern military systems. As in the case of discipline, it created a unified army similar in outlook. Therefore, attention was paid to the Levend Chiftlik soldiers who went to the city in their uniforms (“he’yet-i mahsûsa”) and those who did not obey this rule were punished.\footnote{B.O.A. C. AS. 16353 (3 N 1221/14 November 1806 ). A hatt addressed to şiikki-salis defterdar.}

If we remember the main issue at stake at the beginning of the May 1807 Rebellion, the issue of the uniforms appears crucial. As we have tried to remark above, the issue was
not simply one of uniforms but mainly of the representation of different identities. It is clear that some aspects of the uniforms of the new army were foreign to society or, at least, to the Janissaries. The efforts of the above-mentioned authors to explain that the uniforms represented the native costumes of Anatolia or Rumelia strongly suggest that the new uniforms were in fact perceived by many people as resembling the European costumes.

The same problem also surfaced with regard to musical instruments used by the New Army. The beating of side drums ("tranpete") was another element criticized on account of its resemblance to European practices. Even though it does not appear clearly in the treatises on what grounds the Janissaries opposed the practice, the pro-Nizam-ı Cedid authors try prove that it was not imported from Europe and in fact resembled the Arabic drum-beating. The side-drum was an instrument used for military purposes and was known as "tabl-ı harb" in Arabic and "kös-i ceng" in Persian. During campaigns, it served the purpose of communication and encouragement of the soldiers. Münib Efendi, one of most influential ulema of early nineteenth century, had written a treatise stating that beating of drums was not against the Islamic law. Unfortunately, above-mentioned treatise of Münib Efendi has been discovered yet. In Vasif's History, there is a short treatise on the issue of using musical instruments during campaigns. The text is placed under the title of “Digression” ("istirdâd") after a short note on the establishment of a new regiment in Üsküdar at the location of Kavak Saray. The purpose of the digression is to show to the positive impact of the drum and zurna on animals and human beings. After providing some examples on the influence of music on the animals, the author divides the musical sounds into two: First are those that rejoiced people, causing rise of desires and dancing. The author notes that it was these sounds that were considered by the ulema as the “inventions of the Satan” ("muhterîât-ı şeytaniyye"), since it belonged to an “inordinate

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722 Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi, p. 73; Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, not mentioned; Kuşmâni, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 21b; İşbîlir, Zebîre, p. 25.

723 Kuşmâni, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 21b; İşbîlir, Zebîre, p. 25.

724 Kuşmâni, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p. 22a; İşbîlir, Zebîre, p. 25; Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, (this part is missing); Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi, p. 73.


726 It is a primitive double-reed musical instrument.
appetite” (“nefsl-i emmâre”) which manifested itself in Satanical manners.727 The second type of sounds also influences the listeners, yet it imposes a kind of a “majestic” (“heybetli”) feeling mixed with enthusiasm rather than arousing desires. This kind of sound makes the human spirit gain a feeling of “greatness” (“azamet”) and maturity that helps the individual to develop ability and determination to defeat the enemy. Musical instruments such as kös (a kind of big drum), tabl (drum), boru (horn), and zil (cymbal) were musical instruments which support the second category of music. After this categorization, the author gives some detailed explanation on each of the musical instruments of the second category in terms of its usage in history and its effects on human beings. During wars, these instruments would not only frighten the enemy, but also contribute to the bravery of the soldiers and divert their fear of death.728 It is important to note that the author emphasizes that each of these four instruments was also subject to change in different periods. There could be different types in different times, in different countries according to specific needs. Yet, despite some changes, all the new instruments had originated from these four instruments. Even though the author does not give specific examples for the period we deal with, one should underline that there is an inherent cohesion between the notion of change and the universality of knowledge that the pro-Nizam-ı Cedid authors employed in order to support for their argumentation for military modernization.

Turning back to Koca Sekbanbaşı and Kuşmâni, both authors criticize their opponents on religious issues. They attack those who criticize the Nizam-ı Cedid army as having nothing to do with Islam. In Kuşmâni’s treatise, on the other hand, there are also frequent references to the heterodoxy of the opponents. He claims that new army was blamed by not being protected by a saint (“pir”).729 Kuşmâni attacks the opponents at this very point, declaring that the Janissary army was not blessed by Hacı Bektaş, and opposes the idea that Janissaries were “chosen” soldiers protected by this saint. In fact, he tries to convince the reader that the name Hacı Bektaş, contrary to the belief of the Janissaries, did not refer to the saint but to commander of the first Janissary regiment established by Aladdin Pasha, the brother of Sultan Orhan.730 The aim here seems to be to shatter the idea

727 “zirâ nefsl-i emmârenin da’vâsî efâl-i şeytaniyye ile tavsîf olunur”.

728 Vasif, Tarih-i Sultan Selim, pp. 82-87.

729 İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 24.

730 Kuşmâni, Zebîre, Bayezid 9430, p.32b; İşbilir, Zebîre, p. 41.
of “chosen troops” that the Janissaries used against the new soldiers, and thus to break down the solidarity and self-confidence among them. As an alternative argument, Kuşmâni upholds the idea of the “ocak of Islam”. Here, he emphasizes that Islamic armies’ success during the earlier periods were not due to the blessings of Hacı Bektaş, reminding his readers that had been there historical Muslim armies with no connection to the saint, yet also successful. It appears that the real aim of Kuşmâni was to warn the Janissaries not to be content with the “imagined” blessing of the saint, but to work hard and to be disciplined. Koca Sekbanbaşi is comparatively more modest in this respect and asserts that when the newly established Janissary army was despised and provoked by the sekbans, the newly recruited soldiers preferred to run away. Consequently, Süleyman I invited a Bektashi sheik from Anatolia. The Sultan demanded that the saint pray for his new army, so they might not leave their corps and stand firm against the enemy. From that day onwards, the soldiers no longer fled and considered themselves as the “children of Hacı Bektaş”. Even though Koca Sekbanbaş, unlike Kuşmâni, does not downplay the connection of Bektashis with the Janissaries, he still argues that the Janissary army was not consecrated directly by Hacı Bektaş, but a descendant of his.

In short both authors argue strongly that the opponents had no right to criticize the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers as being “frankish” soldiers, and advised them to take heed of the fact that the members of the new corps are perfect Muslims, struggling hard for the holy war while the Janissaries were ignorant and Muslims only in name. And since they were ignorant Muslims they further did not know the essence of Islam, which is why they could declare that they would prefer to become an infidel (“kefere”) rather than a Nizam-ı Cedid soldier. In short we can conclude the Janissaries were under severe criticism by both authors. Yet, it is important to note that they were not merely trying to silence the Janissaries and convince them to the benefits of the new army, but they seemingly tried to

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731 Kuşmâni, Zebûre, Bayezid 9430, p. 31b; İşbîlîr, Zebûre, p.40.

732 Kuşmâni, Zebûre, Bayezid 9430, p.32b; İşbîlîr, Zebûre, p. 41.

733 Wilkinson, An Account of Principalities, pp. 241-2; Uçman, Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi, pp. 46-47.


735 Kuşmâni, Zebûre, Bayezid 9430, p. 45a; İşbîlîr, Zebûre, p. 60: "Bizlere göre kâfir olmak ve kefere memleketine gitmek ise Nizâm-ı Cedid olmakdan ehvendir".
setting out to discredit every cultural symbol with which the Janissaries identified themselves.

2.2.4. Reaction to the Nizam-ı Cedid Reforms: Views and Attitudes of the Opponents

As might be noticed from the preceding discussions, there were some reactions and circulating ideas of the opposition groups that Koca Sekbanbaşı and Kușmâni tried to silence. If we retain a critical awareness about the biases of the authors of the treatises, we are able, to a certain degree, to hear the complaints or the voices of those in opposition as far as they make it into the treatises. Except for Ebubekir Efendi and to some extent Ömer Faik’s works, there is another work which criticizes the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms. Rather than a pamphlet or treatise, it resembles either a series of notes or private correspondences of two or more individuals. It is more like a correspondence, since sometimes the writer seems to answer or clarify some points that had been already mentioned by someone else. As mentioned in above pages, Necib Asım and Karal assert that the author is likely to be Mahmud Tayyar Pasha. We may have some suspicions that it might also a member of the religious classes. Yet for the time being, the best candidate seems to be Mahmud Tayyar Pasha.

Even a glimpse into the text clearly shows the deep hatred of the author for Selim III, for other previously mentioned figures of the period, more importantly, to everything related to the Nizam-ı Cedid. In this respect, some of his notes might help us to hear some arguments of the party opposed to the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms and also present a chance for

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736 [Yazıksız] Necib Asım, “Üçüncü Selim Devrine Ait Vesikalar”, Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası, 15/XII (79) (Teşrin-i evvel 1341/October 1922), pp.394-401. The manuscript was discovered and published by Necib Asım Yazıksız. It was a four-page manuscript containing, at the bottom of first page, the name “Tayyar Pasha”, written by the same pen. The text consists of short notes – about one paragraphs each- the end of some of which dates are recorded. The earliest date is 17 C 1216/25 October 1801 and the latest one 1221/1805-6. In addition to this, it contains some forms of address such as “behey efendi”. These notes are generally comments by the author on certain historical events (the establishment of the Nizam-ı Cedid, the Wahhabis), government (the rule of Selim III) and some leading historical figures of Selim III’s period, including the sultan himself, Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey, Valide Kethüdasi Yusuf Ağa about whom the author explicitly expresses his animosity.
us to counterbalance the arguments of the treatises mentioned above. Contrary to Koca Sekbanbaşı and Kuşmâni, this author evaluates the *Nizam-ı Cedid* policy of Selim III as something utterly against Islam, and as an attempt to divert the Muslims towards non-Muslim ways. These steps, consequently, had caused the hatred of the Muslims. Due to the adoption of the guidance of the “European infidels” ("frenk kefere") during the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms, the Islamic religion was neglected to a degree that it became almost forgotten. The single reminder that one was still living in an Islamic country was the fact that the müezzins still called to prayer five times a day.\(^{737}\) The author comments that the real intention of Selim III was not “reform” Islam, but to “convert” it.\(^ {738}\) In another note, the author complains that with the introduction of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps, Muslims were put into the infidels costumes.\(^ {739}\) He laments, saying “Efendi, now there is not a single sipahi nor a Janissary. All of them have become franks wearing hats.”\(^ {740}\) It means that the author perceives the new army, in a way, similar to that of the Janissaries, as their view was reflected in the treatises of Koca Sekbanbaşı and Kuşmâni. Just like the Janissaries, the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reminded him neither the principle of reprisal nor of the holy war as a means for Islam to take revenge, but the frankish costumes and of an attempt to harm the Janissaries. The author also criticizes the imposition of tax on wine ("zecriye"), i.e. he attacked the *İnad-ı Cedid* taxes.\(^ {741}\)

If looking at the timing of these treatises, particularly the pro-*Nizam-ı Cedid* ones, it is striking that they were compiled toward the end of Selim III’s reign. As we have remarked previously, it was this period where a concentration of problems related to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* appeared. Koca Sekbanbaşı’s Treatise was submitted in 1222/1807, just before the fall of Selim III\(^ {742}\) Kuşmâni’s *Zebîre* was written down in 1221/1806.\(^ {743}\)

\(^ {737}\) Necib Asım, “Üçüncü Selim Devrine Ait Vesikalar”, p. 398.


\(^ {739}\) Necib Asım, “Üçüncü Selim Devrine Ait Vesikalar”, p. 399.

\(^ {740}\) Necib Asım, “Üçüncü Selim Devrine Ait Vesikalar”, p. 398: "Efendi, şimdi ne sipah var ne yeniçeri. Cümlesi başı şapkali frenk oldu.”.

\(^ {741}\) Necib Asım, “Üçüncü Selim Devrine Ait Vesikalar”, p. 399.


\(^ {743}\) Kuşmâni, *Zebîre*, Bayezid 9430, p. 72a.
Therefore, they were written in a period when the tensions leading to the Rebellion was intensifying rapidly. The harsh language of the treaties, together with the intolerant attitude towards the other party, might be evaluated as symptoms of nervousness and frustration in the face an inability to convince the opposing group of the necessity of military revival and hard work for the interests of the state. Mert Sunar draws our attention to another but similar point. According to him, the authors of the reform proposals who submitted their treatises before the establishment of the Nizam-ı Cedid army were careful not to write things that would cause the resentment of Janissaries, but Koca Sekbanbaşı and Ubeydullah Kuşmâni never hesitated to attack the Janissaries and their privileges. To support his claim, Sunar gives the example of the emphasis on the commercial activities of the Janissaries and states that “while propagandists of New Order questioned extra-military occupations of the Janissaries, the central administration paradoxically gave permissions to the members of the New Order to engage in crafts and trades in their free times in an attempt to attract more recruits.”

This lack of tolerance seems to have been felt in the atmosphere of the period. A good example in this regard is the political shyness and fear of Ömer Faik Efendi took part in a meeting on 1 Ra 1219/10 July 1804. During this meeting, Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi asked Ömer Faik’s opinion on the Nizam-ı Cedid policy of the time. Initially, Faik Efendi preferred to remain silent. However, upon the insistence of Ahmed Efendi, he confessed timidly that even though the military reforms were to some degree successful and necessary, there were on the other hand some deficiencies in the “spiritual and formal” issues. Without going into the issue of “spiritual” deficiencies, he only adds that the availability of a standing and regular army in İstanbul and Anatolia is not enough for the defense of the territories, and the troops therefore should be sent to the fortresses at the borders. It seems that his answer did not satisfy Ömer Faik himself, since the following day he sat down and wrote his treatise, known as Nizam-ı Atik (The Old Order). According to this treatise, the real problem was that measures were not taken that would ensure the “manifestation of divine guidance”. He felt that such an argument could be considered as an

744 Beydilli, “Küçük Kaynarca’dan Tanzimat’a”, p. 29.
745 Sunar, Cauldron of Dissent, p. 44.
746 Beydilli, “Küçük Kaynarca’dan Tanzimat’a”, p. 29.
747 Ömer Faik Efendi, Nizamü’l-Atik, p.3b.
oppositional attitude to the general reform policy and he could be called a “donkey and idiot” (“eşek ve ahmak”) according to the humour of the period.\textsuperscript{748} Indeed among the thirty-two measures he mentions in his treatise, nine are devoted to the spiritual matters, which can be summarized as an effort to improve of the general spiritual level of the public by giving more importance to sheiks and public prayers as a state policy. Though these measures do not appear to be very radical, we might infer from Ömer Faik Efendi’s comments that in fact these were issues that the elite and Nizam-ı Cedid supporters were not giving importance and even could not bear to hear about. Even though his criticisms are not directed against the Nizam-ı Cedid per se, we can infer that spiritual and religious issues were not considered important by the ideologues of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms. This in turn reminds us the severe criticisms and accusations of the anti-Islamic measures of the Nizam-ı Cedid made by the author of the TOEM-text. Therefore, reading this treatise together with the TOEM-text reveals the accelerating intolerance and degree of tension between these parties especially on the religious matters.

2.3. The Janissary Corps: The Issue of Esame-Papers

The pro-Nizam-ı Cedid treatises represent the Janissaries as a paramilitary urban mob mainly concerned with the other things than their military duties. According to this representation, their only connection to the military issues was the collection of their salaries (“ulufé”), despite drawing their salaries, they opposed any attempt at military reorganization. They were not only responsible for the decline of the Empire and the series of defeats at the hands of the enemy, but also for the failure of any reform attempt. In fact, this discourse was not unique to the authors of the treatises. There were earlier and later historians who adopted the same line.\textsuperscript{749} Historians like Ahmed Refik have even depicted

\textsuperscript{748} Ömer Faik Efendi, \textit{Nizamü’l-Atik}, p. 4a.

the Janissaries as bandits ("eşkıya gürühu") who often robbed other residents of their areas. It would be rather simplistic to explain the problems related to the Janissaries only within the conceptual framework of "degeneration" and "decline". It is better to evaluate it more in terms of a transformation of the Janissary army that started from the late sixteenth century onwards. From that point on, we see a process of localization or settlement of the Janissary army in many Ottoman cities. The gradual discontinuation of the devşirme system, the levy of boys drafted as future kapıkulu, and the increasing recruitment from the Muslim population seem to have played a decisive role in the localization process. This development, no doubt, was against the logic of the whole Janissary military system whereby the Janissaries as a principle were uprooted from their native social origins and maintained limited contacts with the non-military sections of the Ottoman society. As a consequence of the localization process, they became intermingled with the local non-military segments of the cities in which they were stationed. It is probable that the economic pressures and the necessity of earning a livelihood induced them to involve in the trades and crafts. Therefore, this development can be evaluated as an adaptation of the Janissaries to the changing conditions of the Empire. Looking the Janissary army from this perspective and considering them as one of the classes affected by the general conjuncture of the Empire seem to be a more reasonable approach than placing the Ottoman decline squarely on the shoulders of the Janissaries. Indeed, Avigdor Levy criticizes such an approach.

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750 Ahmed Refik, Kabakçı İsyani, p. 17.

approach by arguing that the accounts of Ottoman modernization should be relieved from
the story of “villains and heroes” and the setbacks in the process due to the conservatism of
the Janissaries and the ulema. 752

One crucial factor that led to the transformation of the Janissary army into a
paramilitary class were the muster rolls (“esâme defteri”) on which salaries (“ulufe”) were
determined. Originally the esame was a sealed pay certificate given exclusively to
Janissaries signifying their right to get salaries. The records of the esames were kept in an
esame defteri. 753 In time these factors came to be illegally sold to people who were not
Janissaries. Finally, in 1739, permission was granted for the sale and purchase of the
esames. 754 With the process of the commercialization of the pay certificates, different
segments of society could obtain Janissary esames.

The most important result of this development was the emergence of a group of
people who identified their interests with those of the Janissaries. One could observe a
horizontal and vertical expansion of those who were registered in the esame-rolls.
Horizontally, the spectrum of registered broadened to various segments of the lower levels
of society. Vertically, it reached to the dignitaries such as the members of the palace, ulema
and bureaucracy. 755 We do not know exactly how the esame-rolls and “ulufe” as an
economic sector worked, and how it passed into the hands of the lower and especially upper
classes. 756

1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman War”, Aksan, Ottomans and Europeans, pp. 209-223; Quataert,
Donald, “Janissaries, Artisans and the Question of Ottoman Decline, 1730-1826”, 17th
Congress of Historical Sciences I: Chronological Section (Madrid, 1992), pp. 264-268;
Levy, Avigdor, “Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire
in the Eighteenth Century”, Middle Eastern Studies, 8/3 (July 1982), pp. 227-249.


753 For more information, see Uzunçarşılı, Kapukulu Ocakları, pp. 387-389, 411-463,

754 Kafadar, Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations, p. 110.

755 For more details on the commercialization of the pay certificates and the groups
that owned them, see Ahmed Cavid, Hadika-yi Vekayi, pp. 37-8; Kafadar, Yeniçeri-Esnaf
Relations, pp. 111-3; Uzunçarşılı, Kapukulu Ocakları, pp. 486-505; Berkes, Türkiye’de
Çağdaşlaşma, pp. 116-7; Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. I, p. 16.

756 The most detailed source in this respect is Uzunçarşılı’s, Kapukulu Ocakları, pp.
385. See also Sunar, Cauldron of Dissent, pp. 59-61. Ebubekir Efendi, the author of Vaka-
For the reign of Selim III, there are some important clues that show the how the esame-rolls passed into other than the intended hands.\textsuperscript{757} As regards the process of the {\textit{Cedid}}, comments that since 1182/1768-9, the income of the Janissaries had been insufficient to provide for the livelihood of the Janissaries, and they had thus began to get involved in trade and arts ("kâr ü kesb"). Since it was impossible for them to continue their drills under these conditions, they began to lose their military discipline. The author comments that most of them even did not even possess weapons, and if they did, often sold their arms. See Ebubekir Efendi, {\textit{Vaka-yı Cedid}}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{757} Since the Rebellion started in the fortresses, we will focus on two examples of recorded abuses. The first example is a case of abuse by the commanders ("dizdar") of Kala-yı Tisa, on 3 Za 1204/16 July 1790. After informing us that the mevacib of the soldiers of the Kala-yı Tisa were out provided from the İstanbul poll tax ("cizye") every 3 months, the source begins to enumerate the abuses of the dizdars. Even though the distribution of the salaries was done upon the writ ("arz") and request of the dizdars, they did not inform the center on the deserters and the soldiers who had died, thus transferring the esame-papers to undeserving people and embezzling the mevacib of the soldiers. As a measure to prevent these abuses, the center decided the continued appointment of new soldiers by the writ of the dizdars, but now under stricter control of the supervisors. See B.O.A. C. AS. 4018 (3 Za 1204/3 July 1790) It seems that these measures were not effective in preventing the abuses. By an imperial order Abdullah Efendi, the scribe of the treasurer of Derviş Pasha, was delegated the roll-call of the Kala-yı Tisa on 2 R 1208/6 November 1793. According to the related source, Abdullah Efendi examined soldiers one by one and paid their salaries. A result, it was detected that 34 soldiers were not present: "eimme, hüteba ve dizdarların ve hidmetkar esamısı diyerek müstehak olmayarak 34 neferin yerine na-tuvan neferat tedarik." See B.O.A. C.AS. 4881 (2 R 1208/6 November 1793) Even though it is not clearly stated, it seems that the vacant places were not reported, and passed on to the sons, servants and retinue of the officials at the fortresses, thus the esame-papers were transformed to the non-military people. Another example is the abuse perpetrated by the kapucubası Mehmed Ağa, supervisor ("nazır") of Kala-yı Saba who "due to his covetousness" kept the certificates of the deserters and dead. Since he did not inform the center on these cases, he was able to receive their salaries ("mevacib") and consume ("ekl") them. Even though the document does not explain the reason, Mehmed Ağa sometimes gave the old diplomas ("berat") to the newcomers which caused further problem: The name in the diploma and the new soldier did not match. No doubt, the ensuing confusion made it difficult for the center to check and determine the exact number of soldiers at the fortresses. Thus, an inspection of the number soldiers was ordered, yielding interesting results: Out of 990 soldiers, there were 25 missing ("na-mevcud"). This meant that the salaries of 25 recorded soldiers were probably embezzled by the supervisor ("nazır") Daily payment ("yevmiyye") of one soldier in the fortresses was 56 akçes per day, which means that 1370 akçes were going to the hands of the supervisor or some untitled persons. From these two examples, we might infer that the pattern of abuse was not to inform the center of the deaths and desertions and thus to accumulate their esames and mevaci. Assuming that such abuses were not noticed by the center and a person remained in a position for a long time, it would be possible for him to accumulate considerable amount of "vacant" esame. As we have seen in the report dated 6 November 1793, another method seems to have been the appointment of relatives and servants to vacant positions which also served accumulation of in a single family.
vertical expansion, it is difficult to find out how the pay certificates were transferred into the hands of non-military classes, since they were kept secret and mostly gained by illegal ways like bribery. Still, we can draw on an interesting anecdote narrated by Câbî Ömer Efendi. According to the story, during his grand vizierate (28.07.1808-15.11.1808), Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, himself a former Janissary of the 42nd regiment, frequently invited his former Janissary comrades for conversation.\footnote{For the Janissary origin of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, see Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, p. 40. Câbî Ömer Efendi notes that after becoming grand vizier, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa built a fountain in Eski Odalar. The date of the entry is 27 B 1223/18 September 1808. See Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 221.} During a conversation with his Janissary comrades, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha narrates an incident that took place thirteen years before, while he was in İstanbul for a period of eight months. During his stay in the Janissary barracks, once or twice salaries of the Janissaries were distributed and he noticed that a servant of a certain member of the \textit{ulema} frequented the barracks during these times. The servant of the \textit{ulema} took about 700 guruş \textit{ulufe} payment from a certain regiment. After narrating the story, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha confessed that he later learned that the attendant in question was a servant of Veliefendizâde.\footnote{Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, pp. 241-42.} Cevdet Pasha also gives some insights into the process. According to him, it was the Janissary scribes of the Janissary army who sold the soldiers’ \textit{esames} whomever they wished.\footnote{For further details, see Cevdet Pasha, \textit{Tarih}, vol. I, p. 96.}

Among the group of people who held \textit{esame}-papers, members of the ruling class such as the \textit{ulema} and palace officials seem to have had a major presence. How might we explain the motives of these people? It would too simplistic to explain the interest in accumulating of \textit{esame}-papers simply by referring to individual corruption and greed. It is possible that there might be some connection between this interest in \textit{esame}-papers and the increase in the number of household populations of certain state officials and \textit{ulema} which forced them to find new sources of income to feed the household members. Thus in order to balance the increasing household expenditures, these people might have found it easier and more rational to utilize a ready income from the imperial treasury, namely to hold the state-sponsored \textit{esame}-papers. For instance, Câbî Ömer Efendi notes that Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, during his grand vizierate, ordered the \textit{ulema} and bureaucrats to give over to the
state treasury ("hazine mande") the Janissary esame-papers, in the possession of in their household members and attendants.\textsuperscript{761}

Whatever the incentives for the accumulation of the esame-papers were, it is clear that there was an accumulation of these papers in the hands of certain people. Though it is difficult to give an exact number of the members of different classes holding them, we are sometimes able to come across some names by chance. For instance, the Veliefendizâde mentioned in the above anecdote of Câbî was probably famous Veliefendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi, an influential member of the ulema of his period. As we might recall, he was the master of Kethûda Said Efendi, the author of History of Kethûda Said. If we proceed from the information provided by Câbî that the incident took place thirteen years before the grand vizierate of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, Veliefendizâde should have been either the kazasker of Anatolia or newly appointed kazasker of Rumelia.\textsuperscript{762} The identity of some people who accumulated esame-papers were also revealed when they trade their esame during the grand vizierate of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. Among them a professor ("mûderris") and Sahaflar Şeyhi Efendi had the same amount of income from esame-papers, worth 650 akçes yevmiyye.\textsuperscript{763} There are some other examples Mehmed Ragıp Efendi, a judge and the former seal-bearer ("mûhûrdar") of Yusuf Ağa, the Valide Kethûda of Mihrisâh Sultan, had accumulated esame-papers worth 6000 akçes, while Şemseddin Molla\textsuperscript{764}, a powerful ulema member, had 1800 akçes yevmiyye and finally an imam of the Cihangir Mosque in Tophane had esame-papers 3000 akçes.\textsuperscript{765} Contemporary narratives usually mention the names of esame holders from the ulema class, even though they also mention that there were similar examples from among the craftsmen, bureaucrats and palace officials. This particular underlining of ulema-cases might be related to the glaring


\textsuperscript{762} He was appointed as the kazasker of Anatolia on 14 Ca 1203/10 February 1789 and his period of kazaskerlik of Rumelia starts in 1208/1793-94. See Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{763} Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol I, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{764} Ahmed Şemseddin Efendi (d. 1224/1809) was the son of müderris Feyzullah Efendi, known also as Mahmûd Çavuşzâde. After becoming a müderris and obtaining the Mecca paye, became the judge of Istanbul in Za 1206/June-July 1792 and dismissed in 1207/1792-3. He performed the duty of Anadolu kazasker from M 1212/July 1797 to 1214/1799-1800. His first period of Rumelian kazasker-ship corresponds to year 1218/1803-4 and the second one to 1222/1807. For more details see Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{765} Neticeti‘l-Vekayi, p. 43.
fact of the proliferation of esame-papers among a social class expected not to be involved in such disapproved and worldly concerns.\textsuperscript{766}

The widespread use of the esame-papers for private interests meant a great problem for the imperial treasury. The imperial treasury was to feeding a huge number of people who were not performing any military duty. The second author of Neticetü’l-Vekayi claims that only 1/20 of the salary payments was reaching the actual soldiers, while the remaining part was going to the civilians.\textsuperscript{767} In another document, the same fact is stressed. It states that there was constant shortage of soldiers during wartime and the fortresses could not be sufficiently manned.\textsuperscript{768} This issue is well-summarized in an imperial edict addressing the ağa of the Janissaries. The document reads that even though the daily wages were at a satisfactory level, most of the soldiers were still not participating in the campaigns. According to the document, the cause of problem was the fact that the vacancies ("mahlulât") were kept secret by certain military officers and they were illegally sold to unqualified people.\textsuperscript{769} From the document we also learn that there was even one individual who possessed twenty esame-papers.\textsuperscript{770} Another important problem was that vacant positions were either filled by outsiders such as mosque-officials who recited prayers or were held and embezzled by their commanders in the fortresses.\textsuperscript{771} The result of such irregularities was serious. For instance, while the fortress of Hotin (Khozim) was manned on paper by the 26\textsuperscript{th} Janissary regiment and 18,102 guardians, the fortress was fact manned only by the officers.\textsuperscript{772} An imperial order dated 11 $\S$ 1204/26 April 1790, provides us with

\textsuperscript{766} Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{767} Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 42b.

\textsuperscript{768} T.S.M. A. E. 1379 (undated, reign of Mahmud II). It is a document composed in the form of recommendations on certain problems of the Empire during the reign of Mahmud II.

\textsuperscript{769} B.O.A. C.AS. 5197 (17 L 1204/30 June 1790)

\textsuperscript{770} "Bir adamda yirmisi bulunuyor". It seems that this expression does not give an exact number but rather implies the high probability of an individual holding this amount the esame-papers. See B.O.A. C.AS. 5197 (17 L 1204/30 June 1790).

\textsuperscript{771} B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 200, pp. 284-6, order no. 1003, (1 R 1208/6 November 1793).

important details concerning the abuses of the abuses in the esame-paper. It was written during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1786-1792, when there emerged an urgent need for soldiers for the İsmail army. Thus, the army was ordered to recruit new soldiers from the capital. The edict also ordered that all of those craftsmen, common people, and servants holding Janissary esame-papers, – regardless of their connections and bonds to households, were to be sent on the campaign. Still, they were given option of sending a replacement (“yoldaş”). The esame-papers of those who would not obey this order were to be annulled and transferred to those who actually served in the army. In fact, while many people illegally benefited from the esame-paper income, there were a good amount of real soldiers without any payment. In order to solve the acute problem of esame-papers which created a serious drain on the imperial treasury and the manpower of the army, some attempts were made, even predating the reign of Selim III. The issuing of a series of government orders to prohibit the arbitrary transfer of esame-papers also proves the fact the center was not able to solve the problem. During first years of Selim III, with a decree dated 17 L 1204/30 June 1790, the sale and purchase of the right to daily wages was prohibited, while vacant positions would be openly declared, and retirement would be granted only to the capable soldiers. It was further stipulated that each individual would hold only one esame-paper, and the papers would not pass from one barrack to another.

During the early reign of Mahmud II, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha made the most serious attempt to regulate the flow of esame-papers. In order not cause major resistance he encouraged people to bring their esame-papers and offered to pay five akçes for a daily esame-value of 10 akçes from the income of commodity-customs. This meant that the esame-holders would get a payment of half of their esame-value, an operation known as “esame çalmak”. Moreover, the trade of esame-papers was forbidden. What appears to

773 B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 194, p. 407, order. no. 1 (11 Ş 1204/24 June 1790).

774 Mouradge D’Ohsson, Tableau General De l’Empire Ottoman, 7 volumes, (İstanbul: Les Editions ISIS, 2001), vol. VII, p. 299.

775 For an account of attempts prior to the reign of Selim III, a good summary is provided by Uzunçarşılı, Kapukulu Ocakları, pp. 477-505.


be noteworthy is that while Alemdar Mustafa Pasha attempted to regulate the esame-issue by the measures mentioned above, Câbî mentions a meeting of Janissaries, where the officers came to the conclusion that the annulment of the esame-papers was a great blow to their economic interests and a decision was taken to assassinate the Grand Vizier.  

For our purposes, the expansion of the number people who became owners of esame-papers is very crucial. It created a broad social group of people who would be directly affected by the fate of the Janissary army. It led to the emergence unlikely alliances between different classes who shared Janissary interests. The successes and the expansion of the New Army in Anatolia, the attempts to expand it in Rumelia, and the emerging the rumours on the abolition of the Janissary corps are likely to have alarmed these people. In a document, probably dating immediately before rebellion in Thrace, we learn that there were widespread of rumours about the annulment of the Janissary esame-papers and the enrollment of the population into the new army. In another document, which was written in an informal language during the early years of the reign of Mahmud II, there is again an elaboration on the esame-issue. Informing the reader that some people in the capital, especially the palace members preferred to lead a comfortable life by consuming the esame-papers of the soldiers reserved for the holy war, the author proceeds to question the loyalty of these people. According to him, the loyalty to the cause of the Janissaries among those people is superior to the loyalty to the Mohammedan religion and to the interests of the Sublime Porte. In fact, what they are interested in was not the benefits of the Janissaries, but rather the income of their esame-papers. When there were


780 Indeed it seems very likely that the during the planning process of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, considerations including the abolishing of esame and forcing the disobedient soldiers to drill regularly, yet the “reformers” seem to have abandoned this thought “in order not to cause suffering to people”. See Halil Nuri, *Tarih*, pp. 149-150. It is very likely that they were afraid of reactions. Kafadar, *Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations*, p. 111.

781 Kafadar, *Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations*, p. 111.

782 B.O.A. HAT 3701 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). Since in his note at the upper margin of the document, Selim III talks about the protection of Tekfur Dağlı and Istranca, it probably deals with the events on the eve of the Edirne Incident.

783 T.S.M.A. E. 1379 (undated, reign of Mahmud II): “*Yeniçeri gayreti din-i Muhammediye ve din-i devlet-i aliyye üzerine gâlîbdir*”
rumours that *esames* would be abolished, they had become very frightened.\footnote{Since the writer does not give exact dates and employs frequent flashbacks to reign of Selim III and the early years of Mahmud II, it is not clear whether the rumour circulated before the 1807 Rebellion or on the eve of the Alemdar Incident. But, as we have seen, during the grand vizierate of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, there was an attempt at abolishing the *esames*-papers, so the source presumably refers to that period. The document also refers to Alemdar Mustafa Paşa as deceased “merhûm”.} Thus the author warns the reader that the participation of such an elite even in the councils on war was harmful to the interests of the state.\footnote{T.S.M.A. E. 1379 (undated, reign of Mahmud II).}

Since we are not able to determine the names of the *esame*-holding individuals during the reign of Selim III, it is very difficult to find out whether there indeed were factions formed on the basis of the common interests of *esame*-paper holders. However, we know that Ahmed Şemseddin Efendi who held *esame*-papers worth 1800 akçes, was at the Meat Square (Et Meydani) during May 1807 Rebellion. He is especially famous for rebuking İbrahim Nesim Efendi in the council which convened immediately after the beginning of the Rebellion in order to discuss the measures to suppress the Rebellion. Şemseddin Efendi attended the council as the former kazasker of Rumelia together with some other leading bureaucrats and *ulema* members. During the council, when İbrahim Nesim Efendi asked those present concerning the measures to be taken, Şemseddin Efendi angrily rudely replied “*this is your own dirt, you must clean it.*”\footnote{Derin, “Kabakçî Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 103: “Bre hey kahbe hîz, bu âlemî harâba verdin, sâîr meşveretlerde ulemâ-ya izâmanda kime suâl ederdiniz, bu sizin pislediğiniz bokdur, temîz edin.” See also Şanizâde, *Tarih-i Şanizâde*, vol. I, p. 185 Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 6; *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 224.} After the rise of Mahmud II to power, he was sent to exile together with some other members of *ulema* who were suspected of being involved in the Rebellion (1223/1808).\footnote{Neticeti’l-Vekayi, p. 31: “Hala Rumeli Kazaskeri bulunan mezûb Şemseddin dedikleri lâin azl ve Burusa’ya nefy ile düçûr-î gazab-ı elim oldu.”} Passing now to another individual, Veliefendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi even though he died about two years before the 1807 Rebellion, it might be instructive to draw attention to the apologetic tone of his *kethûda*, Said Efendi. If we recall that in the *Neticeti’l-Vekayi*, the second author comments that Kethûda Said Efendi was not telling the exact truth, one wonders whether Kethûda Said Efendi was not one of the *esame*-paper holders.\footnote{We should admit that these are only some suggestions. *Esame*-paper holders were not necessarily following the interests of the Janissaries behind the scenes. Yet, our aim is...} Mustafa Nuri Pasha, talking in general
terms, also confirms that not only the Janissaries but also the people who were gaining income from the Janissary salaries were among the strongest enemies of the Nizam-ı Cedid. Under the pretext of defending the Janissary interests they were always damning the Nizam-ı Cedid corps and claiming that they resembled the infidels (“kefere”).

If we try to sum up the issue on esame-papers, it will suffice to put forward that during the Nizam-ı Cedid period it might be misleading to talk about the opposition of the Janissaries without taking into consideration the groups of people who were not members of the Janissary corps but held esame-papers. Bearing this in mind might also help us to question to question some taken-for-granted generalizations to the effect that the Janissaries refused reform and modernization. The issue of esame-papers was not the only the problem within the traditional military system. For instance, there seems to have been a problem in the commandership of the army. Also the mevacob was not enough for the soldiers. In fact if we take a more at the situation, it was not only the Janissaries but the whole military system which was in a state of crisis.

2.4. The Economic Problems: The İrad-ı Cedid

The İrad-ı Cedid has usually been considered among the causes of the discontent of the people to the Nizam-ı Cedid military reforms. In fact it was among the most immediate targets of the rebels of May 1807. In a document (“hüccet-i şer’iyeye”) signed by the leading military, religious and bureaucrats of the period Mustafa IV certified, by the Islamic court on 23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807, there is a reference to the İrad-ı Cedid. It criticizes the palace members and ruling elite of the Selim III’s reign for not being far sighted and for to at least illustrate the possibility of this happening. In fact, Veliefendizade Mehmed Emin Efendi is described as an influential religious authority respected by influencing Selim III and also an ardent follower of his reforms. See Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 17. Moreover, Mehmed Ragıp Efendi who was holding a considerable amount of esame-papers was mühürdar to Valide Sultan Kethüda Yusuf Efendi, counted among the Nizam-ı Cedid elite.


790 T.S.M. A. 1557 (undated).

791 T.S.A. E. 1379 (undated, reign of Mahmud II). See also an imperial edict of Selim III quoted in Ahmed Cavid, Hadika-yi Vekayi, p. 59.
introducing a major innovation, hitherto unwitnessed, under the name of the Nizam-ı Cedid. According to the document, oppression had been caused as a consequence of the measures of the İrad-ı Cedid.\textsuperscript{792} This important document was in fact a victory proclamation of the rebels and their supporters over the Nizam-ı Cedid supporters. Even though it does not mention which measures of the İrad-ı Cedid were oppressive, it is clear that the İrad-ı Cedid as whole was disliked by the party that gained the upper hand after the Rebellion.

It is not difficult to understand the rationale of those who were behind the Nizam-ı Cedid program. The ongoing unsuccessful wars on the frontiers proved the urgent need for comprehensive measures in the military realm. The available military system was not sufficient to defeat the enemies or at least to defend the borders of the Empire. There was a need to fight the enemy by the same weapons and the same military technology as the enemy was employing. Therefore, it was decided to establish a new army. Since the borders on the Balkans realm were under threat and there was a relative peace on the eastern borders, the new army was established in İstanbul, probably to protect both the capital and also the Balkans. It would be a disciplined standing army, always obedient to its commanders. Yet, the problems were not solved with this decision. The architects of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms faced the major issue of financing the new army. Since the old army remained intact and an additional new army was established, this venture would bring an extra burden on the already suffering economy. The economic system was apparently not ready for supporting such a huge program.

When he had acceded to the throne in 1789, Selim III had inherited an economy already suffering from serious problems. During the reign of Abdülhamid I, the Empire had entered into a war against the Russians (L 1201/August 1787) and only six months later against the Austrians as well (Ca 1202/February 1788). Fighting on two fronts meant an extra increase of the military expenditures, exacerbating the burden on finances of the Empire. The wars brought Ottoman finances almost to the brink of bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{793} The

\textsuperscript{792} B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1223/31 May 1807): “Sebeb-i tahrîr-i kitâb-ı şeriat- \textsuperscript{793} Cezzar, Yavuz, \textit{Osmanlı Maliyesinde Buna\'lım ve Değişim Dönemi: VIII. Yydan Tanzimat'\a Mali Tarih}, (Alan Yayıncılık, 1986), p. 112; Salzmann, Ariel, “An Ancien...
financial crisis was accompanied by a lack of liquidity. Thus Selim III faced a lack of available cash money as soon he came to power. Despite this monetary crisis, the Janissaries were demanding payment in gold, which indeed doubled the problems for the center. Selim III had no chance but to order the available full-value coins to be spent for the payment of the soldiers. To solve the crisis, imperial councils were held and finally it was decided to request from the people to deliver their gold and silver to the Imperial Treasury. Many people, including members of the palace, had obeyed the imperial order. Within two days a considerable amount of valuable items was gathered from the population. Even though only the disobedience of ulema is put under the spotlight, it seems that some other people also did not obey. For instance, the gold and silver possessions of those people, located at the bazaars of Istanbul, Edirne and Bursa, were confiscated by the state but the owners were later compensated. Due to the financial crisis, debased coinage was introduced to the internal market, the result of which was inflation. One of the most important symptoms of the dire economic straits of the Empire was the request for credit from the Netherlands and Spain, however with no positive result. As expected, inflation struck most heavily people with a limited income, a circumstance acknowledged by the Sultan himself. In a decree, he notes that prices of the basic goods had reached to a degree at which it had become impossible for the public to subsist. The merchants were


794 B.O.A. HAT 1411/57448(1203/1789).


withholding goods – even during the month of Ramazan- and then selling them twice their actual price.\footnote{HAT 174/7554 (undated, catalogue date is 1212/1797-8).} Throughout his rule, Selim III was not able to solve the existing financial problems. Moreover, his reign witnessed the French invasion of Egypt (1798-1801), Serbian Uprising (1804), the Edirne Incident (1806), the Russian War (1806-1812), and the English Naval Expedition (1807), all of which meant almost continuous additional military expenditures. Added to this was the financing of the new reforms which in itself was a costly affair.

In order not to place an extra burden on the already strained state treasury, a special fund, the İrād-ı Cedid was established for the provisioning of the army and for the payment of the new soldiers.\footnote{Halil Nuri, Tarih, p. 156b.} As might be gleaned from related codes, the İrād-ı Cedid derived a part of its income from excise taxes imposed on as raw materials, alum and dyestuffs. In addition to the tobacco custom office (“duhan giümrück”), the İrād-ı Cedid was also to draw on zecrîye tax farm, the income from which constituted the tax on wine and liquor (“rüsumat-ı hamr ve arak”). The zecrîye tax farm was converted into a share (“esham”) which was reserved for the non-Muslims, giving them by the rights that they could pass them on to their children.\footnote{Salzmann, Ariel, C., The Measures of Empire: Tax Farmers and the Ottoman Ancien Regime, 1695-1807, Ph. D. Thesis, (Colombia University, 1995), p. 421.} Moreover,

The codes of İrād-ı Cedid also stipulated the seizure of the incomes of the vacant timars as well as those whose annual income was less than 500 guruş. In order to realize this, there was a need to make a survey to acquire reliable data on these timars. However, since such a survey needed too much time, it was decided that for the time being the timars of those deceased and without an offspring as well as the vacant ones were to be seized by the New Treasury.\footnote{Halil Nuri, Tarih, p. 164.} It is difficult to determine the exact number of timars seized by this Treasury, and also to find official explanations for the seizure. However, the underlying purpose seems to have been not only to provide income for İrād-ı Cedid but also to stop the abuses in the timar system, and in addition, to capture the timars of those administrators who did not take part at the military campaigns.\footnote{These examples are provided just to give an idea on the seizures of some timar and zeamets.} For instance, 37 timars from the sancak...
of Bozok (present-day Yozgat), 13 from Üsküb and Selanik, 803, 173 from HÜDAVENDIGAR805 81 from sancak-I Kars-I Maraş806 were seized by the İrad-ı Cedid treasury and farmed them to people considered to be trustworthy by the state. There is that no doubt it was more profitable place these timars under the control of the İrad-ı Cedid rather than to keep them vacant. However, taking into consideration the problems concerning the timar surveys and tendency of local powerful figures to accumulate as much as land under their control, we might suspect that the İrad-ı Cedid administration also worked for the benefit of such rich and powerful figures. According to Yavuz Cezzar, the codes of İrad-ı Cedid with respect to the timars signified an attempt to reorganize the timar system.807 However, during the reign of Mustafa IV, the timar system would be restored to its traditional form. The timars or zeamets that had previously been seized by the İrad-ı Cedid treasury would be reserved for the pensions of the soldiers. Some other timars would be left to the control of the state treasury and the remaining group of timars, “as in old days” would be given to the assistant functioneers (“mülazim”) of the related sancaks.808

Coming to the İrad-ı Cedid regulations concerning to the life time tax-farms, i.e. the malikane system, the mirî and haremeyn revenue sources (“mukataas”) with annual interest (“faiz”) of more than 10 kese and also the “vacant “ ones would be not sold and would also

803 B.O.A. A. E. (III. Selim), 14194 (21 R 1208/26 November 1805). All of these timars were transferred as short-term tax farm (“ıltizam”) to Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey, the mutasarrıf of Bozok, upon his request with 100 guruş down payment (“muaccele”).

804 B.O.A. A. E. (III Selim) 19119 (11 Za 1219/11 February 1805). The income 9 vacant timars, reserved for pensions (“mütekaid”) of soldiers of Levend Chiftlik, was given to a certain Numan Ağa for one year, with 1310 guruş down payment.

805 B.O.A. A. E. (III. Selim) 19114 (7 M 1218/29 April 1803). 30 of these were reserved as pension for Levent Chiftlik, 18 had no owners, and the timars of the 39 timar holders who did not attend the Anapa campaign were seized. 27 were not present in the Üsküdar yoklama, and 5 from the office handling the affairs of the province of Archipelago (“derya kalemi”) were transfered to the İrad-ı Cedid and given to Elhac Ali Ağa for one year, with down payment of 9000 guruş.

806 B.O.A. C. Tımar 5031 (20 Za 1219/20 February 1805). All of them were seized and given to Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey, “ber vech-i emanet” and for one year.

807 Yavuz, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım, p. 206.

808 For a detailed documentation, see B.O.A. HAT 1359/53387 (15 N 1222/16 November 1807).
be seized by the İrad-ı Cedid. Since malikanes, seized by the İrad-ı Cedid, were not to be leased again, economic historians like Cezzar have argued that the process meant the gradual abolition of the malikane system. There is lack of detailed studies on those social groups who were affected by the new developments in the malikane system. In her chapter devoted to the application of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms in Diyarbakır, Ariel Salzmann considers this attempt at the seizure of malikanes, as a centralization effort which began to redefine the relationship between the center and the periphery. Moreover, she states that even though there was not an open revolt in the region as a reaction to this centralization process, it nevertheless severed the relationship between the center and the periphery and also imposed new and significant fiscal burdens on the local craftsmen and tradesmen.

As for the other cases of the applications of the İrad-ı Cedid stipulations, it is difficult to reach a conclusion at the present level of research. However, one might safely assume that the changes regarding the malikane system affected a considerable number of people, since the malikane system was composed of a hierarchy of system from tax-farming owner at the top to the intermediary agencies and reaching down the masses.

Connections between the İrad-ı Cedid and the May 1807 Rebellion have not been studied in detail yet. There are some sources which provide clues about the reasons of the popular resentment against the İrad-ı Cedid. Firstly, people seem to have been unable to understand its purpose and to have been frightened by its measures. We might recall that Koca Sekbanbaşı’s Treatise emphasized that if people understand what the Nizam-ı Cedid or İrad-ı Cedid meant, they would not object it. At a more general level, the problem appears to have been the inevitable control of the mukataas the New Treasury. This increasing control might have been affected not only the small holders but also the high-level state officials and the ulema and ayans. According to Salzmann, the İrad-ı Cedid reforms undermined the fiscal basis of the “Ancien Régime”. By the reforms, the author argues, threatened the fiscal privileges of the great provincial magnates, and the gentry.

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809 Halil Nuri, Tarih, p. 162a.

810 Cezzar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım, pp. 165-6. Cezzar shows that the process seizure of the “vacant” malikanes by the Imperial Mint started earlier than the establishment of the İrad-ı Cedid. See also Salzmann, “Ancien Régime Revisited”, p. 407.

811 Salzmann, Measures of Empire, p 432; Cezzar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım, pp. 161-192.

A note presumably belonging to Mahmud Tayyar Pasha, provides us with another clue about the reactions against the İrad-ı Cedid. In one note, dated 1220/1805, there is a comment that despite the strict prohibition of alcoholic beverages by Islamic law, such beverages were promoted as a source of income during this period. As mentioned above, one of the revenue sources reserved for the İrad-ı Cedid was the income from the zecriye tax farm which in turn depended on the tax on wine and liquor (rüsumat-ı hamr ve arak). Thus, the author of the note probably was referring to this state policy. According to the author, the reformists who accepted the income from such a forbidden source had in fact preferred worldly interests over the salvation. Thus, from his viewpoint, even providing income from a sinful source was an act against Islamic law.

Another problem was related to the practical application of the İrad-ı Cedid program. Corruption and other abuses by the group behind the İrad-ı Cedid seems to have increased the popular resentment. For instance, in the Legal Document (“Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye”), dated 23 Ra 1223/31 May 1807, there is an accusation against the members of palace and bureaucracy that they made the innovations (i.e. Nizam-ı Cedid and İrad-ı Cedid) solely for their self-interests. Indeed a contemporary account explains that Feyzullah Efendi, the director of the İrad-ı Cedid was dismissed from his post due to the embezzlement of more

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815 The *Hamr Emanet* was abolished in 1080/1666, and it was recreated in 1099/1687-8, in order provide revenue for the imperial treasury, which was suffering from a lack of funds the military expenses. Yet as the prevalent imperial edict also underlines, it was considered as an extraordinary source of income (“imdad-ı seferiye”) and abolished one year later. For details, see Ahmed Cavid, *Hadika-yı Vekayi*, pp. 215-222.


817 B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1223/31 May 1807).
than 1000 kese from the İrade-ı Cedid treasury.\textsuperscript{818} In an edict, Selim III also underlined such abuses and issued warned Elhac İbrahim Reşid Efendi, another director of the İrade-ı Cedid.\textsuperscript{819} In his imperial edict to the Grand Vizier, Selim III decreed that İbrahim Efendi never observed the laws of the İrade-ı Cedid. Upon his investigation, the Sultan noticed that ordinary people made great fortune with the already farmed-out mukataas. He continues by saying that

For such lands, the already-issued imperial fermans are now circulating in the hands of money-lenders; therefore each person making use of those fermans usurps a certain amount of akçes which in turn creates an annual loss of 1,000 kises in the treasury of İrade-ı Cedid. Is this a fair and equitable practice? What is worse is that we harm the people and oppress the poor under the pretext that we collect taxes as revenues. The people are now getting through the fortune of the state. From now onwards, do not allow even one akçes of İrade-ı Cedid to be usurped by anyone. In accordance with the laws, you shall inform me about which land will be leased to which mültezim, together with the amount of tax-farm. In sum, the mültezims will neither usurp even one akçes themselves nor allow anyone else, saying “this is a notable person” and so on, to benefit the tax-farms. I assigned one hundred kises of allowance for İrade-ı Cedid, provided that it would be thoroughly preserved. In case of such a usurpation, let me know everything in detail; otherwise you shall be subject to punishment.\textsuperscript{820}

Apart from mentioning the carelessness of İbrahim Efendi, the same document, provides some other insights as to what kind of abuses were taking place regarding the mukataas seized by of İrade-ı Cedid. As far as we learn from the edict of the Sultan, the related edicts of mukataas were issued for one or two years before and they were circulating between the money-lenders and pashas were also gaining income from this “illegal system.”\textsuperscript{821} According to Asım, some people also tried accumulate some commodities such as grain, honey, oil and wood using the Nizam-ı Cedid as a pretext and this illegal practice created a rapid in the prices of these goods, which in the end created

\textsuperscript{818} Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p.5a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.98.

\textsuperscript{819} B.O.A. HAT 7532 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1805). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4. Elhac İbrahim Reşid Efendi served as the director of the İrade-ı Cedid from 8 Za 1213/13 April 1799 to 13 Ra 1220/11 June 1805. See Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{820} B.O.A. HAT 7532 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1805).

\textsuperscript{821} B.O.A. HAT 7532 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1805).
inflation. As we shall see in the following chapters, abuses of the ruling elites under Selim III played a crucial role in causing hatred and resentment towards them.

2.5. The Weakening Political Legitimacy of Selim III

So far we have discussed the issues that were directly or indirectly connected to the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms. Yet it might be misleading to represent the Nizam-ı Cedid as the sole cause of the May 1807 Rebellion. In the following part, we will try to show that the perceived legitimation of Selim III underwent serious erosion and this was an important factor paving the road leading to the Rebellion. The causes of the deterioration of imperial image and the legitimacy of Selim III can be divided into two different categories: firstly, issues that were directly related to his personality, and secondly, the general events in the Empire which also undermined his political authority, the Nizam-ı Cedid being only one of them.

If we start with the first category, it is best to first look at the ideal of a “warrior” ("cihangir") sultan that was pursued by Selim III during the early years of his reign. Especially the loss of the Crimea, the first Muslim territory lost to the Russians, was a severe blow both to the rulers and subjects. Therefore, it created an expectation of the rise of a warrior sultan that would save the Crimea and change the fate of the Empire. A poem of Selim, written while he was in the royal “cage”, reflects how deeply he was affected by the loss of the Crimea.

Though the heathen tempt Islam
Behold, we stand with our glory then
While they enslave each and every Tatar
Shalt Crimea still remain in heathen hands
Now then I send the Ottomans to battle
Then I put the ungodly enemy to the cleaver
Let me get to take vengeance on the infidel


823 For the interpretation of a dream of Selim, two years after his accession to the throne, as the signal of the recapture of the Crimea, see Ahmed Cavid, Hadika-yı Vekayi, pp. 182-183.
Shalt I otherwise pass away with open eyes

The above poem reflects us the emotions of an heir to the throne, determined to overcome the problems of the Empire after coming into power. Indeed, according to Tülay Artan his poems in the royal cage, reflected the enthusiasm of Prince Selim a return from the stabilized “collective rule to charismatic rulership”. In another poem, also written while in the “cage”, Selim III expresses his enthusiasm to participate in the campaigns but also the frustration of not having the opportunity to realize his aim.

Now desires the stout heart to fight against his enemy
Yet the lattice not allows to show up in the field of the rivalry

Serious military defeats, the loss of the Crimea and continuous wars with the Austrians and Russians, might have made the common people to anticipate Selim III’s enthronement in the hope that he might have overcome the problems of the Empire and change its fate. Unfortunately, historical events that unfolded after the enthronement of Selim III must have caused disappointment for both the Sultan and his subjects. The problems of the Empire continued and Selim III was not able emulate well the ideal of a warrior sultan. The war with the Austrians and the Russians continued. Selim III tried to push through an alliance with Prussia and the Britain which would help him to regain territories lost during the time of Abdülhamid I. Meanwhile the military disasters, in October and November 1789, at Galatz, Fokshani, Rimnik, Belgrade and, finally, at Bender, created severe crisis in the capital. The crisis was multiplied with the loss of Wallachia, causing problems in the provisioning of the capital city. The enthusiasm accompanying the accession of Selim III had by now mostly faded away and people were


826 Fatih Salgar, III. Selim: Hayatı, Eserleri, (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2001), p. 73.

827 Necib Asım, “III. Selim Devrine Ait Vesikalar”, p. 397: “Efendî hazretlerini tâsîdîk cennet-mekân-î firdevs-aşîyân Abdülhamid Han zamanında avâm-î nâs ve belki hass, Sultan Selim deyû can verûb kendîm-î füllüsuna her an ve her nefes duâ ederler idi. Vaktâ ki cîlî-lî Sultan Selim mukadder olduğu vàyî cihân taze hayat bulmak ümûdi var iken fesîşhanallah hilâkat-î Adem saltalahu aleyh ve selemden birerî mêşhûd olmayan bed ve mezaîm númâyân ve memâlik-i mahûsâ ser-tâ-pâ harâb ve virân oldukdan sonra” In another entry, he prays as follows “Aman efendîm Cenab-î Hakk bir daha Selim isminde şehzâdeye selâmî vesmesün.” p. 400
looting and protesting and setting fires in the streets of İstanbul.\footnote{Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, p. 42.} Another disappointment was the result of alliance with the Prussians.\footnote{On 26 November 1789, Diez, Prussian ambassador in İstanbul offered a formal alliance with the Porte. By the proposal, the Prussians would declare war on Russia and would fight until the recovery of Crimea and the Caucasus. In return, he asked the Ottoman support for the claims of Prussia to Danzig and Thorn and return of Galicia to Poland. See Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, p. 45.} Some members of the \textit{ulema} had reacted, in the imperial council, against the Prussian alliance on the grounds that an alliance with an infidel power was against the sharia. However, an official alliance was signed with the Prussians on 31 January 1790.\footnote{Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, p. 46.} Keeping in mind Selim III’s determination to avenge himself on his enemies and to fight for his ideals, it is interesting trace his ideas changed from “\textit{cihangir sultan}” to a more bureaucratic ruler leading the Empire from the palace. At the beginning of his rule he even thought about to transfer his residence to Edirne.\footnote{Bağış, Ali İhsan, \textit{Britain and the Struggle for the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, Sir Robert Ainslie’s Embassy to İstanbul: 1776 -1794}, with a preface by M.S. Anderson, (İstanbul: ISIS, 1984), p. 68.} This change was the main issue of a conversation between an Ottoman delegate and Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon comments that the disorder in Rumelia had to be suppressed immediately and it was is necessary for the Sultan himself to pass Edirne in order to lead the military operations.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 140/5814 (13 Za 1205/24 July 1802).} The Ottoman delegate answers saying that for a long time it had not been customary for the Ottoman Sultans to lead the campaigns personally. Not satisfied with this reply, Bonaparte insists on direct participation of the Sultan in the expedition and notes that he will write a letter to the Sultan suggesting him to go to Edirne. Then he comments that it was necessary for every ruler to deal personally with the matters of his state, and the participation of the Sultan would contribute to the enthusiasm of the soldiers.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 140/5814 (13 Za 1205/24 July 1802).}

The arguments of the Ottoman delegate are supported by Selim III himself, this time in a letter to Napoleon. It seems that Napoleon had advised the Sultan to go to Edirne as the
commander of his soldiers. As a reply, Selim III explains that the conditions of the Empire during the period of its establishment were not same as conditions under his rule. During the early period, Selim III continues, the early sultans had to participate in the campaigns to spread the power of the Empire in different regions and make the local officials to work hard. However, according to Selim III, direct participation of the rulers in campaigns was no longer necessary after the stabilization of the imperial system. Loyal and hard working officials in all over the domains of the Empire were able to take care of military and administrative affairs without the direct presence of the ruler. Selim III argues that he was able to get information on the conditions of the reaya and army, thanks to direct contact with these officials. Selim III continues by assuring that the emergence of a disorder in a region or the disloyalty of a certain official were natural occurrences in every state and not peculiar to his reign. He had mechanisms in place of controlling the officials themselves as well. He concludes that there was no need for him to directly be present in person in a certain region since he would be informed on everything as if “he had himself directly attended” events. In order to further convince Bonaparte, Selim III notes that he was also dealing with issue of improving the conditions of his army. Since his enthronement, he had been seriously involved in disciplining the old army and also had established a new army (i.e. the Nizam-ı Cedid) that was rapidly increasing and expanding into various parts of the Empire. It seems that Selim III had a rationale to stay at the capital. Yet, one feels that he himself was not satisfied with his own explanations and he was trying to present the image of an active “cihängir sultan” by struggling to show that even if he was not participating in the campaigns, he was still dealing with the military issues in the capital.

The question of Selim III leading campaigns in person was also discussed in an imperial council. As far as can be understood from a relevant edict of the Sultan, the participants of the council were of the opinion that the participation of the Sultan in the campaign was crucial, while Selim III himself was reluctant. After the meeting, it was announced the Sultan would lead the campaign. However, it seems that the necessary

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834 B.O.A. HAT 6091 (6 M 1219/17 April 1804).

835 After the formal acceptance of Ottoman-Prussian alliance on 31 January 1790, Selim III decided to continue the war. The treaty had a great effect in Istanbul. Orders were sent for the recruitment of new soldiers from Anatolia and Rumelia. During these preparations, the rumours of Selim’ passage to Edirne were circulating in Istanbul. The imperial council referred by Selim III in his above imperial order must have taken place during that period. The order proves that news of his leading the campaign was not just a rumour, but officially declared news by the Porte.
preparations were not taken, consequently Selim III rebuked the officials for causing a great a scandal which put him in the difficult position of being considered as insincere by the “European states, the soldiers and people.” After noting that he would go to Edirne in the coming Spring, he orders the Salih Pasha, the kaimmakam, to make necessary preparations immediately. Then he underlines that he would punish the participants of the council if they did not make sure that he went on the campaign. It seems, however, that he was not willing to participate in the campaign at that date, either. Selim III had accepted to at least to make a journey to Edirne. Yet due to some unknown reason, even the journey was never carried out.

These fluctuations in Selim III’s attempts to come to term with the ideal of the warrior sultan must have heavily damaged his imperial prestige in the eyes of the soldiers, something that he had been very worried about anyway. The military defeats before and during his reign, as we have stated, had made people to anticipate the rise of a warrior sultan. Indeed, to a certain extent this expectation is reflected in the council mentioned above, where there seems to be a weak effort of reviving the warrior sultan image – albeit was a very weak and temporary attempt. Even though Selim III himself had acceded to the throne with the same aspiration, he was not able to live up to this image. Can we explain the failure by merely referring to changes in the character and/or image of Selim III, or as it somehow related to the structure of the Ottoman political system of the Empire in early nineteenth century? Indeed, from the late seventeenth century onwards, the absolute authority of the Ottoman sultans began to decrease. In this century, too, some rulers like Mehmed III (r.1595-1603), Osman II (r. 1618-1622), Murad IV (r. 1623-1640) and Mustafa II (r. 1695-1703) tried to revive this imperial image, yet no more as effective as the earlier periods. Thereafter, the sultans became more like symbolic figures legitimizing the continuity of the bureaucratic institutions. Especially at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the legitimacy of the Ottoman dynasty had decreased to a certain extent. This development meant that the importance of the bureaucracy was increasing, while the power of the palace was decreasing. Tülay Artan describes the process as a shift from the


charismatic rulership to collective rule whereby the rulers’ “presence at the state apartments and palace was only necessary to ensure that the appropriate bureaucratic decrees were ‘properly legitimized’”. It might be instructive to remind that Selim III used a very similar argument in order convince Napoleon. According to him, there was no need for the Ottoman sultan to lead the campaigns or physically present in the every corner of the Empire, since his loyal men took care of the state.

After the defeat and expulsion of the French armies from Egypt, Selim III added the title of warrior “Gazi” to his official titles. His acquisition of the “Gazi” title was announced in the different parts of the Empire. It is ironic that the Sultan did not actually participate in the Egyptian campaign. Even though Egypt was saved from French invasion, without the help of Russians and the British it would have been impossible to expel the French forces. Indeed, in the notes attributed to Tayyar Mahmud Pasha, the author attacks Selim III on this point. The author criticizes Selim III on the grounds that he had delivered Egypt to the “infidels” and innocents had suffered due misconduct of the “shameless ruler” ("padişah-ı bi-âr"). It might be replied that this was the opinion of an individual who was hostile to Selim III anyway. Yet, in the epic poems (”destan”) written after the invasion reflects the sentiments of the people as well:

Is this a fantasy or is it a dream?
Our reliever never shows up, are the roads snowbound?
Wake up o Sultan Selim! Hast thou a heart of stone?
All Egypt mourns, crying they long after him

.......
March on the infidel, do not neglect thy duty
No virgin bride remaineth neither any wealthy
If Egypt surrendereth to the infidel French

839 For a detailed study of the concept, see Artan, Tülay, “From Charismatic Rulership to Collective Rule”, Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Tarih, 4 (Nisan 1993), pp. 53-95.

840 B.O.A. C. Saray 3886 (5 M 1217/7 May 1802); B.O.A. C. Saray 5675 (4 Za 1216/9 March 1802). The documents are about the reception of the order by the in various the kazas in Rumelia. Forty eight judges of the kazas informed the center that the order was received.

841 Necib Asım, “III. Selim Devrine Ait Vesikalar”, p. 397. The date of the entry is 1221/1806.
O Sultan! Abdicate thy throne then, swiftly get through here.\textsuperscript{842}  

…..

O Sultan and thy vizier! Remain where ye are  
Just do not let the army starve, replenish its supply.\textsuperscript{843}

Apart from the failure of Selim III to realize his ideal of being a warrior sultan and the consequent disappointment of the public, another major cause of the decrease in Selim III’s legitimacy seems to have been his inability to produce offspring. The Times, makes some interesting comments on the causes of the May 1807 Rebellion.\textsuperscript{844} The related article begins with the statement that after the “revolution”, the unrest did not calm down in İstanbul and all the blame was placed on Selim III. According to the newspaper, the charges against him mainly revolved around his attempt to force the whole Ottoman army to adopt the European tactics and his treatment of the Janissaries with the greatest contempt. The second charge was the Sultan’s inability to produce an heir to the throne. The article informs the reader that according to the Turkish law, rulers who did not produce male offspring within seven years would be deprived of the right to the throne.\textsuperscript{845} According to the newspaper, this shortcoming of Selim III, was in fact, due to an intrigue of the mother of Prince Mustafa who had poisoned Selim III while he was in the “cage”. After the attempt was noticed, Selim III had been saved by a “speedy antidote”. However, he had lost his sexual fertility. Thus Selim III had ascended the throne amidst great melancholy. Therefore, his mother planned to produce offspring herself, most probably with Yusuf Ağa, his

\textsuperscript{842} Öztelli, Uyan Padişahum, pp. 519-21.

\textsuperscript{843} Öztelli, Uyan Padişahum, p. 537.

\textsuperscript{844} The Times, Monday, August 03, 1807; pg. 3; Issue 7115; col. C (from The Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8).

\textsuperscript{845} The Times, Monday, August 03, 1807; pg. 3; Issue 7115; col. C (from The Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8): “the late Sultan had produced no heir to the throne; so that according to the religion and laws of the country, he ought to be deprived of it. …..might be deprived of his power in seven years, the time which the Turkish law allows for the production of an heir.”
steward and “lover” Yusuf Ağa. The same story is repeated in a letter, in French, which talks about the Rebellion. One Ottoman source also alludes to the same point. In a scene depicted by Oğulukyan and taking place at the Et Meydanı, the rebels make reference to the same issue and ask Şeyhülislam whether it is reasonable to support a Sultan who has not been able to produce offspring for eighteen years. Ubeydullah Kuşmâni draws attention to the same point, but laments that his dethronement even though the inability of the Sultan was not proved yet.

The above story in *The Times* sounds like one of the stereotypical palace intrigues ascribed to the Orient. It probably reflects the gossip circulating in Pera and Galata among the Levantine part of the population. However in two respects, it still deserves mention. Firstly, it draws our attention to an issue that is not emphasized by the modern Turkish studies on Selim III, namely his inability to produce an heir to throne. We learn that it was an important source of anxiety not only for the Sultan and his mother but also for the public. Secondly, the story provides information that this was one of the issues that undermined the imperial legitimacy of Selim III. Indeed, this fact was also observed by Colonel Sorbier, a French envoy, who came to İstanbul on 9 August 1807. Sorbier had been sent by Napoleon in order to strengthen the resistance of Selim III against the military and diplomatic advances of Russia and England and to win over the Porte. However, he was only able to reach İstanbul a short time after the fall of the Sultan. In his first report on the causes of the Rebellion, Sorbier mentions the fact that the Janissaries blamed the Sultan for having no children.

*The Times* newspaper also underlines that the Sultan’s childlessness was a serious cause of anxiety for Selim III and his mother. A clue in this regard is provided by two

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846 Remaining part of the story is connected to the establishment of new military system under the initiative of Yusuf Ağa and Queen Mother.

847 From Isaac Morier to George Canning, Principal Secretary of State Foreign Affairs, Malta, 1 August 1807, (PRO, FO 78-58).


849 Kuşmâni, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 26a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p.137.

850 For more detailed information on his mission see Black, C. E., “Sorbier’s Mission to Constantinople”, *The Journal of Modern History*, 16/1 (March 1944), pp. 23-30.

Ottoman sources. On 13 Za 1205/14 July 1791, the pregnancy of a concubine has been announced to the public after the Friday prayer in the Ayasofya Mosque. In the source, it is emphasized that the people had rejoiced upon the news and began to wait for the birth of an heir to the throne.\textsuperscript{852} However, it later became clear that the news was unfounded. The author of \textit{Diş Ruzname} remarks in an entry dated 2 B 1206/25 February 1792 that all the experienced midwives had been brought to the palace and they all confirmed that the concubine was not pregnant. Then, he goes on to narrate the whole story: A concubine had been brought to the palace by \textit{Başçukadar} Gürçü Hüseyin Ağa,\textsuperscript{853} during the reign of Mustafa III. When it was understood that the concubine a free woman of Tartar origin, she was dismissed from the palace. However, she later showed some symptoms of pregnancy and in order to get some money from the queen mother (\textit{Valide Sultan}), she informed her that she was pregnant. According to the author, Valide Sultan and palace dignitaries granted great amounts of money to her. During the celebrations in the city expenditures reached to 9809 \textit{kese}.\textsuperscript{854} Câbî Ömer Efendi, without giving much detail, notes down the rejoicing and later disappointment of the people and the palace members when it was discovered that it was a false pregnancy.\textsuperscript{855} It seems that about seven months after the news of the pregnancy of the concubine, it was proved that the pregnancy was false. For our purposes, rejoicing of the Valide Sultan, the early announcement of the pregnancy and the expenditures for the occasion are clues about the anxiety of the palace on the issue of availability of an heir to the throne.

As might be recalled, \textit{The Times} also mentions an attempt to poison Selim III while he was in the “cage”. It is hard to be sure whether it really happened or not. An Ottoman historian, Câbî Ömer Efendi also makes a short reference to it. He narrates that the event had taken place during the time of Abdülhamid I. However, according to him, it was not the mother of Prince Mustafa but Nazif Efendi who attempted to poison Prince Selim. The


\textsuperscript{853} This should be Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. He entered the palace during the reign of Mustafa III and became a confident of Selim III. After the rise to power of Selim III, he became \textit{mabeynci} and \textit{tebdilci} to \textit{hane-i hassa}. In M 1204/September-October 1789, he became başçukadar. On, 16 B 1206/10 March 1792 he was appointed as the grand admiral. He married Esma Sultan, the daughter of Abdülhamid I. For more details, see the appendix I..

\textsuperscript{854} Uzunçarşılı, “\textit{Diş Ruzname}”, 618.

reason of hatred of Nazif Efendi seems to be connected to the Selim’ secret correspondences with Louis XVI and Nazif Efendi’s betrayal of this fact to Abdülhamid I.\textsuperscript{856} Being afraid that Selim III would murder him after acceding to the throne, Nazif Efendi planned the assassination. He sent two concubines to Prince Selim with instructions to poison him. However, one of the concubines, who fell in love with Selim, warned the Prince. After rise to power, Selim executed Nazif Efendi, under the pretext that “\textit{they have attempted to assassinate me and destroyed my ability to produce offspring}.”\textsuperscript{857} Despite the differences in details, the similarity of both accounts regarding the connection between the poisoning and failure of Selim III to have an heir is interesting. With available information, it is quite difficult to decide on the issue, yet the story might have been produced by the palace in order to give a “reasonable” explanation to public concerning the inability of Selim III to produce an offspring. Especially the unlikely connection between the poison and inability to produce offspring makes one suspect that spread of such an explanation would serve for the purpose of depicting Selim III as an innocent victim of an early assassination attempt.

Another attempt to assassinate Selim III took place three years after his enthronement. On 20 R 1206/15 December 1791, the Sultan paid a visit to the Ayasofya Mosque to perform the Friday prayer. During the prayer, an Arab attacked threw a \textit{misket gülle} at the Sultan. One of the \textit{gülle} broke the lattice (“\textit{kafes}”) and which had fallen before the ağas of \textit{hane-i hassa}.\textsuperscript{858} The assassin was captured and immediately executed.\textsuperscript{859} Câbi

\textsuperscript{856} Nazif Efendi (d. 1203/1789) was the son of Hacı Selim Ağa. He followed a bureaucratic career, became \textit{Ruzname-i evvel} (1190/1776) and director of the Imperial Mint (1192/1778). In R 1196/February 1783, he became the chief of the accounting officer (“\textit{baş muhasebeci}”) and one year later \textit{defterdar-i ıkki-i evvel} (Ca 1198/March 1784). He acquired the post of \textit{sadaret} kethüda on 4 B 1199/12 May 1785, but dismissed on 7 Za 1198/11 September 1785. His second appointment to the same post was on Za 1202/August 1788. Nazif Efendi was a figure close to Abdülhamid I and the faction of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha. His wife, Dürüşehvar Hanım, was a daughter of Abdülhamid I. He also seems to have had role in the reveal of the attempt of Prince Selim (III) to usurp the throne. He and his father Hacı Selim Ağa were executed after the rise of Selim to the throne (27 N 1203/21 June 1798). See Edib, \textit{Tarihi}, pp. 131-2, Uzunçarşılı, “Halil Hamid Paşa”, pp.239, 247-50; Mehmed Süreyya, \textit{Sicill-i Osmanı}, vol. IV, p. 1235.


\textsuperscript{858} \textit{Hane-i Hassa} is the department in the Palace where the sacred relics were kept.

\textsuperscript{859} Edib, \textit{Tarihi}, p. 260. Edib Efendi states that he looked like an Algerian (“\textit{Magribi}”) and did not know Turkish.
states that he was murdered at the spot without any interrogation.\textsuperscript{860} The attempt seems to have aroused agitation among the public. Although it was narrated that the assassin declared that Murad Bey owed him, the author of the \textit{Ruzname} says that actual reason remained undetermined. The author argues that the assassin was a fool (“\textit{deli}”).\textsuperscript{861} After the assassination attempt, a process of hunting down the vagrants in the city, especially the Arabs, was initiated. Three days later, an imperial edict was produced decreeing the expulsion of the suspects from the city.\textsuperscript{862} It seems that the expulsion of the vagrants from İstanbul was not an easy process and it does not seem to have been very effective. For instance, about one month later, 10 Ca 1206/5 January 1792, even though most of the inns, bath houses and districts were cleared of the vagrants, it seems that they were still protected by the certain individuals or groups. For instance, some of those who were expelled from the city claimed that they were Algerian in origin and especially those in Galata were later employed by Cezayirli Seydi Ali Pasha. Likewise, the medrese students (“\textit{suhtes}”) of Sultan Mehmed Medrese sought protection by high religious officials.\textsuperscript{863}

Another incident that might have been an assassination attempt happened took place during an imperial trip to Bahariye, on the very eve of the Rebellion when the gossips circulating around about the issue of uniforms. According to Câbî, while the Sultan was sitting in the residence in Bahariye, a snake emerged behind the cushion he leaned over. Only Câbî mentions the incident. Unfortunately, he does not make any reference whether it was an attempt to assassinate the Sultan or not. Yet, the possibility of an attempt to kill Sultan deserves to be taken into consideration.\textsuperscript{864}

One more crucial point in the increase in the dissatisfaction with the rule of Selim III was his incompetency, at least in the eyes of the people, to control the ruling elite around himself. As we shall see in the final chapter, there was great hatred towards the ruling elite among the common people and especially the rebels. Particularly the abuses attributed these

\textsuperscript{860} Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 89. Câbî describes the assassin as “\textit{Özbek kiyafet[li] kimesne}” and there is no reference whether he was a “fool” or not. He also notes that Selim III became angry with those who murdered him without questioning the cause of his attempt. According to him, the assassin threw stone to the Sultan.

\textsuperscript{861} Uzunçarşılı, “\textit{Diş Ruzname}”, pp. 615-6.

\textsuperscript{862} Uzunçarşılı, “\textit{Diş Ruzname}”, p. 616.

\textsuperscript{863} Uzunçarşılı, “\textit{Diş Ruzname}”, p. 618.

\textsuperscript{864} Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. p. 126.
leading officials seem to have caused animosity among the people. More interesting case seems to be that of Ebubekir Efendi. He had no expressed hostility towards Selim III or his reform policy. Yet, his deep hatred of the abuses of the ruling elite of Selim III made him to celebrate the May 1807 rebellion, as a movement abolishing the despotism of these figures. The line between criticizing a ruler and his cabinet appears very delicate and easy to cross. In Asım’s case, for instance, hatred of the cabinet also turns out into a criticism of Selim III for allowing his officials’ abuses and becoming a puppet in their hands. In Ebubekir’s writing there is no explicit criticism of Selim III, but no praise of him either.

As it is well-known the Nizam-ı Cedid was among the most important factors that undermined the legitimacy of the Selim III. For the Janissaries, it was a move away from the tradition order and a policy that caused a disruption in the social order, aimed at the Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi argues that despite abolition of the Nizam-ı Cedid by the Sultan, the rebels did not want to put an end the rebellion on the grounds that that the Sultan had not abolished it during the Edirne Incident when many innocent people had been murdered and now would never end it. He had promised to abolish the rival troops – the Nizam-ı Cedid army – after the Edirne Incident, but had not kept his promise. This is a point that is also emphasized by foreign observers. Sorbier’s report also states that Selim III was accused of not disbanding the regular troops despite his promises.

Selim III was an unlucky sultan. Apart from his failure to recapture Crimea, his subjects had to digest many other serious problems as well. As we have mentioned previously, one of the greatest shocks was the invasion of Egypt. To this was added the Wahhabi attack on the holy places of Islam. Wahhabism started as a puritanical religious movement in Arabia, but adopted a political character after the coalition between the Saudi rulers. In 1803, they gained the control of Mecca and the following year ravaged Madina. In 1805, the Wahhabis also gained the control of Madina and established again control over

Mecca. In February 1807, the Saudi ruler did not allow the entrance of the pilgrims into the holy places.\textsuperscript{869} The pilgrims had to return without performing the pilgrimage. Since the protection of the roads to Mecca was one of the most important duties of the Ottoman Sultans, the redirecting of anger at them was something natural. In other parts of the Empire, criticism was directed to Selim III for not being able to protect the holy places and prevent the failure of pilgrimages. Most people thought that it was an act of divine punishment on the Ottoman dynasty.\textsuperscript{870} Probably in reply such criticisms, Asım argues that the Sultan spent great effort and money on protecting the roads, but such a disaster had occurred due to the ignorance and disloyalty of his officials.\textsuperscript{871} Sorbier’s report also mentions that Selim III was accused failing to protect the caravan to Mecca.\textsuperscript{872} As we shall see in the following chapter, it was again during his rule a British navy force threatened the capital city of the Empire.

2.5.1. Struggle for the Throne?

Sultan Mahmud, my brother, went into the cage, meaning he was captivated in the royal cage. He never caught a glimpse of worldly pleasures. In the sense that ‘one who do not taste does not know [tatmayan bilməz”]’, he became like a blind and deaf. I, on the other hand, had already reached the age of twelve, already held a taste of earthly joyce. I have seen nice places. Reflections of the splendors called sociability and friendship had already touched my soul deeply. However, immediately after the death of my father, they put me into my place of isolation without allowing me say farewell to my servants and friends. An amusement ground consisting of a narrow alley barely a few feet wide as a porch, being

\textsuperscript{869} Founder of the religious movement was Muhammed b. Abdalvahhab (b. 1703-d. 1787?). In the year 1744, he established a marriage alliance with Muhammed b. Suud (d. 1766). This is also considered as the emergence of the Saudi Emirate. Following the death of Muhammed b. Suud, his son Abdülaaziz followed the policy of his father and tried to expand the areas under of influence. For more information the Wahhabi movement, see Kursun, Zekeriya, Necid ve Ahsa’da Osmanlı Hakimiyeti: Vehhabi Hareketi ve Suud Devleti’nin Ortaya Çıkısı, (Ankara: TTK, 1998); Commins, David, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006); Çağatay, Neşet, “Vehhabilik”, İslam Ansiklopedisi (Eskişehir: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001)

\textsuperscript{870} Driault, E., Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, Sebastiani ve Gardan, translated from French by Köprülüzâde Mehmed Fuad, (İstanbul: Kanaat Kitaphanesi, 1329) p. 51.


stuck here all the time with a couple of hideous Arabs and a bunch of slave-girls who speak no word of Turkish, how is this better than being held in a dungeon for a long time.873

This very tragic and human cry belongs to Prince Mustafa (IV). He was the son of Abdülhamid I and was forced to seclusion after the enthronement of his cousin Selim IV.874 Mustafa’s resentment at being isolated from the rest of the world is very clear and one feels that he was ready to try every possible way to get out from the “cage”, a place which was worse than a dungeon for him. Unfortunately, as he certainly knew, the only ways for an Ottoman prince to be free from the “cage” were either to die or to ascend to the throne. Therefore, he seems to have been involved in schemes to usurp the throne of his cousin.

Indeed, the above quotation was part of his reply to one of his confidants who had advised him to give up his plans of usurpation of the throne. In the rest of the same letter, Mustafa tries to justify his intention to dethrone Selim III by arguing that Selim, too, had been involved in intrigues against the reigning Sultan (Abdülhamid I), while he was the heir to the throne.875 In order to convince his confidant to whom the letter is addressed, Mustafa

873 T.S.M.A. E. 2650 (undated, catalogue date is 1202-3/1787-89); Öz, “Selim III, Mustafa IV ve Mahmut II”, p. 26: “Kardeşim Sultan Mahmud kafese girdi yani harem saray-ı uzlete giriştir oldu. Cihân lezzeti ne idi gormedi men lem yezuk lem ya’rif kabilinden a’ma ve asam gürühundan oldu. Velâkin benim sînnim on iki yaşına bağlı olmuş lezzet-i cihândan hüssini almış idim. Seyr ü seyrângâhların görmüş idim. Üns ü ülfet dedikleri ellez ü lezîz-i cîlvelerin merâyâsı ruhuma tes’îr etmiş idi. Ve bunlar emsâli lezâiz-i cihân ile ülfet ve meşgül iken nâ-gehân pederim Abdülhamid Han vefât eylediğinde anda galmânlaridan ve gerek etbâ’ ve ehibbâlaridan biriyle vedâ dahi meydân birakmayıp revân v der-akab bizleri harem saray-ı uzletimiz olan bir köşeye çelis ve avlu olarak her an bir fersah miktârı ancaq olabilir bir ara bahçeden ibâret bir seyrângâh bu kadarca mekrûhül-manzar bir kaç arab ile beş on nefer Türkçe bilmez cevarî ile dâimül’evkat hemen bir mahalde kalma zindanda tulâ’-yu medîd ile kalmakdan ne fark olabilir.”

874 Abdülhamid I had two sons: Mustafa (IV) and Mahmud (II).

875 The letter is quoted in a report made to a certain individual, probably to Mahmud II. It was written during the reign of Mahmud II, probably after the execution of Mustafa IV. It might be suspected that it was written by one of the enemies of Mustafa IV in order prove the latter’s intrigues against Selim III. Yet, the author seems to be objective and accuses both Selim and Mustafa for being involved in intrigues against the ruling sultan while they were in cage. Rather than blaming one side, the aim of the author seems to prove that fact that struggles for throne brought calamities upon the Empire. Even though Mustafa IV is one of the most discredited rulers of the Ottoman Empire, and his letter might be considered as a proof of his intrigues against Selim III, I think his letter is very valuable insofar as it is one the very few humane reflections on the life of a prince in royal cage.
asserts that he could not bare to live in isolation anymore and would prefer to die rather than remain in the cage. He goes on to ask his confidant for help if he did not want to witness his death.

The author of the above report argues that the efforts of Prince Mustafa against Selim III were insignificant attempts without any serious result. According to the author this fact was related to the transformation that had taken place how Ottoman princes were educated. Thanks to the practice of sending the princes to the sancaks, the earlier princes had had military and political power and were consequently more dangerous in the struggle for the throne. After the introduction of the cage system, however, the princes lost the access to political and military power, therefore were left only with the possibility of sending letters to various people for help.

The author’s argument is illuminating in the sense that since the princes themselves did not have any military and political power, the most rational choice for them was to collaborate with the influential people in order to benefit from their political and military power, like Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa, Tayyar Pasha or Hafız İsmail Pasha. There are some examples of connections and intrigues used by Prince Mustafa to secure his rise to the throne. According to the above-mentioned author, Prince Mustafa sent letters to Pehlivan Ağa in order to encourage him to rebel, via his household merchant (“kapı bezirgani”) encouraging him to rebel. Indeed, as we shall see in the following chapters, there are some clues as to the connection of Pehlivan Ağa with Prince Mustafa. In the case of revolt of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha, the author claims that Prince Mustafa provoked Tayyar Pasha, with the consideration that if the revolt grew, it would lead to the fall of Selim III. The

876 Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa (Pasha) (d. 1807) served in various military posts. He became ağa of the Janissaries on 24 Ş 1221/6 November 1806. For more details, see Appendix I.

877 The author says that he was informed of the news by one of confidants of Mustafa IV, who in turn had learnt from executed mirahor-i evvel Seyyid Mehmed Ağa. See T.S.M.A. E. 2650 (undated, catalogue date is 1202-3/1787-89); Öz, “Selim III, Mustafa IV ve Mahmut II”, p. 25.

878 T.S.M.A. E. 2650 (undated, catalogue date is 1201-3/1787-89); Öz, “Selim III, Mustafa IV ve Mahmut II”, p. 25.
role of Prince Mustafa was only to make problems worse by collaborating with certain individuals or to exploit the problems and establish different alliances.

Another method for an heir to throne to employ was to trigger disorder and exploit the already existing tensions or problems which would undermine the legitimacy of the reigning sultan and might in the end lead to a rebellion. In a similar way, rather than creating new problems for Selim III, Prince Mustafa used already existing ones. As we have discussed above, there was a growing dissatisfaction to Selim III and his ruling elite, especially as we come closer to May 1807. The reform policy of Selim III had created dissatisfied groups, ready to take sides. Under these conditions, Prince Mustafa had one wonderful opportunity to win over the public opinion. We will never be sure whether Mustafa (IV) was actually against the Nizam-ı Cedid reform. His policies after coming to the throne do not show a Sultan completely against reforming the Empire. Prince Mustafa’s attempt to collaborate with Pehlivan Ağ a proves that Mustafa followed the clever policy of collaborating with the highest official of this military class. The language of the Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye suggests that rather being personally opposed to reform, he followed a populist policy in order to win over the crowds. He promised the people, and especially the Janissaries what they wanted to hear, the abolition of the Nizam-ı Cedid and the regaining of their earlier prestige. We will suggest that the Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye might also evaluated as a legal and official document proving that he kept his promise and followed his policy of acting as the patron of the Janissaries. While Prince Mustafa needed military help in order to ascend the throne, the Janissaries might have considered him as a good alternative to Selim III. Thus, he acted as the champion of the Janissaries who were disdained for long time by the ruling elite and the Selim III. This might explain the love of Janissaries to him.879 In some instances, he was referred by the Janissaries as the “beloved of the Janissaries” (“ocağın gulü”).880

879 A poem written following the murder of Mustafa IV after the Janissary revolt of 1808, expresses the sentiments of the Janissaries well: “Saray kapıları birden açıldı /İstanbul içinde ateş saçılıdı/Sultan Mustafa’ya hulle biçildi/Ağlaman gaziler der yeniçeri Öksüzler babası dünyadan göçtü/mektep çocukları duaya geçti/ocaklı kullarına mahzunluk çöktü/Onun için ağlıyor der yeniçeri”. See Öztelli, Uyan Padişahım, from Alemdar Mustafa Paşa Destanı, p. 107.

880 After the Alemdar Incident, the Janissaries had marched to the Palace and Mahmud II had murdered Mustafa IV in order to prevent his reaccession, guaranting his stay at the throne. Meanwhile the Janissaries at the At Meydani were crying out for the enthronement of Mustafa IV, saying that “we demand our beloved” (“ocağımızın gülünü isteriz”). When the news of his murder had reached the Janissaries at the At Meydani, they
Coming to the role of Prince Mustafa in the outburst of the May 1807 Rebellion, the contemporary narratives provide some clues. For instance, according to Asım, Abdurrahman Ağa, the kahvecibaşı of Mustafa’s mother, had gone to the fortresses in disguise after the outburst of the rebellion. Oğulukyan also gives similar information on the role of Abdurrahman Ağa. However, his involvement is usually narrated as starting sometime after beginning of the Rebellion. Mustafa Necib Efendi provides a general picture of involvement of Prince Mustafa. According to the author, the Prince first attempted to gain an upper hand during the rebellion of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha, and then in the Edirne Incident. However, when he was not successful in turning these incidents into a general uprising, Mustafa began to provoke the yamaks. Mustafa Necib Efendi also claims that with the help of his men in the palace and in İstanbul, Prince Mustafa had collaborated with some members of the religious and military classes. Thus a clique was formed with the aim of securing Prince Mustafa’s rise to the throne. This fraction, according to Mustafa Necib, included Musa Pasha, the kaimmakam.

The struggle for throne seems to be an integral part of the May 1807 Rebellion, together with the decrease in the imperial legitimacy of Selim III. With the purpose to usurp the throne, Prince Mustafa considered every problem as an opportunity to use for his own benefits.

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were shocked and then demanded at least to see his corpse and shouted that they did not want Sultan Mahmud as the sultan. When they were reminded that they had no alternative other than Mahmud, the Janissaries made the very interesting reply: “Esma Sultan olsun”, some suggested “Crimean khans” and some others suggested “Konya Monlâ Hünkâr olsun”. Finally a group of people replied that “her kim olursa olsun, padişah bir adam değil mi? Kim olursa olsun Allah ocağımıza zevâl vermesin.” See T.S.M.A. E. 2650. (The anonymous narrator notes that the dialogue had passed between him and the Janissaries at the At Meydanı). See also Emecen, Feridun, “Osmanlı Hanedanı Alternatif Arayışlar Üzerine Bazı Örnekler ve Mülahazalar”, İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi, 6 (2001), p. 75.

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882 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 35.
2.6. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to pinpoint some important domestic issues that played a role in the outburst of the rebellion of May 1807. The *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms stand at the top of the list of the causes of the rebellion. However, the economic problems, the decrease in the legitimacy of Selim III and the efforts of Prince Mustafa to usurp the throne are important factors that must not be ignored.

We tried to concentrate on the reactions to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reform program and endeavoured to make a categorization of the opposition to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* in different periods. A detailed study of the period revealed during the first period (1792-1805) there were not collective reactions to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms. Contrary to the argument of Stanford Shaw, the opposition was weak and remained at individual level. The second period, on the other hand, was marked by rise in the collective reactions to the reforms. Three important incidents occurred during the same period: the Selimiye Mosque, the revolt of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha and finally the Edirne Incident. The first one was a reaction of the Janissaries to their replacement by the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers in the Friday Prayer ceremony. Though there were some implications in the revolt of Tayyar Pasha that it was against the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms, it seems to be a better approach not to ignore another aspect of the uprising that it was a struggle for power between the two dynasties of Anatolia. The Edirne Incident, on the hand, was a collective reaction of the Thracian population and some of the ayans to the expansion of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* into the Rumelia.

The intensification of the opposition to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms was also accompanied by a struggle on ideological level. As might be noticed we paid more attention to the perception of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* by different segments of society, depending on some clues provided in the treatises studied in the prevalent section. Particularly the treatises of Kuşmâni and Koca Sekbanbaşı tried to silence the opposing party to the reforms. The main targets of these authors seem to have been the Janissaries who, according to these authors, considered the new military system as threat to their livelihood and privileges. As far as reflected in these sources, the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms were considered, by most segments of society, as a new military system that might be defined as constant military drills, uniformity and denial of heroic deeds. The gap between the Janissaries’ ideal of war did not match to the process of the standardization, uniformity and strict rank-and-file hierarchy that was trying to be established by the new military system.
Particularly the uniforms and the some musical instruments used by the new army seem to be the major issues of discontent. Apart from the military issues, the establishment of the İrade-i Cedid, especially its income from the alcoholic beverages, and the seizure of some timars seem to be the basic sources of discontent among certain groups of people.

The main argument of this chapter was actually to underline that the Nizam-i Cedid reform was not the sole problem of the Empire, rather it brought to the surface the other major problems of the period. Moreover, the Nizam-i Cedid program was used as a pretext by certain groups, including Prince Mustafa (IV) to achieve their own goals. We will see in the next chapter, the same argument was also relevant for some international powers as well.
CHAPTER 3
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE GREAT POWERS

“We must save them in spite of themselves” 884

3.1. Introduction

The Porte became one of the main centers of the European diplomacy during the period under study in this work. It was not by chance that we see the establishment of the permanent consulates during the same period. 885 The Empire, no more militarily powerful, gave importance to diplomatic relations. Moreover, there seems to be a remarkable xenophobia among the Ottoman ruling elite regarding the secret intentions of the foreign powers. Within this context, the need to establish a regular and stationary army to defend the imperial domains becomes more meaningful. If we recall that the underlying concern of the authors mentioned in the second chapter, was to create a strong army against the foreign

884 From Arbuthnot to Rear Admiral Louis, Pera, 25 November 1806, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 5)

powers, we can understand that this external danger was also the most important source of anxiety for them. This appears to be a well-grounded fear of a once-powerful empire that was forced to adopt a defensive position.

The present chapter is an attempt to put the May 1807 Rebellion into an international context concentrating on the period from 1806 to 1807. The Empire experienced two very serious incidents in the international arena during that period. The Porte declared war on Russia, and suffered from the naval expedition of the British fleet anchoring off Seraglio which found its reverberations conditions too. The first part is about the relationship of the Porte with Russia, Britain and France until the appointment of Sebastiani as the French ambassador to the Porte. Sebastiani’s appointment was a breaking point since his appointment brought very important changes in the foreign relations of the Porte. After his coming to the capital, the Porte changed alliances and came closer to the orbit of France than the old allies, namely Russia and Britain. Moreover, Sebastiani played an important role in the break of war with Russia after the crisis of the Principalities.

The second part is devoted to the British Naval Expedition/Dardanelles Operation. Through a detailed study of the incident, we aim not only to explore its importance in the military and diplomatic history, but also to underline the great panic prevailed over the masses and the ruling elite witnessing the arrival of the enemy fleet at the capital of the Empire. The British Naval Expedition played a role in directing the popular hatred towards the ruling elite, a hatred that found expression during the course of May 1807 uprising. The final part concerns related to the relationship between the Porte and France. However, rather than giving a chronological account, it attempts to find some answers to two important questions. The first one is about the policy of Napoleonic France in respect to the Porte and the second one is whether the great powers of the period, particularly France, had an involvement in the uprising.

On very general terms the aim of this chapter is to place the May Rebellion to a wider framework of international politics and make more of the internal events appear in a more meaningful light. It will also help us to avoid, as far as possible, the reductionist trap of looking at the Rebellion from the narrow perspective of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms.
Therefore, the primary aim of the present chapter will be to study the complex relationship between the internal and external problems of the Empire which, was reflected in both arenas.

3.2. The Porte and the Great Powers

3.2.1. Triple Alliance and France (1798-1806)

The years immediately before the Rebellion saw the increase of problems in the domestic sphere. The international arena was also becoming more and more complicated. The main actor of the period was the Napoleonic France, altering the existing political situation, creating new alliances and causing the creation of new ones. Since the present status quo did not fit into the Near Eastern policy of Napoleon, he tried to change it according to the interests of the French government. All these developments did not take long to get reflected in the relationship between the Porte and France.

The good relations between France and Ottoman Empire were reversed due to invasion of Egypt in 1798. The unexpected attack of Napoleon to this valuable province had forced the Ottoman Empire to establish an alliance with her traditional enemy Russia and also England, “partly in consequence of his [Napoleon’s] implied threat to march from occupied Egypt through Syria and perhaps to take possession of the Dardanelles.”

After the Campo-Formia Treaty, signed between France and the Hasburgs in October 1797, the Russians were pressing hard to make an alliance with the Porte. Yet, their suggestion had not been warmly received by the Porte. However, with the invasion of Egypt, the Porte had no chance but to accept the offer to help. A formal alliance was signed with the Russians in 3 January 1799 and two days later, with Great Britain. The Treaty was to last for eight years and the crucial article of the agreement was to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman

Empire. According to the treaty, the Porte granted the grant right of passage through the Straits to the Russian warships during the war.\textsuperscript{887} The Triple Alliance was established and thanks to the joint attacks of the allies, Napoleon’s first attempt to gain a stronghold in the East was doomed to failure.

Napoleon was not a person to uncontestedly leave the political arena to his rivals, and tried gain to his former influence over the Porte. The Triple Alliance was not so strong and continually weakened by the distrust of the each party towards the others. The Porte never trusted its traditional enemy, i.e. the Russians. There was the problem of Corfù, saved from the French by blockage of the allies (3 March 1799). A joint system of occupation was established thereafter in the region.\textsuperscript{888} But there were problems in terms of the rights of each state over this region. The strategic position of Corfù was making it a playground of international rivalry.\textsuperscript{889} In fall of the same year, the tensions increased since the Russians passed more than 8,000 soldiers to Corfù. The negotiations with Russia and Great Britain started in İstanbul. Finally, a settlement was reached by a Russo-Ottoman convention agreed upon on 21 March 1800.\textsuperscript{890} According to the agreement, the Ionian Islands were organized as a republic under the name of The Septinsular Republic.\textsuperscript{891} This Republic


\textsuperscript{888} Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, pp. 267-8.

\textsuperscript{889} Corfù, with its safe harbour, was one of the most important places in the Adriatic Gulf. Its closeness to the coast of Albania, made Albania open to attack from that Island. Therefore, it was very reasonable for the Porte to keep the region under its control in order to protect Albania.

\textsuperscript{890} Soysal, İsmail, \textit{Fransız İhtilali ve Türk-Fransız Diplomasi Münasebetleri (1789-1802)}, (Ankara: TTK, 1999), 302; Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, p. 270.

\textsuperscript{891} In Ottoman Turkish it was called “\textit{Cezâir-i Seba-i Müctemia Cumhûru}.” The Seven Isles (Corfù, Zante, Cephalonie, Ithaqa, Saint-Maure, Paxo, Cerigo) and smaller ones around it originally belonged to the Venetians. The region in question was conquered by France in 1797 and handed over to France, in accordance with the Treaty of Campo-Formio. With the joint expedition of the Ottoman and Russian navies, smaller ones were captured in the fall 1798. Corfu was recaptured from France on 5 March 1799, while the areas in the vicinity of Albania passed to the control of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha. See Boris Mouraivieff, \textit{L’Alliance Russo-Turque au Milieu des Guerres Napoleoniennes}, preface de
would have a senate and constitution that would be approved by the Russians and the Ottomans and would be under the joint protection and guarantee of both countries. It was accepted that the Republic was formally under the suzerainty of the Ottomans, to whom it was to pay a tribute ("cizye") every three years. 892 The new status of the Seven Isles was recognized by the Amiens Treaty (27 March 1802) as well. 893 The Seven Islands continued to be a problem between the Russians and the Ottomans for several years to come. 894

In 1802, the French Revolutionary Wars ended with a general pacification of Europe. It provided an opportunity for Napoleon to turn to Near Eastern affairs and try to reverse the setbacks experienced during the Egyptian expedition. 895 The Porte, having some problems with Russia, was also ready to reach an understanding with France. In other words, both states were ready to return their prewar relations. Thus, negotiations started between these two countries. During the negotiations, Bonaparte secretly guaranteed the protection of the Ottoman territories against possible attacks by Britain and Russia. 896 Consequently, Paris Peace Treaty was signed on 25 June 1802 and the formal ratifications were exchanged on 8 September. Each party promised mutual help if one was attacked by

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892 For more details, see Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, pp. 302-3.

893 The Amiens Treaty was signed by Britain on the one side and France, Spain and the Netherlands on the other. The Treaty meant the end of revolutionary wars in Europe. The Porte was not represented in the negotiations that ended with the Treaty. The presence of Russians in the islands and British in Egypt was forcing Selim III to make a separate peace with France. His attempt was not successful and Amiens Peace Treaty was signed before the coming of the Ottoman delegate, Galib Efendi. When the news of the treaty reached the capital, the Sultan got very annoyed with Russia and Britain for not having consulting the Ottoman plenipotentiary. See Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 280; Sosyal, Fransız İhtilali, p. 314.

894 By the Tilsit Treaty, (9 July 1807), Russia delivered the Seven Islands to France. However, upon the conquest of the region by Britain and they passed to the British. In the following year, it became an independent state under the British protection. See Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, p. 304.

895 Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 1.

896 Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 2.
another state, and guaranteed the territorial integrity of each other. The ancient capitulations were renewed, with the new Ottoman grant of opening of the Black Sea and the Straits to the French trade. Thus, very soon after the Egyptian conflict, better relations between the two countries seemed to have been established, while the Triple Alliance seemed likely to break apart. Napoleon was quick in benefiting from the above peace treaty and initiated his program of regaining the trust of the Porte. For this purpose he sent General Brune, who was instructed, among other things, to restore and develop the commercial relations with the Porte. General Horace Sebastiani, a name that was to be heard frequently in the following years, was sent to the capital with Levant with the duty of making an investigating the Levant. In these years, Napoleon was especially concerned to with reestablishing the prewar relationship with the Porte, especially in commerce, with the prospect of enabling the Russian commerce with the Russia thanks to the right of passage from the Black Sea.

During the year 1804, the Porte preserved its neutrality and tried to detain both sides, despite the constant pressure applied by the representatives of the great powers in the capital. Most important one in this regard were the efforts of Brune. He struggled hard

897 Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, pp. 334-7; Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 281.
898 Britain, official ally of the Porte, was given the same right on 24 July 1802, about one month later from France.
900 Guillaume-Marie-Anne, Marshall Brune (b.1763-d. 1815) was the French ambassador to the Porte between the years of 1802 and 1804. See Bacque-Grammont, Jean-Louis, Kuneralp, Sinan and Hitzel, Frederick, Représentants Permanents de la France en Turquie (1536-1991), (İstanbul-Paris, ISIS, 1991), pp. 45-7.
901 Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 3; Driault, Edouard Selim-i Salis ve Napoleon: Napoloyun Şark Siyaseti, Sebastiani ve Gardan, translated by Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad, (Dersaadet: Kanaat Matbaasi, 1329/1911), pp. 29-32. B.O.A. HAT 140/5807.G (17 Ca 1217/15 September 1802), notes that Sebastiani was sent to Algeria.
902 For a good summary of commerce in and passage through the Black Sea, see Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, pp.10-3.
903 B.O.A. HAT 31/1494 (undated)
convince the Sultan for a formal recognition of the imperial title of Napoleon. The Ottoman ministers were afraid that if the Porte refused the recognition, Napoleon would declare war against the Empire. In a meeting, Reisülküttab Mahmud Raif Efendi expressed this problem to Fonton, the chief interpreter of the Russian ambassador. The former insisted that it was not reasonable for the Porte to enter into a war with this great power just for the refusal of a title. The issue left the Porte in a very difficult position, due to its efforts to maintain neutrality. The allies, on the other hand, were trying to convince the Sultan that Napoleon had designs in Egypt and Greece. Consequently, Napoleon sent a letter to the Sultan denying all such rumours. In reply, Selim III assured him that he did not believe the false news and commented that it consisted of gossips originating from those trying to worsen the good relations between the two states.

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905 Mahmud Raif Efendi functioned as reisülküttab from August 1800 to 4 August 1805.

906 Jean Joseph Fonton (b. 1747-d. 1832) was a member of the famous Fonton family. He was educated in Paris and became the chief interpreter of the French embassy under Choiseul-Gouffier. In 1793, he left the French embassy and passed to the Russian protection. Two years later, he became a dragoman in the Russian embassy. In 1803, he became the chief dragoman. For more details about him and his family, see Groot, Alexander H. de Groot, “Dragoman’s Careers: Change of Status in Some Families Connected with the British and Dutch Embassies at Istanbul, 1785-1829”, Turkology Update Leiden Project Working Paper’s Archive, Department of Turkish Studies, Universiteit Leiden; Naff, “Reform and Diplomacy”, p. 300.

907 In a conversation between Mahmud Raif Efendi and the Fonton, the former argued that the issue of imperial title would bring about a war with France. However, he commented that outbreak of a war due to a word was unreasonable and against the logic of international laws. See B.O.A. HAT 31/1480 (1219/1804).

908 B.O.A. HAT 31/1494 (1219/1804); B.O.A. HAT 31/1493 (undated).

909 Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 332; Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 24.

910 B.O.A. HAT 6091 (27 M 1219/8 May 1804). It is a letter from Selim III to Napoleon; For a copy of the letter in French, see Le Baron I. De Testa, Recueil des Traites de la Porte Ottomane avec Les Puissances Étrangères, vol. II (Paris: Amyot, Editeur des Archives Diplomatiques, MDCCCLXV), pp. 256-60.
However, the Porte was still reluctant to recognize the imperial title of Napoleon. Therefore, on November 7, Brune declared his decision to leave the city. Selim III, probably in order not to anger his allies, still refrained from giving an immediate reply.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 32/1533(undated); Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, p. 34.} Therefore, the French ambassador left İstanbul on 22 December 1804.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 32/1533 (1219/1804); B.O.A: HAT 31/1480 (1219/1804); Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 332; Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, pp. 34, 36; Driault, *Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon*, p. 32.} This act meant a suspension of the diplomatic relations between the two countries, which gave Russia a chance to increase her influence on the Porte.

The Russian ambassador took the deteriorated relationship between France and the Porte as an opportunity to renew the 1799 Alliance. In mid-December 1804, Italinsky,\footnote{Andrey Yakovlevich Italinsky (1743-1827) served as the Russian ambassador to the Porte first between 1803-1806 and 1812-1816.} the Russian ambassador, was delegated this task. The renewal of Anglo-Russian alliance against France (April 1805) had also strengthened Russia’s position vis-à-vis France.\footnote{Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 333.} Italinsky worked hard to convince the Porte to join the coalition that Russia was trying to form against France. He explained that it was to be a defensive alliance against France and envisaged cooperation between the allies to expel France from Italy. Their main expectation from the Porte was to continue to permit the passage of Russian warships through the Black Sea and the Straits.\footnote{Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, p. 38; Armand Goşu, *La Troisième Coalition Antinapoléonienne et la Sublime Porte 1805*, Avec un preface de Mihai Maxim, (İstanbul, Les Editions ISIS, 2003), p.13.} The Ottoman ministers explained to the negotiators that they could conclude a secret alliance with the Russians if there was an attack either on the Porte or the allies, meaning that they were ready only for a defensive alliance.\footnote{Driault, *Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon*, pp. 32-3; Shaw, *Between Old and New*, pp. 332-3.} Finally, on 23 September 1805, the Ottoman and Russian representatives signed a treaty by which the Porte accepted to join the coalition against France. Put simply, this was a renewal of the

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911 B.O.A. HAT 32/1533(undated); Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, p. 34.


913 Andrey Yakovlevich Italinsky (1743-1827) served as the Russian ambassador to the Porte first between 1803-1806 and 1812-1816.

914 Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 333.


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defensive clauses of 1799, for nine years. It contained 15 articles and 10 secret articles. In the treaty, it was clearly stated that the alliance was defensive. The involved parties would act jointly against the enemies, and if one of the countries was under attack, the others would intervene. If there was a failure of one ally to defeat the aggressive enemy, the other would send help in the form of army and navy. If the war was too far to send military help, the alliance partners would help financially. The involved parties had right to sign treaties with other countries, on the condition that such treaties would not contain clauses harming the interests of allies. The treaty would be valid for nine years. The first 15 articles can be considered as items that could be dealing with any defensive measures against any state, yet the secret clauses of the treaty made clear that the enemy in question was Napoleonic France. Bonaparte’s ambitions and projects of territorial expansion had made all the states vulnerable to his aggression. Therefore, for his own part, the Porte was to allow the passage of Russian warships from the Black Sea. The Porte agreed to cooperate with Russia to prevent other naval powers from entering the Black Sea, and to accept Russian help in defending the Straits in case of need. Both parties would consider the Black Sea as an area closed to the foreign warships and any the attempt on the part of the others to pass the Sea would be jointly prevented. As might be easily noticed, especially from the secret clauses, the agreement was directed against an act of aggression by France.

The alliance treaty signified a success of Russian diplomacy. However, it did not last long. The Porte had accepted these conditions and the alliance since it did not trust France’s intentions and needed another power or powers support against her. Yet, it did not trust its British and Russian allies either. Meanwhile observing the increasing influence of his enemies at Porte, Napoleon began to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. As a first mollifying act, he decided to change his policy in Egypt, which was based on playing off


this province against the Porte. Thus, Talleyrand\textsuperscript{919} ordered Drovetti, his agent in Egypt, not to cooperate with Mehmed Ali\textsuperscript{920} against the Porte.\textsuperscript{921} Meanwhile, the offer for the recognition of Napoleon as emperor was changed to recognition of him as the Sultan’s equal, with the title of \textit{padişah}.\textsuperscript{922} Selim III was still reluctant on the issue of recognition and the pressure of his allies was an important factor in his reluctance.\textsuperscript{923} He did not want a complete break with the France either, since such a policy would make him completely dependent on his allies. Thus, as soon as the news of Napoleon’s victories against Russia and Austria at Ulm (17 October 1805) and Austerlitz (2 December 1805) reached İstanbul, Selim III felt himself more free to act and had more courage ignore his agreements with the Triple Alliance.\textsuperscript{924} Consequently, he refused to ratify the 23 September treaty with Russia. In that respect, the defensive treaty produced no real effect.\textsuperscript{925} In order to strengthen the

\textsuperscript{919} Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles Maurice (b. 1754-d. 1838) was one of the most famous diplomats of the nineteenth century. He served as the minister of foreign affairs between 1797-1799; 1799-1807 and 1814-1815.

\textsuperscript{920} Mehmed Ali Pasha (Kavalalı) (d.1265/1849) was the nephew of Hüseyin, the ayan of Kavala. Mehmed Ali became the governor of Egypt in Ra 1221/June 1805. He was later appointed as the governor of Salonika, but the center was not able to remove him away from Egypt. Consequently, Kavalalı was reappointed as the governor of Egypt (§ 1221/October-November 1806). Ali Pasha fought against the Wahhabis (1811-1818) and with the Treaty of Kütahya (1833), he was appointed as the governor of Egypt, Hijaz and Crete while his son took Acre, Damascus, Tripoli and Aleppo and Adana. Mehmed Ali Pasha began his quest for independence in the year 1838. By the London Convention of 1841, he was granted the hereditary rulership of Egypt. For more details, see Fahmy, Khaled, \textit{All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army and the Making of Modern Egypt}, (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997).


\textsuperscript{922} Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, p. 333; Puryear, \textit{Napoleon and the Dardanelles}, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{923} B.O.A. HAT 1417/57933 (undated).

\textsuperscript{924} Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, pp. 333-4.

\textsuperscript{925} Mouravieff, L’\textit{Alliance Russo-Turque}, p. 203; S. Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, p. 334.
newly emerging pro-French tendencies, Pierre Ruffin, the charge d’affairs of France in İstanbul, promised that Napoleon would help the Porte to regain the Crimea and would never isolate the Ottomans by making separate treaties against the interests of the Porte. Finally, Selim III sent Muhib Efendi as an extraordinary ambassador to Paris, carrying the official order recognizing the imperial title of Napoleon. Thus, as Napoleon became military and politically victorious over the enemies in Europe, the Porte began to follow a more pro-French policy.

The treaty of Pressbourg (26 December 1805) was signed by Austria and France after the defeat of the former at Austerlitz. According to the Treaty, France gained Istria, Cataro and Dalmatia from Austria. Thanks to the Treaty, France gained a stronghold in the Mediterranean and began to pay more attention to the region. This point is clearly expressed in a letter from Talleyrand to Ruffin that France: “happily approached the states

926 Pierre-Jean Ruffin (1742-1824) became charge d’affairs in 1798. During the French attack to Egypt he was imprisoned in the Seven Towers (Yedi Kule). See Représentants permanents, pp. 44-5.

927 Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 335.

928 Muhib Abdurrahman Efendi (d. 1236/1821) was from İstanbul. He first entered divan-ı hümayun. After being employed as the beyliği kesedarı, he became assistant of the secretary of the negotiations (“miyaleme katibi yardımıcısı”) (1790) and then beyliği. On 10 M 1221/30 March 1806, he was appointed as ambassador to Paris. After his return (28 Z 1226/12 January 1812, he became defter emini. Muhib Efendi appointed as the supervisor of the royal printing house (“tabhane-i amire nazırı”) (21 M 1233/1 December 1817). He died on 18 August 1821 (19 Za 1236). For more details see Küreli, İbrahim, “Abdurrahim Muhib Efendi’nin Paris Risalesi”, İlimi Araştırmalar, 5 (1997), pp.177-197; Küreli, İbrahim, Abdurrahman Muhib Efendi’nin Fransa Sefaretnamesi (Küçük Sefaretname), unpublished M.A. Thesis (İstanbul Üniversitesi: 1992).

929 Muhib Efendi reached Paris on 21 May 1806. See Lavisse, Rambaud, Histoire Generale, vol. IX, p. 663; Mouravieff, L’Alliance Russo-Turque, p. 204; Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 82; Shupp, Paul F. The European Powers and the Near Eastern Question, 1806-1807, (USA, Colombia Univ. Press, 1931), p. 73. He was received by Napoleon on 5 June 1806. For his speech and response of Napoleon, see Le Baron I. De Testa, Recueil des Traites, vol. II, pp. 274-5.


931 Dalmatia was under the Venetian rule until 1797 and then passed to the Austrians. For more information on the nine-years of French presence in the region, see Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 68, Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, vol. V, p. 138.
of the Ottoman Empire, and would thereby multiply the relations between the two neighbours." Therefore, the French government initiated the policy of regaining its former influence in the Ottoman Empire and prepared itself as for the role of the protector of the Ottoman Empire. As we shall see below, this will be the main slogan of Napoleon for a long time.

The gains of the French made with the Treaty of Pressbourg did not please the Russians. They were suspecting that by gaining a stronghold in the Mediterranean, France would challenge the Russian influence in the Balkans and might also rival their intentions regarding the Ottoman Empire. The Russian government immediately set out to develop new policies for the new situation in the region. In early January 1806, the state council in St. Petersburg discussed the issue. They considered that now Napoleon was in a position to threaten the survival of the Ottoman Empire, and thus it was necessary to keep the alliance with the British. From then on, it was to be a policy of Russia to work together with Britain in order to regain the confidence of the Ottoman rulers. Czartoryski, the Russian Minister of Foreign affairs, presented several memoirs to Tsar Alexander which contained suggestions for the “maintenance of Russian influence in Turkey and removal of the French menace.” According to the Minister, in order to be ready against France, Russia had to keep 100,000 troops on the frontiers of the Principalities and strengthen their military power in Corfu. If the Porte refused the passage through the Straits, they would occupy the Principalities. More attention would be paid to the Orthodox subjects in the Balkans if the Porte followed a pro-French policy. Czartoryski also proposed the plan of creating independent states in the Balkans under Russian protection, except for Moldavia,

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932 Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, p. 68.
935 Shupp, *The European Powers*, p. 16.
Bessarabia and Wallachia. Finally he suggested an immediate peace with France which would allow Russia time to improve her capabilities.\footnote{Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, pp. 16-7.}

Apart from Russia, Austria was also displeased with the territorial gains made by France by the Treaty of Pressbourg. The Austrian government was worried that France would advance into the Balkans. News of the Russian preoccupation with the relations with the Porte and concentration of troops on the frontiers of the Principalities quickly reached Vienna which increased its suspicion that Russia would probably act before Napoleon to conquer Istanbul. Rumours of an approaching war circulating in Russia also reached Vienna. Similar news was also being reported by Count Merveldt, the Austrian ambassador to Russia. Merveldt observed that the Russians were very determined not to allow the establishment of the French dominance in the Ottoman Empire. According to him, the Russians would dare to destroy or partition of the Empire rather than allowing a French dominance and closure of the Straits.\footnote{Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 32.} Meanwhile, reports came from Vienna that the Austrian troops were moving close to the Ottoman frontiers. Even though Stadion, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained that these military movements were only to protect its own lands and did not have any intention of aggression on the Ottoman territories, this explanation did not satisfy the Russians.\footnote{Despite the denial of any intention of aggression in the Balkans on the part of the Austrians, the publication of some articles in the Hamburg daily Papers in early 1806 had caused anxiety in the Russian circles. In one of these articles, it was stated that France had promised Bosnia and Serbia to Austria as compensation to the losses in the Treaty of Pressbourg. Thus, Bosnia and Serbia would be occupied by France and Austria. See Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 17.}

As might be suspected from the political situation of the Ottoman Empire until year 1806, rather than adopting a certain position, the Porte tried to play the great powers of the period off against to each other. Or, one might say, rather than defining a certain policy, the Porte tried to devise certain tactics and changed sides frequently since it was not able to control the situation itself. After the victory of Napoleon at Austerlitz, it came closer to France. The following two years, which can be considered in a way as a result of changing
alliances, were to bring to the Ottoman Empire one long war (1806-1812), and the arrival of an enemy fleet to the Seraglio, which proved to be great blows that the Empire was not able to withstand without coming to the brink of collapse.

3.2.2. A Restless Period (May 1806-February 1807)

One of the most important actors in the political scene of Istanbul in 1806-1808 was the Horace Sebastiani.940 Due to the reluctance of the Porte not to recognize the imperial title of Napoleon, Brune had departed in protest. Therefore, throughout the year 1805, France was not represented at the capital on the level of ambassadorship.941 Sebastiani’s appointment as the French ambassador to the Porte signified the improvement of relationships between the two countries after a diplomatic crisis. Two years of Sebastiani’s presence and great influence in Istanbul symbolized dominance of the French influence on the Porte. He became a successful spokesman of the French policy in the Ottoman Empire.

3.2.2.1. Sebastiani in İstanbul

This was not Sebastiani’s first journey to the East. He had paid a visit to İstanbul in 1801, for a special mission to deliver the articles of the peace treaty signed in Paris between Talleyrand and the Ottoman ambassador, Ali Efendi942 on 9 October 1801. The main

940 Horace-François-Bastien Sébastiani (1772-1851). For details on his life see Appendix I.

941 Diplomatic issues were undertaken by Ruffin.

942 Moralı Ali Efendi (d. 1224/1809), was from Morea. He was employed as the purse-bearer of the imperial land registry office (“defterhane kesedari”) and served as the ambassador to Paris from Ra 1211/September 1796 to 1218/1802. After his return, he was appointed as the finance director of the Naval Arsanel (“tersane defterdarı”) (1804). He was dismissed in M 1221/March-April 1806. On 25 Ca 1222/31 July 1807, after the May uprising Ali Efendi became first defter emini and later Tophane naziri. After the rise Mahmud II to power, he was appointed as umur-i bahriye naziri (19 B 1223/10 September 1808). Ali Efendi escaped with Ramiz Efendi and Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha after the
articles of the treaty concerned the improvement of commercial relations, renewal of capitulations, opening of the Black Sea region to French merchant vessels and the recognition of the Septinsular Republic. Since Napoleon was eager for the approval of the treaty, General Sebastiani was sent with a text of it, as well as a private letter to the Sultan. He was appointed this duty on 11 October 1801. Napoleon instructed him on certain points: Since France was not able to achieve her goals by through Egyptian campaign, she should improve relations with the Porte and expand its political and commercial influence on the route to India. According to the French emperor, securing the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and creating a powerful Empire that could stay firm against Russia and Britain were the main contours of the new policy of the French government. Therefore, he advised Sebastiani to work in accordance with the above policy. A proof of the good intentions of France was that she had not provoked the mutiny of Pasvandoğlu. On the contrary she was ready to help the Porte to suppress it. Sebastiani was also ordered to investigate the issue of evacuation Egypt by Britain as well as the nature of relationship between the allies – namely Russia, Britain and the Ottoman Empire. After receiving these instructions, Sebastiani and his companion by the name of Langrage started his journey. He arrived Istanbul on 26 November 1801. In the city he

murder of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. He was later pardoned and appointed as the commander of the Dardanelles. Ali Efendi was executed in the same year. For more details, see Herbertte, Maurice, Fransa’da İlk Daimi Türk Elçisi: Morali Es-seyyid Ali Efendi (1792-1802), translated by Erol Üyepazarcı, (İstanbul: 1997). In the introduction to the Turkish edition of the book, Üyepazarcı provides a good summary of Ali Efendi’s life.

943 Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, pp. 320-21.
945 Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, p. 322.
946 Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, p. 322.
947 Driault notes that he arrived on 24 November. See Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 30. According to Mesmay, it was on 27 November. See Mesmay, Horace Sebastiani, p. 44. See also Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, p. 322; B.O.A. HAT 140/5808.İ (19 S 1217/20 June 1802).
visited various leading officials. Upon his insistence personally to deliver the letter of Bonaparte to the Sultan, he was officially received by Selim III (8 December 1801). The Sultan expressed his hope regarding the establishment of peace between the two countries and gave him a letter addressed to Napoleon. Sebastiani left İstanbul on 25 December and arrived at Paris a month later (27 February 1802).

Sebastiani’s second mission in the East was in June 1802 and in September; he left Paris for a new diplomatic mission in Tripoli, Egypt and Syria. According to Coquelle, initially he was meant to be appointed as an ambassador to İstanbul. However at the last moment Napoleon had changed mind and sent Sebastiani on a special mission to Egypt and Syria. He was to visit Alexandria to investigate whether it had been evacuated by Britain as stipulated in the Treaty of Amiens. He also was also instructed to get information on the conditions of the former French commercial establishments and find ways for their immediate reorganization. Sebastiani had some secret instructions, too. Among them was the task of encouraging the governor of Tripoli increase his connections with Napoleon. He was also ordered to visit the Emir of Cairo with the offer of a mediation between them and the governors. Sebastiani embarked from Toulon on a French frigate on 17 September 1802 and visited Tripoli, Alexandria, Jaffa, Acre, Zante, Corfu and

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948 For the details of his negotiations in İstanbul see Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, pp. 323-324.

949 Mesmay, Horace Sebastiani, p. 44; Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 30; Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, p. 323.

950 Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 30; Soysal, Fransız İhtilali, p. 323. For more details on his activities in İstanbul, see Mesmay, Horace Sebastiani, pp. 44-6.

951 Mesmay, Horace Sebastiani, p. 46.


954 Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 31; Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 14.

955 Mesmay, Horace Sebastiani, p. 47; Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 31.
Cephalonia. He reached Alexandria on 16 October and met with Hurşid Pasha, the muhafiz of Alexandria, and informed him that he would visit Egypt. On 26 October, Sebastiani reached Egypt and was received by Hüsrev Pasha. After delivering a letter of Talleyrand to the Pasha, he declared that his duty was to check whether the British had completely evacuated the province and expressed France’s intention to reestablish commercial relations with the Porte. Sebastiani also stated that he would make investigations regarding which regions of Egypt French consuls should be stationed in.

The British government was suspicious of the real purpose of Sebastiani’s mission to Egypt. A newspaper article called attention to the mission, arguing that such an important


957 Hurşid Ahmed Pasha (d.1238/1822) was a Georgian slave of Selim Surri Pasha. He enjoyed the patronage of Reisülküttab Mehmed Raşid Efendi and later of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. He was appointed as the muhafiz of Alexandria with the rank of mirimiran. Hurşid Pasha served as the governor of Egypt from Za 1218/March 1804 to Ra 1220/June 1805. He became the governor of Morea (§ 1221/October-November 1806) and then serasker of Sofia (S 1222/April 1807). He was appointed as the Grand Vizier in § 1227/September 1812. After his dismissal in R 1230/April 1815, he served as the governor of Bosnia, Salonika (1231/1816), Anatolia (1232/1817) Aleppo (1233/1818) and Morea (1235/1820). He became governor of Rumelia in Ca 1236/January 1821. Hurşid Pasha died while he was the serasker of Morea. See Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. II, p. 679.

958 Hüsrev Mehmed Pasha (d.1271/1855) served as the kapı kethüda of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. In the year 1215/1800-1, he was appointed as the mutasarrıf of Karahisar with the rank of mirimiran. After serving as the muhafiz of Alexandria, he became the governor of İzmit with the rank of vizier. In Ca 1801, Hüsrev Pasha was appointed as the governor of Egypt (M 1218/April May 1804). After a period of governorships, he became grand admiral on Z 1226/December 1811. After his dismissal, he was employed in the governorships of Trabzon, Erzurum, Kars, Bolu, Eğriboz, and also as Şark seraskeri. His second appointment as the grand admiral took place on 2 Ra 1238/9 December 1822. He was deposed on 22 B 1242/19 February 1827 and took up a residence in Üsküdar. On 11 L 1242/19 May 1827, Hüsrev Pasha was appointed as the serasker as well as given the governorships of Bolu, Kastamonu and Çankırı. He became the head of the Supreme Council of the Judicial Ordinances (“Meclis-i Vala Reisi”) (Z 1253/March 1838) and then the Grand Vizier (19 Ra 1255/5 July 1839). He was dismissed on 7 R 1256/8 June 1840 and banished to Tekfurdağı. After release, he was employed as serasker (1 S 1262/29 January 1846). For more details, see Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. II, pp. 682-3.

official would not be delegated a simple mission as checking the issue of evacuation of Egypt. It also argued that making investigations in the region could not be a reasonable aim of the mission, since very detailed charts of all part of Egypt were already prepared by the skillful draftsmen who had accompanied Bonaparte during the Egyptian campaign. According to the newspaper, the secret reason behind Sebastiani’s mission was to bring about amity between France and the Porte by persuading the Egyptian beys to listen to the Porte and induce them to make a “peace” with the Porte. Thus, he would increase prestige and influence of Napoleon in the imperial councils. 960 Indeed, one of most important aim of his mission seems to have been to look at the affiliations of the Mehluk beys in the region and promotion of the pro-French sentiments in the East, in which he was quite successful. 961 Yet one suspects that Sebastiani was not merely aiming to persuade the beys to obey the Porte. Indeed, his attempt to establish connections with the Mehluk beys did not please the Ottoman rulers. After communicating with the center, Hüsrev Pasha informed Sebastiani that he had no authority to negotiate with the issue of umera with him. 962 In one of his reports, Hüsrev Pasha informed the Porte that during his interview with General Sebastiani, he warned Sebastiani not to send letters to the beys. However, the Pasha had learnt that during the Sebastiani’s stay in Dimyat (Damiette), he had sent letters to the beys. 963 About a month later, Hüsrev Pasha wrote another letter to center. This time it seems that Sebastiani requested permission to go to Acre. Upon being questioned by the Pasha as to why he wished to go to that region, Sebastiani explained that Bonaparte aimed at the elimination of internal strife in the Empire so that commercial affairs could be conducted in safety. Therefore, continued Sebastiani, he was delegated by Bonaparte to

960 The Times, Tuesday, December 28 1802; p. 2; Issue 5603, col. D.

961 For details of his reports and activities in Egypt, see Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, pp. 14-9; Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolloyn, pp. 30-2; Mesmay, Horace Sebastiani, pp46-49.

962 B.O.A. HAT 3449 (/8 B 1217/4 November 1802); Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 14.

963 B.O.A. HAT 89/3638-F (5 § 1217/2 December 1802)
reconcile Cezzar Ahmed Pasha and the Porte.\textsuperscript{964} He was instructed to solve the problems between Napoleon and Cezzar Pasha and to secure a letter from the latter to the former. Upon the request of Sebastiani to get a letter from Hüsrev Pasha addressed to Napoleon, the Pasha refused by saying that he was not authorized to write such a letter. Coming to the issue of his visit to Acre, despite warnings, it seems that Sebastiani went to the region. Recalling us the comments made in the above-mentioned newspaper, Hüsrev Pasha notes that due to the animosity between Britain and France, France was not trying not leave influence on the issue of umera to the British alone.\textsuperscript{965}

The third journey of General Sebastiani to the Ottoman Empire was as an ambassador. His successes in the previous missions must have made him a good candidate for the duty. Former acquaintance with the leading Ottoman officials and the good impression he left during his former visits were other reasons of his appointment as ambassador. Before he left Paris for İstanbul, Napoleon gave another set of instructions which reflect the main contours of the policy of Napoleon wished to promote in the Ottoman Empire. The instructions were produced in May 1806 and consisted of twenty-eight pages. They were written by Napoleon and revised by Talleyrand.\textsuperscript{966} In the first article it is noted that Sebastiani should gain the confidence of the Porte and assure it that Napoleon had no intention other than to help the creation of a strong Empire that would

\textsuperscript{964} Cezzar Ahmed Pasha (d.1219/1804) was from Bosnia. He became mirimiran in 1187/1773 and two years later beylerbey. On Z 1189/February 1776, he was appointed as the governor of Sayda and later the leader of the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca (“emirü’l-hac”) and governor of Damascus (C 1199/April 1785). His second appointment to the governorship of Sayda was in the year 1201/1786-87. He became the governor of Damascus for the second time on S 1205/October 1790, but was dismissed in 1210/1795-6 and continued as the governor of Sayda. Cezzar Pasha was appointed as the emirü’l-hac and governor of Egypt with the addition of Damascus, Trabulus and Jerussalem. In M 1214/June 1799, he resigned and took up a residence at Sayda. In the year 1218/1803-4, he was appointed as the governor of Damascus and given the task of suppressing the Wahhabis. However, he was not able perform the duty due to his poor health conditions and died on M 1219/May 1804. See Mehmed Süreyya, \textit{Sicill-i Osmanî}, vol. I, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{965} B.O.A. HAT 3449-H (8 B 1217/4 November 1802)

\textsuperscript{966} Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 67; Mesmay, \textit{Horace Sebastiani}, p.54. The Turkish translation of some parts of these instructions is available in B.O.A. HAT 5737 (undated).
stand firm against Russia.⁹⁶⁷ This article can be considered as a reply to the suspicions raised by Russia to the effect that after landing Dalmatia, France was intending to attack the Ottoman territories in the Balkans.⁹⁶⁸ Thus, through Sebastiani Napoleon was intending to refute such rumours. The former was to ensure that the French presence in Dalmatia was not perceived as a danger for the Ottoman Empire, on the contrary was seen a great advantage in the case of an attack by his enemies.⁹⁶⁹ In the second article, Napoleon summarized his policy in the Near East: “The constant purpose of my policy is to make a triple alliance between me, the Porte and Persia, indirectly or implicitly directed against Russia”.⁹⁷⁰ Indeed, as we shall see later, Napoleon’s plan of forming an alliance with the Porte and Persia against Russia was one of the most important underlying policies of France.⁹⁷¹ He also noted that the Porte should be informed and warned on the aggressions of Russia in Georgia. According to him, the Porte did not follow the developments in this region and thus was not able prevent events before they took place.⁹⁷² Napoleon also declared that he wanted to be treated as the power most favoured by the Ottomans and regain the influence he had lost. Sebastiani, the instructions continued, should achieve this aim through diplomatic skill and confidence not by arrogance, force, or threat.⁹⁷³ Yet, as we shall see in the following pages, Sebastiani used more frequently the latter rather than the former in his diplomatic relations with the Porte. Napoleon insisted that Sebastiani should


⁹⁶⁹ B.O.A. HAT 5737 (undated).

⁹⁷⁰ Coquelle, “Sebastiani: Ambassadeur a Constantinople”, p. 577: “Le but constant de ma politique est de faire une Triple alliance de moi, de la Porte et de la Perse, dirigée indirecctement ou implicitement contre la Russie.”

⁹⁷¹ B.O.A. HAT 32/1533 (undated).

⁹⁷² B.O.A. HAT 5737 (undated).

gain such a degree of confidence that he would be informed by the Porte about all the demands of the Russians and British. In the fourth article of the orders to his new ambassador, Napoleon clearly stated that he would not tolerate or protect any uprising against the Porte, neither in Egypt, Syria or Greece. Here he was making reference to the mutiny of Pasvandoğlu in Vidin and the Serbian uprising. As to the Serbian uprising, he ordered Sebastiani to conduct an investigation on this uprising by stopping on his way to Istanbul. All of the matters related to the uprising were to be discussed with Ottoman ministers. Sebastiani was to assure that no aid would be provided to the any kind of rebellion in the imperial territories and that his aim was to promote good relations and establish an alliance with the Porte against Russia and Britain.

After these explanatory articles, Napoleon instructed Sebastiani to work hard to cause disfavour to the Russians on the part of the Ottoman rulers. The uncontested influence

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975 B.O.A. HAT 5737 (undated); Shupp, The European Powers, p. 75; Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 83.

976 In the part of the instructions translated into Turkish, it is recorded that the Porte improved its understanding of the foreign relations, probably referring to the establishment of permanent embassies in some parts of Europe. However, Napoleon continues telling Sebastiani that, the Empire’s internal conditions had deteriorated greatly. There were revolts and chaos in some parts of the Empire. Despite the fact that such revolts might have occurred in any country and were temporary events, he calls attention to the danger of spread of these revolts to other parts of the Empire. The disorder in Rumelia, Albania, Damascus, Bulgaria and Trabzon caused great damage to the welfare of the regions and also to the Empire. In each of these places, there were powerful figures governing the regions almost independently from the center. Napoleon also comments that even though these governors did not live peacefully with each other, they act jointly in the face of external dangers. See B.O.A. HAT 5737 (undated). See also Shupp, The European Powers, p. 75; Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 83.

977 Shupp, The European Powers, p. 75


979 Coquelle, “Sebastiani: Ambassadeur a Constantinople”, p. 578: “Son étude constante doit être de jeter de la defaveur sur la Russie. Il doit déprécier ses forces militaires, la bravoure de ses troupes, de toutes manières et constamment, vivre avec legation russe froidement et sans beaucoup d’égards, la traiter avec hauteur plutôt qu’avec
France and the disfavoring of Russia, if these aims were achieved by Sebastiani, it would be used to convince the Porte to close the Straits, thus would prevent the passage of all kinds of Russian ships. 980 A good way to harm British and Russian interests and win over the sympathy of Porte, was to offer the Porte a restriction of the number of “berats” to fifty. In economic terms, Sebastiani was also to adjust the tariffs, as France would agree to an upward adjustment. 981 According to Napoleon, the Ottoman authority in Wallachia and Moldavia should be reestablished. 982 And, the Ottoman ministers had to be convinced that the Russia was planning to integrate the pashalik of Belgrade into the Principalities which would increase Russian power in the region. 983

As far as reflected in the instructions of Napoleon to Sebastiani, one gets the sense that Napoleon was in favour of a strong Empire and followed the policy of preserving its territorial integrity. In the part of the instructions translated into Turkish, it is noted that Selim III’s modernizing ideas were well-known by Napoleon and thus the Ottoman Empire deserved to be considered as a part of the Europe. 984 In that respect, Talleyrand recorded that the Empire had made some progress in modernizing its army and France was ready to offer any required aid to improve the internal conditions of the Empire. 985 How shall we explain the change in the policy of a state that had recently attacked an important province of the Porte? The answer should be related to the position of Russia. France’s attack on

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981 Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 81.
983 Shupp, The European Powers, p. 75.
984 B.O.A. HAT 5737 (undated).
985 Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 81.
Egypt was a complete failure which improved Russo-Ottoman relations, leaving the Porte under great influence of Russia. Now, Napoleon was convinced that if he did not persuade the Ottoman Empire such an alliance was undesirable, the Porte would be left to the mercy of Russia, which had a strong ally in Britain. Therefore, he ordered Sebastiani to win over the Ottoman ministers, by stressing the advantages of a new, good relationship, with France.\footnote{Puryear, \textit{Napoleon and the Dardanelles}, p. 80.} Therefore, the promise of an internally strong Empire, benefiting from French aid, was necessary to encourage the Porte to refuse any possible Russian demand and reject any treaty disadvantageous either to the Porte or France. Sebastiani was also to offer a peace treaty with France which would render the Porte more confident vis-à-vis Russia, and also England. The prize would be the recovery of the Crimea, the loss of which was a very sore point for the Porte.

This seems to have been Napoleon’s immediate plan. A more general plan was the formation of a triple alliance between Persia, Porte and France, which would serve as a barrier against Russian expansion in both directions. If Sebastiani was able to convince the Porte to close the Straits to the passage of the Russians, Russia would be trapped. Not all of instructions to Sebastiani were favourable to the interests of the Porte, suggesting that Napoleon had much more general and long term plans, in addition to his benefiting from the Ottoman Empire as a barrier against Russia. For instance, while planning to improve the position of the Porte in the Principalities, he was also ordering Sebastiani to investigate the Wahhabi problem with the aim of determining whether the Wahhabis could be established as a power between India and Europe.\footnote{Even though I did not come across the document, it is known that Sebastiani presented a report on the Wahhabis to the Porte. See B.O.A. HAT 6101 (contains the minutes of the meeting held on 6 S 1222/14 April 1807). See also Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 75.} Furthermore, the relations with Tepedelenli Ali Pasha were to be improved so that the Pasha could one day be used as to “\textit{protect the French interests in the Adriatic}.”\footnote{Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 75.} In order to develop a definite policy on these above matters, accurate information was needed and Talleyrand wanted information about Egypt,
Arabia and Persia, as well as the situation of Ali Pasha in Albania. After receiving his instructions, Sebastiani, accompanied by his wife set out for his journey on 12 June. After arriving in Vienna on 10 July, they reached Bucharest on 28 July. It was a difficult journey due the health problems of his wife.

While Sebastiani was on his way to İstanbul, a peace treaty known as the Oubril Treaty (20 July 1806) was signed between Baron Pierre d’Oubril, the Russian councilor of state, and H.G. Clarke, from the French Ministry of War. As might be recalled, Russia was not happy with the occupation of Dalmatia by France after the Treaty Pressbourg and was anxious on possible aggression by the new neighbour of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, she was trying to establish a defense line against France by occupying of Cattaro, Corfu and Curzola. However, according to the Treaty, Russia yielded to evacuate Cattaro, confirmed the independence of the Septinsular Republic and stated she would limit the number of the Russian soldiers in the Republic to four. Russia also recognized Napoleon as the Emperor of France and King of Italy. In return France would evacuate Ragusa and acknowledge its independence under the protection of the Porte. Both powers accepted the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

After the signing of the Oubril Treaty, France also tried to reach a peace with Great Britain and started the negotiations with this country as well. But the issue of Sicily remained a huge obstacle on the way to a peace settlement. During the negotiations with Yarmouth on 23-24 July, France implied that she was ready to recognize the British the

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991 For the details of the diplomatic traffic before the treaty, and for a good analysis of the Russian, British and French relations in 1806, see Shupp, *The European Powers*, pp. 81-104.

992 Shupp, *The European Powers*, pp. 81-2. Cattaro is one of the principal towns in Dalmatia. Curzola is a small island in Adriatic Sea.

993 Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, p. 96.

994 For other articles of the peace treaty see Shupp, *The European Powers*, p.102.
occupation of Malta and Cape of Good Hope. After the conferences, Yarmouth wrote the text of treaty which was submitted first to Clarke and then Napoleon. By the treaty, Great Britain would recognize Joseph Bonaparte as the king of Naples and Sicily, which meant that giving Sicily up to Napoleon. Both countries would mutually guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Except some details, Napoleon accepted the articles formulated by Yarmouth. These treaties made it seem that a general peace would prevail in Europe in the close future.

Hopes for a peace in Europe were weakened, however partly due to the deposition of Czartoryski from the position of the Russian minister of foreign affairs. He was replaced by Baron de Budberg, a figure less friendly towards the French. According to the latter, Oubril had signed the treaty without receiving any instruction from his government.

Russian military circles, too, were not very happy with the idea of making a peace with France, especially without taking the revenge for Austerlitz. The Russians suspected that by the Oubril Treaty, France was intending to gain dominance over the Ottoman Empire and put it under its protection. Even though, they argued, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was recognized by France, there was no item in the treaty that would guarantee the security of this country against acts of aggression by Napoleon. The French occupation of Ragusa and the increase in the number of French soldiers in Dalmatia made the Russians strongly suspect that France had not given up the plan of invading the Ottoman Empire and was

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996 For more details on the text of treaty formulated by Yarmouth, see Shupp, *The European Powers*, pp. 105-6.

997 The Porte seems to have followed the negotiations between the France, Russia and Great Britain with the help of the Prussian ambassador in İstanbul. For details, see Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. I, pp. 165-8.


following a policy of diverting the allies through peace negotiations.\(^{1001}\) A report reached to St. Petersburg stating that the Russo-Ottoman relations were worsening due to the refusal of the Porte to allow the passage of the Russian ships and troops through the Dardanelles, and also the revocation of the “barat privileges of the Russian subjects”, all these points pointing the increasing French influence over the Porte.\(^{1002}\) When Oubril returned his country carrying the treaty with France, the State Council refused to ratify it.\(^{1003}\) Talleyrand was informed of this fact. Following these developments, the British government also declared that it would not make a peace without the participation of Russia.\(^{1004}\)

When Sebastiani was on the way of Istanbul, the possibilities of a peace between France, Great Britain and Russia seemed to have failed. On 10 September 1806, Sebastiani was informed by Talleyrand about the nullification of the Oubril Treaty. According to Talleyrand, treaty had not been approved by Russia since it contained articles advantageous to the Ottomans. Russia was not in favour of a strong and independent Empire, and on the contrary, wished to see the Porte to fall into complete anarchy so that she could easily find a pretext for attacking the imperial territories. In order to prevent the intentions of Russia, from coming to fruition, Talleyrand advised Sebastiani to work hard for the closure of the Straits and prevent the Russian aggressions.\(^{1005}\)

Sebastiani arrived in Istanbul on 9 August 1806. He was received well in the capital, a fact testified to the new phase of Ottoman-French relations. He submitted a letter to Selim III which summarized the general policy of France.\(^{1006}\) After expressing the amity between the two rulers, he referred to the Oubril Treaty, stressing the point that the independence


\(^{1002}\) Shupp, *The European Powers*, p. 117.

\(^{1003}\) Shupp, *The European Powers*, p. 119.


\(^{1006}\) For the details of his reception by the Sultan, see Mesmay, *Horace Sebastiani*, pp. 56-8.
and integrity of the Ottoman Empire had been accepted by the Russia and France. After a short note concerning the advantages of the possession of Dalmatia by an “ancient ally”, Sebastiani called the attention of the Sublime Porte to the dangers in Wallachia and Moldavia. The favourable stipulations of the Oubril Treaty pertaining to the Ottoman Empire had increased the confidence of the Porte in Napoleon. Sebastiani’s official reception took place on 28 August. During this long meeting, the new ambassador declared that his country was ready to act in compliance with the Ottoman wishes on the issue of berats, a matter that continuously created tensions between Porte and foreign countries.

3.2.2.2. The Crisis in the Principalities

Through his clever policies, Sebastiani was able to create a favourable atmosphere not long after his arrival. Thereafter, he was able exert pressure for the removal of the present hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia. Sebastiani had been ordered to stop on his way to İstanbul and to get information on the conditions of Wallachia and Moldavia and also on the Serbian uprising. In July 28, he had been in Bucharest where he met with Prince Ipsilanti. While Ipsilanti tried to learn the plans of Napoleon, Sebastiani had sought to

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1007 The other articles of the treaty mentioned in the letter was the evacuation of Ragusa and Montenegro by the Russians, the recognition of the independence of the Septinsular Republic, the paying tribute to the Porte, and the return of all British and Russian soldiers with the exception of four thousand Russian soldiers in Corfu. See B.O.A. HAT 139/5743 (1221 C.3/18 August 1806).

1008 Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 71; Shupp, The European Powers, pp. 143-4. The berats of protection removed the non-Muslim subjects from the jurisdiction of the Ottoman laws. By the establishment of the regular diplomatic representation in the Empire, the Porte began to allow protection to its own non-Muslim subjects. Through the articles of various treaties, the protégé system became very widespread and also open to abuse. Selim III tried to limit the number of the protégés who would enjoy the privilege. On 16 January 1806, memoranda were sent to embassies stipulating the conditions to hold a berat. Only Muslim subjects in the active service of the embassies and consulates were allowed to have berat. See Sonyel, Salahi R, “The Protégé System in the Ottoman Empire”, Journal of Islamic Studies, 2/1 (1991), pp. 56-66.

1009 Shupp, The European Powers, p. 140. Prince Constantine Ipsilanti (b. 1760-d.1816) belonged to one of the Phanariote families. He served as chief interpreter
find out Ipsilanti’s political considerations. The French emperor suspected that the Prince, already known to be a pro-Russian figure, was being used by the Russians for their own plans of aggression against the Ottoman territories. During the meeting, Sebastiani had told the Prince to advise the Serbian rebels to be more conciliatory towards the Porte. Moreover, during his stay in the region, Sebastiani had also tried to promote pro-French sentiments among the upper elite of Wallachia.\textsuperscript{1010} After leaving Bucharest, he had also met with Tirsiniklioğlu\textsuperscript{1011}, and warned him on the importance of maintaining internal peace in the Empire in order to stand firmly against the foreign enemies.\textsuperscript{1012} This policy of aiding the suppression of the disorders in the Empire was closely connected to the instructions he had received from Napoleon and Talleyrand. Still, is it possible to believe that France was concerned solely with the security of the Ottoman Empire in the region? Drawing on a report of Reinhard\textsuperscript{1013} to Talleyrand, Shupp provides important details on the French-Russian rivalry in the region that help us to understand the French concern about the Principalities. Before the arrival of Sebastiani in Bucharest, another French official, Reinhard, had been sent to the region with the duty of promoting the French commercial interests there. Reinhard was appointed as the commissioner-general of commercial affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia and resided in Jassy. Another official was stationed in Bucharest, with the title of under-commissioner.\textsuperscript{1014} Thus, before the arrival of Sebastiani, it

\textit{(baştercüman)} of the Porte (1796-9), the hospodar of Moldavia (1799-1801) and Wallachia (1802-6, 1807). After his deposition by the Porte, he was reinstated upon the request of the Russian government. In face imminent war with Russia he escaped to Kiev. With the Russian advances in Wallachia, he tried gather a military force. However, being unsuccessful, he fled to Russia, where he died there in 1816. See \textit{Encyclopedia Americana}, Lieber, Francis, (Philadelphia: 1833).

\textsuperscript{1010} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, pp. 140-1.

\textsuperscript{1011} This period also corresponded to the heyday of the Edirne Incident.

\textsuperscript{1012} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 142.

\textsuperscript{1013} Charles-Frederick Comte Reinhard (1761-1837) was a French diplomat and briefly served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1806-7, he was appointed as the Consul to Moldavia and arrested by Russia for one year.

\textsuperscript{1014} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, pp. 170-1.
was Reinhard who held a meeting with Ipsilanti on 13 July and with Muruzi 1015 on 24 July. During his own investigations, Sebastiani had noticed that Muruzi was closer to the French interests. On the other hand, he had heard that Russia was constructing a military road to the Dniester, across from the Ottoman fortress of Hotin.1016 All these pieces of information greatly worried the French government about the Russian intentions in the region.

One of the earliest diplomatic acts of Sebastiani was to insist on the deposition of the hospodars, namely princes Muruzi and Ipsilanti on 24 August 1806, only two weeks after his arrival.1017 It was very clear that a sudden deposition would create a diplomatic crisis in the Porte’s relations with Russia. By the Russo-Ottoman Convention of 24 September 1802, it had been decided that the hospodars of the Principalities should be kept in place for seven years. They could only be removed from their offices before the term stipulated in the treaty, if they had been proven guilty of misconduct. Moreover, the Russian party had to be informed beforehand on the matter which justified their deposition. Prince Ipsilanti and Muruzi had been appointed as the governors of Wallachia and Moldavia, respectively in 1802.1018 Therefore, according to the stipulations of the treaty, the princes, had the right to govern for three more years. Their dismissal would constitute a violation of the Convention, a point that had to be well-known by the Ottoman ministers.

The Porte had made previous protestations to Russia, complaining about the actions of the hospodars. Yet, now it was France, through Sebastiani, that pressed hard for the dismissal of these hospodars. For instance, in an undated document, addressing the Sultan, it is recorded on one occasion, Sebastiani insisted on being received by the Sultan unofficially. He explained his urgent need to enter the presence of the Sultan by saying that

1015 Muruzi, Prince Alexander (d.1816) was a Phanariote notable. He served as the hospodar in Wallachia (1793-6, 1799-1801) and Moldavia (1792-3; 1802-6; 1806-7).

1016 Shupp, The European Powers, p. 171.


1018 Shupp, The European Powers, p. 146.
he held a letter from Napoleon to Selim III. Unfortunately it had been possible to come across a copy or the translation of this letter. Yet, the main idea of the letter is clearly described by Sebastiani. In the letter from Napoleon to Selim III, the former informed the Sultan on the treason and intrigues of the hospodars of the Wallachia and Moldavia and strongly demanded their deposition, so that the Ottoman Empire may be saved from their intrigues. In order to force the Porte to take a decisive act in the matter, Sebastiani stressed that he would leave the city unless he received a certain reply from the Porte. Despite his insistence, he did not get a chance to see the Sultan. The next day, Sebastiani sent Frangini, his chief interpreter, who conveyed the message that he was waiting for a clear answer on whether the hospodars would be dismissed or not. In order to lessen the Ottomans’ fear of the Russians, Sebastiani, via Frangini, ensured them that France and Russia had signed a treaty by which both states guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and this treaty automatically voided earlier articles. It seems that Sebastiani was assuring the Porte that the 1802 Convention was not valid anymore and therefore there was nothing to be worried about. Indeed, he made the assurance that France could deal with Russia, if the Porte was not successful.

Despite the encouragement of the French ambassador, the Porte was aware of the dangers inherent to deposing Ipsilanti and Muruzi. The ruling elite was well aware of the fact that the issue at stake was one of proximity either Russia or France. A state council was

1019 B.O.A. HAT 34/1743. The document is undated, yet it contains a clue as to its date. Facing difficulty to enter the presence of the Sultan, Sebastiani complains that despite the fact that it had been more ten days since his arrival in Istanbul, he has not able to see any results on a previous issue he talked about. Sebastiani had come to the city in 9 August 1806 therefore, the document must have been written earliest on 19 August 1806.

1020 B.O.A. HAT 34/1743 (undated). The rigid tone of the sentence is very interesting: “Eflak ve Boğdan voyvodalarının devlet-i aliyyeye fesâd ve hıyanetleri beyânya çırkâbe-i mefâsîd ve hıyanetlerinden mülk-i saltanatı tathîr içün mersûmânı azl ü te’dibleri Françe imparatorunun derece-i gayette matlûbudur”.

1021 Frangini brothers (François-Eugéne and Antoine) were Italian Levantines who worked for the Venetian embassay at the time of the Treaty of Campo-Formio. Both later entered the service of the French embassy. See Naff, “Reform and Diplomacy”, p. 300.

1022 B.O.A. HAT 34/1743 (undated).
organized by several leading officials, during which the demands of Sebastiani were discussed. The participants shared the opinion that keeping good relations with France was a better option for the Empire. It seemed to them that France was more powerful than Russia and therefore they did not prefer to be enemy of France. Moreover, they seem to be convinced that the Oubril Treaty voided the former treaties with Russia. In light of these considerations, the participants began to discuss official pretexts for the deposition of the princes. For Ipsilanti, they did not have to try hard to find a pretext. He would be accused of creating disorder in the Empire by instigating the Serbian uprising and provoking some rebels (“serkeşan”). Muruzi, on the other hand, would be made to resign (“istifa ettirilüb”). The participants of the meeting decided to find a solution to silence the Russians later.

From the minutes of the same council, one gets the sense that the dismissal of the hospodars was not a very urgent matter for the Porte and most probably, without the insistence of France it would never have taken place. Or rather, the Porte would not have dared to dismiss them. At the upper margin of the same document, there is comment by Selim III, reading that “For my own part, I would take every risk to dismiss the prince of Wallachia, for my sultanic will upholds such a change.” As might be noticed, the problem of the Porte and the Sultan was with Ipsilanti, the governor of Wallachia, rather than Muruzi, the governor of Moldavia. For the latter, there was not a serious reason for dismissal and the Porte would have been glad to leave at his post. Therefore, the Ottoman statesmen were also discussing the possibility of only deposing the hospodar of Wallachia. However, France seems to have pressed for the dismissal of Muruzi more than

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1023 B.O.A. HAT 166/6956 (undated). The document contains the minutes of the meeting held between Sebastiani and Reisülküttab on the evening of 12 November 1806.

1024 B.O.A. HAT 34/1743 (undated).

1025 B.O.A. HAT 34/1743 (undated): “Bana kalsa Eflak beyinin azli için ben herşeyi göze alirim. Çünkü hayır-hâh-ı devletim bunu tebdili tervîc eyliyorlar”.

1026 Historian Asım also notes that the dismissal of the Ipsilanti was due to his provocation of the Serbs and his connections with the Russians, Muruzi, on the other hand, was closer to France, and therefore he was allowed to resign. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 157.
Ipsilanti, since it was “Muruzi Bey with whom the French had a dispute.” Therefore, Napoleon would not be satisfied with the dismissal of only Ipsilanti.\textsuperscript{1027} On the other hand, The Ottoman officials were not willing to offend Prince Muruzi, and they finally decided to make him resign.\textsuperscript{1028}

For Sebastiani and the French government, the deposition of the hospodars was a great diplomatic success and signified the victory of French influence at the Porte. Sebastiani had not only secured the deposition of pro-Russian hospodars, but also ensured the appointment of pro-French figures.\textsuperscript{1029} Four days after the deposition of the hospodars Sebastiani was received by the Sultan. During the meeting, Selim III explained that he was eager to improve relations with Napoleon and ready to resist the Russian pressure. Yet, he remarked that he could not depend on his Janissary troops and asked for artillerymen and engineers from France.\textsuperscript{1030} On 16 September, Sebastiani presented a note to the Porte which declared that the Russians had refused the peace treaty, meaning the Oubril Treaty.\textsuperscript{1031} No doubt, this was a further attempt by Napoleon to bring the Porte closer to France. As we have seen, the Treaty had clauses which were quite favourable to the interests of the Porte and its refusal by Russia was perceived by the Porte as a proof that France was a better friend than Russia.\textsuperscript{1032} In the same note, Sebastiani continued, it was no longer possible for the Porte to maintain its neutrality and that it should close the Straits to Russian ships. He also emphasized that if the Porte allied itself with Russia or Britain, it would be considered

\textsuperscript{1027} B.O.A. HAT 1777 (undated).
\textsuperscript{1028} B.O.A. HAT 1777 (undated).
\textsuperscript{1029} B.O.A. HAT 4531 (undated).
\textsuperscript{1030} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{1031} From Sebastiani to the Sublime Porte, 16 September 1806, in Testa, \textit{Recueil des Traites}, vol. Deuxieme, pp. 279-80.
\textsuperscript{1032} Puryear, \textit{Napoleon and the Dardanelles}, p. 102.
as a violation of its neutrality. Sebastiani assured that his government was ready to defend the interests of the Porte by way of the strong troops stationed in Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{1033}

3.2.2.3. The Declaration of War Against Russia

The Ottoman officials, at least those who participated in the above-mentioned meeting, supposed that after some protests Russia would stop dealing with the issue of the deposition of the hospodars. However, the matter became more serious than they had expected. The Ottoman ministers seem not have calculated the importance of the issue for Russia. The dismissed hospodars were known to be pro-Russian figures.\textsuperscript{1034} Consequently, the Russian government did not wish to lose them, while France was struggling for the appointment of more pro-French figures.\textsuperscript{1035} What made the issue more serious were the unsatisfactory replies issued by the Porte in answer to the inquiry of the Russian ambassador as to the cause of the depositions. Italinsky, the Russian ambassador, promptly demanded an explanation excuse for the dismissal of Ipsilanti and Muruzi, basing his arguments on the point that it was against the Convention of 1802. These princes had three more years to rule. Moreover, he sent a courier to the Court of Petersburg with the information on the developments in the capital.\textsuperscript{1036} Only several days after the dismissal,  

\textsuperscript{1033} From Sebastiani to the Sublime Porte, 16 September 1806, in Testa, \textit{Recul des Traites}, vol. 2, pp. 279-80; B.O.A. HAT 32/1506 (undated). For the difficulties faced by the Porte regarding the closure of the Straits to the Russian ships and the pressure by both sides, see B.O.A. HAT 32/1505 (undated).

\textsuperscript{1034} For Muruzi, Hammer notes that he was never exclusively devoted to either to Russian or French interest, yet he tried to manipulate both parties. His act seems to have brought about his downfall. See From Hammer to Stadion, Iassy, (3 October, 1806), doc. no. 96, (from Austrian Consular Reports), Jorga, \textit{Documentele Familiei Callimachi}, vol I, pp. 147-9.


\textsuperscript{1036} From Sturmer to the Ministry, Constantinople, August, 25\textsuperscript{th} 1806, (Documents in Vienna Imperial Archives), Jorga, \textit{Documentele Familiei Callimachi}, vol. II, pp. 535-6.
the Porte finally replied that Ipsilanti was deposed since he was a traitor due his relations with Tirsiniklioglu and also provoking the Serbian uprising.\textsuperscript{1037}

Arbuthnot\textsuperscript{1038}, the British ambassador, was following these issues seemingly leading up to a war between Russia and the Porte with great anxiety, and was worried about the increasing influence of the French ambassador in the capital. From London, he was instructed to secure the restoration of the hospodars, something it was claimed the Porte was bound due to earlier alliances. Among the instructions, there was advice to work for the immediate removal of Sebastani from Istanbul and also prevent the closure of the Straits to Russian vessels.\textsuperscript{1039} Through frequent dispatches, both ambassadors had already insisted that the deposition of the hospodars meant a declaration of war.\textsuperscript{1040} On 27 August, Italinsky wrote a memorandum to the Porte, protesting the deposition of the hospodars. He underlined that it was a violation of the 1802 Convention and demanded their reinstatement. The note ended with a threat that Russia was preparing to move troops on the Dniester.\textsuperscript{1041} Yet, Arbuthnot had no hope that his and Italinsky’s warnings would have an effect on the Porte. On 28 August, he asked General Fox, the commander of the British military forces in the Mediterranean, to send two warships to the capital, so as to increase the British prestige in the Empire. On 8 September, the British ambassador issued another formal note and tried to prevent the new hospodars from assuming their duties.\textsuperscript{1042} At the

\textsuperscript{1037} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 146.

\textsuperscript{1038} Charles Arbuthnot (b.1767-d. 1850) was appointed as Precis Writer in the Foreign Office (1793) and later was appointed Secretary of Legation in Sweden, where acted chargé d’Affaires from 1795 to 1797. He then became Consul General in Lisbon (1800-1). Two years later he was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Stockholm. On 5 April 1804, he was appointed as Ambassador Extraordinary to the Porte. From 1810 to 1814, he served as Joint Secretary to the Treasury and then became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1828). See \textit{Annual Register or View of the History and Politics of the Year 1850}, (London: 1851), p. 253.

\textsuperscript{1039} From Howick to Arbuthnot, Downing Street, 10 November 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 10).

\textsuperscript{1040} B.O.A. HAT 6014 (21 L 1221/31 December 1806).

\textsuperscript{1041} Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 72; Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 149.

\textsuperscript{1042} Puryear, \textit{Napoleon and The Dardanelles}, p. 102.
same time, Italinsky sent a dispatch to his country suggesting that the Russian troops at Dniester should enter the Ottoman territories since otherwise, it would be impossible for Russia to maintain its influence in the region.

It seems that both ambassadors, facing a failure in diplomacy, were planning to force the Porte to reconsider its actions, by the naval operation of the British and military move of the Russians. Indeed, on 22 September Italinsky sent another ultimatum to the Porte and demanded an immediate reply to his first communication, pointing out that the number of the British ships in the Mediterranean was increasing and a Russian army assembled on the Dniester with the purpose of being ready to aid the Porte in the case of an attack by Napoleon.\(^{1043}\) Even though these naval and military preparations were presented as being undertaken against France, they must also have the aim of proving the military power of the allies to the Porte and to reminding the immediate threat of an approaching war. Indeed, the possibility of a naval attack by the Britain was a nightmare scenario for the Ottoman ministers.\(^{1044}\) The reply from the Porte came on 26 September, announcing that Ipsilanti was deposed due to his treason, as clearly proved by his escape from Wallachia.\(^{1045}\) New orders came on 27 September from St. Petersburg, ordering Italinsky to stand firm against the dismissal of the hospodars.\(^{1046}\) Therefore, he sent a new note to the Porte, repeating the same demands but also underlining the disorder in the Principalities following the deposition, and the consequent financial oppression of the Christian subjects in the region. Therefore, he warned, if these problems were not solved Russia would intervene to protect the Christians in the region.\(^{1047}\) After receiving the note, the Ottoman ministers became aware of the possibility of an immediate war and called Arbuthnot for a meeting on 5


\(^{1044}\) B.O.A. HAT 166/6956 (undated). The document contains the minutes of the meeting held between Sebastiani and Reis Efendi on the evening of 12 N 1221/23 November 1806.

\(^{1045}\) Shupp, *The European Powers*, p. 156.


\(^{1047}\) B.O.A. HAT 5556 (undated); Shupp, *The European Powers*, p. 157.
October. During the meeting Arbuthnot underlined that if a war broke out with Russia, Great Britain would enter the war as an ally of Russia. If Italinsky were to leave, he made clear that he would also leave. Moreover, he asked the Porte to keep its neutrality in international relations.  

Upon his question regarding the future relationship with Britain, the ruling elite declared that the Ottoman-British alliance would not be renewed since such an act would bring war with France. Arbuthnot was asked to act as mediator on the issue of hospodars. In response, the British ambassador suggested that the Sultan should write a letter to the Tsar explaining that his grand vizier had made a mistake by not consulting the Russian ambassador before their dismissal of the princes but he was now ready to depose the newly appointed ones and install candidates approved by the Tsar. In this context, it is very important to note that the refusal of the Oubril Treaty by the Russian should have played an important role, since the treaty had been an important factor encouraging the Porte in the dismissal of the hospodars. The next day, Selim III wrote a letter to Napoleon and noted that due to the pressure of Britain and Russia, he was intending to dismiss the new hospodars, since his Empire was not ready for a new war. Meanwhile, Sebastiani instructed the commander the French troops in Dalmatia to be ready. This time, it was Sebastiani that was alarmed by the above developments. He had tried to convince that the Empire would not be alone in case of a war with Russia. Yet he was anxious whether Porte would be able to defend itself in case of a double attack by Russia and Britain. In order to be prepared for an immediate war, the Porte attempted to strengthen the fortifications around the Danube and recruit new soldiers.

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1049 Shupp, *The European Powers*, pp. 159-60.

1050 B.O.A. HAT 166/6956 (undated). The document contains the minutes of the meeting held between Sebastiani and Reis Efendi on the evening of 12 N 1221/23 November 1806.


Under the pressure from both sides, the Porte adopted a policy of gaining time and tried to prevent Italinsky’s departure from the city, through the mediation of the British ambassador.\textsuperscript{1053} In a note to Arbuthnot, the Porte asked whether the Tsar would nominate the new hospodars if the Porte accepted its fault in deposing Ipsilanti and Muruzi.\textsuperscript{1054} Arbuthnot was also trying to prevent the departure of Italinsky. Therefore, he dictated a note, and another note was written by the Porte.\textsuperscript{1055} In this note\textsuperscript{1056}, it was stated that Constantine Ipsilanti was deposed due to his treason and Muruzi had resigned, but he had also been found guilty of collaborating with Ipsilanti. The mistake seems to have been placed shoulders of Hafiz İsmail Pasha, the former grand vizier. According it, it was İsmail Pasha who had neglected to inform the Russian ambassador before the dismissal. Therefore, he had acted against the stipulations of the Convention of 1802. The Porte realized the obligation to observe the stipulations that it had agreed in the Convention. Thus, the note in question was to be considered as a formal declaration of the reinstatement of the dismissed hospodars. Therefore, in principle the Porte accepted the deposition of the new hospodars, but hoped that the Tsar would not insist on the reappointment of the old figures to which the Porte did not trust anymore. As a final point, the Porte also asked the Russian ambassador not to announce the document related to the reinstatement of the

\textsuperscript{1053} B.O.A. HAT 1701 (undated)

\textsuperscript{1054} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, pp. 163.

\textsuperscript{1055} B.O.A. HAT 1701 (undated).

\textsuperscript{1056} There are two different copies in the Archives of Turkish Prime Ministry. The first copy is undated, and on the upper margin it is noted that “\textit{taraf-i devlet-i aliyyeden Rusya elçisine verilmek üzere İngiltere elçisinin kaleme aldığı sened süretidir}”. The document was probably the draft dictated by the British ambassador and presented to the Sultan or \textit{reisülküttab} for approval. See B.O.A. HAT 34/1683.A (undated). (For a copy of the document see Appendix 4). On the upper margin of the second record, it is noted that it is the copy to be sent to the Russian ambassador. The second one carries the date of 27 B 1221/10 October 1806. There are very slight differences between two copies. In the first draft, after noting the Porte’s trust in its ally, the Russian Tsar, it is stated that one of the hospodars (Ipsilanti) had been dismissed due to involvement in treason against his master, while the other (Muruzi) had resigned. In the second draft, on the other hand, apart from his resignation being mentioned, Muruzi is accused of having collaborated with Ipsilanti. This change might be due to the fact that the Porte thought that a volunteer resignation might not convince the Russians. See B.O.A. HAT 34/ 1683 (27 B 1221/10 October 1806).
hospodars publicly and requested that appointment of the new ones should wait till Selim III had written a letter to the Tsar.\footnote{1057} It was necessary to wait a reply from St. Petersburg, since depending on Tsar’s reply, either the former hospodars would be restored or new ones that would please both the Tsar and the Sultan would be nominated.\footnote{1058} As might be noticed, the Porte admitted that there had been a mistake in deposition of the old hospodars, but tried to depict it as an individual mistake of the Grand Vizier.

In the meantime, Italinsky was on board to leave the city. Through British officials, information was sent to him that the hospodars would be restored. Italinsky was not completely satisfied with the developments. He insisted on an unconditional restoration of the hospodars. Otherwise he would leave immediately.\footnote{1059} However, due to the efforts of Arbuthnot, he delayed his departure for some time.\footnote{1060} Meanwhile, the Porte tried to make a separate British-Ottoman convention. The former one was due to end on 5 January. However, the Porte proposed to make a secret convention, according to which the older one was to continue without a formal renewal. It is highly probable that the aim of the Porte was to separate Britain and Russia and also to continue its peaceful relations with Britain without knowledge of France. The proposal was rejected by the British ambassador, yet he was still not sure that whether such a written agreement might not perhaps be helpful in creating a distance between the Porte and France.\footnote{1061} Finally, Arbuthnot decided to stay firm in the issue of hospodars and side with Russia and by a note dated 12 October, he declared that there must be an immediate and unequivocal restoration of the hospodars, if the Porte did not want an attack on both sides.\footnote{1062} Now, it was necessary for the Porte to choose its sides. In order to lend force to his note, Arbuthnot sent Pole, a member of his

\footnote{1057}B.O.A. HAT 34/1683 (undated).
\footnote{1058}B.O.A. HAT 34/1683.A (undated).
\footnote{1059}Shupp, The European Powers, p. 166.
\footnote{1060}Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 108.
\footnote{1061}From Arbuthnot to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no 80)
\footnote{1062}Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 73; Shupp, The European Powers, p. 164.
staff, to the Porte. The latter informed the Porte of the formation an alliance between Russia, Britain, Prussia and Sweden against France.\textsuperscript{1063} Finally on 16 October, an issue was produced by the Reisülküttab announcing the reinstatement of the Ipsilanti as hospodar of Wallachia. The next day Muruzi was reinstated as the prince of Moldavia.\textsuperscript{1064} The Porte also secretly agreed to allow the passage the Russian warships through the Dardanelles and to renew the treaty stipulations concerning Moldavia and Wallachia.\textsuperscript{1065}

The decree of the 16 October did not reach the Russian court before the beginning of November. In fact, during the same day, General Michelson, commander of the Russian army, had received orders to occupy the Principalities.\textsuperscript{1066} Thus, Michelson’s started with the aim of capturing important Ottoman fortresses in the region that would secure the control of Moldavia and Wallachia. Without much difficulty, the forts began to fell: Hotin on 10 November, 22 November, Bender,\textsuperscript{1067} and Kili\textsuperscript{1068} on 4 December.\textsuperscript{1069} News was coming from the Moldavia that the Russians were about to enter the Principality.\textsuperscript{1070} Meanwhile, Michelson issued a statement arguing that the Russians had come to save the Empire against French aggressions. Therefore, he invited the Turks in the region to unite with Russians to drive out the French from the neighborhood. He also noted that as


\textsuperscript{1064} This time Muruzi did not want to be reinstated, on the pretext that he had been unjustly deposed and now reinstated under the pressure from the Russian government. For details see B.O.A. HAT 1742 (undated). For the prevalent letter from Muruzi, see B.O.A. HAT 1737 (undated).


\textsuperscript{1067} Bender is the capital of Bucak province in Bessarabia on the Dniester River.

\textsuperscript{1068} Kili/Kilya/Kilia/Chilia is on north branch of the Danube mouth in Moldavia.

\textsuperscript{1069} For the details of the movement of the Russian troops in the region see Asım, \textit{Tarihl-i Asım}, vol. I, pp. 184-203; Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 245.

\textsuperscript{1070} B.O.A. HAT 1561 (17 N 1221/28 November 1806).
stipulated in the Treaty of Alliance between Russia and Ottoman Empire, one had to help
the other in expelling the enemies. For our purposes, the importance of Michelson’s
declaration lies in the remaining part. According to the General, the real aim of Napoleon
was to destroy the Janissary army and to help Selim III to consolidate the Nizam-ı Cedid
army. According to the declaration, with the destruction of the Janissaries the Empire
would be vulnerable to French aggressions and “Napoleon would proclaim himself emperor
of the East and overlord of the Ottoman Empire.” As Asım also notes, the purpose of
this manifesto seems to have been to create disorder and frustration among the residents of
the region, with the aim of weakening the resistance against the Russians. We have
argued in the second chapter that the Nizam-ı Cedid had created an anxiety in the Empire
which was sometimes abused for certain other purposes. In international politics, there
seem to have been similar cases. Leaving aside the question of whether France really had
the intention of destroying the Janissary army or not, it is sufficient to underline here that
foreign states were also abusing the anxiety of people about the Nizam-ı Cedid for their
own purposes. The Russians had entered Bucharest on 13 November and finally occupied it
on 27 December.

Despite restoration of the hospodars, the Porte was still in a difficult situation. Due to
the march of the Russian troops towards the Ottoman frontiers, the Porte demanded an
explanation. Italinsky denied any knowledge on the plans of his government and confessed
that he was also very surprised with the march of the Russian army. However he remarked
that the developments on the frontiers should not be taken as proof of a Russian intention to

\[\text{References}\]

1071 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 22 December 1806, (FO 78-52 doc. no. 93). For a French copy of the proclamation of Michelson, see Pouqueville, F.C.H.L., *Histoire de
la regeneration de la Gréce comprenant le précis des événements depuis 1740 jusqu’en

1072 Shupp, *The European Powers*, p. 246


pp. 253-4.
declare war.\textsuperscript{1075} The British government, on the other hand, was aware of the fact that the war actually started. Instructions were sent to Arbuthnot to demand from the Porte to end the hostilities among the former allies, remove Sebastiani from the capital and give the right of free passage of the Russians to the Straits.\textsuperscript{1076} Neither Italinsky nor Arbuthnot seem to have had information more than that already known by the Porte on the issue of the movement of the Russian army on the Dniester.\textsuperscript{1077} When reports came from Kara Mehmed Pasha, the commander of the fortress of Hotin, the chief interpreter of Italinsky was called to the Porte to explain the aggressions of the Russians. He assured that there was no serious matter to be worried about. He explained that it was due to the anxiety of the Russians in the case of the dismissal of the hospodars and Russia’s wish to be ready for an aggression of the France.\textsuperscript{1078} Arbuthnot was later invited to a conference by the Porte where he repeated that Italinsky had not received dispatches either from the Principalities or from St. Petersburg. He suggested that the presence of the Russian forces on the frontiers was probably to protect the Empire against the designs of Napoleon. Arbuthnot advised the Ottoman ministers to wait for the dispatches from St. Petersburg, before making a decision. During the meeting Reisülküttab Galib Efendi commented that the Russians were trying to gain what had been denied them by the Treaty of Oubril.\textsuperscript{1079} If we remember that Sebastiani was frequently meeting with the Ottoman ministers, we can consider the argument about the Treaty of Oubril as a counterargument presented by the French ambassador to the Porte as the real reason of the Russian march. The conference ended with a promise by the British

\textsuperscript{1075} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 255; From Arbuthnot to Howick, 2 December 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 90).

\textsuperscript{1076} From Howick to Arbuthnot, Downing Street, 20 November 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52; doc. no 10).

\textsuperscript{1077} From Arbuthnot to Howick, 2 December 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 90).


\textsuperscript{1079} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 22 December 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 93).
to obtain an explanation from Italinsky.\textsuperscript{1080} After the meeting the news of fall of Bender reached Porte, yet Italinsky still kept his silence.

Meanwhile the march of the Russians and fall of the Ottoman fortresses had created anxiety and anger among the public. The \textit{ulema} and Janissaries were accusing the administration as being soft and indecisive. There was increasing pressure for the declaration of war. Thus, on 20 December a meeting was held and Arbuthnot was consulted again. The meeting ended with the decision to hold a new one on 22 December.\textsuperscript{1081} It seems that despite the public pressure for war, the Porte was still hoping to maintain peace since after the meeting, Reisülküttab asked Arbuthnot to write a letter to General Michelson and read it in the next council. The letter in question simply stated that in case of war the Porte would lose one of its strongest allies.\textsuperscript{1082} Reis Efendi was hoping to delay the declaration of war. Thus, the Porte had promised Arbuthnot to take no steps before the arrival of a reply from General Michelson.\textsuperscript{1083}

Sebastiiani was very angry with the reinstatement of the hospodars. Despite all his efforts of encouragement, the Porte had acted to the contrary and yielded to the pressures from Russia and Britain.\textsuperscript{1084} It seems that he had not expected such an early concession by the Porte and was afraid that his primary aim of breaking the Porte’s alliance with Russia would be ruined.\textsuperscript{1085} Yet, the march and attacks of Michelson on the Principalities have been good opportunity to convince the Porte to issue a declaration of war. Sebastianni was

\textsuperscript{1080} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 22 December 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 93).

\textsuperscript{1081} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 22 December 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 93). See also Driault, Edouard, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani, ambassadeur à Constantinople, du 24 dec. 1806 au 10 Mars 1807), \textit{Revue des Etudes Napoleoniennes}, p.403.

\textsuperscript{1082} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 22 December 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 93).

\textsuperscript{1083} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 26 December 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52, doc. no. 95).

\textsuperscript{1084} B.O.A. HAT 174/7506 (undated); HAT 174/7506.A (undated).

\textsuperscript{1085} HAT 174/7506.A (undated); Puryear, \textit{Napoleon and the Dardanelles}, p. 110.
also instructed by Napoleon to urge the Porte for an alliance with France.\textsuperscript{1086} It is clear that immediately after receiving his instructions, Sebastiani sought contacts with the Porte. On the night of 23 November 1806, he met with the Reisülküttab and the first question Sebastiani posed was whether the Porte would continue the alliance with Britain and Russia, underlining that the policy of France towards the Ottoman Empire would also be shaped according to the answer. The French ambassador noted that he had been ordered by Paris to obtain a definite reply on this issue. When he noticed that the Reisülküttab was not sure about the policy and probably trying to assess more clearly the political conditions of Europe, Sebastiani emphasized the military power of his government and assured that Napoleon was aiming to expel the Russians completely from the Black Sea region. Sebastiani then brought the discussion to the deposition of the hospodars and criticized their restoration despite the warnings and support of Napoleon. He also demanded a clear answer on the issue of the closure of the Straits to the Russians. Sebastiani’s real intention in asking all these questions was to offer an alliance between France and the Porte defensive or offensive depending on the choice of the Porte. A detailed reading of the conversation between these two statesmen makes it clear that the aim of Napoleon was to encourage the Porte to declare war on Russia. Indeed, on 7 November, Sebastiani had received orders from Paris that he had to work “vigorously” to bring about a war.\textsuperscript{1087} He had again been instructed to obtain an alliance between France, Persia and the Porte against Russia. Therefore, during the above meeting, Sebastiani underlined the point that with such an alliance there would be no need to be afraid of the naval attack of the British. This was an important point since the naval superiority of Britain always left the Porte faced with a dilemma.\textsuperscript{1088} Moreover, the French troops in Dalmatia would be ready to help the Ottomans in case of need.\textsuperscript{1089}

\textsuperscript{1086} From Arbuthnot to Rear Admiral Louis, Pera, 23 November 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52).

