‘A Reign of Terror’

CUP Rule in Diyarbekir Province, 1913-1923

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University of Amsterdam, Department of History
Master’s thesis ‘Holocaust and Genocide Studies’

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Preface

A little less than two decades ago, in my childhood, I became fascinated with violence, whether it was children bullying each other in school, fathers beating up their daughters for sneaking out on a date, or the omnipresent racism that I did not understand at the time. In essence, I was interested in why people hurt each other physically and psychologically. The German occupation of the Netherlands provided much food for thought, so I started reading thick popular books and Dutch war novels in primary school. Later, in my adolescence, this interest became more serious as it crystallized further to include the televised race riots in Los Angeles, the nationalist wars like those in Yugoslavia or Eastern Turkey, the televised Rwandan genocide, and finally, the Holocaust – my first monomaniac fascination. I was absorbed by the black-and-white propaganda movies of thousands of well-dressed Nazis rhythmically marching and saluting through streets draped with hundreds of flags. But this was no over-moralized cliché anti-Nazi statement. On the contrary, my interest was rooted in other emotions: I wanted to be like them, to experience in person that nationalist hysteria, the feeling of belonging to an enormity, the unlimited power, and the occult satisfaction of mass hate. But upon seeing the images of the death camps, the children, the injections, the obscenity of the body count, I realized that something insane was going on. With very strong emotions of righting injustice, I wanted to leap into history to free the victims, break their chains, tear down the barbed wire and end the suffering.

Since I was determined to know more about the evils committed in this period, I kept searching and finding material about the Nazi genocide. I wrote several papers and organized a documentary screening about the shoah, and by the time the topic was finally taught in my third-year history class, I knew more about it than my history teacher, Mr. Henk Wes, whom I would like to thank on this occasion for his inspiring classes and for urging me to pursue my interest further. In this never-ending quest for finding satisfying answers to those disturbing questions haunting me since my childhood, I registered for Sociology at the University of Groningen. With the intellectual equipment of the modern social sciences, genocide didn’t seem like an unfathomable mystery anymore. Since the dawn of time human beings have been involved in organizing the mass-murder of their fellow human beings. Along with a growing expertise in genocide studies and a continuous process of redefining ethic frameworks, I became interested in the Armenian Genocide. Not only was this one of the major examples of modern genocide, it was also carried out in the region where I was born (Eastern Turkey). Well before any scholarly exercise I began interviewing the elderly from that region, as will be explained in the introduction. Not only did I realize that the events were very much alive in the collective memories of present local communities, it also became clear that these memories fully contradicted the denialist policies of Turkish state organs. In order to fully commit myself to a more or less thorough study
of an aspect of the genocide, I opted for the one-year MA programme that the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies offered at the University of Amsterdam. During this intensive course I experienced a very productive year, culminating in 3 publications and this MA thesis.

Naturally, I owe many people gratitude. First of all, thanks to the CHGS staff for their ceaseless efforts to consort with their parameters as this included educating their students; Ton Zwaan of the University of Amsterdam for guiding me through the process of understanding how human societies and genocides function; the staff at the Zoryan Institute for everything; Osman Aytar of Stockholm University for providing addresses in Istanbul; Ara Sarafian of the Gomidas Institute for everything including chip butty; Mesut Özcan of Kalan Publishing for everything; Samuel Totten of the University of Arkansas for giving me books; Erdal Gezik for his inspiration and hospitality; Canan Seyfeli of Ankara University for sending me certain ciphers; Hilmar Kaiser for intellectual exchanges; Fuat Dündar for re-emphasizing important details of archival research; the staff of the Ottoman archives in Istanbul for their professional help; Jan Bet-Sawoce for his help on Syriac sources; in particular Ahmet Taşğın of Diyarbakır Dicle University for everything; Müfit Yüksel for sharing his erudition; Mark Levene of Southampton University for his help and enthusiasm; Gürdal Aksoy for help with oral history; Şerafettin Kocaman of the Beyazıt Library for help with the Takvim-i Vekayi issues; Sabri Atman for introducing me to Syriac society; George Aghjayan for sending me oral histories; Zülfikar Özdoğan of the International Institute for Social History for help with sources; Fatih Özdemir of Middle East Technic University for intellectual exchanges, and Ali Levent Üngör for carrying my suitcase with 46 kilos of books from Turkey to Germany. I specifically thank my good friend Nışan Sarcan, whose help and support during the writing process was indispensable. Then, I also have to thank the dozens of (partly anonymous) respondents that I interviewed for the sake of oral history material.

Special acknowledgement also goes out to the AUV Fund (University of Amsterdam) and GUF Fund (University of Groningen). With a generous grant each, their financial support facilitated my research greatly.

Above all I would like to thank my supervisors: Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate and Dr. Karel Berkhoff of the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam.

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Introduction

This is a study of Ottoman government policies in the province of Diyarbekir from 1913 to 1918. In this period, the Ottoman Empire was under the rule of the then reigning ‘Committee of Union and Progress’ (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti). From 1913 on, a small but radical faction within this semi-official political party ordered empire-wide campaigns of ethnic cleansing, involving mass-deportation, forced assimilation, and genocidal destruction of various ethnic communities. Hundreds of Arab, Armenian, Kurdish, Syriac, and other communities suffered losses as a result of these forced relocations and persecutions. Combined with wartime famines due to corruption, failed harvests due to deportations, and the outbreak of contagious diseases, millions of human beings died. The CUP put its policies into practice for the sake of a thorough ethno-religious homogenization of the empire, resulting in the establishment of a Turkish nation-state in 1923. In the first Republican decades, processes of social engineering went on as many CUP potentates remained influential and continued to formulate and implement new nation-building policies in the Turkish Republic.

Although several general studies on these ethnic policies have been written, there are only few case-studies.1 The wartime history of provinces such as Bitlis, Adana, Mamuret-ul Aziz, or Diyarbekir have been left practically unexplored by historians. This study will analyze the wartime history of Diyarbekir province, which has been selected because of its centrality in the Ottoman Empire. Its administrative, legal, and military importance is illustrated by the fact that it lodged a powerful governorship, a court-martial, and the Second Army. Furthermore, it harboured a broad diversity of ethnic and social groups of whom little is known. Diyarbekir is especially an interesting case because it can provide opportunity for testing the following research questions.

As mentioned above, the two main lacunes in the historiography of the First World War of the Ottoman Empire are firstly the local implementation of anti-Christian policies, and secondly the fact that many other communities suffered losses too. These two issues will be addressed for Diyarbekir province: the deportation and destruction of Ottoman Christians, and the deportation and settlement of Ottoman Muslims. It is not widely contested that between 1914 and 1924 Anatolia was more or less cleansed of Ottoman Christians through migration, forced conversion, deportation, and massacres. Throughout time, these events came to be known as ‘the Armenian Genocide’, the planned, coordinated CUP program of systematic destruction of the Ottoman Armenian community.2 However, history proves to be more complex as innovating research

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shows that many issues of this human catastrophe remain unaccounted for. One of these issues is the relationship between center and periphery during the deportations, in other words, how (in)dependent local civil servants were of the central authorities. A second issue is the fate of other (non-Muslim) minorities. Since this study is on Diyarbekir province, the lesser known experiences of Syriacs and Yezidis will be included. It is known that they were subjected to similar genocidal attacks, but questions remain on how this should be conceptualized. Thirdly, the long history of Kurdish-Armenian relations included periods of coexistence alternated with periods of friction, the large-scale political violence of 1915 being a milestone of friction. Yet, relatively little research has been done on the complex and often ambivalent actions of Kurdish individuals and tribes before, during and after the genocide. The participation of Kurdish tribesmen in the massacring of Christians will also be considered in detail for Diyarbekir. Regarding the second core problem, there is little detailed research on deportations of Kurds. It is unclear whether Kurdish citizens were deported out of wartime necessities to thwart off their potential alliances with Russia, or whether these deportations were premeditated programs of ethnic restructuring and forced assimilation. Then again, this approach needs to reckon with the Balkan migrants that were forced to settle in the eastern provinces, Diyarbekir included. Naturally, all of these questions cannot be answered exhaustingly, but these critical issues may pave the way for new areas of inquiry.

Until recently, scholarly studies on the CUP have expounded on its genesis, organizational structure, cadre, and ideology. Many aspects of its demographic plans and factual policies towards the Ottoman population, including their consequences for the communities and regions involved, remain obscure. This study aims at filling this gap by attempting to contribute to our empirical understanding of CUP policies in Diyarbekir province. A comprehensive analysis of the period, including a full discussion of the entire scheme of social engineering, is outside the scope of this study, therefore only one province will be at the center of our attention: Diyarbekir. Sporadically we will glance beyond its provincial borders, as this will only be done in cases where the particular can only be explained by the general, i.e. to contextualize Diyarbekir in the bureaucratic fabric of Ottoman society.

Before proceeding into the structure of this thesis, it is first important to point out why it seems necessary to focus on Diyarbekir as a key to understanding the aforementioned problems. Grasping the relationship between center and periphery requires concentrating on a region per se. This is significant because the implementation of any policy depended on the balance between the administrative autonomy of governors and mayors on the one hand, and the Interior Ministry on the other. Important topics are the different levels of state involvement in the process, local

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tensions and power structures utilized by the state, the varied position of the local populations to
the policies, different forms of resistance and collaboration, and the actual implementation of the
process as to who is involved and under what circumstances. This way, an analysis of the meso-
level would bridge the gap between the too general macro- and too specific micro-level. Firstly,
Diyarbakir was to constitute a hub where deportees were concentrated from all over the vast
empire. Secondly, Diyarbakir province harboured a formidable diversity of ethnic and religious
communities. Each of these has its (often very traumatic) collective memories and popular
narratives about the period thus it seems meaningful to explore these and compare the various
experiences. Since written sources were scarce among the population of Diyarbekir, an appeal
for use of oral history will be made. Last but not least, this regional approach is methodologically
useful in terms of writing hitherto neglected local history.

This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the political
situation in the Ottoman Empire at the eve of the war, in particular the ideas and actions of the
CUP vis-à-vis their subject nationalities. Its three concepts, crisis, nationalism, and ethnic
restructuring will be elaborated as the chapter concentrates on key decisions taken by the CUP, in
the period 1910-1914. The chapter will also provide a bird’s eye view of Diyarbekir province
before the outbreak of the war. Along with brief ethnographic and socio-economic explorations,
this will deal with intercommunal relations and with the Turkification of administrative posts by
loyal and influential CUP members. Chapter two examines the persecution of the Christians in
the province of Diyarbekir. This reconstruction will focus on the fate of the Diyarbekir province
Armenians and Syriacs (including the Tur Abdin region), and on passing convoys of deportees.
The role of Kurdish tribesmen in the persecution will also be scrutinized. Chapter three takes up
the deportations of Kurds to the western provinces and their intended assimilation into the newly
formulated Turkish culture. It intends to reflect the situation in Diyarbekir in the aftermath of the
war, when the destructions had ebbed down. It will also look into the actions of remaining CUP
members and local accomplices, and the implications of the war for Diyarbekir. Chapter four will
conclude by summing up the main findings of this study and adding some more general remarks
on the context of the events.

The material for this study is based on original documentation from Ottoman, American
and European consular, diplomatic, and private archives and memoirs. Ottoman archival material
is unquestionably the prime source for any discussion of the deportations. The Ottoman
archives, located in the Sultanahmet district in European Istanbul, are not only one of the richest

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collections of official, archival state documentation in the world, they also permit the historian in her/his research to descend to the provincial level without any shortage of documentation. However, use of the Ottoman archives also bears certain restrictions, in that the archival material unearthed for the CUP period needs to be treated with reservation and careful assessment. Due to the sectarian and secretive nature of the CUP many decisions and orders were issued orally. This is especially true for compromising situations such as murderous orders. Therefore, it is futile to delve in the Ottoman archives for direct references containing the destruction of an entire group. For this reason, post-war court-martial records, parliamentary investigations, and memoirs of CUP potentates will supplement state documents. In addition to official documents, a bottom-up perspective will also be utilized. Perpetrator, survivor, or bystander memoirs are very useful in drawing local pictures and furnish details on small cities, villages, neighbourhoods, and families. Oral history fulfills a crucial role in bridging the gap between the historian’s fetishism for written documentation and the anthropologist’s diversified heuristic program. Even though nine decades have passed since the events, many details remain strikingly vivid in the admittedly fragmented memory base of Eastern Anatolian communities. This is particularly valid for (often rural) communities with no written traditions, such as Alevi, Syria, or Kurds.

Thus, oral history is certainly a legitimate method of obtaining data. Fortunately, a lot of work has already been carried out: there are extensive Armenian oral history collections and survivor testimonies on the genocide. Other collections, both in Turkey and in Europe, are in the making. The complexity of Ottoman society and relative paucity of detailed, micro-level material regarding our topic requires this multi-dimensional approach.

14 In the past decade the History Department of Sabanci University in Turkey initiated a broad and ambitious oral history project: <http://www.sabanciuniv.edu/sozlutarih>. The History Foundation (Tarih Vakfi, not to be confused with the semi-official Turkish History Foundation, Türk Tarih Kurumu) has completed several projects and continues its oral history activities. Sözlü Tarih Kılavuzu (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1993). The Netherlands Dersim Foundation (Hollanda Dersim Vakfı) is currently transcribing hundreds of oral history interviews with elderly Dersimites.
Chapter 1: ‘Turkey for the Turks’

1.1 Crises in the Ottoman Empire

From the middle of the nineteenth century on, the Ottoman Empire was vexed by several crises as politicians struggled for the political survival and cultural formation of the decaying empire. From the middle of the nineteenth century on, the Ottoman Empire was vexed by several crises as politicians struggled for the political survival and cultural formation of the decaying empire.15

The reigning Sultan, Abdulhamid II (1842-1918), struggled with managing the power balance between his government and various oppositional political groups. The Sultan, a pious, intelligent but ruthless leader, became the controversial 34th Sultan of the House of Osman. The core concept during his autocratic rule (1876-1909) was centralization of all domains of Ottoman society: education, taxation, communication, transportation, and other societal areas were thoroughly centralized and improved. Parallel to these developments, the Sultan enforced censorship on the press and organized dozens of tribes into irregular mounted regiments called Hamidiye that massacred many Armenian communities in Eastern Anatolia in the 1890s.

Grappling with a manifold political crisis, Abdulhamid remained in power and continued his despotic regime in spite of two unsuccessful attempts at his life.16 As the 20th century set in, the fragmented opposition became more outspoken in its ideas and began exerting critical influence on Ottoman politics.

One of the many oppositional parties in the decades before the First World War was the ‘Committee of Union and Progress’ (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), founded in 1899 at the Medical Academy in Istanbul. The cadre of the CUP was made up of intellectuals, state officials and young military officers, pushing for installment of the constitution and the convention of parliament. The main force behind the organization was the chief telegraphist of Salonica, Mehmed Talât (1874-1921),17 who, after 1906, came to lead a major faction within the still secret CUP. Other groups within the CUP were the group around İsmail Enver (1881-1922),18 a young major in the Third Army Corps. As a result of lobbying and disseminating propaganda among

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15 İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun en uzun Yüzyılı (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), pp.13-32.
17 Talât was born in 1874 as the son of a minor Ottoman civil servant. He graduated from Edirne High School, joined the staff of the telegraph company in Edirne, but was arrested in 1893 by the Abdulhamid regime for subversive political activities. After two years imprisonment, he was appointed chief secretary of post in Salonica and rendered important services to the CUP. After the revolution of 1908, he became member of parliament for Edirne, and in 1909, he rose to the rank of Minister of the Interior. He was subsequently appointed Minister of Post and then elected Secretary General of the CUP in 1912, further boosting his power base within the party. In 1914 he yielded to Enver Paşa’s pressure to enter the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. As Minister of the Interior he was responsible for the deportation and persecution of the Ottoman Armenians. In 1917 he became Grand Vizier but resigned on 14 October 1918, two weeks before the Ottoman capitulation. Together with Enver Paşa and Cemal Paşa he fled in a submarine to Germany, where he was murdered in Berlin on 15 March 1921 in an act of revenge by Soghomon Tehlirian, an Armenian hitman. In 1943, his remains were flown over to Turkey and reburied in Istanbul. Tevfik Çavdar, Talât Paşa: Bir örgüt ustası'nın yaşam öyküsü (Ankara: Dost, 1984).
18 Born on 22 November 1881 in Istanbul, Enver began making a career in the Ottoman army at a young age. In 1908 he was one of the three leaders of the CUP movement that rebelled against Abdulhamid. From 1909-11 he served as military attaché to Berlin and became thoroughly Germanophile. When Italy occupied Libya, Enver organised the Ottoman resistance in Tripoli. 1913 saw Enver lead the bloody coup d’état, after which he remained an influential member of the Ottoman government until 1918. In 1914 Enver had become Minister of War and, after purging army officers deemed disloyal to the CUP, conducted secret negotiations with Germany aimed at constructing a military alliance. The calamitous defeat at Sarıkamış on 29 December 1914 severely damaged his charisma, but Enver fought back and with Russia withdrawing from the war in 1917, he pushed the Ottoman forces into Baku in 1918. The arrival of the armistice and the end of the war caused Enver to flee to Germany in a submarine. From there, he left for Central Asia with the aim of uniting the Turkic peoples in a pan-Turkian state. His political fantasies ended when he was killed in the 1921 revolt by the Basmachi against the Bolsheviks on 4 August 1922. Louis A. Springer, “The Romantic Career of Enver Pasha,” in: Asia, vol.17, no.6 (1917), pp.457-61.
Ottoman citizens, the CUP exerted enough pressure on Abdulhamid for him to proclaim the constitution on 23 April 1908. The re-installment of the constitution and the parliament was by no means the cure for all diseases the Ottoman Empire suffered. On the contrary, one could contend that it in many ways it contributed to a deconcentration of power and increased the incapability of the government in dealing with the ensuing crises.

From 1909 on the ailing empire grappled with a severe crisis, comprised of internal and external pressures. Internally, the country was torn due to uprisings of both nationalist and rustic varieties. Between 1904 and 1911, a continuous war raged between the Ottoman army and rebellious Arabs in the remote southeastern province Yemen. The war had a detrimental effect upon Ottoman military morale due to the high death rate among Ottoman soldiers, compared to other fronts. An other boiling pot was Albania, that demanded autonomy in 1910 even though its population was predominantly Muslim and nationalism hadn’t gained foothold among larger segments of Albanian society. Kosovo and Montenegro too became scenes of important uprisings between 1910 and 1912. The Dersim region with its small but heavily armed Kızılbaş population rose in rebellion in 1911 and 1912. Most of these uprisings were caused by either organized ethnic nationalism or discontent with Ottoman rule, such as taxation and military conscription. The centralizing efforts of respective Ottoman governments in the Balkans did not offer much solace and proved counterproductive. But rebellions initiatives were conceived in the Anatolian provinces as well, where intercommunal friction was prevalent and governmental control weak. Moreover, provincial centers like Van, Bitlis, and Diyarbekir were hotbeds of Armenian and Kurdish separatist nationalism. At this juncture, Zionism too started becoming a serious problem for the Ottoman government. Since this form of secular Jewish nationalism was fixated upon establishing settlements and independence in Palestine, it was a harmful ideology for the Ottoman elite. It is not difficult to surmise that the effect of these series of internal crises was not beneficial to societal peace.

The external crisis wasn’t any milder. First of all, the Ottoman Ministry of Economy had to cope with exorbitant debts: for 1908-1909 the country owed its creditors 11,711,128 Turkish pounds, which dropped to 11,000,004 pounds for 1910-1911, approximately one-thirds of the Ottoman national budget. This kept the empire at the edge of bankruptcy. The major Western powers had been encroaching upon Ottoman territory for the sake of imperialist expansion for a long time. Italy occupied Tripolitania in October 1912 and escaped potential repercussions

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because of Ottoman military impotence and British rejection of intervention in favour of the Ottomans. CUP efforts of deploying a paramilitary expedition including Enver proved futile; the Italian government even ordered bombings of Gallipoli. Bitter and disillusioned, the Ottoman government, lead by Minister of the Interior Kâmil Paşa (1823-1913), turned its back on the European powers and could only organize an ineffective economic boycott when Austria-Hungary officially annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina. The most severe and acute crisis hadn’t come forth yet. Emboldened by these exhibitions of Ottoman humiliations, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire in October 1912. The Ottoman armed forces, underpaid and underfed, struggled with their technically obsolete weapons and could not hold long. Completely demoralized, the army retreated to the outskirts of Istanbul and awaited the terms of truce the Balkan countries issued on 3 December 1912.

Although Edirne, the former capital of the Ottoman Empire, was being besieged and desperately in need of relief, the negotiations of 22 January indicated that the government would surrender this important city to the Bulgarian government. The CUP was infuriated and a group of hardliners including Talât, Enver, the particularly powerful doctors Bahaeddin Şakir and Nâzım, orator Ömer Naci, militant Yakup Cemil and others embarked on a reckless raid to the ‘Sublime Porte’ (Bâb-ı Âlî), the governmental building. On 23 January 1913 in the afternoon, the building was surrounded and occupied by a dozen armed men. In the ensuing skirmish, three CUP members and many guards were killed as the short-tempered Yakup Cemil shot the Minister of Defense, and Enver walked into a cabinet meeting and boldly demanded the immediate resignation of the cabinet. The coup d’état was a success.

The period 1908-1914 was characterized by fiery political discussions about religion, modernity, and population politics. In the apocalyptic atmosphere in Istanbul, other political factions like the ‘Freedom and Coalition Party’ (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası) were pushing for radical changes too. However, of all these different parties, the CUP would emerge victorious owing to Talât’s organizational talent combined with Enver’s ruthless decisiveness. The country was now on the verge of a new episode in its long and problematic history. The humiliating defeats of the Balkan wars coupled with ethnically organized massacres on all sides did not only mark a new stage in the life-threatening crisis for the Ottoman Empire, that now lost its most profitable and

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30 Besides its political importance, Edirne bore a particularly emotional significance for many CUP members such as Talât, who was born and raised in Edirne. According to his wife, the only instance when she saw Talât cry rivers of tears was when his hometown fell. “Eşi Hayriye Hamam Talât Paşayı anlatıyor,” in: Yakın Tarihçimiz, vol.II (1962), p.194. His misery quickly turned into vengefulness when he dragged an ill Enver out of the hospital to encourage him to recapture Edirne. He then personally rushed to the front in a self-sacrificial attempt to fight along the ranks of Ottoman troops but was sent back. Tevfik Cavadar, Talât Paşa [n.17], pp.249-51.
32 For the periodization of the Young Turk period as 1908-1950 see: Erik-Jan Zürcher, Een geschiedenis van het moderne Turkije (Nijmegen: Sun, 1995), 113-268.
fertile provinces. It also struck an emotional chord among many CUP members, of whom many where born and raised in places like Monastir, Salonica, Plovdiv, and other cities. A high-ranking commander of the CUP’s paramilitary wing,34 wrote in his memoirs that the humiliations in the Balkans stirred feelings of revenge in Enver Paşa as he raged:

“It is completely unacceptable to forget the valleys and plateaus that were conquered with the blood of our ancestors; to leave the squares, mosques, tombs, bridges, monasteries and castles where Turkish warriors reigned for 400 years, in the hands of the previous inhabitants; to be expelled from Thrace to Anatolia. I am more than willing to dedicate the rest of my life to take revenge on the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Macedonians.” Yes, as Enver Paşa spoke these words, he got excited, his face turned red, and lightning struck in his eyes. He truly wanted to avenge the Balkan war and would do anything to accomplish this.35

In a personal letter Enver wrote: “Pour sentir plus amèrement toutes les blessures et se préparer pour une vengeance plus cruelle, je veux que toutes les générations prochaines sentent les hontes que nous portons et se venge plus durément envers nos ennemis”.36 Later he added: “[N]otre haine se fortifie: vengeance, vengeance, vengeance, pas d’autre mot!”37

In the months after the coup, the CUP, wielding power from behind the scenes, would gradually impose a violent dictatorship upon the country. Enver greedily reconquered Edirne, was promoted to general, and became Minister of War. The new cabinet stood under the auspices of Talât, who had become Minister of the Interior. As the CUP kept absorbing political power, it also became more repressive:

To them politics was much more than a game and having seized power they meant to hold on to it. To do so they were willing to use all possible means, so that repression and violence became the order of the day. Nothing was sacred in the pursuit of power and those guilty of dissent must be prepared to pay with their lives.38

Slowly but steadily the political climate in Istanbul depacified to an extent unseen in the Abdulhamid era, with political violence becoming commonplace. These assassinations were carried out by organized gangsters loyal to factions around Talât and especially Enver. Hüseyin Cahit (1875-1957), publisher of Tanin, one of the most important newspapers of the period, witnessed one of these political murders as a hitman loyal to Enver Paşa shot an opponent of the CUP in his presence.39 The CUP became the propelling force behind Ottoman state terror. What had started out as a moderate political party pressing for reforms, developed into a vindictive, violent dictatorship, which furthermore became rabidly nationalist.

34 The commander in question was Hüsamettin Ertürk. The CUP’s paramilitary wing was called ‘Special Organization’, whose two-fold task it was to foray across the eastern border, and to carry out ethnic cleansing against Ottoman minorities. Philip H. Stoddard, The Ottoman government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: a preliminary study of the Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa (unpublished dissertation, Princeton University, 1963).
37 Enver to a German friend, 8 May 1913, in: Ibid., p.242.
The evolution of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire is a long and complex path through myriad twists of the minds of Ottoman intellectuals and international geopolitics. Since the 19th century, the concept, imported from the French Revolution by authors like Nâhil Kemal (1840-1888), became more and more influential among the new generation educated during the Abdulhamid era. The majority of politicians in the CUP adopted some form of nationalism as the war drew nearer. Although a full discussion of the ideological debates within the CUP is outside the scope of this study, a brief description of the ideas of influential thinkers and powerful politicians is necessary in order to comprehend the policies that were in effect after 1913.

Since Turkish nationalism was in its incipient phase, the very definition of the nation caused disagreement among Ottoman intellectuals. What was the ‘nation’ of the Ottoman state? The first coherent attempt at expounding a nationalism was written by Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), who published an article titled Three Types of Policy in 1909. In this pamphlet Akçura pointed out that the impossibility of forging a nation out the Ottoman minorities precluded the ideology of Ottomanism to be successful. Akçura then targeted Islamism and declared it dead because of the genesis of nationalism among Muslim minorities like Albanians and Kurds. He urged his readers to embrace (pan-) Turkism as their future ideal. According to Akçura, pan-Turkism (Turanism) would prevent Russia from intruding in Eastern Anatolia and would unite all Turkophone ethnic groups in one state ‘from Vienna to the Chinese wall’. Although his theories were as clear as crystal for Akçura, others had reservations. In CUP texts the national ‘in-group’ is often designated as the Ottoman Muslims, alternately called “Muslims” (İslamlar) or “Turks” (Türkler), and it was the latter category that caused much controversy. There were many slogans containing the term ‘Turk’, but it was never quite clear who these ‘Turks’ were.

A good example of this dilemma is a polemic between Halide Edib (Adıvar), a feminist nationalist author,42 and Mehmed Ziya (Gökalp), party ideologue of the CUP.43 In an article published during the war, Halide Edib pleaded for abandoning the notion of Turanism and concentrating on Anatolia as the homeland of the ‘new Turks’. Gökalp, on the other hand, criticized her for ignoring other Turkish groups and emphasizes cultural nationalism instead of territorial nationalism. Gökalp continued to state that “it becomes clear that our nation consists

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42 Halide Edib Adıvar (1889-1964) was born in a Sabatayist (Jewish convert) family from Salonica. She emerged to the scene of Turkish politics as a staunch patriot but criticized CUP policies against the minorities. This did not refrain her from directing orphanages in Lebanon where Armenian children were turkified, an integral part of the persecution of the Christians. After 1919 she supported Mustafa Kemal ( Atatürk) and became a professor of literature in the Turkish Republic. Muazzer Uyguner, Halide Edip Adıvar (İstanbul: Varlık, 1968).
43 Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) was perhaps the most influential intellectual of the CUP era. He was born in Cermik (Diyarbekir) from a Zaza mother and Turkish father. He studied in Istanbul but was banned back to Diyarbekir because of his support for the constitutional movement. He published countless articles in many journals, founded the CUP branch in Diyarbekir and quickly rose to become a member of the ‘Central Committee’ (Merkez-i Umami) of the CUP. After the war he was banned to Malta and began working for the Kemalists in Diyarbekir. Taha Parla, The social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876-1924 (Leiden: Brill, 1985).
of Turkophone Muslims”.45 This exchange between Gökalp and Adıvar symbolizes two trends in CUP nationalism: Anatolian-Turkish nationalism, and Turanist-Turkish nationalism. No matter how intense the debates were between these ideologues, they all agreed on one thing: the new nation was to be made up of Turkish Muslims.

One should not conclude from this brief overview that a uniform interpretation of nationalism existed in the CUP. On the contrary, the sectarian nature of CUP allowed for sub-groups to maintain their differing opinions on the nature and virulence of nationalism.46 Although there are indications that certain individuals in the CUP had adopted an intolerant form of Turkish nationalism from 1906 on,47 this did not apply to the general current of the CUP:

\[\text{The Unionists were motivated by a peculiar brand of Ottoman Muslim nationalism, which was to a very high degree reactive. It was defined in a particular and antagonistic relationship between Muslims who had been on the losing side in terms of wealth and power for the best part of a century and Ottoman Christians who had been the winners. The Unionists' ideology was nationalist in the sense that they demanded the establishment of a state of their own: before 1918 they took every step to make the existing Ottoman state the Muslims' own and after 1918 they fought to preserve what remained of that Ottoman Muslim state and to prevent it from being carved up. But the nation for which they demanded this political home was that of the Ottoman Muslims – not that of all of the Ottomans, not only that of the Turks and certainly not that of all the Muslims in the world.48}\]

An important aspect of Turkish nationalism was that the CUP began founding local nationalist centers and CUP branches all over the empire. This way they were able to gather regional information and indoctrinate the local notables with Turkish nationalism. Gradually, debate on the identity of the state was no longer the prerogative of a select group of educated intellectuals. On 22 March 1912 a group of Ottoman intellectuals founded the ‘Turkish Hearths’ (Türk Ocağı), an organization involved in disseminating Turkish nationalist propaganda among the Ottoman Muslims. Although the organization was intended to operate independently from the CUP, Talât tried to control it by having Ziyâ Gökalp ‘infiltrate’ the headquarters of the Turkish Hearths. From then on the Hearths’ official journal, ‘Turkish Homeland’ (Türk Yurdu), began publishing articles full of nationalist slogans, wishful threats, and military fantasies.49 An other organization controlled by the CUP was the ‘Society for National Defense’ (Müdafaa-ı Milliye Cemiyeti), a semi-secretive faction of CUP members ready to pledge themselves to commit any act that would Turkify the empire. This organization, lead by Kara Kemal (d. 1926) and closely connected

46 Memoirs of peripheral CUP members reveal that the CUP was comprised of three main factions, corresponding to the omnipotent triumvirate: a Turanist, pro-German group around Enver Paşa, a group of patriotic hardliners around Talât, and a more liberal group around Cemal Paşa. Although a conforming ideology was an important element in the formation of these groups, nepotism and loyalty perhaps were the decisive factors. Faîth Rifki Atay, Zeytindagi (Istanbul: Bateş, 1981), p.38.
47 Answering to the question whether Armenians were allowed to join the CUP, two CUP members wrote in a letter: “Ottoman non-Muslims are allowed to join our party on one condition. Our organization is a purely Turkish one. It will never agree with the enemies of Islam and Turkism.” Dr. Bahadeddin Şakir and Dr. Nâzım to Hayri Efendi, 2 June 1906, in: Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991), vol.2, part 4, p.115.
to other CUP organizations launched a campaign of ‘nationalization’ well before the war. Their control of several monopolies such as that on tobacco, sugar, and petrol, allowed them to sell supplies at astronomic prices, bringing forth huge profits – all under the banner of ‘nationalization’ of the economy.\(^{50}\) One of the foundations intent upon indoctrinating the Ottoman Muslim youth with nationalism and militarism,\(^{51}\) was the ‘National Turkish Student Association’ (\(\text{Millî Türk Talebe Birliği}\)). Şükrü Kaya (1883-1959), an inconspicuous but very important CUP insider served in its board of commissioners.\(^{52}\) The overlap between all of these new organizations was obvious: they were all ‘national’ (\(\text{millî}\)) in character and would obviate any potential hazard to the national, Turkish renaissance.

Total or near-total power allowed the CUP to extend their dictatorship to the Ottoman provinces. They sought to accomplish this by the appointment of trusted party loyalists as mayors and governors. Though many of these organizational structures were unofficial,\(^{53}\) some individuals were openly appointed governor (\(\text{vali}\)) or delegate (\(\text{murahhas}\)). They were employed for the sake of collecting local information and putting the CUP ideology into practice. Examples of wartime CUP governors were Rahmi Bey (Izmir), Cemal Azmi (Trabzon), Ahmed Muammer (Sivas), Hasan Tahsin (Erzurum), Cevdet Bey (Van), Sabit Bey (Mamuret-ül Aziz), Mustafa Abdüllhalik (Bitlis), Ali Münif (Cebel-i Lübnan), and the for this study relevant Dr. Mehmed Reşid (Diyarbekir). In the army too, purges were carried out by Enver Paşa, who single handedly sought to rejuvenate the corps but in the process also dismissed ostensibly disloyal elements, and employed military staff with CUP affinities. The CUP also began developing its connections with influential urban Muslim elites in provincial capitals and smaller cities. Opportunistic Kurdish notables in Bitlis\(^{54}\) and chieftains of the Balaban tribe in Erzincan\(^{55}\) seeking to settle scores with rival tribes began collaborating with local CUP henchmen. In exchange for pledging wartime loyalty they would receive logistic support and material compensation.\(^{56}\) The principal aim of this entire undertaking was to gradually gain control over the various populations of eastern Turkey in order to implement plans of ethnic restructuring of the Ottoman Empire.

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\(^{50}\) Nâzım H. Polat, \(\text{Müdafaa-ı Millive Cemiyeti}\) (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1991).

\(^{51}\) Zafer Toprak, “\text{Ittihat ve Terakki’nin paramiliter gençlik örgütleri},” in: \(\text{Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi}\), vol.7 (1979), pp.95-113.

\(^{52}\) M. Çağatay Okutan, \(\text{Millî Türk Talebe Birliği (MTTB) 1916-1960}\) (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004).