\textsuperscript{1087} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{1088} In a document, which is a translation of an article from the French newspaper \textit{Moniteur}, it is argued that the real cause of restoration of the hospodars was the fear of
Sebastiani was also waiting for messages from Paris giving news on the victories of Napoleon. Such news would help the Porte to assure that France had the power to help in case of further hostilities with Russia. The victory of Jena reached Istanbul and in a letter dated 11 November, Napoleon declared his victory and encouraged Selim III to be self-confident. He also advised the Sultan to gather his energy and send his troops to recapture Bender and the other fortresses along the Dniester. Relieved by the victory of France, the Porte must have felt able to act more freely. On 1 December, Napoleon wrote another letter to the Sultan announcing the defeat of Prussia. He advised him to depose the treacherous hospodars whom he had restored under pressure. The Sultan was to take initial step by deposing them and no longer believing the Russians. In a letter bearing the same date, Napoleon instructed his ambassador to encourage the Porte to be ready against the aggressions of Russia. More importantly, he authorized Sebastiani to sign a secret, defensive and offensive treaty by which France would guarantee the recovery of the Principalities.

double attack by the British naval force and Russian troops. See B.O.A. HAT 175/7633 (undated)

1089 B.O.A. HAT 166/6956 (undated).
1090 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 1 December 1806, (1 December 1806).
1091 By the Battles Jena and Auerstadt, in October 1806, France defeated the Prussians decisively and opened most parts of Prussia and Poland to French occupation.
1094 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 1 December 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 85).
As we have seen above, Sebastiani had made an initial interview with the Reisülküttab on November 1806. After receiving new instructions, dated 1 December, Sebastiani acted on them immediately arranged a meeting with the Reisülküttab the next day (2 December).\textsuperscript{1097} With the occupation of Prussia, the Russians needed the assistance of other states especially Austria and the Porte. If Austria or the Ottoman Empire made an alliance with Russia, the French troops in Prussia and Poland would suffer great difficulties. However, if an alliance was made with the Porte and France, the Russians would have to fight on two frontiers. For these reasons, France was trying to sign a defensive and offensive alliance with the Porte.\textsuperscript{1098} The Porte also needed a strong ally against the aggressions of Russia and in a letter, dated 8 December, Selim III expressed that he was willing to make an alliance.\textsuperscript{1099}

Feeling the support of the French government, the Porte became more enthusiastic about the declaration of war against Russia. A state council was held on 27 December and Sebastiani was among the participants. During the meeting, the issue of declaration of war was discussed and the ministers decided to declare war.\textsuperscript{1100} It was argued that the Russian aggressions made the holy war obligatory in order to defend the imperial territories.\textsuperscript{1101} The same tone is prevalent on formal statement of the Porte.\textsuperscript{1102} On 27 December, two important letters were written, one from the \textit{divan} to the Grand Vizier, mentioning the unjust attacks of Russia and the obligation of all Muslims to be prepared for holy war. The

\textsuperscript{1097} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 2 December 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 90)


\textsuperscript{1100} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 28 December 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52, doc. No. 96).

\textsuperscript{1101} For a summary of the discussions passed during the war council whereby a \textit{fetva} was received, see B.O.A. HAT 91/3715 (undated).

\textsuperscript{1102} B.O.A. A. AMD. 51/18 (25 L 1221/4 January 1806; B.O.A. A.AMD 52/17(undated).
second letter was written by Selim III to Napoleon, announcing the formal declaration of war. A reply came from Napoleon, congratulating him for making the decision to fight against the enemy who was murdering the innocent Muslims and demolishing the mosques. He also asked the Sultan to send a trustworthy official in order to sign the alliance between France and the Porte.

After the decision to declare war, it became clear that the Russian ambassador could no longer stay at the Capital. It was the beginning of hard days for the British ambassador, too. Arbuthnot personally believed that it had been the Russians who started the war. For instance, in a letter, dated 26 December 1806, he confessed that he found the Russian policy as “unjust” and “impolitic”. Yet, he did not express his feelings to the Reisülküttab, but just complained that the Porte was acting in compliance with the dictates of France. The British ambassador particularly blamed the Russian court for not ending the crisis after the restoration of the hospodars and pushing the Porte into the hands of Napoleon, as after the break of war the French assistance would naturally be demanded by the Porte. During his meeting with Reisülküttab, Arbuthnot was informed that the Russian ambassador could no longer stay in the country and that the Reisülküttab was no longer able to control affairs. Thereafter, Fonton was called to the Porte and demanded that the Russian ambassador should leave the country within there days. Still, Arbuthnot was able to secure five days for the Russian ambassador and twenty days for the Russian merchants and other Russians in the Empire. The following day, while Arbuthnot was at the Porte,

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1103 Shupp, The European Powers, p. 266; Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, p. 123.


1105 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 26 December 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52, doc. No. 95).

1106 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 26 December 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52, doc. No. 95).

1107 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 26 December 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52, doc. No. 95); B.O.A. HAT 6237 (undated).
Italinsky received a dispatch from Count Razoumoffsky, the Russian ambassador to Austria. He declared that the Russians had entered the Principalities before the news of the restoration of the hospodars reached to the Russian authorities.\textsuperscript{1108}

An official manifesto was issued on 5 January 1807 and copies were submitted to all embassies.\textsuperscript{1109} In the document, the Porte tried to justify itself by accusing the Russians of being accustomed to attacking their neighbours and never obeying the laws of international politics. They had attacked and conquered the Crimea. The Russian consulates, established in different parts of the Empire were acting as secret agents and deceiving the Ottoman subjects. According to the document, the Russians never refrained from supporting the Serbian rebels with the intention of creating further disorder in the Empire. The Russian troops had seized certain fortresses, sent forces to the Septinsular Republic and thus violated the regulations related to the Republic. In respect to the passage of the Russian ships through the Straits, the document argued that the ships were allowed to pass only if they were headed for the Septinsular Republic, but that the Russian officials were abusing this concession by the transporting the soldiers against Italy without the knowledge of the Porte and thus violating the principle of neutrality of the Empire. In the matter of the Principalities, the Porte blamed the Russian government for using the excuse of not having been informed beforehand, as a pretext for hostility.\textsuperscript{1110} Compared to the note delivered to Italinsky before the reinstatement of the hospodars, the language adopted by the Porte is more critical of the Russians. As might be recalled, even though there had been a very short reference to the treason of Ipsilanti in the earlier document, the emphasis had been on the culpability of the grand vizier. In the formal manifesto, on the other hand, the Porte explained that its reason of not informing the Russians beforehand had been not to give Ipsilanti a chance to flee. According to declaration, whatever the causes of the crisis may

\textsuperscript{1108} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 26 December 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52, doc. No. 95).

\textsuperscript{1109} An English copy of the manifesto was published in \textit{The Times}, Tuesday, March 1807, pg. 3; Issue 6997; col. C

\textsuperscript{1110} B.O.A. A. AMD. 51/18 (25 L 1221/4 January 1806); B.O.A. A.AMD 52/17 (undated).
have been, the dismissed hospodars had been restored in order not to create a further crisis. On the other hand, the Russians had revealed their true intention, namely to abuse the crisis as pretext for their aggressions on the imperial domains, by attacking Ottoman territories and oppressing the innocent Muslims.

Besides being a formal declaration of war against Russia, the document is important in that it addresses not only the Russians but also the European states. By frequent references to laws of international politics and depicting itself as declaring war only under the direct aggression by the enemy, the Porte was to prove its innocence and the declaration of war was an act of self-defense.\textsuperscript{1111} On 7 January 1806, the Straits were closed to all foreign ships for the duration of the war with Russia. Yet, it was not the Russians but the British who would manage to sail through and anchor off the Seraglio.

3.3. “İngilizlü Vakası”: The British Naval Expedition

From the beginning of the diplomatic crisis of the hospodars to the declaration of war, Arbuthnot, the British ambassador, played the role of mediator. But he clearly had expressed the side Great Britain would take if a war broke out between the Porte and Russia. This position adopted by the ambassador was in compliance with British interests in the Near East. As much as Russia, the British government was worried about Napoleon’s secret intentions in the Near East, both in Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Britain was very anxious about the nearly unrivaled influence of France, the architect of which was Sebastiani. In case of an aggression against the Empire, the British would lose the security of the road to India, leaving aside other political and economic interests in the Empire. Therefore, Arbuthnot noted in one of his dispatches that “the interest of our own depends much on the preservation of this Empire” and concludes that “we should save them in spite

\textsuperscript{1111} B.O.A. A. AMD. 51/18 (25 L 1221/4 January 1806); B.O.A A. AMD. 52/17 (undated)
of themselves.”\textsuperscript{1112} In another dispatch, he makes a very similar comment stating that “the Turks if it were necessary should be saved in spite of themselves”.\textsuperscript{1113} The best way to attain this was to ensure that the Porte kept its neutrality. Yet, no sooner than the beginning of the crisis between Russia and the Porte, Arbuthnot noticed that a rupture of relations was very apparent and a war was very likely between the former allies. Therefore while he was playing the role of mediator, he asked his government to send a squadron to the Dardanelles. The main problem was not only to end the crisis of the hospodars. The more important issue was to put an end to the “fatal” influence of the French, represented by the successful efforts of Sebastiani. According to Arbuthnot, the war with Russia had already been decided upon by the French, which had only been waiting for the arrival of Sebastiani in order to set the plan in motion.\textsuperscript{1114}

3.3.1. The Flight of the British Ambassador

Arbuthnot expected Sidney Smith,\textsuperscript{1115} the British admiral, to send a part of his squadron to the Dardanelles. It would be beneficial in reconciling the Porte to all Russian demands. He would go on to state that for the time being they had completely destroyed the French influence thanks to the dread of their fleets.\textsuperscript{1116} Thus, on 22 October, London gave

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1112} From Arbuthnot to Rear Admiral Louis, Pera, 26 November 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52).
\item \textsuperscript{1113} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 26 December 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52, doc. No. 95).
\item \textsuperscript{1114} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, pp 136-7.
\item \textsuperscript{1115} Sir William Sidney Smith (d.1841) was a distinguished naval officer. He participated in the defense of Egypt against France and negotiated the evacuation of the city with Kleber. In 1802, he returned to the Parliament of Rochester and two years later became a colonel of Marines. In 1805, Smith was promoted to rear-admiralship and then vice-admiralship. He became lieutenant-general of the Marines (1830) and died in 1841. See Rose, Hugh James, \textit{A New General Bibliographical Dictionary}, 12 vols., (Oxford: 1853), pp. 59-60.
\item \textsuperscript{1116} From Arbuthnot to senior officer of his Majesty’s ships of War at the Dardanelles, Büyükdere, 20 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52).
\end{itemize}
orders for a dispatch a squadron to the Dardanelles. On 12 November, Thomas Louis, a rear admiral anchored in Malta.\textsuperscript{1117} Meanwhile, Arbuthnot wrote to London that he was looking forward to the arrival of Louis’s squadron. The latter moved onto Bozca Ada with three lines of battleships. Then, leaving two ships there, Louis reached the Dardanelles on the ship called Canopus. On 27 November two ships – Canopus and Endymion, were in the harbour in İstanbul. One of these ships, Canopus, took Italinsky away from İstanbul on 25 December 1806.\textsuperscript{1118} Arbuthnot later declared that his real intention had been to invite battleships to the city. He would rather have preferred the admiral to stay at Dardanelles, as this would have been sufficient to demonstrate the British naval force to the Porte and then return to Bozca Ada. Yet a secret piece of intelligence had changed his mind and thus Louis arrived in İstanbul. Arbuthnot had learnt that Sebastani had demanded from the Reisülküttab that the passage of the Russian warships should be prevented otherwise he would leave the Porte. Sebastani was informed by the Reisülküttab that the presence of the naval force of Britain was preventing the Porte from acting “as Bonaparte has required” yet he assured Sebastani that the Porte would follow the demands of France as soon as the Russian were vanquished.\textsuperscript{1119} The British ambassador noticed that the presence of even a small naval force would provide greater advantages than all diplomatic tactics. Moreover, he was aware that the Porte was in a great dilemma and if news of the victory of France were to arrive, it would change its mind again. Therefore, it is likely he thought that presence of even a ship would help the Porte to decide in favour of its former allies. Especially the victories of Napoleon over Prussia were greatly increasing his anxiety.\textsuperscript{1120} As might be recalled, after the victory of Jena, Napoleon had instructed Sebastani to make an alliance with the Porte. The sole obstacle was the naval superiority of the Great Britain,

\textsuperscript{1117} Shupp, The European Powers, 239.

\textsuperscript{1118} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 26 December 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52, doc. no. 95).

\textsuperscript{1119} From Arbuthnot to Howick; Pera, 1 December 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 85).

\textsuperscript{1120} From Arbuthnot to Rear Admiral Louis, Pera, 21 November 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52).
which the Ottomans dreaded even more than the French armies. Therefore, Arbuthnot believed that the British ships should station off the Dardanelles till the influence of Sebastiani was completely removed. 1121 Meanwhile a Russian frigate was also at anchor in the Bosphorouros, only waiting for a fair wind to depart. 1122

After the declaration of war and the departure of Italinsky on 25 December, Arbuthnot’s situation became worse. The Reisülküttab and other ministers were suspecting that as an ally of the Russians, his conducts were more in favour of them than the Porte. During that period, the Porte preferred to follow a policy of gaining time. For instance, when Arbuthnot requested a direct audience with the Sultan, he was not outright refused but rather was rejected kindly with various excuses. For Arbuthnot, these were the symptoms of the overwhelming dominance of Sebastiani over the Porte. 1123 It is very clear that the British ambassador was deeply depressed by the undeniable influence of the French. It was only the ships in sight that provided him a relief and encouragement to deal with the Porte. 1124 Also, the ships were for him the only means that would force the Porte to return its former allies. 1125

Upon the request of the British ambassador, a conference was arranged on 25 January, lasting four hours. 1126 His primary aim was to declare the instructions he received from London in January. He started the meeting by criticizing the Porte for some past events such as the issues of renewal of alliance, good reception accorded to Sebastiani, 1127

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1121 From Arbuthnot to Rear Admiral Louis, Pera, 23 November 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52).
1122 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 2 December 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52).
1123 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 28 December 1806, (PRO, FO, 78-52, doc. no. 96).
1124 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 15 January 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 3)
1125 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 15 January 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 3,
1126 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 27 January 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 9; B.O.A. HAT 167/7022 (undated).
1127 He seems to be very annoyed with the warm reception given Sebastiani. He argues that the tensions between the Porte and its former allies had started after Sebastiani’s
and the recognition of the imperial title of Napoleon. Arbuthnot argued that the good relations with France were violation of the alliance. According to him, even the presence of Sebastiani in the capital was “incompatible with the existence of friendship between the Porte and allies.”

Therefore, he demanded that the French ambassador should be removed immediately. This meant that the Porte had to choose between France and the former allies. He ensured that the defense of the Empire would be provided if the Porte preferred the former allies. If, however, good relations continued with France, Great Britain did not lack means to pursue her own interests. Another matter was the renewal of the alliance. He emphasized that his government was in favour of the renewal of the alliance and maintaining good relations between the two states. However, if the Porte did not accept his demands, the Russian and British fleet would join at the Bosphorus. He noted that he had already sent letters to the British merchants in the Empire to leave the city, in case that these demands were not realized. After that he would join the British fleet that waited at Bosphorus.

Arbuthnot secretly left the city at the evening of 29 January. He had made up his mind in the morning of the same day. After the decision to leave the city, he faced the arrival. To prove his point, he gives the example of grant of five horses to the French ambassador at the birthday of Napoleon. According to the ambassador, Sebastiani should not even have been received by the Porte as an ambassador. See B.O.A. HAT 166/6971 (16 Za 1221/25 January 1807).

1128 B.O.A. HAT 166/6971 (16 Za 1221/25 January 1807); From Arbuthnot to Galib Efendi, Pera, 26 January 1807 (PRO, FO, 78-55).

1129 From Arbuthnot to Galib Efendi, Pera, 26 January 1807 (PRO, FO, 78-55).

1130 He mentions an interesting incident that took place at the time of the conference, the execution of the father of Prince Ipsilanti, now in Russia. Arbuthnot notes that beheading by the order of the Sultan intentionally took place at the time of the conference, since the Porte considered that he had requested the meeting for making “an application for his favor.” He states that the father of Ipsilanti had been harassed in in order to learn the possessions of the family. See from Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 27 January 1806 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 9)

1131 B.O.A. HAT 166/6971 (16 Za 1221/25 January 1807); B.O.A. HAT 1162/46234.C (29 Za 1221/7 February 1807). It is a letter from Reis Efendi to Sıdkı Efendi, Ottoman envoy in London, informing him on the latest developments. For a summary of the minutes of the meeting, see B.O.A. HAT 177/7754 (undated).
difficulty of a secret departure in a country where the “spies are employed in the greatest number”. In order to carry the British merchants and his family on board of Endymion, without raising suspicion, he devised a clever plan. Accordingly, all the merchants were to be invited for dinner party on board. After making sure that all merchants were on board, he went on board himself. After he explained to them the motives that were causing him leave the city secretly.1132 Before leaving, he also had left a note for the Reisülküttab that would be submitted to him after his escape.1133 After it got dark, set to sail and with favourable wind, they soon left the city behind. Since the guardians of the fortresses did not notice the presence of the ambassador on board, they passed Dardanelles without any obstacle.1134

According to Driault, Arbuthnot escaped due to his fear of being imprisoned.1135 Yet as the British ambassador well knew, Italinsky had not been imprisoned after the declaration of war against Russia. Therefore, it is likely that there were some other factors influencing his decision to flee as well. According to Asım, he was not able to digest the

1132 He notes that only one person, Captain Juchereau, objected the plan and they madet great effort to convince him. Juchereau argued that it would be impossible to escape from the fires of the batteries. After promising not to inform the Porte of the escape, he was allowed to back on shore. On the other hand, Driault argues that all of the British citizens on board protested, since all of them had left their family and possessions in the city. See Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 94. In a note dated 29 January that was to be submitted to the Porte, the British ambassador declared that the Porte should be responsible for the protection of the British subjects and their possessions which had been left in the city. At the same date, he requested the protection of especially the possessions of the embassy. See Translation of a note from the Porte, dated 29 Za 1221/9 January 1807 (in PRO, FO 78-55). Selim III had issued an edict which ordered that the possessions should be kept intact and none of them should be lost or embezzled. See B.O.A. HAT 107/42124 (undated)

1133 In the note dated 29 January 1807, Arbuthnot stated that on 28 January his request for the issue of ferman was denied and under these conditions, it would be impossible for him to carry on his duties in safety. Therefore, he was “forced” to retire to the British fleet of Bozca Ada, where he would be safe. He noted that if the demands he had presented in the meeting of 25 January were met without delay, he would return. See From Arbuthnot to Reis Efendi, Endymion off the Seraglio Point, 29 January 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55).

1134 Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 94.

1135 According to Driault, this was the main cause of his escape. See Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 95.
improving relations with France and his decreased prestige in comparison to Sebastiani.\textsuperscript{1136}

On the other hand, Câbî argues that an imperial edict issued under the influence of French ambassador and prohibiting the sale of British products was an important factor that made up the mind of the British ambassador.\textsuperscript{1137} Aside these factors, Arbuthnot’s dispatches direct us to some others as well. After the declaration of war, it seems that he was experiencing difficulties in communicating with his native country and also Britain’s ally, the Russians.\textsuperscript{1138} According to information he provided, the Porte was not permitting him send couriers via Ruscuk, so that he had to send them via Vidin. For instance, one of his former messengers, carrying letters to General Michelson was detained at Ruscuk.\textsuperscript{1139}

Therefore, he was proposed to carry on urgent communications via Malta,\textsuperscript{1140} while the others could be carried via the Danube.\textsuperscript{1141} Yet, the most important case seems to have arisen when he wanted to secure a \textit{ferman} or passport for an officer of the ship Endymion to be taken to Admiral Louis. Therefore, he had sent Pizani\textsuperscript{1142} to the Reisülküttab early in the morning of 27 January, so that his dispatches would be carried during the evening of the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{1136} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asum}, vol. I, p. 217.
\item \textsuperscript{1138} From Arbuthnot to Louis, Pera, 21 January 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 1).
\item \textsuperscript{1139} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 16 January 1806 (PRO, FO 78-52; doc. no. 6).
\item \textsuperscript{1140} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 16 January 1806 (PRO, FO 78-52; doc. no. 6; From Arbuthnot to Louis, Pera, 16 January 1806 (PRO, FO 78-52; doc. no. 1).
\item \textsuperscript{1141} From Arbuthnot to Louis, Pera, 16 January 1806 (PRO, FO 78-52; doc. no. 1)
\item \textsuperscript{1142} Bartholomew Pizani (d.1826) was the second in rank of the Great Britain’s four dragomans in İstanbul. The Pizani family served eleven British ambassadors without a break. See Groot, Alexander H. de Groot, “Dragoman’s Careers: Change of Status in Some Families Connected with the British and Dutch Embassies at Istanbul, 1785-1829”.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
same day. However, according to his own explanation, Galib Efendi, the Reisülküttab, was not pleased with the idea of sending dispatches to England, especially soon after above-mentioned conference, and therefore Pizani was not successful. The next day, Pizani was again sent to renew the application, yet without any result. Pizani was just informed that the delay of the issue of the imperial edict did not mean the refusal of the application. Then, Arbuthnot decided to send the messenger without a fermaṇ and wrote a note to Galib Efendi requesting an explanation for the refusal for the application. In the meantime, he heard from various sources that there was an intention to seize the ship Endymion in İstanbul and thus keep him and the British subjects as hostages. From a safe source of information he also learned that Porte was really intending to keep them as hostages and later Pizani delivered him the note of the Reisülküttab which did not give answer about the above issues. All the above factors might have played an important role in his fled from the city. However, it should be recalled from the summary of the meeting on 25 January, the British ambassador had already made his intention of leaving the city after sending away the British merchants. Therefore, it seems that that Arbuthnot had noticed the fact that it was no more possible to persuade the Porte to obey his demands in the meetings and had therefore decided to force the Porte by a naval expedition.

The British ambassador met the British squadron under the command of rear-Admiral Louis, at the mouth of the Dardanelles on 31 January. From there, he continued communications with the Porte through the medium of Salih Pasha, the Grand Admiral.\(^{1143}\) In a meeting with Salih Pasha, on 1 February,\(^{1144}\) Pizani,\(^{1145}\) assured the Pasha that

\(^{1143}\) The *Times*, Wednesday, April 1 1807; pg. 2; issue 7010; col. E. Salih Pasha (d.1240/1824) was one of palace officials, serving as the *mirahor-i sani*. He was appointed as the grand admiral on 10 N 1221/21 November 1806. After a short tenure in admiralship, he was deposed (16 Z 1221/24 February 1807) and banished to Tekfurdağı. For more details, see Appendix I.

\(^{1144}\) From a report of a Salih Pasha, we learn that he was at the Fortress of Sultaniye on 1 February 1807, to supervise the construction of the batteries and to check out the conditions of the artillery and munitions there. See B.O.A. HAT 175/7632 (23 Za 1221/1 February 1807).

\(^{1145}\) Pizani accompanied Arbuthnot on his flight, and after reaching to Kepez Burnu at the Dardanelles where they met with the British squadron, Arbuthnot sent him back to
departure of the ambassador was a precautionary measure since there had been rumours that he would be held captive at Yedi Kule. However, Salih Pasha seemed to be surprised and emphasized that he had no information regarding such plans. He also remarked that Arbuthnot had left the city too early and without any investigation into the truth of these rumours. In reply, Pizani noted that the Grand Admiral should help the ambassador to improve the relationship between the two states, possibly preventing war. Pizani assured him that Arbuthnot would wait off Bozca Ada until a reply would come from London. After the return of Pizani to the ship, they sailed to Bozca Ada to join Admiral Duckworth. In a letter, dated 6 February, Arbuthnot wrote that a British frigate had just arrived carrying strict orders from London to force the Straits and bombard the city. For this purpose, Admiral Smith and Louis were to the join them in a short period of time with a fleet. Therefore, he wrote, if the Salih Pasha wished to protect the capital from destruction, he should meet with the British ambassador either on Bozca Ada or the ship of the ambassador. If, however, the Pasha did not arrange the meeting and the expedition would start as soon as the arrival of the new ships.

Arbuthnot sent Pizani for an interview with Salih Pasha, and asked for a conference with him. On 11 February, Arbuthnot was to meet Salih Pasha and depending on the result of the negotiations, he would decide whether their passage would be hostile or amicable. However, due heavy wind, it was impossible for the British ambassador to inform the grand admiral that he escaped due the fear of being imprisoned at Yedi Kule. See B.O.A. HAT 168/7094 (23 Za 1221/1 February 1807); Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 5b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 99.

**1146** B.O.A. HAT 168/7094 (23 Za 1221/1 February 1807); HAT 40/2007.A (28 Za 1221/4 February 1807).

**1147** From Arbuthnot to Howick, Canopus, off Tenedos, 3 February 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no 11).

**1148** B.O.A. HAT 40/2007.A (28 Za 1221/4 February 1807)

**1149** B.O.A. HAT 1577 (undated).

**1150** From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George, off Tenedos, 14 February 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 12).
land, they finally met 13 February. The meeting seems not to have been satisfactory to either side. Salih Pasha did not yield to anything proposed by the ambassador. On the other hand, the grand admiral tried to convince him to return the city with him to negotiate his demands with the Ottoman ministers. In reply, Arbuthnot proposed that he would try to stop the progress of the fleet towards İstanbul, on the condition that was allowed to anchor at the entrance of the passage. He also made an interesting proposal to Salih Pasha that on each of the forts around the Straits, a British officer should be stationed to supervise them during the time during the negotiations to ensure that “no additional works were carried on”. Salih Pasha refused the offer saying that he could not act against the orders of the Sultan.1151 An interesting comment also was made Salih Pasha. According to him, if the alliance with Russia was reached through the meditation of Britain, France would consider it as an act of hostility and “then would not fail to invade the Turkish Empire.” Arbuthnot replied that his government would help the Porte in such case. He also promised the Pasha that he would personally – with an Ottoman delegate - visit Michelson to restore peace. To commit himself on such issues was beyond the authority of the Grand Admiral and consequently he asked the ambassador that Duckworth should not move from his present location.1152 Both Duckworth and Arbuthnot had been instructed that in case of a failure of negotiations, they were authorized to force the passage to the city. After discussing the matter with Duckworth, the ambassador proposed that they should not lose time and pass the Dardanelles before a new negotiation.1153 Then, he wrote a note to Pizani to be handed to Salih Pasha, stating that after their arrival to the city, he would once more offer a

1151 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George, off Tenedos, 14 February 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 12). It is highly probable that the Grand Admiral was also trying to gain time for the fortifications before certain movement of the fleet towards the city. See Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 5b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.99.

1152 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George, off Tenedos, 14 February 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 12).

1153 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George, off Tenedos, 14 February 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 12). It seems that it was Duckworth who was being informed on the general plans of Britain on the expedition. Indeed, he was instructed to direct the operation to Egypt if real hostilities started with the Porte. See Shupp, The European Powers, p. 378.
negotiation, maintaining that no hostility would occur by the British side, and asking that no fire should be opened on them.\textsuperscript{1154}

On 3 February, the Porte issued a note to the British ambassador proclaiming that there had been no need for him to leave his post in the city. According to the Porte, at the meeting of 25 January, after making some propositions he had declared that the English fleet would join a Russian squadron at Bozca Ada, then would force the Dardanelles and reach İstanbul. Three days after, the note continues, the ambassador sent a long note of thirteen pages, in English. Since the translation of the note had taken time, they were not able to send a prompt reply and in the meantime the ambassador had left the city secretly. The same note contains an interesting claim, stating that there had no application for a passport. Moreover, there had been no issue that would have threatened the security of the ambassador.\textsuperscript{1155} Another note was sent on 9 February repeating the same details.\textsuperscript{1156} In fact, the Porte suspecting that application for issue of a \textit{ferman} for the messenger was being used as a pretext for the securing the arrival of the fleet in İstanbul. This would have made it reasonable for the Porte to delay the procedures to gain time. Especially when the ambassador changed his language and said that the imperial edict had been requested for an official ("\textit{ofçiyal}")}, the suspicion of the Porte increased and the Sultan ordered the fortification of the fortresses on the Bosphorus.\textsuperscript{1157}

\textbf{3.3.2. The British fleet in the City}

\textsuperscript{1154} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George, off Tenedos, 14 February 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no 12); Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. I, pp. 224-5.

\textsuperscript{1155} B.O.A. A. AMD. 52/27 (25 Za 1221/3 February 1807. For an English translation of a note from the Porte to Arbuthnot, dated 25 Z 1221/5 February 1806, see PRO, FO, 78-55. B.O.A. HAT 834/37639.B (25 Za 1221/3 February 1807; B.O.A. A.AMD (25 Za 1221/3 February 1807). On the upper margins of last two documents, it is stated it is the copy of the declaration submitted to the ambassadors.

\textsuperscript{1156} Translation of a note from the Porte, dated 29 Za 1221/9 January 1807 (PRO, FO, 78-55); HAT 167/7023 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 167/ 7022 (25 Za 1222/3 February 1807).

\textsuperscript{1157} B.O.A. HAT 167/7023 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 167/7025 (8 Z 1221/16 February 1807); B.O.A. HAT 167/7006 (undated).
The negotiations and correspondences between the two sides did not produce any effective result. Therefore, early in the morning of 19 February\textsuperscript{1158} after finding a favourable wind, Duckworth, the vice-admiral, ordered the advance movement of eleven ships of 3-deckers, four other ships of line and four frigates towards the Straits, while the remaining ships would wait at Bozca Ada.\textsuperscript{1159} The purpose was to enter the city before the fortifications were completed.\textsuperscript{1160} During the passage the cannons were fired from the fortress of Çanak Kale, yet these did not cause any serious damage.\textsuperscript{1161} However, when the enemy fleet opened fire, a great disorder prevailed among the Ottoman soldiers. According to Saint-Denys, Salih Pasha “departed”, after seeing the destructive effect of the bombardment. His “departure” caused panic among the soldiers and only the French officers remained in their place.\textsuperscript{1162} The fleet continued to proceed, ignoring the ineffective fire from Kepez Burnu.\textsuperscript{1163} There was a half-completed fortress at Naara Burnu (in Gelibolu) equipped with fifty-four cannons, and when the fleet came within range, it was fired upon.\textsuperscript{1164} According to a report sent by Salih Pasha, most of the cannons had been filled during the French expedition to Egypt and not been examined thereafter.\textsuperscript{1165}

\textsuperscript{1158} According to Ebubekir Efendi, the expedition started on 10 Z 1221/18 February 1807. See Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 5b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{1159} The Times, Friday, April 17 1807, pg.3; issue 7024; col. A; From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 6 March 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 16) See also Driault, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani” p. 411.

\textsuperscript{1160} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 6 March 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 16).

\textsuperscript{1161} In his report about the conditions of the defense of the city Juchereau Saint-Denys, argued that the bad fortifications of the Kilid Bahir and Sultaniye fortresses and the distance of the artillery from the entrance of the Straits would provide an easy passage for the enemy. For the details of his report see Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, pp. 52-56. See also Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 5b-6a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 100; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 224 for the movement of the fleet.

\textsuperscript{1162} Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 68.

\textsuperscript{1163} Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 5b-6a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{1164} Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 6a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{1165} B.O.A. HAT 40/2007 (26 Z 1221/6 March 1807).
seems that the soldiers in the fortress were mostly new recruits and escaped from their posts immediately after start of the bombardment by the British fleet.\textsuperscript{1166} An eyewitness, the French counselor at Çanak Kale, gives a different picture. He notes that after the beginning of the firing, he went down to the battery to watch the fight. He never accuses the Ottoman soldiers of acting cowardly, and on the contrary emphasizes that they held their position despite the bombardment by the British fleet. Moreover, they acted very skillfully in firing the cannons, and he seems to very sure that some damage was caused to the ships.\textsuperscript{1167}

Around Naara Burnu, the fleet came upon an Ottoman squadron\textsuperscript{1168} anchored there to prevent the passage of the enemy. However, as soon as their fire was countered by the enemy fire, the crew of the Ottoman squadron immediately began to escape.\textsuperscript{1169} Rather than murdering or capturing the crew, the British soldiers carried the Ottoman soldiers\textsuperscript{1170} to the shore after setting fire to six ships and capturing one corvette.\textsuperscript{1171} According to a report in

\textsuperscript{1166} Ebubekir Efendi narrates the incident as follows: “Hadımoğlu’nun köçekçi Türkleri 'aman gardaş gavurun gulamparesine göt dayanıyordu dişerek dağıları gıyub ve soluciónu köylerinde almış yemiş iki derde deva olmak itikânda olduklarını yoğurt ayardı başına çekmişler.” See Ebubekir Efendi, 

\textsuperscript{1167} B.O.A. HAT 159/6636 (undated). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

\textsuperscript{1168} The Ottoman squadron anchored close to the upper side of Naara Burnu to prevent the passage of the British fleet. Salih Pasha had ordered them not to move. The initial fire was countered by the British fleet. See Ebubekir Efendi, 

\textsuperscript{1169} It is again Ebubekir Efendi who makes interesting comments on the incident: “top endâhte başlar başlamaz donanmanıza bir takım ateş savurduklarında kimi demürlerin kat’ ile karaya şitâb ve kiminin demürü düşmüş tarafından atlan edevât-i harbiyye ile maktu’ olmağa cümlesi karaya düşüb ve kendülerini şaşurub kimi kendiyü bahre ilka' ve kimi sefinede kalab dehşet ve hayret üzere durur iken ...” See Ebubekir Efendi, 

\textsuperscript{1170} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 223; Ebubekir Efendi, 

\textsuperscript{1171} According to Driault, it was an easy success, since most of the crew was on shore due to it being the first day Kurban Bayramı. See Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 102. Though it was actually the second day of the Bayram, there might be some truth in his argument. Indeed, Mustafa Necib also notes the Turkish crew was in the mosques. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayı, p. 17. Asım, on the other hand, states that the crew did not consist of professional soldiers: “dirneti tabir olunur tutma hâşeratdan
The Times, thirteen British soldiers were killed while sixty-six were wounded during the passage. It was an easy passage for the British.

The news of the incident reached to the city through a captain called Tönbekzâde on the evening of 20 February 1807. He informed the tersane emini who in return informed the grand vizier late in the evening. The latter decided to inform the Sultan and other ministers next morning. Since the next day was Friday and the second day of the Kurban Bayram, Selim III decided to delay the announcement of the issue until after the Friday prayer. Another source of information was the French engineers and officers at the fortresses. They rode to the city a few hours after the incident at Naara. They were the ones who narrated the “departure” of Salih Pasha and the ignorance of Feyzullah Efendi, the Bosphorus superintendent (“Boğaz naziri”). Sebastiani seems to have been among those who received the earliest news about the beginning of the expedition, thanks to the presence of the French consular in Çanak Kale. On 19 February, the latter wrote Sebastiani that in the afternoon of the previous day, müezzin in a mosque in Gelibolu had noticed the enemy ships and had notified him. Three hours later, the ships had anchored at a point

ibaret olmağa İngiltere gemilerinin henüz suvadını gördüklerinde suurları başına kara olub çend ruz mukaddem ise amiralleri ....” See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 224. There is a correlation between the explanations of Ebubekir Efendi and Asım. Both suggest that the crew were inexperienced and got scared after the initial fire. In both explanations, it is also implied that Salih Pasha ordered the soldiers to station there. See Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 6a; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 100-1. Another factor that might explain the minimal degree of resistance to the passage is that the previous note of the British ambassador to Salih Pasha claimed that the passage was for negotiation and no hostilities would be initiated by the British fleet. If a fire was opened, though, they would also defend themselves. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, pp. 224-5.

1172 The Times, Tuesday, May 05 1807; pg. 2; issue 7038; col. F. For more details see James, William, The Naval History of Great Britain from the Declaration of War by France in February 1793, to the Accession of George IV in January 1820, 6 vols. (London: Harding, Lepard Co., 1826), p. 437.


1174 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 6b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 102.

1175 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 6b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 102.

1176 Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol II, p. 70.
between Lapseki and Naara Burnu, while the Muslim soldiers immediately prepared a
defense. Then the consular had personally climbed a hill looking onto Sea of Marmara, and
after observing the ships were about to sail, had immediately sent men to inform the
 guardians of Naara Burnu and Kum Kale. All these sources confirm that the Porte was
able to receive the news probably late in the evening of 19 February and the discussion of
the issue was left for the next day.

Some time after the passage of the fleet, the favourable wind stopped, thus the British
fleet lost the chance of entering the city when it was unprepared. It stationed near to the
Princes Islands on 20 February. The next day, Arbuthnot sent a dispatch to the Porte
(21 February) insisting on the removal of the French ambassador, the immediate
submission of the Ottoman fleet - stored with provisions for six months, permission for
Russia to occupy the Principalities until peace was established and, finally renewal of the
alliance. Despite the fact that the Porte was practically acting as an enemy of Britain, he
noted he was still ready for negotiation.

Meanwhile, the news of expedition spread in the city and people rushed to the shore
the witness this extraordinary event. Since it was the second day of the Kurban Bayram,
the number of the people gathering must have increased. Except for the fortresses around
Bosphorous there was no effective system of protection for the city, which increased fear of

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1177 B.O.A. HAT 159/6639. It is a translation of note sent by the French consular to
Sebastiani. In return Sebastiani delivered the original letter to the Porte, which was
translated.

1178 The Princes’ Islands (Kızıl Adalar or Adalar) are a chain of nine islands off the
coast of İstanbul, in the Marmara Sea. The largest one is Büyükkada, and the others are

1179 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 6 March 1807,
(PRO, FO, 78-55, doc. no. 16); Prevost, Baron, “Constantinople en 1806 et 1807”, Revue
Contemporaine, XIV (1854), p. 171.

1180 The Times, Saturday, 18 April 1807; pg. 2; issue 7925; col. A; Shupp, The
European Powers, p. 382; Prevost, “Constantinople en 1806”, p. 172; James, Naval
History, p. 441.

the masses. People were particularly worried that their houses – mostly wooden – would burn down during a bombardment by the fleet.\textsuperscript{1182} It seems that even more than the common people, the members of the Palace were in great anxiety. In one of his dispatches Sebastiani informs us that the women and eunuch of the palace were crying and demanding peace.\textsuperscript{1183}

In fact, some preparations for fortifications had started after the declaration of war. Immediately after the departure of Italinsky, Selim III had ordered Juchereau de Saint-Denys, to present a report on the present conditions of the Dardanelles and the defense of İstanbul. His aim was to strengthen the fortifications of the city against a possible Russian attack. The French officer had presented a long report, the main idea of which was that an enemy fleet under the command of a skilled admiral would easily pass the Dardanelles, in case of a favourable wind. He advised the establishment of strong batteries on elevated corners of both sides of the shore. Therefore, Selim III had ordered his grand vizier to execute this project. However, this plan, crucial for the defense of the city was ignored by the Ottoman officials.\textsuperscript{1184} Therefore, despite the earlier concern of the Sultan, the city was not ready to mount for defense and was still vulnerable to attack.

In a letter from Sebastiani to Talleyrand, dated 18 February, the ambassador complained that the Sultan, his ministers were afraid of the expedition and they would accept all the demands of the British. According to him, no one was concerned with the fortifications. Sebastiani added that he alone was struggling for the defense of the city.\textsuperscript{1185} Some other sources confirm the complaints of the French ambassador. For instance, one argued that under the immediate threat of bombardment of the capital, the Sultan was


\textsuperscript{1183} Driault, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani” p. 413; Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p.103; Cevdet Pasha also that Selim III was very frightened. See Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VIII, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{1184} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol II, pp. 57, 64.

\textsuperscript{1185} Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 103.
inclined to obey the demands of the British.\footnote{1186} Especially the news of the burning of the fleet had also created great anxiety in the city.\footnote{1187} Thus, the ministers met and they all were ready to accept the demands of Arbuthnot to save the city.\footnote{1188} Taking these points into consideration, the Sultan sent İshak Bey\footnote{1189} to the French ambassador, on the evening of 20 February. He conveyed the message that it was impossible to protect the city and his throne against an immediate attack. Therefore, Selim III asked him to leave the city as soon as possible.\footnote{1190} In return, Sebastiani tried to encourage the Sultan stating that the British fleet would not be successful and, he would not leave his post without a formal order and also permission from his government.\footnote{1191} Thereafter, Sebastiani visited the Reisülküttab, explaining him that with such limited number of soldiers, the British navy could not be successful in a land attack and could not gain the control of the city. Therefore, he suggested the erection of strong batteries especially around Topkapı. He did not forget to ensure that with some other measures, the expedition could easily be thwarted.\footnote{1192}

As might be noticed, before urging the fortifications, Sebastiani struggled to encourage the Sultan and his elite to defend the city. After the talk with the Reisülküttab, he requested an audience from the Sultan. He participated in the imperial council and assured that the British could not capture the city. On the contrary, with new fortifications, the

\footnote{1186} The Times, Wednesday, March 25 1807; pg 2; issue 7004; col. F.

\footnote{1187} Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 103.


\footnote{1189} Saint-Denys asserts that it was a certain İsmail. See Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 71. Cevdet Paşa, too, gives the name as İsmail, a loyal servant of the Sultan. See Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VIII, p. 113. According to Prevost, too, he was a favorite of the Sultan. See Prevost, “Constantinople en 1806”, p. 172.


\footnote{1192} Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VIII, p. 113.
British fleet would be trapped in the Sea of Marmara and he presented a report on for the defense of the city. After urgings of the French ambassador, the Sultan decided to defend the city and asked Sebastiani to help him. Thus, about 200 French officials voluntarily joined the defense efforts. It seems that Napoleon had been anticipating such a passage of the British through the Dardanelles and offered to send 1000 artillerymen and soldiers ready in Dalmatia. His offer of help was rejected by the Porte, except for four engineers and the same number of artillery officers. As a result, only very limited number of officers came from Dalmatia to the city to help the defense. According to the Moniteur newspaper, ten artillerymen came (in the evening) and erected batteries within five days. Thanks to their efforts, 300 cannons were placed on the batteries at different points. Still, time was needed to complete all the preparations. Therefore, a policy of detaining the British by long procedures and slow flow of transactions was followed.

Though the fleet was able to create anxiety among the people and rulers, it seems that especially by the help of Sebastiani, they were beginning to reverse the critical situation to its own advantage. The fortifications were continuing to be built on almost all strategic corners of the city and the initial panic was turning to enthusiasm especially among the ordinary residents. As we have remarked earlier, the fear and panic of the palace was

\[\text{\footnotesize 1193} \quad \text{B.O.A. HAT 169/7178 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806-7). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4; Driault, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani”, pp. 411, 423; Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VIII, p. 113; Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 105; Prevost, “Constantinople en 1806”, p.175.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 1194} \quad \text{Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 76.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 1195} \quad \text{The Times, Saturday, April 18, 1807; pg. 2; issue 7025; col. A. According to Sebastiani, three officers were sent by Marmont and they arrived on 22 February. See Driault, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani”, p. 413.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 1196} \quad \text{The Times, Saturday, April 18, 1807; pg. 2; issue 7025; col. A; Coquelle, “Sebastiani: Ambassadeur a Constantinople”, p. 589.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 1197} \quad \text{B.O.A. HAT 175/7633 (undated).} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 1198} \quad \text{Coquelle, “Sebastiani: Ambassadeur A Constantinople”, p. 589. For a list of the batteries see Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, pp. 261-2.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 1199} \quad \text{Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, pp. 106-7.} \]
greater than that among the common people. The masses were more determined to take the revenge on the enemy who had attacked them without any cause and forced the Sultan to accept their demands.\(^{1200}\) According to Saint-Denys, the enthusiasm of the people began to influence the ruling elite, too. A few hours after the decision to obey the demands of the British, Selim III was determined to use this nearly “national enthusiasm” for the defense of the city.\(^{1201}\) Jorga also notes that during the initial phase of the Expedition, neither the şeyhülislam or grand vizier, nor any other ministers had been available. Most of them had seemed to have forgotten their own duties. On the other hand, the residents of the city were rushing to the shore to defend themselves and chase away the insincere allies.\(^{1202}\)

After it had been decided to mount a defense, the city was divided into several strategic regions. The defense of the city gates and some places of strategic, and particularly the construction of batteries around the shore were entrusted to various high ranking officials.\(^{1203}\) The fleet had anchored opposite of the Sarayburnu. Therefore, special

\(^{1200}\) Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, p. 72.

\(^{1201}\) Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, p. 87. Prevost describes it as an honorable sentiment compared to the passiveness of the ruling elite. See Prevost, “Constantinople en 1806”, p.175. See also Driault, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani”, p. 403.

\(^{1202}\) Jorga, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol 5, p. 149: “Bu dönemde, Türk toplumunun içерisindeki en sağlıklı unsurların ulemadan ve askerlerden oluştuğunu iddia eden Fransız diplomatın yerinde iddiaları böylece kanıtılmış oldu. Sadrazam ortalıkta görünmüyor; kaptan-ı derya görevini unutmuş; Şeyhülislam ruhları ateşlemek için ortaya çıkmıyor; reis efendi, müzakere zamanının çöktüத robesinin bilincine varıp ve III. Selim hor gördüği ve nefret beslediği eski askeri rejinin yenerleri, toplcular ve en yaşılardan en gencine kadar İstanbul halkı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun sürekli küçük düşüren ve kayıplara maruz bırakılan sahte dostlara karşı ayaklanmak gibi asıl bir düşünceye eillerinde silahları olduğu hâlde sahile indiklerinde, çaresiz boyun eğdi.”

\(^{1203}\) Deffedar Osman Efendi to Çatladı Kapı; Reisülküttab Efendi and Beylikçi İzzet Efendi to Ahur Kapı; kethüda-yı sadır-ı ali and Ramiz Efendi to Yeni Kapı, İbrahim Nesim Efendi to Kum Kapı; Ragib Efendi, the director of the Imperial Gunpowder Works (Baruthane Nazırı) to the Imperial Gunpowder Works (“Baruthane”); Köse Kethüda Çelebi and Gümüşkü Hasan Ağası to the region from Harem İskele to Şemsi Paşa. Even though he implies that there were some other regions, the author does not enumerate them. See Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmânı*, p. 7a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 102. Mustafa Necib adds some others to the list: Ahmed Aziz Efendi to Davut Paşa İskesi, former deffedar Hasan Tahsin Efendi to Samatya Kapısı; *Hububat Nazırı Elhac Mustafa Efendi to Yedi Kule. After his arrival, Köse Musa Paşa was assigned to Üsküdar while the Mustafa Reşid
attention was paid to the protection for this important part of the city. New batteries were built there and munitions weapons were distributed to those who were placed in these new batteries.\footnote{B.O.A. C.AS. 7554 (23 Ca 1222/29 July 1807); B.O.A. C.AS 7555 (26 Ca 1222/1 August 1807); Prevost, “Constantinople en 1806”, p.175.} It seems that it was Sebastiani who suggested the erection of batteries on Kız Kulesi and Harem İskelesi.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 654/31964 (undated). According to the document, Sebastiani had advised the construction of batteries one day after the meeting, accompanied by an engineer called Ali Bey.} The ambassadors of Spain, Marki d’Almenara, and France, together with the commanders of the artillery and an engineer, were supervising the construction of batteries around Tophane and Kurşunlu Mağaza.\footnote{Driault, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani”, p. 411; B.O.A. HAT 654/31964 (undated); Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 7a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 102. See also Prevost, “Constantinople en 1806”, p.176; Mesmay, Horace Sebastiani, pp. 66-7.} The Sultan himself was personally visiting the places where the batteries were being constructed, encouraging and honoring the soldiers and also watching the enemy.\footnote{Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I., p. 103; Driault, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani” p. 418.} According to Ebubekir Efendi, above-mentioned officials assigned to different regions had sent out the Janissaries to collect men from the residents of İstanbul to be used in the construction of the fortifications. These officials were personally supervising the regions under their control and encouraging the workers.\footnote{Eubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 7a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 102.} According to Mustafa Necib Efendi, strong fortifications were erected around these regions and more than 600 artillery were stationed within two days.\footnote{Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 18.} For the defense of the city, about 5000-7500 soldiers were newly recruited.\footnote{Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 233; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 19.} By
imperial edicts new soldiers were also sent from the places close to İstanbul. Meanwhile, small navy of was stationed off Beşiktaş. Sebastiani had sent out letters to the Greek Christians advising them to be loyal to their Sultan. Then, the Patriarch sent dispatches to all the metropolitans, giving the same advise. The Christian subjects helped in the defense of the city by carrying materials batteries and also cannons.

An important change occurred in the post of the grand admiral. Salih Pasha was deposed and Seydi Ali Bey was appointed on 16 Z 1221/24 February 1807. One factor that played a role in this deposition might have been the defeat of the Ottoman squadron by the British fleet. Indeed, in a contemporary record it is noted that a few days after the arrival of the fleet, Salih Pasha came to the city and thereafter was dismissed. Moreover, Salih Pasha was inexperienced and the Porte might have preferred a more experienced figure like Seydi Ali Bey, who might prove more useful in the critical days ahead.

According to Asım, before the appointment Seydi Ali Bey was requesting the Sultan’s authorization to command a navy so that he could destroy the British fleet in a short period.

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1212 Yayla İmmamı Risalesi, p. 171. For detailed information how the crew was recruited to the navy and the reactions of the Janissaries to be recruited as crew, see Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, pp. 104-6.


1214 Driault, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani”, p., 422. See also Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 108.

1215 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 27 (16 Z 1221/24 February 1807); Neticeti’l-Vekayi, p. 11a; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 18; Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 103.


1217 B.O.A. HAT 143/5929 (undated). It is a letter to Vahid Efendi in Warsaw.

1218 According to Arbuthnot, Salih Pasha “never having been at seas in his life, cannot be supposed to be very well calculated for this situation.” However, he was superior to his predecessor in other respects. See From Arbuthnot to Howick Louis, Pera, 1 December 1806, ((PRO, 78-52). He was banished to Tekfur Dağ. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 19.
of time. Since the Sultan was convinced about the ignorance of Salih Pasha in the affair, Seydi Ali’s bravery must have been very encouraging. 1219

On 21 February, Ishak Bey was sent to the British fleet by the Sultan to inquire about their purposes. 1220 Ishak Bey was informed that a note had already been sent to the Porte and the British authorities would act depending on the reply. The next day, Ishak Bey returned but just to inform that the chief interpreter of the Porte would bring an answer. In the evening, the dragoman appeared, stating that the translation of Arbuthnot’s note was taking time and therefore the Porte was not able send a certain answer. He suggested that he should write down once again the main points he was insisting on. He also warned the ambassador not to come closer to city, in which case a massacre would take place. The Porte was following a policy of gaining time. Therefore, the ambassador wrote down a new project of negotiation. Upon the warning of the dragoman, he refrained from mentioning the removal of Sebastiani, an issue that was to be decided secretly. Even though Arbuthnot had in mind to go to shore for negotiations on 23 February, his illness prevented him. 1221 As far as we learn from the despatches of Arbuthnot, Duckworth was planning the bombardment of the city and the artillerymen were called for the final orders. The main target seems to have been the Arsenal. However, due to unfavourable weather, they were not able to pinpoint the Arsenal. Meanwhile Ishak Bey returned (22 February) to the ship (Royal George) who informed the British that the dragoman would follow him with the translation of their notes. Arbuthnot insisted that the military works on the shore should be

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1220 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 6 March 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 16); B.O.A. HAT 4809 (undated). In the document, Selim III notes that it would be better to detain the British ambassador. Ishak Efendi was famous professor of mathematics and translator in the Arsenal. See Mustafa Nuri, Netayicü’l-Vukuat, vol IV, p. 44. Ishak Efendi (d. 1836) was appointed as “başhoca” to Mühendishane in the year 1831 together with his duty of chief interpreter of the Divan ("divan terciümanlık"). For more information, see Beydilli, Kemal, Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishane: Mühendishane Matbaası ve Kütüphanesi, 1776-1826, (İstanbul: Eren, 1995), pp. 66-7, 315, 318-20.

1221 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 6 March 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 16); From Arbuthnot to Canning, London, 6 June 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 20); Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napoleon, p. 112.
suspended and the Ottoman ships should not be removed from their stations. The dragoman arrived again in the evening and was informed that he would not go to the meeting until the all military works had completely ceased. However due his illness, Louis would go for the meeting.

When no reply came, Duckworth sent a note (23 February) to Porte declaring that if it did not wish to bring a disaster upon the city, an envoy should be sent to the squadron for the negotiation of a peace. On 24th, Duckworth sent two dispatches and protesting the fact that the fortifications were continuing and stating that he would come to a safe place to conclude the peace. He threatened that if Ottomans continued not to cooperate, he would burn all the Ottoman ships in the Sea of Marmara. The reply came in the evening specifying the place for the meeting as a fortress around the shore of Anatolia. On 25 February, Louis was waiting to go to the place for the negotiation. Meanwhile, Duckworth sent another note changing his proposals: the British would take back their earlier demands if the Porte immediately removed Sebastiani and renewed the British-Ottoman alliance. The reply to the note of Duckworth of 25 February finally came on 26 February. The Reisülküttab declared that there was no safe place for a Briton in the city until the fleet returned to the Dardanelles, and until then, no negotiation would take place. Upon receiving this answer, Duckworth threatened to set fire to the city and returned his original demands.

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1222 From Arbuthnot to Canning, London, 6 June 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 20).
1223 From Arbuthnot to Canning, London, 6 June 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 20).
1226 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 6 March 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 16); Driault, *Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon*, p. 112.
3.3.3. The Departure of the Fleet

The British fleet suffered from the hostile actions by the Janissaries and the common people. In one of his dispatches, Arbuthnot makes some references to the “fanatic spirit of the populace” and describes them as “wild” and “frantic”.1229 In one instance, about fifty1230 soldiers, responsible for the protection of Fenerbahçe, passed to Kınalıada to prevent the soldiers of the British fleet from taking water and food from the Island. They hunted a number of British soldiers that had gone to the Island for water.1231 Apart from the young son of the admiral of the fleet, five British soldiers were captured. Ottoman soldiers who captured them were honored by Selim III.1232 Next day, another incident occurred.1233 A group of fifty soldiers under the command of the police superintendent (“subaşı”) of Kartal were sailing to pass the Kınalıada, again to prevent the enemy from taking water.1234 However, their movements were noticed by the British fleet and the admiral sent 500 soldiers against them. During the ensuing fight, the Ottoman soldiers were unsuccessful against the British. Some succeeded to leave the island while the others remained. When they were discovered, the Turks sought refuge in a convent on the Island. After a short

1229 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 6 March 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 16).
1230 Mustafa Necib states that they were about forty to fifty. Asım gives the number as six soldiers. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 20; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 233. According to another author, they were sixty. See Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 86.
1233 James, The Naval History, p. 444. According to the source, the Turks was erecting a battery on the island.
1234 Câbî narrates the two incidents as if they happened during the same day and notes that the Turks were about 250, all from the common people (“ahali”). In the related document, they are described as soldiers. This confusion might be related to the fact that most of these soldiers were probably newly recruited from among common people. See Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 107-8.
period of time, the enemy surrounded the building. The monks of the covenant helped the Ottoman soldiers and secured their flight through the back door. Consequently, not only the Ottoman soldiers, but also the monks were honored by the Sultan. By an imperial order, forty-two Christian residents of the Kızılada and Heybeliada who had helped the soldiers were exempted from poll-tax. It seems that about seven British soldiers were killed and sixteen were wounded during the above incidents. The British, on the other hand, had twelve Turkish captives. By a note to the Porte, Duckworth stated that for the sake of good relations, he would release the Turkish captives. He did not to forget to ask the release of five British captives in the city that were captured in the previous event. Initially, the Porte hesitated to release the captives, in order not to cause unrest ("kıyıl üb kal") among the soldiers. In the end, the British captives sent back to their fleet.

On 26 February, a proposal was sent to the British by the Porte, completely different from the one Duckworth had made. At that point, rear-admiral Louis and the ambassador noticed that they could no more achieve anything through the expedition. Thus, in the morning of 1 March, the British fleet began its return, under a strong northern wind. The

1235 Asum, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, pp. 233-4. James does not give these details but argues that Sebastiani and the ağa of the Janissaries were on the island when the British attacked, probably for the erection of the battery. See James, The Naval History, p. 445.

1236 B.O.A. C.AS. 8490 (22 Z 1224/28 January 1810). The record is an imperial edict confirming the tax exemption of a certain Yorgi, son of Yani, who was among the forty-two Christians granted abovementioned tax-exemption.

1237 The Times, Tuesday, May 05 1807; pg. 2; issue 7038; col. F. According to Asum this event took place three days before the departure of the fleet. See Asum, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 234.

1238 Two of these Turkish captives were previously released. See B.O.A. HAT 1454 (undated). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

1239 Asum also argues that there were five soldiers and with son of an officer it makes six. See Asum, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 234.

1240 B.O.A. HAT 1454 (undated).

1241 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 6th March 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 16).
Ottoman fleet followed it, especially due to the pressure of the common people. Sebastani was not in favour of this idea, probably not believing that the Ottoman navy could be good match for the British fleet in a battle. However, Selim III, upon the insistence of the people, had to consent to departure of his fleet to follow the enemy under the command of Seydi Ali. The latter embarked under the cheerful cries of the crowds at the shore. On 3 March, the British fleet had anchored on a point between Lapseki and Naara Burnu and during the same morning, the first fire came from the Ottoman batteries. The fears of Duckworth had materialized. The fortifications that had been completed during their stay at the city proved to be fatal during their return. This time, none of soldiers in the fortresses fled, and a very effective bombardment of the fleet was started. One of the cannons of “enormous dimensions” almost cut through the main-mast of the ship Windsor Castle. Royal George and Actize were also damaged, and almost all of the ships had suffered from the fires from the fortresses. The Times reports that 49 soldiers were murdered and were 137 wounded during the return of the British fleet. Driault, depending on data from the Moniteur, states that 137 British soldiers were killed and 416 wounded. The actual numbers might be somewhere in between the numbers provided by these two sources. On 4 March 1807, the British fleet anchored again off Bozca Ada. After the expedition, a new one expedition was attempted, this time with the capturing Alexandria, on 17 March 1807, with a fleet of 17 battleships carrying 5100 soldiers under the command of Louis. Without facing any serious difficulty, the British soldiers landed

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1242 The Times, Friday, April 17 1807; pg. 4; Issue 7024; col. C.

1243 Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, pp. 113-4.

1244 The Times, Tuesday, May 05 1807; pg. 2; issue 7038; col. F; Mustafa Nuri, Netayici’l-Vukuat, vol IV, p. 45; See also Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüğü, p. 171; Prevost, “Constantinople en 1806”, pp. 175-6.

1245 Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 114.

1246 B.O.A. HAT 175/7598-D (27 Z 1221/7 March 1807; B.O.A. HAT 175/7598.A (27 Z 1221/7 March 1807).

1247 Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 125.
and captured Alexandria (22 March 1807). From there, they reached Reşid in two days. The aim was to capture Cairo, however the fleet was again defeated and began to leave Alexandria on 15 September 1807.

3.3.4. The British and the Porte

Why did the British Expedition take place? From the dispatches of the British ambassador before and after the Expedition, it seems that rather than stage a direct attack on the capital city of the Empire, the purpose was to prove the naval strength of Britain. According to the British ambassador himself, the purpose was to help the defense of the Empire in case of an aggression of on part of France. One particular aim was also to help the Russians. On the other hand, it seems that the Porte was not sure whether the Expedition was an individual attempt on the part of the ambassador himself or whether he acted in accordance with the instructions he had received from London. Indeed, in a letter to Sıdkı Efendi, the ambassador in London, it is noted that the Porte was not sure whether government in London was aware of the “strange” conducts of the British ambassador in Istanbul. If not, Sıdkı Bey was advised to inform that in the five or six months since the death of her wife “he was deadly haunted by insanity”. There is also a mention of an attempt by the British ambassador to commit suicide. Therefore, through of

1248 Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 126.
1250 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 15 January 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 14). See also Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 17.
1251 HAT 851/38109 (undated); HAT 5914. (undated). Both are written to Vahid Efendi.
Sıdkı Efendi, the Porte was trying to find out whether the actions he had taken in accordance with the wishes of the British government or not.\textsuperscript{1253} Whatever the causes of the expedition were to both sides, the failure was a deep embarrassment for Great Britain.\textsuperscript{1254} Arbuthnot also experienced a great embarrassment due to the failure.\textsuperscript{1255} Contrary to his expectations, the British expedition ended with the utter victory of French influence on the Porte. This meant that they had no more chance of advancing their own interests in the Empire in peaceful terms.\textsuperscript{1256} The most important result of the British expedition, for our purposes, was the great shock of the Porte of facing an enemy fleet at the capital of the Empire. It was Feyzullah Efendi, the Boğaz nazırı, who paid the bill. He had been appointed as the director ("defterdar") of the İrād-i Cedid on 13 Ra 1220/11 June 1805.\textsuperscript{1257} After the declaration of the war against Russia he was appointed as the Boğaz nazırı.\textsuperscript{1258} Due to his impotence regarding the fortifications, Selim III decided to exile him to Karahisar.\textsuperscript{1259} However, before he could be exiled, an order reached to Ali Pasha, the commander of Kilid Bahir fortress, commanding his execution.\textsuperscript{1260} His severed head was sent to the city on 25 M 1222/4 April 1807.\textsuperscript{1261} In his placard ("yafte"), Feyzullah

\textsuperscript{1253} B.O.A. HAT 1169/46234.C (29 Za 1221/7 February 1807). From Reis Efendi to Sıdkı Efendi: "kendıye bayağı cünûn sûreti arz olub".

\textsuperscript{1254} For a discussion of the debates in the English Parliament, see The Times, Saturday, May 21, 1808; pg. 2, Issue 7367, col. B (House of Commons, Friday, May 20).

\textsuperscript{1255} From Arbuthnot to Canning, London, 6 June 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 20).

\textsuperscript{1256} From Arbuthnot to Canning, London, 6 June 1807, (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 20).

\textsuperscript{1257} Asım, Tarihi Asım, p. vol. I, p. 231; B.O.A. HAT 88/3631 (undated).

\textsuperscript{1258} B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 93, order no. 267 (evahir-i Z 1221/February-March 1807); Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, 8a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 104; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 16; Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 10a.

\textsuperscript{1259} Asım, Tarihi Asım, vol. I, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{1260} B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 93, order no. 267 (evahir-i Z 1221/February-March 1807).

\textsuperscript{1261} Asım, Tarihi Asım, vol. I, p. 231; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 8a-8b. According to Mustafa Necib, it was on 27 M 1222/6 April 1807. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 24;
Efendi was accused of not having performed his duty regarding the fortifications of the fortresses around Bosphorous, thus making the passage of the enemy fleet to the city possible.\textsuperscript{1262} As usual, all of his possessions were confiscated by the center.\textsuperscript{1263} Pizani, the dragoman of the British, seems to have played a role in the failure of Feyzullah Efendi. According to Saint-Denys, Pizani consciously tried to detain both Salih Pasha and Feyzullah Efendi in order to distract their attention from the fortifications.\textsuperscript{1264}

The results of the Expedition did not end with the execution of Feyzullah Efendi. As we have remarked earlier, Salih Pasha lost his post of grand admiral. Hadımzâde Osman Bey\textsuperscript{1265} was also found guilty for ignoring the fortifications. An order for his execution was also issued. In an undated document, sent to the center by Hüseyin Ağa, the local fortress commander ("dizdar") of the Sultaniye fortress, he is blamed for escaping from his post during the passage of the British fleet.\textsuperscript{1266} Yet, in order not to cause a disorder in the fortresses, his execution was delayed.\textsuperscript{1267} Hadımzâde was an influential figure around the region and since his own men manned some fortresses; his execution would cause a mutiny.\textsuperscript{1268} We come across his name as the mütesellim of Biga (in Çanakkale) and nazır of the fortresses on Bahr-ı Sefid in the year 1213/1799.\textsuperscript{1269} As we have remarked previously, the Porte had started the project of the strengthening of the fortresses around İstanbul. As a part of the project, Hadımzâde Osman Bey was appointed particularly for the defense of Bozca Ada. He was also ordered to enroll one thousand soldiers from Biga for that

\textsuperscript{1262} A full text of his yapte is provided in Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 8b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{1263} For some details on the procedure see B.O.A. HAT 107/4206 (undated).

\textsuperscript{1264} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{1265} Hadımzâde Osman Bey became kapıcıbaşı and was appointed as Akdeniz muhafızı on Za 1221/January 1807. Mehmed Süreyya, \textit{Sicill-i Osmani}, vol. IV, p. 1287.

\textsuperscript{1266} BO.A. A. AMD 53/55 (undated).

\textsuperscript{1267} B.O.A. HAT 175/7607 (undated).

\textsuperscript{1268} B.O.A. HAT 175/7607 (undated); HAT 175/7598-G (28 Z 1221/8 March 1807).

\textsuperscript{1269} B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme Defterleri}, no. 207, p. 10, order no. 32.
He was probably appointed to this duty to benefit from his influence and military power in the region. His eldest son, Ahmed, was appointed as the commander ("muhafız") of Seddülbahir fortress in year 1214/1799. It seems that after the declaration of war against Russia, Hadımzâde was delegated the duty of the commandership of Bahr-ı Sefid. However, claiming that he was ill and too old for the duty he had asked for the delegation of the duty to his son Ahmed together with eighty men and he permitted to reside in İstanbul. Coming to Pizani, Selim III first ordered his exile to Bolayır or another suitable place. Despite his request to remain in Sultaniye Kalesi (Çanak Kale), he was exiled to Kütahya. In one of his letters to the dragoman of the divan, Pizani confesses that found the escape of the British ambassador quite natural in face of the great influence of the French ambassador. According to Pizani, he was aware of distrust of the Reisülküttab to him, yet he ensured the dragoman that he was called to the frigate to join Arbuthnot for another matter and was made to sail with him without any delay. On the other hand, he does not refrain himself from confessing that he had wholehearted sympathy to Great Britain.

The expedition was not restricted to diplomacy and the military sphere. During that period, it seems that there was an ideological battle which increased the unrest in the city. While Sebastiani was spending great efforts for the defense of the city during the Expedition, he also seems to have used the opportunity to stage propaganda against the pro-Russian or pro-British figures among the ruling elite. According to Asım, he was provoking Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa, the famous ağası of the Janissaries, saying that the British fleet had

1270 B.O.A. A.AMD 41/10 (7 Ra 1213/19 August 1798).
1271 B.O.A. HAT 157/6532 (14 Ra 1214/16 August 1799); B.O.A. HAT 42/9 (24 N 1213/1 March 1799).
1272 B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, 217, five orders in pp. 70-1, (evahir Za 1222/20-20 January 1808) are related to the same issue.
1273 B.O.A. HAT 175/7598.C (28 Z 1221/8 March 1807); Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 7b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 103.
1274 B.O.A. HAT 1451 (29 Za 1221/3 February 1807).
come due to the invitation of the Ottoman ministers.1275 Pehlivan Ağa, Asım continues, spread news in the places he visited during the expedition in these words: “The British and Russians are among us. Our honorable Padişah has vainly made panic and suffered. Probably when they deliver the city to the enemy, they will become kings.”1276 Wilkinson also makes a reference to the connection between Sebastiani and Pehlivan Ağa. According to the author, Pehlivan Ağa once served as the guard of a French ambassador and was a figure loyal to the French cause. Wilkinson argues that when Sebastiani noticed that the Porte and Britain was about to reach an agreement, he sent Pehlivan Ağa to the Sultan. Pehlivan Ağa, according to the author, made a speech to the Sultan to convince him to fight against the enemy rather than reaching an understanding with the British.1277 Wilkinson’ is quite different from that of Asım, yet the motives of Sebastiani’s connection with Pehlivan Ağa and his persuasion on the issue are found in both. Again according to Asım, when these gossips reached to the British commander off the shore, he responded by spreading other news among the Janissaries that

indeed our arrival was due to the invitation. The Russian will come from the Black Sea. These fights are pre-arranged. The ultimate aim is to meet with the Russians at the capital city, to abolish the Janissary army and finally to station the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers in their place. However, the plan was not achieved due to the efforts of the Janissaries.1278

Both sides seem to have expected some benefit from circulating these ideas or gossips. The part originating with Sebastiani seem to be more directed against the pro-Russian or British figures among the ruling elite, whose dismissal from the administration seems to have been his aim. On the other hand, the counter-propaganda of the British seems to be also directed against the ruling elite.

1277 Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities, pp. 177-8.
Should we disregard these rumours as the symptoms of panic prevailing in the city during the expedition? Asım does not reduce it to one of simple gossip. In order to prove his point, he narrates a talk between İbrahim Nesim Efendi, assigned to region of Yeni Kapı, and his “hoca”. While the British fleet is still in the Sea of Marmara, “hoca” wants to talk to İbrahim Kethüda and finds him in resting in his residence. Noticing that his “hoca” was very upset and anxious, İbrahim Efendi wants to learn what is going on. When the former refers to the British expedition, the latter gives a very interesting answer:

O Hoca Efendi, this world is temporal. So do not fall into despair. Now if I stuck my leg out towards here, then this fleet shall get there, and likewise if I stuck it out towards the further side, so will it head thither. You have understood what I really mean. Now let us avert your worldly despair and converse on any other subject.\(^\text{1279}\)

According to Asım, those who had invited the British fleet in had also prevented an attack of the Ottoman navy under the admiralship of Seydi Ali Pasha and had kept the Ottoman navy at Yeni Kapı.\(^\text{1280}\) He also argues that Feyzullah Efendi was a victim in this regard.\(^\text{1281}\) Ebubekir Efendi, the author of Vaka-yı Cedid gives another interesting detail. According to him, on the eleventh night of the arrival of the British fleet, İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Mahmud Raif Efendi and Galib Efendi held meeting at the residence of Mahmud Raif Efendi and invited General Smith, too and asking him the departure of the fleet. He notes that the fleet left the city the next morning.\(^\text{1282}\) Therefore, the meeting should be held on 28 February. The interesting matter is that Nesim Efendi was among the participants and the enemy left the city one day after the meeting. Yet, it is difficult to decide whether this was an official meeting or not, and whether there was a secret agreement between the ruling elite and the British. According to Cevdet Pasha, most of the ruling elite were still pro-

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\(^{1282}\) Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-yı Cedid*, p. 16.
British during this period. He argues that the initial tendency of the ministers to yield to the demands of the British ambassador might have the main cause of the spread of such rumours. However, not having without further evidence, he refrains to reach a final conclusion over the matter about the matter of the invitation of the British fleet by the ruling elite.  

Whatever the purpose of the rumours were, we have reason to suspect that contributed to animosity among the residents, especially among the Janissaries against the secret intentions of the ruling elite, a dangerous symptom before the May 1807 Rebellion. Moreover, above-mentioned rumours might have created sense, especially among the Janissaries, that they were being sacrificed and betrayed by the ruling elite, who did not hesitate to collaborate with the foreign states for its own private interests. Moreover, these rumours must have increased the anxiety of the Janissaries that their army would be abolished, which might have aggravated the animosity between the old and the new army. Needless to say, the arrival of the enemy fleet at the heart of the Empire might not only have made the people suspicious regarding the real intentions of the enemies of the Empire, but also might have questioned the policy of the Porte. For instance, Zinkeisen underlines that there began to emerge a dislike for the overwhelming dominance of France over the Porte. This great confidence to an infidel, according to the author, irritated some Muslims.  

The event, occurring only a few months before the revolt seems to have been of utmost importance in terms of crystallization of the public opinion. According to Asım, for instance, even while the Ottoman rulers, as well as the populace, were in panic, it was students of religion and the Janissaries who were ready to protect the city and made a great effort throughout the expedition. Their enthusiasm passed to other residents and finally also the Ottoman ruling elite. Though the Janissaries and the common people seem to have

been the heroes of the British expedition, Driault notes that the Janissaries were not satisfied with the developments. The most important factor, according to him, was the fear of the Janissaries that the victory over the British would be used by the government to improve the Nizam-ı Cedid army.\textsuperscript{1286} He mentions another issue which seems to be of crucial importance, namely the anxiety of the Janissaries regarding the immediate threats posed by foreign powers. According to the Janissaries, though the British fleet had departed, it could not be considered as a complete success for the Porte as the fleet might return. The Russians were on the Danube and also at Bozca Ada. France, under the guise of friendship was involved in intrigues against the Empire. Thus, the Empire was in a very vulnerable situation and the Ottoman ministers were not doing anything to save the Empire.\textsuperscript{1287} If we remember that there were rumours to the effect that the British fleet had been invited by some of the Ottoman ruling elite, the hostility of the Janissaries and probably most of common people might have increased during the Expedition. This point is very crucial since all of the contemporary Ottoman sources dwell on the fatal hatred towards the ruling elite of the time, which found its expression during the May 1807 Rebellion.

Another important result of the British expedition that became important at the initial outburst of the Rebellion was the fortresses on the Bosphorous. As we have remarked above, the fortification of the city gained momentum especially after the declaration of war against the Russians. And during the expedition, new soldiers and new equipment were placed in these fortresses. According to Driault, many rabbles (“\textit{serseri}”) were brought from Anatolia to be employed during the expedition and about two thousand of them remained in the fortresses after the expedition.\textsuperscript{1288} The increased number of the fortresses, of course, meant the increase in the number of rebels during the May 1807 Rebellion. On the other hand, we might also find a correlation between the incapacity of the soldiers at the

\textsuperscript{1286} Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 200.


\textsuperscript{1288} Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 203.
fortresses and the later intentions of the Sultan. Since there was no guarantee that the
capital would not come under attack again, Selim III might have considered replacing these
soldiers with that of the *Nizam-i Cedid* soldiers who might have been more effective on the
defense of the city.

### 3.4. The Uprising and Great Powers

#### 3.4.1. A War for France

Before discussing whether any of the great powers might have any direct or indirect
role in the 1807 Rebellion, there are some questions regarding the policies of these great
powers on the eve of the Rebellion. The first question is why France had pressed so
vigorously for a war with Russia? At first sight, this question might seem unrelated to the
uprising. However, the Rebellion broke out while there was a war in the Danubian region
and when the bulk of the Janissary army was at the frontiers, waging this war. It was also
directly related to the British expedition, which took place to force the Porte to make peace
with Russia and to continue peaceful relations with the old allies. Moreover, these two
incidents brought the issue of military aid from France which caused great debate and
accelerated the anti-French sentiments among the masses on the eve of the uprising.

As the French ambassador to the Porte, the basic goal of Sebastiani was to break
down the Triple Alliance and to gain the confidence of the Porte. He received strict orders,
on 7 November 1806, to work “*vigorously to bring about a war between these two
countries*”, namely the Ottoman Empire and Russia.\footnote{Shupp, *The European Powers*, p. 192.} He was quite successful in
achieving his targets. Under his pressure, the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia were
dismissed, the Triple Alliance was broken, and the tensions with Russia led to war. Not
only Sebastiani but also the French agents in different parts of the Empire made efforts to

\footnote{Shupp, *The European Powers*, p. 192.}
bring war and to combat against the influence of the rival states on the Porte. Moreover, there seems to have been a conscious policy of encouraging the Porte to annex the Crimea. Sebastiani was instructed to encourage the Porte in the idea of regaining of the Crimea. Playing with the idea of recapturing of that region signaled that France wished the Porte to give up its neutrality and to take a more offensive position. In a meeting with Sebastiani, Reisülküttab Galib Efendi, explicitly states that the Porte had behaved in accordance with the advice of the French ambassador, particularly in the events leading to the departure of Italinsky and declaration of war against Russia. These words suggest that without the encouragement of the French ambassador, the peaceful relations with Russia would have continued or at least, there would have been no war.

It is clear that France played a considerable role in the bringing about the Russo-Ottoman war of 1806. This is best described by the following comments of Shupp: “It appeared that Turkey had been successfully converted by Napoleon into an instrument of war against Russia and Britain.” The problem to be solved is why Napoleon encouraged the Porte to wage a war against Russia. Why to encourage an empire trying to establish a new military system to declare war against a superior military power? The Nizam-ı Cedid reforms had not been stabilized yet and the soldiers of the old system were

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1290 Drovetti in Egypt, Poqueville in Albania, David in Bosnia, Mériage in Vidin, Lamare in Ruscuk, Sebastiani in İstanbul. For more details, see Shupp, The European Powers, p. 424.

1291 B.O.A. HAT 149/6256 (undated). The document is translation of a letter in cipher, most probably it was gained secretly: “Kırım ‘in ekseri ahâlisi ehl-i İslâm’dan olub Rusyalu’ya candan itâatleri olmadığı ve devlet-i aliyyenin ol cânibde külliyetli tarafıldırı olduğu derkâr olmaga Kırım üzerine tertib etmek üzere devlet-i aliyyeyi ibrâm eyleyesiz. İklim-i mezkur arâzi-i İslâm’dan ve mülk-i Osmaniye’nin kilidi mesâbesinde olan memâlikden olub Rusyalu’nun mukaddeme-i gasbaları ol taraftan zuhûr etmiş olduğundan bu defa devlet-i aliyye ittihiâz-i firsât birle istihlâsına kayâm içün ol cânibde i’mâl-i kuvvet etmek iktizâsındadır”. Arbuthnot also emphasizes that the Porte never abandoned the ideal of recapture of the Crimea. See from Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 1 December 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 85).

1292 B.O.A. HAT 1735 (undated). It contains the minutes of the meeting of the Reisülküttab with Sebastiani.

1293 Shupp, The European Powers, p. 537.
“no better than an undisciplined rabble.”\textsuperscript{1294} Therefore, the encouragement of the Empire to wage a war, during this transitional period does not seem like a clever policy to be sought by an ally of the Porte. As might be recalled, Napoleon declared that his primary concern was to preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which he thought would form a bulwark against Russia. Following his traditional policy of setting a barrier in the East against progress of Russia, Napoleon tried to form an alliance between Persia, Ottoman Empire and France.\textsuperscript{1295} Thus, the collapse or weakening of the power of the Porte would also damage the interests of France. Indeed, within a short period of time and without a great difficulty, Russians took the control of the Principalities, an important region where France even did not bear to witness Russian influence, leave alone occupation.

These are questions difficult to answer. It seems that to understand the policies of France in the Near East during that period, one needs to turn to Dalmatia. Napoleon probably encouraged the Empire to go to war, since he was confident that he could send his troops in Dalmatia to protect the Empire. After gaining Dalmatia, the French government tried to convince the Porte that, contrary to the claims of Russia, the presence of France in Dalmatia was very beneficial for the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{1296} This presence would prevent the secret designs of Russia on the Empire from being carried out.\textsuperscript{1297} Further, the French presence was used to encourage the Porte not to obey any kinds of demands by the British nor the Russian ambassadors. According to Sebastiani and his government, the Ottoman

\textsuperscript{1294} The quotation is from a dispatch of Arbuthnot, to Howick Louis, Pera, 26 December 1806, (PRO, 78-52).


\textsuperscript{1296} B.O.A. HAT 5737 (undated)

ministers had to put an end to the Triple Alliance and come closer to the orbit of France by accepting an alliance with Persia and France.\textsuperscript{1298}

France tried to benefit from the presence of the French troops in the neighborhood of the Porte. She assured that the troops in Dalmatia were always ready to aid the Porte as long as it remained a friend of Napoleon.\textsuperscript{1299} In this context, the British Expedition and the Russian advances in the Principalities created a great advantage for France.\textsuperscript{1300} The success of Sebastiani during the Expedition greatly helped him to gain confidence of the Sultan. As a result, he was granted the order of “\textit{legion d’honor}” and also a residence previously confiscated among the family possessions of Prince Ipsilanti.\textsuperscript{1301} He himself states that no other ambassador in the Empire enjoyed such a great trust and influence.\textsuperscript{1302} The gratitude of the Sultan created an opportunity for Sebastiani to make some requests. Few days after the departure of the British fleet, he was invited to a private meeting with the Sultan. During the meeting, Selim III declared that he was a good friend of Napoleon and would collaborate with him. An alliance would be signed between the two countries. He also informed Sebastiani that the possessions of the British merchants would be confiscated and his Empire would henceforth only use French textiles. This meant the end of the British

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1298] B.O.A. HAT 166/6956 (undated). The document contains the minutes of the meeting held between Sebastiani and Reis Efendi on the evening of 12 N 1221/23 November 1806.
\item[1299] B.O.A. HAT 166/6956 (undated).
\item[1300] \textit{The Times}, Thursday, February 12, 1807, pg. 2, issue 6970; col. C.
\item[1301] Despite his successful career, Sebastiani was not happy in İstanbul. He asked Talleyrand permission to turn back his home country. He had some private problems. On 10 April, Sebastiani’s wife gave birth a daughter and died three weeks later. See Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 171; Driault, \textit{Tilsit}, p. 139. Selim III wrote to a note to Kaimmakam Paşa about the unfortunate event: “Kaimmakam Paşa, Fransa elçisi Sebastiyaın General’in madamasi mütevefiyye olduğunu işidüb acıdım. Tercümanını çağurub Reis Efendi tarafından ta’rız eleyeyüb hattını suâl etdirsün. İrsâl eyledighet hemidiyeyi dahi tercümane verüb ırsâl eylesün.” See B.O.A. HAT 174/7552 (undated). According to Zinkeisen, Sebastiani was also granted 30,000 livres. See Zinkeisen, \textit{GOR}, vol. VII, pp. 457-8.
\item[1302] Eduoard, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani”, p. 419.
\end{footnotes}
commerce and rise of economic relations with France.\textsuperscript{1303} The Sultan expressed his pleasure at hearing that six French ships would join the Ottoman fleet on the Black Sea. Moreover, he requested the ambassador to write to his government to send artillery officers to educate the Ottoman artillerymen. During the same meeting, it was also decided that a joint army of French and the Ottoman would be sent to the Crimea to recover it from the Russians. The Sultan also consented Sebastiani’s proposal that a French detachment would join the Ottoman army at Vidin and a joint expedition should be staged to save the Principalities. However, in order not to tension among the masses, the last issue was to be set down in a secret convention.\textsuperscript{1304}

In a dispatch, dated 10 March, Sebastiani informed his emperor of these points.\textsuperscript{1305} The reply came on 21 March 1807. In the letter, Napoleon noted that he would gladly send several French officers asked by the Sultan. However, he was upset that the Sultan had not asked for a few one thousand soldiers, rather than just several hundred.\textsuperscript{1306} Napoleon underlined that he was ready to offer further assistance in terms of soldiers and munitions and money.\textsuperscript{1307} Meanwhile, Napoleon was gradually increasing the number of soldiers in Dalmatia and at the end of May it was estimated to be 100,000 French soldiers in the region.\textsuperscript{1308} In a French newspaper, it was stated that all states except France were working for the collapse of the Empire. Especially the Russians, with the aim of capturing İstanbul, were stubbornly involved in intrigues against the Porte. Even though France was victorious in most part of Europe, she was never attacking the lands of other states and trying to keep

\textsuperscript{1303} Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 115.


\textsuperscript{1305} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 427.

\textsuperscript{1306} B.O.A. HAT 139/5734.A (11 M 1222/21 March 1807): “\textit{Bir kaç Fransa ofçiyalleri taleb buyurmuş olmalaryla taraf-i hümâyûnlarına ırsâl ederim. Bir kaç bin nefer taleb buyurmadıklarına teesif ve tahazzûn etdim. Yalnız 500 nefer taleb buyurdıkları anda hareket etmeleri üzere tenbih eyledim.}” In the letter it is also noted that a certain amount of artillery and artillerymen were already sent.

\textsuperscript{1307} B.O.A. HAT 139/5734.A (11 M 1222/21 March 1807).

\textsuperscript{1308} \textit{The Times}, Friday, April 24, 1807, pg. 3, Issue 7029, col. C.
the territories of those states intact, as opposed to Russia which was using its power for territorial expansion.\textsuperscript{1309}

It seems that there is a certain pressure on the Porte for to allow the passage of French troops through the Balkans. Could it be that under the guise offering military help to the Ottomans, Napoleon was intending to settle in some strategic positions in the Balkans? He had already gained a stronghold in Dalmatia and was gathering troops in the region. Therefore, by using Dalmatia as a base, he could expand slowly into the Balkans. Such a tactic would have served two benefits. Napoleon was convinced that the Ottoman Empire could not be strong barrier against the Russian expansion in the region. Therefore, he would have to create such a barrier himself. More importantly, he might also have planned to benefit from France’s presence in Dalmatia as a stepping stone expanding his lands in the region, which would gradually have undermined the power of both Russia and the Ottoman Empire. With several hundred soldiers, no military success could be achieved in the imperial territories. However, there was another proposal of sending French army from Dalmatia to the Danube. Selim III had asked that the request should come from Napoleon.\textsuperscript{1310} The expansionist policy of Napoleon was a great anxiety of Great Britain, too. For instance, the issue of France attempting to create disorder in the Empire by instigating revolts in the Serbian and the Principalities was discussed in the British Parliament. Great Britain suspected that the real intention of Napoleon was to create a small state between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, an idea causing great anxiety throughout the European continent. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire would have meant a great blow to British interests.\textsuperscript{1311}

The Porte was reluctant for allowing the passage of the French troops through territories or the presence of them in any parts of the Empire. The Ottoman ministers were

\textsuperscript{1309} B.O.A. A.AMD. 54/4 (17 M 1222/27 March 1807).

\textsuperscript{1310} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 466.

\textsuperscript{1311} B.O.A. A.AMD. 53/3 (17 M 1222/27 March 1807). In the document it is noted that it is a translation the records of a discussion in the British parliament.
particularly worried about a passage from Bosnia.\textsuperscript{1312} At one point, Sebastiani notes that this was probably due to fear of a possible reaction by the people.\textsuperscript{1313} The Porte had explained that the Bosnians were “a wild people” (“\textit{huşunetli bir kavim}”) and they would oppose the passage of the French forces through their region.\textsuperscript{1314} The grand vizier was also of the opinion that the passage of the troops would create a reaction in Bosnia and also Rumelia, since these areas had witnessed the attack of a former ally, i.e. Russia to the Ottoman territories.\textsuperscript{1315} According to Cevdet Pasha, the attitude of the Porte was mainly due to fear of a reaction of people for the entrance of the foreign soldiers into the territories of the Empire. He notes that people were not even able to bear seeing the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} soldiers, leave alone foreign ones. Zinkeisen also claims that there was a general unrest among the common people of the news coming of the French artillerymen from Dalmatia.\textsuperscript{1316}

One gets the sense that there were some other considerations of the Porte and the Sultan in addition to a possible reaction by the people. In a document, Selim III clearly expresses that he was not very keen on granting safe conduct to the French detachment to pass through Bosnia saying that “\textit{Letting the French troops to pass through would indeed be a perilous thing to do.}” (“\textit{Françe askeri imrari pek de cesaret olunur şey olmayub}). He advised his \textit{kaimmakam} to detain Sebastiani as much as possible, even if the Bosnians did accept the passage of the troops. It is clear that the Sultan and his ministers were not worried only about the reaction of the Bosnians. One clue in this regard comes from the comments of the Sultan in the same document. It appears that the Sultan was afraid that it would not be possible to control the French troops in the imperial domains. Therefore, he emphasized that the French troops would be accepted only if there was a great problem in

\textsuperscript{1312} B.O.A. HAT 131/5426 (undated).
\textsuperscript{1313} B.O.A. HAT 6101. The record contains the minutes of the meeting held on 6 S 1222/14 April 1807.
\textsuperscript{1314} B.O.A. HAT 131/5426 (undated).
\textsuperscript{1315} B.O.A. HAT 143/5929 (undated).
the Empire. We might also suggest that the Sultan and his ministers were afraid that if they allowed the passage of the troops they would not be able to remove them from the Ottoman lands again. Therefore, in order to detain France, they used a possible reaction of the Bosnians as a pretext and tried to gain time with several dispatches. Another factor that might have played a role in the decision of the Porte is the reluctance of the Rumelian pashas about the march of the French troops. According to Sebastiani, it was Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and as well as the governor of İbrail ("İbrail Nazırı") who were reluctant and due to their opposition the passage was not granted. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha was not happy about the proposal of passage of the French troops through the Ottoman lands. He even rejected a French artilleryman to him by Marmont, saying that he did not need his help. Upon hearing the news that the French troops were to pass to the Danube, Alemdar had become so angry that the Lamarre felt it necessary to leave Ruscuk. Tepedelenli Ali Pasha was also among those who were against the presence of the French troops in Dalmatia, leave alone their passage through the Ottoman lands. He accused the


1318 Shupp, The European Powers, p. 582.

1319 B.O.A. HAT 145/6134 (undated). He also notes that İbrail Nazırı was a supporter of Muruzi. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

1320 Marmont, General Auguste (b. 1774-d. 1852) served as the French commander in Dalmatia between 1806 and 1809. Two years later he was sent to Spain. In the year 1826, he was appointed as French ambassador sent for the coronation of Nicholas at Moscow. Marmont was appointed by Charles X to head troops of Paris. For more details, see Headley, J. T., Napoleon and His Marshalls, 2 vols. (New York: 1846), vol. II, pp. 92-114.

1321 Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, pp. 177-8.

1322 Lamarre was a French agent in Empire.

Sultan for consenting to the aggressive intentions of France in order to save the Empire from Russia. According to Sebastiani, on the other hand, those who were refusing the passage were not wishing the well-being of the Empire.

On Tuesday, 14 April 1807, an important meeting was held between Sebastiani and the kaimmakam at the Porte, following a request made by the ambassador on Monday. Since Sebastiani had asked the participation of kethüda Bey and the Reisülküttab as well, they also joined the meeting. During this meeting, Sebastiani talked about the hostile intentions the Russians had vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire since 150 years, with the ultimate aim of its destruction. He emphasized that the Russians had never gave up their hostile intentions. They had captured the Crimea unjustly and now was trying to take the Septinsular Republic under its direct control. He added that the Russians never hesitated to provoke the Ottoman reaya against their government. After these initial statements, the French ambassador underlined that Napoleon had announced his sincere intention of preserving the Ottoman Empire, not forgetting to emphasize that without his support, Porte would find itself in a very difficult position. It seems that Sebastiani was very angry due to the reluctance of the Porte to allow the passage of the French troops in Dalmatia and claimed that it was not in accordance with the good relationship between the two states. According to him, if two states made an alliance, it was very necessary for both

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1326 In a letter to Talleyrand, bearing the same date, Sebastiani commented that there was a considerable unease among the Turks regarding the news of arrival of a French army at Dalmatia. A similar letter was sent by Sebastiani to Marmont, on 31 March, emphasizing the evidence of opposition of the project of passage of French army among the various groups in İstanbul. See Shupp, The European Powers, p. 482.

1327 One of the main issues discussed in the meeting was removal of the Prussian envoy, Baron Senfft von Pilfach, who had reached the Capital on 7 April 1807. Sebastiani was demanding his immediate removal on the pretext that he was an enemy of France, coming to the city secretly and after a meeting with Ipsilanti. See B.O.A. HAT 6101 (records of the meeting held on 6 S 1222/14 April 1807). For the same issue, see also Zinkeisen, GOR, vol. VII, pp. 483-480; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 8b-9b; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 105-6.
parties to accept the passage of the soldiers of its ally.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 6101 (minutes of the meeting held on 6 S 1222/14 April 1807): “Bir devlet bir devlet ile ittifâk eyledikde asker imrâr eylemek muktezâ-yi ittifâkdan ne semere hâsil olur.”} He noted that contrary to the expectations of the Ottoman ministers, his Emperor was not very annoyed. However, the ambassador noted, the passage of the French troops would also be helpful in the suppression of the Serbian uprising instigated by the Austrians.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 6101 (records of the meeting held on 6 S 1222/14 April 1807).} Neither the warnings nor the threats of the French ambassador convinced the Ottoman ministers to allow the passage of the French troops, however.

Napoleon and Sebastiani were aware of the fact that Ottoman ministers did not wish receive military help from France either. However, they explained that the Serbians, with the aid of Russia and Prince Ipolitanti, had captured Belgrade, there was a plan for the unification of the Principalities. Such a risk meant a new difficulty for the Ottoman army which did not have time and finance resources to deal with it. Within this context, the arrival of troops would create a great relief for the Ottomans. A rejection of the Napoleon’s proposal would be considered as a sign of mistrust.\footnote{B.O.A. A.AMD 40/56 (undated).} On 7 May 1807, Selim III wrote a letter to Napoleon, talking about the well-prepared state of the Ottoman army, thus kindly implying that there was no need, for the time being, for the assistance of France.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 139/5734.C (29 S 1222/7 May 1807).} Meanwhile, reports came from the French agents at Ruscuk, Vidin and David at Travnik, and also from Sebastiani that the Turks were opposing the passage of French detachments in Dalmatia through the Ottoman lands in order to help the Ottoman army on the Danube.\footnote{Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 432.} Therefore, Sebastiani was suggesting that it would be better to give up the project and only send some French officers and six hundred artillerymen to the center. The remaining parts, he advised, should be decided in a special treaty between the two states.
Talleyrand sent a reply from Finkeinstein, on 21 May, informing him that no troops would be sent except the several engineers and artillerymen asked for by the Sultan.\textsuperscript{1333}

On 24 April 1807, an imperial order was sent to Hüsrev Pasha, the governor of Bosnia, to ask for help from France and to permit the passage of the French detachment.\textsuperscript{1334} Even though the Porte asked for three hundred French soldiers in Turkish attire, Marmont announced that he was ready to send five hundred soldiers, but in French uniforms (29 April 1807).\textsuperscript{1335} Allowing this change was beyond authority of Hüsrev Pasha, therefore the parties waited for a reply from the Porte. The Porte permitted the entrance of an artillery force without any specifications.\textsuperscript{1336} The French detachment passed through Travnik on 12 June. On the same day, it was reached by news about the change in the throne reached them. The new Sultan ordered the return of the detachment.\textsuperscript{1337}

Apart from the military aid, another important issue was an alliance with France. Selim III had accepted an alliance between France and the Porte. Vahid Efendi\textsuperscript{1338} was sent to France to conduct the negotiations.\textsuperscript{1339} For the job, the Porte preferred a candidate that would not be easily be deceived by Napoleon and would not sign a treaty that would damage the interests of the Porte. Even though it was announced that the envoy would go to France as soon as possible, Vahid Efendi was advised travel slowly and to act according to

\textsuperscript{1333} Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 181.

\textsuperscript{1334} Shupp, The European Powers, p. 474.

\textsuperscript{1335} Shupp, The European Powers, p. 474.

\textsuperscript{1336} Shupp, The European Powers, p. 476.

\textsuperscript{1337} Shupp, The European Powers, p. 477

\textsuperscript{1338} Mehmed Emin Vahid Efendi (d. 1244/1828) functioned as Zecrüye başkatibi and muhassılı. He was appointed as Mevkufati and after a short time (L 1221/ December 1806) as defter emini. After being chosen as the special envoy to Paris, he was granted the rank of nişanlı. After his return from Paris, he was delegated, on 21 B 1223/12 September 1808, the duty of carrying the negotiations with British, which ended with the Treaty of Kala-yı Sultaniye. For more details, see Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{1339} TSMA E. 3327-1(undated); B.O.A. HAT 32/1540 (undated). In the document, other candidates are recorded as Seydi Ali Efendi, Ramiz Efendi, Ibrahim Afif and İsmail Ferruh Efendi; and Amir Bey.
the newest developments. It makes one think that the Porte was not very enthusiastic to make an alliance with France.\textsuperscript{1340} The task of Vahid Efendi was kept secret and he was presented as the new Ottoman ambassador to replace Muhib Efendi.\textsuperscript{1341} Asım makes reference Vahid Efendi’s duty within this framework. He also comments that the reason his new duty was to make negotiate the Triple Alliance between France, Persia and the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{1342} After being delegated as the plenipotentiary for the negotiation, Vahid Efendi was given a long list of instructions. He was ordered to take into consideration the war between Russia and France and conduct his affairs depending on the developments in that war. If France would defeat Russia, he was to sign a defensive alliance with France and send the Turkish text of the alliance to the Porte. If there would be a request for an additional item or a change in a certain article, he would accept it if advantageous and ask permission to wait for a reply from the Porte. If he was asked to sign an offensive treaty, he was instructed to reject it by underlying that Sebastani had agreed to respect the decision of the Porte in this regard. He would also stress that the Porte accepted the inclusion of in the defensive alliance. On the other hand, if Russia were to defeat France, Vahid Efendi was ordered to sign any kind of treaty. Vahid Efendi was also ordered not to enter an alliance that would include Persia.\textsuperscript{1343}

After the arrival of Vahid Efendi to Warsaw, similar instructions were sent by İbrahim Hilmi Pasha, the Grand Vizier in Edirne. Hilmi Pasha ordered him not to give an exact number of the French soldiers might be sent to Empire, and to declare that he had not been informed on the matter. He was also reminded that he was delegated to sign a defensive alliance only and should never to sign an offensive one. If he was insisted to make an offensive alliance, Vahid Efendi was advised to declare that his Empire preferred

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1340} HAT 32/1540 (undated).
\item \textsuperscript{1341} B.O.A.HAT 6096 (undated); B.O.A.HAT 6092 (undated); HAT 32/1540(undated).
\item \textsuperscript{1342} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I., p. 174. Asım also notes that Vahid Efendi was promoted to the rank of nişancı on 13 L 1221/29 December 1806 and within two days he set out for his new duty.
\item \textsuperscript{1343} B.O.A. HAT 6096 (undated).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
neutrality, and if the offensive treaty was against Russia, to maintain that there was already a war between the Empire and Russia, with the Empire intending recapture its lost lands. Regarding the negotiations about the passage of the troops, Hilmi Pasha advised Vahid Efendi to give evasive answers in accordance with the policy of the Porte in face of the previous insistence of Sebastiani on the same issue.\textsuperscript{1344} The above-mentioned instructions received by Vahid Efendi suggest that the Porte was hesitant and almost timid about an alliance with France, particularly an offensive one. The impression that emerges is that the Porte was trying not to be deceived by the French diplomats and also waiting for the result of the war between Russia and France. That might also be the reason why Vahid Efendi was given a limited maneuvering area by the Porte. On 29 December, Vahid Efendi, Ottoman plenipotentiary of the Ottoman Empire, and Muhammed Mirza, the Persian ambassador to Paris, left for Paris, accompanied by Jaubert.\textsuperscript{1345}

While Napoleon was trying to establish a general peace in Europe, in the mid-April he began to negotiate with Vahid Efendi who had arrived Warsaw, promising that France would annul the stipulations of Küçük Kaynarca Treaty. In order to attain this goal, Napoleon argued that it was necessary for the Porte to make an alliance with Persia. He again assured that the French troops would assist the Ottoman army and attack Russia. Yet, it later became clear that Vahid Efendi was trying to delay the proceedings and making the excuse that he was not authorized to negotiate certain matters. Even though Shupp evaluates as the personal attitude of Vahid Efendi, it seems that he was behaving in accordance with the above-mentioned instructions given by the Porte. Indeed, Puryear notes that Vahid Efendi was pressed hard to sign a treaty principally drafted by Talleyrand. Talleyrand had proposed that “If the concert to be established in the military operations of France and Turkey requires the passage of troops across the respective territories, such troops enjoy during their stay in the territories of their ally every support and subsistence.”

\textsuperscript{1344} For more details see B.O.A. HAT 143/5929 (undated).

\textsuperscript{1345} Coquelle, “Sebastiani: Ambassadeur a Constantinople”, p. 585; Asım, \textit{Tarihi Asım}, vol. I, p. 175. Pierre Amédée Jaubert (1779-1847) was a French orientalist and diplomat. He was sent to Persia for making arrangements for the inclusion of Persia to the Triple Alliance.
If France would send aid to Persia and French possessions in India, her troops enjoy passage through the Ottoman lands. Another interesting item was the stipulation that the Ottoman government was to pay the indemnities for the losses of France during the Egyptian expedition out of customs revenues. Talleyrand also proposed that more economic privileges should be granted to France than Britain. Moreover, it was stipulated that there would be no renewal of the alliance with Russia and Britain and the Straits would be closed to them.\footnote{Puryear, \textit{Napoleon and the Dardanelles}, pp. 171-2.}

In his \textit{Sefaretname}, Vahid Efendi notes that the friendship of Sebastiani in İstanbul was completely different from the attitudes of the French ministers in Paris. Even though he does not give the details of his meeting with Talleyrand, he makes some interesting comments. According to his account, “\textit{under the guise of friendship but in reality to create disorder in the Islamic lands}”, Talleyrand had proposed that the Porte should allow the stationing of the French troops in Montenegro, Serbia and also at the Straits. Moreover, Talleyrand advised to end the alliance with Britain forever.\footnote{ Çağlar, \textit{Mehmed Emin Vahid Efendi}, p. 98. He does not give any other details on the meeting but comments that “\textit{bu fakire tecviz ve ruhsat-ı kämile ile me’müriyetimize mebni istediği gibi yedimizden bir takrib sened ahziyla bütün dünyayı tahrik ve tehzîz ettiremek misillî küsûl-ı devlet ve kavânın-i mülk-ü İslâmîyyeye uymaz nice nice teklîfât-ı garîbeye âgaz ve bu cihetle tarafınıza gâh ihâfe ve gâh niyâz ü nâz ederek bir hayli siksâtarda ise de ...”} As we have remarked, Vahid Efendi had been with very strict instructions and above proposals were beyond his authority. Consequently, despite the urgings and attempts of Napoleon, Vahid Efendi refrained from signing a treaty of alliance.\footnote{Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, pp. 181-2. Shupp notes that the Porte was also suspecting that France was trying to reach an agreement with Russia, Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, pp. 431-2.} Therefore, Napoleon transferred the negotiations to General Caulaincourt who assumed the duty on 1 June. The initial conference ended with no result.\footnote{Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 183; Puryear, \textit{Napoleon and the Dardanelles}, p. 173.}

From a slightly different perspective, Napoleon’s policy might be regarded as part of the Eastern Question. In fact, in his note to Talleyrand concerning Sebastiani’s mission in...
1806, Napoleon asserted that he had been offered a great part of the Ottoman territories, yet he did not consent to the Ottoman partition and preferred the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{1350} It is interesting to note that Russia was not following a policy of partitioning of the Empire either. According to Shupp, both states “preferred to organize at least European Turkey into numerous states according to race, religion or political propinquity (to each Power) with varying degrees of political status. Each wished to bring the Balkan Peninsula under its exclusive diplomatic protection.”\textsuperscript{1351} During the time of Sebastiani’s ambassadorship in İstanbul, numerous memoranda and reports were submitted to Napoleon. Though none them had a direct effect on policy, these memoranda and reports must have played a role in shaping Napoleon’s ideas about the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire. For instance, an influential memorandum was submitted by M. Codrika\textsuperscript{1352} to Napoleon. In the Codrika Plan, there were two suggestions for the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire. The first one envisaged the partitioning of the Ottoman territories into two. An Asiatic government with the capital of Baghdad would be under the rule of the Ottoman dynasty and a European government to be ruled by Christians with their capital of İstanbul. As an alternative to this plan, he suggested the establishment of small provinces in the Ottoman Europe, namely Bulgaria, Serbia, Albania, Bosnia, the Greek Islands and Greece. Only Rumelia was to remain under the Ottoman rule. Egypt, not surprisingly was to pass under the French control.\textsuperscript{1353}

The Codrika Plan was never put into effect. Yet, it is very important to note that the second plan is very similar to the map of the Balkans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

3.4.2. Sebastiani and Kabakçı Mustafa

\textsuperscript{1350} Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 67; Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{1351} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{1352} Codrika was an adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France.

\textsuperscript{1353} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, pp. 76-7.
Even if we except that Napoleonic France had some secret intentions and forced the Porte to enter a war with Russia, this does not necessarily mean that France played a role, through Sebastani, in the outbreak of the May 1807 Rebellion. İlhan Bardakçı puts forward an interesting claim in this regard. In a newspaper, he published a Turkish translation of a report bearing the date 16 June 1835. It was written by François Gellehi, the councilor to the French embassy in İstanbul. In the part of the report translated by Bardakçı, Gellehi notes that the Greeks in Morea would certainly revolt, demanding their independence. France had made some promises in this regard. He argues that fortifications in Çanakkale and measures taken by the Porte in Limni would have to be made ineffective, which in return required the elimination of the supporters of Rauf Pasha. The instigation of an uprising among the soldiers of the fortresses was being proposed as a plan by Gellehi with a view to achieving the above aims. The crucial part comes after this explanation: Gellehi informs his correspondent that the same method had been previously applied by Sebastani on the Janissary army previously. However, he notes the difficulty of carrying out the same plan again since there was a lack of the trustworthy and powerful mediators which had brought success the first time. It is clear that the reference is to the May 1807 Rebellion. Unfortunately, Bardakçı does not provide the reader with the information on how he had received the report. He only states that it was not found in the archives.

1354 An independent state was established in Morea in the year 1830. Therefore, it is difficult to understand the historical context of the above letter. Most probably there is a mistake in the date of the document.

1355 “Buna Ne Buyrulur” in İlhan Bardakçı, İmparatorluğu Veda, 4th edition, (İstanbul: Alioğlu Yay., 2002), pp. 219-20: “İki önceki hükümdar Selim’in devrilmesinde büyük payı olan Yeniçeri ocağı üzerinde o zamanki selefimiz Sebastani’nin kullandığı usul, şimdi bu günlerde ne derece uygulanabilir? Ancak Sebastani Horace’in çok muhem ve emin aracılara kendisini hissettiren başarılı günlerin şansına bugün pek sahip değiliz. ..... Mora’da isyan İstanbul’dan Sebastani’nin ordu merkezindeki faydali çalışmalar gibi sonuçlanabilirse müttefik Napoleon tarafından düşünülen Akdeniz hakimiyetindeki yerimizi alamız bakımından bize sadece sevinmek düşer ....”

1356 Unfortunately, despite some research it has not been possible to obtain any further information on the above letter. Therefore, we will treat it not as historical evidence but just as a suggestion of the possibility of an involvement of Sebastani.
According to the report, it was Sebastiani who instigated the Janissaries a rebellion thanks to the help of some mediators. If we take the above suggestion seriously, we should answer some important questions. Why Sebastiani should have played a role in the Rebellion during a period in which he managed to eliminate the rival ambassadors in the Empire and gain the great confidence of the Porte? A more logical candidate in this regard could be either Russia, already at war with the Porte, and standing to benefit from a chaos in the Empire more than France. Since we do not any evidence for the involvement of Sebastiani, we should be cautious regarding the arguments for his involvement. However, the possibility of his involvement is not so easy to disregard.

It would be helpful at this point, to turn to the issue of Dalmatia. The most logical explanation for a possible involvement of France would probably be her aims of expansion in the Balkans and of forming a barrier in the region against Russia. For that purpose, a pretext was needed to enter the Ottoman lands and station troops there. Within this framework, the insistence of France on the deposition of the hospodars, and later, on the declaration of war against the Russians, might seem more meaningful. It is very important to note that Napoleon and his ambassador must have been aware of the fact that the dismissal of the hospodars, subject to certain stipulations, would certainly lead a war between the two old allies. However, if the peace was preserved between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, France would not dare to send troops into the Ottoman lands since they would naturally face a strong reaction from Russia and Britain, as happened during the French expedition to Egypt. However, if the Triple Alliance was broken and Russia attacked the Ottoman lands, an easier entry under the guise of military assistance would be possible. When the policy of the Porte radically changed with the rejection of French proposal and the permission for the passage of only a very limited number of soldiers into the region, France’s expansionist intention was defeated, most probably by the anti-French parties in the Empire. Indeed Cevdet Pasha also comments that Sebastiani was involved in
the Rebellion with the aim of putting the Porte in a difficult position which force it to accept military help from France.\footnote{Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VIII, p. 151: “İşte hal böyle ber minvâl-i fitne ve ihtilâl üzere cârî iken Fransız elçisi Sebastiyani dahi devlet-i alîyyeyi bir gaileye uğratib da Fransa’dan istimdâda mecbûr etmek ve bu vesîleyle memâlik-i İslâmiye’ye ve belki İstanbul’a asker sevk edebilmek ...” Unfortunately the author does not give his source of information, therefore it is not clear whether these are his personals opinion or rely on a historical evidence.}

If we dwell on the possible involvement of France in the uprising we come some advantages that such an involvement would have offered to France. According to Puryear, the Rebellion and change on the throne provided two advantages for Napoleon. It was a pretext to abandon the Porte, and also an excuse for forcing Russia to wait for the news before entering into discussions with France on the partition of imperial lands.\footnote{Puryear, \textit{Napoleon and the Dardanelles}, pp. 189-90. According to the author, both at Tilsit and afterwards, Napoleon gave Alexander considerable reason to hope that a partition of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans might be arranged.} If, as argued in the report published by Bardakçı, Sebastiani provoked the Janissaries, this might also be related to their efforts to force a change in the cabinet and carry more pro-French figures to power.\footnote{These are mere speculations supported by no concrete historical evidence. But our intention is to produce some arguments that would provide incentives to look at the issues from a different angle and provide some questions and possible answers, instead of repeating the handed-down explanations in respect to the outburst of the Rebellion. However, it should be noted that most of these new questions and answers were shaped by the archival documents and contemporary sources during the preparation of this work. These questions should be placed before the background of French-Ottoman relationship during the period under scrunity.}

Sebastiani had already some connections with Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa, the Ağa of the Janissaries. As might be recalled, there was an attempt by Sebastiani to convince Pehlivan Ağa that the British fleet had been invited by some Ottoman ministers. Pehlivan Ağa, in turn, believed this and circulated the information among the Janissaries. As we have suggested earlier, if Sebastiani was the origin of these this rumour, he was probably intending to create a reaction against the pro-Russian or pro-British figures in the cabinet. We might also speculate that by creating a disorder in the capital, he was also trying to
weaken the Empire in a way that would make the French military help necessary. Another important clue of the incident might be an allusion to a kind of secret relation between Sebastiani and Pehlivan Ağa. It is also very important to note that if there was an intention to instigate a rebellion, especially among the soldiers of the forts, Sebastiani was among the few foreigners who had a chance to have contacts with them. There was a French consulate on the Kala-yı Sultaniye or Çanak Kale. More importantly there were French engineers and artillerymen, educating the soldiers and also trying to help with the improvement of the fortifications around the Bosphorous. They had been employed for the improvement of the military conditions of the Empire. As we have remarked above, they were also employed in the fortifications of the city during the British expedition.

Cevdet Pasha, on the other hand, suggests another source used by Sebastiani in provoking the Janissaries, namely the yasakçıs, or the personal guards of the embassy. According to Cevdet Pasha, the ambassador was talking to these soldiers and offering presents to them. In some secret conversations, Sebastiani tried to deceive them by arguing that the administrators had established the Nizam-ı Cedid army to abolish the Janissary army and to set aside Janissaries’ salaries for themselves. He also said that “Our emperor knows the matter and he is sorry for you, since he would never wish for the abolishment of the old military system of the Empire. Our soldiers are very close to the Empire, therefore they can be immediately called to Istanbul, in case of need.” The source of inspiration of Cevdet Pasha seems to be Asım. According to Asım, after the establishment of the Nizam-ı Cedid, the French ambassadors were frequently sending presents either to the yasakçıs or the regiments they belonged to. They were assured that France was a loyal friend of the

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1360 B.O.A. HAT 42/9 (24 N 1213/1 March 1799). A small house and a bakery belonging to the consulate were confiscated and it was sold to Hadimzâde Osman Bey.

1361 For some examples see B.O.A. A.AMD 37/40 (undated); B.O.A. A.AMD 37/58 (15 B 1211/15 January 1797); B.O.A. A.AMD.37/69 (21 B 1211/20 January1797).

Empire and the attack on Egypt was due to the will ("irade") of the Ottoman ministers. The French ambassadors, Asım continues, also underlined that they considered the Janissary army as the backbone of the Empire. But the Nizam-ı Cedid army, donated with many privileges, had been established to replace the Janissary army. The French ambassadors did not forget to express their sadness for the Janissaries, and underlined that their government was ready to send the French army on the frontiers if necessary. These suggestions were reaching the ears of the Janissaries. Even though we cannot be sure whether such talk was really taking place, it is important to note that once again, the main issue was the passage of French soldiers. Asım states that the French ambassadors were consciously provoking the Janissaries and struggling to deepen their hatred towards the newly established military system.

The connection of the French ambassadors with the Janissaries or the rebels did not end here. We have evidence that Sebastiani had some secret contacts with Kabakçı Mustafa after the Rebellion. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure that their acquaintance had started earlier. According to a report, Sebastiani met Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa, noticing his influence after the May Rebellion. This information is confirmed by French historian, Saint-Denys. The author notes that the ambassadors in the capital, including Sebastiani, preferred to establish contacts with Mustafa Ağa after the Rebellion. Particularly, the French ambassador did not lose time to establish friendly relations with Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa and tried to exert his influence over the Porte through this friendship. A later historian, Miller, add some details to the same issue. He asserts that Sebastiani established a

1366 According to a report found in PRO, Sebastiani met Kabakçı Mustafa after the Rebellion and after noticing his influence. See PRO, FO-78-60, a document named “References”.
1367 Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol II, pp. 149-50.
relationship with Kabakçı Mustafa through the mediation of Alexander Sutzo, some time after the Rebellion. According to the author, his new friend provided the French ambassador an immense degree of power via Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa’s influence over the yamaks that could be used as a pressure group against the Porte. According to him, Sutzo, chief dragoman was executed for revealing state secrets. According to Asım, the next day after the killing of Sutzo, Sebastani accused the Porte that he had been executed under the pretext of having conducted espionage for France and threatened to leave the city.

An undated document, in the Archives of Topkapı Palace Museum, confirms the connection between the French ambassador and Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa. It is a report by a certain individual to an unknown correspondent, most probably to Mustafa IV. It seems that the writer of the report had been delegated the task of finding out details of a meeting (“müläkat”) of these two figures, namely Sebastani and Kabakçı Mustafa. Upon investigating, he discovered that the first meeting occurred following the initiative of Sebastani who had visited Kabakçı. The second meeting, the writer of the report declares, took place at the seashore residence “sahilhane” of Sebastani. It seems that the ambassador sent his interpreters to Mustafa three times. The final meeting was a dinner party at the residence of Sebastani. It is clear that following the initiative of Sebastani, a close relationship was established between the two. Unfortunately, the writer of the report confesses that he was not able to find out the issues that were discussed during these meetings. The document seems to belong to the reign of Mustafa IV, since it is declared that Kabakçı Mustafa granted 1000 guruş sign-up bonus (“bahşiş”) to the retinue of the

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1369 Miller, Mustapha Pacha Bairaktar, p. 204.
ambassador during the dinner party. Spending such amounts of money would have been a luxury for the Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa before the Rebellion.\footnote{1372 T.S.M.A. 1756 (undated). I would like to thank to my friend, Süheyla Yenidünya, for providing me a copy of the document. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.}

In the year 1806, Arbuthnot issued a warning to the Porte. He informed that he had heard the arrival of a certain French agent called Doulcet du Ponteesulant. He had left Paris on 13 September and was about to arrive in İstanbul. According to the ambassador, if the information he had received was true, this agent would go to Cairo after visiting Sebastiani. His real intention was to create disorder and uprisings against the Sultan in the places he passed through. In order to prevent this, he advised that if after his arrival, Sebastiani demanded passports for this man, the demand should be refused.\footnote{1373 B.O.A. HAT 1334/52055.F (11 Ş 1221/24 October 1806)}

The negotiations of between Russia and France were another indicator of the change in the policy of Napoleon. These two powers had started negotiations on the partition of the Empire.\footnote{1374 Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, p. 124.} According to Berkes, when Napoleon heard of the Rebellion, he was relieved and stated that he hoped the Empire could be saved. However he was now free from having to depend on the Empire being saved. According to Jorga, Napoleon published an article where he commented that Selim III and his ministers had fallen since they had not treated the Serbians and the Russians harshly.\footnote{1375 Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, vol. 5, p. 154.} More details are provided by Driault. The above article was, in fact, the published form of a letter sent by Napoleon to General Lemarois, the governor of Warsaw to be published in the newspaper, on 24 June. A copy of the letter is quoted in Driault’s work called Tilsit.\footnote{1376 Driault, Tilsit, p. 168.}

A revolution took place at Constantinople. The Sultan Selim and twelve of the principal personalities of the Porte were strangled by the Janissaries. Sultan Mustafa was enthroned. The cause of this insurrection is related to the Serbians’ progress and the lack of energy that the Janissaries reproach to the government. They accused the ministers of having collaborated with the Serbians and the Russians. The new sultan proclaimed that he would not conclude peace with the
Russians until the old borders are not re-established and the Crimea reconquered.\textsuperscript{1377}

Apart from the detail that Selim III did not die during the uprising, the important part of this letter is its mentioning of possible causes of the Rebellion. It seems that Napoleon tried to show that it was an uprising was directed the Russian influence at the Porte and weakness of the Porte in suppressing the Serbian uprising. At the end of his letter, he assured the journalists that this news is official and certain.\textsuperscript{1378} Yet, there is no allusion in the primary sources to the connection between the two uprisings. Moreover, as we have remarked in the related parts, the anti-French sentiments were more pronounced than the anti-Russian ones on the eve of the Rebellion.

The possibility of an involvement of France in the outburst of the Rebellion raises another related matter to the scene. What was the ultimate aim in the instigation of the Rebellion? Most probably, the French government did not plan the deposition of Selim III. The ultimate aim was probably a cabinet change, not the deposition of Selim III, known to be close to France. Even if the uprising started due to the intrigues of Sebastiani, he seems to have lost control over the rebels at the end, leading to the fall of Selim III from power and appointment of a party that was not overly favourable to a pro-French policy – at least at the beginning. We should recall that immediately after the Rebellion, the passage of five hundred French artillerymen at Travnik was refused by the new Sultan, under the pressure

\textsuperscript{1377} Driault, \textit{Tilsit}, p. 168: “Ce même 24 Juin, Napoleon écrivait au General Lemarois, gouverneur de Varsovie: “Faites mettre dans les journaux de Varsovie la nouvelle suivante: "Une révolution a lieu a Constantinople. Le sultan Sélim et douze des principaux de la Porte ont été égorgés par les janissaries. Le sultan Mustafa a été mis sur la trone. La cause de cette insurrection du peuple vient des progrès des Serviens et du peu d'énergie dont les janissaries se plaignent de la part du gouvernement. Ils accusaient les ministres de s'entendre avec les Serviens et les Russes. Le nouveau sultan a proclamé qu'il ne ferait point la paix avec les Russes que les anciennes frontières ne soient rétablies et la Crimée reconquise.”

\textsuperscript{1378} Driault, \textit{Tilsit}, p. 168. “Et la lettre impériale se terminait ainsi: “Le journaliste peut dire que ces nouvelles sont officielles et certaines”. Cette dernière formule n'était pas superflue; ce n'était pas la les vrais caractères de la révolution de Constantinople; mais Napoleon avait peur qu'elle n'ait été dirigée contre l'influence française a Constantinople, a laquelle le sultan Sélim avait été dans les derniers mois tout dévoué.”
from the Janissaries. In fact, the passage of French troops was completely forbidden during the reign of Mustafa IV. A report by Sebastiani reveals that the news of the coming of French artillerymen was considered as a signal of forced imposition of a French type of military drill and it increased the worry of the Janissaries before the Rebellion.

In talking about possible involvement of the foreign powers in the Rebellion, we should admit that Russia was also a good candidate. She was already at war with the Porte and a disorder in the Empire would have been quite beneficial for their interests. We have already talked why France had urged for the dismissal of the hospodars and insisted on the declaration of war. In the same way, we should ask why the Russians did not end their march on the Dniester despite the reinstatement of the former hospodars. As we have remarked, there is an explanation to the effect that the dispatches informing Russia the reinstatement of the hospodars had arrived late. It should also be remarked that the policy of Russia was also problematic especially after the restoration of the hospodars, a fact best summarized in the following words of Arbuthnot:

he [Italinsky] agrees with me that nothing of any importance is at present to be laid to the charge of the Porte and he fears, as I do too, that his Court has been influenced by the wish of having some Turkish provinces to restore, in any case reverses in the war with France should force the Emperor to negotiate.

In this respect, he blames especially the Russian court for not ending the crisis after the restoration of the hospodars and pushing the Porte into the hands of Napoleon, since after the outbreak of war, the French assistance would naturally be sought by the Porte. More importantly, Arbuthnot, and the Russian ambassador suspected that Russia was taking the crisis as an opportunity to capture some provinces. At this point, it is very important to note that in Michelson’s declaration there was accusation on France. The French government was aiming at the destruction of the Janissary army and helping the

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1379 Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, p. 179
1380 Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, p. 177.
1381 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 26 December 1806, (PRO,FO 78-52).
1382 From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 26 December 1806, (PRO,FO 78-52).
Sultan for that purpose. With the destruction of the Janissaries, the main obstacle to French aggression would be removed, opening the way for France to enter the Empire.\textsuperscript{1383} It is clear that the Russian general was trying to create disorder among the military classes of the Empire and trying to direct the hostility of the Janissaries towards the ruling elite and also France. This might be one of main reasons for the strategy of the Russians in creating a reaction among the Janissaries, a point which is noted by Arbuthnot as follows:

\begin{quote}
I shall only observe further that the Court of Petersburg has, I believe been greatly mistaken in the expectations which seemed to be formed receiving assistance from the Janissaries. There is a passage in Michelson’s proclamation which favours the option that reliance was placed on the effects produced by schism between the Janissaries and troops of new discipline.\textsuperscript{1384}
\end{quote}

In a similar way, according to Asım, the British expeditionary party was also spreading news that they had indeed been invited by part of the Ottoman ruling elite, and the ultimate aim was to abolish the Janissary army and replace it with the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} corps after the British meet with the Russians in the region.\textsuperscript{1385} Immediately after the departure of the British fleet from İstanbul, it met a Russian fleet under the command of Admiral Seniavin off Bozca Ada. The admiral had suggested that they should stage a joint expedition to the Ottoman capital. However, Duckworth refrained from a second attempt.\textsuperscript{1386} The Russian admiral attempted to capture the Fortress of Bozca Ada with seven or eight ships.\textsuperscript{1387} On 15 May, he demanded the commander of the fortress to surrender. However upon being refused, he attacked and gained the control of the fortress. After that, the Russian general transported the Turkish families and soldiers to the Asian coast. The

\textsuperscript{1383} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 246.

\textsuperscript{1384} From Arbuthnot to Howick, Pera, 15 January 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55).

\textsuperscript{1385} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. I, pp. 236-7

\textsuperscript{1386} Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 119;

\textsuperscript{1387} \textit{The Times}, Saturday, May 16, 1807, pg 3; issue 7048; col. F.; B.O.A. HAT 143/5929 (undated).
The ultimate aim of Seniavin was to march directly to İstanbul. However he lacked means to achieve this goal.1388

As might be remembered, Koca Sekbanbaşı talks in detail a plan of attack by the Russians on the Straits, an idea developed by Şeremet, an Ottoman Christian subject. In fact, possibility of such an involvement is suggested by Niyazi Berkes.1389 The Russian consulate at Büyükdere was close to the fortresses, which would have enabled easy contact. However, we should not forget that Italinsky had left the city quite long time ago. Still, there is a very interesting document written by Selim III to his kaimmakam, in which he accuses the Russians of deceiving the Janissaries. Even though the document undated, it seems that it was written some time before May.1390 The issue seems to be a problem in the fortresses due to the stationing of some riflemen on the fortresses by the order of the Sultan. Selim III assures the kaimmakam that he had no other purpose in mind than the protection of the Bosphorus against the aggression of the enemy. However, according to the Sultan, the Russian spies took this action as an opportunity to deceive the soldiers and to create disorder among them. Even though there is no mention of how the spies were going about this deception, the spies used them was apparently that the new soldiers had been sent to replace the old ones. The Sultan blames the soldiers for believing the gossip of the spies and insists that he had no other intention than the improvement of the fortifications of the city. At the end of document, Selim III ordered the Sekbanbaşı to find the spies.1391 There are only two possibilities for the emergence of such a problem in the fortresses: The first might be the British expedition. However, there is not such a recorded problem occurring during the period. Therefore it seems more likely that Selim III wrote the record on the very eve of the 1807 Rebellion. Since we will discuss the attempt at stationing the riflemen on the following chapter, it will be suffice here to note that it is possible that the Russians

1388 Mouravieff, L’Alliance Russo-Turque, pp. 252-3.
1389 Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, p. 125.
1390 B.O.A. HAT 7522 (undated, catalog date is 1222/1807). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.
1391 B.O.A. HAT 7522 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).
played a role before the Rebellion. However, one final point should be added that while the Sultan accuses the role of a Russian spy in the affair, he does not offer evidence for it. It is probable that he was merely expressing his suspicion in this regard. 1392

3.5. Conclusion

As the above sections suggest, the Ottoman Empire, especially the capital, had turned into a diplomatic battleground for the great powers of the period, namely Russia, France and Great Britain. For a long time, the Porte tried to keep its neutrality and benefit from the diplomatic traffic. According to a document, while the allies, Russia and Britain, were trying to detach Porte from France, a reverse attempt was also true. In this fragile situation, the Porte followed a “policy of balance”. 1393 Unfortunately, this policy ended with a war Russia and the British Expedition.

These important incidents found reflections in the arena of internal politics as well. The idea of being surrounded by enemies on all sides created anxiety among the common people. During the British expedition, the population witnessed the arrival of an enemy fleet at the capital and was among the first to defend the city, surpassing even the rulers. Moreover, the gossips circulating in the city and emanating from different sources directed masses’, and particularly the Janissaries’ attention towards the ruling elite. Suspicion of betrayal by the ruling elite deepened the hatred towards it. Particularly, the presence of the French troops in Ottoman lands was a serious issue that annoyed the masses in the capital. Selim III and his ministers were accused of not working for the benefit of Islam but for the European powers, particularly France. All these matters contributed to the ruling elite becoming target of the rebels and to the weakening of the imperial legitimacy of the Sultan.

1392 B.O.A. HAT 7522 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).
1393 B.O.A. HAT 169/7175 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806): “... her biri ne gâne muvâzene ile kullanılmakta idiği ma‘lüm-i hümâyûnlari olan mevâddandır.”
The foreign states also used the internal problems of the Empire for their own benefit. For instance, the fear of the Janissaries was exploited by the great powers of the period for various purposes. Though historical evidence does prove this, there seems a possibility that French ambassador instigated the uprising and did not hesitate to establish contacts with one of the most prominent rebel leaders in order to benefit from Kabakçı Mustafa’s influence over the Porte and the masses.

As final note we should admit that even though there might have been some direct or indirect role played by some of the foreign powers in the 1807 Rebellion, this does not contradict the fact that there were some internal problems, especially the Nizam-ı Cedid attempt or some other social, economic problems that we have discussed in the previous chapter. We should not note that if the foreign powers had a role in the uprising, this should be seen more as an attempt to exploit already existing internal problems in order to create a disorder in the Empire.
CHAPTER 4
FIVE DAYS OF A REBELLION (25 May-29 May 1807)

"On dört kala yürüyüş ett i birden,
Gaip erenler erişti geriden,
Mert yiğitler şıkar aldı sürüden
Mübarek gazası Halil Ağa'ya”

4.1 Introduction

The uprising started on 17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807 and ended on 21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807. Though the Empire suffered from its consequences for a long period of time, the main stage of the Rebellion lasted just for five days. It started with the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi and came to an end with the fall of Selim III and enthronement of Mustafa IV.

Despite the prolific documents and contemporary narratives, we do not have a well established chronology for the May 1807 Rebellion. One of the main problems of the available modern literature on the Rebellion is the limited focus on the chronology. Though some modern sources provide general factual information, it is usually based on the narratives of the later period, particularly Cevdet Pasha’s History. Moreover, very limited cross-checks are available between the contemporary narratives, the archival materials and foreign accounts. For that reason, most modern studies follow the story of one or two contemporary narratives and offer the reader one story, neglecting the other.

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1394 Quoted from Öztelli, Uyan Padişahım, p. 101.

1395 Cevdet Pasha’s treatment of the uprising is in the eighth volume of his History, covering the pages 155-186.
versions in other sources. For these reasons, this chapter and the next one will concentrate on the chronology of the May 1807 Rebellion. This chapter aims at making a chronological analysis of the five days of the May 1807 Rebellion. Since there are some discrepancies, conflicting information, and different versions of the same incidents in the contemporary sources, the archival materials will be taken as the basic source and the gaps will be filled in by the narratives.

The first day was the very first stage of the Rebellion. After the murder of Halil Haseki and Mahmud Raif Efendi, the uprising started. The next day witnessed the organization of the rebels and the panic that prevailed among the Ottoman ministers. Despite some efforts to put an end to the disorder at the forts, no result was achieved. The rebels, on the other hand, started the march on the third day of the Rebellion and managed to convince the artillermen to join them. The rebels reached the Et Meydanı on Thursday and after the arrival of some members of ulaire, they demanded the execution of eleven officials. During that day and the following day, most of these officials were murdered or executed. Moreover, with the order of Selim III, the Nizam-ı Cedid was abolished. However, the order did not satisfy the rebels and during that night some secret talks took place for the fall of Selim III. The following day the capture and execution of the remaining officials continued but the fall of Selim III from power and the accession of Mustafa IV was the most important development of the day.

4.2. The Rebellion Starts (Monday, 17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807)

The first sparks of the unrest burnt into flame on the evening of 24 May due to the anxiety of a group of yamaks suspecting that the Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms were sent to the forts. Their decision to meet the following day at the Umur Yeri seems to be for the purpose of discussing the matter among themselves. However, due to the intervention of Halil Haseki it turned into the first scene of the uprising. Halil Haseki was murdered on the
spot. The second main incident of the day was the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi while he was trying to get away from the yamaks chasing him.

4.2.1. The First Scene: The Murder of Halil Ağä

On Monday, 17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807, alarming news came from Hüseyin Ağä, the dizdar of the Yuşa Tabya (or the Macar Tabya) battalion ("tabya"). According to his report, the yamaks of İrva (Revancık), Anadolu Feneri and Garıbpçe fortresses went first to Anadolu Kavağı fortress and then to Yuşa Tabya on Sunday night (16 Ra/24 May). At the last battalion, the visitors asked their friends whether they had heard that the Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms were sent and kept at the residence of the commander of the fortresses ("Kavak Ağä"). According to Hüseyin Ağä, there was no consensus among the yamaks of the Yuşa Tabya and thus all gave contradictory replies. In fact, rather than making an inquiry, the real aim of the visiting yamaks seems to have been to warn their comrades. If their friends would yield, they themselves would also be forced to wear the new uniforms. According to the same report, that night ended with the decision of the yamaks to meet the next morning in order to discuss the issue further. They decided to meet at Hünkar İskelesi (in Beykoz) and to expel the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers from the fortresses.

1396 B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4. It is a report of Hüseyin Ağä to Kaimmakam Musa Pasha. Hüseyin Ağä was later appointed as the commander of the Anadolu and Rumeli Kavak, Yuşa Tabya, Telli Tabya and Kireç Burnu Tabya upon the request of the officers and yamaks of these fortresses. He later retired See B.O.A. HAT 53271 (15 Ca 1222/21 July 1807).

1397 The auxaliries ("yamaks") of the fortresses around the Straits are usually referred to as "yamak", or "tabyali" in contemporary sources. The term yamak refers to the assistants to the Janissary corps, artillery and bombardiers and also the soldiers employed in the fortresses. "Tabyali", refers to the soldiers serving as the guardians of the bastions ("tabya"). Ebubekir Efendi (the second author of Fezleke-i Kuşmânî) refers to them as "guzât-ı Şarkiyye", inspired by the fact that they were mostly from the Black Sea region. According to Saint-Denys, a considerable number of Laz and Albanians were brought from Trabzon and stationed at the forts. See Saint-Denys Rêvolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 108.

1398 B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807).
around the Bosporous. Therefore, the next morning, (17 Ra/ 25 May), the *yamaks* came to the Umur Yeri\textsuperscript{1399} around Hünkar İskelesi. After some time, Halil Ağa\textsuperscript{1400}, the commander of the Macar Tabya, and Hüseyin Ağa, writer of the report, came to Umur Yeri. Upon the questioning of the commanders on their intentions, the *yamaks* declared that they were not willing to wear the new uniforms sent to the fortresses. In reply, Halil Ağa denied such intentions on the part of the center. However, the *yamaks* were not convinced and they argued that if this was not the case, the *Nizam-i Cedid* soldiers would not be sent to the fortresses. The *yamaks* also announced that they would meet again at eight o’clock [04:31] and thereafter would inform the commanders about their final decision on that matter. Meanwhile, Halil Ağa was still trying to convince them, but he was silenced by the rifles of the *yamaks* at Umur Yeri. Hüseyin Ağa, on the other hand, was saved by the *yamaks* of his own battalion and escaped by a rowboat. After that, Hüseyin Ağa arrived at the city and wrote the above report.\textsuperscript{1401}

Before going into the details of the report of Hüseyin Ağa, it is important to underline certain points. The report is very important both for the sequence of events and also for some new insights on the immediate causes of the Rebellion. It is an official record which was written by an eye-witness of the uprising. Thanks to his report, we are able to learn that the first gathering was organized by the *yamaks* of İrva, Anadolu Feneri and Garibçe and then with the additional ones from Yuşa and Anadolu Kavaği on the night of 16 Ra 1222/24 May 1807. It also proves that Halil Ağa was murdered on the morning of 17 Ra/25 May. From the same document it becomes certain that Halil Ağa was murdered on spot at Umur

\textsuperscript{1399} Umur Yeri is situated between Sütlüce and Beykoz and across Büyükdere. See the map in Kayra, Cahit-Üyepazarcı, Erol, *İkinci Mahmud’un İstanbul’u: Bostancıbaşı Sicilleri*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür İşleri Dairesi Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1992), pp. 88-91.

\textsuperscript{1400} Halil Ağa/Haseki was the commander of Macar Tabya. He had a waterside residence (“*yalı*”) close to the Macar Tabya. He also had a garden in the same vicinity. See the map in Kayra-Üyepazarcı, *II. Mahmud’un İstanbul’u*, pp. 88-91,141.

\textsuperscript{1401} B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807). It seems that this was not the first disorder caused by the *yamaks* in the fortresses. In the same document, it is stated that the *yamaks* had previously experienced problems with their commander (“*Paşa*”)}
Yeri at Hünkar İskelesi or at least in a place not far away from Umur Yeri. Another important point is the fact that the events had actually started on the evening of 24 May and the death of Halil Ağa occurred on the following morning. Therefore, the uprising started early in the morning on Monday, 17 Ra/25 May.

Apparently Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi is the only author who mentions Umur Yeri as the first meeting place of the yamaks and as the spot where Halil Haseki was killed. The author of Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanmasına Dair Bir Tarihçe gives us a different version. He makes reference neither to the place of the murder of Halil Haseki nor to the gathering of yamaks, but narrates a dialogue between Halil Haseki and a group of eight leaders

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1402 Ebubekir Efendi states that Halil Ağa was murdered by the yamaks of Telli Tabya and does not mention the meeting at Umur Yeri. See Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 113.

1403 Ebubekir Efendi claims that due to false news of the arrival of the Nizam-i Cedid garments at the fortresses, the yamaks gathered a few days ago and agreed to act together (“ahd u misak”). See Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 113. Other contemporary sources do not mention the gathering of the evening of 16 Ra/24 May. For the beginning of the Rebellion, different dates are provided by the contemporary sources. In Yayla İmamı Risalesi, there is an interesting case. He gives the date, 16 Ra 1222/24 May, as the beginning of the Rebellion, the murder of Halil Ağa and Mahmud Raif Efendi. However, he notes that it was on Monday, which, in fact, corresponds to 17 Ra/25 May. See Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 223. On the other hand, Mustafa Necib gives the date as 17 Ra/25 May, but as corresponding to Tuesday. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 30. A similar case is repeated by the anonymous author of the short History published by Derin. This time the provided date is 18 Ra/26 May, but the day is stated as Monday. See Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 99. For Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, the uprising started on 16 Ra/24 May, Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yi Selimiyeye, Topkapı 1595, p. 5; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihişesi”, p. 386. The following sources give 17 Ra/25 May as the beginning date of the Rebellion: Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 113; Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yi Cedid, p. 19; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 21; B.O.A. C. AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807); Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticeti’l-Vekayi, p. 16; Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 99; Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günluğü, p. 176. Oğulukyan gives 13 May (the Julian Calender) as the starting date of the Rebellion and it corresponds to 25 May of the Gregorian Calender. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3.

1404 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yi Selimiyeye, Topkapı, no. 1595, p. 6a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihişesi”, pp. 386, 387, footnote 108. In the Topkapı copy, it is stated that Mahmud Raif Efendi was murdered before Halil Haseki and the yamaks gathered at the Umur Yeri in order to discuss the matter and meanwhile Halil Haseki intervened and then was murdered. Therefore, the source puts the death of Mahmud Raif Efendi earlier than the murder of Halil Haseki and the gathering at Umur Yeri.
(“sergerde”) of the yamaks. According to him, after the arrival of new uniforms, Halil Ağa called eight yamaks and demanded them to wear the new uniforms. In return, the yamaks asked permission to discuss the issue with their friends. While they were discussing the matter, Halil Ağa came and asked about their final decision, insisting that they should wear the new uniforms. However, the author says, the other party kindly rejected the offer. Consequently, Halil Ağa became furious, cursed the yamaks (“şütüm-i gâlize”) and hit a certain Deli Mehmed with a whip of “elephant penis” (“fil zekeri’”). Meanwhile the others were still begging the Ağa to forgive them for their reluctance to wear the uniforms. Halil Ağa threatened to strangle and throw all of them into the sea. After that point, Deli Mehmed fired his pistol and killed Halil Haseki. The motives of a meeting, though limited in terms of the participants, and the intervention of Halil Ağa are present in the Tarihçe, too. The apologetic tone of the author is easy to notice, emphasizing the violent response of Halil Ağa. Contrary to the above report of Hüseyin Ağa, the author of Tarihçe notes that rather than the yamaks it was Halil Ağa who had an aggressive attitude and in a sense provoked the yamaks to respond spontaneously and violently, resulting in his death.

4.2.2. The Question of Uniforms

The report of Hüseyin Ağa is crucial for our purposes in some other respects. It is usually narrated that the Rebellion broke out due to the attempt of Selim III make the yamaks to wear the new uniforms. One of the most detailed stories is narrated by the author of Yayla İmami Risalesi. After the army left for the campaign against the Russians, Selim III decided to bring forth the issue of the Nizam-ı Cedid and thus two days before the Rebellion (15 Ra 1222/23 May) he secretly called Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa and declared his intention to attend the Friday prayer (“Cuma Selamlık”) wearing the Nizam-ı Cedid uniform and ordered Arif Ağa to do the same. If the story is true, Selim III’s calling of


1406 Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 221.
Arif Ağa should not be a coincidence. He was the highest Janissary officer in the absence of Ağa of the Janissaries and the Sultan was probably trying to learn about his opinion on this issue. If a top rank Janissary officer wore the new uniform publicly, it would also greatly influence the opinion of the ordinary soldiers. Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa, however, did not give an encouraging reply and behind his words one gets sense of a hidden warning. Instead of giving a certain answer to the Sultan, he replied that the issue was beyond his authority. Selim III did not like his answer and sent him away after rebuking. After he left, the Sultan called Bostancıbaşı Hasan Şakir Bey. This time Selim III did not mention his intention of attending the Friday prayer in the Nizam-ı Cedid uniform, instead he ordered Şakir Bey to make the soldiers at the fortresses wear the Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms. The talk with the Sekbanbaşi might have caused the Sultan to notice that the change of the uniforms of the Janissaries that remained in the city would not be an easy matter and thus he tried to make a smaller scale attempt on the soldiers of the fortresses. In fact, the Sultan must have well known the fact that the Bostancıbaşı was the supervisor ("nazır") of the Four Fortresses, there was already a certain amount of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers there.

1407 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, pp. 221-2: “Şevketlî inayetli efendim, ben senin aciz bir kulunum; hâşi, ben size mühâlefet haddim değilir. Lâkin bu mâdde mülâhaza-yi hûmâyûn buyrulup zirâ sonu gayet fenâ bir şey olmak ihtimaldir.”

1408 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 222.

1409 It was during the reign of Abdülhamid I that the importance of the fortresses around the shores of the Black Sea began to increase. The increasing naval power of the Russians in the Black Sea forced the Porte to repair and erect new ones around the Bosphorous, especially after the establishment of a navy around Azak Sea. During that period, the administration of the fortresses was under the supervision of a bostancıbaşı and there were masters ("usta") as the commanders of the Anadolu and Rumeli Kavak. After 1774, there were five fortresses, namely Rumeli Feneri, Anadolu Feneri, Garibçe, Poyraz Limanı and İrva (Revancık) and Bağdadıcık (or Kilyos) collectively called as the Five Fortresses ("kala-yi hamse”). In 1780 and during the grand admiralship of Cezyirli Hasan Pasha, their administration was delegated to the Tersane. See Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı, “Kaynarca Muahedesinden sonrası Durum İcâbi Karadeniz Boğazı’nın Tahkimi”, XLIV/175 (Belleten: 1980) pp. 514, 516. These fortresses were initially manned by the falconers ("çakırcı, sahinici") recruited from different parts of the Empire. For instance, by an imperial edict, dated, 28 Ca 1199/8 April 1785, 215 “şahin, çakır ve atmaca götürcüler ve serbazaradan ve doğancayan” were recruited from Özi (Oczakov), Rumelia, Sivas, Adana, Maraş and some other places in the Empire. According to the same edict, the total of 215, 204 were distributed to first four fortresses and the remaining 11 were to be stationed at the Fortress of Revancık. As an income, each of them was to be assigned a fief
Since the *bostancis* were traditionally more obedient and loyal to the Sultan, it would be a good starting point for the attempt. If the attempt was successful, it would gradually expand to other soldiers. In the end, Bostancıbaşı gave a satisfactory answer to the Sultan and hence made his famous promise. “*O His Majesty, your servant can make them dress not

(“*tmar*”). See B.O.A. *Tahvil* no. 30, *Divan Defterleri* (1193-1272/1779-155), p. 9. It was not a professional force and was not effective in the defense of the regions they were expected to protect. Therefore, they were sent back and new professional soldiers including artillerymen, armorers, commander and lieutenants (“*kethüda*”) were sent to the fortresses. See Tuğkın, Cemal, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Devri’nde Boğazlar Meselesi*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1943), pp. 61-62; Üzunçarşılı, “*Kaynarca Muahedesinden Sonra*”, pp. 513-14. In the year 1202/1788, the number of the fortresses reached seven hence they are called as Seven Fortresses, ("*Kala-yı Seba*") with the addition of Liman-ı Kebir and İrva (Revancık). As we have remarked, their administration was under the control of the *Tersane* and a *Boğaz Naziri* was appointed for the administration of these forts. The superiority of the Russians in the 1786-1791 Russo-Ottoman war required the increase in number and the total number of the fortresses reached nine: namely Kala-yı Bağdadık (on the Rumelian side), Kala-yı Revancık (or İrva, on the Anatolian shore); Kala-yı Rumeli Feneri (on the Rumelian side of the Straits); Kala-yı Anadolu Feneri (on the Anatolian side of the Straits); Kala-yı Garibçe (on the Rumelian side of the Straits); Kala-yı Liman-ı Kebir (on the Rumelian side of the Straits); Kala-yı Poyraz Limanı (on the Anatolian side of the Straits), Telli Burun Tabyası (or Tellı Tabya, on the Rumelian side of the Straits); and finally Yuşa Burun (or Macar Tabyası on the Anatolian side of the Straits). See Üzunçarşılı, “*Kaynarca Muahedesinden Sonra*”, pp. 515-7. After 1792, the increasing threat of the Russians in the Black Sea caused further fortifications and an administrative reform in the fortresses, together with the increase in the number of the soldiers. The new regulations aimed at establishing a rigid hierarchical system of rank-and-file. There were to be a commander, lieutenant (“*Kethüda*”) and other officers, all under the command of Superintendent of the Nine Fortresses (“*Nazır-ı Kala-yı Tisa*”). There were also to be a corporal (“*onbaşı*”) for a unit of ten soldiers, upon the death or leave of the corporal, one of the remaining nine soldiers were to rise to this rank and new soldiers were to be recruited for the vacant places. For details, see Beydilli-Şahin, *Mahmut Raif Efendi*, p. 79-80; C.A.S. 36690 (27 M 1208/3 September 1793). In all of the fortresses there would be a one master (“*usta*”), (with an annual payment of 600 gr.), one steward, (with daily payment of 86 akçes); one *topçubaşı* (with daily payment of 86 akçes); one *bölükbaşı* (with daily payment of 76 akçes); the chief of ammunition stores (“*cebecibaşı*”), (with daily payment of 66 akçes); one cannon master (“*top ustası*”) to each cannon (daily payment of 50 akçes); and *topçu neferi* (with daily payment of 46 akçes) and *humbaracibaşı* with daily payment of 86 akçes and other related officers. Besides a secretary two *mehters* were employed in each fortress. For further details see B.O.A. A. AMD. 34/23 (25 B 1209/15 February 1795) Thus at the time of Rebellion, there were nine fortresses referred to as *kala-yı tisa* in the Ottoman records, under the command of the *Boğaz nazır*. During the time of the Rebellion, the *nazır* was, Mahmud Raif Efendi, a former *reisülküttab*.

With the *Nizam-ı Cedit* program, the soldiers of the nine fortresses were ordered to improve their military skills with regular drills. See B.O.A. C.A.S. 36690 (27 M 1208/3 September 1793); B.O.A. A. AMD. 34/23 (25 B 1209/15 February 1795); Beydilli-Şahin, *Mahmut Raif Efendi*, pp. 80-1.

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only uniforms but even hats, which all depend on your imperial auspices.” Therefore, the author of Yayla İmami Risalesi continues, new uniforms were sent to the fortresses on the night of 16 Ra/24 May.1411

Another historian, Oğulukyan, does not make any reference to the Sultan’s talk to Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağâ, but mentions the order of Selim III to Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey and the latter’s promise. He also provides some more details. According to him, during the talk, the Sultan noted that if some of the yamaks did not wish to wear new uniforms and perform new military drills, they were to be allowed to leave their posts. If Hasan Şakir achieved his duty, on the other hand, the Sultan assured him that he would be granted the rank of pasha until his death. After this conversation, Selim wore the “şemsiyeli şapka” of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers.1412 After promising the Sultan to dress the yamaks in Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms, the Bostancıbaşı called Halil Ağâ and repeated the order of the Sultan. Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey also stated that the Sultan was intending to make the other military classes in the city wore the new uniforms.1413 After that, Halil Ağâ repeated the same order to the yamaks under his command. Upon the refusal of the yamaks to obey, Halil Ağâ tried to kill some of them. In response, the yamaks attacked him, Halil Ağâ jumped into the sea in order to save his life, but was murdered together with one of his soldiers.1414

1410 Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 222: “Nola efendim, ben kulun onlara libas değil şapka dahi giydirmek senin himmetinle mümkünür.” In a private letter, a certain Mustafa informs his correspondent that it was Haseki Halil Ağâ who, after receiving the order of joining of the yamaks to the Nizam-ı Cedid, addressed the soldiers saying that “Nizam-ı Cedid neferât olmak şöyle dursun pâdişâh-ı âlem-penâhımızın emr-i hümâyûnu şabka giydirmek dahi olsa sizlere giydirir idim.” It seems to be another version of the same motive. See B.O.A. C. AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807). For a transcribed copy of the letter, see Uzunçarşılı, İ.H. “Kabakçî Vakasına Dair Bir Mektup”, Belleten, vol. XXIX, no. 116 (Ankara: Ekim 1965), pp. 559-654. According to Uzunçarşılı it might be a letter of kapı kethûda of Yusuf Ziya Pasha to his master.

1411 Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 222.

1412 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 2. The author notes that he witnessed the last scene.

1413 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 2.

1414 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3.
Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi also mentions the conversation between Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağâ and Selim III. According to him, the talk took place during the Friday prayer at the Sultan Bayezid Mosque. Yet, there are some striking differences in his narration. According to the author, the issue concentrated on the stationing of the Nizam-ı Cedin soldiers at certain points of the city. The author underlines that the Sultan considered the stationing of the Nizam-ı Cedin army at certain points as a necessary measure due to the fact that a very limited number of soldiers remained in the city after the departure of the bulk of the army for the campaign. Thus, he asked whether it was possible to place some Nizam-ı Cedin soldiers in outposts (“karakol”) that would patrol the city. In reply, Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağâ requested permission to consult the Janissary Ağâ, pretending that such a decision was beyond his authority. However, Selim III did not want him to do so.

As might be recalled, the sources which mention the dialogues of Selim III assert that the talk took place on Friday, thus it is very likely that these authors and Tüfengçibaşı refer to the same talk. Ebubekir Efendi repeats the similar details of Tüfengçibaşı’s History and notes that it took place on 14 Ra/22 May 1807. He adds some interesting points. Though he does not note clearly whether it was decided during the same talk or not, he asserts that Selim III declared that he would go to the next Friday prayer accompanied by the Nizam-ı Cedin soldiers. In his explanations there is a strange combination of the stationing of the Nizam-ı Cedin soldiers at the fortresses and also the previously mentioned issue of the Sultan’s going to the Friday prayer in the Nizam-ı Cedin soldiers. Yet, we should underline that in his narration there is no reference to the talk with the Bostancibaşı.

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1415 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 5a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 385. It was most probably the last Friday prayer before the Rebellion. If so, the date of the above conversation should be 14 Ra/22 May. Indeed, Ebubekir Efendi confirms our suggestion. See Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedin, p. 18.


1417 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedin, p. 18.

1418 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedin, p. 18.
Moreover, the motive of the Sultan going to the mosque in *Nizam-ı Cedid* dress is changed with the motive of paying a visit to the Mosque accompanied by *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers.\(^{1419}\)

The idea of imposition of the new uniforms is repeated by some other contemporary authors as well. For instance, the author of *Kabakçı Ayaklanmasına Dair Bir Tarihçe* does not make any reference to the dialogue of Selim III mentioned in some sources, but argues that Halil Ağa and Mahmud Raif Efendi were secretly ordered to dress the *yamaks* in the *Nizam-ı Cedid* uniforms and Halil Haseki promised to realize this aim.\(^{1420}\) The uniforms were brought and Halil Ağa called eight *yamaks* and ordered them to wear the uniforms which ended with a quarrel and the death of Halil Ağa.\(^{1421}\) In a similar way, Asım notes that Selim Sabit Efendi\(^{1422}\) and Mahmud Raif Efendi, together with Haseki Halil Ağa, were delegated the duty of dressing the *yamaks* in the *Nizam-ı Cedid* uniforms and of incorporating them into the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army.\(^{1423}\) However, when the news reached the fortresses the *yamaks* met at a certain place on 17 Ra/25 May.\(^{1424}\) A foreign newspaper, *The Times*, states that the Ottoman ministers advised the Sultan to take the opportunity of the absence of the bulk of the Janissaries and compel the Janissaries at the fortresses to adopt

\(^{1419}\) Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-yı Cedid*, pp. 18-19.

\(^{1420}\) Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, pp. 99-100.

\(^{1421}\) Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 100.

\(^{1422}\) Selim Sabit Efendi served as *kapı kethüda* of various dignitaries. On 6 B 1222/9 September 1807, he became *yeniçeri kitabeti vekili* and also *eski odalar kışlakları emini*. He continued to perform the duty of *bina emini* during the reign of Mustafa IV. See B.O.A. *Sadaret Defterleri*, no. 357, p. 53; B.O.A. HAT 1355/53034 (undated); Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 12a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 112. In 1223/1808 Sabit Efendi became the *masraf-i şehriyari* and two years later poll tax accountant (“*cizye muhasebecisi*”). In 1236/1820-1, he was exiled to Dimetoka (Didymotechia in modern Greece) and was appointed as *ruznamçe-i evvel* and then Karadeniz Boğazı nazırı and *Rumeli ciheti bina emini* (1237/1821-2). After serving as *haremeyn muhasebecisi* (1242/1826), *cizye muhasebecisi* (1245/1829-30), *defter emini* (L 1247/March 1832), *Mısır kapı kethüdası* (Z 1248/April-May 1833), he died on N 1249/January-February 1834. See Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. V, p. 1493.


\(^{1424}\) Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 21, he does not refer to Umur Yeri or any other place as the meeting place.
the *Nizam-ı Cedid* military discipline. Consequently, Mahmud Raif Efendi was sent with money and clothes to the fortresses, but was murdered before he scarcely opened the matter.\textsuperscript{1425}

Saint-Denys is another contemporary author who asserts that there was a real attempt to change the uniforms, but the origin of the order was not Selim III, but Kaimmakam Musa Pasha.\textsuperscript{1426} The most interesting part of his assertion is the argument that it was Musa Pasha who ordered Mahmud Raif Efendi to go to the fortresses, pay the salaries of the *yamaks* and also make them wear the new uniforms he brought.\textsuperscript{1427} The author comments that Musa Pasha gave the order intentionally in order to create a response that would lead to the fall of the Sultan and his own rivals. For this purpose he had previously stationed some Janissaries at the fortresses to provoke the *yamaks*.\textsuperscript{1428} The absence of the Janissary army should have offered him a good opportunity in this regard. Ebubekir Efendi, the author of *Vaka-yı Cedid*, claims that after the Janissary army left, the ruling elite considered it a good opportunity to increase the number of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers and the Sultan ordered the preparation of 80,000 new clothes.\textsuperscript{1429} In this way, not only could the Sultan achieve the placement of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers but also manage it without serious reaction. Therefore he ordered the preparation of several thousand uniforms and their distribution to the regiments on the Bosphorous (“Boğaziçinde kalan ocaklar”) and the remaining party to Mahmud Raif Efendi to be distributed to the *yamaks*. Another order was sent to the fortresses which stipulated that the soldiers of the fortresses were either to join the *Nizam-ı Cedid* military discipline.

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\textsuperscript{1425} The Times, Monday, August 3 1808, pg. 3; issue 7115; col. C. (from the Hamburg Papers, Milan., July 8).

\textsuperscript{1426} Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. II, pp 109. For a similar explanation, see Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih*, vol. VIII, p. 154. But it might be instructive to underline that Cevdet Pasha gives this information as one of the many factors leading to the outburst of the Rebellion. We should also note that he rather makes a long and mixed list of various short-term causes of the rebellion provided in the contemporary sources.


\textsuperscript{1429} Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-yı Cedid*, p. 18. The author gives the number depending on hearsay.

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Cedid army and wear the uniforms or leave their posts immediately. Uniforms were sent to Mahmud Raif Efendi and the Bostancıbaşı explained the order to the commanders of the fortresses. The officers willingly or unwillingly obeyed the order. However, their soldiers were reluctant and killed Halil Ağa.\footnote{1430}

Though not referring to the issue of the uniforms at the palace level, Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi is another author who reflects that there was a historical attempt to change the uniforms. However, he dwells more on the issue of the stationing of of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers at the fortresses. According to the author, the increase in the number of Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers in the fortresses were making the yamaks worried, they felt that they would become a minority among the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers and finally would be forced either to accept the uniforms or would be kicked out from their posts, if they rejected the offer. Therefore, they were secretly meeting at certain times and insisting that they were Janissaries and it was impossible for them to become a part of the Nizam-ı Cedid army.\footnote{1431} Meanwhile Mahmud Raif Efendi and Bostancıbaşı Hasan Şakir Bey\footnote{1432} met to discuss the matter and secretly tried to convince some of the yamaks.\footnote{1433}

One foreign report on the Rebellion argues that Selim III never gave up his plan of converting the Janissary army to the new military system even after the failure of the Edirne Incident. According to the document, the Sultan was planning to use fortresses around the Bosphorous as the locomotive of his innovations.\footnote{1434} As might be recalled, we have noted in the second chapter, the Janissaries responded when they felt violation of their privileges. The report confirms this idea by saying that this project was conceived as a direct violation

\footnote{1430} Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 19.

\footnote{1431} Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiye, Topkapı 1595, pp. 4-4a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 384.

\footnote{1432} In the text published by Derin, his name is given as Hüseyin Şakir, Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 384.

\footnote{1433} In order to convince them, he announced that their salaries would be increased if they accept to wear the new uniforms. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiye, pp. 4-5a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, pp. 384-5.

\footnote{1434} From Baron Hubsch, 3 June 1807, (PRO, FO 58-78). The document is in French.
by the Janissaries. The report explains the reason of the outburst of the incident on Macar Tabya to be due to the fact that Halil Ağa had, by the order of the Sultan, ordered the yamaks there to wear the uniforms of the disciplined soldiers, an action which offended them.

Among the contemporary narratives, there is a radically different story on the issue of uniforms. The central motive is still the new uniforms but the source of the problem is not the Sultan or any other person, but rather Ragıb Mehmed Pasha and Prince Mustafa (IV). According to Mustafa Necib Efendi, Prince Mustafa was the real figure behind the problem and through his loyal servants and also by collaborating with Kaimmakam Musa Pasha he tried to provoke the yamaks against the center. In the meantime, Şamlı Ragıb Pasha was appointed as the governor of Karaman with the rank of Pasha. He passed to Üsküdar to go to Karaman and in order to gain the favour of the Sultan, he prepared clothes similar to the Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms. Ragıb Pasha ordered some of his soldiers to wear them. However, since most of them were “Laz” and “kalalulardan”, his soldiers were reluctant to wear these. Therefore, the reluctant soldiers of Ragıb Pasha went to the Seven Fortresses (“Kala-yı Seba”) and narrated the incident, immediately after which gossip and anxiety started that “Ragıb Pasha was granted three horse hair-plumes (tuğ) by the Sultan

1435 From Baron Hubsch, 3 June 1807, (PRO, FO 58-78).

1436 From Baron Hubsch, 3 June 1807, (PRO, FO 58-78).

1437 Elhac Mehmed Ragıb Pasha was from Damascus. In 1210/1796, he became one of the bureau chiefs (“hacegān-ı divan-ı hümâyūn”). He was delegated the duty of confiscating of the possessions Cezzar Ahmed Pasha after his death. He became baruthane nazıri on 15 S 1221/4 May 1806, and rikab kethüda on 18 M 1222/28 March 1807. On 15 S 1222/24 April 1807, he was appointed as the governor of Karaman. For more details, see Appendix I.

1438 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-ı Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 29.
for the purpose of making the whole world Nizam-i Cedit.\textsuperscript{1439} This was enough for the

yamaks to arrange immediate meetings during which they killed Halil Ağa.\textsuperscript{1440}

It seems that the purpose of Ragib Pasha was not consciously to invoke a rebellion, rather he unintentionally triggered it.\textsuperscript{1441} He was \textit{rikab kethüdâsî} and appointed as the governor of Karaman on 15 S 1222/24 April 1807.\textsuperscript{1442} It seems that he set for his new post a few days before the outburst of the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{1443} He was dismissed from the above post on 27 Ra 1222/4 June 1807\textsuperscript{1444} and exiled to Kütahya at the beginning of June.\textsuperscript{1445} If we depend on this information, he should have been dismissed only ten days after the Rebellion. Indeed, we have an attachment to the same order, carrying the date 29 R/6 July and stating that Ragib Pasha had arrived at Kütahya.\textsuperscript{1446} Ragib Pasha’s dismissal and exile a

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\textsuperscript{1439} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim -i Salis Asr Vekayi}, pp. 29-30. Tayyarzâde Ahmed Ata Bey, a later historian, argues that Ragib Pasha tried to dress his own retinue and it was used by the \textit{yamaks} as a pretext for revolt. See Tayyarzâde Ahmed Ata, \textit{Tayyarzâde Ata Bey’in Bazi Fikra-yı Tarihiyyeyi Havi Risalesi}, Bayezid Ali Emiri, no. 82, p. 5a.


\textsuperscript{1441} B.O.A. C. DH. 1857 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). It is a list of appointments and depositions during the reign of Mustafa IV. During his stay at Kütahya, Ragib Pasha was paid a salary. See B.O.A. HAT 1365/54053 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

\textsuperscript{1442} B.O.A. \textit{Sadaret Defterleri}, no. 357, p. 34; Beydilli, \textit{Bir İmamın Günliği}, p. 174; Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 11b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 111. Selanikî Memiş Efendi, was appointed in his place. He was also granted the \textit{malikane} of Konya and Akşehir. See B.O.A. HAT 3214 (undated, catalogue date is 1221).

\textsuperscript{1443} B.O.A. C. AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807):“Şamlı Ragib Efendi rikâb kethüdâsî iken üç tuğ ile çerâğ olub Konya valisi olub vak'a günü Üsküdar’da olub iki üç gün müürûnda hareket edüb Gekbüze’ye varr iken tuğ sancağı merfû’ Kütahya kal’asına kal’abend oldu.”

\textsuperscript{1444} B.O.A. C. DH. 1857 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

\textsuperscript{1445} B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri}, no. 5, p. 95, order no. 272 (evahir-i Ra 1222/29 May-6 June 1807). According to Ebubekir Efendi, he was sent to Kütahya on 5 R 1222/13 June 1807 See Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 20a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{1446} B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri}, no. 5, p. 95, order no. 272 (evahir-i Ra 1222/29 May-6 June 1807).
\end{flushleft}
few days after the Rebellion arouse suspicion and it seems that there was a connection between his attempt to dress his soldiers and the outburst of the Rebellion. Indeed, Mustafa Necib’s explanation of his exile is within this line.\textsuperscript{1447} Cevdet Pasha also notes that his dismissal and exile was a measure to calm the rebels down.\textsuperscript{1448} However, we should be aware of the possibility that Ragıb Pasha’s deposition might also be related to disfavour of Mustafa IV or any other unrelated matter. Some clues by Asım suggest that the first possibility cannot easily be ignored. According to him, Ragıb Pasha was dismissed from the office and exiled on Thursday (28 May) under the pretext that he had promised the recruitment of new soldiers for the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army.\textsuperscript{1449} Fortunately, there is a document which explicitly states the real cause of Ragıb Pasha’s dismissal. The record in question is about the appointment of a new governor to Aleppo during Mustafa IV’s reign.

It seems that Kaimmakam Pasha had previously asked the opinion of the grand vizier, during the campaign, whether it was appropriate to appoint of Abdullah Pasha, former governor of Damascus, or Mehmed Hakki Pasha, as the new governor of Aleppo. In reply, the Grand Vizier advised the appointment of Hakki Pasha and added that Ragıb Pasha should be appointed as the \textit{Boğaz serasker}. However, the Kaimmakam noted that in a meeting these matters had already been discussed and the appointments of both Pashas to their respective offices were considered to be problematic. For our purposes, the important matter is the fact that Ragıb Pasha’s appointment as the \textit{Boğaz serasker} was rejected because “his vezaret was previously abolished due to the fact that he had tried to adopt an attitude contrary to the mood of the people and tried to promote the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} during

\textsuperscript{1447} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asri Vekayi}, p. 32; Kethüda Said states that his dismissal was on Thursday, but does not make any comment. However, it is very meaningful to note that his dismissal is mentioned after his narration of abolition of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army. See Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, p. 101; Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Neticetü’l-Vekayi}, pp 14.


\textsuperscript{1449} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 31: “\textit{Mukaddemce rütbe-i vezâretle Karaman eyâleti tevcih olunan Şamlı Ragıb Paşa dai Nizâm-ı Cedid askeri tertibine müteahhid olmak bahanesiyle zebân-zede-i süfêhâ olmağın vezâreti ref’ ve ilga’ ve Kütahya’ya nefy ve icle birle der devletden def’i...”
the reign of the previous Sultan.” Therefore, it was commented that his appointment to the Bosphorous would not be received well by the soldiers. At the top of the same document, Mustafa IV also strictly emphasized that the appointment of Ragıp Pasha was not appropriate. Therefore, as suggested in this document and some contemporary sources, Ragıp Pasha’s attempt to impose new uniforms to his soldiers seems to be historically true, a fact which caused his dismissal and exile a short time after the Rebellion.

4.2.3. Behind the Uniforms: The Presence of the Nizam-ı Cedid Soldiers at the Fortresses

Despite some differences, almost all of the contemporary narratives dwell on the issue of the new uniforms. It symbolized the delicate issue of the conversion of the yamaks/Janissaries to the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. If Selim III really had such a secret intention, a good time was chosen, since the main body of the Janissaries was absent. Yet, with the available and conflicting information, it is very difficult to prove historically whether there really was such an attempt. However, it might be interesting to underline an observation that some of the chronicles that are closer to the rebels, or in one or another way apologetic about the Rebellion, either consider the issue of uniforms as gossip or do not dwell on Selim III’s dialogues or orders in this regard.

Among those who deny the reality of the issue of uniforms is Ebubekir Efendi. From his account one gets the sense that there was real anxiety among the yamaks that they would be forced to wear the new uniforms. Yet, for him the real problem that triggered the Rebellion was the stationing of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers at the fortresses. Indeed, a

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1450 B.O.A. HAT 1365/54051 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “Devr-i sâbıkda vezâret verilmiş ise de mizâc-ı nâsa mugâyîr tavr u harekete ibtidâri ve Nizâm-ı Cedid’i ıtervice çâlîsîdi vechîle vezâreti ref’ olunmuşdu.”

1451 B.O.A. HAT 1365/54051 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

1452 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 12b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 112.
close analysis of the above report of Hüseyin Ağğa reveals that there is no evidence for the dispatch of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* uniforms to the fortresses. It seems more likely that the soldiers of the fortresses were either suspicious of such an attempt or heard of such news. The denial of such intentions by Halil Ağğa during the meeting at Hünkâr İskelesi arouses suspicion too. On the margin of the same document, Selim III notes that “*Who fabricates such unthinkable hearsays? You must for certain ensure that such fabricators be uncovered and the affairs be set in order.*”\(^{1453}\) As might be noticed the Sultan regards it as sheer gossip and orders the arrest of the originator of such false news. If there was a reality behind these rumours related to the uniforms the Sultan probably would not hide it from his own *kaimmakam*. As might be recalled in the previous chapter we have studied an order of Selim III which accused the Russian spies of deceiving the Janissaries. Even though it is an undated record, it seems that it was written a short time before the Rebellion.\(^{1454}\) In the same document Selim III confessed that he had no purpose by stationing some riflemen ("*tüfengçi*”) on the fortresses other than strengthening the Straits against the aggressions of the enemy. However, according to the Sultan, the Russian spies took it as an opportunity to deceive the soldiers and to create disorder among the soldiers.\(^{1455}\) Therefore, we have some insights which suggest that the attempt of the imposition of the uniforms might not be historically true.

If there was no real attempt on the part of the center to change the uniforms of the *yamaks*, we should find an explanation as to the existence of great tension at the forts on the eve of the Rebellion. As might be recalled, during the meeting at Hünkâr İskelesi, the *yamaks* asked Halil Ağğa why the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers were present at the fortresses if the Porte had not designs to convert the *yamaks* to *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers. This clue should direct our attention to another issue, namely the presence of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers at

\(^{1453}\) B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807). It is the report of Hüseyin Ağğa, the *dizdar* of Yuşa Tabya to Kaimmakam Pasha: “*Böyle hatr u hayale gelmemiş sözleri kimler i’câd eyliyor elbette härice çıkarmağa dikkat olunub rabita verimelidir.*”

\(^{1454}\) B.O.A. HAT 7522 (undated, catalog date is 1222/1807).

\(^{1455}\) B.O.A. HAT 7522 (undated, catalog date is 1222/1807).
the fortresses. This is a very important point since the actual cause of discontent seems to be the presence of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers at the fortresses. Their presence was probably making the yamaks suspicious that the center was attempting to replace them with the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. In fact, this might also explain why the initial incident started from among the yamaks, rather than the Janissaries. We might suggest that it was due to the fact that it was the yamaks who were the first to face the new army or better to say they the first to feel the direct threat.

A note by Kaimmakam Musa Pasha, added to the report of Hüseyin Ağa, states that there was another source of information about the murder of Halil Ağa. It was the captain (bölükbaşi) of Halil Ağa. The latter provides information that a detachment of the Nizam-ı Cedid army at the Rumelian side of Bosphorus came to Sarıyer, while another group went to Beykoz. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether this movement of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers was for the suppression of the disorder or not. Yet it is also noted that the yamaks already returned to their own fortresses, therefore it does not seem likely that they were sent for the suppression of the disorder. Another proof of the unrest being due to the presence of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers is also confirmed by a comment of Selim III, saying that “It is impossible for the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers to stay there, they should return to the Levend Chiftlik.” Selim III, in another edict written after the incident, rebukes the Musa Pasha for the fact that there were still “disciplined soldiers” in the region, saying that “Kaimmakam Pasha! Since the time of this occurrence, I have over and over again dispatched orders stating that no drilled soldiers shall be left in those localities.” A letter, dated 18 July 1807, states that Mahmud Raif Efendi was sent to the fortresses to

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1456 B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807).
1457 B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807).
1458 B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807).
1459 B.O.A. HAT 211/48419 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “Kaimmakam Paşa bu madde zuhûrundan beri muallem askerden o semtlerde kalmışın deyyü yüz kere yazdım.” It is clear that it was written after the incident. Unfortunately I did not have an opportunity to see the original document. I was informed that the original copy was lost. The above quotation is from the summary in the Hatt-ı Hümayun collections.
enforce the new regulations of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, but the “*tabyalis*” opposed and killed him.  

No mention of uniforms is made, and it is difficult to determine whether the “new regulations” also included the new uniforms.

It is almost certain that there were some *Nizam-ı Cedid* troops around the Bosphorous. This fact leads us to question whether their presence was for a systematic and gradual displacement of the old soldiers in the fortresses with the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army. There is a document which in some way serves as a reply to this question. The document is written by Musa Pasha and it informs Selim III on some matters previously posed by the Sultan.  

The points put forward by the Sultan are generally related to the needs of the army. However, the Sultan also seems to be very concerned with the defense of the region around the Bosphorous. Kaimmakam Pasha quotes one of his previous orders about the dispatch of “*temiz piyade askeri*” to the Straits and also the appointment of some *ayans*, such as Sirozi İsmail, with soldiers for the defense of the region. With this limited information it is difficult to determine whether the Sultan had in mind the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers or not. Fortunately, in the following lines it becomes clear that the soldiers in question are imperial troops (“*asakir-i şahane*”).  

Due to some problems, the dispatch of Sirozi İsmail Bey was not approved by the grand vizier. Therefore, Selim III ordered the “*piyade başı bağıl asker*” to be sent immediately to the Bosphorous.

For the presence of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers at the fortresses, there are some important clues in some of the contemporary narratives. One of the first to consult is the account of Saint-Denys, who knew the fortresses well and was probably still there. Saint-

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1460 From Isaac Morier, Malta, 18 July 1807, (PRO, FO 78-61). The information is provided in a document titled “References”, attached to the letter. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

1461 B.O.A. HAT 121/4901 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). In the document, Kaimmakam Pasha quotes the previous orders of the Sultan and then gives information about them.

1462 B.O.A. HAT 121/4901 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “Boğazın muhafazasına başı bağıl asker erişdirilsün. süretden sürete tahvil ile nasıl olur. Boğaz muhâlifdir. Bir rabtalı karar verilik husûle gelecek suret iltizâm ve te’kid olunsun”.

1463
Denys notes that after the departure of the Janissary army for the campaign, the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers and yamaks were stationed at the fortresses to strengthen the defense of the city. For one month they shared the same post, but without any peaceful relations.\textsuperscript{1464} Ebubekir Efendi, (the second author of Fezleke-i Kuşmâni), provides some more details on the presence of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers at the fortresses some time before the Rebellion. According to him, Ahmed Efendi came to Üsküdar with 1500 Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers and was sent to Macar, Telli Tabyā and Anadolu Kavak forts with the forces under his command.\textsuperscript{1465} Ahmed Efendi was the nephew of Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha and like his uncle, he formerly had a religious career, but later became a major ("binbaşi") in the Nizam-ı Cedid army.\textsuperscript{1466} Ebubekir Efendi does not give an exact date, but it seems that Ahmed Efendi was sent to the fortresses some time after the Edirne Incident. The forts he was appointed to were bound to the Bostancı corps. Öğulukyan also gives some information concerning the stationing of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers in newly established bastions with the purpose of helping the others to become acquainted with the new army system and also to convert all yamaks to Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers.\textsuperscript{1467} However, the old soldiers did not have good relations with the new soldiers and after quarrels they kicked them out. But, the author says, the Bostancıbaşi came and resettled the new soldiers. According to the author, the yamaks were not pleased with the coming of the new soldiers to the fortresses and were waiting for an opportunity.\textsuperscript{1468}


\textsuperscript{1465} Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmânî, pp. 12a-b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{1466} Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmânî, pp. 12a-b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 112. Among the contemporary sources which also mention Ahmed Efendi is Câbi Ömer Efendi. Unfortunately he does not make any reference to his connection with Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha. Câbi refers to him as İçelli Ahmed Pasha who was appointed to Domuz Deresi with several thousand Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. He also notes that this appointment made the yamaks worried and increased the gossip in the coffee houses. Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 126.

\textsuperscript{1467} Öğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{1468} Öğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 2.
There is another official document which also confirms the placement of *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers at the fortresses and gives some numbers. The document is dated 1 M 1222/11 March 1807 and it is an order addressing the director of the *İrād-ı Cedid* for the distribution of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers to some of the fortresses.\footnote{B.O.A. C. AS. 37874 (1 M 1222/11 March 1807). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.} According to the document, a certain amount of *Nizam-ı Cedid* infantry forces had previously come from Anatolia and were stationed at the Levent Chiftlik.\footnote{B.O.A. C. AS. 37874 (1 M 1222/11 March 1807).} Even though the name of Ahmed is not mentioned it might be still his forces. About 400 of these soldiers were to be distributed to the fortresses of Rumeli Kavak, Anadolu Kavak and Yuşa and also the newly established battalions at Kireç Burnu with the help of above-mentioned Halil Ağa.\footnote{B.O.A. C. AS. 37874 (1 M 1222/11 March 1807).} Therefore, the director of the *İrād-ı Cedid* was ordered to send these 400 infantrymen to Halil Ağa.\footnote{B.O.A. C. AS. 37874 (1 M 1222/11 March 1807).} Another 200 *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers were to be sent to Binbaşı Pilavcı Ağa, the *muhafız* of Hınızır Deresi on the Rumelian side and also to Hüseyin Ağa, the *muhafız* of Kara Burun. The duty of the second group was to patrol the shores they were close to and serve as an outpost.\footnote{B.O.A. C. AS. 37874 (1 M 1222/11 March 1807).} As we have pointed out before, the name of Binbaşı Ahmed Bey is not mentioned in the document, yet we can be sure that a group of 600 *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers were sent for the protection of the shores and to help the defense of fortresses about two and a half months before the Rebellion. A document, dated 21 S 1222/30 April 1807, mentions the payment of the salaries of the soldiers of Üsküdar and Levend Chiftlik stationed at Yuşa, Telli Dalyan and the Anadolu and Rumeli Kavaks, together with those present at Kara Burun and Tonuz (Hınızır Deresi).\footnote{B.O.A. C. AS. 22354 (21 S 1222/29 April 1807). Tüfengçibaşı refers to the dispatch of *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers at Levent Chiftlik to Hınızır Deresi. From the Üsküdar regiment, soldiers were stationed at Karaburun, Fil Burnu and some other places. He also notes that from time to time, the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers were sent to the region in order to}
fortresses to which 400 hundred *Nizam-ı Cedid* infantrymen were distributed, Yuşâ, Anadolu and Rumeli Kavak, and Telli Dalîyan, were the ones formally bound to the *Bostancı corps*.1475

There are some important documents which suggest or even prove that there was an attempt for the systematic stationing of the disciplined army in the fortresses. One of these documents belongs to an earlier date. There is no specified date on the document, but the catalogue date is 1212/1797-98. It mentions the existence of “*muallem asker*” around the Bosphoros for the fortifications of the Black Sea Strait. It seems that these measures were not considered sufficient and therefore it talks about the dispatch of 1200 soldiers from the Üsküdar regiment together with the forces from Seydişehir to the fortress of İrva and 1000 soldiers, together with the Kırşehir regiment, to the region extending from the fortresses of Kilyos to Rumeli Feneri.1476 Therefore, though we do not have the number of soldiers that

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1475 It was originally the fortresses of Anadolu and Rumeli Kavak where the *bostancı* were employed. They were under the supervision of a master from the corps of imperial gardeners. The fortresses of Yuşâ Tabya and Telli Dalîyan, built later, were also included in the same system. See B.O.A. A. AMD. 34/23 (25 B 1209/15 February 1795); Beydilli-Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 8. Therefore, Rumeli Kavak, Anadolu Kavak, Yuşâ Tabya and Telli Tabya were connected to the *Bostancı Ocağı*. See B.O.A. C.AS. 48549 (23 R 1211/26 October 1796); B.O.A. *Mühimme Defterleri*, no. 227, p. 88. New soldiers were appointed by the Bostancıbaşı to these fortresses. B.O.A. C.AS. 24666 (28 Z 1217/28 April 1803). Their drills were to be supervised by Bostancıbaşı and a figure from the ruling elite was to be appointed as the supervisor of the Four Fortresses (“*Kala-yı Erbaa*”) in charge of the order and also to deal with the salaries of the soldiers. A secretary would help him and distribute the salaries in the absence of the supervisor (“*nazır*”). The masters of the four fortresses were to be equal to the commander (“*dizdar*”) of the others. See B.O.A. A. AMD. 34/23 (25 B 1209/15 February 1795.) As in the case of other fortresses, there would be one master (with an annual payment of 600 gr.), one lieutenant (“*kethüda*”) (with daily payment of 86 akçes); one *topçubaşı* (with daily payment of 86 akçes); one *muallim bölükbaşi* (with daily payment of 76 akçes); chief of ammunition stores (“*cebecibaşı*”), (with daily payment of 66 akçes); one cannon master (“*top üstası*”), (with daily payment of 50 akçes); and cannoneer (“*topçu neferi*”), (with daily payment of 46 akçes). See B.O.A. A. AMD. 34/23 (25 B 1209/15 February 1795) Salaries of the officers (“*mustahfızân*”) in Yuşâ and Telli Tabya were paid from the poll tax (“*çizye*”) of Istanbul. See B.O.A. C.AS. 4079 (8 L 1204/21 June 1790).