\(^{53}\) These covert structures were mostly acquaintanceships and familial relationships such as Talât’s personal friendship with Kara Kemal, but also Enver’s brother-in-lawship with Cevdet, governor of Van. Though many CUP members were non-Sabetayists, some were related to each other through several large extended families of Sabetayist descent from Salonica (16th-century Sephardic converts), such as the Kapançi, Yakubi, and Karağaç families. Together, these networks formed the social basis of the CUP elite. Elie Kedourie, “Young Turks, Freemasons and Jews,” in: \(\text{Middle Eastern Studies}\), vol.7, no.1 (1971), pp.89-104.

\(^{54}\) \(\text{Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arsivi}\) (Ottoman Archives İstanbul, hereafter cited as \(\text{BOA}\)), DH.KMS 19/27, Talât to Bitlis and Van, 4 April 1914.

\(^{55}\) Vatan Özgül, “\text{İttihat ve Terakki ve Balaban Aşireti: Bazı Belgeler Işığında İňihatlarının Aşiret Çalışmaları},” in: \(\text{Toplumsal Tarih}\), vol.16, no.96 (2001), pp.38-42.
1.2 ‘Nationalization’ of the population

It is not precisely clear when the CUP planned to engage in an all-out, full-frontal campaign of ‘nationalization’, i.e. Turkification of the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, it is possible to reconstruct some of the key processes and decisions that may very likely have lead to shaping wartime policies. Three parallel developments were in effect during the years before the war. First, an ethno-religious polarization at the highest political level impelled the CUP leadership to steer away from political pluralism: according to them, only their vision was an acceptable model for the Ottoman Empire. Convinced that the country could only be saved by forcefully transforming it into a ethnically homogenous state with an ethnically homogenous population, it took several key decisions. Second, detailed ethnographic research on almost all non-Turkish Ottoman peoples was to facilitate these plans of ethnic restructuring. Third, the CUP initiated a policy of implementing several trial balloons aiming at Turkification of many domains of Ottoman society.

It was no surprise that the huge losses of the Balkan wars, the ensuing establishment of nation states by formerly Ottoman subjects, and the persecution of Ottoman Muslims in those regions, confirmed suspicions in the CUP that non-Turkish Ottomans could not be trusted. The conclusions the CUP drew from its analysis of the political predicament of the Ottoman minorities quickly turned very hostile. In the tense ambience of the Ottoman parliament, the various (Turkish, Greek, Arab, Armenian, Kurdish) politicians couldn’t stand each other any longer and ignored, accused, cursed, provoked, or even threatened each other. Especially from the Balkan wars on, ethnic-minority members of parliament often polemicized with CUP members about the laws of Turkification they continuously issued. Very often these ethnic-minority members supported each other in common solidarity during plenary debates against the CUP.57 In this constellation, the CUP kept emphasizing the victimization of the Ottoman Muslims in the Balkans and threatened discordant minorities with sanctions. Although a detailed program was lacking, the CUP leadership gradually became more determined to homogenize the country by changing its demography by force.58 Party ideologue Ziyâ Gökalp wrote extensively about turkifying the Empire by concentrating the non-Ottoman Muslims on Ottoman territory and instilling Turkish nationalism into the Ottoman Muslims.59 According to Gökalp, this would contribute to the nascence of a new Turkey. As he wrote in a poem titled ‘Motherland’ (Vatan):

57 For examples of hostile parliamentary debates including rich use of profanity and even an occasional brawl, see: Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, vol.1, İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997), pp.627-28, 488 footnote 11.
58 This phenomenon has often been described as ‘social engineering’, a range of often ideologically driven policies directed at violently changing a population in any way whatsoever. For an application of the term on CUP policies see: Hilmar Kaiser, “The Ottoman Government and the End of the Ottoman Social Formation, 1915-1917,” paper presented at the conference Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah, University of Zürich, 7 November 2001, at: <http://www.hist.net/kieser/ahget/Essays/EssayKaiser.html>.
A country that nobody plots against,
Each individual being united in ideal, language, tradition, religion,
Its parliament clean, without Boşo’s speaking,
Its children happily sacrificing their lives at its borders,
Hey Turks, that is what your motherland should be! 60

It becomes clear from this poem that Gökalp fantasizes about a nation state, as he indulges in wishful dreams of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and political homogeneity. He refers to Yorgo Boşo, a Greek member of parliament known for vehemently criticizing CUP policies. But Gökalp did not only romanticize a Turkish nation state using poetry. According to one of his closest students, his investigations were functional as they laid out the theoretic framework for the future Turkification of the empire.61

It did not take long before the CUP party dictatorship started brainstorming about the at that time still vague notion of Turkification. At the party congresses in Salonica (1910, 1911) and Istanbul (1912, 1913) they adopted Turkish nationalism and emphasized ‘national education’, but no explicit comments were made on the fate of the Ottoman minorities.62 Due to the secretive nature of the CUP and the sensitivity of this question, critical decisions were taken behind closed doors. According to Halil Menteşe (d. 1935), chairman of the Ottoman parliament, Talât stated to him in a meeting that “he was preparing for cleaning the country of treacherous elements”.63

The new policy slogan ‘Turkey for the Turks’ has often been attributed to Talât.64 In May, June and August 1914, Enver Paşa organized a series of secret meetings at the War Ministry, at which “the elimination of non-Turkish masses” was discussed with Special Organization operatives, most notably one of its commanders, Eşref Kuşçubaş (d. 1922), Enver’s closest trustee.65 During these meetings, the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire were juxtaposed with the presence of clusters of non-Turkish people in strategic areas, such as in the Aegean area, which harboured hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Greeks. CUP loyalists decided that these “internal tumors” once and for all had to be removed, in other words, “Infidel İzmir had to become Turkish İzmir”.66 This encompassing program was primarily directed against non-Muslim Ottoman civilians like Greeks, Syriacs and Armenians, and secondarily against non-Turkish Muslim

63 Halil Menteşe, Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Beş İttihat Ve Terakki’nin anıları (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), p.165.
64 According to British sources, Talât spoke these words at the 1910 CUP congress. George P. Gooc h & Harold W.V. Temperley (eds.), British documents on the origins of the war 1898-1914 (London: Printed and published by His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1926), vol.9, part 1, document no.181, pp.207-8. However, there is no definitive evidence that corroborates this claim, although “at this conference the Turkists gained the upper hand.” Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler, vol.3, İhtihat ve Terakki (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997), pp.286-87.
populations like Arabs, Kurds, and Albanians. Small or scattered religious groups such as Alevis, Yezidis, Druzes, Jews, or Shiites were targeted as well.

The introduction of this policy of ‘nationalization’ required a great deal of organization. Existing Ottoman bureaucratic tools sufficed and needed minor creative adjustments to carry out the program of social engineering. First of all, the hierarchic fabric of Ottoman state organs allowed for the highest echelons of any ministry (such as the Minister of the Interior) to telegraphically communicate with even insignificant civil servants and police officers at county level. Discipline was reinforced not only by the proverbial Ottoman culture of obedience, but especially by the CUP’s notorious reputation for ruthlessness. Still, many written orders were revoked and replaced by covert oral orders, a typical CUP practice. An other important bureaucratic apparatus was the ‘Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants’ (İskân-ı Aşâir ve Muhacirîn Müdürüyeti, henceforth İAMM). This organization was established in early 1914 and served two purposes: on the one hand, to advance the sedentarization of the many Turkoman, Kurdish, and Arab tribes, and on the other hand, to provide accommodation for homeless Muslim refugees, expelled from the Balkans and Russia. It would later be expanded to constitute four branches, namely settlement, intelligence, deportation, and tribes. The most prolific name in the İAMM was Şükrü Kaya, the “Director of Deportation” (Sevkiyat Müdürü) who organized most of the deportations. Since the army would play a secondary role in the program, the concentration and purposeful canalization of a huge reservoir of violence was delegated to the Special Organization, which was reorganized in 1914 and split into an external branch assigned with instigating rebellions in Iran and Caucasia, and an internal branch charged with supervising the program of nationalization. The organization’s rearrangement meant that it was detached from regular Ottoman military jurisdiction and brought under the direct control of the CUP, most specifically under the auspices of Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir (1877-1922) and Dr. Nâzım (1872-1926). With a single order the CUP could now deploy tens of thousands of ruthless and heavily armed paramilitary troops to all corners of the vast empire.

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67 Covert oral orders were an important phenomenon during CUP rule. Although it was logical that genocidal orders were issued orally, even critical decisions like the alliance with Germany and the declaration of war on the Entente powers were taken this way. Said Halim ve Mehmed Talât Paşalar Kabinelerinin Divan-ı Âli ve sevkiyet hakında Divanije mehse Fuad Bey merhum tarafından verilen takrir üzerine berây-i taklibat kâr’u isâbet eden Beşinci Şube tarafından icrâ olunan tahkikat ve zabt edilen ifâdet muhtevisidir (İstanbul, 1918), p.4.
68 İkadım, 29 December 1913 (no.6052), p.3.
69 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlî İmparatorluğu’nda AŞiretlerin İskânı (İstanbul: Eren, 1987), p.120.
71 Adil Hikmet Bey, Aya’da Bey Türk (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1999).
72 Cemal Kutay, Birinci Dünya Harbinde Teşkilât-ı Mahsus ve Hayber Cengi (İstanbul: Tarih, 1962).
73 Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir was born in Thrace and enjoyed his medical education at the Military Medical Academy in Istanbul. After joining the CUP in 1906 he moved to Paris where he assisted Ahmet Rıza in reviving the CUP. After returning to Istanbul he became one of the most influential members of the CUP’s Central Committee in 1912. His closeness to Talât quickly allowed him to rise in rank, exemplified by the fact that he was charged with organizing the Special Organization in 1914. His role in the persecution of the Armenians was pivotal. He was shot dead in Berlin on 17 April 1922 by Aram Yerganian, an Armenian hitman. Hikmet Çiçek, Dr. Bahattin Şakir: İttihat ve Terakki’den Teşkilât-ı Mahsus’a ya bîr Türk Jakobeni (İstanbul: Kaynak, 2004).
74 Dr. Nâzım was born in Salonica and joined the first CUP in 1889 during his medical education. He continued his study in Paris where he met Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir and worked with Ahmet Rıza to unite the CUP with the ‘Ottoman Freedom Committee’ in 1907. After 1908 he too became a member of the Central Committee, and even made it to Secretary-General of the CUP. His role in the persecution of the Armenians was as covert as it was profound. In 1918 he became Minister of Education but fled the country before the armistice. He was executed in
Along with aligning bureaucratic organs, the CUP ordered the conduct of detailed research on the demographic and ethnological characteristics of the targeted ethnic and religious groups. This was initiated on 14 March 1916 by the IAMM, renamed to ‘General Directorate for Tribes and Immigrants’ (Aşır ve Muhacirün Müdûrîyet-i Umûmiyesi, AMMU). These investigations were carried out by CUP specialists, continued during and after the war, and consisted of both field work and careful examination of previous research. Thus, Baha Said was assigned with researching Kızılbaş and Bektashi communities, Mehmed Tahir and Hasan Fehmi with researching Ahi communities. Esat Uras conducted research on the Armenians, while Zekeriya Sertel concentrated mainly on Kurdish-Alevi tribes. Habil Âdem was assigned with mapping out details on Kurdish and Turkoman tribes. Zekeriya Sertel, who worked at the Tribes division of AMMU, later wrote in his memoirs that the purpose of these research programs was “to gather information in order to act accordingly”. Though most of this research was ordered by Şükrü Kaya, it becomes clear from Ottoman documents that in several instances Talât personally requested detailed information like lists and maps, often covering even the village level. In the end, the CUP research program produced thousands of pages of detailed expertise on the targeted ethnic groups.

From the summer of 1913 on, the CUP gradually but resolutely launched extensive campaigns of Turkification on practically all domains of Ottoman society. Starting with geography, the CUP began turkifying place names. On 5 January 1916 Enver Paşa ordered the complete Turkification of all Armenian, Greek, and Bulgarian names denominating provinces, districts, counties, villages, mountains, and rivers. This way all traces of non-Turkish cultures were wiped out, e.g. Kızılkilise (“Red Church”) county in the Dersim district was changed into Nazimiye (after the Ottoman politician Nâzım Paşa). Although Enver Paşa’s law was suspended until the end of the war, this CUP practice continued well into the 1960s and changed tens of thousands of topographic names. Because societal Turkification was an other important CUP program, it obliged all state organs (including all schools) to correspond and communicate only in the Turkish language and began harassing businesses in non-Muslim hands by forcing them to use Turkish in all corporate transactions. The Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, Ahmed Nesimi, admitted that this linguistic enthusiasm was in essence a method to have more Muslims
employed in the Ottoman economy. This would serve the establishment of the ‘national economy’ the CUP dreamed of.\(^{82}\)

In 1914, most businesses in the Aegean area were owned by Ottoman Greeks. When persuasion didn’t cause the desired effect, the CUP took recourse to more violent methods of Turkification of the economy. It sent emissaries like Special Organization agent Kara Kemal to assist Responsible Secretary Celal Bayar in turkifying the economy of İzmir.\(^{83}\) In the summer of 1914 this political and nationalist persecution gained momentum as boycotts and expropriations escalated into kidnappings and assassinations of Greek businessmen and community leaders, and even wholesale deportation and massacres of villages.\(^{84}\) The fact that after this terror campaign many Ottoman Greeks opted to emigrate to Greece, abandoning their territory to the benefit of Ottoman Muslims, was perceived by the CUP as an administrative success. The program of Turkification was being translated into policy.

1.3 Diyarbekir province before World War I

Reforming Ottoman administrative units was an important aspect of the reform policy the CUP carried out. At the turn of the century, the empire was organized into provinces (vilayet) with governors (valî), districts (sancak or livâ) with district governors (mutasarrîf), counties (kaçâ) with mayors (kaymakam), and communes (nâbiye) with directors (müdür). In 1914 the government revised its provinces and altered several borders and names.\(^{85}\) Diyarbekir was a relatively large province (42,100 km\(^2\)) locked in between the Euphrates in the west, the Tigris in the east, the Armenian plateau in the north, and the Mesopotamian desert in the south. Its continental climate ensured mild winters and extremely hot summers which at times paralysed social life. Historically, Diyarbekir was an administrative center as it used to be the headquarters of the 16th century governorship (beylerbeyliği) from where large parts of eastern Turkey were ruled.\(^{86}\) At the eve of World War I, the Second Army was stationed in Diyarbekir city, which also harboured a court-martial and one of the largest prisons of the Ottoman Empire.\(^{87}\) Although there were regional variations in the economic conditions of the province, generally it thrived due to its favourable location on the ancient Silk Road.\(^{88}\) There were copper mines in Maden county and the border


\(^{83}\) Bayar, Ben de yazdım [n.65], vol.5, pp.1606-11.


\(^{85}\) It is possible to interpret the Ottoman practice of redistricting as an effort to reduce the demographic proportion of Christians to the benefit of Muslims, although no systematic research has been conducted with respect to this subject. Vahakn N. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of the Turko-Armenian Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1999), pp.139-44.


regions with Bitlis province were known for being oil-rich, though no large-scale steps had been
taken to exploit either. Like the rest of the empire, Diyarbekir was a pre-industrial region where
subsistence farming and cyclic pastoralism were dominant economic occupations for peasants
and nomads in the countryside. In order to comprehend the further internal societal structure
of Diyarbekir province, a sketch of the social characteristics of the region in the years before the
war is in order.

Diyarbekir province boasted a formidable diversity of ethnic and religious groups, whether
small or large, scattered or concentrated, urban or rural. The Ottoman Muslims, later
denominated ‘Turks’, were the majority in urban residential areas because of the fact that they
had been occupying most administrative positions for a long time. Armenians inhabiting the
cities made their livings as merchants or craftsmen and in most bazaars the majority of tradesmen
were indeed Armenian. Some of these Armenians were quite prosperous people, having family
members abroad and being active in politics. But the bulk of Diyarbekir Armenians were
peasants organized in large extended families (gerdastans) in villages, most specifically in the Lice,
Silvan, Beşiri, and Palu districts. The Kurdish population of the province can be divided in
several categories: tribal versus non-tribal Kurds, and (semi-)nomadic versus sedentary. The
dozens of large and powerful Kurdish tribes in the region were generally commanded by a
chieftain (ağa) and de facto controlled extensive territories. All were able to mobilize thousands,
sometimes tens of thousands of mounted warriors, often to combat each other in pursuit of
power, honour, and booty. Non-tribal Kurds could be powerless peasants (kurmancı) or Kurds
from noted clergy families (meşayıl). It is important to point out that all peasants, irrespective of
ethnic or religious background, paid tribute and taxes to Kurdish chieftains and landlords. The
mere 1000 Jews of Diyarbekir province owned one small synagogue and were generally an
inconspicuous ethnic group among the much larger Christian and Muslim populations. They
mainly engaged in small-scale trade and some horticulture. The Yezidis, a peculiar monotheist
religious group, inhabited villages in the southeastern regions of the province. Ottoman state
discrimination and oppression against them pushed them into a marginal social status, which
caused them to frequently engage in organized brigandry. The Kızılbaş were both Turkoman
and Kurdish heterodox Shi’ites, and inhabited only a few villages in the province whereas others
were semi-nomads. The Zaza, an until recently unexplored ethnic group socially close to the
Kurds were villagers and occupied themselves with agriculture and horticulture. Concentrated in

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89 Hellmut Christoff, Kurden und Armenier: Eine Untersuchung über die Abhängigkeit ihrer Lebensformen und Charakterentwicklung von
91 Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The social and political structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed, 1992), chapters 2, 3, and 4.
traveler’s record,” in: Jewish Social Studies, vol.6 (1944), pp.195-226; Erich Brauer, The Jews of Kurdistan (Detroit, MI: Wayne State
University Press, 1993).
the north, the Zaza in Diyarbekir province were and are Muslims, and several important Muslim 
clerics emanated from them. The Arabs of the province were also named Mahalmi because of 
the peculiar dialect they spoke. Most of them lived in Mardin but also in the villages in and 
around Midyat, though they numbered no more than several thousands. The Syriacs (alternately 
named Assyrians or Arameans), an embracing denomination including all Aramaic-speaking 
Syrian-Orthodox, Syrian-Protestant, Syrian-Catholic, Nestorian, and Chaldean Christians, 
inhabited many villages but especially the southeastern parts of the province. The mountainous 
region around Midyat, also known as Tur Abdin, was a Syriac stronghold with dozens of often 
exclusively Syriac villages. A demographically and politically insignificant group were the 
Gypsies, who lived in urban centers and were ostracized by most other groups. In eastern 
Anatolia the Gypsies were named Poşa or Kereçi. Finally, there is both material and immaterial 
evidence of the existence of Shemsi communities, although their numbers seem to have shrunk 
dramatically by the late 19th century. These archaic sun-worshippers were under the influence 
of the ancient Zoroastrian religion and used to worship in several temples all over what was now the 
Ottoman province Diyarbekir. All in all, the population of Diyarbekir province had a very 
heterogeneous ethnic and social composition.

For many of these ethnic communities the province bore more than average importance 
because of the concentration of pivotal religious locations and presence of the highest clerical 
authorities. Since religion defined communal boundaries in the Ottoman theocracy, this only 
added to the portentousness of Diyarbekir. For example, the two main monasteries of the Syriac 
Christians, Mor Gabriel and Deyr-ul Zaferan, were located in the Mardin district. These were not 
only offices of bishops and patriarchs, but in general the heart of Syriac religion, culture, and 
education in seminaries (madras) . Diyarbekir city harboured the Syrian-Orthodox Virgin 
Mary Church, the Chaldean church, the Armenian Apostolic church which was one of the largest 
and most sophisticated churches in the Ottoman Empire, a protestant church, and dozens of 
Armenian villages had churches and schools. For the Diyarbekir province Muslims the many 
mosques and seminaries (medrese) were important as places of worship, education, and socializing. 
Moreover, influential Islamic orders like the Nakşibendî, Kadîrî, Rufai, and Kûfrevi were active 
all over the province among large Zaza, Arab, but especially Kurdish families. These orders were

95 Karl Hadank, *Mundarten der Zâzâ, hauptsächlich aus Sîwerek und Kor* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1932).
97 The Tur Abdin region was particularly famous for its strong tribal cleavages. The two main tribes reigning in Tur Abdin were the Dekşuri and Hevêkan, the latter originating from the Botan emirate that was violently dismantled in the mid-19th century. Both tribes had hereditary chieftains of Muslim-Kurdish descent and both tribes treated their Muslim and non-Muslim subjects (such as Syriac Christians and Yezidis) alike. Tribal interests and loyalties were superordinated to religious interests and loyalties. The continuous competition between these two tribes often escalated into assassinations and plunder. Hans Hollerweger, *Turabdîn* (Linz: Freunde des Tur Abdin, 1999).
100 Gertrude Bell, *The churches and monasteries of the Tur Abdin and neighbouring districts* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter’s Universitätshandlung, 1913).
lodged in large medreses even in small counties, where students were taught on religion, language (Arabic, Persian, Kurdish, Ottoman), and history. Some of these were quite famous for their quality education, such as the Red Medrese (Medreseya Sor) of Cizre, the Hatuniye, Zinciriye and Sitti Radrîye medreses of Mardin, and the Mesudiye and Sîtrâbas medreses of Diyarbekir city. Furthermore, local saints and cults (ziyaret), visited by people of all religious groups, were scattered all over the province. One example is the Sultan Şeyhmus cult, located at the Şeyhan caves between Diyarbekir and Mardin.

Westerners too lived in the province. Diyarbekir had a French consulate and a British vice consulate (that were revoked when the Ottoman Empire declared war on France and Britain) and an American Protestant mission. The German government considered the deployment of a vice consulate because of the possibility that Diyarbekir could become a hub along the Baghdad railway, but decided to found consulates in Mosul and Aleppo. Several dozens of American, German and French, both Protestant and Catholic missionaries were active in education and health care in the province. However, due to its rugged and inaccessible terrain like most eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, most of the province was terra incognita for western observers. The West also exerted its presence through former Ottoman subjects who possessed western passports. Mostly these were Christian notables who became Russian, French, or British subjects to evade high taxes and derive benefit from the political immunity western citizenship offered in many instances.

It is very difficult to come to quantitative grips with Diyarbekir province due to the absence of reliable demographic data on all ethnicities inhabiting the province before the war. Figures from various sources contradict each other, which has hampered academic efforts undertaken to map out the demography of the province. According to the 1913-1914 census performed by the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, the Diyarbekir province Armenians numbered 106,867 in 249 localities. According to a German consular report, the ethnic distribution in Mardin district was as follows: 27,000 Muslims, 10,000 Armenian Catholics, 10,000 Syriac Christians, 1500 Syriac Catholics, 1400 Protestants, 100 Chaldeans, summing up to a total of 50,000 inhabitants in the entire district. The Armenian Patriarchate calculated the total number of Armenians in Mardin to be 14,547 whereas according to the German consulate

101 Orhan Cezmi Tuncer, Diyarbakır Kiliseleri (Diyarbakır: Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür ve Sanat Yayınları, 2002).
103 Politisches Archiv Auswärtiges Amt (German Archives Berlin, hereafter cited as PAAA), R14078, Notes of Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Zimmermann, 5 March 1913, enclosure no.2.
106 PAAA, Botschaft Konstantinopel 170, Aleppo consul Rößler to special ambassador Hohenlohe-Langenburg (Istanbul), 27 September 1915.
they numbered no more than 11,400, assuming that all Protestants were ethnic Armenians. An Armenian almanac estimated the pre-war number of Armenians at 124,000. \textsuperscript{107} Johannes Lepsius, director of the \textit{Deutsche Orient Mission}, diverged from this calculation:

\begin{quote}
Von seiner Gesamtbevölkerung von 471500 Bewohnern waren 166000 Christen, und zwar 105000 Armenier und 60000 Syrer (Nestorianer und Chaldäer) und 1000 Griechen. Die übrige Bevölkerung setzt sich zusammen aus 63000 Türk en, 200000 Kurden, 27000 Kizilbasch (Schl’iten) und 10000 T scherkessen. Dazu kommen noch 4000 Jesidis (sogenannte Teufelsanbeter) und 1500 Juden. \textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

Ottoman archival material diverges even further from these numbers:

Table 1: Ottoman demographic data for Diyarbekir province. \textsuperscript{109}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>5417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaldean</td>
<td>4783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syriac Catholic</td>
<td>3582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syriac</td>
<td>28,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>9004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>51,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>434,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>541,203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to this demographic classification, Diyarbekir province in 1913 harboured 1954 Jews, 104,818 Christians, and 434,236 Muslims. On the one hand, it is very likely that in this table the demographic balance between Muslims and Christians is skewed in the advantage of the Muslims, and on the other hand there is no mention of marginal social groups such as Yezidis or Alevis living in the province. All in all, the statistics clearly contradict each other. For the bulk of the population it seems reasonable to contend that for approximately one-thirds it was made up of Christians and for approximately two-thirds of Muslims. \textsuperscript{110}

\begin{footnotes}


\textsuperscript{110} This is confirmed by Lepsius: “Die christliche Bevölkerung betrug also reichlich 1/3, die muhammedanische 2/3 der Gesamtbevölkerung des Wilayets.” Lepsius, \textit{Der Todesgang [n.108]}, p.74.
\end{footnotes}
1.4 Social relations between the groups

In his travel account of 1895, the English ethnographer Parry wrote about his experiences in Diyarbekir province:

It is most striking, when on first visits the East, to find a mixed company thoroughly enjoying each other’s society, which, when analysed, would be found to contain an Old Syrian or two, a Protestant, half-a-dozen Moslems, and a substantial quota of the Papal varieties. Yet they are all talking together in perfect good-fellowship, smoking each other’s cigarettes, and discussing with quite marvellous tact the latest political news.¹¹¹

In Mardin city, for example, serenity ruled when the British traveller and photographer Gertrude Bell visited the citadel town, which she qualified as “more splendid[ly] than any place I have ever seen.” According to her, all different ethno-religious elements peacefully coexisted in perfect harmony.¹¹² The British officer Mark Sykes, who had conducted fieldwork and several studies on the Ottoman Empire, visited Palu in 1913 and wrote that there was no trace of enmity between the local Zazas and Armenians.¹¹³ Sykes also wrote that İbrahim Paşa (d.1909)¹¹⁴ of the Milan tribe had encouraged Christians (Armenians and Chaldeans) to take refuge in the vicinity of Viranshehr, and established a bazaar in that town, which rapidly increased in size. While other tribes and chiefs plundered and massacred Armenians, İbrahim protected and encouraged Christians of all denominations. It is estimated that during the great Armenian massacres he saved some 10,000 Armenians from destruction.¹¹⁵

The British army major Soane, who was fluent in Kurdish and had traversed the Diyarbekir region in native disguise, commented two years before the war that the Diyarbekir Chaldeans “were on excellent terms with their ferocious neighbours,” referring to the Kurdish tribes dwelling north of Diyarbekir city.¹¹⁶ Benevolent Muslim notables wrote optimistic articles that in Diyarbekir Armenians and Kurds had always gotten along well and that the Ottoman government was to blame for any possible mutual distrust between these two peoples that had

¹¹¹ Oswald H. Parry, *Six Months in a Syrian Monastery: being the record of a visit to the head quarters of the Syrian church in Mesopotamia with some account of the Yazidis or devil worshippers of Mosul and El Jilwah, their sacred book* (London: Horace Cox, 1895), p.41.
¹¹² Gertrude Bell Archives (Robinson Library, University of Newcastle upon Tyne) [hereafter cited as GBA], Gertrude Bell to her mother, 25 April 1911.
¹¹⁴ İbrahim Paşa was born into the Milan tribe in the Urfa area, became chieftain in 1863, and managed to build a reputation for himself by amassing tribal successes. When Sultan Abdulhamid II established the mounted Hamidiye regiments in 1891 he joined them and acquired even more respect from the population. He soon became the single most powerful commander of the Hamidiye regiments in the eastern provinces, boasting fortified headquarters and many thousands of mounted warriors of the 41st, 42nd and 43rd regiments. When the CUP wrested the 1908 revolution İbrahim repudiated the new cabinet and declared his independence. The Ottoman army was deployed and İbrahim was definitively defeated and forced to flee into the mountains south of Urfa, where he died. M. Wiedemann, “İbrahim Paschas Glück und Ende,” in: *Asien,* vol.8 (1909), pp.34-54.
¹¹⁵ Sykes, *The Caliph’s Last Heritage* [n.113], p.324.
lived in “eternal brotherhood” (vifak-ı kadım) and even “consanguinity” (yekdestî). According to these views, pre-war interethnic relations were peaceful and the atmosphere was congenial.

The interethnic and interfaith relations in Diyarbekir in the years before 1914 may not have been as idyllic as some observers have portrayed. In fact, they were frail due to the prolonged crisis that afflicted the Ottoman Empire. The gradual expulsion of Ottoman rule from the Balkans co-occurred with massacres perpetrated against Ottoman Muslims in places like Crete, and conjured questions of loyalty of Christian citizens to the Ottoman state. During the Abdulhamid era massacres which struck Diyarbekir on 1 November 1895, the destruction of human lives and property was massive and profound. Approximately 25,000 Armenians forcibly converted to Islam in all of Diyarbekir province, 1100 Armenians were killed in Diyarbekir city and 800 or 900 Armenians in the outlying villages, while 155 women and girls were carried off by Kurdish tribesmen. In Silvan county 7000 Armenians converted and 500 women were carried off. In Palu 3000 and in Siverek 2500 converted to escape being massacred. In Silvan, along with Palu (where 3000 Armenians converted), “7500 are reduced to destitution and 4000 disappeared: killed, died of cold, etc., or escaped elsewhere”. According to Kévorkian and Paboudjian, 2000 houses and 2500 shops and ateliers were burnt down in the province during the 1895 massacres. An unknown percentage of these converts reconverted to their faiths, returned to their villages, reclaimed their possessions, and rebuilt their homes and businesses once the persecution was discontinued.

Still, the memory of the atrocities was very much alive among the population of Diyarbekir. Ely Soane wrote in his travel account:

[…] it is, among the underworld of western Kurdistan and northern Mesopotamia, a common subject of talk in the cafés how much the Sultan and the Government paid the ruffians of the town to do their dirty work, and how much the Kurdish Aghas presented to the authorities to be allowed to finish unhindered the blood-feuds that existed between themselves and Armenians sheltering in Diyarbek and the towns of Armenia. A very reign of terror overshadows the apparently peaceful and prosperous town.

The province was beset by tribal, ethno-religious, and political conflicts. The heavily armed tribes of the province frequently engaged in armed combat to overpower each other and spared very few when beating a competitor tribe. In the Hazakh district (present-day İdil) Serhan II, 123

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120 Blue Book Turkey, No.8 (1896), enclosure in document no.140, p.127.
121 Kévorkian & Paboudjian, Les Arméniens [n.90], p.398.
123 Serhan II was a notorious Kurdish brigand, whose ruthlessness was only matched by his greed. In the pre-war years his power gained momentum as he succeeded his father as chieftain of the Mala Osman. Fed up with his terror, a group of Tur Abdin Syriacs filed a complaint against him at the Syriac Patriarchate in Istanbul, requesting a parliamentary inquiry and prosecution of Serhan. Contrary to their expectation, the case was neglected and no legal action was undertaken. BOA, DİLMU 77-2/15, 9 August 1910.
chieftain of the Mala Osman dynasty of the Hevêrki tribe perceived a threat in the person of Khalife Meso of the Mala Meso dynasty of the Şerxan tribe. In 1913 tribesmen loyal to Serhan carried out a raid against Kiwex village, where Meso, his brother Cercur, and his nephew Kato were living. In the ensuing massacre 24 men including young boys and 2 women were killed. Although Serhan was a Muslim and Meso of Yezidi descent, there were both Yezidis among Serhan’s adherents and Muslims among Meso’s adherents, thus clearly rendering this a tribal conflict.\textsuperscript{124} An unknown number of inhabitants were killed in the Syriac village of B’sorino in 1907 during a punitive campaign by Midyat Kurds who feared that the local chiefains would become too influential. The church was burnt down and the houses were destroyed, but inhabitants proclaiming loyalty were allowed to work for the Midyat chiefains.\textsuperscript{125}

When Gertrude Bell toured Tur Abdin in the years before the war, she was robbed at night in the village of Khakh.\textsuperscript{126} Since the theft was committed in the area ruled practically autonomously by the very powerful Çelebi dynasty of the Hevêrki tribe, their chieftain İsmail was brought in from Mzizah village. İsmail was furious about the breach of cultural norms of hospitality. Having no suspects, he arbitrarily rounded up five men and the mayor of Khakh, a man named Melke, threatening them with incarceration. Soon, it became known that tribesmen around chieftain Abdikê Hemzikê of the semi-nomadic Zakhuran tribe\textsuperscript{127} were responsible for the theft.\textsuperscript{128} The Çelebi chieftain used the opportunity to settle tribal scores and join forces with local government forces to assassinate Abdikê Hemzikê, disperse the Zakhuran, and pillage their villages seizing all of their cattle.\textsuperscript{129} The uncrowned master of social banditry however, was Alikê Battê of the Haco dynasty of the Hevêrkan tribe, whose name alone struck fear and respect into the hearts of the locals.\textsuperscript{130} In August 1913 Alikê Battê engaged in a skirmish with gendarmes during an attempt to rob the Ottoman post carriage in Nusaybin. The post was delayed for some time and the brigand escaped into the Tur Abdin mountains.\textsuperscript{131} At the end of 1913 Ali and his accomplices were arrested and incarcerated but profited from the general amnesty the government had granted.\textsuperscript{132} Although they were threatened with re-imprisonment if they would

\textsuperscript{124} Ömer Şahin, \textit{Komkûjî li hemberti Ezidiyan} (Heidelberg, 2001), unpublished private manuscript.

\textsuperscript{125} GBA, diary entry for 17 May 1909.

\textsuperscript{126} For details on Khakh village see: Hollerweger, \textit{Turabdin} [n.97], pp.164-75.

\textsuperscript{127} According to tribal myths, the Zakhuran were remnants of a huge tribe commanding a vast area in Northern Mesopotamia, until they split up and formed the two major tribes in the region: Hevêrkan and Dekşurî. Due to their conflicts with the Çelebi core, they sided with Haco Ağâ of the Hevêrkan tribe and became active in Kurdish nationalism in the Republican era. Their power crumbled, and in the 1940s they numbered a mere 500 tribesmen. \textit{Aşiretler Raporu} (Istanbul: Kaynak, 2003, second edition), p.250. Presently the Zakhuran are a relatively small tribe, centered in Zakhuran village, 40 kilometres east of Midyat. They own the villages of Harebreş, Gundê Keportî, Ömerê Ahu, Şîvok, Sabrika, I斯塔van, Gelîta, Mêvenka, Hirabehori, Hirabegura, Hirabecbrû, Calkagundo, Hasakor, Ancik, and Hirabehala. For data on the Zakhuran tribe see: Cevdet Türkay, \textit{Başbakanlık Arşivi Belgelerine Göre Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemauldar} (Istanbul: İşaret, 2001), 146.

\textsuperscript{128} GBA, diary entries for 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 May 1909.

\textsuperscript{129} This is confirmed by Abdikê Hemzikê’s grandson. Interview conducted in Kurdish with Aslan family (Zakhuran tribe), Midyat (Mardin province), 28 July 2004.

\textsuperscript{130} Alikê Battê was relatively young when he became one of the most charismatic and fierce chiefains in Kurdish tribal history. He avenged his uncle Haco II by killing his murderer Cîmo with his bare hands. He waged a guerrilla war against the Ottoman government for two decades, only to perish during a skirmish in 1919. For more on Alikê Battê see: Mustafa Aldur, “1850-1950 yillar arası Turabdin’e Hevêrkan ve Mala Osmân,” in: \textit{Özgür Polistika}, 15 September 2002; \textit{Public Record Office} (British Archives London, hereafter cited as PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 371/107502, 149523, 163688, 3050.

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{BÖA}, DH.ID 145-2/38, 13 August 1913.

\textsuperscript{132} \textit{BÖA}, DH.EUM.EMN 38/7, 1 December 1913.
continue their brigandage, after being released, they resumed their criminal careers and were no longer sought after.133

Clashes of tribal nature did not only occur in the Mardin district. The north and east of Diyarbekir province were other peripheral regions with influential Kurdish tribes competing for power. Most specifically, the Xerzan (Garzan) valley in the Beşirî district was torn by tribal warfare. The largest conflict was that between the Reşkotan and Etmanki tribes, which was settled through a victory won by the former.134 The feud between the Elikan and Pencînaran tribes was an other source of violence in the Garzan region.135 The latter conflict was provoked by Pencînar chief tain Bişarê Çeto, a loose cannon, who had telegraphically expressed his joy over the 1908 revolution in the hope of being left alone by the government.136 Together with his equally trigger-happy brother Cemil Çeto they were known for extorting Armenian, Kurdish, and Syriac villagers in the region.137 These two brigands had been robbing and murdering at will but legal action was suspended in July 1914 and the Çeto brothers evaded prosecution.138

There were also intra-tribal intrigues and power struggles, most notably in the Reman tribe. Its famous female chieftain Perîxan, widow of İbrahim Paşa, had six sons who competed for succession: Mustafa, Said, Emin, Abdullah, İbrahim, and Ömer.139 In order to succeed their mother, the sons had to outclass each other in absorption and exertion of power. In other words, they had to express leadership qualities. Of all her sons, Ömer was particularly eligible for this fratricidal operation due to his ferociousness. Before the war, Ömer’s campaign of plunder, provocation of government forces, and bravado did not go unnoticed. In the summer of 1914, the government declared him persona non grata and ordered him arrested and incarcerated. Ömer escaped prosecution and retreated into the Garzan region.140 Finally, the Zirkî tribe in Lice had been fighting off the aforementioned Mîlan tribe to gain control over parts of the northern region of Diyarbekir province. Their chieftain Aziz Sabri had aligned himself with the CUP when İbrahim refused to submit to their rule.141

Ethno-religious conflict was another form of strife. Missionary activity among the various Christian churches was one source of discontent and conflict. When a young Jacobite Syriac convert to Catholicism dared to convert one of his fellow villagers to Catholicism, he was first

133 BOA, MV 194/22, 8 November 1914.
135 “Şer û kilamak ji herêma Xerzan: Serê Pencînaran û Elikan,” in: Ibid., pp.11-18. This conflict had been raging since the 1890s, when Hamidiye regiments had threatened the Elikan’s domination in certain areas around Xerzan. Ismail Beşikçi, Doğu’dan Değişim ve Yapsal Sorunlar (Göçebe Alihan Asireti) (Ankara: Sevinç, 1969), pp.78-79.
137 BOA, DH.EUM.EMN 38/30, 6 December 1913.
138 BOA, DH.EUM.EMN 89/5, 28 July 1914.
140 BOA, DH.ID 80/5, 8 August 1914.
interned at Deyr-ul Zaferan. When the monks found out he wouldn't reconvert they beat him up and chased him out. A Protestant Armenian remembered well that before the war, there were weekly brawls between Catholic and Protestant Armenians in his town. On several occasions even the clergy joined the fighting. In Lice, Syriacs and Armenians squabbled over the Akkilise monastery which both communities aimed to appropriate. The government mitigated the conflict and a compromise was reached. However, the severest conflicts seem to have raged between Muslims and Christians. When Gertrude Bell visited Diyarbekir she noticed

the nervous anxiety which is felt by both Christians and Moslems – each believing that the other means to murder him at the first opportunity – is in itself a grave danger and very little is needed at Diarbekr to set them at each other's throats. During the 3 days that I was there tales of outbreaks in different parts of the empire were constantly being circulated in the bazaars. I have no means of knowing whether they were true, but after each new story people went home and fingered at their rifles.

These ethnic tensions may have also well been conflicts based on economic interests, since there was an ethnically organized labour market. While Armenians occupied most positions in the Diyarbekir trade world, together with Syriacs they had also monopolized the cloth production. Kurds controlled the livestock trade. Due to the Abdulhamid era massacres, no love was lost between the Christian and Muslim merchants in the pre-war years. Muslim shopkeepers, outnumbered by Christian tradesmen, fostered jealousy and hate towards their colleagues. This opportunism was reported by the German vice consul in Mosul, Holstein, as follows:

Im allgemeinen bekümmert sich der Kurde in der Gegend von Diarbekir nicht viel um die Politik einzelner Kur denscheichs, er profitiert nur von der Gelegenheit, sich durch Raub und Plünderung zu bereichern und erblickt in der manchmal damit verbundenen Ermordung einiger Armenier weiter kein Verbrechen. So erklärte mir ein Kurdischer Holzhacker in Diarbekir, auf meine Frage, wieviel Armenier er schon auf dem Gewissen habe, ganz naiv: Genau könne er es nicht sagen, aber rund ein halbes Dutzend würden es wohl schon sein.

Possible palliatives and mitigations were dismissed. When Süleyman Bey of the noted Cemilpaşazâde dynasty urged the Muslim marketers of Diyarbekir to treat the Armenians with respect and bury their hatchets, he was met with resistance and ridicule, and experienced great frustration. The Armenians, on their turn, boycotted all Muslim-owned shops at Christmas 1908. The Diyarbekir bazaar faced far graver situations when Muslim merchants were simply allowed to snatch Christian property. During the great fire of August 1914 the grain market of

144 BOA, DH.İD 162-2/51, 16 August 1913.
145 GBA, Gertrude Bell to her mother, 6 June 1909.
147 Beysanoğlu, Diyarbekir Tarihi [n.141], pp.760-1.
148 P.A.A., Holstein to Bethmann-Hollweg, 22 May 1913.
149 GBA, diary entry for 30 April 1909.
Diyarbakir became the scene of mass plunder as many Muslim merchants joined hands in seizing the opportunity to loot the stores of Christians. Soon it became known that the police chief, Memduh Bey, had “allowed Kurds and Muslims to pillage Armenian stores” (Kürtlerle müslümanların Ermeni mağazalarını yağma etmelerine müsaade olunduğu).\textsuperscript{151} According to Mihran Boyadjian, an Ottoman-Armenian civil inspector, Memduh had started the fire himself to create opportunities for pillage.\textsuperscript{152} Not only was the involvement in the pogrom massive, the apathetic attitude of local government agents to the violence implied tacit approval.

Political conflicts were usually conflicts between political factions on the one hand, and the Ottoman state on the other. The Armenians of Diyarbakir were generally anti-Russian and many adhered to the Dashnak party, that desired Armenian autonomy. Concretely, its program aimed at more freedom and more decentralization in the Ottoman administration of the eastern provinces, the introduction of Armenian as educational and official language, and an end to injustice, usurpation, and expropriation committed mostly by Kurdish tribes against Armenian peasants.\textsuperscript{153} Chief editor of the Armenian publishing organ Aｚādamart was Rupen Zartarian, a noted Armenian revolutionary who hailed from Diyarbakir. Kurdish nationalism, though not as organized and settled as its Armenian counterpart, also existed in the province. On 19 September 1908 Müftü Suphî Efendi founded the Diyarbekir office of the ‘Kurdish Assistance and Progress Society’ (Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti) in Diyarbekir. Prominent members were Dr. Mehmed Şükru (Sekban), former mayor of Diyarbekir Pirineçizâde Arif, Mirikatibizâde Ahmed Cemil (Asena), Mehmed Tahir, and Halîl Hayâl.\textsuperscript{154} According to its statutes, it aimed to observe the constitution, pursue the notion of Ottomanism, end tribal warfare, and maintain “harmony and good relations between their compatriots the Armenians, Nestorians, and other Ottoman subjects”.\textsuperscript{155} The Bedirxan dynasty, a remnant of the omnipotent 19\textsuperscript{th}-century Botan tribal confederation, were involved in explicitly Kurdish-nationalist politics.\textsuperscript{156} An adherent of Kurdish nationalism was Derwis Ağa of Çelik village, south of Midyat, who allied himself with the Bedirxans as a means to protest against misrule and corruption by lower Ottoman officials.\textsuperscript{157} However, there were also ideologically-driven politicians such as Hasan Bey of Cizre, a cousin of the noted nationalist Abdulrezzak Bedirxan, whose brother Mîran chieftain Süleyman Bey was shot dead by Ottoman gendarmes near Cizre. Hasan explained to the vice consul Holstein that he had no doubts that Russia would logistically assist the Kurdish national movement in liberating Kurdistan from the “Turkish yoke” and establishing a Kurdish nation state.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{150} GBA, diary entry for 9 February 1909.
\textsuperscript{151} BOA, DH. SFR 44/234, Emniyet-i Umûmiye Müdürülüğü (Ali Münif) to Diyarbekir, 13 September 1914.
\textsuperscript{154} Tunaya, "Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler" [n.57], vol.1, pp.430-4.
\textsuperscript{155} Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti Nizamnamesi (Istanbul: Kasbar, 1324), p.1, article 1.
\textsuperscript{156} Malmîsanîj, Çizrû Botanî Bedirhanîlêr ve Bedirhanî ailesî dernegî’ nin tutanaklari (Spånga, Sweden: Apec, 1994).
\textsuperscript{157} PAAA, Holstein to Bethmann-Hollweg, 22 May 1913.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
It is quite difficult if not impossible to describe the relationships between the dozens of ethno-religious and political communities in Diyarbekir province with one adjective. Claiming that ‘everything was fine,’ or that ‘the religions did not get along’ would oversimplify the complex relationship between Kurds and Armenians, or between Syriacs and Arabs. Very often the relationship depended on local conditions. Nevertheless, it is possible to state that the absence or very feeble presence of a state monopoly of violence in rural areas allowed for the maintenance of many conflicts, be it tribal or ethno-social. Therefore, living conditions were relatively insecure, with arbitrary exertion of (mortal) violence by certain powerful tribes and state agents. This only added to the general atmosphere of distrust and sectarianism among the inhabitants of the province.
Chapter 2: Persecution of Christian communities, 1915

2.1 Mobilization and war

The Committee of Union and Progress had not remained idle in Diyarbekir province before the war. The first CUP office in Diyarbekir was opened on 23 July 1908 by Ziyâ Gökalp, who after all was a native of the region, and also was its representative in the party’s Central Committee. Gökalp began publishing the newspaper *Peyman*, which adopted a relatively modest tone and emphasized coexistence of the various Ottoman subjects. After the catastrophic defeats of the Balkan wars, the atmosphere changed as relations polarized. The CUP dictatorship exerted its influence in this province through a network of mainly Kurdish members. The most influential CUP members in Diyarbekir were those related to the wealthy and powerful Kurdish Pirinççizâde dynasty, who owned large estates in the province, including the rice fields west of Diyarbekir city. One of their kinsmen was deputy Aziz Feyzi (1879-1933), who was known for his coarseness and fanatic patriotism. He was the son of Pirinççizâde Arif, who passed away in 1909 and had adhered to the Kurdish Assistance and Progress Society (see page 30). According to a German report Feyzi had undertaken a study trip to Germany in 1911. On behalf of many other Kurdish notables, he vehemently protested in the Ottoman parliament against the proposed government plan of expropriating Kurdish landowners. Feyzi was a CUP hardliner. He had held fierce and hostile discussions with Armenian member of parliament Vartkes Serengulian (1871-1915) in which he accused Vartkes of sinister Armenian separatist revolutionary designs. He became more and more fanatic in his anti-Armenian emotions, and reportedly had Ohannes Kazazian, a Catholic Armenian from Mardin and his political rival in the elections, assassinated in 1913. At the outbreak of the war, Mihran Boyadjian travelled to Diyarbekir and encountered an energetic Feyzi on the way:


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159 Şevket Beysanoğlu, Ziyâ Gökalp’ın İlk Yazi Hayatı: 1894-1909 (İstanbul: Diyarbakır’ı Tanıma Derneği Neşriyat, 1956), pp.11-12.
160 Up until the Balkan wars, Gökalp used to compare Ottoman society to U.S. society as in both countries many different ethnic groups coexisted under one denomination, Ottoman respectively American. In fact, Gökalp even rejected Turkish ethnic nationalism as it entailed nation-building based on blood bonds, which he considered unreal. Mehmed Mehdi, “Türklük ve Osmanlılık,” in: *Peyman*, vol.II, quoted in: *Ibid.*, pp.99-101, 105.
162 PAAA, R14084, Mutius to Bethmann Hollweg, 14 June 1914.
163 Meclisi Mebusan Zabıt Ceridesi, first election period, ninety-ninth sitting, third session, p.2894.
Finally he threatened: “Vous allez voir maintenant, ce que c’est que de réclamer des réformes”.166

Other CUP sympathizers in Diyarbekir were Pirinççizade Südkı (Tarancı), Yasinzâde Şevki (Ekinci), his brother Yasinzâde Yahya (Ekinci), and Müftüzâde Şeref (Uluğ), among less prominent others.167

The CUP’s policy towards the inhabitants of the eastern provinces varied between containment and repression. The day after the Kurdish revolt of Bitlis, on 4 April 1914, the Central Committee of the CUP convened to review its policy towards the eastern provinces. Mithat Şükru (Bleda) pointed out that Russia was gradually tightening its grip on many Kurdish tribes in both the Ottoman Empire and Persia. According to him an other danger were Armenian revolutionaries, who were awaiting the right opportunity to revolt and could at any time strike. He concocted a divide-and-rule strategy and maintained that on no account should Kurdish and Armenian politicians be allowed to unite. He suggested that the CUP should now adopt a more sophisticated stick-and-carrot strategy, enrolling potentially loyal chieftains through rhetoric and bribery, while threatening potentially disloyal chieftains with deportation and incarceration.168

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 stirred up acute international tensions. In the midst of this belligerent atmosphere, the CUP sought to forge alliances with any of the Great Powers in order for the empire to emerge from its diplomatic isolation. Cavid Bey, the pro-British Minister of Finance, had appealed to Britain in 1911, but apart from Winston Churchill, the Foreign Office was not interested.169 Talât flirted with Russia on his trip to the Crimea in May, where he spoke to the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov about a possible alliance. The Russians expressed ambivalence in judgement but in essence were not interested.170 Cemal Paşa approached France but left empty-handed, lamenting the negotiations with the French as “a huge disappointment” (büyük bir hayal kırıklığı).171 On 24 July 1914 a general mobilization was issued by the Ottoman general staff. On 28 July, the same day that Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia, Enver Paşa proposed a defensive alliance between Imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire to the German ambassador Wangenheim. In the next days Grand Vizier Said Halim, Chairman of the Parliament Halil, Enver, and Talât launched intensive negotiations with the Germans behind closed doors. Finally, on 2 August, one day after the German declaration of war against Russia, a written agreement was signed between the two

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166 Ibid., p.480.
167 Like CUP structures at the national level (see footnote 53), many of these people were related to each other: Aziz Feyzi was both Ziyâ Gıkalp’s and Şerif’s cousin, and Südkı was related to both of them on the maternal and paternal sides. Malimsani, Kürt Teavün [n.154], p.41.
The discussions were top secret, and even Cemal Paşa had no knowledge of them. Three days later Austria-Hungary joined the Turko-German alliance and completed the Central Powers bloc, whereas Russia, France and Britain united into the Entente Powers. The Ottoman Empire was now officially allied to Germany and as a consequence of the treaty was inevitably obliged in this political constellation to prepare for war. Following the succession of declarations of war in August 1914, the Germans urged Minister of War Enver Paşa at the end of October to act against Russia. Without a formal declaration of war, Enver ordered the Ottoman navy to immediately bomb the Russian shore, destroying oil tanks and sinking 14 vessels. Though few politicians in Istanbul knew of Enver’s solo adventure, this fait accompli triggered declarations of war by the Triple Entente powers. From 11 November 1914 on, the Ottoman Empire was officially at war with Russia, France, and Britain.

World War I was nothing that incidentally happened to the Ottoman Empire. The CUP consciously headed towards a belligerent direction, and by participating in the war it hoped to radically solve the many problems of the Empire. From the first day of the war, its dictatorial rule became more repressive towards oppositional groups. Discordant behaviour was dealt with systematically and ruthlessly. On 6 September 1914 Talât ordered the Ottoman security apparatus to closely “follow and observe” (takib ve tarassud) the local leaderships of Armenian political parties who, according to Talât, had been engaging in “agitation and disturbance” (mefsedet ve melanet) against the notion of Ottomanism all along. An other perceived problem were the foreign capitulations, a set of legal concessions under which foreign subjects enjoyed privileges, such as exemption of Ottoman taxes. The CUP regarded the capitulations as humiliating and did not wait long to confront them: all capitulations were unilaterally abrogated on 17 September. The CUP’s bold policies did not only directly cause the ranks to close, it also led to an indirect form of turkification as government functionaries voluntarily left office. On 12 November, Minister of Commerce Süleyman Bustani, a Syriac Protestant, resigned from his cabinet portfolio out of protest over what he considered ongoing CUP aggression. This trend allowed the CUP to fill these administrative positions with nationalists.

Meanwhile, the mobilization did not go unnoticed in Diyarbekir province. The city streets swarmed with soldiers of the Second Army Corps, led by Ahmet İzzet Paşa, which was partly

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172 For the eight articles of this treaty see: Şevket S. Aydemir, Makedonya’dan Orta Asya’ya Enver Paşa (İstanbul: Remzi, 1972), vol.2 (1908-1914), p.510.
173 Cemal, Hâtîraları [n.171], pp.142-43.
176 In the parliament, CUP members had dubbed the capitulations “satanic angels”. Meclisi Mebusan Zabit Ceridesi, 3rd election period, 4th sitting, 60th session, p.1028. In his memoirs Cemal Paşa confessed they wanted to “tear them apart”. Cemal, Hâtîraları [n.171], p.438. The annulment of the capitulations “was received euphorically as a military success.” Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler [n.57], vol.3, p.420.
177 “İmityaz-ı Ecnebiyenin (Kapitülasyon) îlgası Hakkinda İrade-i seniyye,” in: Takvim-i Vekayi, no.1938, 17 September 1914. Together with the capitulations, the reform plan for the eastern provinces Russia had designed in 1913 mainly to curb abuses against Christians, was also de facto cancelled. Roderic H. Davison, “The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914,” in: The American Historical Review (1947), pp.481-505.
lodged in large mosques such as the Nebii Mosque. On 3 November, the mayor of Diyarbekir held a public speech, explaining the conduct of the war to an exclusively Muslim crowd. Upon hearing that the Russian army was pushing into the provinces of Van and Erzurum, the frantic crowd yelled “Praise to Mohammed! Death to the Russians and their allies!” The non-Muslims of the city, frightened and cautious because of this outbreak of mass rage, did not leave their homes in the following days. The army began requisitioning goods from the population and drafting men into the army. Daniel Thom, a missionary in Mardin, summarized these acts and wrote that “the Govt. has robbed the city, and the country around, of its men, of its animals, of its money,” leaving the people “pennyless, shops all closed”. Gradually, the Armenian elite of Diyarbekir was targeted and persecuted. Coinciding with his earlier order, on 29 November Talât ordered the arrest of Thomas Muggerditchian, the former interpreter of the British consulate in Diyarbekir. Muggerditchian was accused of espionage for the Entente Powers and would be sent to the court-martial. He escaped arrest, fled to Egypt and subsequently wrote his memoirs.

From November 1914 on, the CUP began drawing up formations of irregular brigands in order to invade Russia and provoke war. This secret military organization was integrated into the existing ‘Special Organization’ (Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa). The cadre of these new guerrilla bands (çetes) was to be made up of convicts, Kurdish tribesmen and Muslim immigrants, and were to be led by the same gangsters the CUP had used in the Balkan wars and in prior political competition. The convicts, named “savages and criminals” even by CUP officials, were very often Kurdish tribesmen, or local outlaws and bandits who had committed crimes of theft or manslaughter. According to an Ottoman bureaucrat, they were drilled in Istanbul for one week before being deployed in various regions. The entire operation was led by Dr. Bahadettin Şakir and was kept out of control of the Ottoman army as much as possible. On 18 November Talât personally ordered the drawing up of lists of names of “those convicts who were able to exert influence on tribes”. A week later, the Special Organization was put together in Diyarbekir. Among the members enlisted in the paramilitary organization were the Zaza brigand Alo, as

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180 Ali Emîrî, Osmanlı Vilâyât-ı Şarkîyyesi (İstanbul: Dâr-ul Hilâfe, 1918), p.34.
181 Ishaq Armalto, Al-Qousara fi Nakabat an-Nasar (Beirut: Al-Sharfe Monastery, 1970, 2nd edition). This detailed chronicle was written in 1919 in Arabic by the Syriac priest Ishaq Armalto and provides a very valuable account of Diyarbekir province before and during the war. The book has recently been translated into Swedish: De Kristnas Hemska Katastrofer: Osmannernas och Ung-turkarnas Folkmord i norra Mesopotamien 1895 / 1914-1918 (Stockholm: Beth Froso Nsibin, 2005), translated by Ingvar Rydberg. This author has used an unofficial Turkish translation by Turan Karataş (Sweden, 1993), p.22.
183 BOA, DH.SFR 47/243, Talât to Diyarbekir, 28 November 1914.
185 A. Mil, “Umami Harpte Teşkilât Mahsusa,” in: Vakti, 2 October 1933 up to 18 April 1934, republished as: Arif Cemil (Denker), I. Dünya Savası’nda Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa (İstanbul: Arba, 1997).
186 Ibid., p.196.
188 Denker, Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa [n.185], pp.236-38.
189 BOA, DH.SFR 47/70, Talât to provinces, 18 November 1914.
well as the Chechen criminal Hamid and his group of loyal warriors. Hamid was recruited by CUP Responsible Secretaries, who cabled the following notification to the Central Committee in Istanbul:

The courageous bandit Chechen Hamid, resident of the town of Reşadiye in the Bergama district, has requested help to assist the army with some of his comrades and if allowed, form a significant corps in Diyarbekir. Since we hope that aforementioned gentleman is able to serve in this way, their dispatch will benefit the homeland. We would like to request a telegraphic answer on whether their patriotic venture will be necessary or not, and present our compliments, dear brothers. 191

During the winter of 1914, the brigands began penetrating into Russian and Persian territory to incite the Muslim populations to rise in rebellion and join the Ottoman forces. In this guerrilla war, Special Organization operatives such as Yenibahçeli Nail, Deli Halit, and Topal Osman, also attacked Armenian villages, plundering, raping, and killing with impunity. Ambassador Wangenheim wrote to the German Chancellor that their anti-Russian actions across the Erzurum border frequently escalated into “Übergriffen und Ausschreitungen” against Armenian villagers. 192

The war on the eastern front gained momentum when warmonger Enver Paşa, driven by expansionist designs towards the east, on 29 December attempted to attack the Russian army in Sankamış. Against all military advice from German and Ottoman strategists, Enver insisted on waging an encirclement campaign through the rugged Kars mountains. However, the Russian general Yudenich anticipated the outflanking manoeuvre, outsmarted Enver and delivered a heavy blow to his forces. Enver’s attack failed miserably, and as a result the Third Army was effectively wiped out. Of the 90,000 soldiers that engaged in the Sankamış battle, approximately 78,000 perished, mainly through frost. 193 The CUP leadership was convinced that the disastrous defeat had been caused by “treacherous Armenian elements”. Retreating Ottoman soldiers took revenge on Armenian villagers, massacring many and pillaging their goods. After returning from the front, Enver wrote a letter to the Armenian patriarch of Konya, expressing his respect and admiration for the courage the Armenian soldiers had shown in the Sankamış battle. Enver gave the example of sergeant Ohannes who had received a medal for valor. 194 This may not have been how Enver really felt. In a personal discussion with publisher Hüseyin Cahit, Enver bitterly blamed the Armenians for the fiasco and proposed their deportation to somewhere they wouldn’t cause trouble. 195 The defeat triggered a new wave of persecutions, especially in the front line provinces Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van. On 26 December 1914 Talât ordered “the dismissal of all

191 Quoted from internal CUP correspondence, 23 November 1914, quoted in: Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, [n.57], vol.3, p.349.
192 PAAA, R14085, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, 29 December 1914.
193 Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to die: a history of the Ottoman army in the first World War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), pp.51-74. For a detailed account of the Sankamış disaster see: Alptekin Müderişoğlu, Sankamış Dramı (İstanbul: Kaştaş, 1997), 2 volumes.
Armenian police officers, police chiefs, and government employees, and the deportation of anyone who opposes these measures. This official notice marked an acceleration in CUP suspicion towards Armenian loyalty to the Ottoman state.

For the population of Diyarbekir, there was little to celebrate between Christmas and New Year’s Eve 1914. The news of Enver’s losses reverberated in Diyarbekir and had a detrimental effect on the morale of the locals. The war was experienced closely and emotionally, since both Muslims and Christians had been drafted into the army, and many of them had perished in the Sankamış campaign. The bad news distressed the communities and strained their relationships, sparking suspicion and enmity. The Saint Ephraim church was vandalized and property was stolen, whereas gendarmes beat up a Syriac village headman. The governor also prohibited the use of all non-Turkish languages in some of the province’s institutions, such as the American hospital or the French mission. In February 1915 the government initiated arms searches in Christian houses in Diyarbekir. During these violent searches the inhabitants were accused of treason and espionage, and hiding guns in secret arms stores. On 18 February 12 young men of the large Syriac village of Qarabash were convicted to death under charges of alleged desertion. Four of them were hung publicly in the central square in Diyarbekir in order to deter potential deserters. When their compatriot villagers protested against the execution, gendarmes clubbed two men to death and dispersed the group.

March also saw the disarming of Armenian soldiers and their recruitment, together with many other Christian men, into labour battalions. The cadre of these battalions were deemed disloyal elements, as an official decree proscribed them “at all costs” from taking up arms in the regular Ottoman army. The labour battalion conscripts were deployed in road construction under dire circumstances in and around Diyarbekir. Irrespective of weather conditions, every individual, including teenagers, was forced to carry a daily load of 55 kilogram. They were escorted by two dozens of soldiers. Many conscripts in the labour battalions perished of exhaustion, exposure, and maltreatment. On 5 March 1915 a Syriac native of Diyarbekir, Abed Mshiho, was conscripted in a labour battalions numbering 1100 men, and assigned to work on

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196 BOA, DH.ŞFR 48/166, Talât to the provinces of Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van, 26 December 1914. Talât Paşa’s involvement in the dismissal of Armenian government officials typifies his qualities as a micro-manager. In February he urged local officials to keep him abreast of the developing situation with regards to the Armenian civil servants. BOA, DH.ŞFR 50/3, Talât to the provinces of Erzurum, Van and Bitlis, 14 February 1915. When he got the impression that the firing wasn’t proceeding quickly enough, he personally had police chief Krikor and police officers Armenag, Boghos, and Şahin of the Van police squad removed from their offices and deported to Mosul. BOA, DH.ŞFR 50/79, Talât to Van province, 6 March 1915. For the official declaration sanctioning the dismissal of all Armenian and Greek police officers see: BOA, DH.ŞFR.EUM.MEM 80/63, 21 November 1916.

197 Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], pp.26, 27.


199 Abed Mshiho Na‘man Qarabashi, Vergoten Bloed. Verhalen over de gruweldaden jegens Christenen in Turkije en over het leed dat hun in 1895 en in 1914-1918 is aangedaan (Glanerbrug, The Netherlands: Bar Hebraeus, 2002, translated by George Toro and Amill Gorgis), p.60. This important diary was originally written in Aramaic under the title Dmo Zliho (“Shed Blood”) by Na‘man Qarabashi, a native of the village of Qarabash. During the war Qarabashi was a theology student at the Syriac monastery Deyr-ul Zaferan. Along with Armalto’s account it is one of the very few survivor memoirs.

200 Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.27.


the Diyarbekir-Aleppo road. According to his account, the maltreatments increased every other day, bastinado and other beatings becoming commonplace, the violence escalating in sporadic murders of individual conscripts by late March.\footnote{Qarabashi names nine Armenians who were lead away and killed. Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho [n.199], pp.62, 64-66.}

March 1915 was perhaps the most fateful month for the future development of the Ottoman Empire in general and of Diyarbekir province in particular. The naval attacks upon the Dardanelles straits and the Russian move towards Van cast panic into the hearts and minds of the CUP leaders.\footnote{In case the Entente navy would penetrate the Straits, Talât promised they would blow up the Aya Sofia and retreat into the Anatolian heartland, from where they planned to resist and repel the Entente. Talât laughed at Morgenthau’s protests by saying that not even six men in the CUP would care about the building, Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Ann Arbor, MI: Gomidas, 2000), p.132.} This reinforced their established fear of a nightmare scenario in which potential Armenian disloyalty would pave the way for an Allied incursion into Anatolia. This ‘wishful suspicion’ lead to a series of meetings of the Central Committee in Istanbul in mid-March. As a result of these gatherings, Dr. Bahâeddin Şakir was delegated substantial authority to deal with “the inner enemies”. The Special Organization was reorganized, expanded, and placed under his jurisdiction.\footnote{For a detailed reconstruction of this decision-making process see: Tüner Akçam, İnsan hakları ve Ermeni sorunu: İtilat ve Terakkı’den Kurtuluş Savaşı’na (İstanbul: İmge, 2001), pp.260-65, especially p.264.} The army was given more autonomy on Talât’s orders to “turn to the Third Army for the application of measures aimed at Armenian actions.”\footnote{BOA, DH.SFR 51/15, Talât to the provinces of Erzurum, Van, and Diyarbekir, 14 March 1915.} Four days later he imposed total censorship on the Armenian newspaper Azadamart and sent Osman Bedri, police commissioner of Constantinople, to confiscate their presses.\footnote{Heinrich Vierbücher, Armenien 1915: Die Abschlachtung eines Kulturvolkes durch die Türken (Bremen: Donat & Temmen Verlag, 1985 [1930]), p.49.} This radicalization at the center metastasized into the periphery as Diyarbekir saw the appointment of its new governor: Dr. Mehmed Reşid.

### 2.2 The ‘reign of terror’ begins

On 25 March 1915 the governor of Diyarbekir, Hamid Bey, was relieved of his duty and replaced by Dr. Reşid. Mehmed Reşid (Şahingiray) was born in a Circassian family in Russian Caucasus on 8 February 1873. When the Tsarist government intensified its campaign against the Circassians in 1874, his family fled to the Ottoman Empire. Reşid grew up in Istanbul, where he enrolled in the Military School of Medicine and joined other students to found the kernel of a secret political party that would later adopt the name CUP. In 1897 the Abdulhamid regime exiled him to Tripoli for his politically recalcitrant activities. Having made career in the army and risen to the rank of major, he wrote a book on the CUP revolution in 1908. However, he was never influential in the CUP core and his power did not match up to that of party bosses Dr. Bahâeddin Şakir or Dr. Nâzım. In 1909 he relinquished his employment in the military and became district governor and mayor in several provinces between 1908 and 1914. During his professional path Reşid gradually radicalized and scapegoated the Christians as the reason for the Empire’s erosion and wretched condition. By 1914 he was thoroughly convinced that the Ottoman
Christians were abusing their ostensibly privileged positions and therefore were to blame for the Empire’s depressed economy. He was delegated the task of secretary-general of the international reform plan for the eastern provinces which was annulled when the CUP engaged in war. In 1915 he became governor of Diyarbekir and in 1916 he was appointed governor of Ankara. When the war was over, he was arrested and incarcerated in Istanbul. With the assistance of his former henchmen, he escaped from prison and lived incognito at various Istanbul addresses. Fed up with being forced to evade the law, and fearing arrest and possible execution, he committed suicide when a police chief tracked him down on 6 February 1919.208

When Reşid acceded to the governorship of Diyarbekir province, he brought with him 30 mainly Circassian Special Organization operatives, such as Çerkez Harun, Çerkez Şakir, and Çerkez Aziz.209 They were joined in Diyarbekir by more troops released from the local prison.210 This way, Reşid absorbed more effective power than the average Ottoman governor. For Reşid, it was certainly true that “[i]n the provinces party bosses of one kind or another often exercised substantial control, amounting in some cases, […] to virtual autonomy”.211 Upon arrival in Diyarbekir, Reşid and his men faced a poor rule of law, a serious desertion problem, and an anxious population. The bazaar, for example, was buzzing with rumors that the Russians had invaded Istanbul.212 The Muslims feared an invasion of Diyarbekir by the Russian army, whose reputation as a valiant fighting corps had preceded its offensive into the south. The Christians were torn between fear and hope: whereas one moderate group (such as the clergy) was terrified that a Russian incursion may trigger reprisals, an other, discordant group (such as nationalists) expressed audacious beliefs that it was possible to defend themselves against the brutal policies of the CUP dictatorship.213

The concerns of many young men were of a pragmatic nature. They wanted to avoid the possibility of being conscripted into the Ottoman army and to be sent off to an almost certain death, at the front or in the labour battalions. Therefore, some had actually gone into hiding in the complex web of rooftops of Xançepêk, a neighbourhood with a large concentration of Armenians. Some of these draft evaders had acquired weapons.214 Dr. Floyd Smith, an American doctor of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), witnessed that at the end of February, the Armenian bishop Tchilgadun finally “went upon the roofs and lectured the men, telling them that they were bringing ruin upon themselves and the whole Christian quarter.