1476 B.O.A. HAT 4691 (undated, catalogue date is 1212/1797-98).
were stationed before, a new total of 2200 was sent to the region. As we have remarked earlier, we do not know the exact date of the document, yet some clues suggest that there is a problem with the catalogue date of the document in question. For instance, at the top of the same document, Selim III comments that if İnce Pasha’s forces were not enough to protect both sides of the Straits, new forces under a governor of Anatolia would be required. İnce Pasha in question might have been İnce Mehmed Pasha who was rewarded with the “rank of mirimiran as beylerbeyi of Rumelia, provided that he would also assume the supervision of the Black Sea Strait and guarding the neighboring coasts as additional offices” on 12 L 1221/23 December 1806. İnce Mehmed Pasha was formerly a kapıcıbaşı and promoted to the rank of military governor (“mirimiran”) and obtained title of Pasha after this appointment. Since he is referred to as Pasha in the above document, we can claim that the document might have been written after 23 December 1806.

We may now be sure of the presence of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers in some of the fortresses, at least the above mentioned 600 soldiers were stationed a few months before the Rebellion. The purpose of the settlement of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers was probably to improve the defense of the city since the Russians were still at Bozcada. Moreover, the British Incident proved how defenseless the city was, therefore the Porte was determined not to suffer another embarrassing event. In order to organize the fortifications around the Straits, Selim Sabit Efendi was appointed to the Rumelian side, and Seyyid Mehmed

1477 B.O.A. HAT 4691 (undated, catalogue date is 1212/1797-98).
1478 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 20: “Bahr-ı Siyah Nezareti ve Edirne’ye varınca sevahilin muhafazası şartıyla Rumeli beyler payesi rübe-i mirimiranlık kapucubaşı İnce Mehmed Bey’e”. İnce Mehmed Pasha (d.1223/1808) was promoted from the rank of kapıcıbaşı to mirimiran and appointed as the Rumeli Beylerbeyi on the condition of supervision of the Black Sea Strait on 12 L 1221/23 December 1806. See B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 20; B.O.A. C. AS. 6841 (10 S 1222/10 April 1222); B.O.A. C.AS. 20084 (13 L 1221/24 December 1806); B.O.A. D.DRB. MH. 49/10 (24 L 1221/4 January 1807); Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 14b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.116. According to one source he escaped together with Kadı Abdurrahman Pasha, Ramiz Pasha and Tersane Emin Ali Efendi in 1223/1808. See Yayla İmamı Rısaleleri, p. 258.
Efendi, as the official in charge of construction affairs, to the Anatolian side. Mahmud Raif Efendi was appointed as the highest authority for the supervision of the fortifications. Comparatively better trained *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers must have been chosen for the defense.

Anticipating a possible reaction of the old soldiers at the fortresses it seems that the four fortresses connected to the corps of the imperial gardeners were chosen. However, from the contemporary chronicles we learn that the soldiers of these forts were not pleased with this development either. According to Ebubekir Efendi, for instance, though the *yamaks* were not Janissaries, they considered themselves a part of the Janissary army. After referring to the ongoing hostility between the old and new soldiers, the author considers the appointment of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers to the fortresses as an unfortunate event, a fatal mistake and the sole cause of the Rebellion. According to him, this was an act that brought two hostile parties together, thus deteriorating gravely the existing hostilities. Another contemporary author claims that from the time of hearing the news of the placement of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers at different points around the Straits, not only the *yamaks* but also the Janissaries began to hold meetings and to discuss the matter in their

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1480 Seyyid Mehmed Efendi graduated from the *enderun* during the reign of Abdülhamid I. See Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 12a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 112.

1481 B.O.A. D.DRB. MH. 52/46 (15 S 1221/24 April 1807); Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, *Vaka-yı Selimiye*, Topkapı 1595, p. 3; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 383. Câbi also mentions the names of these three figures, but if they were sent for the distribution of the salaries of the *yamaks*, and for announcing that the Sultan demanded them to wear the new clothes and also to make drills. Câbi, *Câbi Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 126. Asım, does not mention Seyyid Mehmed Efendi but writes that it was Selim Sabit Efendi and Mahmud Raif Efendi who were appointed for the fortifications around the Straits. See Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, pp. 20-21.


1483 Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 12b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 112.

1484 Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 12b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 112.
barracks. Moreover, karakollukcus were secretly sent by the yamaks to the Janissaries in order to provoke them.\footnote{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 4; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 385.}

What is clear in this complex issue is the fact that there was a turbulent atmosphere a very short time before the Rebellion. It seems that the yamaks became very anxious about the policies of the center. In such a mood, it is clear that they could be suspicious of anything related to themselves or to the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} army. Therefore, the presence of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} soldiers, the appointment of new ones, might have been considered by the yamaks as proof of the intention of the Porte to replace them or convert them into \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} soldiers. Also, Mahmud Raif’s appointment, as one of the leading figures of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} program, must have increased the suspicion of the yamaks.\footnote{Despite some confusion in some of the contemporary narratives, Mahmud Raif Efendi was appointed as the Bosphorous superintendent (“\textit{Nazır-ı Boğaz}”) in February 1807, a few months before the Rebellion. See B.O.A. C.AS. 5927 (5 S 1222/13 April 1807).} As might be recalled, the Janissaries constantly feared the abolition of their army and their replacement with the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} and the hostilities began to increase with the attempts of stationing of the new army around the Straits. The yamaks were physically closer to the new army than the Janissaries, therefore the Rebellion broke out there.

\subsection*{4.2.4. Second Scene: The Murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi}

A report from Kaimmakam Musa Pasha informed Selim III that Mahmud Raif Efendi was also murdered by the rebels (“\textit{haşerat}”).\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 5028 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). For a transcribed copy of the same document, Appendix 4 and Kılıç, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması}, ek II.} According to his report, Mahmud Raif Efendi, after the murder of Halil Ağa, tried to escape with a rowboat towards the city, but was captured and murdered.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 5028 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).} Immediately after hearing the news, Musa Pasha
underlines, he called the second treasurer ("şikk-i sani defterdar"), and sent men to İbrahim Nesim and İbrahim Reşid Efendi in order to invite these statesmen for a meeting at the Porte. It is clear that he wrote the telhis to the Sultan before the meeting since he ensures that decisions taken during the meeting would be immediately reported to the Sultan. Moreover, Musa Pasha informs the Sultan that orders would be sent to Înce Mehmed Pasha for the suppression of the disorder. As might be noticed, above-mentioned document gives some important details on the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi. After hearing the death of Halil Ağa, he began to run away for the purpose of reaching the city by rowboat but was caught and killed afterwards.

At this point we should ask why Mahmud Raif Efendi began to escape and why the yamaks chose him as a target. According to Ebubekir Efendi, the author of Vaka-yı Cedid, the yamaks investigated and learned that the uniforms were kept at Raif Efendi’s residence at Anadolu Kavak. As we have suggested before, it is very difficult to prove the truth of the claim that Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms were sent to the fortresses. However, it might be reasonable to think that even if the issue of the uniforms was just gossip, the yamaks might have suspected that they were kept by Mahmud Raif Efendi and therefore they marched towards Anadolu Kavak. According to Tüfengçibaşı, after learning about the death of Halil Ağa, Mahmud Raif Efendi began to run away, fearing that the yamaks would kill him as well. But he was followed by fifteen rowboats full of yamaks. According to Ebubekir Efendi, after the murder of Halil Ağa, the yamaks went to Mahmud Raif’s

1489 B.O.A. HAT 5028 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).
1490 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 20.
1491 According to Câbî, he was at Macar Tabya at that time. See Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 126.
residence at Anadolu Kavak, however since the latter had heard of the incident beforehand, he began to escape by rowboat, followed by eighteen rowboats of yamaks. Raif Efendi must have thought that he would be saved by the favourable currents. However, he had turned towards Büyükdere with the intention of taking refuge at the Bostancı Ocağı there. Ebubekir Efendi also adds that despite the warnings of his men that the shores of Büyükdere were full of counter currents he did not change his mind. 1494 It seems that immediately after reaching the shore of Büyükdere, he was caught and killed together with his servant called Ayvansaraylı Nuri, who seems to have attempted to fire his pistol in order to protect his master. 1495 Indeed, another source states two servants accompanied Mahmud Raif 1496 and Nuri should be one of them. 1497 His other servant, Emin Ağa, the tobacco-keeper (“duhani”), managed to escape to the city and informed İbrahim Nesim Efendi on

1494 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13a; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 113-4.

1495 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 114. There seems to be a confusion in this regard. According to him, the servant of Halil Ağa, not that of Mahmud Raif was murdered while he was trying to protect his master. See Oğuluğûyan, Ruzname, p. 3.

1496 Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İyâni...”, p. 254. A private letter found in the Archives of the Prime Ministry notes that there was a rowboat of four pairs of oars (“dört çiﬁte kayak”). See B.O.A. C. AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807). It is not clear there were some other people in the boat except Raif Efendi’s own servants. While talking about the murder of Raif Efendi, Asım notes that the yamaks did not touch Selim Sabit Efendi. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 22. Unfortunately it is not clear to me whether Asım implies the presence of Selim Sabit at Büyükdere or Selim Sabit saved his life some time during the Rebellion. In the abovementioned letter there is a similar explanation: According the writer of a letter, following the murder of Raif Efendi, the yamaks protected Selim Sabit on the pretext that he was not from the Nizam-i Cedid party. Moreover, they sent him to his residence to protect him from any assault. See B.O.A. C. AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807). Most probably Selim Sabit Efendi was not at Büyükdere during the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi.

1497 Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İyâni...”, p. 254. Mustafa Necib says that he was a young man ("civan") and assistant of the seal-bearer ("mühürdar yamak") of Mahmud Raif Efendi. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 30. But there is no reference to his attempt to save his master. Câbi, on the other hand, he was shot while he was trying to save his master and asserts that he was Mahmud Raif’s tobacco-carrier (“tütüncü”). See Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 127.
the incident. One source asserts that a yamak, called Kara Ali, killed Raif Efendi together with his servant.

There are some clues in the contemporary sources as to the question of why Raif Efendi preferred to go to Büyükdere, rather than reaching the city. According to Oğulukyan, he ordered the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers to go and wait for him at Büyükdere Çayı after the death of Halil Ağa. Meanwhile, the yamaks of Macar Tabya noticed his flight and began to follow him. When he was stopped by them he turned to the Bostancı Ocağı at Büyükdere. Upon his arrival at Büyükdere, Mahmud Raif Efendi saw that there was no Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers and sat on a wooden bench ("peyke"). Shortly afterwards, he was murdered by the yamaks reaching the spot. Yet, another contemporary source asserts that Raif Efendi was not completely alone at Büyükdere. He became aware of the fact that he could survive if he escaped by sea. His aim was to land at Kireç Burnu, but later changed his mind and turned to Büyükdere. There the master of the Büyükdere bostancı tried to save Raif Efendi by requesting the rebels, but without any success. If this detail is true, at Büyükdere there was at least the master of the imperial gardeners who tried to protect him. The presence of the master at Büyükdere is confirmed by another source too. Câbi asserts that Raif Efendi landed to Kalender, close to Büyükdere. According to him, the master of the Kalender imperial gardeners invited him to the ocak, but he refused and killed thereafter.

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1498 Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçi Mustafa İsyanı...”, p. 255.

1499 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı, no. 1595, p. 6a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihiçesi”, p. 386.

1500 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3. Asım also repeats the same information. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 21-2.

1501 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3. The author of Tarihçe, does not make any reference to the attempt of Raif Efendi to escape by sea. He just notes that after hearing the news of Halil Ağa, he ran away and came to Büyükdere. And thereafter he was murdered with one of his servants. See Derin, “Kabakçi Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 100.


The author of *Yayla İmamı Risalesi* offers a completely different story of the murder of both Halil Ağa and Mahmud Raif Efendi. As might be recalled, in his narration Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey had promised the Sultan to force the *yamaks* to wear the *Nizam-ı Cedid* uniforms. According to the author, while the Bostancıbaşı was on the way with the new uniforms, an imperial edict was sent to Mahmud Raif Efendi for that purpose. Thus, on the night of 16 Ra’/24 May, Raif Efendi and Halil Ağa gathered the *yamaks* and read aloud the edict which ordered them to wear the uniforms. According to this story, both officials faced a rapid and violent reaction. Immediately after the announcement of the edict, the rebels cursed severely ("galiz şetm") both the writer (i.e. the Sultan) and the reader, and then killed Mahmud Raif and Halil Ağa.1504 According to *The Times* newspaper, one of the rebels exclaimed: “*In the name of God and through God, I do not kill a Musulman, but Mahmud the Englishman*” and immediately shot him dead.1505 Meanwhile the Bostancıbaşi, carrying the clothes, was around Bebek when he heard of the fate of Mahmud Raif Efendi, he returned to the city and came to the fortresses only the next day.1506

Câbî Ömer Efendi, on the other hand, does not make any reference to the gathering of the *yamaks* immediately before the Rebellion, but narrates the events as if the initial case happened during the distribution of the salaries. More importantly, he does not mention the murder of Halil Ağa but asserts that a certain Süleyman Ağa, Bosphorous superintendent, was murdered at the very beginning of the Rebellion.1507 Most probably he confuses Halil Ağa with Süleyman. He also confuses the post of Raif Efendi and represents him as a figure coming to the fortresses for the distribution of the payments, together with Selim Sabit Efendi and Mehmed Seyyid Efendi. He claims that it was this group of officials who had advised the *yamaks* to wear the new uniforms and make regular drills.1508 According to

1504 *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 223.

1505 *The Times*, Monday, August 3 1808, pg. 3; issue 7115; col. C. (from the Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8).

1506 *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 223.


him, Mahmud Raif Efendi was at Macar Tabya for the distribution of the salaries. However, when the yamaks went there, he had already left, upon hearing the incident.\footnote{Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 127.} A foreign observer, Saint-Denys, does not make any reference to the murder of Halil Ağa and represents Mahmud Raif Efendi as a victim of the secret intentions of Musa Pasha. After receiving the order from the latter, Raif Efendi goes to Rumeli Kavak, for the payment of the salaries. Addressing the yamaks, he announces the order of the Sultan and demands them to obey the order. According to his story, the uniforms must have been kept by Raif Efendi since as soon as the yamaks saw them they began to murmur.\footnote{Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 110. According to the author, the yamaks expelled the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers and the latter group returned their barracks.} Then, Mahmud Raif Efendi takes a second and more dangerous step and orders some yamaks to wear the new clothes. After that point, the yamaks try to kill Raif Efendi but since he is protected by the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers, the author argues, they are not successful in their initial attempt. Being frightened, Raif Efendi gets on a boat and seeks refuge at Büyükdere, but is murdered as soon as he lands with one of his servants.\footnote{Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, pp. 110-1. Kethüda Said also notes that he was murdered as soon as he landed at Büyükdere. See Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Neticeti’l-Vekayi}, p. 13; Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selimiyye}, Bayezid 3367, p. 100a.} It is an interesting account of the murder of Raif Efendi and the break of the Rebellion. Saint-Denys does not mention the gathering of yamaks, the murder of Halil Haseki and depicts a picture where Raif Efendi came just for the purpose of distributing of the uniforms and as if he was the one who tried to convince the yamaks. Another interesting point is presence of the uniforms during the talk between Raif Efendi and the yamaks and the initial attempt of the yamaks to kill him.

This does not fit into the details of the document that we have mentioned at the beginning of this section or the information provided by most of the other contemporary sources.

Turning back to the details of the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi, we should try to find answers to some important questions. The yamaks were at Umur Yeri at Hünkar İскеlesi when Halil Ağa was murdered, and Anadolu Kavak was not far from there. As
already mentioned, almost all sources confirm that Raif Efendi began his escape before the arrival of the *yamaks*. Why did Raif Efendi prefer to pass to the *Bostancı Ocağı* on the other side of the shore? It seems that he did not have too much time to escape to a secure distance from the rebels. While on the sea, he might have thought that it would be better to reach the nearest place, i.e. Büyükdere, rather than going a longer distance to the city.\(^{1512}\)

Indeed, if we follow Oğulukyan, it seems that after noticing that it was impossible for him to reach the city, he preferred to land at Büyükdere whereby he could be saved by the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers he had sent previously.\(^{1513}\) Asım asserts that he landed at Büyükdere in order to seek refuge in the *Bostancı Ocağı*, but murdered as soon as he got there.\(^{1514}\)

It is easier to understand the reason behind the murder of Halil Ağa. It seems that it was a rather spontaneous reaction of the *yamaks* during the quarrel between him and the *yamaks*. However, the death of Mahmud Raif Efendi changed the colour of the event and it seems to be a more intentional and conscious move. He was followed and consciously murdered by the *yamaks*. Indeed, the author of *Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanmasına Dair Bir Tarihçe* brings a similar explanation. According to him, after the murder of Halil Ağa, the *yamaks* (as might be remembered he only mentions a gathering of eight *yamaks*) became very frightened and repented. Therefore for them, the murder of Halil Ağa was an accident. However, after noticing that they would be executed due to the murder of their commander, they decided to kill Mahmud Raif Efendi, who, for them, was the real figure behind the issue.\(^{1515}\) Another source confirms this by saying that upon hearing that the *yamaks* were coming to assassinate him he had began to escape.\(^{1516}\) In conclusion his murder seems less accidental than the case of Halil Ağa.


\(^{1513}\) Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 3.

\(^{1514}\) Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, p. 22.

\(^{1515}\) Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 100: “Biz Ağamızı katı eyledik, birimiz sang kalmayuz, gelin şu Reis Efendi’yi daha katı eleyelim, sonra ne olursa olsun, zira bu madde onun başı altındadır”

\(^{1516}\) Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsyanı....”, p. 254.
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4.3. The Rebels Organize: (Tuesday, 18 Ra 1222/26 May 1807)

Compared to the first, the second day of the Rebellion was more tranquil. Nobody was murdered and there was no visible clash. During that day, the rebels organized themselves and chose their leaders at Büyükdere Çayı. On the other hand, learning about the death of Halil Haseki and Mahmud Raif Efendi, the Ottoman ministers realized the seriousness of the matter. They held meetings and sent delegates to Büyükdere to discover the purpose of the rebels and to convince them to put an end to the disorder.

4.3.1. The Gathering of the Yamaks

After receiving information about the disorder at the fortresses, the Porte arranged frequent meetings.1517 Information had come from different sources. One was the captain of Halil Ağa.1518 As might be recalled, Hüseyin Ağa also escaped to the city after the murder of Halil Ağa. Another source of information might be Emin Ağa, the tobacco-carrier of Mahmud Raif Efendi. According to a contemporary author, Emin Ağa came to the city and

1517 Tüfengçibaşı, Vaka-yı Selimiye, Topkapı 1595, p. 6; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 387; Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 100; Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 14a. According to Oğulukyan, it was after the gathering at Büyükdere that the Porte held meetings. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3. Kuşmâni, also asserts that these meetings began to be held after the arrival of the news of the gathering of the yamaks at Büyükdere. See Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 14a-14b; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 115-6. Mustafa Necib states that there was only one meeting whereby it was decided to send some Janissary officers to the Straits in order to calm them down. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 32.

1518 B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807). It is the report of Hüseyin Ağa, the dizdar of Yuşa Tabâya to Kaimmakam Pasha. For a transcribed copy of the same document, see Kılıç, Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması, ek III. Ebubekir Efendi, the author of Vaka-yı Cedid, argues that Seyyid Mehmed Efendi and İnce Mehmed Pasha and some other officials also escaped to the city after the murder of Halil Ağa, Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, pp. 19-20.

1519 There is no reference to him in the official documents related to the rebellion. But from some of the contemporary sources we learn that he was the one who narrated the details of the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi.
informed İbrahim Nesim Efendi, who in turn reported the issue to the Porte. According to the version of Mustafa Necib Efendi, the duhâni of Raif Efendi was already in İstanbul, had learned about the incident from the boatmen and informed İbrahim Nesim Efendi.

After the murder of Halil Ağa, Musa Pasha informed the Sultan that the Bostancıbaşı and some other officials were sent to the Straits to investigate the problems there. Indeed, some contemporary sources note that, the very first action of the Porte was to send Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey to the region. However, it seems that he did not dare to contact the rebels and turned back from either Bebek or Büyükdere. According to Yayla İmam Rısalesi, the Bostancıbaşı returned from Bebek after hearing the fate of Raif Efendi and then came to Yalı Kiosk. The author also states that Şakir Bey did not dare to enter the presence of the Sultan and to inform him about the developments. Ebubekir Efendi asserts that the Bostancıbaşı hesitated to go further from Bebek, noticing that the number of the yamaks had increased considerably, and turned back. Meanwhile the Janissary officers came to the official bureau of the Janissary Ağa (“Ağa Kapısı”), and gave information about the increase in the number of yamaks.

With the news of the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi, the ruling elite was alarmed. Consequently Musa Pasha, the kaimmakam, called the second treasurer, İbrahim Nesim and

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1520 Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsyani...”, p. 254.
1521 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 32.
1522 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimyiye, Topkapı 1595, p. 6a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihiçesi”, p. 387; Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3; Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 21.
1523 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimyiye, Topkapı 1595, p. 6a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihiçesi” p. 387; Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 2; Yayla İmam Rısalesi, p. 223. According to Oğulukyan, he did not dare move further from Kalender Garden, waited at Bebek and sent information to the city from there. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3. Saint-Denys, confirms his arrival to Büyükdere by his grand boat. See Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 112.
1524 Yalı Köşkü (Shore Kiosk) is at Saray Burnu.
1525 Yayla İmam Rısalesi, p. 223.
1526 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 21.
İbrahim Reşid Efendi for an immediate meeting.\textsuperscript{1527} It was held on Tuesday, 18 Ra/26 May at the Çardak Kolluk.\textsuperscript{1528} The other participants were Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa and a number of Janissary commanders.\textsuperscript{1529} During the meeting Musa Pasha questioned Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa about the disorder at the fortresses. According to one author, Sekbanbaşi replied that he did not have any information on the issue, but with the imperial order necessary measures for its suppression would be taken immediately.\textsuperscript{1530} On the other hand, Asım asserts that Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa explained that the \textit{yamaks} had revolted, and they were becoming crowded and intending to march towards the city. Both authors note that he ended his words by emphasizing that he was waiting for orders to suppress the rebellion.\textsuperscript{1531} Thereafter, İbrahim Nesim Efendi commented that these rebels were a “crowd of roughs” (\textit{“karga derneği”}) and the Rebellion was not an issue to bother about. It could be easily suppressed and only if it were not suppressed, more serious measures would be taken.\textsuperscript{1532} It is interesting to note that, rather than Musa Pasha, it seems that it was İbrahim Nesim Efendi who did not understand the importance of the Rebellion. Indeed, Asım Efendi criticizes İbrahim Nesim Efendi and other participants of the meeting at Çardak Kolluk for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1527] B.O.A. HAT 5028 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).
\item[1528] Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İstyarı...”, p. 255; Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 22. Çardak was the name of the shore extending from Yemiş İskele to Keresteciler. There was a quay called Çardak İskele and an outpost next to it. The outpost was under the control of the 56th regiment of the Janissary army, and its soldiers were responsible for the security of Çardak İskele, from Büyükgümrük İskele to the Unkapanı from the sea shore and also of the places from Bahçe Kapı to Küçükpazar.
\item[1529] Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 22; Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İstyarı...”, p. 255. In B.O.A. C.AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807), it is noted that the meeting was held at a time close to the evening prayer. According to the writer of this private letter, Musa Pasha came to the meeting place with the Sekbanbaşi. Cevdet Pasha notes that İnce Mehmed Pasha also attended the meeting. See Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VIII, p. 157.
\end{footnotes}
failing to take the necessary measures before it turned into a dangerous uprising.\textsuperscript{1533} Tüfengçibaşı underlines that for two days meetings were held at the presence of Musa Pasha.\textsuperscript{1534} During these meetings, the major issue was the dispatch of the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} soldiers to suppress the Rebellion. Some participants suggested the strengthening the defense the city in case of an attack by the \textit{yamaks} from the sea. Therefore, the dockyard manager (“\textit{Tersane Liman Reisi}”) was also invited to the Porte.\textsuperscript{1535} The meeting ended without any result.\textsuperscript{1536}

On the other hand, the murder of a high official sealed the fate of the Rebellion and the rebels. One day after the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi, the \textit{yamaks} met at Büyükdere Çayı and exchanged oaths.\textsuperscript{1537} It seems that the leadership of the rebellious crowd crystallized during the gathering at Büyükdere. Though there are some differences in terms of the names and details of other leaders, there is a consensus on the rise of Kabakçı

\textsuperscript{1533} Asum, \textit{Tarih-i Asum}, vol. II, pp. 22-3;
\textsuperscript{1535} Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Selimiye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 6; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 387. This might be another meeting than the one at Çardak Kolluk.
\textsuperscript{1536} According to Ebubekir Efendi, the most important meeting was held on Thursday, 20 Ra/29 May at the Çardak Kolluk. The participants were Kaimmakam Musa Pasha, Hacı İbrahim Efendi, İnce Mehmed Pasha, the governor of Kocaeli, Sekbanbaşı Arif Efendi and the \textit{başyasaçı} of the 56\textsuperscript{th} regiment. They were not able to reach any conclusion. See Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 14b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 116. I am not sure whether this is the same meeting held on Tuesday, mentioned above. Despite the differences in terms of the date, the two meetings seem to be similar in terms of the names of the participants and meeting place. To my knowledge a meeting was held at Çardak Kolluk only once.
\textsuperscript{1537} Saint-Denys notes that they met at the grand valley at Büyükdere after leaving several guards in each of the fortresses. See Saint Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 113. The author of \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi} claims that rebels arranged a meeting at “Fener Kalesi”, i.e. at Rumeli Feneri Fortress, on Tuesday and decided to go to İstanbul in order to discuss the matter with the Janissaries. See \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, p. 223. A contemporary epic poem also confirms that the \textit{yamaks} met at Büyükdere and exchanged oaths: “\textit{On dört kal’a bir araya geldiler, Büyük Dere’de kavıl ü karar ettiler, Mustafa’yi şol seras ken diktüler, çekildi bayrıklar Asitane’ye}” See Öztelli, \textit{Uyan Padişahım}, p. 101.
Mustafa as the leader. Unfortunately, there is no agreement on the issue of how some of them became leaders. For instance, Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi argues that the chiefs were elected by the yamaks. Câbi Ömer, too, claims that the rebels chose Kabakçı Mustafa as their leader, but does not mention the other ones. According to Oğulukyan, six people emerged as leaders due to the support they got from the some leading figures of the Palace ("saray ricalı") and the ulema. If we rely on this claim, it was a preplanned Rebellion and some of the yamaks who already had previous connections with the palace and the ulema naturally became leaders afterwards. However it does not seem very reasonable to believe that some palace officials of Selim III secretly helped the rebels.

The rebels at Büyükdere promised not to injure anyone, particularly women and children, not to touch the honour of anyone, and never to molest the valuable and minor possessions of anyone. In addition to strict rules, each of the yamaks also promised to

\[^{1538}\text{Ebubekir Efendi gives the names of four of them: Kabakçı Laz Mustafa Çavuş from 25th regiment; Arnavud Çavuş, from Poyraz Limanı and the 17th regiment; Mahmud Çavuş, from Anadolu Feneri; and Süleyman Çavuş. See Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 13b-14a; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 114-5. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi gives the following names as the chiefs of the rebels: Kastamonulu Kabakçı Mustafa of the 24th sekbons; İbiş of the 25th regiment; Arnavud Ali of the 64th regiment and Ahshaal Memiş. See Vaka-ı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 7a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 388. Oğulukyan, does not give their title, posts or the regiments, but just enumerate the names of Oduncu Süleyman; Bekir, Çili; İbiş Memiş; Kabakçı Mustafa. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3. Yayla İmam Rıalesi, on the other hand, does not mention the crystallization of leadership at Büyükdere but gives the names of the rebels: Kabakçı Mustafa of the 26th sekbons, Arnavud Sülü of the 33th Avcılarım, İbiş Beşe from the 64th regiment. See Yayla İmam Rıalesi, p. 223. Saint-Denys gives the name of only Kabakçı Mustafa whom all promised to obey his orders, and delegated the authority of punishing the cowards and the betrayers. See Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 113. As might be noticed in the above short lists, there is not a consensus over all the names. The only common name is Kabakçı Laz Mustafa, but there are conflicting details on his squadron and title. Another common name, despite some differences in details is, Süleyman/Sülü Beşe/Oduncu Süleyman, most probably referring to the same person.}\]

\[^{1539}\text{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-ı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 7a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 388.}\]

\[^{1540}\text{Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p.127.}\]

\[^{1541}\text{Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3.}\]
perform strictly the daily five prayers and never to drink alcoholic beverages. After these promises, the rebels performed some rituals such as kissing the Quran (“Enam”) and jumping over a sword. Oğulukyan emphasizes that they also promised not to give any damage to the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects and the foreigners. These rules, mentioned in some of the contemporary sources, are related to the restrictions on the moral conduct of the rebels. It seems that they also took some decisions about their targets. For instance, one source claims that, the rebels promised not to give up their march and to continue the uprising until the Nizam-ı Cedid program was abolished. According to Oğulukyan, the rebels also decided to march to Et Meydanı and to solve their problems in accordance with Quran (“Kuran’a göre murafaa olmak”). A later historian, Cevdet Pasha argues that the rebels promised not to disband until their demands were accepted by the Porte. From the account of Oğukyan one gets the impression that these rules were dictated by their leaders who, thereafter, made the other rebels swear over the sword (“kılıç üzerinde yemin ettiler”). According to one source, such oaths were also exchanged when the rebels reached to the Imperial Foundry (Tophane). In a similar way each swore “to respect the lives of every Turk and Frank, to take no measures without the consent of the Müfti and the ulemas, thirdly to draw up their demands upon the Porte in writing at Et Meydanı”. Then,

1542 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 114.

1543 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3. Tüfengçibaşı mentions only the practice of jumping over the sword. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 7; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 389. Saint-Denys, on the other hand, argues that the chiefs ordered their fellows to avoid pillage and not to insult any person except for the functionaries who would be designated by them as the enemies of the people. They would not give up their aims until their death. See Saint Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, pp. 113-5.

1544 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3.


1547 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3.
they all stepped over the sabre laid over the ground. As we have remarked, the contemporary sources narrate that such mutual promises and rituals were performed while the yamaks were at Büyükdere. Therefore, with the available information we are not sure whether there was a renewal of oaths at Tophane as well.

4.3.2. Dispatch of Delegates

On Tuesday, a group of 30-40 influential figures of the Janissary army, such as the elders, those who presided over the treasury of regiments (“orta mütevellileri”), the kitchen masters (“aşçı ustalari”) and the scribes, were sent to the fortresses in order to advise the yamaks to end the Rebellion and return their posts. According to Tüfengçibaşı, the delegates came across the yamaks at a point close to Büyükdere, since the other party was also moving towards Büyükdere. Therefore, we may suggest that the talks between the two parties must have taken place somewhere close to Büyükdere.

Ebudékir Efendi notes that delegates were sent both on Tuesday and Wednesday. Mustafa Necib Efendi does not give the exact date but notes that a meeting was held following the murder of Raif Efendi whereby it was decided to send Janissary officers to the Straits in order to calm down the rebels. He also claims that since the first party of delegates sent to the rebels did not return and no news was received, the Porte sent another party of delegates. Among the second group was Kazgancı Laz Hacı Mustafa Ağa.

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1548 The Times, Monday, August 3 1808, pg. 3; issue 7115; col. C, (from the Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8).

1549 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, pp. 6-7a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 388.


1551 Ebubékir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 21.

1552 He was the orta mütevelli of 25th regiment. During the reign of Mustafa IV he was appointed as the director of the Gümüşhane mines, but was later sent to exile. For more details about him, see Appendix I.
When he arrived, Mustafa Necib writes, the yamaks were regretful for the murder of Raif Efendi and Halil Ağa. It seems that after talking with yamaks, Kazgancı Mustafa Ağa wrote to the center that if the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers would be removed from the region the disorder would end. However, the author claims, it was not a sincere act on the part of either the yamaks or Mustafa Ağa, since even after the removal of the Nizam-ı Cedid army by an imperial order, the rebels started marching towards the city, feeling safer from any aggression from the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. As might be recalled, Selim III ordered the retreat of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers from the region. If the order in above-mentioned account is the same one, we can claim that Selim III yielded to the demands of the rebels at the very initial phase of the Rebellion.

The dispatch of two different delegations to the rebels is narrated differently by another contemporary historian. According to this source, the chief scribe of the Janissary army (“Yeniçeri Ocağı Başyazıcısı”) and the Başyazıcı of the 56th regiment and some Janissary elders were sent on Wednesday, 18 Ra/26 May. Their warnings were not effective in calming the yamaks down. After their return, the Sultan called Kazgancı Laz Mustafa, together with the custodian of the 17th regiment (“on yedinin oda bekçisi”), and three Janissary elders. They entered the presence of the Sultan at the Chamber of Circumcision (“Sünnet Odası”) at the Topkapı Palace. Selim III demanded them to disband the rebellious crowd and underlined that he was ready to abolish the Nizam-ı Cedid and execute those whose heads were demanded by the rebels. The Janissary officers, in reply, asserted that it was no longer possible to stop the Rebellion and thus it was better to

1553 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 33.
1554 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 33.
1555 Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması Dair Bir Tarihçe”, p. 101. According to this author the rebellion started on 18 Ra/26 May. Even though there is a mistake on the date, the day is true. According to the author, delegates were sent after the arrival of the rebels at Tophane. He does not mention a previous dispatch of the delegates, therefore, it might be possible that he refers to the first party of delegates.
await the entry of the rebels to the city. Yet, they promised to try to put an end to the Rebellion after the executions.\textsuperscript{1558} One foreign source of information notes that the rebels sent messengers and emphasized that they would not disperse until all of their demands were accepted.\textsuperscript{1559} According to Oğulukyan, a group from the Janissary officials was sent after the return of the Bostancıbaşı without any result. He notes that Kazgancı Laz Elhac Mustafa Ağa was also among those.\textsuperscript{1560} The private letter found in the Archive informs his correspondent that after the Çardak meeting, about fifty Janissary officers, including the \textit{seğirdim aşıcuları}, \textit{karakollukçular}, and the elders went to Beşiktaş, by boats, in order to meet with the rebels and to advise them.

According to the same source, when the delegates arrived at Beşiktaş, a group of the \textit{yamaks} was passing by and despite the invitation of the Janissary commanders to talk with them the \textit{yamaks} ignored their call and continued the march. After a second try, they got the reply that there would be no discussion or explanation till their arrival at Tophane.\textsuperscript{1561} According to Asım, the dispatch of Kazgancı Mustafa Ağa was particularly preferred, since he was from the Black Sea region, like most of the \textit{yamaks}. Moreover, he was a powerful and rich person with a considerable influence over the \textit{yamaks}.\textsuperscript{1562} From Asım’s explanation, it seems that only Kazgancı Mustafa was sent to the rebels and he came across them at Yeniköy. The clearest point in this issue seems to be that a group of people or only Kazgancı Mustafa was sent for advice on Wednesday.\textsuperscript{1563} A report from the Musa Pasha to the Sultan states that a certain number of \textit{turnacı},\textsuperscript{1564} some Janissary officers (“\textit{ocak zabıtami}”) and elders were sent to the Straits to calm down the \textit{yamaks} and they returned

\textsuperscript{1558} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, p. 101.

\textsuperscript{1559} From Hubsch, 3 June 1807, (PRO, FO 78-58). The document is in French.

\textsuperscript{1560} Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{1561} B.O.A. C.A.S. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807).


\textsuperscript{1563} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, pp. 24-25.

\textsuperscript{1564} \textit{Turnacı}, the members of the 73\textsuperscript{rd} regiment of the Janissary army.
after accomplishing their duty.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 211/48419 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).} As might be noticed there are contradictory details in terms of the date and the number of delegates sent to the rebels. With the available information it is also difficult to assess how many times the delegates were sent and what passed between them and the \textit{yamaks}.

This is not the only problem related to the issue of the delegates sent to the rebels. There are implications that the delegates had already anticipated being sent to the rebels and thus their dispatch was part of a secret plan. Some of the contemporary sources assert that these delegates were, in reality, the collaborators of the rebels.\footnote{Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Cedid}, p. 21; \textit{Yayla Îmami Risalesi}, pp. 223-4. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi does not make reference to the issue of collaboration, but notes that the \textit{yamaks} did not listen to them. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 7a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 388.} Therefore, their advise was insincere and never intending to put an end to the Rebellion.\footnote{Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 4; Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p.} A good example is mentioned in \textit{Yayla Îmami Risalesi}. Its author does mention the dispatch of Kazgancı Mustafa, but argues that while the rebellious crowd reached Yeniköy, Kazgancı Mustafa and some \textit{odabaşıs} secretly sent news to the rebels encouraging them to continue their march. Moreover, they ensured that there was nothing to fear since the whole Janissary army was supporting them.\footnote{\textit{Yayla Îmami Risalesi}, pp. 223-4.} As we shall see later, it is certain that the \textit{yamaks} reached Yeniköy on Wednesday. Therefore, the incident he mentions must have taken place on Wednesday. However, most of the other sources mention the visit of Kazgancı Mustafa by the order of the Sultan rather than the sending of secret news.

4.4. March of the \textit{Yamaks} (Wednesday, 19 Ra/27 May 1807)

The third day of the Rebellion started with the march of the rebellious \textit{yamaks} from Büyükdere Çayırlı, where they had gathered, towards the city. The most important incident
was their visit to Tophane to invite the artillerymen to join them. With the participation of artillerymen, the number and power of the rebels increased and the Rebellion turned into a military uprising, rather than a minor incident caused by the *yamaks*.

The famous march from Büyükdere finally started on Wednesday, 19 Ra/27 May, both from the sea and land.\(^{1569}\) The main body of the crowd seems to have followed the shore route from Büyükdere to Ortaköy and then to Beşiktaş. Some sources claim that they were about 600 when they began to move towards the city.\(^{1570}\) The highest number provided by contemporary narratives is 1500\(^{1571}\) and the lowest one is 300.\(^{1572}\) Mustafa Necib limits the number to 400 or 500.\(^{1573}\) On the other hand, one foreign report gives an approximate number of 6000.\(^{1574}\) A private letter claims that there were about 3000-5000 *yamaks* on Monday, two days before the march. However, he says, disorder occurred on Tuesday and some of the rebels fled to the imperial army on campaign, while some others

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\(^{1569}\) From Hubsch, 3 June 1807, (PRO, FO 78-58); Asım, *Tarihi Asım*, vol. II, pp. 25-6. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi notes that the march started after mid-afternoon on the same day. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, *Vaka-yi Selimiyye*, Topkapı 1595, p. 7; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 389. According to the author of *Kabakçı Ayaklanmasına Dair Bir Tarihçe*, on Tuesday, 19 Ra/27 May, they started their march and reached to Ortaköy. But the date he provides corresponds to Wednesday, not Tuesday. See Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, pp. 100-1. Oğuluşkyan gives the date as 15 May (Julian Calender)/28 May (Gregorian calendar). See Oğuluşkyan, *Ruzname*, p. 4. Ebubekir Efendi, states that on the evening of 25 Ra/2 June, they moved from Rumeli Hisarı. See Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-yi Cedid*, p. 22. As might be recalled Ebubekir Efendi gives 17 Ra/25 May as the beginning date of the rebellion. Therefore, it is difficult to explain the long time (one week) gap between the outbreak of the rebellion and the march of the rebels in the account of the author. According to Saint-Denys, on the other hand, the rebels waited for three days till the invitation was sent to Kabakçı Mustafa and after this development the march started on 29 May. See Saint Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. II, p. 114.

\(^{1570}\) Saint Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. II, p. 114; Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, p. 100. The latter does not mention Büyükdere as the meeting place of the rebels before the march towards the city.

\(^{1571}\) Oğuluşkyan, *Ruzname*, p. 4.

\(^{1572}\) Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-yi Cedid*, p. 22.


\(^{1574}\) From Hubsch, 3 June 1807, (PRO, FO 78-58).
escaped to the city. In the end, there remained about 900-1500 yamakṣ immediately before the march.\textsuperscript{1575} An official survey on the number of the yamakṣ reveals that about 1953 yamakṣ were employed in the Nine Forts about three months after the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{1576} Therefore, the high numbers, such as 3000-6000, seem to be exaggerated.

During the march towards the city, the rebels carried flags and moved behind their leaders.\textsuperscript{1577} They invited the Muslims to join them.\textsuperscript{1578} For this purpose, they sent criers to various places to ensure people that no one would be harmed and no aggression would occur to their possessions. Those who violated these rules would be executed immediately. The rebels also announced to the residents that they could safely open their shops and deal with daily routines.\textsuperscript{1579} According to Asım, they also declared that their ultimate aim was to abolish the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid}.\textsuperscript{1580} It seems that they did not get any negative response from the

\textsuperscript{1575} B.O.A. C.A.S. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807).

\textsuperscript{1576} B.O.A. C. AS. 16564 (6 B 1222/9 September 1807). The document provides details for each of the fortresses: “Kal’a-yı Seba tabyalarda mevcud zabitan ve neferat defteri: Kal’a-yı Fenarı Rumeli: tob ustası : 22 + neferat: 186 = 208; Kal’a-yı Garibce: tob ustası : 23 + neferat 191 = 214; Kal’a-yı Liman-i Kebir: tob ustası: 20 + neferat 184 = 204; Kal’a-yı Kilyos : tob ustası 26 + neferat 248 = 274; Kal’a-yı Poyraz Limani: tob ustası 38 + neferat 361 = 399; Kal’a-yı Fenar-ı Anadolu: top ustası 20+ neferat 178 = 198; Kal’a-yı Revancık: tob ustası 15 + neferat 126 = 141; Tabya-yı Kilburnu: takriben : 103; Tabya-yı Babaz Burnu : Takriben : 106; çavuşan ve kalyoncuyan ve atmacıyan ve Rah Abi ve tevabi: takriben: 98; zabitan: takriben= 9 dizdar+ 9 kethüda+ 9 + 9 topçuyan + 9 çavuş = 45; takriben: 184 top ustası + 1769 neferat= 1953” Since the document has a date that is close to the rebellion, it provides a good idea on the number of yamakṣ at the fortresses a short time after the Rebellion. According to it, there were about 1953 yamakṣ. If we suppose that the number of yamakṣ increased after the Rebellion, it means that there were about 1500-1800 yamakṣ at the time of the rebellion. For a transcribed copy of the same document, see Kılıç, \textit{Kabakçi Mustafa}, pp. 52-3.

\textsuperscript{1577} Öğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 4.


\textsuperscript{1579} Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçi Mustafa İsyani...”, p. 255.

\textsuperscript{1580} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 26. Öğulukyan does not mention the issue of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} but notes that they invited the Muslims to join them while ensuring the reaya that no harm would come to them. See Öğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 4.
public and their number seems to have increased with the joining of other people.\footnote{1581 Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması..”, p. 101; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 26. A later historian, Cevdet Pasha, for instance, states that though they were about 400-500 at the time of their march from Büyükdere, when they reached Tarabya the number increased to 900. See Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VIII, p. 157.} Yet, the rebels did not always receive the newcomers warmly. Câbî narrates an interesting story that took place at Yeniköy. According to him, Galatalı Keşabloğlu, Dalkılıç Hasan Ağa and some other leading figures of the 25\textsuperscript{th} regiment met the rebels marching towards the city at Yeniköy, probably to join them. However, Câbî says that the rebels did not answer any of the questions posed by them. It seems that the new group followed the crowd and questioned them again and again. Finally at Ortaköy one rebel briefly informed them that they had promised not to explain anything.\footnote{1582 Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 127.} We do not know the rest of the story, but it is quite possible that the new group was not allowed to join the rebels.

The rebels arrived at Ortaköy on Wednesday evening.\footnote{1583 According to Oğulukyan, the residents of Ortaköy were frightened by their arrival. However, the chiefs of the rebels ordered their men that “Watch your arms comrades, lest any accidental wrongdoing should happen; and do not dare to usurp anything from the people. Otherwise you shall suffer punishment!”\footnote{1584 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, pp. 4-5. According to him, they arrived during the midnight: “yoldaşlar, silahınızı gözetin, olmaya ki kaza ile bir sakatlık olsun ve sakin reayadan parasız bir şey almaysız, yoksa paralarız ha!”\footnote{1585 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 5.} Without losing time at Ortaköy, the rebels continued their march and erected their flags at Kabataş and waited there. The halt at Kabataş, Oğulukyan says, was due to the fact the rebels were not sure of the response of the artillerymen.\footnote{1585 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 5.} Therefore, instead of moving further, they sent representatives to the Imperial Foundry (“Tophane-i Amire”) to inform them of their arrival. According to Oğulukyan, only after the invitation of the commander of the Artillery (“Topçubaşı”) did all the rebels come to Tophane.\footnote{1586 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 5.}
Tüfengçibaşı, on the other hand, claims that they all together went to Tophane without the above procedures.\textsuperscript{1587} According to another source, that night the rebels stayed at Ortaköy, while a group went to Tophane.\textsuperscript{1588} Ebubekir Efendi does not mention the stop or stay at Ortaköy, but mentions that they reached Beşiktaş at one o’clock [21:29] in the evening and came to Tophane at five o’clock [1:30].\textsuperscript{1589} Even if we accept that they arrived at Beşiktaş at the time he noted, it seems strange that movement from Beşiktaş to Tophane should take four hours. In the light of Oğulukyan's account that they stopped at Kabataş to wait for permission from the Topçubaşı, their slow motion becomes more meaningful.

4.4.1. The Visit of Tophane

The purpose of the rebels in visiting Tophane was to convince the artillerymen to join the uprising.\textsuperscript{1590} According to Tüfengçibaşı, they talked with the officers and soldiers of the Tophane, convinced them to join the rebellion and consequently the cauldron (“kazgan”) was sent to the Tophane Meydani.\textsuperscript{1591} Oğulukyan, on the other hand, puts forward that despite the cordial reception by the Topçubaşı, the rebels did not dare to enter and waited at the Square until the next morning, until the artillerymen sent their cauldron upon the request of the rebels. He does not mention any conversation between the yamaks and the...


\textsuperscript{1588} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 101.


artillerymen.\textsuperscript{1592} Besides the artillerymen, the cannon-wagoners also sent their cauldron.\textsuperscript{1593} It seems that cauldron the Royal Armory ("Cebehane") was also sent to Et Meydanı.\textsuperscript{1594}

Few sources mention the details of the visit of the rebels to Tophane. One of them is Mustafa Necib Efendi. According to the author, it was not an easy task for the rebels to convince the artillerymen to join them, since they were one of the most loyal regiments of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{1595} If this claim is true how should we explain why the artillerymen joined the rebels instead of confronting them? An explanation comes from the same author. He argues that news was sent from the Kaimmakam and Sekbanbaşı to the artillerymen that the Rebellion was a common act and thus they should also join it.\textsuperscript{1596} Saint-Denys also provides some details in this regard. According to him, after arriving in İstanbul, Kabakçı Mustafa personally went to the presence of the Sekbanbaşı and invited the Janissaries to join the rebels. After that permission, he says, Kabakçı Mustafa made speeches first to the sailors ("kalyoncu") and then to the artillerymen in order to win their support.\textsuperscript{1597}

The third day of the Rebellion, therefore, started with the march of the rebels from Büyükdere to the city. They seem to have followed the shore and waited at shortly Ortaköy and then at Kabataş. The first purpose was to convince the collaboration of the artillerymen. With the joining of the artillerymen, the Rebellion turned into a real military uprising. According to one article, in The Times, their number was about 13,000 after the joining of

\textsuperscript{1592} Öğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{1593} Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-ı Cedid, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{1594} B.O.A. C.A.S. 50601(11 R 1222/18 June 1807).

\textsuperscript{1595} Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{1596} Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 33. Saint-Denys claims that it was Musa Pasha and the emissaries of the Şeyhülislam who convinced the loyal artillerymen to join the rebels. See Saint Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 118. According to Cevdet Paşa, Sekbanbaşı secretly sent news to Tophane that they should not resist the yamaks. See Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VIII, p. 160.

\textsuperscript{1597} Saint Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, pp. 115-6. Unfortunately the speeches, which he employs almost on all occasions seem to be fictitious, romantic and very Western in style. See pp. 117-19 for examples of two long speeches he attributes to Kabakçı Mustafa.
the Tophane and they chose a “coppersmith of Constantinople as their leader”, that should be Kazgancı Mustafa.\textsuperscript{1598} On the same day, Selim III called the Kaimmakam to the Palace and they talked at the Chamber of Circumcision about the issue. During the meeting, Selim III asked Musa Pasha the reason why the Rebellion was not put down yet. When the latter remained silent, the Sultan criticized himself, saying that it was due to his own “mildness” ("hilmiyet") and repeated it once more.\textsuperscript{1599}

4.5. The Gathering at Et Meydanı: Thursday, 20 Ra/28 May

The fourth day was the most decisive day of the uprising. The whole day can be symbolized by the Et Meydanı. It was the final spot of the march of the yamaks and where the famous execution list of the victims was announced. With the invitation of the ulema, the rebels tried to legitimize their uprising. The Square also witnessed the violent killing of several people by the rebels.

On Thursday morning, the rebels passed to Galata and reached Kalafat Yeri (the Careening Ground). With the newcomers joining them there, they passed by barges ("mavna") to Unkapanı.\textsuperscript{1600} Meanwhile a group of them went to Uzunçarşı and entered the bazaar. It seems that those witnessing their coming began to run away and close the shops in great panic. However, the rebels ordered the non-Muslims in the bazaar not to close the shops, but invited the Muslims to join them after closing their shops.\textsuperscript{1601} Some of the rebels went to Silah Pazari to purchase weapons and then passed to Divanyolu. Some incidents

\textsuperscript{1598} The Times, Monday, August 3 1808, pg. 3; issue 7115; col. C. (from the Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8). There must be confusion with Kabakçi Mustafa and Kazgancı Mustafa.

\textsuperscript{1599} Tüfengçibaşi Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 7; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşi Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 389.

\textsuperscript{1600} Derin, “Kabakçi Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, p. 102; Oğuluşyan, Ruzname, p. 5; Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 22; B.O.A. C.AS 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807).

\textsuperscript{1601} Oğuluşyan, Ruzname, p. 5; C.AS 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807).
seems to have taken place at the bazaars. For instance, one source informs us that a rebel who got a simit without paying was killed by his companions while he was eating it. ¹⁶⁰² Another source notes that a Janissary who stole a basket and another who took a pair of shoes without paying for them were put to death at the spot. ¹⁶⁰³

The main body of the rebellious crowd, on the other hand, opened their flags and reached to Et Meydanı ¹⁶⁰⁴ and then to Ağa Kapısı. ¹⁶⁰⁵ They entered the city from the gates of Unkapanı and Cebeali and moved towards the Yeni Odalar. ¹⁶⁰⁶ The cauldrons were carried out from the barracks, following the traditional custom in the Ottoman history. It seems that at that point too, the rebels sent messengers and invited the Janissaries and the Muslims to join them. ¹⁶⁰⁷ After they came to the Et Meydanı, the rebels were received by the Janissaries and at the place called Tekke they took an oath (“ahd-i ittifak”) and then sent

¹⁶⁰² Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 5
¹⁶⁰³ The Times, Monday, August, 3, 1808, pg. 3; issue 7115; col. C, (from the Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8).
¹⁶⁰⁴ Et Meydanı (The Meat Square) is usually confused with At Meydanı (the Hippodrome). Et Meydanı is the name of the square in Aksaray. After the conquest of İstanbul, the Janissary barracks were built in the place across the Şehzade Mosque. Later new ones were also erected in Aksaray. The older barracks were called Eski Odalar and the new ones Yeni Odalar. In the Yeni Odalar, there were seven gates, namely Adet Kapısı, Ağa Bölüğü Kapısı, Solaklar Kapısı, Meydan Kapısı, Çayır Kapısı, Et Kapısı and Karaköy Kapısı. At the center of Yeni Odalar there was a square called Tekke Meydanı and a mosque known as Orta Cami. Et Meydanı was also situated between Yeni Odalar. See Uzunçarşılı, Kapukulu Ocakları, vol. I, pp. 238-241. The reason why this famous square is called Et Meydanı is related to the function of the Square serving as the place for the distribution of the meat for the Janissaries. Every morning, meat coming from the slaughterhouses outside the city was carried to a place at the Square called Tomruk and from there delivered to eight Et Tomruğu (butchers). See Uzunçarşılı, Kapukulu Ocakları, vol. I, pp. 248-9.
¹⁶⁰⁵ Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 22.
a group of soldiers to invite the Armory. They brought out the cauldrons in the barracks and another group brought the cauldrons of Armory.1608

4.5.1. The Elite Meeting

The increase in the numbers of the rebellious crowd, especially after the joining of the artillerymen, must have created great anxiety among the ruling elite and the Sultan. According to information provided by Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, on Wednesday, around midnight, Selim III sent orders to Musa Pasha to bring several Janissary officers to his presence the next morning. Therefore, at the break of day on Thursday, ten leading figures of the Janissary army went to the Palace, accompanied by the Musa Pasha and Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa.1609 They were received by the Sultan at the Chamber of Circumcision. The Sultan demanded them to put an end to the Rebellion and asked whether the real cause of the Rebellion was the Nizam-ı Cedid army. Unfortunately we do not know the reply of the Janissary leaders. He assured that would abolish the Nizam-ı Cedid army, and had already ordered Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa to close the barracks of the new army.1610 Kethüda Said also

1608 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 10; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 393; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 34.

1609 These were “Yetmiş Beş cemâatin kâtibi Kazgani Ömer Efendi ve yirmi beş bölügün ihtiyarı Kazgani Laz Hacı Mustafa ve Yirmi beş cemâatin mütevellisi Hacı Süleyman and dokuzuncu cemâatin mütevellisi Mustafa, altmışdördün mütevellisi Hacı Yakub ve on yedi bölügün Arnabud Hacı Mehmed Odabaşı ve Ser Turna Ali ve Ser Turna Osman ve ocak muhzur” were received by the Sultan at the Chamber of Circumcision. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 8a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 390.

asserts that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* was abolished on Thursday morning.\footnote{Kethüda Said Efendi, *Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis*, Bayezid 3367, p. 100a; Kethüda Said Efendi, *Neticetü’l-Vekayi*, pp. 14a-14.} If these assertions are true, we can claim that the real purpose of the Sultan in inviting the Janissary leaders was to announce the abolition of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army and to leave no pretext for the continuation of the Rebellion and to end the disorder in the city as soon as possible. Another author confirms that the delegates were informed that the Sultan was ready to accept the demands of the rebels in order to end the Rebellion.\footnote{Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 14b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 116.} Meanwhile, the palace gates were closed.\footnote{Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 14b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 116.}

While some leading figures of the Janissary army were at the presence of the Sultan, the Janissaries gathered at the Ağa Kapısı, waiting for the result of the meeting. After the end of the meeting, Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa announced them the decision of the Sultan. However, the news was not received warmly by the Janissaries. They claimed that they could not trust these words, saying that the Sultan would never abolish the *Nizam-ı Cedid*. The reference point in their argument was the Edirne Incident. According to them, even though a good number of Muslims had died and many cities were devastated during the Edirne Incident, the Sultan had not abolished it. Therefore, he would not abolish it now. Consequently, the Janissaries declared their reluctance to end the Rebellion.\footnote{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, *Vaka-yı Selimiyye*, Topkapı 1595, pp. 8-9a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 390.} Tüfengçibaşı states that after this reply, the Sekbanbaşı went to Divanyolu, while about a group of four hundred Janissary leaders went to the courtyard of the Süleymaniye Mosque.\footnote{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, *Vaka-yı Selimiyye*, Topkapı 1595, p. 9a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 391.
After the reception of the Janissary leaders by the Sultan, Musa Pasha went to the Porte.\textsuperscript{1616} Kethüda Said claims that the ruling elite decided to hold a meeting after the joining of the artillerymen.\textsuperscript{1617} Mustafa Necib provides similar details and informs us that it was on Wednesday mid-night that Musa Pasha wrote letters (“tezkere”) calling the elite to a meeting.\textsuperscript{1618} Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi invited members of high ranking ulema, while Musa Pasha called other officials.\textsuperscript{1619} According to Ebubekir Efendi, in addition to the Şeyhülislam, the Anadolu and Rumeli kazaskers, the judge of İstanbul and the fetva emini (head of the office dealing out with the fetvas under the Şeyhülislams) were also invited to the meeting.\textsuperscript{1620} Accordingly, they all came to the Porte at the time of the morning prayer on Thursday.\textsuperscript{1621} It seems that more than fifteen functionaries attended the meeting.\textsuperscript{1622} Asım notes that the participants of the meeting wished to go to the Palace in order to hold the meeting there. Yet, Selim III ordered that the discussion of the measures to be taken


\textsuperscript{1618} Mustafa Necib Efendi, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi}, p. 33.


\textsuperscript{1620} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 14b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 116.


against the Rebellion should take place at the Porte. Therefore, in compliance with the order of the Sultan, the meeting was held at the Porte.\footnote{Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 27.}

The meeting at the Porte focused on the measures to be taken to suppress the Rebellion. However, it is more famous for the quarrel between İbrahim Nesim Efendi and Şemseddin Efendi, the former kazasker of Rumelia. As usual, different versions are provided for the incident by the contemporary authors. For instance, according to the author of Yayla İmamı Risalesi, İbrahim Nesim Efendi came to the meeting late and immediately after entering he commented on the measures to be taken against the rebels with following words: “I’ve heard the news that a few Laz scoundrels from fortresses have arrived. Let us send news to our imperial troops, so that they will get to crush them like dogs.” Hearing these words, Şemseddin Efendi exploded with fury: “You pig, bitch! So you create this conspiracy and then escalate it so as to wash our white beards in blood? You infidel fag!” Upon these harsh and unexpected words, İbrahim Nesim Efendi left the meeting in a paralyzed manner. According to the same author, this incident took place before the arrival of the rebels at Et Meydanı.\footnote{Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 224. See also Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 29-30: Bir kaç kaleli Laz köpekleri gelmiş; bizim asker-i şahaneye haber gönderelim. Varsun köpek kirar gibi kirsunlar.”; “Bak hızır kahbe, bu fesadı çıkarub bu dereceye getürüp ahır bizim ak sakallarımıza kana boyayacaksız. Bre kafır püşt.”} Though not mentioning the late coming of İbrahim Nesim Efendi, another author remarks that İbrahim Nesim Efendi asked a question concerning the measures to be taken, but faced the aggressive response of Şemseddin Efendi.\footnote{Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması ...”, p. 103: “Bre hey kahbe hîz, bu âlemi harâba verdin, sâir meşveretlerde ulemâ-yı izândan kime suâl ederdiniz, bu sizin pislediğiniz bokdur, temyîz edin”.} And then Şemseddin Efendi sent away Nesim Efendi in disgrace.\footnote{Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması ...”, p. 103: “Kalk bre kahbe-i bi-ar, şu meclisden cehennem ol, sen şimdi kıyâfetini bulursun ve âleme rüsvâ olursun”.} Asım also refers to the criticism of Şemseddin Efendi, who had accused the ruling elite in general but particularly blamed İbrahim Nesim for the worsening of the disorder and for causing sorrow to the Sultan due
to their oppression and treason. Oğulukyan provides us with different details and a somehow different version of the same incident. The author explains that İbrahim Nesim Efendi, during the meeting, questioned Kaimmakam Musa Pasha on the measures to be taken to suppress the Rebellion. In reply, Musa Pasha excused himself saying that he was very new in the office and suggested that “they should be the ones to correct the events” (“nasıl yaptıysanız gidin öylece çekin”). Then, Hacı İbrahim Efendi interfered and suggested that the gates of the inner city should be closed and fortified with cannons and the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. In that way, İbrahim Efendi argued, they could prevent the entrance of the rebels to the city and the rebels could be defeated in a few hours by the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. As might be noticed, in Oğulukyan’s account, it is Hacı İbrahim Efendi who suggests employing the Nizam-ı Cedid army to suppress the Rebellion. Therefore, Şemseddin Molla rebukes Hacı İbrahim Efendi and objects that the city gates should never be closed. Thereafter, Mustafa Reşid Efendi joins and ends the discussion by suggesting that they should all disband and try to save their lives. After that, all of the participants leave the Porte in a great hurry. Mustafa Necib, on the other hand, does not give the names of those present at the meeting, but refers to the quarrel between İbrahim Nesim Efendi and Şemseddin Efendi. According to him, the quarrel was due to the offer of the former to use from the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers against the yamaks. But, Şemseddin Efendi rebuked and İbrahim Nesim Efendi left the place, together with Elhac İbrahim Efendi, after saying that there was nothing to be done anymore.

Apart from the quarrel between some participants of the meeting, there are some other important points about the meeting at the Porte. It seems that after the meeting, the ulema wished to go to the Palace. However, it is very likely that the Sultan did not give

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1628 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 6.
1629 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 6.
1630 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 6.
1631 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-ı Salis Asrı Vekayi, pp. 34-5.
permission. Oğulukyan narrates the same scene from the perspective of the Palace and the Sultan. He writes that the Sultan was very worried during that time. His favorites ("rikab and musahib ağalar") begged him to permit the entrance of the elite and ulema to the palace. However, the Sultan replied that if he allowed to the Kaimmakam and Şeyhülislam to enter the Palace, the rebels would not find any ulema around and would put the reaya to sword. It seems that the Sultan implied the need of the rebels to find some members of ulema to legitimate their cause and to receive the ulema to voice their requests, particularly a fetva. After mentioning this talk, Oğulukyan notes that the ulema, together with the Şeyhülislam, were called by the rebels to the Square. His explanation can be considered as further evidence of the fact that the palace gates were closed and the Sultan, for a certain reason, did not want to allow them to come to the Palace. According to Tüfengçibaşı, all of the ruling elite, except for the ulema, had escaped after the entry of crowds to the Square. Being left alone, the ulema wanted to go to the Palace and to be at the side of the Sultan during the turbulence. Therefore, they wrote a letter to the Rikab-i Hümayun expressing their wish. However, they received orders to wait at the Porte or at Ağa Kapısı rather than coming to the Palace. Therefore while the members of the ulema were discussing the issue at the Porte, the rebels entered Et Meydanı. Then the ulema went to Ağa Kapısı. At this point, they have met with the rebels coming towards Et Meydanı. Unfortunately, the available information does not provide us certain explanation, on the wish of the ulema to go to the palace. If such a request was true, it


1633 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 5.


1635 Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-ya Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 100; Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü'l-Vekayı, p. 14a. Ebubekir Efendi notes that they were at the Paşa Kapısı while the rebels were coming towards Et Meydanı. See Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 14b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 116.

might help us to question the collaboration of the *ulema* with the rebels. It suggests that the *ulema* preferred to be at the palace and with the Sultan, rather than being around during the Rebellion.

As might be recalled, a good number of the Janissary commanders were at the courtyard of the Süleymaniye Mosque about the time when the *yamaks* were about to reach Et Meydanı. After the gathering of the crowds at the Square, Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa sent Kahveci Mustafa Ağa, the sergeant-major (“*oçak başçavuşu*”), to the Janissary officers at the courtyard of the Süleymaniye Mosque in order to bring them to Ağa Kapısı so that they could discuss the measures to end the Rebellion.\(^{1637}\) After a short discussion, the Janissary leaders suggested to invite the *ulema* to the Paşa Kapısı\(^{1638}\) to consult them. Consequently, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, the chief judge of Rumelia (*Sadr-ı Rum*) Ahmed Muhtar Efendi\(^{1639}\) and the chief judge of Anatolia (*Sadr-ı Anadolu*) Mehmed Hafid Efendi\(^{1640}\) came to Ağa Kapısı upon their invitation. Thereafter, the Janissary ağas requested permission to return to the Janissary barracks.\(^{1641}\) A similar explanation comes from Ebubekir Efendi, in *Vaka-yı Cedid*. The author asserts that while the ruling elite was at the Porte, the Janissaries


\(^{1638}\) Paşa Kapısı/Bab-ı Asaﬁ/Vezir Kapısı/Paşa Sarayı/Bab-ı Ali, served as the official bureau of the grand viziers before the Tanzimat Era. After Tanzimat it was called Bab-ı Ali (the Sublime Porte). From the 17th century onwards, the grand viziers began to use a certain building as the Paşa Kapısı. In 1654, the palace of Halil Paşa, a former grand vizier, served as the official bureau. The palace was, supposedly, across the Alay Kiosk. For more details, see Uzunçarşılı, İ.H., *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*, (Ankara: TTK, 1988), pp. 249-262.

\(^{1639}\) Mollaccızağ Ahmed Muhtar Efendi, (d. 1226/1811) became the Anadolu Kazasker in 1215/1800-1 and Rumeli Kazaskeri in 1 Ş 1221/14 October 1806. For more details see Appendix I.

\(^{1640}\) Aşır Efendizâde Mehmed Hafid Efendi (d. 1226/1811) was the son of Reisülküttab Mustafaefendizâde Şeyhülislam Mustafa Aşır Efendi. In Za 1213/April 1799, he obtained the rank of İstanbul and became Anadolu Kazasker on 1 Ra 1222/9 May 1807. After being dismissed (11 Ra 1223/7 May 1808), he was exiled to Kastamonu. For further details, see Appendix I.

invited the Şeyhülislam to the Ağa Kapısı. But according to him, the Janissaries invited them to the Square.\textsuperscript{1642}

\textbf{4.5.2. The Ulema at the Meydan}

There are different versions and very confusing details in contemporary sources regarding the presence of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and some ulema members on Thursday. Some claim that it was Selim III who sent Fetva Emini to Ağa Kapısı to question the demands of the rebels.\textsuperscript{1643} The ulema was delegated by the Sultan the duty of informing the rebels that all of their demands would be yielded.\textsuperscript{1644} The Sultan also ordered them to announce the abolition of the Nizam-ı Cedid military system in accordance with the fetva.\textsuperscript{1645} But, the primary function of the ulema was to convince the rebels to end the turbulence. After receiving the order from the Sultan, Ataullah Efendi, Sadr-ı Anadolu Aşır Efendizâde Hafid Efendi, Sadr-ı Rum Ahmed Muhtar Efendi, İstanbul Kadısı Muradzâde Mehmet Murad Efendi\textsuperscript{1646} went to Ağa Kapısı.\textsuperscript{1647} While they were waiting there, the rebels

\textsuperscript{1642} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Cedid}, p. 22.


\textsuperscript{1646} Muradzâde Mehmed Murad Efendi (d.1223/1808), served as the İstanbul judge between 10 Ca 1221/26 July 1806 and 1 Za 1222/31 December 1807. On 9 C 1223/2 August 1808, he was exiled to Kizanlık. For further details, see Appendix. I.

\textsuperscript{1647} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, pp. 28-29. Ebubekir Efendi, in \textit{Fezleke}, does not mention the names the ulema but notes that Şeyhülislam, the kazaskers of Rumelia and Anatolia, the judge of İstanbul and fetva emini were sent to Ağa Kapısı for the same purpose. See Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 14b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 116.
also came to Ağakağı and invited them to the Tekke at the Square. Some other sources do not mention the delegation of the ulema by the Sultan, but argue that the rebels came and invited the ulema to the Square. For instance, Ebubekir Efendi, in Vaka-yı Cedid, claims that after the arrival of the Şeyhülislam to Ağakağı, the Janissaries invited him to the Square. Thereafter Ataullah Efendi went to Et Meydanı, accompanied by the Janissaries and in a very respectful manner. Oğulukyan also argues that the rebels invited the ulema to the Square, after the end of the meeting at the Porte.

The letter in the Archives gives a different explanation: Selim III called Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi three times on Wednesday, but Ataullah Efendi refrained from going to the Palace. Consequently, Selim III advised that he should, at least, visit his tutor ("ilâlâ"). Thereafter, Ataullah Efendi went to Paşa Kapısı together with some leading members of the ulema. After their arrival at Paşa Kapısı, Selim III called him again and this time Şeyhülislam Efendi went alone to his presence. After returning to Paşa Kapısı, he informed the others that the Sultan had “cursed” the Nizam-ı Cedid, i.e. abolished it. The Sultan had also ordered the rebels return to their posts and to put an end to the Rebellion. After that development, the kazaskers of Rumelia and Anatolia went to Ağakağı, informing the Sekbanbaşı of the above decision of the Sultan. However, the rebels were not satisfied with sole verbal permission and asked for a written fetva and also for the arrival of ulema at the Square. If we rely on his explanation, it seems that Selim III invited the Şeyhülislam to produce a fetva for the abolition of the Nizam-ı Cedid.

Some other contemporary narratives note that Fetva Emini Efendi was the first member of ulema sent to the rebels by the ulema in order to learn their demands and

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1649 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 22.
1650 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 22.
1651 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 6.
1652 B.O.A. C. AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807).
announce the abolition of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, while the others waited at Ağa Kapısı.\(^{1653}\) In turn, the rebels requested *Fetva Emini* to invite Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi to the Square. After hearing this, Ataullah Efendi and other members of the *ulema* went to the Square.\(^{1654}\)

Another source, on the other hand, remarks that after receiving the imperial order to question the demands of the rebels, Ataullah Efendi went to Ağa Kapısı, some leaders of the rebels came to his presence and invited Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa and Ataullah Efendi to the Square.\(^{1655}\) *Yayla İmami Risalesi* confirms this explanation: According to the author, after coming to the Square the rebels called the *ulema*\(^{1656}\) and Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa to Et Meydanı and took them to the Tekke.\(^{1657}\)

On the other hand, Mustafa Necib Efendi just states that Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and the *ulema* went to the Square.\(^{1658}\) In his account, there is neither the motive of the delegation of the *ulema* by the Sultan nor their invitation to the Square by the rebels. The author of *Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanmasına Dair Bir Tarihçe* provides some different details. According to the author, after their arrival at Tophane several rebels visited the


\(^{1655}\) Üzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafâ İsyani....”, p. 256.

\(^{1656}\) The author of *Yayla İmami Risalesi* gives a list of the *ulema* who went to the Square. However, he confuses Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi with Salihzâde Ahmed Esad Efendi, the former şeyhülislam. He claims that the şeyhülislam was not there (“gâib olmuştu”). However, he names Esad Efendizâde Ataullah Efendi as the Nakibü’l-eşraf. Actually, the Nakibü’l-eşraf of the time was Dürrizâde Seyyid Abdullah Efendi. The other names he mentions are Sadr-ı Rum Mollacakzâde Ahmed Muhtar Efendi, Sadr-ı Anadolu Aşir Efendizâde Mehmed Hafid Efendi. See *Yayla İmami Risalesi*, p. 225. As might be noticed, the famous Münib Efendi is not available in the list.

\(^{1657}\) *Yayla İmami Risalesi*, p. 225. *Tekke* was at the Et Meydanı. It was a building reserved for the Janissary officers and *seğirdim aşçıları*. See B.O.A. C. AS. 6536 (29 C 1225/1 August 1810); Üzunçarşılı, *Kapukulu Ocakları*, vol. I, p. 248.

residence of Münib Efendi at the Bosphorous and brought him to Tophane by a rowboat. The same author asserts that after the quarrel between İbrahim Nesim and Şemseddin Efendi, the ulema noticed that the problem could not be solved these discussions therefore decided to go to the Square. Therefore, after the meeting the ulema – including Şeyhülislam – went to Ağâ Kapısı accompanied by a karakollukçu. While they were waiting for news from the Square at Ağâ Kapısı, Münib Efendi, at the Square, declared that the Şeyhülislam was a pious and abstinent person (“mütedeyyin and perhizkar”). Then, Ataullah Efendi and the fetva emini went to the Square. In his story, too, there is neither invitation of the rebels, nor the delegation by the Sultan.

One of the most interesting and different versions for the presence of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi belongs to Câbî. According to him, the rebels at the Square decided to gain the support of the ulema. It seems that the rebels conceived the presence of the ulema at the Square mainly as a measure to prevent the ulema from supporting the Sultan who was already backed by the Nizam-ı Cedid army. Such a coalition would be fatal for the rebels and gaining the favour of the ulema was very critical for them. Therefore, they sent forty men to the residence of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi in order to invite him to the Square. In return, Ataullah Efendi asked whether there were any members of the ulema at the Square. The rebels confessed that there was no members of the ulema at the Square, but they stated that they could call the ones Ataullah Efendi wished to see at the Square. Consequently, the kazaskers and Nakibül-eşraf Abdullah Molla were brought to the

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1659 According to the Bostancıbaşı Defteri, his residence was around Kanlıca. See Kayra-Üyepazarı, İkinci Mahmut ‘un İstanbul’u, p. 145.

1660 Derin, “Kabakçı Ayaklanması...”, p. 102. According to the author, in order to convince Münib Efendi the rebels uttered “Efendi, sen bizim başımızın tacını, biz sensiz bir ferde müdâhale eylemeyiz”.

1661 Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 103.

1662 Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 103.


It is important to underline that in Câbî’s version, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi was at his residence, not at Ağa or Paşa Kapısı.

Among these very confusing details on the arrival of the ulema at the Square, there are some facts that seem to be certain. It seems that Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and some members of the high ranking ulema were around Paşa Kapısı or Ağa Kapısı and it was fetva emini who was sent to the Square in order to declare the abolition of the Nizam-ı Cedid and to advise the rebels to return to the forts. After his questioning, the rebels must have expressed their wish to see the Şeyhülislam and the other members of the ulema at the Square, Ataullah Efendi and the others must have arrived at the Square. This seems to be the most logical explanation since as we shall see immediately below, this line of explanation is also in conformity with details of the preparation of the list of victims.

Despite different versions of the presence of the Şeyhülislam and ulema, all of the contemporary sources agree that they were present at the Square on Thursday. With the arrival of the Şeyhülislam and other leading ulema at Et Meydanı, the famous events which ended with the murder of about eleven officials started. Unfortunately, we have very limited details as to what passed between the rebels and Ataullah Efendi at the Square. Oğulukyan provides some details concerning this issue. From his explanation, it seems that the rebels talked with Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, explained their complaints and asked for a reply from him. As we shall see later, their complaints mainly focused on the poverty of the people and abuses of the ruling elite. It is important to note that the Şeyhülislam himself was also accused of being a part of the unjust system administered by oppressive elite. One of the important questions was whether God would be pleased

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1665 Chief of the Descendants of the Prophet Muhammed.


1667 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 7. In the narration of Oğulukyan, one feels that the yamaks talked with the Şeyhülislam in an accusing manner.

1668 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 7.
with the murder of thousands of Muslims during the Edirne Incident.\textsuperscript{1669} And without waiting for a reply from the Şeyhülislam, the rebels demanded the execution of those who were involved in the Edirne Incident.\textsuperscript{1670} The reference to the Edirne Incident is also mentioned by another source: A young rebel called İsmail criticized Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi by commenting that the *ulema* do not properly reveal the facts of the *Sharia* and “you give vagabonds like us the opportunity to have a say.”\textsuperscript{1671} It was very probable that the young man especially had in mind the Edirne Incident, since immediately after these words he asked Ataullah Efendi whether he was the one who issued the *fetva* during the Edirne Incident.\textsuperscript{1672} In some accounts, the respect of the *yamaks* at the Square towards the Şeyhülislam is well emphasized.\textsuperscript{1673}

In another narrative Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi was brought to the Tekke at the Square where the leaders of the rebels explained their cause, asked him to produce a *fetva* for three issues and finally requested the deliverance of eleven statesmen to them.\textsuperscript{1674} According to Tüfengçibaşı, the rebels had two requests: The deliverance of those included in the execution list and issue of an order from the Sultan declaring the abolition of the *Nizam-i Cedid*.\textsuperscript{1675} The author says that both were accepted by the Sultan. Actually, the

\textsuperscript{1669} Derin, “Kabakçi Mustafa Ayaklanması ....”, p. 104. Öğulukyan puts forward that Salihzâde Esad Efendi was also among those whose heads were demanded by the rebels, but was saved by the new Şeyhülislam. See Öğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{1670} Derin, “Kabakçi Mustafa Ayaklanması ...”, p. 104.


\textsuperscript{1674} Uzunçarşıtı,“Kabakçi Mustafa İsyani...”, p. 256.

Sultan must have abolished the new army before this talk. Indeed, according to Asım, after arriving at the Square, Ataullah Efendi informed the rebels of the abolition of the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} and questioned their remaining demands. The rebels, in reply, asked for the execution of ten functionaries. Another source claims that the rebels declared their demands and requested the issue of a \textit{fetva} from the Şeyhülislam.

### 4.5.3. Preparation of the List of the Victims

It seems that some time after the arrival of the leading \textit{ulema} members at the Square, the rebels gave a list of the persons that were to be executed. However, as usual, there is no consensus on how the list was prepared. According to Kethüda Said, the list was prepared after the arrival of the \textit{ulema} and was presented to the Şeyhülislam who immediately delivered it to the Sultan. According to Ebubekir Efendi, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi promised the execution of the figures in the list and a \textit{fetva} was issued by him, while he was still at the Square. Unfortunately, in his account it is not clear whether the list was prepared before or after his coming. However, he claims that Ataullah Efendi wanted the rebels to promise that they would not harm anyone, other than those included in the execution list. Consequently, the rebels delivered him a written promise that they would kill only those who caused damage or killed other people. This promise, according to the

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1677 Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 29. As might be recalled Asım argued that Ataullah Efendi and the \textit{ulema} were sent there by the order of the Sultan in order to inform them about the abolition of the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} and to interrogate their demands.

1678 Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Cedid}, p. 22.


author, was attached to the list. And thereafter an imperial order was issued for the capture of those demanded and was sent to Kaimmakam Musa Pasha.

These are very important points since if these assertions are historically true they suggest that a kind of bargaining took place between the Şeyhülislam and the rebels. On the other hand, from the narration of Oğulukyan, one gets the sense that it was the rebels who dictated the execution list to the Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi. Ebubekir Efendi is among the authors who argue that the list was dictated to the ulema after their coming to the Square. In this respect, a good clue comes from another source. According its author, the execution list was dictated by the rebels, but it was Fetva Emini who wrote the list. Asım does not give information on the issue of how the list was prepared but just states that it was delivered to Ataullah Efendi after his arrival. According to Mustafa Necib, the execution list was already submitted to the Sultan by Musa Pasha on the evening that the rebels persuaded the artillerymen to join their cause. According to the same author, Musa Pasha wrote a letter to the Sultan, noting that the rebels would not disband until those demanded by the rebels were executed. Therefore in his story, it is very likely that it was prepared by Musa Pasha himself beforehand. According to Ebubekir Efendi, the list was first delivered to the Porte by Sekbanbaşı Ağa and then to the Rikab-ı Hümayun. Saint-Denys, on the other hand, asserts that the list of the victims was sent by Kaimmakam Musa

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1681 Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-ı Cedid*, p. 22.


1684 Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 7: “.... asiler bunu da bırak, Efendi, eline bir kağud al ve dediklerimizi yaz dediler.”


1686 Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 104.


Pasha to Kabakçı Mustafa previously and the latter showed it to the crowd at the Et Meydani. Thereafter, yamaks were sent out to different parts to search for those on the execution list. Though it is very difficult to be sure by whom the list was prepared, it seems unreasonable to disregard the arguments of Mustafa Necib and Saint-Denys. Indeed, another contemporary author notes that a group of rebels went to Kapan-ı Dakik to find Abdüllatif Efendi, the nāb of the Kapan-ı Dakik, who was also included in the execution list, before the arrival of the rebels at the Square.

Another confusing issue is the number of the victims demanded by the rebels. Most of the contemporary sources argue that eleven people were included into the execution list. According to Tüfengçibaşı and Asım, it was only ten. In fact, Tüfengçibaşı’s list is correct. But since he does not mention Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey among the victims, the number falls to ten: İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Hacı İbrahim Efendi, Kethüda Memiş Efendi,

1692 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 225.
1693 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-ı Cedid, p. 22; Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsyami...”, p. 256; The author of Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanmasına Dair Tarihiçe also gives the names of eleven people: Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey, İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Elhac İbrahim Efendi, Vezir kethüdası Memiş Efendi, Reis Efendi, İrad-ı Cedid defterdarı Ahmed Bey, Mabeynci Ahmed Bey, Kapan Naibi, Sırkatibi Ahmed Bey, Ebubekir Efendi and Valide Kethüdası Yusuf Ağa. See Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 104. Kethüda Said Efendi does not name them one by one. Subsequent details of those murdered, namely, İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Memiş Efendi, Ahmed Safi Efendi, Ebubekir Efendi, Bostancıbaşi Hasan Şakir, Mabeynci Ahmed Bey, Abdüllatif Efendi, Yusuf Ağa, Elhac İbrahim Efendi, Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi and İrad-ı Cedid defterdarı Ahmed Bey makes a total of eleven people. See Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarihi Vaka-ı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 101a; Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 14. The same is also relevant for Asım. It is important to note that a modern Ottomanist, Stanford Shaw, also gives the number of the people included into the execution as eleven. However, he does not mention the name of Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi. Moreover, Shaw claims that Memiş Efendi was the “director of the Grains”, who was actually kethüda-ı rikâb-ı hümâyûn during that time. On the other hand, he identifies Abdüllatif Efendi, the present the supervisor of the Grains, as Lütfüllah Efendi “as teacher in the technical schools”. See Shaw, Between Old and New, pp. 381-2.
Reis Vekili Safi Efendi, Valide Kethüdası Yusuf Ağa, Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi, Mabeynci (Court Chamberlain) Ahmed Bey, Darbhanı Emini Ebubekir Efendi and Kapan Naibi Abdüllatif Efendi. Some other sources claim that twelve people were included. According to Saint-Denys seventeen leading figures of the Selimian era were murdered within two days. Yet, in his account it is not clear whether all of these people were on the list. He also claims that Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Efendi was included and he was one of the two, together with Ahmed Bey, who were able to survive. Therefore if we include these two figures, the total number demanded by the rebels should be nineteen for him.

The highest number is provided by Oğulukyan who claims nineteen people were in the famous execution list. This is not the end of his list. Oğulukyan also argues that while the list was being prepared, some of the rebels suggested the inclusion of four non-Muslim reaya as well. As far as we learn from Oğulukyan, their execution was demanded on the ground that these four Non-Muslims served the center and were abusing their positions for their own benefits. However, one of the influential figures among the rebels pointed out that the murder of these reaya would not be appropriate since they were...

1695 Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 15a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 116; *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 226; B.O.A. C.AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807). They do not name them separately. Unfortunately I was not able to determine the extra ones in their lists.


1698 These were Kaimmakam Köse Musa Pasha, İbrahim Kahya [İbrahim Nesim Efendi], Elhac İbrahim Efendi, Valide Kahyası Yusuf Ağa, Çelebi Efendi/Köse Kahya [Mustafa Reşid Efendi], Memiş Efendi, *Nizam-i Cedid defterdari* Ahmed Bey, Reis Efendi Safi Efendi, Darbhanı emini Bekir Efendi, Gümüşkülü Ağa Hasaniko, Morali Ali Efendi, Aziz Efendi,Şakir Ahmed Efendi, sabık Şeyhülislam Salihzâde, Emin Paşazâde Emin Bey, Kapan Naibi Adbülatif Efendi, Mabeynci Ahmed Bey, Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi and Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey. The most striking figure in his list is Kaimmakam Musa Pasha. I did not come across any other implication for the inclusion of Morali Ali Efendi, a former director of the naval arsenal, Aziz Efendi, another former director of the naval arsenal, or Şakir Ahmed Efendi, a former superintendent of grain and provisions (“hububat naziri”). See Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 8. A later historian, Tayyarzâde Ata Bey, gives the number as eighteen. See Tayyarzâde Ahmed Ata, *Tayyarzâde Ata Bey’ın Risalesi*, p. 5a.

innocent in the sense that they had no chance other than serving their masters, namely the ruling elite.\footnote{Oğulukyan, Ruzname, pp. 7-8.} According to Oğulukyan, the reaya were saved thanks to the efforts of this influential figure at the Square.\footnote{According to Oğulukyan, the man who saved the life of Düzoğlu and the others subsequently confessed that he had not known Düzoğlu personally. He later paid a visit to the Imperial Mint to see Düzoğlu. As might recalled, Oğulukyan was serving the Düzoğulları at the Imperial Mint and therefore he writes that he saw the man who saved the lives of the reaya during this visit. On the other hand, Andreasyen, depending on Patriarch Ormanyan’s account, claims that Kazaz Artin and Nuryan Ohannes applied their friend, Kazgancı Mustafa, to save the lives of the reaya in the list. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 8, footnote 13.} For our purposes, this information is very important since it suggests that the names included in the execution list were probably prepared by the yamaks and the process was open to suggestions, rather than there being a list prepared formerly and dictated by one single person.

As for the historical reality of the assertion of Oğulukyan on the inclusion of the four non-Muslims into the execution list, it was not possible to come across any documentary evidence confirming this claim. Yet, a supporting detail comes from Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi. The historian narrates a scene similar to that of Oğulukyan: A man whose head was covered with a shawl brings a list (“pusula”) to the chiefs of the rebels. It included the names of ten money-changers (“sarraf”), including Şamanto, Tingiroğlu, Şabçı and Güllabioğlu.\footnote{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, pp. 25-26a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, pp. 411-2.} After submitting the list to Kabakçı Mustafa, the mysterious figure asks him to bring these sarrafs to the Square for execution. Kabakçı Mustafa, in return, gives the list to Ali Efendi, the scribe of the 72\textsuperscript{nd} regiment, and asks Ali Efendi’s opinion.\footnote{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 26a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 412.} The latter objects to their execution, arguing that these non-Muslim were the servants of the Empire and it would not be just to execute these innocent people. Ali Efendi might have suspected that the man who brought the list had a personal problem with the sarrafs, since he advises him that he should solve his problems by applying to the judicial courts, rather
than demanding their murder.\textsuperscript{1704} After these exclamations, he tears the list and sends the mysterious person away.\textsuperscript{1705} Though the motive for murder of a certain number of non-Muslims is present in both Oğulukyan’s and Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi’s accounts, the former notes that five men were in the list, the second argues that it was ten. Moreover, Oğulukyan does not mention a mysterious figure bringing the list or any other details related to the incident. Yet, both argue that these figures were saved by an influential man. As we shall see later, Ali Efendi was the same person who tried to prevent the rebels from marching from Et Meydanı to At Meydanı.\textsuperscript{1706} Therefore, he seems to be a figure who tried to prevent the excesses of the rebels. One final note should be on the date of the incident. According to Oğulukyan, the incident took place when the famous list was being prepared, which suggests that it was on Thursday (20 Ra/28 May). However, Tüfengçibaşı mentions the incident as taking place on Saturday, 22 Ra/30 May.

At this point, we should try to answer the question of why certain people were on the execution list. The narrative called \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanmasına Dair Bir Tarihçe} is very important in this respect. The anonymous author gives not only the sequence of addition of the people to the list but also the reason why they were included. His list begins with Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey. According to the author, since he promised the Sultan to dress all the \textit{yamaks} in \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} uniforms and even hats he was added to the list.\textsuperscript{1707} The author states that while the names were being dictated one by one, an objection occurred when it came to Memiş Efendi.\textsuperscript{1708} One person among the crowd claimed that Memiş Efendi was from Salonika. He served as the head of the tobacco custom office “\textit{dühan gümrüğü emini}” and later entered the \textit{hacegan} class. After being employed as the controller of supplies of the barley (“\textit{arpa emini}”) and \textit{hububat nazırı}, then as the official in charge of the constructions of the Belgrad and Sokol


\textsuperscript{1707} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 104.

\textsuperscript{1708} Mehmed Memiş Efendi (d. 1222/1807), was from Salonika. He served as the head of the tobacco custom office “\textit{dühan gümrüğü emini}” and later entered the \textit{hacegan} class. After being employed as the controller of supplies of the barley (“\textit{arpa emini}”) and \textit{hububat nazırı}, then as the official in charge of the constructions of the Belgrad and Sokol
Efendi should not be held responsible for anything since only twenty days had passed since his appointment as the *rikab kethüda*. Indeed, he was appointed on 19 April, therefore it had been more than one month. However, the other rebels refused to exclude him by alluding to Memiş Efendi’s connections with the Serbians, a point we will evaluate later. Another objection was made when the others tried to include Mustafa Reşid Efendi. This objection, according to the author, saved the life of Mustafa Reşid Efendi. It is not perfectly clear whether it was a single person or several people who made the objections. It seems more likely that it was one person, since when a third objection was made, the others rebuked him by saying that “*Enough of that! So are you really the kapı kethüda of these.*” Ebubekir Efendi, the director of the Imperial Mint, on the other hand, was not as lucky as Mustafa Reşid Efendi. Towards the end of the preparation of the list, the armorers (“*cebeci*”) were bringing the cauldron of the Armory to the Square. One of the *cebecis* reminded the rebels preparing the list that they had forgotten Ebubekir Efendi, who according to him should be at the top of the execution list. After Bekir Efendi was added

fortresses, he became the chief treasurer (“*muhasebe-i evvel*”) in 1221/1806 and second treasurer (“*defterdar-ı şikk-ı sani*”) on § 1221/October-November 1806. On 20 S 1222/29 April 1807, he was appointed as the *kethüda-yı rikab-ı hümâyün*. For more details see appendix I.

Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Efendi (d. 1231/1819), is also known as Köse Kahya. He became a hacegan in 1182/1768-9 and later İstanbul *mukataacısı*. He was appointed as *Yeniçeri katibi* (1202/1787-88) and *kethüda-yı sadr-ı ali* (15 N 1204/29 May 1790). On 16 M 1207/13 September 1792, he became *tophane* and *arabacilar nazır*. After serving as the director of the *İrad-ı Cedid* (1209/1794), he was appointed as the chief treasurer on 8 Z 1213/13 Nisan 1799. He served as the director the Arsenal (L 1217/February 1803) and was dismissed on 1218/1803-4. About two years later he was appointed to the same post (Ra 1221/June 1806). After the dismissal he became *rikab-ı hümâyun kethüda*. For more details see appendix I.

Derin, “*Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması....*”, p. 104: “*Olamaz, sen bunların kapu kethüdası misin?*”.

Eubekir Efendi (d. 1222/1807) was from Safranbolu. He moved to İstanbul and became a porter at the Imperial Mint. He was appointed to the position of assayer. In 1216/1801-2, he became the director of the Mint, a post he held until his death. For more details see Appendix I.

Derin, “*Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması....*”, pp. 104-5.
to the list, the rebels sent it to the Porte and immediately afterwards an edict promising their execution was issued.\footnote{Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 105.}

As might be noticed from the above details, there is some contradictory information on the number of the people included into the list. Fortunately we have an original document which seems to be a copy of the execution list prepared at the Square. At the upper margin of the document, the names of eleven officials are written: “\textit{Bostancıbaşı} [Hasan Şakir Bey], \textit{Sirkatibi} [Ahmed Efendi], \textit{İbrahim Kethüda} [İbrahim Nesim Efendi], \textit{Mabeynci Ahmed Bey}, \footnote{Mabeynci Ahmed Bey (Kör, Yekçeşm) (d. 1222/1807) was the son of Halil Pasha. He entered \textit{enderun} during the reign of Mustafa III. After the accession of of Selim III to the throne, he became the court chamberlain (“\textit{mabeynci}”) and remained in the office until his death. For more details see appendix I.} \textit{Tersane Emini Hacı İbrahim Efendi}, \textit{Rikab Kethüdası Memiş Efendi}, \textit{Rikab Reisi} [Safi Efendi], \textit{İrad-ı Cedid Defterdarı Ahmed Bey}, \footnote{Seyyid Ahmed Bey (d. 1225/1811) became the master of the ceremonies (“\textit{teşrifatçı}”) in 1210/1795-6. He was appointed as şikk-ı sani defterdarı and the director of the İrad-ı Cedid on 3 B 1221/16 September 1806. For more details, see Appendix I.} \textit{Kapan Naibi} [İabdülłatif Efendi], \textit{hala Darbhanı Emini Bekir Bey}, \textit{Valide Kethüdasi} [Yusuf Ağa].\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 7537 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). For a copy of the same document, see \textit{Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri}, Istanbul University TY 6975, p. 37a. See also Appendix 4 and Kılıç, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa İsyani}, p. 68.}

As might be noticed, only the official titles of most of the people are recorded. For instance, the Bostancıbaşı of that period was Hasan Şakir Bey, Sirkatibi was Ahmed Bey, Rikab Reisi (Reisülküttab’s deputy) referred to Ahmed Safi Bey, Kapan Naibi (the director of Grains) was Abdüllatif Efendi\footnote{Abdüllatif Efendi (Paşa), (d. 1222/1807): He served as a \textit{müderris}. He served as the \textit{kapan naib} till the rebellion. See Appendix I for more details.} and Valide Kethüdasi (steward of Valide Sultan) was Yusuf Ağa. It is important to underline that this document might be the final version of the list submitted to the Sultan or the Porte. As we have studied above, some contemporary accounts refer to exclusions and inclusions of some people.
At the lower margin of the same document, there is a short note (consisting of six lines) which provides information on the demands of the rebels. The note starts with the notification that the Janissaries at the Square were pleased with the Sultan’s abolition of the Nizam-ı Cedid army (“asakir-i cedid”). This detail makes one point clear, that the Nizam-ı Cedid army was abolished earlier than the submission of the execution list. However, the abolition of the new army system was not enough for the Janissaries to end the Rebellion. Therefore, it states that unless the figures in the list were executed, the “Janissaries” would not disperse. Though written in quite a polite way, and not referring literally to a rebellion, it cleverly describes the conditions of the rebels at the Square and emphasizes that the Rebellion would not end without the execution of the above mentioned elite. At the end of the same document there is another condition of the rebels. It is stated that the rebels demanded the execution of those in the list within two hours. No doubt, this does not seem to be the original list written by rebels at the Square. Rather it is an official document written by a certain official addressing the Sultan directly. Unfortunately, there is no indication of the identity of the writer of the document. However, the expression of “taraf-ı dâiyânemize” suggests that the writer of the document was a member of the ulema and most probably the Şeyhülislam. In another document, which

1718 The first two or three words at the beginning of the second line are illegible in the document found at the Archives. Fortunately enough, in the copy provided at Hatt-ı Hümayun Suretleri, the missing words are available. See Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 37a.

1719 Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 37a

1720 B.O.A. HAT 7537 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 37a

1721 “Bunlar iki saate kadar matlûbâları üzere husûle gelûr ise deyû vakit ta’yîn eyledikleri dahi ıhûr olunmağa ol bâbda dahi emr hazret-i veliü’l-emrindir”. This is written as the final sentence (consisting of two lines) and it seems to have been added to the document after the main body of the text was written. A comparison of the two copies also confirms our suspicion. In the copy found at the Istanbul University TY 6975, the last sentence is not available. The reason of this difference in two copies is not clear to me. I will suggest two possibilities in this regard: The copy found at the University might be an earlier version and thus the last sentence is missing. Another possibility might be that the one at the University was the final version submitted to the Sultan and the last sentence was omitted.
seems to have been written in reply to the above document, the Sultan addresses Kaimmakam Pasha and orders the execution of all of them immediately and the dispatch of their severed heads to the rebels “eşkiya”. According to Tüfengçibaşı, the execution list was prepared by the elders and influential figures of the Janissary army and the yamaks at the Square. After deciding and writing the names of the elite, they sent the list to Kaimmakam Pasha to be submitted to the Sultan and it demanded the deliverance of those recorded in the list. This might be the same document under study.

Some clues in the same record suggest that Şeyhüislam Ataullah Efendi was not present at the Et Meydanı and learned about the demands of the rebels via the Sekbanbaşı, Fetva Emini and the official who kept the records of events (“vekayi katibi”). These three officials were sent to the Square where the rebels stipulated their conditions to them. As might be recalled, in Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanmasına Dair Bir Tarihçe there was a similar explanation. Apart from these details, the document makes another implication. It is the fact that Şeyhüislam Ataullah Efendi and some of the members of the high ranking ulema were not probably present at the Square while the rebels prepared the list and declared their conditions to end the Rebellion. Rather than Şeyhüislam Ataullah Efendi, they seem to have expressed their demands to the above three officials sent to the Square. Indeed, one incident narrated by Tüfengçibaşı supports our claim. According to the information provided by the author, after the dispatch of the list to the Şeyhüislam, the rebels there

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1722 B.O.A. HAT 7531 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 37a: “Kaimmakam Paşa, bunları şimdi idâm edüb cümlèsinin ser maktû’ larını eşkiyâya ırsâl edesin, şimdi”.


1725 B.O.A. HAT 7537 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “…lakin bâlâda mastûr kimeselerin tertib-i cezâlari olunur ise herkes mahaline gidüb hidmet-i lâzimelerine kıyâm edeceklerini cemiyetlerine ırsâl eden hala sekbanbaşı ağa kullari ve fetvâ emini ve vekayi katibi efendiler dâî’lerine takrîr eylediklerini taraf-i dâî’yânemize ihbûr etmelileriyle…” Vakayi katibi is the clerk who kept the records a record of the events.

decided to go to At Meydanı, close to the Sultan Ahmed Mosque. Tüfengçibaşı argues that the idea of going to At Meydanı was mainly for the purpose of plundering and oppressing the people. It is important to remark that the author narrates the intention as if uttered by the rebels. No doubt, there is no way to be sure of the reality of these words. However, even if this was true, one other purpose might be to move to a place closer to the palace, probably to catch the victims in the list or follow the developments more closely. At this point the author mentions the efforts of Ali Efendi, the scribe of the 72nd regiment, who tried to convince the rebels not to go to At Meydanı. While Ali Efendi tried to prevent them, he was severely handled by the attacks of the angry crowd. The author praises Ali Efendi for his brave attempt. Thereafter, the rebels were questioned by the Janissary elders on their intentions. In reply they demanded that the Şeyhülislam and the ulema should come to the Square. And after that point the ulema members and Ataullah Efendi came to Et Meydanı. As might be recalled, most of the contemporary sources claim that the latter came to the Square before the preparation of the list, however, in Tüfengçibaşı’s account this group arrived after the invitation of the rebels some time after the deliverance of the list to the Kaimmakam.

As we have remarked above, some sources claim that Selim III ordered the execution of the eleven officials immediately after the deliverance of the list to him. For instance, Asım remarks that after the deliverance of the list to Kaimmakam Pasha, strict orders came from the Sultan on the capture and execution of those included to the list. We have a


1729 According to the author, the members of the ulema were at Ağa Kapısı when they were invited. Those who came to the Square were the Şeyhülislam, kazaskers of Anatolia and Rumelia, the Sekbanbaşı and some former sekbanbaşis. At the Square they were invited to the Meydan Tekkesi. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-ı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 11; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 394.

document which reads “Kaimmakam Pasha execute them immediately and send their heads to the rebels. Now.” Unfortunately, it is not clear whether Selim III refers to the execution and deliverance all of those on the execution list. Yet in the other copy, in Hatt-i Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, the order is written immediately below the famous list, therefore it is very probable that the order was valid for the execution of all the names in the list. If our supposition is true, it seems unlikely that Selim III tried to save some of them as asserted in some contemporary accounts.

4.5.4 Executions on Thursday

After the submission of the execution list and the related order of the Sultan, a new phase of the Rebellion started, which might best be summarized as the process of the capture of those demanded by the rebels. As might be recalled, some of the statesmen escaped after the meeting at the Porte on Thursday and most of them sought shelter in certain places. The first one found and executed by the rebels was İbrahim Nesim Efendi. After the quarrel with Şemseddin Efendi, he seems first to have gone to his house and then to a house, at Yeni Kapı with his mehterbaşı in disguise. Ebubekir Efendi remarks that immediately after the dispatch of the list, the rebels began to search for the elite on the list by appointing twenty to thirty men for different places, thanks to which İbrahim Nesim

1731 B.O.A. HAT 7531 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

1732 Hatt-i Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 37a.

1733 Mustafa Necib Efendi, for instance, argues that the Sultan initially permitted the execution of those on the list, except for Hacı İbrahim, İbrahim Nesim and Sırratibi Ahmed Efendi. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salîs Asrî Vekayi, p. 35; Asum, Tarih-i Asum, vol. II, p. 31; Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VIII, p. 137.
Efendi was captured. One record suggests that not only the rebels but also the Porte searched for İbrahim Nesim Efendi. The document is written by Beyhan Sultan, sister of Selim III, to Kaimmakam Musa Pasha. It seems that Kaimmakam Pasha sent men several times to her residence to ask whether İbrahim Nesim Efendi was there or not. Therefore she felt obliged to write a note to the Pasha in order to ensure him that İbrahim Nesim Efendi was not kept in her house. Beyhan Sultan suggested that the Pasha could send men in order to search any part of the house, if he did not trust her.

It seems that it was the rebels who caught Nesim Efendi. He was found at the house of Güllabioğlu Agop, a non-Muslim merchant, at Yeni Kapı, was brought to the Square where he died under the violent attacks of the rebels. Together with him, his mehterbaşı Ali was also murdered while he was struggling to protect his master. Among the

1734 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 15a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 117.

1735 B.O.A. HAT 7521 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 37a.

1736 B.O.A. A.E. (IV. Mustafa) 1929 (21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807). The document is a list of victims murdered during the Rebellion. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4. It does not refer to his capture at Kumkapı, but informs us that he was murdered at the Square. According to Asım, İbrahim Nesim Efendi was followed by a porter who betrayed his place to the rebels. See Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 30. Mustafa Necib notes that he first went to his house and then to the residence of Hasan Şevki Efendi, the kapı çukadar of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, in Daltaban Çeşmesi for the purpose of escaping by sea. When he arrived there, he ordered the preparation of a rowboat at Langa Yeni Kapı. He sought refuge in the residence of Güllabizâde Agop Efendi in Yeni Kapı. I suppose İbrahim Nesim Efendi’s aim was to hide in the Güllabioğlu’s house till the preparations for his escape by sea were completed. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayî, pp. 39-40. According to the author of Bir İmamın Günülgü, his murder was at 6 [14:34] o’clock on Thursday. See Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günülgü, p. 177. For more details of his capture and murder, see Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 15a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 117; Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yi Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 12; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 396; B.O.A. C. AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807); Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İspanı..”, p. 257; Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanmaları..”, p. 106; Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 9; Yayla İmam Risalesi, pp. 227-8; Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 135; Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yi Cedit, p. 24; Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 124; Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 101a; Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü’l-Vekayî, p. 14.

contemporary sources, it is Ebubekir Efendi who narrates his murder in greater detail as an eyewitness.\footnote{1738} Kethüda Said Efendi informs us that the remaining officials were searched by the center ("\textit{taraf-i devlet}"). In order to encourage the capture of the fugitives, a 5000 guruş award was promised for each of the remaining ones on the execution list.\footnote{1739} Therefore searching for the missing statesmen seems to have been conducted both by the central authority and also by the rebels themselves.\footnote{1740} İbrahim Nesim Efendi Efendi’s murder was followed by another person not included in the list. It was the \textit{kapı kethüda}\footnote{1741} of Hacı Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı İşyani Mustafa...”, p. 257; Öğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 9; \textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi}, p. 227-8; Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr-i Vekayi}, p. 40; Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yi Cedid}, p. 24; Câbi, \textit{Câbi Tarihi}, vol. I, pp. 135-6. According to Saint-Denys, he was betrayed by the Jew who wanted to take a cash box made of jewelry that İbrahim Efendi carried. See Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 123.

\footnote{1738} His narration of the murder is one of the most horrific and tragic scenes of the rebellion. Ebubekir Efendi narrates it in great detail: “\textit{Evvela İbrahim Kethüdâ Langa Yeni Kapusu haricinde Sira Yalilar’da düler kalılarandan Gullabi Oğlu nun hânesinde mehterbaşısı ile ma’an girdiklerini sâbûň şahsun arif bir iki bakkâl çakkâl maküleri gördüklerinde hût-be-hût hânesini basub zîr-i zemînde käin şarab hânesinde başında Ahmediyye ve ayağında kemmûni renk bir köhnê kalyoncu şalvari ile tehêl-i hava ve hey’et yalın ayak başi kahbahr ve iki tarafında tutub ve başını birçok yerinden yarub al kana istigrâk ile yevm-i mezûbûrde kable’l-asr meydâna getûrûlb büyûk kapu dâhilinde safta uğuruna mehterbaşısı ile ma’an yüksekân päre etdiklери ve kâlçlûn arsa asdiklari ve kemâl-i gayz ve garezlerinden kâlc ve boçaklarını manûn yalyub ve kesret-i zihâmân darb ve cerhine mvañfâk olmayanların amân karinda ben de senin kicinden bir katre kanûn yalyub diyenin had ü hasri olmadiği ve ba’zûllerinin dahe hüzur tekelîf ve meşûkâk ile lahm-pâre-i hündürinden beş on dirhem mikdarına naïl olanlar köpek peynî tulunu çekûdûrûg gibi etlerini ağzıyla çekûdûrûg ve hâtta guzût-i merhumeden biri götûne bir mişe odun sokub odunun ucunun renk-i kazûrâyıyla sabsa etdiğini ol hengâmda benden gayri \textit{Et Meydânı’nda bulunanlardan katı çok kimselerin şuhûdleri oluşdu.”} See Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmânî}, p. 15a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 117. Another contemporary narrative that narrates his murder in great detail is Öğulukyan. See Öğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 9.


\footnote{1740} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayakanması...”, p. 105.

\footnote{1741} \textit{Kapı kethüda} refers to the representative of a governor in İstanbul. Tüfengçibaşı notes that the \textit{kapı kethüda} of Hacı Ahmedzâde was a resident of Sultan Mehmed. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yi Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 13a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 396. Another author notes that his name was İsmail and he was murdered due to his former sins. See Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İşyani...”, p. 257.
Ahmedoğlu Hacı İbrahim Ağa, the *voyvoda* of Bolu. According to Ebubekir Efendi, he was murdered only half an hour after İbrahim Nesim Efendi. Some sources remark that he was at the Square and witnessed the murder of İbrahim Nesim Efendi. One record also confirms his murder at Et Meydanı. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, on the other hand, argues that he was not present at the Square, but had been brought by some rebels for execution. According to Ebubekir Efendi, *kapı kethüda* of Hacı Ahmedoğlu came to the Square to witness and “enjoy” the scene of the murder of İbrahim Nesim Efendi, whose oppressions were not unknown to him. Unfortunately his presence was noticed by the people from Bolu who cried out that he was the advisor (“*akl-i faalli*”) of Hacı Ahmedoğlu, the locomotive of the establishment of the *Nizam-i Cedid* army which had caused the migration of poor people from Bolu. Asım, too, notes that Hacı Ahmedzâde was one of those who struggled for the establishment of the *Nizam-i Cedid* in the region together with Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey.

According to Mustafa Necib, on the other hand, his name was Mehmed Efendi and conducted the affairs of Hacı Ahmedzâde in İstanbul. See Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi*, p. 50.

1742 Hacı Ahmedzâde İbrahim Ağa was the *voyvoda* of Bolu. His father, Hacı Ahmed Ağa served as director of the imperial dockyards, between 1185-86/1777-78 for seven months, and later was appointed as the *voyvoda* of Bolu. See B.O.A. C. BH. 11492 (2 Ca 1193/18 May 1779). In an undated document a certain Salih Bey asks the grant of the rank of *silahşörlük* (title of first regiment of Ottoman household cavalry) to the brother of Hacı Ahmedzâde called Halil. See B.O.A. HAT 120/4895.C (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1805-1806). For more detail see Appendix I.

1743 Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 15b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 117.


1745 B.O.A. A.E. (IV. Mustafa) 1929 (21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807): “... ve Hacı Ahmedoğlu’nun Kapu Kethüdası Et Meydani’nda maktul”


1747 Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, pp. 15a-b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 117.

It is difficult to decide whether the *kethüda* was murdered due to his connections with Hacı Ahmedzâde. There seems to be some grounds for the complaints of the residents of Bolu about the oppressions of Hacı Ahmedzâde. According to a document, some of the residents of that city sent a petition to the *divan-ı ali* and complained that Hacı Ahmedoğlu was oppressing the people. Therefore, they were asking for dismissal. In the same document it is mentioned that there were some similar previous complaints.\(^{1749}\) As a result, two inspectors were sent in order to make the necessary investigations in Bolu.\(^{1750}\) It seems very likely that Hacı Ahmedzâde was not dismissed from the *voyvodalık* at that time, but immediately after the rise of Mustafa IV to power. In the prevalent document it is noted that “due to the complaints of the people during the accession to the throne, Hacı Ahmedzâde Seyyid İbrahim Ağa has been dismissed...”\(^{1751}\) Unfortunately from the above phrase it is not clear whether the people complained once more or the incident of the murder of his *kethüda* is implied. From other details in the same document, we learn that Hacı Ahmedzâde İbrahim Ağa was replaced by Hulusi Ahmed Ağa, a *kocabaşı*. However, it seems that in the meantime thirty-four petitions and a judicial decree (“*ilam*”) were sent from Bolu asking for the reappointment of İbrahim Ağa. The document states that İbrahim Ağa and his brother belonged to an old dynasty and took special care to ensure the security of the people. In addition to that, Hacı Ahmedzâde participated in the campaigns and therefore, it is argued, the complaints directed against them should be put forward by fugitives of wars.\(^{1752}\) In the end, it was decided for the reappointment of Hacı Ahmedzâde İbrahim Efendi as *voyvoda*, however, since he was in the campaign, his brother was to be appointed as his deputy (“*vekaleten*”).\(^{1753}\)

\(^{1749}\) B.O.A. HAT 189/9015 (undated, catalogue date is 1203/1788-89).

\(^{1750}\) B.O.A. HAT 189/9015 (undated, catalogue date is 1203/1788-89).

\(^{1751}\) B.O.A. HAT 1355/52963 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8).

\(^{1752}\) B.O.A. HAT 1355/52963 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8).

\(^{1753}\) B.O.A. HAT 1355/52963 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8).
In addition to İbrahim Nesim Efendi, four more figures in the execution list were executed on Thursday. These were Memiş Efendi, Bostancıbaşı Hasan Şakir Bey, Bekir Efendi and Ahmed Safi Efendi. A foreign source comments that Selim III anticipated that the rebels would calm down with the sacrifice of these four officials. Most of the primary sources confirm that all, except for Hasan Şakir Bey, were executed at the Porte and their heads were sent to the Square. Safi and Memiş Efendi were already present there and were murdered immediately after the order came to Kaimmakam Pasha for their execution. On the other hand, Ebubekir Efendi was at the Mint while the order for his execution was received. Therefore, he was called to the Porte and executed as soon as he entered the building. Câbî also confirms the presence of Bekir Efendi at the Imperial Mint at that time. However, according to him, it was Ahmed Şakir Efendi, Ebubekir’s son-in-law, who came first to the Porte. However, Musa Pasha sent him back, saying that he had invited Bekir Efendi. After his arrival, Ebubekir Efendi was executed at the Kürk

1754 From Hubsch, 3 June 1807, (PRO, FO 78-58). Apart from these, the names of İbrahim [Nesim] Efendi, Hacı İbrahim Efendi and Mabeynî Ahmed is mentioned in reference to those demanded by the rebels.


1758 Ahmed Şakir Efendi (d.1235/1810-1) served as the director of the Imperial Mint from 1213/1798-9 to 1216/1801-2. He was appointed as nüzül emini of the Mediterranean in 1222/1807 and as director of the Mint one year later. For more details, see appendix I.
Odası at Paşa Kapısı.\textsuperscript{1759} These three figures, Safi, Memiş and Bekir Efendi were murdered at the Porte on Thursday.\textsuperscript{1760}

Mustafa Necib gives the information that Safi Efendi was added to the list by Kaimmakam Musa Pasha due to personal hatred.\textsuperscript{1761} On the other hand, some other sources claim that Safi Efendi was not on the list, but murdered due to the efforts of Musa Pasha for personal conflict.\textsuperscript{1762} In the light of these conflicting details, it comes to mind whether there was a mistake in the murder of Safi Efendi. Indeed, Oğulukyan argues that he was executed due to a mistake, since the rebels were, in reality, demanding the head of Reis Efendi, i.e. the Reisülküttab, in the army.\textsuperscript{1763} Therefore, we have to solve the problem of whether the rebels had in mind Safi Efendi or Galib Efendi. Finding an answer to this question is important in order to understand whether there was a confusion or whether that Musa Pasha murdered him due to personal animosity. Some contemporary historians, as Câbi, narrate his murder as if Safi Efendi never suspected when he was invited to the room where he was to be executed.\textsuperscript{1764} However, we have a document which proves that Safi Efendi was very

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\textsuperscript{1760} According to some sources, Memiş and Safi Efendi were executed in a room adjacent to Kürk Odası at the Paşa Kapısı. See Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 10; \textit{Yayla İmam Risalesi}, p. 227; Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmânî}, p. 16a; Asîler ve Gaziler, p. 119. According to another source, they were executed at the Hamam Odası at the Porte. See Uzunçarşı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsyani...”, p. 257. Mustafa Necib, on the other hand, asserts that Memiş, Safi and Bekir Efendi were killed at the lowest ("süfla") floor of the kiosk across the Kum Meydanı. See Mustafa Necib Efendi, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi}, p. 35. The author of the letter in the Archive combines all these suggestions and argues that Safi and Memiş were executed at the bathouse of the Porte and Bekir Efendi was executed at Kum Meydanı. See B.O.A. C.AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807) During this period, Paşa Kapısı was around Soğuk Çeşme and close to Çağaloğlu Hamam. Therefore, the hamam in question might be Çağaloğlu Hamam. Kum Meydanı was around Çinili Kiosk. See Sakaoğlu, Necdet, “Osmanlı Sarayında Spor Müsabakaları: Lahanacılar-Bamyacılar”, \textit{Toplumsal Tarih}, 102 (Haziran 2002), pp. 48-51.
\textsuperscript{1761} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi}, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{1763} Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 10. The Reisülküttab of the period was Galib Efendi. He was appointed on 19 B 1221/20 October 1806 and remained in the office until 19 Ca 1222/25 July 1807.
\textsuperscript{1764} For further details of his execution see Câbi, \textit{Câbi Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 132.
aware of the fact that he was among those on the famous list. In a petition to the Şeyhülislam, he claimed that there was a confusion in the list and begs him to save his life by correcting the mistake. Furthermore, according to his explanation, it was the Reis Efendi whose head was demanded by the ilam written at Et Meydani, not the deputy of reisülküttab (“rikab reisi”). Therefore, he argues, his execution would be a fatal mistake, since the rebels were demanding the head of Reis Efendi and the rebels had already noticed their mistake. In the remaining part of the same document, Safi Efendi underlines how innocent he is and requests the Şeyhülislam to correct this fatal mistake. 1765 Two points should be underlined at this point. The first one is the fact that Safi Efendi was in the list when he was executed. Besides, he tried to save his life by underlining the point that he was confused with the Reisülküttab of the time. However, it is important to recall that in the copy of the list we have mentioned above, there is no mention of Safi Efendi in name, just the name of his office. And it is not written as “Reis Efendi” as argued by Safi Efendi, but as “Rikab Reisi”. 1766 As we know “Reis Efendi” refers to the Reisülküttab and “Rikab Reisi” to the delegate of the Reisülküttab who undertakes the affairs of the ministry while the latter is participating in an imperial campaign. During that period, the Reisülküttab was Galib Efendi and Safi Efendi was his delegate. Therefore, in the list of the victims, there does not seem to be a confusion as claimed by Safi Efendi. If there was such hatred between Musa Pasha and Safi Efendi, Musa Pasha might have changed the names while he was sending the final copy to the Sultan, or he even sent a copy of his own. However, since we cannot be sure whether the above-mentioned list was the final copy or not, it is very difficult to reach a final conclusion. Oğulukyan notes that his corpse was taken secretly to his house by the rebels. 1767

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1765 B.O.A. HAT 7536 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). Since the Safi Efendi addresses his correspondent as “veliyyân-niam efendim”, we suggest that he sent his petition to the Şeyhülislam. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

1766 B.O.A. HAT 7536 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

1767 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 10. According to the author, Safi Efendi was an advocate of the rebels. Musa Kılıç, in his M.A. Thesis, suggests that all these facts might help us to question the assertions that the list was prepared by Musa Pasha beforehand. See Kılıç, Kabakçı Mustafa İsyani, p. 69.
According to the author of *Yayla İmam Risalesi*, Bostancıbaşı Hasan Şakir Bey was murdered some time after his return from the Bosphorous and by the order of the Sultan on the grounds that he did not perform his duty perfectly, in other words he did not inform the Sultan about the seriousness of the Rebellion.\[^{168}\] If we rely on the same source, his execution took place before the arrival of the list from the rebels.\[^{169}\] Most of contemporary sources confirm that Bostancıbaşı was at the Palace at that time.\[^{170}\] Therefore, according to the above-mentioned source, his execution was due to the anger of the Sultan rather than the result of being on the execution list. Oğulukyan and Ebubekir Efendi confirm this information and argue that he was indeed sent to the “firin” by the Sultan.\[^{171}\] On the other hand, Saint-Denys claims that Bostancıbaşı was one of the most hated figures of the ruling elite. He also confirms that Şakir Bey was sent to Büyükdere following the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi and was at the Palace during the entrance of the rebels to the city.\[^{172}\] The author asserts that after entering the city, a considerable number of the *yamaks* and Janissaries came to the Porte and demanded the head of Şakir Bey.\[^{173}\] In the Palace, he says, a great terror and panic prevailed and the palace members advised the Sultan to deliver Bostancıbaşı so that the rebellious crowd would calm down.\[^{174}\] Initially Selim III refused to yield to the demands of the crowds. Upon this development, the author notes,

\[^{168}\] *Yayla İmam Risalesi*, p. 226: “Sen, ben anlara şapka dahi giydiririm demişdin, niçin bana bunların galebesini takrîr vermedin?”

\[^{169}\] *Yayla İmam Risalesi*, p. 226.


\[^{171}\] Oğulukyan asserts that Selim III became angry with him and sent him to prison “firin” at the Palace to be executed. See Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 9. Ebubekir Efendi also confirms his execution at the firin. See *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 16a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 119.


Şakir Bey prostrated before the Sultan and declared that he was ready to sacrifice himself to prevent further disorder by the rebels. Thereafter, his head was sent to the Square and put before “Kabakçıoğlu”. If we compare Saint-Denys’ account with other contemporary accounts of the murder of Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey, his version seems to be more romantic. The author does not talk about any imperial anger towards Şakir Bey, on the contrary he argues that the Sultan tried to save him. In the list of the victims we have studied previously, Şakir Bey was at the head of those demanded by the rebels, information which refutes the claims of the above authors. Again as might be recalled, the rebels were pressing for the immediate execution of those on the list and since Safi, Memiş, Bekir Efendi and Şakir Bey were close to the Palace or the Porte, they were among the first to be executed by the imperial order. After the dispatch of the heads of Safi, Memiş and Bekir Efendi, the rebels declared that they wished the victims to be delivered alive.

We have no clear information about whether the murder of İbrahim Nesim Efendi was before or after the execution of the above four figures. A clue in this regard is provided by the author of Ceride. According to the author, İbrahim Nesim Efendi was murdered by the rebels on Thursday at 6 o’clock [14:31]. Though the author gives the date as 17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807, corresponding to Monday, it seems that this was due to a confusion. If İbrahim Nesim Efendi died at 6 o’clock [14:31], the death of the kapı kethüda of Hacı Ahmedzâde should be around 6:30 [15:05]. The same author remarks that Memiş, Safi, Ebubekir Efendi and Şakir Bey were strangulated at 8 o’clock [16:34], i.e. two hours after the death of İbrahim Nesim Efendi. The vacant offices after the murder of these people were filled by the ones: Hasan Tahsin became the rikab kethüda in place of Memiş Efendi,


1776 B.O.A. C. AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807); Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 24.

1777 Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüğü, p. 173. There is another reference on p. 105, this time without any specific information on the timing of the executions.
Said Mehmed Halet Efendi Reis vekili in place of Safi Efendi, Seyyid Mehmed Efendi as the director of Imperial Mint and Sariyerli Ali Ağa as the new Bostancıbaşı.

Following the murder of these four officials, criers were sent to every corner of the city for the proclamation of the decision of the Sultan that the Nizam-ı Cedid had been abolished. Accordingly, imperial decrees confirming the same information were also sent to Rumelia and Anatolia. There is a short imperial edict which reads that “It is my imperial decree that all revenues allocated to the Nizam-ı Cedid shall be entirely abolished.” Unfortunately it is an undated document therefore it is difficult to decide whether it is the document written for the abolition of the İrad-ı Cedid/Nizam-ı Cedid. At first glance, one suspects that it might be the famous decree issued by Selim III for the abolition of the Nizam-ı Cedid on Thursday, during the Rebellion. However, the style of handwriting seems to be more similar that of Mustafa IV. Therefore, it seems more likely that it was written later. Moreover, according to some contemporary sources in the order written by Selim III, he wrote “I have abolished and reprobated İrad-ı Cedid.”

The final issue of Thursday, the fourth day of the Rebellion, was the insistence of the rebels to ensure the security of the princes at the Palace. After mid-afternoon on the same day, the rebels began to worry about the security of the princes, i.e. Mustafa (IV) and

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1778 Sariyerli Ali Ağa, served as the lieutenant of the bostancıbaşı (“haseki ağa”) and was appointed as the Bostancıbaşı on 20 Ra 1222/28 May 1807. See B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 35.


1781 B.O.A. HAT 1364/53936 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “Nizam-ı Cedid’e dahil olan irādān külliyen ref‘ olumması emr-i hūmâyūnum olmuşdur.”

1782 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-ı Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 52: “İrad-ı Cedid’i ref‘ ü la’net eyledim.”
Mahmud (II) in the Palace. It is very clear that the rebels were worried about a possible assassination of these two princes. Therefore, they decided to send some representatives, or better to say, guards that would provide their security. According to Asım, the request of the rebels on that matter was transferred by the Şeyhülislam to the Sultan. On the other hand, Tüfengçibaşı argues that Selim III was informed by the Porte about the request of the rebels. Kethüda Said Efendi does not clarify whether the request was conveyed to the Sultan by the Şeyhülislam or the Porte. However, he notes that an imperial edict had been issued by the Sultan, emphasizing that because he did not have offspring, the princes were more valuable for him than his own life. Unfortunately it was not possible to come across copy of such an imperial edict. If it had really been issued, it seems that the Sultan had tried to convince the rebels that no harm would occur to his dear princes. Yet, in the end he yielded to the insistence of the rebels, most probably not to increase the tension. Thereafter, Osman Ağa, a former Sekbanbaşı and Hafız Derviş Mehmed Efendi, the chief preacher to the Sultan ("imam-ı evvel") and known also as "Aygır İmam" were appointed as the representatives of the ulema by the Şeyhülislam.


1784 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, p. 32.


Thursday passed with the murder of five people from the list, and the abolition of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*. The night came before the seizure and execution of the remaining ones on the list. It seems that after the preparation of the list, the *ulema* were removed from the Tekke and taken to the barracks of the 72nd regiment for rest and there they passed the Thursday night.\(^{1788}\) According to Tüfengçibaşı, the remaining elite rested at the house of Arabzâde Arif Efendi.\(^{1789}\) Even though the *Nizam-ı Cedid* was abolished, the rebels did not put an end to the Rebellion on Thursday. Mustafa Necib Efendi argues that it was due to the fact that their real aim was the dethronement of Selim III.\(^ {1790}\) Yet, there are some confusing issues that remain unanswered. The first question is why the rebels did not end the Rebellion after the abolition of the program on Thursday and dispersed only after the fall of Selim III from power. Some answers lie in the developments of the next day.

### 4.6. The Fall of Selim III (Friday, 21 Ra/29 May 1807)

The fifth and final day of the Rebellion was the last day of Selim III on the throne. It was Friday and instead of Selim III, it was Mustafa IV who attended the Friday Ceremony at the Ayasofya Mosque.

The day started with the insistence of the rebels on the seizure and execution of the remaining names in the execution list. According to Kethüda Said, during that morning a note was sent to the Sultan by the Şeyhüislam Ataullah Efendi which declared that the

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rebels were demanding the deliverance of the fugitive officials otherwise the disorder would not stop but would accelerate.\textsuperscript{1791} There is a short record which reads that

His imperial highness, our munificent and prosperous Sultan, They still demand the rest of those wanted and insist on receiving them alive promptly. What is more, they are uttering intimidating words. I beg you to be so kind as to exert your majestic efforts in order find to a solution.\textsuperscript{1792}

If this is the same one referred to by Kethüda Said, it should have been written by the Şeyhülislam, and the expression of “threatening words” might imply either the danger inherent in the intensification of disorder or the dethronement of the Sultan. With the available information it is difficult to decide and it might have been written after the murder of İbrahim Nesim Efendi. For instance, Kethüda Said Efendi refers to the insistence of the rebels for deliverance of the remaining ones after the murder of İbrahim Nesim Efendi.\textsuperscript{1793} According to the same author, in order to ensure that the fugitives were being searched for by the Porte, Münib Efendi was sent by the ulema at Paşa Kapısı to the Square. Meanwhile the rebels at the Square began to insist on the enthronement of Prince Mustafa.\textsuperscript{1794}

\section*{4.6.1. The Accession of Mustafa IV}

The most important incident of Friday was the accession of Prince Mustafa (IV) to the throne. It is difficult to trace the steps that led to the dethronement of Selim III during that day. As usual, contemporary accounts give quite different versions, therefore it is very

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\textsuperscript{1791} Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarihi Vaka-yi Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, p. 102a; Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Neticetü'l-Vekayi}, p. 15a. \\
\textsuperscript{1792} B.O.A. HAT 174/7533 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “\textit{Atfetli saadetli Sultanım hazretleri, matlübin bakiyye kalanlarını yine hayyen talebde israr edüb azim ta’cil ediyorlar. Ve muvahhis kemâtı tahaddüs ediyor. Lütf edüb çaresine ikdâm ve gayret buyurarsız.”} For a copy of the document see Appendix 4. \\
\end{flushright}
difficult to make some generalizations concerning this issue. Apparently, there seems to be two different perspectives in this regard among the contemporary sources. According to one group, the issue of dethronement was decided previously. For instance, Ebubekir Efendi claims that the dethronement of Selim III was decided on Thursday night. As might be recalled, the members of the *ulema* that were at the Square remained at the Janissary barracks that night.\(^{1795}\) If we follow this line of argument, we can suggest that the main purpose of the rebels in keeping the Şeyhülislam and other members of the *ulema* at the barracks was probably to convince them and to get a *fetva* for the dethronement of Selim III. Asım makes a contribution which provides us more information as to what might have happened on Thursday evening at the Janissary barracks. According to him, on Thursday Prince Mustafa secretly sent one of his men, Abdurrahman Ağâ, who later became the *kahvecibaşı* of Valide Sultan to the Janissary barracks, around 4 o’clock [00:34] in the evening.\(^{1796}\) There, Asım notes, he discussed the issue of the enthronement of Prince Mustafa and then returned.\(^{1797}\) As opposed to Ebubekir Efendi, no reference is made to the conversation between the *ulema* and the Janissaries at the same barracks. Yet, both accounts can be considered as complimentary to each other in the sense that Thursday night was a time when the issue of dethronement was seriously debated, implying that it did not emerge suddenly on Friday morning. Though we do not have evidence to prove the reality or falsehood of such assertions, these two accounts are important for suggesting that the dethronement was decided on Thursday evening and one for showing the role of *ulema*, and Prince Mustafa. Naturally enough, both Asım and Ebubekir Efendi narrate that the next day started with the rebels surrounding the Palace (“*ihata*”) and crying for the accession of Prince Mustafa.\(^{1798}\) It is interesting to underline that the author of *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*

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\(^{1795}\) Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 16a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 119.

\(^{1796}\) Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 34.

\(^{1797}\) Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 34.

\(^{1798}\) Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, pp. 16a-b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 119.
gives similar details, but with strikingly different comments. He confirms that the *ulema*\(^{1799}\) had really stayed at the Janissary barracks\(^{1800}\) voluntarily, but pretended to stay with due to the pressure of the rebels.\(^{1801}\)

As for Asım, he does not mention of the role the *ulema* of the *ulema* in the secret meetings of Thursday night, he notes that on Friday the rebels met with the *ulema* and asked them some questions and made some insistent requests.\(^{1802}\) Though not giving any detail about what kind of questions were posed to the *ulema*, he comments that the *ulema* yielded to some requests of the rebels, and tried to resist some unreasonable ones.\(^{1803}\) According to Asım, Ataullah Efendi and Ahmed Muhtar Efendi preferred to remain silent while the talk was conducted by Muradzâde Efendi, the judge of İstanbul. It seems that the talks mainly dwelt on the capture of the fugitive officials on the list. In return, Ataullah Efendi informed the Porte about the insistence of the rebels on the issue and the urgent necessity of their capture.\(^{1804}\) Thereafter, in order to ensure the rebels that the fugitives were being searched by the Porte, Mehmed Münübib Efendi was sent to the Square.\(^{1805}\) Münübib Efendi was immediately surrounded by the rebels. He declared that all of their demands were accepted and yielded to by the Sultan. Münübib Efendi ended his words by warning the rebels to return to the fortresses, otherwise their attitude would be considered as “*hurúc ale’s-sultan*” (withdrawal of allegiance from the Sultan).\(^{1806}\) At this point, Asım, depending

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1800 According to the author, they stayed at the barracks of the 75th regiment, rather than the 72nd. See *Yayla İmami Risalesi*, p. 229.

1801 *Yayla İmami Risalesi*, p. 229.

1802 Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 34.

1803 Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 34.


on hearsay, argues that the attitude of the crowd changed together with their requests.\textsuperscript{1807} It seems that Muradzâde Efendi was the first to notice the change in the attitude of the rebels and also that their intention was the dethronement of Selim III.\textsuperscript{1808} According to Asım, Muradzâde also became aware of the fact that if Selim III remained at the throne, the \textit{ulema}’s security would be endangered in the sense that the Sultan would get rid of them as soon as possible. Therefore, he made up his mind and asked \textit{“Can we henceforth really rely on this person as our sultan?”} Then Münib Efendi went to the room where the leaders of the rebels/Janissaries (\textit{“sanadid”}) were present.\textsuperscript{1809} After talking with the leaders for a while, he returned to the place of the \textit{ulema}, followed by the leaders in the room. The leaders came to Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and informed him about their decision on the dethronement of the Sultan and exerted pressure on Ataullah Efendi that Selim III’s rule was not appropriate any longer Ataullah Efendi and the \textit{ulema}, noticing that they had no other choice, informed the Porte about the demand of the rebels. Then all members of the \textit{ulema}, together with the Sekbanbaşı, were called to the Square, and then marched towards the Palace behind the two flags of the rebels.\textsuperscript{1810}

This is the basic line of explanation for the historians who argue that the dethronement of Selim III was decided on Thursday night. The second group of contemporary authors, on the other hand, argues that the issue of the fall of Selim III emerged on Friday. Tüfengçibaşı’s explanations can be evaluated within this category. According to him, early on Friday morning, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and the \textit{ulema} together with Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa, former Sekbanbaşıs and some influential Janissaries, held a meeting.\textsuperscript{1811} Up to that point, the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} was abolished and some figures in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 35.
\item Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 35.
\item Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 36: \textit{“min baad bu padişahın tarafından emniyet mutassavver midir?”}
\item Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 36.
\item Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 15a; Derin, \textit{“Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”}, p. 400.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the list were executed, while the remaining ones were being searched for. There was no reason for the rebels to continue the Rebellion. Therefore, they decided that the rebels should return to their places. At this very point, it seems that Ataullah Efendi intervened, making his famous question of “Go and ask the chiefs and gang-leaders, whether they do have any further wishes, and ascertain whether they are quenched?” Consequently three or four Janissary elders were sent to the Square to talk to the leaders of the Rebellion. After announcing the decision at the meeting the leaders asked permission to discuss the matter with the rest of the rebels. Meanwhile, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and the Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa sent some new men to the Square, saying “Tell them to come then. The issue is over, let them put one their robes of honor and let us dispel the crowd. Well then, do they have anything else to say?” The aim was obviously to disband the rebels as soon as possible. Upon this question, Tüfengçibaşı argues that Bayburdi Süleyman was the first to announce their wish for the accession of Prince Mustafa. His comrades Kabakçı Mustafa, Memiş and Ali supported Süleyman and insisted on the dethronement. Münib Efendi, Muradzâde, Hafid Efendi and Mustafa İzzet Bey tried to convince them that it would not be appropriate and pledged them to change their minds. However, Bayburdi Süleyman concluded the issue by saying that “Now seeds of enmity have been sown between the Sultan and his subjects.” In his story, Ataullah Efendi has a passive role and Münib, Muradzâde and Hafid Efendi try to prevent the dethronement of Selim III. It is important to underline the fact that, according to Tüfengçibaşı, the talks of the rebels and ulema were realized via the Janissary leaders; they did not take place directly between the ulema and the rebels. For instance, when the rebels expressed their wish for the dethronement of Selim III, the Janissary leaders refrained, saying they would not declare such a serious decision to the Şeyhülislam. But when the rebels began to cry for the accession of Prince Mustafa, the

1812 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 16a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihiçesi”, p. 400: “Varın sergerde ve başbuğlara bir kerre suâl edin daha bir me’süleri var mıdır, tamam mûdür istîfâr olunsun?”

Janissary elders came to the presence of the *ulema* at the Porte. After receiving the reply from the rebels, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi sent news to Paşa Kapısı and called the *ulema* to the Square.\textsuperscript{1814}

One contemporary author does not make any reference to the above-mentioned meeting of the *ulema* and some other figures, but rather remarks that on Friday, Ataullah Efendi and Münib Efendi secretly requested the leaders of the rebels to be satisfied with the abolition of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* and the executions of those on the list.\textsuperscript{1815} The narration is somehow similar to the argument of Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi. However, the author differs in terms of the role of Ataullah Efendi. In his narration, Ataullah Efendi does not ask any deliberate questions that would lead to dethronement of Selim III, rather he asks the rebels to put an end to the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{1816} In his account, it seems that the issue of dethronement was already discussed among the rebels, but not among the *ulema*. For instance, when Ataullah Efendi asks the rebels to end the Rebellion, the leaders beg him not to make such requests.\textsuperscript{1817} Their answer implies that there was pressure from the ordinary rebels for the dethronement of Selim III and they were not able to control it. After this reply, Ataullah Efendi and Münib Efendi seem to have been convinced that there was no other alternative than the dethronement. Consequently, instead of further insistence, they asked for insurance that no harm would come to Selim III after his fall. After the promise of the leaders of the rebels in this regard, Ataullah Efendi and Münib Efendi went to the Porte and talked to Musa Pasha. After learning the matter, Musa Pasha wrote a *telhis* to the Sultan at 3 o’clock [11:30].\textsuperscript{1818} Though not going into most of the above details, another anonymous author

\textsuperscript{1814} Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, *Vaka-yı Selimiyye*, Topkapı 1595, pp. 16-17a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, pp. 400-1.

\textsuperscript{1815} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması.”, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{1816} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması.”, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{1817} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması.”, p. 106: “... bizim silâhımız ile dördüümüzü birden bu odada i’dâm buyurun, ba’dehû neferata cevap verin, böyle olur, sâir tarîk musavver değildir.” It is important to underline that the talk seems to have taken place in a room.

\textsuperscript{1818} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması.”, p. 106.
implies that after sunrise the rebellious crowd began to press hard for the seizure of the remaining names on the list. Noticing the mood of the crowd, the chiefs began to talk about the dethronement of Selim III. The *ulema* tried to change the minds of the rebels. They were unsuccessful and went to the Porte with the rebel chiefs to inform the Kaimmakam Pasha on the matter.\(^{1819}\)

According to Kethüda Said, Ataullah Efendi informed the *sudur-ı kiram* at the Paşa Kapısı on the insistence of the rebels on the capture of the remaining officials. In return, the *sudur-ı kiram* sent Münib Efendi to the Square in order to ensure that the fugitives were being searched for. However, Kethüda Said asserts, in the meantime the rebels began to insist on the enthronement of Prince Mustafa.\(^{1820}\) From his narration it seems that Münib and Ataullah Efendi envisaged no other option than yielding to the new demand, and all the *ulema* at the *Paşa Kapısı* were invited to the Square. After the coming of the *ulema*, the Sekbanbaşı and the Janissary officers, together with the *ulema*, came to Porte. Meanwhile, the ruling elite was busy with putting on their *divan* costumes.\(^{1821}\) Kethüda Said adds one more detail. According to the author the newly appointed Hasan Tahsin Efendi, Halet Efendi and Seyyid Mehmed Efendi were also among this group.\(^{1822}\) Another source confirms that after the departure of the Şeyhülislam from the Square, the rebels began to move towards the Palace.\(^{1823}\) Ebubekir Efendi, the author of *Vaka-yı Cedid*, gives a very short account of the events on Friday, ending with the dethronement of Selim III. Early in

\(^{1819}\) Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsyanı...”, p. 258.

\(^{1820}\) Kethüda Said Efendi, *Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis*, Bayezid 3367, p. 102a; Kethüda Said Efendi, *Neticetü’l-Vekayi*, p. 15: “Ol esnâda firka-yı müctemia beynlerinde saded tebeddül etmiş olub Sultan Selim Han hazretlerinin hal’i sadedini ihdâs etmeleriyle Sultan Mustafa Han .... culûs-ı hümâyûnlarına rağbet ve heveslerin ızhâr ve hal’ maddesinde kemâl mertebe inâd ve isrâr etmeleriyle...”


\(^{1823}\) Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 106.
the morning, the leaders dispatched some *ulema* members to the Porte, demanding dethronement of Selim III, an idea that they initially never thought of.1824

Historian Câbi, on the other hand, refers to a talk between Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and one of the rebel leaders at the Square.1825 According to the author, the latter asked the Şeyhülislam whether one who does not obey the rule of a sultan whose order is against the *sharia* and the established customs (“*kanun-i kadim*”) should be considered as a culprit. In reply, Ataullah Efendi asked for more specific examples. This time the other party asked another question, whether they would be labeled as rebels (“*zorba*”) if they would not obey - but without harming anyone - the order of the Sultan to wear the *Nizam-i Cedid* garments, to perform military drills like the “infidels”, to use weapons (“*harbelü tϋfeng*”), and to beat trumpets which were against the sayings of the Prophet. In reply, Ataullah Efendi assured that they could not be considered rebel under such conditions.1826

Then, Câbi, says, the rebels requested and secured a *fetva*. After getting the first *fetva*, they seem to have secured another *fetva* for the punishment of the statesmen who convinced the Sultan to such anti-*sharia* orders or considerations.1827

One foreign observer asserts that in the morning of 31st May [should be 29th May], Kabakçı Mustafa came to Et Meydanı and gave a speech to the rebels, gazing at the severed heads of the victims lying before him. After talking about the elimination of their “*enemies*” and the dispersion of the *Nizam-i Cedid* soldiers, Kabakçı Mustafa asked whether Selim III deserved to rule over them and advised the audience to consult the *ulema* in that respect. With the exclamations of the rebels in favour of the deposition of the Sultan, Kabakçı Mustafa sent messengers to ask some questions to the *ulema*.1828 Therefore, we

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1824 Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-yı Cedid*, p. 25: “… Bab-ı Ali’ye irsâl ve evvel emrde davalarında ve hülyalarında olmayan cülüs-i hümayunu matlûb...”


1827 Câbi, *Câbi Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 130. Câbi’s narration is very complicated in terms of the chronological flow of events. For instance, it is very difficult to even determine whether the above incident took place on Thursday or Friday.

might suggest that Saint-Denys gives less credit to an active involvement of the ulema in
the dethronement of Selim III, and dwells more on the role of Kabakçı Mustafa. One of the
most important questions posed was whether a sultan whose acts and regulations were
against the religious principles of the Quran, could stay on the throne.\textsuperscript{1829} The Şeyhülislam,
being prepared for such a question, issued a fetva declaring that such a ruler could not stay
on the throne.\textsuperscript{1830} After receiving the fetva, Kabakçı Mustafa made another speech to the
crowd, asking whether they wanted Selim III as their sultan or not.\textsuperscript{1831}

As might be noticed, there is not a common explanation for the incidents that paved
the way for the dethronement of Selim III, especially for the role of the ulema and the
Şeyhülislam. It is also difficult to find a single version as to how the idea of the
dethronement of Selim III materialized. In a similar way, there are quite different details for
the incidents that took place after the dethronement until the accession of Mustafa IV. If we
turn to the Square again, among the cries of the rebels Fatiha was recited for the rise of
Mustafa IV to power. After the decision for the fall of Selim III was taken, the problem for
finding an official that would go the Palace to inform the Sultan seems to have emerged. It
was first suggested that Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and the ulema should go. But Ataullah
Efendi opposed this idea, saying that he would not go alone. Therefore, he accepted to go
with five hundred soldiers, together with a group of ulema, the former sekbanbaşısı and also
Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa.\textsuperscript{1832} The gates of the palace were still closed. Among the cries of “We
do not want the rule of Sultan Selim but Sultan Mustafa Han” the ulema and other elite
reached Imperial Gate (“Bab-ı Hümayun”).\textsuperscript{1833} Upon the advice of Ataullah Efendi, the

\textsuperscript{1829} Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 132.

\textsuperscript{1830} Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 133.


\textsuperscript{1832} Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 17; Derin,
“Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, pp. 401-2

\textsuperscript{1833} Bab-ı Hümayun is the name of the outermost big gate of the Topkapı Palace.
rebels ("efrâd-i asker") waited at the Bab-ı Hûmayun, while the others entered the Palace.1834

Contemporary sources do not provide a single uniform story for the events took place after the arrival at the Palace. According to Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, at the Bab-ı Hûmayun Ataullah Efendi addressed Münib Efendi and asked him to enter the Palace and inform the Sultan about the decision for his dethronement. However, Münib Efendi begged to be excused from such a duty. Upon the hesitation of Münib Efendi, Ataullah Efendi turned to Hafid Efendi, Anadolu Kazaskeri, who accepted the duty. Thereafter, Hafid Efendi went to the Palace together with Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağâ. However, since the palace gates were still closed, they wrote a letter to the chief of the staff of the black enunchs ("Darüssade Ağâ") claiming that there was no way of dispersing the rebels unless Prince Mustafa was enthroned.1835 Upon the increasing numbers of the crowd and the tensions, Hamdullah Bey,1836 the Chief Bailiff ("Çavuşbaşı"), told to Ataullah Efendi, Musa Pasha and the remaining elite who were still at the Porte ("Bab-ı Asafî") to go to the Palace.1837

The author of Yayla İmamı Risalesi has a radically different version for the same story. For him, Kazgancı Mustafa, a few turnacbaşı and some elders of the Janissaries personally went to the Palace and entered the presence of the Sultan. In his story, rather than the ulema or any other figure, the Sultan was the one who told these leaders that he would yield to all the demands of the rebels, like the abolition of the new army system and the deliverance of all of those on the list and thus advised them to put an end to the

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1836 Şehsuvarzâde Hamdullah Bey (Paşa) (d. 1224/1809) became mirahor-ı sani (1190/ 1776), silahdar ağâ (1197/1783) and başçavuş (Ra 1195/January 1785). During the rebellion he was served as çavuşbaşı, after a short time (R1222/June 1807) he was appointed as rikab kaimmakam. For further details, see Appendix I.

Rebellion. Unfortunately, the author seems to have confused several steps and motives leading to the dethronement. For instance, he does not mention the dispatch of two delegates to the Palace to protect the princes. Consequently no reference is made to Mehmed Efendi’s rebuking the Sultan. Rather in his story, Kazgancı Mustafa seems to have the role of talking with the Sultan in a rude manner. After returning to the Square, they informed other leaders that the Sultan was ready to yield to all of their demands. This time, Kabakçı Mustafa rejected the suggestion by arguing that it was not possible to trust the Sultan anymore since though he had cursed the Nizam-ı Cedid previously he did not keep his promise. He insisted that the Janissaries did not want him as the Sultan but Prince Mustafa. Despite the efforts of Kazgancı Mustafa to convince the rebels to refrain from the issue of dethronement, Arnabud Sülü, one of the leaders from the fortresses, declared the final decision for the dethronement of Selim III. After that point, the ulema joined the scene and they went to Bab-ı Hümâyun. After reaching the palace, Musa Pasha, Ataullah Efendi, the kazaskers and Sekbanbaşı asked for permission to enter the Palace, the gates of which were still closed. According to the author, Selim III was at Alay Kiosk at that time. It seems that the Sultan did not allow their entry to the palace and communication between Kaimmakam Musa Pasha and the Sultan was conducted by a messenger ("karakulak"). Through the mediation of the karakulak, the ulema and Musa Pasha and the others begged the Sultan to leave the throne to Prince Mustafa, yet Selim III refused stubbornly. However, witnessing the murder of Mabeynci Ahmed Bey around Soğuk Çeşme seems to have frightened the Sultan who later changed his mind and accepted the

1838 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 229.

1839 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 229: “Şevketlü, sen bunu bu dereceye getirdin ve sende asla merhamet yoktur. Sana her ceza sezâdir.”

1840 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 229.

1841 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, pp. 229-30.

1842 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 230.
accession of Prince Mustafa. Thereafter, the *ulema* and the state elite entered from the gate of Soğuk Çeşme.\footnote{Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 229.}

According to Mustafa Necib, a group of *ulema*, and the Janissary leaders went to the Porte and then with Musa Pasha they entered the Palace and enthroned Mustafa.\footnote{Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Saliş Asrı Vekayı*, p. 53.} Further details on this issue are provided by Historian Câbî: According to him, Şeyhülislam, the *kazaskers* and *Nakibül-eşraf*, followed by the leaders of the rebels went to the Porte and met with Musa Pasha. After the meeting, a decision was taken in favour of the dethronement of Selim III. After the arrival at the Palace, Silahdar Ağa, Darüşsade Ağa and Hazinedar Ağa were called by the *ulema* and statesmen. After the coming of these four palace officials, Kabakçi Mustafa and Kazgancı Mustafa demanded the accession of Prince Mustafa, otherwise the rebellion would not end.\footnote{Câbî, *Câbî Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 139.} The Sultan, hearing the coming of the Şeyhülislam, Kaimmakam and others, refrained voluntarily from the throne.\footnote{Câbî, *Câbî Tarihi*, vol. I, pp. 139-40.} According to Saint-Denys, Selim III had already heard of the decision before he accepted the Şeyhülislam who declared the decision for the accession of Prince Mustafa to the throne.\footnote{Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. II, pp. 136-7.}

Oğulukyan depicts the dethronement of Selim III as a voluntary act by the Sultan himself. According to him, on Friday, the Sekbanbaşi invited him to attend the Friday prayer. However, the Sultan rejected the invitation by claiming that he conceived that the rebellion was against him and he had no subjects as a ruler.\footnote{According to Câbî, the arrangements for the performance of Friday prayer at Sultan Mehmed Mosque were made previously. However, when Selim III was informed by Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi on the issue of dethronement, he refused to attend the Friday Prayer, fearing that he would be dethroned while he was away from the Palace. In turn, Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi suggested that they could find an excuse and attend a mosque closer to the palace. See Câbî, *Câbî Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 139.} Thereafter he invited Prince
Mustafa to take the throne. Meanwhile the crowds had gathered around road from Paşa Kapısı to Soğuk Çeşme Kapısı and then a voice was heard, asking whether they would like to see Mustafa as their new Sultan. The question was repeated three times and replied with affirming cries.

Leaving aside the contradictory information in details, it is clear that the most serious issue on Friday was the dethronement of Selim III and the accession of Mustafa IV to the Ottoman throne. Though Selim III’s voluntary relinquishment of the throne to his cousin is in conformity with the image of Selim III depicted in some contemporary sources, it seems possible that the Sultan did not leave the throne to Prince Mustafa until the last moment.

The biat ceremony took place some time on Friday afternoon. After the enthronement, the new Sultan went to the Ayasofya Mosque around 6 o’clock [14:31]-6:30 [15:01] in order to perform the Friday prayer. It was mostly thanks to the insistence of the soldiers to see and salute the new Sultan during the Friday prayer that Mustafa IV went to the above mosque, and hutbe was read in his name. Çâbi is the only author who notes that the ceremony was in the Sultan Ahmed Mosque at 5 [13:31] o’clock. An American newspaper also informs us that the first visit of Mustafa IV was to Sultan Ahmed

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1849 Oğulukeyan, Ruzname, p. 10.


Mosque. The author of Yayla İmami Risalesi suggests that about 5 [13:31] o’clock it was announced that ceremony would be at Sultan Ahmed, however at 6.15 [14:46], the Sultan visited Ayasofya. Before his visit, the rebels around Bab-ı Hümayun were ordered to stand back and then they stood respectfully in order to salute the new Sultan. After one hour, the new Sultan returned to the Palace. His accession to the throne is celebrated in a contemporary epic poem by Nigârî:

“My soul for thy sake: It is worth to sacrifice!
So may God make your sultanate safe from mischance
Here he hath come to the throne: Sultan Mustafa
First hailing the mosque of Hagia Sophia”

4.6.2. The Capture and Murder of Some Officials

Mustafa IV ascended the throne on Friday, 21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807. As we have already remarked, İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Memiș Efendi, Şafi Efendi, Hasan Şakir Bey and Ebubekir Efendi were the ones executed on Thursday. Before the enthronement of Mustafa IV, the execution of some of the remaining officials on the execution list must have taken place. We have a document which provides the list of the victims who were killed before the accession of Mustafa IV. Apart from those mentioned above, the names of Elhac

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1856 Yayla İmami Risalesi, pp. 230-1.
1857 Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 231.
1858 Öztelli, Uyan Padişahım, p. 103: “Râhuna aşk edem bu canı fêdâ; Vüçudun hatasız eylesin Hüdâ; Tahta cülüs etti Sultan Mustafa; Önce selamlayub Ayasofya’ya”.
İbrahim Efendi, Mabeynci Ahmed Bey, Sirkatibi Ahmed Efendi are included in the same list. This means that from the remaining six people on the list, three of them were murdered on Friday.

Among those, Mabeynci Ahmed seems to be the first one executed on Friday around Soğuk Çeşme and before Alay Kiosk.\textsuperscript{1860} He was found at the house of a non-Muslim at Ördekli Sokak in Kumkapı by the rebels.\textsuperscript{1861} Most of the contemporary sources confirm that he was murdered by the rebels before the enthronement of Mustafa IV.\textsuperscript{1862} Some claim that he was murdered when a group of ulema and ruling elite, followed by the crowds, were marching towards the Palace and at a point close to Alay Kiosk.\textsuperscript{1863} Some time after his murder, the above group arrived at Alay Kiosk and they all gazed at the severed body of Ahmed Efendi, taking it as a warning.\textsuperscript{1864} Tüfengçibaşı remarks that his murder was about the time when Ataullah Efendi and Musa Pasha entered the palace.\textsuperscript{1865} As might be recalled, one author notes that it was his murder that frightened and convinced the Sultan open to gates of the Palace for the group coming for the dethronement.\textsuperscript{1866} However, two

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1860} B.O.A. A.E. (IV. Mustafa) 1929 (21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807). \\
\textsuperscript{1861} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 16b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 120; Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-ı Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 19a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 403. According to one source, he was captured at Sultan Ahmed. See Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, p. 107. \\
\textsuperscript{1865} Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-ı Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 19a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 403. \\
\textsuperscript{1866} \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, p. 230. He notes that the murder took place about 3.30 [12:08] and the accession of Mustafa IV on 5 [13:35] o’clock.
\end{flushright}
other authors argue that his death occurred some time after the enthronement of Mustafa IV, again before the Alay Kiosk.\(^{1867}\)

The murder of Elhac İbrahim Reşid Efendi, the Minister of Navy ("Bahriye Naziri"), followed the first death on Friday. He was among those who escaped on Thursday after the meeting at the Porte. It seems that he first went to the Tersane, and then sought refuge at the residence of Mehmed Emin Vahid Efendi at Ayyansaray, with a few servants.\(^{1868}\) However, after three or five hours, he must have felt insecure there and thus returned to his own residence at Beylerbeyi.\(^{1869}\) There, he hid in the sewer of his mansion, where he was caught upon the information given to the Porte.\(^{1870}\) Consequently, he was captured by the officials sent by the Porte.\(^{1871}\) The important point in his capture is the fact that he was the sole fugitive who was captured by state officials rather than the rebels. Indeed, Mustafa Necib remarks that an enderun çukadar of Musa Pasha was responsible for his capture.\(^{1872}\) According to Oğulukyan, the new Sultan, who was asked about his fate, left the decision to the Janissaries, but ordered him first to be taken to the Porte.\(^{1873}\) Consequently, İbrahim

\(^{1867}\) Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsyani...”, p. 259; Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 11.


\(^{1871}\) Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 17a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 121.


Efendi was brought to the Porte and kept at the room of Çavuşbaşı Hamdullah Bey.\textsuperscript{1874} Contrary to those captured by the rebels, he was relatively well received and brought to the Porte on a horse and offered coffee.\textsuperscript{1875} Unfortunately, this did not change his fate and he was later delivered to the rebels who surrounded the building.\textsuperscript{1876} Öğulukyan comments that the rebels were afraid that he would be executed by the Porte and only his head would be sent to them.\textsuperscript{1877} After receiving him, the rebels forced İbrahim Efendi to walk towards Et Meydanı under attacks.\textsuperscript{1878} Unable to move further, he was murdered at a spot in Bayezid.\textsuperscript{1879} The above-mentioned document also confirms his murder at Bayezid.\textsuperscript{1880} Ebubekir Efendi gives some clues that might help us to determine a rough time of his death. According to the author, his murder corresponded to the time when the cauldrons were


\textsuperscript{1875} Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 17b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 121; Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 141.

\textsuperscript{1876} Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 17b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 122.

\textsuperscript{1877} Öğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{1878} Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 17b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 122; Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İşyanı...”, p. 258; Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yi Cedid, p. 27; Öğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 13.


\textsuperscript{1880} B.O.A. A.E (IV. Mustafa) 1929 (21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807).
carried back to the barracks. Therefore, the crowd bringing İbrahim Efendi met the cebeceis returning from the Square with their cauldron. According to the author, it was the cebeceis who murdered him on the spot one hour before the evening and it was after the accession of Mustafa IV. Some authors note that after the Friday Prayer the crowds began to return when he was captured and the Square was becoming less crowded. On the other hand, Asım argues that after the Friday Prayer, the rebels were still insisting on the deliverance of the fugitives and had returned to the Square for this purpose. Confirming information is also provided by the author of Bir İmamın Günlüğü and Kethüda Said Efendi. If we rely on this explanation Elhac İbrahim Efendi must have been murdered on Friday and within a few hours after the enthronement of Mustafa IV.

Sırkatibi Ahmed Bey was found by the rebels at the house of his chief-kitchener ("aşçıbaşı") at Bozdoğan Kemerı. In order to escape from death, he tried to jump to the

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1881 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 17b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 122. See also Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 108.

1882 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 17b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 122. See also Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 108.


1885 Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 103a; Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 16a; Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüüğü, p. 173.

1886 B.O.A. A.E. (IV Mustafa) 1929 (21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807); Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsynı...”, p. 258; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 17a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 120; Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 27-8; Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, 136; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 52; Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 228; Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 109; B.O.A. C. AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807); Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüüğü, pp. 173-4; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 40; Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimıyve, Topkapı 1595, p. 22a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arıf Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 407; Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, pp. 103a-103; Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 16. According to a foreign report, he jumped from the window of his mansion in order to escape torture, See from Isaac Morier to George Canning Principal Secretary of State Foreign Affairs, Malta, 1 August 1807, (PRO, FO 78-58). Some sources argue that he was found on Saturday morning: Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 27; Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 100.
roof of another house.\textsuperscript{1887} He was not successful in this attempt and yet survived after the fall. However, he must have been fatally wounded since he was decapitated immediately after his fall by the rebels “so that he would not die canonically unclean” (“murdar olmasın diye”).\textsuperscript{1888} It is clear that he was murdered at the spot since he probably would not have survived being carried to the Et Meydanı. According to Mustafa Necib, Tüfengçibaşı and Oğulukyan, Ahmed Bey was murdered by the servants of novice Janissaries (“Acemi oğlanları”).\textsuperscript{1889} We should note that there is confusion in the details of the death and names of Sirkatibi Ahmed and İbrahim Efendi in the account of Saint-Denys. According to the author, it was İbrahim Efendi who jumped from the roof of the residence where he sought refuge.\textsuperscript{1890} Ahmed Bey’s severed head was sent to the Square while the body was dragged by the Jews and Christians under the pressure of the rebels and finally left around Şehzadebaşı.\textsuperscript{1891} A was poem recited for his murder:

\begin{quote}
“He hath flown off the roof and ended up in hell
That is long enough to fly for such a scoundrel”\textsuperscript{1892}
\end{quote}
There are some interesting details on the murder of Şırkatibi Ahmed Bey and Mabeynci Ahmed Bey. As might be recalled both were palace officials and seem to have left their offices sometime before the Rebellion. According to Ebubekir Efendi, he heard of the disorder at the fortresses, Şırkatibi Ahmed Efendi requested to be admitted to become a müderris with the “hamise paye”. The purpose seems to be to escape death by entering the religious career. Tüfengçibaşı asserts that it was on Wednesday that Ahmed Bey wrote a note (“şukka”) to Salih Bey, the superintendent of the Treasury (“hazine kethüdası”), in which he asked Salih Bey to request the Sultan to secure him the above müderris degree. According to Asım, he was given this rank on 18 Ra 1222/26 May 1807. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi gives some more details as to what happened afterwards: Selim III approved the requests and sent the related document to the Şeyhülislam. During the same night Bülbül Hafız Feyzullah Efendi was appointed as the new mabeynci and sırkatibi. The same night Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi was also sent away from the Palace with the title of Kapıcıbaşı. He was granted the diploma by the Sultan, but it remained at the Porte among the turmoil of the ensuing Rebellion.

The total number of people murdered during the Rebellion, until the accession of Mustafa IV, was eight people from the execution list, namely, Memiş, Safi, Ebubekir, İbrahim Nesim, Hasan Şakir, Elhac İbrahim, Şırkatibi Ahmed and Mabeynci Ahmed Bey. If we add Halil Haseki, Mahmud Raif Efendi, the mühürdar of Mahmud Raif Efendi, the mehterbaşi of İbrahim Nesim Efendi and the chief orderly (“kapı çukadarı”) of Hacı

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1896 Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 17a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 121. According to Câbi, on the other hand, he was granted the diploma on 5 S 1222/14 April 1807, about one month before the rebellion. However, there is no further evidence to support his claim. See Câbi Ömer Efendi, *Câbi Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 122.
Ahmedzâde, the total number of the murdered people reaches to fourteen.\footnote{1897}{B.O.A. A.E. (IV Mustafa) 1929 ((21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807). On the other hand, \textit{The Mercantile Advertiser}, depending on a French Newspaper, argues that fifteen people were put to death: İbrahim [Nesim] Efendi, Haci İbrahim Efendi, İngiliz Mahmud Efendi, Selim Efendi, B cultivation Efendi, Hasaniko, the custom-house officer, tersane emini Morevi Ali Efendi, \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid defterdarı} Ahmed Efendi, [Mabeynci] Kör Ahmed Efendi, Sırbatı Ahmed Efendi, Bostancıbaşı, Yusuf Ağa, Şamil Ragib Efendi, Halil Haseki, Kapan Naibi, \textit{The Mercantile Advertiser}, 1807.09.23; issue 4713; p. 2. As we have seen above, there is no mention of names such as Hasaniko, Morevi Ali Efendi, Selim [Sabit] Efendi, and Ragib Efendi in the contemporary Ottoman sources. Leaving aside the historical facts, the importance of such news is the fact that they reflect the gossip, circulating around the city.} The next day, the relatives of the victims were allowed to take and bury the corpses of those on the Square and other places.\footnote{1899}{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 25a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 410.}

\section*{4.7. The Political Purge and Survivals}

The pressure for the execution of the remaining fugitives did not end after the accession of Mustafa IV. The rebels insisted on the execution of Abdüllatif Efendi, the \textit{kapan naibi}, and Yusuf Ağa, and the Kethüda of late Valide Sultan. Since Yusuf Ağa was on pilgrimage, he was able to escape death. When he arrived at Geyve, on the way to the capital, he was exiled. However, his enemies pressed hard for his execution. On the other hand, Abdüllatif Efendi was a \textit{müderris} and was banished by the order of the Şeyhülislam. His \textit{müderris} title was erased, he was granted the rank of \textit{mirimiran} and executed.
thereafter. Therefore, except for Ahmed Bey, the director of the İrade-i Cedid, all of the figures on the list were murdered.

4.7.1. Survival of Ahmed Bey

The only person on the list that was able to escape a certain death was Ahmed Bey, the director of the İrade-i Cedid. He was also on the list and sought shelter after the meeting at the Porte.1900

There are different stories in the contemporary sources about his escape. According to Tüfengçibaşı, he went to the Janissary barracks to hide and was finally found at the kitchen of the 100th regiment.1901 Câbi also confirms the above information and notes that he begged the Janissaries to save him.1902 His attempt to seek shelter at the barracks must have the next day after the accession. For instance, one source narrates that about the time the ulama were returning home after the meeting at the Square, the news of presence at the barracks reached the Janissary commanders there.1903 Indeed Kethüda Said clearly expresses that he was caught on Saturday.1904 When found, he was in very miserable condition and was paralyzed by the danger of an imminent death.1905

1900 According to Asım, he was not included in the list of those demanded by the rebels. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 41. However, we have seen that he was very certainly included in the famous list. According to the author, only ten people were in the list. The missing one person in his list should be Ahmed Bey.


Most of the contemporary sources do not mention his adventure before reaching the Janissary barracks. Thanks to details provided by Mustafa Necib Efendi, we have some clues in this respect. According to the author, Ahmed Bey sought shelter immediately after the meeting at the Porte that ended with a quarrel between Şemseddin Efendi and İbrahim Nesim Efendi. He informs us that actually he did not go far away and hide in the house of one of his friends in the vicinity of the Paşa Kapısı. However, suspecting a possible betrayal by his host, he ran away from this house late in the evening. From there he went to the house of his kethüda in Kirazlı Mescid, close to Süleymaniye. His steward informed the Janissary leaders of the matter, so that they would not send a watchman (“kolcu”) to that region. However, his place was discovered upon the betrayal of a child. Thereafter, he was captured by the rebels and while he was being brought to the Square, the watchmen saved him from the hands of the rebels and brought Ahmed Bey to the barracks on the grounds that he was their comrade (“yoldaş”) and a well-wisher (“hayır-hâh”) of the Janissary army. Therefore, Ahmed Bey was taken to the barracks. As it is clear from the above details, there are different versions of his coming to the barracks. While some argued that he had already hidden there, others asserted that he later sought refuge or finally some others believed that he never came to the barracks but contacted with the Janissaries.

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1906 According to Ebubekir Efendi it was the barrack of the 76th regiment. See Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-ı Cedid, p. 28; Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, on the other hand, states that it was the 100th regiment and then he was taken to the 56th regiment. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-ı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 24; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 410. Oğuluğyan does not mention his escape to the barracks, but asserts that he begged the Janissaries excusing that he was very recently appointed to the office. See Oğuluğyan, Ruzname, p. 14. Kethüda Said, on the other hand, claims that he was captured in a certain place and then brought to the barracks. See Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-ı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, pp. 103-104a; Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 16. Another source notes that it was the 64th regiment. See Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, 110.

1907 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 50.

1908 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 51.

1909 For details see Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 51.

1910 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 52.
This confusion in various accounts might be related to the efforts of the contemporary historians to find an answer to his escape from certain death. In this regard, the common theme in almost all of them seems to be the connection of Ahmed Bey, in one way or another, with of the leading figures of the Janissary army. Some sources note that the real reason that convinced the Janissaries to protect and save his life was his construction of the Janissary barracks and his good relations with them.  

Official information also confirms this statement:

The second treasurer Ahmed Bey was captured and is currently imprisoned in the Janissary barracks. Yet, as the abovementioned person had been previously in charge of constructing the barracks of the regiment, he properly constructed and restored our barracks. Therefore we beg for the imperial favour for his pardon and release.

He was indeed the construction supervisor (“bina emini”) of the Janissary barracks, before his appointment as director of the İrād-i Cedid. Kethüda Said adds one more factor for explaining his protection by the Janissary officials, namely the intervention and favour (“rica”) of Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa. Sekbanbaşı probably played a role since another author also argues that Ahmed Bey initially did not go to the barracks, but from the place of his hiding sent a letter to the Sekbanbaşi, begging him to save his life. After the approval of Sekbanbaşi, he came to the barracks in disguise. Asim also argues that he

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1912 B.O.A. HAT 53006 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “Şîkk-i Sânî defterdârı Ahmed Bey ahz ile el-yevm dergâh-ı ali yeniceri kışlalarında mahbûs olub ancak mîr-i mûmâ-ileyh mukaddemâ ocaḳ-ı âmirlerinin kışlaları binâ’ emânetine memur olmak hasebiyle kışlalarımız güzel binâ ve ihyâ eyledi afv ve tîlâkına müsâade-i seniyye buyurulmasın”. The document is a telhîs. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.


was saved thanks to his previous duty of repairing of the barracks and also the favour of the Sekbanbaşı. Yet, according to the author, he was not among the list of victims, a factor that made his survival easier. However, as we have studied above, Ahmed Bey was certainly in the execution list. In Mustafa Necib’s version, on the other hand, the person to whom the Janissaries applied for the survival of Ahmed Bey becomes Kabakçı Mustafa.

Another issue that remains obscure is the issue of whether Ahmed Bey was taken to the Square or remained at the barracks until he was allowed to go home. A contemporary author provides some details: While those in the Square were intending to kill him, the leading figures advised the rebels that it would not be ethical to murder a person who sought refuge in their barracks and then advised them to leave the decision to the Sultan. Tüfengçibaşı also mentions that he was taken to the Square, but there is no mention of a letter sent to the Porte. Instead, he says that Ahmed Bey was assured that he would not be killed since he sought refuge in the Janissary barracks. He was kept at the barracks for that night and then sent to his own house. Câbi notes that he was later transferred to Tophane. According to the same author, he or the Janissaries bribed the leaders of the rebels for the purpose of not opposing the protection of Ahmed Bey by the Janissaries. The official document which makes a brief reference to the issue, states that he was imprisoned at the barracks of the Janissaries. It also makes one more point clear, that the Janissaries kept Ahmed Bey at the barracks and asked the Sultan for his release via the Sekbanbaşı.

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1921 B.O.A. HAT 53006 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

1922 B.O.A. HAT 53006 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).
4.7.2 The Execution of Yusuf Ağa

The pressure for the execution of Yusuf Ağa was great. His sole chance was his absence city during the Rebellion. As might be recalled he was the famous valide kethüda who exerted great power over the palace and Porte until the death of the Valide Sultan (1805). After her death, Yusuf Ağa decided to go on a pilgrimage. However, since the roads to Medina were closed by the Wahhabis, Yusuf Ağa returned without having performed the pilgrimage. The Rebellion broke out while he was on the way to İstanbul. Consequently he was not in the city during the Rebellion, but his possessions were confiscated and his house was sealed up by the center.

Contemporary authors have different stories for his exile and later execution. According to one version, he arrived at Geyve (in present-day Kocaeli) on 5 R 1222/12 June 1807 and at this village he received the imperial edict that exiled him to Kütahya. According to Kethüda Said, initially there was an imperial edict for his execution, however he was later forgiven and banished to Kütahya. On the other hand, Mustafa Necib has a different story. According to him, Yusuf Ağa was around Bozok (present-day Yozgat) when the Rebellion broke out. He sought refuge in Bozok under the authority of Cabbarzade Süleyman so that it would be difficult to execute him. As might be recalled Süleyman Bey was one of the most important local magnates of Anatolia.

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1923 Mihrışan Sultan died in December 1805.


1926 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmânî, pp. 21a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 129. According to the author, since the dethronement of Selim III occurred when he arrived at Geyve, Yusuf Ağa was banished to Kütahya.


Unfortunately it was not possible to come across any official document referring to his initial exile to Kütahya. The contemporary narratives also provide confusing details in this respect.\textsuperscript{1929} If he really was exiled to Kütahya, the duration of his stay at Kütahya is not clear. According to Ebubekir Efendi, upon his request to the Porte, his place of exile was changed to Bursa, but he does not give a time frame.\textsuperscript{1930} There are some documents related to his exile to Bursa. As far as we learn from the first document, an imperial edict was issued previously for Yusuf Ağa’s exile to Bursa and for the protection of his possessions.\textsuperscript{1931} The document does not have an exact date, but according to Oğulukyan an imperial edict for his exile was produced on 27 May (Julian calendar), corresponding to 8 June 1807.\textsuperscript{1932} Accordingly, the writer of the above-mentioned document informs the Sultan that the imperial edict was sent for Yusuf Ağa’s exile to Bursa and the valuable goods present with him were sent to the capital.\textsuperscript{1933} Indeed, we have a copy of the imperial edict which ordered the exile of Yusuf Ağa to Bursa and the confiscation of his goods.\textsuperscript{1934} Even though the records do not make any references to where

\textsuperscript{1929} Kethûda Said Efendi does not make any reference to Yusuf Ağa’s request but notes that his place of exile was changed to Bursa. See Kethûda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vakayı Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, p. 108a; \textit{Neticetü‘l-Vekayi}, p. 20. For a repetition of the same details, see Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 44. The author of \textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi} just notes that he stayed in Bursa after the Rebellion, no mention of the first place of exile and the related imperial orders. See \textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi}, p. 236. Çâbi does not mention his exile to Kütahya either and writes as if Yusuf Ağa voluntarily went to Bursa. See Çâbi, \textit{Çâbi Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{1930} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 21a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{1931} B.O.A. HAT 53028 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).


\textsuperscript{1933} B.O.A. HAT 53028 (undated). In another document the list of the valuable goods he possessed during the time of execution is given. There existed nine items in the list, including a dagger, a red ruby ring, a golden box, a jade box decorated with diamond, another golden box, a box decorated with diamond. All of them was decorated with invaluable jewels. See T.S.M.A. E. 534-176 (undated). In another document it is recorded that the horses of deceased Yusuf Ağa and one horse of the deceased Kapan naibi were brought to Istanbul and delivered to the Master of Horse. See B.O.A. HAT 53864 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

\textsuperscript{1934} B.O.A. HAT 53827 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “Yusuf Ağa’yı Bursa’ya nefy edesin. Mali mîrîden hafz olund”. 
he was at the time, this eliminates the assertions that Yusuf Ağa went to Bursa voluntarily. Rather it is clear that it was due to a formal decision. In addition to what it does say, what the document is also important: For instance, in the case of changes in the place of exile, the official documents usually declare that the place of exile was transferred (“tahvil”) from there to somewhere else. In the above-mentioned record there is no implication in this regard, therefore it is difficult to be sure whether Bursa was the second place of exile or not. A report by Mehmed Emin, a müteferrika of dergah-ı ali, clarifies some points. Mehmed Efendi notes that he met Yusuf Ağa at Geyve and brought him to Bursa. This report proves that Yusuf Ağa’s first place of exile was Bursa. Therefore, with the help of the archival documents, we can be sure that Yusuf Ağa was at Geyve and banished to Bursa by an imperial order.

In the capital, it seems that the yamaks were worried about that Yusuf Ağa’s exile to Bursa since they considered this as a sign of his exemption from execution. In fact, it was not only the yamaks who were dissatisfied with the exile and exerted pressure on the government. His opponents in the capital were not calmed down by Yusuf Ağa’s exile. For instance, Câbi narrates that some people in the capital were pressing hard for his execution, arguing that the rule of Mustafa IV would not stabilize if such an influential figure of the previous reign continued to survive. As far as reflected in an official document, at the end the Sultan was informed of the necessity of executing Yusuf Ağa since the gossip (“kayl ü kal”) about him had increased considerably. In return, the Sultan

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1935 Müteferrika, the department of a police-station dealing with petty offenses and licences.

1936 B.O.A. HAT C. SM. 4876 (9 Ca 1222/15 July 1807).


ordered the issue of a fetva for his execution.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53175 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). It is by Kaimmakam Pasha. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.} Thereafter, the Kaimmakam secretly informed the Reisülküttab and asked him to write a note (“tezkere”) to the Şeyhülislam. Consequently, the Şeyhülislam produced a fetva at the upper margin of the tezkere of the Reisülküttab, approving the execution of Yusuf Ağə.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53175 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).} Sending the related tezkere to the Sultan, the Kaimmakam asked for the final decision of the Sultan. In case of the approval by the Sultan, a haseki would be sent for the execution. Kaimmakam Pasha advised that the whole affair should be conducted very secretly.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53175 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).} In reply, Mustafa IV wrote a short note which approved the execution of Yusuf Ağə and ordered the dispatch of a haseki for that purpose. The Sultan, too, demanded that the issue be conducted in secret, so that Yusuf Ağə would not have time to escape.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53175 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).} Consequently, Yusuf Ağə was executed by an haseki\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53175 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).} sent to Bursa.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53175 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).} An imperial edict, addressing the prominent figures of Bursa, ordered the execution of Yusuf Ağə without delay. The order carries the date of evail-i R/8-17 June, which implies that he was executed in mid-June in Bursa.\footnote{B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 95, order no. 273 (evail-i R 1222/8-17 June 1807).} If we rely on Mustafa Necib Efendi’s account, Yusuf Ağə must have been executed two days after his arrival at Bursa.\footnote{Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, pp. 65, 67.} His severed head was sent to the capital. It seems that his decapitated head arrived to İstanbul sometime after the second half of June 1807.\footnote{Oğulukyan, gives 12 June (Julian calendar)/24 June (Gregorian calendar), Ruzname, p. 14; Asım gives the date as 17 R/24 June, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 44; Ebubekir}
Oğulukyan provide the copy his placard ("yatfe"). According to it, Yusuf Ağa was accused of abusing his office, being greedy and oppressing the poor especially by introducing the *Nizam-i Cedid*.\footnote{For the copy of the placard, see Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 21b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 129; Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 15.}

### 4.7.3. The Execution of Abdüllatif Efendi

Another figure executed after some delay was Abdüllatif Efendi, the director of granaries. He was a müderris and the only figure in the list of the rebels that had a religious career. He served as the kapan naib for a long period of time.