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209 Mehmed Reshid, Mülâhazât (İstanbul, 1919), transliterated in: Nejdet Bilgi, Dr. Mehmed Reshid Şahingiray’ın hayatı ve hâlâtı (İzmir: Akademi, 1997), p.89, footnote 28. According to Abidin Nesimî, son of the then mayor of Lice, Hüseyin Nesimî, the number of volunteers Resid employed was 20. Abidin Nesimî, Yıllara İçinden (İstanbul: Görnem, 1977), p.39.

210 Yeghiayan, British Foreign Office Dossiers [n.152], p.151.


212 Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.28.

213 Ibid., p.28.

As a result quite a number surrendered.”\textsuperscript{215} Still, there were a number of both Muslim and Christian deserters when Dr. Reşid became governor.

In a post-war booklet titled “Reflections” (Mülâhazât),\textsuperscript{216} Reşid defended and sought to legitimize his wartime policies as governor of Diyarbekir. These memoirs, composed of two of his four wartime notebooks (the other two notebooks were lost), bear extraordinary importance as they allow a close look at his line of thought when he was appointed governor. From the moment he set foot in Diyarbekir, Reşid found confirmation of his prejudices of a conspiracy of disloyal Christians. He wrote:

My appointment to Diyarbekir coincided with a very delicate period of the war. Large parts of Van and Bitlis had been invaded by the enemy, deserters were transgressing, pillaging and robbing everywhere. Yezidi and Nestorian uprisings in or at the border of the province required the application of drastic measures. The transgressive, offensive and impudent attitude of the Armenians was seriously endangering the honor of the government.\textsuperscript{217}

In his memoirs Reşid especially targeted the Armenians. He accused them of “high treason” (hıyânet-i rataniye) and of “pursuing the goal of an independent Armenia” (miştakil bir Ermenistan gyesini takîh).\textsuperscript{218} In his paranoia and animosity Reşid ignored the many Muslim deserters, and imagined an army of Armenian deserters whereas they may not have been as countless and organized as he visualized. He believed that the Armenian draft dodgers on the rooftops were all “formidably” (müdhiş) organized revolutionaries, and that their amount numbered more than one thousand. Moreover, according to Reşid “there was not a single Armenian in the province that was not participating in this national endeavour”.\textsuperscript{219}

In order to deal with these perceived problems, Reşid organized a committee for the “solution of the Armenian question”. This council was named “Committee of Inquiry” (Tabkîk Heyeti) and had its own “Militia Unit” (Milis Alayı) at its disposal.\textsuperscript{220} According to a German charity worker the committee, drawn up of a dozen CUP loyalists, was “ein Scheinkomitee zur Lösung der armenischen Frage” and served only one purpose: to eliminate the Henchak and Dashnak parties.\textsuperscript{221} It was headed by Colonel Mustafa Bey (Cemilpaşazâde), and consisted of deputy Aziz Feyzi, postal clerk İbrahim Bedreddin,\textsuperscript{222} Majors Rüşdü Bey and Yasinzaâde Şevki

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\textsuperscript{216} The booklet was alternately titled “Persistence” (Sebat).

\textsuperscript{217} Reşid, \textit{Mülâhazât} [n.209], p.24.

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., pp.95, 99.

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid., pp.103, 106.

\textsuperscript{220} Süleyman Nazif, “Doktor Reşid,” in: \textit{Hadisat}, 8 February 1919. It is possible that the establishment of these provincial committees was an empire-wide undertaking. There is evidence that in other provinces similar organizations were set up. \textit{Yale University Library}, Ernst Jäckh Papers, file 49, folio 1354, “Anlage Abschrift”.

\textsuperscript{221} \textit{PA.AA}, R14087, director of the Deutscher Hülfsbund für christliches Liebeswerk im Orient (Frankfurt am Main) Friedrich Schuchardt to the Auswärtiges Amt, 21 August 1915, enclosure no.6.

\textsuperscript{222} On 2 September 1914 Ibrahim Bedreddin (Bedri for short) became the postal clerk of Diyarbekir province. Previously he had held this office in Basra and Mosul. After the defeat of the Balkan wars of 1912-’13, he had coordinated the CUP-sponsored deportation of the Ottoman Greeks of Iğda (a town between Çanakkale and Bursa). On 12 September 1915 he was officially appointed district governor of Mardin, which he remained until 11 December 1916. On 24 January 1917 he was assigned to the governorship of Diyarbekir, which he occupied until 24 November 1918. Yeghiayan, \textit{British Foreign Office Dossiers} [n.152], pp.69-70.
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(Ekinci), his brother Yasinzâde Yahya (Ekinci), İAMM representative and director of the Diyarbekir branch of the ‘Society for National Defense’ Veli Necdet, police chief Memduh Bey, militia commander Şevki Bey, and Şeref Uluğ (son of the müftü). On orders of Reşid they selected the following civilians and appointed them Captain: Zazazâde Hacı Süleyman (a Zaza butcher by profession in the Diyarbekir bazaar), Halil (a butcher as well), Cercisâzâde Abdülkerim, Direkçizâde Tahir, and Pirinciçizâde Sidî (Taranç). The following volunteers were nominated Lieutenant: Halifezâde Salih, Ganizâde Servet (Akkaynak), Muhtarzâde Salih, Şeyhzâde Kadri (Demiray), Pirânîzâde Kemal (Önen), Yazıcızâde Kemal, Zaza Alo Efendi, and Hacı Bakr.

At that time, a certain Hacı Zeki of Lice, a fanatic activist incited the locals of Mardin to take up arms against the Christians. Zeki convened groups of Muslims at his house in Mardin city where he held inflammatory political speeches, openly calling for pogroms. The district governor of Mardin, a moderate man by the name of Hilmi, was displeased by Zeki’s aggressive vilification. Since the outbreak of the war Hilmi had been showing consistent efforts to restrain conflict, and maintain relative stability and moderate rule. He reprehended Zeki and expelled him from Mardin. Zeki then took off to Diyarbekir where he found willing partners among the CUP elite that were just consolidating their rule in the provincial capital. On 6 April 1915 Talât ordered Reşid to “appoint a capable, loyal, and devout İttihadist for the vacant position of mayor” in Diyarbekir. Reşid immediately fired the relatively mild Cemilpaşazâde Dr. Fuad Bey and replaced him with the rabidly anti-Armenian Sıdkı. Police chief Dersimli Hüseyin Bey was replaced by İAMM boss Veli Necdet, who had previously had occupied the office of provincial secretary. All the key positions in Diyarbekir were now occupied by CUP loyalists.

In Diyarbekir, Reşid now embarked on a relentless campaign to find and punish deserters. On 1 April he issued a proclamation demanding the surrender of all arms to the police. When this failed to produce the results he had expected, he brutalized the arms searches from 5 April on. Aided by his gendarme commander, Major Rüşdü, he personally supervised and participated in the warrantless searches of churches and houses. Whereas district governor Hilmi in Mardin visited the Christian clergy to congratulate them on Easter, Reşid’s roundups of Armenian men became more and more arbitrary and categorical. As he wrote: “On a certain day I had the 3 or 4 most important streets in the Armenian neighbourhood barricaded and ordered surprise searches

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223 A müftü (mufti) is a Muslim jurist who is versed in Islamic religious law (the shari’a) and provides binding advice on its application.
224 Beysanoğlu, Diyarbekir Tarhi [n.141], pp.793-94; Bilgi, Dr. Mehmed Reşid [n.208], pp.26-27. See also: Joseph Naayem, Shall this nation die? (New York: Chaldean Rescue, 1921), pp.182-83. Reverend Naayem was a Chaldean priest of Urfa, where he witnessed the killing of his father and the persecution of the Christians. Disguised as a Bedouin Arab, he narrowly escaped with his life.
225 Armalo, Al-Qousara [n.181], pp.29, 34.
226 BÖA, DH.ŞFR 51/220, Talât to Diyarbekir, 6 April 1915.
227 Reşid, Mülâhazât [n.209], p.112. Right after the appointment of Sıdkı, a wave of violence swept over the labour battalions as two supervisors came to inspect the workers, yelling “You’re not here to play, come on, I want to see blood on those rocks!” Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho [n.199], p.65.
228 Yeghiayan, British Foreign Office Dossiers [n.152], p.48.
229 Floyd Smith to James Barton, 18 September 1915, quoted in: Kieser, “Dr. Mehmed Reshid” [n.199], p.265.
230 Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho [n.195], pp.63.
on every single house in the early morning, arresting more than 500 armed deserters". By 15 April Reşid had already had more than 600 Armenian notables and artisans arrested and put in jail. There he had them tortured to exact confessions on the locations of hidden arms depots. The prisoners were beaten, burnt with hot irons, had their nails pulled out with pliers, and suffered prolonged bastinado. Even so, Reşid was not satisfied with what had been accomplished and wired Istanbul twice to request the deployment of more manpower to assist his force of 300 gendarmes and policemen. The Interior Ministry did not comply with his requests, frustrating and galvanizing him into more severe measures.

A peculiar aspect of the operation was the hunt for “recalcitrant” books and other texts, generally written in non-Ottoman languages. In CUP jargon this material was branded “harmful documents” (evrâk-ı meşâr) and needed to be confiscated. As Floyd Smith wrote: “Books and papers were sure to bring condemnation to a household.” On 22 April Reşid’s men went from door to door in the Xançepêk and Fatihpaşa neighbourhoods to find books. The Syriac tailor Habib had warned the inhabitants to hide their books, especially books in the French and Armenian languages. The militia also paid a visit to the Armenian bishop Tchilgadian and accused him of hiding arms in secret niches in the large Armenian church St. Sarkis. They raided his room, took away all his books and documents, and sent them to Reşid for examination. The next days the books were burnt publicly. Vahram Dadrian was a young boy when he was deported with his family from Çorum. After many trials and tribulations they arrived in the Syrian desert and met an Armenian man named Pakrad who had just escaped from Diyarbekir. Pakrad related them that his father Abraham got caught up in the books searches. A corporal took two of their books and walked out, facing a frantic crowd of Muslims:

The corporal gestured to the crowd to shut up. “Listen! Look here. Look what we found in his home,” he yelled, lifting a geography book into the air. “You don’t know how to read, so you don’t know how dangerous this book is. But I won’t have to say much before you can draw your own conclusions. In the hands of our enemies this book is a more terrifying weapon than all the guns and cannons of the army. This book gives the locations of all the cities, villages, rivers, and roads in Turkey. All of them meticulously portrayed. Anybody who goes through this book can find not only the plan of every city, but also the location of every house and whether it belongs to a Christian or a Muslim. They have marked each one with a cross or a crescent, so that one day when they rebel it will be easy for them to tell a Muslim...”

232 Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.170], p.29.
233 Reşid, Mülâhazât [n.201], pp.105.
234 Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho [n.195], p.127. Fa’iz Al-Ghusayn, an Ottoman bureaucrat hailing from Damascus, was arrested for his opposition against the CUP and put in the Diyarbekir prison, where he witnessed the tortures inflicted on the Armenian notables. He later fled to Bombay and wrote his memoirs in Arabic. Fa’iz Al-Ghusayn, Martyred Armenia (London: C.A. Pearson Ltd., 1917).
235 Reşid, Mülâhazât [n.201], pp.103, 104.
236 In World War I, the CUP confiscated and destroyed an unknown but undoubtedly large number of non-Turkish language works. A striking example is the fate of the books at library of the Armenian school of Sivas. In October 1916 Talât was disturbed by the idea that the library kept “important volumes on the condition of the Ottoman Empire in French, German, English, Russian, and Kurdish,” and ordered “the immediate seizure of these books and their dispatch to Istanbul by post.” BOA, DH.SFR 69/75, Talât to Sivas province, 23 October 1916. Five months later, when the books still weren’t sent, he repeated his order, requesting the books to be sent “urgently”. BOA, DH.SFR 76/243-14, Talât to Sivas province, 24 May 1917.
237 Floyd Smith to James Barton, 18 September 1915, quoted in: Kieser, “Dr. Mehmed Reshid” [n.208], p.264.
238 Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.29. Patriarch Rahmani, Les dégâts causés à la nation syrienne (présenté devant la conférence de la paix, 1919).
household from the others.” Grumbling from the mob – arms into the air in defiance! “Oh, oh, oh… clobber him, kill him, let him rot, the traitor.” “Please, calm down. Not so fast,” the corporal ordered with authority, “I haven’t finished yet. Look. Here’s an other book.” He held up an other book – a physics text. “It tells you all you need to know about how to make gun-powder, bullets, and dynamite. These conspirators’ homes are filled with books like this. Both the young and the old read these books and learn what to do to destroy our country. But thank God and the Sultan that we have been vigilant and were able to uncover their plot at the last minute. Now it’s we who will destroy their homes and put their children to the sword.” The policemen had a hard time clearing a way through the violent crowd. They finally succeeded and, pulling and pushing their victim, they took him off to jail.

Pakrad’s father Abraham died in jail, where changes of escape or survival were very slim. As the city prison was now swarming with prisoners, Reşit ordered the large caravanserai of Diyarbekir evacuated. Every day several dozens of prisoners were locked up and tortured in that khan.

The violent persecutions were not limited to Diyarbekir. In April a gradual shift occurred from discerning between combatants and non-combatants, to not discerning between them anymore. This momentum is exemplified by the crucial battle of Van, which had very high stakes for all parties. The Van front saw mutual indiscriminate massacring of Muslims by the joint Russo-Armenian forces and of Christians by Ottoman forces. The anti-Armenian measures at the national level now became more and more categorical as well. Moreover, inspired by the brutalizing war in Persian Azerbaijan and in Transcaucasia, they were also gaining ‘total’ traits: more and more violence was applied. Fear of Allied landings on the western coasts added fuel to the fire. As a result, the CUP began incarcerating dissidents and assailing the Armenian community all over the Ottoman Empire. Beginning on 24 April 1915, the political and cultural elite of the Ottoman Armenian community was targeted for arrest and deportation to the interior. With very few exceptions, these men were tortured to death in the next months. Simultaneously, deportation convoys to the interior were rerouted to Der el-Zor in the Syrian desert. The persecutions soon increased in intensity and were extended to larger parts of the Ottoman Empire.

In Diyarbekir, Reşit had not been distinguishing at all ever since he arrived. His intensive arms searches of the first three weeks of April had delivered some results for his militia as many arms were found. The scope of armament and the extent of its organization were blown out of proportion and photos were taken of the arms and the culprits. On 27 April Reşit wired an elated telegram to Talât summarizing and evaluating his work in Diyarbekir:

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239 Qarabashi, *Dmo Zliho* [n.199], pp.82, 128. This famous caravanserai, a large inn providing shelter to travelling businessmen or pilgrims, was also known as “guest house” (*misafirhane*) or simply “khan” (*han*) and is presently known as the Deliller Hanı near the Mardin Gate. After restoration in the 1990s, it became the 5-star Hotel Kervansaray.
For ten days, the pursuit of deserters has been carried out with utmost severity. As a result of yesterday’s purges a significant amount of explosives, fifty bombs, lots of ammunition and various arms, and a great deal of dynamite powder was found. 120 leaders and operatives of the villages were taken into custody. Until now, only in the city more than 1000 deserters of different regions were apprehended, many of whom are party members. Searches and pursuit are continuing.

Having incarcerated the bulk of the political elite of the Diyarbekir Christians, Reşid’s militia now targeted their religious leaders. Blanket arrests of priests and monks were carried out and their houses were ransacked. In Mardin, where Reşid’s persecutions had not yet started, the news from Diyarbekir nevertheless caused fear. The Armenian Catholic Bishop Ignatius Maloyan had become anxious about the worsening situation and seems to have written a letter to his coreligionists, in case something would happen to him. Maloyan urged his parish to remain calm and loyal to the government, and wrote: “Above all, never lose your faith in the holy trinity.” The letter was sealed and entrusted to the Syriac Orthodox Bishop Gabriel Tabbuni on the first of May.

While the war was raging in all intensity on the eastern front, the CUP began questioning the loyalty of the Ottoman Armenians even more. On 5 May 1915 Talât authorized the Third Army to disarm all Armenian gendarmes in Diyarbekir. This way, even loyal Armenians were categorized as disloyal and treated as such. The next day the Directorate for Employment and Supplies of the Ministry of Economy ordered all its offices to fire their Armenian staff and “deport those of whom it is necessary to areas where there are no Armenians”. After Reşid had already arrested these men in Diyarbekir, he proceeded to persecute the city’s clergy and extend the arrests to the villages. On 9 May he summoned the Chaldean priest Hanna Soha in Mardin to come to Diyarbekir for interrogation. Upon arrival, the militia publicly maltreated him before killing him in broad daylight in the streets. The absence of constraints in his murder emboldened the militia and triggered a new wave of arrests and violence, this time targeting the surrounding villages as well. The predominantly Christian villages Kabiye, Qarabash, and Qatarbel, all situated on the plain of Diyarbekir, were subjected to brutal arms searches by Yasinzâde Yahya and Pirinççizâde Sîdkı between 10 and 20 May. The village men were tortured with bastinado, and dozens were taken away to the capital, filling the prison and the

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244 Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.30.
245 BOA, DH.ŞFR 52/234, Talât to Reşid, 5 May 1915.
246 BOA, DH.ŞFR 52/249, 6 May 1915, Ministry of Economy to the provinces of Erzurum, Bitlis, Van, Sivas, Manuret-ul Aziz, and Diyarbekir. Since there were no other educated clerks available, Syriac employees Aziz (son of Yakub) and George Meqdesi Nano of the Diyarbekir office of the Ministry of Economy were allowed to continue their work. The director of this office, Saib Ali Efendi, protected these two secretaries all throughout the war. Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.33. Most Armenian civil servants had already been fired and replaced by Muslims at that time. Some were still in office at the Ministry of Post. On 23 May this Ministry too took action, and ordered the dismissal of all its Armenian clerks and the transfer of the vacant functions to “trustworthy Muslims” (emîn ve müslîm kimselerle). BOA, DH.ŞFR 53/89, Ministry of Post to the provinces of Diyarbekir, Adana, Sivas, Ankara, Van, and Erzurum, 23 May 1915. For Haleb see: BOA, DH.ŞFR 53/90. The day after, the Ministry had to deal with the replacement of the Armenian postal clerk responsible for the deliverance of post between Diyarbekir and Sîrt. Although there were no other qualified employees available, it warned that the appointment of the new postal clerk should in no way be an Armenian. BOA, DH.ŞFR 53/97, Ministry of Post to Bitlis, 24 May 1915.
German charity worker Schuchardt wrote: “zwischen dem 10. und 30. Mai wurden weitere 1200 der angesehensten Armenier und anderen Christen ohne Unterschied der Confessionen aus dem Vilajet Diarbekir […] verhaftet”. Reşid then imposed a death penalty on any Armenian going outside the city walls. Diyarbekir had become an open-air prison.

The persecutions also spread into the countryside, most notably Mardin city, which was still ruled by Hilmi Bey, who had stalled and resisted anti-Christian persecutions in his district. On 15 May Reşid sent Aziz Feyzi to organize the round-up of the Christian elites of Mardin. During a secret meeting in which tens of Muslim notables participated, a plan was laid out for the crack-down on the Mardin elite. However, this was practically impossible because of Hilmi being in office. Talât was still busy micro-managing the national persecution of the Armenian political elite. On 19 May he ordered Henchak leader Paramas court-martialled in the Diyarbekir prison and inquired on the whereabouts of Krikor Nalbandian. On the 22nd he requested information on Agnouni, Rupen Zartarian, and their colleagues.

A critical event in Diyarbekir was the first large massacre involving the integral destruction of entire village populations. On the morning of 20 May 1915 Reşid ordered Yahya and Sıdkı to disarm Qarabash, a village shortly northeast of Diyarbekir. The village was invaded with 50 men and thoroughly disarmed, seizing even bread knives. Its men incarcerated, its weapons confiscated, Qarabash was now completely emasculated. That same evening Yahya and Sıdkı visited the neighbouring Kurdish villages, inciting them to attack Qarabash and explicitly giving them fiat to plunder. Two days later, on 22 May, the village was invaded by mounted Kurds, who massacred its population with daggers, axes, and swords. Its two priests, Paulus and Behnam, were trampled to death under the hooves of the horses. The women were raped, the houses were burnt, and valuables were seized. The few survivors fled to Diyarbekir, were some of them were treated by Floyd Smith. Smith reported the arrival of the Qarabash survivors as follows:

May 21, 1915, there came to our compound in Diarbekir from the village of Karabash, three hours to the east, three or four wounded and the following day (May 22) over a score of wounded Armenian and Syrian women and children. They, the villagers, told of a night attack by the Kurds three days previous and that the next morning the government had sent gendarmes who refused to allow anyone to come to Diarbekir. Some managed to get away and finally all who could walk or be carried came on the dates mentioned. The wounds were practically all infected and I have classified them as follows: […]
(c) Wounds made by heavy cutting instruments, probably axes. […]

247 Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.32.
248 Qarabashli, Dmo Zliho [n.199], pp.81, 86, 92.
249 PAAA, R14087, director of the Deutscher Hülfsbund für christliches Liebeswerk im Orient (Frankfurt am Main) Friedrich Schuchardt to the Auswärtiges Amt, 21 August 1915, enclosure no.6.
251 Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.33.
252 BOA, DH. SFR 53/58, 19 May 1915, Talât to Reşid.
253 BOA, DH. SFR 53/74, 22 May 1915, Talât to Reşid.
254 Qarabashli, Dmo Zliho [n.199], p.81.
Two children about seven and nine years and one woman; attempted decapitations. Deep incised wounds of the nape of the neck (just below the skull), 5-8 inches long and of a depth equal to the thickness of the muscles of this region.255

On that same evening, the 160 families of the village of Kabiye were targeted.256 The terrified villagers, comprised of some remaining men but mostly women, children, and the elderly, had taken refuge in the Mor Kiryakos church. Siddik had persuaded Ömer, Mustafa, and Emin, three sons of Perîxan, matriarch of the Reman tribe (see page 29), to cooperate in the raid. They had brought with them dozens of tribesmen, who combed the village for hemp rope to tie the men together. On orders of Siddik the men were tortured with hot iron pins, while women and girls were raped in the church. Within five hours, the militia and the tribesmen had hacked the villagers to death with axes. Many were crammed into haylofts and barns and burnt alive. After the massacre, the Reman brothers loaded two saddle bags of money and gold and carried the goods away.257 The few survivors escaped to Diyarbekir, where some were killed after all by gendarmes. One survivor stated that she survived the massacre “between the corpses of her relatives” (men bayn lashat herbo). When she fled to Diyarbekir city, a Zaza family proposed to take her into their home, but she refused out of fear. An other survivor, a boy, had escaped death by hiding in a vineyard, which was overgrown by that time of the year. He was the only male survivor of the Kabiye massacre.258

In April, some Armenians had already sporadically been deported from their native regions, though this was not an empire-wide campaign. The deportation of the entire Armenian millet was officially organized from 23 May 1915 on, when Talât issued orders for the integral deportation of all Armenians to Deyr-ul Zor, starting with the northeastern provinces.259 That same day he urged the Fourth Army Command to court-martial any Muslim who collaborated with Christians.260 The Third Army had been put under command of General Mahmud Kâmil Paşa,261 who had issued a similar order. His orders instructed “any Muslim who protected an Armenian hanged in front of his house, the burning of his house, his removal from office, and his


256 In the 1960s, Professor of Semitic languages Otto Jastrow travelled to Diyarbekir and Beirut to conduct several very valuable interviews with survivors from many villages. Jastrow uploaded these recordings to an online archive (<http://semarch.uni-hd.de/> ) and transcribed them in both Aramaic, Arabic, and German. For the Kabiye massacre see: Otto Jastrow (ed.), Die mesopotamisch-arabischen Qultu-Dialekte (Wiesbaden: Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner GmbH, 1981), vol.II, Volkskundliche Texte in Elf Dialekten, pp.309-71.

257 According to Qarabashi the amount of money stolen was 150 pounds. Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho [n.199], p.89.

258 Jastrow, Die mesopotamisch-arabischen [n.256], p.310. Many survivors of the Christian villages of the plain fled to the city but were not received with open arms. Survivors and scared villagers came pouring into the churches. A survivor girl related that upon arrival at the Syriac Mother Mary church, she was chased away at the door by a Syriac Orthodox priest, who cursed at her and did not even give her a morsel of bread. Ibid., pp.324-25. According to the son of an Armenian survivor from the village of Satıköy, this priest was B’shero Abu Tuma, who had also been forced by Reşid to act as an informer and betray houses where Armenians were hidden. Interview with David Krikorian (aged 75) from Satıköy village (Diyarbakir province), conducted in Turkish in Amsterdam on 16 December 2004.

259 BOA, DH.SFR 53/91, 53/92, and 53/93, Talât to provinces, 23 May 1915. This is the single instance in which the empire-wide nature of the deportations are reflected in one order at the most central level.

260 BOA, DH.SFR 53/85, Talât to Cenala Paşa, 23 May 1915.

261 On 12 February 1915 Mahmud Kâmil replaced General Hafiz Hakkı, who had died in a spotted typhus epidemic. Erickson, Ordered to die [n.193], p.104.
appearance before a court-martial.” These massive arrests and persecutions prompted the Entente Powers to announce a joint declaration on 24 May, denouncing CUP policies against the Armenians. The declaration vehemently criticized these “new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization” and promised “that they will hold personally responsible [...] all members of the Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres”. The CUP leaders, especially Talât, panicked and attempted to disguise the deportations, requesting permission from the Grand Vizier on 26 May to issue a temporary deportation law. Although the deportations had already begun, the Grand Vizier endorsed Talât’s law on the 29th, rushing the bill through parliament the next day. This legal cover was the official inception of the deportation of Armenians to the Syrian desert, authorizing the army to proceed with this fait accompli, delegating its daily implementation to the İAMM.

2.3 ‘Burn, destroy, kill’

At this stage, moral thresholds were crossed both on the national and provincial level. Talât had assumed supervision and therefore responsibility of a very risky operation: the deportation of an entire population. The murderous initiations on the plain of Diyarbekir too, had crossed a boundary as entire village populations were now targeted for destruction. The relationship between these two developments remain a chicken-and-egg enigma. However, it is possible to reconstruct at least some elements of this momentum. Rafael de Nogales Mendez was a Venezolean officer in German duty, serving in the Ottoman army as a mercenary. In the spring of 1915 he had witnessed the massacres against Christians in Van and Bitlis, committed by Halil Paşa and Tahir Cevdet Bey. He visited Diyarbekir late June and had the opportunity to speak to Reşid in private. According to Nogales, Talât had personally ordered Dr. Reşid to unleash hell on Diyarbekir with a telegram containing a mere three words: “Burn - Destroy - Kill” (Yak - Vur - Öldür). Although this order was most probably destroyed (assuming it existed at all), there was clearly no instruction for Reşid to desist. Moreover, Reşid admitted himself that he had merely obeyed Talât’s order, who seemingly had confided to him: “j’assume la responsabilité morale et matérielle”. Reşid interpreted the order as connivance of his policy, characterized by American consul Jesse Jackson as a “reign of terror”.

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262 Takvim-i Vekâyi, no.3540, p.7.
263 PRO, FO 371/2488/51010, 28 May 1915; National Archives RG 59, 867.4016/67, 29 May 1915.
264 BOA, MV 198/163, 30 May 1915.
265 Halil (Enver Paşa’s uncle) and Cevdet (Enver’s brother-in-law) swept through Van and Bitlis after their defeats on Persian territory and in Van. During their retreat, they massacred the Armenian inhabitants of Bitlis, Van, and the plain of Muş. For an eyewitness account see: Grace Knapp, The Tragedy of Bitlis (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1919).
267 National Archives, RG 59, 867.4016/77, Jackson to Morgenthau, 5 June 1915, in: Sarafian, United States [n.250], p.84.
Content with the results in Diyarbekir plain and emboldened with Talât’s approval, Reşid had Feyzi conduct arms searches in Mardin on 24 May. These were equally brutal and categorical as those carried out in the previous month in Diyarbekir. The next day he took it a step further and ordered Hilmi Bey to arrest all Christian notables in Mardin. Hilmi refused by answering he could not think of any reason why he should carry out arrests in his city and openly disobeyed his superior’s order. Nevertheless, Feyzi sidestepped bureaucratic protocols and proceeded with the persecutions, backed by a group of Muslim notables and the militia. Together they incarcerated dozens of Christians in Mardin. The persecutions also spread to the northern parts of the province, which were closer to Kharput, capital of Mamuret-ul Aziz province. Reverend Henry Riggs, a missionary in that city, wrote to the American ambassador Morgenthau that the Armenian pastor of Çüngüş (Tchunkoush) had “died a violent death in prison there.” The same fate had befallen preachers in Hani and Lice.

By the end of May, the entire Christian elite of Diyarbekir was in prison, where some had already died under torture. Dr. Reşid administered the coup de grace to the elite in the last week of that month. On Sunday 25 May 1915 Major Rüşdü cuffed 807 notables including Bishop Tchilgadian, and lead them through the Mardin Gate. On the shores of the Tigris the men were loaded on 17 large Tigris rafts (keleks) under the pretext that they would be deported to Mosul. Militiamen accompanied the notables on the rafts as they sailed one hour downstream to the “intersection of two rivers” (serê du avê), a violent torrent where the Batman creek joins the Tigris. This area was the home of the notorious Reman tribe, south of Beşiri. At this gorge, Major Rüşdü had all rafts moored by the left bank of the river and ordered the Christians to write reassuring letters to their families in which they were compelled to write that they were safely underway to Mosul. The men were then stripped of their clothes and valuables and massacred by Rüşdü’s men. In carrying out the hands-on killing the militia was assisted by Kurdish tribesmen loyal to Reman chieftain Ömer, who had been induced by Aziz Feyzi. All men were slaughtered and dumped in the river, with the exception of Bishop Tchilgadian, who was forced to witness the bloodbath as a form of psychological excruciation before being lead back to Diyarbekir. After the massacre, Ömer and Mustafa were invited to Aziz Feyzi’s house, where they celebrated their accomplishment. The men were later received at the governorship, where Reşid congratulated them for their bravery and patriotism.

268 Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.33.
269 National Archives, RG 59, 867.4016/77, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, 25 May 1915, in: Sarafian, United States [n.250], p.35.
270 According to Yusuf Halaçoğlu, these rafts were called Shahtur. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, “Realities Behind the Relocation,” in: Türkayya Ataöv (ed.), The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2001), p.117. Halaçoğlu ignores the fact that the Armenians loaded on these rafts never arrived anywhere, but were robbed, put to the sword and drowned.
271 Qarabaschi, Dmo Zliho [n.199], p.128.
His wish was granted by the Directorate for General Security and the militia received financial benefits and was decorated with medals.  

On the 30th of May the ritual was repeated with 674 Christians and 13 rafts. This time, the murder was supervised by Veli Necdet and 50 militiamen. On arrival at the Reman gorge the victims were robbed of a total of 6000 Turkish pounds and stripped of their clothes. They were killed and thrown in the river as Ömer’s tribesmen and the militia lined up on both banks with their guns. Those that managed to swim and emerge to the surface were shot dead. Back in Diyarbekir, the militiamen sold the expensive clothing they had taken from the victims on the market. Among those killed were Onnik Kazazian, a wholesaler from Istanbul who happened to visit Diyarbekir, and his friend Artin Kassabian, the former interpreter of the French vice consulate. Other victims were the noted bankers Khatchadur Dikranian and Tirpandjian. The same fate befell Mihran Basmadjian, graduate of the Euphrates College in Kharpout, Dikran Chakidian, and Nalband Hagop, all of them Dashnakists, as well as Hagop Ovasapian, the negotiator Stephan Matossian, the former provincial interpreter and secondary school teacher Dikran Ilvanian, member of the municipal council and representative of Singer Missak Shirikdjian, all of them members of the Ramgavar party. To the dismay of Holstein, the German vice consul of Mosul, a week later the rafts arrived empty. Holstein had found out that the Christian convoys had been “entirely slaughtered” (sämtlich abgeschlachtet) and had witnessed their corpses floating downstream: “seit einigen Tagen treiben Leichen und menschliche Glieder im Fluß hier vorbei”.  