According to the author of *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, ten days after the murder of Yusuf Ağa, the imperial edict for his execution was produced.\footnote{*Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 236.} In the list reporting the figures murdered before the accession of Mustafa IV, there is a strange note about the fate of Abdüllatif Efendi. In the document, it is stated that Abdüllatif Efendi was “poisoned”.\footnote{B.O.A. A.E. (IV Mustafa) 1929 (21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807): “dakik kapanı naibi efendi zehir nüşüyla maktul”.

\footnote{For the copy of the placard, see Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 21b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 129; Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 15.}

There are two historical mistakes in this information. First of all, as we shall see later, Abdüllatif Efendi was not executed at this time, i.e. not before the rise of Mustafa IV. Moreover, he was executed rather than being poisoned.

Contemporary accounts provide contradictory information concerning his capture and execution. According to Ebubekir, after hiding for ten or twelve days Abdüllatif Efendi emerged.\footnote{Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 19b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 126.} If we suppose that he sought shelter on Thursday, 20 Ra/28 May, it means that he was captured on around 10 June or 12 June. Tüfengçibaşi Arif Efendi, on the other hand, gives an earlier date and argues that Abdüllatif Efendi was captured on 22 Ra/30 May, Efendi, as 18 R/25 June, *Vaka-yi Cedid*, p. 30; while Câbi gives 9 R/16 June as the date of arrival of his head. See Câbi, *Câbi Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 154.

\footnote{For the copy of the placard, see Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 21b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 129; Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 15.}

\footnote{B.O.A. A.E. (IV Mustafa) 1929 (21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807): “dakik kapanı naibi efendi zehir nüşüyla maktul”.}

\footnote{Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 19b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 126.}
while the *ulema* and rebels were still at the Square.\textsuperscript{1953} Therefore according to him, Abdüllatif was captured one day after the accession of Mustafa IV. When news of his capture reached to Square, he says, the leaders of the Square (“meydan ağaları”) hesitated to murder him on the grounds that he was from the *ulema* class and consequently advised that the decision should be left to the Şeyhülislam.\textsuperscript{1954} Oğulukyan, on the other hand, does not give any of the above details, yet remarks that the rebels wished to kill him too, but because he belonged to the *ulema* class, he was saved by the Şeyhülislam and then banished to Bursa.\textsuperscript{1955} Most of the contemporary sources confirm that Abdüllatif Efendi was saved by Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi who was concerned preserving the honour of the religious class.\textsuperscript{1956} Indeed, some sources assert that he was exiled to Sinop, even without being discovered in his place of hiding.\textsuperscript{1957} According to one narrative, on the other hand, his execution was delayed not due to the interference of the Şeyhülislam, but rather to give him time to finish accounts of the *kapan-i dakik*. After the completion of the work, the author asserts, he was ordered for exile to Sinop Castle, but then this was changed to Bursa.\textsuperscript{1958}

We have an official document which clarifies some conflicting points in contemporary sources. It seems it was written by the *kaimmakam* to Mustafa IV. The *kaimmakam* first makes a reference to a *tezkere* written by Şeyhülislam Efendi and then makes some comments on it. From the information provided in the document, it becomes very clear that Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi was really involved in the issue. As a first act,


\textsuperscript{1955} Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 15.


\textsuperscript{1958} Uzunçarşılı, “Kabaçığı Mustafa İsyanı...”, p. 260.
Abdüllatif Efendi’s name was erased by the Şeyhülislam from the _ulema_ class. Then Ataullah Efendi wrote a _tezkere_ to the Reisülküttab which informed the latter on the matter and declared his exile to a distant city. Thus, the document makes it clear that Şeyhülislam Efendi had a role in his escape from death whatever the reason was. Most probably he was trying to prevent the execution of a member of religious the class and thinking that his elimination from the _ulema_ class and exile would be enough for the punishment of Abdüllatif Efendi. However, the writer of the record notes to the Sultan that this was considered as a minor persecution by the soldiers (“asakir”) and there were signs that Abdüllatif’s enemies would not calm down with his banishment. Therefore, he suggests execution of Abdüllatif Efendi and asks for an imperial edict to approve the execution. Thus, the fate of Abdüllatif Efendi was sealed by a short note of approval by the Sultan at the top of the same document. There is a short note in another document which read “the former director of the granaries should be executed.” Unfortunately, it is not clear whether it was written after the exile of Abdüllatif Efendi or not. Even though there is a reference to his exile to a distant place, no specific city is recorded. However, lack information on his exile to Bursa or the grant of _mirimiranlık_ suggests that the document was written while Abdüllatif Efendi was still in Istanbul. If our last supposition is true, we can assume that due to a probable intervention of the Şeyhülislam he was sent to Bursa and evaded death for some time. One clarification in this regard comes from another document, which is in fact the imperial edict sent to Bursa _naibi_ (deputy of judge) for the execution of Abdüllatif Efendi. The document states that he was first sent to Bursa, then his name was erased from the _ulema_ class by the Şeyhülislam and finally he was given the rank of

1959 B.O.A. HAT 1361/53651 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

1960 B.O.A. HAT 1361/53651 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

1961 B.O.A. HAT 1361/53651 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).


mirimiran. His name was erased from the müderris class and he was promoted to the above rank on 15 R 1222/22 June 1807.

We have some confirming information from the contemporary sources as well. Kethüda Said states that Abdüllatif Efendi was first exiled to Bursa, his ulema rank was erased and then he was granted the rank of mirimiran. Mustafa Necib and Câbî confirm that he was granted the rank of Pasha with two horse-hair plumes ("iki tuğ") while he was on exile. It is clear that a good formula was invented for the execution of Abdüllatif Efendi. Even though his name was eradicated from the ulema class, it was probably still difficult to execute a former member of the ulema. Therefore, promoting him to the rank of Pasha would make his execution possible. Turning back to the last document under study, it orders the related officials in Bursa to execute Abdüllatif Efendi immediately after the arrival of the edict. Needless to say, there is no reference to the pressure from certain groups in the city, but rather the cause of his execution is explained as due to Abdüllatif Pasha’s unruly behaviours against the demands of the Sultan. The date of the edict is evas-ı R 1222/18-26 June. Therefore, his execution in Bursa should be around the end of June. Fortunately we have a document which provides the exact date of his death, 24 R 1222/1 July 1807. This means that he was executed nine days after the promotion to the rank of mirimiran. The arrival of his severed head was around the very end of the same


1965 B.O.A. C.DH. 1857 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). It is a list of appointments.

1966 Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 104a; Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 20


1969 B.O.A. C.DH. 1857 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).
In his placard ("yafte"), he was accused of oppressing the merchants of the kapan and the poor.

4.8. Conclusion

In this section we tried to establish the chronological account of the Rebellion, depending on the comparative analysis of the contemporary narratives and the available documentary sources. Except for the last part, on the execution of Yusuf Ağa and Abdüllatif Efendi, we tried to proceed on a daily basis and tried to give a detailed account of the incidents that took place within five days from the outbreak of the Rebellion to the accession of Mustafa IV, with the concern of placing the incidents in a time frame.

Apart from this concern, we tried to find answers to some important issues. One of most important issues was whether the Rebellion started among the yamaks of the fortresses due to the attempt of the center to impose the Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms on the yamaks. As in most topics, we have seen that there was conflicting comments and information in the contemporary sources. Consequently, we were not able to find a clear answer to this issue. However, we have detected a more important factor that accelerated the unrest among the yamaks. It was the conscious attempt of the center to station the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers at some of the fortresses which increased the anxiety of the yamaks and made them suspicious that the center was trying to replace them with the new army. The available documentary information also encourages us to think that the yamaks initially did not set out to create a Rebellion, but met at Umur Yeri to discuss the issue of uniforms. It seems very likely that the intervention and consequent murder of Halil Haseki changed

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1971 For his full placard ("yafte"), see Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 19b-20a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 126. Shorter references are also available in Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 15; Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 144.
the color of the meeting. With the intentional murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi, the rebels understood that there was no return and it turned into an uprising in the real sense.

Another important question was the role of the *ulema* in the Rebellion and their collaboration with the rebels. Again, available information does not offer enough material to reach a conclusion in this respect, but helps us to question the taken-for granted assumptions as to the preparation of the famous list by the *ulema* and especially the Şeyhülislam, their eagerness to collaborate with the rebels and to work against the interests of the center. The available clues suggest that Ataullah Efendi and some high ranking *ulema* were not at the Square while the execution list was being prepared at the Square by the rebels. It seems more likely that the list was prepared by the rebels and was open to suggestion. It was later submitted to the Şeyhülislam. Consequently, it also helps us the claims by some contemporary and later historians that the execution list was prepared beforehand by Musa Pasha. Moreover, the famous Şeyhülislam and other *ulema* seem not to have played a leading role, but rather yielded to the pressure of the rebels and consented the fall of Selim III from power.
CHAPTER 5
INSTABILITY AND INSECURITY: THE SHORT REIGN OF MUSTAFA IV

"Kildi Sultan Mustafa evreng-i pür-uluvva
çulus" 1972

“Rumeli’den geldi bir çatak
Mihr-i hümayunu aldı çabucak
Sultan Mahmud’u etti çıçak
Bayram ertesi ya kılıç oynar ya biçak” 1973

5.1. Introduction

This chapter could be considered as a continuation of the previous one, in which we tried to establish a basic chronology for the five days of the May 1807 Rebellion. To put in a very simple way, it started with the murder of Halil Haseki and ended with the dethronement of Selim III. However, the individuals, factions and the problems involved with the uprising did not disappear immediately after the Rebellion. There was not a stable rule and the earlier tensions continued to exist during the reign of Mustafa IV. For instance, immediately after the Rebellion, unrest arouse in the army. The imperial army suffered the dismissal and later the murder of a Janissary Ağa, and also, the forced deposition of a Grand Vizier. The capital, too, witnessed frequent depositions in high offices, including the post of the Şeyhülislam due to the intrigues plotted by various power groups. The residents


1973 Quoted from Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüğü, p. 111.
of the capital were not also affected by the turbulent atmosphere of the period. In this respect, the real breaking point that led to the end of the May 1807 Rebellion seems to have been the death of Selim III and the accession of Mahmud II. During the grand vizirate of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, the remnants of the earlier factions or individuals were eliminated to a great extent.

One of the basic purposes of this chapter is to establish a factographic background of the reign of Mustafa IV. For practical purposes, rather than studying each individual event of the period on a daily basis or dwelling on almost every scene, we will make a survey of the most important developments or incidents of his reign; namely the preparation of the Legal Document ("Hüccet-i Şer'iyye"), disorder in the army, the Çardak Incident, the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa, the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and the dethronement of Mustafa IV. The main course to be followed in the present chapter will be to keep track of the incidents reflecting the clash between various parties or individuals, particularly the ones where the former rebels were either directly involved or acted as a pressure group.

5.2 The Aftermath of the Rebellion

In chronological terms, we have last covered was the accession of Mustafa IV on Friday, 21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807. As might be recalled, the new Sultan attended the Friday ceremony and returned to the Palace. The period that we refer to as the aftermath of the Rebellion is quite long span of time covering fourteen months, starting from Mustafa IV’s accession and ending with his fall. In this part we will concentrate on the first four days after the uprising. The most important incidents during this short period were the grant of positions and money to the rebels and the preparation of a document known as Hüccet-i Şer'iyye.
5.2.1. Grants to the Chiefs of the Rebels

After the Friday ceremony, the rebels returned to the Et Meydanı where they had spent the night. At the Square, they were offered food and granted some presents by the new Sultan.1974 The members of the ulema went their homes and returned to the Square on the following day, Saturday, 22 Ra/30 May, for a meeting.1975 During that day, a meeting was held at the Janissary barracks. Among the participants were the ulema, Sekbanbaşı, ex-sekbanbaşı and the elders and influential figures of the Janissary army. Apparently, the main purpose of the meeting was to discuss the measures to be taken to disband the rebels. During the meeting, the chiefs of the rebels were questioned whether they had any further requests from the new Sultan.1976 Upon their request, some of the chiefs were promoted to certain positions. Tüfengçibaşı claims that Kabakçı Mustafa was appointed as the superintendent of the Bosphorus forts to replace İnçe Mehmed Pasha.1977 An official document, on the other hand, suggests that the figure who replaced İnçe Pasha was Kazgançı Mustafa Ağa, not Kabakçı Mustafa.1978 As might be recalled, İnçe Mehmed Pasha


1977 “Karadeniz Boğazı’nda vaki’ Rumeli kaledelerinin nezâret ve ağaltığı ki iki ay mukaddemce kil’a-ı mezbüreye iki tuğ ile İnçe Mehmed Bey nasb olunmuşken vak’a zuhurunda firâr ile hânesinde ihtifâ etmekden nâşî mîr-i mümâileyh yerini iltimâs etmekle...”. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, pp. 22-23a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihcesi”, p. 408. Ebubekir Efendi also argues that Kabakçı Mustafa was appointed as the muhafız of the forts in place of İnçe Mehmed Pasha. See Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.114.

1978 B.O.A. HAT 53006 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “Boğaz kaledeleri muhafazasına İnçe Mehmed Paşa kulları me’mûr olub bu defa azl olunmuş olduğundan
was promoted to the rank of *mirimiran* and appointed as the Rumeli *Beylerbeyi* 12 L 1221/23 December 1806 provided that he would protect the Black Sea Straits. Asım neither mentions exactly when these appointments took place nor makes any reference to the meeting under question. He solely notes that Kabakçı Mustafa was granted the rank of *turnabaşı*, Süleyman was appointed as a captain ("kapudan") and Kazgancı Laz Hacı Mustafa as the Boğaz *muhafız.* On the other hand, in an official document, Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa is referred to as "ağya-yı Boğaz Seyyid Mustafa". The document carries the date of Sunday, 23 Ra 1221/31 May 1807; therefore, Kabakçı Mustafa must have been appointed as the Bosphorus superintendent either on Saturday or Sunday. In the same document, Kazgancı Mustafa is referred as a Janissary officer presiding over the treasury of the 25th regiment ("mütevelli"). Unfortunately, we do not know the exact date for the dismissal of İnce Mehmed Pasha from the above-mentioned position; yet, but one document confirms that Nuhası/Kazgancı Elhac Mustafa Ağa, with the rank of *Zağarcıbaşı*, was appointed as the "*muhafız of Bahr-i Siyah*" on 27 Ra 1222/4 June 1807, five days after the accession of Mustafa IV. Therefore, it is possible to conclude

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1979 B.O.A. *Sadaret Defterleri*, no. 357, p. 20. The related entry is as follows: "*Bahr-i Siyah Boğazı nezâreti ve Varna ya varınca sevâhinin muhafazası şartıyla Rumeli beylerbeyi pâyesiyle rütbe-i mirimirânlık kapucubaşı İnce Mehmed Bey’e tevcîh ...."  
1981 B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807); B.O.A. HAT 53323 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807).  
1982 *Zağarcıbaşı* is the commander of the 64th regiment of the Janissary army.  
1983 B.O.A. *Sadaret Defterleri*, no. 357, p. 38. *The Times, Monday*, August 03, 1807; pg. 2, issue, 7115; col. F (from The French Papers, Paris, July 24), informs that Kazgancı Mustafa was appointed as the commander of the Rumeli Feneri with the rank of *Zağarcıbaşı*: "...but the garrison has not chosen to accept him and has demanded another chief, who is less of a party man...." Unfortunately, we do not have evidence to confirm the appointment of Kazgancı Mustafa as the commander of Rumeli Feneri fortress, and refusal by the soldiers there.
that Kabakçı Laz Mustafa was appointed as the nazır-ı Boğaz, while Kazgancı Mustafa as Boğaz muhafızı, a short time after the Rebellion.

According to Tüfengçibaşı, another chief of the rebels, Arnabud Ali from the Poyraz Limanı fortress, was appointed as the superintendent of the forts on the Anatolian side. He and Kabakçı Mustafa were also granted a pension with the rank of Serturna ("serturna tekaüdlüğü"). Another chief called Bayburdî Süleyman was appointed as a captain of a frigate in the Naval Arsenal ("tersane-i amire sancak kapudanlığı"). The chief called Memiş refused any promotion but requested a grant of one thousand gold coins. However, upon the insistence of the others for a further demand, he accepted serturna tekaüdlüğü with a daily payment of 120 akçes. Seventeen other leading figures among the rebels were granted daily payments of 50, 60, 40 or 30 akçes. According to Tüfengçibaşı, the remaining ones also requested to be paid 25 akçes yevmiyye. Their request was immediately rejected by Sekbanbaşı Mehmed Arı Ağa, on the grounds that such a payment would make a total of 10,000 kese akçes, which meant a great burden for

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1984 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 23a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 408. Ebubekir Efendi does not talk about his appointment but just notes that was granted the rank of turnacı. See Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 23b. To my knowledge there is not a further source that confirms the appointment of Ali as the superintendent of the fortresses in the Anatolian side.

1985 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 23a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 408. He was later exiled to Sinop sometime on September 1807. See Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 25a; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 115; Asm, Tarih-i Asm, vol. II, p. 52. According to Ebubekir Efendi he was the nephew of a certain Kürd Süleyman Kapudan. If true, it seems that Bayburdî Süleyman benefited from the influence of his relative. See Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 13b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 115.


the treasury already troubled with financing the ongoing war against Russia.\textsuperscript{1989} The problem seems to have been solved by the suggestion of the Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa that the remaining ones should content themselves grants ("atiyye") by the Sultan, rather than allocation of an extra salary from the treasury. Tüfengçibaşı praises Sekbanbaşı for saving the Empire from this extra burden.\textsuperscript{1990} Asım does not mention the contribution of the Sekbanbaşı; moreover he comments that granting the robes of honor ("hil'at"), and the money in the name of coronation accession gift ("cülusiyye") created a great burden on the treasury.\textsuperscript{1991}

The above-mentioned details are crucial in the sense that they could provide us with a clue about the number of the rebels, at least that of the \textit{yamaks}. It could be suggested that there were four key figures who acted as prominent chiefs: Kabakçı Mustafa, Arnabud Ali, Bayburdî Süleyman and Memiş. With the other seventeen chiefs, a total number of twenty-one leaders seem to have played the leadership in the May Rebellion. For the number of the remaining ones, the amount of money given could be useful: if a daily payment of 25 akçes amounted to a total burden of 10,000 \textit{kese} akçes for the treasury, then it means that there were about 5479 who individuals that requested a daily payment of 25 akçes.\textsuperscript{1992}


\textsuperscript{1991} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 52. According to him, the robes of honor and grants were provided on Monday. As we will see in the following pages Asım makes a reference to a letter of Halet Efendi which talked about the ceremony of deliverance of the \textit{Hüccet-i Şer'iyye} to the Janissaries on Monday. At the end of the ceremony the rebels were provided with robes of honor and some grants. If this is true we can suggest that the appointments were made previously and the robes of honour were granted on Monday, if they are not provided robe of honor on two different occasions.

\textsuperscript{1992} 1 \textit{kese} = 5,000 (since the year 1658)

\[10,000 \times 5,000 = 50,000,000\]

A daily payment of 25 akçes \(> 25 \times 365 = 9125 \) (the annual payment of one person)\>
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the number included only the yamaks. As might be recalled, a register written a short time after the Rebellion declares that the total number of yamaks at the forts was 1953. The discrepancy between these two numbers brings to mind two possibilities: either 10,000 kese akçes was an exaggerated number or we can suggest that the remaining 3528 people were the Janissaries who took an active part in the rebellion. Yet, the first suggestion sounds more reasonable.

5.2.2. Hüccet-i Şer'iyye: The Legal Document

One of most important incidents that took place immediately after the Rebellion was the preparation of a document called Hüccet-i Şer'iyye, through which the new Sultan and the rebels made mutual promises. To put in a very simple way, Mustafa IV promised the rebels that they would not be punished, while the latter, in return, promised never to be involved in matters outside the scope of their duties any longer. Its content and the parties involved make it one of the most interesting documents in Ottoman history. Therefore, it deserves a detailed study.

The document in question was signed on 23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807. A close study reveals that it was composed of three different parts: the main body of the text, the signatures of the officials with various ranks and positions. After the third one, it was an imperial decree of Mustafa IV, annotated on the upper margin of the main text. The main body of the text is further divided into three different subsections: Enumerating the

\[ \frac{50,000,000}{9125} = 5479.45 \approx 5479 \]

1993 B.O.A. C. AS. 16564 (6 B 1222/9 September 1807).

1994 There are some original copies of the document: See B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807); B.O.A. HAT 53323 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807). In the latter, the imperial edict of Mustafa IV and some of the signatures of the functionaries are not available. The study of Kemal Beydilli on Hüccet-i Şer'iyye depends on the first one. For a transcribed version of the document and its cross-checks with the copies provided by Asım, Kethûda Said, Câbî, Mustafa Necib and Cevdet Paşa, see Kemal Beydilli, “Kabakçı İşıyanı Akabinde Hazırlanan Hüccet-i Şerîyye”, Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi, 4 (İstanbul: 2001), pp. 42-48.
problems before the Rebellion and placing the *Nizam-ı Cedid* program is placed at the center of all, the first part could be considered as an evaluation of the May 1807 Rebellion. In that part, the *Nizam-ı Cedid* is defined as a great and unique “*bid‘at*” and the *İrad-ı Cedid* as the source of numerous evils and oppressions. As might be noticed, the criticism focuses on the anti-religious aspect of *Nizam-ı Cedid*, while the *İrad-ı Cedid* is criticized for economic problems it brought about. To follow the logic of the document itself could lead one to put blame on the leading ruling elite and the influential figures in the palace of Selim III. Their names are not mentioned, but they are accused of initiating the *Nizam-ı Cedid* program. The ruling elite is also blamed for some other issues, such as seeking their self-interests and oppressing the poor. According to the document, each member of the elite was very rich and busy with imitating the foreign, i.e. European lifestyle in every aspect including architecture and costumes. Consequently, they alienated themselves from the populace and antagonized the animosity of the soldiers of the “glorious Janissary army.” In the document, Selim III is not directly accused, whereas the same elite is accused of deceiving the Sultan.\(^{1995}\)

The second part of the main body of the text focuses on the reaction of the soldiers to the above-mentioned problems. This part is quite short and briefly describes the Rebellion, which was an insurrection by the Janissary commanders and soldiers collaborating with the “*loyal*” members of the *ulema* and the ruling elite with the sincere intention of rectifying the world (“*islâh-ı âlem*”). Thus, they had severed their allegiance (“*tebaiyyet*”) to Selim III. The document emphasizes that the uprising was something against the oppression of the ruling elite and those involved in the Rebellion were driven by the good intention of correcting a fatal mistake. It also acknowledges that it was a movement that was accomplished by the collaboration of the *ulema* and some other figures among the ruling elite and conducted in accordance with Sharia and laws (“*şer‘ ü kanûn*”). It is important to note that the record was written in a very carefully chosen words to describe the Rebellion. There is a kind of apologetic tone in the presentation of the Rebellion. The terms

\(^{1995}\) B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807); B.O.A. HAT 53323 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807).
such as “rebellion”, “rebel”, and “huruc ale’s-sultan” was never used, the term uprising (“kıyam”) is employed only once to describe the phenomenon. Indeed, the May Rebellion was celebrated since it had brought order to the Empire and in that respect it was welcomed not only by common people but also by the new Sultan. Therefore, the participants were to be exempted from any accusation or punishment.

As far as reflected in Hüccet-i Şer’iyye, there was nothing wrong in the uprising neither for the Sultan nor for his ruling elite. On the contrary, a message was given to those involved in the Rebellion that they would not be held responsible for anything and consequently, they would not be punished. However, the section in the following part makes it clear that there was indeed a problem in the uprising for the center: The Janissaries, the men of sword, were involved in an issue outside the scope of their authorities, or in other words, they exceeded their rights and responsibilities. The document underlines that what happened was tolerable only once because it happened for the first time; however from then, the commanders and soldiers of the Janissary army would have to serve the Empire loyally and not to deal with the issues beyond the scope of their duty. Therefore, they were asked to make a promise that they will avoid any kind of such involvements any more. In return, the Sultan would not accuse them for anything unless they broke their promise. The final part of the main text is about the procedures to be followed for the register of the document. It was signed by by highest authorities in the city, such as Kaimmakam Musa Pasha, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and also some other high-ranking officials in the government, some members of the ulema and Janissaries. Furthermore, it was registered in the legal courts and also in the registers of the chief accounting office (“başmuhasebe”) and Imperial Chancery (“divan-i hümayun”). The document ends with the notification that one copy of the document was to be sent to the Janissary army and to be kept there. At the very end, it is stated that it was written and completed on Sunday, 23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807.1996

1996 B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807); B.O.A. HAT 53323 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807).
As we have outlined, on the upper margin of the text there is an imperial decree by the Sultan in which he declares that he read the text very carefully and approved it. From then on, the Sultan underlines that the Janissaries should obey the stipulations mentioned in the text and should behave in accordance with their promises. Mustafa IV expected from the Janissaries not to interfere in any issue, minor or major, related to the Empire. In return, the Sultan himself promised that nobody among the members of the ulema, Janissaries and the ruling elite would be held responsible for this matter, namely the uprising.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807); B.O.A. HAT 53323 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807).}

Immediately below the main text, there are signatures of various functionaries, containing the names and signatures of forty-four figures, which could be classified under two categories according to their occupations and titles. The first group is composed of signatures of seven influential figures of the center. Apart from Musa Pasha, all the others are members of the ulema, including the Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi.\footnote{The names of the remaining members of the ulema are as follows: Muradzâde Esseyyid Mehmed Murad, the judge of İstanbul; Mehmed Münib Efendi, the former judge of İstanbul; Aşir Efendizâde Mehmed Hafid Efendi, the kazasker of Anatolia, Dürrizâde Esseyyid Abbullah Hüsnî Efendi, the Nakibü’l-eşraf; Ahmed Muhtar Efendi, the kazasker of Rumelia. See B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807); B.O.A. HAT 53323 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807).}

The remaining thirty-seven names and signatures belong to military figures. The first thirty are leading Janissary officers.\footnote{Five serturnaî, one ex-serçavuş and one serçavuş, one serkatib-i ocak, five sersekbanân. and the remaining sixteen the mütevelli of various divisions. See B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807); B.O.A. HAT 53323 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807).}

Among them, one striking name is “Bende Elhac Mustafa, mütevelli, 25”, who must be the famous Kazgancı Laz Mustafa Ağa. The remaining ones are from the fortresses.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807); B.O.A. HAT 53323 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807): “Bende Osman, Kala-yı Büyükderere, 25; Bende Osman, sergerde, 64; Bende İbrahim Haseki, 64; Bende Sîleymân Kapudan; Bende Ali, Dızdar-ı Kilburun; Bende Mehmed Mütevelli, 50; Bende Mustafa, Ağa-yı Boğaz-ı Bahr-ı Siyah”}

1997 B.O.A. HAT 19418 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807); B.O.A. HAT 53323 (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807).

1998 The remaining thirty-seven names and signatures belong to military figures. The first thirty are leading Janissary officers. Among them, one striking name is “Bende Elhac Mustafa, mütevelli, 25”, who must be the famous Kazgancı Laz Mustafa Ağa. The remaining ones are from the fortresses. The first two, both bearing the name Osman, seem to have been soldiers, the first one from the 25th regiment and Fortress of Büyük Liman, while the second one is only noted as a leader (“sergerde”) and as belonging to the 64th regiment. These probably were
the active figures in the Rebellion. On the other hand, there are some names such as İbrahim Haseki (of 64th regiment), one dizdar of Külburun called Ali and one mütevelli of the 50th regiment. It is difficult to decide whether these figures were involved in the Rebellion or included in the list as being the representatives of the commanders of the fortresses. The remaining two are more familiar names: Süleyman Kapudan and Mustafa, “ağa-yi nazır-i Bahr-i Siyah”. The first one should be Bayburdi Süleyman who was appointed as a captain after the Rebellion. One contemporary source notes that among the chiefs there was a certain Bosnian diver (“Boşnak Gavas”). According to this source, Boşnak Gavas was the diver (“gavas”) of Cezayirli Hasan Pasha and was also given captainship. Apparently, only one person, Bayburdi Süleyman, was granted this position. If there is no confusion in the names or Boşnak Gavas was not the nickname of Bayburdi Süleyman, we can talk about a confusion by the author. The second one is famous Kabakçi Mustafa. Apart from these two figures, name of a certain Osman is mentioned as “sergerde”, literally meaning the leader of a band. Most probably, it is a reference to his leadership in the Rebellion. If we recall, Tüfengçibaşı was talking about a nucleus of four leaders and seventeen other leaders of the rebels who were given certain ranks and grants after the meeting on Saturday. In this document, on the other hand, only the names of seven figures from the forts are provided. What is clear at this point is the fact that Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye was signed after the Saturday meeting and appointments of the leaders of the rebels to some posts.

The Hüccet was written by Münib Efendi and had two original copies. One copy was delivered to Kaimmakam Musa Pasha by Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağası. Thereafter,

2002 The same author also mentions a certain Zeynel Beše who was given “haseki tekaüldülügü”. See Derin, “Kabakçi Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 110.
2004 B.O.A. HAT 53891(undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8); B.O.A. HAT 53981.A (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.
Kaimmakam Pasha presented this copy to the Sultan. In return, the Sultan sent another copy (“mukaddem yapılan sened”) to the Kaimmakam to be delivered to the Sekbanbaşı. Both copies were then registered to the relevant departments. After these procedures, the copy sent to the Sultan was kept at the Palace, while the other one in the barracks. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi states that it was kept at the barracks of 25th regiment, the mütevelli of which was Kazgançı Mustafa. The copy that was to be kept by the Janissaries was delivered by Halet Efendi, the deputy to Reisülküttab, through a ceremony. Both Kethüda Said and Asım emphasize that the ceremony took place one day after the registration of the document in various departments. If we suppose that the registration procedures of the document were completed on the same day, the ceremony should have taken place on Monday, 24 R/1 June.

Asım describes the ceremony drawing on a letter written by Halet Efendi to Kaimmakam Musa Pasha. According to the letter, Halet Efendi left the Porte in the company of Teşrifatı Efendi, Muḥṣir Ağa and a scribe behind the karakulak. The document was carried by Teşrifatı Efendi. A group of ulema, appointed by the Şeyhülislam

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2005 B.O.A. HAT 53981.A (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). B.O.A. HAT 53094 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807) informs that it was kept at the Imperial Treasury. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

2006 B.O.A. HAT 53981 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

2007 B.O.A. HAT 53820 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.


2012 Muḥṣir Ağa is the head of Janissary Ağa’s guards and controller of the prison in the Janissary Ağa’s headquarters.
joined them, including Münib Efendi. Around Dökmeciler (in Süleymaniye) they were surrounded by the Janissaries waiting respectfully. Halet Efendi received the document and walked among the soldiers. It is emphasized that the document was carried by Halet Efendi with great reverence, after which it was delivered to Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa, who took it again reverentially. The Sekbanbaşı broke the seal, opened the document and announced the audience that it was a “sacred document”, (“hüccet-i şerife”), embroidered with the imperial decree of the Sultan. Thereafter, Münib Efendi read it aloud explaining the essence of the Quranic verses and the traditions of the Prophet. Finally, the document was delivered to Halet Efendi, who read it aloud once more, which was followed by the prayers recited by the preacher of the Süleymaniye Mosque. The ceremony ended with a question by Halet Efendi whether the Janissaries were satisfied with the document produced. Upon their affirmative answer, he asked whether they would keep their promise; in other words, they would not be involved in state affairs and would fight against the enemy, which was also followed by affirmative answers of the soldiers present.

From the available narratives and documents, it is really hard to keep track of the sequence of events after the Rebellion that led to the preparation of the document called Hüccet-i Şerîyye. Even though most of these sources provide a copy of the document, almost none of them mentions how it was prepared and who made the initial request for its preparation. According to Kethüda Said, on Sunday, 23 Raşid 31 May, a meeting was held at the residence of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, to which Kaimmakam Pasha, Anatolian and Rumelian kazaskers, the Nakibü’l-eşraf, Mehmed Münib Efendi, and the judge of

2013 The other members of the ulema were the preacher of Süleymaniye Mosque, clerk that kept a register of the events (“İstanbul Vakayi katibi”), the chief bailiff of the nakibül-eşraf (“nakibül-eşraf baş çavuşu”). See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 50.


İstanbul attended. The account of the same meeting by Asım is very similar to that of Kethüda Said. However, while the latter notes that the meeting was held on Sunday (23 Ra 1222/31 May 1807), the former gives the date as Saturday, 22 Ra 1222/30 May 1807. A modern study on the same document by Kemal Beydilli argues that the decision to prepare a legal document for mutual promises was taken at the meeting held on 23 Ra/31 May, which corresponds to Sunday. Therefore, it confirms the date provided by Kethüda Said Efendi. Cevdet Pasha provides some complementary information as to the matters discussed during the meeting that led to the preparation of the Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye. According to the author, Musa Pasha was concerned with accumulating more political power in his hands after the Rebellion. By this assertion, Cevdet Pasha probably implies that Musa Pasha aimed at freeing himself from any interference with the elimination of the possibility of an intervention from the rebels. On the other hand, the rebels were worried about being reprimanded in the future. With these concerns in mind, the above-mentioned meeting was held. From Cevdet Pasha’s account it appears that the meeting was held on the initiative of Kaimmakam Musa Pasha and probably also upon the request of the Janissaries and the rebels.

Almost none of the contemporary sources takes notice of the concerns of the Sultan in the process. Needless to say, it is very clear that one of the most urgent issues for Mustafa IV was to establish order in the city and this could only be done by dispersing the rebels. Indeed, an official document emphasizes these points. Though the document belongs to a later date, it makes some references to the above issue. According to the record in question, after the accession of the new Sultan and the murder of most of those on the execution list, it was time for the rebels to return their places. For the rebels, on the other

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2016 Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 17a; Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 104a


hand, assurance by the Sultan was required that they would not be executed thereafter.\textsuperscript{2020} It was also important for the Sultan as well. In cases that where the Janissaries or the \textit{yamaks} were involved in a disorder, Mustafa IV would be able to remind them of their written promise. Indeed, the importance attached to the document by the Sultan is marked with one of his imperial edicts which reads: “So you were going to dispatch me the document to be kept by us. Why did not you send it? Give me an urgent reply.”\textsuperscript{2021} It leaves no doubt that Mustafa IV was eager to have a copy of the document and to keep it at the Palace, so that he could remind the rebels who signed it in cases of need. Therefore, the Legal Document can be considered as serving the interests of both the former rebels and the Sultan. However, it is difficult to determine which one had stronger initiative in the matter. A quotation made in Aşım’s \textit{History} gives us one clue. While talking about the ceremony of deliverance of the final copy of the document to the Janissaries, Halet Efendi asks them whether they were pleased with the deliverance of the “sacred document” (“\textit{hüccet-i şerife}”) that was prepared in accordance with their request.\textsuperscript{2022} Therefore, it is very probable that the initiative came from the rebels for a legal and written guarantee that would make them exempt from any kind of punishment. As far as it is noticeable from the same document, it was first the Sultan who promised that no harm would be done and thereafter, the leaders of the rebels made their own promises. Therefore, it seems that the stronger party in this bargaining was the leaders of rebels/soldiers.

\textsuperscript{2020} T.S.M.A. E. 9198 (17 Ca 1222/23 July 1807). The record seems to be a \textit{hüccet} signed on 17 Ca 1222/23 July 1807. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the historical context of the document, but it seems very likely that it was somehow related to the forced deposition of Şeyhülislam Ömer Hulusi Efendi on 8 Ca 1222/13 July 1807.

\textsuperscript{2021} B.O.A. HAT 53843 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “\textit{Sened kağıdı tarafımızda hafz olunmak için tarafına göndercektiniz Niçin göndermediniz. Bir haber matlubumdu.}”

\textsuperscript{2022} Aşım, \textit{Tarih-i Aşım}, vol. II, p. 51: “\textit{Ağalar, yoldaşlar bu töhmetdir havflyla sened istedığınız maddeyi şevketili kerametli padişahınız cümle ulerń ve ricāl-i devletleri size hidmet saymışdır; şimdi mutmain oldunuz mu?”
According to Niyazi Berkes, both Hüccet-i Şer'iyye and Sened-i İttifak violated Ottoman religious and secular laws. Both could be categorized neither as a justice decree ("adaletname") nor as a fetva. The documents were against the Islamic law in the sense that there was no provision in the laws in effect that allowed a Muslim ruler or Caliph to make a pact with his servants. In a similar way, it was against the logic of the Ottoman laws since there could be no covenant between a Sultan and his servants ("kul") who were expected to have utmost obedience to their rulers. According to the author, the real importance of the document was to give a religious coloring to a completely political matter which was referred as "bid'at". Beydilli, on the other hand, does not attribute such a deep meaning to the Hüccet-i Şer'iyye and describes it simply as a paper of amnesty exchanged between the concerned parties. Yet, he also asserts that the Hüccet-i Şer'iyye is a new kind of document, unprecedented in the Ottoman history. In fact, securing a legal document ("hüccet-i şeriyye") was not an attempt unique to the May 1807 Rebellion. A similar document was prepared during the Patrona Halil Rebellion (1730).

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2024 Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, pp. 129, 133.

2025 Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, pp. 128-9.

2026 Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, pp. 130-1.

2027 Beydilli, “Hüccet-i Şeriyye”, p. 36.

2028 Patrona Halil Rebellion broke out in autumn of 1730 and put an end to the famous Lale Devri (Tulip Era) in the Ottoman history. It caused the fall of Ahmed III, the murder of Grand Vizier Nevşehirli Damat Ibrahim Pasha and the rise of Mahmud I. For a detailed analysis of the 1730 Rebellion, see Aktepe, Münir, Patrona İsyam (1730), (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1958); Olson, Robert W., “The Esnaf and Patrona Halil Rebellion of 1730: A Realignment in Ottoman Politics?”, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, 17 (1794), pp. 329-44.
Abdi, a contemporary historian of the Patrona Rebellion, the rebels managed to receive a legal document (“şer’i hüccet”) on Thursday, 29 Ra 1143/12 October 1730. If we follow Abdi, all of the rebels entered the presence of Şeyhülislam Mirzazâde Mehmed Efendi, although they feared that they could face punishment in the hands of Mahmud I (r.1730-1754). According to the same author, the document was signed by the former kazaskers and was later presented to the Sultan. He approved it with the following note: “Let it be done in accordance with the legal document delivered to them.” Thereafter, the document was given to the rebels who in turn promised to capture those who dared to create disorder and deliver them to their commanders. More interestingly, they also promised not to interfere in state affairs and their promise was also recorded in the courts (“sicils”). Münir Aktepe notes that the rebels agreed to disband on the condition that they would not be persecuted in future, and in return they would disband larger crowds if they were permitted to have a force ready at command, in order to protect themselves from a possible attack. However, despite their promise, the rebels continued to interfere in

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2029 Two contemporary narratives devoted to the Rebellion are Destârî Salih Tarihi and Abdi Tarihi. We do not have much information on both authors. Destârî Salih Efendi seems to have been a figure close to Sultan Ahmed III. The History of the former was published by Bekir Sttkî Baykal under the title of Destârî Sâlih Tarihi: Patrona Halil Ayaklanması Hakkında Bir Tarihçe, (Ankara: TTK, 1962). The latter was published by Faik Reşit Unat: Abdi Tarihi: 1730 Patrona İhtilali Hakkında Bir Eser, (Ankara: TTK, 1943).

2030 Abdi, Abdi Tarihi, pp. 47-8. The uprising started on Thursday, 28 September 1730 and ended on Monday, 2 October 1730 with the accession of Mahmud I to the throne. It means that the legal document was secured by the rebels 10 days after the rebellion. And up to that time the rebels did not lay down their arms. See also Aktepe, Patrona İsyani, p. 164.

2031 Abdi, Abdi Tarihi, p. 48: “yedlerine i’tâ olunan hüccet-i şer’îyyesi mûcibince amel oluna”. According to Aktepe, it was the Şeyhülislam and the Istanbul judge who promised the rebels that they would not be punished. See Aktepe, Patrona İsyani, p. 163.

2032 Abdi, Abdi Tarihi, p. 48.

2033 Aktepe, Patrona İsyani, p. 163
governmental affairs and create disorder in the city. Consequently, they were executed on 25 November 1730 by the order of Mahmud I.  

The argument of Beydilli that the Hüccet-i Şer‘iiyye was basically a paper of amnesty ("amannâme") is very reasonable and this idea forms the backbone and essence of the document. However, the document prepared after the Patrona Rebellion fits into the category of "amannâmâ" better than Hüccet-i Şer‘iiyye. In the former one, Mahmud I did not make any direct promise to the rebels. It was the Şeyhülislam and the judge of İstanbul who promised the rebels that they would not be executed unless they were involved in a disorder. A study of the document, signed after May 1807 Rebellion, reveals that there are some more complicated issues behind this basic idea of serving just as a paper of amnesty. First of all, it is an official document that binds the Sultan and center that the rebels who had caused the dethronement of a sultan would not be executed. This promise was made by the highest authority in the Empire. This point is crucial in the sense that it undermines the legal and executive powers of the center, especially the monopoly of violence that was so vital for a political authority. Moreover, the Sultan who should be a supra-figure simply becomes a party in the process that produced the document. The second issue is the role of a military class, the Janissaries in our case, in political or religious issues. As might be recalled, in the document, the Nizam-i Cedid was recognized as a “bid‘at” and the Janissaries were celebrated for putting an end to it. However, it can be misleading to argue that the document recognizes the right of the Janissaries to fight against “bid‘ats”. As it is clearly stipulated in the document, the reaction of the military class against a “bid‘at” was forgiven only for once. But what if similar cases emerge in future? In other words, if new innovations emerged in future, who would be responsible for correcting of similar mistakes? These points are not that much clarified in Hüccet-i Şer‘iiyye.

The best answer to the above points comes from another document which refers to Hüccet-i Şer‘iiyye. Fortunately, the document makes some clarifications on some obscure

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2034 See Aktepe, Patrona İsyanı, p. 169-181. It means that Patrona Halil and other chiefs were executed about 43 days after the issuing of the şer’i hüccet.

2035 Aktepe, Patrona İsyanı, p. 163.
points that remained uncertain in the Hüccet. In the second document one finds a clear answer to the question of what would happen if a similar event took place such as the case of the Nizam-i Cedid or if the ruling elite did not perform their duties properly. The document makes it clear that dealing with such problems were left to the ulema rather than the military class. It also states clearly that the ulema members were the main group to perform the duty of “forbidding the evil” (“nehy-i münker”). Therefore, it was the duty of the ulema, not the responsibility of the Janissaries, to deal with the “bid’at”. Thus, we could argue that the Hüccet recognizes and appreciates the rectification of a “bid’at” and some other mistakes; however, on the other hand, it admits that this was an extraordinary case and prohibits against possible examples in the future in principle, especially those to be started by the initiative of the military class. Niyazi Berkes, on the other hand, argues that the Hüccet was based on three basic ideas: commanding good and forbidding the evil (“emr-i bi’l-ma’ruf ve nehy-i ani’l-münkir”); the idea that the Janissaries would guarantee the application of this principle; and finally the fact that it gave the army the right to oppose illegal affairs. However, it seems more likely that the Hüccet-i Şer’iyye was prepared in order to eliminate the possibility of a future involvement of the military classes in political matters. As remarked above, if very serious problems occurred, the duty of correcting mistakes was left to the ulema, not to the Janissaries - at least in principle.

A later example of a similar document was signed during the reign Mahmud II; therefore, it might be useful to compare Sened-i İttifak and Hüccet-i Şer’iyye. Sened-i İttifak is considered as the best symptom of the decentralization process of the Ottoman Empire and as the attempt of the ayans to gain an upper hand in the executive powers of the center. It was concluded between the ayans and Grand Vizier Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, the Şeyhülislam and some other leading statesmen and the religious elite of the time. Hüccet-i Şer’iyye was a legal document approved by the Sultan himself, and also by the

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2036 T.S.M.A. E. 9198 (17 Ca 1222/23 July 1807).

2037 Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, p. 129.

Şeyhülislam and some other leading figures in the center. *Sened-i İttifak* can be evaluated as a result of the process of bargaining between the local magnates which made their power recognized and also put them into the situation of those on whom the future of the Ottoman dynasty depended. The *Hüccet* does not place the Janissary army into such a position, but it recognizes it as a pressure group that had the power to cause the fall of an Ottoman sultan and thus, it tried to curb down this power. *Hüccet-i Şer'iyye* is a legal document signed by the Sultan himself. As Berkes also notes, in the *Sened-i İttifak*, the Sultan was not a party and was kept above the issue. 2039 On the other hand, in our document, Mustafa IV was directly involved and was the party making promises to his subjects. *Hüccet-i Şer'iyye* does not question the legal rights of the Sultan and does not refer to any guarantee of the survival of the Empire. The only point might be the fact that the Janissary could fight against the “*bid’at*”, but it was approved only once. Another difference seems to be fact that *Hüccet-i Şer'iyye* was more short-sighted in prospect since the real motive in its preparation was the concern of the Janissaries or the rebels to avoid persecution and the Sultan’s concern to bring order to the Empire as soon as possible. On the other hand, *Sened-i İttifak* seems to have more detailed and more farsighted stipulations, and demanded a hand in some issues like the register of the soldiers, and putting the sovereign right of the Sultan under the protection of the *ayans*. As a final point of comparison, we might draw attention to two important articles of *Sened-i İttifak*: One article stipulated that the Sultan and his grand vizier were the ultimate authority in the Empire; therefore, the *ayans* declared that they would prevent anyone or any group who refused to obey their orders. If the grand vizier was involved in affairs against the law, he would also be prevented. 2040 Therefore, while in the *Hüccet* we observe the idea that it was the *ulema* that was to function as a power to correct the abuses and other mistakes, in the *Sened-i İttifak* this role seems to have been assumed by the powerful magnates. More interestingly, *Sened-i İttifak* places the power of magnates above the Janissary army and stipulates that they would be the power group that

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2040 See articles nos. I, II and IV.
would fight against the mistakes of the army as well. Its sixth articles seems to have been inspired from the 1807 uprising. The above-mentioned article declares that in case of a Janissary revolt in the capital, the ayans would not only suppress the rebellion but would also try to abolish the army or regiment that had caused it and their revenues (“esames and dirlik”) would be taken back.\footnote{The sixth article is as follows: “Âsitâne’de ocaklardan ve sâireden bir günê fitneh ve fesâd hâdis olur ise bilâ-istizân cümle hânedânlar Âsitâne’ye vuruûda sitâb edüp mütecâsir olunur ve ol ocakn kaldrîlמ�masına ya’ni o makûle fitneh ve fesâda bâdî olan sınıf ve yeyahud şahs tahkîk olunub eğer sınıf ise bu def’a bâ’is-i fiten olan Boğaz Kal’âs neferâtûn kaldrîl représ misûllü kendîleri kahr ve tenkîl ve dirlik ve esâmîleri ref’ olunmak ve eşhâdan ise her ne tabakadan olur ise olun bi’t-tahkîk i’dâm olunmak hususuna cümle hanedânân ve vûcûh-i memâlik müte’ahhid olup ve cümle[sî] Âsitâne’nin emniyetine ve istihslâl-i âsâyişine kefîl olmağla bu rabîtâ-i kavîyye ne makûle esbîbâ tevâkkuf eyler ise istihslâline bi’l-ittifâk ve ale’d-devâm ikdâm ve gayret oluna”. See Akyıldız, “Sened-i İttifâk”, pp. 219-20.}

Leaving aside the intention of the ayans to have a share in the right of violence, the document declares its position for a possible Janissary rebellion in the future. In that regard, the Hüccet dealt with more a past incident, while Sened-i İttifak is more directed to possible future incidents. We might also suggest that Sened-i İttifak signified the highest point in the decentralization process of the Empire, while the Hüccet can be seen as a legal document proving the weakness of the central government and probably opening the way for the supremacy of the military class that will be dominant during the reign of Mustafa IV.

These are some comments to be underlined from our perspective. Yet, another matter is how the document was evaluated by contemporary historians. As remarked earlier, most of them present a copy of the document.\footnote{The contemporary authors who provide a copy of the Hüccet-i Şer’iyye are: Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp.18a-19b; Asiler ve Gazler, pp. 123-4; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr-i Vekayi, pp. 59-62; Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, pp. 145-148; Asim, Tarih-i Asum, vol. II, pp. 46-49; Kethûda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, pp. 104-106 ; Kethûda Said Efendi, Neticetü’l-Vekayi, pp 17-9.} It can be considered as a sign of the fact that it was a well-known and widely circulated document during that period. While some contemporary sources just present a copy of it without any further comment, especially those who are against the Rebellion give a negative description of the Hüccet and describe
it as monstrosity ("ucûbe")\textsuperscript{2043} or strange ("garîbe").\textsuperscript{2044} Unfortunately they do not explain why it was so strange for them. According to Mustafa Necib Efendi, the document was prepared in order to relegate the role of those who took part in the Rebellion from interference to the stately affairs.\textsuperscript{2045} The most severe criticism comes from Asım. His criticism, however, is directed more to the ceremony held for its deliverance to Janissaries. Asım discusses that there was no need for such a pompous ceremony since the Legal Document was not an important or sacred event as the deliverance of \textit{surre}, sword or \textit{sancak} that should be accompanied with a procession with a ceremony.\textsuperscript{2046} Therefore, he describes the incident as “incredibly strange” ("agrebü'l-garâib").\textsuperscript{2047} Asım particularly criticizes Münib and Halet Efendi for organizing and participating in a ceremony for the submission of the \textit{Hüccet} to the “enemies” of “\textit{din ü devlet}”.\textsuperscript{2048} His criticism revolves around two points. For him, \textit{Hüccet-i Şer'iyye} was not a document to be proud of and one that should be submitted in a pompous way. The second problem was the voluntarily involvement of Münib Efendi and Halet Efendi, who had benefited from the grants of Selim III, previously.\textsuperscript{2049} From his comments we can conclude that Asım considers the \textit{Hüccet-i Şer'iyye} as something against the established customs and does not approve the involvement of the higher members of \textit{ulema} and the ruling elite in such a ceremony.

\textit{Hüccet-i Şer'iyye} was a legal document that concerned both the rulers and the rebels. The document legally put an end to the Rebellion. The Sultan kept his promise and did not punish the rebels. On the other hand, as we shall see in the following parts of this chapter, the rebels were less careful in keeping their promises.

\textsuperscript{2043} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 59: “hüccet-i ucûbetü'l-menkibe

\textsuperscript{2044} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{2045} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 59.


\textsuperscript{2048} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{2049} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 52.
5.2.3. Disorder in the army

The imperial army took its share from the disorder that raged the capital. A short time after the Rebellion, it witnessed two very important dismissals, including that of a grand vizier and Janissary Ağa and the murder of the latter. As we shall see below, the main source of disorder in the army was soldiers at the lowest level and the upper layers of the army, the struggle of the various factions among the army elites.

5.2.3.1. Dismissal of the Ağa of the Janissaries (24 Ra 1222/1 June 1807)

News of the May Rebellion and the accession of Mustafa IV reached to the imperial army at Silistria. Two messengers were sent to the army to announce the accession of Mustafa IV. They returned to the capital on 29 Ra 1222/6 June 1807 and submitted a report about the conditions of the army. According to their report, Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa, the Ağa of the Janissaries, was dismissed before their arrival to the imperial camp and the deputy commander of the Janissaries ("kul kethüdası") was appointed in his place. The Janissaries, however, were not satisfied with the sudden deposition of the Janissary Ağa and they all rushed to Silistria in order to protest the decision and ensure his

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2050 The Ottoman army under the command of the İbrahim Hilmi Pasha, the Grand Vizier, marched from the capital on 29 March 1807. On 12 S 1222/21 April 1807, it reached and camped at the Edirne Sahra. See B.O.A. HAT 151/6374 (15 S 1222/24 April 1807); B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, p. 28 (evail-i Za 1222/31 December-9 January 1807). During the stay at Edirne, İbrahim Hilmi Pasha tried to gather forces from Macedonia and Thracia. The army arrived in Silistria on 24 May 1807.

2051 B.O.A. HAT 1361/53576 (29 Ra 1222/6 June 1807). It contains the report of couriers called Ahmed and Hüseyin. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

2052 B.O.A. HAT 1361/53576 (29 Ra 1222/6 June 1807). According to Mustafa Necib, Eyüb Ağa was called early in the morning to the presence of the Grand Vizier İbrahim Hilmi Pasha and appointed as the new Ağa, Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 73.
In fact, their reaction seems to have been more serious than a simple protest since in the above-mentioned report it is referred to by the expression that they “attacked the imperial camp”. Consequently, Pehlivan Ağa was reappointed. According to the same report, Pehlivan Ağa initially declined to accept his reappointment but later complied and was rewarded with a robe of honor. The couriers reported that they had reached the imperial camp two hours after the incident and when they arrived, the disorder had already ended without anyone being hurt. Subsequently Pehlivan Ağa announced the imperial decree, to the commanders and the soldiers in the army, informing the change in the throne. The report ends with the remarks that the audience was very pleased not only with the enthronement of Mustafa IV but also with “uprising of the people to Nizam-i Cedid.” Messengers were immediately sent to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, the serasker of the Danube, and celebrations were made.

A letter from Reisülküttab Galib Efendi to Musa Pasha, also confirms the general pleasure with the news of accession of Mustafa IV.

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2053 B.O.A. HAT 1361/53576 (29 Ra 1222/6 June 1807). The next day after the arrival of the army in Silistria, a meeting was held and the conditions of the enemy and the tactics on the movement of the army were discussed in order to save the city of Bucharest from the enemy. For this purpose, it was decided to destroy the fortifications around the island of Karalaş and then to attack Bucharest. The duty to go to Karalaş was delegated to Pehlivan Ağa. The Ağa and Janissaries had stationed at Karalaş while Pehlivan Ağa, from time to time, visited the army at Silistria particularly to participate in meetings. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, pp. 72-73. Therefore, when the news of the accession of Mustafa IV reached to Silistria, the bulk of Janissary army was in Karalaş. For a good summary of the conditions of the Ottoman army, relations with Russia and France, see B.O.A HAT 1356/53133 (6 Ca 1222/12 July 1807).

2054 B.O.A. HAT 1361/53576 (29 Ra 1222/6 June 1807): “ordu-yu hümâyûna hücüm”.

2055 B.O.A. HAT 1361/53576 (29 Ra 1222/6 June 1807).

2056 It is noted it was towards Tuesday evening. See B.O.A. HAT 1361/53576 (29 Ra 1222/6 June 1807). B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sudaret Mektupculoğu Defterleri, no. 18, pp. 129-30 (undated), informs that Pehlivan Ağa was dismissed on Monday, 24 Ra 1222/1 June 1807 and the news reached the camp one day after the dismissal and reappointment of Pehlivan Ağa. All this confirms that the news of rise of Mustafa IV reached the army on Tuesday, 25 Ra 1222/2 June 1807.

2057 B.O.A. HAT 1361/53576 (29 Ra 1222/6 June 1807).

2058 B.O.A. HAT 54118 (26 Ra 1222/3 June 1807). From Galib Efendi to Musa Pasha.
The incidents of dismissal and reappointment of Pehlivan Ağa seem to be more complicated than it was reflected in the report of the mentioned messengers. For instance, another report comments that the Janissaries gathered in Silistria on the grounds that İbrahim Hilmi Pasha, the Grand Vizier, had dismissed Pehlivan Ağa untimely.2059 A minute ("mazhar") prepared by the leading elite and the Janissary commanders and sent to the center gives the exact date of the dismissal of Pehlivan Ağa as Monday, 24 Ra 1222/1 June 1807.2060 During that day, İbrahim Hilmi Pasha dismissed Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa and sent him to the residence of a mütesellim in Silistria for the purpose of further exile. However, the Janissaries opposed the decision arguing that they were not pleased with the deposition of Pehlivan Ağa. They, the mazhar says, threatened that they would not fight unless the Ağa, dismissed without any charge, was reappointed.2061 Thereafter, the leading figures of the army who wrote the mahzar went to the tent of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha and asked for Ağa’s reappointment after repeating the arguments of the Janissaries. Finally, Pehlivan Ağa was reappointed.2062 The military elite and the grand vizier were probably afraid of the fact that the Janissaries in the army would not attend the campaign if the Ağa was not reinstalled. Therefore, they yielded to the pressure by the Janissaries.

Mustafa Necib Efendi provides the most detailed account about the incident of Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa and the factors behind it, as well. According to the author, Pehlivan Ağa was among the collaborators of Prince Mustafa who sought to secure his accession to the throne and involved in some intrigues for that purpose. He even planned to march to the

2059 B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807). It is a report from Çelebi Mustafa Pasha to Mustafa IV. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

2060 B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculuğu Defterleri, no. 18, pp. 129-30 (undated).

2061 B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupcuğu Defterleri, no. 18, pp. 129-30 (undated).

2062 B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupcuğu Defterleri, no. 18, pp. 129-30 (undated).
capital with the army, but the conditions of the war delayed his plans. Mustafa Necib argues that well-wishers of the state (“hayr-hâh-i devlet”) were well aware of his intrigues, including his intention to march to the capital. Mustafa Necib does not reveal the identity of the “hayr-hâh-i devlet” but adds that these people informed the Sultan on the necessity of his deposition. Consequently, his dismissal was ordered to the Grand Vizier in the army.

If this information is correct, the dismissal of Pehlivan Ağa should have been produced by Selim III. A later historian, Uzunçarşılı, argues that a secret order indeed was sent to İbrahim Hilmi Pasha due to the fact that the center was afraid that he could suddenly march to the capital or create a disorder in the army. According to Mustafa Necib, Pehlivan Ağa was at the residence of Şatırzâde, the mütesellim of Silistria, when he heard of his own dismissal and thus, he became aware of the fact that he had two options for his future career: either to provide the change in the throne that would open him the road to the grand vizierate or to give up any future hopes. Therefore, as Mustafa Necib argues, he immediately sent news to the Janissaries at Karalaş declaring that he was deposed, but the real purpose behind the dismissal was to get rid of from the Janissary army. The Janissaries were quick to show their response to his call and rushed to Silistria to assure his reappointment.

Another source argues that the

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2063 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 73. In a letter found at the Topkapı Palace Museum Archive, there is information that Prince Mustafa provoked Pehlivan Ağa via his kaptı bezirgan and a master (“usta”) called Hüseyin Ağa. The writer of the record comments that this information was correct and he heard from Seyyid Mustafa Efendi, who had it learned from former grand master of the horses (“mirahor-i evvel”). See T.S.M.A. E. 2650 (undated, catalogue date is 1202-3/1787-89).

2064 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 73.

2065 Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, p. 65. Unfortunately the author does not reveal his source for this crucial information.

2066 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 73.

2067 Karalaş is on the left bank of Danube in Wallachia, opposite Silistria.

2068 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 73.

2069 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 74.
Janissaries fired on the newly appointed Janissary Ağ, caused him to flee under the pretext that they were already pleased with Pehlivan Ağ. Therefore a meeting was held at the presence of Grand Vizier İbrahim Hilmi Pasha. All participants, except for the chief accountant (“muhasebe-i evvel”) Ramiz Efendi and the corresponding secretary of the Grand Vizier (“mektub-i sadr-i ali”) Tahsin Efendi, agreed that it would be better to reappoint him in order to prevent further disorder in the army. Mustafa Necib notes that even though Pehlivan Ağ frequently visited the imperial camp before the incident, he did not dare to come to Silistria thereafter. Apparently, Pehlivan Ağ hesitated to visit the imperial camp even when news of the accession arrived. After the second appointment, he was also granted the rank of Pasha, 10,000 guruş was sent to him on 24 Ra 1222/1

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2070 B.O.A. C.AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/ 18 June 1807): “...Ordu-yu hümâyûn havâdisi suâl buyuruyor ise yeniçeri ordusu ayağı tozu ile Silistria’den Karalas’a geçüb vezir ordusu Silistria’dde kalub üç beş gün sonra kul kethûdası ağa edib karşuya irsâl etdiklerinde yeniçeri takımı biz ağamızdan hoşnud ve razıyuz deyû gelen kul kethûdasını kürsüna tutub kaçrückdiklerindenda berî tarafà geçüb vezir üzerine hücum etdiklerinde vezir gediklilerinden bir kaç kişi telef olub vezir firar ve kethûda vesâiri perîsan. Osman Efendi ve reis efendiden gayri kimesne kalmayub yeniçeri ağası sâbiki yerine ağa nasb etmişler...”

2071 Abdullah Ramiz Efendi (Pasha) (d.1228/1813) started his career as a müderris and became deputy judge (“naib”) to the judge advocate (“ordu kadisi”) during the Egyptian campaign (1213/1798-9). He was appointed as the supervisor of the mortar corps (“humbarahane naziri”) and later as başmuhamasebeci (S 1221/April-May 1806). He was employed as eyaletli naziri (12 B 1221/25 September 1806), and again as başmuhamasebeci (24 L 1221/4 January 1807). Ramiz Efendi was dismissed in Ra 1222/May 1807 and banished to Kavala. For further details see Appendix I.

2072 Mehmed Tahsin Efendi (d. 1223/1808) was a müderris. He later entered sadaret mektubi department and became a hacegan and then serhalife. He was appointed as mektupçu on 24 L 1221/4 January 1807. On 19 S 1223/16 April 1808, he became çavuşbaşı and then baruthane naziri (19 B 1223/10 September 1808). He was appointed as the first treasurer (“defterdar-ı şikk-i evvel”) on 19 Ş 1223/10 October 1808. He died during the Alemdar Incident. See B.O.A. Sadaret a.j. d.438, p. 12; Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 254; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. V, p. 1620.

2073 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 74

2074 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 74

2075 B.O.A. 53149 (29 R 1222/6 July 1807); Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 76. Thereafter he gained the title of Ağâ Paşa.
June 1807 by the Sultan. After the celebrations, Tahsin and Ramiz Efendi were dismissed and new appointments were made.

To sum up, the first disorder in the army after the uprising at the capital first showed itself first with the deposition and reappointment of the Ağa of the Janissaries. It seems that Pehlivan Ağa was a figure close to Prince Mustafa and the order for his deposition was produced during the reign of Selim III but realized after his fall. Under the pressure of the Janissaries, Hüseyin Ağa was reappointed. But this did not end the unrest in the army, but rather produced further problems.

5.2.3.2. Deposition of Grand Vizier İbrahim Hilmi Pasha (11 R 1222/18 June 1807)

The most scandalous incident in the army took place in the office of the grand vizierate; that is to say, it was the forced dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha on 11 R 1222/18 June 1807. The dismissal of Pehlivan Ağa was ordered by the center, but his reappointment was due to the pressure of the Janissaries. In the case of the second dismissal, it was the Janissaries who demanded the deposition of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha. In one of his reports to the Sultan, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, the new Grand Vizier, explains the incident as being caused by unruly behaviors of the soldiers, who were already used to “serkeşlik”. They had refused to cross the Danube and dared to attack İbrahim Hilmi Pasha. One contemporary source adds that when the Janissaries were about to attack his tent, İbrahim Hilmi Pasha sought refuge in the tent of Reisülküttab Galib Efendi. Meanwhile, the imperial seal was

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2076 B.O.A. HAT C.AS. 22028 (24 Ra 1222/1 June 1807). The imperial order for the grant of the above amount was issued on 22 Ra 1222/30 May, one day after the accession to the throne.

2077 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 75.

2078 B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807). It is from Çelebi Mustafa Pasha to Mustafa IV.

2079 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 75
taken from him by Çavuşbaşı Ağa and Ebubekir Pasha was appointed as the deputy to the Grand Vizier in the army ("kaimmakam of liva-yı saadet").

Both Asım and Mustafa Necib emphasize the role of Pehlivan Ağa in the dismissal of the Grand Vizier. According to them, as a supporter of Mustafa IV, his position in the army became more stabilized after the rise of Mustafa IV. Pehlivan Ağa, Mustafa Necib asserts, became more self-confident and haughty, and did not hesitate to involve himself in the dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha. With this intention, he passed to Karalaş and invited military officers to a meeting. During the meeting, he declared that there was unrest among the Janissaries and they were reluctant to see İbrahim Hilmi Pasha as the Grand Vizier. The available sources do not specify the real intention of Pehlivan Ağa in providing the dismissal of the Grand Vizier; yet, it seems that the former wished to replace him. Asım has some other points to emphasize. According to him, the day after the announcement of the rise of the Mustafa IV, Galib Efendi and Mustafa Refik Efendi paid a visit to Pehlivan Ağa to congratulate him for being confirmed in his office. During the visit, Pehlivan Ağa informed his visitors that the Janissaries were insisting on the

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2080 After the appointment of kul kethüdası as the ağası of the Janissaries, the remaining Janissaries officers were appointed to vacant places according to their ranks. For more details of these appointments see B.O.A. HAT 53264 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). Unfortunately, it is an undated document, therefore it is difficult to decide whether the above series of appointments occurred after the first dismissal or the murder of Pehlivan Ağa.


2082 As might be recalled İbrahim Hilmi Pasha was appointed as the Grand Vizier on 1 B 1221/14 September 1806, following the deposition of Hafız İsmail Pasha. After his deposition he was sent to Şumnu. Upon his request, he was appointed as the governor of Salonika and his rank of Pasha was preserved.

2083 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 75.

2084 Mustafa Refik Efendi (d. 1223/1808) entered the mektubî-i sadr-t ali section and became second halife (1210/1795-6) and later chief halife. On S 1213/July-August 1798, he was appointed as the corresponding secretary of the Grand Vizier (“mektubî-i sadr-t ali”) and then mektubî-i rikab-t hümâyun (Za 1213/April 1799). Refik Efendi became sadaret kethüda on 3 B 1221/16 September 1806. On 24 Ş 1222/27 October 1807 he became Reisülküttab. For further more details, see Appendix. I.
dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha and advised them to take the matter seriously into consideration. Consequently, a meeting was held with the other high-ranking officers of the army. At the end of the meeting, the dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha was decided and thereafter they all went to the tent of the Grand Vizier to announce the decision. Meanwhile, Ebubekir Pasha took the imperial seal from Hilmi Pasha, which meant his formal dismissal. Compared to Mustafa Necib’s account, the idea of disorder is less emphasized in Asım’s narration of the incident of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha. In addition, though Asım also implies that there was an involvement of Pehlivan Ağa and the Janissaries on the dismissal of Hilmi Pasha, the issue is not as much emphasized as in the account of Mustafa Necib. After his dismissal, says Asım, the dismissed Grand Vizier was sent to a town, two hours away from the imperial camp.

The author of Yayla İmamı Risalesi finds a direct correlation between the May Rebellion and the dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha. According to him, the Janissary elders in the capital wrote a letter to Janissary officers in the army advising “here we have put this affair in order and reorganized the regiment. So will you in the army”. After receiving the letter, the author argues, the Janissaries in the army decided to eliminate Mustafa Refik Efendi and Reisüküttab Galib Efendi. The most striking explanation in his account is the attempt of Pehlivan Ağa to protect İbrahim Hilmi Pasha when the Janissaries were about to attack the latter, saying that such an act would bring dishonor to the Janissary corps. Therefore, the Janissaries did not attack the grand vizier. But upon the insistence of the Janissaries, İbrahim Hilmi Pasha was dismissed and sent to Şumnu. Protection of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha by Pehlivan Ağa seems to be an interesting detail, which is repeated in

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2087 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 96. Asım notes that he was sent with the help of Cabbarzâde Süleyman Ağa.
2089 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 237.
an archival material as well.\footnote{B.O.A. C.AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807). As might be recalled from the previous chapter, it is a private letter to an unknown correspondent.} In the same source, it is emphasized that Pehlivan Ağa tried to prevent the murder of Hilmi Pasha, and advised the Janissaries to wait for the arrival of the new Grand Vizier to be sent by the center.\footnote{B.O.A. C.AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807): “Haşerat takımı gerev veziri vesâirini kilic işürüp paralayacak iken yeniçeri ağası önerine sedd ü bend olub oğullar yeni padişahırdır isminiz zorbaya çıkar gørelim Asitaneden mühr-ü himâyûn kime gelür andan sonra matlûbumuzu arz ederiz diyerek def ‘i meclis etmişler iken ..”} Some contemporary authors declare that after the dismissal of Hilmi Pasha, a collective petition (“arz-ı mahzar”) was sent to the capital by the military elite in the army.\footnote{Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 75; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 96.} Fortunately enough, we have a copy of this document.\footnote{It holds the title of “Ocaktu ve ricâl-ı aliyye taraflarından ateb-i ulyâ-yı mülükâneye arz için tertib olunan mahzarın sürêtidir.” For the original copy, see B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculuğu Defterleri, no. 18, pp. 129-30 (undated). For a transcribed version of the same document, see Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, pp. 66-7.} The petition starts with the incidents of the “untimely” dismissal and reappointment of Pehlivan Ağa and emphasizes that after the incident, animosity and distrust emerged between İbrahim Hilmi Pasha and Pehlivan Ağa.\footnote{B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculuğu Defterleri, no. 18, pp. 129-30 (undated).} Therefore, the Janissaries, supporting Pehlivan Ağa, declared that they would not obey the orders unless İbrahim Hilmi Pasha was deposed. Consequently, officers of the army gathered at the tent of Pehlivan Ağa, decided to ensure that Çavuşbaşı Ağa take the imperial seal and to appoint Ebubekir Pasha as kaimmakam. After that, both the Janissaries and Pehlivan Ağa promised that no harm would be done to anybody and İbrahim Hilmi Pasha was sent to Şumnu.\footnote{B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculuğu Defterleri, no. 18, pp. 129-30 (undated). Unfortunately I did not come across an exact date for the dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha. A detailed study of the above document suggests that the incident of his forced deposition corresponds to Friday, 26 Ra 1222/3 June 1807, a few days after the dismissal and reappointment of Pehlivan Ağa. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi notes that he was replaced by Çelebi Mustafa Paşa on 11 R 1222/18 June 1807. But I am not sure whether}
reference or wish for the appointment of a new grand vizier. The above-mentioned
document is very important not only because it narrates the dismissal from the perspective
of the army, but also it suggests that the main problem that led to the deposition was the
hatred between the Janissary ağa of the Janissaries and the Grand Vizier.

The strange dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha increased the unrest in the army. According to Asım, the Janissaries intended to eliminate the leading figures in the imperial
army at the campaign, following the example that occurred in the city. This threw the elite
in the army into great fear. The defeat of Çarhacı Ali Pasha by the Russians also contributed to the turmoil in the army. With the revolt and the increase of disorder in the
army, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, the serasker and governor of Silistria came from Ruscuk to
the imperial camp with five thousand soldiers under his command. From one of his own
letters, we learn that Mustafa Pasha established a relative peace in the army.

Meanwhile a secret meeting was held in İstanbul, at the residence of Şeyhülislam
Ataullah Efendi. The major issue was the appointment of a new grand vizier and the best
this is the official appointment date of Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, rather than the exact date of
the incident. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 31a; Derin,
“Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 419


2097 Çarhacı Hacı Ali Pasha (d. 1239/1823) became mirimiran and the muhafız of
Yenbu’l-Bahr in the year 1219/1804-5. He obtained the rank of vizier and was appointed as the
skirmisher of the army (“ordu çarhacısı”) and the governor of Silistria (Za 1221/January 1807). Ali Pasha became the muhafız of Eğriboz and in 1222/1807. He served as the sadaret kaimmakam (Za 1223/December 1808-January 1809), also assumed the grand admiralship on S 1224/March-April 1809). After his dismissal (23 B 1224/3 September 1809), he was exiled to Limni. At the end of the same year he was appointed as the governor of Trabzon and deposed in 1225/1810. After a period of exile in Ankara, he was appointed as the governor of Konya (M 1229/January 1814). After a third period of
exile in Limni and Keşan, he was employed in various governorships such as Kars, Sivas, Karahisar (Ra 1233/January 1818), Alaiye and İçel (1234/1819) and Eğriboz (1236/1820-1). In the year 1237/1821, he was exiled to Tokat where he died on M 1239/September 1823. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicillî-i Osmanî, vol. I, p. 282.


2099 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 75; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol II,
p. 99. According to Asım, he was invited by the officers in the army.

2100 B.O.A. HAT 54147 (17 Ca 1222/23 July 1807).
candidate was Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, *Serasker-i Boğaz Bahr-i Sefid*.\(^{2101}\) It seems that the Porte waited for the arrival of official documents from the army, yet not to cause further delay, an order was sent to Çelebi Mustafa Pasha declaring his promotion to grand vizirate and ordering him to reach the army as soon as possible.\(^{2102}\) We do not know the exact date of the meeting, but Çelebi Mustafa became Grand Vizier on 11 R 1222/18 June 1807 and arrived in Silistria on Tuesday 24 R 1222/1 July 1807.\(^{2103}\) After the arrival of the new Grand Vizier to the imperial camp and meeting with him, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha returned Giurgiu (Yergöyük).\(^{2104}\) Tahsin Efendi accompanied Alemdar Mustafa Pasha.\(^{2105}\)

The forced dismissal of Grand Vizier İbrahim Hilmi Pasha was the second cause for the unrest in the army. He was dismissed due to the pressure of the Janissaries and Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa seems to have been behind the scene. As might be noticed, the strife between the two highest officials of the Empire, a Grand Vizier and Janissary Ağa, threw the army into disorder and ended with the dismissal of the Grand Vizier. İbrahim Hilmi Pasha’s forced dismissal was followed by the coming of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the camp at

\(^{2101}\) B.O.A HAT 54043 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). For a copy of the imperial decree on the appointment of Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, see T.S.M.A. E. 7030-13 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808). It is from Mustafa IV to Çelebi Mustafa Pasha.

\(^{2102}\) B.O.A HAT 54043 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). We have a copy of the order in Achieves of Topkapı Palace Museum. In the document, Mustafa IV addresses Çelebi Mustafa Pasha as the *Boğaz Seraskeri*. After informing that the dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha, he orders the Pasha to set out for arrival to the imperial camp as soon as he received the order. See T.S.M.A. E. 1280 (undated, catalogue date is 1215-24/1800-1809). Historian Asım remarks that Çelebi Mustafa Pasha was the governor of Anatolia at that time and he was appointed to the post with the prospect that he could control and discipline the soldiers. For a copy of the imperial decree for his appointment see Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, pp. 97-8.

\(^{2103}\) After receiving the order, he went to Edirne on Thursday, 19 R 1222/26 June 1807. He left Edirne on Monday, 23 R 1222/30 June 1807, received the imperial seal and then reached the imperial camp at Silistria. See B.O.A. HAT 1363/53765 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

\(^{2104}\) B.O.A. HAT 54147 (17 Ca 1222/23 July 1807); *Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi*, pp. 76.

\(^{2105}\) Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi*, p. 76.
Silistria. The forced dismissal of Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, on the other hand, was implemented by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha himself.

5.2.3.3. The Murder of Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa, Commander-in-Chief of the Janissaries (12 Ca 1222/18 July 1807)

As in the capital, further disorder and problems dominated the army. The dismissal and reappointment of Pehlivan Ağa (24 Ra 1222/1 June 1807), the forced deposition of grand vizier (11 R 1222/18 June 1807) was followed by the murder of Pehlivan Ağa (12 Ca 1222/18 July 1807). The last one was the most interesting and mysterious event in the army. In little more than a month, Pehlivan Ağa was killed by the Janissaries to whom he owed his reappointment. According to a report, during that day, 300 or 500 Janissaries gathered at the bridge of Karalaş, signaling the beginning of an uprising. According to Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, the writer of the report, it was customary among the Janissary army ("kaide-i ocak") to send Janissary officers in such incidents to question and calm the soldiers down. From the report, it is possible to guess that Pehlivan Ağa did not follow the traditional way, rather became very angry and rebuked Janissaries quite severely. Immediately after the incident kul kethüdası Selim Ağa was appointed as the new Ağa of the Janissaries by the order of the Grand Vizier.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to find a satisfactory explanation among contemporary sources about the murder of Pehlivan Ağa. According to Mustafa Necib Efendi, Pehlivan Ağa became a victim of his own intrigues, in the sense that he was the one that triggered unrest which went out of control afterwards. The Janissaries, both willing to plunder the

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2106 B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807). It is from grand vizier Çelebi Mustafa Pasha.

2107 B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807).

2108 B.O.A. HAT 1360/53499 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 78; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 102. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.
imperial camp and also trying to create an excuse to return home, decided to kill their Ağa Pasha by attacking his tent. It is clear that it was a much unexpected aggression for Pehlivan Ağa since, Mustafa Necib argues, he received them before his tent and when he was about to advise or question them on the problem, he was murdered by the Janissaries. It seems that he was first wounded by fires but murdered by the physical attack of one of them.2109 We would like to draw attention to a discrepancy between a document and Mustafa Necib’s account. In the latter, it is narrated as if Pehlivan Ağa was not aware of the uprising against him and was caught rather unexpectedly. On the other hand, in the former, he seems to have been aware of the incident beforehand, but did not take any measure to prevent it.2110 Mustafa Necib’s explanation does not illuminate the incident in all dimensions. If they really intended to plunder the imperial camp and then to return home, the best option would be the murder of the Grand Vizier, which would throw the army to utmost disorder. According to Mustafa Necib, after the murder of Pehlivan Ağa, the Janissaries really intended to attack the Grand Vizier for that purpose; however, they were calmed by some mediators. It is not very reasonable to believe that they were calmed before attacking the Grand Vizier, while they showed their brutal hatred towards the Janissary Ağa.2111

One plausible explanation comes from the above-mentioned report by Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, the Grand Vizier himself. In his report to the Sultan, he explains that after his arrival at the imperial camp as the new Grand Vizier, he struggled hard to discipline the Janissaries and to prepare them for the campaign. However, he comments, it was very difficult to establish order among the Janissaries. It was mainly due to their role in the reappointment of Pehlivan Ağa, which severely undermined his authority over the soldiers.2112 It is ironic that Pehlivan Ağa lost his control and influence over the army after being reappointed

2109 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 78.

2110 B.O.A. HAT 1360/53499 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 78; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 102.

2111 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 78

2112 B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807).
thanks to the efforts of the Janissaries. According to the same report, Pehlivan Ağa was not aware of his weakened authority over the army. On the contrary, since he was granted the rank of Pasha, he was trying to continue his relations with the Janissaries as before – or even more self-confidently.\textsuperscript{2113} Therefore, his attitude towards the Janissaries seems quite violent and brutal, such as striking them with maces ("topuz") and by other oppressive means.\textsuperscript{2114} It seems that this kind of attitude towards the Janissaries was not new for Pehlivan Ağa, but it became unbearable for the Janissaries due to his weakened legitimacy following his second appointment. Mustafa Pasha also notes that his oppression was particularly questioned by newly recruited soldiers.\textsuperscript{2115} According to the same report, problems accelerated deeply when the news of embezzlement by Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa of the accession gift reached to the army, making the soldiers suspect that Pehlivan Ağa also embezzled their own sign-up bonus ("bahşiş").\textsuperscript{2116}

There are some similar motives in the account of Asım. According to him, especially after his reappointment, Pehlivan Ağa followed a haughty and harsh policy not only towards the officers but also soldiers, despite his deteriorated legitimacy in the eyes of the officers of the army.\textsuperscript{2117} Asım also blames him for embezzling ("dest-i itâle") the fees ("avâid") and salaries of his soldiers.\textsuperscript{2118} Therefore, the soldiers were waiting for a minor

\textsuperscript{2113} B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807).

\textsuperscript{2114} B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807).

\textsuperscript{2115} B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807): “taşradan gelûb yol erkan ve yenidoerîlik bilmeyen”.

\textsuperscript{2116} B.O.A. HAT 53980 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807). The first document is a short hatt of Mustafa IV asking the related official whether one thousand kese akçes was sent to the Janissaries in the army. The second one is a record of the amounts sent both to the Janissaries and other soldiers in the army: One thousand kese akçes for the Janissaries, 175 kese akçes for the remaining soldiers in the army and one thousand kese akçes for some other expenditures, a total of 2575 kese akçes was allocated for the army on the campaign. See B.O.A. HAT 1364/53894 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). Unfortunately, I was not able to determine an exact date as to when the accession tax ("cülüs bahşiş") reached to the army.

\textsuperscript{2117} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 102.

\textsuperscript{2118} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 102.
excuse to get rid of Pehlivan Ağâ. On the day of his murder, Asım notes, Pehlivan Ağâ came to a meeting place of the soldiers, carrying a mace in his hand. Then he violently acted towards the soldiers creating a tumult with the intention of disciplining the soldiers. However, the oppressed and angry soldiers fired at him. As might be recalled there was a similar example in the above report, too. There is another important detail in the report by Çelebi Mustafa Pasha which claims that the murder of Pehlivan Ağâ was not approved by all of the Janissaries and some of them decided to take the revenge of their murdered Ağâ afterwards. Therefore, the rebellious Janissaries fled from the army in order to escape punishment in the hands of the Janissaries and their officers. Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, in his report, gives a further clue about the identity of the murderers of Ağâ Pasha. They were “bayrak askerleri”, (company soldiers) not Janissaries in the real sense. Upon the questioning of the Grand Vizier, the Janissaries denied that those involved in the murder were Janissaries. In the same report, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha also ensures the Sultan that the real body of army was working hard for the campaign and was loyal to the Sultan. He also emphasizes that even the fugitives were returning to the camps in Karalaşi and Silistria.

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2120 B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807). In another report, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha does not mention any fugitives or the reaction of the other Janissaries. He just notes that after the murder of Pehlivan Ağâ the Janissaries returned to their places, B.O.A. HAT 1360/53499 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

2121 The term “Bayrak askeri” (company soldier) refers to volunteer soldiers recruited temporally. The companies were usually made of 500-1000 soldiers. Raising troops locally to augment the Janissaries was an old practice. Locally recruited troops were known by different names, such as sarıca, sekbân, levend. Serdengeçti (shock-troops) and dalkılıç soldiers would be recruited to the Janissary after their service in a certain campaign. In the Balkans such companies were usually formed by the Albanians and Bosnians. See Uzunçarşılı, Kapıkuşlu Ocakları, p. 488-9; Aksan, Virginia H., “Ottoman Military Recruitment Strategies in the Late Eighteenth Century”, Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and Conflicts (İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 2004), pp. 191-209. According to Pakalın, they would join the navy in spring and would return home during summer. See Pakalın, Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri, vol. I, p. 181.

2122 B.O.A.HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807).
Another aspect of the same issue comes from another document. The document in question is an undated one from the Grand Vizier to the Sultan. After giving some information about the conditions of the army, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha begins to talk about the murder of the Ağa Pasha on Thursday, 12 Ca 1222/18 July 1807. The Janissaries gathered at the bridge the same day and began to complain among themselves “Why are they still keeping us waiting? Either make us march upon the enemy or let us go. We do not have any allowance left.” Moreover, they complained that the Sultan sent them accession bonus, but it was not distributed to them. Noticing the crowd, Pehlivan Ağa came to the meeting place. However, he was not well received by the Janissaries. After accusing their Ağa Pasha for trusting (“itibar”) some figures in the Janissary army such as Camcı Bayraktar and Başıyazıcı and disregarding all the other Janissaries, they killed Pehlivan Ağa. There is no further clue about the identity of these figures. The author of Yayla İmamı Risalesi makes some contributions as to the identity of the figures called Camcı Bayrakdar and Başıyazıcı. According to him, the murder of Ağa Pasha by his own soldiers was due to an incident related to Başıyazıcı Abdi Efendi and his relative Camcı Alemdar, who came to the army after the deposition of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha. He notes that these two figures were among the dalkılıç and bayrak ağas who had been receiving either five hundred or eight hundred guruş, and then recruiting some soldiers.” Immediately before the incident, Pehlivan Ağa was talking to kul kethüdası while the Janissaries shot Camcı Alemdar. When he heard the noise, Pehlivan Ağa went outside with his mace and was immediately murdered by the Janissaries. Kuşmâni criticizes or rather mocks the Janissaries for murdering their own Ağa Pasha.

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2123 B.O.A. HAT 1360/53499 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

2124 B.O.A. HAT 1360/53499 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): “bizi neden bekleirdiler, ya düşman üzerine hareket olunsun ve yahud izin versünler, harçlğıımız kalmadı”.

2125 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 237.

2126 Kuşmâni, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 28a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 141.
Should we study the turmoil in the army only at the individualistic level, for instance Pehlivan Ağ’a’s haughtiness or Janissaries’ hatred of the Grand Vizier İbrahim Hilmi Pasha or Pehlivan Ağ’a? According to Asım, as in the capital, there were factions prevalent among the officers of the army. Some of them were delighted at the news of the rise of Mustafa IV, while others were not. The dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha seems to have been related to the role of factions. For instance, in the imperial decree by Mustafa IV ordering Çelebi Mustafa Pasha to join the imperial army in order to assume the post of grand vizierate, the Sultan notes that Hilmi Pasha gained animosity by believing in the “words of some some subverters” ("bazı mıfsidlerin sözü") One source argues that while the Janissaries demanded the deposition of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha, they insisted on the appointment of Hafız İsmail Pasha, the former Grand Vizier. With very limited knowledge of the factions within the army it is difficult to identify the different factions there. The most obvious party seems to be the groups of officials who will later become the Rusçuk Yârâni (the Comrades of Ruscuk), which will be studied through the end of this chapter. At this point, what we can underline is the fact that the after the May 1807 Rebellion, three serious events occurred in the army, ending with the dismissal of a Grand Vizier and murder of Ağ’a of the Janissaries, reminding the dismissal and reappointment of Şeyhülislam, dismissal of two kaimmakams and two sekbanbaşı in the capital, which is the topic to be discussed hereafter. The importance of the factions in the army will show itself in the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the capital.


2128 T.S.M.A. E. 1280 (undated, catalogue date is 1202-3/1787-89).

2129 B.O.A. C.AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807).
5.3 The Disorder in the State Apparatus

The yamaks returned to the forts a short time after the deliverance of the Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye. Indeed, in the rest of the above mentioned letter to Kaimmakam Musa Pasha, Halet Efendi notes that after the ceremony the robes of honors were put on the rebels, then they all kissed the hands of Münib Efendi, Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa and himself. After the ceremony, Arif Ağa invited Münib Efendi and Halet Efendi to a kiosk to drink coffee. While they were drinking coffee, Halet notes, they observed that the yamaks got on barges ("mavna") at Unkapanı to return to the fortresses.\textsuperscript{2130} Asım remarks that the ceremony took place on Monday, one day after the signing of the Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye.\textsuperscript{2131} Therefore, the return of the yamaks should have been on Monday, 24 Ra‘l June.\textsuperscript{2132} If they returned on Monday, it means that they remained at the Square for another two days after the accession of Mustafa IV. During these days, they were treated with respect at the Square by the Sultan and offered food like pilav and zerde\textsuperscript{2133} Tüfengçibaşı informs that on Saturday night the government sent rice, butter and coffee to the barracks, which were distributed by Kazgançı Mustafa Ağa.\textsuperscript{2134} As an eyewitness, Oğulukyan notes that the rebels passed by ships to their fortresses and he heard that they were crying "O comrade, our fame has

\textsuperscript{2130} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{2131} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{2132} Ebubekir Efendi notes that the rebels returned on the third day of the enthronement. See Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 29. For Kethûda Said their return was on Tuesday, corresponding to 25 Ra‘l June. See Kethûda Said Efendi, Neticetül-Vekayi, p. 19. On the other hand, as far as I could follow from Tüfengçibaşı’s narrative, it was true that the date of return was one day after the deliverance of the Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye to the Janissaries, however his account suggests that the incident took place on Saturday and the rebels left the city on Sunday, after having been granted robes of honor at Ağa Kapısı. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 26; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 413.

\textsuperscript{2133} Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 29; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 18a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 122.

It seems to have been a cheerful return for the yamaks since another source also narrates that they were singing a folk song and firing their pistols.

It was expected that the Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye and the return of the rebels would bring peace to the capital. However, the disorder only changed its nature. This time there were not crowds at Et Meydanı, but frequent depositions in the important posts of the state apparatus and the various forms of violence in the city proved that the unrest and struggle between various factions or groups would not fade away very easily.

5.3.1. The Deposition of Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa (17 R 1222/24 June 1807)

Unfortunately the return of the rebels to the barracks or the fortresses did not mean the end of disorder in the capital. They were frequently involved in some of the events that took place in the capital, either directly or indirectly. The first incidence was the dismissal of Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa, due to the pressure of the yamaks and the Janissaries. On 16 R 1222/23 June 1807, the Janissary officers met at the Terkim Mosque (İskender Paşa Mosque) and demanded the distribution of the money embezzled by the Sekbanbaşı. Since no result was achieved during that day, the next day the Janissaries met at the Süleymaniye Mosque. During that day, the Janissaries and karakollukçus gathered at the courtyard of the Mosque, asked for the dismissal of Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa and the appointment of Kahveci Mustafa Ağa, the oacak başçavuşu. Apparently the meeting was

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2135 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 14: “Ya Yoldaş, yedi krala namımız gitti”.

2136 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 18a; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 122-3.


2138 Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 33a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 422. According to Oğulukyan, the meeting at the Mosque was on 11 June (Julian)/23 June (Gregorian), Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 17.

2139 B.O.A. HAT 1359/53392 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). Kahveci Mustafa Ağa (d. 1223/1808) became oacak başçavuşu and was appointed as the Sekbanbaşı
not only for the dismissal of Arif Ağa but also for the appointment of Mustafa Ağa. This point seems to have troubled the Porte. Kaymakam Pasha argued that that the Janissaries should leave the appointment of the new one to the Sultan and the Porte, rather than insisting on a certain person. On the other hand, it seems that Mustafa IV yielded to the demand of the Janissaries and ordered the appointment of Mustafa Ağa as the new Sekbanbaşi.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 1359/53392 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). The authors of Yayla İmamı Risalesi and Fezleke-i Kuşmâni narrate as if the karakulak came to the Porte just to express the demand of the Janissaries at Süleymaniye Mosque that they did wanted the deposition of Arif Ağa. Upon the question of Kaymakam Pasha whether they had a specific candidate, he did not specify a certain name but noted that they would accept any person appointed by the Sultan. See Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 233; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 23a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.132.} As a result, Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa was dismissed from the office and Kahveci Mustafa Ağa was appointed\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 1359/53393 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); B.O.A. HAT 53483 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.} on 17 R 1222/24 June 1807.\footnote{B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 42; Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selim-i Salis, p.107; Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 20 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 70. Mustafa Necib, on the other hand, gives the date as 19 R/26 June. See Mustafa Necib Efendi, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 68.} The former was exiled to Bursa and the amount he embezzled was distributed to the Janissaries.

The basic problem about the dismissal of Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa was the accusation that he kept a certain amount of the monetary grant of the Sultan for himself, instead of distributing it to the soldiers.\footnote{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 27a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 413.} This money seems to have been delivered to Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa on 24 Ra/1 July, immediately after the return of the rebels.\footnote{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, pp. 27a-27; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 413.} A document states that Mustafa IV had ordered the distribution of the money only to the yamaks, urging that it
should not be distributed to the others.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53439 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). The document discusses whether it should be delivered either by “biniş” or sent with a certain individual.} Yayla İmami Rısalesi gives some further details. The Sultan sent 100,000 guruş for the yamaks, but 40,000 of this amount was kept by the Sekbanbaşı.\footnote{Yayla İmami Rısalesi, p. 231. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 27a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihi”si”, p. 413: 200,000 gurush for the Janissaries and 100,000 gurush for the yamaks. According to the author, from the amount sent to the barracks, 20,000 gurush was provided by Esma Sultan. Even though the author says that that she paid it as a thank offering celebrating the imperial accession (“şükran-i cülüs-i hümâyun”). Asım laments that the great amount of “cülüs bahşi” was a real burden for the treasury. See Asım, Tarih-i Asum, vol. II, p. 70} He delivered the remaining amount to a turnacı called Çolak Mahmud to be distributed among the yamaks.\footnote{According to The Times, a total of 2,500 purses were given to the Janissaries on the part of the new Sultan.\footnote{The Times, Monday, August 03, 1807, pg. 2; issue 7115, col. F (from the French Papers, Paris July 24).} Kethüda Said, Mustafa Necib and Asım do not give that much detail, but remark that Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa was dismissed due to embezzlement of some part of the money granted by the Sultan.\footnote{Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticeti’l-Vekayi, p. 20a; Kethüda Said, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 107; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 68; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuştanı, p. 23a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 132.} Apart from this, the author argues, Arif Ağa also embezzled half of 100,000 guruş, which was to be distributed to the Janissaries.\footnote{Yayla İmami Rısalesi, p. 231. If the numbers provided by the source are correct, it is very interesting to observe that the same amount was distributed to the yamaks and to the Janissaries. Since we do not have an exact number of these groups, it is difficult to comment on whether the money allocated as “cülusiyye” was determined according to the number or the role of these groups.} According to The Times, a total of 2,500 purses were given to the Janissaries on the part of the new Sultan.\footnote{Yayla İmami Rısalesi, p. 231.}
remaining amount. According to Yayla İmami Risalesi, upon the protest of the yamaks, Arif Ağa sent the remaining amount which was distributed thereafter.\footnote{Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 231. He is the only author who claims that the Sekbanbaşı sent the amount before his banishment.}

Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi offers a more complicated story. According to him, Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa was a victim of the intrigues of the yamaks and Kahveci Mustafa Ağa. He claims that Kahveci Mustafa Ağa brought 100,000 guruş to the fortresses, but the yamaks did not want to accept it saying that it was less than they had expected and each requested a daily payment of 25 akçes.\footnote{As might be recalled, during the meeting on 22 Ra/30 May, after some monetary grants and ranks to the four chiefs and seventeen other leaders, the remaining ones had also demanded a daily payment of 25 akçes, which was refused by Sekbanbaşı. If this is true, it might prove the fact that the yamaks still expected the yevmiyye rejected by the Sekbanbaşı.} From his narration, it becomes clear that most of the soldiers at the fortresses were not satisfied with the previous settlement of the payments. Kahveci Mustafa Ağa, Tüfengçibaşı continues, took the opportunity and argued that if he had become a sekbanbaşı, he would have arranged the payment of salaries they asked for. Therefore, the Sultan sent 40,000 more to the fortresses. However, four chiefs of the yamaks wrote a petition to the Porte in which they complained that this amount was not distributed to them, probably to put the blame on the shoulders of Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa. Finally, Tüfengçibaşı notes that after an investigation it was found out that the person behind the problem was Kazgancı Mustafa Ağa.\footnote{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-ı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 29a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 416.}

At this point, we should draw attention to some of the details on Tüfengçibaşı’s account regarding the matter. The first point is his conscious effort to defend Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa. He was innocent, but became the victim of some other people like Kahveci Mustafa and Kazgancı Mustafa Ağa. For him, he was the person who saved the treasury from a great burden by preventing the payment of 25 akçes daily wages to the soldiers at the fortresses. We are not in a position to have a clear opinion on the reality of his assertion. However, there seems to be some obscure points in his story. First of all, Tüfengçibaşı states that the money sent to the fortresses was not embezzled, however at another point he
mentions that the four leaders applied the Porte arguing that the additional payment of 40,000 guruş were not paid to them, the exact amount specified in Yayla İmami Risalesi. Tüfengçibaşı tries to explain the complaints of the yamaks in terms of their greediness and claims that they were trying to get an extra 40,000 guruş apart from the 100,000 guruş sent by the Sultan. However, none of the contemporary narratives mentions an extra payment for the fortresses. Therefore it is very likely that the original amount sent there should be 60,000 guruş as asserted by the author of Yayla İmami Risalesi. Indeed, only when talking about the causes of the dismissal Arif Ağa, Tüfengçibaşı makes some clarifications on the points that he had left obscure previously, yet still with an apologetic tone. This time he admits that Arif Ağa spared 40,000 guruş from the “atiyye” and gave 5,000 guruş to Abdullah Ağa, the karakulak of the Janissary Ağa. The author does not mention why Abdullah Ağa was given this amount, but most probably to ensure that that he would not reveal the embezzlement. The problem arises when Abdullah Ağa finds his share insufficient and requests more. However, Arif Ağa refuses to pay him more and thus kind of hostility emerges between the two. Consequently, Abdullah Ağa collaborates with Kahveci Mustafa, who seems to have been willing to be appointed as sekbanbaşı. After that point Abdullah Ağa and Mustafa Ağa provoke the Janissaries informing them that Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa embezzled 40,000 guruş from their payment.

There are some documentary clues proving that Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa had really embezzled a certain amount of money. For instance, in an undated document, there are two short entries about Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa. The first short entry informs that he kept 30,000 guruş for himself from the possessions of Yusuf Ağa, the former Valide Kethüda. It is also

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2154 Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 231.
noted that the money should be taken back and delivered to the treasury.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 745/35223.A (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808): “Sersekbânân-ı sâbâk Mehmed Arif Ağa’nın valide kethüdâsı esbak Yusuf Ağa’ya ricâ edüb malından ahz etdiği 30,000 guruş. Mehmed Arif Ağa’dan ve canib-i miriye ahz olunmak”} In the document the verb request (“rica”) is used while explaining how the money passed to Arif Ağa. Though it is a very obscure expression not clarifying where, why and how the money/property was extracted from Yusuf Ağa, it might be somehow related to some strange accusations directed against Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa in some contemporary sources. To begin with \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, its author briefly notes that Arif Ağa bribed the ruling elite during the “\textit{time of accession to the throne}”.\footnote{\textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, p. 233.} 

Though he does not make further explanation about the matter, some other sources complete the picture. Ebubekir Efendi, in \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, remarks that Arif Ağa frequented the houses of the ruling elite for many nights and requested money saying that “\textit{you were also included in the list but it was me who saved you}.”\footnote{Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 23a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 132.} Yusuf Ağa was not in the city during and after the Rebellion, but the above information is very important since it provides us a profile of the highest military authority in the capital trying to abuse the turmoil in the city and it also gives us a sense of the horror that prevailed over the ruling elite during that time. In addition to that, we might suspect that Arif Ağa did get the money either directly from Yusuf Ağa with the promise to save his life, or through his relatives for the same purpose. Another possibility might be that Arif Ağa illegally seized the money or the possessions of Yusuf Ağa while his goods in the city were being confiscated by the Porte. However, the verb “rica” implies that the first two possibilities are more reasonable. Cevdet Pasha claims that Yusuf Ağa had established secret contacts with the followers of Prince Mustafa while he was employed as the valide sultan kethüda. The same author also notes that Yusuf Ağa bribed Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa and some others in order to prevent his own execution and ensured that he would be only exiled.\footnote{Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VIII, p. 195.} Cevdet Pasha does not give
any clear information on when and how he bribed the Sekbanbaşi, but from his explanation it seems that it was probably after Yusuf Ağ'a’s return from the pilgrimage. As might be recalled the uprising occurred when Yusuf Ağ'a was around Geyve and he was banished to Bursa, rather than being executed. It might be instructive to underline that the execution of Yusuf Ağ'a at Bursa was on mid-June 1222 and the deposition of Sekbanbaşi on 17 R 1222/24 June 1807. Therefore, if the above argument of Cevdet Pasha is correct, with the dismissal of Arif Ağ'a, Yusuf Ağ'a should have lost a protector and soon he was executed.

The second short note in the above mentioned document is more important since it proves that Arif Ağ'a embezzled a certain amount from the “atiyye” to be paid to the Janissaries or the yamaks. Unfortunately, this part of the document is greatly distorted and some part of the crucial information is illegible. Yet, it seems that, Beyhan Sultan sent a certain amount to be distributed to a certain group, but Arif Ağ'a spared some amount of for himself. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi notes that Esma Sultan sent 20,000 guruş as a thank offering celebrating the imperial accession (“şükran-i cülüs-i hümâyun”) to be distributed to the Janissaries. If we assume that there is a confusion in the names of Esma and Beyhan Sultan, they should be referring to the same issue.

The incident of dismissal can be evaluated as a struggle for power between Kahveci Mustafa and Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağ'a or an individual abuse of the latter which led to his dismissal and exile. Rather than the result, the way the dismissal of Sekbanbaşi was realized is more important for our purposes. The involvement of the yamaks and the Janissaries might be understandable since the issue was directly related to them. From a different perspective, we should not forget that they had promised not to be involved in the issues other than their own duties. However, as we have seen in the above incident they

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2162 B.O.A. HAT 745/35223.A (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808): “Sersekbannan-i sabık Mehmed Arif Ağ'a’ya ... için atufetlû Beyhan Sultan efendimizden .... guruş atiyye-i hümâyûn gelûb bir .... i'tâ etmeyûb ekl ü bel etmekle ... fukarâsına taksim olunmasi ...”

2163 B.O.A. HAT 745/35223.A (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808).

again gathered and exerted pressure on the deposition of a high leading official. Indeed, Öğuluğyan considers the incident as a sign of hegemony of the former rebels over the city during the reign of Mustafa IV.\textsuperscript{2165} He also provides us another dimension in the struggle between Kahveci Mustafa and Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa saying that the former had a close relationship with Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa.\textsuperscript{2166} Even though Câbi does not give a specific name, he also asserts that Başçavuş Kahveci Mustafa Ağa had a coffeehouse at Atpazarı and thus had acquaintance with the \textit{yamaks} and Janissaries.\textsuperscript{2167} The latter asserts that the \textit{yamaks} and Janissaries had already decided to appoint him as \textit{sekbanbaşı}.\textsuperscript{2168} Mustafa Necib also makes a short reference that Kahveci Mustafa was appointed due to the pressure of rebels ("\textit{eşkiya}").\textsuperscript{2169} From one perspective this relationship should not be surprising if we take into consideration that Arif Ağa probably embezzled a certain amount of money that should have been distributed to the \textit{yamaks} and the Janissaries. However, from another perspective it shows the undeniable influence of both the Janissaries and the \textit{yamaks} over the Porte.

5.3.2. Two Appointments in a Day

The \textit{yamaks} and Janissaries acting as a very active and powerful pressure group became more evident in the incidents related to Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi. Leaving aside the issue of whether they had the right to do it or not, the forced dismissal of a \textit{sekbanbaşı} was an issue somehow related to military affairs. Thus, the above incident does not seem as

\textsuperscript{2165} Öğuluğyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{2166} Öğuluğyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{2167} Câbi, \textit{Câbi Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 154. This information also implies the importance of coffeehouses as the meeting places and establishment of relations between the different strata of the society, including the military class.


\textsuperscript{2169} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi}, p. 68.
striking as that of the dismissal and reappointment of a Şeyhülislam, the highest ranking **ulema**. Ataullah Efendi was dismissed from his post on 7 Ca 1222/13 July 1807 and Ömer Hulusi Efendi was appointed in his place. However, on the following day, Ataullah Efendi was reappointed to the same post.

5.3.2.1. Dismissal of Şeyhülislam Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi (7 Ca 1807/13 July 1807)

As might be expected, most of the chronicles evaluate this surprising sequence of deposition and appointments as a strange event and offer various explanations. The strange thing for them is the deposition and reappointment of a Şeyhülislam only one day after his dismissal, rather than the causes of dismissal of Ataullah Efendi. Among those who talk about the causes of the dismissal in detail are Kethüda Said and Asım. According to the former, the *yamaks* were not pleased with some efforts of Ataullah Efendi trying to curb their excesses and also trying to keep order in the Empire. If his explanation is correct, there should be discontent between the *yamaks* and Ataullah Efendi sometime before his dismissal. Moreover, both authors talk about the role of a coalition including Seyyidâ Efendi, Mütekâid Mustafa Pasha and Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa leading to the deposition of the Şeyhülislam.

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2170 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 46. See also Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayı, p. 70; Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yi Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 36a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 426; Oğulukeyan, Ruzname, p. 20.


2173 Seyyidâ/Seydâ Efendi (d. 1224/1809) was the brother of Hayri Efendi (1734/5-1789), a former Reisülküttab. Seyyidâ Efendi was a *müderris* and served in his capacity as *vezir müfettişi* or *miri katibi*. The author of *Yayla İmamı Risalesi* describes him as evkaf *müfettişi*. For more details, see Appendix I.
Seyyidâ Efendi seems to have been an affluent and influential figure during Selim III’s reign, especially thanks to his connections with the retinue of former Valide Sultan by his wife and he also seems to have close connections with the ruling elite of that period. Asım describes him as a very talkative person and most people yielded to his requests to avoid his idle talk. However, since Asım draws a very negative picture of him, it is very difficult to determine whether his requests were yielded just to avoid his idle talks.2175 Câbi describes him a man of “brilliance and letters” (“erbâb-ı tab‘ ve şu’âra”). Yet he also asserts that Seyyidâ Efendi frightened the elite by his remarks and they yielded to his demands.2176 His connections with the palace and being the brother of a former reisülküttab must have already provided him a considerable degree of influence during this period. In short, Seyyidâ Efendi was a figure whose fate rose during the reign of Selim III. His privileged position seems to have changed radically with the rise of Mustafa IV.2177

According to Asım, Seyyidâ gradually began to worry of a calamity that would fall upon

2174 Mütekâid Seyyid Mustafa Pasha (d. 1228/1813) was the husband of late Şah Sultan (1761-1802), the daughter of Mustafa III and the brother of Kara Vezir Mehmed Pasha (d.1727/28-1799). He was appointed as the governor of Rakka with the rank of vizier (Ş 1192/September 1778) and later was promoted to the rank of nişancı. He was employed as the governor of Aydın, Bosnia (L 1193/October-November 1779), Aydın (1194/1780), Aleppo (M 1197/December 1782), Karesi, and the vizier of the dome (“kubbe veziri”) and then governor of Sivas. It was followed by the governorships of Kars (1198/1784), Adana (1198/1784), Maraş and Konya. Mustafa Pasha was allowed to stay at Rami Chiftlik as a pension. Thanks to his wife, he stayed in a residence around Eyüb and sometimes in Rami Chiftlik. During that period he stayed at Havass-ı Refia and kept his rank of Pasha. For more details, see Appendix I.

2175 According to Asım, he was an idle talker, an ignorant person seeking his own interests. Due to his connections, he was able to accumulate a great amount of wealth which he did not hesitate to show off. Asım criticizes him not only due to the problems in his character or seeking worldly pleasures but especially due to the conceited and despising attitude towards the ulema. It might be important to recall that Asım was a müderris who felt himself frequently frustrated in his life either by the ulema or the ruling elite of Selim III. As a well-educated person but having little opportunities for social mobility he should have directed his hatred to “ignorant” figures such as Seyyidâ Efendi who, for Asım, did not deserve the respect and comfort he had. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 76.


himself. He was especially afraid of punishment by Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi due to his despising attitude of Seyyidâ Efendi towards him and some other members of the ulema during the previous reign. Therefore, in order to escape an anticipated punishment, Seyyidâ set out to make plans for the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi. As a first step, he tried to contact with Kabakçı Mustafa, now the superintendent of the forts. One day Seyyidâ Efendi invited Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa to his own residence and tried to convince Kabakçı Mustafa for the urgent need to dismiss Ataullah Efendi. From Asım’s account it seems that Kabakçı Mustafa initially was not willing to depose the Şeyhülislam, however he was finally convinced by Seyyidâ Efendi. According to Asım, in order convince Mustafa Ağa, Seyyidâ Efendi argued that Ataullah Efendi never had either the intention or the approval for the dethronement of Selim III. He explained that due to the fact that the Şeyhülislam received favour from Selim III, he would not hesitate to secure his rise to the throne as soon as he found an opportunity. That was, he continued, the reason of the silence of the Şeyhülislam at the Et Meydanı and sooner or later the Şeyhülislam would take revenge on Kabakçı Mustafa and from other rebels. If such a talk had really taken place between the two, we can argue that Seyyidâ Efendi abused Kabakçı Mustafa’s fear for his own interests.


2180 Asım notes that Kabakçı Mustafa was a servant of İsmail Ağa, one of the former superintendents of the Straits. This might be İsmail Ağa that is mentioned in an official document as the former “nazır-i Kal’a-yı Seb’a”. See B.O.A. Rumeli Ahkam Defterleri, no. 59 (evahir-i Ca 1222/7-16 July 1807). The author also informs that there was acquaintance between Seyyidâ Efendi and İsmail Ağa, thanks to which he should have established contacts with Kabakçı Mustafa. Indeed, Asım notes that they were close friends. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 77.


After the collaboration of Seyyidâ and Kabakçî Mustafa for the deposition of Ataullah Efendi, Mütekâid Mustafa Pasha enters the scene. Even though Kethûda Said Efendi briefly notes that Kabakçî Mustafa Ağa, Seyyidâ Efendi and Mütekâid Mustafa Pasha had collaborated, it is again Asım who gives some more details on Mütekâid Mustafa’s involvement in the issue. According to him, he had previous connections with Seyyidâ Efendi, who introduced Kabakçî to Mütekâid Mustafa Pasha. At that period Mustafa Pasha was residing at Eyüb, which was in a way like a pensioner’s life (“tekâüden ikamet”). It seems that Kabakçî Mustafa and Seyyidâ convinced Mustafa Pasha arguing that all the Janissaries wished for the deposition of Ataullah Efendi and his dismissal was a very urgent issue. Kethûda Said also gives similar but very brief information: Seyyidâ Efendi introduces Kabakçî Mustafa Ağa to Mütekâid Mustafa Pasha and they both convince Kabakçî Mustafa for the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi, arguing that it was an urgent matter. As far as reflected in the details provided by Asım, in accordance to their plans, Mütekaïd Mustafa Pasha wrote a letter to Valide Sultan and consequently Ataullah Efendi was dismissed on Monday, 7 Ca 1222/13 July 1807. Tüfengçibaşi Arif Efendi, on the other hand, claims that it was the Sultan who insisted on the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi.


2185 The author of *Yayla İmamı Risalesi* does not make any connections between these three figures and the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi. However, he notes that one day Seyyidâ Efendi came across Kabakçî Mustafa at a tomb in front of his house and invited Mustafa to his house for a coffee. During the conversation, he said that Mütekaïd Mustafa Pasha also wish to see him at his estate in Rami. When both paid a visit to Rami Chiftlik, Mustafa Pasha did not like the visit of Kabakçî Mustafa. The author also informs that Mustafa IV was not pleased with the connection between these figures and exiled Seyyidâ Efendi to Tarsus. See *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 234.


Efendi. Şanizâde, drawing on the information provided by Asım, asserts that Mütekâid Mustafa Pasha had a role in the Şeyhülislam crisis. Indeed, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, during his grand vizierate, proposed exile of Mütekâid Mustafa Pasha either to Filibe or Gümülcine with the consideration that he would no longer be involved in the intrigues of the capital. He was accused of having a direct role in the dethronement of Selim III and retaining close affiliations with Mustafa IV, the former Sultan. Therefore, he was exiled to Filibe after the confiscation all of his mukataas and revenue on 3 C 1223/27 July 1808. In a letter by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, it is noted that from his total revenue of three or four hundred kese akçes, only one hundred or half a hundred would be left to Mütekaïd Mustafa Pasha. It is important to note that Filibe was the mukataa of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and his exile to Filibe seems to have been related to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha’s concern to keep him under his own control. If we try to figure out a comprehensive picture from these details, it seems the circumstances leading to the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi were the result of a coalition initiated by Seyyidâ Efendi and approved by the Mustafa IV.

5.3.2.2. Reappointment of Ataullah Efendi (8 Ca 1807/14 July 1807)

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The dismissal of Ataullah Efendi seems to have created surprise and response among contemporary sources. Some historians put the emphasis on the discontent of the *ulema* with Samanizâde Ömer Hulusi Efendi, the new Şeyhülislam. According to these authors, the figures behind the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi were some members of the *ulema*. Interestingly enough, neither of them makes reference to whether the *ulema* were satisfied or not with the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi. In fact, in their story, the discontent of the *ulema* seems to be more related to the attitude of the new Şeyhülislam towards them. When they paid a visit to the newly appointed Şeyhülislam to congratulate his promotion, they were not well received by Ömer Hulusi Efendi. According to both authors, the visitors perceived an unfavourable attitude by Hulusi Efendi as a sign of future calamities that would fall upon them by the wrath of the new Şeyhülislam and therefore they decided to get rid of him.\(^{2196}\) Câbî Ömer Efendi provides more details as to what happened during the reception of some members of the *ulema* by the new Şeyhülislam. The author notes that Ömer Hulusi Efendi was a very nervous person and while the *ulema* were standing in his room to be received, he immediately ordered the dispatch of men to various parts of the Empire for the dismissal of inefficient and ignorant judges and *naibs*.\(^{2197}\) After that he received the *ulema*, but still did not show respect to their rank as the visitors deserved.\(^{2198}\) It is interesting to underline that the authors narrate the event as if no reaction would have occurred if Ömer Hulusi Efendi had received his visitors well enough. Rather than involving in an open struggle, it seems that the unsatisfied *ulema* preferred to provoke the Janissaries advising them that the dismissal of Ömer Hulusi Efendi was for their own benefit.\(^{2199}\)

\(^{2196}\) *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 232; Câbî, *Câbî Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 150. Câbî does not make any reference to the protest or the pressure of the Janissaries for the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi. Rather he notes that Kaimmakam Köse Musa Pasha wrote a *telhis* to the Sultan noting that the *ulema* would create a disorder therefore recommended the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi.

\(^{2197}\) Câbî, *Câbî Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 149.

\(^{2198}\) Câbî, *Câbî Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 149.

\(^{2199}\) *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, pp. 232-3.
Even though Aşım follows the basic line of the above story, he gives some important details that help us to have a more complete picture. From his account we learn that the ulema were received at the residence of Mekkizâde Efendi, the son-in-law of Ömer Hulusi Efendi, since the latter did not have a residence in İstanbul. Therefore, it seems that Hulusi Efendi did not have time to deal with the ulema well enough while he was busy with the arrangements of his new residence.\textsuperscript{2200} The importance of Aşım’s account lies in the fact that he gives us crucial details on the efforts by the disappointed ulema to ensure the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi. For instance, after some investigation they discovered that the deposition of Ataullah Efendi was due to the coalition of Seyyidâ Efendi, Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa and Mütekaid Mustafa Pasha.\textsuperscript{2201} Aşım also notes that they also learned that the Janissaries were not really involved in the issue of dismissal. Therefore, Muradzâde, Münib Efendi, and Şemseddin Efendi held a meeting one day before the gathering at Süleymaniye Mosque.\textsuperscript{2202} During that meeting, they wrote a letter to the Janissaries. Though Aşım does not remark, they probably invited the Janissaries to react for the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi. At that point, it might be interesting to refer to Hücctet-i Şer’iyye. In the process of dismissal of Ataullah Efendi, some members of the ulema notice a “wrong” that was done to a Şeyhülislam and they try to repair it with the help of the Janissaries.

Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi contributes to the matter by opening another dimension for the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi. According to him, the real force behind the scene was Reis Vekili Halet Efendi, a childhood friend of Ataullah Efendi. Moreover, Halet Efendi was the tutor (“lala”) of Ataullah Efendi and received favour from Ataullah Efendi’s father. Therefore, when the Kaimmakam informed Halet Efendi about the matter two days before the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi, Halet Efendi tried to convince him that it would not be appropriate to dismiss Ataullah Efendi and warned that “within one day they would

\textsuperscript{2200} Aşım, \textit{Tarih-i Aşım}, vol. II, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{2201} Aşım, \textit{Tarih-i Aşım}, vol. II, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{2202} Aşım, \textit{Tarih-i Aşım}, vol. II, p. 78.
force you to reappoint him”. In reply, the Kaimmakam implied that he had no other choice since the Sultan himself was insisting on his dismissal. According to the author, after the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi, Halet Efendi prepared a brilliant plan to provoke the yamaks and the Janissaries. He prepared a fictitious list into which some leading figures from the forts and Janissaries were written down, including the Sekbanbaşı. The list was sent to Kabakçı Mustafa with the argument that those in the list were to be executed; however, since Ataullah Efendi had refused to approve these executions, he was replaced by Ömer Hulusi Efendi, who was willing to produce a fetva for the executions. The message was quite clear. If the new Şeyhülislam was not replaced, they would come under the threat of an execution. As we have seen in the discussion about the Hüccet-i Şer'iyye, the possibility of being executed was a nightmare for those involved in the Rebellion and that was the basic reason they had secured the Hüccet. It it could be seen that both Seyyidâ Efendi and later Halet Efendi abused fear of Kabakçı Mustafa for their own interests. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi does not make any reference to the coalition of Kabakçı, Seyyidâ Efendi and Mütekâid Mustafa Pasha. But he claims that Kabakçı Mustafa became very frightened when he saw the list and sent it to the Sekbanbaşı. One wonders whether Kabakçı Mustafa was really involved in a coalition, but when he saw the list, he became frightened and began to support the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi. One point that gives us a motive in the story mentioned, by some other chronicles, is a meeting in which some members of the ulema also participated on the night of the deposition of Ataullah Efendi. However, in Tüfengçibaşı’s story, it is Halet Efendi who invited the Sekbanbaşı to the

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house of Burnaz Beyzâde\textsuperscript{2207} where some ulema members seem to be present.\textsuperscript{2208} Though the reason is not explained, the members of the ulema seem very anxious and pledge Halet Efendi to find a way to dismiss of Ömer Hulusi Efendi. One clue that might connect us to the other story is the note by Tüfengçibaşı that the members of the ulema were afraid of being dismissed and exiled by the new Şeyhülislam.\textsuperscript{2209} No mention of the visit of the ulema to the Ömer Hulusi is made, but their anxiety was probably related to it. After the meeting the Sekbanbaşi, the author asserts, sent secret news to the barracks and called fourteen odabaşıs to Ağa Kapısı, where he informed them on the matter and advised them to gather at the courtyard of Süleymaniye Mosque, in the case the reappointment could not be achieved by Kaimmakam Pasha.\textsuperscript{2210} As might be noticed, there are two lines of stories on the reappointment of Şeyhülislam Efendi, one emphasizing the role some members of the ulema, while the second giving more credit to the role of Halet Efendi. It is very possible that reactionaries in these two stories were connected by the meeting at the residence of Burnaz Beyzâde.

In both lines of explanation, the meeting of the Janissaries at Süleymaniye plays the key role in the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi. As in the case of dismissal of Sekbanbaşi

\textsuperscript{2207} Burnaz Beyzâde Derviş Mehmed Esad Bey was a müderris. He was a resident of Soğanağa District on Divanyolu. He was the son of müderris Burnaz Bey, the mektubçu of Köstendili Dervişi Bey. In the Ceride, published by Beydilli, he is mentioned in the case of embezzlement of a considerable amount of money from the endowment of Aişe Hanım in the same district. He later confessed the embezzlement of the money. Depending on this incident and his connections with Halet Efendi, Beydilli argues that he was not a trustworthy figure. According to Câbi, Burnaz Beyzâde was exiled to İzvornik in Bosnia (26 Ca 1227/7 June 1812). For more details see Beydilli, \textit{Bir İmamın Günlüğü}, pp. 81, 84, 132-3. For the details of the impropriety in the endowment and his exile to Pazarcık, see Câbi, \textit{Câbi Tarihi}, vol. II, pp. 858-60


Arif Ağa, the Janissaries again met at the courtyard of the Süleymaniye Mosque. Early in the same morning of 8 Ca 1222/14 July 1807, the Sekbanbaşı met Kaimmakam Hamdullah Pasha and informed him that the Janissaries in the courtyard insisted on the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi and warned that otherwise a great disorder might occur. Kaimmakam Pasha rebuked Sekbanbaşı noting that the

O you Ağa, do you think this is a clowning? Do you think that the lofty office of Şeyhülislam, which is one of the most distinguished positions in the Empire, is a child’s play? Dismissing a person and appointing him the next day would be an act to cause prejudice to the imperial authority of the Sultan, who is the asylum of the universe. Furthermore, this would hurt the imperial greatness and pomp and such a conduct would mean disgrace towards the glory of the sultanate, which by no means acceptable.

Musa Pasha is known to have been close to Ataullah Efendi however, since he was not in the office of kaimmakam-ship during that period (22 R/29 June 1807 to 2 C/6 August 1807), Ataullah Efendi seems to have lost a figure close to him. As might be noticed from above quotation Şehzuvarzâde Hamdullah Pasha, the kaimmakam, does not seem close to Ataullah Efendi.

The meeting at Süleymaniye achieved its aim after a short time. Upon the warning of Sekbanbaşı that the city might suffer another disorder and a probable plunder, Hamdullah Pasha called the Sekbanbaşı, Rikab Kethûda Mustafa Efendi and Halet Efendi to the Porte

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2211 Probably for that reason, the author of Yayla İmamı Risalesi and Oğulukyan make a serious confusion and assert that crowd at Süleymaniye asked for the dismissal of Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa, reappointment of Ataullah Efendi and also Musa Pasha. See Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 233. However, as we have remarked above, Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa was dismissed on 24 June, Musa Pasha on 29 June and Ataullah Efendi on 13 July. Therefore, there is not a coincidence between these dates. Oğulukyan notes that the gathering at Süleymaniye was on 11 June (Julian Calendar)/23 June (Gregorian Calendar). See Oğulukyan Ruzname, p. 17.


and then they went to the Palace.\textsuperscript{2214} During the meeting with the Sultan, discussion seems to have passed between the Sekbanbaşı and Mustafa IV. At the beginning, the Sultan insisted that he himself had appointed Ömer Hulusi Efendi, implying that there would be no return. However, it seems that the Sekbanbaşı boldly opposed the decision and warned that the Sultan that the incident could lead to a great turmoil that would ruin the city. He also ensured that if any more similar cases occurred again, he would sacrifice himself.\textsuperscript{2215} Finally the Sultan yielded and approved the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi.\textsuperscript{2216}

The great pressure on the Porte and the Sultan for the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi is also reflected in some official documents. It was a very embarrassing situation for the Sultan and the Porte. Not only they yielded to pressure exerted by a group of Janissaries but also they were forced to depose a Şeyhülislam only one day after his appointment without any serious charge. Therefore, particular attention was paid not to offend Ömer Hulusi Efendi. Instead of directly dismissing him, the Sultan preferred that he should resign and stay in any place he wished to.\textsuperscript{2217} Moreover, it would be publicly declared that Ömer Hulusi Efendi had resigned voluntarily from the post, a case which Asım describes as an “unheard dismissal” (“azl-i nâ-mesbûk”).\textsuperscript{2218} Mustafa IV did not forget to send presents to Ömer Hulusi Efendi.\textsuperscript{2219} Another document informs that Hulusi Efendi was received by the Sultan together with Kaimmakam Pasha.\textsuperscript{2220} This kind attitude of Sultan Mustafa towards

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item B.O.A. HAT 53320 (undated). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.
\item B.O.A. HAT 53320 (undated). His dismissal over a night seems to have created a disadvantage in later career of Ömer Hulusi Efendi. For an example, see B.O.A. HAT 22687 (undated). See also Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 79.
\item B.O.A. HAT 1362/53745 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).
\item B.O.A. HAT 1355/52971 (undated).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Ömer Hulusi Efendi can be explained in terms of respect shown to the holder of the highest position in religious hierarchy who was now forced to leave his post. However, from another perspective, it could be considered as a sign of disapproval of Mustafa IV for his deposition. Indeed, Kethüda Said also remarks that the Sultan yielded unwillingly to the pressure of the Janissaries so that the incident would not create another disorder.\footnote{Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Neticetü'l-Vekayi}, p. 22a; Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, p. 109a.} Moreover, it also suggests that the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi was in fact favoured by the Sultan. Indeed, as we have remarked above, Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi argues that it was the Sultan who insisted on the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi.\footnote{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 39; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 431.} This also might help us to question the unquestioned or taken-for-granted connection between Ataullah Efendi and Mustafa IV.

Whatever the reasons for the dismissal and reappointment of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi were, it is clear that the Janissaries and Kabakçı Mustafa played a role in the matter. This was an act contrary to their promise in the \textit{Hüccet-i Şer'iyye}. Indeed, the author of \textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi} blames Janissaries for forgetting their promise.\footnote{\textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi}, pp. 232-3.} When Sekbanbaşı Mustafa Ağa informed the Sultan on the protest of the Janissaries, Kethüda Said notes, those in the courtyard of Süleymaniye were reminded of their promise in the \textit{Hüccet} and asked why they dared to interfere in the dismissal and appointment of a Şeyhülislam.\footnote{Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Neticetü'l-Vekayi}, p. 22a; Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, pp. 108-109a. Historian Asım follows Kethüda Said for the narration of the events that passed between the Janissaries at Süleymaniye and the Porte. See Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 79.} In reply, the Janissaries argued that their conduct was not against the stipulations of the \textit{Hüccet}, but rather, owing to their compliance with it (“\textit{riâyetimizden ne’şet etmişir}”).\footnote{Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Neticetü'l-Vekayi}, p. 22a; Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, p. 109a.} According to them, some “müfsid” on behalf of the Janissaries had dared to interfere in the
dismissal of Ataullah Efendi.\textsuperscript{2226} Apparently, the Janissaries were in fact used to secure the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi. Though no more clear explanation is provided after that point, it seems that according to the logic of the Janissaries at Süleymaniye they were correcting a mistake, which, in fact, was again in fact against the promise in the Hüccet. A more important point in this respect is the fact that the Janissaries had not supported the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi, but somehow it was falsely transmitted to the center as if they wished the dismissal.

Ataullah Efendi did not lose time to get rid of Seyyidâ Efendi. He was exiled next day after the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi. As we have remarked, the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi happened on 7 Ca 1222/13 July 1807 and his reappointment on 8 Ca 1807/14 July 1807. According to Âsim, exile of Seyyidâ Efendi corresponded to the date of reappointment of Ataullah Efendi.\textsuperscript{2227} Therefore, it should have been either on 14 or 15 July.\textsuperscript{2228} His immediate exile after the second appointment of Ataullah Efendi could also be regarded as a proof of hostility between the two.

\subsection*{5.3.3. Changes in the Porte}

Another office also witnessed frequent changes. About one month after the uprising, the holders of the office of kaimmakam-ship began to replace each other frequently. After the Rebellion and the accession of Mustafa IV, Kaimmakam Musa Pasha remained in his


\textsuperscript{2227} Âsim, \textit{Tarih-i Âsim}, vol. II, p. 81

\textsuperscript{2228} According to Câbî he was first exiled to Adana. See Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 415. According to the information provided by him, Seyyidâ Efendi did not have peaceful relationship with the leading figures of Adana who complained the Porte about Seyyidâ Efendi. Consequently he was sent to Tarsus on 25 R 1222/2 July 1807. See Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 150. Âsim mentions only his exile to Tarsus. See Âsim, \textit{Tarih-i Âsim}, vol. II, p. 81. He was released one year later. However, on the very day of his arrival to İstanbul, he seems to have annoyed İzzet Mehmed Paşa, a former Grand Vizier and immediately afterwards he was exiled to the Island of Limni on 6 S 1224/23 March 1809. See Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, pp. 415-6.
office, but later left the post twice. The first was on 29 June 1807 and Şehzuvarzâde Hamdullah Pasha was appointed as the new kaimmakam. Musa Pasha was reappointed on 6 August 1807 and left office again on 20 December 1807, this time replaced by Tayyar Mahmud Pasha.

5.3.3.1. Dismissal of Kaimmakam Musa Pasha (22 R 1222/29 June 1807)

The first leave of Musa Pasha was on 22 R 1222/29 June 1807.\(^{2229}\) It seems that he used his health as a pretext and resigned from office.\(^{2230}\) For the author of \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, Musa Pasha voluntarily resigned and asked for permission to stay at Yeniçehir-i Fener (modern Larissa, Greece).\(^{2231}\) The vacancy was filled by Şehzuvarzâde Hamdullah Bey with the rank of Pasha.\(^{2232}\) It is very strange that at the zenith of his career, Musa Pasha left his post and preferred to stay away from the capital. Mustafa Necib, too, comments that it was an unexpected resign.\(^{2233}\) Most of the contemporary authors try to bring an explanation for the leave of Musa Pasha. According to Asım, he had illegally and unjustly accumulated a good fortune, benefiting from the disorder immediately before and after the Rebellion and therefore he needed time to consume it. Moreover, Asım argues, Musa Pasha was clever enough to notice the vagueness of the future especially a possible defeat in the war against the Russians; consequently, he preferred to save himself and his money from future uncertainties. According to Şanizâde, he preferred to resign after the Rebellion apparently to create the image that he was forced to involve in the Rebellion.\(^{2234}\) He also


\(^{2231}\) \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, p. 232.


argues that Musa Pasha probably wished to stay in İzmir in order to escape to Europe. In other words, his deposition was due to his efforts to control the Janissaries, implying that the Janissaries might have had a role in his deposition. Asım notes that his health was also problematic during that period, which was noticed by the Sultan, as well.

There is confusion in some contemporary sources concerning the place Musa Pasha stayed after the first deposition. But it is clear that he stayed in Gelibolu. In fact, Gelibolu was not the place he originally asked for. As the author of Yayla İmamı Risalesi already notes, he requested to stay in Yenişehir-i Fener. His request was accepted by the Sultan. However, since his retinue and relatives were quite crowded, and needed animals of burden to transport them, Musa Pasha preferred to travel from İstanbul to Yenişehir-i Fener by sea route. Horses were not easily available due to wartime conditions. However, travel by sea was not as easy as he anticipated. The Dardanelles were closed due to the Russo-Ottoman war. Therefore, he wrote a petition to the new Kaimmakam and asked for permission to stay in Gelibolu for a few months until the Straits were reopened. Therefore, Gelibolu became his temporary place of stay. Since Musa

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2236 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 19.
2238 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 42; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayı, p. 69; Neticetü’l-Vekayı, p. 23. Asım, on the other hand, informs that he was sent to Bursa. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 75.
2239 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 232.
2240 B.O.A. HAT 53839 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); B.O.A. HAT 53198 (undated); B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, order no. 275, p. 96 (evahir-i R 1222/28 June-6 July 1807). The last record is an imperial decree announcing the leading officials of Yenişehir the dismissal and exile of Musa Pasha to Yenişehir-i Fener. For a copy of the second document see Appendix 4.
2241 B.O.A. HAT 53198 (undated).
2242 B.O.A. HAT 53198 (undated).
Pasha was reappointed only one month later and before the opening of the Straits, he returned from Gelibolu to the capital.\textsuperscript{2243} Tüfengçibaşı informs that Musa Pasha was secretly called from Gelibolu for the second appointment as the kaimmakam by the dispatch of Emin Ağa, a tebdil haseki.\textsuperscript{2244}

Musa Pasha was reappointed as the \textit{kaimmakam} on 2 C 1222/7 August 1807.\textsuperscript{2245} Hamdullah Pasha, the former one, was deposed and allowed to stay at Kadıköy.\textsuperscript{2246} Mustafa Necib notes that it was Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi who, after securing his own post, called back Musa Pasha.\textsuperscript{2247} According to the second author of \textit{Neticeti’l-Vekayi}, Musa Pasha was reappointed due to the insistence of the “fitnegân” to return of his office, and the Porte and Sultan yielded to the pressure. For him, the incident was a scandal (“\textit{rezalet}”) which greatly harmed “\textit{şan-ı devlet}”.\textsuperscript{2248} On the other hand, Asım offers a classic explanation and argues that Hamdullah Pasha was dismissed due to his inability to cope with the problems of the period and he was too old to administer the Porte.\textsuperscript{2249}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{2243} B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri}, no. 5, order no. 275, p. 96 (evahir-i R 1222/28 June-6 July 1807).
\item\textsuperscript{2244} Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yi Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 41a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 434. \textit{Tebdil haseki} refers to the palace officials who accompanied the Sultan during his incognito inspections.
\item\textsuperscript{2245} B.O.A. \textit{Sadaret Defterleri}, no. 357, p. 49; Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yi Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 41a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 433. For a copy of the imperial decree addressed to Musa Pasha for his reappointment see T.S.M.A. E. 7030-6 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). In the document the pretext of deposition of Hamdullah Pasha is explained as his old age.
\item\textsuperscript{2246} B.O.A. HAT 1354/52945 (undated); B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri}, no. 5, order no 298, p. 101 (evaih-i C 1222/6 August- 15 August 1807). In the second document, the stay of Hamdullah Pasha in a place close to İstanbul is attributed to his old age. Asım, \textit{Tarihi Asım}, vol. II, p. 117. Upon the letter (“tezkire”) of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, he was granted a pension. See B.O.A. HAT 1355/53016 (undated). According to Câbi he was granted a salary of 500 guruş, Câbi, \textit{Câbi Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 161.
\item\textsuperscript{2247} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 81.
\item\textsuperscript{2248} \textit{Neticeti’l-Vekayi}, p. 23.
\item\textsuperscript{2249} Asım, \textit{Tarihi Asım}, vol. II, pp. 91, 117.
\end{itemize}
The second and final deposition of Musa Paşa is closely related to the return of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha from the Crimea on 15 Ş 1222/18 October 1807.\footnote{Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Selimiyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 48a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 443. Oğulukyan notes that he arrived on 7 October (Julian Calendar)/19 October (Gregorian Calendar), on board of a small ship from Russia. See Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 18.} According to Asım, Tayyar Pasha came to the city as soon as he had heard of the accession of Mustafa IV.\footnote{Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 113.} In one of his letters to the Grand Vizier, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, Mustafa IV explains that following his accession to throne, Tayyar Pasha came to İstanbul and asked for grace (“inâyet”).\footnote{T.S.M.A. E. 2446-6 (7 S 1223/4 April 1808).} Therefore, he was called by the Sultan to his presence and was granted the 	extit{mukataa} of Canik.\footnote{Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 113.} While he was planning to go to Canik, Tayyar Pasha was appointed as the new kaimmakam with the restoration of his former rank of Pasha and also the grant of governorship of Trabzon.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53138 (undated); Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, pp. 118. According to the document, he was called to the Porte and granted the governorship of Trabzon. Upon the question of the appointment of a \textit{kapu kethüda}, he requested the appointment of Çavuşbaşı Hasan Efendi. Behram Pasha, the former governor of the city, was appointed as the governor of Kara Hisar-ı Sahib.} Indeed, in an imperial edict which certifies the change in the office, Tayyar Pasha is referred as the governor of Trabzon.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53421 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).} One document declares that Mustafa IV appointed Tayyar Pasha as kaimmakam believing that he would not act as reckless (“müseyyibâne”) as Musa Pasha.\footnote{T.S.M.A. E. 2446-6 (7 S 1223/4 April 1808).}

Tayyar Pasha was appointed as the new Kaimmakam on Saturday, 19 L 1222/20 December 1807.\footnote{B.O.A. \textit{Sadaret Defterleri}, no. 357, p. 80. For a copy of the order issued for appointment of Tayyar Pasha, see B.O.A. HAT 1365/54007 (undated), T.S.M.A. E. 2446-5 (Z 1222/February 1222) and B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme Defterleri}, no. 226, p. 5 (22 L 1222/23 December 1807).} Asım notes that Musa Pasha again resigned in order to save his life and

\footnote{Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 113.}
to stand free from the increased pressure and control of the palace members over the
government.\textsuperscript{2258} On the other hand, in most of the official official documents, poor health of
Musa Pasha is mentioned as the main pretext.\textsuperscript{2259} After his second dismissal, too, Musa
Pasha was allowed to choose his place of stay as "tekâüd". Upon his request he was
allowed to stay at İstanköy [Cos, Greece], his mukataa.\textsuperscript{2260} Though not mentioning whether
it was upon the request of Musa Pasha or not, Mustafa IV orders his stay at İstanköy.\textsuperscript{2261} It
is also important to note that the health conditions of Musa Pasha was really bad during that
period. One good proof comes from an official document. On his way to the island of
İstanköy, probably weakened by the travel, the health of Musa Pasha became worse when
he arrived at İzmir. Unable to travel further, he wrote a petition to the center requesting to
rest there until the Spring. After being allowed to stay in İzmir, he wrote another letter in
order to express his gratitude. Consequently, his place of "exile" was changed to İzmir by
an imperial order.\textsuperscript{2262}


\textsuperscript{2259} T.S.M.A. E. 7031-2 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). This is of one of the
few documents in which the names of the deposed kaimmakams and his successor are
mentioned. In most of the documents only the name of the deposed, i.e. Musa Pasha, is
mentioned. Therefore it is difficult to determine whether the orders belong to his first or the
second dismissal. For such examples, see T.S.M.A. E. 7031-1 (undated, catalogue date is
1222/1807); T.S.M.A. E. 7031-3 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); B.O.A. HAT
1359/53444 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); B.O.A. HAT 1365/54004 (undated);
B.O.A. HAT 53981 (undated).

\textsuperscript{2260} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, pp. 118.

\textsuperscript{2261} B.O.A. HAT 53624 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). For a copy of the
imperial decree ordering him to stay at İstanköy, see B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme-i Mektume
Defterleri}, no. 5, order no. 318, p. 110 (evahir-i L 1222/22-30 December 1807).

\textsuperscript{2262} B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri}, no. 5, order no. 342, p. 116 (evail-i S
1223/18-26 April 1808); B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme Defterleri}, no. 227, p. 40 (30 January-8
February 1808); B.O.A. HAT 53687 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808). For a copy of
the document see Appendix 4. Asım does not mention the change in the place of exile as a
permanent one. According to him the stay in İzmir was due to the problems in the
Dardanelles. See Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 118. This is probably because there are
confusion about causes of his stay in Gelibolu and İzmir.
We should note an observation on the related documents on his stay or exile. In his second dismissal one could possibly feel that Mustafa IV wished to send him as soon as possible away from İstanbul and the second one seems more likely to have been a real exile.\textsuperscript{2263} For instance, in a related document it is noted that the kapi kethüda of Musa Pasha was warned that the Pasha should go to his place of exile as soon as possible. Therefore, early in the morning of the next day, he was on board and set out for İstanbul.\textsuperscript{2264} This observation might suggest that Tayyar Pasha was either called to İstanbul for this purpose or at least after his arrival Mustafa IV preferred to see Tayyar Pasha in the office rather than Musa Pasha. \öğulukyan puts forward an interesting explanation in this regard. According to him, Musa Pasha was called from Russia by Mustafa IV.\textsuperscript{2265} The author explains that the invitation of Tayyar Pasha and his later appointment as kaimmakam was due to the pressure of the Janissary leaders ("dayı") on the government for the appointment of figures like Tayyar Pasha, Hakkı Pasha and Hafız İsmail Pasha to important positions. Though we do not have evidence that confirms the request of the Janissaries for the coming of Tayyar Pasha from Russia, some details in an official record also suggest that Tayyar Pasha was indeed called by the Sultan.\textsuperscript{2266} The document seems to have been written by Kaimmakam Musa Pasha to the Sultan, which confirms that an imperial decree was sent to Tayyar Pasha declaring that he was pardoned ("afv u ıtlâk").\textsuperscript{2267} The order was clearly sent while he was in Russia, since it is stated that after receiving the order for his release Tayyar Pasha met with the Russian tsar. During the meeting, the Emperor talked about some issues related to the Ottoman Empire. He returned to İstanbul on a ship provided by the emperor, Alexander I (r. 1801-1825).\textsuperscript{2268} Moreover, even the house that he was to stay in İstanbul had been

\textsuperscript{2263} B.O.A. HAT 53952 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); B.O.A. HAT 53624 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).

\textsuperscript{2264} B.O.A. HAT 53109 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8).

\textsuperscript{2265} \öğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{2266} B.O.A. HAT 53809 (undated).

\textsuperscript{2267} B.O.A. HAT 53809 (undated).

\textsuperscript{2268} B.O.A. HAT 53809 (undated). See also \öğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 18.
arranged previously.\textsuperscript{2269} According to Asım, after coming to the city, Tayyar Pasha resided at the house of Ömer Ağa, his former \textit{kapi kethüda}. However, the aforementioned document states that since the house of his \textit{kapi kethüda} was ruined by a fire, it was better for Tayyar Pasha to stay at the residence of Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi.\textsuperscript{2270}

\textbf{5.4. Daily violence in İstanbul in 1807}

The disorder in the city after the May Rebellion was not only observed in the frequent depositions and dismissals. Disorder and turmoil seem to have been observable in every aspect of daily life. As in the reign of Selim III, gossips circulating in the coffeehouses were a great problem during that period, too.\textsuperscript{2271} As usual, the Sultan tried to prevent gossips on the grounds that they damaged the influence of the central authority.\textsuperscript{2272} Therefore orders were issued for the control of coffeehouses very frequently.\textsuperscript{2273} Apart from these, there were some more serious incidents that occurred during this period. Most of these problems were directly radiating from the military classes and especially from among the \textit{yamaks}.\textsuperscript{2274} In order to clarify our point we will give three different examples: the Beşiktaş Incident and the incident at Çardak, which ended with the dismissal of a Sekbanbaşi and finally the attempt of the \textit{yamaks} to convert a church into a mosque.

\textsuperscript{2269} B.O.A. HAT 53809 (undated).

\textsuperscript{2270} B.O.A. HAT 53809 (undated); Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{2271} For some more details, see Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{2272} B.O.A. HAT 1363/53848 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 1362/53732 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8).

\textsuperscript{2273} B.O.A. HAT 53410 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8); B.O.A. HAT 53785 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 53975 (undated).

\textsuperscript{2274} There are some other examples in the contemporary narratives. For the oppression of the \textit{haseki} ağa of Üsküdar, for instance, and his murder by the Janissaries, see Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, pp. 20-21.
5.4.1. Beşiktaş Incident (September 1807)

The first incident occurred around September 1807 and was a result of some excesses of committed by several yamaks. After spending some time at the wine shops ("şerbethâne") of Galata, a group of yamaks rode their horses towards Beşiktaş, molesting the Muslims and non-Muslims on their way. According to the second author of Neticetü’l-Vekayi, after reaching Beşiktaş, they dismounted and began to walk towards the excursion spot ("mesiregâh") around the district known as Yahya Efendi. Apparently, their excesses accelerated there and they began to disturb some women. Tüfengçibaşı, on the other hand, does not make any reference to Galata or their march towards Beşiktaş; he only remarks that they became drunk in the taverns of Beşiktaş and while they passed outside the gate of Çirağan, dressed in full arms and drunken, they were detected by Beşiktaş bostancis from a certain distance. Consequently, the yamaks became frightened and fired upon the bostancis. Several other yamaks at the Mevlevihane of Yahya Efendi heard of noise and came to the spot. In the story of second author of Neticetü’l-Vekayi, on the other hand, the yamaks came across the bostancis around the Paşa district.

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2275 According to Oğulukyan, it took place on 4 September 1807 (Julian Calendar)/16 September 1807 (Gregorian Calendar). See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 18. According to Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, too, was on 13 B 1222/16 September 1807. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yi Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 44a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 438.

2276 According to the second author of Neticetü’l-Vekayi, they were four yamaks. See Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p.24a. Oğulukyan also gives the number as four. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 18. For Tüfengçibaşı they were two in number. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yi Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 45a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 439.

2277 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 24a.

2278 This must be the place known as Yahya Efendi Dergahı in Beşiktaş.

2279 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, pp. 24a-24.


2281 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 24.
According to him, the *bostancı* first advised them to quit their unruly behavior. Due to the fact that the Sultan was around Beşiktaş, they warned the *yamaks* not to cause any problems around the region.\(^{2282}\) However, the *yamaks* did not heed to the warnings and attacked the *bostancı*.\(^{2283}\) Therefore, a fight started between the two groups. Meanwhile Mustafa IV was paying a visit to his sister, Esma Sultan, at her kiosk called Gülşenabad,\(^{2284}\) and watching the street.\(^{2285}\) He noticed the fight. Then he nervously opened the windows and ordered the *bostancı* to kill the notorious *yamaks*.\(^{2286}\) After receiving the order directly from the Sultan, the *bostancı* chased the *yamaks* and finally captured them on a spot called Dar Boğaz, close to Levent Chiftlik.\(^{2287}\) On the other hand, according to Tüfengçibaşi, it was Başçukadar Abdülfettah Ağa, not the Sultan himself, who witnessed the fight between the two groups and ordered the execution of the *yamaks*. The Sultan was later informed of the matter.\(^{2288}\) Finally all the *yamaks* were captured around Levent Chiftlik and sent to the Ağa Kapısı.\(^{2289}\) On the night of the incident, Sekbanbaşı put the captives into the dungeon and they were executed promptly.\(^{2290}\)

Oğulukyan, on the other hand, narrates a slightly different story: The Sultan was around Beşiktaş in disguise when four *yamaks* robbed several men, opposed the officers

\(^{2282}\) *Neticetü’l-Vekayi*, p. 24.

\(^{2283}\) *Neticetü’l-Vekayi*, p. 24.

\(^{2284}\) Tüfengçibaşi Arif Efendi, *Vaka-yı Selimiyye*, Topkapı 1595, p. 44; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşi Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, pp. 438-9. He notes that the Sultan was there in disguise paying a visit to the Palace of Gülşenabad. According to Oğulukyan, the Sultan was making a visit to *tekke-i mabeyn* in disguise. See Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 18.

\(^{2285}\) *Neticetü’l-Vekayi*, p. 24.

\(^{2286}\) *Neticetü’l-Vekayi*, p. 24.

\(^{2287}\) *Neticetü’l-Vekayi*, p. 24.


(“zabit”) and finally murdered a man before the eyes of the Sultan.2291 Thereafter, the Sultan declared that everyone was free to capture and murder the rebels. Consequently, all the Muslims and non-Muslims began to chase the yamaks.2292 Though the yamaks managed to escape for some time, they were finally captured by some Croati ans.2293 After their capture, Mustafa IV ordered the Sekbanbaşı to capture and execute all the other unruly yamaks in the city.2294 Accordingly, the following day the Sekbanbaşı captured some other yamaks around Galata and in some other places.2295 All were immediately put to death and their corpses were thrown into the sea.2296 The corpses were thrown into the sea during the day and not secretly, which implies that it was planned to serve as an exemplary punishment for the rest of the yamaks.

An official document confirms the capture of two soldiers who “dared to engage in unwelcomed subversive act the day before in Beşiktaş.”2297 The same document also asserts that the following night after the incident, the Sekbanbaşı carried out interrogations and

2291 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 18.
2292 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, pp. 18-19.
2293 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, pp. 18. 19.
2294 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 24; Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 19. According to Tüfengçibaşı, the imperial order was issued upon the request of the Sekbanbaşi. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 46a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 440.
2295 The author of Neticetü’l-Vekayi notes that forty-seven yamaks were executed. See Neticetü’l-Vekayi, 25a. Tüfengçibaşı gives the number as twenty-three. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 46; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 440. Oğulukyan does not provide an exact number. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 19.
2297 B.O.A. HAT 53601 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). From a note in the document it becomes clear that it was written one day after the incident: “dünkü gün Beşiktaş’da hilaflı rızâ bî-edeblîge cesâret eden hezeleden.” For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.
seized nineteen more soldiers ("hezele") with similar accusations. It is important to note that the record does not inform whether the above-mentioned soldiers were yamaks or not, however it explicitly refers to the capture of an unruly bostancı during the same night. A total of twenty-three soldiers were imprisoned on the same night and executed at the dungeon of Baba Cafer. It is emphasized that they were executed by the common consent of the Janissaries so that no one could dare to engage in such acts any longer. No doubt, the presence of the Sultan as a witness of the Sultan had increased the importance of the incident and severed the ensuing punishments. Another important point is the fact that it seems to be one of the rare examples of the incidents after the Rebellion that had brought the center and the yamaks (or the former rebels) into direct conflict. Apparently, the execution of a considerable number of yamaks is the first and final case of the murder of yamaks under the order of the Sultan Mustafa IV.

The interesting matter is the exile of Kazgancı Hacı Laz Mustafa some time after the above incident. According to Oğulukyan, the Sekbanbaşı detected that Kazgancı Mustafa was the leader of the unruly yamaks and therefore he was exiled on 21 September, with the idea that his exile would bring order to the yamaks. Complementary information is also provided by the second author of Neticetü'l-Vekayi. The author does not make a direct connection between the fight of the yamaks and bostancıslar in Beşiktaş, and the banishment of Kazgancı Mustafa. However, immediately after talking about the Beşiktaş Incident, he remarks that Kazgancı Mustafa exiled to Cyprus, while Süleyman Kapudan, one of the

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2298 B.O.A. HAT 53601 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). It is not clearly stated whether the second group of soldiers were also involved in the same incident or were seized for other undisciplined conducts. It seems more probable that the former two soldiers were the ones directly involved in the incident. It might be recalled that Tüfengçibaşı asserts that there were two who fought the bostancıslar.

2299 B.O.A. HAT 53601 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). At the upper margin of the document there is a short note about the approval of the execution of the soldiers by the Sultan.

2300 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 19. The date he provides is 9 September (Julian Calendar) which corresponds to 21 September in the Gregorian Calendar.
former leaders of the rebels, was exiled to Sinop. Historian Asım does not make any reference to the connection between the exile of Kazgancı Mustafa and the Incident at Beşiktaş. He just notes that since Kazgancı Mustafa was a very talkative (“pür-gû”) and prattling fellow (“herze-hây”), he was exiled to Kastamonu and after some time he was released and returned to İstanbul. Asım asserts that Kazgancı Mustafa did not correct himself after the return from exile and did not hesitate to provoke the Janissaries and yamaks and became a constant source of fear for the ruling elite. However, since his elimination, Asım notes, could not be ensured owing to the conditions of the time, he was promoted to the rank of kapıcıbaşı and appointed as the director of the Gümüşhane Mines. Therefore, as Asım also notes, this appointment should be seen as a pretext used by the center to send him away from the capital and also to benefit from his experiences in mining. According to the same author, he was executed some time after his arrival to city.

Contemporary authors do not seem to have been happy with the rule of new kaimmakam. According to Oğulukyan, Tayyar Pasha acted contrary to the expectations. Rather than dealing with urgent issues such as suppressing the excesses of the yamaks, he established good relations with them as their fellow-countryman. Unfortunately, the author does not specify what kind of relations Tayyar Pasha had with the yamaks. But it must have been related to patronage. One specific example he provides is particularly important: According to the author, Tayyar Pasha put an end to the exile of Kazgancı Mustafa and brought him to the capital on 15 January (Julian)1808/8 January 1808 (Gregorian). Moreover, he appointed him as the director of the Keban Mines. Indeed, we have a

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2301 Neticetül-Vekayi, p. 25a.
2306 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 19.
document which proves his appointment as the director of the Keban and Ergani Mines on 17 Za 1222/16 January 1808.\textsuperscript{2307} However, fearing death at the hands of Kör Yusuf Ziya Pasha, the governor of Erzurum, he requested to be appointed as the director of Gümüşhane mines.\textsuperscript{2308} Câbî also notes that he was forgiven by Tayyar Pasha and appointed as the \textit{emin} of Gümüşhane mines.\textsuperscript{2309} There is an official entry on the appointment of Kasabaşı Ahmed Ağa to the mines of Keban and Ergani on 3 Z 1222/1 February 1808, which means that Kazgançı Mustafa was really reluctant to assume the duty or he was deposed a short time after his first appointment.\textsuperscript{2310} On the same day, Kazgançı Mustafa Ağa was appointed as the director of the Gümüşhane Mines.\textsuperscript{2311} These points confirm the information provided by Oğulukyan and Câbî and also the favour of Tayyar Pasha towards Mustafa Ağa. Indeed, the fate of Kazgançı Mustafa seems to have changed negatively after the fall of Tayyar Pasha and especially after the accession of Mahmud II. During the grand vizierate of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, he was dismissed from the position of the director of the Gümüşhane Mines around 10 B 1223/1 September 1808.\textsuperscript{2312}

\textbf{5.4.2. The Çardak Incident (16 Ra 1223/12 May 1808)}

\textsuperscript{2307} B.O.A. \textit{Sadaret Defterleri}, no. 357, p. 85 (17 Za 1222/16 January 1808). There is also an entry in \textit{Bir İmamın Günlüğü} which notes that he was appointed as the \textit{maden emini} on that date, See Beydilli, \textit{Bir İmamın Günlüğü}, p. 183.

\textsuperscript{2308} Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 19.


\textsuperscript{2310} B.O.A. \textit{Sadaret Defterleri}, no. 357, p. 85 (3 Z 1222/1 February 1808).

\textsuperscript{2311} B.O.A. \textit{Sadaret Defterleri}, no. 357, p. 85 (3 Z 1222/1 February 1808).

\textsuperscript{2312} Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 217. \textit{Fodla furun katibi sabık Anbar emini} Mehmed Efendi was appointed as the new director.
The most serious act of the *yamaks* was observed in the incident that led to the deposition of Sekbanbaşı Kahveci Mustafa Ağa.\(^{2313}\) As might be recalled, he was appointed as *sekbanbaşı* after the deposition of Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa. In the case of Kahveci Mustafa, there was a direct intervention of the *yamaks* and the Janissaries, while they had acted as a pressure group in the deposition of Arif Ağa. The incident took place early on the morning of Thursday, 16 Ra 1223/12 May 1808, about one year after the Rebellion.\(^{2314}\) In very simple terms, on that day, a group of *yamaks* suddenly arrived the Çardak Kolluk, captured Sekbanbaşı Mustafa Ağa and demanded the appointment of a new person in his place.

Contemporary sources add different details to the above incident: The second author of *Neticetü'l-Vekayi* argues that the problem was a result of the reaction of the *yamaks* to the exile of *odabaşı* of the 9\(^{th}\) regiment to Bursa by Sekbanbaşı Mustafa Ağa. One day after the exile, about three to five hundred Janissaries and *yamaks* captured the Sekbanbaşı.\(^{2315}\) According to Kethüda Said, on the other hand, it was the imprisonment of four *yamaks* that triggered the events. The author notes that the Emin Ağa, the ağa of the *yamaks*, could not manage to discipline the *yamaks* and wrote a petition to the center asking for their punishment. Thereafter, Sekbanbaşı sent men to secure the imprisonment of the four *yamaks*.\(^{2316}\) The incident must have taken place at Macar Tabya. The author notes that Abdülkerim and his men fired cannons from the fortress to stop the rowboat bringing their friends to the prison. Unsuccessful in this attempt, they followed the boat. Then, with the

\(^{2313}\) Câbî confuses the sequence of events and narrates as if Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa was appointed after the dismissal of Kahveci Mustafa Ağa. Therefore it is difficult to differentiate which incidents or acts happened on a certain one. See Câbî, *Câbî Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 154.

\(^{2314}\) *Ruzname* (Milli Emlak), p. 49. According to Oğulukyan, the new Sekbanbaşı was appointed on 1 May (Julian Calendar/13 May (Gregorian Calendar). See Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 22. Mustafa Necib notes that the incident took place sometime around evail-i S 1223/28 March-6 April 1808. See Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi*, p. 85; *Yayla İmami Risalesi* gives the date R 1223/27 May-25 June, *Yayla İmami Risalesi*, p. 239.

\(^{2315}\) *Neticetü'l-Vekayi*, p. 29a.

help of the soldiers from 56th Janissaries at Çardak, they saved their friends from prison. Mustafa Necib underlines another point. For him, the incident was related to some of the rebels who got jealous of the power and the wealth Sekbanbaşı gained in a very short period of time despite the fact they supported him at the beginning.

In an official account, the incident is explained by the efforts and intrigues of Ahıska Hasan Ağa, the başyasakçı of 56th regiment of the Janissaries. According to the information, Hasan Ağa collaborated with the yamaks of the Macar Tabya with the intention of becoming Sekbanbaşı after the elimination of the present one. With that purpose, he called a group of twenty or thirty yamaks from the Macar Tabya and also thirty

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2318 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 85. The author gives the name of Sekbanbaşı as Kahveci Mehmed Ağa, which should be Kahveci Mustafa Ağa.

2319 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 49. Oğulukyan provides some details as to the connection of the matter with Hasan Ağa and also to the issue of why the yamaks were involved in the matter. According to him, the governor of İzmit was delegated the duty of protecting the region from the Bosphorus to Karaburun. He imprisoned three yamaks who did not pay him due respect. Başyasakçı of Çardak -must have been the above-mentioned Hasan Ağa – informed the other yamaks about the imprisonment of their comrades. The next day, some yamaks took the prision guards by surprised and saved their friends. Consequently, Sekbanbaşı Mustafa Ağa rebuked Başyasakçı for triggering the incident. According to Oğulukyan, the second time Başyasakçı was called by the Sekbanbaşı, he ran away to Macar Tabya in order to escape punishment. After informing Kerim Çavuş, from 25th regiment and “dayı” of the fortress, about the events, Kerim and his men came to Çardak and the Janissaries of the 56th regiment also joined them. They unexpectedly came to Ağa Kapısı. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 21. Kethûda Said also argues that there was an involvement of Başyasakçı Hasan Ağa in the matter: According to the author, upon the escape of four yamaks from the prison with the help of their friends, the leaders of Janissaries met with the Sekbanbași. After an investigation it was discovered that the secret leader of the incident had been Hasan Ağa from Ahıska and that he had connections with the yamaks, most of them coming from the same region. The meeting ended with the decision to punish Hasan Ağa and others. However, since towards the end of that night the yamaks had come to Ağa Kapısı and captured the Sekbanbaşı punishment of Hasan Ağa was delayed. See Kethûda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, pp. 111a-111. For a very similar explanation see Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 86-7. If as Kethûda Said noted, a decision was taken for the persecution of Hasan Ağa and others, it is possible to suggest that the sudden arrival of yamaks and capture of the Sekbanbaşı was related to the attempt to escape persecution. For more details on the incident, see Kethûda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, pp. 111a-113. Câbi Ömer Efendi provides an explanation similar to that of Kethûda Said Efendi. See Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 156.
or forty Janissaries from the 56th regiment, his own bölük, to Çardak. During the meeting, they discussed the methods to bring by force (“bagteten”) Sekbanbaşı Kahveci Mustafa from Ağa Kapısı to Çardak Kolluk. Therefore, Abdülkerim, from the Macar Tabya, together with seven or six Janissaries from 56th regiment, went to Ağa Kapısı. The group must have come to Ağa Kapısı very early in the morning, since they disturbed Karakulak Haseki Abdullah in his sleep, obviously to catch the Ağa without opposition. After waking Abdullah up, they told him to call Sekbanbaşı Mustafa Ağa that they had news to tell him. Thereafter, they captured the Sekbanbaşı by surprise and brought him to Çardak. According to the same source, about one hundred armed soldiers gathered at the Duhan Gümrüğü Meydanı (Tütün Meydanı), sent a man to Porte declaring that they did not want Mustafa Ağa as their Sekbanbaşı.

We have two official documents that illuminate the events after the capture of Sekbanbaşı Kahveci Mustafa Ağa. In contrast with the above account, one of the documents informs that Sekbanbaşı was taken to Tütün Gümrüğü, where he was surrounded by armed soldiers. Therefore, Mustafa Ağa should also have been at the Square at that time. The same document confirms that a soldier from 56th regiment was sent to the Porte declaring that those at the Square requested the dismissal of Mustafa Ağa and

2320 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 49; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.215.

2321 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 49; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 215; B.O.A. HAT 53702 (undated). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4. According to the document, those who captured the Sekbanbaşı were about 50-60 Janissaries. As might be recalled, in the Ruzname (Milli Emlak) it was noted that 5-6 soldiers and Kerim had captured the Sekbanbaşı. It is very probable that the remaining soldiers waited outside the Ağa Kapısı while their comrades captured Mustafa Ağa.

2322 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 49; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 215. B.O.A. HAT 53702 (undated) confirms that the incident took place early the morning. Unfortunately there is no date on the document.

2323 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 49; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.215.

2324 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 49; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 215.

2325 B.O.A. HAT 53702 (undated).
the appointment of another person. Upon the investigation of Kaimmakam Pasha, the Janissaries explained that their hatred towards Mustafa Ağa was due to his mischief and thus he left them no other option than exerting pressure for his deposition. According to the Ruzname (Milli Emlak), the soldiers at Tütün Meydanı requested the appointment of Hasan Ağa as the new Sekbanbaşı. The document, on the other hand, does not make any reference to this point; rather it argues that in order to put and end to the disorder, the dismissal of Mustafa Ağa was required and the best candidate was Muhzir Ağa, being a trustworthy person employed at the Porte and also one who had considerable influence over the Janissaries. Moreover, it is stated that the Janissaries were insisting just on the dismissal of the Sekbanbaşi and were ready to accept any one to be appointed by government. At the upper margin of the same document, there is an imperial edict of

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2326 B.O.A. HAT 53702 (undated). According to Ruzname (Milli Emlak) “suhte kıyafet bir adam” was sent. See Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 49; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 215.

2327 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 49; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.215. Mustafa Necib also confirms that the appointment of Hasan Ağa was requested. According to the author, Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa was called to the Porte after the incident and warned accordingly. Thereafter, the Sekbanbaşi and karakulak were saved from the hands of the yamaks and the Janissaries. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 85.

2328 Netictü’l-Vekayi gives his name as Mehmed Ağa, Netictü’l-Vekayi, p. 29; Oğulukyan as Muhib Ağa, Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 22; Kethüda Said as the deputy of the Muhzir Ağa (“Muhzir vekili”) Hayrabolulu Mehmed Ağa, Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarihi Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 112a. Mustafa Necib claims he was a muhzır and his name was Hayrabolulu Mehmed Ağa. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, pp. 85-86; Asım and Câbi, refer as Hayrabolulu Mustafa Ağa. See Tarihi Asım, vol. II, p. 88; Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 201. Mehmed Süreyya also gives his name as Mehmed Ağa. See Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. III, p. 942. According to Câbi, he was dismissed on 9 Ş 1223/30 September 1808. See Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 201. According to Sicill-i Osmanî, he was from Hayrabolu and from the 40th regiment of the Janissary corps. He was dismissed in 1224/1809 and appointed as the sekbanbaşi for the second time on 1225/1810. He died on S 1226/March 1811. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. III, p. 942.

2329 According Câbi, while Kaimmakam Pasha was trying to find a candidate, the scribe of Muhzir Ağa suggested Muhzir Mustafa Ağa. See Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 154.

2330 B.O.A. HAT 53702 (undated). Oğulukyan claims that neither the yamaks nor the Janissaries insisted on the appointment of a specific figure. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 22. Kethüda Said confirms this information. According to him, however, they insisted on the dismissal of Mustafa Ağa and declared that otherwise they would kill him. See Kethüda
Mustafa IV ordering the appointment of Muhzir Ağa as the new sekbanbaşı.\textsuperscript{2331} From the same document, it is clear that Kaimmakam Pasha did not want to leave the appointment of such an important official to the Janissaries and most probably preferred the appointment of a figure serving in the Porte and close to him. After the incident Sekbanbaşı Kahveci Mustafa Ağa was exiled to his own chiftlik in Bursa.\textsuperscript{2332} Karakulak Abdullah voluntarily followed his master and went to Bursa.\textsuperscript{2333}

The incident, no doubt, was as scandalous as the appointment and reappointment of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi. In an imperial edict, probably written after the Çardak Incident, Mustafa IV orders the Kaimmakam Pasha to talk to Sekbanbaşı Ağa and warn him not to enroll new soldiers to the Macar Tabya, under the pretext that their unruly conducts till then had created a great fiasco (“rezalef”) for the army and the state.\textsuperscript{2334} Therefore, the center did not lose time to execute the culprits. One contemporary source

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\textsuperscript{2331} B.O.A. HAT 53702 (undated).

\textsuperscript{2332} B.O.A. HAT 53710 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808); \textit{Ruzname} (Millî Emlak), p. 49; Beyhan, \textit{Saray Günüluğu}, p. 216; Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 22; Kethûda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, p. 112a; Asum, \textit{Tarih-i Asum}, vol. II, p. 88; Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Arsi Vekayi}, p. 85. It is important to note that the author of \textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi} narrates the incident after the capture of Sekbanbaşı as if the Ağa was immediately sent to exile without waiting for a decision from the Sultan. Consequently, the kul kethüdasi tells the Sultan that “Bu misällü ağa azli vaki olmamıştır”. In reply, the Sultan answers that he did not know about the matter and it was probably Yasakçı, i.e. Hasan who dared it. Thereafter, the Janissaries gathered at Paşa Kapısı and asked similar questions to the ulema and Kaimmakam Pasha, who confessed that they did not know the matter. See \textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi}, p. 239. Câbî explains the events in a similar way. According to the author, there was a ship that took the Sekbanbaşı as soon as he came to Çardak to take him to Tekfur Dağı. However, due to the unfavorable winds, the boat was not able to move far and it was noticed by the Sultan from the Palace. Neither the Sultan nor Kaimmakam Pasha accepted they knew anything on the issue and thereafter Sekbanbaşı was taken to another ship at Balukhane. See Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, pp. 156-7.


\textsuperscript{2334} B.O.A. 1365/53992 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8): “Kaimmakam Paşa, bu hatt-i hümâyûnumdan bâits budur ki yarin Sekbanbaşı kapuya geldikde tenbih edesin. Bundan sonra Macar Kalası na ziya de nefer yazılsısun, iktizâ etmez. Dikkat etsinler. Zıra anlarin ettiğiniz ocağınızda gerek devlet-i aliyyeye azîm rezâlet oldu....”
notes that on the same day the Janissaries of the 56th regiment, guarding the Çardak, were strangled in the dungeons and their corpses were thrown into the sea. Meanwhile, due to the undisciplined acts of some *yamaks*, the new Sekbanbaşı murdered twenty-five of them in the dungeons of Baba Cafer. Another source notes that the residents of the city became very frightened and that day the shops were not opened. For Kethüda Said Efendi, what worried the people was the capture and forced dismissal of a high-ranking official by the “rebels”. Not surprisingly, it seems to have become the hot topic among the people, especially in the coffeehouses. Therefore, a meeting was held in which the incident was discussed and a decision was taken to punish those who created disorder in the city. Mustafa Necib asserts that Başyasakçı Hasan Ağa was strangled during the midday (“*nsfü‘n-nehâr*”) at the Porte, together with a chief orderly of a vizier (“*vezir çukadari*”) on the grounds that they were the collaborators of the former. After the enthronement of Mahmud II, Kahveci Mustafa Ağa was appointed as the governor of İzmit

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2335 *Neticetü'l-Vekayi*, p. 29.

2336 *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 238.

2337 Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 22.


2341 Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi*, p. 86. *Yayla İmamı Risalesi* confirms this information. According to its author, the name of *vezir çukadari* was a certain Pehlivân and he was the one who put Sekbanbaşı Mustafa Ağa to a boat and sent him to exile. See *Yayla İmamı Risalesi*, p. 239. According to Asım, the Janissaries and the common people attacked him and then demanded the execution of Hasan Ağa. See Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 89. Câbi notes that after becoming sekbanbaşı, Muhzir Ağa called the Janissary leaders and made investigations about the Çardak Incident. The Janissaries confessed that they had no role in the incident and the culprits were Başyasızı Hasan and *vezir çukadari*. After warning the Janissaries as to the seriousness of the issue and not to deal with such issues, the new Sekbanbaşı sent orders for the execution of the culprits. See Câbi, *Câbi Tarihi*, vol. I, pp. 159-60.
with the rank of mirimiran. Yet, the appointment was seemingly a pretext for his execution, since he was murdered on his way from Bursa to İzmit.\footnote{2342 T.S.M.A. E. 3323-4 (undated); Şanizâde, \textit{Tarih-i Şanizâde}, vol. I, p. 58. According to Mehmed Süreyya, his murder was on 3 \textsection 1223/24 September 1808. See Mehmed Süreyya, \textit{Sicill-i Osmanî}, vol. IV, p. 1134.}

The forced deposition of Kahveci Mustafa Ağa took place on Thursday, 16 Ra 1223/12 May 1808. One day after the incident, corresponding to Friday, a meeting was held after the Friday prayer.\footnote{2343 B.O.A. \textit{Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculuğu Defterleri}, no. 18, p. 118-119 (20 Ra 1223/15 June 1808). It is a report to Kaimmakam Pasha. Unfortunately, there is not any further detail concerning the participants and the place of the meeting.} During the meeting, a decision was taken to write about the matter to the Janissary army on the campaign and to ask for the dispatch of a letter from there to the remaining officers of the Janissary army in the capital. In the report coming from the army to the Kaimmakam Pasha, it was noted that the dismissal of the Sekbanbaşi in such a way was an unprecedented (“\textit{nâ-mesbûk}”) incident that would strike a serious blow on the imperial authority; however, it was also remarked that the incident had occurred due the fragility of the situation (“\textit{iktizâ-ı nezâket-i halden}”) and they were consoled with the fact that the disorder ended without growing any further.\footnote{2344 B.O.A. \textit{Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculuğu Defterleri}, no. 18, pp. 118-119 (20 Ra 1223/15 June 1808).} It is also remarked that in accordance with the letter from the center, the Janissary Ağa was called and a meeting was held, in which Kethüda Bey and Reis Efendi also participated. The purpose of the meeting was to write a letter to the Janissaries in the capital to warn them about their unruly acts that led to the dismissal of a Sekbanbaşı. During the meeting the Ağa of the Janissaries agreed to write the letter, yet he wanted to share some problems that came to his mind with the participants of the meeting. As far as it could be understood from the document, the Janissary Ağa was not in favour of writing a letter of warning until a report from the new Sekbanbaşi reached him. Apparently, he hesitated to write a letter of
warning since it would not only frighten but also alienate the Janissaries at the capital all together.2345

Interestingly enough, what the Janissary Ağası said during the aforementioned meeting directs us to another interesting matter: the connection of the incident with Tayyar Pasha and also the factions in the capital. According to the Ağası of the Janissaries, there was a strong possibility that the incident might have been provoked by Tayyar Pasha. His collaborators were above-mentioned Başyazıcı and odabaşı of the 18th regiment, both followers of Tayyar Pasha.2346 The involvement of Tayyar Pasha is mentioned by a contemporary source as well. According to this source, Tayyar Pasha was jealous of Sekbanbaşı Kahveci Mustafa Ağası, who talked to the Sultan during every Friday prayer. Therefore there was envy between the two and Mustafa Ağası was eliminated by the faction headed by Tayyar Pasha.2347 Indeed, in one of his letters, belonging to a later date, Tayyar Pasha makes a brief reference to the incident, and confesses his direct involvement in the Çardak Incident. According to him, he really provoked the Janissaries, with whom he had already good relations, for the elimination of Kahveci Mustafa Ağası. Tayyar Pasha explained that he eliminated Mustafa Ağası on the grounds that he was a great supporter of the Grand Vizier.2348

From the above examples it is clear that the yamaks and Janissaries gained an upper hand in the city or better to say, their excesses reached an uncontrollable level. We should not take the above incidents as rare examples of the disorder created in the city. As told above, the incident at Beşiktaş was important because the excesses of the yamaks turned into a fight with the bostancı, representing the central power and this was noticed by the Sultan himself. Therefore, it was followed by severe punishment. The importance of the

2345 B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculuğu Defterleri, no. 18, pp. 118-119 (20 Ra 1223/15 June 1808).
2346 B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculuğu Defterleri, no. 18, pp. 118-119 (20 Ra 1223/15 June 1808).
2347 Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 238.
2348 T.S.M.A. E. 1148-2 (8 S 1223/5 April 1808)
Çardak Incident, on the other hand, lies in the dismissal of a high ranking Janissary officer by the direct interference of the yamaks.

5.4.3. To Convert a Church

There are further examples which give us some clues about the disorders caused by the yamaks. Some contemporary chronicles provide us further information on many other examples of the yamaks that were either not noticed by the center or not subjected any punishment. For instance, Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi asserts that from the accession of Mustafa IV onwards, the yamaks were illegally patrolling the city particularly around the Bosphorus. He accuses them for being rapacious, molesting and violating the women and grasping the possessions of the reaya. They are also presented as having close relations with the prostitutes and even sometimes bringing them to the forts.\textsuperscript{2349} No doubt, the pressure and power of the yamaks was felt more directly at the regions around the fortresses. Asım provides further details about the excesses committed by the yamaks. The author notes that especially the yamaks of Rumeli Kavak were making aggressions to the fields and possessions of the residents of the Bosphorus.\textsuperscript{2350}

A good example, in this respect, is the attempt of the yamaks to convert a church in the village of Rumeli Feneri to a mosque. The only author that mentions the incident is Oğulukyan: During the first day of a certain religious festival, about three hundred yamaks came to the courtyard of the church reciting the azan and declared that they converted the church into a mosque.\textsuperscript{2351} Though it is not clearly stipulated in Oğulukyan’s account, it seems that the intention of the yamaks by reciting azan in the courtyard of the church seems to have been declared thus it was now a mosque. Indeed, in the related document it is noted


\textsuperscript{2351} Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 20.
that recitation of azan in a church does not necessarily mean that is converted to a mosque.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 1354/52898 (undated). For a transcribed version of the document, see [Altunay] Ahmed Refik, \textit{Onuncu Asr-ı Hicri’de İstanbul Hayati (1786-1882)}, (İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1988), p. 19-20. For a copy of the document see also Appendix 4.} According to Oğulukyan, upon this forced conversion, the Christians of the village of Rumeli Feneri complained to the Şeyhülislam. The Şeyhülislam, in return, explained the “\textit{dayıs}” that the harac of the non-Muslims of the region was allocated to their own salaries and if they were ready to pay the amount they could convert the building to a mosque.\footnote{Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 120} From the relevant document we learn that the Şeyhülislam issued a \textit{fetva} on the matter. However, rather talking about the issue of harac, the main idea of the \textit{fetva} was the point that just by reciting azan a church could not be converted into a mosque. And depending on the \textit{fetva}, the Sultan issued an imperial order that prohibited the attempt of the yamaks.\footnote{B. O.A. HAT 1354/52898 (undated).} The order notes that, after declaration of the decision to the yamaks, they all agreed to obey the order, to stop exerting pressure on the issue and pledged the Sultan to forgive their mistake.\footnote{B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme Defterleri}, no. 225, pp. 61-62 (evahir-i R 1222/20-30 July 1807).}

In an order, dated evahir-i R 1222/20-30 May 1807, addressing to Serturnaî (Kabakçı) Mustafa Ağa, nazır-ı Boğaz and some other officers of the fortresses, some of the undisciplined conducts of the yamaks are listed. According to the record, most of soldiers of the fortresses were frequenting the city, wandering in the streets and bazaars and not heeding to the warnings of the bostancıs of the city. Though the visits of the yamaks were not completely prohibited, some restrictions were imposed. They were to visit the streets unarmed and without disturbing anyone. Those who did not obey these rules were to be captured and punished.\footnote{B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 225, pp. 61-62 (evahir-i R 1222/20-30 July 1807).} Furthermore, the government brought a general prohibition on
the use of weapons. Câbi also notes that detailed imperial edicts were produced for the punishment of those wandering armed in Üsküdar, Galata and Eyübi and other places.\footnote{Câbi, 
Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 160.}

But none of the precautions were able to end the excesses of the yamaks and the disorder in the city until the fall of Mustafa IV from power. It is quite clear that certain people or factions had an overwhelming dominance of certain people or factions during the reign of Mustafa IV. Apparently, all these disorders created great panic among the residents of İstanbul. According to Oğuluğyan the whole city was left to the mercy of the unjust and oppressive ulema and yamaks. Both the Muslim and non-Muslim population of the city were praying that someone would end the disorder in the city. He also adds that the Greeks were wishing for the coming of the Russians while the Armenians and the Jews wished for the arrival of the British to save the city.\footnote{Oğuluğyan, Ruzname, p. 20.}

Kethüda Said remarks that the continued disorder in the city, the rage of the Janissaries and the inability of the sultan to control these excesses seriously undermined the legitimacy of the Sultan in the eyes of the people and the ruling elite.\footnote{Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, pp 116-117a; Kethüda Said Efendi, A Short History of, p. 7.} Without doubt, conditions of the persons who were close to Selim III were worse. For instance, Kuşmâni describes the situation quite clearly. While trying to prove his own bravery, Kuşmâni also portrays the general atmosphere that prevailed over these people. As might be recalled he praises himself as the bravest one who was not frightened by the attitudes towards them.\footnote{Kuşmâni, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 27b, 28a; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 140-1.}

5.5. Fall of Mustafa IV

The year 1223/1808 started with some noticeable events, such as the dismissal of Tayyar Pasha and Halet Efendi, murder of Kabakçı Mustafa, the dismissal of Ataullah
Efendi and finally the fall of Mustafa IV. At first sight, they, especially the dismissals, may not be considered as related to each other and evaluated as ordinary incidents. Particularly, considering the unexpected dismissal of two Sekbanbaşı and two Şeyhülislams, their extraordinariness seems relatively lower. However, the peculiarity of the first examples lies in the fact that their dismissals were not related to any pressure from the Janissaries, but due to some more obscure or a complex web of causes. In this part after providing a chronology of these incidents we will try to offer some explanations for their causes, both of which will lead us to the factions in the capital, to the imperial army and especially to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha.