Bishop Tchilgadian had been forced twice to watch how his parish was slaughtered. Although Ambassador Wangenheim later reported to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg that “[d]er armenische Bischof von Diarbekir soll aus Verzweiflung Selbstmord begangen haben,” this was certainly not true. After the second massacre he was lead back to Diyarbekir, where he was ordered to sign a written declaration that the murdered Armenians had died of natural causes. When he refused he was thrown into prison, where he was tortured to death. His teeth were knocked out, his beard was pulled out, he was forced to squeeze boiled eggs in his palms, and his eyes were gorged out. In the meantime, his wife was raped by several militiamen before being slaughtered. Finally, a large nail was hammered through Tchilgadian’s head before he was burnt

273 BÖA, DH.EUM.MEM 67/31, 27 July 1915. Deputies Aziz Feyzi and Zülfü Bey, and militia Major Şevki were decorated with honorary medals for their “great achievements”. BÖA, DH.KMS 43/10, 11 January 1917. According to a British intelligence report, “Deputy Feyzi was received by the Kaiser and decorated with the Iron Cross”. Foreign Office 371/4172/24597, no.63490, folio 304.  
274 PAAA, R14087, director of the Deutschen Hülfsbundes für christliches Liebeswerk im Orient (Frankfurt am Main) Friedrich Schuchardt to the Auswärtiges Amt, 21 August 1915, enclosure no.6; Lepsius, Todessang [n.108], pp.75-76.  
276 Épisodes des massacres [n.272], pp.22-23.  
277 PAAA, Botschaft Konstantinopel 169, Holstein to Wangenheim, 10 June 1915.  
278 PAAA, Botschaft Konstantinopel 169, Rößler to Wangenheim, 29 June 1915; R14086, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, 9 July 1915.  
279 National Archives, RG 39, 867.4016/77, Morgenthau to Secretary of State, 20 July 1915 (enclosure no.3), in: Sarafian, United States [n.250], p.103.  
280 Vierbücher, Armenien 1915 [n.207], pp.61-62.
to ashes in front of the Melek Ahmed mosque by officer Resul Hayri Bey. The other priests and monks werestrangled to death with thick ropes. All of this happened on orders of Aziz Feyzi.281

After the elimination of the Armenian elite of Diyarbekir, Reşid quickly expanded the violence to genocidal proportions. Having massacred the bulk of the male elite, the rest of the Diyarbekir Armenians were now targeted. On 1 June he had his militia evacuate 1060 Armenian men and women of the Armenian neighbourhood Xançepek and escort them to the Diyarbekir plain through the Mardin Gate. The people were gathered and a proclamation was read out loud, offering the Armenians their lives in exchange for conversion to Islam. Although the decision was not unanimous, the victims refused, whereupon they were stripped of their clothes and belongings. The militia and local Kurdish villagers then massacred them with rifles, axes, swords, and daggers. Many women were raped, some were sold as slaves. The corpses were either thrown in wells or trenches, or left on the plain to rot, “the men on their stomachs, the women on their backs.”282 It did not take long for Talât to issue the following deportation order for the Diyarbekir Armenians: “All Armenians living in villages and towns of the province, will be resettled to Mosul, Urfa and Zor, with no exceptions. Necessary measures will be taken to secure their lives and property during the deportation”.283 At the same time, the İAMM ordered the “documentation of the names and places of the Armenian villages, the number of deportees, and the abandoned property and plowland”.284

İAMM agent for Diyarbekir Veli Neddet was charged with implementing Talât’s orders. The remaining Armenians were to be deported to the south and consisted mainly of women, children, and the elderly. One day after her father was tortured to death by Reşid’s militiamen, Aghavni Kassabian, daughter of a noted Armenian merchant, was deported with her family:

Turkish gendarmes came to our house in the morning and told us that we were going to be put on a deportation march. We were given little time to gather a few things that we could pack on a donkey. We gathered silverware, some clothes, two rugs, a Bible, soap, some family photographs. We packed as much food and water as we could, but we expected to be able to buy food when we needed more. We hid some jewels on our bodies, and each had an allotment of money. […] By noon we joined a long line of Armenians and were marched down the streets to the Citadel Gardens, where we met up with thousands of Armenians. Some had donkeys, some had ox-drawn carts, and most were on foot carrying packs and small children and infants. The gendarmes began cracking the whip and we began to move in a big mass toward the New Gate from where I could see a long snakish line of Armenians moving around the city walls going south. We were marched out past the Citadel and around the black city walls waving in the heat. By the end of the day, we were sleeping on the ground somewhere on the flat, hard plateau. The tributaries of the Tigris cut ravines into the limestone ridges, and in their flanks were occasional huts built out of the rock, where Kurds lived. There was nothing but dry ground and sky and limestone ridges. Nothing.285

281 Dadrian, To the Desert [n.238], p.66; Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho [n.199], p.129; Yeghiayan, British Foreign Office Dossiers [n.152], p.48; Épisodes des massacres [n.272], p.26-28; Interview with David Krikorian [n.258].
283 BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/87, Talât to the provinces of Trabzon, Mamuret-ul Aziz, Sivas, Canik, and Diyarbekir, 21 June 1915.
284 BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/15, İAMM to the provinces of Adana, Haleb, Erzurum, Bitlis, Van, and Diyarbekir, 14 June 1915
On the fifth day of the deportation, Aghavni’s mother had gone delirious and died of exhaustion. On the sixth day, all of their possessions were gone, either depleted or stolen by gendarmes. One night she was raped by a gendarme. Hunger, thirst, murder, and exhaustion had dramatically reduced the number of deportees by the time her convoy had reached the desert. Aghavni herself was abducted by a Kurdish nomad and bore him two children, before she escaped to the remainder of her extended family in the United States.\footnote{Ibid., pp.218-23.} Those that were marched further into the desert often did not even make it to Rakka. A German named Greif, living in Aleppo, reported that the convoys of Diyarbekir Armenians were nearly reduced to non-existence in the desert. He wrote that “many raped female corpses were laying around naked” \textit{(geschändete Frauenleichen massenhaft nackt herumlagen)}, and added the following detail: “Viele von ihnen hatte man Knüttel in den After hineingetrieben”.\footnote{PAAA, R14093, Das Geheime Zivil-Kabinet des Kaisers (Valentini) an den Reichskanzler (Bethmann Hollweg), 10 September 1916, enclosure no.3.}

The Ottoman deportation apparatus had already depopulated the Armenian settlements of the northeastern regions of the Empire by late June. Scores of deportees arrived at Diyarbekir, which was designated by the İAMM as one of the hubs where the Armenians were to be concentrated. From there on they were deported to the south. However, in practice the city was often the final destination for many deportees. Reşid’s militiamen and Kurdish villagers robbed and massacred them often before they reached the city gates. At the end of July, a convoy from Kharput arrived in Diyarbekir. An eyewitness summarized their fate as follows:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

Aurora Mardiganian was a little girl when she was deported from Erzurum. On arrival in Diyarbekir she witnessed the slaughter of a convoy and the disposal of their bodies:

\begin{quote}
In the meantime the Jews of Diyarbekir had come out from the city, driven by gendarmes, to gather up the bodies of the slain Armenians. They brought carts and donkeys with bags swung across their backs. Into the carts and bags they piled the corpses and took them to the banks of the Tigris, where the Turks made them throw their burdens into the water. This is
Those that did manage to slip through the murderous meshes in Diyarbekir either committed suicide or were seized from the convoys and absorbed into Muslim households. The Syriac monk Qarabashi witnessed the deportation of a convoy of several thousands of Armenians heading to Mosul. Between Diyarbekir and Mardin he discovered a naked 10-year old Armenian girl who had become orphaned in the preceding massacres. Deeply disturbed, Qarabashi fed the emaciated girl bread, cheese, yoghurt, and a pickle. He decided she had to hide in the bushes near the Tigris, for if she was found by militiamen she would certainly be murdered. When he returned the next day to check on her, she was dead. A couple of days later Qarabashi met three Armenian women in a nearby Kurdish village. The women had been deported from Sivas and Erzincan and were serving as slaves in the household of a Kurd named Sufi Hasan. When one of her became ill, Sufi Hasan took her away and shot her dead. In several instances, local authorities or gendarmes sold entire convoys to Kurdish tribesmen for sums ranging between 500 to 1000 pounds. The tribesmen, aware of the fact that the Armenians had brought along many movable assets, would then strip the clothes from their backs and either leave the deportees to die or kill them outright.

The massacres and deportations quickly spread out into the province. Whereas the Circassian militiamen were sent to the north of the province, Aziz Feyzi and Memduh Bey were assigned the south. This division of labour may have fluctuated somewhat since Reşid deployed his militia wherever and however he saw fit. Reşid removed the mayor of Çermik, Mehmed Hamdi Bey, for not obeying his orders to destroy the Armenians living in his district. Talât later approved Reşid’s replacement of the mayor of Maden by Dr. Osman Cevdet (Akkaynak). After the dismissal of the mayors the evacuation of the Armenian villages and neighbourhoods of Maden commenced. At first, the 35 richest families of Maden were ordered to mobilize for deportation, followed by the rest of the Maden Armenians, many of whom were miners. They were given very little time to prepare, and on the first day of deportation the men were selected and incarcerated in the large caravanserai of Maden. The convoy was then marched off to Urfa.
via Diyarbekir. In the process, the supervising officer stole 300 pounds from them and stripped them of many private belongings.296

The Ergani-Maden district was a station for deportees arriving from Kharput, north of Maden. When a convoy of 1500 people arrived in Ergani after a march of 4 days, the officer in charge selected the men, ostensibly to work in the mines. All men above the age of 11 were taken away to the caravanserais, where they joined the native Maden Armenians.297 The bulk of these men were not employed in the mines, but pushed over the edge of the Maden cliff into its deep ravine. This must have happened at least before 7 July, when Mariza Kejejian, a deportee from Kharput witnessed “heaps of corpses” (Leichenhaufen) on the road between Maden and Ergani.298 Three months after the massacre, Mary Riggs, a missionary working in Kharput, was allowed to travel south and saw “unmistakable signs of horrible cruelty”. Riding through the Maden gorge, Riggs looked down the canyon and saw “countless naked bodies in positions showing how they had been hurled from above.”299 Four years later, Gertrude Bell visited the same khan where the Armenian men had been held. A Chaldean carpenter in that khan “described his escape from Mardin and showed me behind the Khan a deep grave where hundreds of Armenians were buried”.300

The destruction of the Maden Armenians equaled the destruction of the Maden economy, since the copper mines were rid of almost all of its miners. Whereas Rafael de Nogales wrote around 26 June that “the Argana-Maden mines continued normally,” it did not take long for this to change.301 By the late summer, the Austrian general Josef Pomiankowski travelled through the region and lamented that because of the elimination of the Armenians “wird das unschätzbare Erzlager von Argana nicht exploitiert, ist verlassen und liegt brach”.302

The genocide struck the adjacent region between Lice and Piran (renamed Dicle in the Republic) around mid-June. The mayor of Lice, Hüseyin Nesimi Bey, had refused to implement Reşid’s orders to persecute the Armenians of Lice. When Reşid intensified the violence, he orally communicated an order to Nesimi to murder the Armenians of Lice. Shocked by this explicit murderous desire, the mayor refused and demanded the order in writing.303 Reşid ran out of patience, removed him from office and sent Çerkez Harun to murder the disobedient mayor. Nesimi was taken from his home and escorted to Diyarbekir but was shot dead on the way by his

296 PAAA, R14087, Rößler to Bethmann-Hollweg, 3 September 1915, enclosure no.4 (22 August 1915).
297 PAAA, R14087, Rößler to Bethmann-Hollweg, 3 September 1915, enclosure no.4 (22 August 1915).
298 PAAA, R14093, Das Geheime Zivil-Kabinet des Kaisers (Valentini) an den Reichskanzler (Bethmann Hollweg), 10 September 1916, enclosure no.6.
299 Mary W. Riggs, “The Treatments of Armenians by Turks in Harpoot” (10 April 1918), in: Barton, Statements [n.255], p.33, Inquiry Document no.III.
300 GBA, diary entry for 21 October 1919.
301 Nogales, Four years [n.266], p.124
303 PAAA, R14087, director of the Deutscher Hülfsbund für christliches Liebeswerk im Orient (Frankfurt am Main) Friedrich Schuchardt to the Auswärtiges Amt, 21 August 1915, enclosure no.6: “Der Kaimakam von Litsche hat die durch einen Boten des Walis mündlich überbrachte Ordnung die Armenier umzubringen, zurückgewiesen mit dem Bemerken, er wünsche den Auftrag schriftlich zu haben.”
The assassination did not go unnoticed and Reşid was asked about Nesimi’s whereabouts, but ignored the request. The question was reiterated a month later in a tone indirectly accusing Reşid of the murder. The Interior Ministry wrote: “It is contended by the family of the ex-mayor of Lice, Hüseyin Nesimi Bey, that he was assassinated. Please report whether he was murdered in the line of duty.” Reşid gave an affirmative answer but claimed that a “notorious Armenian brigand” had put Nesimi to death.

With the elimination of the mayor Reşid had obviated the most important obstacle for his objective: the destruction of the Lice Christians. He sent İbrahim Bedreddin to supervise the killings in Lice. The men were arrested, tied together with rope, lead away to a cave named Gobê Gumbo, stripped of their belongings, and finally had their throats slit. “So many ropes were required for the work that a public crier gave orders that the townspeople were to provide a stipulated quantity.” At the same time, the villages of Lice were targeted. One by one, the villages were surrounded by the militia and Kurdish tribesmen, either some hours after dark or at daybreak. The village of Henne, a village of four hundred Christian families, was invaded and rid of its male population within a day. After the militia had finished the men they returned to the village, where the terrified women had assembled together in houses. They were raped, deported, or left to die in hunger and misery. Similar events took place in the villages of Fûm, Şimşim, Cûm, Tappa and Naghle. The vacant position for mayor in Lice was occupied by Ilyas Nuri Bey, who left the Armenians alone and allowed them to recover from the massacres. A number of Christian families converted to Islam to survive the genocidal persecution and indeed managed to live in Lice for several decades before migrating to Diyarbekir city, Istanbul, or Western Europe.

The example of Lice was to be a model for other parts of the province. The genocide took on recurrent systematic procedures. Reşid ruthlessly and purposefully eliminated any opposition to the genocide. In July he had his Circassian henchmen Aziz and Şakir assassinate the vice mayor of Beşiri, Ali Sabit El-Suweydi in a manner similar to Hüseyin Nesimi. After Sabit was eliminated, Reşid’s militia and the Reman chieftains razed the Beşiri valley and massacred the Armenians and Syriacs in that region. This time, Talât personally requested information on the

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304 Hüseyin Nesimi’s son wrote in his memoirs that his family was very much aware of the fact that Nesimi had been assassinated by Reşid’s men. Abidin Nesimi, Yillarım Kenden (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1977), pp.39-46.
305 BOA, DH.SFR 56/361, Directorate for Employment to Diyarbekir, 12 October 1915.
306 BOA, DH.SFR 58/46, Directorate for Employment to Diyarbekir, 17 November 1915.
307 Reşid, Mülâhazât [n.209], pp.86-87.
309 Naayem, Shall this nation die? [n.224], pp.199-207. The killings in the neighbouring Piran district were routinely cruel. In that region elderly Kurds remember morbid but vivid anecdotic information from villagers who had participated in the massacres. According to them, the perpetrators would assail the villages and dispatch of their victims by slashing their throats wide open. As they operated with axes, this often lead to decapitations. After the killing was done, the killers saw that the insides of the victims’ windpipes were black because of prolonged use of tobacco. Interview conducted with Ş. family (Hani district) in Kurdish in Diyarbekir, 15 July 2004.
310 Reşid, Mülâhazât [n.209], p.84.
311 Interview conducted with an anonymous Armenian family (Lice district) in Dutch in Amsterdam, February 2003.
312 Reşid, Mülâhazât [n.209], pp.83 footnote 20, 89-90.
murders of Nesimi and Sabit. However, no form of litigation followed against Reşid, who continued his work with ever more zeal. He dismissed the mayor of Savur, Mehmed Ali Bey, an opportunist who had profiteered from the persecution against the Christians. Allegedly, Mehmed Ali was also involved in a series of gambling and sex scandals, nota bene in the holy month of Ramadan. The next official to be deposed was İbrahim Hakki Bey, mayor of Silvan. According to Reşid, he “distributed Armenian women here and there, stole Armenian property, and exempted Armenians from deportation in exchange for money”. After his dismissal, Reşid appointed Adil Bey, brother of deputy Zülfü Bey, as mayor of Silvan. The militia then cooperated with the local Kurdish chieftain Sadık Bey to carry out the killings in the Silvan district.

An even worse fate befell the mayor of Derik, who had refused to carry out Reşid’s genocidal order, demanding a direct order from Istanbul. The mayor was killed for his opposition to the persecutions of the Christians in his district. Reportedly Reşid personally went to inspect Derik, delegating the persecution to Halil (son of İbrahim Paşa) and Hidayet Bey. This triggered a wave of incarcerations, tortures, and summary executions. Finally, the militia, headed by Tevfik Bey, began massacring the Christians of Derik, they targeted the Yezidis too. A noted Yezidi chieftain was decapitated and several Yezidi families in Derik were forced to convert to Islam. In Derik, the Kurdish chieftains Seyid Ağâ and Zülfikar Bey of Khirar village protected the Armenians and Yezidis in the village. Those who could escape made for the caves northeast of Derik, but Reşid sent his loyal militia leader Çerkez Harun to massacre remaining Christians in the district.

After these dismissals and political assassinations, the last mayor still to be resisting Reşid’s genocidal violence to penetrate into his district was the mayor of Midyat, Nuri Bey. Reşid first attempted to have Nuri removed by appealing for a legal inquiry about his ‘negligence’ towards the Armenians. Reşid later claimed that Nuri had not been dealing adequately with an alleged Armenian uprising in Midyat, and wrote that the Armenians were targeting the Muslims with “the organization of quite a terrible massacre” (gâyet müthiş bir katliâm tertibâtı). Although this was a rather dubious assertion, Reşid still used this pretext to recommended Halil Edib, criminal judge of Mardin, for Nuri’s position. However, the Ministry refused twice and stated that there was no need to replace Nuri as he had not acted irresponsibly or incompetently as a mayor.

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514 BOA, DH.ŞFR 57/97, Directorate for Employment to Diyarbekir, 24 October 1915.
515 Reşid, Mülahazât [n.209], pp.83-84, footnote 22.
516 Interview conducted with Meçin family (Silvan) in Turkish in Ankara, 19 June 2004.
517 Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.81.
518 Interview conducted with Temel family (Derik) in Kurdish in Bremen, 21 March 2002.
519 Noel, Diary of Major E. Noel [n.282], p.8.
520 Jacques Rhétoré, Les chrétiens aux bêtes! Souvenirs de la guerre sainte proclamée par les Turcs contre les chrétiens en 1915 (unpublished manuscript, Bibliothèque du Saulchoir), pp.43-44. Rhétoré was a Catholic priest who was in Mardin until 1915. The text has been translated to Italian in: Marco Impagliazzo (ed.), Una finestra sul massacro: Documenti inediti sulla strage degli armeni (1915-1916) (Milano: Guerini, 2000), and recently published in French as: Jacques Rhétoré, Les chrétiens aux bêtes! Souvenirs de la guerre sainte proclamée par les Turcs contre les chrétiens en 1915 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 2005).
521 Reşid, Mülahazât [n.209], p.85.
522 BOA, DH.ŞFR 54-A/300, Directorate for Employment to Diyarbekir, 7 August 1915.
was started anyway, but when it did not produce the rapid results Reşid had expected, he resorted to violence once again. Nuri was assassinated and Midyat too was deprived of opposition against the violence.

An other center of violence was the northern district of Palu. Of the over 300 villages in Palu, 48 contained an Armenian presence. The other villages were mainly inhabited by Kurds and Zazas, and many villages were mixed. According to one survivor, the violence engulfed the Palu villages on a day when the sun was eclipsed (10 August 1915), evoking images of apocalyptic doom among the Armenian villagers. As in other districts of Diyarbekir province, the modus operandi was first to immediately kill the men and then deport the rest. The Armenian male population of Palu town were taken to the bridge over the Murad river, had their throats slashed, and were thrown in the river. Garabed Farshian, an Armenian boy who was orphaned, was taken to a Turkish village and saw that “il y avait du sang dans le fleuve”. A recurrent action in the villages was the requisitioning of rope to tie the men together and lead them away. As Noyemzar Khimatian-Alexanian of Baghin village remembered: “The soldiers went from house to house asking for rope. After that they took the males, 15 and older and collected them. They used the rope to tie their hands. The men and teen-aged boys were taken to a distant field and stabbed to death”. In an other village, the militia rode in and collected all men into the church. The men and the boys came back out with their hands tied behind them. They were taken away to the banks of the Murad river and butchered with long knives. The militia then carried off pretty women and children for personal use, and did not hesitate to throw babies in the river to drown. Finally, the decimated convoy was deported to the south. Some were able to escape the convoys by bribing officers or villagers, or by giving their children to benevolent local families. For example, the little girl Heranush Gadarian from Habab village was given to an Ottoman corporal and assimilated in his extended family.

The very few Armenian men that were still alive by this time, were those working in labour battalions. On 1 April 1915 the Interior Ministry ordered the Third Army to draw up a labour battalion consisting of 4000 men. A week later, the Ministry of War issued an other decree, ordering the conscription of more men in order to cope with the shortage. This time, it was authorized to enlist even women into labour battalions. From 27 May on, the practice of

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323 BOA, DH.ŞFR 57/167, Directorate for Employment to Diyarbekir, 28 October 1915.
325 Interview with Antanik Baloian, unpublished manuscript titled “Antanik Baloian’s Story,” by Nelson Baloian.
327 Interview with Noyemzar Khimatian-Alexanian by Linda J.P. Mahdesian.
329 Interview with Margaret Garabedian DerManuelian by George Aghjayan in Providence, RI, February 1990.
330 Heranush’s story was related to her granddaughter Fethiye Çelik, who attempted to trace her Armenian relatives and found them in the United States. Fethiye Çelik, Ananevnen (Istanbul: Metis, 2004).
331 BOA, DH.ŞFR 51/186, Ali Münif (Directorate for General Administration) to Diyarbekir, 1 April 1915.
332 BOA, DH.ŞFR 51/231, Ministry of War to Diyarbekir, 8 April 1915.
“quittance” (bedel), ensuring exemption from conscription was prohibited by Talât.\textsuperscript{333} The battalions became a death trap to the conscripts as malnutrition, exhaustion and exposure had already begun to decimate their numbers. However, the greatest threat to their physical existence were not these hardships but outright massacres, perpetrated by their Ottoman superiors. On the Palu-Diyarbekir road, 1200 conscripts were massacred on 1 June.\textsuperscript{334} A week later 160 men working in the labour battalions near Diyarbekir city were taken to the Devil’s Gorge (Şeytan dere) and battered to death by Sidki and Yahya. On 5 July an other 2000 soldiers were killed near Diyarbekir.\textsuperscript{335} By the end of August, the few labour conscripts that still remained alive in the province were serving in battalions near Siverek. Terrified for a similar fate, they inconspicuously dawdled over their work in order to postpone a potential massacre. When that fateful day arrived, a few conscripts resisted by killing a gendarme with a large stone, taking his rifle and shooting two others, including an officer. The desperate men were finally overpowered and massacred.\textsuperscript{336} The skirmish was reported to Istanbul, where Talât interpreted it as “Armenian men who killed and wounded some of their superiors and Muslims”. He then sent an order to all provinces to “deal accordingly with this issue”.\textsuperscript{337} After this event, the fate of the Christian labour battalions was sealed: they were finished off quickly. Even if the work was as yet unfinished, a wave of brutal although selective massacres swept through the provinces. Thousands of conscripts were dispatched mostly with knives and daggers, to save ammunition.\textsuperscript{338} Travelling between Urfa and Diyarbekir, a German officer saw an entire labour battalion, laying by the roadside with their throats slit.\textsuperscript{339} An unknown number of Armenians remained alive in the labour battalions, even after 1915.

The murderous violence against the Christian and especially Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire had long reached genocidal dimensions due to its organized, systematic, and categoric nature. While hundreds of thousands of human lives were being destroyed, little was known among the population, especially in the western provinces. Secrecy and censorship were two important regulations to be observed by the organizers of the genocide. Nobody was to open his or her mouth about the events, and any news of the massacres was to be suppressed. Talât ordered the Trabzon-based newspaper Mesveret closed down because it had published an apologetic explanation of the “temporary deportation” of the Armenians.\textsuperscript{340} The government

\textsuperscript{333} \textit{BOA}, DH SFR 53/131, Talât to Mamuret-ül Aziz, 27 May 1915.
\textsuperscript{334} Noel, \textit{Diary of Major E. Noel} [n.282], p.11.
\textsuperscript{335} Qarabashi, \textit{Dmo Zliho} [n.199], p.70.
\textsuperscript{336} Jacob Künzler, \textit{Im Lande des Blutes und der Tränen: Erlebnisse in Mesopotamien während des Weltkrieges (1914-1918)} (Zürich: Chronos, 1999 [1921]), pp.47-48. Künzler was a Swiss missionary in Urfa during the war and heard about this massacre from a Syriac conscript, who had survived the killing.
\textsuperscript{337} \textit{BOA}, DH SFR 55-A/11, Talât to provinces, 1 September 1915.
\textsuperscript{338} Jacob Künzler, \textit{Dreizig Jahre Dienst am Orient} (Basel: Birkhauser Verlag, 1933), p.54.
\textsuperscript{339} Germany, Turkey and Armenia: A selection of documentary evidence relating to the Armenian atrocities from German and other sources (London: Kelkher, 1917), pp.80-85.
\textsuperscript{340} \textit{BOA}, DH SFR 54-A/181, Talât to the provinces of Erzurum, Adana, Bitlis, Urfa, Canik, and Maraş, 29 July 1915.
denied all national and international allegations and tried to counter these with propaganda.\textsuperscript{341} For
disinformation to be convincing the CUP deemed some sort of visual material necessary. Since
Reşid had already displayed piles of guns he had found in Diyarbekir, this formula was reapplied:

\[\text{After the gendarmes had killed a number of Armenian men, they put on them turbans and}
\text{brought Kurdish women to weep and lament over them, saying that the Armenians had}
\text{killed their men. They also brought a photographer to photograph the bodies and the}
\text{weeping women, so that at a future time they might be able to convince Europe that it was}
\text{the Armenians who had attacked the Kurds and killed them, that the Kurdish tribes had}
\text{risen against them revenge, and that the Turkish Government had had no part in the}
\text{matter.}\textsuperscript{342}\]

In Istanbul, few people had reliable information of the horrors at their disposal. When Hüseyin
Cahit inquired at the prestigious \textit{Cercle d'Orient} about the events, even the Armenian members of
the foundation knew nothing about the massacres.\textsuperscript{343} Only at a short distance from the club, Talât
was engaged on a daily basis in organizing the dispersion and isolation of the surviving Armenian
intelligentsia.

The fate of two Armenian intellectuals indicates both Talât’s and Reşid’s direct
involvement in their elimination: Vartkes Serengulian (1871-1915), deputy for Erzurum and
Krikor Zohrab (1861-1915), author and deputy for Istanbul. On 12 May 1915 Vartkes dashed to
Talât’s house to protest against the mass arrests of the Armenian intelligentsia. Talât, his personal
friend for more than a decade, calmly listened to Vartkes’ fulmination, but flatly answered: “This
is a question of the homeland, Vartkes. It does not allow appeals to personal relations and
friendships”.\textsuperscript{344} Vartkes and Zohrab were arrested in late May.\textsuperscript{345} Hüseyin Cahit recalled how he
was visited early on a morning by Zohrab’s wife, Clara Yazidjian. The nervous woman trembled
and sobbed because of Zohrab’s arrest, and asked Hüseyin Cahit to implore Talât to release her
husband. Together they went to Talât’s house and woke him up from his sleep. Mrs. Yazidjian
begged Talât to exempt her husband from deportation but the stoic Interior Minister sat in his
pajamas and listened to the woman’s story quite indifferently. He then comforted her that Zohrab
was being sent to Diyarbekir for a minor legal affair and that she had nothing to worry about. All
pleas were in vain as both Zohrab and Vartkes were deported. When they reached Adana, Talât
ordered local officials to contact them on 17 June.\textsuperscript{346} The duo was deported to Aleppo where
they begged Cemal Paşa to intervene and save them from being court-martialed. However,
Cemal Paşa's request was rebuffed by Talât, who insisted them to be sent to Diyarbekir. Finally,
between Urfa and Diyarbekir the two were murdered by Çerkez Ahmed, on orders of Reşid. Çerkez Ahmed later confessed that he personally shot Vartkes dead with a single bullet to his head and shattered Zohrab’s head with a rock. The government spread the story that Zohrab had died of a heart-attack. The German journalist Von Tyszka refuted this, claiming that at least Vartkes was “jedenfalls kerngesund” but nevertheless had not arrived in Diyarbekir either.

Together with these assassinations, witnesses to the explicit killing had to be silenced in order for state secrecy to be tight. The CUP had lost control over some of its Special Organization operatives, who did not fully perform the program as they wished. These loose cannons would for example brag about their genocidal accomplishments, or abuse their license to kill by shooting people for fun. They had become out of favor. When the CUP felt it did not require their services any longer, local officials disposed of them by summarily executing them, mostly in the autumn of 1915. For example, Talât requested the aforementioned Çerkez Ahmed to be sent to Istanbul as he and his gang would affect security conditions in Urfa. When this did not happen, Talât issued a decree that his “elimination is required” (izalesi vacip). Ahmed was deported to Damascus and hung by Cemal Paşa. Yakup Cemil, one of the CUP’s most important gangsters, had acquired so much power in the war that he figured he could get away with practically everything. He went too far when he openly threatened Enver Paşa, whereupon Enver had him arrested and executed in front of a firing squad. The Reman brothers Ömer and Mustafa were killed in September 1915 by Reşid’s assistant Çerkez Şakir, who ordered his Circassian militia to murder the tribesmen with daggers. A peasant who happened to walk by coincidentally saw the violent settlement and was killed as well, in order to silence potential witnesses. Militia member Zaza Alo was first deployed on the Syrian front but deported to Çankırı, where he was later killed in a skirmish with gendarmes. At the same time, Major Rüşdü of the Diyarbekir militia was accused of corruption, embezzlement, and personal enrichment – which was still forbidden, at least officially. He escaped elimination and prosecution owing to protection offered by his superior Reşid and continued his work in the province.

A final problem that was as yet unsolved was the question of the property taken from or left behind by the victims. In the official decree for deportation (30 May 1915) a clear stipulation for confiscation was included with regard to the property. The Armenians were to bring along anything they wished, and as for the immovables, the specification contained clear instructions on how to handle the goods: “the type and value and amount of the real estate are to be

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347 Refik, Iki Komite, Iki Kitai [n.187], pp.175-76.
348 PAAA, R14088, Von Tyszka to Zimmermann, 1 October 1915, enclosure no.1.
349 One of the most infamous killers was Çerkez Ahmed, who vaunted himself as follows: “I served this country. Go and look, I turned the areas around Van into Kaaba soil. You won’t find a single Armenian there today. While I’m serving this country, bastards like Talât are drinking ice-cold beer in Istanbul, and place me under arrest, no, this is damaging my honour!” Refik, Iki Komite, Iki Kitai [n.187], p.175.
350 BOA, DH.SFR 55/132, Talât to Reşid, 21 August 1915.
351 Refik, Iki Komite, Iki Kitai [n.187], pp.176-77.
352 Mustafa R. Esatlı, İstihat ve Terakki tarihinde esrar perdesi ve Yakup Cemil niçin öldürüldü? (İstanbul: Hürriyet, 1975).
353 Épisodes des massacres [n.272], p.30.
354 BOA, DH.EUM.AYŞ 24/2, 11 October 1919.
determined [...] and its liquidation through auctions and its equivalent rendered to the owners.” However, these were rhetorical pretexts as the unilateral expropriation of the Ottoman Armenian community occurred simultaneous to or shortly after their murder. Everything that they owned was automatically confiscated by the government, which issued a decree for the establishment of ‘Commissions for Abandoned Properties’ (Emvâl-ı Metrûke Komisyoni) in all provincial capitals. These committees were charged with the allocation and liquidation of all Armenian property seized by the authorities, and drew up detailed inventories of sequestered property. As a rule, mobile goods were looted by officials who had organized the killing of its owners, whereas the confiscated real estate was transferred to the state, which needed the farms, factories, and shops for Muslim settlers (see chapter 3). Some immobiles were allocated to the army. As for Armenian money, hard cash was looted by whoever killed its owner, and bank assets fell into the hands of the CUP. The revenue of the genocide was considerable: in 1916 the Ottoman Ministry of Economy moved 5 million Turkish gold pounds, representing about 30,000 kilograms in gold, to the Reichsbank in Berlin. This was highly unusual for an agricultural empire on the losing hand in a world war, facing rampant scarcity.

On 1 July, the CUP ordered the establishment of a Commission for Diyarbekir, appointing Nâzım Bey and Reşad Bey as its directors. An additional order indicated that the local population was in no way to meddle in the property affairs. The local commission, headed by Reşid, coordinated the organized larceny from beginning to end. All of the militia leaders were involved in the scheme. While the banker Tirpandjian was tortured in prison, Veli Necdet occupied his house and remained there throughout the war. Police chief Memduh Bey reportedly gained 50,000 Turkish pounds in the persecutions. İbrahim Bedreddin, who became district governor of Mardin, sent emissaries to retrieve valuable documents taken by Kurdish chieftains. Since the illiterate tribesmen had no means to redeem bank notes such as insurances, checks, and other valuables, these were to be delivered to the authorities. Churches and houses of rich Christians were converted to military hospitals, ammunition depots, state orphanages, or

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555 BOA, DH.ŞFR 57/5, Talât to Karesi province, 14 October 1915.
556 BOA, MV 198/163, 30 May 1915.
557 Gilbert Gidel, Confiscation de biens des réfugiés arméniens par le gouvernement turc (Paris: Massis, 1929). The government in Istanbul requested detailed knowledge of Armenian-owned ploughland. For example, on 5 July the IAMM asks literally: “What kind of instruments and machines are needed to harvest the crops on the farmland abandoned by the Armenians?” BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/301, IAMM to the provinces of Sivas, Diyarbekir, and Manuret-ul Aziz.
558 BOA, DH.ŞFR 54-A/390 & 390-I, Talât to provinces, 13 August 1915.
560 BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/273, IAMM to Diyarbekir, 1 July 1915. Four days later, the Commission was established. BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/307, 5 July 1915.
561 BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/106, IAMM to the Presidency of the Commissions for Abandoned Property of Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Zor, Aleppo, Izmit, Kayseri, and Maraş, 22 June 1915.
562 Yeghiayan, British Foreign Office Dossiers [n.152], p.42.
563 Edward Noel, Diary of Major E. Noel [n.282], p.11.
mosques. Inventories such as carpets, curtains, silverware, clerical clothing, closets, and even sacraments were sold or carried off by policemen and gendarmes.\footnote{Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho [n.199], pp.130-31.}

Although he denied everything in his memoirs, blaming irregularities on his ignorance of provincial conditions, and challenging his denouncers to prove their claims, the evidence of Dr. Mehmed Reşid’s personal enrichment in the expropriation campaign is overwhelming.\footnote{Reşid, Mülâhazât [n.209], pp.109-11.} Even though he was ordered by Talât to “return the cash, jewellery, and other property to the Armenians who have been attacked during their deportation”,\footnote{BOA, DH.SFR 56/315, Talât to Reşid, 6 October 1915.} Reşid went as far to even confiscate the property of the American missionaries.\footnote{Kieser, “Dr. Mehmed Reshid” [n.208], p.265.} As Fa’iz Al-Ghusayn witnessed during his brief arrest in the Diyarbekir prison:

> You might see a carpet, worth thirty pounds, sold for five, a man’s costume, worth four pounds, sold for two medjidies, and so on with the rest of the articles, this being especially the case with musical instruments, such as pianos, etc., which had no value at all. All money and valuables were collected by the Commandant of Gendarmerie and the Vali, Reshid Bey, the latter taking them with him when he went to Constantinople.\footnote{Al-Ghusayn, Martyred Armenia [n.233], p.30.}

Reşid later objected to these claims and asked the rhetorical question: “Have those who utter this heinous slander ever thought of how it would have been possible to carry and hide 200,000 pounds and so many valuables?\footnote{Reşid, Mülâhazât [n.209], p.109.} This was possible. According to a Dr. Hyacinth Fardjian, Dr. Reşid had looted jewellery, precious stones, a pile of carpets, and an assortment of antiquities. Dr. Fardjian related: “I myself saw Rechid Bey arrive at Aleppo by a train bound for Constantinople with 43 boxes of jewellery and 2 cases full of precious stones”.\footnote{Foreign Office 371/4172/24597, folio 304.} When Reşid was assigned to the governorship of Ankara in March 1916, he had amassed a fortune from the expropriations. Convinced that he could get away with the embezzlement, he responded to an advertisement in the newspaper İkdam for a house worth 9,000 pounds. According to Minister of Education Ahmed Şükrü Bey, “it was suspicious that Reşid had arrived in Diyarbekir with financial straits but managed to buy that house only two years later”.\footnote{For Ahmed Şükrü’s deposition on 12 November 1918 see: Osman S. Kocahanoglu (ed.), İttihat ve Terakki ’nin Sorgulanması ve Yargılanması (İstanbul: Temel, 1998), p.195.}

The practice of confiscation was in fact a concrete result of the indistinct notion of the aspired ‘national economy’. On 6 January 1916 Talât ordered an empire-wide decree about the factories confiscated in the genocide. The order read:

> The movable property left by the Armenians should be conserved for long-term preservation, and for the sake of an increase of Muslim businesses in our country, companies need to be established strictly made up of Muslims. Movable property should be given to them under suitable conditions that will guarantee the business’ steady consolidation. The founder, the management, and the representatives should be chosen from honourable
leaders and the elite, and to allow tradesmen and agriculturists to participate in its dividends the vouchers need to be half a lira or one lira and registered to their names to preclude that the capital falls in foreign hands. The growth of entrepreneurship in the minds of Muslim people needs to be monitored, and this endeavour and the results of its implementation needs to be reported to the Ministry step by step.373

In Diyarbekir, one of the most telling examples of this policy was the fate of the silk factory in Diyarbekir. The factory was owned by Tirpandjian and used to provide work for dozens of employees, mostly Christians. Silk was woven, dyed in various colors, and processed into regional clothing, characteristic for Diyarbekir. Lütfü Dokucu was the grandson of one of the employees. His grandfather was killed in the genocide when the militia rounded up the employees and executed them. Müftüzâde Hüseyin, brother of Müftüzâde Şeref, laid his hands on the factory and exploited it in the decades after the war.374

By autumn 1915, the Christian population of Diyarbekir province was thoroughly dispossessed, deported, and critically reduced in numbers. On 18 September Reşid wired a telegram to Talât, reporting that “the number deported from the province amounts to approximately one hundred twenty thousand”.375 According to Jacques Rhétoré, during the persecutions of 1915-1916 a total of 144,185 Christians disappeared, of which 58,000 Gregorian Armenians, 11,500 Catholic Armenians, 10,010 Chaldeans, 3450 Catholic Syriacs, 60,725 Jacobite Syriacs, and 500 Protestants.376 A higher estimate was calculated by Major Noel, who wrote that the total number of victims was made up of 45,000 Gregorian Armenians, 6000 Catholic Armenians, 7000 Chaldeans, 2000 Catholic Syriacs, 96,000 Jacobite Syriacs, and 1200 Protestants, all in all summing up to 157,000 people victimized.377 Whatever their precise numbers, the Christian population of Diyarbekir province was all but eradicated. Entire villages, neighbourhoods, parishes, and extended families were destroyed or reduced to destitution in the genocidal persecution of 1915.

2.4 Center and periphery

The identities of the organizers and perpetrators of the genocidal persecution in Diyarbekir province have been explored relatively well. There was little doubt that the local CUP elite collaborated with certain Kurdish tribesmen to achieve their aim of destroying the Armenian community of the province. On the other hand, little is known regarding the scope of victims targeted. The notion that official CUP policy targeted only the Armenians contradicts clearly with

373 BOA, DH.SFR 59/239, JAMM to provinces, 6 January 1916.
374 Interview with Lütfü Dokucu (aged 81) from Diyarbekir, conducted in Turkish by Şeyhmus Diken in Diyarbekir (2003), published as: “Lütfü Dokucu,” in: Şeyhmus Diken, Diyarbekir diyarım, yitirmişem yanarım (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003), p.49.
375 BOA, DH.EUM, 2.Şb. 68/71, Reşid to Talât, 18 September 1915.
377 Noel, Diary of Major E. Noel [n.282], p.11.
the broad diversity of non-Armenian victims, especially in the Mardin district.\footnote{For a detailed study of the genocide in Mardin see: Yves Ternon, \textit{Mardin 1915: Anatomie pathologique d’une destruction} (special issue of \textit{the Revue d’Histoire Arménienne Contemporaine}, vol.4, 2002). One of the most interesting but understudied regions still awaiting in-depth research is the Tur Abdin district around Midyat. To do justice to the complexity and multi-faceted nature of the wartime events in that region, involving interethnic loyalties, Kurdish tribal machinations, and armed Syriac resistance, one would have to conduct a separate, multi-dimensional study. The \textit{Seyfo Center}, based in the Netherlands, is currently collecting Syriac Oral Histories that have been kept in private hands until now and may prove very useful in an account of the persecutions in Tur Abdin. See: <http://www.seyfo.com>.

\footnote{Sarafian, “The Disasters” [n.242].}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.263.}
\footnote{Rhétoré, \textit{Les chrétiens aux bêtes!} [n.164], p.65.}
\footnote{Armalto, \textit{al-Qousara} [n.181], p.40.}

In other words, how Armenian was the genocide supposed to be? The Mardin district can serve as a fitting backdrop for an exploration of this discrepancy because of the district’s religious diversity. The evidence, admittedly patchy, supports the argument that Dr. Reşid amplified the anti-Armenian persecution into an anti-Christian persecution, and by the time he was reproached for this policy, it was too late.

Most Christian notables of Diyarbekir were incarcerated in May. By this time, there hadn’t been much persecution in Mardin, the citadel city south of Diyarbekir. As in other provincial towns Reşid had ordered the mayor, Hilmi Bey, to arrest the Christian notables of the city. Hilmi reportedly answered that the Armenians of Mardin were Arabic-speaking Catholics, and had little in common with the Gregorian Armenians. The mayor also added that they were unarmed and honorable citizens, and that there was no reason at all to arrest any other Christians either.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.263.}

Reşid was not interested in this reply and sent Aziz Feyzi in May to incite Muslim notables to destroy the Mardin Christians. Feyzi toured the region and bribed and persuaded the chieftains of the Deşi, Mişkiye, Kiki, and Helecan tribes. From 15 May on, the scenario of Diyarbekir was repeated in Mardin. Memduh moved into the house of the notable Syriac family Yonan and began organizing the process of persecution. First he arrested dozens of Armenian and Syriac men and tortured them to extract confessions of disloyalty and high treason. In the meantime he extorted large sums of money from the families of the arrested men who offered Memduh financial compensation in exchange for the release of their children.\footnote{Rhétoré, \textit{Les chrétiens aux bêtes!} [n.164], p.65.}

Reşid sent İbrahim Bedreddin and militiamen Çerkez Şakir and Çerkez Harun to Mardin to organize the physical destruction of the Christian population of Mardin. Together they organized a militia of 500 men and placed them under command of the brothers Nuri and Tahir El Ensari, both of them Sheikhs of the Ensari family.\footnote{Armalto, \textit{al-Qousara} [n.181], p.40.}

While Hilmi was still in office, the group bypassed standard bureaucratic procedures and began arresting Christian notables, such as Anton Gasparian.\footnote{Armalto, \textit{al-Qousara} [n.181], p.40.}

However, Reşid and his men probably considered the presence of an uncooperative mayor an intransigent obstacle for the organization of a massacre, a complex undertaking all the same. Therefore, Reşid attempted to apply his tested method of having the mayor removed, but his appeal only got the equally unwilling official Mehmed Şefik Bey reinstalled to his old district Mardin. Moreover, Talât suggested İbrahim Bedri to be “assigned to a vacant office of district
Having replaced Hilmi by Mehmed Şefik, Reşid did not observe this new political constellation with district governor Şefik either. He ignored Şefik and treated his emissary Bedri as a shadow-official with the authority of a district governor. In Mardin, Bedri was assisted by Halil Edib, who became criminal judge on 17 June 1915. Bedri himself officially became district governor only on 12 September. The Gleichschaltung by the CUP had not been implemented perfectly, but it was sufficient for the genocidal designs to be carried out in Mardin.

On 3 June 1915, at eight o’clock in the evening, Mardin was surrounded by Reşid’s militiamen, headed by Çerkez Harun. Memduh Bey arrested the Bishop Ignatius Maloyan and his entire Armenian Catholic clergy and locked them up in the Mardin castle, a fortress on top of the city. The next days he arrested hundreds of Christian notables, according to a French eye-witness, “tous pris dans les divers rangs de la société, sans différences d’âge, ni de rite, ni de condition”. The men were all taken to prison and severely tortured for a week by criminal judge Halil Edib.

On 9 June a group of militiamen arrived from Diyarbekir with dozens of sets of chains and galloped off to the fort. The prisoners were explained that they were summoned by governor Reşid and would be taken to Diyarbekir the next morning. The notables realized at this point they were going to be killed.

The treatment of the Mardin notables was a copy of that of the Diyarbekir notables, who had already been massacred in the Reman gorge by that time. The first convoy, just over 400 Christians of all denominations, left Mardin on 10 June and was marched off to Diyarbekir by Memduh on horseback. After having walked two hours in the burning heat, Memduh took away four notables (Iskender Adem, his son August, Naum Cinanci, and Iskender Hammal) and killed them. Three hours later, the convoy was halted at the Kurdish village Adirshek, near the Sheikh canyon. Memduh Bey gathered the convoy and read their death sentence out loud. He added that conversion to Islam would avert death and gave those who refused conversion one hour to prepare for their deaths. Memduh had barely finished his words when Bishop Maloyan responded he would never convert and preferred to die as a Christian rather than to live as a Muslim. The great majority of the convoy agreed, whereupon Memduh took 100 men, lead them away to the Şeyhan caves and had them all murdered and burnt. After this first massacre he

BOA, DH.SFR 53/291, Talât to Reşid, 8 June 1915. Hilmi was demoted and assigned to a minor office in the Mosul province. Just as he left for Mosul, Reşid sent out orders for him to be murdered. Hilmi escaped assassination because the mayor that was assigned with this task was a personal friend who procrastinated in carrying out the order. In the meantime Hilmi crossed into Mosul province, out of the jurisdiction of the Diyarbekir provincial authorities, and thereby out of Reşid’s deadly reach. Sarafian, “The Disasters” [n.242].


The German word Gleichschaltung (literally: “synchronization”) is a typical Nazi euphemism and describes the process by which the Nazi regime successively established a system of authoritarian control and tight coordination over all aspects of society between 1933 and 1939. This included the purification of the state bureaucracy and amounted to removal of officials without National-Socialist sympathies. Karl D. Bracher, “Stufe totalitärer Gleichschaltung: Die Befestigung der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft,” in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol.4 (1956), pp.30-42; Volker Dahm, “Nationalität und partikulare Vielfalt: Zur Frage der kulturpolitischen Gleichschaltung im Dritten Reich,” in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol.43, no.2 (1995), pp.221-66. Contrary to the NSDAP, the CUP did not have enough time and power to prepare, implement, and consolidate this operation before the war, therefore the Gleichschaltung of provincial bureaucracies was often fulfilled impromptu during the war.


Rhétoré, Les chrétiens aux bêtes! [n.164], p.70.
returned and took an other 100 men off to the Roman castle Zirzawan, where he slaughtered them and threw them in large wells. 389 Those who agreed on conversion were taken away by the Kurdish villagers to their shaikh and became Muslims. Only the next day, the rest of the convoy was marched off further and halted four hours from Diyarbekir. For the last time, Memduh turned to Maloyan and urged him to convert. When he refused, Memduh pulled out his handgun and shot the Bishop in his head. 390 He then ordered the firing squad to massacre the rest of the convoy. 391 The work was finished and the perpetrators rode to Diyarbekir and reported their accomplishment to governor Reşid. 392 Two weeks later Talât asked Reşid about the whereabouts of Maloyan. 393

The killings in Diyarbekir province had become so explicit that national and international political actors freely began speaking about them. The genocide had definitively broken through the circle of CUP secrecy. Apart from the Catholic clergymen in Mardin, an other Western observer to the massacres in Diyarbekir province was the German vice consul of Mosul, Walter Holstein. On 10 June he wired the German embassy, expressing his abhorrence of the crimes. When Holstein spoke to the governor of Mosul about the killings, the latter responded “daß allein der Vali von Diarbekir Verantwortung trage”. 394 However, Holstein was not content with this evasive reply and dispatched a second, more indignant telegram to the embassy two days later:

Die Niedermetzelung der Armenier im Vilajet Diarbekir wird hier alltäglich bekannter und erzeugt eine wachsende Unruhe unter der hiesigen Bevölkerung die bei der unverständigen Gewissenlosigkeit und der Schwäche der hiesigen Regierung leicht unabhäbige Folgen herbeiführen kann. In den Bezirken Mardin […] haben sich Zustände zu einer wahren Christenverfolgung ausgewachsen. Daran trägt zweifellos die Regierung die Schuld. 395

The well intentioned message made its way through the German bureaucracy to Talât and most probably to Reşid too. 396 What Holstein did not know was the preparation for a second convoy of Christian notables in Mardin, the day after his cable.

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388 Simon, Mardine: la ville heroïque [n.386], p.64.
389 Rhétoré, Les chrétiens aux bêtes! [n.164], p.78.
390 Bishop Maloyan was later beatified by the Vatican: Ciliciae Armenorum seu Mardinen: Beatificationis seu Canonizationis servi Dei Ignati Choukrullah Maloyan, archiepiscopi mardinensis in opium fidei, uti fertur, interfeciit (1915): Positio super vita, martyrio et fama martyrii (Rome: Tipografia Guerra, 2000).
391 Armatlo, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.47.
393 PAAA, Botschaft Konstantinopel 169, Holstein to embassy, 13 June 1915. This telegram contains a footnote which reads: “Herrn Kap Humann für Enver”. The note refers to Lieutenant Commander and Marine Attaché Hans Humann, a personal friend of Enver Paşâ’s and a staunch advocate of Ottoman expansion into the Caucasus. According to an intimate observer, Humann had unfettered access to the CUP elite and held “an outstanding position of extraordinary influence.” Ernst Jäckh, The Rising Crescent: Turkey yesterday, today, and to-morrow (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944), p.119.
394 PAAA, Botschaft Konstantinopel 169, Holstein to embassy, 13 June 1915.
395 Talât seemingly was not moved much by these protests. He listened to the stories about the massacres and replied to an employee at the German Embassy named Dr. Mordtmann, “daß die Pforte den Weltkrieg dazu benutzen wollte, um mit ihren inneren Feinden - den einheimischen Christen - gründlich aufzuraumen, ohne dabei durch die diplomatische Intervention des Auslandes gestört zu werden.” PAAA, R14086, Wangenheim to Bethmann-Hollweg, 17 June 1915.
In the meantime, the second convoy of Mardin Christians, 266 people of all denominations, was sent off on 14 June. This convoy was lead by militia commander Abdul Kadir (a subordinate of Çerkez Şakir) and Tevfik Bey, who had eliminated the Armenians of Derik.\(^{397}\) As had been done to the first convoy, the group was halted at the Sheikh’s caves where they were forced to pay tribute to the Sultan Şeyhmus cult. The men noticed that Kurdish tribesmen, armed with rifles, axes and spades, had surrounded them. The militiamen invited the Christians to descend to the cave to drink from the cold spring water, but those who went for a sip never returned. The killings went on during the night and on the next day. More than 100 men were killed at the Şeyhan caves, whereafter the convoy was marched off to Diyarbekir. All of a sudden, the convoy came across three mounted gendarmes approaching the convoy at high speed. The gendarmes reached the convoy and proclaimed that the Sultan had pardoned the non-Armenian Christians from persecution. Their hands were untied and they were allowed to drink water and eat bread. The Armenians were not fed and continued the deportation with their hands tied. The convoy was marched off again and reached Diyarbekir on 16 June, where they were sent to the caravanserai-prison.\(^{398}\)

As in Diyarbekir, after the elimination of the notables, the remaining Christians were sent off to their deaths. These were mainly women, children, and the elderly, although many men were still alive as well. On 2 July, a convoy of 600 men was taken away and slaughtered just outside the city walls. Before sending the victims down the Mardin road to the valley, İbrahim Bedri and Memduh resorted to large-scale extortion. On 13 July, Memduh negotiated with the families of the Christian men still in custody about considerable ransom, which amounted to several hundreds of pounds per family. Having extorted the families, the men were sent off and killed on the Diyarbekir road.\(^{399}\) After the men, their families were targeted. From late June to late October several convoys comprising hundreds of women and children were lead away and destroyed. For example, on 10 August, a convoy of 600 women and children were taken through the Mardin plain further south. Some had already died of exhaustion and sunstrokes when the convoy was halted in the district of the Kiki tribe. After Kurdish tribesmen had finished selecting women and children they fancied, the 300 remaining victims were massacred with axes and swords. A small batch of survivors was able to flee and hide in the desert caves.\(^{400}\) Within a month or two, the Christian population of Mardin city had drastically been reduced.

The district of Mardin counted several large villages with large numbers of Christian inhabitants. The largest among these were Q’sor (Gulliye) and Tell Ermen, each harbouring

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\(^{398}\) Ishak Armalto was one of the survivors of this second convoy. Upon arrival at the caravanserai in Diyarbekir, Armalto and a Joseph Paul Keyip saw three woven baskets (*zembils*) filled with chopped-off ears, noses, fingers, penises and gorged-out eyes. Armalto, *Al-Qousara* [n.181], pp.52-53, 103.

\(^{399}\) Sarafian, “The Disasters” [n.242].

several thousand souls. Tell Ermen had already experienced some persecution and arrests by Memduh’s militia, but massive violence was not applied until 1 July. On this day the militia and a large number of Kurdish tribesmen invaded the village, where the terrified villagers had nestled in the church. On orders of the militia commander and with assistance from the village headman Derwiş Bey, the church was attacked and a massacre ensued. The killers used bland instruments and did not distinguish between men and women, decapitating many of the victims. Some were drawn and quartered, or hacked to pieces with axes. A little girl who crawled out from under the corpses was battered to death when she refused to convert to Islam. Approximately 70 women were raped in the church before being put to the sword. After the massacre Kurdish women entered the church and used daggers to stab to death any survivors.\textsuperscript{401} The bodies were disposed of by being thrown into wells or burnt to ashes.\textsuperscript{402} When Rafael de Nogales visited the village a few weeks later, he met a few severely traumatized survivors, and was shocked by “corpses barely covered with heaps of stone from which emerged here and there a bloody tress or an arm or leg gnawed on by hyenas”.\textsuperscript{403} A German navy officer visited Tell Ermen too and saw chopped-off children’s hands and women’s hair.\textsuperscript{404} A week after the massacre, a Major Von Mikusch reported to Consul Holstein he had met the militia, who had “related about the massacre, beaming with joy” (\textit{freudestrahlend von Massacres ergählt}).\textsuperscript{405} The next day, on 2 July at 8 o’clock in the evening, Memduh Bey ordered the attack on the village of Q’sor (Gulliye), a predominantly Jacobite Syriac agricultural center on the Mardin plain. The militia was headed by Sergeant Yusuf, son of Nuri Ensari, and aided by chieftrain Mohammed Ağa of the Milli tribe. Kurdish tribesmen of the Deşi, Mişkiye, and Helecan tribes, as well as some Arabs, had come over to Q’sor to participate. The village was invaded and the population was massacred. Children were thrown from roofs and mutilated with axes. Many villagers were crammed together in the house of the village headman Elias Cabbar Hinno, and burnt alive.\textsuperscript{406} After the massacre, the village was burnt down, a spectacle visible from Mardin, where the inhabitants looked down in awe. According to Hyacinthe Simon, İbrahim Bedreddin watched the bloodbath too, cheering and applauding:\textsuperscript{407}

Durant ce drame sanglant un homme était assis au balcone de sa terrasse, humant l’air frais du matin et contemplant une rosace de feu piquée sur la plaine: c’était le gouverneur de Mardine, c’était Bedreddin Bey. Les barbares égorgeaient et brûlaient ses subordonnées, lui fumait sa cigarette.\textsuperscript{408}

\textsuperscript{401} Armalto, \textit{Al-Qousara} [n.181], pp.102-3.
\textsuperscript{402} \textit{PAAA}, R14087, director of the Deutscher Hilfsbund für christliches Liebeswerk im Orient (Frankfurt am Main) Friedrich Schuchardt to the Auswärtiges Amt, 21 August 1915, enclosure no.5.
\textsuperscript{403} Armalto, \textit{Al-Qousara} [n.181], p.102.
\textsuperscript{404} Nogales, \textit{Four years} [n.266], pp.171-72.
\textsuperscript{405} \textit{PAAA}, R14086, Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, 9 July 1915.
\textsuperscript{406} Noel, \textit{Diary of Major E. Noel} [n.282], part 1, p.11.
\textsuperscript{407} Simon, \textit{Mardine: la ville heroique} [n.386], p.53.
Dozens of pretty women were raped and dozens more were carried off. According to survivor Abdulaziz Jacob, Yusuf Ensari had kept at least 50 women in his home in Mardin for serial rape.\(^{409}\) The massive looting went on for two more days and by the third day the once prosperous village Q’sor had been reduced to a state of complete devastation.\(^{410}\)

The massacres in Mardin were a major component of the ‘reign of terror’ that Dr. Reşid had pursued all over Diyarbekir province. It is very probable that due to Reşid’s fanaticism, the CUP genocide in Diyarbekir exceeded in efficiency, scope, speed, and cruelty any other province of the Ottoman Empire. Reşid’s militia murdered without mercy, without distinction, and without consequences. His bloody rule obviously did not go unnoticed, since vice consul Holstein had already denounced the governor’s policy. Other international observers were disturbed of his campaign as well. A French report noted about Reşid’s treatment of the Christians he imprisoned: “Il est difficile de décrire ici en détail les souffrances et les tortures que ces malheureux ont subies en prison pendant tout ce temps”.\(^{411}\) Likewise, Aleppo Consul Jesse Jackson wrote on 28 June that the persecution of the Armenians in his city intensified. Jackson informed Ambassador Morgenthau specifically about “the horrible things taking place in Diarbekir. Just such a reign of terror has begun in this city also”.\(^{412}\)

Most protests emanated from German officials, stationed in the eastern provinces. Aleppo Consul Walter Rößler wrote about Diyarbekir province that they received “die schauerlichsten Gerichte, welche uns ganz an spanische Inquisition erinnern”.\(^{413}\) Ambassador Wangenheim forwarded to Berlin the news about “das Vilajet Diarbekir, in dem die Armenier besonders grausam verfolgt werden sollen”.\(^{414}\) When Holstein received the news about the Q’sor and Tell Ermen massacres, he wrote an even more indignant telegram to Wangenheim:

> Der frühere Mutessariff von Mardin, zur Zeit hier, mitteilt mir folgendes: Der Vali von Diarbekir, Reschid Bey, würde unter der Christenheit seines Vilajets wie ein toller Bluthund; er hat vor kurzem auch in Mardin siebenhundert Christen (meistens Armenier) darunter armenischen Bischof in einer Nacht durch aus Diarbekir speziell entsandte Gendarmerie sammeln und in der Nähe der Stadt wie Hammel abschlachten lassen. Reschid Bey fährt fort in seiner Blutarbeit unter Unschuldigen deren Zahl wie der Mutessariff mich versicherte, heute zweiseitend übersteigt. Falls d. Regierung nicht sofort ganz energische Maßnahmen gegen Reschid Bey ergreift, wird muselmanische niedere Bevölkerung d. hiesigen Vilajets gleichfalls Christenmetzeleien beginnen. Die Lage hier in dieser Hinsicht wird täglich drohender. Reschid Bey sollte sofort abberufen werden womit dokumentiert würde dass die Regierung seine Schandtaten nicht billig und wodurch allgemeine Erregung hier beschwichtig werden könnte.\(^{415}\)

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\(^{409}\) Yeghiayan, *British Foreign Office Dossiers* [n.152], p.229.


\(^{411}\) Beylerian, *Les grandes puissances* [n.275], p.49, document no.156: “Note du Département sur les massacres arméniens”.


\(^{413}\) PAAA, R14086, Rößler to Bethmann Hollweg, 29 June 1915.

\(^{414}\) PAAA, R14086, Wangenheim to Bethmann Hollweg, 9 July 1915.

\(^{415}\) PAAA, Botschaft Konstantinopel 169, Holstein to Embassy, 10 July 1915.
The insistence pertaining to this message impelled Wangenheim to take a stand about the reports. The next day he replied to Holstein he would convey the content of his message to the Sublime Porte. On 12 July 1915 Wangenheim slightly adjusted the telegram, translated it to French, and sent it to Talât, who knew French. Wangenheim reproduced the exact wording of “wie Hammel abschlachten lassen” as “égorgé comme des moutons”. 416

After this sequence of written communication, Talât officially reproached Reşid for ‘overdoing’ the carnage. Several instances of reprehensions are especially significant as they contain intimations of the scope of the massacres. On the same day Talât received Wangenheim’s message about the indiscriminate killings in Diyarbekir province, he dispatched the following telegram to Dr. Reşid:

Lately it has been reported that massacres have been organized against the Armenians of the province and Christians without distinction of religion, and that recently for example people deported from Diyarbekir together with the Armenians and the Bishop of Mardin and seven hundred persons from other Christian communities have been taken out of town at night and slaughtered like sheep, and that an estimated two thousand people have been massacred until now, and if this is not ended immediately and unconditionally, it has been reported that it is feared the Muslim population of the neighbouring provinces will rise and massacre all Christians. It is absolutely unacceptable for the disciplinary measures and policies procured to the Armenians to include other Christians as this would leave a very bad impression upon public opinion and therefore these types of incidents that especially threaten the lives of all Christians need to be ended immediately, and the truth of the conditions needs to be reported. 417

In this important telegram, Talât not only literally reproduced Holstein’s words “slaughtered like sheep,” but also used the euphemism “disciplinary measures and policies” to endorse what Reşid had been doing correctly so far: destroying the Armenians of Diyarbekir.

In July, Reşid’s excesses became notorious among anyone that even came near his province as it was strewn with corpses. The governor of Bagdad, Süleyman Nazif (1870-1927), a noted intellectual hailing from Diyarbekir traveled to his hometown in this period. Nazif later wrote that the pungent smell of decaying corpses pervaded the atmosphere and that the bitter stench clogged his nose, making him gag. 418 Nazif had seen the exception to the rule, because most bodies were disposed of in the rivers Euphrates and Tigris. Rößler wrote that the “Vorbeitreiben von Leichen auf dem Euphrat” had been going on for 25 days, adding: “Die Leichen waren alle in der gleichen Weise, zwei und zwei Rücken auf Rücken gebunden”. 419 Cemal Paşa, in charge of the Syrian region south of Diyarbekir, reproached Dr. Reşid with an urgent and personal telegram on 14 July, complaining that “the corpses floating down the Euphrates are probably those of the Armenians killed in the rebellion, these need to be buried on the spot, leave no corpses out in the

416 PAAA, Botschaft Konstantinopel 169, Wangenheim to Talât, 12 July 1915.
417 BOA, DH.ŞFR 54/406, Talât to Reşid, 12 July 1915.
418 Kocahanoğlu, İttihat ve Terakki [n.372], pp.522-23.
419 PAAA, R14087, Rößler to Bethmann Hollweg, 27 July 1915.
open”.\textsuperscript{420} Two days later Reşid answered Cemal by pointing out that the Euphrates bore little relation to Diyarbekir province, and that the floating corpses were coming from the Erzurum and Mamuret-ul Aziz directions. Reşid noted that burials were exceptional and that “those who were killed here are either being thrown into deep deserted caves or, as has been the case for the most part, are being burnt” (\textit{ihrak}).\textsuperscript{421} Faiz El-Ghusayn was a witness to the burning of dead bodies when he entered Diyarbekir province near Karapınar. He saw hundreds of bodies burned to ashes. He also saw that there were many women and children among the dead, consumed by fire.\textsuperscript{422} The rumors of Diyarbekir having become an open-air cemetery reached Talât, who ordered Reşid on 3 August to “bury the deceased lying on the roads, throw their corpses into brooks, lakes, and rivers, and burn their property left behind on the roads”.\textsuperscript{423}

Reşid did not pay much attention to, let alone seriously consider the wave of negative feedback and his reputation grew more and more nefarious. The German protests became much more explicit by the end of July. An employee at the German embassy wrote to the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg a most explicit report which read: “Seit Anfang dieses Monats hat der Wali von Diarbekir, Reschid Bey, mit der systematischen Ausrottung der christlichen Bevölkerung seines Amtsbezirks, ohne Unterschied der Rasse und der Konfession, begonnen”.\textsuperscript{424}

As reports of massacres poured into Mosul province, Walter Holstein became increasingly enraged and wrote a bitter telegram to his colleagues in Istanbul:

\begin{quote}
Jedermann weiß daß der Vali von Diarbekir beispielsweise die Seele der in seinem Vilajet vorgekommenen entsetzlichen Verbrechen an der Christenheit ist; jedermann annimmt mit Recht daß wir die Greuelaten auch kennen und man fragt sich weshalb wir gestatten daß ein notorischer Massenmörder unbestraft und weiterhin Vali bleibe. Allein der Ausdruck unserer Mißbilligung der Greuel dürfte kaum genügen den uns kompromittierenden verschiedenen Auffassungen wirksam entgegenzutreten. Erst wenn wir die Pforte gezwungen haben die in Diarbekir Mardin Secert etc. in Beamtenstellungen sitzenden Verbrecher rücksichtslos zur Rechenschaft zu ziehen, und zwar schleunigst, erst dann fällen die Verdächtigungen gegen uns fort. Ich las in verschiedenen deutschen Zeitungen türkische amtliche Dementis der Christengreuel und bin erstaunt über die Naivität der Pforte daß sie glaubt die Tatsachen der Verbrechen türkischer Beamten durch krasse Lügen aus der Welt schaffen zu können. Die Welt hat Greuelaten wie sie erweislich von Amtswegen im Vilajet Diarbekir begangen worden sind und werden noch nicht erlebt.\textsuperscript{425}
\end{quote}

This report too was forwarded to Talât, who began losing his patience, since he was forced to explain Reşid’s compromising and embarrassing actions to German officials. Reşid obviously hadn’t taken any measures to act according to his instructions a month ago. To clear things up, two days after Holstein’s cable, Talât sent a second telegram admonishing Reşid that the persecution and massacre of all Christians in the province was not permitted. He also urged him

\textsuperscript{420} Cemal to Reşid, 14 July 1915, quoted in: \textit{Ibid.}, p.519.
\textsuperscript{421} Reşid to Cemal, 16 July 1915, quoted in: \textit{Ibid.}, p.519.
\textsuperscript{422} Al-Ghusayn, \textit{Martyred Armenia} [n.233], p.20.
\textsuperscript{423} Talât to Reşid, 3 August 1915, quoted in: Kocahanoglu, \textit{İttihat ve Terakki} [n.372], p.519.
\textsuperscript{424} PAAA, R14086, Hohenlohe-Langenburg to Bethmann-Hollweg, 31 July 1915.
\textsuperscript{425} PAAA, Botschaft Konstantinopel 170, Holstein to Embassy, 14 August 1915.
to dismantle the militia, that caused the provincial authorities to be held responsible for the killings.\textsuperscript{426} This was still not the end of Talât’s reprimands to his zealous subordinate. It had become clear that Reşid had not only persecuted and murdered non-Armenian Ottoman Christians, but also non-Ottoman Armenians. His indiscriminate slaughter of \textit{ethnic} Armenians without consideration of \textit{political} identity became a serious problem. One of these was Stepan Katosian, an Armenian-American who had summarily been put to death in the Diyarbekir prison. The execution probably caused a diplomatic riot since the Ottoman Empire was not at war with the United States, in which case it still would have been a legal violation. Talât therefore asked Reşid for information about Katosian’s execution.\textsuperscript{427} To assure that this was the last instance in which Reşid transgressed international law, Talât ordered the consistent screening of the political identities of Armenians from then on.\textsuperscript{428} The purpose of this order was for non-Ottoman Armenians not to be persecuted. For example, an Iranian Armenian named Migirdiç Stepanian was allowed to leave for Persia via Mosul.\textsuperscript{429}

Apart from specific instructions readjusting Reşid’s extreme behaviour, Talât released several national decrees defining the categorical scope of those to be persecuted and deported. At first, he excluded the Armenian converts to Islam from deportation to the south.\textsuperscript{430} Most converts were not persecuted anymore and, provided they kept their silence, were allowed to continue living in their homes. Two weeks later he reincorporated the converts into the deportation program. Talât’s order read that “some Armenians are converting collectively or individually just to remain in their hometowns,” and that “this type of conversions should never be lent credence to”. Talât contended that “whenever these type of people perceive threats to their interests they will convert as a means of deception”.\textsuperscript{431} On 4 August Talât excluded the Armenian Catholics from deportation, requesting their numbers in the respective provinces.\textsuperscript{432} On 15 August the Protestant Armenians were excluded too from deportation to Der Zor. Again, Talât requested statistical data.\textsuperscript{433} Besides these official directions, the general methodology of the genocide consisted of killing the men and deporting those women and children who were not absorbed into Muslim households. This means that in general, Armenian women were not to be subjected to the immediate on-the-spot killing as the men were.\textsuperscript{434}

\textsuperscript{426} BOA, DH.SFR 54-A/248, Talât to Reşid, 16 August 1915.
\textsuperscript{427} BOA, DH.SFR 56/131, Talât to Reşid, 24 September 1915.
\textsuperscript{428} BOA, DH.SFR 57/50, Talât to Reşid, 17 October 1915. Talât later specified the order and requested information on “Armenian officials employed at consulates of allied and neutral countries”. BOA, DH.SFR 70/152, Talât to provinces, 30 November 1916.
\textsuperscript{429} BOA, DH.SFR 57/57, Talât to Reşid, 17 October 1915. Whereas his superordinate Talât was scolding him continuously, two days later Reşid received an appreciative telegram from his subordinate Halîl Edîb in Mardin. Edîb expressed his praise on the Eid el-Adha (\textit{kurban bayram}), the important Muslim festival involving sacrifice of cattle: “I congratulate you with your Eid, and kiss your hands that have gained us the six provinces and opened up the gateways to Turkistan and the Caucasus.” Halîl Edîb to Reşid, 19 October 1915, quoted in: Bilgi, Dr. Mehmed Reşid [n.208], p.29, footnote 73.
\textsuperscript{430} BOA, DH.SFR 54/100, Talât to provinces, 22 June 1915.
\textsuperscript{431} BOA, DH.SFR 54/254, Talât to provinces, 1 July 1915.
\textsuperscript{432} BOA, DH.SFR 54-A/252, Talât to provinces, 4 August 1915.
\textsuperscript{433} BOA, DH.SFR 55/20, Talât to provinces, 15 August 1915.
excluding the Jacobite Syriacs from deportation was issued for those provinces with Syriac communities.\(^{435}\)

2.5 Widening and narrowing scopes of persecution

There is contradictory evidence on the precise nature of Reşid’s local implementation of Talât’s national instructions. On the one hand, Reşid observed the commands for exclusion of non-Armenian Christians from further genocidal destruction; on the other hand, he disregarded all narrowing of victim categories. According to an other interpretation it is conceivable that the series of rebukes compelled him to mitigate the persecution, even though the harm was done. In other words, Reşid discontinued the persecution of the non-Armenian Christian communities when they had already been largely destroyed. These restrictions of time may have added to restrictions of location. It is also possible that this turn of events only happened in and around Diyarbekir city, since in Mardin İbrahim Bedri, Aziz Feyzi, and Memduh Bey had taken over the district. The most compelling example of selective persecution, steered from above is the causal link between Holstein’s telegram of 12 June and the fate of the second convoy of Mardin notables. In that chain of events Reşid indeed seems to have followed orders and limited the scope of the genocide.