5.5.1. Dismissals and Reappointments

5.5.1.1. Deposition of Halet Efendi

Halet Efendi was appointed as the deputy to the Reisülküttab (“Reis Vekili”) on 20 Ra 1222/28 May 1807. Ebubekir Efendi argues that he was the most suitable one for this position.2361 On Saturday, 7 M 1223/5 March 1808, however, Halet Efendi was suddenly dismissed.2362 Immediately after his dismissal, he was exiled to Kütahya.2363 Salih Bey, the former keeper of the registers of landed property (“defter emini”) became the new Rikab Reisi.2364 According to the some sources, Halet Efendi was deposed due to his animosity

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2361 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 19b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 126.

2362 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 90; Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 46; Beyhan, Saray Günliği, p. 208. On 13 M /11 March, Tayyar Pasha was dismissed. On 20 M/18 March, Halet Efendi was exiled to Kütahya. See Neticeti’l-Vekayi, p. 28a.

2363 B.O.A. HAT 53507 (undated). Immediately after his deposition he was ordered to go to his place of exile while he was in Kadıköy. Mustafa IV notes that he should not stay long in Kadıköy. He was banished to Kütahya on 20 M 1223/18 March 1808. See Neticeti’l-Vekayi, p. 28a.

2364 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 90; B.O.A. HAT 53237 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808). Ahmed Şakir Efendi was appointed as defter emini and the
with Sebastiani and his conducts against the orders of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{2365} It seems that the French ambassador deeply hated Halet Efendi. Asım asserts that the envy between the two was, to a great extent, related to the rational policy of Halet Efendi in international politics. Halet Efendi held the opinion that France would leave the Empire alone as soon as she gained utmost benefits from it. Therefore, Halet Efendi thought that it was necessary to keep good relations with Britain. All these points, claims Asım, made him the target of the French ambassador.\textsuperscript{2366} In order to get rid of Halet Efendi, Sebastiani frequently complained about him and expressed that the Ottoman-French relations would deteriorate and even lead to a war as long as Halet remained as the Reis Vekili.\textsuperscript{2367} Meanwhile the British party on the Bosphorus had attempted to contact Halet Efendi, Sebastiani was aware of the fact that the British were trying to improve relations with the Porte.\textsuperscript{2368} It is clear that Sebastiani labeled Halet Efendi as a pro-British figure and considered him as an obstacle to the interests of his state.\textsuperscript{2369} Indeed, Câbî argues that his dismissal was related to the anti-French and pro-Russian policy pursued by Halet Efendi.\textsuperscript{2370} From a letter written probably by the Grand Vizier in the army to Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, it becomes obvious that Halet Efendi was, in fact, dismissed through the efforts of the French ambassador. The writer of the document criticizes the decision. According to him, rather than dismissing him for this reason, it would have been better to send Halet Efendi away from the capital by appointing him to a new position in the army, so that it would not have created the superintendent of grain and provisions (‘‘hububat nazıri’’), in place of Salih Bey. See Neticetü‘l-Vekayi, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{2365} Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 46; Beyhan, Saray Günüğü, p. 208; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 140, 147.

\textsuperscript{2366} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 146, 165.


\textsuperscript{2368} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 165.

\textsuperscript{2369} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 159.

\textsuperscript{2370} Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 166. According to the author, he was dismissed on 2 Ca 1222/8 July 1807 and exiled to Engürü (modern Ankara), but this should be due to a confusion.
impression that he was dismissed by the interference of a foreign ambassador.\textsuperscript{2371} The problem for the writer seems to be the way he was dismissed, rather than the dismissal itself.

Halet Efendi was a figure close to Mustafa IV and particularly to Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi. As might be recalled, he was one of the key figures behind the reappointment of Ataullah Efendi, with whom he was acquainted with from childhood.\textsuperscript{2372} Indeed, in the above-mentioned letter to the Şeyhülislam, it is commented that the dismissal and exile was an injustice done to Halet Efendi. The writer also underlined that his correspondent must have been deeply annoyed by the exile. Therefore, he tried to console Ataullah Efendi by assuring that Halet Efendi would be released soon and be promoted to other offices again. Finally he notes that if approved by the Şeyhülislam, Halet Efendi could be immediately called to the army.\textsuperscript{2373} Another letter written by the same person to the Kaimmakam notes that Halet Efendi was a talented person in the management of foreign affairs and worked for the benefit of the state. Therefore, he requests the release of Halet Efendi.\textsuperscript{2374} From the final letter by the same person to the Kaimmakam, we learn that Ataullah Efendi also wished for the release of Halet Efendi. However, since Halet Efendi was banished by the order of the Sultan, he advises that his written request for the release of Halet should be kept secret from the Sultan not to make him angry.\textsuperscript{2375}

5.5.1.2. Deposition of Tayyar Pasha


\textsuperscript{2372} Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, pp. 36-37a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 427.

\textsuperscript{2373} B.O.A. \textit{Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri}, no. 18, p. 101 (21 M 1223/19 March 1808).

\textsuperscript{2374} B.O.A. \textit{Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri}, no. 18, p. 101 (undated).

\textsuperscript{2375} B.O.A. \textit{Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri}, no. 18, pp. 101-2 (15 S 1223/12 April 1808).
A very short time after the dismissal of Halet Efendi (7 M 1223/5 March 1808), Tayyar Pasha was deposed from the post of kaimmakam-ship. As might be recalled, he had been brought to power following the second dismissal of Musa Pasha on Saturday, 19 L 1222/20 December 1807.\textsuperscript{2376} Tayyar Pasha’s stay in the post was not long. In little more than three months, he was dismissed and replaced by Elhac Mustafa Pasha\textsuperscript{2377} on Friday, 13 M 1223/11 March 1808.\textsuperscript{2378} Contemporary sources provide some answers to the reasons of his dismissal after such a short period of time. While the author of the \textit{Ruzname} notes that he was dismissed due to his inappropriate behavior contrary to the expectations of the time,\textsuperscript{2379} the second author of \textit{Neticetü’l-Vekayi} brings a classical explanation arguing that he was only interested in worldly pleasures, and did not bother about stately affairs.\textsuperscript{2380} Asım, on the other hand, praises Tayyar Pasha for his good conduct of the affairs of his office.\textsuperscript{2381} For Asım, the real cause of the dismissal was related to the problems between him and a faction headed by Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi. Tayyar was supported by Osman Paşaçâde Kazasker İzzet Bey, a figure who wanted to become a Şeyhülislam. These two figures collaborated to secure Tayyar Pasha’s position as grand vizier, and the latter to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item B.O.A. \textit{Sadaret Defterleri}, no. 357, p. 80. For a copy of the order for the dismissal of Tayyar Pasha, see B.O.A. HAT 1365/54007 (undated) and T.S.M.A. E. 2446-5 (undated, catalogue date is Z 1222/February 1808).
\item Hacı Mustafa Pasha (Eğinli) (d. 1229/1814) had a bureaucratic career. In the year 1216/1801-2, he was delegated the duty of reconciling the relationship between İşkodrah İbrahim Pasha and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha. He became tevkiî in 1222/1807 and kaimmakam on M 1223/March 1808. He was exiled to Bursa after his dismissal. On M 1227/February-January 1812, he was appointed as the governor of Rakka and then Hamid. He was then exiled to Bursa where he died on 16 Z 1229/9 December 1814. See Mehmed Süreyya, \textit{Sicill-i Osmanî}, vol. IV, p. 1195.
\item \textit{Ruzname} (Milli Emlak), p. 46; Beyhan, \textit{Saray Günülüği}, p. 209.
\item \textit{Neticetü’l-Vekayi}, p. 28a.
\item Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 140.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
replace Ataullah Efendi. When Ataullah Efendi learned about the affiliation between the two and the intention of İzzet Bey, Tayyar was dismissed. Öğulukyan provides an explanation similar to that of Asım. According to him, too, Tayyar Pasha was deposed due to the envy between him and the Şeyhülislam. Saint-Denys adds another figure, Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa as being instrumental in the deposition. He asserts that the deposition of Tayyar Pasha was due to the collaboration of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi with Kabakçı Mustafa in order to replace Tayyar Pasha with Hafız İsmail Pasha, the former Grand Vizier. According to the author, they applied to the Sultan for the deposition of Tayyar Pasha. For Kethüda Said, the figures behind the dismissal were Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and Rusçuk Yarani. They were, Kethüda Said claims, worried about the possibility that their plan to secure the accession of Selim III would be ruined by a figure close to Mustafa IV. Consequently, the elimination of Tayyar Pasha was an urgent matter for them. They perceived that their success depended on the elimination of Tayyar Pasha and therefore wrote letters for his dismissal. Refik Efendi, in return, set about sowing dissension between the grand vizier and Tayyar Pasha and advised Sünbülzade Abdülباقي Efendi, to draw up and send a letter on remonstrance of the Janissaries. On the other hand, according to the author of Yayla İmamı Risalesi, it was the Janissaries who wanted the dismissal of Tayyar Pasha. In one of his letters, Tayyar Pasha himself highlights another dimension

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2382 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 141, 166. See also Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, p. 92.

2383 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 20.


2385 Sünbülzade Abdülباقي Efendi (d. 1227/1812) was the son of Vehbi Efendi. He became divan-i himayun kisedar, piyade mukabelecisi (1222/1807), küçük tezkireci (1223/1808). He was dismissed on Za 1223/December 1808 and exiled to Kütahya. In the year 1226/1811, he was appointed as süvari mukabelecisi and then tezkire-i evvel. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanlı, vol. I, p. 104.


2387 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 239.
for his own dismissal. As might be recalled, there were some allusions to the role of Tayyar Pasha in the dismissal of Sekbanbaşı Mustafa Ağa. He explains that those who noticed that they could not do whatever they want as they did during the time of the ex-\textit{kaimmakam} decided to eliminate him.\footnote{2388 T.S.M.A. E. 1148-2 (8 S 1223/5 April 1808).} Therefore, for Tayyar Pasha, he fell victim to people who saw him an obstacle to their own interests.

Mustafa Necib Efendi dwells on the issue of the old envy between Cabbarzâde and Tayyar Pasha. Tayyar Pasha was dismissed to prevent a revolt by Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey, already frightened by the coming of his enemy to power.\footnote{2389 Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 85.} There could be some truth in his claim. The military power of Cabbarzâde Süleyman was really needed in the campaign. An undated document refers to the same issue. It reports that Ahmed Efendi, the grandson of Darendeli Mehmed Pasha, a former grand vizier, was sent to Cabbarzâde Süleyman to invite him to participate in the campaign against the Russians. Ahmed Efendi returned with a negative reply. Cabbarzâde, on behalf of the Anatolian ayans, had declared that they did not trust Tayyar Pasha and refused to pass to Rumelia until he died.\footnote{2390 B.O.A. HAT 53472 (undated); B.O.A. \textit{Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri}, no 18, pp. 109-10.} Since it is an undated document it is difficult to be sure whether it was written before or after the dismissal of Tayyar Pasha. Yet, a letter of Tayyar Pasha suggests that it was written some time before his deposition. In the letter, Tayyar Pasha complains that despite his loyalty and efforts for the benefit of the state, “several people” wrote to the Grand Vizier declaring that Süleyman Bey was willing to join the army, but on the condition that Tayyar Pasha was deposed.\footnote{2391 T.S.M.A. E. 1148-1 (8 S 1223/5 April 1808).} In fact, it was not only Cabbarzâde who was not pleased with Tayyar Pasha. For instance, Oğulukyan notes that though the coming of Tayyar Pasha to power created a general pleasure among the public, they were disappointed when the Pasha began to deal with his personal issues especially taking revenge on Cabbarzâde, Kara Osmanoğlu and
Yusuf Ziya Pasha. In the struggle between the two, it was Süleyman Ağa who managed to eliminate his rival.

The evidence of the pressure exerted on Mustafa IV for the dismissal and exile of Tayyar Pasha is noticeable in some documents. For instance, in one of his letters to the Grand Vizier Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, Mustafa IV writes that even though Tayyar Pasha’s loyalty was beyond doubt, his dismissal was required. He declared that he was sending Tayyar to the army, and ordered Çelebi Mustafa Pasha to employ him in duties such as the suppression of rebellious Serbians. It seems that the Sultan was not the figure behind his dismissal, and most probably he yielded to pressures in this regard.

After the deposition, Tayyar Pasha was allowed to stay at the residence of his kapı kethüda for three days and then marched towards Rumelia, followed by his kapı kethüda one week later. At the beginning Tayyar Pasha was not exiled but rather sent to Rumelia to be employed in a military post keeping his title of Pasha. However, his employment was discussed in a meeting at the imperial camp and its participants found it appropriate to exile Tayyar Pasha to Dimetoka (Didymotechia in modern Greece), but allowed him keep of his rank of vizier. Therefore, it seems that the officers of the army and especially Çelebi Mustafa Pasha did not want Tayyar Pasha’s arrival in Edirne. There is a statement (“takrîr-i ali”) by Çelebi Mustafa Efendi on the issue. It provides some insights into some matters he was worried about.

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2392 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 19.

2393 T.S.M.A. E. 7030-20 (undated, catalogue date is 1262-3/1846).

2394 B.O.A. HAT 53906 (undated); Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 168. The information that he went to the house of his kapı kethüda after the dismissal is confirmed by B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 91. The name of kapı kethüda is recorded as Selim Sabit Efendi.

2395 T.S.M.A. E. 1148-1 (8 S 1223/5 April 1808).

2396 T.S.M.A E. 4360 (7 S 1223/4 April 1808); HAT 1365/54039 (undated). For the copy of order for his exile to Dimetoka, see B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, 59 (evahir-i M 1223/19 -28 March 1808).

2397 B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri, no. 18, p. 103 (undated).
pleased with the way of Tayyar Pasha was dismissed. He criticizes Tayyar Pasha’s keeping
his vizirate after the dismissal and being allowed to stay in the capital several days more.
According to him, these acts created an impression that Tayyar Pasha was coming to Edirne
or imperial army would take over the post of the grand vizirate. 2398 It could be suggested
that Çelebi Mustafa Pasha was also suspicious of a secret intention on the part of the
Sultan, too, for the appointment of the Tayyar Pasha as the grand vizier. To prove his point
that it was not appropriate to trust Tayyar Pasha, Çelebi Pasha complains that even on road
to Edirne, Tayyar Pasha did not refrain from sending letters to the ayans in Rumelia and
also to the Janissaries. These increased suspicions and also anxiety that he was about to
create disorder in the regions he passed through. 2399

Fortunately enough, we have an evaluation of the events that took place following his
dismissal from the eyes of Tayyar Pasha. According to him, the decision for his exile to
Dimetoka was taken through the provocations created by Çelebi Mustafa Pasha in order to
secure military help from Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey. 2400 Therefore, when he reached
Burgos (modern Burgaz, Bulgaria), 2401 he received the order for his stay in Dimetoka.
According to a letter of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, Tayyar was frightened because he was
exiled to Dimetoka. 2402 Mustafa Pasha does not clearly state why Tayyar Pasha was so
frightened. It was probably due to the thought of a possible execution. 2403 According to
Mustafa Pasha, this fear led Tayyar Pasha to gather crowds around himself with the

2398 B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri, no. 18, p. 103 (undated).

2399 B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri, no. 18, pp. 103-5
(undated) and pp. 106-7 (13 S 1223/10 April 1808).

2400 T.S.M.A. E. 1148-2 (8 S 1223/5 April 1808); Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II; p. 166.

2401 T.S.M.A. E. 1148 (8 S 1223/5 April 1808). He says that he was at Karşdırâran
when he received the order.

2402 B.O.A. HAT 658/32139 (3 Ra 1223/29 April 1808); T.S.M.A. E. 4360 (7 S
1223/5 April 1808).

2403 B.O.A. HAT 658/32139 (3 Ra 1223/29 April 1808).
intention of creating disorder or Rebellion around the region. In a letter to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, on the other hand, Tayyar Pasha argues that it was the Bostancıbaşi of Edirne who created these fictitious gossips about his secret intentions and he was the one who tried to create disorder, not himself. It seems that Tayyar Pasha was frightened when he heard the news that Yılkıoğlu was marching towards Edirne and thereafter he began to gather forces to save his life. At Burgos, Tayyar Pasha wrote petitions both to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and to the Porte requesting change of his place of exile either to Varna or Ahyolu (in modern southeastern Bulgaria). However, it seems that Alemdar Mustafa Pasha did not want him to stay at Varna, on the grounds that he would create disorder in the region and would not even bother to go to Varna. Despite these warnings, Mustafa IV ordered Tayyar Pasha immediately to reach Varna. From a letter of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, we learn that even though he received the order for his dispatch to Varna, he banished Tayyar Pasha to Hacıoğlu Pazarı, located in the inner Balkans. He excused himself saying that Varna was situated on Black Sea coast and was within easy reach. Though it is not clear whether Tayyar Pasha was really gathering men around himself, it is obvious that Çelebi Mustafa Pasha sent him away both from the capital and

2404 B.O.A. HAT 658/32139 (3 Ra 1223/29 April 1808).
2405 T.S.M.A. E. 1148-1 (8 S 1223/5 April 1808).
2406 B.O.A. HAT 53700 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808). It is also noted that he was to stay at Burgos (Burgaz) until the decision reached to him. See T.S.M.A. E. 1148-1 (8 S 1223/5 April 1808).
2407 B.O.A. HAT 53700 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808).
2408 B.O.A. HAT 53741 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 53973 (undated); B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, p. 59 (evahir-i M 1223/19 -28 March 1808).
2409 B.O.A. HAT 658/32139 (3 Ra 1223/29 April 1808); B.O.A. HAT 1364/53911 (undated). The second document is an imperial edict of the Sultan questioning the grand vizier why he did not obey his order for the exile of Tayyar Pasha. According to Asım, while Tayyar Pasha was at Hacıoğlu Pazarı, the order for his employment as the muhafız of Varna was received. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 166.
the army and made him stay in a region where he would be prevented from reaching the shores of the Black Sea, which would, otherwise, help Tayyar Pasha to reach the lands of his dynasty. Indeed in one of his own letters, Tayyar Pasha requested permission from Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to pass to Anatolia.\textsuperscript{2411} It is clear that the real intention of Tayyar Pasha was to return to Trabzon and to revive his dynasty, which according to him would mean the existence of a great supporter in Anatolia for Alemdar Mustafa Pasha.\textsuperscript{2412}

According to Asım, since both Alemdar Mustafa and Tayyar Pasha were hostile to Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, both had come closer to each other.\textsuperscript{2413} However, if we take into consideration the plot of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and \textit{Ruscuk Yârân} to enthrone Selim III, Tayyar’s exile to a distant place, both from Anatolia and İstanbul, was a very important step for eliminating a possible obstacle to their secret plans.\textsuperscript{2414} In fact, it seems that there were some gossips circulating both in the capital and in army that Çelebi Pasha was deceived by the above party. Consequently, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha feels the necessity to explain that he was not deceived by the proponents of the former Sultan (“\textit{devr-i sabik takımı}”). In one of his correspondences, he rejects the idea that he was influenced by the supporters of the former Sultan in the exile of Tayyar Pasha, but rather due to the intolerable conducts of the Pasha himself.\textsuperscript{2415}

\textsuperscript{2411} T.S.M.A. E. 1148-1 (8 S 1223/5 April 1808).

\textsuperscript{2412} T.S.M.A. E. 1148-1 (8 S 1223/5 April 1808).

\textsuperscript{2413} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 166. Saint-Denys adds some more interesting details to the relationship between the two. According to him, Tayyar Pasha was able to gain the confidence of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and he managed to transfer him the vengeance against Sultan Mustafa and his favorites, especially against Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa. See Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutons de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 165. Unfortunately I did not come across any historical evidence supporting this claim. It is important to note that whatever the factions Tayyar Pasha had sought to take vengeance, I think he remained loyal to Sultan Mustafa IV and probably never worked for the enthronement of the deposed Sultan, Selim III. I will also dare to claim that probably the author confuses Tayyar Pasha with certain members of the group called \textit{Ruscuk Yârân} or probably consider him as active as the members of this group.

\textsuperscript{2414} For more information, see Uzuncaşılı, \textit{Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, pp. 92-93.

\textsuperscript{2415} B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri, no. 18, p. 105-106 (undated).
Mustafa IV’s concern with the protection of Tayyar Pasha seems to have continued after his deposition too. In one of his letters, written during the debates on whether he should be sent to Varna or not, the Sultan states that Tayyar Pasha should be exiled to Varna. But in an almost apologetic way, he emphasizes that his intention was not to protect ("tehâsüb") Tayyar Pasha. It seems that there were some debates on his execution. Therefore, Mustafa IV feels the need to explain that if he would order the execution of Tayyar Pasha, the supporters of Selim III would celebrate ("düğün bayram") under the pretext that Tayyar Pasha was finally punished for his previous intrigues. The Sultan confesses that he did not want to give a pretext to pro-Selimian figures to enjoy. He also underlines that he did not allow his execution since Tayyar Pasha had refused previously the Nizam-ı Cedid and run away to the Crimea. After his accession, he came to Istanbul and asked for a grant ("inâyet"). Therefore, the Sultan says, with the concern that he would not act as ("müsibane") as Musa Pasha, he appointed Tayyar as the kaimmakam. He also notes that from Varna, Tayyar probably would run away to the Crimea, in such a case the grand vizier should inform the Sultan. In the case of his retreat to his own country, the Sultan comments, he could not gather as many soldiers as he did in the year 1805.

Probably thanks to the protection of Mustafa IV, Tayyar Pasha was not executed. With his exile, the pro-Selimian figures got rid of an important supporter of Mustafa IV, about one month after the accession of Mahmud II (2 B 1223/24 August 1808).

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2416 T.S.M.A. E. 2446-6 (7 S 1223/4 April 1808); T.S.M.A. E. 7030-21 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808): “Benim murâd-ı hümâyûnum anacak devr-i sâbık takımının haz edeceği bir şeyi vücuda gelmesin dayûdür. Yoksa Allah bilir tehâsüb değildir”.

2417 T.S.M.A. E. 2446-6 (7 S 1223/4 April 1808); T.S.M.A. E. 7030-21 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808).

2418 T.S.M.A. E. 2446-6 (7 S 1223/4 April 1808); T.S.M.A. E. 7030-21 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808).

2419 T.S.M.A. E. 2446-6 (7 S 1223/4 April 1808).

2420 According to the author of Yayla İmami Risalesi, his decapitated head arrived in the capital on 13 Ş 1223/4 October 1808. See Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 252.
5.5.2. Execution of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa (Wednesday, 19 Ca 1223/13 July 1808)

Apparently, the army factions played a role in the dismissal of Tayyar Pasha. A more direct role of the army was observed in the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa. We have almost no information about his life before the May uprising. The only point is the fact that Kabakçı was from the Black Sea region and the name of his father was Hüseyin.\(^\text{2421}\) He is mentioned as “Seyyid” in two sources; however, it is difficult to ascertain whether he was really a descendant of the Prophet or not.\(^\text{2422}\) Ebubekir Efendi describes him as a former “kalyonlar başağası çavuşlarından”.\(^\text{2423}\) Asım informs us that İsmail Ağa, a former nazır of Boğaz, was a relative of Kabakçı Mustafa.\(^\text{2424}\) According to Koçu, he was from Rize and was a pirate during his youth. He was, Koçu argues, among the vanguards who rushed to defend the fortress of Anapa against the Russian siege, hence the nickname “kabakçı”, meaning vanguard.\(^\text{2425}\) However, this point is not mentioned by any contemporary source.

Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa was murdered on Wednesday, 19 Ca 1223/13 July 1808.\(^\text{2426}\) That day, Uzun Hacı Ali Ağa, the ayan of Pınar Hisar and Ketencioğlu,\(^\text{2427}\) with several

\(^{2421}\) İstanbul Şeriyye Sicilleri, Galata Mahkemesi, no. 583, p. 35.

\(^{2422}\) İstanbul Şeriyye Sicilleri, Galata Mahkemesi, no. 583, p. 35; B.O.A. C.DH. 2774 (undated).


\(^{2425}\) Koçu, \textit{Kabakçı Mustafa}, p. 59.


hundred cavalrymen \(^{2428}\) secretly came to the house of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa at Fener Karye at six o’clock in evening [02:40]. \(^{2429}\) Finding him asleep, they cut his head off and sent it to the imperial army. \(^{2430}\) After the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa, only those carrying the head returned to the army, while the others remained at the spot, including Ketencioğlu and Hacı Ali Ağa. \(^{2431}\) Obviously those who carried the head met the army at Çorlu. \(^{2432}\)

There are various differences in the contemporary sources concerning the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa. After thirty-six hours of marching, Hacı Ali Ağa arrived at the village of Fener in the middle of the night. \(^{2433}\) After reaching the residence, Saint-Denys

\(^{2428}\) In a report that seems to have been written sometime after the incident, the number is given as 600. See T.S.M.A. E. 8751 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4. Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 52 gives as 300; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 223; Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 240 as 150; Neticetül’-Vekayi, p. 30 as 1500; Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günliğü, p. 107 as 500. Kethüda Said does not provide an exact number but notes that they were several hundred cavalrymen. See Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Şalis, Bayezid 3367, p. 103. According to an extract from a private letter, it was five hundred men. See Extracts from a private letter, Smirna, 17 August 1808, (PRO, FO 78-61). Kalost Arapyan suggests that they were about 80. See Arapyan, Ruscuk Ayam Mustafa Paşa, p. 8.

\(^{2429}\) Ruzname (Milli Emlak) p. 52; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 209; TSMA E. 8751. Asım asserts it was “after the sunset (“bade'l-magrib”). See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 195. Kalost Arapyan also informs that Uzun Hacı Ali Ağa and his men arrived at the village in the evening. See Arapyan, Ruscuk Ayam Mustafa Paşa, p. 8. According to Kethüda Said, his residence was at “Fener-i Haliç-i Bahr-i Siyah” and outside the Rumeli Feneri fortress. See Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Şalis, Bayezid 3367, p. 103. There is a record in İstanbul Şeriyeye Sicilleri, Galata Mahkemesi, no. p. 583, p. 35, according to which Kabakçı Mustafa bin Hüseyin Ağa bought a house around Fortress of Rumeli Kavak on 20 Ş 1222/23 October 1807. See the copy of the document in Appendix VI. The record proves that Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa bin Hüseyin bought a field together with a kiosk in it from İnce Mehmed Pasha, the nazir of kala-yı tisa. If this is the same kiosk where he was murdered, he should have lived there for about nine months before his death. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

\(^{2430}\) Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 52; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.223; Neticetül’-Vekayi, p. 31a


\(^{2432}\) Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Selis Asrî Vekayi, p. 94.

notes, Hacı Ali Ağa and his four men knocked the door of Kabakçı Mustafa’s residence announcing that they had a very urgent message from Kaimmakam Pasha and then asked the room of their chiefs. When they entered the room, they found Kabakçı in his nightgown surrounded by his wives and slave girls.\textsuperscript{2434} Among the trembling women, Hacı Ali and his men led him towards the door. At that moment, Saint-Denys asserts, Kabakçı Mustafa asked about their intentions and why he was being dragged out from his family and house. Then he asked for time to pray. However, Hacı Ali Ağa angrily replied that it was not the time to pray and immediately afterwards cut his head off.\textsuperscript{2435} The second author of Neticetiü’ll-Vekayi argues that he was taken out of his harem.\textsuperscript{2436} Kethüda Said, on the other hand, narrates that Uzun Hacı Ali Ağa and his men came while the servants of Kabakçı Mustafa were busy with preparation of the needs of the morning prayer ("salat-i subh") and some others were still sleeping. Hacı Ali Ağa told them that he had received an order for his execution and entered Kabakçı’s bedroom and killed him while he was asleep.\textsuperscript{2437} Among contemporary sources, it is Asım who argues that it was Kabakçı Mustafa’s first night after marriage, a point that seems to have transmitted to later studies via this author. Afterwards they killed him together with two of his followers.\textsuperscript{2438}

A later historian, Reşad Ekrem Koçu, gives further details on the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa, drawing on the memoirs of Hacı Mustafa Ağa (d. 1904-05) passed to his grandson Aşık Razi. Hacı Mustafa Ağa’s father was Hacı Ali Ağa, the executioner of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa. According to this story, during that period, Hacı Mustafa Ağa was about eighteen or nineteen years old and accompanied Hacı Ali Ağa during his march to İstanbul.\textsuperscript{2439} According to Koçu, they reached the Fener district at midnight on Wednesday-

\textsuperscript{2434} Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 171.
\textsuperscript{2435} Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 171.
\textsuperscript{2436} Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 31a.
\textsuperscript{2437} Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{2439} Koçu, Kabakçı Mustafa, p. 57. Koçu states that Hacı Mustafa Ağa was more than a hundred years old when he died.
Thursday, 13-14 July. After their arrival in the village, Hacı Ali Ağâ paid utmost care to prevent any noise. At the head of the group was Ketencioğlu. Before going to the residence of Kabakçî, they first captured several yamaks sleeping in a coffeehouse and learned the location of the house of Kabakçî outside the fortress. They were also informed that Kabakçî Mustafa married the daughter of a certain fisher called Temel Ağâ and it was his first night after marriage. Therefore, there was no one except the aunt of the bride and the newly married couples in the house. The guests who had attended the wedding feast were placed in houses in the village. Thereafter, Hacı Ali Ağâ and his ten men entered the courtyard of the house and noticed that eight yamaks were sleeping. Having told them that he had an imperial order, Hacı Ali Ağâ entered the house breaking the door. Meanwhile, they noticed that there were several men and women sleeping at different parts of the house. Before they woke up, Hacı Ali and his men entered the bedroom of Kabakçî Mustafa, who was sleeping with his wife. Not awakening Kabakçî Mustafa Ağâ, Zeybek Mustafa, one of the men of Hacı Ali Ağâ, severed his head and sent it to the army by Ketencioğlu. This is the most detailed narration of the murder of Kabakçî Mustafa. Unfortunately, the mysterious memoir mentioned by Koçu could not be found. Therefore, it is difficult to verify the above information. A comparison with the information in the contemporary sources shows that the main problem in Koçu’s account is the claim that it was Ketencioğlu who took the decapitated head of Kabakçî Mustafa to the army. As we shall see immediately below, there are official documents proving that Ketencioğlu stayed in Rumeli Feneri after the incident and and died during the ensuing fight with the yamaks. If the claim of Koçu is true, the only possible explanation might be that

2440 Koçu, Kabakçî Mustafa, p. 173.
2441 Koçu, Kabakçî Mustafa, p. 173.
2442 Koçu, Kabakçî Mustafa, p. 175.
2443 Koçu, Kabakçî Mustafa, p. 175.
2444 Koçu, Kabakçî Mustafa, pp. 175-6.
2445 Koçu, Kabakçî Mustafa, p. 176.
Ketencioğlu returned to the Fener district after delivering the severed head of Kabakçı, but the possibility seems to be very weak.

Initially the yamaks were shocked by the murder of their comrade and famous chief. They had supposed that there was a formal decree either from the Sultan or from the imperial army. Consequently, they protested that there was no reason for the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağə.2446 An official document which seems to be one of the first records on the matter confirms news of the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağə by Ketencioğlu and his cavalrymen. The same report informs the Sultan that the Bostancıbaşı and Sekbanbaşı were sent to the region for further investigation. Therefore, the contact of the Sekbanbaşı with the yamaks must have taken place after his arrival to the district. The yamaks asked the Sekbanbaşı whether there had been an imperial order for the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağə and for their elimination as well.2447 Kethüda Said notes that after the first shock, the yamaks themselves sent men to the city to determine the causes of the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağə.2448 After narrating the incident, they asked whether there had been an imperial order or not. If the information provided by him is true, the dispatch of some yamaks to the city probably happened before the arrival of the Sekbanbaşı.2449 After he returned to the city, the Sekbanbaşı inquired about the matter at the Porte and learnt that no order had been given by the Sultan for the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağə.2450 Thereafter,


2447 T.S.M.A. E. 8751 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808). The record is from the Kaimmakam Pasha to Mustafa IV. There is no mention of Hacı Ali Ağə in the document. I suspect this might be related to the fact that Ketencioğlu was a former commander (“dizdar”) of Rumeli Feneri fortress. He had escaped to Rumelia after the May 1807 Rebellion. If we assume that above information was provided by the yamaks or the officials of the fortresses, it is natural that they wrote Ketencioğlu, with whom they should have an acquaintance rather than Hacı Ali Ağə.

2448 Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 103.


2450 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 52; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.224.
Mustafa IV called the Kaimmakam Pasha to his presence and discussed the issue with him for one hour.\textsuperscript{2451}

The available sources confirm the point that not only the yamaks but also the Sultan and his ministers were shocked by the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa. They did not have an idea whether it was a personal act of Hacı Ali Ağâ or whether he was sent by the imperial army.\textsuperscript{2452} Therefore, the Porte sent a letter to the Grand Vizier Çelegbî Mustafa Pasha requesting information on the issue.\textsuperscript{2453} In reply, they were informed that the order for the execution was issued by the Grand Vizier himself and the reason was the oppressive acts committed by Kabakçı Mustafa Ağâ in the regions around Midye.\textsuperscript{2454} In another record, this time to the Sultan himself, Çelegbî Mustafa Pasha confesses that he gave the order for the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa while they were about to move from Edirne. Moreover, he recommended the appointment of Hacı Ali Ağâ as the Bosphorous superintendent, a suggestion approved by the Sultan.\textsuperscript{2455}

Fortunately enough, we have a copy of the order issued by the Grand Vizier for the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa. It addresses the ayan of Pınar Hisar and the mütesellim of Vize


\textsuperscript{2452} B.O.A. C.SM. 470 (undated); Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 52; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.224.

\textsuperscript{2453} B.O.A. HAT 53788 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808); B.O.A. C.SM 470 (undated). See also Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayî, p. 94. For the copies of these documents see Appendix 4.

\textsuperscript{2454} B.O.A. HAT 53788 (undated). A letter to the Grand Vizier suggests that the issue of oppression around Midye was more complicated. According to the document, Kabakçı Mustafa Ağâ had complained about a certain figure who was appointed as ayan to İğne Ada and Midye. It seems that there was a conflict between this figure and Süleyman Ağâ, the commander ("başbuğ") of the same region. See B.O.A. C. DH. 2774 (5 Ş 1223/26 September 1808).

\textsuperscript{2455} B.O.A. HAT 23134 (undated); B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227; pp. 84-5 (evasit-ı C 1223/4-14 August 1808); Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 191, Neticetü l-Vekayî, p. 35.
and orders the aforementioned execution.\textsuperscript{2456} The order justifies the execution by underlying that Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa illegally attempted to establish dominance around Midye and oppressed the residents of the region. Consequently, frequent petitions were sent to the army by local residents. After stating these causes, the document ordered the \textit{ayan} of Pınar Hisar and the \textit{mütesellim} of Vize to eliminate Kabakçı Mustafa in order to save innocent people from oppression.\textsuperscript{2457} The same document also gives clues as to why most of those who killed Mustafa Ağa did not return immediately after the execution. They were ordered stay there until the arrival of another order for their return and in the meantime they were to attend to the defense of the fortresses.\textsuperscript{2458}

Thanks to the reply by the Grand Vizier, Mustafa IV and the Porte finally learned that the order for the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa had been taken by the army. However, the Porte hesitated to inform the \textit{yamaks} on the origins of the execution on the grounds that more serious events could occur if they learned the order was given by the army. Therefore, it was publicly declared that there was no formal decree for the execution.\textsuperscript{2459} In the formal document, no an accusation against the Grand Vizier or other officials in the army is made about the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa. Yet, it is underlined that if the center had been informed beforehand, they could have taken the necessary measures to achieve the aim in an easier way.\textsuperscript{2460} Therefore, it is advised to keep the involvement of the imperial army

\textsuperscript{2456} B.O.A. Mūhimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 130, order no. 380 (evail-i Ca 1223/25 June-4 July 1808). It is important to note that the name of \textit{ayan} of Pınar Hisar is mentioned as Ahmed. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

\textsuperscript{2457} B.O.A. Mūhimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 130, order no. 380 (evail-i Ca 1223/25 June-4 July 1808).

\textsuperscript{2458} B.O.A. Mūhimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 130, order no. 380 (evail-i Ca 1223/25 June-4 July 1808). According Mustafâ Necib, the order was issued on 20 Ca 1223/6 July 1808, two days earlier than the date of the order in the above Mūhimme.

\textsuperscript{2459} B.O.A. C.SM. 470 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808).

\textsuperscript{2460} B.O.A. C.SM. 470 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808).
secret till the arrival of the army to the capital, to prevent further disorder by the yamaks.\(^{2461}\)

In the meantime, disorder prevailed in Rumeli Feneri. Following the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa, the yamaks asked Hacı Ali Ağa about the reason of the murder. When they received the reply that he was executed due to an imperial order, they wanted to see a copy of it. However, when they were told that there was not a written but an oral order for the execution, the yamaks responded by attacking them.\(^{2462}\) Among the contemporary authors, it is Saint-Denys who argues that Hacı Ali Ağa really carried a written order from the Grand Vizier and showed it to the yamaks when they asked for it.\(^{2463}\) According to the author, the yamaks initially could not decide whether to obey or fight against Hacı Ali Ağa and his men. However, it was the cries of the women of Kabakçı Mustafa calling for vengeance that helped them to decide what to do. At that moment a certain Süleyman Ağa, according to the author he was the uncle of Kabakçı Mustafa, called the yamaks to fight against Hacı Ali Ağa, who had murdered their innocent master without an order from the Sultan.\(^{2464}\) Therefore, the yamaks attacked the executioners of their master. Unable to defend themselves, the forces of Uzun Hacı Ali Ağa sought refuge in the Fortress of Rumeli Feneri and a fight started between the two groups.\(^{2465}\) The fight seems to have continued from Wednesday to Sunday but the yamaks did not manage to enter the fortress.\(^{2466}\) Kabakçı Mustafa was executed on Wednesday, 19 Ca 1223/13 July 1808;

\(^{2461}\) B.O.A. C.SM. 470 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808). It is noted that the letter was written within the knowledge of the Sultan.

\(^{2462}\) Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 52; Beyhan, Saray Günügü, p. 224.


\(^{2464}\) Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 173. This Süleyman Ağa might be the aforementioned figure who was appointed as the başbuğ of Midye and İğne Ada by Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa. See B.O.A. C. DH. 2774 (5 § 1223/26 September 1808).


\(^{2466}\) Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 52; Beyhan, Saray Günügü, p. 224.
therefore, it is clear that the fight started on the very day of his death and continued for five days. Kethüda Said notes that during the fight the *yamaks* of other fortresses helped their friends.\(^{2467}\) The sounds of the cannons aroused great anxiety among the people.\(^{2468}\) According to a foreign newspaper, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha sent a body of 1000 cavalrymen on 19th July,

> to the relief of Ketengi Oglu, who formerly attacked the famous Kavaghi Oglu and who was at this time besieged by the Tabiales in Fanaraki.\(^{2469}\) However, “as this small party having been overpowered the preceeding night, was obliged to take refuge in the adjacent woods, afterwards to retreat along the famous aqueduct of Emperor Justinian to Birgos. Here they joined again the army of the Mustapha Bairactar.\(^{2470}\)

According to the same source, the following day, the yamaks submitted, struck with terror, some entered “on board the fleet and partly into the service of Mustapha.\(^{2471}\) Finally, those in the fortress asked for “*rey*” and began to move outside the fortress. During their movement, Ketencioğlu was murdered.\(^{2472}\) It is interesting to note that the newspaper does not mention the death of Ketencioğlu. An official document, however, confirms the death

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\(^{2469}\) *The Times*, Friday, September 16, 1808; pg. 2; issue 7468; col. B (Foreign Intelligence, Vienna, 24 August).

\(^{2470}\) *The Times*, Friday, September 16, 1808; pg. 2; issue 7468; col. B (Foreign Intelligence, Vienna, 24 August). 19\(^{th}\) July corresponds to Tuesday, 25 Ca 1223. Therefore, the above forces should be sent about one week after the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa.

\(^{2471}\) *The Times*, Friday, September 16, 1808; pg. 2; issue 7468; col. B (Foreign Intelligence, Vienna, 24 August).

of Ketencioğlu and also provides further details. Five of his men were captured and the remaining ones ran away during the fight.2473

Ensuing fight between the men of Hacı Ali and the yamaks was also a turning point for the yamaks too. During the fight, some of them were killed and while the remaining ones ran away to other places.2474 Therefore, a short time following the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa, a very limited number of yamaks remained at the fortresses. Consequently, the Porte decided to send bostancıs to the fortresses that were under the authority of the Bostancıbaşı. The aim was not only to increase the number of the soldiers but also to bring order to the fortresses.2475 It was a good opportunity for the center to appoint new soldiers and gain the upper hand in the region. For the remaining fortresses, it was decided to return to the previous order that was established during the grand admiralship of Cezayirli Hasan Pasha.2476 From then on, the fortresses were to be under the authority of a grand admiral. Two mirimirans would be appointed to the fortresses in the Anatolian and Rumelian side of the Straits.2477 However, from an imperial order we learn that four fortresses continued to be under the command of the Bostancıbaşı, while the

2473 B.O.A. HAT 53127 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808): “Boğaz tarafında olan Ketancıoğlu’nu idâm ve beş aded dîl ahz eylediklerini …” The center learned the above details from the report of a certain man with the rank of serturnai at the region. In reply, he was ordered not to permit the entrance of foreigners to the fortresses. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

2474 B.O.A. HAT 53190 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808); B.O.A. HAT 23134 (undated).

2475 B.O.A. HAT 53190 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

2476 Cezayirli Hasan Gazi Pasha (d.1204/1790) was one of the most famous grand admirals in the Ottoman history. He became grand admiral on Z 1183/April 1770. He was later appointed as the boğaz muhafızı (Za 1186/February 1773) and Ruscuk serasker and the governor of Anatolia (M 1188/March-April 1774). In the year 1199/1785, he became sadaret kaimmakam. On Şaban 1203/May 1789, he was appointed as the serasker of Özi. On 1 Ra 1204/19 November 1789, Hasan Pasha became grand vizier. He died on 14 B 1204/30 March 1790. For more details see Appendix I.

2477 B.O.A. HAT 53190 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808).
remaining ones came under the supervision of a Bosphorous superintendent.\textsuperscript{2478} New artillerymen were also stationed in the fortresses.\textsuperscript{2479}

The appointment of Hacı Ali Ağâ as the \textit{boğaz nazıri} was a final blow to the overwhelming dominance of the \textit{yamaks} and the disorder created by them at the Straits. Most of the \textit{yamaks} were from the Black Sea region and were tied to each other by kinship and local ties. The new system brought to the fortresses after the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa and the stationing of new artillerymen and \textit{bostancılar} from the center must have broken the local ties that connected the \textit{yamaks}. As we have remarked previously, most of the former \textit{yamaks} were either killed during the fight with the forces of Hacı Ali Ağâ or sought refuge in other places. Forces of Hacı Ali Ağâ were stationed at the fortresses, signifying the end of comfortable days for the old \textit{yamaks}.\textsuperscript{2480} Some of the fugitives went to the Dardanelles. However, since they created disorder there, some of them were sent away from the region around 9 C 1223/2 August 1808.\textsuperscript{2481} After the enthronement of Mahmud II, a detailed edict was issued for the administration of the fortresses, addressing Hacı Ali Ağâ, the new \textit{Boğaz nazıri}.\textsuperscript{2482} The order begins with enlisting the problems related to the old organization of the fortresses, namely the four under the supervision of the \textit{Bostancıbaşı} and the remaining ones under the \textit{Boğaz nazıri}. It states that the old system ceased to function due to the certain reasons and disorder prevailed in the fortresses. Therefore, Hacı Ali Ağâ was ordered to station new and disciplined soldiers at the fortresses. The \textit{yamaks}, the edict stated, should no longer stay at the those fortresses but were to be sent to other fortresses in the Empire. The \textit{yamaks} willing to serve the Empire could go to the fortress of

\textsuperscript{2478} B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme Defterleri}, no. 227, pp. 84-5 (evasıt-ı C 1223/4-14 August 1808).

\textsuperscript{2479} B.O.A. HAT 23134 (undated).


\textsuperscript{2482} B.O.A. \textit{Mühimme Defterleri}, no. 227, p. 88 (evasıt-ı C 1223/4-14 August 1808).
İbrail to fight against the enemy.\textsuperscript{2483} For those who accepted the new duty, salaries would be sent to Varna and the necessary provisions would also be provided by the center during their travel. If they were reluctant to be employed at İbrail, all were allowed to sell their estates ("emlak") at the fortresses and return either to their own villages or wherever they preferred. Yet, no salaries would be paid from then on. At the end of the same document, Hacı Ali Ağâ is ordered to undertake these arrangements smoothly.\textsuperscript{2484}

The three incidents we have tried to explain above seem to have generated from different sources: the dismissal of Halet Efendi from the French ambassador, the dismissal of Tayyar Pasha and the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağâ from the army. The reason why we have narrated the above three incidents in a detailed way was to stress the point that they reflect not only the complexity of the situation in the capital but also to provide the reader some idea in terms of the different sources of factions through the end of the reign of Mustafa IV. From this perspective, it might be argued that the dismissal of Halet Efendi, Tayyar Pasha and the execution of Kabakçı were not separate incidents, rather parts of the same conscious effort to eliminate some of the strongest figures of Mustafa IV’s period so that the resistance to the coming of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the capital would considerably be weakened. In the incident of Halet Efendi we see the role of Sebastiani, and in the case of Tayyar Pasha the factions of the army and finally in the murder of Kabakçı the direct role of army. As we shall see in below, during the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the city there was almost no influential figure to prevent his coming or show a reaction when he entered the city in order to ensure the accession of Selim III.

\textbf{5.5.3. March of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha}

\textsuperscript{2483} B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, p. 88 (evasit-i C 1223/4-14 August 1808). It seems that the Fortress of İbrail was not chosen coincidentally. According to the document, soldiers of that fortress were their fellow-man and the commander of the fortress was their fellow countrymen ("hemşehrileri").

\textsuperscript{2484} B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, p. 88 (evasit-i C 1223/4-14 August 1808).
Modern studies narrating the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to İstanbul usually talk about the efforts of *Ruscuk Yârânm*, which is described as a secret and pro-Selimian and pro-Nizam-ı Cedid committee that convinced Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, who already had a strong affiliation towards Selim III, to march on the city in order to enthrone the deposed Sultan.\textsuperscript{2485} This viewpoint carries with it very important historical realities. However, a complete dependence on this line of explanation, in our view, provides a rather limited image, which depicts that the only unhappy group during the reign of Mustafa IV were the members of the group of known as the *Ruscuk Yârânm*. Another important point that should be emphasized is the fact that among the contemporary chronicles narrating the story of the march of Alemdar Pasha and the fall of Mustafa IV, only Kethüda Said and Asım and to some extent Mustafa Necib Efendi, dwell exclusively on the efforts of the *Ruscuk Yârânm* or use this term. More interestingly, a close study of these sources reveals that Asım was greatly influenced by Kethüda Said’s *History* and borrowed most parts of the story from the mentioned account. Kethüda Said Efendi provides a very detailed and comprehensive story of the *Ruscuk Yârânm* and most of it is repeated by Asım. The repetition of the same story seems to have been adopted by Cevdet Pasha, thus bequeathed to modern studies. The purpose of this part is not to deny the validity of one over the other, but rather to investigate whether there are different stories in some other chronicles and, if found, to try to find some connecting points, rather than preferring one to another.

\textbf{5.5.3.1. Sebastiani and Beyhan Sultan}

A good starting point for the discussion of this complex incident might be a contemporary report which describes us a wide range of people or factions who were not

\textsuperscript{2485} Among modern studies, one of the best and most comprehensive explanations of Alemdar’s attempt to provide the accession of Selim III is Uzuçarşıli’s book on Alemdar Mustafa Paşa. The source mostly depends on the works of Asım and Cevdet Paşa and a rich amount of documentary evidence. Miller’s *Mustapha Pasha Biaraktar* is the second. Miller supports his arguments with contemporary narratives, including foreign authors, and some archival material.
satisfied with the rule of Mustafa IV. The document in question is a report written to Mustafa IV and provides some insights into the efforts and coalitions of some figures in the capital. It seems that the writer had personal contacts with the Sultan and was an influential person having connections with the director of the imperial dockyards.\footnote{2486} At the beginning of the report, he assures the Sultan that he was striving hard to get news. Obviously, he was particularly interested with the connections of Sebastiani, the French ambassador. He assures that he sent his loyal men to watch out for the visitors of the ambassador.\footnote{2487} After mentioning these points, he starts to narrate a very interesting incident. He had learned the story from his own wife, who in turn was informed by the mother of a Naqshibendi sheik at Eyüb.\footnote{2488} From his account, it seems that one day during the first ten days of the month of Ramazan, a group of women paid a visit to the aforementioned tekke and distributed money to the poor. They also placed an “order for Kalima al-Tawhid in order that their wish come true”. The mother of the sheik paid special interest to the visitors when she learned that they were the concubines of the Fourth Woman of Selim III.\footnote{2489} When she asked about their

\footnote{2486} T.S.M.A. E. 4227-48 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV). See also Şen, Osmanlı’da Dönüm Noktasi, p. 162.

\footnote{2487} It confirms the claim of a later historian, Driault, that Sebastiani was surrounded by the spies. The author also notes that his correspondences were always read by the Porte. See Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 287.

\footnote{2488} T.S.M.A. E. 4227-48 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV). Unfortunately some parts of the document are much damaged. For instance, the part where the name of the sheik is written is missing. There were several Naqshbendi tekkes in the district: Şeyh Selami Efendi Tekkesi, Kaşgari Tekke, Şeyhülislam Mustafa Efendi (Baba Haydar) Tekkesi, Oluklubayır Tekkesi, Murad Buhari (Şeyh Murad) Tekkesi and İzzet Paşa Tekkesi. Particularly Şeyh Selami Efendi had close connections with the ruling elite of Selim III and the tekke was built by İbrahim Nesim Efendi for the sheik. Therefore, one suspects whether the above mentioned sheik might be Selami Efendi. However, he was exiled to İzmir on 17 R 1222/17 June 1807, a short time after the May uprising and he does not seem to have been present in the city during that period. See Turgut Kut (ed.), “İstanbul Hankahları Meşahiyi”, Journal of Turkish Studies, 19 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1995), pp. 50-1, 53, 55, Yücer, Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf, pp. 248-293.

\footnote{2489} T.S.M.A. E. 4227-48 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): “husûl-i murâd için kelime-i tevhîd sipariş etmişler.” The Fourth Woman (Dördüncü Kadın) of Selim III was Refet Kadın. According to an account, she was with Selim III during his murder. After the death of the Sultan she bought a waterside residence in Beşiktaş. She died on 23 C 1284/22 October 1867. Uluçay, Padişahlarin Kadınları ve Kızları, p. 118.
wish, the women replied that they would already be happy soon. Since there are some missing words in the document, it is unclear whether the women explicitly declared their wish or not; yet it seems that both parties were implying the enthronement of Selim III. Then, in order to sound out the visitors (“ağız aramak”), the mother of the sheik exclaimed God knows and commented that such an attempt could not be managed by the sole efforts of several women. The women, probably trusting her since he was mother of a sheik, put aside all considerations and naively began to speak out the details to prove that many people were indeed struggling for the enthronement of the deposed Sultan. According to them, the French wished for the rise of Selim III and contacts were already established with Sebastiani for that purpose. To get military assistance, the party had also talked with the Janissaries of the imperial dockyards. The Janissaries demanded money in return for their assistance and Beyhan Sultan had promised to pay the amount they asked for. Besides Beyhan Sultan, one kalyon çavuş had also promised to give three thousand kese to the Janissaries. The writer of the report laments that the mother of the sheik had forgotten the name of that çavuş.

Noticing the importance of the dialogue, the mother of the sheik went to the wife of the writer of the report and narrated the incident. After listening to her wife, the author of the report visited the tekke to question her further. It seems that after this talk, he contacted with some of the pro-Selimian Janissaries and especially someone who requested the release of Süleyman Kapudan. The latter must have been Bayburdi Süleyman. As might be recalled, he was one of the chiefs of the rebels and was granted captainship thereafter. He was exiled to Sinop around September 1807, shortly after the incident at Beşiktaş. From the above data, it could be suggested that the visit of the women was in the month of Ramazan. The month of Ramazan coincides with the fourteen-month reign of Mustafa IV only once. Therefore, the visit must have taken place on Ramazan 1222/2 November-1 December 1807. Since the author notes that the women visited the tekke during the first ten days of Ramazan, the date of the visit must be sometime between 2-12 November 1807.

2490 T.S.M.A. E. 4227-48 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV).
The above document is important since it proves that there was an attempt to enthrone Selim III. Indeed, there is another clue in another record which suggests that deposed Selim was also struggling to rise again to the throne. According to the writer, the deposed Sultan did not hesitate to send letters to create further disorder in the city.\footnote{T.S.M.A. E. 2650 (undated, catalogue date is 1202-3/1787-9). It seems that these letters were sent by the help of a certain Süleyman Ağā.} If we turn to the above report, unfortunately he does not name the real figure behind the conspiracy against the reigning Sultan, except for the names of Beyhan Sultan and Sebastiani. The important issue is to find out why Beyhan Sultan and Sebastiani were involved in such a conspiracy. For the role of Beyhan Sultan there is less need for explanation since she was the sister of Selim III and had close relations with him and his circle. As might be recalled İbrahim Nesim Efendi, murdered during the Rebellion, had served as her steward. While the Porte was searching for İbrahim Nesim during the Rebellion they seem to have exerted pressure on Beyhan Sultan for his deliverance.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 7521 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 37a.}

The involvement of Sebastiani deserves more attention. Why would a representative of a foreign state be involved in a conspiracy against a reigning Sultan? There are some clues in some of the contemporary narratives and documents which emphasize Sebastiani’s role. The clearest explanation comes from Oğulukyan. According to the author, Sebastiani, under the direction of Napoleon, went to Rustuk. There, he convinced Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to work for the accession of the deposed Sultan.\footnote{Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 32.} Unfortunately the author does not give an exact date for his important assertion. From his narration, however, it seems that after the conversation with the French ambassador, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha came to the imperial camp at Edirne. The arrival of Alemdar to Edirne was on 27 June 1808. Sebastiani left İstanbul on 26 April 1808 and used the Black Sea route stopping at Varna and Bucharest. On his route he talked to the influential figures in these places. He seems to
have arrived at Bucharest on 4 May.\footnote{Saint-Denys notes that he left the city through the end of April after leaving the affairs of the embassy to M. Latour de Maubourg. See Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, pp. 163. Driault gives the date of his departure as 27 April and notes that he had received the order to return on 17 April. See \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 316. Coquelle notes that Sebastiani left the city on 27 April and met with several pashas during his travel. See “Sebastiani: Ambassadeur A Constantinople”, p. 611. According to Mesmay, he was ordered to leave the city on 17 April and left on 26 April. See Mesmay, \textit{Horace Sebastiani}, p. 73. Sebastiani was granted a harness by the Sultan. See B.O.A. HAT 1365/54026 (undated). See also Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 169.} There is a letter confirming his departure from İstanbul on 26 April via Paris. The writer of the letter notes that Sebastiani departed after a splendid dinner with the Persian ambassador. He left the city with the second secretary of the Persian ambassador. In another part of the same letter, it is stated that Sebastiani was at Jassy to talk to the Russian general. It is also stated that he spent his days visiting troops in Rumelia.\footnote{From Isaac Morier, Malta, 18 July 1807, (PRO, FO 78-61). The information is provided in a document titled “References”, attached to the letter.} His arrival at Paris was 25 Ca 1223/19 July 1808.\footnote{B.O.A. A.AMD. 54/12 (11 C 1223/4 August 1808). According to Mesmay, he arrived at Paris on 12 June. See Mesmay, \textit{Horace Sebastiani}, p. 73.}

According to another Ottoman narrative, Sebastiani’s departure from the city was twenty days after an incident that created tension with the Porte.\footnote{Neticeti’l-Vekayi, p. 28. He notes that Sebastiani left İstanbul on 28 M 1223/26 March 1808, one month earlier than the known date. It is recorded that it was for a “husüs-i malûme  içün Asitane’den kıyâm ve hareket ve Rumeli sevahilinden kral canibine azimet eyledi.”} The incident in question was the execution of two Croatians (“Hırvat”) gardeners by the Bostancıbaşı. They had murdered two Muslims in Kadıköy. Consequently, the culprits were executed and their corpses were thrown into the sea.\footnote{Neticeti’l-Vekayi, p. 27. According to Saint-Denys they were three thieves of Croatian origin. See Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 159. Driault, on the other hand, mentions the persecution of two French by the Bostancıbaşı. See Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 307.} However, it was found out that the Croatian gardeners were under the French protection.\footnote{Driault, \textit{Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon}, p. 307.} Therefore, Sebastiani sent an official note
to the Porte demanding the delivery of the Croatians to him. Learning that they had already been executed, the French ambassador protested stating that it was his duty to punish people under the protection of the French emperor. He also informed that it was not possible for him to stay in the Empire anymore. To prevent a diplomatic crisis, Mustafa IV sent presents to calm down the French ambassador.\textsuperscript{2500}

According to Asım, the above crisis was only one of the problems created by the French ambassador. The author asserts that after the enthronement of Mustafa IV, Sebastiani had lost his previous privileged position and began to show an ill-tempered attitude towards the Porte.\textsuperscript{2501} Asım argues that Sebastiani had previously triggered a crisis after the refusal against the coming of the French artillerists to the capital, which had been requested by Selim III, the murder of the dragoman and finally he intervened in the appointment of a governor to the province of Baghdad.\textsuperscript{2502} For the second matter, he applied to the Kaimmakam Pasha by complaining that Halet Efendi intended to execute Kostaki, the kapı kethüda of the hospodar of Wallachia. He argued that Kostaki was under the protection of the French government and his murder would severely damage the good relations between the two states.\textsuperscript{2503} As far as narrated in Asım’s History, the murder of the Croatians took place only one day after his accusation against Halet Efendi. According to him, the Croatians in question murdered a monk in Üsküdar and when Sebastiani heard their imprisonment for interrogation, he protested.\textsuperscript{2504}

\textsuperscript{2499} With the fall of the Venetian Republic in 1797, its possessions in Eastern Adriatic passed to France. It bequeathed its rights to Austria the same year. Eight years later they were restored to France as the Ilyrian provinces. It was finally won back by Austria in 1815.

\textsuperscript{2500} Neticetü’l-Vekayi, pp. 27-28; Saint-Denys, Rêvolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, pp. 160-1.

\textsuperscript{2501} For some examples, see Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 144-5.

\textsuperscript{2502} For more details, see Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 145.

\textsuperscript{2503} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II; p. 146.

\textsuperscript{2504} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II; p. 146.
If we turn back to the meeting between Sebastiani and Alemdar Mustafa, it is certain that it was before the march of the latter to the capital on 4 C 1223/28 July 1808. Moreover, it must have taken place during Sebastiani’s travel to Paris after his duty ended in İstanbul. In a letter, it is informed that he spent some time in Rumelia among the Ottoman forces.\(^{2505}\) Therefore, it is reasonable to think that he had a chance to talk to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha too. Indeed, Ebubekir Efendi, the author of *Vaka-ı Cedid*, asserts that Sebastiani left İstanbul changing his mind in favour of fleeing İstanbul (“kararı firara tebdil”), and on his way to Paris he went to Rusçuk, and talked to Alemdar Pasha. Unfortunately, the author does not give any details as to matters that were discussed between the two.\(^{2506}\) One crucial clue comes from another historian, Câbi. Though he does not provide us the exact time of the meeting between the French ambassador and Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, he asserts that it was some time after the great council in Edirne. After the meeting, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha wrote letters to the *ayans* of Rumelia and Anatolia and then talked to Sebastiani. After this information he notes that the issue was discussed with Sebastiani in the army. After these meetings, the commanders decided to move to the capital within a few days.\(^{2507}\) The presence of Sebastiani in the Ottoman army is also confirmed by a report by Başçukadar Abdülfettah Ağa\(^{2508}\) sent to the Sultan.\(^{2509}\) Therefore, it seems clear that Sebastiani was in Edirne on the eve of the march of the army to the capital. If we suppose that Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and Sebastiani talked in Edirne, Sebastiani must have been around Edirne

\(^{2505}\) From Isaac Morier, Malta, 18 July 1807, (PRO, FO 78-61).

\(^{2506}\) Ebubekir Efendi, *Vaka-ı Cedid*, p. 31.


\(^{2508}\) Abdülfettah Ağa, (Deli Fettah) (d. 1223/1808), was a Circassian slave of İzzet Mehmed Pasha. In the Palace, he served Prince Mustafa (IV). During the reign of Selim III he was employed in the retinue of Silahdar Ağa. After the rise of Mustafa IV, he was appointed as the *başçukadar* (11 R 1222/18 June 1807). He was found guilty in the murder of Selim III and therefore executed on 6 C 1223/20 July 1808. See Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi*, p. 108-9.

\(^{2509}\) T.S.M.A E. 8703 (undated). The focus of the report is not the presence of the French ambassador, rather the anxiety of the Grand Vizier we have mentioned above. Abdülfettah Ağa just mentions the French ambassador as a witness while he was offering presents to the Grand Vizier.
through the end of June and the beginning July 1808. But since some sources suggest that
the two figures talked in Ruscuk, it could also be suggested that both had met before the
meeting at Edirne.

Câbî gives some more details about the secret motives behind the march of Alemdar
Mustafa Pasha to save Selim III. According to the author, the real reason was related to a
dispatch of Napoleon Bonaparte sent to Alemdar Pasha. To prove his point, he refers to a
meeting whereby Reis Efendi accused Sebastiani for being the sole reason of hostility with
Britain and the Porte and the subsequent sufferings of the Empire.2510 As far as it could be
concluded from Câbî’s account, the Reisülküttab was referring to the British Expedition,
which according to him, caused the dethronement of Selim III. Reis Efendi continued by
blaming the French ambassador that France kept none of its promises.2511 According to
Câbî, such accusations annoyed Napoleon and he decided to correct his mistake. Napoleon,
Câbî argues, sent letters to Alemdar Pasha promising that if he secured the rise of the
deposed Sultan, he he promised to ensure that the Russian borders of the Empire would be
as they had been during the reign of Ahmed III and also would take expenditures and
damages from Britain and deliver it to the Porte.2512 The author notes that the promises of
the French emperor convinced Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. Therefore he discussed the matter
with the Grand Vizier and they decided to march to the city.2513 Therefore, according to
Câbî, the real cause of Alemdar’s march to İstanbul was the letter of Napoleon and the
efforts of Sebastiani.2514 If this information is correct, it is very probable that the letter was
delivered to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha by Sebastiani during the mysterious meeting.


cülûs ettirir iseniz, Sultan Ahmed hudûdundan Moskovlu ile sınırlarınızı kat’ ve musâlaha
olunub ve her ne kadar masârîf-i seferîyeniz ve İngilizlüden rahneniz vâkı‘ oldu ise
 cümlesini bi-temâmiha edâ ederim.”

2513 Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 172. According to his account, the grand vizier
already knew the real intention of marching to the city.

Oğulukyan provides a different detail on what happened at the Palace after the arrival of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. According to him, Alemdar Pasha was at the gates of the Palace waiting to be allowed to see Selim III. He ensured that no harm would be done to Mustafa IV and he could safely rest in the Palace after his fall. The most important words came after that point:

Hence all members of the army shall testify to my words. No harm will be done unto him, which shall be for the sake of the supreme interests of the state. You must all know that I am not acting on my own behalf. Because other states have forced me to do so. I swear to God that my aim here is neither to vilify one party nor to extol another. Forsaking all my personal concerns and affairs I have come here only and only to protect the interests of our state so that it can retrieve its former state of peace. Therefore Selim must be brought back to the throne.\textsuperscript{2515}

He does not mention any specific name, yet in light of the clues above, it seems that Oğulukyan implies the role of the French ambassador.

The importance of the involvement of Sebastiani and more generally of France in the dethronement of Mustafa IV lies in the fact that it is difficult to explain the march of Alemdar to İstanbul only with the influence and manipulations of the group called \textit{Ruscuk Yârânı}, a point taken for granted in modern studies. Without denying the role of this group we can suggest that, as argued in the report on the conspiracy against the reigning Sultan that understanding the involvement of France is crucial for understanding the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and put it into broader framework, rather than explaining it just as the efforts of \textit{Ruscuk Yârânı} or Alemdar Pasha to his “deep love” for Selim III.\textsuperscript{2516}

In order to offer a more reasonable explanation, we should have a look at the Ottoman-French relations in general and especially the conditions of the French


ambassador. Immediately after the May Rebellion, both Sebastiani and his government were worried about the policy the new Sultan would follow in foreign relations. Discouraging letters from Sebastiani convinced Napoleon that the best policy to follow was to start negotiations with Russia, independent from the Porte, yet still trying to prevent Russian domination over İstanbul and the Dardanelles. Therefore, Napoleon signed the Tilsit Treaty with Russia on 7 July 1807 and with Prussia on 9 July 1807. For the ongoing war between the Porte and Russia, Napoleon ordered Talleyrand to encourage the Porte to sign an armistice with Russia. Therefore, after the ratification of the alliance at Tilsit, Russian and French officers were sent to the Danube to visit the Ottoman imperial camp and to convince the Ottoman Grand Vizier to sign an armistice with Russia. However, news of the Russo-French armistice (22 June) created a shock in the Empire when it was revealed on 18 July. However, when the Franco-Russo armistice was heard, the Porte asked whether the territorial integrity of the Empire was guaranteed and why Vahid Efendi, the Ottoman ambassador, was not invited to the negotiations. In a letter to Talleyrand, Sebastiani noted that this created a pretext for certain groups to promote anti-French sentiments.

One of the earliest acts by the new Sultan was to revoke the order the former Sultan had issued for the coming of five hundred French artillerymen from Dalmatia to the capital and asked France to call them back while they were already in Bosnia. As might be

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2518 The secret terms of the Treaty included the item that the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire was to be discussed in another meeting. See Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, pp. 194-6.


2520 Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, p. 207.


2522 Coquelle, “Sebastiani: Ambassadeur A Constantinople”, p. 596; Shupp, *The European Powers*, p. 551; Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, p. 193; B.O.A. HAT 52946 (undated). In the document the pretext of the refusal of the artillerymen is stated that the Porte was afraid of a harm that could be done to them by the Janissaries.
recalled, one of the most important issues before the Rebellion was the passage of French troops from Dalmatia. One later historian notes that the “the coming of the French forces seemed to presage the enforced introduction a French type of military discipline and drill, the prospect of which angered the Janissaries.” Moreover, Mustafa IV had sent the official letter informing his rise to the Ottoman throne quite late to Paris, a point that annoyed Napoleon. Therefore, orders were sent to Sebastiani that he should tell the Sultan that he was offended by the refusal of the artillerymen without any official notification beforehand. Sebastiani was also reminded to declare that Mustafa IV was acting “foolhardy” in failing to write to Napoleon who was the sole protector of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, two days after the accession of Mustafa IV to the throne, a meeting was held at Bebek Kasrı, whereby Sebastiani was officially informed that there would not be a change in the official policy of the Empire towards France and the former alliance would be improved even more than before. Moreover, it was also decided during the same meeting that official documents (“sened”) would be exchanged between the parties declaring the assurances of both sides. In the document issued by the Porte, it was declared that the May 1807 Rebellion which caused a change in the Empire was an internal affair that would have no influence on the international policy of the Empire, and it was further stated that particularly the alliance between the France and the Porte would be even firmer than before. The Porte also promised that it would continue the war with Russia and Britain. Sebastiani, in the name of his state, declared that there would not be a change in the relations with France and Ottoman Empire and their alliance would continue. In return, France guaranteed that it would act according to the interests of the Empire and would not

2523 Puryear, *Napoleon and the Dardanelles*, p. 177.

2524 T.S.M.A. E. 3327-4 (2 § 1222/4 October 1807).


2526 B.O.A. HAT 57946 (undated).

2527 For the copies of the documents (“sened”) delivered to the French ambassador, see B.O.A. HAT 53021 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 1357/53242.C (undated)B.O.A. HAT 1357/53242.D (undated); B.O.A. A. AMD 53/37 (undated). For a copy of the last document see Appendix 4.
sign a treaty that would include stipulations violating the territorial integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{2528} During the same meeting, Sebastiani was also questioned on the intentions of France. As an answer, Sebastiani assured them that France would not make a treaty with Russia or Britain which contained articles that would damage the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{2529}

Sebastiani took special care to prevent the contacts and improvement of the relations between the Porte, Britain and Russia. He struggled hard to prevent the negotiations with the British and Russian envoys for peace, and threatened to leave the city if they were accepted.\textsuperscript{2530} Meanwhile the British were trying to reestablish diplomatic relations with the Porte, which had been interrupted since the departure of Arbunthont, the British ambassador.\textsuperscript{2531} Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian delegate, and Arthur Paget, the British plenipotentiary, were at the Dardanelles to initiate the negotiations with the Porte.\textsuperscript{2532} The Porte also considered it reasonable to approach the British party. Detecting this tendency, Paget tried to come closer to the influential figures, especially the Kaimmakam and the Büyük Mirahor. The notes sent by Paget were received favourably by the Porte. Both parties tried to keep these connections secret, especially from the French ambassador.\textsuperscript{2533}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2528} B.O.A. HAT 1357/53221 undated; B.O.A. 53242.E (undated); B.O.A. HAT 165/6918 (8 R 1222/); B.O.A. A.AMD 54/39 (undated).
\item \textsuperscript{2529} B.O.A. A. AMD. 53/14 (8 R 1222/15 June 1807). It contains the minutes of meeting between Reisülküttab and Sebastani. See also Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 552.
\item \textsuperscript{2530} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 552.
\item \textsuperscript{2531} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 153.
\item \textsuperscript{2532} Puryear, \textit{Napoleon and the Dardanelles}, p. 207. Tilsit Treaty was a great shock for the British too. They tried to benefit from the deteriorated relationship between the Porte and France after Tilsit by trying to establish an Anglo-Ottoman alliance. Therefore, Arthur Paget was sent to open negotiations with the Porte. He arrived at Bozca Ada (Tenedos) at the end of July 1807.
\item \textsuperscript{2533} B.O.A. HAT 1358/53315 (undated); B.O.A.HAT 1359/53456 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808). In these documents it is noted that even though France was discouraging negotiations with Britain, it was better to make a peace with them while Britain was still willing to reach an agreement. The naval superiority of Britain was the main factor that convinced the Porte to keep good relations with Britain. It is also noted on
\end{itemize}
Meanwhile, however, Alexandre Sutzo, the chief dragoman of the Porte, revealed the secret negotiations to the French ambassador.\textsuperscript{2534} Sebastiani immediately demanded his passport unless the negotiations with Britain were terminated immediately.\textsuperscript{2535} Under pressure, the Porte yielded and the negotiations with the British came to an end.\textsuperscript{2536} On 31 October 1808 an imperial order was issued ordering the murder of the dragoman.\textsuperscript{2537} According to Asım, the next day after his execution, Sebastiani applied to the Porte accusing it for murdering the dragoman under the pretext that he had betrayed the interests of the Porte. A contemporary foreign observer, Saint-Denys, argues that his execution was a just act since the dragoman had acted really treacherously.\textsuperscript{2538} The same author argues that the execution of the dragoman did not please Kabakçī Mustafa Ağa either. It might be recalled that Sutzo was the figure who introduced Sebastiani with Kabakçī. According to Saint-Denys, the dragoman was under the protection of Sebastiani with Kabakçī. According to Saint-Denys, the dragoman was under the protection of Kabakçī Mustafa and after the execution he struggled for the deposition of Kaimmakam Tayyar Pasha to replace him with Hafız İsmail Pasha, the former Grand Vizier.\textsuperscript{2539} An official document written after the issue of the imperial order for the execution reveals some important clues about the execution of the dragoman. The writer of the document, probably Kaimmakam Pasha, argues that even though it is clear that “Rum taîfe” were untrustworthy subjects, it might have been unreasonable to execute the dragoman without being interrogated. The writer also adds that there was no serious

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{2535} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, pp. 154-5.
  \item \textsuperscript{2536} B.O.A. HAT 165/6915 (13 Ca 1222/18 August 1807).
  \item \textsuperscript{2538} Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, pp. 156-7. The author laments that his family fell into a great misery after the death of the dragoman and was ignored by the French.
  \item \textsuperscript{2539} According to Saint-Denys, the figures behind the execution were the Kaimmakam Pasha and Master of the Horse. See Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, pp. 155-7.
\end{itemize}
evidence proving the betrayal and his execution might give the French ambassador a pretext to leave the city, something he was already expecting for. Therefore, he suggests that it would have been better to exile him to a distant place. However, Mustafa IV urged for his immediate execution and wrote with a strict tone that his order had never issued execution orders for innocent people until that time and there was nothing in the matter that concerned the French ambassador. ²⁵⁴⁰

In very general terms, the conditions of Sebastiani and the French citizens in the city deteriorated greatly after the May 1807 Rebellion. Indeed, one article in The Times, drawing on the French Papers, states that “a great deal of haughtiness towards the Francs” was conducted after the May Rebellion. According to the newspaper, “a great many of Francs and even the Frenchmen were insulted and one of them received a wound with a dagger.”²⁵⁴¹ There were the incidents in which a keeper of a public bath Galate cursing a French citizen and a Janissary slapping another one.²⁵⁴² Under such conditions, Sebastiani considered it as his duty to interfere in favour of the foreigners in the city.²⁵⁴³ Therefore, he warned the Porte that he would leave the city if these excesses were not ended immediately.²⁵⁴⁴ He again demanded his passport. The ambassadors of Spain and Holland also warned the Porte that they would follow Sebastiani if he left the city.²⁵⁴⁵

²⁵⁴⁰ B.O.A. HAT 57959 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807-8) “Şimdi katl olunsun benim hatt-ı himâyêınım cümû olmayanlar hakkında sâdî olmaz. Bu benim reâyâmîr. Bundâ elçiye ne var. Şimdi emrîm icrâ olunsun”.

²⁵⁴¹ The Times, Tuesday, January 20 1808 pg. 2; issue 7262; col. D. (from the French Papers, Paris, December 5).

²⁵⁴² B.O.A. HAT 1360/53567 (undated); Asum, Tarih-i Asum, vol. II; p. 146. Driault argues that an innocent Frenchman was murdered in the street while another was murdered after being robbed. Unfortunately the author does not give reference to his source of information for these incidents. See Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 305.

²⁵⁴³ The Times, Tuesday, January 20 1808 pg. 2; issue 7262; col. D. (from the French Papers, Paris, December 5).

²⁵⁴⁴ B.O.A. HAT 1360/53567 (undated); The Times, Tuesday, January 20 1808 pg. 2; issue 7262; col. D. (from the French Papers, Paris, December 5).

²⁵⁴⁵ B.O.A. HAT 1360/53567 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 1362/53705 (undated); The Times, Tuesday, January 20 1808 pg. 2; issue 7262; col. D. (from the French Papers, Paris,
meetings, Mustafa IV yielded to those demands and an apology ("tarziye") was produced to overcome the diplomatic crisis. Moreover, some bostancıs were discharged and the culprits were punished.

Sebastiani took his share from the anti-French mood in the city. He was attacked by a yamak. It is difficult to determine when the incident took place and exactly what happened. According to Cevdet Pasha, it was during the May Rebellion. However, a letter in French gives the exact date. According to it, the incident took place on 12 April 1808. From the related documents, it seems that a certain yamak from the Kireç Burnu Fortress shot Sebastiani. Aarmed by the incident, the Porte sent presents, two rings, and a valuable harness to calm down the ambassador. Contrary to expectations, Sebastiani asked the Porte that the yamak should not be punished. Consequently, an order was issued announcing that there was no need for the capture and punishment of the yamak.

In order to thank him for his goodness, a group of commanders and yamaks of the fortress paid a visit to the ambassador. During the visit, Sebastiani advised the yamaks not to create disorder anymore. In return, the yamaks promised to work hard and to be obedient to the Sultan. Their officers, on the other hand, complained that the yamaks did not have a certain

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2546 B.O.A. HAT 1362/53705 (undated).
2547 The Times, Tuesday, January 20 1808 pg. 2; issue 7262; col. D. (from the French Papers, Paris, December 5).
2548 HAT 1360/53567 (undated); Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II; p. 147.
2550 From Isaac Morier, Malta, 18 July 1807, (PRO, FO 78-61).
2551 B.O.A. HAT 1359/53424 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808); B.O.A. HAT 54003 (undated). For a copy of the second document see Appendix 4.
2553 B.O.A. HAT 1360/53509 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808); B.O.A. HAT 1359/53424 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808).
2554 B.O.A. HAT 54003 (undated).
place to be stationed during the nights. Therefore, the officers continued, they were not able to control the *yamaks* perfectly and asked to be stationed in a house belonging to an Armenian in Tarabya. After promising that he would inform the Porte of their request, Sebastiani granted them a certain amount of money.2555

The document that we have studied at the beginning of this section suggests that there was the involvement of some important figures, such as Beyhan Sultan and the French ambassador for the dethronement of Mustafa IV. Though we do not have very strong evidence for the involvement of the latter, the available sources suggest that the deteriorated conditions of the Frenchmen in the capital after the May Rebellion and the pro-Selimian policy of France were the main factors that led Sebastiani to contact with Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and to convince him to march the city.

### 5.5.3.2. The Ruscuk Yârânı

If the French ambassador was really involved in the intrigues for the enthronement of Selim III, we may suggest that Sebastiani was one of the key figures who ensured the connection between the army and the capital. From the available information, it could be concluded that there were some other figures that provided contact between the pro-Selimian factions in the army and in the capital. These figures are collectively known as the Comrades of Ruscuk (“*Ruscuk Yârânı*”). Among them were Mehmed Emin Behiç Efendi,2556 Mehmed Tahsin Efendi and Ramiz Efendi and Mustafa Refik Efendi, Galib Efendi. Being pro-Selimian, they sought refuge in the presence of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha some time after the accession of Mustafa IV to the throne. Indeed, after his rise to power,

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2555 B.O.A. HAT 1360/53509 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808); B.O.A. HAT 1359/53424 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808). From these documents we learn that Sebastiani kept his promise. The Porte rented the house in question with the intention that better relations could be established between the *yamaks* and the ambassadors.

2556 Mehmed Emin Behiç Efendi (d.1224/1809) started his bureaucratic career as hacegan. After various services, he was appointed as the Tuna *mubayaaci* with the rank of chief treasurer on Z 1221/February 1807. He was appointed as the chief treasurer on 23 Ş 1222/26 October 1807. For more details, see Appendix I.
he ordered Çelebi Mustafa Pasha to exile Mustafa Refik Efendi, Ramiz Efendi and Tahsin Efendi. In reply, the Grand Vizier noted that the banishment of Mustafa Refik Efendi was not appropriate due to the conditions of the time. He added that Mustafa Refik had good relations not only with the Ağa of the Janissaries but also with the Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. From his comments it seems that the real concern of the Grand Vizier was not to offend Alemdar Mustafa Pasha whose provisions and contributions were crucial for the army. As for Tahsin Efendi, he notes that he had already been dismissed from defterdarlık and while he was in the army without any post, he went with by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. Tahsin Efendi was deposed from the post of defterdar-i sadr-ali after the dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha and returned to Ruscuk with Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. In the aforementioned letter, the Grand Vizier adds that since Tahsin Efendi was not in the army it meant an exile in practice. He also adds that Ramiz Efendi had already been exiled to Kavala. At the lower margin of the same letter, Mustafa IV notes that he ordered the exile of these three figures since they were close to İbrahim Nesim Efendi and he would respect the considerations and suggestions of the Grand Vizier. However, only four days

2557 B.O.A. HAT 53523 (15 Ca 1222/21 July 1807). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

2558 B.O.A. HAT 53523 (15 Ca 1222/21 July 1807).

2559 B.O.A. HAT 53523 (15 Ca 1222/21 July 1807). In order to prove his point he gives the example of a letter of Kaimmakam Pasha to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha for an issue related to Hacı Ahmedoğlu. Though no details about the letter in question was written, the Grand Vizier argues that the letter had greatly offended the Pasha. Consequently, Alemdar Mustafa had attempted to leave the army and was calmed down with great difficulty. As might be recalled, Hacı Ahmedoğlu was the voyvoda of Bolu and participated in the campaign. I suspect that the letter of Kaimmakam Pasha was either about the exile or the execution of Hacı Ahmedoğlu.

2560 B.O.A. HAT 53523 (15 Ca 1222/21 July 1807).

2561 B.O.A. HAT 53523 (15 Ca 1222/21 July 1807). According to Asım, the real cause of Ramiz Efendi’s exile was his promotion as chief treasurer and being a favorite figure during the reign of Selim III. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 181. See also Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, p. 70.

2562 B.O.A. HAT 53523 (15 Ca 1222/21 July 1807); Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, p. 70.
after the above letter, a new one was sent to the Sultan again by the Grand Vizier. After the
death of Pehlivan Ağa, he says, both Galib and Mustafa Refik Efendi were deposed and
both went to Ruscuk. Çelebi Mustafa Pasha explains that their presence at Ruscuk was
part of a certain task and they could be more useful there. From his previous letter it seems
that he had refrained sending them to exile in order not to offend Alemdar Pasha.
Therefore, by sending them to Ruscuk he not only preserved good relations with Alemdar
Pasha but also sent these two figures away from the army. Yet, one wonders what changed
in the four days in the imperial camp so that they decided to send away Mustafa Refik
Efendi and Galib Efendi to Ruscuk. According to Uzunçarşılı, the murder of Pehlivan Ağa
deteriorated the situation of Mustafa Refik and Galib Efendi, the Reisülküttab in the army.
Musa Pasha issued an order for their execution with the aim of these figures close to Selim
III, who in return sought refuge in Ruscuk.

Among the figures collectively known as Ruscuk Yârânı, Ramiz Efendi seems to have
played the role of the “wise man”, while Mustafa Refik and Behiç Efendi mostly acted as
the connection between Porte and the army. Both disguised themselves as figures loyal
to Mustafa IV and therefore gained the confidence of the Palace. Two visits, one by
Mustafa Refik and the other by Behiç Efendi are crucial in this respect. The first one was
by Mustafa Refik Efendi. In accordance with the plan of Ruscuk Yârânı, Refik Efendi
went to Istanbul under the pretext of visiting his family. On the way to Istanbul, he visited
the imperial camp at Edirne, where he learned about his appointment as the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{2563} B.O.A. HAT 53400 (19 Ca 1222/25 July 1807).
  \item \textsuperscript{2564} Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, p. 74. In an article on Alemdar Mustafa
                  Pasha, the same author does not give the name of Musa Pasha. He argues that Refik and
                  Galib escaped Ruscuk since their friends at the capital secretly informed that an order was
                  sent to the Grand Vizier for their execution. See Uzunçarşılı, “Mustafa Paşa, Alemdar”,
  \item \textsuperscript{2565} Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, pp. 82-3. See also Uzunçarşılı, “Alemdar
                  Mustafa Paşa”, p. 721.
  \item \textsuperscript{2566} Kethûda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, pp. 119a-119;
\end{itemize}
Reisülküttab. Mustafa Refik Efendi was officially appointed on 24 Ş 1222/27 October 1807 after his arrival at the capital. It seems that his appointment as Reisülküttab had been decided before his arrival to the capital. His visit was a good opportunity for those at Rusçuk since Refik Efendi could contact with the leading officials in the capital. Securing the appointment of Refik Efendi to one of the key posts of the administration must have increased the power of not only Refik Efendi but also the Rusçuk Yârâm. Indeed, Kethüda Said asserts that he immediately set out to contact with Nezir Ağâ, Selim Ağâ, and Abdülfettah Ağâ, all influential figures close to the Sultan. Mustafa Refik Efendi had

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2567 Kethüda Said Efendi, *Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis*, Bayezid 3367, pp. 119a-119; Kethüda Said Efendi, *A Short History of*, p. 11. B.O.A. HAT 1364/53903 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); B.O.A. HAT 1357/53186 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807). The former Reisülküttab was Arif Efendi. In a related document, it is noted that though Arif Efendi was a loyal figure, he did not have the talent to manage the affairs of this ministry, therefore his dismissal was required. Since there was not a suitable figure for the post in the army, Mustafa Refik Efendi was considered as the best candidate. Therefore it is asked that after his appointment, he should immediately return to the army. At the upper margin of the document, Mustafa IV declares his approval and notes that he would be granted five thousand guruş for immediately returning to the camp immediately. See B.O.A. HAT 1362/53727 (19 Ş 1222/22 October 1807). After the appointment of Refik Efendi, Arif Efendi was appointed as the Çavuşbaşi. Asım notes that the arrival of Refik Efendi to the army was on 15 N 1222/16 November 1807, a date that coincides with the arrival of Galib Efendi from Rusçuk to the army. See Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II; pp. 183. See also Uzunçarşılı, *Alemdar Mustafa Paşa*, pp. 84-5.

2568 B.O.A. Sadaret Deşterleri, no. 357, p. 57. In the related entry, it is stated that his appointment was two days after his arrival to the city, which corresponds to 22 Ş 1222/25 October 1807. Asım also notes that he reached İstanbul on evas-i Ş 1222/14-23 October 1807. See Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 183.

2569 Nezir Ağâ (d. 1223/1808) was a eunuch and a favorite of Mustafa IV. He was appointed as hazine-i hümâyûn vekili on 20 M 1223/18 March 1808 after the death of Beşir Ağâ. Nezir Ağâ was executed 6 C 1223/30 July 1808 due to his involvement in the murder of Selim III. See *Yayla İmam Rısalesi*, p. 247; Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi*, p. 108, Şanızâde, *Tarih-i Şanızâde*, vol. I, p. 22; *Neticetü'l-Vekayi*, p. 28a; Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II; p. 163.

2570 Selim Ağâ (Ebe Selim) (d. 1223/1808) was appointed as the superintendent of the treasury (“hazine-i hümâyûn kethûdâsî”) on Ra 1222/June-July 1807. He played a role in the murder of Selim III and was executed on 16 C 1223/9 August 1808. See Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi*, s.112.

private talks with them and tried to convince these ağas that the anarchy prevailing over the city could only be terminated with the coming of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to İstanbul.\textsuperscript{2572} It is clear that Refik Efendi was trying to find their vulnerable spot. He did not forget to emphasize that the disorder was undermining the political authority of the Sultan. In order to prove his point, Refik Efendi reminded the appointment and dismissal of the Şeyhülislam due to the pressure of the Janissaries.\textsuperscript{2573} It is clear that in his arguments, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, an ayan, was presented as a hero who would bring order to the Empire. After these contacts, Refik Efendi returned to the army.\textsuperscript{2574} However, Mustafa IV did not approve the coming of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. Therefore, the first attempt ended without success for the \textit{Ruscuk Yârâni}.\textsuperscript{2575}

In the army, on the other hand, there was a standoffish relation between Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, the Grand Vizier and Alemdar Mustafa Pasha.\textsuperscript{2576} To establish a coalition against Alemdar, the former invited Yılıkoglu Süleyman, the former müessellim and ayan of Silistria, Gavur Hasan and İbrail Nazırlı Ahmed Ağa to the imperial camp at Edirne. They were rivals and enemies of Alemdar Mustafa.\textsuperscript{2577} After being informed by Mustafa Refik on this development, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha marched from Ruscuk with a considerable force


\textsuperscript{2574} Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, p. 120a; Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{A Short History of}, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{2575} Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{2576} The offishness between the two is also mentioned in some of the official documents. For some examples, see B.O.A. HAT 1362/53739 (undated); T.S.M.A. E. 8626 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808); B.O.A HAT 1360/53494 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808): In the final document, the Sultan advises the elimination of the offishness between the two. See also Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, pp. 95-97.

and suddenly came to Edirne under the pretext of a hunting match. He reached Edirne on 3 Ca 1223/27 June 1808. His sudden arrival threw not only the Grand Vizier but also the Sultan into great anxiety. The latter called the Kaimmakam Pasha and Şeyhülislam for consultation twice in the course of one night. Kaimmakam Pasha sent an urgent letter to the grand vizier questioning the reason for the coming of Alemdar Pasha to the camp without an imperial order. A reply was sent to the center but an official was also sent to the army to investigate the issue. In the meantime the supporters of Alemdar wrote letters full of complaints depicting the coming of Gavuroğlu and others as a mistake of the Grand Vizier. They did not forget to emphasize that if these figures were not sent away, the situation would deteriorate. The Sultan, in reply, wrote to the leading figures in the camp that Yılıkoğlu, Gavuroğlu and İbrahim Nazırı should be sent away from the army as soon as possible. By an edict to the grand vizier he ordered to send Yılıkoğlu and the others to the Straits to join Mehmed Hakkı Pasha.

The second visit planned by Ruscuk Yarâni, was the visit of Behiç Efendi. He first visited the imperial camp and then went to the capital. It seems that he was sent to the capital under the pretext of provisioning of the army asking where to spend the winter after the armistice. In the city, he met secretly with Nezir, Selim and Abdülfettah Ağa and


Mustafa Necib Efendi, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 91.


Mustafa Necib Efendi, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 92.

Mustafa Necib Efendi, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 92.


B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri, no. 18, p. 23 (25 C 1222/2 July 1807).
talked about similar things as he did with Mustafa Refik Efendi. However, there is an interesting point to emphasize. According to Kethüda Said, in order to prove how the political authority of the Sultan was weakened in the face of the unbridled Janissaries, Behiç Efendi gave the example that the Russians were surprised and were saying that “shall we make a treaty with Kabakçı Ağa, or enter into stipulations with so weak a government, whose dignity is insulted in the person of the Grand Vizier and which is carried away by the levity of worthless pertubators.” After some other similar examples, Behiç Efendi also tried to persuade the ağas that the best and only solution for all these problems was the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha commanding of six thousand soldiers, who was ready for that purpose. At this point, Abdülfettah Ağa told something a very serious matter and asked if Alemdar Pasha was loyal to Mustafa IV, it would be better for him to begin with murdering of the deposed sultan. This suggestion threw Behiç Efendi into great shock. Even though Kethüda Said condemns these wicked words without much consideration, the suggestion of Abdülfettah Ağa is crucial to understand the anxiety of Mustafa IV and his followers. It proves that the main concern of followers of Mustafa IV was the possibility of enthronement of Selim III, rather than the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha or the army to the capital. In other words, if the deposed Sultan was eliminated, they could accept the coming of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the city more easily since there would remain nothing to fear.

We also have reason to suspect that the suggestion of Abdülfettah Ağa reflects the dilemma of the followers of Mustafa IV. They were suspicious of a conspiracy by the

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followers of Selim III, but were not sure whether to eliminate Selim III or not. As might be recalled from the report on a conspiracy against Mustafa IV, the Sultan and his men were alerted about such a probability. According to Uzunçarşılı, the elimination of deposed Selim III was the primary aim of Mustafa IV and he considered him as threat to his throne. According to the historian, the basic problem was Mustafa IV’s rise to the throne after an “enlightened”, “reformist” and “honourful”, “lover of music” and “polite” ruler who had gained the respect of even his enemies. He implies that Mustafa IV lacked all these qualities. As the disorder prevalent during his reign had proven, claims Uzunçarşılı, Mustafa IV noticed that he could not be a match for the Selim III. Therefore, his throne was never safe as long as the Sultan in confinement survived. We do not have any proof that confirms the comments of Uzunçarşılı. In fact, there is no need to go that far in our comments. Rather than focusing on the personalities of each Sultan, we should underline that there was a throne for which both Mustafa IV and Selim III struggled.

According to Uzunçarşılı, on M 1223/March 1808, Nezir Ağa joined the army in Edirne. He was carrying the salaries of the soldiers, but the real purpose was to discuss the murder of Selim III with the Grand Vizier. The latter approved the idea in principle, yet advised that the elite of the army should also be consulted. Consequently, Nezir Ağa consulted Mustafa Refik Efendi and some military officers. In the meantime, Refik Efendi warned sadaret kethüdası Moralı Ali Efendi and the plan for the murder of Selim III was finally rejected by the army. The above comments by Uzunçarşılı are not, for the time being, supported by historical evidence. Even though, there is at least one document which proves that Nezir Ağa indeed went to the imperial camp for the payment of the salaries of the soldiers and brought a fur coat and a dagger to the Grand Vizier. Yet, it is still difficult to reach a conclusion about whether Mustafa IV had sent Nezir Ağa to consult the leading figures of the army or not. For the case of suggestion of Selim’s assassination,


2591 Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, p. 90.

2592 T.S.M.A. E. 7030-18 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808); Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 168. According to Oğulukyan, the mission of Nezir Ağa was to invite the army to the Capital. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 26.
Uzunçarşılı relies on Cevdet Pasha, but it is again difficult to ascertain whether it was a comment of Cevdet Pasha or drew on a contemporary source or evidence.

Among contemporary historians, Asım’s explanation confirms that of Uzunçarşılı. Asım was probably the main source for Cevdet Pasha’s similar comments as well. According to Asım, Nezir Ağâ was particularly chosen to carry the salaries to the army and “devr hillati” to the Grand Vizier. He was also to discuss some matters related to the treasury and campaign. He adds that as far as he heard from some people, Nezir Ağâ’s secret mission was to talk about the elimination of Selim III, the deposed Sultan. According to the same historian, the underlying concern for the followers of Mustafa IV in eliminating of Selim III, was to silence the pro-Selimian factions in the army and the capital. Asım claims that this was not the first time that the elimination of the deposed Sultan was proposed. It had been previously been suggested to Musa Pasha, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and also the Janissaries. However, they had advised to wait. When Musa Pasha was consulted for a second time, however, he resigned from his post in order to save own his life. It seems that not only Musa Pasha, but also the Janissaries and others had not dared to be involved in such a serious attempt and declared it should be decided by the common consent of the army. Probably for that reason, Nezir Ağâ was sent to the army. As we have told above, he consulted the matter to the Grand Vizier and some other influential figures in the army. He did not forget to explain that the ruling elite and ulema in the capital collaborated with each other to eliminate Selim III and all were just waiting for the consent of the army. He also added that if the purpose was realized, Mustafa IV would grant him the right to remain in the office of the grand vizierate for his life time. It was the best method to persuade Çelebi Mustafa Pasha. Yet, in reply to Nezir Ağâ, Çelebi


Mustafa Pasha declared that it was necessary to convince military elite of the army. Therefore, according to Asım, Nezir Ağa talked to Kethüda Osman Efendi. From the narration of Asım, it could be concluded that Osman Efendi personally did not like the idea and gave an evasive answer that if the Janissary army, ulema and other ruling elite agreed on the matter, the army would also obey it. Indeed, Osman Efendi called the Janissary Ağa and other officers to a meeting and explained that the Janissaries had not cleared themselves from the mistake of the murder of Osman II yet. Therefore, the army would be condemned eternally if they were involved in the murder of another sultan. The Janissary commanders confirmed the warnings of Osman Efendi and ensured they had no intention to murder of Selim III. They also declared that his deposition in May 1807 was an accidental event. According to Asım, Nezir Ağa was not secure a promise for the murder of Selim III and therefore returned to the capital in two days.

If Nezir Ağa’s real aim was to propose the murder of Selim III, the most important question to ask is why Nezir Ağa consulted so many figures and especially Mustafa Refik Efendi for such a secret issue. It would have been enough for him to consult the Grand Vizier and probably the Ağa of the Janissaries. In some sources, it is argued that that Çelebi Mustafa Pasha was not aware of anything and was deceived by the Ruscuk Yârânı. However, it seems that the Grand Vizier was well aware of the existence of, at least, the proponents of the former Sultan (“devr-i sabık takım”). For instance, in one of his correspondences, he rejects the idea that he was under the influence of supporters of the former Sultan as in the case of the exile of Tayyar Pasha. Therefore, we cannot be strictly certain about the fact that the Grand Vizier Çelebi Mustafa Pasha was not aware of

2601 For a discussion of the issue see Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, pp. 83-4, footnote 1. The author rejects the idea that Çelebi Mustafa Pasha was aware of the real intention of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and the Ruscuk Yârânı.
2602 B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri, no. 18, p. 105-106 (undated).
the existence of a pro-Selimian faction in the army. Unfortunately no names are provided for the figures he suspected of being pro-Selimian and therefore it is impossible for the time being to be sure whether Mustafa Refik Efendi was among the suspicious ones or not. Yet, it seems still incredible to believe that a figure so close to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha was not suspected. The most reasonable explanation appears to be the fact that Mustafa IV did not take the serious responsibility for the murder of Selim III on his shoulders solely. Taking the consent of the Grand Vizier, the Janissary Ağâ and some other influential figures would reduce the criticism to be directed against him after the murder of Selim III. Apart from these points, we might argue that the fear of assassination of Selim III seems to have been a very crucial factor that accelerated the plans of the pro-Selimian figures and the march of Alemdar Mustafa to İstanbul.

For Mustafa IV and his followers, the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha with the army to the city was a great risk and it seems to have thrown them into a great dilemma. In that regard, we should mention a very interesting document found in the Archive of the Topkapı Palace Museum. It is a report written by the aforementioned Selim Ağâ. The document is like a spy report but the correspondent is not specified. Selim Ağâ talks about an incident that took place a very short time before the march of the imperial army from Edirne to İstanbul. According to the report, upon hearing the movement of the army towards the capital, Hekim Lorenzo, the palace physician, referred as “serpent” (”me'lûn”) in the document, entered the presence of Mustafa IV and asked for the Sultan’s approval to poison deposed Selim and Prince Mahmud saying that “Senin işin tamamdır.” However, the offer was rejected by Mustafa IV. Even though why a report was written is not clear, the incident he narrates was obviously happened on the very eve of

2603 As might be recalled there is a famous story that while he was a prince, Selim wrote letters to the French emperor through the meditation of Lorenzo. According to Shaw, the French ambassadors Saint-Priest and Choiseul-Gouffier maintained the contact and influence with Prince Selim through his private physician Lorenzo. See Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 13.

2604 T.S.M.A. E. 9648 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808). For an evaluation of the same document see Şen, Dönüm Noktastı, p. 160. For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.
the march. In order to prove his point Selim Ağa gives a chain of the narrators of the story: He had heard the story from the Hazine Kethüda, who in turn had heard it from an interpreter but did not remember his name. The important point for our concern is if this narration is true, how a physician could make such a suggestion and moreover, why Mustafa IV did not accept it before it was too late. If we recall that he sent Nezir Ağa to get the consent of the army for the elimination of Selim III, this point becomes more interesting.

If we turn back to the conversation between Abdülfettah Ağa and Behiç Efendi, from a different perspective, we could also suspect that Abdülfettah Ağa might have put forward the idea of eliminating Selim III in order feel out the policy of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and his party in this regard. Indeed, Behiç Efendi cleverly rejected the offer by arguing that the assassination of the deposed Sultan would create a crisis in international politics, especially with France. Apperantly, Behiç Efendi managed to convince Abdülfettah Ağa and others both about the march of Alemdar Pasha and survival of Selim III. After convincing the ağas, Behiç Efendi warned that this should be kept secret and if necessary, they should deny that the Sultan permitted the coming of Alemdar Pasha. These points are important to prove that the coming of Alemdar Pasha was an act approved by the Sultan and some palace ağas.

Before going into details of the arrival of the army and Alemdar to the capital, we should question some other issues. Attributing the coming of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha only to the efforts of Rusçuk Yarım and the role of Sebastiian and some other factions still do not explain satisfactory the decision of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to march to İstanbul. Why should an ayan rush to save a deposed Sultan undertaking great risks? Without disregarding the above factors, we will argue that the personal ambitions of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha

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2605 T.S.M.A. E. 9648 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808).
should have played a role in his march. Kethûda Said brings a very reasonable explanation in that regard. According to the author, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha was anticipated his promotion to the grand vizirate after the dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha. As might be recalled, he had paid a visit to the imperial camp at Silistria and returned after the arrival of the new Grand Vizier, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha. The real aim of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, Kethûda Said Efendi argues, was his anticipation to be appointed as the new Grand Vizier. When he learned that Çelebi Mustafa Pasha was promoted to this post, he became greatly disappointed and decided to take vengeance on both the Sultan and the new Grand Vizier. According to the author, the frustration created deep resentment (“istifâ-yı derûnî”) and Alemdar felt himself offended by the Sultan and the leading state elite. Consequently, after his return to Ruscuk, he was reluctant to assist the imperial army and sometimes created problems in the provisioning of the army, which deepened the envy between him and the new Grand Vizier. Therefore, the answer to his march lies in a combination of various factors we have tried to discuss above.

5.5.3.3. The Army at Edirne

The Ottoman army moved from Karalaş to Silistria and began the march towards Edirne on 3 B 1222/7 September 1807 to spend the winter there since an armistice was

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signed with Russia. The army reached Şumnu on 15 B/18 September. After staying there for about ten days it finally reached Edirne on 21 B/24 September 1807. The Russian Tsar refused to ratify the armistice under the pretext that Meyendorff, the Russian delegate, was not authorized to sign an armistice. Both sides, therefore, began to prepare for war. Consequently, the return of the army was not an immediate plan in terms of the war strategies of the Ottoman side. The Russians were still in the Principalities. In the meantime the due date of the armistice ended and a treaty with the Russians did not seem possible in the near future. Therefore, the leadership of the army was of the opinion that

2611 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 108-9. Tilsit Treaty (7 July 1807) stipulated for an armistice between the Porte and Russia. Consequently, on 25 July 1808, Galib Efendi, tevkii-i divan-i hümâyûn, was sent from Silistria as the Turkish plenipotentiary to negotiate armistice with Russia. He left the imperial camp on the Danube. It was about that time that the Porte received the articles of the Tilsit Treaty. The Turkish-Russian armistice was signed on 21 C 1222/24 August 1807 at Slobosia, near Giurgevo (Yergögü). The armistice would be effective for nine months and would end on 21 March 1808. It stipulated for the cessation of hostilities between two parties and the opening of negotiations for definitive settlements. The armistice contained seven articles. The issues that were unsettled by the two parties would be later decided by the mediation of Napoleon. Russia and the Porte would evacuate the Principalities after thirty-five days of signing the document. All the Russian forces would depart and a limited number of Turkish forces would remain in the region to serve as the police force. It also brought a limitation on the number of soldiers on the fortresses of İsmail, Yergögü and İbrail until the signing of the treaty. Moreover, Russia would evacuate Bozca Ada and draw back the ships so that the Dardanelles would be opened. The Porte ratified the armistice on 21 September 1807. Russian and the Ottoman delegates who signed the armistice expressed their wish that the peace treaty should follow it as soon as possible. At that point, the French ambassador insisted on the fact that the negotiations for the peace treaty should be conducted in Paris and the Porte should deliver him the conditions the Porte wished for the conclusion of the peace. This was rather like an ultimatum to the Porte. The French ambassador threatened that if the negotiations were not held in Paris, he would depart immediately from Istanbul. Therefore, a notification was sent to Muhib Efendi, who was about to return from Paris, authorizing him to conduct the necessary negotiations. For more details, see Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 104-105, 134; Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 391; Shupp, The European Powers, pp. 553, 555; Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 240; B.O.A. HAT 1355/52999 (undated); Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles, pp. 213-4; Miller, Mustapha Pacha Bairaktar, p. 202; Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 151; B.O.A. HAT 53913 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 1356/53120 (undated). For a copy of the armistice, see Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II; pp 104-8.


preparations for the war were necessary and wintering at Edirne was the best way. In that way, the Serasker would protect the shores of Danube.\textsuperscript{2614} The tactic was to station the Sacred Banner ("Liva-\ı Şerif") in Edirne and the army would go to Sofia.\textsuperscript{2615}

It was first decided that the army should spend the winter at Şumnu. However, in his letters to the center, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha informed that due to the scarcity of provisions in Şumnu, the army was stationed at Edirne. As far as it could be concluded from the related documents, Mustafa Pasha insisted on coming to Edirne, and requested a secret approval from the Sultan. In reply, Mustafa IV advised him to be patient and stay at Şumnu for another five or ten days. The Sultan emphasized that the decision to winter at Şumnu was taken by the imperial council, therefore it would be inappropriate for him to issue a secret order without consulting the imperial council. He also assured him that he would order the organization of the meeting as soon as possible. Mustafa IV also noted that gossips were circulating among the Janissaries in İstanbul that the army would leave the Principalities to the “infidels” and they would winter at Edirne comfortably. Due to these problems he advised his Grand Vizier to be patient.\textsuperscript{2616} It seems that Çelebi Mustafa Pasha had already transferred the army from Şumnu to Edirne. Consequently, Mustafa IV approved by noting that it would be inappropriate to cause the soldiers suffer at Şumnu without enough provisions. In addition, the Sultan also asserted that stationing at Edirne would be more beneficial in the case of a possible disorder by the Serbians. He added that he would send money with Başçukadar Abdülfettah Ağa within a few days.\textsuperscript{2617}


\textsuperscript{2615} B.O.A. HAT 1363/53798 (undated). This is an imperial edict of Mustafa IV advising that the army should not stay long at Edirne which would cause frustration for the soldiers.

\textsuperscript{2616} T.S.M.A. 7030-12 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808); B.O.A. 1358/53356 (11 B 1222/14 September 1807); TSMA E. 8626 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808). See also Uzunçarsılı, \textit{Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, pp. 77-81.

\textsuperscript{2617} T.S.M.A. E. 7030-11 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808); B.O.A. HAT 1359/53420 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808). From another undated document we learn a valuable dagger, and fur coat was sent with Abdülfettah Ağa, carrying the salaries of the Janissaries. See B.O.A. HAT 53982 (undated).
aspect of the same issue from a report of Abdülfettah Ağa. In a report to the Sultan, the latter declares that he found the Grand Vizier in great anxiety due to the fact that he had moved the army from Şumnu to Edirne without the permission of the Sultan. Consequently, he was under great stress fearing that he would be executed very soon.2618

Kethüda Said and Asım explain the march of the army from Edirne to İstanbul in terms of the manipulations by the Ruscuk Yârân. After his return to Edirne, Behiç Efendi explained his efforts in the Capital and they began to wait for a pretext for the coming of Alemdar Pasha.2619 For that purpose, they had to convince both the Grand Vizier in the army and also the Sultan and some other influential figures in the city. In order to convince Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, they argued that a meeting should be held with the participation of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha regarding the war and also conditions of the army. Therefore, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha invited Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the imperial camp.2620 The latter came to Edirne accompanied with some Rumelian ayans and five or six thousand sekbons.2621 After his arrival, meetings were held and it was decided that

since, owing to the dilatory proceedings of the French, the negotiation for peace was spun out to a great length and, the period of armistice undefined, it was but a folly to allow the enemy to gain time; and that their stay at Edirne caused a ruinous waste of the goods of the true believers, and necessarily brought upon its inhabitants an expense of above a thousand purses.2622

2618 T.S.M.A. E. 8703 (1222/1807-8).


This matter was especially emphasized by Mustafa Refik and Behiç Efendi, who suggested that the army should return to the capital as soon possible.\textsuperscript{2623} Therefore, at the end of the meeting it was decided to return to İstanbul.\textsuperscript{2624} After the decision to move to the city was taken, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha did not lose time to declare his wish to have the honor of entering the presence of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{2625} The decision to return to the capital did not solve all the problems. Those in the capital had to be convinced both for the return of the army and the visit of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. Dispatches were sent by the army declaring that there was no need to stay at Edirne, which would cause unnecessary and extra burden for the treasury.\textsuperscript{2626} Therefore an imperial order was sent approving the return of the army to the city.\textsuperscript{2627} Kethüda Said and Asım note that while the Sultan and some among of the ağas of the Enderun were aware of the move of the army, the Şeyhülislam, ulerma and most of the Janissaries did not know about the plan. The movement of the army towards the city was kept secret to prevent possible resistance and rumor in the city.\textsuperscript{2628}

5.5.3.4. The March Starts


\textsuperscript{2624} Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vaka-ı Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, p. 126a; Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{A Short History of}, pp. 22-23; B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu, no. 18, p. 127 (undated); \textit{Neticetü'l-Vekayi}, p. 31. The last two sources also mention the decision but no reference to the manipulations of the Ruscuk Yârâni is made


\textsuperscript{2627} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi}, pp. 94-95.

The march towards the capital started on Thursday, 19 Ca/13 July 1808. They marched towards the city with 15,000 soldiers from the Ruscuks forces. According to Kethüda Said, not to face a problem, all communications were suspended between Edirne and İstanbul and roads were closed, in accordance with the plan of the Ruscuks Yarım.\textsuperscript{2629} When they reached to Çorlu, a letter informing of their approach and the decision to come to İstanbul was sent by Hacı Ali Bağdadi. Hacı Ali delivered the letter to the Sultan on Thursday, 20 Ca 1223/14 July 1808.\textsuperscript{2630} An official confirms some of the above details. It carries the date 18 Ca 1223/12 July 1808 and was written to Mercan Ağa, the Darüşsadade Ağa, probably by the Grand Vizier. It informs Mercan Ağa that the march of the army was a necessary and beneficial act not only to avoid unnecessary expenditures, but also to restore order in the capital. It also states that these points were also explained to the Sultan by Hacı Ali Ağa as the mediator.\textsuperscript{2631} The writer advises that if some rumours were produced especially about the coming of Alemdar Pasha, they should not bother but ignore them.\textsuperscript{2632}

The march seems to have been declared to the Kaimmakam and Şeyhülislam while the marching party was around Çorlu. The Kaimmakam and Şeyhülislam began to investigate whether the march was a spontaneous movement or was realized by the permission of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{2633} According to Kethüda Said and Asım, in agreement with the former secret arrangements, Mustafa IV denied any previous cognizance and called


\textsuperscript{2631} B.O.A. \textit{Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri}, no. 18, pp. 127-8 (18 Ca 1223/12 July 1808).

\textsuperscript{2632} B.O.A. \textit{Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupçuluğu Defterleri}, no. 18, p. 127-8 (18 Ca 1223/12 July 1808). This caused rumour both among the people and elite in the Capital on the reasons of sudden march of the army. See \textit{Ruzname}, (Milli Emlak), p. 53; Beyhan, \textit{Saray Günlüğü}, p.227.

Kaimmakam Pasha and the Şeyhülislam for a meeting to be held on Friday at the residence of the Şeyhülislam. The participants of the meeting, says Kethüda Said, did not bother too much for the coming of the army and perceived it as something related to the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa. However, the author notes, they were paralyzed, in the midst of the meeting, when they learned that Alemdar Mustafa Pasha accompanied the army. Since the Sultan did not confess that he had previous cognizance especially about the coming of Alemdar Pasha, they were surprised about how the army could march the city without the formal approval of the Sultan. Therefore, for some time confusion and panic prevailed over the participants of the council and each of them suggested different things. Some suggested that the army should be sent back by the order of the Sultan, while some others advised the closure of the city gates. At the midst of this confusion, Kaimmakam Mustafa Pasha noted that the army had already reached Silivri and they would enter the city on Tuesday. Consequently, the participants noticed that there was not time to prevent the entrance of the army and they yielded to the march willingly or unwillingly. The decision of the council was approved by the Sultan. Nezir Ağa was sent to the Grand Vizier, carrying the order of their invitation to the city on the same day.

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2639 B.O.A. HAT 1362/53676 (undated).

In the afternoon on Tuesday 25 Ca 1223/19 July 1808, the Grand Vizier and Alemdar Pasha reached Davudpaşa. They were greeted by the leading state officials, including the Şeyhülislam and then by the Sultan and the liva-yi şerif was delivered. After this ceremony, Mustafa IV returned to the city, followed by the Grand Vizier and other leading officials. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha did not enter the city that day and waited with his men and the ayans at ÇırIPCÇay at Davudpaşa.

Before the march of Alemdar to İstanbul, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha dealt with some important matters. Immediately after his arrival, he dismissed Kaimmakam Hacı Mustafa Pasha and ordered his stay in Üsküdar. One of the most important events during that interval was the sending to exile of some of the prominent members of the ulema, including Şeyhülislam Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi. The dismissal of Ataullah Efendi happened two days after the arrival of Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, on Thursday, 27 Ca/21 July. During that day, the Pasha came to the Palace in disguise and entered the presence

2641 For the details of the ceremony, see Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p.53; Beyhan, Saray Günliği, pp.225-6; Mustafa Necib Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 95; Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yi Cedid, p. 32; Yayla İmami Risalesi, pp. 241-2; Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, pp. 169-70; The Times, Friday, September 16, 1808; pg. 2; Issue 7468, col. B; (foreign intelligence, Vienna, August 24; B.O.A. HAT 1355/52986 (undated).


2643 On Wednesday, 26 Ca 1223/20 July 1808, Süleyman Ağa, the Ağa of the Janissaries, who recently arrived the city suddenly died and kul kethüdası Ahmed Ağa was appointed in his place. See B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 105; B.O.A. HAT. 53170 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4. His death seems to be suspicious, yet there is no implication in this sense in contemporary narratives. According to Yayla İmami Risalesi, he returned from a tebdil and died suddenly after coming to his residence. See Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 242; Neticetii’l-Vekayi, p. 31. Câbî gives the date of his death as 23 C 1223/16 August 1808. See Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 201. According to Arapyan, on the other hand, Süleyman Ağa was demanded to provide the enthronement of Selim III. Thus he died due to this great shock. See Arapyan, Ruscuk Ayam Mustafa Paşa, p. 9.

2644 Neticetii’l-Vekayi, p. 31.

2645 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 105.
It seems that it was upon the request of the Grand Vizier that the meeting was held and he requested from the Sultan the dismissal of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and appointment of Arabzâde Mehmed Arif Efendi. The Sultan does not seem to have been reluctant about the offer, and immediately afterwards müezzinbaşı was sent for the invitation of the latter. It was again on Thursday that Alemdar Mustafa and Behram Pasha, the governor of Trabzon, were invited to the Porte to discuss some matters. During that day, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha paid a visit to Grand Vizier, together with Behram Pasha. He entered the Palace and talked to the Grand Vizier and the newly appointed

2646 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 105.

2647 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no.357, p.105; Ruzname, (Milli Emlak), p. 54; Beyhan, Saray Gün Cummings, p.227; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 96; Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 242-3. Arabzâde was replaced by Salihzâde Ahmed Esad Efendi on 22 C 1223/ 15 August 1808. See Şanizade, Tarih-i Şanizade, vol. I, p. 45; Bir İmamnân günliâği, p.108. Arabzâde Mehmed Arif Efendi (b. Za 1151/February 1739-1241/1816), was the son of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi. He became a müderris in the year 1175/1761-62. On § 1199/June 1785, he became the molla of Yenişehir-i Fener and obtained the Mecca rank. Mehmed Arif Efendi was appointed as the İstanbul kadi on M 1204/October 1789 and obtained Anadolu rank. On 25 S 1208/2 October 1793 he became İstanbul kadi and two years later became Anadolu kazasker. After obtaining the Rumelia rank (1213/1798-99), he was appointed as the kazasker of Rumelia (1215/1801-2). He performed the last duty in 1220/1805 for a second time. Mehmed Arif Efendi became Şeyhülislam on 27 Ca 1223/21 July 1808, after the deposition of Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi. Arif Efendi did not stay long in the office and was dismissed on 22 C 1223/29 August1808. He died on 17 L 1241/25 May 1816. For more details, see B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no .357, p. 105; Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 60; Beyhan, Saray Gün Cummings, p.241; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicilî-i Osmanî, vol. I, pp. 314-315.

2648 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 54; Beyhan, Saray Gün Cummings, p.227. Ataullah Efendi was sent to his residence at Bebek after his dismissal. See Kethûda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yî Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 127; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 198. An imperial order was produced prohibiting his move out of his residence. See Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 31. Four days after his deposition, Ataullah Efendi was exiled to Çirpan. See Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 243. On 7 C 1223/31 July 1808, he was exiled to Kizanlık. His place of exile was changed to Güzelhisar (12 C 1225/15 July 1810) where he died.

2649 Ruzname, (Milli Emlak), p. 54; Beyhan, Saray Gün Cummings, p.227.

2650 The Times, Friday, 16 September 1808; pg. 2; issue 7468; col. B (Foreign Intelligence, Vienna, 24 August). According to this source, the grand vizier went to the Palace together with Alemdar Mustafa Pasha.
Şeyhülislam. Thereafter, he returned to the house of his kapı kethüda.\textsuperscript{2651} From the related entry in Sadaret Defterleri we learn that both Pashas came to the Porte in disguise and unofficially. Unfortunately, neither the reason of the visit nor why they visited in disguise is stated. It might be related to the fact that Alemdar Mustafa Pasha was trying to take urgent measures before his march.\textsuperscript{2652}

Some other changes were also realized in the posts of the leading ulema on Saturday, 29 Ca/23 July 1808, again before the final arrival of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. Ahmed Şemseddin Efendi, the kazasker of Rumelia, Alizâde Es-Seyyid Mehmed Nureddin Efendi,\textsuperscript{2653} the kazasker of Anatolia and Mehmed Münib Efendi, Mehmed Murad Efendi were all dismissed.\textsuperscript{2654} Those dismissed were sent to exile: Alizâde to Kütahya, Şemseddin Efendi to Bursa, Münib Efendi to Ankara and Muradzâde to Edirne.\textsuperscript{2655} On Monday, 1 C

\textsuperscript{2651} Permission was previously obtained for the residence of Alemdar Pasha in Istanbul. For instance, in one document, it is stated that since it was necessary to prepare a residence in the city for the Pasha before his coming, permission was requested for the dispatch of Hasan Ağa, the director of the imperial dockyards, and kapı kethüda of the Pasha, to the Pasha in order to learn where he would prefer to reside in the city. See B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 105. According to an extract from a private letter, he entered the city at the head of two thousand forces, talked with the Sultan and returned after the dismissal of the Şeyhülislam and the Janissary Ağa. See Extracts from a private letter, Smirna, 17 August 1808, (PRO, FO 78-61). However, as we have noted above the Janissary Ağa had died and some evidence prove that the Şeyhülislam was dismissed a very short time before his arrival.

\textsuperscript{2652} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{2653} Alizâde Es-seyyid Mehmed Nureddin Efendi (d. 1230/1815) became müderris and then the molla of Salonika (R 1200/February 1786). He was appointed as Mecca molla on N 1210/March 1796 and became Istanbul judge on 1214/1799-1800 and dismissed in the year 1215/1800-01. Nureddin Efendi was appointed as the kazasker of Anatolia (1222/1807). After his dismissal on 29 Ca 1223/23 July 1808, he was exiled to Kütahya. On Z 1223/February-January 1809, he was pardoned and appointed as kazasker of Rumelia on Z 1226/December 1811-February 1812, but was dismissed on 10 R 1227/23 April 1812 and exiled to Manisa. He died on 12 C 1230/22 May 1815. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. IV, p. 1268.

\textsuperscript{2654} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357 p. 107; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 96; Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 54; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 228; Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p.127; Neticetü’l-Vekayi., pp. 31-32a.

\textsuperscript{2655} Neticetü’l-Vekayi, pp. 31a-31; Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p. 127; Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 243.
1223/25 July 1808, Ahmed Muhtar Efendi was sent to Svishtov (Ziştovi), and Muradzâde Efendi to Tatar Pazarı (in modern Filibe).\textsuperscript{2656} The dismissal and exile of the \textit{ulema}, together with Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, nominally meant the elimination of the old cadres of the \textit{ulema}. In fact, Kethüda Said argues that the main purpose of the march of the army was to expel the \textit{ulema} who had been involved in the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{2657} According to him, another purpose was to prevent the issuing of a \textit{fetva} for the murder of Selim III and to achieve the change in the throne as smoothly as possible.\textsuperscript{2658}

5.5.3.5. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha in İstanbul

The final entrance of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha was on Thursday, 4 C 1223/28 July 1808. As we have already noted, he visited the city a few days ago, but it was his second visit that brought radical changes. Early in the morning of that day, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha moved from Davudpaşa, came to the Porte with five thousand armed men, got the imperial seal from Çelebi Mustafa Pasha and delivered it to Çavuşbaşı Tahsin Efendi to be sent to the Palace.\textsuperscript{2659} According to Oğulukyan, the taking of the imperial took place after the talk with Çelebi Mustafa Pasha. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha called Çavuşbaşı and in a great fury demanded the imperial seal to be delivered to the Çavuşbaşı.\textsuperscript{2660} All these sequence of events seems like a coup d’etat starting with the forced dismissal of Çelebi Mustafa Pasha. Another interesting point is the dismissal of the highest secular official of the Empire by an

\textsuperscript{2656} \textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi}, p. 243.

\textsuperscript{2657} Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, p. 128a.


ayan. It is not clear whether Alemdar came to the city with the intention of first dismissing Çelebi Mustafa Pasha and then dethrone Mustafa IV. According to the narrative of Ruzname (Milli Emlak), apparently, two Pashas were discussing some secret matters and during the conversation Alemdar Mustafa Pasha got angry and grasped the imperial seal.\textsuperscript{2661} The author of Yayla İmami Risalesi provides some clues as to what passed between Çelebi and Alemdar Pasha. According to him, the latter entered the Porte in great fury and rebuked Çelebi Mustafa Pasha for not acting in accordance with his former promises.\textsuperscript{2662} If we rely on this account, obviously, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha had promised to secure the accession of Selim III to the throne.\textsuperscript{2663} A similar explanation is brought by Câbi. He claims that after his arrival, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha was treated kindly by the Sultan and therefore did not keep his promise he delivered to Alemdar Pasha. For that reason he was accused by Alemdar Mustafa Pasha with indulging in worldly pleasures while he suffered outside the city.\textsuperscript{2664} Therefore, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha waited outside the city probably for the accomplishment of the affair. Yet, when he suspected that that the Grand Vizier would not dare to prepare the conditions for the enthronement of Selim III, he came to the city to conclude the matter. The author of the Yayla İmami Risalesi praises Çelebi Mustafa Pasha since he confessed his hesitation to cause the fall of Mustafa IV saying that he did not betray his own state “hâin-i devlet”.\textsuperscript{2665}

According to Kethüda Said, the Grand Vizier did not know the real intention of Alemdar Pasha and Ruscuk Yârâni. He was just informed that they were to come to İstanbul and bring order to the city. According to the same author, it was only one day before the arrival of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the city, he was told the real intention, namely the

\textsuperscript{2661} Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 57; Beyhan, Saray Günü

\textsuperscript{2662} Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{2663} Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 244.


\textsuperscript{2665} Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 244.
enthronement of the deposed Selim III.\footnote{2666} According to the same author, the problem about the dismissal of Grand Admiral Seydi Ali Pasha had already created tension between the Grand Vizier and Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. Alemdar and his followers had included Ali Pasha to the list of those to be dismissed on the grounds that he was collaborating with the rebels.\footnote{2667} Yet, both authors argue that the real intention of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha was to get rid of this powerful figure who would prevent the realization of their plan.\footnote{2668} As might be recalled, we have discussed that before their coming powerful figures like Tayyar Pasha and Kabakçı Mustafa and some high ranking ulema had been eliminated in order to prevent any possible resistance to the accession of Selim III. If we take into consideration the fact that Seydi Ali Pasha was the Grand Admiral, the employment of his ships against Alemdar and his men would completely ruin their plan. Therefore they told Çelebi Mustafa Pasha that Ali Pasha should be dismissed immediately. However, Mustafa IV and his mother did not want Ali Pasha’s dismissal. Apart from the support of the Palace, Ali Pasha himself was a strong figure descending from the Janissary commanders acting as the rulers ("dayı") of Algiers. Therefore it was not an easy matter for the Grand Vizier to dismiss him. However, Alemdar’s party was not convinced with the excuses of Çelebi Mustafa Pasha and continued to insist on the dismissal of Seydi Ali. Therefore, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha sent news to Alemdar Pasha telling him that he was struggling hard for the elimination of the oppressors ("mütegallibe"), but the dismissal of Seydi Ali Pasha required more time. More importantly, he emphasized that Alemdar Mustafa Pasha should feel comfortable since he was bringing order to the city, therefore there was no need for him to stay and advised his


correspondent to return.\textsuperscript{2669} In reply, he received a letter from Alemdar Pasha which noted that he would not return \textit{“without completely accomplishing the matter”}.\textsuperscript{2670} This unexpectedly harsh letter from Alemdar created great anxiety for the Grand Vizier.\textsuperscript{2671}

After realizing the real purpose of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, in a great panic, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha tried to warn the Sultan mediating some figures close to him.\textsuperscript{2672} However, being involved in the matter, they did not listen to the Grand Vizier.\textsuperscript{2673} Being unsuccessful, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha suggested to some ağas of the Palace that the best thing was to kill Mustafa Refik and Behiç Efendis together with some of their collaborators and also to close the city gates.\textsuperscript{2674} However, the ağas assured him that Alemdar Mustafa Pasha had no purpose other than strengthening the power of the reigning Sultan.\textsuperscript{2675} After learning about these important developments, Mustafa Refik Efendi sent information to Ramiz Efendi noting that the Grand Vizier noticed their plan and they should conduct their affairs urgently.\textsuperscript{2676} On the other hand, Câbi suggests a different line of explanation. According to the author, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha had chosen his side and was worried about Alemdar

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\textsuperscript{2672} Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selim-i Salis}, Bayezid 3367, p. 129; Kethüda Said Efendi, \textit{A Short History of}, p. 27; Asum, \textit{Tarih-i Asum}, vol. II, p. 201. The authors do not give details on the identity of the people close to Selim III, but note that they were \textit{“mukarriban”}.


\end{flushright}
Mustafa Pasha’s possible attempt to enthrone the deposed Selim III. Therefore, he decided to eliminate Alemdar Pasha in order to solve the problem. Consequently, he wrote a secret letter to Sirozi İsmail Bey noting that Alemdar Mustafa Pasha had received 16,000 akçes from the treasury but achieved nothing. The Pasha advised his correspondent to get rid of Alemdar Pasha for the benefit of the state. However, İsmail Bey secretly informed Alemdar Pasha about the letter, who in turn, got furious saying that the Grand Vizier had received a great amount of money on his behalf but embezzled it. Therefore, the attempt of Çelebi Pasha to get rid of Alemdar was ruined by the reluctance of Sirozi İsmail. Why Çelebi Pasha delivered the imperial seal so easily it is not clear, yet most probably he was very frightened. After that point, Çelebi Mustafa Pasha was sent to Davudpaşa. After the rise of Mahmud II to power, he was granted Doğu sancağı and appointed as the commander of İsmail Fortress.

Among these different details, one point that seems quite clear is the fact both the Sultan and the Grand Vizier was caught by surprise. The Sultan was on Beşiktaş when he heard of the extraordinary event of the forced dismissal of Çelebi Mustafa Pasha by an ayan and then hurried to the Palace. The flow of these complex events prove the fact that the party/ies that worked for the enthronement of deposed Selim III had made a very brilliant plan. We would also like to underline an observation that some events we have referred as strange and at the first appearance seemed unconnected to each other such as the dismissal of Tayyar Pasha and Halet Efendi, later the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa appear to have


2679 Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 246. According to Câbi, he was allowed to keep his rank and sent to İsmail fortress on 6 C 1223/30 July. See Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 178.

2680 Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 175. According to entry in Ruzname, he was about to pay a visit to the Çrağan Palace, but postponed the visit upon the incident. See Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 57; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.231. According to Oğulukyan, he was visiting tekke-i mabeyn but returned when he heard the preparation of rikab. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 27.
been the parts of the same plan of eliminating the powerful figures who could notice their plan and produce a counter precaution or at least prevent the coming of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the city. As might be recalled, we have studied the dismissals of Halet and especially Tayyar Pasha and the murder of Kabakçı Mustafa from the perspective that these actions were to break down a possible resistance against the dominance of pro-Selimian figures. It appears that together with the changes in the cadres of the *ulema* these measures were taken successfully.

The execution of Kabakçı is important from another perspective. His elimination was to eliminate one of most important source of military resistance to their plan. If we recall that Hacı Ali Ağası replaced him and the other *yamaks* were dispersed, this point becomes more meaningful. The conscious dispersal of the last remnants of the *yamaks* can also be evaluated from the same perspective. According to Oğulukyan, three days after his arrival, the Grand Vizier called the Janissary Ağası and ordered him to disband all the undisciplined *yamaks* on the fortresses; otherwise he would massacre all of them.\(^\text{2681}\) Obeying the order, the Janissary Ağası repeated the same order to the eight “odabasıs of the tabyali”. It seems that most of the *yamaks* obeyed the order and went away from the fortresses. However, two of those who did not leave their place were executed and four of them were exiled.\(^\text{2682}\) We can also add to the list the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi, Münib Efendi and Şemseddin Efendi. Apart from being the ones having a role in the dismissal of Selim III, it must have been very clear to Alemdar and his party that if they remained in their office they would not consent to the fall of Mustafa IV from power.

The brilliant plan of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and *Ruscuk Yarâmî* worked quite well until the Pasha’s arrival at the Gate of Felicity (“Babü’s-Saade”). He was accompanied by the new Şeyhülislam, some leading members of the *ulema* and some members of the ruling elite. The presence of the Şeyhülislam seems to have made the intention of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha quite clear. Indeed, according to the author of *Neticetü’l-Vekayi*, Mercan


Ağa understood what was happening soon as he saw the Şeyhülislam. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha also announced that he came to secure the rise of Selim III to the throne. It is very clear that it was an immature announcement, since Mustafa IV and his retinue began to discuss the measures to eliminate Selim III and Mahmud II to remain unrivalled in the throne. In the end, Selim III was killed by the harem ağas of Mustafa IV. However, the survival of Prince Mahmud changed the fate of Mustafa IV.

Mahmud II ascended the Ottoman throne on 4 C 1223/28 July 1808, after which a systematic started persecution for those known to have been close to Mustafa IV or thought to have had a role in May 1807 Rebellion had started. After the change in the throne, Ataullah Efendi, Ahmed Muhtar Efendi and Muradzâde were sent to exile (9 C 1223/2 August 1808). Tayyar Pasha was executed on 12 Ş 1223/3 October 1808. Musa Pasha was not also to escape the wrath of the Sultan and was murdered in İzmir. His

2683 Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 33. See also Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 96.


2686 Ruizname (Milli Emlak), p. 59; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.238; Mustafa Necib Efendi, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 111.

2687 As might be recalled, after his second dismissal, Musa Pasha was sent to Îstanköy but due to his health conditions, it was changed to İzmir. He was executed while he was inat İzmir on the pretext of having a role in the fall of Selim III not long after the accession of Mahmud II to the throne. A haseki was sent to İzmir for this purpose. The haseki first contacted with the kâdi and mütesellim of İzmir informing them on the imperial order for his execution. See Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 41. With naib and armed men accompanying the haseki, they went to the residence of Musa Pasha and executed him. For more details of his murder, see Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 236; Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol I, pp. 41-2; Oğulukyan, Ruşname, p. 34; Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 38.

2688 According to Bir İmamın gününlüğü, his head came on 22 C 1223/15 August 1808 and exhibited at Bab-ı Hümayun. See Beydilli, Bir İmamın gününlüğü, p. 108. Ruizname gives the date 21 C 1223 /14 August 1808, Ruşname (Milli Emlak), p. 60; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.240. His decapitated head was exhibited on Orta Kapu on 21 C 1223/14 August 1808. According to Şanizâde his head was brought to the Capital on 2 B 1223/24 August
decapitated head was exhibited on Orta Kapı on 21 C 1223/14 August 1808. According to Câbi, the list of the names of the Janissaries who collaborated with Kabakçı during the May 1807 Rebellion were secretly prepared and presented to Grand Vizier Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. Unfortunately he does not mention the names of these Janissaries, but asserts that most of them were sent to exile and he heard the news of the execution of the odabaşı and odabekçi of the 25th, the mütevelli of the 1st and 64th regiments, the odabekçi and mütevelli of the 93rd regiment and one officer from the 26th regiment 14 Ş 1223/5 October 1808.

5.6. Conclusion

As might be noticed from the details provided throughout this chapter, the complexity of the incidents that took place prevents us to a great extent from making generalizations on the reign of Mustafa IV. His reign starts with the dispersal of the rebellious crowds who had officially been promised by the Sultan to be free from execution. However, the disorder and turmoil marked his whole reign ending with march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha who in turn establishes an “ayan dictatorship”. If the coinage is true, we will argue that the Hüccet-i Şer’iyye had a great role in the domination of the military classes in the aftermath of the May Rebellion. Mustafa IV rose to the throne when the imperial authority of the Sultan was


2689 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 60; Beyhan, Saray Günüğü, p. 240.

2690 Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 243. Aşım mentions the murder of two odabaşı. See Aşım, Tarih-i Aşım, vol. II, p. 199. There is a document which informs the execution of a figure called Civelek Odabaşı, a former master (“usta”) of 36th regiment. He was captured in Sivas and executed thereafter. It informs that he was involved in incident of “Sultan Selim Han”, but it is not clear whether the incident in question is the murder of Selim III or the May 1807 Rebellion. See B.O.A. HAT 17316.A (undated). It is from the governor of Sivas.
greatly weakened. His hesitation to persecute those who rebelled against the former Sultan further undermined his authority.

How was it possible that despite the great care not to molest innocent people during the Rebellion, the *yamaks* went out of control after the Rebellion? It was probably related to a power vacuum that emerged immediately after the Rebellion. In this vacuum the *yamaks* or the Janissaries were either directly involved in some incidents or were used by some other factions or figure. In both cases, they acted as a very strong pressure group. They managed to gain an upper hand and disturb the life in the city. Though written for the 1703 Rebellion, the following comments best summarize the situation after the May 1807 Rebellion.

The events culminating in Mustafa II's removal were marked essentially by a minimum of disorder and violence. Ahmed III’s accession, however, inaugurated an escalation in both. The comparative order and control that had characterized the rebel’s actions in the previous few week, gave way to vandalism and near anarchy as various elements tried to take the law into their hands and made conflicting demands on the very government they helped create. Each component part expected the government to serve its interests - sometimes to the exclusion of all others. Thus, all elements expected to be not only members of the polity but also of the government.\(^{2691}\)

There is a striking difference between the order and security that prevailed during the heydays of the May 1807 Rebellion and the disorder that disturbed the city during the reign Mustafa IV. This is also a matter that was observed by contemporary accounts. The most striking one is that of Ebubekir Efendi. The author first mentions the end of Rebellion and just (“*adil*”) conducts of the rebels and then starts immediately to narrate the disorder and damage caused by the same people after the rise of Mustafa IV.\(^{2692}\) Both upheavals took place at a time when the rebels seem to have had a considerable degree of influence. This turbulent period takes more than one year starting with the May 1807 Rebellion and continued till the rise of Mahmud II. In fact we see similar cases in both: frequent changes of officials and excesses committed by the rebels.


The primary reason for disorder can be related to the breakdown of the political system with the forced change in throne, the elimination of former ruling elite either by murder or exile, the need for time for the stabilization of new cadres with the new Sultan. Such problems could be witnessed during most changes in the throne, but become more serious under the overwhelming influence of the former rebel groups turning into a serious pressure group. In fact, the establishment of authority or dominance of the new ruler seems to have been constantly curbed by these former rebel chiefs. In very simple terms, the new sultans such as Mahmud I and Mustafa IV seem to have been not that much powerful in eliminating or distancing the new pressure group which apparently had the military power. Finally, one significant fact that bound the new sultans hand and foot for sometime - but for Mustafa IV forever - was the legal documents by which they promised not to punish the rebels and which must have weakened the legitimacy of the new Sultan and increased the prestige and boldness of the former rebels. Revolting of a “kul” against his ruler was a serious act demanding severe punishment. Even if it led to his own enthronement, the new Sultan was expected to punish the rebels. Mahmud I managed to do it after some time, but Mustafa IV never achieved it. Later Mahmud II did it. The question to be asked at that point might be why Mustafa IV was not able to get rid of the former rebels while Mahmud II managed to do it.
CHAPTER 6
A STRUCTURAL EVALUATION OF THE REBELLION

“Şeyh Emini Müslüman olsun derim meşreb bu ya,
Ben zemini asuman olsun derim meşreb bu ya”

6.1. Introduction

In his study of 1703 Rebellion, historian Rifat Abou El-Haj remarks that

The 1703 rebellion was chosen for the light it should shed as much on the structure and processes of Ottoman politics as on the sultan, Mustafa II. Since contemporary sources are woefully inadequate for the reconstruction of normal political life in the second half of the seventeenth century, it becomes necessary to examine it in the abnormal instance.2694

In his attempt to understand the Ottoman political structure by studying an abnormal case, he is guided by the assumption that

the rebellion does not represent a class or a corporate conflict (i.e. ulema vs. palace or bureaucracy vs. military). Rather, it consisted of a struggle between coalitions of factions drawn from various groups - a struggle between composites, including those normally considered “disenfranchised” (e.g. the inhabitants of Istanbul and theological students).2695


Therefore, he tries to understand the Ottoman political structure by making a study of the Rebellion or looking at the period through the abnormal hole opened by the Rebellion.

The aim of this chapter is to concentrate on the power relations of the Selimian era and to see some factors creating divisions among the Ottoman ruling elite. Though we will pay attention to the question of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms, the emphasis will rather be on some other factors as well. This attempt should not be taken as an endeavor to underestimate the Nizam-ı Cedid reform movement but rather to find out some other factors that might be helpful in shedding light upon the political structure of the period under study. Inspired by El-Haj’s argument we will refrain ourselves from evaluating the groups under study as monolithic bodies, but rather considering individuals of different identities forming temporary coalitions for their own interests or for other different reasons. Another aim is to deal with some important questions related to the Rebellion and to the personality of Selim III.

The present chapter is divided into three sub-sections. The first section will make a survey of the political factions during the reign of the Selim III. For the sake convenience, we also categorize the groups as reformists and anti-reformists. However we will not only question these categories but also try to find out some other dynamics that created a common identity for each group and also study them in terms of the identity, patronage, profession and attitude towards foreign powers. In this regard, we will try to analyze two possibilities: The first hypothesis is whether the power struggles between the factions of Halil Hamid Pasha and Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha were carried into the reign of Selim III. For that purpose we will try to trace the connections and clientele network among some members of the Selimian elite. Another question will be whether the members of the factions had similar foreign policy views and similar religious affiliations. Therefore, we will try to find out the basic contours of common and dividing lines of the members of

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2696 Halil Hamid Pasha (d.1199/1785) entered the divan kalem and became amedci with the help of Ismail Raif Pasha. He was appointed as büyük tezkereci (1193/May-June 1779), and then reisülküttab (29 Z 1193/7 January 1780). He became sadaret kethüda (3 L 1194/2 October 1780) and was promoted to grand vizirate on 25 M 1197/31 December 1785. He was executed shortly after his dismissal on 17 C 1199/27 April 1785. For more details, see Appendix I.
these various factions. The primary aim of this section is to detect some common characteristic for each of the two groups and try to find out why they opposed each other. Another important concern of this section will be to try to find answer to the questions of why certain people were included into the execution list prepared during the Rebellion and why certain people were accused of being collaborators of the rebels.

The second section is closely connected with the first one in the sense that the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi connections of some of the murdered individuals during the Rebellion provides another common characteristic of the so-called *Nizam-ı Cedid*. Following Butrus Abu-Manneh’s suggestion, we will try to study whether the Rebellion could be considered as a social conflict between a Naqshbendi Mujaddidi high elite and lower social groups fed by the Bektashi religious ideology. Along with the above-mentioned points, one particular aim is to find out the discernable patterns in the May 1807 Rebellion. We will look at the contemporary people’s perception of the Rebellion, and also try to understand whether the rebels were only against the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, or whether there were some other concerns of the rebels, and to what degree it is legitimate to consider it as a reaction of the Janissaries to the reforms and the reformists. Our purpose is not to deny the centrality of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* issue, but also pinpoint some other possibilities that divided the high elite and also the lower echelons of the society.

The third and final section is devoted to the imperial image of Selim III. Since we have already discussed about his imperial image to a certain extent in Chapter II, we will try to concentrate more on his personality and the myth created around him. Particular attention will be paid whether Selim III was really a passive and timid ruler or not, and whether his personality played a role the failure of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* program and also his own fall.

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6.2. The Power Groups of the Selimian Era

As might be recalled El-Haj considers the 1703 Rebellion as an abnormal instance that revealed some obscure aspects of the political structure of the Empire. However, in our case, the abnormality that the author refers to seems to have started earlier than May 1807 Rebellion. Particularly the conventional historiography considers that the deep cleavages in the social, military and political life started with the implementation of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* program. It has been usually taken for granted that there would be automatic reactions from lower and upper layers of the society to that reform package. According to such a view, for instance, the *ulema* would regard the program as contrary to the spirit of Islam and would react to it. The Janissaries would perceive it as an open challenge to their own means of survival. On the other hand, certain statesmen, such as Köse Musa Pasha or Hafiz Ismail Pasha, would abuse these existing tensions in order to promote their self interests. Therefore, this discourse of the Rebellion is built upon the premises of hostility and rivalry between the reformist group and the anti-reformist factions, simultaneously taking place both among the elite and the lower classes. Therefore, the most dominant view for describing the power groups during the reign of Selim III is to present two antagonistic camps divided according to their attitude towards the reform programme initiated during the period: the advocates of the reforms are considered as progressive people, more concerned with the interests of the state and the other camp is condemned as conservative and even reactionary people who vested their self-interests above the interests of their state. Leaving aside the anachronistic nature of such labels, such a reductionist approach creates the danger of underestimating the dynamics of interest group formations within the Ottoman Empire. The so-called *Nizam-ı Cedid* elite is referred to almost as a political party.

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with a reform agenda under the leadership of the Sultan. After the May 1807 Rebellion they were supposedly annihilated, yet leaving their legacy to Rusçuk Yârânı who convinced Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to reinstall their leader, Selim III. They are presented as the people struggling hard to make reforms despite the opposition displayed by the hostile people or parties. Unfortunately no serious and full-fledged study on the “anti-reformist group” is available. It is hard to say that there exists such a study about the faction called the Nizam-ı Cedid elite either.

Within the framework of this established discourse, the Nizam-ı Cedid program covers almost all aspects of the reign of Selim III reign, which makes it hard to understand other dynamics and factions as well as the concerns of the individuals in the period under study. Several other problems arise if we are to be guided by such discourse. First of all, while the so-called reformist elite is considered as a homogenous body acting as a group, their opponents are seen as individuals collaborating with each other for their personal interests and only coming together under the standard of anti-reformist cause, whether secretly or openly. The main problem in defining the factions of that period seems to stem from the effort to categorize them simply as the supporters or opponents of the Nizam-ı Cedid.

Our critical argument is based on the fact that we do not have enough information to arrive at such general conclusions regarding the members of both groups. We do not have detailed information regarding of their lives, ideas and the factors that led them to oppose or support a certain view. Another important problem is that we are dealing here with a early modern polity where the degree of professionalization and institutionalization was relatively at a low level, whereas the informal relations and clientalism were the


2700 Ahmed Refik, Kabakçı Mustafa, p. 138. This argument forms the basis of the book of Uzunçarşılı on Alemdar Mustafa Pasha.
predominant dominant factor this period. The dominant characteristic of informal relations that underlies the political factions in traditional societies, was also prevalent during the reign of Selim III. In this regard, clientele ties, known as “intisab”, are crucially important. Neumann describes the political factions in a pre-modern world as “aimed at achieving personal career, not political programs.” Therefore, our study of the political factions will be guided by above assumptions.

The aim of this section is by no means to come up with full-fledged answers and satisfactorily to offer thorough definitions the above-mentioned groups. There is not still sufficient data to provide us with a comprehensive picture of these dynamics that led to the formation of sub-groups in the late eighteenth century Ottoman Empire. Yet, our aim will, looking from different angles, be to provide a brief survey of interests groups, and pinpoint some factors behind the formation of various groups. It will be questioned as to whether we should define them as groups with certain programs. The particular concern will be to examine the political cliques of that period, especially the so-called Nizam Cedid elite, and try to figure out some common characteristics of their members, rather than dividing them into very broad categories. Yet for the sake of simplicity we will also use the same categorization but deepen our search within each category.

6.2.1. “The Reformists”


In the mainstream historiographical approach, the category of “reformists” applies to all of the figures who whether directly or indirectly advocated the Nizam-ı Cedid program. Therefore, even though our focus will be on the ones who were publicly present in the course of Rebellion, our evaluation will cover all the “reformists” during the reign of Selim III. For the sake of convenience we will try to base our evaluations on the most famous figures.\(^{2703}\)

6.2.1.1. Profession and Patronage

In terms of their profession the members of the so-called reform party do not consist of a unified body. They are recruited from the ilmiye class, palace officials, bureaucrats and also include some other figures of various professions. Yet, there seems to be a dominance of the bureaucrats. Among them, the most famous ones are Mehmed Raşid Efendi, Ebubekir Râtb Efendi, Mahmud Raif Efendi, Mustafa Reşid Efendi, İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Elhac İbrahim Reşid Efendi and Safi Efendi.

Mehmed Raşid Efendi\(^ {2704}\) appears to be one of the most important figures of the reformists. Yalçınkaya describes him as the key figure for the implementation of the Nizam-ı Cedid program.\(^ {2705}\) Like his father, Kocaağazâde Cafer Fevzi Bey, he became a bureaucrat. Cafer Fevzi Bey was a scribe at the Divan-ı Hümayun and was specialized on

\(^{2703}\) It is a long list covering individuals like Mehmed Raşid Efendi, İzzet Mehmed Pasha, Mustafa Reşid Efendi, Mahmud Raif Efendi, İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi, Salihzâde Esad Efendi, Tatarcık Abdullah Molla, Ebubekir Râtıb Efendi, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha, Behiç Efendi, Mustafa Refik Efendi, Ahmed Bey İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Elhac İbrahim Reşid Efendi, Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi, Safi Efendi, Şırdakıbi Ahmed Efendi, Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey, Memiş Efendi, Ebubekir Efendi, Yusuf Ağa and Abdülmatif Efendi.

\(^{2704}\) Mehmed Raşid Efendi (d. 1212/1798) became beylikçi kisedar (1188/1774), divan-ı hümayun beylikçisi (1195/1781) and mektub-ı sadr-ı ali (L 1198/August-September 1784). He was appointed as the Reisülküttab in the year 1212/1787-88. His second appointment to the same post was on 19 M 1207/6 September 1792 and for a third time on 25 S 1212/19 August 1797. For more information see Appendix I.

the French affairs. 2706 Mehmed Raşid Efendi was employed in the same office. Another important figure deserving name particular attention is Ebubekir Ratib Efendi, 2707 who belonged to the receiver (“amedî”) department of Porte and became one of the well-known figures of the reformers, despite his execution. 2708 Elhac İbrahim Reşid Efendi was the son of a minor bureaucrat, İsmail Efendi, paymaster general (“kul katibi”) at mevkufat kalemi. 2709 It seems that Elhac İbrahim Efendi accompanied his father in the same department and thanks to his talents he had the chance to be employed in mektubi-i sadr-i ali. Looking at İbrahim Nesim Efendi, he started his career in the 1770s again in the office of mektubi-i sadr-i ali. 2710 Mahmud Raif Efendi also followed the same path during the early years of his career. We do not have detailed information on the life of Safi Efendi, but we at least know that he was also a divan-i hümâyun scribe. 2711

As might be noticed there is a significant concentration in the amedi and mektubi-i sadr-i ali departments among the above-mentioned figures. The holders of the positions of the latter department served as the assistants of the Reisülküttab. They served the reisülküttab both in foreign and scribal affairs. 2712

The connection with or knowledge on the


2707 Ebubekir Ratib Efendi (d.1214/1799) entered the amedi department. After serving as sipah katibi (1200/1786) and deputy to Reisülküttab (B 1203/April 1789) and in some other posts, he was sent to Vienna as Ottoman envoy (M 1206/September 1791). He was appointed as başmuhasebeci and then as grain superintendent (“zahire nazırı”) and also şıkka- salis defterdar (Ca1208/December 1793). Ratib Efendi became Reisülküttab in the year 1209/1795. For more information, see Appendix I.


2710 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayı, p. 41.

2711 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayı, p. 36.

foreign affairs opened the servants of this office the way to the post of Reisülküttab. But at the turn of the eighteenth century the members of Amedci department began to fill this position. The amedci or amedi wrote the final copies of the reports of the Reisülküttab and of the steward of the Grand Vizier (“Kahya Bey”) and also prepared the final copies of telhis sent by the grand vizier to the sultan. The connections with the foreign affairs earned the amedi oda a prestigious position during the reigns of Abdülhamid I and Selim III. Therefore, the Amedî gradually became the office where the reisülküttabs were mostly recruited.

Some of the above-mentioned bureaucrats seem to have been close to Halil Hamid Pasha or his followers. Two key figures were Ismail Raif Pasha and Mehmed Raşid Efendi, both of whom stood close to Halil Hamid faction during the reign of Abdülhamid I. Raşid Efendi’s rise starts during İsmail Raif Pasha’s employment as the deputy to reisülküttab in 1768-69. Raşid Efendi was later appointed as the purse-bearer of the

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2713 The office of the reisülküttab was the second most important office in the Porte (Bab-i Asafi), responsible with the scribal services. From the seventeenth century onwards, it began to deal with foreign affairs as well and gained preminence with the establishment of permanent embassies. It had four subordinate departments under its authority, namely beylikci, amedi, ruus and tahvil. See Doğan, Muzaffer, Sadaret Kethüdalığı (1730-1836), Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, (Marmara University, İstanbul, 1995), p. 5.

2714 Lalor, A. Bernard, “Promotion Patterns of Ottoman Bureaucratic Statesmen, From Lale Devri Until the Tanzimat”, İ.Ü.E.F. Gündem Adanalı Araştırmaları Dergisi, I (1972), pp. 80-4; Findley, Bureaucratic Reform, p. 78.

2715 Lalor, “Promotion Patterns”, p. 81; Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdalığı, p. 13.


2717 İsmail Raif Pasha (b.1138/1725-26- d. 1199/1785) was the son of Malatyali İbrahim Pasha (d. 1171/1758). He became sipahiler katibi (1172/1758-59) and silahdar katibi (1174/1760-1). Raif Pasha was appointed as the director of the Imperial Mint in the year 1176/1762-3 and remained in this office until 1179/1765-66. He was later employed as ruzname-i evvel and remained in İstanbul as the deputy to Reisülküttab in 1182/1786-9, during the Russian campaign. His appointment as the Reisülküttab was on Ca 1188/August 1774. He was deposed and exiled to Cyprus in C 1190/July August 1776. After release, Raif Efendi was promoted to the governorship of Egypt with the rank of vizier. It was followed by the governorships of Crete (1195/1781) and the Morea (L 1196/September 1782). On Ra 1198/February 1784, he was appointed as the muhabiz of Belgrade and then Eğriboz. He was executed in 1199/1785. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. III, pp. 837-8.
chancery office ("beylikçi kesedari") (1774). After serving in the same office for seven years he was promoted to the position of the president of the chancery ("divan-i hümayun beylikçisi").2718 During the grand vizierate of Halil Hamid Pasha, he became the corresponding secretary ("mektupçu") (11 August 1784) and was dismissed few months after the execution of the famous grand vizier (13 May 1785).2719 İsmail Raif Pasha, on the other hand, secured the appointment of Ebubekir Ratib Efendi to the post of scribe to amedî and later as the amedî.2720 During the reign of Abdulhamid I, Ebubekir Ratib Efendi provided the contact between Prince Selim and Halil Hamid Pasha.2721 Ratib Efendi was appointed as the writing tutor ("yazı hocası") to Prince Selim in the 1780s.2722 İbrahim Nesim Efendi was another figure who enjoyed the patronage of Mehmed Raşid Efendi.2723 Thanks to his patronage, he managed to gain access to new networks and more importantly to stately affairs. He was a confidant of Raşid Efendi and was assaigned with the task of preparing some of his secret drafts.2724 Mahmud Raif Efendi, too, owed his rise to his patron, Reisülküttab Mehmed Raşid Efendi, who secured his appointment as the chief scribe ("ser katibi") to Yusuf Agah Efendi, the Ottoman envoy to London.2725 After his


2719 Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 110. He was reappointed to the same post on 9 February 1786.

2720 Uzunçarşılı, “Ebubekir Ratib Efendi”, p. 50; Yeşil, Ratib Efendi, p. 29.


2722 Yeşil, Ratib Efendi, p. 34.

2723 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 42.

2724 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 42.

2725 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 31; Beydilli-Şahin, Mahmud Raif Efendi, p. 21. Yusuf Agah Efendi (b.1169/1755-56-d.1239/1824) was the son of Sülleyman Penah Efendi. He entered the mektubi-i sadr-i ali department (1188/1774) and became mevkafati (1195/1781). After various posts, he was appointed as the Ottoman envoy to London in the year 1207/1792. He became the director of the imperial dockyards ("tersane emini"), matbah emini and again tersane emini (1221/1806). Agah Efendi was then promoted as the rikab-i hümayun defterdar (1222/1807) and dismissed on 5 Ra 1223/1 May 1808. He became baruthane naziri (1224/1809) and rikab kethüda (20 Ca 1224/3 July 1809), followed by cebehane naziri and kethüda to Hibetullah Sultan. He was later
return from England, Mahmud Raif Efendi also enjoyed the patronage of İbrahim Nesim Efendi. 2726

As might be seen from the above details, some of the bureaucrats of the Selimian era found a strong patronage of either Halil Hamid Pasha or his followers. Halil Hamid Pasha is not only famous for his reform efforts, but also for his struggle for power against Grand Admiral Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha. Both were powerful figures during the reign of Abdulhamid I and celebrated as prominent military reformers. 2727 At the same time they were the leaders of two rival factions during the same era. Halil Hamid Pasha represented the bureaucracy, while the latter military. The former entered the office of imperial chancery (“divan kalemi”) but was later admitted to the amedî department thanks to the help of Raif İsmail Bey, the director of the Imperial Mint at the time. 2728 A detailed sketch of the members and struggles of these two factions is not yet available. 2729 For a long time there existed a relative balance of power between these two cliques. The relative equilibrium was later upset in favour of Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha after the unsuccessful attempt of Halil Hamid Pasha to enthrone Prince Selim in 1785. His collaborators were Şeyhülislam Dürrizâde Ataullah Efendi, 2730 İsmail Raif Pasha and Yahya Ağası, 2731 a former

appointed as sadaret kethuda on Ca 1226/July 1811, followed by a second appointment in the year 1232/1817. Two years later he became tersane emini and then matbah emini. He died on 2 Ca 1239/4 January 1824. For more details, see Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. V, p. 1685.


2727 But it seems that it was Halil Hamid Pasha upheld a reforming ideal. Sarıcaoğlu, Sultan I. Abdülhamid, p. 188.


2729 For a short table showing the followers of these two factions, see Neumann, “Decision-Making Without Decision-Makers”, p. 33.

2730 Dürrizâde Mehmed Ataullah Efendi (b. 1142/1729-20-d.6 B 1199/15 May 1785) was the son of Şeyhülislam Mustafa Efendi. He became müderris (1148/1735-36), then the molla of Salonika (1172/1758-59) and obtained Mecca paye (1176/1762-63). He was appointed as İstanbul judge on Ra 1183/July 1769. On R 1188/June 1774, Ataullah Efendi became Anadolu kazasker but was dismissed on S 1189/April 1775. He was appointed as kazasker of Rumelia twice, first on 25 C 1193/10 April 1779 and second in 1197/1783. His promotion as the seyhülislam took place on 17 C 1197/20 May 1783, but was soon
Janissary ağa. According to Uzunçarşılı, the motive that led Halil Hamid Pasha to conspire against the reigning Sultan was his conviction that he needed a new and powerful Sultan that would back him in his reform attempts. To this end, Prince Selim was a good candidate. However, Halil Hamid Pasha’s intention was revealed to Abdülhamid I by Cezayirli Hasan Pasha, Ahmed Nazif Efendi and İbrahim Efendi, the former Şeyhülislam, in other words, by the rival faction. This was followed by prosecutions against Halil Hamid Pasha and his collaborators. The Grand Vizier was dismissed and exiled to Gelibolu. Though he was later promoted to the governorship of Jidda, he nevertheless was executed at Bozca Ada on 17 C 1199/27 April 1785, before his arrival at Jidda. İsmail Raif Pasha, and Yahya Ağa were executed around the same time, while Dürrişâde Ataullah Efendi was exiled to Gelibolu where he later died. The prosecutions did not stop, and


2732 Uzunçarşılı, “Halil Hamid Paşa”, p. 239. See also Sarıcaoğlu, Sultan I. Abdülhamid, pp. 147-150.

2733 İvaz Mehmed Paşazâde İbrahim Beyefendi (b. 1132/1719-d. 1212/1797) was employed as the judge of Yenişehir-i Fener (1153/1740), Bursa (1163/1749) and then of Mecca (1165/1751). He became İstanbul judge with th Anadolu paye (1173/1759), became Anadolu kazasker (1175/1761) and then the kazasker of Rumelia. He served as şeyhülislam from 23 B 1188/29 September 1774 to 1 C 1189/30 July 1775. His second appointment to the same post was on 20 Ca 1199/31 March 1785. After dismissal on 14 Ş 1199/22 June 1785, he was exiled to Ankara and was released after the accession of Selim III. See Altunsu, Osmanlı Şeyhülislamları, p. 148; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. III, p. 741.


2736 Uzunçarşılı, “Halil Hamid Paşa”, p. 245.
Safranbolulu İzzet Mehmed Pasha, Halil Hamid Pasha’s son-in-law and the director of the Imperial Mint, was also dismissed.

Gazi Hasan Pasha’s influence became unrivaled greatly after the elimination of Halil Hamid Pasha. Yet, this was to change after the rise of Selim III. According to Uzunçarşılı, Selim III did not like Cezayirli Hasan Pasha and Koca Yusuf Pasha. Under the patronage of Hasan Pasha, the latter had served first as the governor of the Morea. Hasan Pasha also secured the promotion Koca Yusuf Pasha as the Grand Vizier on 23 Ra 1200/24 January 1786. But Selim III dismissed Koca Yusuf Pasha only one and a half month (13 N 1203/8 June 1789) after his accession and appointed Gazi Hasan Pasha serasker of Özi. This meant that the new Sultan wished to send both figures away from the capital. After becoming Grand Vizier, Cezayirli Hasan Pasha (3.12.1789-30.3.1790) tried to appoint Koca Yusuf Pasha as the grand admiral but without success. Koca Yusuf Pasha’s second appointment as the grand vizier was by the advice of Prussian king, the Ottoman ally against Russians. Uzunçarşılı comments that since Koca Yusuf Pasha was a pro-Hamidian figure, Selim III was suspicious that he could enthrone Prince Mustafa, who was

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2737 İzzet Mehmed Pasha (d.1227/1812) was born in Safranbolu. He became the director of the Mint in Ş 1192/September 1778 and then was appointed as kethüda to Şah Sultan. He was dismissed on 3 B 1193/17 July 1779. He later became prefect (“sehremini”) (L 1193/October 1779) and tersane emini (25 Ca 1200/26 March 1786). After serving as governor in various cities and in some other posts, he was appointed as the grand vizier on 25 Ra 1209/20 October 1794. He was deposed on 18 Ra 1213/30 August 1798 and exiled to Sakiz and then Manisa. He died on 12 N 1227/19 September 1812. See Hadika-yı Vüzerä, pp. 47-49; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanlı, vol. III; p. 849.

2738 Uzunçarşılı, “Halil Hamid Paşa”, p. 245; Sarıcaoğlu, Sultan I. Abdülhamid, pp. 152-3

2739 Uzunçarşılı, “Cezayirli Hasan Paşa”, p. 22; Sarıcaoğlu, Sultan I. Abdülhamid, p. 126.

2740 Uzunçarşılı, “Koca Yusuf Paşa”, p. 236.

2741 Taylesanizâde, Tarih, vol.I, p. 370; Uzunçarşılı, “Koca Yusuf Paşa”, p. 237. After the deposition, he was appointed as the Serasker of Vidin.

already twelve years old in 1791. On the other hand, it was only after the enthronement of Selim III that the members of Halil Hamid factions could regain their former influence to a certain degree. İzzet Mehmed Pasha, the son-in-law of Halil Hamid Pasha, was appointed as the Grand Vizier in 1209/1794.

As far as our aim is concerned, the crucial point is whether the factional strife between Halil Hamid and Cezayirli Hasan Pasha continued during the reign of Selim III by their followers. More importantly there is the question of whether this factional strife might be a factor in the May 1807 Rebellion. The available details prevent us to be too optimistic in that respect. Yet, there are two little, but important, evidence which suggests that it would be hard disregard such a possibility. One example is related to Elhac Ibrahim Reşid Efendi who stood close to the Halil Hamid clique. One contemporary author, Mustafa Necib Efendi, claims that there existed tension between Cezayirli Hasan Pasha and Elhac İbrahim Efendi. Drawing on the same source, Cevdet Pasha comments that Cezayirli Hasan Pasha was a mortal foe (“hasm-i can”) of İbrahim Efendi. Unfortunately, Mustafa Necib does not explain the reason of the enmity between the two, but underlines that it was an everlasting one. It seems that İbrahim Efendi was always prudent (“temkinli”) towards Gazi Hasan Pasha. For instance, upon hearing the promotion of the Pasha as the Grand Vizier, he was surprised and even frightened. In order to escape from the wrath of the

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2744 Uzunçarşılı, “Halil Hamid Paşa”, p. 245.
2745 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 57.
2747 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 57. Above story reminds the problem between İshak Bey and Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha. İshak Bey was a descendant of Princess Safiye Sultan but more famous for Selim’s “prince envoy”. He served Cezayirli Hasan Pasha for two years, but aroused the enmity of Grand Vizier Cezayirli Hasan Pasha and lived an adventurous life outside the Empire. On 31 July 1786 he secretly went to Paris by the order of Prince Selim and returned after his rise. He later served as interpreter of the fleet under the patronage of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. For more information, see Beydilli, Kemal, “Şehzade Elçisi Safiyesultanızade İshak Bey”, İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi, 3 (1999), pp. 73-81.
Pasha, he secured himself the position of *sürre emini.* While he was away from the capital, Hasan Pasha died at Şumnu. After returning to İstanbul, İbrahim Reşid Efendi was appointed as the chief of the accounting office ("*başmuhasebeci*") and as *sadaret kethüda.* Looking at the other faction, there is an interesting detail about Musa Pasha, the famous *kaimmakam* and considered in general as an anti-reformist figure. In an undated document, it is noted that Musa Pasha’s wife, Münevvere/Münire Hanım, was the former wife of Hasan Pasha, a former grand vizier. Unfortunately the document does not provide any further detail on the identity of this Hasan Pasha. At least for the reign of Selim III, we know that three Hasan Pashas occupied the position of the grand vizierate: Kethüda Cenaze Hasan Pasha (07.07.1789-03.12.1789), Cezayirli Hasan Pasha (03.12.1789-30.03.1790) and Çelebizade Şerif Hasan Pasha (30.03.1790-15.02.1791). If Hasan Pasha in question is Cezayirli, it might shed a light in the transfer of the struggle between Halil Hamid and Cezayirli Hasan into the reign of Selim III. We should also underline an unknown point about Mustafa Reşid Efendi. Thanks to the studies of Yalçınkaya, we learn that Mustafa Reşid Efendi enjoyed the patronage of Koca Yusuf Pasha and adopted his reform-minded view. As will described below, Mustafa Reşid was one of few “reformists” that were able to escape death during the Rebellion.

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2748 Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi*, p. 57. “*Sürre*” are the gifts sent to Mecca by the sultan annually. “*Sürre emini*” was the official entrusted with the delivery of the *sürre*.


2750 B.O.A. D. DRB. MH. 63/62 (4 M 1224/14 February 1809); B.O.A. MAD 9755, p. 178 (4 M 1224/14 February 1809). Both documents are related the petition of the Münevvere/Münire Hanım on the delivery of a “*han*”, she had bought from the “*tereke baha*” of Hasan Pasha. She explained that the “*han*” belonged to her, but was confiscated by central authority among the other possessions of Musa Pasha.

2751 Uzunçarşılı informs that Cezayirli Hasan Pasha married Emine Hanım, the daughter of Hacı Osman Ağā, his master. He had a daughter, Habibe Hanım. After the death of Pasha, the residence at Kuzguncuk and seashore residence at Öküz Limanı were transferred to Emine Hanım and thus not confiscated by the state. See Uzunçarşılı, “Hasan Paşa”, 322. Unfortunately, the author does not inform whether Hasan Pasha had another wife.

The relevance of Halil Hamid Pasha and his faction to the developments of the Selimian era does not end here. This faction has another important member who was a member of the ulema class, namely İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi. He was the son of İsmail Raif Pasha. İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi was one of the strongest proponents of the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms. He is usually considered as an exemplary figure of “reformist” ulema.\textsuperscript{2753} As we discuss later, some contemporary sources present him not only as a reformist but also one of the leaders of the reform program. Therefore, it seems that İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi was one of the key figures in the “reformist” cadre that was able to perpetuate the legacy of his father and Halil Hamid Pasha’s reform policies. Some contemporary authors display a negative attitude towards him. Asım, for instance, comments that he was an arrogant figure.\textsuperscript{2754} Confirming these claims, Câbî states that during the negotiations with the Austrians İbrahim İsmet behaved as if he was the primary delegate.\textsuperscript{2755} Ebubekir Efendi celebrates his death with the following words “\textit{all people, whether noble or common, were saved from his lofty arrogance when he passed away and laid down his magnificent prayer rug towards the afterlife.}”\textsuperscript{2756}

Another member of the ulema, mentioned as a member this group, is Tatarcı Abdullah Molla. He is known submitting a reform proposal which is usually celebrated as the most important one. This proposal contains a wide range of issues including military and religious matters, economy, taxation system and bureaucracy. His comments on the existing military system suggest that he was aware of the inadequate degree of professionalization of the traditional military system. He also advised translation of technical works from European languages and benefiting from foreign instructors. In his report, he proposed to benefit from the incomes of the pious endowments in order to


\textsuperscript{2756} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, pp. 9a-9b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 106.
finance the military campaigns.\textsuperscript{2757} As to Kapan Naibi Abdüllatif Efendi, it is striking that he was the only member of the \textit{ulema} who was included in the execution list and lost his life a short time after the Rebellion. Salihzâde Esad Efendi and Ömer Hulusi Efendi were other members of the \textit{ulema} that seem to close to the reformists. Esad Efendi also submitted a reform proposal. The most important suggestion in his proposal was that there should be balance between the number of the Janissaries and their burden on the treasury.\textsuperscript{2758} Even though there are some assertions in some of the contemporary sources that Salihzâde Esad Efendi was included in the execution list prepared during the Rebellion, we do not have serious evidence to prove the claim.\textsuperscript{2759} Veliefendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi was a member of the \textit{ulema} known as an advocate of the reforms. Saint-Denys depicts Veliefendizâde as an ardent champion of the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} program as well as other policies of Selim III. Like Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Veliefendizâde was an old companion of the Sultan. Indeed, the father of Veliefendizâde presented to Mustafa III a beautiful Circassian girl who became the mother of Selim, Mihrişah, therefore was connected to Selim III with personal ties.\textsuperscript{2760} It seems that Mihrişah Sultan continued to favour the son of his master which helped Veliefendizâde to accumulate great political and economic power.\textsuperscript{2761} According to Saint-Denys, Mehmed Emin Efendi’s death in 1220/1805 was a


\textsuperscript{2758} For a copy of his memorandum, see Öğreten, \textit{Islahat Layihaları}, pp. 39-40, 59-60; Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VI, p.31.


\textsuperscript{2761} Pouqueville, \textit{Travels through Morea}, p. 143.
great calamity for the Empire. Heyd also asserts that Velifendizâde was a fervent follower of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*. He also submitted a reform proposal in which he draws attention to the need for providing discipline among the Janissaries.

The third group that can be studied under the category of the reformists consists of palace officials, such as Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi and Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi. Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was the most famous prominent figure among this group. As shall be seen hereinafter, he played a crucial role in the internal politics until his death. At the time of the accession of Selim III, he was a member of *hane-i hassa* and then promoted to *mabeyn* and later appointed as *başçukdar*. From one entry in *Dış Ruzname* of Selim III, it appears that his power was already great but increased especially after being promoted to the last post and his marriage with Esma Sultan. Mabeynci Kör/Yekçekım Ahmed was the son of Halil Pasha, who became vizier after serving as the superintendent of the treasury (“*hazine kethüda*”). After the death of his father, Ahmed Bey and his brother İsmail were accepted to the Enderun during the reign of Mustafa III. It seems that the brothers served Prince Selim during his childhood. With the accession


2763 Heyd, “The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization”, p.80. See also Özkul, *III. Selim Döneminde Osmanlı Uleması*, p. 179.

2764 For a copy of his memorandum, see Öğreten, *Islahat Layihaları*, pp. 41-2; Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih*, vol. VI, p. 31.

2765 Uzunçarşıltı, “*Dış Ruzname*”, p. 625.


2767 Halil Pasha (d. 1172/1759) was the son of *Damad-ı Şehriyari* Moralı Hasan Pasha. After being educated in the Palace, he became *hazine-i hümâyun kethüda* (1162/1749) and then governor of Trikala (*Tırala*) (17 Z 1165/16 October 1752). He was employed in the governorship of Eğriboz, Belgrade, Hotin *muhafız* (M 1169/October 1755) with the addition of Özi in the same year. He died on Ca 1172/January 1759. See Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. II, pp. 582-3.


of Adbülhamid I, both seem to have fallen into disfavour and Ismail was expelled away from the palace ("taşra ihrac"). The status of Ahmed Bey improved with the rise of Selim III, becoming a confidant of the Sultan and appointed as the chamberlain ("mabeynci").

A conspicuous character was Sırkatibi Ahmed, who was the son of an archer ("okçu, yaycı"). He also continued his father’s path until being discovered by Selim III. According to Ebubekir Efendi, when he was young he used to collect the arrows of the archers. It seems that Ahmed Efendi also built relations with the elite who frequented Ok Meydanı. He was later discovered by Selim III who was very interested in the art of archery. Consequently, Ahmed Bey was admitted to the Palace and later he became mabeynci. For a long time he served as the sırkatibi. Mustafa Necib argues that his power and influence was even more than a grand vizier. Another source asserts that he was the most powerful figure in the palace and without his knowledge and consultation nothing would be realized. Câbî makes a similar comment by claiming that not only the minor officials at the Palace but even Darüssaade Ağa and Silahdar Ağa were afraid of Ahmed Bey.

The reformist group were composed not only of the bureaucrats and some members of the ulema. As we have seen above, there were important courtiers in the same category. Moreover, it is clear that the bureaucracy was not the only source of power during the

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2771 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 55.
2772 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 53.
2773 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 16b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 120: “Fi’l-asl yaycı esnafından ... nâm bir şecere-i me’lûnun nutfe-i habîsesinden hâsîl .... unfuvân-ı şebâb-ı emredisinde gündüzlerde Ok Meydânı’nda kemânkeşler üçer beşer päre vermeleriyle oklara devşirir ve gece hânelerinde yatur erâzîl-i nâsdan...”
2775 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 53.
2776 Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 102.
period. In fact, the most successful figures of the period were the ones were able to maintain connections, in one way or another, both with the bureaucracy and the palace. İbrahim Nesim Efendi and Yusuf Ağâ are the most famous examples of such a double connection between the administration and the palace. Yusuf Ağâ was already an influential and wealthy person serving as the director of the Imperial Mint and the kethüda to Esma Sultan. Yet his appointment as the kethüda of Valide Sultan was a turning point in his career. The appointment took place on 18 S 1205/27 October 1790, upon the death of Mahmud Bey, the former kethüda. In the original copy of the order, it was stipulated that Yusuf Ağâ was to continue his post in the Mint. Yet, he was clever enough to preserve his connections with Esma Sultan by securing the appointment of his brother, Ömer Ağâ, as the new kethüda of Esma Sultan. Therefore, Yusuf Ağâ had very close connections with the Palace through Esma and Valide Sultan, a situation which Mustafa Necib describes as Yusuf Ağâ’s “getting the control of state”. In addition to that, his other brother, Mustafa, was managing the affairs of Yusuf Ziya Pasha. As might be recalled, we have previously referred to an article in The Times newspaper according to which Yusuf Ağâ was the lover of Valide Sultan and consequently she entrusted the whole

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2778 B.O.A. A. SKT 41/35 (20 S 1205/29 October 1790); Ahmed Cavid, Hadika-yi Vekayi, p. 142; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 66; Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol I, p. 33.

2779 B.O.A. HAT 55709 (undated). For a copy of the order, see Ahmed Cavid, Hadika-yi Vekayi, p. 142.

2780 B.O.A. A. SKT 41/35 (20 S 1205/29 October, 1790); Ahmed Cavid, Hadika-yi Vekayi, pp. 142-3; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 66.

2781 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 66.

2782 B.O.A. E. A. E. (III. Selim) 19174 (24 R 1213/5 October 1798). He does not seem to have an official title since he is referred as “Mustafa birader-i kethüda-yi valide sultan”. In another document the same expression is repeated. See B.O.A. A.E. (III. Selim) 9981 (undated). As might be recalled, we have already mentioned a letter written by a certain Mustafa to an unknown correspondent. See B.O.A. C.AS. 50601 (11 R 1222/18 June 1807). According to Uzunçarşılı it might be a letter of kapı kethüda of Yusuf Ziya Paşa to his master. If his suggestion is correct, then Mustafa should be the brother of Yusuf Ağâ.
government to him. There is no way to be sure of the validity of this assertion. Even if untrue, it might help us to envisage the strong connection between the two and the power accumulated in the hands of Yusuf Ağa. If we take into consideration the influence of Valide Sultan over the Sultan, the power of Yusuf Ağa might easily be imagined.

As for İbrahim Nesim Efendi, he was another figure, enjoying good connections both with the palace and the bureaucracy. He was promoted to the position of sadaret kethüda on 8 S 1218/30 May 1803 followed by his appointment as the kethüda to Beyhan Sultan. Yusuf Ağa’s last promotion secured his relations with Selim III. This post opened him new connections and networks, particularly within the palace. Mustafa Necib Efendi asserts that his appointment as the kethüda to Beyhan Sultan provided him the chance to enter the presence of the Sultan frequently and to have frequent conversations with him. Especially after the death of Valide Sultan, not only the status of Beyhan Sultan but also that of İbrahim Nesim Efendi rose promptly. Following the death of Mihrişah Sultan, Selim III transferred his affiliation and trust directly to Beyhan Sultan and indirectly to İbrahim Nesim Efendi. The Sultan’s confidence for İbrahim Nesim Efendi was the most important factor that helped him keep his power even after his dismissal from the position of sadaret kethüda following the Edirne Incident. İbrahim Nesim continued to frequent the Porte and to deal with state affairs. Mustafa Necib comments that after this dismissal, his prestige grew rather being diminished. As might be recalled, during the Rebellion there was a pressure over Beyhan Sultan to deliver İbrahim Nesim Efendi who was

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2783 The Times, Monday, August 3 1807, pg. 3, issue 7115, col. C (From the Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8).

2784 Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdahlığı, p. 36.

2785 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 43.

2786 From Arbunthont to Spencer, Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PR0, 78-52; doc. no. 77). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.

2787 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 44.

2788 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 44.
suspected to have sought shelter in her residence, which proves the strong connection between the two.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 7521 (undated); Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 37a.}

There are some figures among the so-called reformist group who belonged neither to the \textit{ulema} class nor to the bureaucracy or maintained close connections with the palace. Among them, the most striking figure is Ebubekir Efendi. His life is interesting in the sense that he was an illiterate farmer from Safranbolu, but managed to rise to the office of the director of the Imperial Mint.\footnote{Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 37.} He had started as a porter in the Mint, but struggled upwards, and eventually replaced Ahmed Şakir Efendi as the director (1206/1791). He was apparently a very hardworking person, but also clever enough to establish good connections. For instance, Ahmed Şakir Efendi was his son-in-law.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53032 (undated); Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 38.} Ebubekir Efendi also secured the appointment of one of his followers as the assayer ("\textit{sahib-i ayar}"), a position which vacant after his promotion.\footnote{Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 37.} He was among the very affluent figures of the time.\footnote{Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 143.} Even Ebubekir Efendi refers to him as "\textit{Deli Zengin Bekir}".\footnote{Eubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 16a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 119.}

Most of the figures that we studied above were the sons of minor figures or people from obscure origins. Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was a former Circassian slave, Ebubekir Ratıb Efendi the son of a minor \textit{ilmiye} member, Elhac İbrahim Efendi son of a \textit{kul katibi}, İbrahim Nesim Efendi son of an \textit{imam}, Mahmud Raif Efendi son of a grain superintendent ("\textit{ambar emini}"), and Mustafa Reşid Efendi son of a \textit{gedikli zaim}.\footnote{Beşir Süleyman, \textit{Sicill-i Osmanî}, vol V, p. 1383.} Yet, Ebubekir Efendi was the most obscure one among them, being the son of a farmer from Safranbolu. As for Yusuf

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\footnote{2789 B.O.A. HAT 7521 (undated); Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 37a.}

\footnote{2790 Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 37.}

\footnote{2791 B.O.A. HAT 53032 (undated); Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 38.}

\footnote{2792 Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 37.}

\footnote{2793 Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 143.}

\footnote{2794 Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 16a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 119.}

\footnote{2795 Mehmed Süreyya, \textit{Sicill-i Osmanî}, vol V, p. 1383.}
Ağa, he was from Crete and the son of a poor craftsman. Only İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi, Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey and Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi were the sons of Pashas.