One of the first villages that had been thoroughly destroyed was Kabiye. According to one survivor from that village, a group of survivors from all over the Diyarbekir plain had assembled in Qarabash some time after the massacre, probably around mid-June. Pirinççızade Sidki had drawn up a list of these survivors and had the list read out loud in front of the group. Those with Armenian names were carefully selected from those with Syriac names. Sidki declared that the Syriacs were exempted from persecution on orders of the government. When a young man named Dikran was also placed into the Armenian group he protested to Sidki, pleading that he was a Syriac Orthodox. Although he had spoken the truth, his protests were futile as he was lead away with the rest of the Armenians and butchered.\(^{436}\) The survivors of the second Mardin convoy had been in prison for a week when Memduh Bey arrived one day and ordered all cells opened. The cells were opened and the prisoners were led outside, where Memduh addressed them: “Those of you who are Syriac, Chaldean, and Protestant, raise your hands and state your names”. The Syriacs, Chaldeans, and Protestants were selected from the Armenians and were allowed to go home.\(^{437}\) A similar selection was remembered by a Syriac survivor from a labour

\(^{435}\) BOA, DH.ŞFR 57/112, Talât to the provinces of Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Haleb, and Urfa, 25 October 1915. A year later, an even more lenient instruction was issued towards the Syriacs, requesting information about their numbers and at the same time allowing them to travel within the country for the sake of trade. BOA, DH.ŞFR 68/98, Mamuret-ul Aziz, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Musul, and Urfa, 23 September 1916. Although tens of thousands of Syriacs had been massacred by that time, it did save a terrified and traumatized remnant of the Syriac community to live in their native regions. Still, their relative comfort was probably contingent on the appointment of Süleyman Necmi, Reşid’s successor in Diyarbekir. The new governor was very merciful compared to Reşid, and permitted the Syriacs a breath before İbrahim Bedreddin became governor of Diyarbekir province and launched a second attack against the Syriacs of Tur Abdin.

\(^{436}\) Jastrow, Die mesopotamisch-arabischen [n.255], pp.327-29.

\(^{437}\) Armalto, al-Qousara [n.181], p.54.
battalion working on road construction near Akpınar, between Diyarbekir and Mardin. On 17 June Sิดtki reportedly arrived at the road-building site where he separated the Armenians from the other Christians. An Armenian named Migirditch from Qarabash village was moved to the Armenian side but claimed to be a Syriac Orthodox. Though his identity was confirmed by a native of Qarabash, Sิดtki did not believe him and cursed at him: “Filthy dog, your name is Migirditch and you are supposed to be a Syriac?” The unfortunate man was then sent off to his death with the other Armenians.⁴³⁸ A Syriac conscript in a labour battalion working between Urfa and Diyarbekir in mid-August related to the Swiss missionary Jacob Künzler:


These instances of selection of Armenians illustrate that Reşid delegated the implementation of Talât’s orders to Sิดtki. After Talât’s telegrams, some form of selective killing seems to have been applied.

These telling examples notwithstanding, there is also evidence that runs counter to Reşid’s ostensible pardon to non-Armenian Christians after Talât’s telegrams. The case of the Q’sor massacre shows that orders for differentiation between Christians were simply brushed aside. Reportedly, the executioner of Q’sor, Nuri Ensari, had personally proclaimed the “amnesty” (af) accorded to the Syriacs, while the predominantly Syriac and Catholic village had just been exterminated and was at that time still being razed.⁴⁴⁰ The same treatment befell the Christian women and children, who were supposed to be excluded from immediate massacre as routine. As early as in June, Aleppo Consul Jackson reported about the village of Redwan that “they even killed little children”.⁴⁴¹ A deportation convoy trudging to Mardin was halted by Reşid’s militia at the village of Golikê, where dozens of women were first raped and then killed.⁴⁴² Reportedly Reşid himself “took 800 children, enclosed them in a building and set light to it,” burning the children alive.⁴⁴³

⁴³⁸ Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho [n.199], pp.69-70.  
⁴³⁹ Künzler, Im Lande des Blutes und der Tränen [n.336], pp.47-48.  
⁴⁴⁰ Yeghiayan, British Foreign Office Dossiers [n.152], p.230.  
⁴⁴¹ Jackson to Morgenthau, 8 June 1915, in: Sarafian, United States [n.250], p.50.  
⁴⁴² Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho [n.195], p.72; Reportedly, Aziz Feyzi became known for his idiosyncratic habit of collecting trophies from female victims. On several occasions he had the militia retrieve a necklace of women’s nipples and a rope of women’s hair. Episodes des massacres [n.272], p.50; Yeghiayan, British Foreign Office Dossiers [n.152], p.152.  
The few Greeks were not spared either. The wife of a Catholic Greek citizen of Diyarbekir complained to German vice consul Rößler she hadn’t heard from her husband Yorgi Obégi ever since he, her daughter, and four of her brothers had went into hiding with a Muslim colleague in Diyarbekir. It became known that they were found and deported, but shortly outside of Diyarbekir stripped of their valuables and killed. The Greek Orthodox Priest of Diyarbekir had disappeared without a trace, and was probably murdered as well. Rößler was informed by an Ottoman officer that the then police chief of Diyarbekir, most probably Memduh Bey, had confessed the murder: “le commissaire lui aurait dit qu’il les a tué lui même”. In the Silvan district, 425 Greeks out of a total 583 were killed.

The most compelling evidence supporting the interpretation that Talât’s orders were ignored are the massacres organized in Nusaybin and Cizre. On 16 August 1915 İbrahim Bedri sent militia officer Abdulkadir and chiefain of the Deşî tribe Abdulaziz to Nusaybin. They incarcerated all Christian men of Nusaybin with no distinction of denomination: Syriac Jacobites, Chaldeans, Protestants, and Armenians. In the middle of the night the men were lead away to a desolate canyon, butchered one by one, and thrown into the ravine. Many were decapitated, and each victim was urged to convert to Islam before being killed and hurled down the abyss.

Almost two weeks later Cizre was targeted. On orders of Reşid, deputies Zülfü Bey and Aziz Feyzi had toured the province in April 1915 to organize the genocide. They had also frequented Cizre and had spoken to local Kurdish leaders. On 29 August, Aziz Feyzi lead a group of men including the mufti of Cizre Ahmed Hilmi and Reman chiefain Ömer in the attack. All Christian men were arrested and tortured under the pretext that they had arms hidden in secret depots. They were then cuffed with ropes and chains, and marched out the city, where they were stripped of their belongings and murdered. The naked bodies were dumped downstream in the Tigris, for an obvious reason: the killers did not want the victims’ relatives to see the corpses and panic. Two days later the families were placed on kelek rafts and sent off.

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444 PAAA, R14087, Rößler to Bethmann-Hollweg, 3 September 1915, enclosure no.2. Additionally, Memduh seems to have murdered a Russian and a Brit. The murdered Brit was probably Albert Atkinson, a missionary. Talât later asked Reşid questions on his whereabouts.
446 Rhétoré, Les chrétiens aux bêtes! [n.164], p.220.
449 Épisodes des massacres [n.272], p.14. On his way back to Diyarbekir, Feyzi reportedly visited the Reman district and convinced the brothers Ömer and Mustafa that the time had come to destroy all Christians.
after local Muslims had selected children. Their river journey was short, as their vessels were moored at a Kurdish village shortly downstream. Most women were raped, shot dead, and thrown in the river.\textsuperscript{451} The pollution the decaying corpses caused to the Tigris was of such a nature that the population of Mosul was forbidden to drink from the river for a month.\textsuperscript{452} In Cizre, the only survivors were four women absorbed in a Muslim household. Three of them were killed after all. The other, Afife Mimarbashi, bribed her kidnapper and fled to Mardin as the only survivor of the Cizre massacre.\textsuperscript{453} A total of 4750 Armenians (2500 Gregorians, 1250 Catholics, 1000 Protestants), 250 Chaldeans, and 100 Jacobite Syriacs were killed.\textsuperscript{454} A week after the mass murder, Holstein reported to his superiors that “Banden von Kurden, die zu diesem Zwecke von Feyzi Bey, Deputierten von Diarbekir angeworben waren, unter Duldung der Ortsbehörden und Teilnahme des Militärs die gesamte christliche Einwohnerschaft der Stadt Djeziré (Vilajet Diarbekir) niedergemazelt haben”.\textsuperscript{455}

It is evident that the indiscriminate killings were by no means spontaneous outbursts of local popular bloodlust. Talât’s telegraphic reprimands had arrived late, and were not taken into consideration. As the Interior Minister, he was aware of this, as he was continuously being informed of this fact by German officials in Istanbul, who noted “dass die Weisungen der türkischen Regierung an die Provinzialbehörden infolge deren Willkür zum grössten Teil ihren Zweck verfehlten”.\textsuperscript{456} In the summer of 1915, all Christian communities of Diyarbekir were equally struck by the genocide, although the Armenians were often particularly singled out for immediate destruction. As Norman Naimark wrote: “Protestant and Catholic Armenians could be formally exempted from deportation, even if in practice local authorities made no distinction among the various Christian sects”.\textsuperscript{457} Consul Rößler’s reported that the Ottoman government lost “die Herrschaft über die von ihr gerufenen Elemente”.\textsuperscript{458} These ‘elements’, as Rößler described the genocidal measures, proved particularly ferocious in Diyarbekir province. Major Noel was aware of this, as he remarked about the Syriacs:

In Diarbekir itself the Syrian Jacobites were scarcely molested. Of all the Christian communities they know how best to get on with the Turks, and when the massacres were ordered they were officially excluded. In the districts, however, the Government very soon lost control of the passions they had loose (if they ever wanted to keep them in control), with the result that the Jacobites suffered there as much as anybody else.\textsuperscript{459}

\textsuperscript{451} Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], pp.89-90.
\textsuperscript{453} Sarafian, “The Disasters” [n.242].
\textsuperscript{454} PAAA, Botschaft Konstantinopol 170, Hohenlohe-Langenburg to Auswärtige Amt, 11 September 1915.
\textsuperscript{455} PAAA, Botschaft Konstantinopol 170, Holstein to Embassy, 9 September 1915.
\textsuperscript{458} PAAA, R14087, Rößler to Bethmann Hollweg, 27 July 1915.
\textsuperscript{459} Noel, Diary of Major E. Noel [n.282], part 2, p.14.
Contrary to Rößler’s notion, Reşid had a firm control of his murderous infrastructure. Especially in and around Diyarbekir district, most instances of massacre in which the militia engaged were directly ordered by himself. An exploration of the perpetrators involved, the timing, scope, and methodology of the killings clearly reveals Reşid’s will propelling them. Due to his personal disposition, Dr. Mehmed Reşid gave a distinct shape to the genocide, configuring the scopes of victims from the outset, even when Talât modified them.
The winter of 1915-1916 was a harsh season in Diyarbekir province. The Christians of the province had been effectively destroyed and dozens of villages were desolate.\textsuperscript{460} Since the majority of the victims were peasants, the genocide caused an unprecedented bad harvest in the hinterland, causing the remaining people to starve. In many villages people often ate plain grass or hay and even lacked the means to bake acorn bread, normally the simplest staple food.\textsuperscript{461} They were considered lucky as others had no other choice than to resort to cannibalism. In Diyarbekir city, food was so scarce that people were seen picking human flesh with knives out of the heaps of corpses laying along the city walls. The desperate city dwellers often ate the flesh without preparation.\textsuperscript{462} These conditions in Diyarbekir were not regional but part of a national crisis.\textsuperscript{463} Governor Reşid seemingly did not pursue any attempts to alleviate the people’s suffering. He was removed from office and appointed governor of Ankara on 1 March 1916. The governor of Ankara, Süleyman Necmi Bey, replaced him as governor of Diyarbekir.\textsuperscript{464}

Health conditions were terrible and curable illnesses quickly lead to death as medicine was scarce and prioritized to the army.\textsuperscript{465} The corpses of the many who had died from persecution, starvation, and illness were seldom buried but thrown into wells and rivers, causing cholera, dysentery, and typhoid epidemics.\textsuperscript{466} Local Muslims named these contagious diseases “the Armenian disease” because Armenian convoys were dying as a result of them.\textsuperscript{467} The epidemic did not only strike the persecuted population, unpersecuted locals were often contaminated too. Aware of the criminal nature of popular participation in the genocide, the widespread outbreak was interpreted by Muslims as a “punishment of God” for the massacring. In September 1916, the death toll of the epidemic rose to 250 people every day, most of the victims being soldiers, gendarmes, and refugees. In the same month 4000 people perished of disease in Mardin, and in November, the body count numbered an additional 850.\textsuperscript{468} According to Ishak Armalto, from

\textsuperscript{460} In 1916, the majority of surviving Armenian deportees were concentrated in several open-air concentration camps along the Euphrates river in the Syrian desert. Tens of thousands were dying as a result of deliberate exposure to epidemics and starvation. Still, Talât’s faction resumed the deportations with genocidal massacres in the spring of 1916, setting off a ‘second phase’ of the genocide. Raymond Kévorkian, “L’extermination des déportés arméniens ottomans dans les camps de concentration de Syrie-Mésopotamie (1915-1916), la deuxième phase du génocide,” in: \textit{Revue d’Histoire Arménienne Contemporaine}, vol.2 (1998), pp.7-61. The Syriac groups that had sought refuge in the Tur Abdin mountains were met with a second military attack in 1917, and despite German pressure and armed self-defense small-scale systematic massacring was carried out there. Sébastien de Courtois, \textit{Le génocide oublié: Chrétiens d’Orient, les derniers araméens} (Paris: Ellipses, 2002), pp.168-76.

\textsuperscript{461} \textit{Seyfo Center Archives} (Enschede), transcript of an interview with Abdallah Goge (approximately aged 110) of B’sorino village (Midyat district, Mardin province), conducted by Sabri Atman in Aramaic, in Gronau (Germany) on 17 February 2004.

\textsuperscript{462} Beysanoglu, \textit{Diyarbekir Tarihi} [n.141], p.787.

\textsuperscript{463} American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, \textit{The Most Terrible Winter the World Has Ever Known} (New York: American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, 1917).

\textsuperscript{464} \textit{BOA}, MV 241/277, 1 March 1916.

\textsuperscript{465} Victor Schilling, \textit{Kriegshygienische Erfahrungen in der Türkei (Cilicien, Nordsyrien)} (Leipzig: J.A. Barth, 1921).

\textsuperscript{466} The sewer system of Diyarbekir is a refined network of cisterns and drainages that regulates the aquatic infrastructure of the city. Water is tapped from springs and the Tigris, flowing east along the city, and directed into the city from the north, leaving the city from the south through what the locals call “the forbidden stream” (\textit{haram su}). Due to the epidemics, the water became polluted, affecting its health for years. İbrahim Halil, “Şihat Meselenleri: Sehrimizin Sultan,” in: \textit{Küçük Mecmua}, vol.8 (24 July 1922), pp.18-20.

\textsuperscript{467} Interview with a Veli Dede (aged 90) of Holbişv village (Kâhta district, Adıyaman province), conducted on 22 July 1990 in Kurdish by a Haci İbrahim, published in: Kemal Yalçın, \textit{Sende gâler yüreğim} (Bochum: CIP, 2003), pp.371-76.

\textsuperscript{468} Rhétoré, \textit{Les chrétiens aux bêtes}” [n.164], pp.352, 367-76.
March 1916 to September 1917 the total amount of dead increased to 25,000, and an other 2000 died from October 1917 to autumn 1918.\(^{469}\)

Regardless of these difficulties, the war raged daily on the different fronts. For Diyarbekir province, the clashes with the Russian army as well as the desert war with the British army bore significance due to their proximity to the province. After the disaster of Sartkamış, the Third Army was driven back and fought bitterly to defend Erzurum, the gateway between Anatolia and the Caucasus. When that important Ottoman city fell on 16 February 1916, it caused a shock not only among Ottoman officials. A British military observer with the Russian Army wrote about the fall of Erzurum: “Every bazaar from Shiraz to Samarkand, from Konia to Kuldja, began talking of the great Urus, who had taken Erzerum from the Osmanli”.\(^{470}\) The Russian army steamrolled over Muş and captured Bitlis on 2 March. Diyarbekir now gained military importance as the front was only 200 kilometres to the east of the city. Enver Paşa personally visited Diyarbekir on 10 May 1916 to discuss the war with Ahmed İzzet Paşa, commander of the Second Army.\(^{471}\) Colonel Mustafa Kemal Paşa, the courageous hero of the defense of Gallipolli, was put in charge of the 16th Corps of that Army. Although he suffered heavy losses, he managed to repel General Nazarbekov’s forces to the north of Lake Van. On 8 August 1916 Kemal Paşa humbly reported the recapture of Bitlis and Muş.\(^{472}\) The ensuing constellation was a form of stalemate and maintained the status-quo for several months on the Russian front.\(^{473}\) The British imperial army had landed in Basra and was advancing northwards, threatening Bagdad and Jerusalem, while at the same time conducting intelligence operations to persuade Arab elites to discontinue any loyalty to the Ottoman government. The British Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force suffered a serious setback at Kut Al-Amara, as Halil Paşa’s veteran soldiers finally defeated General Townshend’s forces on 29 April 1916.\(^{474}\)

Nevertheless, the Allied military campaigns were productive, and triggered the elaboration of existing plans to divide the Ottoman Empire between the Entente Powers. On 16 May 1916 the Sykes-Picot Agreement was officially concluded by Sir Edward Grey and Paul Cambon. This agreement, unofficially reached in January, stipulated the division of the Ottoman Empire into areas of influence for Great Britain and France. It assigned France control over modern Syria and Lebanon, whereas much of Palestine and modern Israel was to remain under international control. There was some mention of the possibility of cessation of land to establish an Arab state in the Arabian peninsula, but in general France and Britain were to remain in control of the key locations. Ultimately, the western powers were in charge, either directly or through Arab elites

\(^{469}\) Armalto, Al-Qousara [n.181], p.106.


\(^{471}\) Beysanoğlu, Diyarbekir Tarhi [n.141], p.801.


charged with the duty and invested with powers requisite to carry out regulations. The crux of the matter was to secure all kinds of freedoms and privileges for British and French commercial interests. The conduct of railways, water supplies, oil fields, port facilities, and customs tariffs were some of the elements specified in the 12 articles of the covenant.\(^\text{475}\)

In the Ottoman parliament, which had become little more than the CUP’s clubhouse, the imperial designs were furiously reviled. According to Talât, the Turkish nation was waging a war of “independence and liberation” (\(\text{istiklâl ve \(\text{istihlâs}\)}\)).\(^\text{476}\) Other than waging war on many fronts, the CUP elite proceeded implementing its program of modernization and ethnic homogenization. Throughout the year 1916 Talât consolidated his dictatorship, appointing his loyalists to key positions and purging ‘non-national’ elements. The Minister of Interior set the crown on his diligence when he became Grand Vizier on 4 February 1917. Having risen to his new position, Talât initiated several judicial, administrative, cultural, and social reforms. On 15 February he addressed the parliament and read his cabinet’s program to the deputies:

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\text{Gentlemen, we know that our nation, in very tight interaction with European civilization, is existentially connected by alliance to the Central Powers and cannot remain indifferent to the necessities of civilization and modernity. Victory in the war is necessary, both for national security and for reform and innovation. We will walk toward this goal with firm determination (applause).}\(^\text{477}\)
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The modernizing effort consisted for example of secularizing the religious courts (\(\text{\(\text{ş}\)er\(\text{\'\text{\`y}e}\)}\)) and its canonical laws. With restricted jurisdiction they were placed under the Ministry of Justice, and Muslim clerics disappeared from parliament. Women and girls were encouraged to enlist in universities and primary schools, and participate in the labour market. They also gained more legal rights, such as the right to file for divorce.\(^\text{478}\) Along with secularization, the campaign also saw elements of westernization. There were experiments with the Latin alphabet, and in 1917 the Gregorian calendar was introduced.\(^\text{479}\) The ‘national economy’ was gradually beginning to display its contours, a ‘National Bank’ (\(\text{\text{\(\text{Millî}\) Banka}\)}\)) being established. The CUP also began developing a tangent national culture: a ‘national library’, ‘national music’, a ‘national tourism agency’, a ‘national film industry’, a ‘national geography society’, and a ‘national museum’ were but few of the institutions the CUP began creating.\(^\text{480}\) In addition to this construction of cornerstones of the new national identity, the ethnic restructuring continued. Deportation and assimilation programs were extended to the Muslim populations, one of these being the Kurds.


\(^{476}\) Tunaya, \textit{Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler} [n.64], p.605.

\(^{477}\) \text{Çavdar, Talât Paşa} [n.17], p.390.


\(^{480}\) Tunaya, \textit{Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler} [n.57], p.66.
3.1 Deportations of Kurds, 1916

The CUP stance toward the Kurdish population of the Ottoman Empire was of a complex and diverse character. On the one hand, the Kurds were perceived to be Ottoman Muslims, therefore not to be excluded out of the new ‘national’ order. After all, among the first founders of the CUP there were several Ottoman-Kurdish intellectuals, such as Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932) and Dr. İshak Süküti (1868-1902), the latter being a native of Diyarbekir. Moreover, the godfather of CUP nationalist ideology was none other than Ziyâ Gökalp, a Diyarbekir Kurd. In addition to these influential politicians, local CUP elites were often Kurds too, such as in Diyarbekir province. In the provincial capital, the Pirinççizâde dynasty had exhibited loyalty to CUP policy. In Mardin city, tribal leaders of the Deşî and Kiki tribes used the CUP (and vice versa) to push their agendas. Due to familial ties, ideological conformity, but especially political opportunism these Kurdish elites had for instance participated in and profited from the genocidal persecution of the Christians in that province.

Apart from regional administrative institutions, the Ottoman army profited from Kurdish manpower as well. Reşid himself admitted in his memoirs that without the support of the Millî, Miran, and Karakeçî tribes, generally located in the west of Diyarbekir province, it would not have been possible to provide the necessary resources and requisitions for the Ottoman army. In his memoirs, Commander of the Second Army Ahmed İzzet Paşa detailed some of his efforts to reach out to Kurdish tribal elites. According to İzzet, the stick-strategy had only alienated Kurdish tribesmen from the state, thus not produced the desired results. Therefore he had opted for the carrot-strategy to incorporate the tribes. Interestingly, he also wrote that one of the most successful Ottoman officials that had succeeded in gaining the Kurds was the notorious İbrahim Bedreddin, district governor of Mardin. Bedri had cajoled and bribed his way to strong personal friendships with several influential Cizre chieftains.

Taking this bond between the CUP and Kurdish elites into consideration, the CUP seemingly had little to worry about concerning the Kurds. However, this loyalty problem was not as simple as it appeared at first sight. The key word was trust. There was fear for collaboration of powerful Kurdish tribes with the advancing Russian army, as well as with Armenian politicians. The CUP also fostered suspicion about Kurdish-nationalist and secessionist politics. The claims were not totally unfounded as both desertion, Kurdo-Armenian alliances, and nationalism existed. Therefore, the CUP remained on the look-out for of which Kurdish families and tribes were potentially loyal to the government and which ones were not. It then pre-emptively

481 Mehmet Ş. Hanioğlu, Bir siyasal düşünür olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve dönemi (İstanbul: Üçdal, 1981).
482 International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam), Hikmet Kivilemlı Archive, inventory no.56, “İhtiyat Kuvvet Milliyet (Şark)” (unpublished handwritten manuscript, 1932), p.20.
483 Reşid, Mülâhazât [n.209], p.82.
484 Ahmet İzzet Paşa, Feryadım (İstanbul: Nehir, 1992), vol.1, p.257.
485 According to the German journalist Harry Stürmer, who had had the opportunity to speak to CUP insiders during his two-year stay in Istanbul, the CUP feared the Kurds. Harry Stürmer, Two Years in Constantinople (London: Gomidas, 2004), p.7.
distrusted those they already suspected of disloyalty as a military precaution, just in case the tribes in question indeed crossed sides and joined the Russians. In that case, if a certain tribe was disloyal, a threat would have been eliminated; if the tribe was loyal after all, little was lost in CUP eyes. Obviously, their actions did not advance Kurdish trust in and loyalty to the CUP either. A concrete example of CUP distrust in local Kurdish elites for Diyarbekir province can be found in Ahmed İzzet Paşa’s memoirs. The accommodating and liberal İzzet was shocked by an anecdote Mustafa Kemal Paşa had related him. When Kemal Paşa arrived in Hazro county to explore the region for warfare conditions, the mayor of Hazro told him confidentially that the local Kurdish elite was not to be trusted. The mayor suggested that the families needed to be “exterminated root and branch” (kökünü kazmak) as soon as possible.487

There are manifold reasons why the CUP engaged in large-scale deportations of Kurds. First, there were direct political reasons, namely to thwart off possible alliances between Kurdish tribes and the Russian army. Second, there were economic considerations: most Kurdish tribes were (semi-)nomadic and in order to tax them more effectively, they needed to be forcefully settled. Nationalist assimilation was a third concern the Ottoman Ministry of Interior fostered. In their efforts to ‘nationalize’, i.e. turkify the empire, the Kurds were targeted for cultural and linguistic assimilation, and political absorption into the Turkish nation. The combination between a long-term ideological program and short-term war exigencies drove the CUP to deport hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Kurds. The İAMM (renamed AMMU in 1916) supervised the deportation of these people. Those Kurds that had fled west from the Russian occupation were incorporated in the deportation program too.

The relationship between the Kurdish population of the Ottoman eastern provinces and Tsarist Russia had a long history. In the 16th century, the Ottoman government had waged war against Persia and to command a reliable border guard system, it had established large Kurdish emirates. In the Botan and Bitlis regions these functioned as a buffer zone against possible Persian incursions. From 1839 on, westernization and modernization saw the forced dismantlement of these de facto independent emirates.488 By the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman elite realized that their strong existence could have proven useful against Russia. After all, for several decades before the First World War, the Russian Empire had been encroaching on the eastern, predominantly Kurdo-Armenian region of the Ottoman Empire. Although Russian officials often initiated contact with Kurdish tribesmen, “it should be mentioned that the Kurds were not passive pawns, but that many Kurdish leaders eagerly sought Russian intervention as a

487 İzzet Paşa, Feryadım [n.484], pp.273-74.
way to preserve their tribal privileges against a centralizing Ottoman state.  

Ottoman intelligence quickly saw that the Russian strategy toward the Kurds resembled the Russian attitude toward the Cossacks. Russian generals recognized the martial aptitude of the Kurds, and therefore approached them within a military context.

One of the Kurdish notables who sought collaboration with the Russian government was Yusuf Kâmil Bedirxan (1872-1934). Kâmil was a Kurdish nationalist who had participated in the organization of the 1914 Bitlis revolt. In May 1914 he was arrested by the Ottoman government for subversive activities. Just when the war began, he fled to Tbilisi with the assistance of Russian official Yakuchev and became an agent for Tsarist Russia. When its army occupied the Bitlis region in 1916 Kâmil functioned as an intermediary between the Kurdish population and the Russian authorities. According to other accounts the Russian government assigned him ‘assistant governor’ (помощник; namestnik) of Bitlis and Erzurum. After the war he settled in Tbilisi where he gave lessons and wrote books on the Kurdish language.

Kâmil's nephew Abdurrezzak Bedirxan (d. 1918) was equally in earnest about a Kurdish state under Russian auspices. Abdurrezzak evaded the draft and deserted to the Russians, assisting the Tsarist army in its Persian campaign. He was executed by the Ottoman army when he was captured in 1918. Hasan Fevzi was an other Bedirxan notable who had agitated against Ottoman rule and had openly flirted with both Russia and England. In 1912 he had founded a secret political party called İrşad ("True Path") and disseminated propaganda among the powerful Kurdish tribes of the Garzan region. Again, the CUP suspected him of recalcitrance and on 17 May 1916 Talât wired an order to Diyarbekir, requesting information on his political activities and prohibiting him to reside in that province. Talât apparently was not content with the information he received, for he answered that “if his deportation is necessary, he should be deported to an isolated county instead of Istanbul”. A week later he ordered his deportation to Konya, adding that he should be kept “in tight custody and under strict observation” (sıkı bir nezâret ve tarassud altında). Local officials in Konya were informed of his arrival and were admonished to hold him in maximum security conditions. These members of the Bedirxan tribe had openly disseminated their ideas in Istanbul or in the provinces before the war. The CUP

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494 In 1960, Abdurrezzak’s unpublished memoirs were unearthed from the Russian imperial archives in St. Petersburg, translated from Russian into Kurdish by Prof. Dr. Cellêl Cellî, and published in Istanbul. Ebdurrezzak Bedirxan, *Autobiografiya* (Istanbul: Pêrî, 2000).


496 *BOA*, DH.SFR 64/48, Talât to Diyarbekir, 17 May 1916.

497 *BOA*, DH.SFR 64/156, Talât to Diyarbekir, 30 May 1916.

498 *BOA*, DH.SFR 64/225, Talât to Diyarbekir, 6 June 1915.
was aware of their activities, and when concrete intelligence reports on them detailing their actions trickled into Istanbul, the entire tribe was declared undesirable. In June 1915 Talât ordered “that the Bedirxan family cannot be trusted, therefore the conscripts they recruit should not be benefited from”. A year later, Hacı Mirza, Kurdish chieftain of the Haydaran tribe and friendly to Abdurrezzak Bedirxan was targeted when his correspondence with Abdurrezzak was intercepted and Mirza and his tribal entourage were deported from Silvan to western Anatolia due to their “doubtful loyalty” (sadakati meşkûk). Under strict security conditions he was separated from his tribesmen and settled in the west.

An other situation the CUP feared was a possible Armenian-Kurdish alliance. In March 1915 Talât requested information on the chances of armed Armenians and Kurds joining forces against the Ottoman government. In the case this was indeed a fact, he ordered pre-emptive action against possible cooperation between Armenians and Kurds. Armenian and Kurdish nationalists were cognizant of the fact that their nationalist claims and actions were contingent on the success of cordial relations between Kurds and Armenians. These chances were slim, even though some contemporary Armenian nationalists such as Garo Sassouni repeatedly attempted to forge a Kurdo-Armenian coalition. In his monography on the history of Kurdish-Armenian relations, Sassouni lamented that “unfortunately, in this period Kurds and Armenians were unable to agree on rapprochement”. According to the contemporary Kurdish nationalist Dr. Nuri Dersimi, the unattainableness of a Kurdish and Armenian alliance was most of all a function of the Ottoman-Russian war. Dersimi wrote that Istanbul sought to use Kurdish tribes in the war and in the genocide, whereas Moscow applied a similar strategy, forming Armenian bands to keep the Kurds of Eastern Anatolia in restraint. The few Kurds that did collaborate with Armenians were mercilessly persecuted by the CUP. On 14 March 1915 Talât ordered Kör Hüseyin Paşa, chieftain of the Haydaran tribe and captain of a large Hamidiye regiment, surveilled because of his possible collaboration with Armenians in Van province. Similar orders were issued to Mamuret-ul Aziz province, where the CUP was aware of the modus vivendi between several Dersim tribes and Armenian citizens of Kharpot. These Dersim tribes had sheltered and escorted Armenians north to Russian-occupied Erzincan.

Altogether, war exigencies, economic considerations, and assimilation policies led Ottoman Kurds to be deported en masse. On 2 May 1916 Talât Paşa issued the following order:

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499 BOA, DH.SFR 65/21, Talât to Konya, 17 June 1915.
500 BOA, DH.SFR 53/344, Talât to Diyarbekir, 13 June 1915.
501 BOA, DH.SFR 69/249, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 13 November 1916.
502 BOA, DH.SFR 50/210, Talât to the provinces of Van, Bitlis, and Erzurum, 9 March 1915.
505 BOA, DH.SFR 51/14, Talât to Cevdet (governor of Van), 14 March 1915.
506 BOA, DH.SFR 53/222, Command Headquarters to Mamuret-ul Aziz province, 2 July 1915.
It is absolutely not allowable to send the Kurdish refugees to southern regions such as Urfa or Zor. Because they would either Arabize or preserve their nationality there and remain a useless and harmful element, the intended objective would not be achieved and therefore the deportation and settlement of these refugees needs to be carried out as follows.