If most members of the reformist group were from minor origins, then how did they manage to rise to such important positions? It is clear that their capabilities alone cannot account their rise. It seems that most of them owed their rise either to marriage alliances or patronage system. As seen above, Ebubekir Efendi secured his gradual promotion from the position of a porter to that of a director in the Mint only due to his talents but thanks to his good relations with the former directors. Ebubekir Râbi Efendi owed his rise to İsmail Raif Pasha and Halil Hamid Pasha. Elhac İbrahim Efendi’s access to the bureaucracy seems to have been secured by his father. Apparently Elhac İbrahim Efendi accompanied his father in the department and his talents helped him to find a position in the mektubî-i sadr-i ali department. As being the son of a minor bureaucrat, he does not appear to have had the chance of rapid promotion, however working the above-mentioned department, he established relationship with İmamizâde Elhac Mustafa Efendi, the reisülküttab of the time, by marrying his daughter. This marriage secured his promotion to the office of serhalife, mektubcu, silahdar kitabet and mektubcu for the second time. İbrahim Efendi also was the brother-in-law of mektubî-i sadr-i ali Esseyid Abdullah Birri Efendi, who he later replaced him in the same position. In a similar manner, Mustafa Reşid Efendi married

2796 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 65.

2797 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 57. Hacı Mustafa Efendi was appointed as Reisülküttab on 29 Za 1197/17 October 1783. He died on 15 Ca 1198/6 April 1784. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. IV, pp. 1166-7.


2799 Taylesanizâde, Tarih, vol. I, p. 198; B.O.A. HAT 53098 (undated); Edib, Tarih, p.100. Abdullah Birri Efendi (d.1212/1798) was appointed as the official charged with drafting the documents of importance (“mühimmenüvis”) (1182/1768-69) and then serhalife. He was employed as mektubi-i sadr-i ali on C 1192/July 1778. His rapid rise continued with his promotion to the office of Reisülküttab (M 1204/October 1789) and the senior delegate (“birincî murahhas”) during the negotiations with Russia. After his dismissal from the post of reisülküttab (M 1207/August-September 1792), Abdullah Efendi was appointed as ruzname-i evvel, and muhasebe-i evvel. In the year 1209/1794-95, he became kethüda to Beyhan Sultan and kethüda-i sadr-i ali on 14 Ca 1209/7 December 1794. On L 1210/April 1796, he was appointed as tevkii but later dismissed and exiled to
the sister of Yağlıkçızâde Emin Pasha. His son-in-law was Gümrükçü Mustafa Beyzâde and once Reşid Efendi requested the appointment of Mustafa Bey as one of the bureau chieffs in the Porte ("hacegan"), but his request was refused by the Sultan under the pretext that Mustafa Bey was too young. Reşid Efendi’s another son-in-law was Feyzi Abdurrahman Bey. As remarked above, Ebubekir Efendi’s son-in-law was Ahmed Şakir Efendi. Needless to say, the marriage of Hüseyin Pasha to Esma Sultan made him a member of the imperial family. Abdüllatif Efendi was the son-in-law of Keçecizâde Salih Efendi. When the latter was appointed as the superintendent of grain and provisions ("hububat naziri"), he secured the appointment of Abdüllatif Efendi as the...


2800 Taylesanizâde, Tarih, vol. I, p. 68. Yağlıkçızâde Emin Mehmed Pasha (d. 1183/1769) was admitted the office of mektubî-i sadr-i ali. In S 1175/September 1761, he became mektubî and three years later appointed as reisülküttab. After serving in various posts, he became sadaret kaimmakam (8 Ra 1182/23 July 1768). On 8 C 1182/20 October 1768, he was appointed as the grand vizier. Emin Pasha was deposed on 9 R 1183/12 August 1769 and exiled to Dimetoka, where he died. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. II, p. 479.

2801 B.O.A. HAT 8570 (undated).

2802 Feyzi Abdurrahman Bey (d. 1235/1819) was the son of Selanikli Seyyid Mustafa Pasha (d. 1212/1797). After being admitted to the hacegan class, he was appointed to the offices of nişancı (1224/1809), baruthane naziri (1225/1810), tersane emini (1228/1814) and director of the Imperial Mint (1229/1814) respectively. He became sadaret kethîda (Za 1234/August 1819), but was later dismissed and banished to Dimetoka (17 Za 1234/5 September 1819), where he died on 2 Ra 1235/19 December 1819. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. II, p. 526.


2804 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 69. Keçecizâde Salih Mehmed Efendi (d.1215/1800-1) was a müderris and became the judge of Salonika in 1198/1784. With the establishment of Grain Administration ("hububat nezareti") he became the head of its directorate. He was appointed as the judge-advocate of the army ("ordu kadısi") in M 1205/September-October 1790, and then obtained the İstanbul paye. He was dismissed on 27 C 1205/3 March 1791 and exiled to Konya remaining there until Ra 1207/October-November 1792. About two years later, he was exiled to Gelibolu (M 1209/August 1794). On M 1212/July 1797, he obtained the Anadolu paye, one year later was appointed as the Rumeli kazasker. Salih Mehmed Efendi died in 1215/1800-1. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. V, p. 1468; Ahmed Cavid, Hadika-yi Vekayi, p. 245.
Kapan-ı Dakik naib.\textsuperscript{2805} Elhac İbrahim Efendi’s daughter married Mehmed Sadık Efendi,\textsuperscript{2806} a müderris and the son of Yusuf Ağa, which brought about a marital alliance between the powerful families of the Selimian era.\textsuperscript{2807}

The above examples strongly suggest that the \textit{intisab} system and marriage alliances were an important part of promotion system in Ottoman political life throughout the era under question. Carter Findley argues that among the scribal officials of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, the \textit{intisab} or patron-client relationship was a significant factor in promotion patterns.\textsuperscript{2808} This also underlines the importance of informal relations in social mobility. The \textit{intisab} system was very crucial especially when there were many candidates for the same offices and many did not have a chance to advance further. Under such conditions, either family ties or patronage networks turned out to be a decisive factor for promotion.\textsuperscript{2809}

6.2.1.2. All Reformists?

As remarked in several cases, the May 1807 Rebellion is considered in mainstream historiography as reaction to the reforms and as well as the reformists. Therefore, one expects that most of the reformers of the period would be put to death, and all those

\textsuperscript{2805} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi}, p. 69.

\textsuperscript{2806} Mehmed Sadık Efendi (d. 1232/1717) started his \textit{ilmîye} career on 1 M 1209/29 July 1794. On 14 B 1219/20 October 1804, he obtained \textit{musîla-i} Süleymaniye (preparatory level for the Sahîn-ı Seman medreses) and then appointed to the Nuri Osmani medrese (Z 1228/November 1813). He became the judge of Üsküdar on 1 B 1230/9 July 1815 and dismissed one year later. After serving in various judgeships he died in 1250/1834. See Arzu Güldüşüren, \textit{19. \c{Y}üzy\={i}l \c{I}lk \c{Y}arısında Tarık Defterlerine Göre İlmîye Ricali}, unpublished M.A. Thesis, (Marmara Üniversitesi: İstanbul: 2004), pp.115-116.

\textsuperscript{2807} B.O.A. MAD 9755, p. 34 (21 Z 1222/ 21 Z 1808); Mehmed Süreyya, \textit{Sicill-i Osmanî}, vol. III, p. 757. The name of his daughter was Şerife Ayşe Hanım. Elhac İbrahim Efendi had a son, İsmail Zühdü Bey, and a brother, Mehmed Bey.

\textsuperscript{2808} Findley, \textit{Bureaucratic Reform}, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{2809} Lalor, \textit{“Promotion Patterns”}, p. 80.
murdered would be reformists or at least proponents of the reforms. But as shall be demonstrated immediately below, it is hard to substantiate such expectations. At this point, it might be useful to remind names of the figures included in the execution list, submitted by the rebels to the center: Bostancıbaşı Hasan Şakir, Şirkatibi Ahmed Efendi, İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Tersane Emini Hacı İbrahim Efendi,2810 Mabeynci Ahmed Bey, Rikab Kethüdası Memiş Efendi, Rikab Reisi Safi Efendi, İrad-ı Cedid Defterdarı Ahmed Bey, Kapan Naibi Abdüllatif Efendi, Darbhanı Eminı Ebubekir Bey and Valide Sultan Kethüdası Yusuf Ağa.2811 To this long list we should also add Mahmud Raif Efendi. Though he was killed during the initial phase of the Rebellion, it is almost certain that he would have been included in the list if he had survived.2812

Elhac İbrahim Efendi is the only figure in the above list who was entrusted with duties directly connected with the Nizam-ı Cedid and included in the execution list of the rebels. One contemporary source claims that Elhac İbrahim Efendi was included in the execution list, since he was the one who established the Nizam-ı Cedid.2813 Bostancıbaşı

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2810 Elhac İbrahim Reşid Efendi and İbrahim Nesim Efendi are usually mistaken for one another. It is İbrahim Nesim Efendi, who is more commonly referred to as İbrahim Kethüda/Kahya, since he served as the kethüda-yı sadr-ı ali for long years. Both were very influential and powerful figures of the time. In order to describe the extent of their, power Câbi states that they were much more influential had power greater than Nazif Efendi and Büyük Raşid Efendi. See Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 136. Stanford Shaw confuses İbrahim Nesim and Hacı İbrahim Efendi. The author talks about the life of Elhac İbrahim Efendi under the name of İbrahim Nesim Efendi and says that Nesim’s nickname was “Gizli Sıtma” which in reality belonged to Elhac İbrahim. See Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 90. Immediately afterwards, he mentions Arabacızade İbrahim Efendi, a title which actually belonged to İbrahim Nesim Efendi. See Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 91. According to the same author, the person he talked about under the name of Arabacızade İbrahim Efendi died in a campaign against Russia. See Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 91. However, there is no doubt that both İbrahim Nesim Efendi and Elhac İbrahim Efendi were murdered during the May 1807 Rebellion.

2811 B.O.A. HAT 7537 (undated). A copy of the same document is provided in Hatt-i Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, Istanbul University TY 6975, p. 37a.

2812 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p.13a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 113. The author argues that if he had not been murdered at the outset of the Rebellion, he certainly would have been murdered a few days after. He implies that Raif Efendi would be included in the execution list.

2813 Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 104.
Şakir Bey’s murder was due to the “şapka” problem, which was indirectly related to the *Nizam-i Cedid* issue.\textsuperscript{2814} According to Shaw, Yusuf Ağə was neutral towards the reform policies of Selim III.\textsuperscript{2815} On the other hand, another source asserts that he was a figure open to “improvement” and encouraged by Valide Sultan, he proposed the establishment of regular troops that would oppose the Janissaries. Thereafter, he was appointed as the president of *Divan*, a council of twelve members, chosen by the Sultan himself.\textsuperscript{2816} Cevdet Pasha lists Yusuf Ağə among the advocates of the *Nizam-i Cedid*.\textsuperscript{2817} In one copy the placard (“yafte”) of Yusuf Ağə, he is accused of implementing the *Nizam-Cedid*.\textsuperscript{2818}

According to Saint-Denys, all the people that were murdered during the Rebellion were the partisans of the *Nizam-i Cedid*.\textsuperscript{2819} Yet, the most common accusation towards those included in the execution seems to be death of innocent people during the Edirne Incident.\textsuperscript{2820} In that respect, İbrahim Nesim Efendi was at the head of the list.\textsuperscript{2821} Moreover, it seems that not all of those in the list were killed because of having been reformists. For instance, the execution of Memiş Efendi seems to have been demanded due to accusation of being the serving as the “kapi kethüda” of the Serbians, meaning that he served the interests of the Serbians. Though it is difficult whether the rebels had a certain incident in mind or not, there are two possible examples that might have given such an image. He served as construction engineer of Belgrade Fortress where he might have connections with the Serbians. The second example is the delegation of Memiş Efendi with conducting the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2814} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, p. 104.
\item \textsuperscript{2815} Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 88
\item \textsuperscript{2816} *The Times*, Monday, August 3 1807, pg. 3, issue 7115, col. C (From the Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8).
\item \textsuperscript{2817} Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih*, vol. VIII, p. 31.
\item \textsuperscript{2818} Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 21b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 129.
\item \textsuperscript{2819} Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. II., p. 129.
\item \textsuperscript{2820} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, p. 104.
\item \textsuperscript{2821} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, p. 104.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
negotiations with the representatives of the Serbian rebels. A preliminary agreement was
signed after these negotiations with Peter Itchko, the Serbian delegate sent to the capital on
18 August 1806.\textsuperscript{2822} As for Safi Efendi, there seems almost a consensus among the
contemporary historians that he was innocent and was murdered unjustly or mistakenly.\textsuperscript{2823}
According to Oğulukyan, the rebels demanded the beheading of Reisülküttab Galib Efendi.
He also gives an interesting detail, claiming that Safi Efendi was in fact a figure supporting
the rebels. Therefore, he states, the rebels secretly carried his corpse away to his residence
after the execution.\textsuperscript{2824} On the other hand, the main accusation against Abdüllatif Efendi
was the damage he inflicted upon the economic interests of the merchants of \textit{kapan}.\textsuperscript{2825}
Since most of the \textit{kapan} merchants were of Janissary origin, it aroused hatred against
him.\textsuperscript{2826} Abdüllatif Efendi also was famous for being extremely rich.\textsuperscript{2827} Mustafa Necib
argues that his good relations with the ruling elite created enmity and distance between him
and the chief judges (“mevali”) which was the actual reason behind his death.\textsuperscript{2828} Asım also

\textsuperscript{2822} Börekçi, Çetin, \textit{Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Sırp Meselesi}, (İstanbul: Kutup Yıldızı Yay., 2001), p. 80. Peter Itchko was sent by Kara George, the Serbian leader, to the
capital in order to reach an understanding with the Porte. He was instructed to make an
agreement on the conditions that the Serbians were to pay only fixed taxes, a \textit{muhassil}
would be sent by the Porte to the region only to collect the taxes and finally the dismissal of
Janissaries and \textit{kurjalis} from the region. Itchko and other delegates arrived to the Capital in
August and were summoned to Porte on 10 September 1806. They were informed that their
demands were accepted in principle. They left the city towards the end of the same month.

\textsuperscript{2823} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 16a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 119; Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 10; Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi}, p. 37. According to the last author, he was a victim of the personal hatred of Musa Pasha.

\textsuperscript{2824} Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{2825} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 42.


\textsuperscript{2828} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi}, pp. 50, 69.
states that there existed tension between Abdüllatif Efendi and the ulema.\textsuperscript{2829} As we have studied earlier, he was saved by the Şeyhülislam sent to exile, without being delivered to the rebels. Yet, Asım provides us with a different detail. According to him, there were commercial relations between Abdüllatif and Şemseddin Efendi, whereby the latter owed 25,000 guruş to Abdüllatif Efendi. When the former sought to take refuge to a secret place, he sent the certificate of debt to Şemseddin Efendi. The former asked for help from the latter in return for settling his debt.\textsuperscript{2830} Ebubekir Efendi, the director of the imperial mint, was included in the execution list because of being arrogant to cebecis.\textsuperscript{2831} To sum up, the available clues suggest that not all people in the execution list were murdered because of their reformist identities. Memiş Efendi, Safi Efendi, Abdüllatif Efendi and to some extent Ebubekir Efendi’s murder do not seem to be directly related to their reformist identities or their connections with the reformists.

At this juncture, we should ask the question of why certain reformist people were not murdered or included in the execution list. While those who did not have direct connections with the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} were murdered by the rebels, two important figures who were entrusted to positions directly related to the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} managed to survive. For instance, Mustafa Reşid Efendi and Ahmed Bey were employed as the directors of the \textit{İrad-i Cedid} and the latter was still at this position at the time of the Rebellion. According to Asım, the Janissaries deeply hated Mustafa Reşid Efendi and they were eager to kill him before other any reformist.\textsuperscript{2832} Shaw describes Reşid Efendi as the “spiritual leader”, “sultan’s closest confidant” and the “power behind the throne in his reforms”.\textsuperscript{2833} Yet, in an insurrection which is known to be organized against against the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} reforms and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 105: “Merkumun katline sebeb cebehane pişgâhından mürûrunda gâh selâm verüp ve gâh selâm verme yâb mûrûr eylediğine binân Ev Meydân’nda ol habisin ifâdesi buna binân olduğunu erbâb-ı vukûf kendi kelâmından takririni ifâde eder”.
\item Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 45.
\item Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, p. 87.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the elite, he was among the survivors. His name was not included in the execution list either.

Mustafa Reşid Efendi’s close connections with the reform program and his survival is a controversial issue among the contemporary as well as later historians. Some narratives argue that he was in fact included in the execution list. According to one source, the rebels suggested to include him to the list, it was rejected by one person on the grounds that Mustafa Reşid Efendi did not reform anything other than the artillery and mortar corps ("humbaracı") regiments, which were the pillars of the army. Câbî also claims that the commanders of the artillerymen interfered to save him, emphasizing that Reşid Efendi spent efforts to reform their regiment ("ocak"). According to Asım, however, Mustafa Reşid Efendi acted very cleverly by establishing good relations with the Janissaries and acting benevolently towards the poor soldiers during and after the Egyptian campaign. Moreover, during his terms of office at Tophane, he had established good contacts with the seniors and minor officers of the Tophane. Furthermore, whenever any fire broke out in İstanbul, he sent food. Câbî is another author who claims that he was included in the execution list. Yet, he offers a different explanation accounting his survival. According to him, Mustafa Reşid Efendi managed to survive thanks to the efforts of his brother-in-law, Kazasker Mehmed Emin Bey. According to Tüfengçibaşı, Mehmed Emin Bey praised

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2835 Derin, “Kabakçı Mustâfa Ayaklanması...”, p. 104; “Behey cānum, Kûse Kethûda ocağımızın direği gibi topçu ve humbaracı ocaklarından gayri bir şey’e vaz’-ı yed eylemedi.”


2839 Kazasker Yağlıkçı Emin Paşazâde Mehmed Emin Bey (1209/1795) became müderris in the year 1182/1768-69 and Galata molla in 1206/1791-92. He obtained the Edirne paye (Ra 1210/September-October 1795), Mecca paye (Ra 1211/October 1796) and then became the judge of İstanbul in Ca 1215/September-October 1800. The next year he obtained Anadolu paye and was appointed as the judge of İstanbul for a second time (Z 1218/March 1804). After being appointed as the Anadolu kazasker (R 1220/July 1805), he
Reşid Efendi as a loyal and pious person to the Şeyhülislam and secured his invitation to the Meydan. He was brought to the Meydan amidst scenes of great respect, as Kazgancı and Kabakçı Mustafa exclaimed “Masha’‘Allah effendi baba, may Allah spare you”.

As in the case of his inclusion to the list, there exists different versions on the survival of Mustafa Reşid Efendi during the Rebellion. One source claims that he sought shelter after the meeting, during which a quarrel between İbrahim Efendi and Şemseddin Efendi had occurred. After ending the meeting by saying that everyone should take care of himself, Reşid Efendi first went to his residence and then to the palace of Hatice Sultan in disguise. On the other hand, Saint-Denys argues that he took refuge in the house of a Greek gardener. After hiding there for one day he then voluntarily paid a visit to Kabakçı Mustafa at the Meydan. There, the author claims, the latter uttered a speech addressing the rebels, emphasizing the innocence of Mustafa Reşid Efendi who had never issued orders against them. Moreover, he added that he had voluntarily sought refuge and trusted in their justice. According to the author of Vaka-ı Cedid, Mustafa Reşid Efendi was captured on the Thursday night at his residence at Kabataş and then brought to Tophane. There, he requested help for his survival, arguing that he did not introduce anything new other than some improvements in the cannon corps and cannon-wagon corps. A similar

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2842 Hatice Sultan (b. 1182/1768-d.1237/1822) was the daughter of Mustafa III. On 7 M 1201/9 November 1786, she was married to Es-seyyid Ahmed Pasha, the muhafız of Hotin. See Uluçay, Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları, pp. 104-5.

2843 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 6. If the information is true, his escape to her palace should not be a coincidence since Mustafa Reşid Efendi was appointed as her kethûda in the year 1220/1805. Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. 5, p. 1383.


2845 Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-ı Cedid, p. 25
explanation is outlined by Öğülukyan, yet with the difference that he sent a letter to the cannon corps instead of going there personally.\textsuperscript{2846} According to Öğülukyan, after sending the letter, Mustafa Reşid went to the Meydan alone and requested forgiveness from the rebels. In return he was assured that he would be not murdered. Moreover, the chief of the rebels entrusted him the duty of opening the \textit{kapan} and distribute flour to the bakeries so that no problem would occur in the provisioning of the city. After performing this duty, he was appointed as \textit{tersane emini} on 22 Ra 1222/30 May 1807, which means that he supervised the \textit{kapan} only for few days.\textsuperscript{2847} Confirming information comes from Ebubekir Efendi who also mentions his supervision of \textit{kapan} during the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{2848} Kethüda Said Efendi, and following him Asum, does not provide any further details, just noting that he was appointed as the \textit{tersane emini} and it was declared that he would not be not among those included in the execution list.\textsuperscript{2849} Zinkeisen, on the other hand, brings a very interesting explanation and underlines the clever policy of Mustafa Reşid Efendi. According the author, Mustafa Reşid Efendi was a reformist but also the “real commander” of the Janissaries.\textsuperscript{2850}

The survival of Mustafa Reşid is also discussed by some later historians. Balıkhanı Nazırı Ali Bey narrates an interesting talk between Mahmud II and Mustafa Reşid Efendi. During the talk, the Sultan asks Reşid Efendi how he managed to save his life during the Rebellion. The latter answers that the rebels left him as “\textit{My Majesty, they left me as a seed to breed slaves that would befit your imperial reign.}”\textsuperscript{2851} According to Balıkhanı Nazırı Ali Bey, he bribed Kabakçı Mustafa who saved not only his life but protected his residence at

\textsuperscript{2846} Öğülukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{2847} B.O.A. \textit{Sadaret Defterleri}, no. 357, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{2848} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Vaka-ı Cedid}, p. 25


\textsuperscript{2851} Balıkhanı Nazırı, \textit{Eski Zamanlarda İstanbul}, p. 380: “\textit{efendim asrı hümayunuza layık bende yetiştirmek için kulumuzu damızlık bırakılar.”}
The most detailed account is provided by Mustafa Nuri Pasha, who states that, as a clever person Mustafa Reşid Efendi foresaw the seriousness of the Rebellion from the very beginning and asked his steward whether there was anyone in his household that had acquaintance with Kabakçı Mustafa. It was discovered that Kabakçı Mustafa was the nephew of his own chief kitchener. Mustafa Reşid Efendi immediately called the kitchener, informing him that he was not involved in any matter and sent Kabakçı Mustafa a certain amount of money. In return, Kabakçı Mustafa sent news that no harm would be done to him. Cevdet Pasha explains his survival rather because of having good relations both with the conservatives (“efkar-ı atika”) and reformers.

Both Mustafa Reşid and Ahmed Bey were not only forgiven, but also entrusted new duties even during the reign of Mustafa IV. Mustafa Reşid Efendi was appointed as the tersane emini. In an undated record (telhis), apparently written not long after the Rebellion, it was stated that there were several candidates for the directorship of the naval arsenal, including Selim Sabit Efendi, Mustafa Reşid and Derviş Bey. In the document it is stated that the Sekbanbaşi informed Kaimmakam Pasha that the leading figures of the Tersane paid a visit to the Porte to request the appointment of Reşid Efendi. They justified their request by declaring that he successfully served as the tersane emini previously, so that he would create no burden for the Tersane. They also emphasized that he was a figure favoured by the Janissaries as well. Tüfengçibaşı informs that a kalyon çavuş from Tersane came to the presence of the ulema and the Janissaries, requesting the appointment of Mustafa Reşid Efendi as the the tersane emini on the behalf of the dockers (“tersane

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2852 Balkhane Nazırı, *Eski Zamanlarda İstanbul*, p. 379. According to the author, whenever Kabakçı Mustafa passed before the residence, he would say that Çelebi Efendi was his “father”. See also Abdurrahman Şeref, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, p. 291. The residence in question was built in the year 1213/1798-9.

2853 Mustafa Nuri Pasha, *Netayicü’l-Vukuat*, vol. IV, p. 49. The author notes that he learnt the above anecdote from Dede Pasha. The latter might be Dede Hızızı Mustafa Pasha (d. R 1276/February 1860). Mustafa Pasha’s career had started with as the karakulak of Halet Efendi.


2855 B.O.A. HAT 1355/53019 (undated). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.
It seems that Mustafa IV was not hostile to Mustafa Reşid Efendi either. For instance, in the record about his appointment as the director of logistics ("mühimmat nazır"), he comments that it would be suitable for him to be appointed as the "Sultan kethüda", most probably implying kethüda to valide sultan. In the end, Mustafa Reşid Efendi was appointed as Rikab-ı Hümayun Reis on 22 R 1222/29 June 1807. After his dismissal on early (evahir-i) 1222/24 October-1 November 1807, he was appointed as the army supply-master ("nüzül emini") under the command of Akdeniz Boğaz Seraskeri. After his return from the duty he was thought to be appointed as supervisor of logistics ("mühimmat nazırı"). Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Efendi died on 16 R 1234/12 February 1819.

The other figure, Ahmed Bey, the ird-i Cedit Defterdar, was captured but then released by the Janissaries. One expects that even though he was saved from execution, he would be either exiled or not appointed to other posts any longer. However, during the reign of Mustafa IV he was appointed as the nüzül emini of the Rumelian side of the Straits. In a relevant document, Kaimmakam Pasha suggested some candidates together with Ahmed Bey for this post. But without hesitation Mustafa IV ordered the appointment of Ahmed Bey. From another relevant document we learn that after being appointed as the nüzül emini of the Mediterranean, Hakkı Pasha, the serasker of the same region, wrote a

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2857 B.O.A. HAT 53107 (undated).

2858 B.O.A. HAT 1365/54025 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 1364/53924. For a copy of his dismissal see B.O.A. HAT 1365/54001 (undated).

2859 B.O.A. HAT 1362/53661 (undated); B.O.A 1364/53886 (undated); B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 66 (13 N 1222/24 November 1807).

2860 B.O.A. HAT 53107 (undated).

2861 Abdülbaki Nasır Dede, Defter-i Dervişan, II, İSAM, no. 18112, p. 58. According to this source, he went to pilgrimage on 1231/1816. After his return, he spent effort for the appointment of physicians to take care of the pilgrims. Accordingly, a physician began to accompany the pilgrims.

2862 B.O.A. HAT 1362/53739 (undated).
official note (“takrîr”), stating that Ahmed Bey started the job there, but was not able to perform his duties due to his poor health conditions (“zaifül-hal”). Therefore Hakkı Pasha asked for his dismissal and employment in another office.2863 In another relevant document, however, it is stated that Ahmed Bey refused to accept the duty due to his health conditions.2864 &

On the other hand, we observe deeper enmity towards some other other ruling elite of Selimian era. Some figures, such as İbrahim Nesim Efendi, suffered severe persecution and even their wives were exiled. For instance, İbrahim Nesim’s wife was exiled and despite the petition of his son, Kadri Bey, for mercy on the ground that she was ill, Mustafa IV did not permit her release.2865 It appears that Mustafa IV was particularly hostile to Nesim Efendi. In an imperial edict, the Sultan reminded that there was a servant (“iç ağa”) of İbrahim Nesim Efendi, called Necib, and ordered his immediate banishment to a distant place.2866 Therefore, Necib was abruptly exiled to İzmir.2867 Thereafter, Necib’s mother requested his release on the grounds that she was too old and needed his son. At the upper margin of the prevalent document, Mustafa IV wrote that he was merciful to all of “them” and demanded nothing in return except their prayers and good wishes. Contrary to his orders and expectations, the Sultan complained, Necib and some other people circulating gossips or talking against the Sultan.2868

To sum up, a detailed analysis of the contemporary sources suggests that not all the figures, included in the execution list, were murdered due to their reformist identities.

2863 B.O.A. HAT 1357/53210 (undated).
2864 B.O.A. HAT 1356/53083 (undated).
2865 B.O.A. HAT 53334 (undated). Unfortunately, her place of exile is not stated. Only later, she was allowed to return İstanbul. See B.O.A. HAT 53089 (undated).
2866 B.O.A. HAT 1362/53683 (undated): “Maktûl İbrahim Kethüda’nın rikâb iç ağalarından Necib vardır, ani şimdi bir uzak mahale nefy edesin.”
2867 B.O.A. HAT 53226 (undated). Upon the petition of his mother, he was released. In the document the cause of his exile is stated as “mütevveffâ İbrahim Nesim Efendi’nin hidmetinde olmak takribiyle mukaddema nefy ve iclâ olunmuş.”
2868 B.O.A. HAT 53675 (undated).
While some figures, such as Ebubekir Efendi, Safi Efendi, Memiş, and Hasan Şakir Bey, not employed in duties connected to the *Nizam-i Cedid* were murdered, two directors of the *İrad-i Cedid* were able to survive.

### 6.2.1.3. Religious Affiliations

Most members of the reformist group belonged to the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi religious order. Lala Mahmud Efendi, the first kethüda of Mihrişah Valide Sultan was a Naqshbendi.2869 Ebubekir Ratib Efendi was also a member of this order Naqshbendi and a disciple of Sheik Ataullah Efendi.2870 İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi had affiliations with the same order and was a disciple of Nimetullah Efendi, one of the sheiks of the Selimiyye Naqshbendi *tekke*.2871 İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Mehmed Tahsin Efendi, Mustafa Refik Efendi, Mahmud Raif Efendi, Sirkatibi Ahmed Efendi, Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi, and Raşidzâde Cafer Bey were all Naqshbendis.2872 Ebubekir Efendi, the second author of *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, also implies that Yusuf Ağâ and Mahmud Raif had close connections with the Naqshbendi sheiks and established *tekkes* for them.2873 It should not be a coincidence that Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha, becoming a fugitive during the reign of Mahmud II, came to the Naqshbendi *tekke* built by İzzet Mehmed Pasha at Eyüb, changed

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2869 Ahmed Cavid, *Hadika-yi Vekayı*, p. 142. Unfortunately it was not possible to get further information about his Naqshbendi connections, therefore it is not certain whether he belonged to Mujaddidi branch or not.


2872 Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 83; Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 24a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 134; Cevdet Pasha notes that most of the elite (“rical”) of Selim III was a disciple of Sheik Mehmed Emin Efendi, but does not give their names. See Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih*, vol. VIII, p. 201.

2873 Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, pp. 22b, 24a; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, pp. 131, 134.
his clothes and passed to Anatolia in disguise.\textsuperscript{2874} As might be recalled, the Fourth Woman of Selim III visited the tekke of a Naqshbendi sheik at Eyüb and revealed the mother of the sheik on her intention to enthrone the deposed Selim III.\textsuperscript{2875}

Important Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi tekkes were established during the rule of Selim III and some were built by the important figures of the period. The first one was built by Grand Vizier İzzet Mehmed Pasha. He established a tekke in Ca 1210/November 1795 for Ömer Rızâî Dârendevî (d. 1240/1824), a deputy of Bursalı Sheik Mehmed Emin Efendi. İzzet Mehmed Pasha and Darendevî had known each other from Egypt. İzzet Mehmed Pasha also married one of his concubines to Ömer Rızâî Efendi.\textsuperscript{2876} Yet, it seems that the good relationship between İzzet Mehmed Pasha and Ömer Efendi ended after some time. According to one explanation, İzzet Mehmed Pasha complained the Sheik about Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and requested his help in the dismissal of the latter. Ömer Efendi opposed the idea by saying that he would not inflict damage to anyone and would not undermine the income of many people who earned their life within the household of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. He also added that if İzzet Mehmed Pasha was making such a request since he had granted him a tekke, he did not need it. From then on, these two figures did not see each other. The source of the above information is a Menâkibname. Therefore it is difficult to be sure of its historical reality.\textsuperscript{2877} Yet, there is an important point that should be underlined.

\textsuperscript{2874} \textit{Yayla İmamı Risalesi}, p. 259; Uzunçarşılı, “Kadı Abdurrahman Paşa”, p. 435. After that incident, Şeyh Ömer Rızâî Efendi was imprisoned for one day and his tekke was plundered by the Janissaries. See Hür, M. Y., \textit{Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf (19. Yüzyıl)}, (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2004), p. 287.

\textsuperscript{2875} Unfortunately, the name of the Sheik is not mentioned. Apparently, there were four Naqshbendi tekkes in Eyüb during that period: Eyüp Murad Buhari (Şeyh Murad) Tekke, Kaşgari Tekke, Olukbayır Tekke and Şeyh Selâmi Efendi Tekke. Selami Efendi might be the one mentioned in the document, since he was exiled some time after the rise of Mustafa IV. Yet, the possibility of the connection between his exile and the above report seems to be weak since Ebubekir Efendi, in \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, notes that he was exiled to İzmir on 7 R 1222/14 June 1807, several months before the month Ramazan. See Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 24a.

\textsuperscript{2876} Yücer, \textit{Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf}, pp. 109, 284-5.

\textsuperscript{2877} Yücer, \textit{Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf}, pp. 286, 640. His source of information is \textit{Menâkib-i Ömer Rizaî Dârendevî}, p. 15b.
The more striking matter is how a sheik would secure the deposition of a grand admiral, whose deposition requires a great degree of power and influence. As might be noticed, İzzet Mehmed Pasha was aware of the power of the Sheik and thus applied him for such a request. On the other hand, the Sheik does not deny that he had power to secure the dismissal of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, but did not want it since Pasha’s deposition would affect the livelihood of many innocent people, employed in the household of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha.

Ömer Rızaî Darendevî seems to have close connections with Hafiz İsmail Pasha, going back to years when the latter was a bostancibaşı. According to above-mentioned Menakibname, the latter offered Ömer Rıza an endowment (“vakf-ı şerif”) for his tekke and placed the sacred beard of the Prophet (“lihye-i saadet”) with the condition that it should be visited twice a year. Their good relationship seems to have continued during the grand vizierate of Hafiz İsmail Pasha. According to a story in the same Menakibname, when the Pasha was entrusted the expansion of the Nizam-ı Cedid army in Rumelia, he visited the Sheik and asked for prays without mentioning any details of his new duty. During the same night, Ömer Rızaî Efendi saw a dream which signaled that it was too early to station the Nizam-ı Cedid corps at Rumelia. Consequently, he warned Hafiz İsmail Pasha. The above story, if true, suggests one unknown aspect of the reluctance of Hafiz Ismail Pasha for the stationing of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers in Rumelia. It seems that the Naqshbendi Sheik also considered the attempt as an immature act, and the historical facts proved that he was right. Whether a dream or not, the story might also imply that the Naqshbendi religious order did not support the expansion of the Nizam-ı Cedid into Rumelia. But we need more details and stronger evidences to reach a definite conclusion in these points. In the above story, we see a Naqshbendi Sheik expressing his opinion on a state affair. There is one more interesting example. Asım narrates that, one night Bursalı Mehmed Emin Efendi demanded Sırkatibi Ahmed, İbrahim Nesim and Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi to arrange a

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meeting with Selim III, arguing that he was delegated by the Prophet Muhammed to declare some matters to the Sultan. Selim III refused the meeting kindly.2879

The second Naqshbendi tekke was built by Samanizâde Ömer Hulusi Efendi in 1215/1800 at Fatih Otlukçular Yokuşu.2880 Another one was built by İbrahim Nesim Efendi for Sheik Selami Efendi, from İzmir.2881 His father, Sheik İsmail Şerhî Efendi belonged to the Kadiriyye religious order.2882 After some time, Selami Efendi traveled a variety of places and countries such as Persia, Buhara, Belh India, Egypt and Baghdad, finally arrived at İstanbul after eight or ten years of travel.2883 Ebubekir Efendi argues that during his journey, Selami Efendi only learned “tricks” “devices” and “tough talks” sufficient to deceive ignorant people.2884 Yet, it is seems that his travels were for more serious religious purposes. These places were important centers of Naqshbendi circles. Indeed, he got a Naqshbendi diploma (“icazet”) at Buhara.2885 In İstanbul, Selami Efendi was fortunate enough to enter the circles of the upper echelons of the the city and to enjoy the patronage of İbrahim Nesim Efendi, who built a tekke for him in Eyüb in 1213/1798.2886 Yet,

2879 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 84.


2883 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 23a; Defter-i Dervişan, p. 39.

2884 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 23a. “hiyel”, “desâyis” and “ağz haffaflığı”.

2885 Yücer, Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf, p. 269.

2886 Defter-i Dervişan, p. 39; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 23b. Ebubekir gives these explanations with his peculiar style: “Şeyh Selami Efendi hazretleri şöyle bir zât-ı nâ-yâb ve vücûd-ı hâricişi enûkdan eazz bir şahs-i kem-yâbdur diyerek meccâlis ve mahâfilde dellâlliği emrine sarf-i zihn ve kudret ve nasb-i nefs-i himmet etdikleri bazı ağâzesimaktül İbrahim Kethüdâ’nın mezbele-i zehârif-i avvâl olan sämia-i haşar câmiasına vasil oldukça bu makule erbâb-i seyr ve seferde sihir ve efsün ve nireng-i giña-
Ebubekir Efendi does not evaluate construction of the tekke as something positive, and blames Nesim Efendi for believing in and serving the ignorant sheiks such as Selami Efendi. Among the dignitaries of this period, especially İbrahim Nesim Efendi and Mahmud Raif Efendi seem to be close to Selami Efendi. After his death, İbrahim Nesim’s corpse was buried in the Mosque at Saraç Doğan. One of his servants was able to secure permission to move his grave to the tekke built by him and an order was issued for Selami Efendi for that purpose. However, due to the unwillingness of the people, his grave remained at the Mosque. The last, but the most interesting, tekke was located within the Selimiye Mosque complex, built in Üsküdar by Selim III. Its first sheik was Çankırıli Abdullah Efendi. One of the most important sheiks of this tekke was Ali Behçet Efendi (d. 1238/1821).

Probably the most influential Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi sheik of the period was Burusevi/Kerkükî Şeyh Mehmed Emin Efendi b. İsmail (b. 1140/1719-d. 1228/1813). He was born in Kirkuk, therefore known also as Kerkükî. After the death of his father, Mehmed Emin Efendi became a scribe (“divan katibi”) to his uncle Abdullah Pasha, the governor of Urfa. In this city, Emin Efendi established contacts with a Naqshbendi-

2887 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 22b.
2888 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 24a.
2889 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 47.
2890 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 213; Ayyansarayi, Hadikatü’l-Cevami, vol. II, p. 190; The tekke was ruined by a storm in 1237/1823 and repaired in 1834-5 by the order of Mahmud II. Like some other figures of the period, he belonged to Mujaddidi-Mevlevi school. Among his disciples were Halet Efendi, Pertev Pasha, Kethüdazâde Arif Efendi, and Şeyhülislam Türşucuzâde Ahmed Muhtar Efendi. See Yücer, Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf, pp. 108, 261.
Mujaddidi sheik, Sheik Abdunnebi Efendi from the Hamavizade Medrese. Moving with Abdullah Pasha to Aleppo, he had a chance to enter the circles of the leading ulema and sheiks of the city. One year later Abdullah Pasha was appointed as the governor of Diyarbakır. This time, Mehmed Emin Efendi did not accompany his uncle, and went to İstanbul together with a certain Naili Efendi. Passing one night in a guesthouse in Üsküdar, they became guests to İberzade, a friend from Aleppo. It appears that that Mehmed Emin’s knowledge was greatly appreciated by the people whom he met in the house of İberzade. Consequently, Grand Vizier Ragib Pasha came to know him and eventually appointed him as his scribe. After some time, Mehmed Emin Efendi met with Mehmed Agah Efendi, a Naqshbendi sheik who preserved his connections both with the Naqshbendi and Mevlevi orders. Though Agah Efendi was a disciple of Neccarzade Hace Mustafa Riza Efendi of Beşiktaş, he was also a follower of Sheik Nayi Dede, a Mevlevi sheik, and read Mesnevi. During their first meeting, Mehmed Agah Efendi appointed him as his deputy and also joined Emin Efendi and Ümmü Gülsüm Hanım, his grand daughter in marriage. After the death of the Mehmed Agah Efendi, Mehmed Emin...

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2892 Mehmed Şemseddin, Yâdigâr-ı Şemsi, p. 222; Manneh, Studies on Islam, p. 42.

2893 According to Mehmed Şemseddin, his journey to İstanbul was for spiritual purposes. He claims that it was made known to Mehmed Emin Efendi that his spiritual maturity would be provided by a person he would meet in İstanbul. See Mehmed Şemseddin, Yâdigâr-ı Şemsi, pp. 222-3.

2894 Mehmed Şemseddin, Yâdigâr-ı Şemsi, p. 223. It seems that he also continued to tutor.

2895 Mehmed Şemseddin, Yâdigâr-ı Şemsi, p. 223; Manneh, Studies on Islam, p. 42.

2896 Neccarzade or Dülgerzade Şeyh Mustafa Rizâeddin Efendi belonged to the Naqshbendi and Celveti religious orders. He was the founder of the Beşiktaş Neccarzade (Dülgerzade) tekke during the first half of the eighteenth century. Among this deputies were Burusevi Mehmed Emin Efendi and Kethüdazade Arif Efendi, the grandson of Yusuf Ağa. See Yücer, Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf, p. 271. Abou-Manneh informs that some Yekdest chain of Naqshbendi sheiks belonged to Mevlevi order and read Mesnevi. See Manneh, Studies on Islam, p. 42.

2897 Mehmed Şemseddin, Yâdigâr-ı Şemsi, p. 224;

2898 Mehmed Şemseddin, Yâdigâr-ı Şemsi, p. 224.
Efendi became a prominent Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi sheik and as well as teacher of the Mesnevi. He also had a well-established place among the literary and sufi circles of İstanbul. Yet, for an unknown reason, he decided to return to Bursa in 1193/1779 and settled in this city. Emin Efendi passed fifteen years in Bursa and built a tekke there, called Eminiyye after his name. He returned to İstanbul on 5 S 1209/1 September 1794. It seems that he was invited by some members of ulema and dignitaries of İstanbul. Mehmed Emin Efendi had numerous deputies in both cities.

As might be noticed from above-mentioned details, there existed a close connection between Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi religious order and the Ottoman ruling elite, especially in the early nineteenth century. It was Butrus Abu-Manneh who drew our attention to the relationship between the two groups and developed a model to explain this phenomenon. He argued that, during the eighteenth century and particularly after the enthronement of Selim III, there existed a growing tendency towards the strengthening of Orthodox Sunni Islam in İstanbul. He brings forth three basic proofs for this Sunni Islamic revivalism: First, the rise of Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi order in the capital, then the building of many religious buildings by the Sultan and members of the upper classes and finally the increase in the

2899 Manneh, Studies on Islam, p. 42.

2900 Mehmed Şemseddin, Yâdigâr-i Şemsi, pp. 224-5; Manneh, Studies on Islam, p. 42.

2901 Mehmed Şemseddin, Yâdigâr-i Şemsi, p. 225.

2902 Mehmed Şemseddin, Yâdigâr-i Şemsi, p. 225.

2903 Manneh, Studies on Islam, p. 42.

2904 His deputies (“halife”) in İstanbul were Hoca Neşet Efendi, Hoca Selim Efendi, Hoca Mustafa Vahyi Efendi, Hoca Ali Behçet Efendi, Hoca Hüsameddin Efendi, Hoca Keşfi Efendi. He also had deputies in Bursa such as Necmeddin Efendi, the sheik of Eşrefzâde tekke, Abdüllatif Efendi of the Ahmed Gazzî Dergah, Hacı Ahmed Efendi of the Emir Sultan Dergah and Emin Efendi of Münzevi Dergah. See Yücer, Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf, p. 295; Şimşek, Halil İbrahim, Osmanlı’da Müceddidilik, XII-XVIII, (İstanbul: Suf Yayınları, 2004), p.101; See also Algar, Hamid, “Political Aspects of Naqshibendi History”, Gaborieau, M., Popovic, A., Zarcone T., (eds.), Naqshibendis, Historical Developmens and Present Situation of a Muslim Mystical Order, Proceedings of Sevres Round Table, May 1985, (İstanbul-Paris: ISIS Editions, 1990), p. 137.
number of translations of Islamic classics. Indeed, as we have tried to show above, there is considerable evidence pointing towards the connection of the Ottoman ruling elite with that religious order.

There seems to be serious ideological support of the same order behind the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms. For instance, even a glance over the writings of Kuşmâni proves our point. Ubeydullah Kuşmâni, the ardent supporter of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, seems to close relations with the Naqshbendis, if not a disciple of it. As we have tried to explain in Chapter I and II, he almost certainly belonged to the Naqshbendi religious order. Sheik Ebu Tevfik Şeyh Es-Seyyid İbrahim Efendi en-Nakşibendi, whom Kuşmâni praised in his *Zebire*, was the sheik of the *tekke* built by Samanizâde Ömer Hulusi Efendi. Moreover, Kuşmâni acknowledges that Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha advised him write a treatise on the *Nizam-ı Cedid*. Ömer Faik Efendi (d. 1245/1829), the author of *Nizâmü'l-Atîk fî Bahri'l-Amîk*, was a Naqshbendi sheik. He was a deputy of Siddîk Efendi who became the sheik of Beşiktaş Neccarzâde *tekke* Efendi on 3 Za 1208/2 June 1794.

The connection between the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi branch and the upper layers of Ottoman society and especially that of the bureaucracy is beyond doubt. The issue of how a religious order, and particularly Sheik Mehmed Emin Efendi, enjoyed such an influence over the ruling elite deserves some explanation. Manneh suggests that it might be related to the educational activities of the Sheik. Since Emin Efendi was a former scribe and a teacher of Mesnevi and Persian, he was able to reach wider elite circles. However, as Abu-Manneh also underlines, the main factor was the fact that the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi tradition advised the sheiks to seek influence with the rulers. For all these reasons, Abu-Manneh

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2906 İşbilir, *Zebire-i Kuşmâni*, p. 84.
invites us to see “a link between the expansion of the Nakshibendi-Mujaddidi order in İstanbul at this phase and the establishment of the Nizam-i Jedid”. The connection was not only related to the preferences of the ruling elite of Selim III, but also to some aspects of the teachings of the Naqsbendi-Mujaddidi order itself. It advised strict adherence to the sharia and the tenets of Sunni-Orthodox Islam which would produce a regeneration of the Muslim community and the state. Therefore, the sheiks and their deputies were to support the modernization undertaken by the state. On the other hand, the teachings of this religious order mostly appealed to the higher levels of the Ottoman society, since it was a revivalist order with the mission of bringing regeneration to the “umma”.

This point directs us to the evaluation of the issue by contemporary historians. The information provided by some contemporary sources about the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi sheiks and their followers are quite brief and mostly hostile. For instance, Asım has a very hostile attitude towards Sheik Mehmed Emin Efendi and accuses him of charming (“teshîr”) and binding by spell almost all members of the bureaucracy, the palace elite and the ayans to himself. Fascinated by the Sheik, these people professed an utmost obedience to him. But, Asım claims, Mehmed Emin Efendi abused this spiritual obedience as means to get valuable presents and money. In a similar way, under his guidance, his followers were obsessed with worldly desires but caring about nothing for the other world. It seems that Asım did not have a direct knowledge of Mehmed Emin Efendi and comments on what was told about him. Depending on what he was told, Asım argues that Mehmed Emin was extremely fond of worldly pleasures (“hûb-i dünya”) and ironically describes

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2910 Manneh, Studies on Islam, p. 9.

2911 Manneh, Studies on Islam, p. 12.


2913 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 82.

2914 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 82.
him as “possessing the virtue of frequently saying Bismillah; thus performs deeds such as fascination, allurement, temptingness and sorcery.”

Another contemporary historian, Şanizâde, also uses similar details to prove the degree of ignorance of some of the ruling elite. Moreover, he describes Mehmed Emin Efendi as “a worldly-minded and avaricious pseudo-suhte, who is nothing but a pain in the heart.” Şanizâde, also uses similar details to prove the degree of ignorance of some of the ruling elite. Moreover, he describes Mehmed Emin Efendi as “a worldly-minded and avaricious pseudo-suhte, who is nothing but a pain in the heart.”

Asım argues that the powerful figures of the state trembled at the presence of their sheik, eager to serve him and waited his commands. For instance, Raşidzâde Cafer Bey was delegated the duty of preparing and serving coffee for the sheik, while some others acted as the sheik’s butler (“kîlerci”) or tobacco-carrier.

Some later historians followed the path of the previous historians in their attitude towards Mehmed Emin Efendi. For instance, Cevdet Pasha adopts very hostile attitude towards the same sheik. An extreme example is the representation of Reşad Ekrem Koçu. Drawing on mysterious accounts of Aşık Razi, Koçu gives some negative examples about the personality of the Sheik. According to him, Mehmed Emin Efendi was a disciple (“yamak”; “köçek”) of Arnavut Bahçivan Ali Baba, the sheik of the Bektashi tekke in Merdivenköy. According to Koçu, Emin Efendi pretended to be a follower of the Naqşbendi order to the notables of the period, but presented himself as a Bektashi to the common people, especially among the Janissaries. Moreover, in his residence “Bektashi

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2915 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 82: “Kesret-i mûdâvenet ile besmele-i şerîfe hàssasna mâlık ve ol sebeble te ’hiz ve teshîr ve selb ü cezb ve selb ü teshîr makulesi i’mâle mütemellik”


2919 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 82. Cafer Fevzi Bey (d.1248/ 1827) was the son of Raşid Efendi and a member of ilmiye class. He became İstanbul Kadi (1238/1822-23) and obtained Anadolu (1241/1825-26) and Rumeli paye (M 1243/August 1827). See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. II, p. 380.


rules” prevailed, meaning that there was no seclusion of women. According to Koçu, the sheik was very fond of beautiful and young ladies, and boys especially of Arabacıkızi Zübeyde, and also Karakaş Mustafa from Şebinkarahisar.2922 Though Koçu criticizes Emin Efendi, Koçu does not seem to be sure whether the sheik in question was Selami or Mehmed Emin Efendi.2923 Since Koçu does not refer his sources and there is no way to prove these assertions, there is every reason to be cautious of the historical correctness of these claims.

Not only the hostile attitude toward the Naqshbendi sheiks, but also the representation of the followers of these sheiks in some contemporary narratives are striking. Here are some interesting examples: On Thursday, the rebels brought a strange object to Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, at the Meydan, saying that “Bu melun da gavur çktı, haçi koltuğu altında çktı”.2924 The rebels had found it on neck of İbrahim Nesim Efendi during his murder. Ataullah Efendi spent some time to convince the rebels that it was not a cross (“çelipa”). Fortunately we have a detailed description of the object in question. It was a pure golden charm (“tulsım”) in shape of a scissors (“mikras”) with the names of “Selim” and “İbrahim” carved over the two wings, together with some some other “magical” words and figures over it.2925 The same information is confirmed by Oğulukyan.2926 Discovery of such “strange” objects caused gossips during the Rebellion. Emin Efendi has given talismans such as talismanic prayer against blade (“mutalsam kılıç kesmez nüshası”) and bulletproof prayer (“kurşun geçmez vefki”), which were found on some of the victims.2927 Similar accusations were made against Seyh Selami Efendi too. According to Ebubekir


2923 Koçu, Kabakçı Mustafa, p. 126.


2925 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 24a.

2926 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 9.

Efendi, it was Sheik Selami Efendi who prepared the idols ("heyakil") found on İbrahim Kethüda after his murder.\textsuperscript{2928}

Sheik Mehmed Emin Efendi and Selami Efendi were banished some time after the Rebellion. Emin Efendi was banished to Bursa,\textsuperscript{2929} where died in M 1228/3 February-4 March 1813.\textsuperscript{2930} According to Asım, he was exiled due to his evil practices, sayings and attributes that were contrary to the essence of Islam.\textsuperscript{2931} It seems that the discovery of strange objects played a role in his exile. On 17 R 1222/24 June 1807, Selami Efendi was banished to İzmir.\textsuperscript{2932} He died on 1 N 1228/28 August 1813 and was buried at his tekke in Eyüb.\textsuperscript{2933} Why were both sheiks exiled soon after the Rebellion? Can we assume that it was only related to their “ignorant” practices? Or why the people with Naqshbendi affiliations are accused of being “superstitious” and dealing with “magical” things. According to Ebubekir Efendi, for instance, Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi was also dealing with “magic and charm” for a long time. Thanks to his magical powers, he was able to charm most of the courtiers, including the Sultan himself.\textsuperscript{2934} However, we should not forget that both sheiks belonged to a well established and highly intellectual religious order. Therefore accusations concerning their “ignorant” and “superstitious” practices and greedy attitudes, as claimed by some contemporary and later historians, should be taken with great caution. The hatred of Ebubekir Efendi towards Selami Efendi is to some extent is understandable since he seems to have lost his place to Selami Efendi. As we have tried to explain in Chapter I, the writer of the epilogue of \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni} argues that Ebubekir Efendi was an important figure that had close connections with the ruling elite of Selim III. However, the author

\textsuperscript{2928} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, pp. 23b-24a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, pp. 133-4.

\textsuperscript{2929} Mehmed Şemseddin, \textit{Yâdigâr-i Şemsî}, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{2930} Mehmed Şemseddin, \textit{Yâdigâr-i Şemsî}, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{2931} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{2932} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, pp. 24a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{2933} \textit{Defter-i Dervişan}, p. 39; Hüseyin Vassâf, \textit{Sefine-i Evliyâ}, vol. II, p. 299; Yücer, \textit{Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf}, p. 269. He had a \textit{divan} and \textit{manzum mevlediyye}.

\textsuperscript{2934} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, pp. 16b-17a; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 120.
argues, due to his “bad nature”, Ebubekir Efendi was excluded from elite councils. 2935 His disappointment due to being excluded, critical views about Selami Efendi enjoying patronage of İbrahim Nesim Efendi and some other elite make us to think that he was jealous of Selami Efendi.

For our concerns, the crucial point that should be underlined is the fact that the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi affiliations seem to have strengthened the group identity of the so-called Nizam-ı Cedid elite and intensified their alienation from the rest of society. The accusations against their certain religious practices can be seen as symptoms of this alienation. One importance of the prevalence of Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi affiliations among some of the Ottoman ruling elite might be fact that it opened new networks and connections for them. We should look this it as another element that seems to have played a crucial role in the formation of a group identity. We will deal with the idea that the Rebellion was a struggle between the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi and Bektashi orders in the subsequent pages.

6.2.1.4. A Unified Foreign Policy?

This section tried to elaborate on some points and factors which possibly contributed to formation of a group identity of the so-called Nizam-ı Cedid elite. Most members of this group was from the bureaucracy, standing close to the faction of Halil Hamid Pasha, and affiliating with the Naqshbendi religious order. Yet, it might be misleading to imagine the group under study as a homogenous body. This aspect is most evident in their attitudes concerning foreign policy and connections with foreign powers. As shall be demonstrated hereinafter, there existed a close relationship between the foreign policies pursued and the formation of internal factions in a certain period or the other way around.

In the 1790s, there were two important factions in the scene. Yusuf Ağa was the leader of the first faction, dominating the palace cliques as well as the officials remaining

from the reign of Abdulhamid I. The second one, under the leadership of Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, represented the officials who rose to power with the accession of Selim III. Olivier states that, neither Yusuf Ağa nor Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was members of the Imperial Council ("divan"), but attended it upon invitation. Both factions maintained their political power thanks to their close connections with the Palace, one through the Sultan and the other through Valide Sultan. As the heads of rival factions, both Yusuf Ağa and Hüseyin Pasha struggled hard to eliminate other one. For instance, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha’s appointment as the grand admiral in 1792 was a maneuver of Valide Sultan and Yusuf Ağa to send him away from the Palace and send away from the capital. However, the plan proved to be a failure on their part since Hüseyin Pasha not only increased his prestige by defeating the pirates in the Aegean, but also, as a counter act, he secured the dismissal of Yusuf Ağa from the directorship of the Mint, through manipulating the complaints of Janissaries about debased coinage in September 1792. After that incident, Yusuf Ağa was not invited to session of the imperial council, which was held on 6 R 1207/21 November 1792. The relevant source evaluates this as an unusual case. It seems that rumours were circulating about Yusuf Ağa’s fall into disfavour. In another meeting, held on the following day, he was not invited again. Moreover, despite the fact that Yusuf Ağa was usually able to enter the presence of the Sultan very frequently, he was not called to the presence of Selim III for the next three months. As shall be immediately shown below, his faction remained pro-Russian until his death.

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Küçük Hüseyin Pasha’s clique followed a pro-French policy. Tatarçık Abdullah Molla also belonged to this faction, together with Ebubekir Ratıp Efendi and İshak Bey. In the year 1794, Deschorches, the French agent in İstanbul, tried to create a French-Ottoman alliance by conducting negotiations with Tatarçık Abdullah and Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. Hüseyin Pasha’s good relationship with France is attested in one document, dated 15 C 1221/30 August 1806. In the document, Sebastıani complains that the pro-Russian Ottoman ministers, such as Mahmud Raif and Yusuf Ağá, were treacherously collaborating with the hospodars Muruzi and Ipsilanti acting as if Mahmud Raif Efendi and Yusuf Ağá were their representatives “kapı kethüda”. Sebastıani lamented that Küçük Hüseyin Pasha had been different and had served his Sultan sincerely and loyalty.

Reisülküttab Mehmed Raşid Efendi was the leader of another faction in the 1790s. The deposition of Koca Yusuf Pasha and then the appointment of Melek Mehmed Pasha (1792) provided him an opportunity to aggrandize great political power in the domestic and foreign politics of the Empire. He seemed to be clever enough to benefit from the rivalry between the factions of Yusuf Ağá and Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. In the strife between these factions, Sebastıani wrote:

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2945 Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 116. Melek Mehmed Pasha (d. 1216/1802) was the son of Bosnah (Fındıklı) Süleyman Pasha. He became grand admiral with the rank of mirimiran (1166/1752). In the year 1169/1755/-56, he was appointed as the governor of Salonika and then nişanlı (1171/1757). After his marriage with Zeynep Sultan, Mehmed Pasha served in various governorships such as Hanya, Hotin, Vidin and Belgrade. On 7 L 1178/30 March 1765, he became sadaret kaimmakam, a short time later the governor of Anatolia and then grand admiral for a second time (Ş 1180/January 1767). His third appointment to the grand admiralship took place on Za 1187/January-February 1774. After a period of governorships in various cities, Mehmed Pasha became grand vizier on 12 N 1206/4 May 1792, but dismissed on 25 Ra 1209/20 October 1794. He died on 15 L 1216/18 February 1802. He was a favorite of Mustafa III and given the title “Melek” (Angel) thanks to his singular beauty. See Hadika-yi Vüzera, pp. 45-7; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. IV, pp. 1801-2; Dallaway, Jacques, Constantinople Ancienne et Moderne et Description des Cotes et Isles d'Archipel et de la Troade, 2 vols., (Paris, 1797), p.44.
two factions, he collaborated with Yusuf Ağa and Şeyhülislam Dürrizáde Arif Efendi.\footnote{Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 116.} Thanks to his clever policy, he was able to establish an unrivaled influence over the Porte from 6 September 1792 to 20 August 1794.\footnote{Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 116.} Mehmed Raşid was hostile to Tatarcık Abdullah Molla and Vasif Efendi.\footnote{Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asum}, vol. I, p. 256; See also Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VI, p. 135. Ahmed Vasif Efendi (d.1222/1807) entered the \textit{amedî} department and served as \textit{miḳaleme katibi} on 25 B 1186/22 October 1772 and later became \textit{vakânüvis} (6 Z 1197/2 November 1783). He was employed as the Ottoman envoy to Spain (1201/1787). In L 1207/May 1793, he became Anadolu \textit{muhasebecisi}. Later, he was exiled to Midilli (M 1209/July 1794) and released in C 1209/December 1794. The faction of Mehmed Raşid Efendi provided the supremacy of bureaucratic cadres. In fact, Mehmed Raşid Efendi’s faction was a pro-British one.\footnote{Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asum}, vol. I, p. 256; Vasif, \textit{Mehâsinü’l-Âhbâr}, pp. XXXI, XXXII.} The hostility stemmed from the refusal of the latter to accept some decisions taken by Mehmed Raşid Efendi, regarding the Principalities. It seems that in order to get rid of both Tatarcık Abdullah and Vasif, Mehmed Raşid Efendi reflected the visit of Vasif and Abdullah Molla to Şemseddin Molla, the judge of İstanbul, as an intrigue plotted against the Sultan.\footnote{Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asum}, vol. I, p. 256; Vasif, \textit{Mehâsinü’l-Âhbâr}, pp. XXXI, XXXII.} As a consequence, Abdullah Molla was exiled to Aydın Güzelhisar, which was his \textit{arpalık}, and Vasif to Midilli in M 1209/July 1794.\footnote{Halil Nuri, \textit{Tarih}, Bayezid 3369, p. 6a. See also Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VI, p. 135.} After the dismissal of Raşid Efendi (23 M 1209/20 August 1794), both were released in C 1209/December 1794.\footnote{Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asum}, vol. I, p. 256; Vasif, \textit{Mehâsinü’l-Âhbâr}, pp. XXXI, XXXII.} The faction of Mehmed Raşid Efendi provided the supremacy of bureaucratic cadres. In fact, Mehmed Raşid Efendi’s faction was a pro-British one.\footnote{Allan Cunningham, “Robert Liston at Constantinople”, \textit{Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution, Collected Essays}, Edward Ingram, (ed.), 2 vols, (London: Frank Cass, 1993), vol. I, p. 79; Halil Nuri, \textit{Tarih}, Bayezid 3369, p. 12.} Yet, in

\footnote{Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 132.}
order to destroy the balance of power, Selim III tried to strengthen the faction of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. İzzet Mehmed Pasha was close to Küçük Hüseyin’s faction. Mehmed Raşid Efendi was replaced by Dürri Mehmed Efendi. The former one was in alliance with Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Efendi. The final blow to the other factions came with the appointment of Ebubekir Raşid Efendi, one of the confidants of the Sultan and belonging to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha’s faction. On the other hand, Selim III encouraged İzzet Mehmed Pasha to rival, together with Tatarcık Abdullah and Constantin Ipsilanti, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha in order to check his growing power.

The French expedition to Egypt changed the balance of power among the internal factions. The sudden French attack on this Ottoman province led to weakening of the influence of pro-French factions and worked in favour of the pro-Russians ones. The factions under the control of Yusuf Ağa, Mustafa Reşid Efendi and Mehmed Raşid collaborated to support the Russians. İzzet Mehmed Pasha and some other members of the imperial council preferred to remain neutral. In order to overcome the crisis and to channel the unrest, Selim III dismissed İzzet Mehmed Pasha (30 August 1798) and appointed Yusuf Ziya Pasha as the new grand vizier. Naff considers the dismissal of the former as victory of Mehmed Raşid Efendi. According to Shaw, the appointment of

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2954 Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 370.

2955 Dürri Mehmed Efendi (d. 1209/1795) entered divan kalemi in the year 1165/1752. He served as mükaleme katibi (1182/1768-9), divan-i hümâyun kesedarti, tezkire-i sani (1197/1783), mektubcu. In 1205/1790, he became the third delegate (“murahhas-i salis”) and piyade mukabelecisi. After being employed as ruwayne-i evvel (Ra 1205/December 1790) and defter emini, Dürri Efendi became reisülküttab on 23 M 1209/20 August 1794. He died on 13 C 1209/5 January 1795. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. II, p. 424.

2956 Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 371.

2957 Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 132.

2958 Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 132.

2959 Naff, “Reform and the Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy”, p. 298.
Yusuf Ziya Pasha had the objective to get support of the ulema and the Janissaries. Edward Raczyński observes that Yusuf Ziya Pasha seemed to be a pro-Russian figure. The information is confirmed by another author. Therefore his appointment might also prove the rise of power of the pro-Russian figures after the French attack. Yet, Shaw argues that Yusuf Ziya Pasha, İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Mustafa Reşid Efendi, Elhac İbrahim and Mahmud Raif Efendi supported a pro-British and Russian policy.

In 1803, powerful political figures included the Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi and İbrahim Nesim Efendi. But none of them was a match for Yusuf Ağa. The death of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha in December 1803 was another severe blow to the pro-French faction in the Empire. In a letter, dated 30 January 1805 to Selim III, Napoleon himself lamented the death of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and accused Mahmud Raif Efendi for treason. İbrahim Nesim Efendi would be the one to assume the leadership of this faction after the death of Hüseyin Pasha. In the same period we see a

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2960 Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 372. It might be useful to underline that Shaw presents these power struggles mostly as tension between the conservatives and reformers. For instance, he says that the appointment of Yusuf Ziya Pasha provided the support of the conservative elements especially by curbing down the reforms and restricting the operations of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army. Unfortunately he does not provide a source to prove his claims. One main problem in this regard is the fact that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army was used in the defense of Egypt. He also argues that Mustafa Aşır Efendi was appointed as the new Şeyhülislam in order to get support of the conservative elements I think that considering the internal developments of the period during the Egyptian Expedition as a struggle between the pro-Russian, pro-British and pro-French might be more useful.

2961 Raczyński, *1814’te İstanbul*, p. 155.

2962 Göşu, *La Troisième Coalition*, p. 76.

2963 Shaw, *Between Old and New*, pp. 278, 372. As we will see immediately below, İbrahim Nesim Efendi is usually referred as a pro-French figure in other sources. In fact he also asserts that it was İbrahim Nesim Efendi who assumed the leadership of the pro-French party after the death of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. (p. 373) These conflicting arguments might be related either to the changing allegiances of these figures or to be mistake in Shaw’s argument.

2964 Göşu, *La Troisième Coalition*, p. 77, footnote 1. His source of information is a report from Brune to Talleyrand, dated 22 March 1803.

2965 B.O.A. HAT 5425.A (undated); Göşu, *La Troisième Coalition*, p. 96.

2966 Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 373.
friendship developing between İbrahim Nesim Efendi and Ruffin, during the negotiations held in İstanbul (August 1802-February 1804) in order to solve the problems that had accrued since the invasion of Egypt. İbrahim Nesim Efendi seems to have been instrumental in the Ottoman recognition of Napoleon’s imperial titles after being convinced by Ruffin and Roux, the secretary of Talleyrand who was on a special mission in İstanbul, at several secret conferences.

In 1805, Hafiz İsmail Pasha enters the scene as the grand admiral. According to Shaw, he was formerly Küçük Hüseyin Pasha’s man but now a secret enemy of the reformists. At the end of April 1805, he became grand vizier. According to one source, Hafiz İsmail Pasha was chosen by his guide Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Efendi. The latter had been an important figure since 1790s. But due to the efforts of his rival, Yusuf Ağa, he was dismissed from the position of sadaret kethüda in 1792. Goşu holds that Mustafa Reşid Efendi was a partisan of France, while Saint-Denys argues that he was a pro-British figure. The famous and mysterious Safiye Sultanzâde İshak Bey became an advisor to the new Grand Vizier.

As might be noticed from the above details, the reign of Selim III did not signify a complete dominance of pro-French factions in the Empire. On the contrary, there was a

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2969 Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 373.

2970 Goşu, *La Troisième Coalition*, p. 77.


2973 Goşu, *La Troisième Coalition*, pp. 73, 78; Goşu, “The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition”, p. 213.
strong pro-Russian party under the leadership of Yusuf Ağa and Mahmud Raif Efendi. Yusuf Ağa apparently had well-established connections especially via the Muruzi family. Not only he had good relations not only with the Russian ambassador but also he was known to be under the influence of Demetrius Muruzi, (Dimitraçko in Ottoman sources), the brother of Prince of Moldavia. Through the mediation of Demetrius, it seems that Ipsilanti and the Russians were using Yusuf Ağa for the interests of Russia and heaping money on him. Ebubekir Efendi notes that by God’s grace, their plans backfired: Under pressure, Yusuf Ağa went to pilgrimage. On 27 S 1222/6 May 1807, Demetrius (Dimitraçko) was exiled to Kayseri while the prince of Moldavia was banished to Ankara. A foreign observer remarks that frequent presents were also sent by Tepedelenli Ali Pasha to Valide Sultan and Yusuf Ağa.

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2974 We should underline that Arbunthont, the British ambassador, does not describe him as a pro-Russian figure, on the contrary as an anti-Russian figure with a “national prejudice”. But he still supported the Triple Alliance between Russian, Porte and Great Britain. See from Arbunthont to Spencer, Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PR0, 78-52; doc. no. 77).

2975 Göşu, La Troisiéme Coalition, pp. 27, 76. For connections of Muruzi, see also Göşu, “Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition”, pp. 220-1.

2976 Demetrius Muruzi Beyzâde (1768-1812) was the son of Alexander Muruzi, the hospodar of Wallachia. He became a dragoman in 1808 but was banished to Kütahya due to his treason. After release, he was employed as the interpreter during the negotiations between the Turkish and Russian delegates at Şumnu. He was executed following the end of the negotiations. Demetrius Muruzi opened a medical school, mathematical college and a school of languages. See Ergin, Osman Nuri, İstanbul Mektepleri ve İlim ve Terbiye ve Sanat Müesseseleri Dolaysıyla, Türkiye Maarif Tarihi, vols. I, pp. 69, 745-6. Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 10b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 109 describes him: “devletli Ağa efendimizin rûh-i izâfisî ve akl-i fa‘al ve ma‘âșî ve Eflak voyvodasının öz kararı olmakdan nâși cümlle ehli-i imâna tercih ile eczâ-yı meclis-i hâslarından olan Beyzâde Dimitraçko.”

2977 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 10b-11a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 109.

2978 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 11a; Asiler ve Gaziler, 110.

It seems that the demise of the pro-Russian faction/s started in the summer 1805, signaled by the replacement of Mahmud Raif Efendi by Vasıf Efendi. In fact, the ascendancy of the pro-French cliques in the government had started earlier with the appointment of Hafız İsmail Pasha. He was surrounded by pro-French figures. Especially after the dismissal of Mahmud Raif Efendi, the position of the pro-Russian faction gradually weakened. According to an Ottoman source, he was dismissed because he had been employed as the Reisülküttab for a long time and had lost his zeal and did not pay attention to his duties. But more interestingly, the same source underlines that Mahmud Raif Efendi had become notorious for his untruthfulness among the ambassadors. Cevdet Pasha argues that he was dismissed for placating the Janissaries and their proponents.

Yet, there seems to have been more serious causes for the dismissal of Mahmud Raif Efendi. His deposition was directly related to the problems faced during the negotiations between the Russians and the Porte, held between May-September 1805 for the renewal of the Triple Alliance. After the conference on 25 July 1805, the Ottoman ministers had found the articles, numbered three and eight, very demanding and feared that Reisülküttab Mahmud Raif Efendi would consent to them, if not dismissed. As might be recalled Raif Efendi was a pro-Russian figure and this point must have increased the suspicion of the ministers. The new Grand Vizier, Hafız İsmail Pasha, who already had problems with

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2983 1220 Senesi vekayi, p. 12.


2985 Goşu, *La Troisième Coalition*, p. 75.

Mahmud Raif Efendi, used this as an opportunity to get rid of him.\textsuperscript{2987} Despite the convictions of the Porte that a new Reisülküttab would not bring any change in the policies of the Porte, his dismissal at the time of negotiations with the Russians was considered by the Russian diplomats as a measure to weaken the Russian influence due to the tactics of the French.\textsuperscript{2988} Even though Yusuf Ağa still maintained his strong position, losing a pro-Russian Reisülküttab was really traumatic for the Russians. The influence of Yusuf Ağa was not enough to secure Raif Efendi to keep his office.\textsuperscript{2989}

Following the deposition of Mahmud Raif Efendi, Selim III ordered the appointment of a more neutral figure, and Vasıf Efendi was chosen for this purpose. The new Reisülküttab was ordered to conclude the negotiations with Russians as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{2990} The Russian ambassador, Italinsky, tried to secure the appointment of Mahmud Raif Efendi back to the office, but with no avail. With him, the Russians had also lost their most important source of information, Demetrius Muruzi, the adviser of Mahmud Raif Efendi. Due to the bad relations between Muruzi and Vasıf Efendi, it was now impossible to work with the former and thus Italinsky used Scarlat Callimaki as new source of information.\textsuperscript{2991} Since Raif Efendi was under strict surveillance it was impossible for him to establish contacts with Italinsky anymore.\textsuperscript{2992} Therefore, we see that Italinsky attempted to “bribe” Vasıf Efendi. The latter received the money via kapi kahyas of the princes of Jassy and Bucharest.\textsuperscript{2993} Yet these measures were not enough to turn the new Reisülküttab

\textsuperscript{2987} Goşu, \textit{La Troisiéme Coalition}, pp. 78, 80; Goşu, “The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition”, p. 227.

\textsuperscript{2988} Goşu, \textit{La Troisiéme Coalition}, pp. 27, 80-1.

\textsuperscript{2989} Goşu, \textit{La Troisiéme Coalition}, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{2990} Goşu, \textit{La Troisiéme Coalition}, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{2991} Goşu, “The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition”, p. 227; Goşu, \textit{La Troisiéme Coalition}, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{2992} Goşu, \textit{La Troisiéme Coalition}, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{2993} Goşu, \textit{La Troisiéme Coalition}, p. 83.
into a partisan of the Russians. 2994 By the efforts of Sebastiani, Vasıf Efendi became an ardent supporter of France. 2995 Russians distributed money and gifts to some other figures for encouraging them to prevent the promotion of French interests. Not surprisingly, the primary figures who were to be distributed were the ex-Reis Mahmud Raif Efendi and Yusuf Ağa. A secret pension was allocated for Mahmud Raif for his previous services. 2996

We thus see that foreign politics was crucially important in shaping the internal politics and factions for the period in question. One striking example is the fall of Valide Kethüda Yusuf Ağa, the leader of the strongest pro-Russian faction in the capital. In an article in The Times it was reported that Selim III decided to follow the advices of the pro-French party. According to the newspaper, after that point, the Sultan dismissed Yusuf Ağa and several other ministers and issued a general amnesty to the rebels in Rumelia. 2997 From the clues provided in the text, it seems that the event in question was the Edirne Incident that was followed by the dismissal of several officials. Further research on this issue might be very helpful in evaluating the Edirne Incident not only as a turning point in the history of the Nizam-ı Cedid, but also a radical change in the international policies of the Porte.

As for Yusuf Ağa, we know that after the death of Valide Sultan he had gone to pilgrimage. A detail that may help us at this point is provided by the French historian, Driault, who noted that the year 1806 signified the increasing French influence over the Ottoman government, marked by the arrival of French ambassador Sebastiani. It meant at the same time the defeat of the pro-Russian party headed by Yusuf Ağa who afterwards was “exiled” to Mecca. 2998 Ebubekir Efendi, in Fezleke-i Kuş mâni, also asserts that his

2994 Goşu, “The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition”, p. 228; Goşu, La Troisième Coalition, p. 82.

2995 Vasıf, Mehâsinü’l-Ahbâr, pp. XXXV-XXXVI.

2996 Goşu, La Troisième Coalition, pp. 84-5; Goşu, “The Third Anti-Napoleonic Coalition”, p. 228.

2997 The Times, Monday, August 3 1807, pg. 3, issue 7115, col. C (From the Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8).

2998 Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 71.
pilgrimage was a kind of exile. The end of the pro-Russian factions came with the leave of Yusuf Ağa. The dismissal of Raif Efendi was a severe blow, but the elimination of Yusuf Ağa proved to be fatal. The death of Valide Sultan had weakened the power of Yusuf Ağa, who “as long as Valide Sultan lived, he governed the Empire.” İbrahim Nesim Efendi who was instrumental in the dismissal of Mahmud Raif Efendi rivaled with Mustafa Reşid Efendi in the year 1805. As a result, Mustafa Reşid collaborated with Yusuf Ağa. But İbrahim Nesim Efendi acted together with the Grand Vizier Hafiz İsmail Pasha and managed to send away Yusuf Ağa from the capital.

The Edirne Incident, in the summer of 1806, brought important changes. As might be recalled, Hafiz İsmail Pasha was replaced by İbrahim Hilmi Pasha. According to one source, his son-in-law, who was the Bostancıbaşi, was also dismissed. Nakibül-Eşraf Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi became the Şeyhülislam in place of Salihzâde Esad Efendi. On the other hand, İbrahim Nesim and Mustafa Reşid Efendi were also dismissed. Galib Efendi was appointed as the Reisülküttab and Moralı Osman as the director of imperial treasury. Most of the new ministers appointed after the Edirne Incident, favoured a pro-
French policy, which was interpreted by Sebastiani as a victory of France.\textsuperscript{3007} This was one of the important results of the Incident.

Galib Efendi was appointed on 19 B 1221/2 October 1806.\textsuperscript{3008} However, he stood closer to Russia and Britain and did not like the pro-French policies of the center. Indeed, in one of his despatches, the British ambassador describes him as “extremely favorable to Great Britain.”\textsuperscript{3009} He once criticized Sebastiani as being the “minister of the Sultan.”\textsuperscript{3010} The conflict between Galib Efendi and Sebastiani, stemmed from an earlier acquaintance in Paris. According to Arbunthont, the tension was due to the decline of Galib Efendi to receive Sebastiani in Paris, which had offended the latter.\textsuperscript{3011} The two met afterwards, since Galib Efendi mentions about a conference with Sebastiani.\textsuperscript{3012} It is clear that Galib Efendi preferred to keep distance with the French ambassador. Apparently, main reason is that Galib Efendi was suspecting that Sebastiani was trying to replace him with İbrahim Nesim Efendi, the leader of the pro-French faction.\textsuperscript{3013}

On the other hand, after the Edirne Incident, İbrahim Nesim ironically had lost some of his previous power.\textsuperscript{3014} Yet, he was still able to enjoy a great influence.\textsuperscript{3015} Moreover, he

\textsuperscript{3007} Shupp, The European Powers, p. 155.

\textsuperscript{3008} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{3009} From Arbunthont to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no.78)

\textsuperscript{3010} Puryear, Napoleon and Dardanelles, p. 123. Sebastiani describes him as “amenable”, p. 110.

\textsuperscript{3011} From Arbunthont to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 77).

\textsuperscript{3012} B.O.A HAT 140/5808-İ (19 S 1217/20 June 1802).

\textsuperscript{3013} From Arbunthont to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no.77): He notes that Sebastiani became very disappointed and felt insulted imagining that İbrahim Efendi had deceived him. Consequently, Sebastiani revealed the intrigues of İbrahim Efendi to Galib Efendi.

\textsuperscript{3014} From Arbunthont to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 77).
secured the appointment of Mustafa Refik Efendi to his former post as sadaret kethüda. Since Mustafa Refik Efendi was his own product, it did not mean a serious violation of his influence.\textsuperscript{3016} As was remarked earlier, he was a bureaucrat with close connections with the palace since he was the kethüda to Beyhan Sultan. After the death of his mother, Selim III had passed allegiance his sister, Beyhan Sultan. It is known that Selim III was fond of his mother and after her death Sultan’s confidence and love passed to her sister. The increase in the influence of Beyhan Sultan, therefore led to the rise in the influence of İbrahim Nesim Efendi as well.\textsuperscript{3017} Thus, he managed to preserve his power after being dismissed from sadaret kethüda. İbrahim Nesim Efendi was a partisan of France and a good friend of Sebastiani.\textsuperscript{3018} The tension between Galib Efendi and İbrahim Nesim Efendi revolved around the position of the Reisülküttab.\textsuperscript{3019} It seems that İbrahim Nesim Efendi thought he should have been appointed to the position after the death of Vasıf Efendi. One report from Arbunthont gives crucial information in this regard. It is known that İbrahim Nesim Efendi had lost his position as sadaret kethüda after the Edirne Incident in order to avoid the fury of the Janissaries against military reforms. Even though the British ambassador admits that İbrahim Nesim Efendi had aimed to save himself from the rage of the Janissaries, he had an additional reason of “not to allow the choice of a minister for foreign affairs should fall on one who might afterwards difficult to remove.”\textsuperscript{3020} Arbunthont comments that Galib Efendi was not a figure to yield to İbrahim Efendi and not of a temper that would be easily controlled by another. For that purpose, he tried to prevent the promotion of Galib Efendi.

\textsuperscript{3015} From Arbunthont to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no.77).

\textsuperscript{3016} Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VIII, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{3017} From Arbunthont to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 77).

\textsuperscript{3018} From Arbunthont to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no.77).

\textsuperscript{3019} Shupp, \textit{The European Powers}, p. 237, footnote 1.

\textsuperscript{3020} From Arbunthont to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no.77).
as the Reisülküttab. In the end, it was Galib Efendi who gained the position, thanks to his maneuvers in the palace. Yet, the tension between the two did not end after the appointment and Galib Efendi never concealed his intention to eliminate İbrahim Efendi as soon as possible.3021

As might be recalled, there are some indications in some of the contemporary sources for the abuses and collaboration of the Selimian elite with foreign powers. Sebastiani, too, commented that the Porte “was governed only by gold and terror.”3022 Şanizâde also has some points to underline in this regard. The main problem, for him, was the international conditions. According to him, other political entities never wish one certain state to gain power and break the existing “balance of power”. Therefore, they consciously created series of problems that are difficult to solve and frighten the ruling elite.3023 Such problems keep ministers too busy and gradually increase the troubles of the common people, and at the end create animosity between the ministers and the subjects since the ruled consider these problems as mistake of the ruling elite. It also creates tensions among the ruling elite and weakens the decision-making mechanisms. The foreign powers also try to produce supporters for their own interests and in the end completely damage the military and political power of a state.3024 These points, according to Şanizâde, refer to the methods of foreign states to paralyze and destroy a political entity. Şanizâde connects these arguments to the Ottoman Empire by stating that similar incidents were witnessed in the Empire as well.3025 He notes that during the reign of Selim III, some of the elite became pro-Russian, the enemy of the Empire.3026 He accuses these people of sharing the state secrets with ignorant people. If improvements were implemented for the benefit of the state, the

3021 From Arbunthont to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no.77).
3022 Shupp, The European Powers, p. 234.
3025 Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 27.
foreigners would immediately begin to confuse the minds of the common people. He gives the example of the provocations that confused the mind of the people by spreading news that the Russian campaign of 1806 is just a pretext for the destruction of the Janissary army.\textsuperscript{3027} He also provides the example of the British Expedition, noting that those who were not able to prevent the declaration of war against Russia tried to confuse the mind of the people by saying that the British ships had come on the invitation of the elite.\textsuperscript{3028}

As might be noticed from our brief survey, the reformer group certainly did not present a unified picture especially in terms of their foreign relations and personal connections. Some sources stress this disunity as one of the main hindrances to the success of the reforms.\textsuperscript{3029} Needless to say, there is a degree of reality in such debates. Yet we should not forget that we are not talking about a party but a cluster of factions who were mostly motivated by personal interests.

\textbf{6.2.2. The Anti-Reformists}

Up to that point we have tried to investigate the so-called reformist group. It is time to have a closer look at the group that is presented as being hostile to the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} reforms and accused of collaborating with the rebels. There is not a common list for the second group, but some names are suggested by contemporary authors. At the head of the list is Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and Kaimmakam Musa Pasha, followed by some members of the \textit{ulema} and also figures from the military class. It is not easy to detect certain common characteristics of these people. In fact, even though they are presented under the common label of anti-reformist faction, it is unclear to what degree this category

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{3027} Şanizâde, \textit{Tarih-i Şanizâde}, vol. I, pp. 31-2.
\item \textsuperscript{3028} Şanizâde, \textit{Tarih-i Şanizâde}, vol. I, p. 32.
\item \textsuperscript{3029} Yalçınkaya, “Sir Robert Liston’un İstanbul Büyükelçiliği”, p. 203; Olivier, \textit{Türkiye Seyahatnamesi}, p. 155.
\end{itemize}
could apply to all of them. Rather than presenting a solid faction with a certain program, they mainly emerge as individuals.

As we have already discussed to some extent in the first chapter, most of the contemporary and modern sources emphasize the role of twin figures, Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi and Musa Pasha, and of some other individuals that were brought to power before the Rebellion. They are usually accused of having a role in the Rebellion, and gaining an upper hand in internal politics afterwards. However, we do not have convincing historical evidence proving their involvement in the Rebellion, and there are conflicting explanations in the contemporary sources. Moreover, the available explanations are mostly full of value judgments. Therefore, we have refrained ourselves to narrate their assumed role in the previous chapters. Their exclusion from the chronology was a conscious effort to see whether there was something missing in the flow of the events if we do not include the efforts of the “anti-reformist” figures. In this chapter, however, we will try to investigate their roles in the Rebellion and try to study their identity.

According to Oğulukyan, for instance, behind the Rebellion was a group formed by Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, Musa Pasha, Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa and some members of the ulema. He argues that they have collaborated with each other and then found the man that would realize their plan, namely başyasakçı of the 56th regiment, Gürcü Hasan Ağa, Kabakçı Mustafa and Kazgancı Laz Mustafa. 3030

6.2.2.1. Musa Pasha

To begin with, Musa Pasha is usually described as a cunning figure, full of hatred towards the reforms and the ruling elite.3031 The second author of Neticetü'l-Vekayi mocks

3030 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 17.

3031 T.S.M.A. E. 2650 (undated, catalogue date is 1202-3/1787-89); Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 106; Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cédid, p. 18. But we should underline that in the Ottoman sources, the emphasis on his “anti-reformist” identity is less than we encounter in Saint-Denys.
him by saying that “the beardless peewee named Musa” (“boyu kısakı köse nami Musa”) and blames him for being the sole reason for the chaotic condition of the state of that period in those years. He also criticizes this statesman as being treacherous and working against the interests of the state that provided his livelihood. According to Saint-Denys, Musa Pasha was particularly hostile to Hacı İbrahim Efendi and İbrahim Nesim Efendi, due to the great power they enjoyed in the government. Therefore, the author says, Musa Pasha was ready to use all means to eliminate these people, even instigate a Rebellion which would cause the fall of the Sultan.

We should admit that it is very difficult to prove whether he really played a role in the outburst of the Rebellion or not. He is usually represented as the prime actor provoking the yamaks, and also helping them afterwards. In some sources, he is accused of collaborating with Prince Mustafa who had already found followers from among the Janissaries and the ulema to secure his rise to the throne. As might be recalled, the kahvecibaşı of the mother of Prince Mustafa is said to have gone to the fortresses. After his appointment as kaimmakam, Musa Pasha was informed about the plan and collaborated with them. But there is not a satisfactory answer as to why he should collaborate with

3032 Cevdet Pasha, and depending on him Ahmed Cevad, claims that the originator of this expression was Cezzar Ahmed Pasha saying that “Adı Musa, boyu kısakı kose böyle adamdan hayır gelmez”. See Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. 8, p. 103; Ahmed Cevad, Tarih-i Asker-i Osmani, vol. I, p. 263.

3033 Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 38.


3036 Yayla İmamı Risalesi is a good example in this regard. According to its author, Musa Pasha sent provoking news to the yamaks at the time of dispatch of the uniforms and had also secret connections with the Sekbanbaşı. See Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 223. See also Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 9; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 25; Şanizade, Tarih-i Şanizade, vol. I, p. 40; Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 38.

3037 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 28.


the followers of Prince Mustafa. According to Mustafa Necib, it was related to his personal viciousness and therefore he willingly accepted the offer (“canına minnet bilerek”).\footnote{Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 29.} Such an explanation suggests that Musa Pasha was a follower of Prince Mustafa and so belonged to that faction. He is blamed for consciously creating an atmosphere against the ruling elite, especially against İbrahim Nesim Efendi.\footnote{Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 45. The author notes that Musa Pasha made efforts to create an image among the common people that İbrahim Nesim Efendi was the real executive figure of state affairs (“İbrahim Kethüda nâzır-i devletdir”). On the other hand, he was keeping Nesim Efendi busy with extra work so that he could not have time to notice the things going around him.} In accordance with the plan, Musa Pasha ordered Mahmud Raif Efendi to go to the fortresses together with the new uniforms and pay their salaries.\footnote{Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 109.} According to Saint-Denys, Musa Pasha sent secret envoys to the Janissaries, propagating that the moment for the devastation of the Janissaries had come, and he did his best to provoke the soldiers against the ministers.\footnote{Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 112.} Musa Pasha is usually represented as being involved in almost every phase of the Rebellion. As we have remarked above, he was depicted as being present in the first phase. One mysterious issue during the initial phase of the Rebellion is the halt of the rebels at Büyükdere Çayı rather than the prompt march to the city following the murder of Halil Haseki and Mahmud Raif Efendi. According to Saint-Denys, it was because the rebels were secretly ordered to remain inactive and wait for new orders from the figures behind the scene.\footnote{Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 113.} He argues that the rebels received orders from the Şeyhülislam and Kaimmakam, to stand calm and wait until the order was given. Therefore, he claims that their calmness lasted for three days.\footnote{Saint Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 113. But we know that they gathered at Büyükdere the day after the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi, i.e. on Tuesday and most of the sources confirm that the march started on Wednesday. Thus, it seems more likely that they waited only one day.}
Another role attributed to Musa Pasha is sending news to Tophane at the time when
the rebels arrived there. According to one explanation, the artillerymen initially were not
willing to join the rebels; on the contrary, they were ready to fight against them. Yet, at that
moment Musa Pasha sent news with the purpose of urging the artillerymen not to oppose
but to join the rebels since everyone has already agreed to collaborate for this Rebellion
(“bu iş cümlenin ittifakıyladır.”)3046 If this claim is true, he was able to break the resistance
of the artillerymen from the beginning and caused an increase in the number of the rebels.
According to Asım, the arrival and invitation of the rebels to Tophane was declared to
Musa Pasha by the Master-General of the Artillery (“Topçubaşı”). By chance, of Hacı
İbrahim Efendi got word the matter and wrote a long letter to the Master, encouraging and
warning him to prevent the joining of the artillerymen the rebels. But, Asım argues that
Musa Pasha took a counterstep and warned and threatened the carrier of the letter to advise
the Master-General to join the rebels.3047 Musa Pasha is also blamed for the murder of the
leading figures during the Rebellion.3048 According to Câbî, it was Musa Pasha who
convinced Selim III that the execution of the people in the list would effectively put an end
to the Rebellion.3049 Another author claims that he prepared the list and delivered it to
Kabakçı Mustafa, who in turn announced it to the rebels at the Square.3050 According to
Oğulukyan, Musa Pasha deceived the people that he was also included into the execution
list. In reality, the author says, he was trying to take his personal revenge on the ruling elite
in the list and was eager to secure their execution as soon as possible.3051 It is difficult to
prove the reality of all of these claims, yet the murder of Hacı İbrahim Efendi seems to be
suspicious. As might be recalled, he was brought to the Porte after his capture. During the

3046 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 33.
3047 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 27.
(undated, catalogue date is 1202-3/1787-89); Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid, p. 18.
3051 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 10.
stay of İbrahim Efendi at the room of Çavuşbaşı Şehsuvurzâde, it seems that the rebels were not aware of his capture and İbrahim Efendi was ensured that no harm would be done to him. However, after a while we see that he was taken by the rebels and murdered on the way to the Square. According to Mustafa Necib Efendi, it was Musa Pasha who secretly informed Kabakçı Mustafa of the presence of Hacı İbrahim Efendi at the Porte and called the rebels to kill him.\(^{3052}\) The incident seems suspicious in the sense that someone should have informed the rebels and delivered İbrahim Efendi to them. Some sources also find Musa Pasha responsible for the death of Safi Efendi. According to them, even though Safi Efendi was not included into the execution list, Musa Pasha still secured his execution and sent his head to the rebels.\(^{3053}\) Musa Pasha was also the one who sent spies to track down the elite that sought hiding places.\(^{3054}\) He is also accused of being the figure behind the exile of Yusuf Ağa, his old enemy, to Bursa.\(^{3055}\) Musa Pasha is also blamed for sending orders to the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers to wait and remain in their barracks.\(^{3056}\) Another accusation directed against him was to present Selim III the Rebellion as an insignificant event and provide him assurances.\(^{3057}\) Despite all these accusations, if we look at the report of Hüseyin Ağa, we studied previously in the first section of the Chapter IV, there appears a different picture. In a note added to the upper margin of the related record, it is stated that with the movement of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers to Sarıyer and to Beykoz, everything calmed down and the yamaks returned to their fortresses. Contrary to expectations, Musa

\(^{3052}\) Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 56. “kaydımu görsünler”. According to Mustafa Necib, the execution of someone after the “çülüs” was something unheard.

\(^{3053}\) Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 133; Asum, Tarih-i Asum, vol. II, p. 31. Yet as we have seen in the Chapter on Chronology, Safi Efendi was indeed included in the list and we mentioned some possibilities in this regard.

\(^{3054}\) Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 226.

\(^{3055}\) Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 14.

\(^{3056}\) Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 224.

Pasha does not seem to have been satisfied with this information and asserts the Sultan that he immediately sent order to the Bostancıbaşı to suppress the gathering of the “haşerat” and to investigate secretly the persons behind the events and immediately execute the guilty ones.\(^{3058}\) If he was not deceiving the Sultan, he seems to have paid much more importance to the Rebellion than narrated in contemporary sources.

Even if we accept that Musa Pasha played a role in the outburst and in the later phases of the Rebellion, it is important to discover his motives. At this point it might be beneficial to have a closer look at his life. Musa Pasha seems to have had a very turbulent and interesting life story. He was the grandson of Areq/Topal Osman Pasha,\(^ {3059}\) and a notable from Yenişehir-i Fener [Larissa, Greece].\(^ {3060}\) He was first appointed to the position of kapucibaşı. After moving to the capital, he was employed in provincial services and entrusted with some arduous revenue collection tasks.\(^ {3061}\) Accomplishing all the duties, he was promoted to the rank of vizier and appointed as the governor of Trablus Şam [Tripoli in Lebanon] and Cerde Başbuğ (commander) on 1 R 1209/26 October 1794. Since he was appointed to this region previously, it was expected that he could manage to collect taxes...
from the mukataas in the region.\textsuperscript{3062} This region produced an annual revenue of 600 kese akçes, yet none of the previous governors were able collect the taxes completely.\textsuperscript{3063} Musa Pasha also failed in this difficult duty and he was not able to deliver the center the amount he promised. Consequently, he was dismissed and his property was confiscated in return for his debts to the state.\textsuperscript{3064} As far as reflected in a document, the main problem seems that Musa Pasha did not send 740 kese akçes he collected from the region to the center. Therefore, in the related order, he is accused of embezzlement despite the strict orders.\textsuperscript{3065} As a result, his rank of vizierate was revoked and he was exiled to İstanköy.\textsuperscript{3066} According to a record, during his governorship in Tripoli, 20,500 guruş was not delivered to surre emini İsmail, due to an unspecified problem. Therefore, İsmail was forced to pay the deficit

\textsuperscript{3062} B.O.A. C. DH. 6953 (10 R 1209/4 November 1794); B.O.A. C. DH. 9175 (undated); B.O.A. C. DH. 3866 (19 Ca 1212/9 November 1797); Halil Nuri, \textit{Tarih}, Bayezid 3369, pp. 9-9a; Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 114.

\textsuperscript{3063} B.O.A. C. DH. 9175 (undated); Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 114.


\textsuperscript{3066} For a copy of the order for his exile to İstanköy and confiscation of his property, see B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 3, p. 7, order no. 17-18 (evahir-i M 1211/25July-5 August 1796); B.O.A. C. DH. 14638 (evahir-i M 1211/25 July-5 August 1796). The confiscation was to get his debts to the imperial treasury. See B.O.A. C. DH. 14639 (evail-i Za 1211/28 April-7 May 1797); B.O.A. C. DH. 9175 (undated); C. DH. 5061 (11 N 1211/). For the pressure exerted on his servants for the discovery of the goods, see B.O.A. C. DH. 5028 (undated); HAT 187/1808 (15 R 1211/18 October 1796); B.O.A. HAT 119/4821 (undated). According to Mustafa Necib, he was exiled to Cyprus, Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 114.
amount at his own expense. In order to acquire the deficient amount from Musa Pasha, his chiftlik in Yenişehir-i Fener were farmed out ("ظلام") to another person for the year 1210/1795 at the expense of 30,000 gurūş. From this amount, the debt would be paid to İsmail and the remaining one would be paid to Musa Pasha’s kethüda called Hasan to whom he also had debts.Meanwhile, Musa Pasha wrote a petition to the Porte and requested the change of his place of exile from İstanköy to his own country, Yenişehir-i Fener, which was approved by the Sultan (1797).  

After his release, the second phase of his life started, marked by several governorships in Rumelia. He was returned his rank of vizierate and appointed to the governorship of Silistria and delegated the duty of the execution of Paspanoğlu (1797). During this duty he managed to get the control of Niğbolu fortress but no other place in the region. In a report to the center, Musa Pasha boasted about his success and requested the promotion of his mühiydar and treasurer to the rank of hacegan and his son and kethüda to kapicibaşlık, while not forgetting to request financial aid. Even though, he concedes the contribution of Tirsiniklizâde and some other figures in the capture of the Niğbolu fortress, it is important to note that Musa Pasha does not miss the opportunity to

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3067 B.O.A. MAD 10066, p. 155 (6 Ca 1211/6 December 1796); B.O.A. A. AMD 38/28(6 C 1211/7 December 1797). Musa Pasha had several chiftlik in Yenişehir-i Fener known as “Musa Paşa Çiftlikleri” including Köleler, Göceri, Yiğitli. See B.O.A. HAT 31788 (25 S 1224/11 April 1809).

3068 B.O.A. C. DH. 14639 (evail-i Za 1211/28 April-7 May 1797). Another request for this purpose seems to have been written by another person. Unfortunately, in the related document there is no clue about the identity of the writer, but he refers that the wife and two daughters of Musa Pasha came to his presence himself and complained about their very miserable conditions and asked his help for the transfer of Musa Pasha to his home country. See B.O.A. A. AMD 38/28 (6 C 1211/7 December 1797).

3069 B.O.A.C. DH. 6925 (evasat-i R 1214/12-21 September 1799); B.O.A. C. DH. 1572 (evasat-i Ca 1214/12-21 September 1799); Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 114; Vasif, Tarih, p. 78.

3070 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 114.

3071 B.O.A. HAT 2710 (1 Ca 1215/20 September 1800); B.O.A. HAT 83/3435 (4 Ca 1215/4 October 1800); B.O.A. HAT 2621.F (11 L 1215/28 February 1801).
gain some benefits from this limited success. Apart from the above requests, he even asked for an office in Morea.3072

Eventually Musa Pasha was appointed as the governor of Salonika. But since Mehmed Hakkı Pasha was appointed as the serasker of Rumelia, Musa Pasha’s place of duty was changed to Berkofça, before his arrival to Salonika.3073 Musa Pasha declined the second appointment, writing that he could not accomplish it. The center insisted that he should undertake the duty; otherwise he would be dismissed and exiled to Limni. Thereafter Musa Pasha yielded.3074 After the dismissal of Hakkı Pasha, Musa Pasha was transferred to Înebahtı [Lepanto, Greece].3075 This time, he wrote to the center to be pardoned from this duty as well.3076 He was finally appointed as the governor of Salonika and shortly afterwards as the governor of Egypt in May 1805.3077 Mehmed Ali Pasha, the governor of Egypt, was to replace him as the governor of Salonika. It was a good promotion for Musa Pasha and a good opportunity for the center to eliminate the influence of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha from Egypt.3078 However, the order did not satisfy Mehmed Ali Pasha and he refused to leave Egypt and assume the governorship of Salonika. In the meantime Musa Pasha landed in Alexandria on 28 July 1805. His aim was to march to Cairo with the Ottoman and Mamluk forces. However, Mehmed Ali Pasha routed the Mamluk forces and with the support of the grand admiral, he was confirmed as the

3072 B.O.A. HAT 3184 (1 Ca 1215/20 September 1800). His requests were approved by the Sultan, except for Morea.

3073 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 115.

3074 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 115.


governor of Egypt. Musa Pasha returned with the Ottoman fleet to his governorship at Salonika.\textsuperscript{3079} During a conversation with William Leake, a British agent, Musa Pasha accused the Grand Admiral of being bribed by the Mehmed Ali Pasha to delay the march to Cairo. In fact, Musa Pasha’s forces experienced a skirmish with Mehmed Ali’s troops, which proved to be disadvantageous for both sides. Noticing the failure of Musa Pasha’s attempt, the Porte ordered him to return and resume the governorship of Salonika.\textsuperscript{3080} Shortly afterwards, upon the breaking out of the Russo-Ottoman War, Musa Pasha served as the 	extit{serasker} of İsmail.\textsuperscript{3081}

From the details of Musa Pasha’s career, one suspects that he was tried to be kept distant from the capital for a long time. Yet, he was suddenly appointed to one of the most influential posts, as the 	extit{rikab-i hümayun kaimmakam}, on 9 M 1222/19 March 1807.\textsuperscript{3082} Since his arrival in İstanbul coincided with that of the British Naval Expedition, he was delegated with the duty for the supervision of the batteries around Kadıköy.\textsuperscript{3083} After the end of the British Expedition and the march of the imperial army to Rumelia, he assumed the duty of 	extit{kaimmakam-ship}.

A detailed research on his life and career clarifies one point: Musa Pasha seems to have always had financial problems. For instance, during his duty to protect Wallachia and Niğbolu, he was provided with 4,000 	extit{sekbans} requiring a total of 40,000 guruş salary. Despite the financial burden on the treasury and on the hospodar of Wallachia, his failure to achieve anything also seems to have attracted the attention of Selim III, who ordered the voyvoda to conduct an investigation on Musa Pasha’s soldiers and the reason why the military expenditures of the Pasha were so high but still not enough. In return, the voyvoda informed that together with his household troops ("\textit{kapi halki}")}, the number of servants

\textsuperscript{3079} Shaw, 	extit{Between Old and New}, pp. 290-1.

\textsuperscript{3080} Leake, 	extit{Travels in Northern Greece}, vol. III, p. 237.

\textsuperscript{3081} Mustafa Necib, 	extit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{3082} B.O.A. 	extit{Sadaret Defterleri}, no. 357, p. 29 (9 M 1222/19 March 1807).

and soldiers under Musa Pasha’s command was about 3500.\textsuperscript{3084} The voyvoda also commented that Musa Pasha was not able to establish his authority over his soldiers.\textsuperscript{3085} At one point, Musa Pasha was not able to pay his debts to the voyvoda and therefore requested financial aid from the center, which signifies great financial problems.\textsuperscript{3086} Yet, a more serious matter was revealed in the report of the voyvoda of Wallachia. In his report he states that despite the dispatch of money for the payment of the salaries of the Albanian soldiers, the salaries were still not paid and the soldiers had besieged the residence of Musa Pasha. They threatened to capture Musa Pasha and his kethüda either to Vidin or Wallachia. The voyvoda comments that such an incident would be a great scandal.\textsuperscript{3087} In Ca 1218/19 August-17 September 1803, Musa Pasha still appeared to be in trouble for the payment of his former debts. There was pressure from the center for the payment of the remaining amount. Underlying the importance of the amount for the war expenses, Selim III states that he had heard that Musa Pasha kept several hundred kise akçes in Salonika. According to the Sultan, some people were accusing Musa Pasha for his appetite to embezzle and devout the imperial holdings (“\textit{mal-i miriyi ekl ü bel sevdasi}”). The Sultan notes that even though he disregarded such news, he still did not forget to remind that Musa Pasha should pay his debt immediately to save himself from imperial wrath.\textsuperscript{3088}

\begin{footnotesize}
3084 B.O.A. HAT 2621.F (11 L 1215/25 February 1801). For another example of deliverance of money by the voyvoda, see B.O.A. C. DH. 8043 (11 Za 1214/6 April 1800).


3086 B.O.A. HAT 61/2692.B (3 Z 1215/17 April 1800). For more details on the matter, see B.O.A. C. DH. 4532 (1 R 1216/11 August 1801). It is a long document containing the letters from Musa Pasha, and the voyvoda of Wallachia. The most interesting detail in the letter of Musa Pasha is the fact that he had pawned his two chiftliks to pay his debts. See B.O.A. C. AS. 7723 (26 L 1215/12 March 1801).

3087 B.O.A. A. AMD. 46/7 (27 S 1216/9 June 1801): “Müşârûnîleyh hazretlerinin muhâsebesi ve askere ol mikdar deyni neden iktizâ eylediği ve devlet-i aliyyeden aldığı mebâliği neye sarf oldunduğu akl-i beşerin ihâtâ edeceği mevâddan olmadiği zâhir ve feryâd figânın cer-i menfaate mebnî olmasi agleb-i ihtimâl idûği bâhir ise de...”

3088 B.O.A. MAD 10078, p. 234 (29 Ca 1218/16 September 1803)
\end{footnotesize}
One foreign traveler, William Leake, had a chance to talk Musa Pasha at Epakto (in the Morea) in the year 1805. After such comments, Leake informs that Musa Pasha was the governor of Salonika, but was sent there “as a kind of exile.” It seems that Musa Pasha was still suffering financial problems since the same author states that the Pasha was mainly supported by contributions from the neighboring districts. He had 150 purses income in land from the Mollalık and a certain amount from Epakto. However, the demands of the Porte and the presents he had to send to the center rendered him so poor that the pilav offered was made “with oil for want of butter.”

Again for the same reason, his servants, “not without the connivance of their master”, recently stole firewood that was prepared to be sent to the British consul at Patras. The author notes that the amount they stole was enough for the whole winter consumption of the Pasha’s kitchen and hamam. According to the same author, Musa Pasha was trying to accumulate money in order to purchase the Pashalık of Morea for the next year, 1806. As might be recalled he had written a petition to the Porte previously with that aim. Even though there is no evidence, one might ask whether there was a kind of hostility between Musa and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha concerning the pashalık of Morea.

As we have tried to figure out above, Musa Pasha seems to have had a difficult life. Mustafa Necib Efendi confirms our observation and attributes Musa Pasha’s hard life to the

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3089 Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. II, p. 610. The first meeting was on 15 February 1805. The author also visited Musa Pasha’s treasurer (“hazinedar”) and kahya.


3092 Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. II, p. 610. A second meeting of Musa Pasha and Leake was on 17 November 1806, this time in Salonika. The author reminds his reader that Musa Pasha was the one who cooked pilav with oil and stole their consul’s wood.


Rebellion. According to him, Musa Pasha held the “atabekân-i saltanat”, the reason for his sufferings, and waited for an opportunity to take revenge on them as soon as he came to power. One of the most interesting aspects about his career is his sudden rise to the post of kaimmakam-ship. He does not seem to have had an influential protector and spent his life with duties outside the capital. According to Asım, the ruling elite chose Musa Pasha for the position of kaimmakam-ship thanks to his outward gentleness, which must have given an impression that he might easily obey them.

Musa Pasha seems to have been a greedy figure. As already discussed in Chapter V, some of the narratives argue that he resigned from his post after the Rebellion, since he wanted to “digest” the fortune he gathered. Indeed, there is a document which gives some confirming clues supporting this view. During his kaimmakam-ship it seems that Musa Pasha sent some parts of his fortune to Yeni Şehir-i Fener. As far as we learn from the record, he sent one yük of gold and jewelry and precious belongings to Fındık Ahmed, his kethüda in the city. During his exile in İzmir, he also sent a box full of jewel watches again to Fındık Ahmed. After his murder all these goods were kept secret and saved from confiscation by Fındık Ahmed, Kavukçuoğlu Ahmed and a Jewish money-dealer. Indeed some of them were secretly sold in the capital before being discovered by the authorities.

6.2.2.2. “Meydan-i Lahm Efendileri” Ataullah Efendi and ulema

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3095 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Saliş Asrî Vekayi, pp. 16-7. Therefore, he considers the appointment of Musa Pasha as the kaimmakam as a great mistake.


3097 B.O.A. MAD 9756, p. 165 (3 R 1226/ 26 April 1811). The order is a late investigation of his probate estate. According to the order, these goods were brought to Yenişehir by his steward (“vekilharc”) Ömer. A second party was carried by his another man called Raşid.

3098 “Meydan-i Lahm Efendileri” is an expression use by Asım for the ulema who were present at the Square during the Rebellion. Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 198.
Another individual who is sometimes held responsible for success of the Rebellion was Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi. He descended from a great molla family called the Şerifzâdes or the İshakzâdes. He was the grandson of Şerif Mehmed Esad Efendi and the son of Şerifzâde Mehmed Şerif Efendi. Ataullah Efendi was educated by Tokadî Mustafa Efendi. Thanks to his prominent and established ulema family, Ataullah Efendi secured a rapid rise in his career: On 12 L 1185/18 January 1772, he joined the müderris class, and continued his education under the tutorship Münib Efendi. On M 1197/7 December 1782-5 January 1789, he was promoted to the rank (“paye”) of Jerusalem and became the judge of Galata for one year. Another promotion came on 1 Ra 1204/19 November 1789 with the Edirne rank. From 1205/1790 to M 1206/31 August-29 September 1791, he served as the judge of Mecca. After his return to İstanbul, he was promoted to nekabet with the rank of İstanbul kadi (5 L 1208/6 May 1794). His promotions continued, and finally reached Anadolu rank on 13 Şaban 1213/20 January 1799. He then obtained the Rumeli paye (1 Şaban 1215/18 December 1800), and then became kazasker of Rumelia (1 Ş 1219/5 November 1804). On 1 B 1221/14 September 1806, he became the Şeyhülislam in 1161/1748 and was dismissed one year later. See Altınsu, Osmanlı Şeyhülislamları, p. 132.

Şerifzâde/Ebu İshakzâde Mehmed Şerif Efendi (d.1204/1790) became Diyarbakır molla (1167/1754) and obtained the paye of Bursa (1173/1759) and Mecca. He served as İstanbul judge (1180/1766-67), Anadolu kazasker (1185/1771) and kazasker of Rumelia (first time in 1189/1775 and second time in 1192/1778). He became Şeyhülislam on 25 C 1192/21 July 1778 and remained in the office until 5 L 1196/13 September 1782. His second appointment was on 27 Za 1203/19 August 1789, but deposed on 28 M 1204/18 October 1789. He was the brother of Fitnat Hanım. He died on 9 N 1204/23 May 1790. See Altınsu, Osmanlı Şeyhülislamları, p. 152; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. V, p. 1588.
Şeyhülislam following the dismissal of Salihzâde Ahmed Esad Efendi.\footnote{Şanizâde, \textit{Tarih-i Şanizâde}, vol. II, p. 68.} Ataullah Efendi was dismissed from the post prior to the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and was ordered to stay in his residence.\footnote{Şanizâde, \textit{Tarih-i Şanizâde}, vol. II, p. 68.} On 7 C 1223/31 July 1808, he was exiled to Kızanlık [present-day Kazanlık, Bulgaria].\footnote{Şanizâde, \textit{Tarih-i Şanizâde}, vol. II, pp. 68-9.} His place of exile was changed to Güzelhisar (in Aydın) on 12 C 1225/15 July 1810,\footnote{B.O.A. C.ADL. 1139 (13 C 1225/16 July 1810).} where he died on 25 N 1226/13 October 1811.\footnote{According to Şanizâde, he died on 26 N 1226/14 October 1811. Câbî, on the other hand, gives the date as 9 L 1226/27 October 1822. The report of Aydın \textit{muhassil} makes it clear that it was on 25 N/13 October. See Şanizâde, \textit{Tarih-i Şanizâde}, vol. II, p. 69; B.O.A. HAT 665/32320.I (29 N 1226/17 October 1811); Câbî, \textit{Câbî Tarihi}, vol. II, p. 808.}

The role of Ataullah Efendi in May 1807 Rebellion troubled both the contemporary and later historians. Puryear mentions a report of Sebastiani, dated 9 June 1807, where Sebastiani informed that the Rebellion was the work of a coalition of the \textit{ulema} with the Janissaries, and Ataullah Efendi was behind the scene.\footnote{Puryear, \textit{Napoleon and the Dardanelles}, p. 203. Unfortunately I did not have a chance to see the above mentioned document.} A later historian, Tayyarzâde Ata Efendi, believed that Ataullah Efendi had a role in the Rebellion. However, he confesses that he was greatly confused when he learnt that he was never involved in it willingly. Therefore, he began to investigate to find out the truth. During a conversation with Hüseyin Efendizâde Tahir Bey, the son of a former keeper of the Archives ("\textit{evrak müdürü"}), he was informed that two days before the deposition of Selim III, Ataullah Efendi sent the Sultan a list composed of eighteen names to be executed. According to Tahir Efendi he left Selim III with no alternative choice. When Tahir Bey said that some other similar documents were kept in the Archives ("\textit{Hazine-i Evrak"}), Tayyarzâde became convinced that Ataullah
Efendi had a role in the Rebellion. Şanizâde regards Ataullah Efendi’s involvement in the Rebellion as a result of the pressure of the rebels.

Some contemporary authors describe Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi as an erudite, noble, honored figure. According to Asım, he did not smoke, never delegated the charge of arpalîk to somebody, and did never receive due accruing (“kapî harçî”), practices which were common among the ulema of the period and oppressive for the common people. He does not seem to have been a greedy or opportunist person either. For instance, after the Rebellion, Mustafa IV wished to grant him the residence of deceased Sûrkatibi Ahmed Bey in Süleymaniye, so that he could be closer to the Porte and the Palace. However, Ataullah Efendi refused the offer and preferred to rent the house from the sons of Ahmed Bey paying a rent of 250 gurus. Apart from these good qualities, he seems to have possessed some bad qualities as well. In most sources, Ataullah Efendi is described as an insincere figure who claimed to be a partisan of the Nizam-i Cedid, but in reality was a secret enemy of the reforms and a conservative figure. As a person, he is described as “conservative” (“mutaasîb”), “helpless” (“bî-menfaat”), and as “devoid of spiritual tastes” (“zaika-yi ruhâniyeden yoksun”). According to the second author of Neticetü’l-Vekayi, he was the “evil of Islam” (“şer-i İslâm”), rather than Şeyhülislam.

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3111 Tayyarzâde Ahmed Ata, Tayyarzâde Ata Bey’în Baızı Fikra-yi Tarihiyyeyi Havi Risalesî, Bayezid (Ali Emîrî), no. 82, p. 6.


3114 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 68; Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. II, pp. 68-9; Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 150. Mustafa Necib Efendi, who was never friendly to the Şeyhülislam, does not mention Ataullah Efendi’s refusal and insistence on renting the residence. Following the dismissal of Ataullah Efendi, the residence was granted to the heirs of Ahmed Efendi. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 96.


3117 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 31.
pious man but was inwardly full of filth and disgrace”. Once he is mocked as “vicious Ata” (“Ata-yi pür-hata”), and in another case he is called “Ata the Lame” (“Topal Ata”), an expression that is clearly not a common and respectful description of a former Şeyhülislam. His family, the Şerifzâdes or İshakzâdes, do not seem to have had a good reputation either. Asım and Kuşmâni criticize not only himself but also his lineage. Another author also claims that Ataullah Efendi was an ungrateful person and not only himself but seven generations of his ancestors were provocateurs of sedition.

Asım accuses him of having a particular dislike for the members of ulema coming from outside the capital. If his comment is true, we can consider him as a typical representative of established ulema families who tried jealously to preserve their privileges. The ilmiye reforms of Ahmed III initiated a process of the exclusion of rival educational centers such as Edirne and Bursa had sealed the “İstanbulization” of ulema recruitment.

According to Zilfi, an ulema aristocracy who dominated Great Mollahships sealed their success in transforming professional status into patrimony. It is important to note that Ataullah Efendi ordered for the dismissal of nineteen müderris while he was Şeyhülislam. According to Cevdet Pasha, they were dismissed since they had been previously recruited by patronage rather than merit. Indeed, a list of those who were

3118 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 35.
3119 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 31.
3120 Asım refers to his lineage as inauspicious (“me’şüme”). See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 121. Kuşmâni, on the other hand qualifies his ancestors by the following words “hereditarily an enemy of the state and religion, the most errant person of the time and a lame man of foll. (“ol eba an cedd hain-i din ü devlet olan Muhtü’l-vakt bir Arec-i pür belâhet”). See Kuşmâni, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp. 26a-26b.
3121 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 31.
dismissed makes one suspicious since some of them were relatives of certain functionaries. Among the dismissed müderris, there were two sons of Cabbarzâde Süleyman, the son of Mahmud Raif Efendi, the son of Kâdi Abdurrahman Pasha, a son of İbrahim Nesim Efendi, the son in-law of Abdüllatif Efendi, two sons of Yusuf Ağa, and his brothers called Şefik and Habib. Mehmed Sadık Efendi, the son of Yusuf Ağa, was not dismissed, but his rank was reduced to musile-i sahn. Therefore, most of the dismissed müderris who were the close relatives of the ruling elite that were known as reformists. But it is not possible to verify whether their dismissal was based on the principle of merit or due to political reasons. These people were admitted back to the religious class after the accession of Mahmud II to the throne. It seems that Ataullah Efendi dismissed or reduced the rank of some other members of the īlmiyye class. Moreover, apparently he had problems with the Huseynî family. This family had close relations with the Palace and was known to be supporters of the palace circles during the reign of Selim III. A few weeks following Ataullah Efendi’s appointment as the Şeyhülislam two leading members of this family were banished.

3127 Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 152-3. Yusuf Ağa had two sons who followed a religious career. The first one was Mehmed Sadık Efendi (d. 1250/1834) who married the daughter of El hac İbrahim Efendi. His other son was Mümin Efendi.


3129 B.O.A. C. ADL. 421 (undated). It is a petition of Mehmed Latif Efendi, a former judge of Yenişehir-i Fener. He complains that Ataullah Efendi reduced his paye two years and requests a new post from the new şeyhülislam. See also Özkul, III. Selim Döneminde Osmanlı Ulemasi, p. 318.


The relationship between Ataullah Efendi and Selim III is not clearly known. In Chapter V, we saw that Seyyidâ Efendi had convinced Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa for the urgent need to dismiss Ataullah Efendi by arguing that the Şeyhülislam had never sincerely wished for the fall of the Sultan. Therefore, he would probably work to secure his rise.\(^{3132}\) To prove his point, Seyyidâ claimed that Ataullah was a figure trusted by Selim III and that was why he was preferred as the Şeyhülislam.\(^{3133}\) Asım argues that Ataullah Efendi never consented the fall of Selim III. He initially did not support his deposition and later insisted that no harm should be done to the former Sultan following his dethronement. According to Asım, Ataullah Efendi consented the fall of Selim III since he was confused when the rebels asked whether Selim III could be trusted any longer.\(^{3134}\) Asım also emphasizes that the presence of a reasonable figure as Ataullah Efendi at the head of the ilmiye was a great advantage during the Rebellion since he saved the city from plunder and disorder. The same historian argues that there would have been much more bloodshed and disorder in the course of the Rebellion, if there had been an ignorant figure at the same post.\(^{3135}\) On the other hand, according to Saint-Denys, Ataullah Efendi deeply hated Selim III.\(^{3136}\) Interestingly enough there is a poem by Ataullah Efendi dedicated to Selim III, in which he expresses deep affiliation to Selim III.\(^{3137}\)


\(^{3137}\) Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi Divanı, İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi Tarih Yazmaları, no. 2902. In the same book, there is another one for the death of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the poem for Selim III was written before his death or not.
The connection and even the collaboration between Ataullah Efendi and Musa Pasha during the Rebellion is described in some sources mentioned previously.\footnote{Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 17; Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, pp. 28-30; Ahmed Ata, \textit{Tarih-i Ata}, vol. II, pp. 48, 76-8; Uzunçarşılı, \textit{Alemdar Mustafa Paşa}, p. 87. See also Ahmed Cevad, \textit{Tarih-i Asker-i Osmani}, vol. I, p. 263.} Even though we do not have clear evidence to be sure of such cooperation, there is an official document which strongly implies a possible connection between the two. The document in question talks about a marriage contract between the two families. It is an undated document in which Kaimmakam Musa Pasha requests permission for the marriage of his son to the daughter of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi. It was gladly approved by the Sultan.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 53341 (undated). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.} The peculiar handwriting of Mustafa IV leaves no suspicion that the marriage in question took place during the reign of Mustafa IV. Asım and Mustafa Necib Efendi also refer to the same marriage alliance. While Mustafa Necib Efendi just mentions that such a marriage took place,\footnote{Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi}, p. 118.} Asım informs that the son of Musa Pasha, who was a müderris, married the daughter of Ataullah Efendi.\footnote{Musa Pasha had two sons, Mustafa and Salih Bey and two daughters called Hasibe and Kadirşah Hanım. See B.O.A. C. SM. 2069 (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1808).} During the first night of the marriage, the other young daughter of Ataullah Efendi died and people considered her death as a bad omen.\footnote{Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 124.} Though none of the authors give the exact date for the marriage, from the chronology of the events in Asım’s \textit{History} it seems that it took place during the second kaimmakam-ship of Musa Pasha. As we have noted earlier, Ataullah Efendi descended from a great ulema family, or “Great Molla”, to borrow the term used by Zilfi. Şerifzâdes/Ishakzâdes were one of most important ulema families of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that dominated
the Şeyhülislamate, and kazasker posts.\textsuperscript{3143} Together with the Dürrizâdes, Feyzullahzâdes, the family had produced thirteen of all Şeyhülislams of that period.\textsuperscript{3144}

The Ishakzâde family itself produced three Şeyhülislams. Kara İsmail (d. 1725), Ebu İshakzâde İshak (1734), [Ebu İshakzâde] Mehmed Şerif, [Ebu İshakzâde] Şerifzâde Mehmed Ataullah (d. 1811). According to Zilfi, the Great Molla families seldom contracted marriages with non-ulema elites.\textsuperscript{3145} Therefore, the marriage between the children of Musa Pasha and Ataullah Efendi seems to be an unusual practice. As might be recalled, Musa Pasha was called back from his place of exile some time after the latter stabilized his position in the Şeyhülislamate. In that regard we may assume that both figures found this marriage alliance as a good opportunity to seal their alliance during the second kaimmakam-ship of Musa Pasha.

\textbf{6.2.2.2.1. Münib Efendi}

Conventional historiography assumes collaboration between the rebels and most members of the ulema. Not only Ataullah Efendi but some other members of the ulema class are accused of having been involved in the Rebellion. At the head of the list is Münib Efendi. According to one source, about the time when the yamaks were gathering at Büyükdere, Münib Efendi met some leading soldiers of the fortresses. He encouraged the rebels by assuring that the Kaimmakam and the ulema supported their cause and did not forget to give the names of eleven individuals he wanted to eliminate.\textsuperscript{3146} Asım also argues that Hamaloğlu Hacı Mustafa Efendi was secretly sent to the fortresses by the ulema,

\textsuperscript{3143} Zilfi, \textit{The Politics of Piety}, p. 47.


\textsuperscript{3145} Zilfi, “Elite Circulation in the Ottoman Empire”, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{3146} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Vaka-ı Cedid}, p. 21.
including Münib Efendi, for the encouragement of the *yamaks*.\(^{3147}\) As might be recalled, Asım criticizes Münib Efendi for participating in the pompous ceremony held for the deliverance of the *Hüccet-i Şer'iyye* and also working against Selim III whom he owned his rank (“*paye*”).\(^{3148}\)

Münib Efendi was connected to Ataullah Efendi as his tutor. He always seems to have been closer to Ataullah Efendi, but hostile to Samanizâde Ömer Hulusi Efendi. Apparently Ömer Hulusi Efendi never digested his scandalous appointment to and dismissal from the position of Şeyhülislamate after one day. Therefore, after becoming Şeyhülislam, for a second time, he exiled Münib Efendi to Ayıntab.\(^{3149}\) According to Asım, Münib Efendi was deeply hated by Selim III. He says that especially during Münib’s employment as the *Haremeyn Müfettişi* and later as İzmir judge, he fell from favour since the Sultan learnt that Münib Efendi had accepted bribes.\(^{3150}\) After presenting a book on “*Fenn-i usül*” by the help of Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi, he was promoted to the rank of Mecca. Another promotion came after the presentation of the translation of *Siyer-i Kebir* with the help of Yusuf Ağa and the *kahvecibaşı*, after which he obtained the İstanbul rank.\(^{3151}\) About his ideas on reform we do not know much, yet he wrote a pamphlet on playing drums (“*trampete risalesi*”) in order to prove that it was not against the established religious practices.\(^{3152}\)

The other members of the *ulema* associated with the May 1807 Rebellion are Muradzâde Mehmed Murad Efendi, Aşir Efendizâde Mehmed Hafid Efendi, Çavuşzâde

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\(^{3147}\) Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 25. Again depending on hearsay, Asım says that Hamaloğlu accompanied the *yamaks* until the group reached to Tophane and following the enthronement Mustafa IV he was allocated three *kese* akçes and a salary from the Mint.


\(^{3150}\) Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 112.


Ahmed Şemseddin Efendi, Alizâde Esseyyid Mehmed Efendi, Ahmed Muhtar Efendi and Derviş Mehmed Efendi. All of them held important religious posts and descended from prominent families. Muradzâde served as the İstanbul judge, Ahmed Muhtar Efendi, Aşir Efendizâde and Şemseddin were kadaskers, while Derviş Mehmed Efendi was the İmam-ı evvel of Selim III. Şemseddin Efendi was the son of müderris Feyzullah Efendi, Aşirzâde was the grandson of Reisülküttab Mustafa Efendi (d. 1162/1748) and the son of Reiszâde Mustafa Aşir Efendi (Şeyhülislam between 30.8.1798-11.7.1800). Ahmed Muhtar Efendi was the son of İshak Efendi, a kazasker, while Muradzâde Mehmed Murad was the son of Murad Efendi, from mevâli. Derviş Mehmed Efendi was a preacher at the Mosque of Ayasofya-yı Kebir. As might be recalled, Derviş Mehmed Efendi was the one who went to the Palace in order to protect the princes Mustafa and Mahmud and criticized Selim III. Almost all of them were exiled after the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the city. Following the accession of Mahmud II, Atauğull Efendi, Ahmed Muhtar Efendi and Muradzâde were sent to exile on 9 C 1223/2 August 1808. Again, unlike most of the other chronicles of the period, Asım argues that it was not Atauğull Efendi but Muradzâde Murad Efendi who opened the way to the dethronement of Selim III.

The above figures are usually categorized as conservative members of the ulema, headed by Atauğull Efendi. We should be aware against the mistake of assuming that these people were only motivated by their religious concerns. Their political and personal

3153 Şanizâde argues that after his exile, it became clear that he was not actively involved in Rebellion, despite his presence at the Square. See Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol I, p. 176.

3154 Tayyarzâde Ahmed Ata, Fikra-yı Tarihiyye, Bayezid, no. 82, pp.7a-7. According to Tayyarzâde, he was discovered by the Sultan during a visit to the mosque.

3155 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 60; Beyhan, Saray Günlügü, p. 238.


3157 Heyd, “The Ottoman ulema and Westernization”, p. 69: “As a result of the revolution of 1807 reactionary elements in the ulema leadership succeeded temporarily in stopping these reforms by force”. According to Beydilli, there was not such a clear policy of curbing down the reforms. See Beydilli, Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishane, (İstanbul: Eren, 1995), pp. 81-82; Beydilli, “İlk Mühendislerimizden Seyyid Mustafa”, pp. 404-5.
concerns also say much about their certain attitudes. For instance, as we have remarked in the second chapter, Şemseddin Efendi held esame worth of 1800 akçes from the Janissary esames, and we tried to make a connection between his “income” and his upholding of Janissary interests. Şanizâde describes him as an ignorant figure and open to bribery, also being oppressive and greedy. 3158

6.2.2.2.2. Other Figures

So far we have dealt with Musa Pasha, Ataullah Efendi and some other members of the ulema. But there were other figures who are listed in the “anti-reformist” category. One of the well-known individuals was Mehmed Said Halet Efendi. In his earlier profession, he served as the mühürdar yamak to Mehmed Raşid Efendi, also as kethüda to Ebubekir Semi and Ohrili Ahmed Pasha. 3159 We do not know much about his rise. According to Abdurrahman Şeref, he was admitted to the hacegan class with the help of Mustafa Reşid Efendi. 3160 Yet, his real protector seems to have been İbrahim Refet Efendi. 3161 Halet Efendi married the wife of Velifendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi, after being released from

3158 Şanizâde, *Tarih-i Şanizâde*, vol. I, p. 182-5. Şanizâde describes him as an ignorant person. Since he would expect the influential figures (“rical”) to consult him otherwise he would talk against them, the elite sent him presents, including money. He had a considerable income from such the presents. After his death, considerable amount money, garments was found in his house. During the construction of his seashore residence, both Sultan Selim III (1,000 gurş) and some ruling elite helped him. He is usually accused of being ingratitude (“küfrân-i nâm-i nimet”).


3161 İbrahim Refet Efendi (d. 1228/1813) became hacegan and then başmuhasebeci. He was appointed as çavuşbaşı on L 1222/December 1807 and musahib. In the year 1224/1809, he became masraf-ı şehriyari and two years later şehremini. According to Mehmed Süreyya, his rise during the reign of Mahmud II was thanks to Refet Efendi’s loyalty to Selim III. He also emphasizes that Refet Efendi had a great role in the rise of Halet Efendi. See Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmani*, vol. III, pp. 788-9.
exile in Kütahya. He was a Mevlevi. Before the Rebellion, he served as envoy to Paris from 1802 to 1806, and immediately after the Rebellion as the rikab reisi vekili. Again, as in the case of Şemseddin Efendi and Münib Efendi, Halet Efendi also seems to have had relations with the so-called reformist group, a point that might help us to question the problem of dividing the ruling elite into strict categories.

Halet was a figure closely connected to Ataullah Efendi. He was a minor official at this period when compared to his rapid rise during the reign of Mahmud II. His father, Kürim Hüseyin Efendi, was employed as the tutor of Ataullah Efendi and both were friends since childhood. The affection of Ataullah Efendi towards Halet Efendi is revealed in one document written during the latter’s exile to Kütahya. In the letter, it is commented that Halet was unjustly sent to exile and the writer feels certain that the Şeyhülislam was deeply annoyed by the exile. The author tried to console Ataullah Efendi by assuring that Halet Efendi would return and again be promoted to official positions.

Hafız İsmail Pasha is another famous example of those who is presented as a secret enemy of the reforms. He was the son of a haseki called Zernişâni. Hafız İsmail was employed as a haseki of Prince Selim. After Selim’s accession to the throne, İsmail Ağâ was promoted to the position of Ağâ karakulak, then tedbil haseki and after one and a half year to the position of the lieutenant of the Bostancıbaşı ("haseki ağâ"). One year later, he became Bostancıbaşı and then Grand Admiral. After five and a half months he attained the position of Grand Vizier. However, after the Edirne Incident, he was first exiled to Bursa, but later transferred to Sakız. Following the rise of Mustafa IV, he was pardoned and appointed as the governor of Karaman with Seraskerlik of Bahr-ı Sefid Boğaz on 13 R

3165 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 27a. According to Asım, the change in the place of exile was to due to some unpleasant behaviour he engaged in Bursa. See Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 135.
1222/20 June 1807. Ismail Pasha died on 15 Ş 1222/18 October 1807. His death came so sudden that it seems to have surprised even Mustafa IV, who ordered an investigation of his death. In the related report it is stated that he was ill for some time. However, the second author of *Neticetü'l-Vekayi* has some interesting claims about his death. Depending on the information provided by a confidant of the Pasha, the author claims that Hafız İsmail Pasha was poisoned by Hadıoğlu by a secret order of Grand Vizier Çelebi Mustafa Pasha, who suspected that İsmail Pasha would replace him. Hafız İsmail Pasha was not a wealthy person and therefore his possessions were granted to his family by the Sultan.

We do not have enough evidence to prove whether İsmail Pasha was against the reforms or not. Yet, a contemporary source narrates some gossip that might give a clue in this regard. While mentioning the dismissal of Bahriye nazırı Ali Efendi, he implies that the dismissal was due to a former disagreement that occurred between Ali Efendi and Hafız İsmail Pasha during the latter’s Grand Admiralship. According to the author, İsmail Pasha gave certain orders but were refused by the former on the grounds that his orders were against the new regulations in the Tersane. Therefore, after being promoted to the position of grand vizierate, İsmail Pasha tried to secure Ali Efendi’s dismissal and finally achieved his aim on 26 Ş 1220/19 November 1805.

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3166 B.O.A. C.DH. 1857 (undated). It is a list of promotions. See also B.O.A. 1361/53593 (undated); B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 41 (13 R 1222/20 June 1807).


3168 B.O.A. HAT 1356/53134 (undated). The Sultan demanded an urgent investigation on the causes of his death.

3169 B.O.A. HAT 53274 (undated).

3170 *Neticetü'l-Vekayi*, p. 26. According to author, it was Veli Ağa, silahdar of the İsmail Pasha who gave the poison.

3171 B.O.A. HAT 1356/53134 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 1356/53162 (undated); B.O.A. MAD 9755, p. 3 (9 Za 1222/8 January 1808).

3172 *1220 Senesi Vekayi*, pp. 22-3.
İsmail Pasha objected to, but the author notes that they were new. As might be seen from his early career, he seems to have been a confidant of Selim III both before and after his rise to the throne. İsmail Pasha also seems to have been close to Mustafa Reşid Efendi and secured the position of grand vizierate thanks to Reşid Efendi’s favour. Indeed, in one of the despatches from Muruzi to Italinsky, he is described as a man who is not aware of the basic notions of politics but chosen by his spiritual guide Mustafa Reşid Efendi.\footnote{Goşu, \textit{La Troisième Coalition}, p. 77.} Saint-Denys describes Hafiz Ismail as an intelligent and generous person and praises him for working hard for the defense of İstanbul during the British Expedition.\footnote{Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 87.} On the other hand, Wilkinson criticizes him severely as being a “\textit{low-bred, ignorant man, so poor and thirsty after money}” who tried to change the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia with the concern of securing a subsidy with the appointments of new candidates who promised to pay the Grand Vizier.\footnote{Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of Principalities}, p. 110.}

Though not always clearly pronounced, there was a fierce opponent of the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} elite, if not the program itself, namely Mehmed Hakkı Pasha. He was the son of Ahmed Kamil Pasha.\footnote{Uzunçarşılı, “Mehmed Hakkı Paşa”, p. 191.} Like Musa Pasha, the career of Hakkı Pasha is full of exiles and appointments. He is usually known to have been a very nervous person.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 1365/54051 (undated).} Though he was successful in his fight over the Mountaineers in the Balkans, he was dismissed from the duty without any promotion and was exiled (1802). Yusuf Ağa was one of the most important enemies of Hakkı Pasha and his rise to the grand vizierate was systematically curbed by the latter, together with the other opponents in the capital.\footnote{Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. I, p. 372. Asım implies that promotion of Hakkı Pasha to the post of grand vizirate would mean an end to the career of Yusuf Ağa.} On the other hand, Câbî notes that Hakkı Pasha openly declared that he would execute Yusuf Ağa if he was
appointed as the grand vizier.\textsuperscript{3179} It seems that during the period of disorder that prevailed under the rule of Mustafa IV, the grand vizierate of Hakkı Pasha appeared as a solution to reestablish order in İstanbul. Yet, Hakkı Pasha was not appointed due to unknown reasons.\textsuperscript{3180} He was a powerful and influential figure favoured by the Janissaries.\textsuperscript{3181} In one of his letters, he complains that the “süfeha” of Selim III’s reign caused his dismissal and exile despite his sincere and loyal efforts. Therefore, he suffered greatly for six years during his exile in İzmir.\textsuperscript{3182} Hakkı Pasha was close to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha but hostile to İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Elhac İbrahim Efendi and Yusuf Ağa.\textsuperscript{3183}

Kazgancı Mustafa is among the rare figures whose motives to support the rebels is easier to understand. He was a Janissary, also engaged in the craft of coppersmith and managed to accumulate a great amount of wealth in this craft.\textsuperscript{3184} However, due to the Nizam-ı Cedid program the ruling elite intervened in the commerce and artisanship, and he lost money.\textsuperscript{3185} He seems to have had close connections with the yamaks. Like them, Mustafa Ağa was from the Black Sea region and he seems to have had influence over them.\textsuperscript{3186}

\textbf{6.2.2.3. Mustafa IV}


\textsuperscript{3180} For more details see Câbi, \textit{Câbi Tarihi}, vol. I, pp. 183-4.

\textsuperscript{3181} B.O.A. HAT 1365/54051 (undated).

\textsuperscript{3182} B.O.A. HAT 174/7556 (5 Za 1222/4 January 1808).

\textsuperscript{3183} Uzunçarşılı, “Mehmed Hakkı Paşa”, pp. 195, 199, 218.


A list of a faction with a program which was altogether against Selim III should include Prince Mustafa and his supporters. Apart from his own servants, one of the most important figures of that group was Esma Sultan. While Beyhan Sultan took sides with his brother Selim III, Esma Sultan favoured Mustafa IV, his brother. Some suggest that she worked hard for the rise of Mustafa to the throne.\footnote{Balikhane Nazırı, 
*Eski Zamanlarda İstanbul*, p. 100.} According to Uluçay, Sineperver Kadin, the mother of Mustafa, Esma and Hıbetullah and a certain Peykidil played an important role in the May 1807 Rebellion and during the Alemdar Incident.\footnote{Uluçay, *Padişahların Kadınları ve Kızları*, p. 119.} Esma Sultan’s *kethüda* and *rikab kethüda* Osman Efendi was exiled to Mesudiye following the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to İstanbul on the grounds that Osman Efendi had close connections with the clique of Mustafa IV (“*Sultan Mustafa takımı*”).\footnote{Öz, “Selim III Mustafa IV ve Mahmud II”, p. 21.} As might be recalled Pehlivian Hüseyin Ağa is referred to as belonging to the “faction” Prince Mustafa.\footnote{Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi*, p. 73; T.S.M.A. E. 2650 (undated, catalogue date is 1202-3/1787-89); Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 96.}

There is an interesting story about Prince Mustafa’s connection with İbrahim Refet Efendi, whom we have mentioned above as the protector of Halet Efendi. However, the importance of İbrahim Refet Efendi is that he was the one who corresponded with the Prince Mustafa as his instructor educating him for the throne. The document is a report that seems to have been written after the death of Mustafa IV, since he is referred to as “late”.\footnote{T.S.M.A. E. 8990 ((undated, catalogue date is 1226/1811): “*Cennetmekânın efendiliği esnâsında anbar katibi İbrahim Efendi‘den idâre-i umûr-i mülkiyye üzerine malûmât tahsili için mekâtibe eylediği...*”} According to the story mentioned in this document, one day Prince Mustafa demands something from İbrahim Efendi and faces with an unexpected response. İbrahim Efendi advises him to be more concerned to educate himself for rulership rather than wasting his time. After that day, they begin to correspond with each other secretly. In these dispatches İbrahim Efendi asks various questions on a particular condition of the state and...
Prince Mustafa writes answers to these questions, he also takes feedback from the other. Thus, Prince Mustafa became more informed and acquainted with state affairs. According to the writer of the report, these despatches continued for one year.\textsuperscript{3192}

For us, what is striking about the story is the way Prince Mustafa tried to educate himself. Moreover, if we combine the contacts between Halet Efendi, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, İbrahim Refet and Prince Mustafa, one wonders whether there existed a kind of information network among these figures. According to Abdurrahman Şeref, Mustafa IV did not trust Halet Efendi. Looking at the later career of İbrahim Refet Efendi, we see that he served as the prefect ("şehremini") and then çavuşbaşı during the reign of Mahmud II.\textsuperscript{3193} According to the above-mentioned report, a similar relationship continued between İbrahim and Mahmud II. The former seems to have been a very intricate figure. For instance, he used to live a very simple life but maintained a network of spies all over the Empire, which made him very powerful and influential.\textsuperscript{3194} Concerning the political ambition of Prince Mustafa to accede the throne, there is no agreement among the contemporary authors. For instance, Oğulukyan, asserts that Prince Mustafa was in fact unwilling to replace Selim III, but became convinced when he was advised that if he did not accede to the throne the rebels could kill the Sultan.\textsuperscript{3195} But such views seem to be unrealistic when we take into consideration the stories about his involvement in the Rebellion. Yet, what seems certain is the fact that Mustafa IV hesitated to order the murder of his deposed cousin for a long time.

\textbf{6.2.2.4. A Common Identity?}

\textsuperscript{3192} T.S.M.A. E. 8990 ((undated, catalogue date is 1226/1811).

\textsuperscript{3193} T.S.M.A. E. 8990 (undated, catalogue date is 1226/1811).

\textsuperscript{3194} T.S.M.A. E. 8990 (undated, catalogue date is 1226/1811).

\textsuperscript{3195} Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 11.
We do not have reliable information concerning most of the above mentioned figures’ views and positions on foreign and internal policies. According to Wilkinson, “the Mufti, Sheriff-Zaade-Attaa-Effendi and the chief of the Janissaries, Pehlivan Mehmed Ağa were entirely devoted to the French party.” According to him, they willingly helped the promotion of French interests and tried to overthrow the Triple Alliance.\footnote{Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of Principalities}, p. 111.} According to the same author, “the chief of the Janissaries, Pehlivan Ağa, had formerly been colonel of a regiment, which had acted once as a guard of honour, given to a French embassy at the Porte.” Therefore, the author concludes, he was a pro-French figure.\footnote{Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of Principalities}, p. 107.} On the other hand, Halet Efendi was apparently deeply anti-French and hostile to Sebastiani. His observations on France and the Western civilization reveal his distance toward the West.\footnote{For some examples, see Karal, \textit{Halet Efendi}, pp. 32-3} According to \textit{The Times}, most of those individuals who came to power after the Rebellion had a negative attitude towards the partisans of Russia.\footnote{\textit{The Times}, Tuesday, July 14, 1807; pg. 4, Issue 7098, col. E (Vienna, June 21).}

The particular case of Mehmed Hakkı Pasha is a good example of the fact that being conservative or against reforms cannot be the sole dividing line between the so-called reformists and anti-reformists. As we remarked at the beginning of this section it is really difficult to find some common characteristics among those people who are either considered to be anti-reformists or had a role in the Rebellion for certain reasons. From available information, it is very difficult to reach a definitive opinion concerning their involvement or detachment in the Rebellion. Even if we accept that they all in one way or another were involved in the May 1807 Rebellion, one of the most serious problems that should be underlined is the fact that most of the people who are accused of were almost at the top of their official careers: Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi was Şeyhülislam, the highest rank among the ulema; Musa Pasha did not hold the highest title but occupied one of the most important positions in the absence of the Grand Vizier in the capital; Pehlivan Ağa
was a Janissary Ağası, the commander-in-chief of these corps. Hafiz İsmail Pasha was a Grand Vizier when he was accused of causing failure of the expansion of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army to Edirne. Risking to make a sweeping generalization, we might claim that in most of the previous uprisings in the Ottoman history, the principal targets were the people holding these official positions. In May 1807 Rebellion we observe the strange fact that the highest state officials were accused of having been involved in a rebellion. In fact, they themselves were the people who would lose much in case of a change in the throne. It is very difficult to find convincing answers to these important questions. Certain possible answers might be suggested, however. Relying on the assumption that the above officials were to lose something might also give a clue that they were sure that they would not lose anything since they had either collaborated with the new ruler candidate (i.e. Prince Mustafa) or the rebels. Another possibility might be the fact that they were ready to challenge their rivals, therefore they were ready to take risks.

The main possibility is the fact that they had some basic problem with the system itself and decided to put an end to it. They were at the top of their careers, but did not enjoy the rights and responsibilities required by their positions. In fact, a detailed study of the contemporary chronicles suggests that they experienced some problems in this regard. To begin with Şerifzade Ataullah Efendi, Asım has a particular opinion concerning his case. Despite the problems Asım suffered due to Ataullah Efendi’s supposed envy of himself, he still tries to be objective in evaluating the role of Ataullah Efendi. According to him, from the time of his promotion until the outburst of the Rebellion, Ataullah Efendi was despised and ignored by the ruling elite of the period to an extent that he was not esteemed even as much as an “*mahalle imam*”. He would never be informed or consulted about any matter and the Şeyhülislam would usually learn the news from his visitors. Asım argues that he was only esteemed by the Sultan. As we have noted above, there were some similar complaints by Musa Pasha too. For the problem between Hafiz İsmail Pasha and İbrahim Nesim Efendi, there is a similar explanation by some contemporary authors. Asım argues that the influence of İbrahim Nesim Efendi was to such an extent that without consulting

\[\text{Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. I, p. 337.}\]
him no decision was taken and Grand Vizier Hafiz İsmail was a puppet ("sadrazam heman tendise misâl bir şeyh timsâl kaldiğandan") and İbrahim Efendi seems to have felt no hesitation to criticize him.\textsuperscript{3201} That is why, he says, there was animosity between Hafiz İsmail Pasha and İbrahim Nesim Efendi. Mustafa Necib Efendi also makes reference to the tension between the two and comments that it was Hafiz İsmail Pasha who became jealous of the extent of power the latter enjoyed and considered it as a threat to his own power.\textsuperscript{3202} Despite several efforts for the elimination of his rival, Hafiz İsmail was not successful in his removal. Having heard about the tension between the two, Selim III commented that İbrahim Nesim Efendi was a loyal official and advised the latter to have good relations with him.\textsuperscript{3203} On the other hand, in order to improve their relations, İbrahim Efendi granted five kese akçes share ("sehm") to the son of the Grand Vizier by the order of the Sultan, but achieved no positive result.\textsuperscript{3204} Consequently, some contemporary sources assert that Hafiz İsmail Pasha used the Edirne Incident as a pretext to eliminate of the İbrahim Nesim Efendi.\textsuperscript{3205} We will continue to provide some other examples below.

Thus, most of those people who are accused of having been involved in the Rebellion could be categorized under the title of "devlet küskünleri", a term used by Asım.\textsuperscript{3206} Their common characteristic seems to have been a shared hatred against the dominance of the ruling elite and considering them as the primary cause of their exclusion from state affairs. Asım notes that the members of the Palace were not pleased with the dominance of the two

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{3201} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. I, p. 123.
  \item \textsuperscript{3202} Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi}, p. 43.
  \item \textsuperscript{3204} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. I, pp. 123-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{3205} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. I, p. 124; Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi}, p. 44.
  \item \textsuperscript{3206} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, pp. 19, 34.
\end{itemize}
figures over the whole Palace.\textsuperscript{3207} As might be noticed from above explanations most of the people who are accused of being involved in the Rebellion or reacting to the ruling elite are commonly those who are usually said to have been excluded from the administration. For Câbî, there is a direct correlation between the resentment of the Janissaries and the ulema and their involvement in the Rebellion. The ulema complained among each other that they did not have access to the imperial councils even as kadıaskers and therefore they were shamed before the public.\textsuperscript{3208} Moreover, Câbî gives examples to prove that the despising attitude of the ruling elite towards the ulema caused the latter’s resentment. Accordingly, for Câbî, the Janissary commanders complained that “a few youngsters have become the companions of the state” (“bir kaç oğlan makulesi devlet-i aliyyen mahremi ola.”) And the Janissaries in turn sent secret news to the yamaks that they would collaborate with them.\textsuperscript{3209} All these facts force us to rethink on the political circumstances prior to the May 1807 Rebellion, particularly on the issue of change or problem in the system, a point that we will deal hereafter.

\textsuperscript{3207} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 37. Unfortunately he does not give the names of these people but it is very probable that Asım implies Sırkatibi Ahmed and Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi.


<table>
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<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>RELATIVES</th>
<th>CAREER</th>
<th>PATRON</th>
<th>FACTION</th>
<th>FOREIGN CONNECTIONS</th>
<th>RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION</th>
<th>MIRIK</th>
<th>IKEBE</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
<th>LAST DUTY</th>
<th>DEATH</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Naqshibendi</td>
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**Table 1: The Selimian Elite and Its Connections**

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6.3. A Change in the Political System?

One of the most striking aspects of the Selimian era is the virtual absence of a strong grand vizier. Indeed, one foreign observer comments that with the help of a powerful grand vizier, the reform program could have been realized more easily.\footnote{Olivier, Türkiye Seyahatnamesi, p. 155.} A later historian, Cevdet Pasha, makes similar comments and underlines that during that period the post of grand vizierate was reduced to a mere ("kuru") title.\footnote{Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VIII, pp. 62, 146.} Traditionally, the office of grand vizier signified the “absolute delegate” ("vekil-i mutlak") and enjoyed a degree of power comparable to that of the Sultan himself. However, during the early nineteenth century, the grand vizier was the head of the scribal service and the military establishment with the title of commander-in-chief ("Serdar-i Ekrem").\footnote{Findley, Bureaucratic Reform, p. 71.} Rather than securing the rise of a strong grand vizier, there was a tendency to share political power among the members of the bureaucracy, palace, and ilmiye class and even with the Sultan. Yalçıkaya provides us an observation of Liston about the factions of that period. According to Liston, the only point that brought these rival groups together was the rejection of the implementation of arbitrary orders of the Sultan, the restriction of functions of the grand vizier as much as possible and the tendency for the administration of the Empire by a council formed by privileged ("seçkin") people.\footnote{Yalçıkaya, “Sir Robert Liston’un İstanbul Büyükelçiliği”, p. 199.} Another author, Olivier makes a similar observation. According to him, a new council was established through which all projects and policies were to be discussed and decided. For him, the main result of this development was the reduction in the responsibilities of the grand vizier.\footnote{Olivier, Türkiye Seyahatnamesi, pp. 152-53.} Saint-Denys argues that Selim III, too, ordered the discussion of governmental affairs in the councils ("divan") rather than delegating an
absolute authority to the kaimmakams and viziers. Our observation which relies on a lengthy research is the fact that there was a serious effort to curb down the power of strong figures like Hakkı Pasha, later Hafız İstanbul Pasha or to prevent their promotion to the grand vizierate. But what is interesting is the fact that we do not see the rise of even one figure among the so-called pro-Nizam-ı Cedid individuals to power. Apparently, they preferred to remain in the background and to share executive power among themselves.

The consultative assembly ("meşveret") was a continuation of an old practice in the Empire. It was previously the imperial council ("divan-ı hümâyûn") where important issues were to be discussed. However, the Divan lost its former prominence and turned into a council through which the decisions for war and peace would be taken. On the other hand, in the course of the eighteenth century, consultative assemblies began to be held more frequently, particularly to deal with the extraordinary crises, not only for war and peace, but also for any serious internal or external problem. In terms of membership and place of meeting there was not a stable rule, but the councils were usually and normally presided over by the grand vizier. The purpose was usually the legitimation of controversial decisions in the eyes of the populace. Decisions were taken by unanimous decision ("ittifak-ı ara"). Particularly during the reigns of Abdulhamid I and Selim III, consultative assemblies began to become more frequent and regular. Selim III made it a

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3215 Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, p. 107. According to him, Musa Pasha was annoyed since he was not able to enjoy the former power of the kaimmakams.

3216 Doğan, Sadaret Kethûdâlî, p. 128; Miller, Mustapha Pacha Bairaktar, p. 105; Findley, Bureaucratic Reform, pp. 72, 88; Ahmed Cihan, Reform Çağında Osmanlı İlişke Sınıfı, (İstanbul: Birey, 2004), pp. 63-4.

3217 Doğan, Sadaret Kethûdâlî, p. 128; Findley, Bureaucratic Reform, pp. 72, 88.


3219 Akyıldız, Osmanlı Bürokrasisi, p. 32; Doğan, Sadaret Kethûdâlî, p. 128; Cihan, Osmanlı İlişke Sınıfı, p. 72. The councils were usually held either at the Porte or at the residence of the şeyhülislam.
permanent part of the legislative and executive process.\textsuperscript{3220} The issues and participants to the \textit{meşveret} would be decided beforehand and the sultan would be informed. The decisions taken during the discussions would be presented to the sultan by a \textit{telhis}.\textsuperscript{3221} While deciding on the participants to the \textit{meşveret}, particular attention was paid to include members of \textit{ilmîye}, \textit{kalemiye} and \textit{seyfiyye}.\textsuperscript{3222} Apart from the people invited to the meetings, additional people would be called in order to consult or demand information. According to Olivier, twelve officials, namely the Grand Vizier, Şeyhülislam, Kahya Bey, Finance Director (“Defterdar Efendi”), Reis Efendi, Çelebi Efendi, Tersane emini, \textit{çavuşbaşı}, two ex-Reisülküttabs and two former finance directors (“\textit{defterdar}”) were among the regular participants.\textsuperscript{3223} Some other officials who were not present in the meetings would be informed subsequently.\textsuperscript{3224} At the turn of the nineteenth century, the \textit{meşverets} had become regularized to a great extent. According to Muzaffer Doğan, the most influential participants of these meetings were civilian bureaucrats, namely the \textit{Sadaret Kethüda}, the \textit{Çavuşbaşı}, the \textit{Reisülküttab} and the \textit{Defterdar}. He makes an important observation that during this period the influence of the \textit{ulema} was weakened and the military officials were not allowed to interfere in the decisions. Individuals like İbrahim Nesim Efendi during the reign of Selim III or Halet Efendi during the reign of Mahmud II were able to exert major influence on the \textit{meşverets} thanks to their closeness to the Palace and the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{3225} During the reign of Mustafa IV, the consultative assemblies seem to have preserved their importance in the decision making process.\textsuperscript{3226} As might be recalled, the Sultan did not

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{3220} Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, pp. 72-73. See also Cihan, \textit{Osmanlı İlimyi Sınıfı}, pp. 72-3.
\item \textsuperscript{3221} Akyıldız, \textit{Osmanlı Bürokrasisi}, pp. 32-3.
\item \textsuperscript{3222} Akyıldız, \textit{Osmanlı Bürokrasisi}, pp. 35-6.
\item \textsuperscript{3223} Olivier, \textit{Türkiye Seyahatnamesi}, pp. 153-4. He notes that even though grand admiral and valide sultan kethüda were not members of the \textit{divan}, they participated in extraordinary situations and expressed their opinions if they are asked.
\item \textsuperscript{3224} Doğan, \textit{Sadaret Kethüdaliği}, p. 130.
\item \textsuperscript{3225} Doğan, \textit{Sadaret Kethüdaliği}, p. 132.
\end{itemize}
permit Çelebi Mustafa Pasha to move the army from Şumnu to Edirne without the decision from the assembly.

There seems to have been an inner group behind the reform movement. At the administrative level, it appears to have been a small cadre established in order to execute the reform program. The Moniteur Universal, a French newspaper, informs that in July 1792, an “inner committee”, consisting of twenty-four members was established and even the executive powers of the Grand Vizier were delegated to this committee. We also learn that the Reisülküttâb was later included into this committee.\footnote{3227} According to an article in The Times, twelve people chosen by the Sultan formed a divan under the presidency of Yusuf Ağâ.\footnote{3228} At first glance, the commission mentioned by the two newspapers seems to refer to the authors of the well-known reform proposals (“layihas”).\footnote{3229} As might be recalled, the reform proposals were submitted by some leading figures who suggested various solutions to revive the old Empire. By the order of Selim III in the year 1792, some booklets about the reforms to be implemented by the government were written down by twenty-two authors. However, if we combine this data with the information provided by the contemporary Ottoman sources, the picture becomes more meaningful and interesting. In the Yayla Imam Risalesi, there is a reference to an inner committee under the leadership of İsmail Raif Paşazâde İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi. If we follow the author, after deciding on certain points, the ruling elite and the ulema took some decisions on the issues related to the Nizam-ı Cedid and later declared their intention to the Sultan. After his approval, the reform was implemented. Unfortunately, the author does not make further reference on the nature

\footnote{3226} Cihan, Osmanlı İlişki Sınıfları, p. 78.


\footnote{3228} The Times, Monday, August 3 1807, pg. 3, issue 7115, col. C (From the Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8).

\footnote{3229} In fact, a meşveret was held to discuss the matters related to the Nizam-ı Cedid reform. However, it was held in the year 1793. See Asum, Tarih-i Asum, vol. I, pp. 34, 38-39, 354; Cihan, Osmanlı İlişki Sınıfları, p. 77.
of these decisions or on the identity of the participants. Yet, he notes that the leader, İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi, warned the Sultan on following points when the latter ordered its implementation. İbrahim İsmet advised the Sultan on certain points: After underlining that he had no doubt that these decisions would be implemented and would become the basic principles of future policies, he reminded the Sultan that the initiation would require a great degree of bravery (“cesaret”) and resolution (“istikamet”). Otherwise, he warned that both the Empire and his throne would tumble down. Therefore, the Sultan had to be very courageous and never act or approve or issue anything against the New Regime (“Nizam-i Cedid”) under panic. The most important part comes after these initial warnings:

When we discuss on the memorandum among ourselves and then submit its précis to his majesty the Sultan, His Highness should display no opposition to its content and issue the imperial edict in accordance. Furthermore, His Highness had better not confide in his Grand Vizier, who is His absolute representative. The grant of His Majestic authorization is naturally a prerequisite for the fundamentals of the order….  

The above-mentioned commission does not seem to have been formed by all of those who submitted reform proposals, but rather by a smaller group of ten. Interestingly enough, the grand vizier was not included and the Sultan was requested to keep the correspondences secret even from his grand vizier and advised to avoid consulting him. It might not be wrong to claim that the above-mentioned committee tried to accumulate a great degree of decision-making and executive power to initiate the reform programme and requested the approval from the Sultan in all matters. They, as İbrahim İsmet stated to the Sultan, also promised to conduct the affairs in ultimate secrecy and never reveal the secrets to others. If one member of the committee died, a new member would be chosen either from the ulema.

\[3230\] \textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi}, p. 215.

\[3231\] \textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi}, p. 216: “lâyihaya dahil on kişi beynimizde meşveret edüb hulâsasım şeykletli efendimizde takrîr eylediğimizde asla mubahet etmeyeb mucibince hatt-ı hümâyûn-ı şeyket makrûn keşfî kilip bakayım vekîl-i mutlaka ifade edeyim deri sadrazam olan vezirine dahi sir vermeyeb her halde takririmize müsaada ve ruhsat-ı aliyeniz ....”

\[3232\] \textit{Yayla İmami Risalesi}, p. 216: “her halde takririmize müsâade ve ruhsat-ı aliyeniz her bâr erzâni buyurmak evvela şirâze-i nizâm ve dibâce-i intizâmdan olub...”
or the elite by the consent of all. He described the members of the committee with term the “lâ’ime”, literally meaning “the one who reproaches, blames”. If such an inner committee was really established, it seems very likely that their members preferred to conduct their affairs in privacy.

According to the author of *Yayla İmami Risalesi*, after receiving the letter, Selim III approved their decisions and consented to all of their requests. After that point, the author notes, Abdüllatif Efendi, the Kapan-ı Dakik naib, was called to the meşveret. Then the author mentions the establishment of the İrad-ı Cedid. From the above clues, it seems that the above committee was established some time after the submission of the reform proposals but before the implementation of the İrad-ı Cedid. Karal comments that the above statement of İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi signifies that the reform program was the product of a reformist party (“ıslahat partisi”) who made a covenant (“sözleşme”) with Selim III. According to the author, it sealed the collaboration of the reformists with the Sultan in the new project. Olivier notes that the Sultan did not give any orders without the consent of the committee.

*Yayla İmami Risalesi* is not the only native source alluding to the existence of such an inner committee. Câbi provides us the names of these twelve people in the year 1792: Valide Kethüdası Yusuf Ağa, former sadr-ı Rum Tatarcik Abdullah Molla, Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Efendi, Elhac İbrahim Efendi, İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Defterdar Feyzi Efendi, Kethüda-yı Sadr-ı Ali Süleyman Penahzâde Moravi Osman Efendi, Atıf Efendi.

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3233 *Yayla İmami Risalesi*, p. 216.
3234 *Yayla İmami Risalesi*, p. 216.
3235 Karal, *Nizam-ı Cedid*, p.44.
3236 Olivier, *Türkiye Seyahatnamesi*, p. 255.
3237 Süleyman Penahzâde Moravi Osman Efendi (d.1232/1817) served as başhalife, mektubi-i defteri (1198/1784), rikab defterdar (1205/1791), defterdar-ı şikk-ı evvel (1206/1791-2) and tersane emini (1206/1792). After a short period of dismissal, he became nişancı (1210/1795-6), çavuşbaşı (Ca 1213/November 1798) and sadaret kethüda (Za 1213/April 1799). His second appointment to the same post was on Ra 1216/July-August 1801) and the third on S 1218/May-June 1803. He became defterdar (1221/1806) followed by the posts of nişancı (S 1222/April 1807), kethüda to Esma Sultan and rikab-ı hümayun.
Reisülküttab Mahmud Raif Efendi, Münib Efendi, İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi, and finally the Çavuş Ağa. It is instructive to note that the Grand Vizier and Şeyhülislam are not mentioned among the members. In fact, according to the same historian, they were sometimes informed on certain matters, while the remaining ruling elite had very limited chance to learn about state affairs and probably only through their kapı kethüdas. The author comments that the administration of the state has been confined to merely twelve figures. Even among the group members, it seems that not all had the equal chance for access to certain decisions or information. The core consisted of four people, while the rest knew only some basic details. Fortunately, Câbi provides us an example which might help us to have some concrete idea about the structure of the committee. The author claims that the French expedition to Egypt was known by only four people among the twelve. According to him the four core people were called “poletika” and the rest had little information about the matter. Therefore, it seems that the committee did not only confine itself to the matters related to reform program, but also to governmental affairs. In addition to this, from Câbi’s account one gets the impression that there was a hierarchy among the group members and there were four leading figures.

Relying on the correspondence of Sir Liston, Alan Cunningham describes the committee as a “kitchen cabinet” established for the purpose of modernization. But the author comments that only six or seven among these were ready to take the risks of “modernization”. Zinkeisen also makes reference to the presence of an inner party (“die

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Partei des Innern”) under the leadership of “müfti”, İbrahim Nesim Efendi and Hacı İbrahim Efendi and including the Sırkatibi, Çelebi Mustafa Reşid and Ahmed Bey. Apart from these figures, Zinkeisen claims, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha and Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha were also among the members of the inner party. 3242 Shaw also uses the term “kitchen cabinet”, to refer to those who “influenced the events from behind the scenes and were noticed neither by any Ottoman nor foreign observer.” According to him, they were able to administer the Empire regardless of the decisions taken by the grand viziers and decisions taken by the imperial council. They met informally with the Sultan, formulated the laws and regulations. “They were the driving force behind the New Order”. 3243

Without further evidence it is not possible to be strictly certain of the existence of an inner or even a secret committee. We should take into consideration the possibility that the contemporary people might have attributed such a secret nature to the committee. Whether secret or not, the target of the above-mentioned inner committee was to initiate and implement the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms with a limited cadre in order to prevent problems and reactions during the process. If we rely on the document provided by the Yayla İmamı Risalesi, they were the leaders of the reform project, or in order words, the “brain team”. Even if they were not acting secretly, we might assume that they tried to keep the project within a narrow circle of the Ottoman elite. It is very probable that they had already prepared a program, submitted it to the Sultan, and under his approval, initiated it. Needless to say, the consent of the Sultan was crucial for their functioning and the initiation of the reforms.

If we turn back to the issue of the lack of a powerful grand vizier, it gives clues about the relative failure of the Nizam-ı Cedid program, since most of the real brains like İbrahim İsmet and Tatarcık Abdullah had died immaturely. Özkul attracts our attention to another point stating that the influence of İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi had already weakened before

3243 Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 87.
sometime before his death. Relying on Cevdet Pasha, Özkul argues that despite some expectations that İsmet Beyefendi would be appointed as the new Şeyhülislam after the Edirne Incident, Ataullah Efendi was chosen to the position. Özkul evaluates it as a sign of disfavour for the former and considers the appointment of Ataullah Efendi as a tactical mistake of Selim III.

If we combine these suggestions with the personal conflicts and different attitudes toward the foreign policies followed by the reformist group, it becomes easier to understand the eventual failure of the reform program.

6.4. Rebellion as a Social Movement

The members of both the “reformist” and the “anti-reformist” groups belong to the upper layers of the society. Though they are related to the Rebellion either as victims or instigators, the primary actors of the uprising were the military classes, the yamaks and the Janissaries. Therefore, defining their targets, social composition and attitudes during the Rebellion is very important for our purposes. It will help us not only to understand the nature of the uprising, but also to reach some generalizations about the movement.

6.4.1. The Target of the Rebels

Even though he does not go further into the details of the May 1807 Rebellion, Butrus-Abu Manneh makes an important suggestion which is directly related to our topic. In his ‘model’, the source of conflict, which lasted until the Reform Edict of 1839, was not really a struggle between the ‘reformists’ and ‘conservatives’, but rather, a socio-religious

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3244 Özkul, III. Selim Döneminde Osmanlı Uleması, p. 311

3245 Özkul, III. Selim Döneminde Osmanlı Uleması, p. 311.
conflict between the upholders of Islamic Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy.\textsuperscript{3246} The importance of the assumption lies in the fact that besides the factor of \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} reforms curbing the interests of the traditional military forces during the reign of Selim III, the conflict intensified by the rivalry between the Bektashis and the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi order representing the spiritual guidance for the Janissaries and the reformists respectively.\textsuperscript{3247} Therefore, it turned into a conflict between the higher layers of the society with Naqshbendi affiliations and lower layers with Bektashi connections. The author notes that as a strict Sunni-Orthodox religious order, hostile to the Shiites and non-Muslims, the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi order entered into conflict with the Bektashis. Thus, the main target of the insurgents was the disciples of the Sheik Mehmmed Emin Efendi and in fact, nine of them were murdered by the rebels.\textsuperscript{3248} The author explains the main reason for the continuation of the Rebellion and even after the abolishment of the \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} from this perspective. The Rebellion did not end since the ultimate goal of the Bektashis was the elimination of the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi elite.\textsuperscript{3249}

Niyazi Berkes invites us to see the connection between the Janissaries and the Bektashis. Depending on the assumption that the Janissary army turned into a para-military fighting force, the author argues that the Bektashi belief became a political ideology.\textsuperscript{3250} The connection between the Janissaries and the Bektashi order is usually treated as a historical fact.\textsuperscript{3251} That is why after the destruction of the Janissary corps in 1826, a

\textsuperscript{3246} Manneh, \textit{Studies on Islam}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{3247} Manneh, \textit{Studies on Islam}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{3248} Manneh, \textit{Studies on Islam}, pp. 64-5.

\textsuperscript{3249} Manneh, \textit{Studies on Islam}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{3250} Berkes, \textit{Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma}, p. 115. He gives his basic example from \textit{Üss-ü Zafer}. It is again the case of the Bektashi leaders provoking the Janissaries that they were sacrificing themselves while the Sultan enjoying worldly pleasures.

persecution campaign was inaugurated against the Bektashi order as a whole. As might be recalled, there was a conscious effort in the writings of Koca Sekbanbaşı to disprove the connection between the two. Esad Efendi, in his Üss-ü Zafer, also tries to prove that the connection was a fictitious one. Since we have talked in detail about the ideas of Kuşmâni in a previous chapter, here we will mention briefly about how he comprehended the Janissaries and their Bektashi identity. In his writings one point that strikes the reader is his clear distinction between “we” and “others”. “We” in his mind are those who struggle for the benefit of the Empire and try to rejuvenate it. This group includes Selim III and the ruling elite who fell victim to the rebels. On the other hand, the “others” are the Janissaries whom he very frequently refers to as the Bektashi bands (“tâife-i Bektaşiyan”), as well as Musa Pasha and Ataullah Efendi as the representative of the ignorant ulema and officials. For him, the Janissaries interpreted the Rebellion saying “Our Master, Haji Bektash (alayhi al-salah) has risen from the dead” Kuşmâni mocks them by stating that they murdered their own Ağá (i.e. Pehlivan Ağá) whom they thought as the reincarnation of Haji Bektash Wali himself.

If we consistently follow Abu-Manneh’s suggestions, we should find some arguments or clues that the rebels or “anti-reformists” were hostile to Naqshbendi-Mujaddidis. However, it is hard to discover any clues that may suggest such a direct or indirect hint in


Esad Efendi, Üss-ü Zafer, p. 203

Though it requires further research, I would like to draw attention to the similarity between the discourse offered by Kuşmâni and the modernization discourse offered by later historians.

Kuşmâni, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 26b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 138: “Hacı Bektaş aleyhi salat efendimiz uyanmıştır.”

Kuşmâni, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 28a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.141: “Hacı Bektaş Veli hazretlerinin ta kendü deyüş itikad ettiler.”

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this direction. As remarked earlier, there were some accusations against some sheiks, especially against the Naqshbendi sheiks Emin Efendi and Selami Efendi, but the attack focuses mainly on their ignorance and their supposed dealings with charm and magic. Another object of criticism has been their great influence over the ruling elite. As far as reflected in contemporary sources, seemingly, there was not a consciousness on the part of the Bektashis that their fight was against the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi religious order.

There does not even seem to have been an explicit connection between the Rebellion and the Bektashi support. The only clue in that regard might be a short reference by Cevdet Pasha. The famous historian mentions a certain Haydar Baba belonging to the Rufais from Iran ("rufaiz-i Acam"). According to the author, Haydar Baba provoked the Janissaries during the May 1807 Rebellion and then during the Alemdar Incident. The author argues that Haydar Baba fled to Persia. He later returned and stayed at the barracks of 99th regiment. After being discovered, he was sent to Üsküdar by the Ağa of the Janissary army. Haydar Baba died in Bolu probably on the way to Persia. After his exile, the Janissaries asked first to the Porte, and then to the Şeyhülislam for his release from exile.3257 These are the details provided by Cevdet Pasha on Haydar Baba. Fortunately we have an archival document on this matter. In the record, Haydar Baba is described as a Bektashi sheik residing in the barracks of the 99th regiment. By an imperial order he was sent to Persia or Erzurum. But on the way, he died at Gebze.3258 Some traces of the same story can be found in the Üss-ü Zafer of Esad Efendi. He starts with a story that took place as early as 1202/1787-88 in the army and which appears to be strikingly similar to that of the story narrated by Koca Sekbanbaşı. In the story of Esad Efendi, a Russian spy disguised as a Bektashi infiltrates among the “Muslim soldiers” and provokes them to revolt against the ruling elite, saying that while they were wasting their lives in the mountains, their rulers, including the “Osmanlı padişahı”, were enjoying a very comfortable life.3259 Immediately

3257 Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. XII, pp. 54-5.
3258 B.O.A. HAT 17078 (1230/1814-5). For a copy of the document see Appendix 4.
3259 Esad Efendi, Üss-ü Zafer, p. 204.
below, Esad Efendi narrates the story of Haydar Baba. While the latter was in Persia, he meets Yasincizâde Abdülvehab Efendi, who was sent to Persia as an envoy in the year 1225/1810. During their conversation, Haydar Baba tells about his previous adventures to Yasincizâde. Accordingly, Haydar Baba previously traveled to İstanbul and established close relations with the Janissaries. More importantly, Haydar Baba confessed that he was the one that was behind the incidents of the dethronement of Selim III and the Alemdar Incident. After becoming Şeyhülislam in 1236/1821, Yasincizâde wonders whether Haydar Baba is still among the Janissaries and indeed he finds him in the barracks of the Janissaries. Consequently, Haydar Baba is taken into custody by the Ağa of the Janissaries, exiled to Persia, but he died around Bolu. As might be noticed, the story narrated by Cevdet Pasha seems to have been a combination of the above-mentioned document and the story reported by Esad Efendi. There is no way to prove the reality of the story, yet there are some important points that should be underlined. Esad Efendi’s Üss-ü Zafer is known to have been a work written to legitimize the destruction of the Janissary army and the subsequent persecution of the Bektashi religious order. Therefore, it would be rather uncautious to take the examples mentioned in Üss-ü Zafer as historical data to prove the involvement of Haydar Baba in the revolt. The purpose was quite clearly to prove that the Bektashis abused the Janissaries. It is not only Cevdet Pasha who gives credit to the story and uses it as a historical data. A later historian, Frederick Hasluck, too, concludes that the Bektashis were involved in the May 1807 Rebellion, drawing on the story of Esad Efendi.

3260 Yasincizâde Abdülvehab Efendi (d. 27 N 1249/7 February 1834), went to Persia as the Ottoman envoy between 1215/1810-1228/1813. He became Edirne molla (R 1226/May 1811), obtained Mecca rank (1228/12813), İstanbul paye (Ra 1231/February 1816), Anadolu paye (Za 1231/October 1816). In the year M 1232/November-December 1816, he was appointed as Anadolu kazasker and one year later became the Nakibül-eşraf. He served as şeyhülislam twice: between first the years (24 Ca 1236/27 February: 1821-18 S 1238/4 November 1822) and the second from 22 L 1243/7 May 1828 to18 N 1243/8 February 1833. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. I, pp. 131-2.

3261 Esad Efendi, Üss-ü Zafer, p. 204-5. The rest of the story is similar to the one narrated by Cevdet Pasha.

3262 I suggest that it was a combination, since Esad Efendi does not talk about the presence of Haydar Baba at the barracks of the 99th regiment.
The problem is the fact that even though we could prove that such a person really lived, there is no evidence to determine Haydar Baba’s role in May 1807 uprising.

Unfortunately, our clues are scarce as to whether the Janissaries, and more specifically the rebels, perceived the uprising as a religious movement. In a contemporary epic poem (“destan”) by Nigari, we encounter some religious motives. Nigari wishes that Kabakçı Mustafa will be in heaven, the Janissary army “unfolded the green standards of the invisible world” (“çekildi gaipten yeşil sancaklar”) and it was a holy war (“gaza”). Halil Ağa was the first victim:

*With the battle cry “Allah Allah”; so marched the soldiery*

*Thus hath ordained the Greatest Majesty*

*Then arrived thither the Three and Seven Saints*

*And so joint too the Forty saints for delivery*3264

Despite such religious motives in the above poem, there is no convincing proof that the uprising was a religious movement against the elite with Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi affiliations. On the other hand, even though the rebels or their supporters were not aware of the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi connections of the ruling elite, we cannot deny that there was deep hatred towards the member of the ruling elite who had been murdered during the Rebellion.

As we have tried to show in the above sections, the ruling elite known as the Nizam-ı Cedid elite was a group that could be defined by various criteria in terms of social backgrounds, foreign policies, profession, religious affiliations, and also their attitudes to reforms. Therefore, it is difficult to be sure which characteristic of this group created hatred

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3263 Hasluck, *Bektaşılık Tedkikleri*, p. 127: “...Dördüncü Mustafa, Üçüncü Selim’in ıslahat hususuyla ordu ıslahati neticesinde meydana gelen yine böyle bir isyan sayesinde tahta çıkmıştı. Bu ihtilal kendi itirafları mucibince, Bektashi tarikatı tarafından tertib ve idare edilmişti.” The expression “kendi itirafları” should be referring to the confession of Haydar Baba to Yasincizade mentioned above.

3264 Öztelli, *Uyan Padişahım*, pp. 100-3: “Allah Allah, deyüp yürüdü asker; Böyle istedi ol Celil-i Ekber; Erişti geriden Üçler, Yediler; Kırklar da beraber girdi araya”
among the rebels. Probably the best way is to look at some clues as far as expressed by the rebels themselves in the course of the Rebellion.

Though indirectly related to the above issue, we should first delineate a picture of the ruling elite that as portrayed by contemporary authors. An observation that strikes the reader of the chronicles is the fact that some of the people known to be have been among the Nizam-ı Cedid elite are usually accused of being superstitious and irrational people. The most famous story is the so-called “sale of life”. Accordingly, Yusuf Ağa purchased certain years of the life of another person and it was recorded in the court. Consequently, a legal document, dated 23 S 1211/28 August 1796, was produced during the Galata judgeship of Haffaçzade Mehmed Emin Efendi or Şeytan Emin Efendi. Almost all of the contemporary sources mention it as a strange event and most of them provide a copy of it. The record was discovered among the probate estate (“muhallefat”) of Yusuf Ağa. Unfortunately our research at the records of Galata Court did not yield a result. However, there is a document which proves that sale of life really took place, since the document orders the banishment of the “man who sold his life to Yusuf Ağa.”

3265 Haffaçzade Şeytan Mehmed Emin Efendi (d.1233/1818) entered the ilmiye class in 1203/1788 and became devriye molla. In B 1209/February 1795, he was appointed as the Galata judge and assigned bina emini for the imaret of Mihrişah Sultan. He became the judge of Galata on 1 B 1213/12 September 1798. After obtaining the Mecca paye, Emin Efendi was exiled to Gelibolu due to being accused of notifying the “sale of office” (6 Ca 1222/12 July 1807). In 1226/1811, he gained Istanbul paye and then Anadolu paye (N 1229/August-September 1814). On 7 L 1229/22 September, he was appointed as the kazasker of Anatolia. He died on Ra 1233/January 1818. See B.O.A. HAT 1360/53512 (undated); Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 21b; Asiler ve Gazîler, p. 130; Kethûda Said Efendi, Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 21a; Kethûda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selim-i Salîs, Bayezid 3367, p. 109; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salîs Asrî Vekayi, p. 68; Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günânu, p. 181; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. II, pp. 467-8; Güldöşüren, Tarîk Defterlerine Göre İlimîye Ricalî, pp.188-189.

3266 The narratives that provide a copy of it are Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, pp.21b-22a; Asiler ve Gazîler, pp. 130-1; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salîs Asrî Vekayi, pp. 67-8; Kethûda Said Efendi, Neticetü'l-Vekayi, pp. 21a-21; Kethûda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yi Selim-i Salîs, Bayezid 3367, pp.110a-110.

3267 Raczynski notes that Von Ottensfels, the scribe of the Austrian ambassador discovered the record in the archives of the Galata court. The author gives a copy of it. See Raczynski, 1814’tê İstanbul, pp. 182-183.

3268 B.O.A. HAT 1360/53512 (undated).
discovery of the document, Haffafzâde Emin Efendi was exiled to Gelibolu on 6 Ca
1222/12 July 1807. 3269 Yusuf Ağa had a close relationship with Emin Efendi and he had
secured the latter’s appointment as the construction supervisor of the imaret at Eyüb. After
its accomplishment, he was appointed as Galata kadi and obtained İstanbul rank. 3270

Strange discoveries or stories about Yusuf Ağa do not end here. Following the
murder of Yusuf Ağa, while his goods were being sold, three chests were discovered, all of
which were full of sand. In one of them was a copper ball over which the Arabic letter
“vav” was carved. Those who opened it immediately closed the chest, fearing that it was a
“charm”. Another chest was full of grave sand. There was a copper box on which a picture
of a girl was placed. Those who opened it believed that Yusuf Ağa murdered a fourteen
year old girl, burned her corpse and thus charmed and fascinated Selim III. Oğulukyan
notes that he heard that the sheiks who made these charms were sent to exile. 3271 Of course,
there is no way to be sure of the reality of such accusations. Yet, for our purposes, the
important point is the circulation of such news of occultic nature associated with the
murdered people during the Rebellion and their representation as superstitious individuals.
The circulation of such news is important to understand the emotional state of the people
who sought to explain the great influence of the Nizam-i Cedid elite over the Sultan.

Some other examples of popular behaviour might give an idea on how the Nizam-i
Cedid elite was perceived by contemporary people and especially the by rebel. For
instance, while Hacı İbrahim Efendi was being dragged to the Square, those around him
mocked him by crying that “stand up! Hacı İbrahim Efendi is passing”, and some gave him
a piece of paper “I beg you Sire! Please display your grace and take my petition into
consideration.” 3272 On the way to Et Meydanı, he wanted to drink water, the crowd offered

3269 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 21b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 130; Kethûda
Said Efendi, Neticetü‘l-Vekayi, p. 21a; Kethûda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salis,
Bayezid 3367, p. 109; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 68.

3270 Halil Nuri, Tarih, p. 81; Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 235. See also Cevdet Paşa,

3271 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 16.


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him ayran by following words: “An English jug would befit you, but this was how you offered water to the poor”.\textsuperscript{3273} One other source notes that the rebels accompanying Elhac İbrahim to the Square cut one of his fingers saying that “with this finger of his, he had destroyed the homes of the poor” and threw it into the Janissary cauldron.\textsuperscript{3274} Following his death, a certain figure took out his liver, saying “He destroyed my family and made my liver to suffer anguish. So I shall bake and eat his liver.”\textsuperscript{3275} Another source underlines that those in the list were demanded since they were the ones who “ruined and demolished the state.”\textsuperscript{3276} One source severely criticizes İbrahim Nesim Efendi for ruining the poor and innocent people with the help of his servant called Hüseyin. The same author rejoices and depicts his brutal death as an outcome of the curse of the poor people he had ruined. For the author, the murder of all the victims was a divine punishment.\textsuperscript{3277}

There exists really some brutal scenes during the murder of those in the execution list, which might be taken as the manifestations of the deep popular hatred nourished towards them. As an eyewitness, Ebubekir Efendi gives a very lively account of the murder of İbrahim Nesim Efendi: He was taken to the Meydan accompanied by constant despisals not only by the Muslims but also by the non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{3278} According to Oğulukyan, İbrahim Nesim Efendi died within half an hour and his corpse was severely damaged under the brutal attacks of the rebels.\textsuperscript{3279}

\textsuperscript{3273} Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 9: “Sana güzel bir İngiliz testi yaraşırdu fakat sen fakirlere bu suretle çok su içirmişsin.”

\textsuperscript{3274} Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 13: “bu parmağlı ile fakirlerin ocağını yıkmıştır” Mustafa Necib Efendi describes Hacı İbrahim Efendi as a merciless figure. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{3275} Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 228: “Benim hanedanımı dağıttı ve ciğerimi yakdı. Ben de bunun ciğerini pişirip yiyem”.

\textsuperscript{3276} Tüfengcibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 11a; Derin, “Tüfengcibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, pp. 393-4: “bunlar mülkü harâb u yebâb etdiler.”

\textsuperscript{3277} Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, p. 109.

\textsuperscript{3278} Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 9; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kışmâni, p. 15a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 117.

\textsuperscript{3279} Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 9.
Beside the above-mentioned examples of uncontrolled popular outburst, the ruling elite of Selim III, and particularly those murdered during the Rebellion are accused of not properly dealing with state affairs but indulging in luxuries such as dressing and keeping a crowded retinue. Asım criticizes these people since they considered the commands of the Quran and sunnah as futile or silly things containing the stories of Judaism or as the products of reason. He holds that they instead attached importance to renovations (“teceddûd”) and followed the “polittika-yı Efrençîye”. Not only in politics but also in all their attitudes, residences and deeds they imitated the Western models, and in reality the Christian costumes. The echoes of similar arguments come from a foreign source. This source states that, during the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi, one of the rebels exclaimed: “In the name of God and through God, I do not kill a Musulman, but Mahmud the Englishman and immediately shut him death at his feet.” According to Asım, the freedom provided to the Greeks and their close connections with the ruling elite also created hostility not among the public but also among those who are resentful towards the state and the Janissary pretenders (“devlet küskünleri ve ocak taslakçılari”).

If we rely on contemporary sources, the ruling elite was composed of corrupt and oppressive people who abused their posts to accumulate wealth. Needless to say, they

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3281 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 9-10: “kitab ve sünnetde mansûs ve müsbet olan evâmîr ve nevâhî-i ilahi hâşâ nizâm-i aklîden ibâret yahud efsane-i İsrailiyât kabîlinden emr ve vahiy ...” The author does not direct these criticisms directly towards the Nizam-ı Cedid elite but to all of the ruling elite of the Selimian era.


3284 The Times, Monday, August 3 1808, pg. 3; issue 7115; col. C. (from the Hamburg Papers, Milan,, July 8).


are accused of being very affluent. The most famous example is, without doubt, İbrahim Nesim Efendi. According to Asım, 50,000 guruş was not enough for the kitchen expenditures of İbrahim Nesim Efendi. He owned sixty horses but he must have considered them so few that he would not give any horse more to anyone. Needless to say, Yusuf Ağa was among the richest. From his estate ("tereke"), there emerged 60,000 kese only as cash money. Sirkatibi Ahmed also had a considerable amount of fortune. Mabeynci Ahmed is another example. Though executed earlier, Feyzullah Efendi can be included into this circle. It was discovered that only one of his slaves owned thirty-five valuable shawls. Ebubekir Efendi, the director of the Imperial Mint, was also among the richest state elite.

The above examples suggest that there was possibly a more socio-economic, rather than religious, reasons that aggravated the animosity of the masses towards the ruling elite of Selim III, thus turned them into a target during the Rebellion. In this regard, the best example is from Oğulukyan’s Ruzname. The author describes a scene where the ulema, invited to the Square, talk with the rebels. During the talk, the rebels rebuke the ulema exclaiming “Show me in which book it is written [that such acts are lawful].” Then one

3289 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 11: “El-hâletü hâzihi taylumuzda altmış re’s at kalmağla min-ba’d pederim mezardan kıyâm ve bir re’s iltimâsiyla ibrân eylese vermek ihtimâlim yoktur.”
3290 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 11, 64.
3296 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 7. The translation is from Şaşmazer, Lynne M., Provisioning of Istanbul: Bread and Production, Power and Political Ideology in the
of riot leaders, probably Kabakçı Mustafa, addresses the Şeyhülislam and an interesting dialogue takes place between the two:

“The chief of the rebels: For whom God created millet?

Şeyhülislam: for the birds

Chief: - and corn?

Şeyhülislam: - for the animals

Chief: wheat?

Şeyhülislam: for the human beings”

Upon this reply, the leader pulled out a loaf of very poor quality and declared that the poor were forced to consume that bread made of not even corn or barley. Then he displayed a loaf of white bread consumed by the elite, saying that the Muslims were forced to eat this very poor quality bread. The message was very clear. By demonstrating the gap between the rich and poor manifested even in a basic staple as bread, the chief tried to explain not only the economic gap between rulers and the subjects but also the injustice done unto the poor. Yet the points made by the rebel do not end here. For the chief, the ulema were also guilty in conniving at such problems but “when [the state] writes a few lines on a page you issue an order on their behalf. Why? Because they are efendis. Am I right?” After accusing the ulema of supporting the Sultan and approving all his decisions he ended the talk by saying “The poor people are dying.”

There are two points that should be underlined in this respect. The rebel leader considers himself as a part of the common people and tries to act as their representative. Secondly, there was the oppression and injustice done to the poor and they were the ones that should correct these mistakes by the eliminating the unjust ruling elite and deposing the

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3297 Öğülkyan, Ruzname, p. 7. See also Şaşmazer, Provisioning of İstanbul, p. 193.


3299 Öğülkyan, Ruzname, p. 7.
Sultan. One final point concerning the above dialogue is the fact that there exists no reference to the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms and the focus is on the socio-economic problems. Sunar finds a correlation between the figures included in the execution list and their offices, most them being employed either in the posts of provisioning of the city or as the directors of the İrad-ı Cedid. However, as we have tried to explain in the related section this does not seem to be exactly true. While some palace officials were murdered the two directors of the İrad-ı Cedid managed to escape death. The above observations bring us to the idea of “tacit” social contract used in a the Turkish context by Şerif Mardin. In very simple terms, it defined the expectations between society and the rulers. The subjects, too, had some expectations among their rulers and when the Sultan or the ruling elite failed in respecting the rights and privileges, such as the right of enjoying a smoothly-running provisioning system or being immune from oppression, the society turned against the rulers.

In above-mentioned example we observe that the chief questioned the overall system. In this context, the example of bread has been chosen very deliberately. During the reign of Selim III, there were serious problems in the grain provisioning of İstanbul. That was why the Grain Administration (“Zahire Nezareti”) was established (1793) but was not able to introduce substantive measures so as to solve the problem efficiently. During the last three years of Selim III’s reign, though the shortage was overcome to a certain extent, the poor quality of bread and its high price relative to dirhem became the main source of complaints from the populace. For instance, bread weights dropped from 80 dirhem to 60-65 but the grain prices rose in the last years. According to Lynne Şaşmazer, this was a crucial factor in the popular discontent and in the outburst of the May 1807 Rebellion.

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3300 Sunar, Cauldron of Dissent, pp. 134-5.


3302 Şaşmazer, Provisioning of İstanbul, pp. 191-2.
The provisioning of bread was among the ideological requirements of the Ottoman rulers. The stable provisioning of edible bread to the population proved a sultan able to protect his subjects. It was furthermore a symbol of just rule. In the cases of the failure of bread provisioning, the political legitimacy of the Sultan was undermined quickly turning into a source of social unrest.3303

The gap between the economic conditions of the military strata and the Nizam-ı Cedid ruling elite is beyond doubt. Câbi provides us some striking examples. A Janissary, promoted as odabaş, had automatically a debt of 250 akçes to pay his fee (“caize”). On the other hand, his salary of 25 akçes was not sufficient for the basic needs of livelihood, let alone paying his debts. Therefore, he says, they resort to other occupations such as “tablekarlık” or selling “boza” or “salep”.3304 In order to attract the attention of the reader, Câbi compares this economic situation with that of the members of the Nizam-ı Cedid elite. While a Janissary was not able to buy a home, rent a room, or even do not have money to repair his house, Yusuf Ağa, had himself built a huge and magnificent residence at İstinye but then demolished the same residence just because he did not like it. The same was also valid for İbrahim Nesim Efendi.3305

As might be seen from the above examples, the Nizam-ı Cedid elite is usually perceived as a group having close relations with the foreigners, and as oppressive, arrogant and superstitious people, at least by some the contemporary people and rebels. As might be noticed there are also some allusions to the social and economic gaps. This brings us to the question as to whether the Rebellion was a social protest movement. According to Asım, the economic and social oppression from above created hatred towards the state among the common people. The Janissaries, on the other hand, were seeking for an opportunity to get

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3303 Şasmazer, “Policing Bread and Production”, p. 21.

3304 Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, pp. 72, 131. He argues that the rebels used similar examples to convince the şeyhülislam to issue a fetva. Yet this time he also adds the disperaity and unjustice between the salaries and the attention paid by the ruling elite to the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. See Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, pp. 130-1.

3305 For more examples, see Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 72.
rid of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps.\textsuperscript{3306} While the main body of the rebels was marching towards the Square, they encouraged each other saying that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* would be abolished, and religion would be corrected and the tyrannical elite would be eliminated.\textsuperscript{3307}

### 6.4.2. The Participants

The overwhelming majority of the rebels were from the military classes. The active participants were the soldiers, particularly the *yamaks* and the Janissaries. As we have previously tried to show previously, the core of the rebels was consisted of twenty-one leaders. Four of them, Kabakçı Mustafa, Arnabud Ali, Bayburdı Süleyman and Memiş, were prominent leaders, and the remaining seventeen were comparatively less active ones. Taşçı Mahmud, a *kalyoncu*, seems to have been another important figure during the Rebellion. He became later çavuş to Grand Admiral Seydi Ali Pasha and then Başçavuş. Mahmud was executed in the year 1226/1811-12. It means that we are talking about a predominantly military movement. On the other hand, Mert Sunar argues that like most Janissaries of the period, the rebels were also engaged in crafts. To prove his point he underlines that the *yamaks* were “*ordinary cultivators of orchards and vegetable gardens around Bosphorous*”.\textsuperscript{3308} He reaches this conclusion depending on a quotation from Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi.\textsuperscript{3309} In the related passage, Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey secretly advises the *yamaks* to wear the *Nizam-ı Cedid* garments. In order to convince the *yamaks*, Şakir Bey states that “*you have here orchards and vegetable gardens and live comfortably thanks to the benevolence of our sultan. What matters if you become Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers [obeying the order of the Sultan].*” Unfortunately, this cannot be evidence for depicting the *yamaks* as ordinary cultivators, or at least their engagement in trade. His second example is


\textsuperscript{3307} Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{3308} Sunar, *Cauldron Dissent*, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{3309} Derin, “*Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi*”, p. 384.
Kazgancı Mustafa Ağa dealt with the craft of coppersmith and Arnabud Süleyman was a firewood retailer. Without disregarding the general engagement of the Janissaries in certain crafts, the first objection to be made is that Kazgancı Mustafa was a mütevelli, not an active participant of the Rebellion, and as we have seen earlier he is usually considered as a collaborator of the rebels. On the other hand, he does not give reference to his claim that Arnabud Süleyman worked as a firewood retailer.

In order to understand the social composition of the uprising, we should also have a look at the participation of common people. The final point is of importance if we are looking for the social aspects of the May 1807 Rebellion in order to find out some traces of social conflict between the higher elite and lower strata. In the previous chapters, we have seen that the rebels invited the Muslims to join their cause. Oğulukyan notes that there were about 80,000 people present at the Square. On the other hand, Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi informs that there were 50,000 people gathered around Ayasofya crying in favour of the rise of Prince Mustafa to the throne.

According to Asım, porters, Albanians, youngsters, vagrants and idle riff-raff (“bekâr and herze”) rushed from Galata and Üsküdar to join the rebels, especially after the joining of the artillerymen. Consequently, Et Meydanı became so overcrowded, full of residents of the city who came there as if that was a promenade in Kağıthane. It seems that not only men but also women, children and even the prostitutes appeared in the Square.

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3310 Sunar, Cauldron Dissent, p. 117.
3311 Sunar, Cauldron of Dissent, p. 116. In fact it is Oğulukyan who mentions Oduncu Süleyman. See Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 3.
3312 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 5.
According to Sunar and Kafadar, on the other hand, the porters and other daily wage workers were among the main audience and who, give credit for their involvement in the Rebellion. Depending on Asım’s quotation, they argue that the Janissaries were described as “lumpenesnaf” while the established esnaf of İstanbul remained neutral. There might be some truth in their arguments with it is difficult to reach a decisive conclusion on the participation of the petty craftsmen and workers. It might be interesting to note that the contemporary authors do not mention any suhte participation or crafts collaboration in the Rebellion. Moreover, rather than an active participation, the urban masses seem to have acted as the spectators of the rebellion. Indeed, depending on two private letters, a foreign newspaper emphasizes that “the mass of the people took no part at all.”

It seems that on the part of the rebels there was a conscious effort by the rebels to restrict the participation of certain people. It might sound ironic since they were inviting the Muslims in the districts they passed through, but not always eager to welcome the newcomers. Câbi narrates an interesting story that took place at Yeni Köy during the march towards the city. Galatalı Keşablıoğlu, Dalkılıç Hasan Ağa and some other leading figures of (“sergerde”) of the 25th regiment, come across them around Ortaköy. The marching rebels neither welcomed them nor answered their questions. It seems that the sergerdes followed the rebels and questioned them again and again. Finally at Ortaköy one of the rebels just answered that they had promised to explain nothing. As to why the rebels were reluctant to accept some people brings us to two important concerns of the rebels: their obsession to preserve the order and avoid plunder.

6.4.3. Angels or rebels “zorba”

3317 Sunar, Cauldron Dissent, p. 113. His observation depends on Oğulkan, Ruzname, p. 20. Kafadar, on the other hand, depends on a quotation from Asım cited in Berkes. See Kafadar, Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations, p. 114.

3318 The Times, Tuesday, July 14, 1807; pg. 4, Issue 7098, col. E (Vienna, June 21).

According to Kethüda Said, the May 1807 Rebellion was “praise-worthy” in the sense that the rebels did not disturb the innocent people contrary to the expectations. For the author, it was a unique upheaval not only in the Ottoman but also in world history. No harm was done to the ordinary people and the Rebellion ended without murder of anyone, except those in the execution list. The same author comments that it was like a miracle and apparently a grace of God and the Prophet. It is important to underline that he gives credit to the rebel leaders for such an achievement. Thanks to their special care to preserve the order and discipline during the Rebellion, the people who initially condemned the rebels as “zorba” changed their minds and began to think that they were “angels” sent by God to correct the present mistakes.

Kethüda Said Efendi is not alone in emphasizing this aspect of the uprising. The author of *Vaka-yı Cedid* underlines that except for the state elite demanded by the rebels, nobody was murdered, or no violation occurred and justice prevailed over the city, so that even women and children were able to wander in the city safely during the turmoil of the Rebellion. Öğulukyan is another author emphasizing

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this point. He states that not only the residents of the capital but also the “Europeans” in the city were astounded exclaiming that “Nobody was hurt and even nothing was robbed. There is something very bizarre.”\footnote{Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 14: “kimsenin burnu bile kanamadı ve bir pul bile zıyan olmadığını. Olur şey değil”.} The \textit{Times} states that the foreigners were respected during the Rebellion.\footnote{\textit{The Times}, Tuesday, July 14, 1807; pg. 4, Issue 7098, col. E (Vienna, June 21).} Even Asım, quite hostile to the rebels, admits that the rebels assured the people that no harm would be done to them, even any minor damage of property would be compensated. Therefore, the author states, the people felt safer. For him the security and the order that prevailed over the Thursday night was “\textit{muhayyerü'l-ukuf}”.\footnote{Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 33.} Even Mustafa Necib Efendi, despite his hostile attitude towards the rebels, emphasizes similar points.\footnote{Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi}, p. 34.} As a result, the same author notes that the coffee houses, bakeries and other shops were opened and everyone, including women and children, were in the streets without facing any danger.\footnote{Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi}, p. 34.} The only contemporary author who does not pay attention to this aspect of the Rebellion is Kuşmâni. He criticizes the other authors who praise it, and especially Kethüda Said. The author blames those who think that the Rebellion was a result of divine favour that annihilated the oppression of the ruling elite.\footnote{Kuşmâni, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 26b.}

Naturally, This aspect of the Rebellion cannot be explained only by divine favour. We should give some credit to the efforts of the rebels themselves. As might be recalled, in Büyükdere Çayırı the rebels had exchanged oaths and promised not to harm anyone particularly women and children, not to violate the honour of people and even not to have a glimpse at them (“\textit{atf-i nigâh-i sükkan}”), never to violate (“\textit{taaruz}”) valuable and invaluable possessions of others, to strictly perform the daily five prayers and finally never to consume alcoholic beverages.\footnote{Eubbekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 13b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 114.} Their promises can be underlined in three headings: strict

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item Oğulukyan, \textit{Ruzname}, p. 14: “kimsenin burnu bile kanamadı ve bir pul bile zıyan olmadığını. Olur şey değil”.
\item \textit{The Times}, Tuesday, July 14, 1807; pg. 4, Issue 7098, col. E (Vienna, June 21).
\item Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi}, p. 34.
\item Mustafa Necib, \textit{Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi}, p. 34.
\item Kuşmâni, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 26b.
\item Eubbekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 13b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 114.
\end{itemize}
prohibitions on plunder and violation of people, consumption of beverages and strict obedience of religious duties. As was previously discussed, it was also during the same gathering that we witness the crystallization of the leaders of the Rebellion among the yamaks. Therefore it seems that the newly emerging leaders laid down the above principles that should be followed during the course of the Rebellion. Setting such limits in principle, and being able to realize them during the turmoil of an upheaval are two different things. Yet, we have some insights suggesting that special care was taken to obey the above principles during the course of the Rebellion.

The first trial was at Ortaköy, during the march from Büyükdere to the city. As a resident of Ortaköy, Oğulukyan narrates their arrival to Ortaköy. After noting how the residents of Ortaköy were frightened by the arrival of the rebels, he refers to a cry warning the other rebels not to fire their muskets, not to exact anything from the people without payment. The same voice threatened severe punishment for those who did not obey these rules.\(^\text{3329}\) It seems that no incident occurred at Ortaköy, and the first trial was quite successful. Oğulukyan also provides a striking case interesting example after the arrival of the yamaks at the city. A rebel was murdered by his fellows since he ate “simit” (circular bread) without paying for it.\(^\text{3330}\) Câbi gives the same example but noting that the person who bought the “simit” had paid half of the price, but was not able to escape the wrath of Kabakçı Mustafa and the other rebels.\(^\text{3331}\) According to the same author another, another rebel who purchased tobacco paying less than the specified price was murdered at the spot.\(^\text{3332}\) A very interesting example for the 1807 Rebellion is the immediate murder of a rebel, who stole a jewel watch from the deceased Hacı İbrahim Efendi. He was immediately put to death and the chief crushed the watch.\(^\text{3333}\) A more striking example is narrated by

\(^{3329}\) Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, pp. 4-5: “Yoldaşlar, silahınızı gözetin, olmaya ki kaza ile bir sakatlık olsun, ve sakın reâyadan parasız bir şey almayasz, yoksa parasız ha”.

\(^{3330}\) Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 5.

\(^{3331}\) Câbi, *Câbi Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 128.

\(^{3332}\) Câbi, *Câbi Tarihi*, vol. I, p. 128.

Asım. While escaping from the rebels, İbrahim Nesim Efendi took some of his jewelry, some amount of money and a valuable dagger with him. During the turmoil of his murder, they were scattered around. The rebels collected all of them and delivered them to Köse Musa Pasha.\textsuperscript{3334}

On Wednesday, the \textit{yamaks} sent criers to different points of the city announcing that their aim was not to oppress the Muslims, on the contrary to release them from oppression. They also declared that their intention was to abolish the \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} corps and assured the people that they would be free from any fear of plunder and asked them to continue their daily lives and open their shops.\textsuperscript{3335} The most difficult matter for the rebels was to control the excesses of the mobs at Et Meydanı. They had to check the excesses of the rebels and not lose control over the crowd, which was swelling with the newcomers either to watch the events or to take part in them. From Câbi’s account, we learn that though the Square became very crowded with the coming of women, children, elders and even prostitutes, discipline and “justice” prevailed over the Square to such a degree that no one dared to make insinuating remarks or even to look at the women.\textsuperscript{3336} It seems that the chiefs of the rebels demanded utmost obedience and discipline for those who came to the Square for participation. Normally, one would expect that participants would be warmly received by the rebels, since such newcomers would increase the number of the crowds. However, as far as it is possible to understand from Câbi’s narrative, the parties coming from Galata, Üsküdar, Eyüp, and any other places were asked whether the members of the groups coming to the Square would stand surety for each other, so that nobody would be molested and no harm would be done to the possessions of the people. Moreover, the newcomers were also reminded that if they had something to declare or complain, they had to apply to the representatives of the rebels at the Square. It means that there was also a restriction in terms of what should be said in the Square. Câbi notes that the newcomers apparently did


\textsuperscript{3335}Uzunçarşılı, “\textit{Kabakçı Mustafa İyiani...}”, p. 255; Derin, “\textit{Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...}”, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{3336}Câbi, \textit{Câbi Tarihi}, vol. II, p. 130.
not dare to guarantee conducts of their friends, particularly after witnessing that one person was murdered by the rebels due to a minor problem.\textsuperscript{3337}

Apparently such strict rules seem to have provided a certain degree of order and discipline in the Square. They were beneficial for eliminating of the unruly people ("\textit{ehl-i fesâd}") who rushed there for plunder.\textsuperscript{3338} Thanks to the great attention paid by the rebel leaders for preserving the order at the Square, disorder was kept at minimal level. In this regard, Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi provides a brief evaluation with the title "such an extremely strange and astounding case" ("\textit{garîb and acîb halet ki}"). For him it was strange since though the Square was very crowded, nobody dared to take anything from the itinerant ventors ("\textit{tablkar}") without any payment or to oppress others. He expresses his astonishment that even though almost all people carried arms, the Rebellion ended without a single shot.\textsuperscript{3339} Meanwhile the criers, sent to various districts and also in the Square, ensured the people that no harm would be done to the people so that they could open their shops and continue their daily life, not forgetting to threaten that those who attempted plunder and violating the people would be killed.\textsuperscript{3340} It seems that the rebel leaders were not only successful in preserving the order during the day, but also at the Thursday night. Contrary to the fears of the residents of the capital, no incidents happened during that night in which relative tranquility prevailed. According to one author they were able to secure the security of the people to an astonishing degree.\textsuperscript{3341} That should be the basic reason why the common people began to consider the rebels as “angels”.

\textsuperscript{3337} Câbî, \textit{Câbi Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{3338} Câbî, \textit{Câbi Tarihi}, vol. I, p. 130.


The promises of the rebels at Büyükdere Çayırlı were related to the moral conducts to be followed during the Rebellion. However, is it possible to argue that the rebels and their leaders were concerned with these matters just for ethical reasons? According to Mert Sunar, the chiefs of the rebels in the incidents of 1808 and 1826 also paid particular attention to preserve the order and prevent plundering. Depending his argument on the close social and economic ties between the Janissaries, their relatives and the esnaf, he argues that the rebels particularly paid utmost attention not to harm the people whom they already knew.\footnote{Sunar, \textit{Cauldron of Dissent}, 120.} If we depend on such an argument we cannot explain the excesses of the rebels during the Rebellion of 1730, not a long time to change the social composition of neither the Janissaries nor the populace. In order to understand the anxiety of the residents of the people and the concern of the leaders to provide order, one should have a look at the previous rebellions, especially those which broke out in the capital. We do not need to go into the depths of Ottoman history to find some excesses of rebels. There are some examples of disorder and excesses during the 1730 Patrona Halil Rebellion which ended with the fall of Ahmed III and the rise of Mahmud I. Our concentration on the 1730 Rebellion is not a random choice. It was the last uprising before the May 1807 Rebellion which ended with a change in the throne.\footnote{There is another mutiny in the year 1740. It started on 6 June 1740 at Sipahi Bazaar where the shops were attacked and plundered by the rebels. The upheaval spread to the city quite quickly and rebels forced the shopkeepers to close their shops and invited them to join them. Those who did not obey were killed. Then the rebels and their supporters headed towards the Bayezid Square. However, the Janissary Ağası was quick to prevent the uproar from turning into a full-fledged rebellion and the mutineers were dispersed thereafter. It seems that nearly three thousand men were killed during and following persecutions. For more details about the 1740 mutiny, see Olson, Robert W.,“Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolt of 1740 in İstanbul: Social Upheaval and Political Realignment in the Ottoman Empire”, \textit{Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (JESHO)}, XX/2 (May 1977), pp. 185-207.} Therefore, it is quite logical to assume that its memory of it was still alive among the people. Besides, the 1730 Rebellion seems to have been a reference point for the historians of the May 1807 Rebellion. One source, for instance, argues that residents of İstanbul were very frightened and worried at the outburst of the Rebellion since they thought that it would be like the Patrona Halil Rebellion.
Therefore, they hurried to close their shops and sought shelter.\textsuperscript{3344} Ebubekir Efendi celebrates both mutinies as the great occasions that brought great rejoice to common people.\textsuperscript{3345} Another reference to the 1730 uprising is made during the debates at the Square concerning the deposition of Selim III. In this scene, the elders of the Janissaries and some other leading figures argued that Selim III should leave the throne to Mustafa IV and then live in the palace as in the case of Ahmed III, who lived another six years after his deposition.\textsuperscript{3346} These examples confirm our supposition that the memory of the former Rebellion was still alive.

Some of the contemporary narratives and monographs on the 1730 Rebellion suggest that there was a high degree of plunder during this Rebellion. The richest source in terms of references to such excesses is Abdi Efendi. According to him, during the first night of the Rebellion (15 Ra 1143/28 September 1730), some supporters of the rebels attacked the residences of some wealthy people and plundered them. It seems that at least five houses, including one that belonged to a non-Muslim were plundered. Worried about such violations, the mahalle imams and some other people went to the Et Meydan to complain about the excesses of the rebels to their chiefs. However, contrary to the May 1807 Rebellion, apparently, there was not an established policy against such excesses. The first leader they consulted did not listen to them and got rid of them immediately. On the other hand, Muslu Beşe, another leader, assured that people who became involved in such violations were not one of them and gave the representatives of the districts the right to kill anyone who dared to plunder their houses.\textsuperscript{3347} Though in the above incident, it is not that much clear whether the above plunderers were done within the knowledge of the chiefs or

\textsuperscript{3344} Derin, “Kabakçığı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”, p. 102: “...ahâlî-yi İstanbul’a öyle bir gulgule düşdü ki dekâkinler seddî弯 bend kaça ki kaçına olup mukaddemâ vuku‘ bulan Kırk Üç Vakası zannıyla cümle ahâlî lereyâb ve herbirleri kendi ahvâli neticesine meşgûl oldular.”

\textsuperscript{3345} Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 15b.

\textsuperscript{3346} Tüfengcibaşı Arif Efendi, \textit{Vaka-yı Selimîyye}, Topkapı 1595, p. 17a; Derin, “Tüfengcibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 401.

\textsuperscript{3347} Abdi, \textit{Abdi Tarihi}, pp. 32-3.
not, on another occasion, Abdi Efendi notes that, the rebel leaders hunted the rich during
the nights, and plundered their goods without paying any consideration to their social and
political status.\footnote{Abdi, \textit{Abdi Tarihi}, pp. 35-6.} When complaints reached the ears of the chiefs, the author argues, they
denied any connection with the plunderers, sent criers to the districts announcing that they
were allowed to murder anyone who oppressed them. Yet, the author laments that such
violations continued since the chiefs themselves were “plunderers”.\footnote{Abdi, \textit{Abdi Tarihi}, p. 36.} From the incidents
mentioned by Abdi, it is possible to create a long list. Even the İstanbul judge was not able
to escape the plunder at the hands of the rebels.\footnote{Abdi, \textit{Abdi Tarihi}, p. 34.}

A more interesting thing is the fact that during the 1730 Rebellion, seemingly, there
was not an emphasis on religious prayers as in the case of 1807 Rebellion. On Friday, the
second day of the 1730 uprising, the \textit{azan} was not recited and Friday prayer was not
performed. The reason for this is not clear to us, but Abdi notes that it was the rebels who
did not permit the recitation of the \textit{azan}.\footnote{Abdi, \textit{Abdi Tarihi}, p. 35.} Unfortunately, we do not have any further
details on the issue or the reaction of the people to the matter. Yet, there might be a
connection between the promises of the rebels of the 1807 Rebellion and the relatively
loose religious concerns of the rebel leaders in the 1730 Rebellion. The same thing might
also be relevant for the issue of consumption of alcoholic beverages. Lack of similar clues
for the Rebellion of 1730 prevents us from making a further comparison. Yet, what can be
argued at this point is the fact that the rebels of 1807 seem to have been much more
concerned with the justifying of their cause in the eyes of the people and paid special
attention not to cause a negative reaction from among the people, probably in order not
repeat the mistakes of those who staged the 1730 Rebellion. Not only the \textit{yamaks}, but also
some Janissary officers seem to have played a crucial role in checking the excesses of the
rebels. It is important to recall the role of Ali Efendi, the scribe of the 72\textsuperscript{nd} regiment, who

\footnote{Abdi, \textit{Abdi Tarihi}, pp. 35-6.}
\footnote{Abdi, \textit{Abdi Tarihi}, p. 36.}
\footnote{Abdi, \textit{Abdi Tarihi}, p. 34.}
\footnote{Abdi, \textit{Abdi Tarihi}, p. 35.}
tried to prevent the march of the yamaks from Et Meydanı to At Meydanı, whereby the yamaks, according to Tüfengçibaşı, intended to plunder the city and molest the people.\(^{3352}\)

As we have seen in the previous chapters, an execution list was prepared for the murder of about ten non-Muslims and presented to the Kabakçı Mustafa, who in turn delivered it to Ali Efendi. The latter saved them by tearing the list and sending away the man who brought the list.\(^{3353}\)

Turning back to the comments of Kethüda Said Efendi, as might have been noticed from the previous two chapters, the first five days of the Rebellion seem to have been relatively peaceful when compared to the initial period of the Patrona Rebellion. Yet, it does not mean that no excesses were committed during the May 1807 Rebellion. One such incidents, except for the murder of those in the execution list, is the death of kapı kethüda of Hacı Ahmedzade. As might be recalled, we have remarked that there is no consensus among the narratives whether he was already there or was brought by some people. In the end, he was murdered and most probably mistakenly. For Mustafa Necib Efendi, the murder represented the brutality of the rebels who took revenge on an innocent person.\(^{3354}\)

According to Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, the incident greatly infuriated the leaders of the rebels and elders of the Janissaries. After the murder, they rebuked the people and sent criers there to announce that the Square was not the place where anyone could bring people and kill their enemies. After emphasizing that they would prohibit such incidents, they also noted that even minor damages without their knowledge were forbidden, and those who do not obey these rules would be severely punished. The author asserts that thanks to such warnings, the people in the city were saved from any kind of excesses.\(^{3355}\) It is also important to note that the gold coins of the deceased man were scattered, but no one dared


\(^{3354}\) Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salı̇s Asrı Vekayi*, p. 49.

to take them. Needless to say, it also proves the role of the rebel leaders and the junior officers of the Janissary army who served as a control mechanism during the Rebellion.

Another similar incident was the murder of Ali, the mehterbaşı of İbrahim Nesim Efendi. Yet, there is an important difference. In the first incident, the kapı kethüda fell victim to the anger of the people, especially those from Bolu. On the other hand, Ali had accompanied his master İbrahim Nesim, and was killed while he was protecting his master from the attacks of the rebels. From the details provided by Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi it could be concluded that the rebels were trying to detach Ali from his master but he protected his master lying over him. When the rebels were not able to detach him, they both were murdered. A similar point is stressed by Kethüda Said as well. The author informs that due to the fact that the rebels had promised not to kill anybody other than those in the execution list, the rebels struggled hard not to kill the mehterbaşı. Oğulukyan narrates another event that took place during Mustafa IV’s first mosque visit during the Friday Ceremony. A Muslim attacked an Armenian saying that he had nothing to do there. But Armenian was saved by one of chiefs of the rebels, while the Muslim ran away in order to escape from a certain death.

Since we already discussed some important incidents in the previous chapter, we will not go over the same details in order to avoid repetition. Yet, there is one matter that we have not discussed previously, which is the plunder of the goods and possessions of the murdered Nizam-ı Cedid elite during the reign of Mustafa IV. The plunder seems to have been realized during the reign of Mustafa IV and either by the Sultan himself or by the members of his palace. The plunder was mostly related to the new cadres of the new Sultan

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3357 For a general evaluation of the role of junior Janissary officers in the uprisings, see Sunar, Cauldron Dissent, pp. 109-114.


3360 Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 12.
who rose to power after the Rebellion. As we have noted previously, some of the murdered state elite, such as İbrahim Nesim Efendi, Yusuf Ağa, Şirkatıı Ahmed Efendi, Ebubekir Efendi and Hacı İbrahim Efendi, were enormously rich. It seems that during the turmoil of Rebellion and the subsequent change in the throne, the registers of the possessions of the murdered elite was not kept under strict surveillance. Even though we know that they were confiscated by the center, we are not able to follow the exact procedures how their records were kept and their possessions were sold. From the frequent orders of Mustafa IV, apparently, the goods were sold below their real value. The frequency of such orders proves that the problem continued. One source criticizes the harem ağas of Mustafa IV for plunder. Indeed, in one document, there is a short expression that Nezir Ağa plundered the possessions of the Nizam-ı Cedid elite. Mustafa IV himself seems to have been particularly interested in the jewelry of the murdered people. In one record he orders the dispatch of precious goods to his presence, saying that the murdered elite had a great amount of jewelry. It seems that he kept the rare and valuable pieces for himself, sent the remaining ones for sale. By the order of the Sultan, the

3361 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 64. The author says that though there was the urgent need to finance the ongoing Russian war, the elite of Mustafa IV never paid attention to it and embezzled the possessions of the deceased elite.

3362 A typical order is as follows: “Maktûllerin eşyaları dün bahasına füriht olumuyormuş malûnumudur. Değer bahâlarını bulmadıça füriht olumusun. Hasârât-ı mûridir bir dürülü rızâ-yi hûmâyûnum yokdur. Defterdâra tenbîh edesin. Şimdi.” See B.O.A. HAT 53236 (undated). For similar examples, see B.O.A. HAT 53012 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 53032 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 53063 (undated); B.O.A. 53093 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 53613 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 53769 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 53947 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 53967 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 1365/53998 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 54008 (undated).


3364 T.S.M.A. E. 534/175 (undated).

3365 B.O.A. HAT 53707 (undated), B.O.A. HAT 1365/53987 (undated). In the second document Mustafa IV explains that since some of these precious goods could not be used by common people (“nas”), it was more appropriate that they were sent to his presence. In another case, he states “... Yusuf Ağa’nın dahi mücevherâtı çokdur ra’nâ ma’lûnumudur taraf-i hûmâyûma gönderesin”. See B.O.A. HAT 1358/53367 (undated). From another document, we learn that thirty-five shawls of İbrahim Nesim Efendi and Hacı İbrahim
residence of Hacı İbrahim Efendi was not offered for sale and granted to the Chief Woman of his mother, the new Valide Sultan. During the grand vizierate of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, particular attention was paid to discover the lost goods of the murdered state elite.

Despite these patterns, it seems that the residents of İstanbul, especially the reaya were still anxious. They probably did not feel themselves secure enough until cannons were fired, signaling the accession of Mustafa IV to the throne. They were particularly worried of a fight between the rebels and the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers and needless to say, a plunder.

Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 12: “... bundan başka köylerin basilacağı, insanların öldürüleceği, talan yapılacağı ve evlerin yakılacağını dair rivayetler dolaşıyordu. Dehşete kapılış olan halk, surf canını düşünüyor, sokaklar boş, kapılar kapalı ve herkes sap sari kesilmiş äkibetini bekliyordu. ... Fakat rahim olan Allah məsus çocuklara acıdı. Arka arkaya top sesleri duyulunca herkes canlandı, yüzler gülmeye başladı ve sokağa çıkıp herkes “gözünüz aydın” diye selamladı.”
6.5. The Myth of Selim III

Most of the contemporary and later historians find a direct correlation between the personality of Selim III and his dramatic fate. In very simple terms, he is described as a humane figure but lacking some important qualities of a good ruler. The most important criticism is the argument that he was not able to as act as decisively as his position required. Consequently, a myth was created around the personality of the Sultan.

6.5.1. A Timid Sultan

The two most common adjectives added to the name of Sultan Selim are “halîm” and “selîm”. These adjectives are most commonly used by the historian Asım and it seems to have passed to the future historians as a legacy. Therefore, it is important to study the arguments of this historian. These adjectives were not only added for the sake of a suitable rhyme to the name of the Sultan (“halîm; selîm”). They also give crucial hints about how Asım analyzed and perceived the personality of the Sultan. According to him, Selim III was a very “mild” and “sound” person, also generous (“kerîm”), gentle, and compassionate (“rahîm”). In fact, Asım depicts the portrait of a perfect human being,

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3370 For a good analysis of Asım’s comments on the personality of Selim III, see Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, pp. 113-5.

3371 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, pp. 2-3, 209. He uses similar words such as “şefkatli”, “müruvvvetli”, “mâl-i ülfel” and “zârif”.
but at an extreme level.\textsuperscript{3372} Such qualities might be harmful even for an ordinary person, but when it comes to a Sultan, it becomes even more dangerous.\textsuperscript{3373} Consequently, “fear” ("havf") was eliminated from the hearts of his subjects. According to the same author, the Sultan was very sensitive and refrained from dismissing officials, being sympathetic to their personal conditions. He was not able to decide promptly and when he announced the decision, it proved to be too late.\textsuperscript{3374} Asım also argues that the Sultan had neither the power nor the character to refuse, thus approved all requests made to him.\textsuperscript{3375} Therefore, he says, the ruling elite took it as an opportunity to accumulate money and oppressing poor people.\textsuperscript{3376} These facts caused gossip to spread that the Sultan was far from the executing “emr-i siyaset”.\textsuperscript{3377} Asım is not the only contemporary author that depicts an image of a timid and soft Sultan.\textsuperscript{3378} According to Wilkinson, he was a naturally “timid” and “credulous” ruler.\textsuperscript{3379} Dallaway praised Selim III’s good intention to revitalize his Empire, but had doubts whether the Sultan possessed the energy and capability to realize it.\textsuperscript{3380} Another observer underlines his irresolution as well. Reminding the comments of Asım, Pouqueville argues that Selim III was a virtuous and well-informed person but “too weak to take any great irresolution”.\textsuperscript{3381} Sir Sidney Smith makes similar comments.\textsuperscript{3382} Arbunthont, the British ambassador, makes some comments which might be a clue to understand how the Sultan

\textsuperscript{3374} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{3375} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{3376} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, pp. 4, 11.
\textsuperscript{3377} Asım, \textit{Tarih-i Asım}, vol. II, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{3378} See also \textit{Neticetü’l-Vekayi}, p. 33; Şanizade, \textit{Tarih-i Şanizâde}, vol. I, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{3379} Wilkinson, \textit{An Account of Principalities}, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{3380} Dallaway, Jacques, \textit{Constantinople}, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{3381} Pouqueville, \textit{Travels through Morea}, pp. 142, 167..
\textsuperscript{3382} Cunningham, “Robert Liston at Constantinople”, p. 80.
allowed or at least helped the creation of such an image. From his comments it seems that the Sultan did not have self-confidence. Therefore, “Unfortunately, his highness, not seeming to have much reliance on his own judgment, has always permitted those who approach him most exercise over him an undue influence.”

If we rely on Asım, the ruling elite never informed the Sultan on the important issues, particularly those relevant to the Nizam-ı Cedid. Whenever the Sultan asked information regarding the new program, they ensured that there was no problem and if accomplished, it would rejuvenate the Empire. The attempt of some officials to conceal some important matters is underlined in some other narratives as well. One contemporary source argues that Küçük Hüseyin Ağâ (later Pasha), while he served as chief orderly (“serçukadar”), read all dispatches of the Grand Vizier and concealed them from the Sultan. It seems that he usually kept those dispatches against his own will (“re’yimin hilâfı”), an obscure expression probably suggesting that those that were against his personal interests or opinion. Indeed, within the same passage, the same author mentions Küçük Hüseyin intended to give an order to the state that was against the principles of an Islamic state. To those who criticized him, he argued that it was possible since those who achieved it were not extraordinary people. According to the author in the same way Hüseyin Ağâ was keeping the drafts of imperial decrees away from the eyes of the Sultan. It seems that he was the figure behind the execution of Rusçuklu Hasan Pasha. Similar comments are also made about Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi. The latter was accused of abusing his position to acquire money. One source asserts that Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi did not present a petition to the Sultan without bribes. He seems to have used his closeness to the Sultan to a degree that even İbrahim Nesim, Elhac İbrahim, Yusuf Ağâ and Mahmud Raif Efendi were forced to bribe

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3383 From Arbunthont to Spencer, Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no. 77).
3387 Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayıklanması...”, p. 102.
When Selim III read the telhis informing the demand of the rebels for the enthronement of Prince Mustafa, a contemporary source asserts, he began to complain and curse Ahmed Efendi saying that he had entrusted all state affairs to one person by considering him as father, but he brought the problems to the point of causing his fall from the throne. The Sırkatibi’s influence over the Sultan is also emphasized in some other sources. According to Câbî, Ahmed Efendi was an inaccessible person. Even some member of the elite ("taşra ricalı") did not dare to visit his residence. Needless to say, for common people there was no chance of establishing contact with him, even for his poor relatives. It is conspicuous that Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi was transferred to the müderris class, upon his own request and very shortly before the Rebellion. Such examples might be increased depending on the suggestions of the contemporary narratives.

But it is important to underline that basically the Sultan’s ability to access to outside information was severely curtailed by certain people for various reasons.

3390 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmânî, pp. 16b-17a; Asiler ve Gaziler, pp. 120; Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, pp. 136-7.
3392 Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi left his post in the Palace upon his own request on 5 S 1222/14 April 1807, about one month before the Rebellion. According to Câbî Efendi, Mabeynci Ahmed was also sent away from the enderun. According to Ebubekir Efendi, it was three days before, when he heard of the disorder at the fortresses, Sırkatibi requested a hatt for being admitted as a müderris with “hamise paye”. Due to the growth of disorder during the Rebellion and his murder, his diploma remained at the Porte ("Bab-ı Ali"). On the other hand, Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi asserts that it was on Wednesday that Ahmed Efendi wrote a şukka to Salih Bey, hazine kethüdası, in which he asked Salih Bey to request from the Sultan to secure him the above degree of müderris diploma. According to Asım, he was given the above paye on 18 Ra 1222/26 May 1807. Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi gives some more details as what happened afterwards: Selim approved his request and sends the related document to Şeyhülislâm. At the same night Bülbül Hafız Feyzullah Efendi was appointed as the new mabeynci and sırkatibi. The same night Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi was sent away from the Palace with the title of Kapıcıbaşı. See Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selîmiyye, Topkapı 1595, pp. 14-15a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, pp. 398-9; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 41; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmânî, p. 17a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 121; Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 122.
It can be argued that the power of Küçük Hüseyin Ağa, Şirkatibi Ahmed and Mabeynci Ahmed Efendi, as palace members, was not unusual within the context of traditional society where power is to some extent defined in terms of closeness to the ruler. However, Asım provides some hints suggesting that the matter was not so simple. According to the author, there was a conscious effort to exclude the Sultan from the decision-making process and supervision of state affairs. He gives one clear example to prove his point: When Selim III began to notice the abuses of some state elites he wrote a long hatt to the Porte, enumerating the aggressions (“tasallut”) and injustices of his ruling elite. In the same imperial edict, the Sultan emphasized that he would never consent to such abuses, and ordered the Grand Vizier to announce the edict to all of the ruling elite. The Grand Vizier, however, postponed the duty ordered by the Sultan and instead discussed the matter with some of the elite in a meeting. Finally, they all decided to spread the rumour that the Sultan was stimed by a jinn (“Sultan’a cin geldi”). Therefore, the hatt was forgotten in the following turmoil, exactly as intended by the ruling elite.

There also are some claims that the ruling elite used meta-physical powers to influence the Sultan. As might be recalled such accusations are directed mostly towards Nizam-ı Cedid elite with Naqshbendi connections. At present time, such arguments appear unreasonable and difficult to believe. Consequently, for us it is hard to use such materials as historical facts, no matter how meaningful these were for the contemporaries. Yet, we can still benefit from such suggestions in terms of comprehending the method Asım and some other historians used to explain the great influence by certain people over the Sultan. Such a negative influence exerted on a Sultan by his subjects must have appeared to be so unbelievable for the contemporary mind that it could only have been achieved by the help of magical powers.


It appears that Asım and some other contemporary authors accused the Sultan for being too open to manipulation and abuse of the elite around himself. According to Islamic understanding of an ideal Sultan, a ruler should be powerful and always keep his eyes on the ruling elite. Leaving a room for the oppression would be a great mistake for a ruler since God holds the ruler responsible for the oppression of the people exerted by the ruling elite and God would never accept an excuse for it. From this perspective, Selim III made many mistakes. He placed too much trust in his confidants, revealing most governmental secrets to them which immediately spread to rest of the society. He was not able to notice or control the retinue around himself. From the time of his rise to the throne, Asım continues, the Sultan was surrounded by ignorant servants and officials. They were abusing their positions to accumulate wealth and promote their self-interests. Taking the feedback from the Islamic “circle of equity”, the author argues that the Sultan is responsible for as a spirit and cohesive element between the various elements in a society and never should allow the dominance of one group over another.

According to Asım, Selim III was indecisive and was not able to decide in time and take decisions promptly. Şanızâde attacks Asım exactly on this point. He argues that there is no point, as done by some previous historians, in criticizing certain groups or individuals. More particularly, he blames Asım criticizing a deceased Sultan rudely and unjustly. According to Şanızâde, Selim III was not always tolerant and timid. He was clever enough to know to behave in accordance with the needs of time and was able to act stubbornly in certain issues. Şanızâde ensures the reader that every ruler, other than some very young

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ones, works for the benefits of his state and tries to improve the conditions of his subjects. They would never consciously create conditions for the emergence of a revolution.  

The available primary sources do not permit us to reach definitive conclusions on the personality of Selim III. Yet, one point seems to be clear. His mother, Mihrisah Valide Sultan, had a certain degree of influence over him. Some contemporary sources agree that Selim III had great affection for his mother. There is nothing wrong with motherly concerns, but she seems to have created a virtual barrier around her son. Indeed, Asim asserts that Mihrisah Sultan spent major efforts not to bother his son with news that would upset him. Thus, she frequently warned the ruling elite not to send sad news to the Sultan and advised them to solve the problems by consultation among themselves. These assertions might seem unbelievable, yet there exists documentary evidence. In one record, it is stated that Valide Sultan strictly warned the Grand Vizier and the Nizam-ı Cedid elite ("nizam ustaları") not to write any sad news to her son. Thanks to his mother, the writer says, Selim III was passing his days with various pleasures. Raczynski remarks that Selim III was not informed on the French Expedition to Egypt for some time due to efforts of his mother and some viziers. The public, infuriated by the inactivity of the Porte on the matter, set the city on fire so that they could find an opportunity to see the Sultan visiting the site. When he arrived at the locale, people began to shout at him exclaiming “You have surrendered Egypt! Is it now the turn of Istanbul.”

Looking at Mihrisah Valide Sultan, we have almost no information about her. One should ask why she paid such particular attention for her son. These arguments encourage one to question as to whether Selim III

3402 Asim, Tarih-i Asim, vol. II, pp. 13-4.; Dallaway, Constantinople, p. 74; Goşu, La Troisième Coalition, p. 81; From Arbunthont to Spencer, Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PR0, 78-52; doc. no. 77); Pouqueville, Travels through Morea, pp. 143, 167.
3404 T.S.M.A. E. 11173 (11 C 1212/1 December 1797).
3405 Raczynski, 1814’te İstanbul, p. 177: “Mişir’ı kaybettin, şimdi sira İstanbul’a mı geldi”.

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had a mental problem. Did this suggest a possible fragility of the nervous system of the Sultan? On the other hand, according to one author, she did not interfere in any of the state affairs. Some of the later historians assert that she understood the need for reform and backed his son for that purpose.

Selim III does not always appear to be very timid, at least, while he was a prince. There is some evidence which prove that Prince Selim did spent efforts to usurp the throne from his uncle, Abdülhamid I. He was involved in a plot with Halil Hamid Pasha. Apart from this famous story, he is accused of inviting magicians from different parts of the Empire and abroad to charm his uncle. He was involved with these efforts to an extent that the residence of his lala, Mahmud Bey, had turned into a “Hindi Tekke”. Not only the magicians but also the “devlet küskünler” of Abdülhamid I’s reign gathered around Mahmud Bey. He secretly corresponded with Louis XVI. After his rise, he seems very optimistic and active to revive the Empire. He was so enthusiastic that he once claimed there was nothing impossible for the Muslims. He was aiming to regain the Crimea. As we have noted in the Chapter II, the failure in this project undermined his legitimacy, but it also created a serious frustration for Selim III. A detailed study of his life and rule leaves an impression that Selim III in the course of years, he became less insistent on matters and tended more to leave the events to their course of development. According to Mustafa Nuri


3407 1220 Senesi Vekayi, p. 18.

3408 “Valide Sultan’ın da islahat meselesini hakkıyla anlayıp, takdir ettiğini ve bu konuda oğluna yardımcı olduğunu anlıyoruz. Ayrıca oğlu ile arasında derin bir sevgi-saygı bağı olduğunu şahit oluyoruz.” See Şen, Osmanlı’da Dönüm Noktasi, p. 104. The problem with the above assertion is the fact that his impressions depend on six entries from Ruzname of Sirkatibi Ahmed Efendi. But the entries are mostly meeting of Selim III and his mother either in Rami Chiftlik, Eyüb or at the Palace. Only two entries (pp. 168, 170) are about the grants of Valide Sultan to the Janissaries and new soldiers, which are not enough to give an idea about her attitudes and affection to his son.


3410 Bağış, Britain and the Struggle for the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire, p. 68.
Pasha, too, he was for some time courageous and involved in important matters, however as time passed he turned to his original personality, namely he became less confident and less concerned with state affairs.\footnote{Mustafa Nuri Paşa, *Netayicü’l-Vukuat*, vol. IV, p. 47.} In fact this study on his rule reveals a similar impression, but with the important difference that rather than becoming timid again, he gradually became aware of the realities of the system.

At this point it might be meaningful to return to the issue of consultative assemblies and the mysterious “kitchen cabinet”. The rising importance of the councils and the importance attached by the Sultan might have had a role on the creation of his image as a relatively “weak” Sultan. It seems to be that he was more open to share power, or better to say, to rule by consultation.\footnote{For instance, in one of his hatt he writes that “... Mazallahu Teâlâ devlete tezellül gelse yalnız bana râcí olmayıp cümlenize ait olur.... Ben de sizden birinizim. Beraber çalışırım....” See Karal, *Nizam-i Cedit*, pp. 23-4.} Selim III was apparently not distant from state affairs, particularly during the 1790s. According to Liston, he preferred to appoint weak grand viziers especially after the dismissal of Koca Yusuf Pasha. Moreover, he created “meclis-i meşveret” in order to get ultimate control over the ruling elite and also to secure the support of wider circles. He also intended to increase tensions among the rival groups in the councils.\footnote{Yalçınkaya, “Sir Robert Liston’un İstanbul Büyükelçiliği”, pp. 200-1.} One unfortunate issue for Selim III was the immature death of some of the valuable and powerful people, such as Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Tatarcı Abdullah, and İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi. Especially with the death of Hüseyin Pasha, Selim III lost one of most powerful supporters for the reform efforts. That is why Saint-Denys refers to a belief in İstanbul that if Küçük Hüseyin Pasha did not die earlier, Selim III would lose neither his throne nor his life.\footnote{Saint-Denys, *Révolutions de Constantinople*, vol. II, p. 16, note 1.}

As far as reflected in his available imperial edicts, Selim III appears to be very concerned with most of the issues presented to him. And the image that emerges from some of these documents does not clearly match with the “soft” and “indecisive” image of the
Sultan. He seems to be particularly furious about the unsuccessful and ongoing Mountaineers problem. He admits that he cannot keep his anger on this problem since the failure since “they have disgraced us before all people.” The particular concern of the Sultan in regard to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army is beyond doubt. He received regular reports on their numbers, drills and anything related to them. As we have tried to show in the second chapter, Selim III seems to have had more determination over the affairs of the state and especially the military issues. From his own writings comes across the image of a traditional ruler, who tried to impose sumptuary laws, ordered execution of the merchants who stocked goods because “nobody inflicted any punishment” (“hiç kimse siyaset etmediğinden”). In his study to reconstruct the image of Selim III, depending on the articles from *Moniteur Universel* from the year 1789 to 1799, Taner Timur concludes that Selim III was considered as a despotic ruler by the Westerners who oppressed his subjects. He had created a great animosity among different segments of society with new taxes, and wars. It might at least be suggested that he was quite unpopular among his subjects and apparently not considered as a timid ruler.

As a final note on the the myth of Selim III, we should underline that he was not the only Ottoman Sultan who was accused of having such an undesireable personality. The decreased role in the governmental affairs, also the increased stress on worldly pleasures, and being under the influence of certain invididuals were some of the common accusations directed to most of the sultans particularly from the seventeenth century onwards. It is clear


3416 For some examples, see T.S.M.A. E. 3759-3 (undated, catalogue date is 1215/1800); T.S.M.A. 3759-2 (undated, catalogue date is 1215/1800); T.S.M.A. 2757 (undated); T.S.M.A. E. 3786 (undated, reign of Selim III); B.O.A. HAT 13403 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 14762 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 56924 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 55034 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 4830 (undated).


that the contemporary authors still expected these rulers to depict the image of a charismatic leader or a patrimonial ruler. The growing importance of the institutionalized bureaucracy left lesser room to a patrimonial and the charismatic rule and it was to leave its place to collective rule.\footnote{Faroqhi, Suraiya, “Symbols of Power and Legitimation”, vol. II, p. 619; Artan,“From Charismatic Rulership to Collective Rule”, pp.5-6.} In this sense, the wish of Selim III to share power and rule by consultation becomes more meaningful.

6.5.2. Compassionate and Peaceful

Another part of the myth is the argument that Selim III was a ruler that refrained to shed blood of the people and therefore he usually preferred a conciliatory attitude and avoided violent acts. As might be recalled, this was the basic explanation concerning the failure at the Edirne Incident, offered by some of the contemporary and later historians.\footnote{The best formulation is by Cevdet Pasha. See Cevdet Paşa, \textit{Tarih}, vol. VIII, pp. 63-4.} Yet, we have seen that the soldiers were called back when there was no other resort and the failure of the attempt was certain. Moreover, there were violent efforts during the Edirne Incident to crush the resistance of the local people. According to Saint-Denys, on the other hand, the Sultan conducted the affairs fairly actively.\footnote{Saint-Denys, \textit{Révolutions de Constantinople}, vol. II, p. 80.} Our observation on response of Selim III to the Edirne Incident and British Expedition is that they did not prove a good example of decision-making and coordination, rather than Selim III’s kindheartedness.

For our purposes, Selim III’s responses during the May 1807 Rebellion are more important. In fact, the big question that still remains unanswered is the issue of why Selim III did not send \textit{Nizam-i Cedid} soldiers to suppress the Rebellion. Most of the contemporary sources lament that if these soldiers were used against the rebels, the Rebellion would not lead to the dethronement of the Sultan.\footnote{Ebubekir Efendi, \textit{Fezleke-i Kuşmâni}, p. 15b; \textit{Asiler ve Gaziler}, p. 118.} Can we suggest that he was informed by the
officials that the Rebellion was not as serious as to bother or he did not want bloodshed? According to Tayyarzâde Ata Efendi the latter attitude was exactly the case. He claims that the Sultan did not want to benefit from the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers, since the good tempered Sultan did not want bloodshed. According to Oğulukyan, it was only after the dispatch of various Janissary officers to the rebels that one confidant of the Sultan warned him on the seriousness of the problem and underlined the need to take an immediate action. According to the same author, the Sultan called and rebuked Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi for concealing the reality. The latter, in turn, ensured that they sent the Bostancıbaşı to suppress the disorder and he had already killed some of the rebels. Then the Sultan rebuked the confidant for talking about issues on which he did not any information. Oğulukyan argues that from that point onwards, it became impossible to convince the Sultan on the seriousness of the disorder, especially after talking with the Bostancıbaşı who repeated the same details according to the advice of the *mabeyncis*. Therefore, if we follow Oğulukyan’s account, it seems that the Sultan was deceived by the Sırkatibi and never had a chance to realize the reality until it was too late. It is interesting to detect the echoes of above arguments of the contemporary sources that some important or sad news were kept secret from the Sultan. In this story, however, it is difficult to understand why Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi and some other *mabeyncis* should conceal the reality from the Sultan.

It seems to be unreasonable in the sense that if the Sultan would not take decisive measures against the rebels, he would lose the throne, while for Ahmed Efendi and others

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3424 Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 4.
3425 This reminds one observation of Berkes, depending on the arguments of Asım (and also Cevdet Pasha). According to the author, Selim III was not realistic and from time to time he obsessively believed in certain things and then changed his mind. He gives the examples of his adherence to the ideal of a warrior sultan, and believed that he was one of them. See Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, pp. 113-4. It seems that he made himself believe in things that relieved him. In our example, too, we will argue that he tried to convince himself that there was nothing serious to bother after the dispatch of the Bostancıbaşı.
3426 Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 4.
their lives would be at stake. One possible explanation might be the possibility that Sırkatibi and others believed that the Rebellion was really not serious and could easily be suppressed. Yet, there are two serious matters that should be stated against this. First of all, as might be recalled, Bostancıbaşı Şakir Bey returned without any result since he did not even dare to talk with the rebels. Therefore, at least after his return Ahmed Efendi should have understood the immediate danger of a Rebellion. Another point is related to the precaution of Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi to secure his survival. At the very outset of the Rebellion, he requested to enter the müderris class, apparently to escape a certain death, which proves that he was well aware of the danger. There is an interesting explanation by a foreign newspaper, The Times. According to an article in it, immediately after the outburst of the Rebellion Selim III sent the Bostancıbaşı to the fortresses. As might be recalled from the fourth chapter, some of the contemporary authors also mention the dispatch of Şakir Bey to the spot to make investigations. However, according to the above article, he was sent by Selim III for a secret mission to declare that Mahmud Raif Efendi had not acted according to his orders. He also sent money for distributing them to the yamaks to give the message that what they had done was right.3427 Consequently, the newspaper comments, “..this ill timed concession of Selim’s and the villainy of the officer who had the money, in neglecting to distribute it and concealing for his own sense, was the cause of Selim's immediate downfall.”3428 Unfortunately, it was not possible to come across any evidence proving the assertion, and we may suspect that there was confusion with Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa’s embezzlement story and the dispatch of the Bostancıbaşı to the forts immediately after the initial outbreak of the Rebellion.

The idea that Selim III was not informed about the events during the course of the May 1807 Rebellion and got word of it, conflicts with some available documentary evidence. As we have remarked in the chapter on chronology, he seems to have been

3427 The Times, Monday, August 3 1808, pg. 3; issue 7115; col. C. (from the Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8)

3428 The Times, Monday, August 3 1808, pg. 3; issue 7115; col. C. (from the Hamburg Papers, Milan, July 8)
informed on the developments at the fortresses as soon as possible. And rather than being silent and inactive, he seems to be quite anxious and took the incident quite seriously. After noting that the incident should be suppressed immediately without creating any further disturbance, Selim III asked why İnce Pasha was not dealing with the matter. In another related document sent after the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi, Selim III advised Kaimmakam Musa Pasha to “to do his best without panic to protect the vicinity and to calm down the disturbance, and further to watch the surrounding area of the Imperial Dockyard, to protect Istanbul, Galata and Üsküdar, and to forewarn all the officers.” Therefore, he seems to be well aware of the problem and ordered his men to take the necessary precautions.

All these matters bring us again to the same issue. If the Sultan was informed at the initial phase of the Rebellion, we should find an answer to the question of why he did not benefit from the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers. As we have seen, the available documentary evidence suggests that he took the matter quite seriously. At the initial phase of the uprising, most probably he thought that the only problem was with the presence of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers around the Bosphorous. Therefore, they were called back with the expectation that there would be no further problem. He might have also thought that the presence and use of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers against the rebels would create street fights and deteriorate the situation. One chronicle asserts that the Sultan watched the coming of the rebels to Unkapanı and their march towards the city, however did not attempt anything with the conviction that it would still be suppressed. Among the contemporary authors it

3429 B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807). It is the report of Hüseyin Ağa, the dizdar of Yuşa Tabya to Kaimmakam Paşa.

3430 B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807).

3431 B.O.A. HAT 5028 (undated): “telaş etmeyerek etrafin muhafazasına dikkat ve teskîn-i fesâda ihtimâm ve gayret edesin. Tersane tarafına dahi dikkat edüb, İstanbul, Galata ve Üsküdar dahi muhâfaza olunub cümle zabitlere tenbîh edesin.”

3432 Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, p. 102. In the source it is stated that the Sultan imagined that it would be suppressed by the “salîfû‘z-zikr ocaklîlar”. I am not sure whether he implies the Janissaries or the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers.
is Câbî who provides us with a more reasonable explanation for the reluctance of Selim III to employ the *Nizam-i Cedid* soldiers to suppress the Rebellion. The author claims that he heard from İbrahim Bey, a *mabeynci*, that Selim III was afraid of the reaction of the Janissaries in the imperial army. He feared the Janissaries would flee from the army and rush to the city in order to save their rebellious comrades.\(^{3433}\) This explanation sounds very logical, but somehow confusing. A Sultan whose throne and capital was in great danger due to a serious rebellion would not probably calculate the responses of the fugitives from the imperial army in the campaign. If the claim of Câbî is true, it only proves that Selim III did not notice the seriousness of the Rebellion. Retrospectively, it seems to be a tactical mistake, but the real problem seems to be more related to the failure of the officers and officials who did not take the necessary measures contrary to the expectations of the Sultan.

With the joining of the artillerymen and gathering of the rebels at the Square, the seriousness of the incident had become quite evident. But there was still not any attempt on the part of the Sultan to use the new soldiers against the rebels. According to Asım, Selim III, after learning the matter at the time of the arrival of the rebels to the Tophane, refrained to take an action due to two reasons. He did not want a violent suppression and also did not expect a serious result from a limited number of rebels.\(^{3434}\) In fact the use of *Nizam-i Cedid* army against the rebels seems to have been suggested by Hacı İbrahim Efendi during the meeting on the eve of the entrance of the rebels to the Et Meydanı. He suggested that the city gates should immediately be closed and defended by the cannons as well as by the *Nizam-i Cedid* soldiers. However, his offer was refused by Şemseddin Efendi on the grounds that it would lead to a conflict among Muslims.\(^{3435}\)


\(^{3435}\) Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 6.
On the other hand, the rebels themselves seem to have had great fear from a counter attack from the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers. Some sources emphasize that there was great confusion or panic in the Meydan, not long after the murder of İbrahim Nesim Efendi. Since rumours spread that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers were coming, the rebels tried to seek shelter in the barracks. Though it was a short instant of panic, it suggests that the rebels were still worried about the possibility of a march of *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers. Their panic was so great that the leaders of the Square were able bring the rebels to the Square only by force. Witnessing the chaos which prevailed over the Square even by such a rumour, Ebubekir Efendi states that if the 13,000 soldiers, stationed in Levend and in Üsküdar, would have been used against the rebels a few days ago, the “coward” rebels would not be able to create such a disorder, and even the sight of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers would have been enough to disband the rebellious crowd. It seems that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers remained at their barracks waiting for an order until the accession of Mustafa IV. Some time after the accession, their uniforms, weapons and income were confiscated by the center, and they were allowed to go wherever they wanted. On the other hand, Tüfengçibaşı argues that when they heard of the abolition of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army, the soldiers dispersed and most returned to their hometowns.

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3437 Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 15b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 118; Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, *Vaka-yı Selimiyye*, Topkapı 1595, p. 13a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 396. According to Tüfengçibaşı, the turmoil was due to the crowds that brought İbrahim Nesim to the Square, implying that it occurred at the time of arrival of İbrahim Nesim to the Square.


3439 Ebubekir Efendi, *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*, p. 15b; *Asiler ve Gaziler*, p. 118.


These are some suggestions as to why Selim III did not use the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers. Asım has some doubts whether the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers would have been beneficial in fighting against the rebels. In the case of the Edirne Incident, he comments, the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers under the command of Abdurrahman Pasha were unwilling to fight against the Janissaries. The author claims that most of these soldiers were recruited by Cabbarzâde and other military contractors by force and were financially exploited by them.3443 Moreover, Asım stresses that the newly recruited soldiers were also provoked and despised by the Janissaries saying that they were dressed in “Frenk” costumes. Asım also underlines that most of the new soldiers were not willing to fight against their “fellow countrymen” or the relatives in the Janissary army.3444 We do not have evidence to prove such suggestions, yet we should admit that there might be some truth in his comments. If so, we can argue that a separate identity for the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers, a separate esprit de corps was to be created yet. If we think that the pool of recruitment for both corps were the same regional population with the possibility of relatives on both sides, Asım’s argument appears to be meaningful. The creation and consolidation of a new identity for the *Nizam-ı Cedid* corps was still in process during this period. If we think that in the eyes of the common people the Janissary identity was still very influential and more respected, the problem of the new soldiers might be better understood. Another crucial matter is again noted by Asım. He argues that the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers unwillingly came to Istanbul and they were looking for turning back to their fields and their families in their villages.3445 Stanford Shaw and Sipahi Çataltepe underline another point. According to these authors, the rapid increase in the number of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* soldiers weakened the discipline among the new soldiers. Most of the newly recruited soldiers were not able to adopt themselves to the strict discipline in the barracks and some fled to their homelands. According to Shaw, in the early years of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, most of the soldiers were

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recruited from Istanbul and relatively were more accustomed to discipline. However, those enrolled the army after 1794 came from Anatolia and the majority was peasants and tribesmen, less accustomed to discipline. Some of them even plundered the districts around Tarabya, Yeniköy and Beşiktaş. Therefore, for Asım such soldiers could not achieve anything if they were used against the rebels.

Yet, even though how reasonable and logical the explanations of Asım were, we should point out some problems in his explanations. First of all, though it might be true that new soldiers might not have been willing to fight against the Janissaries and they share some sort of a common identity, we should not forget that there were some instances of tensions between two groups during the reign of Selim III, and more importantly, the Sekban-ı Cedid soldiers fought against the Janissaries during the Alemdar Incident. Therefore, it is difficult to be very assertive in this matter. Another crucial problem is whether the Sultan was aware of these problems and did not call them to suppress the Rebellion for that reason. Though he might have been disappointed to some degree during the Edirne Incident, it is difficult to believe that he did not call the new soldiers for that reason.

We should also look at the responses of the Sultan concerning the deliverance of those officials demanded by the rebels and his attitude to leave the throne. Mustafa Necib argues that Kaimmakam Musa Pasha informed the Sultan that without their execution, the rebellious crowd would not disband. In response, the author says, Selim III permitted the execution of all, except for Hacı İbrahim, İbrahim Nesim and Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi. According to Saint-Denys, Selim III at the beginning did not want to submit the victims, but Bostancıbaşi Şakir Bey prostrated in front of him and pledged to be executed.

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3446 Shaw, *Between Old and New*, p. 133.
However, we have already seen there was no exclusion of these three figures and the Sultan had ordered the execution of all of them immediately saying that “Kaimmakam Pasha, you shall immediately behead all those men and deliver their decapitated heads to those bandits”, referring to all of the officials demanded by the rebels.3451

There is no consensus among the contemporary sources about the way Selim III abandoned his throne. Some argued that he acted nobly and left the throne silently.3452 The only act he did, for these authors, was to invite Prince Mustafa to the throne and give him some advice.3453 In an official entry, too, it is stated that Selim III withdrew from the throne with his consent (“hüsn-i rızá”).3454 On the other hand, Yayla İmami presents a different picture. According to him, the group including Kaimmakam Pasha and the ulema came to the Palace requesting to enter the presence of the Sultan, saying that Selim III should consent the accession of Prince Mustafa and thus be merciful to the innocent Muslims to end the Rebellion without further disorder. In reply, the Sultan informed that he would not leave the throne and would fight for it. According to the author, the soldiers at the Palace also did not want the Sultan and were not willing to fight for Selim III.3455 The incident that convinced Selim III to abdicate was the brutal murder of Mabeynci İbrahim Efendi. After witnessing this violent scene, he became frightened and changed his mind. Only after that point, he accepted the group waiting at the gate of the Palace and invited Prince Mustafa for the accession to the throne. In this story, it was Prince Mustafa who first refused to replace his cousin.3456 Some complementary details are provided by Oğulukyan. According to him, Selim III cried following the reading of the telhis for his fall and ordered Bostancıbaşı to

3451 B.O.A. 7531 (undated); Hatt-i Hümayun ve Tahrirat Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 37a.


3454 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 36 (21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807).

3455 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 36 (21 Ra 1222/

3456 Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 230.
call all the *bostancı* inside. But they refused to come. The author gives all these details without making comments, but if we combine them with *Yayla İmamı*’s accounts, we can suggest that the *bostancı*, who were called by the Sultan, rejected to resist his downfall. After that point Selim III seems to have become very disappointed and gave in. This happened on Thursday. The next day, Selim III refused to go to the Friday prayer by saying that “I do not have a public ... I understood that the struggle is against me”. In Oğulukyan’s narration, Selim III did not go to the confinement place of Prince Mustafa. They came across each other, one on the way to the “cage” and the other to the throne.

### 6.6. Conclusion

As might be noticed, instead of trying to give clear cut answers and categorizations, we have tried to give a panorama of the power structure of the period under study. What seems clear in this panorama is the idea that there were various power groups within the same polity, and could be defined according to different criteria. For instance, they can be categorized in terms of their attitudes toward foreign policies, religious affiliations and attitude toward reforms or internal politics. Yet we cannot deny the fact that there was a clustering of certain people around the reform idea, who were mostly members of the bureaucracy and the palace. Leaving aside what the term “reform” meant for these people, it seems that factors such as personal interests, conflicts, international connections and religious considerations played a crucial role in shaping the relationship among the Ottoman elite. International policies, personal contacts or religious affiliations seem to have provided the ruling elite a complex web of network of connections. As might be noticed, our aim was not to deny the role of reformist identity, but to show that it was only one

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3458 Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 10.

3459 Oğulukyan, *Ruzname*, p. 11.
factor, and also to suggest that the identity of both groups were more complex than it is generally assumed.

There seems to be two basic sources of power for Selimian era. The first one is the bureaucracy and the second one is palace. As a traditional society, being close to the Sultan or being his favourite was one of the best ways to secure promotion. The power of Küçük Hüseyin Ağa (Pasha), Yusuf Ağa, Mabeynci Ahmed, Sırkatibi Ahmed and İbrahim Nesim Efendi stemmed from the palace, either from the Sultan or another member of the dynasty. On the other hand, the bureaucracy seems to be a driving force of the reforms together with some powerful members of the ulema as in the case of famous İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi. As might be recalled, we had suggested as a possibility that the rivalry between the factions of Halil Hamid Pasha and Cezayirli Hasan Pasha might have been carried into the reign of Selim III and might have served as an element in defining the tension between so-called the reformist and anti-reformist groups. The most important attempt in that section was to direct attention to the rise of consultative assemblies and probability of the presence of an inner cabinet that have left out, to a certain extent, some people. This point appeared in our study as a crucial element as reflecting the common complaints of the so-called anti-reformist party.

As might be recalled we have previously posed the question of whether the myth of Selim III was constructed during the reign Mahmud II in order to further blame the Janissaries for revolting against a tolerant and peaceful sultan. However, the existence of such a discourse among the contemporary authors does not confirm our hypothesis. Apparently, the myth was constructed by the contemporary historians but rather elaborated and turned into a cliché by the future historians.

On the nature of the Rebellion, we made a comparison between 1730 Rebellion and tried to show that the rebels of 1807 acted more cautiously to preserve order and to avoid plunder. In terms of identity of the participants and leaders, the 1807 Rebellion seems to be restricted to military class which gives it the nature of a military uprising rather than a social movement. After all these debates we have tried question the myth of Selim III and tried to find out whether there was a correlation between his “weak” image and the
sequence of events. With the available knowledge we refrained from making general assumptions but tried to show that there was some truth in the idea of his mother's influence over him. On the other hand, the assertion that he learnt about the Rebellion when it was too late does not match with historical reality. On the contrary, he was informed on the chaos in the fortresses as soon as possible and he had advised the retreat of the *Nizam-i Cedid* soldiers there. Therefore, at least for the initial phase, he clearly refrained from using the new soldiers against the *yamaks* in order not to create further problems. But for the mystery of why he did not use them in the later phases we offered some suggestions but this important question still remains open to debate.
CONCLUSION

Throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire, uprisings of various kinds emerged in the provinces and cities, taking forms such as the resurgence of local notables, popular or religious movements, and the military uprisings. Even during the reign of Selim III, there are a number of revolts of various kinds. This period witnessed the disorder of the Mountaineers (1790-95), the revolt of Pasvandoğlu Osman Pasha in Belgrade (1792), the Wahhabi movement, the Serbian uprising (1804), the revolt of another local magnate, Mahmud Tayyar Pasha (1805), the Edirne Incident (1806) and finally the Rebellion of May 1807. Except for the last one, they took place in the provinces and can be evaluated as a conflict between the center and the rural periphery. The central authority did not reach out effectively to the provinces and for that reason the reign of Selim III is usually labeled as the “age of ayans”, signifying the highest point in decentralization. The Rebellion of May 1807 is quite different from the other uprisings that took place during the reign of Selim III. It broke out at the seat of the throne and was also the last Janissary uprising that claimed the throne of a reigning Sultan. Following this revolt, the Alemdar Incident (1808) broke out, but it was not a Janissary uprising in the traditional sense. The last military uprising in the city ended with the abolition of the Janissary army in 1826.

**Historiographical Issues Concerning the Rebellion**

Among the contemporary authors, there emerged two vague but discernable lines of explanations regarding the May 1807 Rebellion. The first view, represented best by Ebu

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3460 For a collection of essays devoted to the Ottoman military mutinies, see the eighth volume of the *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 8, nos. 1-2 (Spring 2002). The essays concentrate on the period from sixteenth century to the Tanzimat Era.


Bekir Efendi, (the second author of the *Fezleke-i Kuşmâni*), does not deny the connection of the Rebellion with the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms, but its emphasis is on another aspect of the Rebellion. According to this view, the Rebellion was a social reaction against the Selimian elite who abused the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms for their own interests and oppressed the poor. The second view, formulated best by Mustafa Necib Efendi and Ubeydullah Kuşmânî, argues that there was nothing wrong with the *Nizam-ı Cedid* elite and that the upheaval of May 1807 was the reaction of the Janissaries and some *ulema* members to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms. The second view was adopted repeatedly and even sharpened by later historians.

Particularly since the *History* of Cevdet Pasha, diverging views on the Rebellion by some contemporary historians have not been taken into consideration. Later historiography has commented on the same details but with different approaches, such as modernist, Republican or Islamist. Under the influence of centralist, elitist, and progressive views, the rebels have been condemned repeatedly. Unfortunately, most historians have not been overly interested in factual information regarding the Rebellion and have not subjected the available sources to a critical comparative analysis in the light of the study of the documentary evidence. Consequently, the May Rebellion has repeatedly been blamed as having been one of the main obstacles to the Ottoman reform, modernization or Westernization process which gained momentum particularly from the *Tanzimat* Era onwards.

Though not able to detach himself from the decline paradigm and the idea of degeneration of the Janissary army, Niyazi Berkes should be credited as being the first modern historian for dealing with the socio-economic issues concerning the May 1807 Rebellion and distancing himself from state-centered and elitist “chroniclers” of the Republican era. Abu-Manneh, on the other hand, invites us to see the Rebellion not as an outcome of struggle between the reformists and anti-reformists, rather as a class conflict between upper and lower echelons of the Ottoman society, fed by the teachings of the orthodox Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi religious order and the heterodox Bektashi respectively.
Though we were not able to find convincing evidence to prove his views for the May 1807 Rebellion, these views open new perspectives for future research.

Our detailed research on the May 1807 Rebellion aimed at providing a basic chronological account of the events that took place between 1806 and 1808, with the emphasis that we should establish the factual details before reaching some general conclusions on the incidents that took place during this period. Indeed, some important results, summarized below, emerged from such an attempt. If this study has a merit of contributing to the available literature on the May 1807 Rebellion, it seems to be the comparative analysis of the contemporary accounts and together with the archival materials of various kinds and questioning of some taken-for-granted assumptions within the light of the results of such an approach.

**The Rebellion as a Factual Event**

The uprising started on 17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807 among the *yamaks* of the Macar Tabya. The events, in fact, had been initiated during the night of 16 Ra/24 May when a group of *yamaks* visited their comrades stationed at the above-mentioned fort. That night, the *yamaks* decided to gather at Umur Yeri, in Hünkar İskelesi. During the meeting on the next day, a quarrel broke out between the officer called Halil Haseki and the *yamaks* ending with his murder. Knowing that they would be persecuted by the center, the *yamaks* decided to continue their actions and avenge themselves on Mahmud Raif Efendi as well. The murder of these officials determined the fate of the unrest among the *yamaks*. Particularly following the murder of the latter, the event turned into an uprising that threw the Empire into a period of turbulence. During the Rebellion, the rebels demanded the murder of eleven statesmen included in their execution list, and only one of them managed to survive. The Rebellion nominally ended on Friday, 21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807, with the dethronement of Selim III and accession of Mustafa IV to the Ottoman throne. However, immediately after the Rebellion, disorder broke within the army which was on campaign against Russia,
while residents of the capital had to face the unruly acts of the yamaks and some Janissaries.

The ensuing political instability was reflected in frequent appointments and dismissals of high-ranking military and civilian officials, including the forced dismissal of a Janissary Ağâ, a Grand Vizier, and two Şeyhülislams. This period of turmoil reached its climax by the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to İstanbul and then left its place to an ayan dictatorship in the Empire. The yamaks, and the Janissaries, benefiting from the political vacuum that emerged after the enthronement of Mustafa IV, were either directly involved in some incidents or were used by some other factions or figures. In both cases, they acted as a very strong pressure group. Therefore, while the first five days of May 1807 Rebellion did not witness a great degree of violence, the aftermaths of it was marked by violence and frequent incidents that created further chaos in the capital. The primary reason of this intensified disorder in the aftermaths of the Rebellion was related to the paralysis of the political system with a forced change in throne, the political cleansing of former ruling elite either by their murder or exile, and the need for time for the stabilization of new cadres with the new Sultan. Such problems that can be witnessed in most changes in throne became more serious under the overwhelming influence of the former rebels turning into serious pressure group. Mustafa IV seems to be not that much powerful in eliminating or distancing the new pressure groups which apparently had the military power. Finally, one significant fact that tied the hands of the Mustafa IV forever, was the Legal Document (“Hüccet-i Şer‘îyye”) by which he promised not to punish the rebels, a point that have weakened the legitimacy of the new Sultan and increased the prestige of the former rebels. A “kul” revolting against his Sultan was a serious act demanding severe punishment. Even if it led to his own enthronement, the new Sultan was expected to punish the rebels. But Mustafa IV never achieved it. It was an ayan, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, who eliminated Kabakçi Mustafa and other members of the pressure groups in the city after his march to the capital.

An Evaluation of the May 1807 Rebellion
There had already been an undeniable degree of unrest in the whole capital on the eve of the 1807 uprising. As we have remarked previously, most of the relevant sources explain the tension and unrest that prevailed over the Empire within the framework of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reform package inaugurated in 1792. However, a close study of the conditions of the Empire immediately before the revolt reveals that the issue was much more complicated than suggested by conventional historiography. It seems that the uprising signified a culmination of a complex web of problems that the Empire was suffering from. There were more traumatic incidents or factors than just the *Nizam-ı Cedid* that played a direct role in triggering the Rebellion. The deep disappointment concerning the loss of the Crimea, and the French attack on Egypt still being fresh in the minds of the people, additional developments such as the Serbian uprising (1804), the Edirne Incident (1806), the beginning of war with Russia (1806), the Russian occupation of the Principalities (1806) and the British Naval Expedition (February-March 1807) had a catastrophic impact upon the psyche of the contemporaries.

In terms of international relations, the Porte turned into a battleground for the diplomatic struggles of the Great Powers during this era of Napoleonic Wars. Particularly, in 1806, the Porte tried to keep its neutrality despite pressures from Russia and Great Britain to continue the Triple Alliance, and efforts of Sebastiani, the French ambassador, to include the Empire in the orbit of France and to establish a new alliance system between France, Persia and the Porte. In that respect, the appointment of Sebastiani as the French ambassador to the Porte in 1806 signified a turning point in foreign relations of the Empire. In a short period of time, this shrewd ambassador managed to gain the trust of Selim III and some Ottoman ministers. Following his urgings, the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, who were supported by Russia, were dismissed. After a serious diplomatic crisis with Russia and her ally Britain, war was declared on Russia. Most of these events took place one right after the other and did not leave the people or the ruling elite of the Empire with any time to breathe. Among the developments of this time, the British Naval Expedition to İstanbul has a special importance since it was the last serious event that took place before
the Rebellion. Only three months before the uprising, the capital witnessed a foreign fleet forcing the Straits, and anchoring off the Princes’ Islands and threatening the capital. Apart from the traumatic effect of such an incident, the initial panic and ineffectiveness of the ruling elite and the gossip floating around that the British fleet came with the invitation of the ruling elite created a sense of betrayal and deepened the animosity of the masses towards the Ottoman ministers, an animosity that was to be reflected throughout the Rebellion. Our detailed study of the international political arena of the period also gives us the right to claim that the May 1807 Rebellion was an integral part of the Eastern Question.

This point brings us to another related matter, i.e. the weakening legitimacy of Selim III. Again, if we follow a classical line of explanation, Selim III lost his imperial legitimacy in the eyes of his contemporaries because he was the first Ottoman ruler to dare seriously to experiment for the establishment of a new military system based on Western models. However, as far as recorded in the contemporary sources, the decrease of the imperial legitimacy of the Sultan was not only connected to the issue of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms. It seems that Selim III began to lose his legitimacy some time after his rise to throne, particularly after being unable to prevent the French attack to Egypt and making alliances with Britain and Russia to save this province. As he himself had done while still just an heir to the throne, the people in general expected him to be a “warrior Sultan” that would save the Empire and return it to the good old days. Time proved Selim III to be far removed from the image of an ideal ruler, creating disappointment in his subjects. It is difficult to trace the exact trajectory of the change of his public image. Most probably, we need to point that a transformation in his character and his frustration in the face of serious problems of the Empire. Consequently, a myth of a “kindhearted”, “timid” and “indecisive” Sultan, best formulated by Asım and developed by some other historians, emerged. Though not emphasized by later historians, it seems that the inability of Selim III to produce offspring negatively affected his imperial image as well. What seems clear is the fact that Selim III was not perceived as the one to solve the deep problems of the Empire. Neither contemporary authors nor mainstream historiography seem to have been aware of the fact
that the image of an absolutist, patrimonial and charismatic image of the Ottoman sultans had already left its place to a more bureaucratic imperial image.

The complexity of the events before, during, and after the Rebellion should not lessen the attention from the Nizam-ı Cedid issue. It was not our purpose to underestimate the pivotal role of the Nizam-ı Cedid in causing the Rebellion. As we have argued in the relevant chapter, though there were some minor tensions between the Janissary army and the new military system, it did not turn into a serious problem until the Selimiye Mosque Incident (1805). Tensions began to intensify and two important events occurred, namely the revolt of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha in Anatolia (1805) and the Edirne Incident in Rumelia. However, even in these cases we see that the issue of the Nizam-ı Cedid was only one of the factors involved, though not the least important. For instance, though it seems that Tayyar Pasha was, in a way, hostile to the Nizam-ı Cedid army, he was much more hostile to his rival Cabbarzâde Süleyman Bey, to whom he lost the Amasya mukataa. It seems reasonable to approach Tayyar Pasha’s revolt as the outcome of a struggle for power and land between the two local magnates of Anatolia. Since in this struggle, Süleyman Bey stood closer to the center and supported the new military system, Tayyar Pasha had one option, namely to play the role of an antagonist to the reforms. The Edirne Incident (summer 1806), on the other hand, created a great turmoil in the Rumelia and brought the residents of the region to the point of opposing the center. It was a reaction to the expansion of the new military system into Rumelia. The common people, supported by the ayans, opposed this expansion and the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers were forced to retreat, without having had any success in the region.

It is clear that something went really wrong with the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms program. One problem might be that those who initiated the reform program were mostly civilian bureaucrats and some members of the ulema who did not have a real experience in military issues. On the other hand, the Janissaries were very pessimistic and considered the establishment of the new military system as a threat to their livelihood and profession. There was not a serious collective reaction to them until 1805, since it was possibly due to the fact that until this time, the common people and the Janissaries were attempting to
understand the new military system and its extensions such as the İrad-ı Cedid. However, the case of Selimiye Mosque Incident showed that Janissaries were in fact being replaced by the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers in an imperial ceremony, which the Janissaries perceived as a violation of their own privileges. Therefore, we can suggest that the ruling elite of the period was not prudent enough to prevent such violations and allaying the fears of the Janissaries. Needless to say, the expansion of the new military system to Rumelia was considered as a direct attempt to abolish the old military system. That was the reason why the Janissaries, the common people and the military contractors fed by the old system, responded violently. If we look at the announcements of the rebels during the Rebellion, we see that their primary declared aims to be the abolition of the Nizam-ı Cedid army and ending of the oppression of the people.\(^{3463}\)

In this context, we should not forget the efforts of certain groups or individuals to increase the tensions in the city. As we have seen, the foreign powers, such as the French, British and Russians, and the individuals, including Mahmud Tayyar Pasha and Prince Mustafa (IV), exploited the existing problems for the promotion of their own interests. The fear of the Janissaries, and the people connected to them, that the Janissary army would be replaced by the Nizam-ı Cedid, was abused by these groups and individuals, a point that increased the unrest in the capital. The Rebellion broke out at the Black Sea forts since the yamaks were the first ones who were exposed to this direct threat. Even though, this challenge is usually identified as the attempt of the center to dress the yamaks in Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms, some available evidence suggests that this was mere a gossip, and the real problem was the stationing of the Nizam-ı Cedid soldiers in the forts under the supervision of the Bostancıbaşı as well as the attempt by Mehmed Ragıp Pasha to encourage the forces under his command to wear garments similar to the Nizam-ı Cedid uniforms. These two attempts were on the very eve of the uprising and should have increased the suspicion of the yamaks that the center would really change their uniforms and eventually incorporate them into the new military system.

\(^{3463}\) Uzunçarşılı, “Kabakçı Mustafa İsyanı...” p. 255.
The primary sources direct our attention to the role of certain individuals in the outburst of the Rebellion. At the head of the list, Köse Musa Pasha, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and Prince Mustafa (IV). They are accused of having either triggered the Rebellion or collaborated with the rebels during its various phases. A detailed study and a comparative analysis of the sources do not allow us to reach a definite conclusion on these individuals’ role in the Rebellion. Therefore, we have reason to question the validity of some taken-for-granted assumptions. For instance, contrary to some claims, it seems that some *ulema* members, represented by Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi, were not that eager to collaborate with the rebels and to work against the interests of the center and Selim III. With the limited available knowledge, we can at least argue that they did not have a role during the initial phase of the Rebellion. It is true that they were at the Et Meydanı during its fourth and the last days, but rather than playing the role of instigators, they seem to have made an effort to calm down the rebels. For instance, cross-checks between the contemporary sources of the period prove that Ataullah Efendi and some high-ranking *ulema* members were not at the Square while the famous execution list was being prepared, and therefore they do not seem have made a direct contribution to the preparation of the list of the victims demanded by the rebels. Moreover, rather than playing a leading role in the steps culminating in the fall of Selim III, they seem to have tried to prevent the change of rulers but, in the end, to have yielded to the pressure of the rebels. However, as also underlined in the Legal Document, it seems that the some *ulema* members still sided with the rebels and tried to control their excesses, even if they did not play an active role during the course of the Rebellion. This tacit connection with the *ulema* and the rebels shall be broken around 1826, which contributed to the abolition of the Janissary army in that year.

The other figure, Köse Musa Pasha has an interesting life story. Having suffered from a series financial problems and serving in the governorships in different cities, he suddenly rose to the position of *rikab kaimmakam*. As in the case of Ataullah Efendi and other *ulema* members, we do not have enough evidence to prove his connection with the rebels or the Rebellion. However, he seems to have been closer to the faction under the leadership of Prince Mustafa. There are some clues that the latter was very eager to get out of the royal
“cage” and usurp the Ottoman throne. Mustafa IV seems to have secured the support of some figures who conspired to bring about his accession, such as his sister Esma Sultan, Kahvecibaşı Abdurrahman Ağa, and probably Mahmud Tayyar Pasha, Köse Musa Pasha and Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa. These points lead us to suggest that one aspect of the 1807 uprising was a struggle for the throne.

The difficulty of pinpointing a single cause for the outburst of the uprising creates problems for reaching a single and simple definition for the May 1807 Rebellion. The Rebellion seems to be surrounded by several layers of causes, and each layer reveals only one aspect of it. As we have remarked above, the efforts of Prince Mustafa (IV) suggest that one layer was a struggle for the throne between the two cousins. The extension of this struggle will be observed during the reign of Mustafa IV and will end with the death of Selim III and fall of Mustafa IV. On the other hand, there was an undeniable reaction to the Nizam-ı Cedid reforms and the Rebellion can thus be partially evaluated as a reaction to the “modernization” process initiated by Selim III. The Rebellion might be considered to as a kind of “patriotic” response to the influence of the great powers over the Porte. As might be recalled the British Naval Expedition had created “patriotic” sentiments among the residents of the capital, as well as a sense of having been betrayed by the ruling elite. Further, particularly the overwhelming dominance of the French ambassador, Sebastiani, the news of the arrival of a detachment of French artillerymen from Dalmatia, invited by Selim III, created a hostile reaction among the masses. If we add the possibility of the involvement of the foreign powers, especially of the French via the ambassador, in the outburst of the Rebellion, the May 1807 Rebellion gains an international aspect. It seems that there are some truths in all these definitions of the 1807 uprising and it is unreasonable to describe it by focusing on any single aspect.

In terms of the participants, the May 1807 uprising was certainly a military rebellion. It started among the yamaks and grew with collaboration of the Janissaries, artillerymen and the cebecis in the capital. Apart from these military groups, no pivotal part was played by another group or class. For instance, one striking aspect is the lack of the suhte, the medrese students and especially the petty craftsmen, among the active participants. At
every opportunity, the rebels invited the Muslims to join them and the contemporary sources confirm that Et Meydanı was very crowded with the rush of the common people. However, except for the murder of a servant of Hacı Ahmedzâde İbrahim Ağa, these common people seem to have played the role of spectators rather than active participants.

We have two documentary proofs which also suggest that the movement was considered as a military uprising by the center, too. The first evidence is from the Legal Document (“Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye”).\textsuperscript{3464} The description of the Rebellion in this document is very important since it was signed by the chiefs of the yamaks, Janissary commanders and also officials representing the center, at the head of which was the Sultan himself (Mustafa IV). Therefore, we might assume that there was a consensus on the description of the Rebellion. According to the document, the May 1807 uprising was a military movement directed against some bureaucrats and leading palace officials who had initiated the Nizam-ı Cedid and the İrad Cedid reform package. The document states that the Janissaries, with the collaboration of some members of the ulema and bureaucrats, had risen against this ruling group. Therefore, if we rely on this document, the May 1807 Rebellion was a military uprising of the Janissaries, with the support of the ulema and some bureaucrats, against the cadres of Selim III. Uriel Heyd, depending on the Hüccet, argues that the “reactionary elements in the ulema leadership succeeded temporarily in stopping these reforms by force”.\textsuperscript{3465} Yet, as we have remarked above, the ulema does not seem to have assumed the leadership of the Rebellion. Drawing on the information in the Hüccet, Kemal Beydilli describes the May 1807 uprising as an indirect coup d’etat (“ikinci elden darbe”) in the sense that the bulk of the Janissary army was on campaign against the Russians and the remaining military groups had carried out the Rebellion.\textsuperscript{3466} The role of the military groups, the obsession with the murder of certain people, the smooth running of the

\textsuperscript{3464} For more information on Hüccet-i Şer‘iyye see the related part in Chapter V.

\textsuperscript{3465} Heyd, “The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization” p. 69.

\textsuperscript{3466} Beydilli, “Hüccet-i Şeriyye”, p. 41.
Rebellion, lack of plunder and the constant surveillance of the rebels by their chiefs encourage us to think the Rebellion might be an organized coup d’etat.

In very simple terms, we may argue that the outbreak of the Rebellion was closely connected to the aim of eliminating oppression and injustice that the rebels thought stemming from the Nizam-ı Ceddı and İrade-ı Ceddı reforms. However, the abolition of these programs by the Sultanic order did not satisfy the rebels. This was because they wanted to take avenge themselves on the ruling elite which they considered to be behind the reform program. This was the second phase of the Rebellion. However, the rebels did not stop at this point either and demanded the fall of the Sultan who had obeyed all of the elite’s demands. Their anger, in the third phase, was directed against the Sultan. They seem to have found the Sultan to guilty on three matters: He did not keep his promise regarding the abolition of the Nizam-ı Ceddı at the end of the Edirne Incident. He had employed and allowed himself to be directed by unjust and selfish ruling elite, which was a “sin”, in the traditional understanding of Ottoman justice. More importantly, Selim III was found to be guilty of having implemented a program which was against established religion and Ottoman customs.

As we have tried to underline in the last chapter, evaluating of the ruling elite of the time under the strict categories of “reformists” and “anti-reformists” is problematic. Neither the first nor the second group seems to be a homogenous and compact body in any true sense. The reformists were diverse in terms of backgrounds, profession, cliental ties and foreign policies or connections. As for the members of the bureaucracy, we observe that some had clientele ties going back to Halil Hamid Pasha or his followers, a point which brings to mind the question of whether the Rebellion also represented a continuation of the factional strife between the followers of Halil Hamid and the rival faction of Cezayırli Gazi Hasan Pasha. However, we have limited clues regarding the clientele ties of the so-called “anti-reformist” group and it prevents us from reaching a definite conclusion in this regard. One of the most interesting points is the suggestion that there was a “kitchen cabinet” within the “reformist” group which acted as the leaders of the reforms. The most striking unifying element is the Naqshbendi-Mujaddidi affiliations of most members of this group.
Inspired by Abu-Manneh, we have tried to study whether this point can be tied to a discussion of the Rebellion as a social struggle between the Naqshbendis, represented by the high elite, and their antagonists representing the lower echelons of society with Bektashi affiliations. Unfortunately, the analysis of the available sources does not suggest such awareness on the part of the rebels.

The second group, the so-called “anti-reformists”, does not present us with a unified body either. There is not even a discernable common group identity, be it in terms of profession or in terms of the group’s connections. Yet, members of it share the common denominator of being disgruntled statesmen (“devlet küskünleri”). It seems that most of them felt themselves excluded from the administration or sources of authority by the Nizam-ı Cedid elite of Selim III. This was valid even for Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and Köse Musa Pasha. They seem to have had limited access to information and were not invited to meetings of the councils held for certain matters. This might have created a sense of frustration in some of the ruling elite. This exclusion does only seem to be related to some personal conflicts, but a structural change in the decision making mechanisms of the Empire, barring some of the ruling elite in decision making process. With the approval of Selim III, there was a growing importance of the consultative assemblies (“meşveret”), and though not certain it seems that some figures were not able to conceive this structural change and took it more personally. Under these conditions, it was logical for some of these disgruntled elites to come closer to the faction of Prince Mustafa who was already looking for an opportunity to ascend the throne.

Where do we locate Kabakçı Mustafa and his companions into this picture? His power and influence do not seem to have extended to the time before the Rebellion. In that regard, Kazgancı Laz Mustafa was a more influential figure than the former. After the Rebellion, Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa’s power and prestige increased greatly and was able to have meetings even with the ambassadors. However, unlike asserted in some later studies, Kabakçı Mustafa was not a figure that remained in the foreground during and after the Rebellion. During the Rebellion, together with the other chiefs of the rebels, he controlled the excesses of the rebels and preferred to collaborate with the center after the Rebellion.
The Rebellion within the Context of the Ottoman History

As we have remarked earlier, the May 1807 Rebellion was a military uprising where some divisions of the Janissary corps were active participants. Therefore, it should be studied within the context of the Janissary uprisings that took place in the capital. It is usually accepted that there was a correlation between the Janissary uprisings and the degeneration of the Janissary corps. For that reason, studies about the Janissary uprisings generally start with a survey of the corruption and weakening of the military discipline among the Janissaries. Such surveys trace the Janissary uprisings back to the sixteenth and even to the fifteenth centuries. The first one was the Buçuktepe Incident in Edirne (1446) after which Mehmed II (r. 1444-1446; 1451-1481) was ousted from the throne. The long list of the military uprisings ends in 1826, even then only with the abolition of the Janissary army.

The capital of the Empire witnessed at least twelve upheavals where the Janissaries took an active part. Six rulers were dethroned, while Osman II (r. 1618-1622) lost both his throne and life during the course of the 1622 Janissary uprising. Though they occurred in different times and under different circumstances, it seems possible to detect some

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For the list of the Janissary revolts, see Şirin, Asakir-i Mansure, pp. 28-30; Uzunçarşılı, Kapıkuşu Ocakları, pp. 507-31; Kafadar, Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations, pp. 86-117; Kafadar, “Janissaries and Other Riffraff”, pp. 122-23.

Kafadar, Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations, p. 88. The 1622 uprising culminated in the dethronement of Osman II, followed by a regicide. The 1632 uprising took place during the reign of Murad IV (r. 1623-1640). It was suppressed, but the grand vizier Hafiz Ahmed Pasha was murdered by the rebels. 1648 uprising was started by the Janissary officers and ended with the deposition of İbrahim (r. 1640-1648) and the accession of Mehmed IV (r. 1648-1687). Another uprising broke in 1687 and caused the fall of Mehmed IV. In the eighteenth century, there were two major Janissary uprisings, the so-called Edirne Incident (1703), which resulted in the end of the rule of Mustafa II (r. 1695-1703) and the murder of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi. The second one was the so-called Patrona Halil Rebellion (1730) which resulted in the deposition of Ahmed III (r. 1703-1730) and the murder of the grand vizier Neşâ'î Damad İbrahim Pasha. The last major one was in 1807, which ended with the deposition of Selim III.
common patterns common to all the Janissary uprisings. The 1622 uprising was also the first Janissary uprising that set the form for future disorders.\textsuperscript{3470} Starting with the Rebellion of 1622, and particularly after the seventeenth century, the Janissaries seem to have acquired support from the \textit{ulema} and some residents of the city, the craftsmen and also the Bektashis.\textsuperscript{3471} Apparently, every rebellion in the capital turned into a governmental crisis and the rebels demanded a change in the administration and sometimes the deposition of the reigning sultan.\textsuperscript{3472} The collaboration of one social group, such as the \textit{ulema}, the petty craftsmen, the lower layers of society or some civilian bureaucrats, seems to be another common feature of the military uprisings in the capital.\textsuperscript{3473} For instance, in the case of 1703, there were some members of the \textit{ulema} who supported the rebels against the nepotism of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi who himself was the head of the \textit{ulema} stratum. The unrest had started among the armorers ("cebeci"), but spread to the military, civil and the religious layers of the city.\textsuperscript{3474} The collaboration of the \textit{ulema} and craftsmen is quite clear in the incident of 1730 as well.\textsuperscript{3475} The support of or the alliances with other segments of society strengthened the power of the rebels. Even if there was not a secret or explicit collaboration, the presence of the \textit{ulema} during a certain upheaval was crucial for the legitimation of the rebellion. Some high-ranking members of the \textit{ulema} were invited to the Et Meydanı some time after initial gathering. For instance, the rebellious cebecis met at the Meydanı and a mission was sent to the İstanbul judge to bring him to the Square.\textsuperscript{3476} Sometimes, the \textit{ulema} seem to have yielded to the pressure of the rebels either in joining their cause or in producing a \textit{fetva} for the deposition of a Sultan. This was the case for the

\textsuperscript{3470} Kafüdar \textit{Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations}, p.88.

\textsuperscript{3471} Kafadıar, \textit{Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations}, pp.90-3.

\textsuperscript{3472} Kafadıar, \textit{Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations}, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{3473} Kafadar, \textit{Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations}, pp. 68-9. 1622: the support of the ulema and the lower layers of society; 1648: support of the craftsmen and ulema.

\textsuperscript{3474} Abou-el-Haj, \textit{The 1703 Rebellion}, p.3

\textsuperscript{3475} Destari Salih Tarihi, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{3476} Abou-el-Haj, \textit{The 1703 Rebellion}, p. 20.
As we have already remarked in the relevant chapter, there were similar claims about the role of *ulema* in some of the contemporary sources describing the May 1807 Rebellion. In most of the upheavals, a period of plunder ensued, as was the case in the incidents of 1622, 1703 and 1730. Another common characteristic of these rebellions was the fact that the rebels had some immediate social and economic demands, and even if the issue of dethronement of the reigning sultan demanded, such upheavals did not turn into a threat against the dynasty itself, at least during the period under scrutiny.

The closest parallels to the May 1807 Rebellion seem to be shown by the incidents in 1622 and 1730. All of the three are considered as reactions to the reform efforts of the reigning sultan. Osman II intended to replace *devşirme* soldiers with the ones recruited from the Eastern provinces. Thus both Osman II and Selim III were intending to establish an alternative military system, in the latter case the *Nizam-Cedid* army. The establishment of a separate and new army was a radical step taken by Selim III. During the Selimian era, the Anatolian peasants were recruited to the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army and this policy was later fully applied by Mahmud II. Osman II is also credited as being first Ottoman ruler to notice the Ottoman “decline” and try to remedy it. Thanks to the works of Baki Tezcan, it becomes clear that while the modern Turkish scholars considered the 1622 Military Rebellion as a struggle between the reactionaries and the progressives, the contemporary sources evaluated it as a response to the problems created by a young and

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3477 Abou-el-Haj, *The 1703 Rebellion*, p. 70.


3479 Kafadar, *Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations*, pp. 69-70.


inexperienced sultan.\textsuperscript{3482} The 1730 Rebellion is also considered to be a reaction to the reforms undertaken during the Tulip Era (1718-1730), accompanied by the intensification of the Western influences.\textsuperscript{3483} Moreover, the leadership role played by Patrona Halil reminds us the role attributed to Kabakçı Mustafa. In 1703, too, the rebellion continued despite the fact that the Sultan accepted the rebels’ demands, a condition which led to the dethronement of Ahmed III.\textsuperscript{3484}

In almost all of the military uprisings, the weakening of imperial legitimacy of the reigning sultan against whom the rebellions occurred seems to have played a role. These sultans were usually accused of having enjoyed a merry life and not dealing with stately affairs properly.\textsuperscript{3485} It is clear that there emerged a gap between the expectations of the populace and the rule of a certain sultan. Yet, the major blame was usually put on the shoulders of certain individuals such as Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Pasha, Feyzullah Efendi, Cinci Hoca and in our case on the so-called \textit{Nizam-ı Cedid} elite. The reigning sultans were generally considered to have been deceived by such figures surrounding them. They were seen as passive and open to the influence of certain palace officials or ruling elite, who in return abused this close relation to promote their self interest.\textsuperscript{3486} The reactions


\textsuperscript{3483} Kafadar, \textit{Yeniçeri-Esnaf Relations}, p. 106.

\textsuperscript{3484} Abou-el-Haj, \textit{The 1703 Rebellion}, pp.39, 69.

\textsuperscript{3485} These accusations are directed towards almost all of the sultans. See Gökbilgin, Tayyib, “İbrahim” \textit{İslam Ansiklopedisi}, (Eskişehir: MEB, 2001), p. 882. The most famous example is Mehemd IV who is blamed for wasting his time with hunting campaigns. He was nicknamed as “Avcı” due to his passion for the hunt. See Baysun, M.Cavid, “Mehmed IV”, \textit{İslam Ansiklopedisi}, (Eskişehir: MEB, 2001), p. 555; Aktepe, \textit{Patrona İşıyani}, p. 64. The As might be recalled Asım and some other historians of early nineteenth century direct similar accusations toward Selim III.

\textsuperscript{3486} Osman II was accused of having yielded to the influence of his mother and \textit{Kızlar Ağası} and his tutor Ömer Ağası; Ibrahim I to that of Cinci Hoca (Safranbolulu Hüseyn Efendi) and Silahdar Yusuf Pasha; Mehemd IV to that of his mother and grandmother; Mustafa II was considered to have been manipulated by Feyzullah Efendi and to have a deep deference for his mother; and Ahmed III was seen under the influence of Nevşehirli Damad İbrahim Pasha. As might be remembered, Selim III was blamed for his great
to the nepotism of Feyzullah Efendi and Damad İbrahim Pasha were the most famous examples in this regard.\textsuperscript{3487} Moreover, the deposed sultans were usually accused of being ineffective in administration.\textsuperscript{3488} Only with the Osman II, this issue seems to be different. He was considered to having been very active, arrogant and having caused resentment among the Janissaries. He tried to revive the “warrior sultan” image.\textsuperscript{3489} In fact, it might be also instructive to underline the observation that the sultan that against whom an uprising broke out usually tried unsuccessfully to revive the image of the “warrior sultan”. This was the case of Osman II, Mustafa II, and Murad IV and, at least during the early years of his rule, for Selim III. It seems that it was Murad IV and finally Mahmud II who managed to resist the rebels and suppress the rebellion.

These similarities should not stop us from pointing out unique aspects of the May 1807 Rebellion. As we have remarked in the previous chapter, there was no pillaging and plunder during the course of this uprising. To the contrary, the chiefs of the rebels made a great effort to prevent the excesses. Another striking aspect is the absence of participation of the craftsmen in the incidents of May 1807. The “esnafization” of the Janissaries had created an alliance between the petty craftsmen of İstanbul and the Janissary soldiers. This phenomenon manifested itself in the collaboration of these two groups in upheavals of 1703, 1730 and 1740.\textsuperscript{3490} In the 1730 case, even though Patrona Halil himself was nominally a Janissary, he was actively employed as a bath-attendant (“tellak”), while the proximity to his mother and for allowing himself to be manipulated by Nizam-ı Cedid figures such as İbrahim Nesim Efendi, сыркатиб Ahmet Efendi.

\textsuperscript{3487} Abou-el-Haj, \textit{The 1703 Rebellion}, p. 5; \textit{Destari Salih Tarihi}, p. VIII.

\textsuperscript{3488} Abou-el-Haj, \textit{The 1703 Rebellion}, p. 74. It might be meaningful to recall the similar debates of the personality of Selim III.

\textsuperscript{3489} Altundağ, “Osman II”, p. 445.

\textsuperscript{3490} For the 1740 Incident see Olson, Robert W., “Jews, Janissaries, Esnaf and the Revolt of 1740 in Istanbul: Social Upheaval and Political Realignment in the Ottoman Empire”, \textit{Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient (JESHO)}, XX/2 (May 1977), pp. 185-207. See also Quatert, Donald, “Janissaries, Artisans, and the Question of Ottoman Decline”, \textit{17th International Congress of Historical Sciences}, (Madrid: 1992), pp. 264-8.
other participants included itinerant buyers of junk ("eskici"), fruit seller ("manav"), a producer and seller pickles ("tırsucu") and a vendor of firewood ("oduncu"). Almost all active leaders of the May 1807 Rebellion belonged to the military class and were yamaks. It seems that the alliance between the military classes and the craftsmen of the city had been discontinued. With the 1740 uprising, the series of military upheavals had come to an end and sixty-seven years were to pass May 1807 Rebellion.

As we have remarked previously, Şerif Mardin evaluates the Patrona Rebellion as an “urban form of a new kind of estrangement of the Ottoman periphery from the center”. In his view, the 1730 Military Rebellion represented a symptom of cultural alienation of the urban masses from the rulers, the line between the center and periphery becoming crystallized. Jane Hathaway underlines the double edged problem in the 1622 incident, “no rebellion better illustrates the ambiguities of centralization and decentralization than the Genç Osman affair.” In terms of conflicts between the rulers and the ruled, the May 1807 Rebellion was definitely the revolt of the “urban” periphery against the center and created an obstacle on the way to centralization. The Nizam-ı Cedid elite, particularly the bureaucratic cadres had become alienated from the rest of society. Yet, it seems that the Edirne Incident (1806), the prelude to the May 1807 Rebellion, provides a clear example for the conflict between the center and the rural periphery and a more serious setback on the road to centralization. The modernization process was intended to strengthen the power of the center. The struggle between the ayans and the center was mainly for the control of the provincial lands. An attempt was made to expand the Nizam-ı Cedid army to the Balkans, which had been parceled out among the various local magnates acting as centrifugal forces.

If we take into consideration the issue of the alienation of the urban masses from the ruling elite, as discussed by Mardin, then the May 1807 might also be seen as a manifestation of decentralizing trend and an open conflict between the “urban” periphery

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3491 For a more detailed list on the leaders, see Aktepe, Patrona İsyanı, p. 134.


and the center. The military nature of the Rebellion does not mean that there were not social aspects to it. In fact, it is usually stated that the Janissaries of the period intermingled with the common people and formed a paramilitary urban population. Therefore, it is likely that they shared similar interests and concerns with the other residents of the city. From this perspective, we can study the Rebellion as the reaction of common people and military classes – which in fact had become intermingled with each other – to the efforts at social engineering made by a small group of ruling elites in the form of a top-down reform, trying to modernize the people in spite of the people, which seems to have been the main characteristic of the Ottoman-Turkish modernization, particularly from the reign of Mahmud II onwards.

During the reign of Selim III the modernizing process was really restricted to the military sphere and influenced only social and economic sphere as far as it was connected to financing the new army. Consequently, the military modernization of the period can be defined as an effort to professionalization, centralization and standardization which were the basic characteristics of a modern state, a difficult process that was full of setbacks and opposition sometimes in forms of open revolt. The leaders of the move towards more effective and centralized modern state were the Ottoman bureaucracy, which became gradually more professionalized during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century. This group of elite advocated a top-down modernization process and underestimating the modernizing capacity of the masses. This tension became intensified throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, most of the time disregarding the popular demands.

The May 1807 Rebellion ended with the victory of the urban periphery, but for a short period of time. Ironically, a strong figure of the periphery, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, ended this period, who in turn was murdered by the forces of urban periphery. The reign of Mahmud II signified a struggle both against the urban and rural periphery. He not only undermined the local magnates but also destroyed the basic dynamics of the urban periphery by annihilating the Janissaries in 1826. However, the pendulum between the center and periphery did not end with this development. The Tanzimat rulers continued
where Mahmud II left and tried to incorporate the rural periphery into the center through the administrative and fiscal reforms.
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II. Dissertations


APPENDIX 1
Short Biographies of Some Figures Mentioned in the Thesis

Abdüllatif Efendi (Pasha) (d. 1222/1807): He was a müderris and the son-in-law of Keçecizâde Salih Efendi. While Salih Efendi became the superintendent of grain and provisions (“hububat nazırı”), Abdüllatif Efendi became superintendent’s assistant (“kapan naib”). When Keçecizâde Salih Efendi was dismissed and banished to Konya, Abdüllatif Efendi retained his position and remained as the kapan naibi until the May 1807 Rebellion. He was among the ones demanded by the rebels. However, Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi secured his exile to Bursa, after erasing his name from the ilmiye class. He was later promoted to rank of mirimiran on 15 R 1222/22 June 1807. A very short time (9 days) after his promotion to the rank of Pasha, the order for his execution was issued and he was executed on 24 R 1222/1 July 1807.

Abdullah Efendi (Molla, Tatarcı) (b. 1143/1703-31-d. 1211/1797): He was the son of Kırmızı Osman Efendi. Abdullah Efendi started his ilmiye career in the year 1162/1749, he later became the secretary of (“tezkireci”) to İranizâde Esad Efendi, the kazasker of Rumelia. After a short period of exile in Limni, he was appointed as Haremeyn müfettiş. Abdullah Efendi became the molla of Jerusalem (1185/1771), Egypt (1186/1772), Medina (L 1186/January 1773), obtained the İstanbul paye and then the Anadolu paye (1202/1787-8). He became judge-advocate of army (“ordu kadi”) and left the capital with the army (1202/1787-8). He was deposed after a short period of time and exiled to Manisa. He was released on 1203/1789, a short time following the accession of Selim III. On 9 L 1204/22 June 1790, he was appointed as the Anadolu...

3494 Ahmed Cahid, Hadika-yi Vekeyi, pp. 245-6.
3495 B.O.A. HAT 1361/53651 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).
3496 B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, pp. 65-66, order no. 274 (evasit-i R 1222/18-26 June 1807); B.O.A. C.DH. 1857 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-yı Selim-i Salîs, Bayezid 3367, p. 104a; Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü‘l-Vekayi, p. 20
3497 B.O.A. C.DH. 1857 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807).
3498 Halil Nuri, Tarih, p. 2024a.
3502 According to Halil Nuri, he was deposed by grand vizier Yusuf Pasha due to a minor issue. Halil Nuri, Tarih, p. 2024. See also, Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol V, p. 27. Edib, Tarih, p. 33:
kazasker and later Rumeli kazasker (24 Za 1204/5 August 1790). On M 1209/August 1794, he was banished to Güzelhisar and after release (C 1209/January 1795), he became Rumeli kazasker for a second time (I B 1210/11 January 1796). Abdullah Efendi died on 9 Za 1211/5 June 1797.

Abdurrahman Pasha (Kadi) (d. 1223/1808): His family was from the ilmiye class and he also started his career as a judge. He later became the ayan of İbradi (Antalya) (S 1211/September 1796). Abdurrahman Bey was employed as the judge of Kayseri. After leaving his career of judge ship, he was appointed as the director of the Bozkır Mines (Ra 1216/August 1801). In L 1217/February 1803, Selim III ordered the inclusion of provinces of Anatolia and Karaman to the Nizam-ı Cedid recruitment zone. In order to benefit from his services in this regard, Abdurrahman Pasha was appointed as the governor (“mutassarrıf”) of Alanya with the rank of beylerbeyi of Rumelia and commander for the enrollment of soldiers for the Levend and Üsküdar regiments (C 1217/September 1803). Upon his willingness and success in these tasks, Abdurrahman Pasha was appointed as the governor of Karaman (7 Ca 1218/25 August 1803). However, his entry to Konya was postponed due to the reaction of the residents of the city and he entered the city with delay. In the year 1804, he was delegated to the duty of suppression of the Mountaineers with the Nizam-ı Cedid forces. Thanks to his success in the duty, he was granted the malikane of Konya and Akshehir, with the rank of vizier (1804). On the condition of producing soldiers for the Nizam-ı Cedid, Beyshehir, Kayseri and Niğde were given to him, to be governed by a mütesellim. On 25 Ca 1221/10 August 1806, İcil sancak was added to rule. Abdurrahman Pasha was appointed as the governor of Anatolia in Ş 1223/October 1808. After the Alemdar Incident, he ran away together with Mehmed Emin Behiç Efendi and Ramiz Efendi, imperial edicts were issued for their capture. He sought refuge at the chiftlik of Selim Giray with his friends. Following his escape, he was dismissed from the governorship of Anatolia. Kadı Pasha came to İstanbul secretly and visited the İzzet Mehmed Pasha tekke at Eyüb. After several days, he passed to Anatolia. He was captured in İbradi and executed on 10 Z 1223/27 January 1808.

3505 Halil Nuri, Tarih, p. 2024.
3508 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 4.
3509 B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, p. 171 (evail-i Za 1223/19-29 December 108); p. 167 (evail-i Za 1223/19-29 December 1808); 175 (evaszat Za 1223/29 December 1808-8 January 1809), 176 (evaszat Za 1223/29 December 1808-8 January 1809); p. 201 (evahir-i Za 1223/8-17 January 1809); p. 203 (evail-i Z 1223/18-27 January 1809).
Abdullah Ramiz Efendi (Paşa, Es-seyyid) (d. 1228/1813): Abdullah Ramiz Efendi was the son of Feyzullah Bey, the kazasker of the Crimean Han. After moving to Istanbul (1189/1775), Ramiz Efendi became a müderris. His first employment was the deputy judgeship of Jerusalem. He was later called to the capital and worked in the court of Mahmud Paşa.\footnote{Ramiz Paşazâde İzzet Mehmed, Harita-yi Kapudanan-ı Derya, (İstanbul: 1285), pp. 112-3.} During the Egyptian campaign, he served as ordu kadi\footnote{Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 42; Sefine-i Vüzena, p. 61.} (1213/1798-9).\footnote{Ramiz Paşazâde İzzet Mehmed, Harita-yi Kapudanan-ı Derya, pp. 115.} After leaving his religious career, he joined the hacegan class.\footnote{B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p.10.} Ramiz Efendi was employed as eyaletli nazır on 24 L 1221/4 January 1807.\footnote{In the list of appointments, dated 24 L 1221/4 January 1807, it is stated that he was appointed as başmuhasebeci and humbarahane nazır. See B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 22.} Following the accession of Mustafa IV to the throne, he was dismissed (Ra 1222/May 1807)\footnote{Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 43.} and banished to Kavala.\footnote{Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 181; Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 43.} During his journey to Kavala, he met Ahmed Kahya or Köse Kahya, the steward of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, who took him to Ruscuk.\footnote{B.O.A. HAT 54087 (undated). Uzunçarşılı, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, p. 80} Thereafter, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha requested for the release of Ramiz Efendi and it was approved by the Sultan.\footnote{Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 43} Following the enthronement of Mahmud II, he was promoted to the rank of vizier (21 C 1223/14 August 1808) and appointed as the governor of Silistria.\footnote{Ramiz Paşazâde İzzet Mehmed, Harita-yi Kapudanan-ı Derya, p. 115.} According to Ruzname, it was on 22 C 1223/15 August 1808. See Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 60; Beyhan, Saray Günülügü, p. 241.} He was appointed as the grand admiral after the dismissal of Seydi Ali Pasha on 1 B 1223/23 August 1808.\footnote{B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, p. 171 (evail-i Za 1223/19-29 December 1808); p. 167 (evail-i Za 1223/19-29 December 1808); 175 (evasit Za 1223/29 December 1808-8 January 1809), 176 (evasit Za 1223/29 December 1808-8 January 1809); p. 201 (evahir-i Za 1223/8-17 January 1809); p. 203 (evail-i Z 1223/18-27 January 1809); Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 49.} They sought refuge with Selim Giray,\footnote{Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 258.} and he later escaped to Russia.\footnote{B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, p. 171 (evail-i Za 1223/19-29 December 1808); p. 167 (evail-i Za 1223/19-29 December 1808); 175 (evasit Za 1223/29 December 1808-8 January 1809), 176 (evasit Za 1223/29 December 1808-8 January 1809); p. 201 (evahir-i Za 1223/8-17 January 1809); p. 203 (evail-i Z 1223/18-27 January 1809); Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 49.} He returned Ruscuk on 9 R
1228/11 April 1813, where he was executed. His son, Ramiz Paşazâde Mehmed İzzet, wrote a book on the grand admirals of the Empire: Harita-i Kapudanân-ı Derya (İstanbul: 1285).

**Ahmet Bey (Seyyid) (d. 1225/1810):** He entered teşrifatî department. After serving as teşrifat kesedar, master of ceremonies (“teşrifâcî”) (1210/1795-6) and teşrifat ve vekili (1213/1798-9), he became eyaleti nazîr ve sultan kethüda. After serving as comptroller of the barley supplies (“arpa emini”), Ahmed Bey was appointed as şîkk-ı sani and the director of the İrad-ı Cedid on 3 B 1221/16 September 1806. During the May 1807 Rebellion, he was on the execution list of the rebels, but he managed to survive. He was later employed as the kapi kethüda to Çelebi Mustafa Pasha. According to Mehmed Süreyya, Ahmed Bey became sadaret kethüda in the year 1225/1810.

**Ahmed Bey (Mabeynci, Kör, Yekçeşm) (d. 1222/1807):** He was the son of Halil Pasha. Ahmed Bey and his brother İsmail were educated in the Palace during the reign of Mustafa III. It seems that they served Prince Selim (III) during his childhood. Following the accession of Abdülhamid I to the throne, İsmail was sent away from the palace (“taşra ihrac”), while Ahmed remained in the palace. After the enthronement of Selim III, Ahmed became a confidant of the Sultan and as well as his court chamberlain (“mabeynci”). Sometime before the May 1807 Rebellion, Ahmed Bey requested to leave the Palace on 18 Ra 1222/26 May 1807 to be admitted to the müderris class. Accordingly, his request was approved and Bülbül Hafız Mehmed Efendi was appointed as the new mabeynci during the same night, with the title of kapıcıbaşı. These measures did not save Ahmed Bey from death. He was on the execution list of the rebels and found at the house of a non-Muslim at Ördekli Sokak in Kumkapı by the rebels. Ahmed Bey was murdered before the Alay Kiosk on Friday, 21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807.

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3526 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, pp. 9, 17.
3527 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 20a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 127. In an entry, it is stated that Ahmed Bey, a former şîkk-ı sani defterdar was appointed as the kapi kethüda of the grand vizier on 21 R 1222/28 June 1807. See B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 42.
3528 Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, c. I, s. 159. It was not possible to find his name in the table of sadaret kethüdas. See Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdalığı, p.37
3529 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 54.
3530 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 54.
3531 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 54.
3532 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 55.
3534 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 16b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 120; Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 19a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı
Ahmed Faiz Efendi (Sırkatibi) (d. 1222/1807): Ahmed Efendi was the son of Mustafa Efendi, an archer. He followed his father’s path, and later was discovered by Selim III. Thereafter, he was admitted and educated in the Palace. He was appointed as mabeynî. Ahmed Efendi became the sırkatibi on 9 B 1205/14 March 1791 and kept the records of the Rüzname of Selim III. Upon his request, he left the palace service and entered the müderris class with “hamise paye” on 18 Ra 1222/26 May 1807. His newly acquired ilmiye position did not save him. He was on the execution list and was discovered by the rebels at the house of his chief-Kitchener at Bozdoğan Kemerî. While he tried to jump to the roof of another house, he fell and was murdered by the rebels on 21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807.

Ahmed Esad Efendi (Salihzade) (b. 1150/1737-d. 1230/1815): He was the son of Şeyhülislam Topkapı Mehmed Salih Efendi (d. 1741) and the brother of Şeyhülislam Ahmed Faiz Efendi (Sırkatibi) (d. 1222/1807): Ahmed Efendi was the son of Mustafa Efendi, an archer. He followed his father’s path, and later was discovered by Selim III. Thereafter, he was admitted and educated in the Palace. He was appointed as mabeynî. Ahmed Efendi became the sırkatibi on 9 B 1205/14 March 1791 and kept the records of the Rüzname of Selim III. Upon his request, he left the palace service and entered the müderris class with “hamise paye” on 18 Ra 1222/26 May 1807. His newly acquired ilmiye position did not save him. He was on the execution list and was discovered by the rebels at the house of his chief-Kitchener at Bozdoğan Kemerî. While he tried to jump to the roof of another house, he fell and was murdered by the rebels on 21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807.

Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 403. According to one source, he was captured at Sultan Ahmed. See Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması…”, p. 107.

3535 B.O.A. A.E. (IV. Mustafa) 1929 (21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807).

3536 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 53; Beyhan, Saray Günülgü, p. 6; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 16b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 120.

3537 Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 16b; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 120.


Camgöz Mehmed Emin Efendi (d. 1777). In 1174/December 1760, he became the *molla* of İzmir and obtained the Mecca *paye*. Esad Efendi served as the judge of İstanbul (1201/1786-7). He obtained the Anadolu *paye* (B 1202/April 1788) and was appointed as the Anadolu *kazaskeri* on Z 1204/August 1790. He was deposed on 1 M 1206/31 August 1791 and banished to Bursa. He became the *kazasker* of Rumelia in 1209/1794-95 and then in 1212/1797-8. On 29 M 1218/21 May 1803, Esad Efendi became the Şeyhülislam. He was dismissed, on 1 B 1221/14 September 1806, some time after the Edirne Incident. During the reign of Mahmud II, he was appointed as the Şeyhülislam for a second time (22 Ca 1223/16 July 1808). After his dismissal on 2 L 1223/21 November 1808, he was exiled to Manisa. Upon his request, his place of exile was transferred to Bursa and from there to Island of Sakız. He was released from exile and allowed to reside at home on 12 C 1225/15 July 1810.

**Ahmed Safi Efendi (d. 1222/1807):** He was from Erzurum. Safi Efendi started his bureaucratic career as a scribe in the *divan-i hümâyûn* department. On 4 L 1214/1 March 1800, he became the head of the government chancery office (“beyliğçi”). He was appointed as the deputy to *reisülküttab* (“reis vekili”) on 24 L 1221/4 January 1807, following the leave of Reisülküttab Galib Efendi with the imperial army. He was serving in the same position when the May 1807 Rebellion broke out. He was included in the execution list of the rebels and thus was executed on 20 Ra 1222/28 May 1807. Contrary to most of the elite, murdered during the Rebellion, he was not a rich person.

**Ahmed Şakir Efendi (Paşa) (d.1235/1819-20):** He was from Trabzon. After moving to İstanbul, he became *imam* to Firdevsi Efendi. He later entered the Enderun and became the court officer of wardrobe (“tülbent ağışi”). He served as the director of the Imperial Mint from 1213/1798-9 to 1216/1801-2. In L 1218/14 January-February 1804, he became *hububat nazır*. He was dismissed from this duty on 1 N 1220/23 November

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3545 B.O.A HAT 31850 (undated).

3546 B.O.A. C.ADL. 1139 (13 C 1225/16 July 1810).


3549 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 22 (24 L 1221/4 January 1807).

3550 B.O.A. HAT 53030 (undated).


3552 *1220 Senesi Vekayi*, p. 23.
On 6 Ca 1222/12 July 1807, he was appointed as army supply master (“nüzül emini”) to Hafız İsmail Pasha, the serasker of the Mediterranean (Bahr-ı Şefid). During the reign of Mustafa IV, he became defter emini, the supervisor of logistics (“mühimmat naziri”) (7 M 1223/3 March 1808) and then darbhane emini. Şakir Efendi was employed as sadaret kaimmakam with the rank of vizier from 11 B 1225/12 August 1810 to 1226(1811). He became the governor of Anatolia (4 M 1229/27 December 1813) and then of Morea. On Ra 1233/February 1818, he was exiled to Gelibolu and then was allowed to reside in İstanbul. He died on 1235/1819-20. He was the father-in-law of Ebubekir Efendi, the deceased director of the Imperial Mint.

Ahmed Şemseddin Efendi (Şemseddin Molla, Mahmud Çavuşzâde) (d. 1224/1809): He was the son of müderris Feyzullah Efendi, known also as Mahmud Çavuşzâde. After being admitted to the müderris class, he obtained the Mecca paye and became the judge of İstanbul in Za 1206/June-July 1792. He was dismissed in the year 1207/1792-3. Şemseddin Efendi was appointed as the kazasker of Anatolia in M 1212/July 1797, but dismissed two years later. He became the kazasker of Rumelia twice, first in 1218/1803-4 and the second in 1 S 1222/10 April 1807. He was dismissed from his last duty in 29 Ca 1223/23 July 1808 and was banished to Bursa, where he died on 1 S 1224/18 March 1809. Şanizâde describes him as a greedy and wealthy person.

Ahmed Muhtar Efendi (Mollaczâde) (d.1226/1811): He was the son of İshak Efendi (d.1781), a former kazasker. Ahmed Muhtar served as the molla of Salonika (Z 1186/March 1773), Damascus (Ca 1200/March 1785), and Mecca (M 1202/October 1787). He obtained the İstanbul paye in Ra 1207/October-November 1792) and Anadolu paye in 1213/1798-99. In 1215/1800-01, he became the Anadolu kazasker. His promotion to the kazaskership of Rumelia was on 1 Ş 1221/14 October 1806 and was dismissed on 1 S 1224/18 March 1809.

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3553 1220 Senesi Vekayi, p. 23.
3554 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 46.
3555 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 90.; B.O.A. HAT 1357/53220 (undated).
3556 Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. V, p. 1563. According to Ceride, his appointment to the kaimmakam-ship was on 3 B 1223/4 August 1810. See Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüği, pp. 133, 155.
3558 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 55.
3563 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 11.
1222/10 April 1807. Following his release, he became reisül-ulma (1226/1811) and died within the same year.

**Ali Pasha (Seydi) (d. 1235/1820-21):** He was a slave of Elfî Bey. After proving himself in the Cezayir-i Garb ocakları, he became a captain. After being employed in the Naval Arsenal (“Tersane-i Amire”), he became kapıçasıbaşı and then donanma başbuğu. On 16 Z 1221/24 February 1807, Seydi Ali was appointed as the grand admiral with the rank of vizier. He was forced to leave the grand admiralship to Ramiz Abdullah Pasha following the appointment of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha as the grand vizier. On 1 B 1223/23 August 1808, he was appointed as the governor of Silistria. However, upon his refusal to accept the new duty, he was banished to Bursa. His second appointment as the grand admiral was on 3 L 1223/22 November 1808. He was deposed and exiled again, this time to Kara Hisarı Sahib (4 S 1224/21 March 1809), where died there in 1235/1820-21.

**Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi (d.1221/1806):** He was born in Baghdad and started his education there. He served to Kel Ahmed Paşaazâde Ali Pasha and then was employed as secretary (“mektupçu”) to Abaza Mehmed Pasha. Around this time, he was captured by the Russians. Following his release from captivity, Vâsîf Efendi was sent to the army and went to Bucharest as the secretary of negotiations (“mükaleme katibi”) of Abdürezzak Efendi, the Turkish plenipotentiary (25 B 1186/22 October 1772). After return, he was appointed as the director of the State Press (“matbaa-i amire nazır”) (1198/1783), but dismissed due to a problem with beyliççi Mehmed Raşid Efendi. Vâsîf was appointed as official historian (“vakanüvis”) on 6 Z 1197/2 November 1783. In 1201/1787, he was sent

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3564 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 55.
3565 Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 243. According to Ruzname, he was exiled on 9 C 1223/2 August 1808. See Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 60; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 243. Çâbi notes that his exile was on 12 B 1222/15 September 1807 and he was sent to Adana. See Çâbi, Çâbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 193.
3566 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 27; Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 11a; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 18; Çâbi, Çâbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 103.
3567 Sefine-yi Vüzera, p. 61.
3568 Sefine-yi Vüzera, p. 61.
3569 Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 186. According to Sicill, it was on 24 S 1224/10 April 1810. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. I, p. 294. On the other hand, according to Sefine-i Vüzera, after the dismissal, he was granted the the governorship of Egypt, died on Alexandria. See Sefine-yi Vüzera, p. 61.
3570 For more information, see Ahmed Vâsîf Efendi, Mehâsinü’l-Âsâr ve Hakaikü’l-Ahbâr, Mütebe İlgürel (ed.), (Ankara: TTK, 1994).
3571 Vâsîf, Mehâsinü’l-Âsâr, pp. XVIX-XX
3572 Vâsîf, Mehâsinü’l-Âsâr, p. XXII-III
3573 Vâsîf, Mehâsinü’l-Âsâr, p. XXVI
to Spain as the Turkish ambassador. Following the enthronement of Selim III (11 B 1203/7 April 1789), he was appointed as the vakanüvis for a second time, also held the position of the kethüda of Hatice Sultan. In L 1207/May 1793, Vasif became the finance officer of province of Anatolia (“Anadolu muhasebecisi”). He was dismissed and exiled to Midilli in M 1209/July 1794, to be released in C 1209/December 1794. Vasif Efendi was appointed as the vakanüvis for a third time in the year 1213/1798-998 with the addition of being in charge of financial transactions (“Ruzamçe-i evvel”) (14 C 1218/14 October 1799). He became Reisülküttab on 8 Ca 1220/4 August 1805. Vasif Efendi died on 7 Ş 1221/20 October 1806.

Ali Ağa (Uzun, Hacı) (d.1224/1809): He was the ayan of Pınarhisar. Following the order he received from the imperial army, Ali Ağa came to Istanbul and executed Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa (19 Ca 1223/13 July 1808). While he sent Kabakçı Mustafa’s decapitated head to the army at Edirne, Hacı Ali remained in the region and was later appointed as the nazır-ı Boğaz. After the Alemdar Incident (16 N 1223/5 November 1808), he fled (2 L 1223/21 November 1808) went to Pınarhisar. In an order, dated evahir-i Za 1223/8-17 January 1808, his execution was ordered by the Sultan. He died on 12 B 1224/23 August 1809 during the Baba Dağı War. According to Koçu, Hacı Ali Ağa was the father of the grandfather of Aşık Razi, a folk poet.

Ebübekir Efendi (Darbhane Emin, Deli, Zengin) (d. 1222/1807): He was from Safranbolu. After moving to Istanbul, he became a porter in the Imperial Mint. Ebubekir Efendi was later appointed to the position of assayer (“sahib-i ayar”). In 1216/1801-2, he became the director of the Mint, a post he remained until his death. He was on the execution list of the rebels and was executed on 20 Ra 1222/28 May 1807. Some

3574 Vasif, Mehâsinü’l-Âsâr, pp. XXVII-III
3575 Vasif, Mehâsinü’l-Âsâr, p. XXXI
3576 Vasif, Mehâsinü’l-Âsâr, p. XXXII
3577 Vasif, Mehâsinü’l-Âsâr, pp. XXXII-III
3578 According to Ceride, it was on 4 Ş 1221/17 October 1806. See Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüğü, p.183.
3579 Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, pp. 311 315. The author asserts that Hacı Ali Ağa returned Boğazhisar where he was an ayan.
3580 B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, p. 204 (evahir-i Za 1223/8-17 January 1809). For orders produced for his capture see Mühimme Defterleri, p. 227 (evail-i Z 1223/18-28 January 1809). After his execution, his possessions were confiscated by the center. On 17 Ra 1224/2 May 1809, an imperial order was issued for the dispatch of all of his goods to the Capital. The interesting point that should be underlined is the fact that it is stated that he gained considerable money particularly during his position as the Boğaz Nazır. See B.O.A. MAD 9726, p. 72 (29 Za 1224/5 January 1810).
3582 Koçu, Kabakçı Mustafa, p. 57.
3583 B.O.A. HAT 53032 (undated); Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 38.
contemporary authors accuse him for embezzlement of money and claim that he was a corrupt person.\(^{3584}\)

**Ebubekir Ratib Efendi (b. 1750-d. 1214/1799)**\(^{3585}\): He was from Tosya and the son of Çilingir Ali Efendi. His father secured Ratib Efendi’s admission to the amedi department.\(^{3586}\) He was later transferred to the Exchequer Bill Office at the Ministry of Finance (“tahvil kalemî”). Ratib Efendi returned the amedi department in 1769, where he rose to chief secretary (“aslı katibîkî”) in the same office. He became amedi on 11 Ca 1193/27 May 1779.\(^{3587}\) In the 1780s, he was appointed as the writing tutor to Prince Selim (III). After serving as the secretary of the cavalry office (“sipah katibi”) (1200/1786) he became reisülküttab vekili (B 1203/April 1789). However, since he declined the invitation for the last duty, he was dismissed and appointed as the senior memorandum officer (“tezkire-i evvel”). On 13 August 1789, he was exiled to Bozca Ada, where he remained for two years. After release, he was appointed as yeniçeri katibi (1205/1791). On 11 M 1206/10 August 1791, later he was appointed as minister plenipotentiary to Austria.\(^{3588}\) He returned İstanbul on 30 September 1792 and six months later he was appointed as the poll tax accountant (“cizye muhasebecisi”) (25 B 1207/8 March 1793). He became chief treasurer, and then the grain superintendent (1 R 1208/6 December 1793).\(^{3589}\) Ratib Efendi became Reisülküttab on 26 Za 1209/14 June 1795, but was dismissed on 14 S 1211/19 August 1796.\(^{3590}\) On 25 S 1211/30 August 1796, he was exiled to Rodos and executed on 23 C 1214/22 December 1799.\(^{3591}\)

**Feyzullah Efendi (Divitı Güzel, Ekin İti) (d. 1222/1807)**: He was the son of Peksimetçibaşı Ahmed Ağa.\(^{3593}\) He was employed as arpa emini, zimmet halifesi (responsible for tracking bills receivable and agreements) and arpa katibi, zimmet halifesi, and the purse-bearer of the chief of the accounting office (“başmuhasebe kesedari”). In

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\(^{3586}\) Yeşil, *Ebubekir Ratib Efendi*, p. 28.


\(^{3588}\) Yeşil, *Ebubekir Ratib Efendi*, pp. 39-40

\(^{3589}\) Yeşil, *Ebubekir Ratib Efendi*, p. 46.

\(^{3590}\) Yeşil, *Ebubekir Ratib Efendi*, pp. 159-60.


1216/1801-2, he served as first treasurer (“defterdar-ı şık-k evvel”) in the army. Feyzullah Efendi was appointed as tevkii in 1217/1802-3 and as the chief financial officer (”başdefterdar”) for the second time on S 1218/May-June 1803. His appointment as the director of the İrad-ı Cedid was on 13 Ra 1220/11 June 1805. After his dismissal on 3 B 1221/16 September 1806, he was appointed as the supervisor of the fortifications of the forts on the Bosphorus. He was executed due to his ignorance of his last duty. His decapitated head was brought the city on 25 M 1222/4 April 1807.

Galib Said Mehmed Efendi (Pasha) (b. 1177/1763-4 d. 1244/1828-9): He was the son of Seyyid Ahmed Efendi, the chief scribe of the corresponding secretary (“sadaret mektupçusu ser halifesi”). Galib Efendi entered the department of mektubî-i sâdr-ı ali and became hacegan (1202/1787-8). In 1205/1790-91, he was appointed as mıkâlemekatibi and then serhalife ((1206/1791-2). After serving as the clerk who kept the accounts of the Armory (“cebeciler katibi”), he became the amedî (15 N 1212/3 March 1798). On Za 1213/April 1799, Galib Efendi was appointed as the deputy of the (“amedî vekili”) and sent to France to conduct the negotiations of the issues related to the evacuation of Egypt after the French occupation (1216/1802). After return, he became tezkire-i evvel (1217/1802-3) and Reisülküttüb (19 B 1221/2 October 1806). His second appointment to the same office was on 19 S 1223/16 April 1808. He was employed as the sadaret kethüda from 1225/1810 to 1228/1813. He was appointed as Reisülküttüb again on M

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3594 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 24
3596 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 25; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 8a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p.104; Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol.VIII, pp. 71, 120. According to Sicill, after dismissal he was sent to Egypt for a special mission. But it should be a mistake. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanlı, vol.II, pp. 531-2.
3597 According to Mustafa Necib, it was on 27 M 1222/6 April 1807. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 24; Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. I, p. 231; Ebubekir Efendi, Fezleke-i Kuşmâni, p. 8a; Asiler ve Gaziler, p. 104.
3603 Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdâlığı, p. 37.
1229/January 1814. After dismissal, Galib Efendi was exiled to Kütahya. Within the same year, he was granted the rank of vizierate and appointed as the governor of Bolu (Ș 1229/August 1814) and later that of Sivas. After serving as the governor of Niğde (1232/1817), Ankara, Çankırı, Bolu and Kastamonu, Galib Pasha was exiled to Konya (N 1236/June 1812). On 2 R 1238/27 December 1822, he was pardoned and appointed as the governor of Bozok and Kayseri. With the addition of İzmit and Bursa, he became Boğaz muhafızı. Galib Pasha became Grand Vizier on 9 R 1239/13 December 1823. He was deposed on 20 M 1240/14 September 1824 and was exiled to Gelibolu. On the way to Gelibolu, he was appointed as the governor of Erzurum and Şark seraskeri. However, he was again dismissed (1244/1828/29) and banished to Gelibolu, and finally to Kastamonu where he died.

**Halil Hamid Pasha (d. 1199/1785)**: He was the son of Gürcü Hacı Mustafa Ağa, the treasurer (“hazinedar”) of Polad Pasha. His father also served as the kapı kethüda of Çelik Mehmed Pasha. Halil Hamid entered the office of the imperial chancery (“divan kalemi”) and became a scribe to İstavraki, the kapı kethüda of the voyvoda of Wallachia. After the execution of İstavraki, he returned his duty at the Porte. With the help of Raif İsmail Pasha, he was admitted to the amedi department and served under the beyliği. He acted as the deputy of Beyliği Mustafa Refet Efendi. In Ça 1193/May-June 1779, then became the first memorandum officer (“büyük tezkereci”). His appointment as the Reisülküttab was on 7 February 1780. On 3 L 1194/2 October 1780, he became sadaret kethüda. Four months after becoming Grand Vizier, İzzet Mehmed Pasha secured Halil Hamid’s deposition from the last post (27 C 1195/20 June 1781). He was allowed to stay wherever he wanted. After three and a half month, he was appointed as director of Naval Arsenal. His second appointment as the kethüda-yi sadr-i ali was on 16 N 1196/25

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3604 According to Ceride, his appointment was on 1 S 1229/23 January 1814. See Beydilli, *Bir İmamın Günlüğü*, p. 156.


3610 Uzunçarşılı, “Halil Hamid Paşa”, p. 215; *Hadikatü’l- Vüzera*, p. 34.

3611 Uzunçarşılı, “Halil Hamid Paşa”, p. 216; *Hadikatü’l- Vüzera*, p. 34.


3613 Uzunçarşılı, “Halil Hamid Paşa”, p. 216; *Hadikatü’l- Vüzera*, p. 35.
August 1782). Halil Hamid became the Grand Vvizier on 25 M 1197/31 December 1782. During his grand vizierate, he worked to reform the Janissary army and established Sürat topçuları, rapid-fire cannon corps established in 1774. He remained in the office for two years and four months, but dismissed on 22 B 1199/31 March 1785 when his plot to enthrone Prince Selim (III) was discovered. Consequently, he was dismissed and exiled to Gelibolu (25 Ca 1199/5 April 1785). While he was in Gelibolu, he was appointed as the governor of Jidda and Habeş. While busy with preparations for the new duty, he was exiled to İstanköy and four days later an imperial edict was issued for his execution. He was executed on 17 C 1199/27 April 1785.

Hamdullah Pasha (Şehsuvarzâde) (d.1224/1809): He was educated in mabeyn-i hümâyun and became mirahor-i sani (Ra 1190/May-June 1776). After being promoted to positions of the superintendent of the Ushers ("kapıçalar kethüdası") (1195/1781), silahdar âğa (1197/1783), he became başçavuş (Ra 1195/January 1785). Hamdullah Bey was appointed as silahdar âğa for a second time in 1201/1786-7, later tax inspector ("başbakkulu") (C 1201/March-April 1787). He was appointed as deputy of chief bailiff ("vekaleten çavuşbaşı") (B 1203/April 1789), then bölük âgası and finally as the chief bailiff ("rikab başçavuşu") (27 B 1203/23 April 1789). After the first dismissal of Musa Pasha, he became the rikab-i hümâyun kaimmakam with the rank of Pasha (22 R 1222/29 June 1807). He was replaced by Musa Pasha on 2 C 1222/7 August 1807. After being dismissed, Hamdullah Pasha allowed to stay at Kadıköy, where died in 1224/1809.

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3615 For more details, see Uzunçarşılı, “Halil Hamid Paşa”, pp. 224-38.
3620 Taylesanizâde, Tarih, vol. I., p. 370; Vasîf, Mehâsinü’l-Âsâr, p. 211.
3621 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 42; B.O.A. Sadaret a.d. 438, p. 41.
3623 B.O.A. HAT 1354/52945 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 1355/53016 (undated); B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, order no 298, p. 101 (evâl-i C 1222/6 August-15 August 1807); According to Câbî, he was granted a salary of 500 guruş. See Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 161.
Hasan Pasha (Cezayirli, Gazi) (d. 1204/1790): He was a slave of a merchant, called Osman or Mehmed, in Tekirdağ. He conscripted to the Janissary army in 1152/1738 and later joined the deys of Algiers. However, due to a problem with the Cezayir beylerbeyi, he escaped first to Spain and then arrived at Istanbul. In this city, he became a captain in the imperial fleet (1174/1761), rear-admiral (“riyale”) and then became full admiral (“kapudane”) (1180/1766). He became the grand admiral, on Z 1183/April 1770, also serving as the Boğaz serasker, and remained in this post until 1187/1773. After the accession of Abdülhamid I to the throne, he was dismissed and was appointed as the Rusçuk serasker and the governor of Anatolia (1187/1774). His second appointment as the grand admiral was on Ca 1188/July 1774. Five years later, he was also delegated the governorship of the Morea. Hasan Pasha was dismissed from the position of grand admiralship on 24 B 1203/20 April 1789 and was appointed as the serasker of Özi during the reign of Selim III. He served as the grand vizier from 15 Ra 1204/3 December 1789 to 14 B 1204/30 March 1790.

Hasan Şakir Bey (Bostancıbaşi) (d. 1222/1807): He was the son of Ahmed Pasha, a mirimiran. After the death of his father, he suffered from serious financial problems due to the confiscation of family properties by the center. Some friends of his father secured his entrance to the hassa haseki. At the beginning of his career, he supervised the professional male dancers (“rakkas”) during the Sultan’s riding in state (“resm-i biniş”) and after some time he became yol hasekisi. He climbed the ladder of his career as karakulak, and then as the lieutenant of the Bostancıbaşi (“haseki ağa”) (28 Ş 1219/2 December 1804). On 3 B 1221/16 September 1806, he was appointed as the

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3632 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 38.

3633 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 38.

3634 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 38.

Bostancıbaşı. He was serving as Bostancıbaşı for nine months when the May 1807 Rebellion broke out and. He was included in the execution list and executed on 20 Ra 1222/28 May 1807.

Hüseyin Pasha (Küçük, Gazi) (d. 1218/1803): He was a Circassian or Georgian slave of Silahdar Ibrahim Pasha, presented to the Palace during the reign of Mustafa III (1181/1767) and was employed in the service of Prince Mehmed. At the time of accession of Selim III to the throne, Hüseyin Ağa became the mabeynci and later he was appointed as başçukadar (M 1203/October 1789). He became the grand admiral on 17 B 1206/11 March 1792 with the rank of vizier and on 5 C 1207/18 January 1793, he married Esma Sultan. The Ottoman navy under his command left the city on 19 L 1206/10 June 1792 to fight against the pirates in the Aegean and returned with success (12 S 1207/29 September 1792). In 1212/1797, he was appointed as the serasker of Vidin. After his return, he fought against the French during the Egyptian campaign. Hüseyin Pasha died on 23 Ş 1218/8 December 1803. His kapı kethüda was Hürev Ağa, later Pasha.

İbrahim Ağa (Hacı Ahmedzâde, Bolu voyvodası) (d. 1808): He was the voyvoda of Bolu and the son of Hacı Ahmed Ağa. The latter served as the director of the Naval Arsenal for seven months (1185-86/1777-78) and then was appointed as the voyvoda of Bolu. İbrahim Ağa replaced his father as the voyvoda and participated in the experiment to expand the Nizam-ı Cedid forces to Rumelia. While Alemdar Mustafa Pasha was at


3637 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 38.


3643 Göyünç, “Küçük Hüseyin Paşa”, p. 47.

3644 Göyünç, “Küçük Hüseyin Paşa”, p. 43.

3645 B.O.A. C. BH. 11492 (2 Ca 1193/18 May 1779).

3646 B.O.A. HAT 149/6305 (21 C 1211/5 September 1806); Hatt-ı Hümayun ve Tahrir Suretleri, TY 6975, p. 29.
Davudpaşa, waiting to enter the capital, he sent invitation to İbrahim Ağa to join him.3647 A letter, dated 1 C 1223/25 July 1808, from Hacı Ahmedoğlu İbrahim Ağa, reveals that a similar invitation was sent from Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to Hacı Ahmedoğlu’s brother Halil Ağa too. According to the letter, Alemdar Mustafa Pasha demanded Halil Ağa to come to İstanbul with 1000 cavalrmen and to join him. Consequently, Hacı Ahmedoğlu informed that his brother Halil Ağa was on the way and he would join the Pasha within two days.3648 According to Câbî Ömer, he rented a residence close to Sultan Ahmed after the accession of Mahmud II and came to the city, and stationed his soldiers to the hotels on 3 B 1223/25 August 1808.3649 Therefore, Hacı Ahmedoğlu was in İstanbul during the Alemdar Incident and his residence was suddenly attacked by a group of Janissaries, who took him the Square at Sultan Ahmed Mosque and murdered there together with one of his men.3650 According to the author of Yayla İmami Risalesi, he was at the head of the Nizam-i Cedid/Sekban-i Cedid soldiers in order to fight against the Janissaries around Ayasofya. Yet he was captured and murdered together with his kethüda.3651 After his murder, his possessions were plundered by the rebels and his corpse was cut into pieces. One of his arms was brought to Çalışkolu, the former voyvoda of Bolu, by a chamberlain (“serbevabin”) who was granted 2000 guruş by the Çalışkolu.3652

İbrahim Nesim Efendi (Arabacıbaşzâade, İbrahim Kethüda) (d. 1222/1807): His father was Ahmed Efendi, the imam of Ayasofya Mosque in Hotin. After the death of Ahmed Efendi, Hacı Mehmed Ağa, the arabacıbaşı of Hotin took care of İbrahim Nesim Efendi. When the former was appointed as the dergah-ı ali arabacıbaşı, İbrahim Nesim and his mother moved to the capital with him in 1184/1771-72.3653 In 1189/1775, Nesim Efendi was admitted to the office of mektub-ı sadr-ı ali by the help of Mehmed Ağa, who also had become his step-father.3654 In this office, he benefited from the patronage of Reisülküttab Raşid Efendi.3655 In 1202/1788 he became seal-bearer (“mühürdar”) of Elhac İbrahim

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3647 T.S.M.A. E. 2909.1 (1 C 1223/25 July 1808). In an undated document Salih Bey asked the grant of the rank of silahşörlük (title of first regiment of Ottoman household cavalry) to the brother of Hacı Ahmedzâde called Halil. See B.O.A. HAT 120/4895.C (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1805-1806).


3649 Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 205


3651 See Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 256; Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 140. Ahmedzade. Halil Ağa, his brother, was executed after the murder of İbrahim Ağa. In a relevant document, it is declared that though his execution should been realized earlier, it was postponed due the war with the Russians. See B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 136, order no. 397 (evail-i M 1224/16-25 February 1809).


3655 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 42.
Efendi and entered the hacegan class with the Avlonya mansıb. In 1205/1791, we see him as the başhalife of the mektupçu, replacing Elmas Paşazade Mustafa Bey, who was promoted to the position of rikab-i hümâyun mektupçuluk (11 Ca 1209/4 December 1794). Being employed as mektupçu for four years, Nesim Efendi became the sadaret kethûda on 24 S 1213/8 August 1798. After the grand vizier, Yusuf Ziya Pasha, left for a campaign, he was transferred to office rikab-i hümâyun kethûdalık (9 Za 1213/4 April 1799). He was dismissed from the post and allowed to rest in his residence on R 1216/11 August-8 September 1801. Thereafter he negotiated the possessions of the French citizens that were confiscated by the Porte with the French ambassador and then appointed as the eyaletli nazır. He was appointed as sadaret kethûda for a second time on 8 S 1218/30 May 1803, followed by the kethûda-ship of Beyhan Sultan. Ibrahim Nesim Efendi was dismissed from the position of sadaret kethûda on 13 R 1221/30 June 1806. He was murdered on 20 Ra 1222/28 May, during the May 1807 uprising.

Ibrahim Reşid Efendi (Elhac, Gizli Sıtma) (d. 1222/1807): He was the son of İsmail Efendi, kul katibi at mevkufat kalem. Reşid Efendi also followed a bureaucratic career, and entered the mektubî-i sadr-ı ali department. He rapidly rose in this department, and became serhalife, mektubeçu, silahdar katibi and again mektubeçu. On 4 B 1201/22 April 1787, he was appointed as the mektubî-i sadr-ali in the army, together with

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3657 B.O.A. C. Tımar 530 (12 C 1205/16 February 1791). The document is about a zeamet held by İbrahim Efendi in Kostendil, producing a 19626 guruş income. See also Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. III, p. 768; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, pp. 41-2.


3660 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 43. According to Doğan, the appointment was on Za 1213/April-May 1799. See Doğan, Sadaret Kethûdalığı, p. 36

3661 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 43.

3662 Doğan, Sadaret Kethûdalığı, p. 36

3663 Doğan, Sadaret Kethûdalığı, p. 36; According to Sicill, his dismissal was on 23 B 1221/6 October 1806. See Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. III, p. 768.

3664 Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 142; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi, p. 57. See also Edib, Tarih, p.100.

3665 Taylesanizâde, Tarih, vol. I, 198

the Serdar-ı ekrem at Mehadiye. While he was in İstanbul, to return to the army in the Spring, he was appointed as the rikab kaimmakam. During that period, his father İsmail Efendi was serving as the keeper of the registers of the privy purse (“defter-i rikab-i hümayun”). İbrahim Reşid remained in the office from 10 C 1203/8 March 1789 to R 1204/January 1790. Due to an unknown problem with Cezyarili Hasan Pasha, İbrahim Efendi preferred to stay away from the capital and became surre emini. He was later appointed as başmuhasebeci and then as sadaret kethüda, following the appointment of Melek Mehmed Pasha as the Grand Vizier. He remained in the last office from 25 M 1207/12 September 1792 to R 1208/1 March 1793. His second appointment as the defterdar was on 2 N 1210/11 March 1796. The following year, he became rozname-i evvel and then the director of the Naval Arsenal (1212/1797-8). On 8 Za 1213/13 April 1799, he became the director of the İrade-i Cedid. After the appointment of Feyzullah Efendi to this post, he was allowed to rest at home (13 Ra 1220/11 June 1805). Elhac İbrahim Efendi was one of the targets of the rebels and was murdered on 21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807.

İbrahim Hilmi Pasha (Keçiboynuzu) (b. 1160/1747-d. 1240/1825): He was the son of Çiçekçi Mehmed Ağâ, an officer in the Janissary army. İbrahim Hilmi started his career in the bostancı corps, became turnaci, the Janissary Ağâ of Jerusalem (“Kudüs ağası”) (1210/1797-6) and then deputy commander of the Janissaries (“kul kethüdası”). He

3668 Edib, Tarih, p.100; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 57.
3669 Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdâlîğı, p. 35.
3671 Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 58.
3672 Uzunçarşılı, “Diş Ruzname”, p. 649; Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdâlîğı, p. 36.
3677 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 22
3678 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 22; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 58.
became the Ağa of the Janissaries on 12 Ca 1219/19 August 1804 and remained in the office until 1 B 1221/14 September 1806. He was promoted to the position of grand vizierate on 1 B 1221/14 September 1806. Due to the pressure of the Janissaries in the army, he was dismissed on 11 R 1222/18 June 1807. His dismissal was followed by the governorship of Salonika (9 B 1222/12 September 1807) and Bosnia (1224/1809-1228/1213). After a period of exile in Gelibolu, he became the governor of Kandıye and later that of İçel, after which he was exiled again (1234/1819). In the same year, he was appointed as muhafız of İstanköy. In 1236/1820-21, he was appointed as the governor of Adana, in addition to muhafızlık of İstanköy. İbrahim Pasha died on 1 Za 1240/17 June 1825, while he was still the governor of Adana.

İbrahim İsmet Beyefendi (Es-seyyid, Raif İsmail Paşazâde) (b. 1164/1750-d. 1221/1806): He was the son of Raif İsmail Pasha and the grandson of Kesriyeli Ahmed Pasha. İsmet Beyefendi became the molla of Aleppo (1202/1787-88) and then ordu kadısı (C 1205/February 1791). He participated in the negotiations of peace at Ziştovi, with the title of second delegate, holding the Mecca paye (C 1205/February 1791) and was awarded with the İstanbul paye thanks to his success during the above-mentioned negotiations. His success brought his appointment as delegate for the negotiations with the Russian delegates for the Yassy Treaty. On Z 1207/July-August, he became the judge of İstanbul. After serving for three months, he was banished to Bursa due to a conflict with Hakkı Bey, the kethüda-yi sadr-ı ali. After release, he obtained the Anadolu paye (M 1212/June-July 1797). He was appointed as the delegate to negotiate the alliance between the Porte and Russia (Ca 1213/October 1798). He obtained Rumeli paye and became the kazasker of Rumelia in 1213/1798. İsmet Beyefendi was reappointed as the kazasker of Rumelia on Ş 1218/November-December 1803. On 3 B 1221/16 September 1806, he became nakibülg-eşraf. İsmet Beyefendi died on 17 M 1222/27 March 1807.

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3687 Cevdet Paşa, Tarih, vol. VIII, p. 133.
while holding the same post. His son was the famous Şeyhülislam Ahmed Arif Hikmet Beyefendi.

İsmail Pasha (Hafiz) (b.1171/1757-8-d. 1222/1807): He was the son of a haseki called Zernişani/Altın Nişanlı. İsmail became a bostancı and served as the haseki ağası of Prince Selim (III) during the reign of Mustafa III. After the rise of Selim III, he became confidential messenger (“ağa karakulağı”) and tebdil hasekisi and two years later the chief of the tebdil hasekis (“baştebdil”). He became the Bostancıbaşi in 1219/1804. Hafiz İsmail was appointed as the grand vizier on 24 April 1806 and exiled to Bursa and then to Sakız. After the enthronement of Mustafa IV, he was pardoned and appointed as the Boğaz muhafızı and the governor of Karaman (13 R 1222/20 June 1807). He died on 15 October 1807.

Mahmud Bey (Lala) (d.1205/1790): According to Ahmed Cavid Bey, Mahmud Bey was a descendant of Kara Mustafa Pasha. During his childhood and the reign of Mahmud I, he was employed in the imperial pantry (“kiler-i hassa”) and then became çukadar. During the reign of Mustafa III, he was employed first as başçukadar and then as tutor (“lala”) of Prince Selim (III). Following the enthronement of Abdulhamid I, he was assigned away from the Palace with Ayasofya tevliyeti. After the accession of Selim III,
he became the kethüda to mother of Selim III (B 1203/April 1789). He died eight months after the final appointment (17 S 1205/26 October 1790).\textsuperscript{3701}

**Mahmud Raif Efendi (İngiliz, Tanburi) (d. 1222/1807)**\textsuperscript{3702}: Mahmud Raif Efendi was the son of İsmail Efendi, who served as the granary director (“anbar emini”) during the reign of Abdülhamid I.\textsuperscript{3703} Raif Efendi was employed in the section for the assignment of the benefits in land (“tahvil kalemi”).\textsuperscript{3704} In 1208/1793, he was employed in the office of mektubi-i sadr-ı ali. His rise started with patronage of Reisülküttab Mehmed Raşid Efendi who secured his appointment as chief scribe to Yusuf Agah Efendi (1793-1797).\textsuperscript{3705} After return, he became hacegan and was granted the rank of the haremeyn mukataac.\textsuperscript{3706} Raif Efendi was appointed as councillor (“mîşteşar”) of the Ottoman navy (Ra 1213/ October 1798–June 1799).\textsuperscript{3707} In summer 1214/1799, he was appointed as the beylikti and then participated in the Egyptian campaign.\textsuperscript{3708} Raif Efendi was appointed as the Reisülküttab in Ra 1215/August 1800. He was dismissed on 8 Ca 1220/4 August 1805.\textsuperscript{3709} Resting for a while, he was appointed as the deputy of ruznâmce-i evvel (4 L 1221/15 December 1806).\textsuperscript{3710} He became the Bosphorous superintendent. He was murdered on the first day of


\textsuperscript{3703} Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi*, pp. 30-1.


\textsuperscript{3705} Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi*, p. 31; Beydilli-Şahin, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{3706} Beydilli-Şahin, *Mahmud Raif Efendi*, p. 23.


the May 1807 uprising (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807). He had great debts and was not a man of fortune.3711

Mahmud Tayyar Pasha (d. 1223/1808): He was the son of Battal Hüseyin Pasha and the last representative of the Caniklizâde dynasty. During the Russo-Ottoman War (1787-1792), Battal Hüseyin Pasha and his son were ordered to defend the Caucasus and Anapa. However, they escaped to Russia where they stayed until 1799.3712 In this year, Tayyar and his father were pardoned and Tayyar was granted with the rank of Master of the Horse (“Büyük Mirahor”).3713 In June 1799, he became the mütesellim of Amasya and Canik.3714 On the condition of being commander of the soldiers sent from Anatolia to Rumelia, he was also granted the rank of vizierate and the governorship of Trabzon.3715 He participated in the Egyptian campaign and on 23 October 1800. He was then entrusted to suppress the Mountaineers, causing disorder in Rumelia.3716 Later, the sancak of Çirmen was added to his realm of control.3717 For a short period, he acted as the governor of Diyarbakır (1801-2) and then Erzurum (September-October 1803).3718 After that, he asked for the governorship of Sivas from the Porte in 1803.3719 However, he was not granted with this office, and consequently he revolted against the center at the end of which he was forced to flee to Crimea for a second time in 1220/1805. After his return, he was appointed as kaimmakam of the grand vizier on 19 L 1222/20 December 1807.3720 Tayyar Pasha was

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3711 B.O.A. HAT 1364/53938 (undated). Since his goods would not be enough for his debts, his property was not confiscated but sold for paying his debts.

3712 Şahin, The Caniklizâdes (1737-1808), pp. 63-64.

3713 B.O.A. C.DH. 13988 (17 R 1214/21 July 1799).

3714 Karagöz, Canikli Ali Paşa, p. 150; Abdizâde, Amasya Tarihi, p. 175.

3715 B.O.A. C. DH. 2858 (29 S 1215/23 July 1800); Karagöz, Canikli Ali Paşa, p. 150.

3716 T.S.M. A. E. 5930 (undated).


3719 Shaw, Between Old and New, p. 284.

deposed on 13 M 1223/11 March 1808.\(^{3721}\) After a period of exile, he was executed on 12 Ş 1223/3 October 1808.\(^{3722}\)

**Mehmed Efendi (Derviş, Aygur İmam) (d.1213/1816):** He was a preacher of the Mosque Ayasofya-yı Kebir. He later became imam-i sani (Ş 1193/August-September 1779).\(^{3723}\) He served as imam-i evvel-i sultani (1195/1781).\(^{3724}\) Mehmed Efendi became the molla of Üsküdar (Z 1202/September 1788) and obtained the ranks of Mecca, İstanbul (1210/1795-6), and Anadolu (1214/1799-1800). He was appointed as the Anadolu kazasker in 1217/1802-3.\(^{3725}\) He obtained the Rumeli paye in 1218/1803 and became the kazasker of Rumelia in 1223/1808. He was dismissed from the post of imam-i evvel on 27 Ca 1223/21 July 1808 and from the position of the kazasker of Rumelia on 1 M 1224/16 February 1809.\(^{3726}\) According to Şanizâde he was dismissed from the last post before the end of the tenure, because of his strange conducts.\(^{3727}\) Derviş Efendi died on 3 Ca 1231/1 April 1816.\(^{3728}\)

**Mehmed Arif Ağa (Sekbanbaşı) (d. 1223/1808):** He was a convert to Islam. He became ocaklı haskisi, çorbacibaşı, zaşarcıbaşı and was appointed as the Sekbanbaşı on 8 Ra 1221/26 May 1806.\(^{3729}\) He was accused of the embezzlement of a certain amount delivered to him to be distributed among the yamaks after the May 1807 Rebellion and enthronement of Mustafa IV. Due to the protests and insistence of the yamaks and the Janissaries, he was dismissed on 17 R 1222/24 June 1807 and banished to Bursa.\(^{3730}\) During the reign of Mahmud II, he was promoted to the rank of mirimiran and appointed as the

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\(^{3721}\) B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 91; Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 47; Beyhan, Saray Günülgü, p.209; Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 239; Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 28a. Oğuluşuyan, notes as 3 Mart (Julian Calender)/15 March (Gregorian Calender). See Oğuluşuyan, Ruzname, p. 2. Mustafa Necib gives the date as 9 M 1223/7 March 1808. See Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi, p. 85.

\(^{3722}\) According to the author of Yayla İmamı Risalesi, his decapitated head was brought to the capital on 13 Ş 1223/4 October 1808. See Yayla İmamı Risalesi, p. 252.

\(^{3723}\) Tayyarzâde Ahmed Ata, Fikra-yı Tarihiyye, Bayezid, no. 82, pp.7a-7.


\(^{3725}\) B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 108; Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 183


He was executed on 15 Ş 1223/6 October 1808, before his arrival at the place of his new post.3732

Mehmed Ataullah Efendi (Şerifzâde, İshakzâde) (b. 1173/1757-d.1226/1811): He was the grandson of Şeyhülislam Mehmed Esad Efendi and the son of Şeyhülislam Şerifzâde Mehmed Şerif Efendi. Ataullah Efendi was educated by Tokadî Mustafa Efendi. On 12 L 1185/18 January 1772, he became a müderris at the age of twelve.3733 In M 1187/March-April 1773, he was promoted to paye of Jerusalem and Galata mevleviyet (1187/1773). On 1 Ra 1204/19 November 1789, he obtained the Edirne paye. From 1205/1790 to M 1206/31 August-29 September 1791, he held the Mecca mevleviyet.3734 After his return to İstanbul, he obtained the İstanbul paye and became nakibü'l-şraf (5 L 1208/6 May 1794) as well.3735 On 13 Ş 1213/20 January 1799, he obtained the Anadolu paye, and on 1 Ş 1215/18 December 1800 the paye of Rumelia and became the kazasker of Rumelia on 1 Ş 1219/5 November 1804.3736 He was appointed as the Şeyhülislam on 1 B 1221/14 September 1806, following the dismissal of Salihzâde Ahmed Esad Efendi.3737 During the reign of Mustafa IV, he was replaced by Ömer Hulusi Efendi on 7 Ca 1222/13 July 1807. However, upon the pressure of the Janissaries, he was reappointed the following day. The final dismissal of Ataullah Efendi was on 27 Ca 1223/31 July 1808, a few days before the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to the capital and accession of Mahmud II to the throne.3738 Ataullah Efendi was ordered to reside at home,3739 but on 7 C 1223/31 July 1808, he was banished to Kızılanlık.3740 His place exile was changed to Aydın Güzelhisar on 12 C 1225/15 July 1810,3741 where he died on 25 N 1226/13 October 1811.3742


3732 Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 60. The author of Neticetü'l-Vekayi argues that he was executed in Bursa. See Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p 44a. According to Câbî, he was executed on 9 B 1223/31 August 1808, as soon as he arrived to his new post. See Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 233.


3736 B.O.A. C.ADL. 2031 (undated); Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. II, p. 68.


3738 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 105.


3741 B.O.A. C.ADL. 1139 (13 C 1225/16 July 1810).

3742 Even though Şanizâde gives the date of his death as 26 N/14 October, the report of Aydın muhassil makes it clear that it was on 25 N/13 October. See Şanizâde, Tarih-i
Mehmed Emin Efendi (Veliefendizâde) (d.1220/1805): He was the son of Şeyhülislam Veliyüddin Efendi (d. 1768). Emin Efendi followed his father’s path and became the judge of Üsküdar (1181/1767-8) with the Edirne paye. He served as the molla of Damascus (R 1188/June 1774). After obtaining Istanbul and Anadolu paye (15 C 1201/4 April 1787) he became the Anadolu kazasker (14 Ca 1203/10 February 1789). He was then employed as the kazasker of Rumelia for three times: the first in 1208/1793-94, second in 1212/1797-8 and the third in 1216/1801-2. In 1217/1802-3, he was dismissed and exiled to Bursa for two months. Mehmed Emin Efendi died on 22 Ş 1220/15 November 1805.

Mehmed Emin Behiç Efendi (Es-seyyid) (d.1224/1809): He was from Ruscuk and started bureaucratic career as a hacegan. He was appointed as army-supply master of the Danube (“Tuna mubayaacısı”), with the rank of chief treasurer (Z 1221/February 1807). On 16 Ra 1223/12 May 1808, Behiç Efendi was appointed as the defterdar of the imperial army. He became the Minister of Navy on 23 Ş 1223/14 October 1808. Behiç Efendi fled with Ramiz Abdullah and Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha, following the Alemdar Incident. Under the guise of being pardoned he was later called and executed at the Porte in 1224/1809.

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3745 1220 Senesi Vekayi, p. 22.
3746 For more information, see Çınar, A. Osman, Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emin Behiç Efendi’nin Sevanihü’l-Levayih’i ve Değerlendirilmesi, Unpublished M.A. Thesis (Marmara University, 1992).
3749 Çınar, Sevanihü’l-Levayih, p. XIV; T.S.M.A E. 3324-4 (undated); Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 252; Neticietü’l-Vekayi, pp. 43, 44a.
3750 B.O.A. HAT Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, p. 171 (evail-i Za 1223/19-29 December 1808), p. 172-3 (evail-i Za 1223/19-29 December 1808), p. 179 (evast-i Za 1223/29 December-8 January 1808). His possessions were confiscated by the center. See Mühimme Defterleri, p. 189 (evahir-i Za 1223/8-17 January 1809); p. 180 (evahir-i Za 1223/8-17 January 1809; pp. 192-3 (evahir-i Za 1223/8-17 January 1809); p. 201 (evahir-i Za 1223/8-17 January 1809); p. 203 (evai-i Z 1223/18-27 January 1809).
3751 According to Sicill, he was executed on 24 Ra 1224/9 May 1809. Yayla İmami Risalesi and Oğulukyan give the date as 23 Ca 1224/6 July 1809. See Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 266; Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 54. According to Osman Çınar, it was on 22 Ca 1224/5 July 1809. See Çınar, Sevanihü’l-Levayih, p. XXVI.
Mehmed Emin Vahid Efendi (d. 1244/1828)\textsuperscript{3752}: He was born in Kilis. After moving to the capital, Vahid Efendi entered the Assignment of Benefices in Land for Finance Section ("maliye tahvil kalemi"), with the help of his step-father.\textsuperscript{3753} Under the patronage of Topal Halil Efendi, the Zecriye muhassili and the voivoda of Galata, he was appointed as the zecriye baş katibi and muhassili. In 1221/1806, Vahid Efendi became mevkufatı and then defter emini (L 1221/December 1806).\textsuperscript{3754} He was sent to Paris as the plenipotenary to seek alliance with France against Russia. After his return, he became reis vekili and on 21 B 1223/12 September 1808 Vahid Efendi was delegated to undertake the negotiations with Britain, which ended with the Kala-yı Sultanıye Treaty (1808). After this duty, he was employed under the command of Ragıp Pasha, the serasker of the Mediterranean (9 N 1223/29 October 1808), followed by a period of banishment to Kütahya (26 Ş 1224/6 October 1809).\textsuperscript{3755} In 1226/1811, he became the Supervisor of the Imperial Foundry and the director of the Naval Arsenal one year later (L 12227/October 1812).\textsuperscript{3756} He was later granted the rank of vizierate and appointed as the governor of Teke and Hamid (S L 1229/20 September 1814), followed by the governorship of Hanya a few years later. Upon the complaints of the residents of this city, he was dismissed and exiled to İstanköy (1235/1819-20).\textsuperscript{3757} After release, Vahid Efendi was appointed as the muhafız of Sakiz (R 1236/January 1821). He was again exiled, this time to Alaiye (L 1237/June-July 1822). On 23 N 1239/22 May 1824, he became the governor of Aleppo, but deposed three years later and banished to Konya, then to Bursa, deprived of his rank. In the same year (1242/1826-7), he was appointed as the prefect of intramuros Istanbul ("eski İstanbul muhafızı"). His final appointment was to the governorship of Bosnia. He died on 2 S 1244/14 August 1828 before moving to his new duty.\textsuperscript{3758}

Mehmed Hafid Efendi (Aşır Efendizâde) (1226/1811)\textsuperscript{3759}: He was the son of Reiszâde Mustafa Aşir Efendi.\textsuperscript{3760} On Za 1203/July-August 1789, Mehmed Efendi became the molla of Eyüb and then of Bursa (R 1212/September-October 1797). He obtained the Mecca (M 1213/June-July 1798) and then

\textsuperscript{3752} For more details, see Çağlar, Erol, \textit{Mehmed Emin Vahid Efendi'nin Fransa Sefareti ve İngiltere ile Yapılan Görüşmelere Dair Takriri}, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, (İstanbul Üniversitesi: 2002).

\textsuperscript{3753} Çağlar, \textit{Vahid Efendi}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{3754} Çağlar, \textit{Vahid Efendi}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{3755} Çağlar, \textit{Vahid Efendi}, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{3756} Çağlar, \textit{Vahid Efendi}, pp.. 11-2.

\textsuperscript{3757} Çağlar, \textit{Vahid Efendi}, p. 12.


\textsuperscript{3759} He was the author of \textit{Sefinetü’r-Vüzera}. See Kazasker Mehmed Hafid Efendi, \textit{Sefinetü’r-Vüzera}, İsmet Parmaksızoğlu (ed.), (İstanbul, Şirket-i Müretebbiye Basmevi, 1952). For more information on his works, see Mehmet Hafid Efendi, \textit{Sefinetü’r-Vüzera}, pp. 7-11. His \textit{Sefinetü’r-Vüzera} was dedicated to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha.

\textsuperscript{3760} His father, Reizsâde Mustafa Aşır Efendi, served as the şeyhülislam from 18 Ra 1213/30 August 1798 to 18 S 1215/11 July 1800).
 İstanbul paye (Za 1213/April 1799). He became the Anadolu kazasker on 1 Ra 1222/7 May 1807. After his deposition on 11 Ra 1223/7 May 1808, he was banished to Kastamonu (8 B 1223/30 August 1808). He was released on 18 Z 1223 /4 February 1809 and appointed as the kazasker of Rumelia in 1226/1811. Mehmed Hafid Efendi died on 5 Z 1226/21 December 1811.

Mehmed Hakkı Pasha (Koca, Deli) (d. 1226/1811): He was the son of Ahmed Kamil Pasha, a descendant of Sokullu Mehmed Pasha. Mehmed Pasha was a graduate of the Porte and served as the eyaletli nazır. In 1210/1796, he was appointed as the governor of Rumelia with the duty of suppressing the Mountaineers and the revolt of Pasvandoğlu Osman. He was dismissed from this duty and entrusted the governorship of Aleppo, but later was banished to İstanbul (1212/1798). In L 1213/March 1799, he was appointed as the governor of Hanya, then of Eğriboz. In 1215/1800, he became the governor of the Bosnia, yet after a very short time he was entrusted the duty of suppressing the Mountaineers and was appointed as the governor of Rumelia. Mehmed Hakkı Pasha died on 5 Z 1226/22 December 1811.


According to Câbî, he was released on 12 S 1224/29 March 1809 and appointed as the kazasker of Rumelia on 21 Ş 1226/10 September 1811. See Câbî, Tarih-i Câbî, vol. I, p. 420; vol. II, p. 779.


For more details, see Uzunçarşılı, “Vezir Mehmed Hakkı Paşa, (1741-1811)”, Türkiye Mecmuası, VI (1936-39), pp. 177-279.


B.O.A. HAT 3202 (1216/1811). It is a letter from Mehmed Hakkı Pasha. See also Uzunçarşılı, “Mehmed Hakkı Paşa”, p. 183.

Uzunçarşılı, “Mehmed Hakkı Paşa”, p. 188.

Uzunçarşılı, “Mehmed Hakkı Paşa”, p. 189.


B.O.A. C. DH. 8795 (undated). It is a list of appointments. B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 55.
to some maneuvers of Yusuf Ziya Pasha, Kemahlı Osman Ağa was appointed in his place. He was finally appointed as the serasker of the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{3773} His appointments continued, and keeping the seraskerlik, he was appointed to Diyarbakır, and after seven days the muhafız of Limni and then the governor of Adana. He was dismissed from the last duty on 26 Ş 1223/17 October 1808. After the dismissal, he became the governor of Crete (N 1223/June 1808).\textsuperscript{3774} After a short time (8 L 1223/27 November 1808), he was appointed as the Boğaz serasker for a second time, to be dismissed on M 1224/March 1809 and sent to İstanköy.\textsuperscript{3775} After release, he was appointed as the governor of Crete for a second time on 28 M 1225/5 March 1810, followed by governorships of Eğriboz and Karlıeli in the same year.\textsuperscript{3776} He died in Eğriboz in N 1226/October 1811.\textsuperscript{3777}

Mehmed Murad Efendi (Muradzâde, Es-seyyid) (d. 1223/1808): He was the son of Murad Efendi, a senior ulema ("mevalı").\textsuperscript{3778} He served as vezir müfettişi, and then was banished to Gelibolu to be released on 6 Ş 1201/24 May 1787.\textsuperscript{3779} Mehmed Murad Efendi became the judge of Salonika and then of Mecca.\textsuperscript{3780} He served as the İstanbul judge between 10 Ca 1221/26 July 1806 and 1 Za 1222/31 December 1807.\textsuperscript{3781} After the enthronement of Mustafa IV, his term of office was prolonged for six months.\textsuperscript{3782} On 9 C 1223/2 August 1808, he was exiled to Kızanlık.\textsuperscript{3783} Mehmed Murad Efendi died on evasit-i

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{3773} Uzunçarşılı, “Mehmed Hakkı Paşa”, p. 213; B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 67.
\item \textsuperscript{3774} Uzunçarşılı, “Mehmed Hakkı Paşa”, pp. 214-5.
\item \textsuperscript{3775} Uzunçarşılı, “Mehmed Paşa”, p. 125. According to Câbi, he was exiled on 3 R 1224/18 May 1809. See Câbi, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 449.
\item \textsuperscript{3776} Uzunçarşılı, “Mehmed Hakkı Paşa”, p. 216.
\item \textsuperscript{3777} Uzunçarşılı, “Mehmed Hakkı Paşa”, p. 216.
\item \textsuperscript{3778} Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 174.
\item \textsuperscript{3779} Taylesanizâde, Tarih, vol. I., p. 203.
\item \textsuperscript{3780} Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 174.
\item \textsuperscript{3781} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, 357, p. 6; Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 174.
\item \textsuperscript{3782} Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 174.
\item \textsuperscript{3783} Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 60; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p. 238. The author of Neticetü'l-Vekayi informs that he was exiled to Kızanlık on 10 C 1223/3 August 1808. See Netice'tü'l-Vekayi, p. 35. Câbi gives the date of his exile as 8 B 1223/30 August 1808 and to Edirne. See Câbi, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 210. Şanizâde does not give an exact date but claims that he has been among the ones exiled to Edirne after the coming of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha. See Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, vol. I, p. 173.
\end{itemize}
Since he did not have a son most of his inheritance was confiscated by the Sultan.\textsuperscript{3784}  

**Mehmed Münib Efendi (Es-seyyid) (d.1238/1823):** He was from Ayıntab. In 1189/1775, he became a müderris and the tutor of Şerifzâde Mehmed Ataullah Efendi. During the reign of Abdülhamid I, he served as a tutor in the Palace and was greatly favoured by the Sultan ("çerağ-i hass-i haslarından").\textsuperscript{3785} Münib Efendi obtained ranks of Jerusalem (1209/1794-5), the Five Cities ("Bilad-i Hamse”), Mecca (1214/1799-1800) and finally of İstanbul (Ca 1219/August 1804). In the same year, he obtained the Anadolu paye (14 Ş 1222/17 October 1807).\textsuperscript{3786} He was exiled after the march of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to İstanbul, first to Ankara and later to Ayıntab (23 Ca 1227/4 June 1812).\textsuperscript{3787} Münib Efendi begged the Porte to be forgiven, but was not pardoned.\textsuperscript{3788} He died in exile on 20 L 1238/20 June 1823.\textsuperscript{3789}  

**Mehmed Ragib Pasha (Elhac, Ebu Kof, Magribî, Şamlı) (d. 1244/1828):** He was from Damascus and the son of Hüseyin Bey, a ruznamçeci in the same city.\textsuperscript{3790} He was employed in the divan-i hümayun and then mektubi-i sadr-i ali sections. Around Ca 1210/November-December 1796, he entered the hacegan class.\textsuperscript{3791} Mehmed Ragib was delegated the duty confiscation of the possessions of the deceased Cezzar Ahmed Pasha.\textsuperscript{3792} He became the director of the Imperial Gunpowder Works ("Baruthane Nazırı”) on 15 Ş 1221/1 May 1806, and rikab kethüda on 18 M 1222/28 March 1807.\textsuperscript{3793} On 15 Ş 1222/24 April 1807, he was appointed as the governor of Karaman.\textsuperscript{3794} After a short period of time
he was dismissed (27 Ra 1222/4 June 1807) and banished to Kütahya.\textsuperscript{3796} After his dismissal, the governorship of Karaman was granted to Elhac Mustafa Ağa on 6 R 1222/13 June 1807.\textsuperscript{3797} Mehmed Ragib Pasha was appointed as the Akdeniz Boğazı Seraskeri, on 2 N 1223/22 October 1808, following the dismissal of Mehmed Hakkı Pasha from the same post.\textsuperscript{3798} Following a second dismissal, he was again exiled to Kütahya.\textsuperscript{3799} His place of exile was later changed to Bursa by an imperial order.\textsuperscript{3800} In 1227/1812, Ragib Pasha became the governor of Aleppo, but dismissed one year later. His final duty was the governorship of Konya. He died in the same city (Ca 1244/December 1828).\textsuperscript{3801}

\textbf{Mehmed Raşid Efendi (b. 1167/1753-4-d. 1212/1798)}\textsuperscript{3802}: He was the son of Kayseri-yeli Cafer Efendi, a scribe of divan-ı hümayun. Raşid Efendi became beyliği kesedari (1188/1774), and then divan-ı hümayun beylükçisi (1195/1781). During the grand vizirate of Halil Hamid Pasha, he was appointed as the mektubcu (24 N 1198/1 August 1784), but dismissed on 4 B 1199/13 May 1785.\textsuperscript{3803} On 8 Ra 1200/9 February 1786, he became beyliği for a second time and sent to the army as the Reisülküttab (1202/1787-8). He later became reis vekili (13 M 1203/October 1788). With the return of the army, he was appointed as the çavuşbaşı (1206/1791-2).\textsuperscript{3804} Raşid Efendi was reappointed as the Reisülküttab on 19 M 1207/6 September 1792.\textsuperscript{3805} He resigned from the post on 23 M 1209/20 August 1794.\textsuperscript{3806} After serving as defter emini (L 1209/April-May 1795), he became tersane emini (L 1210/April 1796).\textsuperscript{3807} The third and final appointment of Mehmed

\textsuperscript{3796} See B.O.A. C. DH. 1857 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); C.AS. 50601/11 R 1222/18 June 1807).

\textsuperscript{3797} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 30).

\textsuperscript{3798} Neticetü'l-Vekayi, p. 44. According to Câbi he was dismissed on 5 N 1223/25 October 1808. See Câbi, Câbi Tarihi, vol. I, p. 257.


\textsuperscript{3800} B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 133, order no. 390 (evahir-i Za 1223/8-17 January 1808).

\textsuperscript{3801} See also Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. IV, p. 1341.


\textsuperscript{3804} Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{3805} Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{3806} Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{3807} Yalçınkaya, “Mehmed Raşid Efendi”, p. 131.
Raşid Efendi as the Reisülküttab was on 25 S 1212/19 August 1797. He died 15 N 1212/3 March 1798.\(^{3808}\)

**Mehmed Said Halet Efendi (d.1238/1822)**\(^{3809}\): He was the son of Kırımî Hüseyin Efendi, a judge. Halet Efendi himself became a judge and later served as the mühürdar yamak to Reisülküttab Mehmed Raşid Efendi and later kapı kethüda to Ohrili Ahmed Pasha and Ebubekir Semî Pasha.\(^{3810}\) After being employed as the kethüda of the deputy judge ("naib") of Yenişehir Fener, he moved to İstanbul and became a disciple of Galîb Dede, the famous Mevlevi sheik.\(^{3811}\) With the help of Mustafa Reşid Efendi, Halet Efendi was admitted to the hacegan class (1217/1802), and he acted as the Ottoman ambassador to Paris (1802-1806). After his return, he was appointed as the deputy of divan-ı hümâyûn beylikçî on 24 L 1221/4 January 1807,\(^{3812}\) and a short time later he became reis vekîî (20 Ra 1222/28 May 1807).\(^{3813}\) Halet Efendi was dismissed on 7 M 1223/5 March 1808,\(^{3814}\) and banished to Kütahya (20 M 1223/18 March 1808).\(^{3815}\) After his release, he was sent to Baghdad for the execution of Süleyman Pasha, the governor of Baghdad.\(^{3816}\) Halet Efendi served as rikab-ı hümâyûn kethüda between the years1226/1811 and 1229/1814. In 1238/1822, he was exiled to Konya and executed within the same year.\(^{3817}\)

**Mehmed Memiş Efendi (Selanikli) (d. 1222/1807)**: He was from Salonika and became sandîk emini in the same city.\(^{3818}\) Memiş Efendi served as the head of the tobacco custom office ("duhan gümrükü emini"). He later entered the hacegan class (1202/1787-8) and was appointed as the katib-i gureba-yı yesar.\(^{3819}\) He was employed as the arpa emini (4


\(^{3810}\) Tekindağ, “Halet Efendi”, p.123.

\(^{3811}\) Tekindağ, “Halet Efendi”, p.123.


\(^{3815}\) B.O.A. HAT 53507 (undated); *Neticetü’l-Vekayi*, p. 28 a.

\(^{3816}\) Tekindağ, “Halet Efendi”, p. 124.

\(^{3817}\) Tekindağ, “Halet Efendi”, p. 124.


L 1203/28 June 1789) with the title of kapıçibäşi.\textsuperscript{3820} On L 1204/June 1790, he became süvari mukabelecisi.\textsuperscript{3821} Memiş Efendi later became hububat nazir.\textsuperscript{3822} He was appointed as the construction supervisor (“bina emini”) of the Belgrade and Sokol forts (1206/1791-2).\textsuperscript{3823} He became the chief accountant (“muhasebe-i evvel”) in 1221/1806 and second treasurer (“defterdar-ı şikk-i sani”) on Ş 1221/October-November 1806. On 20 Ş 1222/29 April 1807, he was appointed as the kethüda-yi rikab-ı hümâyûn.\textsuperscript{3824} Memiş Efendi was among those whose head was demanded by the rebels and he was executed on 20 Ra 1222/28 May 1807.\textsuperscript{3825}

**Musa Pasha (Köse) (d.1223/1808):** He was the grandson of Arec/Topal Osman Pasha\textsuperscript{3826} and was a notable of Yenişehir-i Fener.\textsuperscript{3827} Musa obtained the title of kapıçibäşi\textsuperscript{3828} and was appointed as the governor of Tripoli and Cerde Bağbuğ with the rank of vizier (1 R 1209/26 October 1794).\textsuperscript{3829} Due to his failure in this duty, he was dismissed, exiled to İstanbul, while his properties were confiscated by the center.\textsuperscript{3830} Upon his request, his place of exile was transferred to Yenişehir-i Fener.\textsuperscript{3831} After being pardoned, he was granted his rank of vizierate again and appointed as the governor of Silistria.\textsuperscript{3832} Musa

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\textsuperscript{3821} Edib, *Tarih*, p. 187.

\textsuperscript{3822} Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi*, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{3823} B.O.A. HAT 35/1791 (10 L 1207/21 May 1793); B.O.A. HAT 174/7541 (undated).

\textsuperscript{3824} B.O.A. HAT 4281 (undated); B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, pp. 11, 17, 34. In the list of appointments dated, 4 L 1221/15 December 1806, he is mentioned as “şikk-i rabi ve hububat defterdarı”. See also Doğan, *Sadaret Kethüdalığı*, p. 37.

\textsuperscript{3825} B.O.A. HAT 1364/53938 (undated).

\textsuperscript{3826} *Hadikatü’l-Vüzera*, pp. 40-2; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. IV, pp. 1303-4.


\textsuperscript{3828} Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi*, p. 114.


\textsuperscript{3830} For the details of the procedures of confiscation see B.O.A. MAD 9748, p. 68 (22 L 1211/20 April 1797), p. 69 (22 L 1212/20 April 1797), p. 80 (1 Za 1211/28 April 1797).

\textsuperscript{3831} B.O.A. C. DH. 14639 (evail-i Za 1211/28 April-7 May 1797).

\textsuperscript{3832} B.O.A.C. DH. 6925 (evas-ı R 1214/12-21 September 1799); B.O.A. C. DH. 1572 (evas-ı Ca 1214/12-21 September 1799); Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asr Vekayi*, p. 114; Vasif, *Tarih*, p. 78.
Pasha became the governor of Salonika and then was sent to Egypt to replace Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha.\textsuperscript{3833} Due to the opposition of the latter, he was ordered to resume the governorship of Salonika.\textsuperscript{3834} Musa Pasha became the governor of Salonika on 19 M 1221/8 April 1806, but it was later changed to Berlofça.\textsuperscript{3835} In 1221/1806 he served as the serasker of Isma'il\textsuperscript{3836}, and then was appointed as the rikab-i hümâyûn kaimmakam (9 M 1222/19 March 1807).\textsuperscript{3837} He resigned from this position on 22 R 1222/29 June 1807.\textsuperscript{3838} Before his second appointment, he stayed at Gelibolu and was reappointed on 2 C 1222/7 August 1807.\textsuperscript{3839} After his second dismissal from the same office (19 L 1222/20 December 1807)\textsuperscript{3840}, he was ordered to reside in İzmir.\textsuperscript{3841} Musa Pasha was executed during the reign of Mahmud II.\textsuperscript{3842} His severed head was exhibited on Orta Kapı on 21 C 1223/14 August 1808.\textsuperscript{3843}


\textsuperscript{3835} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 3. On p. 10 of the same source, the date is given as 12 B 1221/23 September 1806. See also Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Selis Asrı Vekayi, p. 115.

\textsuperscript{3836} Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Selis Asrı Vekayi, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{3837} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 29 (9 M 1222/19 March 1807).

\textsuperscript{3838} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 42; B.O.A. C. DH. 1857 (undated). For a copy of the order see B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 226, p. 3 (28 R 1222/5 July 1807).

\textsuperscript{3839} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 49; Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 41a; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 433.

\textsuperscript{3840} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{3841} B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, order no. 342, p. 116 (evâli-i S 1223/18-26 April 1808); B.O.A. Mühimme Defterleri, no. 227, p. 40 (30 January-8 February 1808); B.O.A. HAT 53687 (undated).

\textsuperscript{3842} According to Bir İmamın günüşüğü, his severed head came on 22 C 1223/15 August 1808 and was exhibited at Bab-ı Hümâyûn. See Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günüşüğü, p. 108. Ruzname gives the date 21 C 1223/14 August 1808, Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 60; Beyhan, Saray Günüşüğü, p. Beyhan, Saray Günüşüğü, p. 240. His decapitated head was exhibited on Orta Kapı on 21 C 1223/14 August 1808. According to Şanizâde his head was brought to the Capital on 2 B 1223/24 August 1808. See Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde vol. I, p. 52. According to Yayla İmami Risalesi, his decapitated head arrived on 13 Ş 1223/4 October 1808. See Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 252.

\textsuperscript{3843} Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 60; Beyhan, Saray Günüşüğü, p. 240.
Mustafa Ağa (Kahveci) (d.1223/1808): He followed a military career, became the ocak başçavuş and then sekbanbaşı (17 R 1222/24 June 1807). According to Şanızâde, he owned a coffeehouse in Çırrır, in Zeyrek. He was dismissed on 16 R 1223/12 May 1808, due to the pressure of the yamaks and the Janissaries. Mustafa Ağa was ordered to reside at his chiftlik in Bursa. Though Mehmed Süreyya argues that he was sent to Bursa with the rank of Pasha, it seems that this promotion was later. Indeed, following the accession of Mahmud II, he was promoted to the rank of mirimiran and appointed as the governor of İzmit. He was executed on 2 Ş 1223/23 September 1808 and the next day, his decapitated head was exhibited in the capital.

Mustafa Ağa (Kazganç, Haci, Laz) (d.1225/1810): He was the Janissary officer presided over the treasury of the 25th regiment (“mütevelli”). He was also engaged in the craft of coppersmith. Mustafa Ağa seems to have served as the lieutenant (“kethüda”) of the Janissary Ağa during the Egyptian campaign. He was banished to Cyprus on 18 B 1222/21 September 1807, was released during the kaimmakam-ship of Tayyar Mahmud Pasha. Mustafa Ağa was appointed as the director of Keban and Ergani mines on 17 Za 1222/16 January 1808. However, upon his request, it was changed to the directorship of the Gümüşhane mines on 3 Z 1222/1 February 1808. Around B 1223/September 1808, he was dismissed from the above position. After learning about his deposition and issue of

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3844 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 42; B.O.A. HAT 1359/53393 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 53483 (undated); Kethüda Said Efendi, Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 20 Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 70. Mustafa Necib, on the other hand, gives the date as 19 R/26 June, Mustafa Necib Efendi, Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi, p. 68.


3848 Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 25a; Oğulukyan, Ruzname, p. 19. The date Oğulukyan provides is 9 September (Gregorian Calender) which corresponds to 21 September in the Julian calendar. According to Asım, he was banished to Kastamonu. Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 129.


3850 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 85 (17 Za 1222/16 January 1808). There is also an entry in Ceride, which notes that he was appointed as the “maden emini” on 17 Za 1223/4 January 1809. See Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günülgü, p.183.


an imperial order for his execution, Kazgancı Mustafa Ağa fled to Trabzon. During the kaimmakam-ship of İznikmidi Halil Pasha (3 Ra 1225/8 April 1810-11 B 1225/12 August 1810), Mustafa Ağa was pardoned and allowed to come to the capital. However, before his arrival, Kazgancı was exiled to İstanköy and died there on 1 N 1225/30 September 1810. According to a foreign newspaper, he was banished twice during the reign of Selim III on the account of his “turbulent spirit”.

Mustafa Ağa (Kabakçi) (d. 1223/1808): He was from the Black Sea region and his father was a certain Hüseyin. In İstanbul, he was employed in the Rumeli Feneri fortress. Mustafa was one of the chiefs of the May 1807 uprising and became Boğaz nazıri on 23 Ra 1221/31 May 1807. He was murdered by Uzun Hacı Ali Ağa on 19 Ca 1223/13 July 1808.

Mustafa Pasha (Alemdar) (b.1765-d. 1223/1808): He was the son of Hacı Hasan Ağa, a Janissary. Mustafa Ağa also enrolled the Janissary army. In Ruscuk, he entered the service of Tirsiniklioğlu İsmail Ağa and became his standard bearer (“bayrakdar”) and treasurer (“Hazinedar”). He obtained the ranks of hassa haseki, silahşör-i hassa (1214/1799) and kapıcıbaşı (1218/1803). Mustafa Ağa became the ayan of Hezargrad, an area under the control of Tirsiniklioğlu. After the death of Tirsiniklioğlu (21 Ca 1221/12 August 1806), Mustafa Ağa replaced him was appointed as the governor of Silistria (1221/1806). On 25 Za 1221/4 February 1807. He became the serasker of the Danube, in

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3855 The Times, Monday, August 03, 1807; pg. 2, issue, 7115; col. F (from The French Papers, Paris, July 24).

3856 İstanbul Şeriyye Sicilleri, Galata Mahkemesi, no. 583, p. 35.

3857 Ruzname (Milli Emlak), p. 52; Beyhan, Saray Günlüğü, p.223; Yayla İmami Risalesi, p. 240; Kethüda Said Efendi, Tarih-i Vaka-ye Selim-i Salis, Bayezid 3367, p .103; Neticetü’l-Vekayi, p. 107 gives the same date but notes that it corresponds to Tuesday. Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüğü, p. 107 notes the dates as Friday, 14 Ca 1223/8 July 1808.

3858 For more details, see Uzunçarşılı, İ.H., "Mustafa Paşa, Bayrakdar (Alemdar, 1765-1808)"; İslam Ansiklopedisi; Uzunçarşılı, İsmail H., Meşhur Rumeli Aylanlarından Tırşılı İsmail, Yılmaz Şüleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa), (Ankara, TTK, 1942); Kalost Arapyan, Ruscuk Ayami Mustafa Paşa’nın Hayatı ve Kahramanlıklar, translated from Armenian by Esat Uras, (Ankara: TTK, 1943); Ali Seydi, Alemdar Mustafa Paşa, (İstanbul: Kanaat Basimevi, 1329/1913).


addition to governorship of Silistria, with the rank of vizier. During the reign of Mustafa IV, he strove for the reinstallation of Selim III and came to Capital with the army for that purpose. On 4 Ç 1223/28 July 1808, he took the imperial seal from Çelebi Mustafa Pasha and became the first grand vizier of Mahmud II. He organized a meeting and invited the local magnates of the Empire, after which the Sened-i Ittifak was signed (8 Ş 1223/29 September 1808). He created a new army under the name of Sekban-ı Cedid. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha was murdered by the Janissaries on 26 N 1223/15 November 1808.

**Mustafa Pasha (Es-seyyid, Mütekâid) (d. 1228/1813):** He was the brother of Kara Vezir Mehmed Pasha (d.1727/28-1799) and the husband of late Şah Sultan (b.1761- d.1802), the daughter of Mustafa III and sister of Selim III. Mustafa Pasha was a graduate confectionary (“helvahane”) in the Palace and later served as the kahvecibaşı of Prince Abdülhamid (I). After the rise of the latter, he became silahşör, kapıcıbaşı, mirahor-ı sani (Ra 1191/May 1777) and kapıcılar kethüdası. On (Ş 1192/September 1778), he was appointed as the governor of Rakka with the rank of vizier. While he was serving as nisancı, he married Şah Sultan. After the marriage, a period his governorships in various cities started: Aydın, Bosnia (L 1193/October-November 1779), Belgrade, Konya, Aydın (1194/1780), Aleppo (M 1197/December 1782), Karesi, and Sivas. He retired in the year 1198/1784. This period of retirement was followed by the governorships of Kars (1198/1784), Adana (1198/1784), Maraş (L 1201/July-August 1787), Konya, Erzurum, and Aleppo. He passed his second period of retirement at Rami Chiftlik, keeping his rank of vizier. According to Mehmed Süreyya, in the year 1222/1807, he became the sadaret kaimmakam, yet it was not possible to find confirming information. He was later exiled to Filibe on 11 C 1223/4 August 1808. He was released and allowed to stay at Rami Chiftlik in Eyüb again. Yet when he arrived at Büyükçekmece, Mustafa Pasha was ordered

3868 We might suspect that the author confuses Mütekâid Mustafa Pasha with Eginli Elhac Mustafa Pasha who became rikâb kaimmakam after the deposition of Tayyar Pasha.
to reside there and finally was pardoned around 23 Za 1223/10 January 1809.\textsuperscript{3870} He died on 13 B 1228/12 July 1813.\textsuperscript{3871}

**Mustafa Pasha (Çelebi) (d. 1226/1811):** He was the son of Ahmed Ağa, a chief of the official representatives of a governor in Istanbul ("başkapı kethüdasi"). After serving as *turnacı*, he became Sekbanbaşı.\textsuperscript{3872} On Z 1220/February-March 1806, he was appointed as Janissary Ağa of Edirne. With the rank of vizier, he became the *muhaфиз* of Seddülbahir (29 Z 1221/9 March 1807).\textsuperscript{3873} Following the dismissal of İbrahim Hilmi Pasha, he was promoted to the grand vizierate on 11 R 1222/18 June 1807. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha took the imperial seal from him on 4 C 1223/28 July 1808.\textsuperscript{3874} He was allowed to keep his rank and was appointed as the *serasker* of İsmail (6 C 1223/30 July 1808).\textsuperscript{3875} On Ra 1224/April-May 1809, the governorship of Kocaeli was also entrusted him.\textsuperscript{3876} On November of the same year, he left the *seraskerlik* of İsmail and he was exiled to Sakız on December 1808. Mustafa Pasha was later appointed as the *muhaфиз* of Sakız.\textsuperscript{3877} He was later banished to Aydın Güzelhisar, where he died on mid Ra 1226/March 1811.

**Mustafa Refik Efendi (d. 1223/1808):** He was the son of a *kethüda* of the sultan’s stables ("hasahur kethüdasi"). Mustafa Efendi entered *mektubî-i sadr-ı ali* section and became *ikinci halife* (1210/1795-96) and then chief scribe (*başlı halife*). He became *mektubî-i sadr-ı ali* (S 1213/July-August 1798) and the *mektubî-i rikâb-ı himayun* (Za 1213/April 1799).\textsuperscript{3878} On Ca 1217/October 1802, he was appointed as the *mektupçu* for a second time. He was promoted to the position of *sadaret kethüda* on 3 B 1222/21 July 1807\textsuperscript{3879} and became *Reisülküttab* on 24

\textsuperscript{3870} Câbî, Câbî Tarihi, vol. I, p. 369.

\textsuperscript{3871} Beydilli, Bir İmamın günülüği, p. 227.

\textsuperscript{3872} Hadikatü’l-Vüzera, Zeyl p. 15; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. IV, p. 1191.


\textsuperscript{3874} T.S.M.A. E. 7030-2 (undated).


\textsuperscript{3877} B.O.A. HAT 627/31015 (undated).

\textsuperscript{3878} Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. IV, p. 1374.

\textsuperscript{3879} B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 9; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. IV, p. 1374.

\textsuperscript{3880} Asım, Tarih-i Asım, vol. II, p. 100. According to Doğan, he was employed as the *sadaret kethüda* in the army from 8 M 1222/28 March 1807- 25 Ca 1222/31 July 1807. See Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdalığı, p. 36.
Ş 1222/27 October 1807. Ş881 His was appointed as ordu kethüdası on 19 S 1223/16 April 1808 and dismissed on 23 Ca 1223/16 July 1808. Ş882 His second appointment as the rikab kethüda was on 23 Ca 1223/16 July 1808. Ş883 He lost his life 27 N 1223/16 November 1808, during the Alemdar Incident. Ş884

Mustafa Reşid Efendi (Celebi, Köse Kahya) (d. 1234 /1819): He was the son of a gedikli zaim. He entered the hacegan class in 1182/1768-9 and later became İstanbul mukataacısı. Ş885 Reşid Efendi was appointed as the secretary to the steward of the Grand Vizier (“kethüda katibi”) and was dismissed in 1186/ 1772-3. He was employed in the same duty for a second time and after the second dismissal, he was exiled to Gelibolu (1196/1785). After release, he was promoted to the same position and later he became the memorandum officer of the finance section (“maliye tezkercisi”) and süratçiler nazırı. In the year 1196/1785, he was appointed as kethüda katibi. Reşid Efendi performed the same duty (2 B 1199/11 May 1785) Ş886 for the fourth time but was dismissed within a week (10 B 1199/20 May 1785). Ş887 He became yeniçeri katibi (1202/1787-88) and then kethüda-ı sadr-ı ali (Ca 1204/January-February 1790). Ş888 He was deposed on 15 N 1204/29 May 1790 and appointed as rikab kethüda (evahir-i R 1204/January 1790). On Ş 1205/April 1791, he was appointed as kethüda-ı sadr-ı ali for the second time. Ş889 After deposition on 26 M 1207/14 September 1792, he became defterdar-ı Cedid. Ş890 In 1215/1800-1, he was first employed as the rikab-ı hümâyun reisülküttab and then the director of Naval Arsenal (L 1217/ February 1803). He was dismissed in 1218/1803-4 and became defterdar on 13 R 1219/22 June 1804, the following year he also assumed the kethüdalık of Hatice Sultan. Ş891 He was dismissed on 13 B 1221/26 September 1806. Ş892 Immediately after the May 1807 Rebellion, Reşid Efendi served as the hububat nazırı for a short time and then was appointed as the director of the Naval Arsenal and then rikab-ı hümâyun reisi (22 R

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Ş881 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 57.
Ş882 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 57.
Ş883 Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdalığı, p. 37.
Ş889 Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî, vol. V, p. 1383; Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdalığı, p. 36. According to Doğan, he was ordu kethüdası.
Ş890 Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdalığı, p. 36.
Ş892 Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüğü, p. 184.
On B 1222/September 1807, he was appointed as nüzül emini for the Akdeniz Boğazı seraskeri, followed by sadaret kethüdalık on 1 L 1223/20 November 1808. After his dismissal, he assumed the duty of the director of logistics ("mühimmat nazır") with the title of Tuna seraskeri (11 Za 1223/29 December 1808). In L 1224/November 1809, he became nişancı and on 20 Ca 1226/12 June 1811 the director of the Mint. Six months later, he was dismissed (21 Ca 1226/13 June 1811). In 1228/1813, he became the supervisor of the Imperial Foundry (Tophane nazırı) and three years later went to pilgrimage. He died on 16 R 1234/12 February 1819.

Ömer Hulusi Efendi (Samanizâde/Summanizâde) (b.1140 /1727-d.1227/1812): He was the son of Hasan Efendi, an ilmiye member with the İstanbul paye. After becoming müderris, Ömer Efendi rose to the İzmir mevleviyet (1190/1776), but was deposed. After a period of rest, he was appointed as the judge of Egypt (1197/1782) and then of Mecca (Za 1199/September 1785). After obtaining the Istanbul rank (1205/1790), he became the kazasker of Anatolia (1209/1794) and then of Rumelia. Ömer Hulusi Efendi became the Şeyhülislam on 18 S 1215/11 July 1800 and remained in the office about three years 4 M 1218/26 April 1803. His second appointment to the same office was on 7 Ca 1222/13 July 1807, but dismissed on the following day. During the reign of Mahmud II, he was appointed to the same position on 22 Ş 1225/22 September 1810. He resigned due to his old age and died on 1 C 1227/12 June 1812.

Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağâ (Paşa) (d. 1222/1807): He was from Sokol (in Belgrade) on the frontier of Bosnia. After moving to İstanbul, he became a Janissary of the 56th regiment.

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3893 Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdalığı, p. 37. B.O.A. HAT 1365/54025 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 1364/53924. For a copy of his dismissal, see B.O.A. HAT 1365/54001 (undated).

3894 B.O.A. HAT 1362/53661 (undated); Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, vol. V, p. 1383. B.O.A. HAT 1362/53661 (undated); B.O.A. 1364/53886 (undated). The entry in B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 66 gives the date as 30 N 1222/20 November 1808 Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüğü, p.184 informs that it was 28 B 1222/11 October 1807. According to Doğan, it was on 29 N 1223/19 November 1808. See Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdalığı, p. 37.


3896 Beydilli, Bir İmamın Günlüğü, p. 143.

3897 Defter-i Dervişan, p. 58. According to the same source he went to pilgrimage on 1231/ and after return from pilgrimage, upon his initiative a physician began to accompany the pilgrims.


He was employed as *ocak bazırgına cümleci*, then *yasakçı of ocak bazırga* (S 1200/4 December-1 January 1785). He was later served as the colonel (“çorbacı”) of the 59th regiment and rose in the positions of *turnacıbaşı, saksoncubaşı, zağarçı* and finally became *kul kethüdası*. Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa was appointed as the Ağa of the Janissaries on 24 Ş 1221/6 November 1806, after the death of Osman Ağa during a fire in the city.\(^{3901}\) He served in the defense of Istanbul during the British Naval Expedition (1806). He was dismissed on 24 Ra 1222/1 June 1807, while he was in army for the Russian campaign.\(^{3902}\) However, thanks to the reaction of the Janissaries he was reappointed. Pehlivan Ağa was murdered by the Janissaries 12 Ca 1222/18 July 1807.\(^{3903}\) He is praised of being a brave and powerful figure.\(^{3904}\)

**Salih Pasha (b. 1175/1762-d. 1240/1824):** He was the son of Safranbolulu Mustafa Ağa and the nephew of İzzet Mehmed Pasha. During the grand vizierate of his uncle, Salih Bey served as his treasurer, and after the dismissal of İzzet Pasha, he was allowed to rest at home. In 1218/1803-4, he was appointed as *mirahor-i sani*.\(^{3905}\) On 10 N 1221/21 November 1806, he became grand admiral\(^{3906}\), however due to his failure in the British Naval Expedition, he was deposed (16 Z 1221/24 February 1807) and exiled to Gelibolu.\(^{3907}\) Salih Pasha was pardoned on B 1224/November 1809 and two years later he became the governor of Kastamonu (Z 1226/January 1812), Bosnia and then Bozok and Kayseri.\(^{3908}\) On R 1232/January-February 1817, he was appointed as the governor of Damascus, but was deposed on R 1236/January 1821. At the end of the same year, he became the governor of Trabzon. He was again dismissed and banished to Tokat (Ra 1237/December 1821).\(^{3909}\)

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\(^{3902}\) B.O.A. *Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculoğu Defterleri*, no. 18, pp. 129-30 (undated).

\(^{3903}\) B.O.A. HAT 1360/53499 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi*, p. 78; Asım, *Tarih-i Asım*, vol. II, p. 102

\(^{3904}\) B.O.A. 53149 (29 R 1222/6 June 1807); Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi*, p. 79.

\(^{3905}\) *Sefine-i Vüzera*, p. 59; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. V, p. 1472


\(^{3907}\) B.O.A. *Sadaret Defterleri*, no. 357, p. 27; *Neticetül-vekayi*, p. 11a; Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrı Vekayi*, p. 18; Câbi, *Câbi Tarihi*, vol. I., p. 103. According *Sefine-i Vüzera*, he was dismissed on 2 Za 1221/11 January 1807. See *Sefine-i Vüzera*, p. 60.

\(^{3908}\) *Sefine-i Vüzera*, p. 60; Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. V, p. 1472

\(^{3909}\) Mehmed Süreyya, *Sicill-i Osmanî*, vol. V, p. 1472
This exile was followed by the governorships of Anadolu and Çıldır. Salih Pasha died in Ahuska on 5 Ca 1240/26 December 1824. 3910

Sébastiani de La Porta, Horace François Bastien de la Porta (b. 11 November 1771- d. 1851) 3911: He was a military officer, diplomat and politician. He joined the French army and became a figure loyal to Napoleon Bonaparte. He came to the Levant with a special mission in 1801 and then in 1802. 3912 His third visit, as the French ambassador to the Porte, was on 28 August 1806. 3913 Sébastiani left İstanbul on 26 April 1808. 3914 After return, Sébastiani served in the Peninsular War and also took part in Napoleon’s invasion of Russia and in the campaign of 1812-13. Sébastiani was elected to the Chamber for the department of Aisne. After the Battle of Waterloo, he voted for Napoleon’s abdication. Starting in 1819, he became a prominent member of the Chamber of the Deputies. In 1833, he was ambassador to the Two Sicilies and in 1835-40, to the United Kingdom. Sébastiani was made Marshal of France in 1840. Two years later he became a Peer of France (1842). He died on 20 July 1851.

Seyyidâ/Seydâ Efendi (d. 1224/1809): Seyyidâ Efendi was the brother of Hayri Efendi 3915, a statesman of the reign of Abdülhamid I who served three times as Reisülküttab (1 Z 1195/18 November 1771-1197/1783; R 1200/February 1786-20 Ş 1200/18 June 1786; S 1203/November 1799-4 M 1204/24 September 1789). Seyyidâ Efendi was a müderris and was employed as vezir müfettişi, miri katibi or the pious endowment inspector (“evkaf müfettişi”). 3916 During the reign of Mustafa IV, was exiled to Tarsus. 3917 After release, he


3914 Saint-Denys notes that he left the city through the end of April after leaving the affairs of the embassy to M. Latour de Maubourg. See Saint-Denys, Révolutions de Constantinople, vol. II, pp. 163. Driault gives the date of his departure as 27 April and notes that he had received the order to return on 17 April. See Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, p. 316. Coquelle, notes that Sebastiani left the city on 27 April and met with several Pasha during his travel. See “Sebastiani: Ambassadeur A Constantinople”, p. 611.


came to the Capital but was later exiled to Limni, where he died on 28 C 1224/10 August 1809.

**Yusuf Ağa (Valide Sultan Kethüdasi) (d.1222/1807)**: He was from Crete and the son of a poor craftsman. He was probably from Hanya, in the same island, since he later built a mosque and fountain there. About seven or eight years old, he was adopted by Süleyman Ağa, a Janissary officer in Crete (“serhad ağası”). Following his master to İstanbul, he was employed by Süleyman Ağa as his hasere. While Süleyman Ağa became the Ağası of the Janissaries he served as his seal-bearer and treasurer. After these posts, Süleyman Ağa was appointed to various posts outside İstanbul and Yusuf Ağa served as his kethüda. During that period, Yusuf Ağa was appointed first to Baghdad and then as the kasabbaşı of Ismail. Returning İstanbul, after six months, he was appointed as director of Imperial powder works at Gelibolu. From that time onwards, he began to climb the ladders of his career very quickly. He became the chief of the palace kitchens (“matbah-ı emini”), then kethüda to Esma Sultan and finally rose to be the director of the Imperial Mint. Yusuf Ağa was appointed as the kethüda to Valide Sultan on 18 S 1205/27 October 1790, upon the death of Mahmud Bey, the former kethüda on 17 S 1205/26 October 1790. In the relevant order, it is declared that he was to continue his post in the

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3921 B.O.A. C. Maarif 1143 (8 § 1211/6 February 1797); B.O.A. C. Maarif 1742 (2 S 1219/13 May 1804).


3926 Mustafa Necib, *Sultan Selim-i Salis Asrî Vekayi*, p. 66. According to the author, he was able to secure the appointment thanks to the contacts he developed with the ruling elite of the period.


Mint. After the death of Valide Sultan, Yusuf Ağâ went to pilgrimage (12 B 1221/25 September 1806). On the way to Istanbul, the May 1807 Rebellion broke out. He was in the list of the rebels, but was exiled to Bursa by an imperial order. Yusuf Ağâ was executed on evail-i R 1222/mid-June 1807 in Bursa.

Yusuf Ziya Pasha (Kör) (d. 1234/1819): He was a Georgian slave of Mirahur Mustafa Pasha. Yusuf Pasha served as Enderun Ağâ of Ispanakçı Mustafa Pasha. He later entered the service of Halil Hamid Pasha and became his sword-bearer (“Silahdar”). After the death of the Pasha, he became the director of the imperial mines (“maden-i hûmayun emini”). He was later promoted to mirimiran and then granted the rank of vizier (1207/1792-3). The following year, Ziya Pasha became the governor of Diyarbakır and then Erzurum (17 Ra 1209/12 October 1794) and Çîldîr (1211/1796-7) was also added to his rule. In the year 1212/1797-8, he was given the governorship of Trabzon, but lost Çîldîr. Yusuf Pasha’s first grand vizierate was on 18 Ra 1213/30 August 1798. He was dismissed on 24 M 1220/24 April 1805. After a period of rest, he was appointed as the governor of Trabzon, then governor of Erzurum and Şîrk serasker (M 1222/March 1807). He became the governor of Baghdad and Basra (18 B 222/21 September 1807), followed by that of Konya (27 L 1222/28 December 1807) and then Aleppo. His second promotion to grand vizierate was on 14 Za 1223/1 January 1809. The second dismissal ended with his exile to Dimetoka. After release, he was appointed as the muhafız of Karheli and Eğriboz (M 1231/December 1815) and then Sakiz (1234/1819). He died there in the same year.

3930 Beydilli, Bir İnâmın Gûnlûgû, p. 183.
3931 B.O.A. HAT C. SM. 4876 (9 Ca 1222/15 July 1807).
3932 B.O.A. Mühiimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 95, order no. 273 (evail-i R 1222/8-17 June 1807).
3937 B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357, p. 87; C. DH 8795 (undated); Hadikatü’l-Vûzera, Zeyl, p. 10.

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APPENDIX 2
List of Appointments and Dismissals of Some Principal Officials\textsuperscript{3940} (1789-1808)

\textbf{Grand Viziers}

Koca Yusuf Pasha (23 Ra 1200/24 January 1786-13 N 1203/7 June 1789)
Cenaze Hasan Pasha (13 N 1203/7 June 1789-15 Ra 1204/3 December 1789)
Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha (15 Ra 1204/3 December 1789-14 B 1204/30 March 1790)

Çelebizade Şerif Hasan Pasha (14 B 1204/30 March 1790-11 C 1205/15 February 1792)

Koca Yusuf Pasha (11 C 1205/15 February 1792-12 N 1206/4 May 1792)
Damad Melek Mehmed Pasha (12 N 1206/4 May 1792-25 Ra 1209/20 October 1794)
İzzet Mehmed Pasha (25 Ra 1209/20 October 1794-18 Ra 1213/30 August 1798)
Yusuf Ziya Pasha (18 Ra 1213/30 August 1798-24 M 1220/24 April 1805)
Hafız İsmail Pasha (24 M 1220/24 April 1805-1 B 1221/14 September 1806)
İbrahim Hilmi Pasha (1 B 1221/14 September 1806-11 R 1222/18 June 1807)
Çelebi Mustafa Pasha (11 R 1222/18 June 1807-4 C 1223/28 July 1808)

\textbf{Şeyhülislams}

Mehmed Kamil Efendi (26 Ca 1202/4 March 1788-27 Za 1203/19 August 1789)
Ebu İshakzade Mehmed Şerif Efendi (27 Za 1203/19 August 1789-27 M 1204/17 October 1789)

Hamidizade Mustafa Efendi (27 M 1204/17 October 1789-9 B 1205/14 March 1791)
Yahya Tevfik Efendi (9 B 1205/14 March 1791-22 B 1205/27 March 1791)
Mekki Mehmed Efendi (22 B 1205/27 March 1791-22 Za 1206/12 July 1792)

Dürrizade Mehmed Arif Efendi (22 Za 1206/12 July 1792-18 Ra 1213/30 August 1798)

Reiszade Mustafa Aşır Efendi (18 Ra 1213/30 August 1798-18 S 1215/11 July 1800)
Samanizade Ömer Hulusi Efendi (18 S 1215/11 July 1800-29 M 1218/21 May 1803)
Salihzade Ahmed Esad Efendi (29 M 1218/21 May 1803-1 B 1221/14 September 1806)
Şerifzade Mehmed Ataullah Efendi (1 B 1221/14 September 1806-7 Ca 1222/13 July 1807)
Samanizade Ömer Hulusi Efendi (7 Ca 1222/13 July 1807-8 Ca 1222/14 July 1807)
Şerifzade Mehmed Ataullah Efendi (8 Ca 1222/14 July 1807-27 Ca 1223/21 July 1808)
Arabzade Mehmed Aşır Efendi (27 Ca 1223/21 July 1808-21 Ca /15 August 1808)

Janissary Ağas

Yahya Pasha (5 Ca 1204/21 January 1790-10 Ş 1204/25 April 1790)
Hasan Pasha (10 Ş 1204/25 April 1790-24 Ca 1205/29 January 1791)
Pekmezci Mehmed Pasha (24 Ca 1205/29 January 1791-16 Za 1205/17 July 1791)
Bektaşi Süleyman Ağá (16 Za 1205/17 July 1791-evail S 1206/30 September-9 October 1791)
Arabzade Ahmed Ağá (evail S 1206/30 September-9 October 1791-5 Za 1206/25 June 1792)

Said Ağá (4 Za 1206/24 June 1792-28 M 1207/15 September 1792)
Tokadlı Mustafa Ağá (28 M 1207/15 September 1792-24 Ca 1212/14 November 1797)
Eyüp Ağá (24 Ca 1212/14 November 1797-21 Ca 1213/31 October 1798)
Ömer Ağá (21 Ca 1213/31 October 1798-3 R 1217/3 August 1802)
Ahmed Ağá (3 R 1217/3 August 1802-19 Ca 1217/17 September 1802)
Halil Ağá (19 Ca 1217/17 September 1802-14 S 1218/5 June 1803)
Tokadlı Mustafa Ağá (14 S 1218/5 June 1803-12 Ca 1219/19 August 1804)
İbrahim Hilmi Ağa (12 Ca 1219/19 August 1804-1 B 1221/14 September 1806)
Osman Ağa (2 B 1221/15 September 1806-24 Ş 1221/6 November 1806)
Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa (24 Ş 1221/6 November 1806-12 Ca 1222/18 July 1807)
Selim Ağa (12 Ca 1222/18 July 1807-26 Ca 1223/20 July 1808)

**Sekbanbaşısı**
Yeğen Mehmed Ağa (8 L 1202/22 July 1788-5 N 1203/31 May 1789)
Çelebi Süleyman Ağa (6 N 1203/1 June 1789-21 Ca 1204/6 February 1790)
Ömer Ağa (B 1204/April 1790-B1205/March1791)
Bıyıklı Elhac Mustafa Ağa (1205/1791-28 L R 1215/30 June 1791)
Mehmed Said Ağa (28 L 1205/20 June 1791-4 Za 1206/24 June 1792)
Hafız Salih Ağa (4 Za 1206/24 June 1792-18 R 1215/8 September 1800)
Buzcezade Mehmed Ağa (18 R 1215/8 September 1800-1 S 1216/13 June 1801)
Halil Ağa (1 S 1216/13 June 1801-19 Ca 1217/17 September 1802)
Osman Ağa (19 Ca 1217/17 September 1802-1 B 1221/14 September 1806)
Arif Ağa (8 Ra 1221/26 May 1806-17 R 1222/24 June 1807)
Kahveci Mustafa Ağa (17 R 1222/24 June 1807-16 Ra 1223/12 May 1808)

**Reisülküttabs**
Mehmed Hayri Efendi (27 S 1203/27 November 1788-3 M 1204/23 September 1789)
Abdullah Birri Efendi (3 M 1204/23 September 1789-19 M 1207/6 September 1792)
Mehmed Raşid Efendi (19 M 1207/6 September 1792-23 M 1209/20 August 1794)
Dürri Mehmed Efendi (23 M 1209/20 August 1794-13 C 1209/5 January 1795)
Firdevsi Mehmed Emin Efendi (13 C 1209/5 January 1795-6 Za 1209/25 May 1795)
Ebu Bekir Ratib Efendi (6 Za 1209/25 May 1795-12 S 1211/17 August 1796)
Mustafa Rasih Efendi (12 S 1211/17 August 1796-25 S 1212/18 August 1797)
Mehmed Raşid Efendi (25 S 1212/18 August 1797-15 N 1212/3 March 1798)
Ahmed Atıf Efendi (17 N 1212/5 March 1798-9 Za 1213/14 April 1799)
Mustafa Rasih Efendi (9 Za 1213/14 April 1799-Ra 1215/August 1800)
Mahmud Raif Efendi (Ra 1215/August 1800-8 Ca 1220/4 August 1805)
Ahmed Vasif Efendi (8 Ca 1220/4 August 1805-19 B 1221/2 October 1806)
Mehmed Galib Efendi (19 B 1221/2 October 1806-19 Ca 1222/25 July 1807)
Arif Mehmed Efendi (19 Ca 1222/25 July 1807-25 Ş 1222/28 October 1807)
Mustafa Refik Efendi (24 Ş 1222/27 October 1807-19 S 1223/16 April 1808)
Mehmed Galib Efendi (19 S 1223/16 April 1808-C 1226/July 1811)

Grand Admirals
Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha (Ca 1188/July 1774-24 B 1203/20 April 1789)
Giridî Hüseyin Pasha (24 B 1203/20 April 1789-16 B 1206/10 March 1792)
Küçük Hüseyin Pasha (17 B 1206/11 March 1792-22 Ş 1218/7 December 1803)
Mehmed Kadri Pasha (27 Ş 1218/12 December 1803-29 Ş 1219/3 December 1804)
Hafız İsmail Pasha (28 Ş 1219/2 December 1804-24 M 1220/24 April 1805)
Hacı Mehmed Pasha (24 M 1220/24 April 1805-10 N 1221/21 November 1806)
Hacı Salih Pasha (10 N 1221/21 November 1806-16 Z 1221/24 February 1807)
Seydi Ali Pasha (16 Z 1221/24 February 1807-1 B 1223/23 August 1808)

Bostancıbaşı
Ferhad Ağa (Ca 1200/March 1786- M 1204/October 1789)
Ebobekir Ağa (1205/1791-1205/1791)
Ahmed Ağa (1206/1791-5 L 1206/5 May 1792)
Osman Ağa (5 L 1206/5 May 1792-?)
Balk Emini Salih Ağa (1 B 1208/2 February 1794-27 L 1209/17 May 1795)
Mustafa Ağa (27 L 1209/17 May 1795-12 S 1212/7 July 1797)
Hacı İbrahim Ağa (12 S 1212/7 July 1797-S 1213/July-August 1798)
Köse Mehmed Ağa (1218/1803-4-1219/1804)
Hafız İsmail Ağa (1219/1804-28 Ş 1219/3 December 1804)
Köse Mehmed Ağa (28 Ş 1219/2 December 1804-3 B 1221/16 September 1806)
Hasan Şakir Bey (3 B 1221/16 September 1806-20 Ra 1222/28 May 1807)
Sarırerli Ali Ağa (20 Ra 1222/28 May 1807-9 C 1223/2 August 1808)
İrad-ı Cedid Defterdars
Mustafa Reşid Efendi (26 M 1207/14 September 1793-8 Za 1213/13 April 1799)
Elhac İbrahim Reşid Efendi (8 Za 1213/13 April 1799-13 Ra 1220/11 June 1805)
Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi (13 Ra 1220/11 June 1805-3 B 1221/16 September 1806)
Ahmed Bey (3 B 1221/16 September 1806-Ra 1222/May 1807)

Kaimmakams of the Grand Viziers
Elhac Mustafa Pasha (-10 Ca 1203/8 March 1789)
Elhac Salih Ağa (10 Ca 1203/8 March 1789-27 Za 1203/19 August 1789)
Silahdar Mustafa Pasha (27 Za 1203/19 August 1789-1206/1792)
İznil Ali Pasha (12 N 1206/5 May 1792-17 L 1206/8 June 1792)
Ebubekir Pasha (10 Z 1213/15 May 1799-10 B 1214/8 December 1799)
Ömer Paşazade Abdullah Pasha (10 B 1214/8 December 1799-2 L 1215/16 February 1801)
Yenişehirli Seyyid Mustafa Pasha (2 L 1215/16 February 1801-R 1217/August 1803)
Musa Pasha (9 M 1222/19 March 1807-22 R 1222/29 June 1807)
Şehsuvarzade Hamdullah Pasha (22 R 1222/29 June 1807-2 C 1222/7 August 1807)
Musa Pasha (2 C 1222/7 August 1807-19 L 1222/20 December 1807)
Mahmud Tayyar Pasha (19 L 1222/20 December 1807-13 M 1223/11 March 1808)
Elhac Eğinli Mustafa Pasha (13 M 1223/11 March 1808-Ca 1223/March 1808)
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<td>R 1221/June 1806</td>
<td>March of the Nizam-i Cedid forces to Rumelia</td>
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<td>Deposition of İbrahim Nesim Efendi</td>
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<td>Kadi Abdurrahman Pasha sieged Çorlu</td>
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<td>Arrival of the French ambassador, Sebastiani, to İstanbul</td>
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<td>Appointment of Ataullah Efendi as the Şeyhülislam</td>
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<td>1 B 1221/14 September 1806</td>
<td>Dismissal of Hafiz İsmail Pasha and appointment of İbrahim Hilmi as the Grand Vizier</td>
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<td>15 October 1806</td>
<td>Reappointment Ipsilanti and Muruzi</td>
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3941 B.O.A. HAT 1561 (17 N 1221/28 November 1806); B.O.A. HAT 3209 (7 C 1221/22 August 1806); B.O.A. HAT 6241.A (21 C 1221/5 September 1806); B.O.A. HAT 139/5743 (1221 C.3/18 August 1806); B.O.A. HAT 107/42124 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807); B.O.A. HAT 7537 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); B.O.A. HAT 1361/53576 (29 Ra 1222/6 June 1807); B.O.A. HAT 1363/53765 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); B.O.A. HAT 1361/53630 (undated); B.O.A. HAT 1360/53499 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807); B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculoğu Defterleri, no. 18; B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5; İstanbul Şeriyye Sicilleri, Galata Mahkemesi; B.O.A. Sadaret Defterleri, no. 357; The Times; From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 6 March 1807 (PRO, FO 78-55, doc. no. 16); From Arbuthnot to Howick, Royal George off the Dardanelles, 6 March 1807, (PRO, FO, 78-55, doc. no. 16); From Arbuthnot to Spencer; Büyükdere, 30 October 1806, (PRO, FO 78-52, doc. no 80); Jorga, Documentele Familiei Callimachi; Neticetü’l-Vekayi; Ebubekir Efendi, Vaka-yı Cedid; Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi, Vaka-yı Selimiyye, Topkapı 1595, p. 7; Derin, “Tüfengçibaşı Arif Efendi Tarihçesi”, p. 389; Şanizâde, Tarih-i Şanizâde, Asım, Tarih-i Asım; Mustafa Necib, Sultan Selim-i Asrî Vekayi; Câbi, Câbi Tarihi; Driault, Selim-i Salis ve Napolyon, Yayla İmami Risalesi, Derin, “Kabakçı Mustafa Ayaklanması...”; Öğüluckyan, Ruzname; Ruzname (Milli Emlak); Prevost, “Constantinople en 1806 et 1807”; Driault, “Correspondance du général Sébastiani”; Doğan, Sadaret Kethüdalığı; Puryear, Napoleon and the Dardanelles; Shupp, The European Powers; Uzunçarşılı, “Kadi Abdurrahman Paşa”.
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<td>The secret departure of the British ambassador</td>
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<td>The British navy forces the Dardanelles</td>
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<td>20 February 1807</td>
<td>The British navy anchored off the Princes’ Islands</td>
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<td>Appointment of Seydi Ali Pasha as the Grand Admiral</td>
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<td>17 S 1222/26 April 1806</td>
<td>The imperial army arrives at Edirne</td>
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<td>16 Ra 1222/24 May 1807</td>
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<td>16 Ra 1222/24 May 1807</td>
<td>The first sparks of unrest among the yamaks</td>
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<td>17 Ra 1222/25 Ra 1807</td>
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<td>Murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi by the yamaks</td>
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<td>Murder of İbrahim Nesim Efendi</td>
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<td>Execution of Memiş, Safi, Ebubekir Efendi, Hasan</td>
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<td>Şakir Bey</td>
<td>Abolition of the Nizam-ı Cedid army</td>
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21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807  Accession of Mustafa IV and dethronement of Selim III

Murder of Mabeynçi Ahmed Efendi, Elhac İbrahim Efendi, Sırkatibi Ahmed Efendi

23 Ra 1221/31 May 1807  Appointment of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa as Boğaz nazır Hüccet-i Şeriyye is signed

24 Ra 1222/1 June 1807  Dismissal and reappointment of Pehlivan Ağa Pasha, the Janissary Ağa

Return of the rebellious yamaks to the forts mid June 1807  Execution of Yusuf Ağa

11 R 1222/18 June 1807  Dismissal of Grand Vizier İbrahim Hilmi Pasha and appointment of Çelebi Mustafa Pasha

15 R 1222/22 June 1807  Abdüllatif Efendi became mirimiran and granted title of Pasha

16 R 1222/23 June 1807  Janissaries demanded the dismissal of Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa

17 R 1222/24 June 1807  Dismissal of Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa and appointment of Kahveci Mustafa Ağa as the new Sekbanbaşı

22 R 1222/29 June 1807  First dismissal of Musa Pasha from the kaimmakamship

24 R 1222/1 July 1807  Arrival of Çelebi Mustafa Pasha at Silistria after becoming the Grand Vizier Execution of Abdüllatif (Efendi) Pasha

7 July 1807  Tilsit Treaty

7 Ca 1222/13 July 1807  First dismissal of Şerifzade Ataullah Efendi and appointment of Samanizade Ömer Hulusi Efendi as the new Şeyhülislam

8 Ca 1807/14 July 1807  Reappointment of Şerifzade Ataullah Efendi as şeyhülislam and the dismissal of Samanizade Ömer Hulusi Efendi

12 Ca 1222/18 July 1807  Murder of Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa, the ağạ of the Janissaries

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Second appointment of Musa Pasha as the kaimmakam

The Ottoman army began to move to Edirne to pass winter

The Ottoman army at Şumnu

The imperial army at Edirne

The Beşiktaş Incident

Banishment of Kazgancı Laz Mustafa Ağa

Return of Tayyar Mahmud Pasha from Crimea

Death of Hafız İsmail Pasha

Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa purchased a residence

Second dismissal of Musa Pasha and appointment of Tayyar Pasha as kaimmakam

Appointment of Kazgancı Laz Mustafa as the director of Keban and Ergani mines

Deposition of reis vekili Halet Efendi

Dismissal of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha from kaimmakam-ship

The Çardak Incident

The dismissal of Sekbanbaşı Kahveci Mustafa Ağa

Alemdar Mustafa Pasha visited the imperial camp at Edirne

Execution of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa

The Grand Vizier was received by Mustafa IV in ceremony at Davudpaşa

Sebastiani arrived Paris

Second dismissal of Şeyhülislam Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi

Second dismissal of Ahmed Şemseddin Efendi, Alizâde Es-Seyyid Mehmed Nureddin Efendi, Mehmed Münib Efendi, and Mehmed Murad Efendi
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 C 1223/28 July 1808</td>
<td>March of Alemdar Mustafa Pasha to İstanbul</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Murder of Selim III, deposition of Mustafa IV</td>
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<td>Accession of Mahmud II</td>
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<td>23 C 1223/16 August 1808</td>
<td>Appointment of Ramiz Efendi as the governor of Silistria</td>
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<td>2 B 1223/24 August 1808</td>
<td>Russo-Ottoman armistice signed at Sloboza</td>
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<td>10 B 1223/1 September 1808</td>
<td>Dismissal of Kazgançı Laz Mustafa Ağa from the directorship of Gümüşhane mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 § 1223/23 September 1808</td>
<td>Execution of Kahveci Mustafa Ağa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 § 1223/3 October 1808</td>
<td>Execution of Mahmud Tayyar Pasha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 N 1223/5 November 1808</td>
<td>The Alemdar Incident</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4
Selected Archival Documents

B.O.A. HAT 7535 (undated, catalogue date is 1220/1805): The revolt of Tayyar Pasha

Benim vezirim,


B.O.A. D. DRB. THR 36/38 (5 C 1221/2 August 1806): A letter by the Grand Vizier İsmail Pasha, concerning the Edirne Incident

Benim saadetli mükerrermetli müruvvetli kârandaşım hazretleri,

meczûm ve me’mûl oldu
gûne içündür diyerek u

B.O.A. HAT 34/1683-A (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806): The Hospodar Crisis
(Taraf-î devlet-i aliyyeden Rusya elçisine verilmek üzere İngilizce elçisinin kaleme aldığı sened sürütedir)

Bundan evvelce Eflak voyvodasî Konstantin Îpsilanti ve Boğdan voyvodasî Aleksandr Muruzî voyvodaların azilleri vuku’nda sâbîk İsmail Paşa keyfiyeti mukaddem Rusya elçisine ihbâr etmeyüb bu vechile bin sekiz iki senesi Eylûl’undede devlet-i aliyyeye ile Rusya devleti beyininde Eflak ve Boğdan’a dâir tanzim olunan sürûta riayet etmedîgine binân devlet-i aliyyeye Rusya devleti tarafîna müteahhid olduğu kâfîfe-i şûrûtun kemâl-i dikkat sahâyeti mâlûz edebilir te’âviyye ve di’âmeyi tayyir olunmamıştir. Bu hâlde zîyad edeceklerini idrâkde ve na’satûnנדârîb yetâri efendisî hakk

Hafız İsmail
B.O.A. HAT 145/6134 (undated, reign of Selim III): France and the Porte

(Kaimmakam Paşa, Fransız askerini biz kabul eylememiz diemedik ki bu kiyi ü kala mahal olsun mahzûrumbuz beyân eyledik. Elçi dahi i’tiraf eyleyüb Bosna’dan cevâb gelsün mahzûru ber-taraf eyleyelim getürdürüz henüz hazırdı. Fransız elçi Ismail Efendi ve Hacı İbrahim Efendi ve Reşid Efendi kulları nezd-i çakériye cebî ve Kethâdâ ve Reis Efendi bendeleri dahi hazırdı. Aralarında cevâbi memâlik-i mahrûsa masûn kalrub fakat cem'î düvele i’lân eyledi imparatoru devlet-i aliyyenin istiklâli hâs birle cem’î ehl-i fransız ile devlet-i aliyyelinden ba’zı kullarının dahi mevcûd olması inhâ etmekden nasıl dönük gün İbrahim Nesim Efendi ve Hacı İbrahim Efendi ve Reşid Efendi kulları nezd-i çakériye cebî ve Kethâdâ ve Reis Efendi bendeleri dahi hazırdı. Aralarında cevâbi memâlik-i mahrûsa masûn kalrub fakat cem’î düvele i’lân eyledi imparatoru devlet-i aliyyenin istiklâli hâs birle cem’î ehl-i

Fransa elçisi Sebastiyan bar’zî ifadât için çakériyle mülâkât istid’a ve mükela-yı devlet-i aliyyelerinden bar’zî kullarının dahi mevcûd olmasını inhâ etmekden nasıl dönük gün Reis Efendi tarafından verilen cevâb gayet mukinda bir maslahata dâirdir ve ben bu maddeyi vesile ederek devlet-i aliyye ve Fransa devleti ve Rusyalunun hallerinden bahsülmek zor olan çakériye kemal-i hüluş ile müzâkere sürû’de edecekâm diyerek feth-i derîçe-i makal-i cevrü’ne bel ir ile hâlî hale zîr-i perde-i hafadâ olmaâ. Bu perdeyi kişad etmeğe muhtâc oldı ki mevâd-i zâmîne aşıkâr olun. Binâen-aleyh devlet-i aliyyeeye zâmîne ve mühim olan maslahatı beyân ederim. Şöyle ki bu def’a Rusya ve Îngilterelûnün devlet-i aliyyeye i’lân-i harb etmeleri eher bir kas’d ve嫁给 mebni olmayub mürçerred saltanat-i derîcê-i makal birle ihbâr-devlet-i aliyyelerinden ba’zı eyleyüb mûcib-i kâbin dahi Moskov vâ Kethâdâ ve Reis Efendi bendeleri dahi hazırdı. Aralarında cevâbi memâlik-i mahrûsa masûn kalrub fakat cem’î düvele i’lân eyledi imparatoru devlet-i aliyyenin istiklâli hâs birle cem’î ehl-i

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- İmparator şimdideye dek devlet-i aliyye istiâne ider me’ülünde iken şeytânlar uyûn-ı başıra perde çekdiler. Yarın gün imparatora oﬁçyal göndericeğim yazacağım tahrîrâda bundan sonra devlet-i aliyyede dostluk kalmadı deyû tahir edeceğim. Eğer bizim âsâkire ihtiyâcımız yokdur deyû mûrûra ruhsat verilmeye işe sade bir zira cebren iâne edelim dîmeýiz dediğine terîfîn Sofya tarafından havâdisim vârdır Surblu Sofya ve Vidîn’e gelmektedir. Ön günê kalmaz ol tarafaları zabt ider ve Rusyalu dahe berûye geçib Edirne’ye doğru gelir. Vükelâ-yî devlet-i aliyye bunu mülâhaza buyursunlar dedikde berû tarafîndan
- cânib-i devlet-i aliyyeden bu bâbda iktâm ve ihtimam derkâr ve itihâd-ı kültûb-i cânibey aşkâr olmaga avn ü inâyet-ı Bârî ile Rusyalu berû tarafîlara gelse ve Surblu maddesi daî-i-mennihî Teâlâ suhûletle biter cevâb ba’del-i-t’â elî-i mersûm
- yazaçûm mektub imparatorun manzûrû olduğu bu maddeden Rusyalu ile rabt-i mûsâlah dna maddinden tekrîr eder ider demekle, berû tarafîndan
- İmparator cenâbînîn tekkedîr edûb itmemesi elî beyn yedindedir nasıl yazar ise imparator cenâbînîn oylece teftîm ider biz imparatorun mukedder olacak cevâb yazar ﬂâ elî beyden me’mûl etmeyiz denilerek tâlîf kalmakda, elî-i mersûm
- madem ki bu maddîn için imparator talimnameâ nâmî gitmişdir bu def’a tebdîl-ı usûl olunmaga berû daha tahrîrîn cevâb isterim denmekle, berû tarafîndan
- asker mûrûru maddesinde elî bey reddy sûreti anîyazyor. Hatt-i hümâyûnda heriflere söz anladakâm dâkkalası tasrîh buyurulmuşdur deyû beynânın kînmakda elî-i mersûm vâkha bunda sûret-i redd yokdur. Lakin işbû hatt-i hümâyûn hülûs u hâkkanîyeti olan şevketli efendimizin karîhalarından sudûr etmiş deyîldir. Devlet-i aliyye ile Fransa devleti beyinin tebrîde çalaslanlar ma’huiâne tertibatâ düşmüşler deyû olan Prusya elîsî maddesînî telmih etmekle, berû tarafîndan
- Prusya elîsînîn adem-i kabûlûyle tardî için hatt-i hümâyûn sudûr etdi ve oyle dümsen âçînên gelên şâhsîn elçilik ile kabûlû câiz olunmagaîdînîn avdeti Prusya terçümânına ifade kîlîndîn denildikde, elî-i mersûm Osmanlu’nun halini acâbî görûyorum ordu kalkacak denîyir yine hareket etmeyîn denîmekle, berû tarafîndan İngîliz donanması ordu-û hümâyûnun hurûcuna mânî’ ve bu def’a sogukdan hayî hayvan zâyî’ olûndan te’hîre sebeb oldu, cevâbî verildikde elî-i mersûm mûkâlemelenin rîkâb-ı hümâyûnlarına arzûn iîräd etmekle, berû tarafîndan
- işbû meçlise me’mûlîn rîkâb-ı hümâyûna arz olunur. Elî beynîn hülûs u safveti meczûm oub geçên sene vákîr’ askerî hali daî cümmeye ma’llâm olan hålâtı olmaga berû hüsûsun rîkâb-ı hümâyûnda haberi çünkaca kadar irsîl edeceğî oﬁçyal evkâtı te’hîr ider ve tebdîrî-lâzîmenin icrâsında kusûr olmumuz cevâbî verildikde, elî-i mersûm mûhû面目ızîyîyet izhârîyala,
- bu meclisde olan vûkelâ devletlere sâdak olduklarinda şûphem yokdur. Şevketli efendimizin Fransalu hakkina hûlûlîma ma’llâmdu. Lakin hârîcî meclisde olanlardarda fêşâd vârdîr kêlemin lêde’l-beyân, berû tarafîndan
- vûkelâmîn cümmîsî devlet-i aliyyenîn sâdak bendesîrîn denîmekle, elî-i mersûm
- ben bunu sadakâtîmden ifadeye cesaret eyedêyim demek ki vekil nasb oluna benim diyecêcîm yokdur dedikden sonra bir şey daha ifade edeyim ki şevketli efendimizin ruhsatî olmakaçça Fransalu’dan bir sûlâsât-ı hudud-i devlet-i aliyyeye ayak basmaz ancak iki sûret vârdîr ki Moskovlu Rumeli’yîn pây-ı endâz olur yahûd Dalmaçya’yıa Surblu mazarrati sirayt ider bu maddedên hükmûniy vûkelâmîa vêlêyîa havâle ederim bu vechîle Rusyalu Rumeli’yıe mûrûr yahûd Surblu mazarrati Dalmaçya’yıa sirayt evlêdîgi takdirde ol vaktî Fransa asâkiri bilâ-ruhsat hudûda girer denîmekle, berû tarafîndan bu eylece teftîm olunamayub asker mûrûru maddesinden redd anlaçalmasun elî bey demin ba’zi şeytânlar ilkay-yi fêsâdûyla askerîn imrâr redd anlaçılıyordu demîşdi. Biz mûretteb ve muallêm ve bu kadar mal sarf etdiğimiz asâkiri istihdâm edemîyoruz askerîn mûrûru ancak dostluk içûn olmaga şayed bir günê halet-i gayr-i merziyye vuku’ bulur ise sonra önû almaz bir şey olur. Merâm redd deîgîldir. Mizâc-ı maslahata tâbîken icrândı idenmekle, elî-i mersûm
- bu husus evvel emrede Bosna’dan isti’lâm olunsa münâsib olur Marmon Cenâralı Bosna tarafına gelinceye dek isti’lâm haberi gelîr bunda imrâr-i vakt yokdur fakat beş on gün te’hir ider denildikde, cevâb olarak elçi-i mersûm isti’lâm olunur ise ifâdêvî vakt olunmasın. E
- Sırblu Vinî’i alur ve Moskovlu Tuna’yî mürûr ider ise açelem bunun içündür dimekte, berû tarafından
- Sırblu’nun Vinî’i alması muhâldir ve Rusyâlu dahî Tuna’yî mürûr ider ise idrîs-i memâlîk-i sâîrînîn kahr u galebesine muktedir ider. Vinî Sırb ile Moskovlu tarafından zahî olunur ise maslahat suübît kесb ider saltanat-i senîyyeye resmen i’lân etmeğe me’mûrum ki eger Fransa askerînîn mürûrûn cêvâb verîlîr ise memâlîk-i mührûsûnîn bir işine ve Fransa askerînîn mâada musâlaha gerek Fransa ceneralî ve sergerdeleri ve gerek efrâd-i askerîden bir güne müdâhele vuku’a gelinceye ve Sırb maddesi hitâm buldûkdan sonra en yakûn târîk ne ise ol tarafından askerînim avdete yemin ederek irozma tahâhûd iderim ve ne vechile sened taleb olunur ise i’tâ iderim dedikden sonra kelâmına fâsilâ vermeyerek bu maddede ân benzer ki bir adama bir tarafdan akçe i’tâsî teknîf ider eger Fransa’nın mukaddema krallığı vaktinde hemgâm-i seferde Fransa devleti bi-taraf olmasa idi …. (two or more words illegible) kesbî imzeye iki Moskovlu tarafîgîrleri Fransalı’nun za’fîna dàiâ Asîtânê’de her ne kadar kizb ü dürüg sohbetler söylerler ise de isga’ olunmasın. Eğer Fransalı’nun za’tî olasî idi bu askeri teknîf etmezi idî. Bükres’de bir mu’temed adamım vardir. Ne kadar hâvâdî olur ise Mikelson ceneralî yazılanları bana tahrîr eylemişdir ve tahrîr idenler Prusya ve İsveç maslahatgûzârîlârdır dedîgîni mütedîkiben ordu-yu hümâyûnîn hareketini suûl edîce
- geçen Pazar ertesi günü hareket edecek idi vuku’ bulan furtuna ve bûruddetden ba’zî hayvanlar doluca ta’bir olunan illet ile vâﬁr hayvan telef olmasın olduğundan te’hir olunmasız ise de mûretteb olan develer erisîdirilmekle bi-mennihi Teâlâ’yı yarmın gün mümkün olmaz ise Cuma ertesi hareket edecekdir cevâbî i’tâ kilindikda elçi-i mürûr
- hülâsâ-yi kelâm olarak vücelâ-yi devlet-i aliyyeye istinâden ba’zî iﬁdâta ibtidîr ideceğim. Sırb maddesi kemâl mertebe mukannâ … (one word illegible) bir maddedir ve hâb u rahât terk iderek her an ve dakika nizâmına say’ olunmasını ricâ iderim deyicek, berû tarafından.
- devlet-i aliyye asâkirı olmadıkça iş bitmez devlet-i aliyyenin me’şürleri dahi iktâm etmek lazım olduğu ma’lûm olan mevâddan olamağla bu husûsa i’tinâ kılnacakdır cevâbi verildikde elçi-i mersûm
- Vidin maslahatı mügâyîr bir madde olmağın Mustafa Paşa ve İbrahim nâzîr ve Pehlivan Ağa Moskov üzerine hücum etsinler ki Rusyalu anlarda ile meşgûl olub Vidin’e gelemze dedikde berü tarafadan
- müşârûn-ileyhûmanın Moskovlu üzerine hücum ıktihâmâları bâbında bâlaları hatt-i hümâyûnlarıyla müveşseh evâmîr-i aliyye ısdârîyla tenbih kılnacağı tebeyyûn olundukda, elçi-i mersûm
- Fransa asâkirinin imrâr maddesinin lâzımedendir zîrâ dümişanlar ayanları tahrîk iderler dimêkê, berü tarafadan
- bu husûsun mektûm tutulacaği ve teshîl-i maslahata elçi beyin say’î hayr-hâhlînîndir ve muktezâ-i safvet bol vechedir denildik de, elçi-i mersûm
- Rum tâifesinden ba’zi müfsidler vardir ki devlet-i aliyye çaresini bulub kimesne ile görüşmemeleri esbâbin istihâs-eyle devlet-i aliyyeye bundan a’lâ maslahat olamaz bunlar bir usûl tutmuşlardır ki iki devlet beyinden bürûdet ilka edûb ol madde olur me râmlarını tervîc iderler. Devlet vékelân-ınz vazîfe-i zimmeti birbirleriyle ittifak ve hata váki’ olur ise afv etmek ve reâyânı sûdet olanlarının te’îlîf ve hâin olanların te’dîb lâzımîndir dimêkê, berü tarafadan
- elçi beyin bu ifâdesi väktâ yolludur ve vékelânın ittifak ile hareketleri sevketlî efendimiz hazretlerinin dahi muktezâ-yi irâde-i seniyyeleridir denilerek elçi-i mersûmün mahzûz olacaği ifâdât-i lâzime bast olunmağla elçi-i mersûm mahzûz olarak
- devlet-i aliyyenin şimdiki halî buhran mesabesinde olur bir harâreti vardir etibbâ-yi cism-i saltanat mesabesinde olan vékelâ-yi saltanat’nî himmetîyle bu harâreti mûndefî’-ı oldukda hersev kinûn-i sûret kèsb ider bu maddenin cèvabına muntarzûm ve tahîrî verîmînesîn iltimâs iderim zîrâ vakit nâzik olmağla ben dahi muâtib olmakdan ihtirâz iderim diyerek ifâdâtına fezleke vermekle biraz dahi sohbet ile meclise hitâm verildi ki iki devlet beyinden ittifak ile elçı-i mersûmün işbu ifâdâtı safveter makrûn ve Sîrb maddesinin istihâs-î esbâb-i râbîtası iki sûrete mevîkî olub biri zikr olunan Fransa askerinin mûrürlarına ruhsat ve dîğerı Bosna valilerinin ve me’şürün-i sâirenin kûlîyetîlî mühimmât ve asâkir ve levâzım-i sâire irsîliyê iktâm olunarak kuvvet-i kahire ıbrâzına ve bu vechede ızhâr-ı kuvvet dahi beher hal akçenin vûcûduna mevîkî olub fıkûd-î nûkûd haleleri ma’lûm olduğundan bu bâbda çâkerleri mutahayyir olduğuma binânâna ne günû emr ü irâde-i şahhâneleri buyrûlûyos ise öylece hareket olunacağı ve asâkir-i mezûrenin mûrürlarına ruhsat takdirindir dahi yine me’şürün-i sâirenin acê ve levâzım i’tâsiyîla bu husûsa kemâl-i iktâm eylemeleri ziyâede ihtimâm muktezâ-yi maslahatdan idûgü muhât ilm-i alilleri buyrûlûdakda emr ü fermân şekvetîlî kerâmêti, mehabêtî kudretlû velinîmetîm pâdişâhîm efendimindir.

**B.O.A. HAT 1454 (undated, reign of Selim III): The British Naval Expedition**

(İngiltere amiralinin takrîri tercîmîndir)

(Benim vezirin sen bilirsin mûnâsîbi. Bizim bir şalope anlardadır. Anlar da an versinler)

(İngilterelûnün esir etdîği sandalda olanlardan geçen gün iki neferi iâde ile gönderdîği kağıdının tercîmesi hâkpây-i hümâyûnlarına arz olunmuşdu. Màadâ on neferi dahi iâde ile işbu kağıdını anlara vermiş olub mehfûmûnda esir olunan beş nefer İngilterelûyî istid’â eder. Lakin mersûmların itâ’sında beyne’l-asâkir kyl ü kal vuku’u hatîrası derîk olduğundan işbu kağıd Yeniçeri Ağası ve Kapudan Paşa kullarına irâe olunarak anlarrın ma’rîfetîyle verîmesi sûreti dahi hatûra gelûr. Bu bâbda ne vechede irâe-i seniyyeleri taalluk eder ise emr ü fermân hazret-i min lehû’l-emrîndir.)
Amiral-i mersum efrâd-ı nâsa isâl-ı kederden ne derecede mûctenib idîğûnû nev-be-nev isâtîle bu bâbda delîl (one word illegible) olarak dûnûk gün üzerine ifkâ’-ı husûmet edenlerden ahz olunanların mecêmû’-nu bu def’a taraf-ı devlet ... (one word illegible) ırsâl için sebillernin tahliyeye karar verdi. Bu misûllü merdâne tavra nazaran mütâreke bayaargası altında ahz ...... (one or more word illegible) nefer İngiltereli hakkına vákî olan tavr-ı mezkûrûn tabtihi husûmet devlet-i aliyyeyi ihtâr etmek çendân lazım olmamak gerek dik. El-hâletü hâzihi amiral-ı mersûm efrâd-ı nâmâsanın mûteallik olan mersûmun hiç olmazsî fîmâ-ba’d tevkîf olunmayab derhal fîrkatâneye red ü teslîm olunanaklarnı istîbâb olmayab ıcrâ-yı adâlet olunanaklara me’mûldür deyû tahrîr eder.

T.S.M.A. E. 5162 (15 C 1221/30 August 1806): France and the Porte

Rîkâb-ı kâmağîb-ı hazret-i cihânî yetis Fransa Büyük Elcisi Sеbastiyani bi’z-zât takdim eyleydi takrîr tercûmesidir.


B.O.A. HAT 7532 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806): The İrâd-ı Cedid
Benim vezirim,

PRO (FO 78-52, doc. no 75): The Hospodar’s Crisis and debates for the declaration of against Russia
Büyükdere, 30th October 1806
The Right Honourable Earl Spencer
My Lord,
When I wrote the dispatches which were sent by Sir Harford Jones, I had not time to relate what had come to my knowledge of the discussions in the Council. It is necessary that this should be made known to your lordship, as it will throu considerable light on the past and present measures of this government. Perhaps your Lordship may recollect that some time since I lamented the determination which had been taken by the leading members of the late ministry to reserve themselves the whole management of foreing affairs. I knew that this was peculiarly detrimental to our interets, as it furnished the means to İbrahim Efendi, the then Chiaya Bey, of causing the adoption of such measures as directly tended to alienate the Sultan from his allies. When therefore it was to be decided whether or no İbrahim Efendi’s system should prevail, it was necessarily our object that those who are not blindliy devoted to France should have the opportunity of delivering their sentiments, and your Lordship has seen that this was brought by M. Pole with not small difficulty and with not less address.
Hâgi İbrahim Efendi and Çelebi Efendi (tho’ from different motives) were the two persons on whom we most depended. The former had before the late change, been been
minister at War; the latter had been Grand Treasurer. Altho’ they had been deprived of their places, they had incurred no disgrace; and as they were still members of the Council which is assembled on extraordinary occasions we were certain that their opinions preserved in writing as we knew they would be, could not fail to have great weight with the Grand Signior.

Hagi İbrahim was the first who spoke.

He began by laying claim to the merit of impartiality and recalled the recollection of other members that he had never been the advocate either of the English, of the French or of the Russians; - that his object had always been to advise that connection which seemed to him to promise best for the welfare of His Sovereign; and that perfectly aware as he was that every word he uttered would be immediately related to the French ambassador, he should nevertheless point out the conduct which in the present Crisis he thought best to be pursued. Here the ex-Chiaya Bey desired to be informed, who the person was whom Hagi İbrahim suspected of holding a secret intercourse with the French embassy. As you seem to take the allusion to yourself, replied the other, you probably feel conscious of deserving it, and let me therefore warn you to beware of the heavy responsibility you are incurring. You have assumed yourself the entire direction of affairs, and you alone will be hereafter answerable for all the evil consequences.

When this personal discussion had ended, Hagi İbrahim proceeded to recommend the measures which appeared to him advisable.

The neutrality of the Porte, he said, was the object which he chiefly had in view, and this he imagined to be attainable, provided the affairs of Government were prudently conducted. But should the Grand Signior be so circumstanced as to have no option left, and were it indispensably necessary to declare either for the one side or the other, it was evident to his mind that an adherence to the present alliances be far the safest system. France by the acquisition of some territory on the confines of this Empire, could it was true, become a troublesome neighbour; let it was be recollected that Her point of attack was narrow, that her troops would be opposed by the most warlike of all the Sultan’s subjects, and that the country thro’ which they would have to march was so mountainous and so full of difficult passes that of itself. It was nearly a sufficient barries. Russia on the contrary from the great extent of her adjoining frontier could send her armies in all directions, and so Moldavia and Walachia were flat open countries inhabited by a comparatively timid race of men, the Russians would to the Danube at least have nothing but an easy march, unattended either with difficulty or danger. But should it be supposed, as he continued to say, that his representation had been a false one; and should it be argued against him that by an alliance with France; an adequate defence would be obtained for the whole interior of the Empire, it could not be imagined be the opinion of any one that their own means or thoughts of their new allies could save them from the attacks England. Her fleets, he said, would easily gain access to all the maritime parts of the Empire; and so impossible was it to take precautions against this species of danger, that were all the armies of France to be assembled for the protection of the Capital, their habitations might easily be bombarded and their ships and arsenals would with equal facility be destroyed. He therefore could not let advise that whatever might be the consequences in respect to France, the first and chief care should be to remain at peace with the allies and as it appeared that to obtain this end the reestablishment of the hospodars was absolutely necessary, he should have no scruple in proposing that measure to his love sovereign.

Çelebi Efendi immediately followed on the same side of the question. As he is a man of more warmth temper, he spoke with still greater animation in support of the measures which Hagi İbrahim had proposed; and his opinion had the greater weight from its being generally known that he was prepossessed in favour of France. Indeed, he did not scruple to say that his advice might have been different if the Empire had been in a state of
preparation to support a war, or if the French had means in readiness to assist them. But as this was not the case in either instance, he felt it would be the wildest absurdity not to make any sacrifices rather than undertake a war, which they could not carry on alone, and for which the succours to be expected from their allies would for a length of time be wholly inadequate and insufficient.

The Ex-Chiya Bey supported his cause with much ability and with equal vigour. He could not however, prevent its being inserted in the minutes that the majority of the Council had voted for concession to Russians; and as we were almost immediately made acquainted with this important circumstance, we naturally were inclined to hope that our ultimate success was nearly certain.

In Ibrahim Efendi, however, we had an enemy who was not to be disheartened by this single failure. He lost no time in communicating with the French ambassador, and having been assured by him that there was no truth in the report of the northern coalition, he went to the next day Council, which was held in the Grand Signor’s Presence, with the fresh and more powerful arguments that he had been able to employ on the first occasion. And it must be confessed that, by the influences he has obtained over his Sovereign’s mind, he was not only enabled to resist the persons who had opposed him on the former day, but even to the mufti himself who had taken the part which we desired and without a fetva from whom no war can be commenced, he made so strong an opposition that during the whole day it remained doubtful on which side the decision would be given.

At length the Grand Signior interrupted the debates by signifying His Will that the deposed hospodars should be reinstated; for, said His Highness, if I am able to have a war, I would rather it in Bosnia than at the Point of my Seraglio. With this the whole discussion ended, and if I am to judge from what I hear, never Sovereign adopted a resolution more congenial to the feelings of his people.

I have had two principal motives for going so much at length into the proceedings of the Council. I have in the first instance wish to prove that we can have no right to consider ourselves as secure from future attacks whilst Ibrahim Efendi continues to enjoy the Sultan’s favour; and that a due regard to our own interests must urge us therefore to use all possible means for the destruction of his influence. But this is a subject which requires to be more fully discussed, and on that account I mean to reserve it for a separate dispatch.

For the present it is more necessary that I should state the other to which to me is of still greater importance than even the disgrace of Ibrahim Efendi.

In relating Hagi Ibrahim’s discourse it has above all things been my earnest desire, if without impropriety I can express myself, to bring it home to the feelings of His Majesty’s Government that as long as our naval preponderance shall continue, it will not be in the power of France to destroy our influence in this country. The Sultan must have been more or less aware that in part I was acting without instructions; and yet even my word has been sufficient to make Him dread, lest His Majesty’s ships should appear in the sight of the Seraglio and had there been no such dread, it must I should think be clear to every ... (one word illegible) that the demands of Russia would never have been consented to. But if I, thus circumstanced, had the means of procuring a decision in our favour, I would of course be infinitely easier to produce a similar effect when I had the power of proving that the language I held was authorized by my government.

I must therefore earnestly submit it to your Lordship’s serious consideration, whether it is not still of most urgent necessity that some of majesty’s ships should be sent at least as far as the Archipelago. I my private individual capacity it might be of little consequence whether what I may have to say should commandly attention, let it in the present varying scene of European politics, it is impossible to foresee what new difficulties may arrive, and I should be deceiving your Lordship as well as myself, if expressed a hope that my bare
word, unsupported by real facts, could again a second time overcome the efforts of the French ambassador and of his adherents.

Should howevr His Majesty and his ministers fortunately for me approve the conduct I have held, and should they choose to employ the powerful weapon which I have presumend to handle, I could then have no scruple in declaring that let whatever happen our voice in the Turkish Council must ever preserve its weight, and even supposing such a calamity to arise as the compleat discomfiture of the new coalition, my opinion then would be that the British fleets could still produce the effect, which at the very name of them was seen to exist on this late occasion.

I have the honour to he with greatest respects,
My Lord
Your Lordship’s most obedient humblest Ch. Arbuthnut

PRO (FO, 78-52, doc. no 77): Arbuthunt, Sebastani and the Ottoman Ministers

Büyükdere, 30th October 1806

The Right Honourable Earl Spencer
My Lord,

According to what I intimidated in a former dispatch, I have reserved for a separate one the whole account of the measures which the conduct of the Ex-Chiya Bey has forced us to pursue, and these shall be now related.

After all that I have written, and all that your Lordship, at least thro’ me has seen, I suppose I may take it for granted that there can be no doubt as to the propriety of endeavouring to remover a person who once already had nearly succeeded in detaching the Sultan from His allies; and whose failure would be of itself sufficient to make him more eager in the cause which he unfortunately has espoused. I have only to prove that I have not committed the fault of precipitation which I attributed to General Sebastani and that my interference has not been offensive to the Sovereign whose advise I objected to.

As connected with subject now before me, I must first take notice of Gaalib the new Reis Efendi of whom as yet I have said but little. There was much to be related respecting him but it could be mentioned with more propriety, whom I was occupied in writing to your Lordship on the subject of his great rival the Ex-Chiya Bey. Gaalib is distinguished among the Turks by his experience in business and by his natural abilities. When at Paris he offended General Sebastani by declining to speak with him concerning the Treaty which was then negotiating, altho’ the General had announced himself as coming with a message from Bonaparte. Here in this country he also became obnoxious to the Ex-Chiya Bey, because he was not of a temper to yield obsequiously to his will, and because his talents were of too high to a cast to be easily controlled.

There were motives sufficient to prevent his being admitted into ... (one word illegible) and Ibrahim the Ex-Chiya, who had always intendeed that he himself should succeed to Vassiff Efendi, and who had quitted his own situarion in government merely for the sake of withdrawing himself for the moment from the rage of the Janissaries, had still an additional reason not to allow that the choice of a minister for foreign affairs should fall on one whom it might afterwards be difficult to remove. Relying with confidence on the extent of this own influence, he had no difficulty in assuring General Sebastani that Gaalib Efendi, who was known to be a candidate for Vassif’s department would fail in his endeavours to become a member of the ministry.

Gaalib was not ignorant of the intrigues directed against him. He had friends in the Seraglio who were in the habit of familiarly approaching the Sultan; and he planned his measures so wisely and with such caution, that those who protected him had little difficulty in getting him named to the situation which he had wished to obtain; and which in consequence of Vassif’s incapacity and ill state of health it had become necessary to render
vacant. His nomination was so sudden and so unexpected, that the French Ambassador could not but imagine that he had been grossly deceived by the Ex-Chiaya; and tho' he was soon convinced of his error, he did refrain in the first moment of his wrath from charging him with a breach of faith. And he did more than this: He had unaccountable folly and imprudence to make Gaalib the confident of his anger against İbrahim; and with a view I suppose to place the new minister in his interests, he related to him with and ill-timed affection of openness all the steps which he himself had taken to prevent his appointment; and above all he did not fail to let it be sufficiently evident that the Ex-Chiaya had been his violent opposer.

Had I not been made acquainted with these particulars by a person to whom the Reis Efendi related them I should have hardly thought it possible that the French Ambassador could have acted so absurdly. He is, I am told, an incessant talker, and on this account is liable to speak imprudently; and as the being in eternal motion seems to be his idea of activity in business it was to be expected that among the innumerable variety of his measures some at least would be unwise and false. The knowledge of what I have been mentioning to your Lordship authorised M. d'Italisnsky and me to expect assistance from Gaalib Efendi in our late difficulties.

It was to be hoped and believed that he would not be an advocate for a French system; and at all events it was quite certain that his own personal system would be oppose the one which happened to b favoured by the Ex-Chiaya: for should his opposition be attended with success it would be the best (?) method of destroying his rival’s influence. In effect the Reis Efendi conducted himself at the Council entirely to our satisfaction. He did not speak with such vehemence as some others, for he seems to be of a wary and cautious temper; and as he is new in office he might imagine his sentiments could no be delivered with the same authority as at a later period of his ministry. However, he spoke and voted in favour of a compliance with the demands of Russia and he thereby rendered to us all the service we could possibly desire. It was naturally my object to cultivate the good dispositions which on so interesting an occasion Gaalib had evinced; and the opportunity of doing it was immediately furnished by the very distinguished, and for a Turk most unusual attentions which he had shown to M. Ple. He had desired that M. Pole would see him frequently; and he had particularly expressed wish to employ him as the channel of any confidential communications which he might have to make to me. To lose not time in meeting the advances of the Reis Efendi, I wrote to him a short letter of compliments and thanks the very moment that Prince Mousoury had been reinstalled and having in that letter expressed my intention of seizing the earliest opportunity to explain my sentiments more at length, I had no sooner given my last dispatches to Sir Harford Jones than I sat down to perform my promise. The letter which I wrote to Gaalib Efendi I have herewith the honour to inclose. Your Lordship will perceive that I availed myself of this occasion to make known my opinion of the Ex-Chiaya Bey and to express my fears that his still prevailing influence would again be injurious to our interests. I had no reason to apprehend that to the Reis Efendi himself such language would be ungrateful; let was what I wrote was also intended for the information of the Sultan, I endeavoured to guard sufficiently against such expressions as might be displeasing to His Highness. Having given the letter to M. Pole, I directed him to wait upon Reis Efendi and to remain with him whilst he was reading it- as one of my chief objects necessarily was not to injure our affairs by overhurrying them, I told him to observe carefully the effect produced by the letter; and if he perceived it to be unfavourable, I authorised him to propose to the Reis Efendi that what I had written should be considered as exclusively confidential between him and me. These were precautions which were found to be unnecessary. In reading the letter, the Reis Efendi gave frequent symptoms of approbation, and when he had ended it he expressed still more strongly the pleasure which it gave him to receive it. He said to M. Pole: “Tell your Ambassador that I
am one of the few persons who have access at all times to the Sultan, and I myself will deliver the letter into His Highness own hands to-morrow morning” He then spoke on the subject of Ex-Chiaya. He owned that he was French in his principles, but he declared that now he could no harm; and tho’ he did not conceal his own declaration to remove him, he seemed to think that it was not yet time. To avoid repetition I shall pass over the remainder of the conversation for in consequence of his desiring M. Pole to call again on the ensuing evening, when in many respects he held the same language, I shall have an opportunity of making your Lordship fully acquainted with all that fell from him. When M. Pole according to agreement made his second visit he found that the letter had been taken to the Seraglio, and that it had been most particularly well received. The Sultan directed the Reis Efendi to inform me that he had been highly pleased with the assurances of friendship which I had expressed in my Sovereign’s name; and that I need have no apprehension of an improper use being made of the confidential intelligence which I might be inclined to communicate as it should be reserved entirely for His own information, and for that of the minister thro’ whom I sent it: and then, alluding to what I had written respecting the Ex-Chiaya Bey His Highness declared that no insinuations could induce Him to depart from that system which bound him to the allies; - that no persons should ever be consulted either on that or any other public subject except the avowed ministers of the Porte; and that no one would ever venture to abuse his favour by giving counsels which he must know before hand would be ill received. The Reis Efendi then in his own name assured M. Pole that neither İbrahim Efendi nor Hantzerly, the Dragoman of the Porte, (whom I had also mentioned) were any longer capable of doing harm. The former, he owned, would under some circumstances be a powerful enemy as he was decidedly in the French interests. He was not however the only one of that way of thinking, as these was Celebi Efendi and also others who had imbribed the same principles. But none of them had the means at present of injuring us; for they knew well that the determination of the master had been taken, and when that was the case those whose duty it was to obey could no other than follow the track which had been prescribed. With the respect to Hantzerly the Reis Efendi considered our fears as entirely groundless. He did not mean to exculpate that Dragoman, but he assured M. Pole that he was no longer in the least consulted; and to give an idea of his present insignificancy at the Porte, he said that according to the proverb the horse must go as the rider directed. But notwithstanding the Reis Efendi’s endeavours to make us believe that the influence of those who are opposed to us could not prove pernicious, he entered eagerly into the idea of carrying on a secret correspondence, and he desired M. Pole to leave his address in writing that he might always know how to send for him. His reception of M. Pole was as usual most extremely cordial – the giving political intelligence to the Turkish government in rendering the most acceptable of all favours, and to let the Reis Efendi have an earnest of what he was likely to receive, I sent to him some extracts of M. Adair’s letters and I put him upon his guard against a M. Doulcet-de-Pontécoulant, who as I had learnt is coming to this place from Paris, and for no good purposes is afterwards to visit Egypt. I could not have touched upon a subject to which the attention of the government would have been more alive.

I do not know whether your Lordship will agree with me that the steps we have taken has already been attended with good effects. Those who are on the spot cannot be but be aware that much detriment arises to foreign ministers from having channels of communication confined to the Dragomans. In my instance it would be on the present occasion have been singularly distressing to have been thus circumstanced. Hantzerly happens to be the old and intimate friend of my Dragoman; and we have proofs without nd that that artful intriguing Greek acts entirely according to the impulse given to him by the French embassy. Indeed he must necessarily harbour enmity against Russia, for he is but lately returned from an exile, into which he had been sent at the instigation of the Russian
minister. But the advantage here alluded to is not the only one. We have ascertained, by the readiness and even pleasure with he Reis Efendi undertook to lay the letter before the Sultan, that he has influence with His Highness and that he is not wanting in courage to exert it. He never attempted to disguise his wish to get of Ibrahim; let he continually said that the time was not yet arrived, and that in the meanwhile we had nothing whatever to apprehend. As it wobe my desire to spare your Lordship the necessity of reading more than what is absolutely necessary for your information, there are details entered into, which I should have passed over, if the importance which the state of affairs in Europe has given the post I hold had not inclined me to imagine that nothing could be deemed superfluous, which would assist in giving an insight into the interior of this government. From what I have written on this as well as on former occasions your Lordship may have collected that the Sultan is personally well-disposed, and that his new Reis Efendi will inclined to cherish and improve that disposition. But unfortunately His Highness, not seemingly to have much reliance on his own judgement, has always permitted those who approach him most to exercise over Him an undue influence.

As long as the Sultaness Mother lived, it was Yussuff Ağa Her Chiaya (i.e. the chief manager of Her Estates) who governed the Empire; and tho’ from national prejudice an anti-Russian, he was from enlightened views of policy a warm supporter of the Triple alliance. After the death of the mother it was to one of his sisters that the Sultan gave his confidence and İbrahim Efendi was Her Chiaya, he immediately obtained the influence which Yussuff had till then exclusively possessed: and swayed either by interests a pecuniary nature, or carried away by the false ambition of establishing a new system which should appear to be his own, he scarcely began to exercise his power we had reason to perceive that it was wholly directed against our own interests.

As yet we cannot judge whether we shall possess the means of wresting from İbrahim the overgrown authority which he converted to our injury. Should we succeed, the Porte would then, according to the expression one who knows it well, entirley belong to us; but whatever should be the result of the efforts we are making, we have had proof that the fear of our enmity can always be usefully employed. So great were the services whih His Majesty had rendered to this government, that we might have hoped to establish our influence on the sure grounds of gratitude and affection. But it would argue a great ignorance of the persons wit whom we have to deal, were we disposed to flatter ourselves that such ties would be lasting. Your voice must be dreaded or it will not be heard; and tho’ being favoured by circumstances, I had fortunately the means of proving that I was animated by an earnset desire to serve the Porte, yet politically speaking it has been of more consequence to produce conviction that we could never be ill-treated with impunity of this, and to the fullest extent, the Porte is now convinced. We cannot answer for the future events, and it would be never be ill-treated with impunity. Of this, and to the fullest extent, the Porte is now convinced. We cannot answer for futute events, and it would be presumptuous to have an over confidence in our own prudence, but should not the French armies be able to ravage and lay waste the whole of Europe, and should M. D’Italinsky and I avoid mismanagement in the conduct of our affairs, it would not I think be too much to assure your Lordship that the French influence shall not speedily recover from the blow which we have had the means of striking against it.

I have the honour to he with greatest respects My Lord
Your Lordship
Much obedient your (?) humble servant
Ch. Arbuthnut

B.O.A. HAT 159/6636 (19 February 1807): British Naval Expedition
Şubat’ın on dokuzuncu tarihinele Çalış Kalesi’nde olan Fransa konsolosu tarafından elçisine gelen kağıdın tercimesidir.

(Françe elçisi tarafından aynı takdim olunamıga tercüme etdirilüb ma’lüm-i mülükâneri buyurmak için hâkây- hümâyûnlara arz olundu).

Marmara Denizi’nden on üç kit’a düşman gemileri görüündüğü Şubat’ın on sekizinci günü öyleden iki saat sonra Gelibolu’dakı imamın biri camiinden keşf edüb işaretle tarafımiza ibhâr olundu. Üç saat sonra donanma-i mezîr Labseki ile Naara Burnu beyininde lenger-endâz olmuşla asâkir-i İslâm derhal makam-i mukâvemete şîtab edüb Paşa dahi gice sabaha kadar askeri teşci’c’i için gezmişdir. Bugünkü saat birde iken ibtidâ Naara Burnu tabyasına ve sonra Marmara’yı görmeye bir dağ tepesine vardım. İngilterelünün amiral sefinesi nisan gösterdiğiñi demir kaldırmak sadeinde olduğunu vesâir gemiler dahi derhal demîr kaldırmaga başladıklarını dürbin ile görduğümde iki nefer pîyâde ve Kum Kal’asına iki nefer süvâri irsâliyle keyfiyeti ihbâr eyledim. Fi’l-vâkî sefâin-i merkume kalkub tamam saât mülûkâneleri buyurulmak içün hâkây- hümâyûnlar arz olunmas.).

Hala top iken nerede iki saât sonra Gelibolu’da imamın biri süvâri irsâliyle keyfiyeti ihbâr olundu. Üç saât sonra donanma-i mezîr Labseki ile Naara Burnu beyininde lenger-endâz olmuşla asâkir-i İslâm derhal makam-i mukâvemete şîtab edüb Paşa dahi gice sabaha kadar askeri teşci’c’i için gezmişdir. Bugünkü saat birde iken ibtidâ Naara Burnu tabyasına ve sonra Marmara’yı görüb bir dağ tepesine vardım. İngilterelünün amiral sefinesi nisan gösterdiğiñi demir kaldırmak sadeinde olduğunu vesâir gemiler dahi derhal demîr kaldırmaga başladıklarını dürbin ile görögümde iki nefer pîyâde ve Kum Kal’asına iki nefer süvâri irsâliyle keyfiyeti ihbâr eyledim. Fi’l-vâkî sefâin-i merkume kalkub tamam saât mülûkâneleri buyurulmak içün hâkây- hümâyûnlar arz olunmas.)

B.O.A. HAT 169/7178 (undated, catalogue date is 1221/1806-7): The British Naval Expedition and Sebastani

Saadettüllâ Reisülküttab Efendi hazretlerince Fransa elçisinin tezkeresi tercümesidir.

(Benim vezirimin bu elçî hekimânê ve insâfâne telyîn ve ilzâm hev sa ba’ya’da imamın biri camiinden keşfî edüb işaretle tarafımiza ibhâr edüb Paşa dahi gice sabaha kadar askeri teşci’c’i için gezmişdir. Bugünkü saat birde iken ibtidâ Naara Burnu tabyasına ve sonra Marmara’yı görmeye bir dağ tepesine vardım. İngilterelünün amiral sefinesi nisan gösterdiğiñi demir kaldırmak sadeinde olduğunu vesâir gemiler dahi derhal demîr kaldırmaga başladıklarını dürbin ile görögümde iki nefer pîyâde ve Kum Kal’asına iki nefer süvâri irsâliyle keyfiyeti ihbâr eyledim. Fi’l-vâkî sefâin-i merkume kalkub tamam saât mülûkâneleri buyurulmak içün hâkây- hümâyûnlar arz olunmas.)

B.O.A. HAT 3701 (updated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): Rumours on the eve of the Rebellion (the document is damaged and some parts illegible)

Vâkıa bu def’a Yeniçeri oçağından bir kimesne ta’yaın olunmadı. Muceb-i havâdisıdır. Tekfur Dağ múhâfázasına münâsib ocağından zabitân gitsün yahud Istranca taraflarına biri me’mûr olsa asker icketiz etmez. Şöyle bir münâsebetli zêmân ile anlara dahi bir me’müriyet bulunsun)

Şevketli, kerâmetli, mehâbetli, kudretli velinimetim efendim pâdişâhîm,
İhtilâf’i emzîcî-i nâs takriÎbîyle elînî-i avâmda ba’zen havâdîs ve erâcîfîn tefsîvüh ü deveren sâmîa-i res olûkça mense ve mûbâdîsî tâhîkîlî ve mütecäsir olanlarîn def’-î fesâd için cânha ve halîne tatbîkten te’dîb ve ımsâllerîn mücîb-i ibret ü terîhît kılmâmak öteden berü kavâd-i mержûbe-i saltanat-i seniyeyeden iken bir mûddetten berü süfêhâ-yî nâsîndan bu makül bi-educbânî tefsîvühânî mûhâbêtî edenlerin müemêt-lî te’debiyyedeyen âvrestî olduğuna binaen esvâk ü bazarda ve konaklarda durül dürlü erâcîf söylenmekde olduğu ve hatta yenîcîleri esâmelerini ref’ ile piyâde tufêngçî neferâtı tâhrîr edeceklerî miş ve Davudpaşa’ya hîrâc olunan ordunun tahrikînden devletin bunlara dâir irâde-i maysûsasî var imiş ve Osman Paşa’inn ref’-î vezâreti musanana’ olub ....(one or two words illegible) edecekler imiş devey birbirine mûnâkîz havâdîs tefsîvüh olunmâkda idîâgu mêmîz’-i çâkerânem olukda devlete dair .... (two or more words illegible) ahalisi için gerek taraf-î benedegânemden ve gerek Sekbanbaşi kulları tarafindan bilinemeyecek tavr ve he’yet ........ (two or more words illegible) sâîr ba’zî mahallerde çend aeded kahvelhaneler sâîd ü temhîr olunmâgla esvâk u bazarda ........... ........ (three or more words illegible) mûnâkît’i olmuş ise de konaklardan ne mahallerde erâcîf söylendiği tecessüs olundukda kapucubaşılardan ......(one or more words illegible) sâîb Esad Ağa ve Nablusi Topal Şeyh Ahmed ve Yeniçeri Ağaşı esîb Mustafa Ağa’nın ağâlûnda kethûdâsi iken ol vakit nefy olunan Eginî Haci Bekir nâm kimesner vazifelerinden hâric mecâlîs ve mehâfîlî havâdîs söylemekde olûkla tahrik olundugundan başka mezkûr Esad Ağa ve Şeyh Ahmed rast geldikleri yerlerde Hakki Paşa’yı gerçî müsâdare ve nefy ettîler lakin mahûdiyyetdird karîben sadarete gelir âleme nizâm verir diyerê mazlûmîyeti sûretini beyan ma’razinda ahe erâcîf dahi nakl eyledikleri tahrik olunmâgla mezûbir Haci Bekir bugün zâbîti ma’rifetiye Rodos Kalesine nefy için mâhsûs emr-i ali isdâr ve serien menfâsina tesyîrî için Sekbanbaşi Ağa’ya i’tâ olundugundan mâyâdâ merkum Esad Ağa’nın İstant Köcezîresine ve Şeyh Ahmed’in dahi Limmi cezîresi’ne nefy ve icláları için başka başka emîrler tâhrîr ve bugün ahşam ertesi tahrik tesyîr olunmâlari için Çavuşbaşi Ağa kullarına i’tâ olundu ve bunland böyle diyahîr ve ihtîmâmda mûzîr olunmayaçağı ma’lûm’-i alîlîrî buyurulduka emr ü fermân şevketli, kerâmetli, mehâbetli, kudretli velinimetim efendim pâdişâhîm hazretlerinindir.

B.O.A. C. AS. 37874 (1 M 1222/11 March 1807): Nizâm-i Cedid soldiers at the Fortresses

İråd-ı Cedid defterdânı izzetli efendi,
Rumeli tarafında Kavak Kal’ası ve Telli Tabya ve Kireç Burnu nâm mahalde mûcûddedên inşa olunan tabyaya ve Anadolu tarafında Kavak ve Yusa Kala’lарına Anadolu Kavak Ağaşı Halil Ağa ma’refiyetîle va’z ve taksim olunmak üçün bundan akdem gelûb Levend Çitlîlî’ne iskân olunan İråd-ı Cedid askerî piyadelerinden dörtüzet neferînîn âğa-yî mûmû-ileyî hârata irsâl ve Rumeli tarafına Hûnzîr Deresi múhâfazasında olan Binbaşi Pilavî (?!) Ağa ve Karaburun múhâfazasında olan Hüseyîn Ağa mâiyyetlerine tevîzî ve taksim ile day-ı sahil ve bahre karagol misâlî növbet növbet keşî ü gûzâr eylemek üçün neferât-ı merkumeden ikiyüz nefer sâvirî asker dahi âğa-yi mûmû-ileyîhuma mâiyyetlerine isâl olunması husûsuna irade-i seniyye müteallik olmaga imdi zikr olunan dörtüzet nefer
B. O. A. HAT 7522 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): Russian Spies and the fortresses
Kaimmakam Paşa,


B. O. A. HAT 123/5064 (17 Ra 1222/25 May 1807): The Rebellion Starts
Bahr-i Siyah Boğazi’nda kâin Yuşa Tabyası Dizdârî Hüseyin Ağa’nın takriridir. 17 Ra 1222
Yuşa Tabyası Dizdârî Hüseyin Dizdâr’ın takriridir. Muahharen Kavak Ağası Halil Ağa’nın Bölükbaşı gelüb keyfiyet andan dahi suâl olundukda Rumeli tarafında olan mualllem ıskâr

Saryyâ tarafına ve Anadolu tarafında olan ısâkîr dahi Beykoz cânîbîne geldiklerini ve hasrât-ı merkume dağlûg herkes kendü kal’alarına azimet ile teskîn-i madde olduğun haber vermişler ise dahi Bostancıbaşı Ağa kullanılar taraf-ı câkerânemden derhal haber irsâiyle terekebi vesâr ıktizâ edenleri ta’yıin birle bir gûne gavga ve nizâm hudûs gelüb keyfiyet andan dahi suâl olundukda Rumeli tarafında olan mualllem ıskâr


B.O.A. HAT 5028 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): Murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi


Şevketî, kerâmî, mehâbletî, kudretî velinîmetim efendim pâdişâhım,


B.O.A. HAT 7537 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): The execution list and related the report

Bostancıbaş; Sirkatibi; İbrahim Kethûdâ; Mabeynci Ahmed Bey; Tersane Emini Haci İbrahim Efendi; Rikab Kethûdâsi Memi Efendi; Rikab Reisi; İrad-ı Cedid defterdarı Ahmed Bey; Kapan Naibi; hala Darbhanı Efendi Bekir Efendi; Valide Kethûdâsî

Et Meydânı’nda tecemmu iden yenici hevli kullarşi şevketî mehâbleti kudretî azametlî pâdişâhım efendimiz hazretlerinin ...... ...... (two words illegible) izhär-i memnünîyet ile devâm-i omr ü devletleri duâsında olub lakin bâlada mastûr kimesnerin tertib-i cezâlari olunur ise herkes mahaline gidüb hidmet-i lâzimelerine kiyâm edeceklerini cemiyetlerine irsâl olunan hala Sekbanbaşi Ağa kulları ve fettâ emini ve vekâyî katibi efendiler dâlîlerine takrîk eyledikleri taraf-i dâiyânemize ihbâr etmeleriyle ol bâbda emr ü r’ey hazret-i velü’emrinindir.
Bunlar iki saate kadar matlûbları üzere husûle gelir ise deyû vakit ta’yîn eyledikleri dahi ihbâr olunma ol bâbda dahi emr hazret-i veliü’l-emrindir.

B.O.A. HAT 174/7533 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): Insistence of the rebels for the execution of the names in the execution list

B.O.A. HAT 7521 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1808): İbrahim Nesim Efendi

B.O.A. HAT 7536 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): Veliyiyin-niam efendim,

B.O.A. A.E. (IV. Mustafa) 1929 (21 Ra 1222/29 May 1807): A report about the murder of the figures during the Rebellion
Bu esnâda Asîtan-i aliyyede mâh-ı Rebiyülevvel’in yirmi birinci günü yevm-i Cuma evketlü mehâbetlü zîll-ullah-ı âlem Sultan Mustafa Han efendimize cülûs-ı hümâyûnlar vuku’ullaya ricâl-i devletden katl olunanlar defteridir. 21 Ra 1222

Kethüdâ-yı sadr-ı sâbık İbrahim Efendi Et Meydanı’nda maktûl
Tersane defterdârı Elhac İbrahim Efendi Et Meydanı’nda maktûl Beyazîd-ı Veli’de
mak tôl
Mabeynci Ahmed Bey Sovuk Çeşme’de maktûl
Ve Hacı Ahmedoğlu’nun kapu kethûdâsî Et Meydanı’nda maktûl
İbrahim Efendi’nin mehterbaşısı maktûl
Rikâb Kethûdâsî Memiş Efendi maktûl
Rikâb Reisi Safi Efendi maktûl
Darbhan Emini Ebubekir Bey maktûl
Bostancı Baş aşası maktûl
Sîrkatibi Efendi Bozdoğan Kemerî’nde maktûl
İngiliz Mahmud Efendi Büyükdere’d maktûl
Kal’a Ağası Haseki Halîl Ğaga Macar Kal’a’sında maktûl
Dakîk Kapanî Efendi zehir nûzûyla maktûl

B.O.A. HAT 1355/53019 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): Appointment of Mustafa Reşid Efendi as the Tersane Emini upon the request of the Janissaries
(Müşâade-i hümâyûnûn olmûşdur)

Şevketî, kerâmîetî, mehâbetî, velinimetim pâdisâhûm efendîm,


**B.O.A. HAT 53028 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV) Exile of Yusuf Ağa**

(ma’llûmûn olmuşdur)

Şevketî, kerâmîetî, mehâbetî, velinimetim pâdisâhûm efendîm,


**B.O.A. HAT 53175 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Execution of Yusuf Ağa**

(Bir hasêki mûrûr edûb tarafina gönderdim. Gîzî gitsin ki fîrîr etmesûn. Bûyle nizâm bulmûsun tebînî edesin)

Şevketî, kerâmîetî, mehâbetî, velinimetim pâdisâhûm efendîm,

Yusuf Ağa hakkinda kîyl ü kal çôgalmış olduğunu ve dûnû gün hâkûçayî şâhânelerîne ifade birle mûmû-îleyhîn i’dâmî husûsus tezkâr olundukda fetvâ-yî şerîf ile olsun deyû sunûh eden irâde-i şâhânelerînî ahşâm hafîçe Reis Efendi kûrallarîn ifade ile semâhetî Şeyhülislâm Efendi du’âçîlara tezkere yazdırûmsîm. Müşûrûn-îleyh Efendi du’âçîlari Reis Efendi kûrallarîn tezkereşi bâlêstîna kendi kaledîyle yazdîgi cevâbda i’dâmîni tecvîz ve belki maslahat vakt u hale mûnûsib idûgünî i’sîr etmeleriyle tezkere-i mezkrû işbû takrîr-i çâkeri derûnuna mevûz’în takdîm-i hâkûçayî hûmâyûnûlîn kilîmişûm. Bu veche mûmû-îleyhîn i’dâmî nezd-i şâhânelerîndê dahi mûnûsib görûlûr ise endûrûn-î hûmâyûndan hatt-î hûmâyûnûlûrîyla bir hasêki kûrallarî mi göndîrîmê irâde buyruklû yohsî hatt-î hûmâyûnûlîn takrîr-i çâkerânem bûlûsîna keşîde buyruklû bu tarafdan gâyet haffi olarak fêrmân-î ali takrîr olunmak î mi irâde buyruklû. Haseki kûrallarîn bîrî me’mûr kûlîndîi sûretde dahi kendiyê ba’zi haffi söz iﬁdâsîyle fîrîrî gailësi çekîmlêmê içûn me’mûr buyrukdûkla hasêki yine taraf-î çâkerânemê göndîrîmek muktezeî idûgün ma‘lûm-î cîhândûrîleri buyrukdûkda emr ü fêrmân şevketî, kerâmîetî, mehâbetî, kudretî velinimetem efendîm pâdisâhûm hazretlerînîndir.
B.O.A. HAT 1361/53651 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): Banishment and execution of Abdüllatif Efendi

(İcrâsi olmuş emri hûmâyûnum olmuşdur. İcrâ olunsun)

Şevketlü, kerâmetli, mehâbetli, kudretli velinimetim efendim pâdişâhım,

Kapan Nâib’inin ismini şahâne Şeyhulislâm Efendi dâ’îleri dekîr-i ulemâ’dan hak etmiş ve sâlîlesini mübeyyin bir kit’a işareti gönderüb nâib-i mûmâ-ileyhin bilâd-ı baideye nefûyi Reis Efendi kullarına yazdıgı tezerelerinde iş’âr eylemîs ise dahi nâib-i mûmâ-ileyhin bilâd-ı baideye nefûy ile asâkırin iskâtî mûmûkin olamayacağı tebeyyûn etmekle ruhsat-ı seniyyeleri buyruluyor ise derhal emr-i âhâne nefâyi ile asâkirin iskâtı ve kâidesi üzere tevcîhi muvâfak olunmu

Bu bâbda sunûh iden irâde-i seniyyelerinin heman simdi taraf-ı çâkerânemde iş’ârî sălîfû’z-zikr işareti ve tezkere merfu’-ı pişgâh-i cihândârîleri kâdem icrâs olunmu

B.O.A. HAT 53006 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Appointment of Kazgancı Mustafa Ağa as the muhasif of the Forts and a request for the survival of Şîkk-ı Sani Ahmed Bey

(Bi’l-cümle iktizâs ve kâidesi üzere nizâm verile)
Pâdişâhım,

Karadenziz Boğazı kal’alari hâlî kalmamak için ocak-ı âmireleri tarafindan neferât-ı kadêmânın gönderilmesi Sekbanbaşi Ağa kullarına şifâen emr ü femmân-ı tâcdârîleri buyrulmuş olduğuna binânen ağa-yi mûmâ-ileyh kulları simdi Bab-ı Ali’e gelüb ferûmûde-i tâcdârîleri üzere emr-i muhâfîzâya kâyâmâlîlî eri buğûn kal’alere isâl edeçegini ifâde eylediğinden başka kâide-i ocak üzere bazı kullarına esâmî tevcîhini tertib birle dekîrini takdim etmekle dekîr-i mezûr ma’rûz-ı huzûr-ı tâcdârîleri kâdemânın dekîr-i mezûr mûcibince zikr olunan esâmîlînârânın kâide-i ocak üzere tevcîhi muvâfik-ı irâde-i seniyyeleri buyruluyor ise iktizâ eden senedâtı itâ etdirileceği

Boğaz kal’alere muhâfazasına İnce Mehemd Paşa kulları me’mûr olub bu defa azl olunmuş olduğundan yerine ocak-ı âmire turnacibaşlarından Kazgancı Haci Mustafa Ağa kulları ta’vîn kilnûmn olmâga kâide-i ocak üzere bir pişyey tevcîhiye kadrînîn terfî’ni ağa-yi mûmâ-ileyh kulları niyâz ve ricâ eylediğî muhât ildî-i alîleri buyrulduka emr ü femmân şevketilî, kerâmetli, mehâbetli, kudretli velinimetim efendim pâdişâhım hazretlerindir.

Şîkk-ı Sânî Ahmed Bey ahz ile el-yevm dergâh-ı ali yencîleri kâslîrlarında mahbûs olub ancak mir-i mûmâ-ileyh mukaddemâ ocak-ı âmirelerinin kîşlaları binân emanetine me’mûr olmâk hasebiyle kâslîrlarımızu güzel binân ve ihyâ eyledi afv ve İlâmîa müsâade-i şâhâne buyrulmasını şevketli, kerâmetli velinimetimiz efendimiz hazretlerinden niyâz u istirhâm ederiz deyû cümlı ocaklu kullarî niyâz ve tazarrû' etmiﬂ olduklarını ağa-yi mûmâ-ileyh kulları ifâde eylediğî ma’lûm-ı hûmâyûnlarî buyrulduka emr ü femmân hazret-i min lehûl-emrindir.

B.O.A. HAT 53094 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Procedures related to the Legal Document (“Hüccet-i Şerîyye”)

(Sened-i mezûr taraf-ı hûmâyûnuma gelüb hazine-i hûmâyûnumda hâfz olunmuşdur) Şevketli, kerâmetli, mehâbetli, velinimetim pâdişâhım efendim

Sekbanbaşi Ağa kullarından gelen senedin mahâline kaydı için taraf-ı çâkerânemê irsâline dâir ma’rûz-ı huzûr-ı mülükâanelerî kîlîn takrîr-ı çâkeri bâlâsîna bade’l-kayd taraf-
1heimâyûnlarda hıfz için ırsâli bâbında hatt-ı hismâyûn-ı şevket-makrûn-ı şehriyârîleri şerefrûz sudur olmuş ve sened-i mezkûr cânîb-î abidâneme ısra buyrunmuş olduğundan mahâline kayd etdirilüb hazine-i himâyûnlarda hıfz olunmak üçin merfü‘-î pişgâh-ı cihândârîleri içinde ma‘lûm-ı alileri buyrunıdında emr ü ferman şevketlû, kerâmetlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû velinîmetim pâdişâhı hazretlerindendir.

**B.O.A. HAT 53820 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Hüccet-i Şerîyye**

(Ba‘de‘l-kayd üdûb tarafında hıfz olunmak üçin taraf-ı himâyûnuma ırsâl oluna)

Şevketlû, kerâmetlû, mehabetlû, velinîmetim pâdişâhî efendim


**B.O.A. HAT 53891.A (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Hüccet-i Şerîyye**

(manzûr ve taraf-ı himâyûnumda hıfz olunmuşdur)

Şevketlû, kerâmetlû, mehabetlû, velinîmetim pâdişâhî efendim,

Sekbanbaşi Ağa kullarîndan savb-ı çâkerânemî gelen oçaklû kulların sened takrîr-ı bendegânemî melfûfen ma‘rûz-ı atebe-i ulyû-yi mülûkâneleri kilnûrûa ol babda emr ü ferman şevketlû, kerâmetlû, mehabetlû, velinîmetim pâdişâhî efendim hazretlerindendir.

**B.O.A. HAT 53891 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Hüccet-i Şerîyye**

(Sened kağdî taraf-ı himâyûnumda hıfz olunmuşdur. Mukaddem yazılan sened kağdî tarafına gönderdim. Sekbanbaşi tarafına veresin)

**B.O.A. HAT 53523(15 Ca 1222/21 July 1807): Ruscuk Yârâmi**

(Benim serdârım, bunlar İbrahim Efendi mütealikâtından olduğundan nefy etmişdim. Kethûdâ sadakâtî hizmet ediyor dirsen ordu maslahati üçin kalması lazımsa sen bilürûn ol tarafîn işini ben senden sorarım)

Şevketlû, mehabetlû, kudretlû, kerâmetlû, adaâletlû velinîmetim efendim pâdişâhî,


**B.O.A. A. AMD. 53/37 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): An Official Declaration after the enthronement of Mustafa IV, concerning the foreign policy of the new government**

Taraf-ı devlet-i aliyyeden Fransa elçisi dâilerine i’tâ buyurulacak sened-güne takrîr-i resminin sûreti tercümesidir.

B.O.A. HAT 1361/53576 (29 Ra 1222/6 June 1807): A report concerning the deposition of Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa

Tataran-ı hazret-i velinimetden cülüs-ı hümâyûn haberi ile ordu-yu hümâyûna gidüb avdet eden Ahmed ve Hüseyin kullarının takriridir. 29 Ra 1222

Tuğrâ-yı hümâyûn götüren tatarlar şimdî avdet etmiş olmalaryla derhal takrirleri alunub takdim –i hâk-pây-ı devletleri kılınıştır.


B.O.A. 1360/53499 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): A report about the murder of Pehlivan Hüsâyın Ağa, the Janissary Ağa


Şevketâli, kerâmêli, mehâbetli, velinimetim pâdisâhım efendim,
Bundan akdemce hâk-pây-ı hümâyûnlara arz ve istizân olunduğu üzere Silistria’dê livâ-yı şerîf kâîmîkâmi Bekir Paşa kullarını lüzûmû mûkûr cem’iyyetî ile Silistria orduşunda tevkiﬂ ve vesâyâ-yı lâzîmeyî telêk edüb çâkerleri bakîyeyû’l-imrâr olan âsakîrî ve kethûdâ-yı çâkerî ve Defterdar Efendi ve Osman Efendi kullarını alûb karşu mûrûrî ile mukaddemce tasmîm olunan mahâle nasb-ı hıyâm ve ûlerrûmûzde olan Yeniçeri vesâîr ocaklar ordulardan ve ordu-yu çâkerîden mahal-be-mahal karagollar ihrâcîyela bir târfändan çî-gûne-i ahvâl-i adây ve klâzûk ve telîfve ve iktîzâ etdiği anda hemân hareket olunmak esbâbunu her derkkada tehîyyeye ve istihzâra ve levâzîm tenfiz intibâhâ riâyet ve ihtimâm ve bir târfanda dahi mûtâreke maddesinde ne gûne irâde-i alîyye sunûh itdîgî haberine intîzâr ve îlm-r-ı eyâm olunmakda iken işbu Cemâyîyeyvevel’în on ikinci gûne Cumartesi gûne Yeniçeri orduşunda metris-nişân olan Yeniçeriler ordu-yu çâkerî tarafına gelecek köprü başına tecemmu ile bizi ne beklediler ya düşmanın üzere ol hareket olunsun veya olud izin versînler hariçlîgîm kalmadî bize şevketâli kerâmêli pâdisâhım cülüs-ı hümâyûn bâhsîsi ihsân buyurmuşlar vermediler sohbetlerini yâd ü tezkâr etmekde olduklarından Ağa Paşa
B.O.A. HAT 53325 (3 C 1222/7 August 1807): From Çelebi Mustafa Pasha to the center, a report about the murder of Pehlivan Hüseyin Ağa

(Benim serdâr-ı ekremim, askeri ıktizâşına göre kullanırsız. Düştan karşımda bir fena şey zuhur etmesin)

Şevketili, kerâmetli mehâbetli kudretli velînim efendim, pâdişâhâvanın ve dedi-i milletin ve kendimizden ibârât beyefendi liderleri ile birlikte her türlü düşmanlık, hbartész ve iktizeretleriyle merhamet etmeleriyle derhâl kulunuz dahi Muhzâm-ı devletî olanlarla derhâl etmeleriyle derhâl kulunuz dahi Muazzâm-ı devletî olan bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulunur ve bulu
B.O.A. HAT 1358/53341 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): The daughter of Şeyhülislam Şerifzade Ataullah Efendi marries the son of Musa Pasha (some parts are damaged and illegible)

(Pek münâsib. İnz-i hümâyûnun olmuşdur)
Şevketli, kerâmetli, mehâbetli, kudretli velinimetim efendim, Semâhatlı Şeyhülislam Efendi dâilerinin kerimeleri mahdûm-ı çâkeriye akd ü tezvîc oluna... azimet olanacağım ma’lûm-ı hümâyûnları buyurlukta emr ü fermân şevketli, kerâmetli, mehâbetli, kudretli velinimetim efendim pâdîşâhî hal hümâyûnum olmuşdur.)

B.O.A. HAT 53839 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Musa Pasha

(Selefin Musa Paşa tekaüdlükle ile Yeni Şehirde ikamet edeceği emr-i hümâyûnun olmuşdur)
B.O.A. HAT 53198 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): First Deposition of Musa Pasha

(Gelibolu’da ikametine ızn-i hümâyûnum olmuşdur)

Şevketlü, kerâmîetlü, mehâbetlü, kudretlü veliînîmetim efendim pâdişâhım,

selef-i câkeri Musa Paşa kullûrin tekaâdulî ile Yenişehir Fener’de ikametine ızn ve
ruhsat-i seniyyeleri ırzâni buyurulmâdan nâşî mahal-i ikametîne azîmetle pâder-i rikâb ise
de de dünkû gün müşarûn-îlekh kullûrin ıya’l u evlâdî Dersaadet’lerine vurûd etmiş ve dâiresî
teksr eylemiş olub el-haletî hâzîhî ıya’l u evlâd ve etbâ’sîyla berren azîmetînîde külliyyeti
hayvana muhtac olmâk cihetîyle usretî derkâr olduğuna bina’n avn ân inayet-i Rabbâni ve
bi-menne-i himmet-i hazret-i cihânbanîleriyle karibûl’-ahlde düşman-i dinin inhizâmîyla
Bahr-ı Sefid Boğazi’nın küsâdî etfa’l îlahîden müsted’â olduğuna nebîn bahren savb-ı
maksûduna azîmet eylemek üzere Boğaz’ın inkişâfîna kadar bir iki mâh Geliolu’da
ikamete ruhsat-i seniyye-i mülûkâneleri ırzân buyurulmasını müşarûn-îlekh kullar bir kit’â
nakirle istid’â etmekle manzûr-ı şhânâleleri buyurulmâk üçün takrîr-i mezûr-i
huzûr-ı mülûkâneleri kîlindi. İltîmâsi vechile müşarûn-îlekh kullûrin bir iki ay Geliolu’da
ikameti husûsuna mûsâade-i seniyye-i taktîrleri ırzânı buyurulîr ise emr ü fermandân
şevketî, kerâmîetî, mehâbetî, kudretî veliînîmetî pâdişâhîm hazretlerînî handır.

İstanbul Şerîyye Sicilleri, Galata Mahkemesi, no. p. 583, p. 35 (20 Ş 1222/23
October 1807): Kabâkeş Mustafa Ağa purchases a residence

Mahrûsa-yı Galata’ya muzâfa kasaba-yı Kasım Paşa’dâ Sirkeci Muslihdîn
Mahallesi’nde sâkin dergâh-ı âli kapucubâsîlarîndan olub sâbika Bahr-ı Siyah Boğazi’nın
muhaﬁzi ve kal’a-yı tis’a nazarı Ìncî Mehmed Bey bin İsmail târîfîndan hüsüs-ü attî l-veyâna ikrâr vekil olduğu Hașan Ağa bin Mehmed ve Es-seyyid Mehmed Ağa bin Es-
seyyid Emin Ağa nâm kimesneler şehadetlerîyle sâbit olan Es-seyyid Mustafa bin Es-
seyyid Mustafa Efendi meclîs-i şer’-i şerîf-i enverde hala Boğaz-ı merkum muhafîz ve
ekal-a-yı mezkûre nazarı Sermortaî bâisî’l-kitâb Es-seyyid Mustafa Ağa bin Hüseyin
târîfîndan hüsüs-ü attî l-veyâyîn tâsîde vekil-sîbîl’-vekâlesi hassa haseleînînden Eyüb Ağa bin Îsmail mahzarînda bi’l-vekâle ikrâr ve takrîr-i kelâm edüb akd-i attî’z-zikrin
suduruna deîn mevukkîlîm múmû-îlehyîn yedîne mûlî hàkk olub mûhrûsa-yı
mezkûreye muzâfa Ìstînye nahiyînesi tâbi Rumeli Fenari bağlari hilalinge käin ve bir
târîfîndan Maslak Çayırî ve bir târîfîndan Kara Tavuk Bağî ve bir târîfîndan Zahraîya?) Bağî ile
mahdûd ve tahminen seîzk dönûm mkdrîn bir kita kûrumî mûlî bağ ve bağ-i merkum
derûnunda mevzi bir kit’a köşkü mevukkîlîm múmû-îlehyîn târîfîndan icâb ve kabûlû hâvî
surûtu mefsûdeden ârî bey’ ü ba’t-ı saihî şérî ve vâhîde ile üçûyî yirmî guruşa
muvvekkîlîm mezûr Mustafa Ağa’ya bey’ ü temîlík ve teslim eyleîdîne ol dahlı ber
minvîl-i muharrer istîrâr ve temellü’l ve teslim ve kabz ve kabul eyleîdikden sonra semeni
olan meblağ-ı mezûr üçûyî yirmî guruşa mevvekk-ı mezûr Es-Seyyid Mustafa Ağa
mûmû-îlehye temamen ve kämlîn def’ ve teslim eyleîdîne ol dahlı yedînden ahz ü kabz
eyledim. Fîma ba’d bağ-ı mezkûr ile derûnunda mevzi köşkü muvekkîlîm mezûr Es-Seyyid
Mustafa Ağa’nın múlûk-ü üstîrâsî hakk-ı sarf-ı olub mevvekk-ı múmû-îlehyîn asla ve katîn
alaka ve medhali kalmamıştır dedîkde anî’t-tasîd-ı şer’î mà wâki’ bi’t-talebî sebt
olunû.Halîl Çelebi bin İbrahim; Mustafa Çelebi bin İbrahimAbdullah Çelebi bin Mehmed
ve hüddîm. Fi 20 Ş 1222.
T.S.M.A. E. 1756 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV) Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa meets with Sebastiani

Benim inâyetli, mürüvvetli efendim hazretleri,

PRO (FO, 78-61, a document titled References): Sebastiani and Kabakçı Mustafa

Tabialis (1) A name for the garrisons of the castles composed of soldiers, artillery men and gunners

Seimen (2) Soldiers, now called regular troops, but dressed and accounted like the Janissaries. They were substituted to the regular troops raised by Sultan Selim under the new form of government, known by the name of Nizam-i Cedid. The Seiman Bashi is the chief of the Seiman. Bash in the Turkish word for head or chief.

Kara Koulaç (3) Adjutant of the Seiman Bashi

Kabakchi oglu (4) Name of the present chief or commander of the Tabialis. These, commenced the revolution which deprived the Sultan Selim of the throne, by killing their commander, the Mahamoud Effendi (once Reis Effendi), who had been sent to the castles to enforce the new regulations of the Nizam-i Cedid, to which the Tabialis were very contrary, and appointed Kabakchi oglu their chief. This man was a common Tabiali, who by natural great boldness has gained so much power and ascendancy that the present Sultan and his ministers dare not do any thing without his approbation. Sebastiani seeing that found it necessary to court that man by visits, marks of respect and presents, in order to maintain his influence and gain his ends.

B.O.A. HAT 1359/53392 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): Deposition of Sekbanbasi Arif Ağa

(Sekbanbasi Ağa’yı azıl edüb yerine oçak başçâvuşu Sekbanbasi nasb oluna)

Şevketlü, kerâmetlü, mehâbetlü, velinimetim efendim pađîşâhüm


B.O.A. 1359/53393 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807): Deposition of Sekbanbasi Arif Ağa

(ma’lûm-ı hümayûnum olunmuşdur. Mûnâsib oldû)

Şevketlü, kerâmetlü, mehâbetlü, velinimetim efendim pađîşâhûm,

B.O.A. HAT 53483 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Deposition of Sekbanbaşi Arif Ağa

(ma’lûm-ı hümâyûnum olmuşdur, Azîz ve mûkerrem olsunlar)
Şevketlû, kerâmêttû, mehbêtûtû, velinimetim efendim padîşâhım, Nasb olunan Sekbanbaşi Ağa kullar hîl’at iksâsından sonra Ağa Kapusu’na vârdukkça cümle zabitân ve ihtiyâr ve ocak-ı âmireleri ağa-ıyyihin Sekbanbaşılığı tebrîk ve tenhiye birle emr ü re’yine mutâavaat edecîklerni beyân eyledidde ağa-yyî mûmâ-ileyh kullar cümlele hitâb ile ihtiyârınız pederim vesâîriniz karndaştâm gibi olmağa şevketlî kerâmêttû velinimetimiz padîşâh-ı alem-penah efendimizde sadâkatle hidmet edelim dedikde cümlele yek-zebân olarak sadık u istitametle hidmet ve uğur-ı padîşâhâhde bezîl-i muukadder ederiz diyerek tezâyûd-ı eyyâm-ı ömûr ü ikbâl-ı şehriyârîleri duâvâtımı tezkât ederek cümlele hidmet-i lâzîmelerine kıyâm için kolluk ve kişlara’nın avdet eyledikleri ma’lûm-ı alileri buyrulduka emr ü fermân şevketlû, kerâmêttû, mehbêtûtû, velinimetim efendim padîşâhım hazretlerinindir.

B.O.A. HAT 53702 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): The Çardak Incident, deposition of Sekbanbaşi Kahveci Mustafa Ağa

(Muhzhir Ağa’yı Sekbanbaşi nasb edesin)
Şevketlû, kerâmêttû, mehbêtûtû, velinimetim padîşâhım efendim,
Ve mûmâ-ileyh Muhzhir Ağa hazretleri Bab-ı Ali’de bir müddetten berü müstahdem ve müdür ü iktiyâr ve ocaklukse beyinde zî-nûfûz ve i’tibar olduğununa binâen mûnasib mülâhaza olunub bu hûsûs ocaklunun istid’âstyla olduğulu ve azîz olunan Sekbanbaşi kullar hadisü’s-sinn olmak hasebiyle hûsn-î zindegânı idemeyüb kavmını tenfîr etmiş olduğundan mucered edecîklerni inhâ eyledidikleri ma’lüm-ı hûmâyûnla buyrulduka her halde emr ü fermân hazret-i min lehû’l-emrindir.

B.O.A. HAT 53710 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Dismissal of Kahveci Mustafa Ağa

(Fermanı yazulub mahaline gönderilsin. )
Şevketlû, kerâmêttû, mehbêtûtû, velinimetim padîşâhım efendim,
ma'lûm-ı hümâyûnları buyruduğdu üzere Sekbanbaşı kullarının azılıye yerine Muhzir Ağa kullarının nasbı hıususu diğer takrîr-i bendegânemle lede'l-istizân şeref-yâfite sudûr olan hatt-ı hümâyûn-ı meymenet-makrûnları mücibince mûmâ-velyeh Muhzir Ağa kulları Sekbanbaşı nasb ve ilbâs-ı hil'at olunmağa Bursa kazasında kâın çiftliğinde ikamet eylemesi için inhausti üzerine fermânı terkîm olunmaka idiği ve şimdi mahaline gönderileceği ma'lûm-ı hümâyûn-ı mülûkâneleri buyrudukda emr ü fernân şevketlü, kerâmî, mehâbetlü, velinimetim efendim pâdisâhım hazretlerinindir.

B.O.A. HAT 53687 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Banishment of Musa Pasha to İ斯塔nköy

(İ斯塔nköye olan me’mûriyeti tahvîl ile ziyade hasta olduğundan İzmir’de ikametine ruhsat-ı hümâyûnum olmuşdur)

Şevketlü, kerâmî, mehâbetlü, velinimetim pâdisâhım efendim,

Musa Paşa kulları mahâl-ı ikametî olan İ斯塔nköy Cezresi’ne azîmî me nerfû-î pişgâh-ı cihândârîleri esnâda İzmir’e ledel-vusûl mübîtlâ eden illeti muhâmân eylem ve harekete kimesne cesâret eden hezîlede on dokuz neferi ahz eden (one word illegible) fukarâ-ı esnâda illeti müzbedölucu (Mehmed Arif Ağa’da) hümâyûn-ı hâlinde İ斯塔nköye gelüb .... (two words illegible) fukarâs ve inâ aktarka Sekbanbaşı’da ahz eyledi .... (one word illegible) fukarâs ve inâ aktarka Sekbanbaşı’da ahz eyledi .... (two words illegible)

B.O.A. HAT 745/3523.A. (undated, catalogue date is 1223/1807-8) Sekbanbaşı Arif Ağa

Sâbit Kapan Nâibi Efendi’nin tertîb-i cezâ olunması

Sersekbanan-ı sâbit Mehmed Arif Ağa’nın Valide Kethüdâs esbâk Yusuf Ağa’ya rica edüb malun dan ahz eylediği 30000 guruş (Mehmed Arif Ağa’da) hât olunub cânîb-i mîrîye sarf olunmak

Sersekbanan-ı sâbit Mehmed Arif Ağa’ya .. (one word illegible) için attfetlî Beyhan Sultan efendimizden ... (one word illegible) guruş atiyey-i hümâyûn gelüb .... (one word illegible) i’tâ etmeyëb eklü ibel etmeğe ... (two words illegible) fukarâsina takım .... (two or more words illegible)

B.O.A. HAT 53395 (undated, catalogue date is 1222/1807)

Haçî İbrahimînî hât olunmasa. Validehâm baş kadın oturacakdâır

B.O.A. HAT 53601 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): The Beşiktaş Incident

(ma’lûm-ı hümâyûnum olmuşdur)

Şevketlü, kerâmî, mehâbetlü, velinimetim pâdisâhım efendim

Ma’lûm-ı alîleri buyruduğdu üzere dünkû gün Beşiktaş’da hilîf-ı rizâ bi-edebliçe cesaret eden hezeleden iki neferi ahz olunmuş olduğundan başka Sekbanbaşı Ağa kulları bu gece taharri ve tecessüs ederek o makule bi-edebliğe mütecâsir olan hezeleden on dokuz nefer ve bostaniyânandân kez allîk bi-edeb zümresinden olan bir neferi dahi ahz etmekte cem’en yîrmî iki nefer heze ocalku kullanım ittifâk ve itîhâdiyla şîmiddî Baba Çafê zindânında cêzâları tertîb ile sârî o makule terhib olunduğu ve inâyllahu Tealâ bundan sonra himmet-i şânâhanelerîyle o misili bi-edebâne tavr ve harekete kimesne cesaret edemeyeceği ma’lûm-ı hümâyûnları buyrudukda emr ü fernân şevketlü, kerâmî, mehâbetlü, kudretlü velinimetim efendim pâdisâhım hazretlerinindir.

900
BoA. HAT 53320 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Deposition of Şeyhülislam Samanızáde Ömer Hulusi Efendi (Some parts are illegible)

(9a-lüm-1 hümâyûnum olmuşdur)
Şevketlü, kerâmîlî, mâyârbetîlî, velinîmetîm pâdişáhîm efendim

..... (four or more words illegible) tensib kîldînî vechile Reis Efendi kullari Samanizade Efendi dâillerine ..... (four or more words illegible) dâillerini talîf ve ne mahalde ikamet etmek ister ise taleb eyledîği ..... (four or more words illegible) sâhâne buyurmulmuş olduğunu tebeyyûn ederek mesîhat-ı İslamiye’den istîfâ’ıma ma’rûz-1 hüzûr-1 mülûkâneleri kîldînî ve manzûr-1 şehrîyârîlîrî buyruluðukdan sonra .... (four or more words illegible) kendî istîfâ’-sî mebînî idîgû nása neşr ü tîlân ounacagî .... (four or more words illegible) emr ü ferман Şevketlü, kerâmîlî, mâyârbetîlî, velinîmetîm efendîm pâdişáhîm...

BoA. 1359/53424 (undated catalog date is 1222/1807-8): Assault of a Yamak to the French Ambassador

(İz-n-ı hümâyûnum olmuşdur)
Şevketlü, kerâmîlî, mâyârbetîlî, velinîmetîm pâdişáhîm efendim

Geçen gün Büyükdere’de Fransa elçisine itâlé-i dest-i zebân iden tabya yamağî te’dîb olunmayub afv olunması geçen gün elçî-i merkum ricâ eyledîgînden Kireçburnu tabyasî yamaklarî ve âglarî mahzûh olduklarîna binânâ inhzâr-1 mahzûzîyet için elçî-i mûsûma gelmelerîyle elçî-i mûsûm nasihat-âmîz katî vâfîr ifâdâtâ ibtidâr etmekle fâmâ-ba’d zât-1 şâhâneleri istîclâb-1 duât-1 hayriye olacak hüsnî tavr ve hareketden aslî udûl etmeyecekləri ba’del-beyân neferatî gice iskât idecek bir mûhûz yerleri olmâdînîndan neferatî zâbta kâdir olmâdiklîrîn beyân iñ tabyalarîna semt olan Tarabya karyesi başında vâkî bir bâb Ermeni hanesinde iskânlîrîn mûsûade buyurulûyor ise neferatî zabî ile bî- edebâne hareket vuku’a gelmeyeçeqini âglarî beyân eyledîgînden elçî-i mûsûm başka başka bahşi ile telîf ve istid’âlarînî Bab-î Ali’ye ifâdeye taahhûd etmekle ricîlärîna mûsûade buyurulmasî elçî-i mûsûm tercumânî vesâtîtînîn inhe etmêgîn el-muhrarâtî bâb-i bârethêa bir kağda zabt ve terkim etdîrîlüb ma’rûz-1 hûzûr-1 mülûkâneleri kîldî. Neferatî merkumenin işBu istid’âlarîna mûsûade buyruďuď güredem ûne neferat-1 merkume mutayyeb olacaklarî ve hem hasbe’l-vakt ü hal Fransalunun celular telîfî làzîmeden oludüngünden elçî-i mûsûm dahi te’lîf kilnacağı ve bu vechile elçî-i mûsûmûn ilımäßiya kendîlere mahalî-ı iskân verîldîkde gerek elçî-i mûsûma ve gerek Büyükdere’dedeb olan sîr elçî teb’alarîna sî-ı muâmele etmeyeceklî fâdîsî derkâr olmâgîa zîk olunan Ermeni hânesi isticâr ile mâhiyyesî cânîbi-mûriden itâ kilnarâm neferatî-1 merkumenîn iskânî muvaﬁk-1 irâde-i seniyyelîrî sîr emr ü ferman Şevketlü, kerâmîlî, mâyârbetîlî, velinîmetîm efendîm pâdişâhîm hazretlerinîndir.

BoA. HAT 1354/52898 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): The Attempt of the Yamaks to convert a church

(9a-lüm-1 hümâyûnum olmuşdur)
Şevketlü, kerâmîlî, mâyârbetîlî, kudretlü velinîmetîm efendîm pâdişâhîm,

Rumeli Fenari Karyesi’nde olan kinisada ezân kıratine mebînî Boğaz neferatî câmi oldu didiklerîne mebînî zîk olunan kinyisînîn ezân kıratîyle câmi olmak lâzim gelmedîgîni mübeyyin cânîbi-1 ısrâît-gârâdân verilen fetvâ-yi şeîfîe mûcîinciple men’î hávi emr-î ali idâr olunmuşdu. Emr-î şerîf-î mezkur neferat-1 merkume mûvâcehelerînînde lede’l-îrâât câmüleyi sem’an ve tâaten merâsimini ba’del-ırcâ hilâf-î em-îr-i ali hareket idenler bizden dêgîldîr deyû ikrâr ve kinyis-yi merkume dahl ve taaruz etmeyeceklîni ve bu hüsûsda vâkî’ olan cûrmelîrînîn afvîni niyâz eylediklerîni Yeniköy nâbî efendî bir kita i’lâmîyle inhe etmêgîn manzûr-1 mülûkâneleri buyurulmak için ma’rûz-1 hûzûr-1 cihândârîlîrî kîldînî ma’lûm-1 alîleri buyruďukda emr ü ferman Şevketlü kerâmîlî, mâyârbetîlî kudretlü velinîmetîm pâdişâhîm hazretlerinîndir.
B.O.A. Kamil Kepeci Sadaret Mektupculuğu Deferleri, no. 18, p. 101 (21 M 1223/ 19 March 1808) Şeyhülislam Şerifzâde Ataullah Efendi and Halet Efendi)

Şeyhülislam Efendi’ye

B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 130, order no. 380 (evâil-i Ca 1223/25 June-4 July 1808): The Order for the execution of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa

(işbu emr-i alı tobrisında mahfüz)

Dergâh- muallâm kapıcıbaşılardan hala Pınar Hisar ayni Ahmed ve Vize müteleselli Mehmed damme mecdehuya

Boğaz nazarı Kabakçı dimekle ma’rûf Mustafa bir müddetten beri Midye vesâir ol tarafları zîr-i zatına almak dâiyesinde olarak hilâf-ı emr ve rizzâ-yı vez’ u harekâte ibtidâr ve Midye ve ol havâli ahâli ve fukarâsına envâ-’ı mezâlîm ve taaddiyâta ictisâr eyleldiği kerre ba’d de ahere arzûhul takdimiyle ordu-yu hümâyûn-u nusret-makrûnuma inhâ olumnağın merkumun izâle-i vücutu ile fukarâ-yi ibâd pense-i taaddisinden talhîsi husûsuna irâde-i kat’îe-i seniyetem taâlul etmekle siz ki ayan ve mütelesell-i mûmâ-ileyhîmsaz merkum Kabakç’i’yi ber vech-i suhûlet ahz ve izâle ve i’dâm edüb keyfiyeti tahrîr ve işâret ve siz (?) bundan sonra avdetini dâr dirâ emrim vuruduna kadar birkaç gün ol taraçda ikamevet emr-i muhâfazâya dikkat eylemiz bâbında ordu-yu hümâyûnumun emr-i evâıl-i serîfim isdâr (blank) ile ısrâl olunmuşdur. İmdî Kabakç’i’yi ahz ve izâle edüb keyfiyeti ış’âra mûsâraat ve minvâl-i meşrûh üzere amel ve harakât eylemeniz bâbında. Fi evâıl-i Ca 1223

T.S.M.A. E. 8751 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Murder of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa

Şevketlû, kerâmetlû, mehâbetlû, velinimetim pâdisâhım efendim
Cülüs-ı hümâyûnlarından mukaddem Karadeniz Boğazı kal’alarından Fenar dizdâr olub cülüs-ı hümâyûnlarinda sonra Rumeli taraflinda gitmiş olan Ketancâoğlu bugün seheri altı yüz mîkdâr süvari ile Boğaz’a varib doğrû Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa’nın hanesine nûzül ile mûmâ-ileyhi idâm etmiş olduğu sahihen hbûrb olunmakdan nâşib bu keyfiyet ne vechile olmuş tashîh ve tahlîk için taraflarından bir adam gönderdileri Sekbanbaş Ağa ve Bostancıbaşı Ağa’ya tenbih ki’lîm-i ma’lûm-ı alileri buyrudukdu emr ü femân şevketlû, kerâmetlû, mehâbetlû, velinîm pâdisâhım hazretlerinindir.

B.O.A. HAT 53788 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Murder of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa

(Manzûrum oldu)

Şevketlû, kerâmetlû, mehâbetlû, velinimetim pâdisâhım efendim
Boğaz Nâzirî Kabakçı Mustafa’nın i’dâmî keyfiyeti Sadrazamları kullanırdan istilâm olunmuşdu. Bu def’a müşarûr-îleyh kullanırdan vârid olan bir kit’a kaîmede merkumun Midye ve havalisini zatba ve fukarâya taaddiyâta ibtidâri cihetiyê i’dâmına karar verülüb Pınarhisar aya’nı ordu-yu hümâyûnlar ta’rîn-i nâmîs sûdû müharrer ve mezûr olmuğa manzûr-ı mülükâneleri buyrulmak için ma’rûz-ı huzûr-ı cihândârileri kilindiği ma’lûm-ı alileri buyрудukda emr ü femân şevketlû, kerâmetlû, mehâbetlû, velinîm efendim pâdisâhım hazretlerinindir.

B.O.A. C. SM. 470 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Murder of Kabakçı Mustafa Ağa

Şevketlû, mürkerremetlû, mürûvetli, karındaş-ı azammı destûr-ı halîlî-’ş-şan hazretleri, Kabakçı Mustafa’nın i’dâmına ictisâr iden Haci Ali vesâir asker ordu tarafindan me’mûren mi yohsa kendîlîgiyle mi geldiklerini istilâm için taraf-ı alilerinden devletlî Sadrazam hazretleri tarafına tahrîr buyruduğunuuz kaimeye cevâb olarak zühûr ve vûrûd iden kaimeyi bi’-telhîs hâkûp-ı hümâyûna arz u takdim buyruğunuuzda bu husûs ordu tarafindan me’mûren olduğu ma’lûm-ı hümâyûn oldu. Lakin hala kal’âlîlar gerek enderûn
ve gerek bu tarafdan bu def'a vuku'na emr ü irade yok bildiler ve bundan başka iâne ne gibi haletler oldu. Şimdi yamaklar böyle olduğunu fehm iderler ise gayet fenâ bir şey olacağını aşıkârdır. Ancak her ne kadar ordu tarafından me'mûren geldiler ise dahi kal'âhîr bilâ-emr bildiler ve taraf-ı alilerinden dahi bizim ve efendimizin haber ve âğahi yok cevab verilmiş olduğundan gelenleri i'dâma mübaşeret ettider. Ordu tarafından mukaddemce taraf-ı alilerine iş'âr olunmuş olsa idi bir çare ve tedbiri bulunur idi. Ama böylece habersizce hareket olunduğundan bu sûreti kese etti. El-hâsil ordu-yu hümâyûn Asîtâne-i alyiyyeye vusûline kadar bu husûsun böyle olduğunun kettm ve ifhâa ihrâmularen münâsib zann olunur. İşbu tezkere bâ-emr-i hümâyûn tahrîr olunub taraf-ı eşreflerine irsîl olundu. Her vechile bu husûsun mektûm tutulması münâsibidir efendim.

B.O.A. HAT 53127 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Murder of Kabakçı Mustafa (ma'lûm-i hümâyûnum oldu. Pek güzel olmuş)

Şevketli, kerâmâetli, mehâbetli, velinimetim efendim pâdişâhım,

B.O.A. HAT 53190 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): Murder of Kabakçı Mustafa (Bu husûs Yeniçeri Ağası ile müzâkere olunub münâsib ise böyle olması anların dahi matûbâli ise ve ocaqca böyle re'y etdiler ise bu vechile tanzim olunsun)

Şevketli, kerâmâetli, mehâbetli, kudretli veli-nimetim pâdişâhım efendim,

T.S.M.A. E. 9648 (undated, reign of Mustafa IV): An suggestion for the murder of Selim III

Hazine Kethüdâsî săbîk Selim takriridir.

Hazine Kethûdası Nasfet Efendi
Uzunçarşı Han’nda Sarraf Yorgi Sarayda Hazine Kethûdâsı yeri olan odada 20 kese akçeye buçak mevcûd.

B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 131, order no. 383 (evâhir-i Ş 1223/12-20 October 1808): Order for the execution of Kazgancı Mustafa Ağa

(işbu kayd ba-fermân-ı ali terkîn olunub ıtlâki için emrî yazılmışdır. Fi evâhir-i Şevval ıtlâkî için emrî ali yazılmıştır. Fi evâhir-i L 23)

Trabzon valisine,
Kazgancı Mustafa’nın i’dâm içi mukaddemce iârâde-i kat’îe-i sâdûr olunmuşken Trabzon tarafına firâr eylediği bi’l-ıbbâr tâhîk-gerde-i şâhânem almaghâ bûvül emrî emr-i şerifimde merkum bulunduğu mahalde ale’l-hal ahz u i’dâm birle icrâ-ı-yi şâhânem mûextérieur eylemek fermanım olmâghâ te’kîden ve tenbîhen mahsûs işbu emrî şerifîm ısâdî ve .... (blank) ısrâl olunmuşdur. İmdî keyfiyet ma’lûmün oldukda ber vech-i meşrûh mersûm bulunduğu mahalde ale’l-hal ahz ve i’dâm birle icrâ-ı-yi iârâde-i hümâyûnun ehemm ü dikkat ve hilâfînda ba-avn-i Teâlâ müsâraat eylemen bâbinda.

Evhâhir-i Ş 23

B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 131, order no. 384 (evâhir-i Ca 1223/25 June-4 July 1808): Kazgancı Mustafa Ağa

Dergâh-ı muallâm kapucbaşılarindan Kazgancı Haci Mustafa Ağa damme mecedehunun bulunduğunu mahalîn kadısına,
Sen ki mevlânâ-yi mûmâ-i ileyhîn, mûmâ-ileyh Haci Mustafa’nın afvî husûsuna iârâde-i aliye-yem müteallik kangi mahalde ise işbu emrî-âlîsânın ibrazînda sebilinî tahlîyeye mübâderet ve afv u ıtlâkîn iktizâ edenlere tefhîm eylemek bâbinda.

Fi evâhir-i Ca 23

B.O.A. Mühimme-i Mektume Defterleri, no. 5, p. 131, order no. 385 (evâhir-i Za 1223/19-23 December 1808)

Dergâh-ı muallâm kapucbaşlarindan sâbitka Gümüşhane emini Kazgancı Haci Mustafa damme mecedehunun bulunduğunu yerîn kadısına,
Mûmâ-ileyh Haci Mustafa’nın mukaddemma hakkında ferman-kazâ ceryânûmûdûr etmiş ise de mûmâ-ileyhîn afvî husûsuna iârâde-i şâhânem taalûk edûb bulunduğunu mahalde sebilî tahliye olunmak bâbinda mahsûs emr-i âlîsânîm ısâdî ve tesyâr olunmuşdu. Ancak mûmâ-ileyhîn her ne kadar hakkında insâd ve nisbet olunan töhmet ve kustûran dâmen-i ismetî pak ise dahi sûtûr-i siyâsete kalem kalem afv vâsif-ı şâhânem keşidesîyle mukaddemma hakkında sudûr iden emrin kaydi terkînine müsâade-i seniyeyem irzânî kılmışmsı husûsuna hala bi’l-istîklâl-i ciwâr Seraskeri olan sadr-i esbak destûr vezîrîm Gazi Elhac Yusuf Ziya Paşa iclâîleh tarafından bu def’a istid’â ve iltîmâm olunmuşuna binânı mukaddemma afvî bâbinda emr-i âlîsânım sudûr etmiş ise dahi hakkında sadr oland emr-i mezkürun kaydi def’ ve terkîn olunmuşla afvî husûsunu tekrâren ifhâm zimînda işbu emr-i şerifîm dahi ısâdî ve ısrâl olunmuşdur. İmdî mûmâ-ileyhîn afvî için mukaddemce emr-i şerifîm sudûr etmiş ise de mukaddemma hakkında sudûr iden emr-i şerîfî mezkürun dahi kaydi ref’ ü terkîn olduğu senki mevlânâ-yi mûmâ-ileyhîn ma’lûmün oldukda mûmâ-ileyh
gitmeyerek doğru kapuya azimet eylemesi muharrer olduğundan kalkub doğru Ağa Kapusu’na gitmiş ve müteakiben Başyazıcı gelüb getürdüğünü haberde on nefer miktâr çavuş ve mülâzim ustalar ve meclis-i şûrâya dâhil olanlardan yetmiş birin mütevellişi Hacı Yusuf Ağa ile ve bir iki ortannun mütevellişleri bu bugün Ağa Kapusu’na vûrûd dâire agavâtını tevkîf ederek Yeniçeri Ağaşı Bab-I Ali’den kapuya avdetinde cümlesi yanı gelüb ve müteakiben Başı yazıcısı gelüb getürdü. 

Bu haberde on nefer mikdârı çavuş ve mülâzim ustalar ve meclis-i şûrâya dâhil olanlardan yetmiş birin mütevellisi Hacı Yusuf Ağa ile ve bir iki ortan mütevellisi bu gün Ağa Kapusu’nun Kâpusuna gitmiş ve mütevellişi Bab-I Ali’den kapuya avdetinde cümlesi yanı gelüb olunan Haydar Baba maddesinden kat’iin söz açmayıarak bu reâyâ fesâd zuhûr edeli yirmi iki mah oldu.

GLOSSARY

Acemi oğlan: novice Janissaries, conscript boy selected and brought up, later to join the Janissaries; servants of the palaces
Ağa Kapısı/Kapusu: the official bureau of the Janissary Ağa. It was the building at Süleymaniye. After the abolition of the Janissary army, that building served as the office of the Ministry of War (“Serasker Dairesi”) and when the Ministry was moved to present-day Istanbul University, the old building was used as the office of the Şeyhülislam (“Meşhat Dairesi”).
Ağa Karakulağı: The confidential messenger of the Janissary Ağa
Akçe: asper, Ottoman silver coin
Ağın: grain superintendents, granary directors
Anadolu muhasebeci: Finance officer of Anatolia
Arapçular nazırı: supervisor of waggoneers
Arpa emini: comptroller of the barley supplies
Arpalık: pensions for the current or former kazaskers. Arpalık, were livings for out-of-office of the Great Mollas. It consisted of the right to oversee the juridico-religious affairs of a lesser magistrature (kaza) in return for the compensations due to the judge's office. Even though it was usually given for the ones out of the service, in the eighteenth century it became automatically granted to virtually all Great Mollas and some professors.
Aşçibaşı: chief cook, chief kitchener, the quartermaster of a regiment
Ayan: local magnates, notables
Bab-ı Hümayun: The imperial Gate, name of the outermost big gate of the Topkapı Palace.
Bahriye nazırı: Minister of navy
Bahşiş: sign-up bonus
Baruthane-i Amire: Imperial Gunpowder Works
Baruthane nazırı: Director of the Imperial Gunpowder Works
Başbakikulu: tax inspector
Başçavuş: sergeant-major
Başçukadar/Sercukadar: Chief Orderly
Başdepthdar: Chief financial officer; chief treasurer
Başmuhasebe: Chief accounting office
başmuhasebe kesedarı: purse bearer of the chief of the accounting office
Başmuhasebeci: chief of the accounting office
Başbuğ: Commander
Başkadın: The First Woman of the Sultan
Başkapı kethüdası: Chief of official representatives of a governor in İstanbul
Başkullukçu: an officer in the kitchen of the Sultan’s palace; a petty Janissary officer “bayrak askerleri”: company soldiers
Baştebdil: chief of the tebdil hasekis
Baştercümman: the chief interpreter of the imperial council
berat: an official diploma or certificate, letter of patent
beylerbey: provincial commander
beylikti: the head of chancery office, the president of chancery
beylikti kesedarı: purse-bearer of the chancery office
Beytül-mal: state or communal treasury, lands or properties over which the state was accorded rights by law
bidat/bida: innovations viewed reprehensive in religious law
bina emini: construction supervisor
Boğaz nazırı: Bosporous superintendent
Bostancı: palace guard; imperial gardeners
Bostancı Ocağı: the corps of the imperial guards
Bostancı ustası: master of the imperial gardeners
Bölükbaşi: captain, division commander, corporal
Bölük-1 erbaa katihi: clerk who kept the accounts of the four cavalry troops of the Janissary corps, except for the sipah and silahdar regiments.
Büyük tezkereci: first memorandum officer of the Porte
Caize: fees  
Cebeci: armorer  
Cebehane: Royal Armory  
Cebehane nazır: Director of the Royal Armory  
Cebeci bey: chief of the ammunition stores  
Cebeciler katibi: the clerk who kept the accounts of the armory  
Cizye: poll tax  
Cizye muhasebecisi: Poll tax accountant  
Cülustiye bahşisi: coronation gift  
Çavuş: sergeant  
Çavuşbaşı: chief bailiff, was originally an palace functionary where he served as the head of the messengers and serving as bailiffs in the imperial councils. At the turn of the 19th century, the chief bailiffs began to assume written business in the Porte related to the selection and preparation of the cases to be decided by the grand viziers.

Çorbaci: colonel of the Janissary army  
Darbhane-i Amire: The Imperial Mint  
Darbhane Emini: Director of the imperial mint  
Darüssade Ağası: Chief of the staff of black eunuchs  
Defter: Register of accounts, log book  
Defter emini: keeper of registers, particularly dealing with the maintenance of records on land tenure  
Defterdar: Finance director, head of the finance department  
Defterdar-ı şıkırvan: First treasurer of the imperial treasury  
Defterdar-ı şıkırvan sani: Second treasurer. The director of the İrad-i Cedid treasury held this rank  
Defterdar-ı şıkırvan salis: Third treasurer of the imperial treasury  
Defterhane: Imperial land registry office for lands and taxes  
Defterhane kesedar: purse-bearer of the office of imperial chancery  
Devriye molla: judgeships of the larger towns of the judicial held on rotational basis  
Divân-ı hümâyun: Imperial council presided by the grand vizier  
Divân-ı hümâyun kesedarı: purse-bearer of the office of imperial chancery  
Divân kalemi: the office of imperial chancery presided over by beyliktü  
Dizdar: local fortress commander  
Dragoman: interpreter, salaried translators of the divan other departments such as finance and tax-farms of the pious endowments under the control of the Darüssade Ağası  
Duhanı şevketçi: Tobacco-carrier of a dignitary  
Duhanı şevketçi: tobacco customs  
Emanet: trusteeship, office of  
Emirü'l-hac/mirü'l-hac: leader of the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca  
Enderun: inner palace, inside service  
Enderun Ağa: lieutenant of the body guard of the Sultan. They were under the command of the bostancibaşi  
Enderun Ağası: Sergeant at arms in the body guard of the Sultan. They were under the command of the bostancibaşi  
Hazine kethüdası: The superintendent of the Treasury  
Haremeyn (evkaf) müftüsü: Pious endowment inspector  
Haremeyn muhasebecisi: Accountant of the pious endowments under the control of the Darüssade Ağası  
Haremeyn şefkâtı: the official who kept the records of the tax-farms of the pious endowments under the control of the Darüssade Ağası  
Hazardar-ı şakir: head of the office dealing out fetvas under the Şeyhülislam.  
Hacegan: “bureau chiefs” in the Porte  
Hane-i hassa: Department in the Palace where the sacred relics were kept  
Hazinedar: treasurer  

Ağası  
Haremeyn mukataacısı: the official who kept the records of the tax-farms of the pious endowments under the control of the Darüssade Ağası  
Haremeyn (evkaf) müftüsü: Pious endowments inspector  
(Hassa) Hasəki: Sergeant at arms in the body guard of the Sultan. They were under the command of the bostancibaşi  
Hasəki Ağası: lieutenant of the bostancibaşı  
Hazine kethüdası: The superintendent of the Treasury  
Hazinedar: treasurer
Helvahane: confectionary
Hilat: robe of honour
Hububat nazırı: Superintendent of grain and provisions
Humbarahane nazırı: The supervisor of the mortar corps
Humbaracı: mortar corps
huzur dersleri: Lecture-classes on Quran, a discussion of Quran verses among the foremost ulema in the presence of the Sultan
Hüccet-i Şeriyye: Legal Document prepared after the incident between the rebels and the leading state officials
Hüfez-i Şeriyye: Religious learned establishment, the educational and judicial organization of ulema
İmam-ı evvel: Chief Preacher to the Sultan
İrad-ı Cedit defterdarı: the director of İrad-ı Cedit treasury
Kapı çukadı: Chief Orderly, messenger between a provincial elite and central government office
Kapı halkı: A vizier’s household troops; private entourage
Kapıbasha: Head of the palace doorkeepers, an honorary title
Kapıcılar kethüdası: the superintendent of the Ushers, controller of the Wardens, the title of Kahvecibaşi: The official that prepared the coffee of the Sultan or a high dignitary.
Kahya Bey: Steward of the grand vizier. Originally he was domestic a servant of the grand vizier’s household but later became the agent of the grand vizier in military and political issues
Kaimmakam- rikab-ı hümâyün: Grand vezir’s deputy, lieutenant of the grand vizier during his absence from the capital in wartime.
Kapan naibi: Grain superintendent’s assistant
Kapandan-ı derya: Grand admiral
Kapı kethüda/kahya: official representative of a governor in İstanbul; the functionary who took the petitions to the Sultan as they were offered in public
Karakol/kolluk: outpost; police stations manned by the Janissaries important gates and other parts of the city
Karakol: messenger
Kazasker: one of the chief judges of Anatolia or Rumelia
Kese/kise: purse containing approximately of 500 guruş
Kethüda: warden, steward with various functions, a man dealing with the affairs of a high dignitary
Kethüda Bey/Kethüda-ı sadr-ı ali/sadaret kethüdası: Steward of the grand vizier.
Kethüda katibi: Secretary to the steward of the grand vizier
Kisedar: purse-bearer; supervisory official dealing with the processing of records on appointments of different sorts. Each office had a distinct kisedar.
Kabbe veziri: “vizier of the dome”, ex-officio member of the Imperial Council
Kal kahyası/kethüdası: deputy commander of the Janissaries
Kal katibi: paymaster general
Maheyn-i hümâyün: The private apartments of the Palace where the sultan received visitors
Maheynici: Court Chamberlain
Maliye tahvil kalemi: Assignment of Benefices in Land for the Finance Section
Maliye tezkercisi: Memorandum officer of the Finance Section
Mansib: a high office or rank
Masraf-ı şehrîyet: Expenditures of the Palace
Matbah emini: Chief of the palace kitchens
Mehterbaşı: guard
Mektubî/mektupçu/Mektubî-i sadr-ı ali: Corresponding secretary of the grand vizier
Mektubi-i sadaret halifesı: clerk in the office of the corresponding secretary
Mektubi-i hariciye: Corresponding secretary of Foreign Ministry
Mevseret: Consultative assembly
Mevacib: payroll, salary
Mevval: The chief judges of the Empire
Mevkufat kalemi: A general stores and payments bureau which also handled extraordinary levies
Mevkûfatı/mevkûfatçı: Controller of the stores and payments bureau
Mevleviye: rank, jurisdiction of a judge
Mirahor-ı evvel: Master of the Horse
Mirahor-ı sani: Second master of the Horse
mirimiran: Military Governor
molla: chief judge
**Muhafız:** garrison commander assigned to protect a sancak or vilayet in the absence of the incumbent, a fortress commander

**Muhasebe-i evvel:** Chief accountant

**Muhzir ağası:** Head of Janissary Ağası’s guard and controller of the prison in the Janissary Ağası’s headquarters

**Muhzir vekilli:** Deputy of Muhzir ağası

**Mukataa:** Revenue source, a source of state revenue farmed out to individuals for a specified number of years

**Mukattaac:** Tax-farmer

**Mutasarraf:** Governor of a province, sancak

**Mühbayaaq:** State merchant for provisioning of supplies of the state

**Müdderris:** Professor in a medrese

**Müftü:** Jurist

**Mühimmat naziri:** Supervisor of logistics

**Müdür:** Keeper of the seals, private secretary of a high official or minister, seal-bearer

**Müdürdar:** Deputy of a müdürdar

**Mütesellim:** A deputy governor or provincial head of administration

**Mütevelli:** Janissary officers presided over the treasury of regiments

**Naib:** Deputy judge

**Nakibâlegraf:** The chief of the Descendants of the Prophet Muhammed

**Nüzü emini:** Army supply master

**Odabaşı:** Chief of the barracks room

**Ordu kadısı:** judge-advocate of an army on active duty on the field.

**Paşa Kapısı/Bab-ı Asafi/Vezir Kapısı/Paşa Sarayı/Bab-ı Ali, served as the official bureau of the grand viziers before the Tanzimat Era. After Tanzimat it was called Bab-ı Ali (the Sublime Porte).**

**Piyade mukâbecelisi:** The functionary who keeps the records of the tmars

**Reisülküttab/Reis Efendi:** chief of the clerks, and head of the Ottoman chancery. From 18th onwards they undertook the foreign affairs

**Reisül-ulema:** title of the most senior members of the ulama

**Rikab başçavuş:** deputy of the başçavuş when he was away from the capital

**Rikab kethüdasi/rikab-i hümayun kethüdasi:** deputy of the sadaret kethüdasi

**Rikab-i hümayun reisi/reis vekili:** deputy to the Reisüküttab

**Rikab-i hümayun defterdari:** deputy of the defterdari during this absence from the capital

**Rikab-i hümayun kaimmakam:** Grand Vizier’s deputy, servant of the grand vizier during his absence from the capital in wartime.

**Ruznamçe-i evvel:** The clerk in charge of financial transactions

**Rüşûmat muhasebecisi:** accountant of the customs

**Saksoncubaşı:** chief keeper of the mastiffs

**Sancak:** a sub-province

**Şeğirîm aşçuları:** kitcheners of the Janissary army responsible for the distribution of the meat brought to the barracks

**Sekbanbaşı:** The second highest ranking officer, on the same level with the Kul Kethüda. During the absence of the Janissary Ağası in wartime, he acted on his behalf.

**Şerûrtnâme/turmacıbaşı:** The colonel of the 73rd Janissary regiment, the hunting attendants of the Sultan, it seems that it also became honorary title in 19th century.

**Silahşörlik:** The title of first regiment of Ottoman household cavalry

**Silahdar Ağası:** Sword-bearer, Sultan’s personal weapon carrier, the highest ranking page of the harem after the hasodaşbaşı chief of the privy chamber

**Silahdar kâtipi:** The secretary of the section of the cavalry units of the Imperial Household

**Sipah kâtipi:** secretary of the sipah (cavalry units) office

**Surre emini:** official entrusted with the delivery of the sure

**Süvari mukâbecelisi:** The functionary who keeps the records of the salaries of the cavalrymen and the harem ağas

**Talîmîli asker naziri:** supervisor of the trained soldiers

**Tebâdil hasekisi:** Palace officials who accompanied a sultan during his incognito inspections

**Tersane:** imperial shipyard of Istanbul; naval arsenal

**Tersane emini:** Director of the Istanbul shipyard; naval arsenal

**Tevkit-i divan-i hümayun:** Official who drew the signature of the sultan

**Tezkire-i evvel:** senior memorandum officer; chief of the section in charge of issuing payment documents titling the holders to certain privileges to collect certain revenue from the imperial treasury
Tezkereci: “memorandum officer” official charged with the duty of writing official memoranda
Tophane-i Amire: Imperial Foundry
Tarnaci: member of the 73rd Janissary regiment, the hunting attendant of the sultan
Ulema: (s. alim): men of religious science
Ulufe: salary, aksesinin yazdğini yaz.
Umur-i cihadiye naziri: Minister of War
Vezir müfettişi: The official responsible for the endowments under the surveillance of the grand viziers
Voyvoda: Administrator appointed to a tributary state; administrator of a mukataa.
Yamak: A supernumerary Janissaries; auxiliaries, Janissary in waiting
Yasakçı: a man who went in front to clear the way for a dignitary, guard of an ambassador or consul
Yeniçeri Ağası: the general of the Janissary corps
Zahire naziri: grain superintendent
Zecriye muhassili: collector of alcoholic beverage tax
Zimmet halifesli: official responsible for tracking bills receivable and agreements