- Turkish refugees and the turkified city dwellers need to be deported to the Urfa, Maraş, and Anteb regions and settled there.
- To preclude that the Kurdish refugees continue their tribal life and their nationality wherever they have been deported, the chieftains need to be separated from the common people by all means, and all influential personalities and leaders need to be sent separately to the provinces of Konya and Kastamonu, and to the districts of Niğde and Kayseri.
- The sick, the elderly, lonely and poor women and children who are unable to travel will be settled and supported in Maden town and Ergani and Behremaz counties, to be dispersed in Turkish villages and among Turks. [...] Correspondence will be conducted with the final destinies of the deportations, whereas the method of dispersion, how many deportees have been sent where and when, and settlement measures will all be reported to the Ministry.507

The deportation of Kurds had now begun, first of all targeting the Kurds deemed ‘disloyal’ by the CUP. When a group of mounted Kurds from Ahlat attempted to defect to the Russians, their deportation to Diyarbekir was ordered.508 Ahmed Izzet Paşa tried to prevent these deportations, suggesting to Talât that “tribal cavalry units” (apayır sivâri fîrkaları) should be established instead.509 His efforts had limited success as the İAMM improvised a makeshift solution. In May, it authorized the temporary settlement of Kurdish chieftains and tribesmen in areas close to the front. This was a local solution between deployment in the war and deportation to the west.510 Since thousands of Armenian villages were empty, Kurds perceived as more soundly loyal to the government were to be settled immediately. In Diyarbekir, Kurds enrolled in the tribal units were settled in the empty Christian villages around Mardin and Midyat.511 İAMM planners further authorized 280 members of the Zırkî tribe to settle with their families in empty villages in Derik district.512

The socio-economic motivations of the deportations were related to the CUP’s agricultural policy. Having destroyed hundreds of thousands of (Armenian) peasants, the peasant population of the country needed to be replenished. In 1911, Diyarbekir deputy Aziz Feyzi had already suggested the tribes of the eastern provinces to be settled, in order to raise the renevue of the land, and to circumvent a possible German imperialist claim on that region.513 In the 1917 CUP congress an agreement was signed on (re)settling the tribes and redefining the administration form of the settlements.514 From then on, one would find specific references to agricultural policy in the deportation orders. On 14 October 1916 the AMMU ordered Kurdish tribesmen from Diyarbekir province deported to central Anatolia via Urfa, specifying that on arrival, the settlers

507 BOA, DH.ŞFR 63/172-173, Talât to Diyarbekir, 2 May 1916.
508 BOA, DH.ŞFR 57/275, İAMM to Diyarbekir, 3 November 1915.
509 Izzet, Feryadım [n.484], p.257.
510 BOA, DH.ŞFR 64/80, İAMM to the provinces of Erzurum, Sivas, Manure-ul Aziz, and Mosul, 20 May 1916.
511 BOA, DH.ŞFR 57/328, İAMM to Bitlis, 7 November 1915.
512 Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanlarla İskân Politikası (1913-1918) (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p.143.
513 Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıt Cevâdiesi 1327 (1911), first election period, third sitting, hundred and fourteenth session, p.3537.
were to be employed in the “farming industry” (zar’iyat işleri). They were to constitute between 5 and 10 percent of the local (Turkish) population. They were to constitute between 5 and 10 percent of the local (Turkish) population. 

Refugee-deportees who had fled the Russian occupation and had arrived in Diyarbekir province were supposed to work on the land too. The order read that the settlers were to be provided with pack animals and ploughs, in order for them to settle down and “begin agriculture immediately”. Due to shortages in Diyarbekir, the AMMU ordered potato seeds to be imported from Elaziz.

Yet most İAMM/AMMU orders reveal that nationalist assimilation was the propelling force behind the deportations. German officials had understood what the CUP was pursuing in the war, as a German teacher wrote in September 1916:


When initiating the deportations, Talât personally paid attention to the efficiency of the Turkification project. In January 1916 he requested specific information on the Kurds living in more than a dozen provinces and districts. Talât wrote: “How many Kurdish villages are there, and where? What is their population? Are they preserving their mother tongue and original culture? How is their relationship with Turkish villagers and villages?” In April he checked again, this time asking how and where which convoys were being deported, and whether the Kurdish deportees had begun speaking Turkish. These examples of correspondence are clear evidence on the nature of the deportations: they were a large-scale attack on Kurdish culture and language, constituencies that could define the Kurds as a nation and therefore pose a threat.

Again, Diyarbekir became a hub for deportation. The local İAMM officials were appointed by the İAMM headquarters in İstanbul but were subject to the governors. They enjoyed more rights than other officials as they had clearance to send ciphers without prior authorization.

Whereas in 1915 Armenians were concentrated in the city to be deported to the south, in 1916 Kurds were sent off to the west. For the Diyarbekir Kurds, the deportations were a one-way trip out of their native province as no Kurd was allowed to (re-)enter the province. According to historian Hilmar Kaiser, Diyarbekir became a ‘turkification zone’:

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515 BOA DH.SFR 69/8, AMMU to Urfa, 14 October 1916.
516 BOA DH.SFR 69/235, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 12 November 1916.
517 BOA DH.SFR 72/180, AMMU to Elaziz, 8 February 1917.
518 PAAA R14093, Das Geheime Zivil-Kabinet des Kaisers (Valentini) an den Reichskanzler (Bethmann Hollweg), 10 September 1916, enclosure no.3.
519 BOA DH.SFR 60/140, Talât to the provinces of Konya, Kastamonu, Ankara, Sivas, Adana, Aydan, Trabzon, and districts of Kayseri, Canik, Eskişehir, Karahisar, Niğde, 26 January 1916.
520 BOA DH.SFR 62/187, Talât to Sivas, 16 April 1916; BOA DH.SFR 62/278, Talât to Adana, 9 April 1916.
521 BOA DH.SFR 72/222, AMMU to provinces, 13 February 1917.
Besides the ‘turkification’ of human beings, whole regions or critical localities were targeted as a second major aspect of the government’s program. Therefore, whole districts were designated as a ‘turkification region.’ Consequently, Ottoman officials did not allow Kurdish deportees arriving from the eastern borders areas in the province of Diarbekir […] to remain there as Muslims from the Balkans had been earmarked as settlers for these regions.522

This strategy for Diyarbekir regulated a segregation of refugee-deportees from Bitlis into ethnically Kurdish and Turkish. The Kurdish refugees were not allowed to stay in Diyarbekir but forced to march on westward, whereas the Turkish ones were immediately settled in and around the provincial capital.523 The official order for deportation of indigenous Diyarbekir Kurds fell on 20 May 1916, 18 days after Talât’s guidelines for deportation. The AMMU ordered “Kurdish tribes to be deported collectively to predetermined settlement areas”524 First they were deported to Urfa,525 but after half a year Urfa became too full and they were rerouted back to Diyarbekir and settled around Siverek.526 For all Kurdish deportees the general rule was applied that no one was allowed to return to Diyarbekir before prior authorization from the Ministry. The settlements were to be permanent.527

The conduct of the deportation of Kurdish tribesmen and refugees stood in stark contrast with the Armenian deportation, a year before. Jakob Künzler witnessed convoys from Palu passing by in Urfa:

Die Behandlung dieser Kurden auf ihrem Deportationszuge unterschied sich von derjenigen der Armenier sehr wesentlich. Es geschah ihnen auf dem Wege kein Leid, niemand dürfte sie plagen. Aber das Furchtbarste war, dass die Deportationen mitten im Winter erfolgte. Kam so einen Kurdenzug abends in einem Türkendorfe an, so schlossen die Einwohner aus Angst vor ihnen schnell ihre Haustüren zu. So mussten die Armen die Winternacht unter Regen und Schnee draussen verbringen. Am andern Morgen hatten dann die Dorfbewohner Massengräber für die Erfrorenen zu machen.528

The deportees were met with xenophobia by many Turkish villagers, who were not familiar with Kurdish tribesmen and therefore feared them. In the cities, the deportees were settled in the demolished Armenian neighbourhoods where they had no means to support themselves. After all, most Kurds were pastoralists and were not versed in agriculture and were often hostile to city life. The Kurdish author Yaşar Kemal was a toddler when his family fled from Van to Diyarbekir,
and was further deported from Diyarbekir to Adana. In his memoirs he related the experiences of
the child deportees: “Children were swarming around, hungry, miserable, and naked. […] They
were roaming around like flocks”.529 The Kurdish poet Cigerxwîn (1903-1984) was deported from
Mardin to the south of Urfa, where he became an orphan when he lost his parents in the
famine.530 A handful of missionaries and relief organizations passionately tried to help the
deportees, appealing at consulates and local Muslim clerics, and providing food and shelter. Even
though they left no stone unturned, due to the enormity of the deportation program their efforts
were a bona fide drop in the ocean.531

At that time, inflation was rampant and the black market flourished. Fraudulent CUP
officials were massively embezzling funds designated for the population. Among them was Kara
Kemal, who was fiddling under the cloak of ‘economic Turkification’. The misappropriation
became somewhat of a sport among a privileged few, creating a stratum living in unrestrained
abundance. By the end of the war, the critical press even grumbled of a ‘class’ of officials who
had become very rich and constituted a “war bourgeoisie” (hârb zengini).532 Among local AMMU
officials too, corruption was expanding. Talât considered this utterly unacceptable because it
countered the deportations and undermined the assimilation program. In November 1916
funds were appropriated for the local AMMU branches: 30,000 pounds were sent to Diyarbekir,
7000 to Siverek, and 7000 to Mardin.533 When the Ministry found out that the allotments were
illegally exhausted by police chief Şeyhzâde Kadri Bey and by the vice district governor of
Mardin, an investigation was ordered.534 An other corruption scandal was uncovered in Silvan,
where the civil servants had neglected their work, causing many refugee-deportees to starve and
live under conditions of utter misery.535 The AMMU headquarters soon found out that it was
conscription officer of Silvan Salih Efendi and mayor of Silvan Cemilpaşazâde Adil Bey who
were in charge of the embezzlements. They had appropriated the daily rations unequally, leaving
the deportees “in an outrageously miserable and wretched state” (fevkâlâde sefil ve peri
bir halde).536 Mayor Adil Bey was discharged when the Ministry proved he had been secretly selling
sacks of rice, designated for the starving deportees, to the population of Silvan for usurious
prices.537

At the end of 1917 the culture of embezzlement and moral bankruptcy, combined with
economic exhaustion triggered a national famine that struck the deportees in particular. Locally,
prices for bread, meat, sugar, salt, rice, wheat, fat, tea, and coffee quintupled. Even local products

529 Yaşar Kemal, Yaşar Kemal Kendini Anlatıyor: Alain Bosquet ile Görüşmeler (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), p.22. For an other
530 Cigerxwîn, Jînenîgariya min (Spånga, Sweden: APEC, 1995), pp.55-57.
533 BOA, DH.SFR 70/149, IAMM to Diyarbekir, 30 November 1916.
534 BOA, DH.SFR 70/237, Directorate for Employment to Diyarbekir, 12 December 1916.
535 BOA, DH.SFR 69/191, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 5 November 1916.
536 BOA, DH.SFR 71/53, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 21 December 1916.
of which there had been a surplus for ages, such as Diyarbekir rice and watermelons, became very scarce. Although the AMMU ordered deportation officials to be cautious of shortages, only in exceptional situations were the deportations cancelled or postponed. For example, only when an entire convoy from Beşiri became ill was their deportation postponed. Nevertheless, because Talât insisted on deportation, the AMMU was often unable to provide even a minimal amount of food for the deportees. In Urfa, many Kurdish children died of starvation due to too late arrival of the designated amount of flour. In Sivas too, due to negligence “hundreds of children were wandering around hungry and wretched” (yüzlerce çocuğun aç ve perişan dolastıkları). When there was no food at all, deportees ate doves, street cats and dogs, hedgehogs, frogs, moles, snakes, and organs of slaughtered animals. In some extreme cases the deportees saw no other option than to eat their own relatives who had died on the road. Starvation was but one side of the problem, adequate shelter was an other. When an Arab and Kurdish convoy was deported from Diyarbekir westward, nearly the entire convoy froze to death in the desert night. The few remaining survivors were distributed among the local villages. Finally, a socially sensitive problem was the moral collapse of Kurdish communities, deported away. An Ottoman army officer noted that out of dire helplessness, Kurdish women saw no other option than “selling their bodies”. The Kurdish politician Memduh Selim Bey lamented after the war that many lonesome Kurdish women resorted to “alcoholism” (müzkirat) and had no choice but to engage in “prostitution” (fuhşiyat). As in the Armenian case, in Kurdish culture prostitution was unheard of until the ravages of the First World War.

The deportees often feared that they would be integrally killed like the Armenians. According to popular beliefs, the CUP elite had ostensibly agreed upon first destroying the “zo” (the Armenians), whereupon they proceeded to annihilate the “lo” (the Kurds). These fears were most acute in the maverick Dersim district, the south of which had actively opposed the

537 BO4, DH.SFR 87/345, Ministry of War (General Directorate for Supplies) to Diyarbekir, 30 May 1918.
538 Ahmad, Kürtistan [n.168], pp.131-32.
539 BO4, DH.SFR 74/258, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 26 March 1917.
540 BO4, DH.SFR 68/91, Talât to Diyarbekir, 23 September 1916.
541 BO4, DH.SFR 78/237, AMMU to Urfa, 30 July 1917.
542 BO4, DH.SFR 78/242, AMMU to Sivas, 30 July 1917.
544 Mehmed E. Zeki, Kürtistan Tarıhsı (İstanbul: Komal, 1977), p.168. This book was originally published in Arabic in Cairo in 1936 by an ethnically Kurdish officer who had served in the Ottoman army during World War I.
545 BO4, DH.SFR 82/180, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 25 December 1917.
548 The war had caused a moral calamity for surviving Armenian women too, many of whom were unable to sustain themselves and therefore ended up in the prostitution business. This even affected children as “there was rampant child prostitution and rape along Turkey’s railroads during this period. Children eight years old and even younger were prostituted in these regions.” Hilmar Kaiser, “Children’s fate during the Armenian genocide,” lecture at Eaton Hall (Glendale, CA), 7 October 2004.
549 The words “zo” and “lo” are derogatory expressions in Turkish culture, referring to colloquial utterances in the Armenian and Kurdish languages, respectively.
550 As the British agent Noel wrote: “In Kurdish there is no word for a prostitute. In the Eastern districts she is euphemistically referred to as a Persian, in the North as a Russian, in the south as an Arab, and in the West as a Turk.” Edward Noel, “The Character of the Kurds as Illustrated by their Proverbs and Popular Sayings,” in: Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, vol.1 (1917-20), p.85.
551 The words “zo” and “lo” are derogatory expressions in Turkish culture, referring to colloquial utterances in the Armenian and Kurdish languages, respectively. First Cerewi, Ki Mala Mir Celadet Ali Bedir-xan (Stockholm: Nûdem, 1996), pp.71-75.
genocide. In July 1915 rumors spread around Dersim that the Ottoman government would destroy the Kurds right after their anti-Armenian campaign. Talât immediately ordered counter-propaganda to be disseminated.\(^{551}\) When the Dersimites were indeed deported a year later, they sang lamentations, praying to God for survival and accusing the Germans of deporting them.\(^{552}\) The rumors spread over to other provinces as well, impelling some deportees to attempt escape from the deportation convoys. Kurdish tribesmen from Mardin and Karacadag apparently overheard they were to be deported to the interior and tried to seek asylum among the Viransehir, Beşiri, and Savur tribes. They were tracked down, captured, and deported.\(^{553}\) But even when they were deported to the western provinces, some deportees still managed to escape. In July 1917 tribesmen of the Hasan tribe were deported from Siverek to Istanbul. Five out of nine deportees escaped from the convoys and were lost without a track.\(^{554}\)

On arrival the Kurds were seldom provided with sufficient material to make a living. As the German officer Ludwig Schraudenbach wrote, not without sarcasm:

> Die Türken verpflanzten damals Tausende von kurdischen Familien aus ihren Bergen nach Adana. Sie sollten dort ‘Ackerbau treiben’. Der k.u.k. Oberleutnant Schalzgruber wusste leider zu berichten, dass oben im armenischen Taurus die Strassen gesäumt seien mit solchen verhungerten oder verhungernden Kolonisatoren. Auch am Bahnhof Mamouré käuerte eine Schar von ihnen, die robusten Körper in Lumpen gehüllt, Säcke voll Pelze und Teppiche schleppend, Kochtopfe auf die verlausten Köpfe gestülpt. Wird bei Adana wirklich etwas zu ihrem Empfang organisiert sein? Wird ihnen Land, Vieh und Werkzeug gegeben werden? Oder wird man sie elend verkommen lassen?\(^{555}\)

The third question could be answered affirmatively. The Ottoman directorate for deportation was predominantly interested in whether there were signs of any progress with respect to the assimilation project. When a convoy of Kurds arrived in Konya, the directorate ordered them settled and a report prepared including information on their native region, language, profession, and numbers.\(^{556}\) Although no systematic longitudinal research has been conducted on the fate of the Kurdish deportees, it seems that for most Kurds the deportation project has not produced much result. Well into the 1990s, Kurdish and Zaza communities, e.g. living in the Konya basin, preserved their tribal identities and languages.\(^{557}\)

The deportations caused many Kurdish children to be orphaned. Many of them had already been half-orphans as their fathers had died in warfare. Their mothers and aunts tried to protect them from disease, hunger, and violence, thereby often sacrificing themselves. The government

\(^{551}\) BOA, DH.ŞFR 54-A/128, Talât to the provinces of Mamuret-ul Aziz, Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, 25 July 1915.

\(^{552}\) Apparently, the Dersimites were aware of the fact that the 1916 Dersim deportations were suggested and initiated by Ottoman Chief of Staff General Bronsart von Schellendorf. The deportees lamented: “German, oh German / Why have you issued a decree on us / May your honour be defiled German / You have brought ruin on our men / May your house burn down German / You have uprooted our men.” (Alamani Alamani / Te çina mera qenûnek danani / Ar di mala te kevi Alamani / Te pašiya mèran mera ani / Mala te bişewîte Alamani / Te kokê mèran mera ani). Dersimi, Haturtam [n.504], pp.80-81.

\(^{553}\) BOA, DH.ŞFR 69/156, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 1 November 1916.

\(^{554}\) BOA, DH.ŞFR 78/142, Talât to Diyarbekir, 16 July 1917.

\(^{555}\) Ludwig Schraudenbach, Muharebe: Der erlebte Roman eines deutschen Führers im Osmanischen Heere 1916/17 (Berlin: Drei Masken Verlag, 1924), p.459.

\(^{556}\) BOA, DH.ŞFR 77/45, İAMM to Adana, 6 June 1917.
ordered the establishment of an orphanage in Urfa to lodge orphans of the Haydaran tribe. The construction of an orphanage in Diyarbekir was not possible due to ‘turkification regulations’: no Kurdish deportees, not even orphans, were to remain in that province. Only the strongest and luckiest orphans survived the deportations. In Palu, orphans were concentrated and needed to be deported. The AMMU knew their deportation would result in their decimation, but it decided to deport them anyway, adding that they were allowed to be nourished from the Elaziz army depots. The same order was issued for Diyarbekir: the Ministry of War was assigned to provide for widows, orphans, and orphanages. In Mid-April 1918, when it had already become clear that an Ottoman defeat in the war was only a matter of time, orphans from Harput, Dersim and Palu were still instructed to march barefoot to Maras and Elbistan.

Naturally, the Kurdish deportations too demand at least some quantitative data, although it would require a separate study to calculate meticulously how many were deported. According to the Ministry of Economy the total amount of all refugee-deportees numbered well over a million. Quantifying the deportations is difficult because many Kurdish tribesmen were deported together with Kurdish refugees from the border provinces Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis. In most accounts, the total number of 700,000 is mentioned, though there are no reliable statistics. According to one researcher, roughly half of these 700,000 deportees died. A concrete example can shed light on the death rate of the deportees. Celadet Ali Bedirxan, a Kurdish intellectual met a group of Kurdish deportees and asked them how many had survived the death marches. The answer he received shocked him: the leader of the group answered that out of 787 people that were deported from the village, 23 had survived. It is even more difficult to determine precisely how many Diyarbekir Kurds were deported. AMMU correspondence surmises some details on the magnitude of the deportations. In October 1916 the amount of refugees that had fled the provinces of Bitlis and Van into Diyarbekir was estimated at 200,000. On 17 October 1916 the AMMU ordered the deportation of 15,000 Kurdish refugees to Konya. In November 800 people were deported from Palu to Siverek, an intra-provincial deportation. On 15 July 1917 40,000 Kurds were ordered deported from Diyarbekir to Konya and Antalya. Two weeks later, 40,000 refugees from Mardin were sent off to the east, even though they were infected with contagious diseases and there was a shortage of

558 BOA, DH.SFR 69/195, AMMU to Urfa, 5 November 1916.
559 BOA, DH.SFR 84/169, AMMU to Elaziz, 27 February 1918.
560 BOA, DH.SFR 85/290, Ministry of War (General Directorate for Supplies) to Diyarbekir, 31 March 1918.
561 BOA, DH.SFR 86/46, AMMU to Third Army Commander, 13 April 1918.
562 BOA, DÜT, 1428-3, Ministry of Economy memorandum (undated).
565 Serdi, Görsî ve Amılar [n.543], p.140.
567 BOA, DH.SFR 69/35, AMMU to Fourth Army Command, 17 October 1916.
568 BOA, DH.SFR 70/74, AMMU to Mamuret-ul Aziz, 22 November 1916.
In spite of the deportations further to the west, in April 1920, 35,940 refugee-deportees in Diyarbekir still had not been settled. These figures suggest that tens of thousands of Diyarbekir Kurds must have been deported to the western provinces.

### 3.2 Settlement of Muslims, 1917

Along with deporting Kurds from Diyarbekir, the CUP also ordered non-Kurdish Muslims deported to that province. This two-track policy would expedite the Turkification process. Most of these settlers were Bosnian Muslims, Bulgarian Turks, and Albanian Muslims that had fled the war and persecutions in the Balkans. Another group of settlers were refugees from Bitlis and Van, the Turkish ones being filtered out for immediate settlement in Diyarbekir. At first the settler-deportees were lodged in the Sincariye seminary, where other poor and miserable Diyarbekirites were temporarily housed as well. These settlers were to be housed in the empty Syriac and Armenian villages, mostly on the Diyarbekir plain. Some were moved north and settled in Palu, others were settled on the Mardin plain. Beginning in the summer of 1915, the settlement policy continued until the end of the war.

The settlers that were deported to Diyarbekir were Muslims who had sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars. Many of them had lived in Istanbul in shabby dwellings, impoverished and traumatized. When the war broke out, the CUP activated its plan for ethnic reorganization and the settlers were incorporated in it. The Albanians were but one group to be deported and settled. In June 1915 the IAMM ordered their “scattered settlement in order for their mother tongue and national traditions to be extinguished quickly”. The Albanians were to be settled all over the empire, including Diyarbekir province. The Bosnian refugees were to be settled in Diyarbekir as well. On 30 June 1915 the IAMM ordered 181 Bosnian families temporarily residing in Konya deported to Diyarbekir and settled in its “empty villages”. The next day, the deportation and settlement of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria and Greece was ordered from IAMM headquarters.

In the meantime, the genocidal persecution of the Diyarbekir Christians was raging in full force. While the Armenians and Syriacs were being massacred, the Muslim settlers were on their way. However, preparations were needed in Diyarbekir in order to lodge the settlers successfully. On 17 June 1915 the IAMM headquarters reiterated its request for economic and geographic data on the emptied Armenian villages of Diyarbekir. In order to send settlers to the province, the

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569 BOA, DH.SFR 78/128 and 78/129, AMMU to Adana and Diyarbekir, 15 July 1917.
570 BOA, DH.SFR 78/253, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 31 July 1917.
571 “Muhacirîn,” in: İleri, 10 Nisan 1920.
572 The Sincariye medrese presently serves as the ‘Museum of Archaeology and Ethnography’ in Diyarbekir city.
573 BOA, DH.SFR 54/216, IAMM to Konya, 28 June 1915.
574 BOA, DH.SFR 54/246, IAMM to Diyarbekir, 30 June 1915.
575 BOA, DH.SFR 54/246, IAMM to Konya, 6 June 1915.
576 BOA, DH.SFR 54/246, IAMM to Diyarbekir, 1 July 1915.
local capacity to absorb immigrants had to be determined. A week later it ordered educational commodities to be provided for the settlers:

It is necessary to appropriate the schools of the towns and villages that have been emptied of Armenians to Muslim immigrants to be settled there. However, the present value of the buildings, the amount and value of its educational materials needs to be registered and sent to the department of general recordkeeping.

This national order was a warrant for the seizure of all Ottoman-Armenian schools and their conversion into Ottoman-Turkish schools. School benches, blackboards, book cabinets, and even paper and pens were allocated to the yet-to-arrive settlers. The Commission for Abandoned Properties was assigned to carry out this operation in Diyarbekir.

The CUP intended the deportation and settlement of Albanians, Bosnians, and Turks to be a one-way trip into Diyarbekir province. Whether coming in from the west or east, non-Kurdish settlers were expected to turkify the province. Turkish refugees from Bayezid and Diyadin (Ararat region) were selected from mixed convoys and directly settled in Silvan. Their livelihood was financed from the ‘abandoned property budget’. When non-Kurdish Ottoman refugees arrived in Diyarbekir from Bitlis, they were the only ones who were allowed to be settled in the provincial hinterland. They were Turkophone Ottomans and were earmarked as ‘Turks’ by the CUP. Only in exceptional situations were the refugees to be sent forth to Urfa, Antep, and Maraş. For example, Talât personally took care that Muş deputy İlyas Sami and Genç deputy Mehmed Efendi were settled with their families in Diyarbekir city. The AMMU systematically set aside the ‘abandoned property’ for these settlers. In September 1916 it ordered “abandoned buildings in Diyarbekir assigned to Turkish refugees coming from Van and Bitlis”. The CUP probably considered it very important that the settlers remained in the province considering they reiterated this over and over. On 9 November 1916 the AMMU warned provincial authorities “to prevent by any means that the Turkish settlers in the province be moved to other regions”.

Four days later the order was repeated “with special emphasis”. Even after the Russian army had imploded and retreated in 1917 and when the Ottoman army swept all the way into Baku, Turkish refugees in Diyarbekir were not allowed to return to their native regions. The order was repeated in March 1918 and in April 1918. The German official Von Lüttichau saw that

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577 BOA, DH.SFR 54/39, IAMM to Diyarbekir, 17 June 1915.  
578 BOA, DH.SFR 54/101, IAMM to provinces, 22 June 1915.  
579 BOA, DH.SFR 54/331, IAMM to Diyarbekir, 7 July 1915.  
580 BOA, DH.SFR 61/121, IAMM to Diyarbekir, 26 February 1916.  
581 BOA, DH.SFR 61/139, Talât to Diyarbekir, 28 February 1916.  
582 BOA, DH.SFR 67/174, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 3 September 1916.  
583 BOA, DH.SFR 69/219, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 9 November 1916.  
584 BOA, DH.SFR 69/248, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 13 November 1916.  
585 BOA, DH.SFR 85/262, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 28 March 1918.  
586 BOA, DH.SFR 86/46, AMMU to Third Army Commander, 13 April 1918.
those settlers that secretly attempted to return to their native regions “unterwegs zu Hunderten umkamen, weil sie kein Brot hatten”.588

The information on the settlements of the Muslim settlers in the districts and towns of Diyarbekir province is sparse. Little fieldwork has been conducted as to whether the settlers remained in the designated towns and villages, or if they migrated somewhere else. An Armenian survivor recalled how in the late summer of 1915 Turks were settled in Palu. Local officials saw to it that the settlers were given the best houses of the deported Armenians.589 According to a native of Palu, in the Republican period Palu town had a Zaza, a Kurdish, and a Turkish neighbourhood. The latter neighbourhood was populated by “immigrants” (muhacir), most of them Pomacs from Thrace.590 Three weeks after the Qarabash massacre the İAMM ordered “the settlement of the immigrants, the confiscation of movables and pack animals, and the reporting of the population settled in emptied Armenian villages”.591 Colonel Cemilpaşazade Mustafa took control of Qarabash as Pomaes and Kurds were settled in that village.592 In Kabiye, all property of the autochthonous Christians was seized and assigned to the settlers: vinyards, watermelon fields, agricultural implements, and even the carrier pigeons. The few survivors who dared to return to their village were chased out by the Muslim settlers.593 Q’sor village, on the Mardin plain, became a command post for the German army in 1917. The Germans demolished the Syriac Catholic church and built houses with its solid stones, settling Kurdish refugees from the Karahisar region in the village.594 The village of Tell Ermen, the Christian population of which had been integrally massacred in July 1915, was repopulated with Circassians and Chechens. Since the settlers already had ploughs and oxes, all they needed for subsistence farming was seed. The Ministry of War was ordered to provide the requisite seeds, distributing 1000 cups of barley and 300 cups of wheat from storage depots to the settlers.595 When the Chechen population surpassed Tell Ermen’s capacity, the construction of a new village for the Chechens was ordered in September 1918.596

An assessment of the settlement of these communities in Diyarbekir province would produce rather ambivalent results. On the one hand they met with hardship as they had difficulties acclimatizing to the hot Mesopotamian climate, on the other hand they were protected and well-provided for by the Ottoman government, and later by the Turkish Republic. It also seems that their ‘Turkificational efficacy’ was overestimated by the CUP. Ninety years after the deportations, it seems that most of the Bosnian, Albanian, and Turkish settlers in Diyarbekir

588 PAAA, R14104, Karl Axenfeld to Embassy, 18 October 1918.
591 BOA, DH.SFR 53/242, İAMM to Diyarbekir, 5 June 1915.
592 Qarabashi, Dmo Zliho [n.199], p.85.
593 Jastrow, Die mesopotamisch-arabischen [n.255], p.346.
594 Ternon, Mardin 1915 [n.142], p.162.
595 BOA, DH.JUM F-26/9, 27 December 1916.
596 BOA, DH.SFR 91/197, AMMU to Diyarbekir, 22 September 1918.
province kurdified themselves more than that they turkified the Diyarbekir Kurds. Besides the demographic preponderance of the Kurds, ethnic intermarriages and economic ties have undoubtedly contributed to this result.

3.3 The aftermath of the war, 1918

In October 1918 the Ottoman Empire suffered a catastrophic defeat when all of its frontlines disintegrated, triggering a sudden implosion of the army. On 30 October 1918 a truce was signed between Minister of Navy Hüseyin Rauf Orbay and the British Admiral Calthorpe, sanctioning unconditional surrender.597 Paralyzed by panic and defeatism, that next night the inner circle of the CUP burnt suitcases full of documents, disbanded the CUP as a political party, and fled on a German submarine to Odessa. The seven escapees were the triumvirate (Enver, Talât, Cemal), the doctors Bahaeddin Şakir and Nâzım, and two others.598 The power vacuum was filled by the new Sultan Mehmed the Sixth (Vahdettin), Grand Vizier Damat Ferit Paşa, and the Freedom and Coalition Party, the CUP’s sworn enemy. They ruled the Ottoman Empire during the interregnum (1918-1923) as long as the Istanbul government had sufficient actual leverage in Anatolia.599

At that time Diyarbekir was severely gripped by famine and local unrest. Talât had prolonged martial law in May 1918,600 but in reality chaos ruled the province. Ottoman soldiers who had not been paid in months raided villages, pillaging goods, and engaging in skirmishes with the locals.601 A German report paraphrased the condition of most eastern cities: “Unendlich viele verhungern. In jeder Stadt des Ostens wiederholten sich die unerträglichen Bilder des Elends auf der Strasse”.602 War and genocide had destroyed the very economic fabric of Diyarbekir. As Ahmad noted in his monography on Kurdistan during World War I:

One may conclude that the four years of the First World War brought the Kurdish people, including a considerable number of Kurdish landowners and merchants, and their homeland, nothing but destruction, homelessness, disease and devastation. It would not be untrue to assert that no other people of the Near and Middle East suffered so much misery or misfortune as the Armenians, the Assyrians and the Kurds of the war.603

The damage to the economy was of a great scope. The persecution of the Christians had amounted to the destruction of the middle class, eradicating entire professions. A French report stated that “le départ massif des chrétiens dont la plupart étaient des artisans et des commerçants,
Therefore, well into the 1940s there were still Christian merchants and craftsmen in Diyarbekir: Seyfi Alpan, “Diyarbakır deported to Diyarbekir, where they were concentrated in the inner city: the Ottoman defeat, Talât ordered all remaining craftsmen (some of whom had been exempted from destruction because of their skills) quoted in: Vahé Tachjian, no.55, 27 December 1924, Beyrouth, exemplaire no.19, “Le retour des chrétiens” (SR Hassatché, d’après un commerçant venu de Diarbekir), (Paris: Karthala, 2004), p.260.

Armenians, shedding light on shocking events the public considered beyond belief. 611 Kurdish Armenians then?” Hasan’s article unequivocally condemned the genocidal persecution of the

production too is an extinct craft. 609 According to one scholar of the period, these economic ravages were even more far-reaching because they were not limited to one generation: “eighty-six years after the 1915 genocide of the Armenians, lands that were once highly productive lie barren in eastern Turkey”.

After 1 November 1918, the flight of the seven CUP leaders caused a massive outburst of bitter invective against the CUP. Public opinion was disenchanted and blamed the CUP for the country’s misery. Although most Ottomans were relieved the war had finally come to an end, the opposition launched a witch-hunt against CUP leaders and loyalists. With censorship lifted, Armenian newspapers published detailed accounts of the massacres, exposing some of the CUP’s most esoteric outrages. When CUP bureaucrats denied the killings, the noted Circassian liberal patriot Hasan Amca published an article titled “Well who killed hundreds of thousands of Armenians then?” Hasan’s article unequivocally condemned the genocidal persecution of the, shedding light on shocking events the public considered beyond belief. 611 Kurdish intellectuals too vented their anger on CUP policies. Kemal Fevzi lamented that Kurdish villages had been reduced to “open, graveless cemeteries” and blamed Talât and his consorts for the

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605 Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Turkey 1800-1914 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p.305. Three weeks before the Ottoman defeat, Talât ordered all remaining craftsmen (some of whom had been exempted from destruction because of their skills) deported to Diyarbekir, where they were concentrated in the inner city: BO4, DH ŞFR 92/47, Talât to Bitlis and Diyarbekir, 5 October 1918. Therefore, well into the 1940s there were still Christian merchants and craftsmen in Diyarbekir: Seyfi Alpan, “Diyarbakır’ın Ekonomik Hayatına Toplu bir Bakış,” in: Karacadag, vol.2, no.17 (20 June 1939), pp.11-14. The Armenian author Migirdic Margosyan is a child of one of these few surviving families in Diyarbekir’s Armenian neighbourhood Xançepêk. He sketches a very nostalgic picture of his youth in the 1940s, when he used to work in his uncle Khachador’s smithy: Migirdic Margosyan, Gâvur Mahallesi (İstanbul: Aras, 2002), pp.101-15.


607 Other than the state-produced wines in Elazığ (Buzbağ), the only indigenous wine left in the region was the Syriac brand Cîricî in Mardin province. However, the last Syriac winemaker Cîricî Yûksel was shot dead in Mardin by the Kurdish Workers Party (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanian, PKK) on 19 September 1992. Zur Lage der Christen im Tur Abdin (Linz: Freunde des Tur Abdin, 1993), p.2.


609 Interview with Fuat Ipliçi (aged 76) from Diyarbekir, conducted in Turkish by Şeyhmus Diken in Diyarbekir (2003), published as: “Fuat Ipliçî,” in: Diken, Diyarbekir [n.374], pp.263-86.


611 Çerkez Hasan, “Peki yazarlere Ermeni’yi kim öldürdü?” in: Alemdar, 5 April 1919. 96
suffering of the Kurdish deportees.612 The oppositional journalist Refi Cevat wrote: “These men
don’t even deserve the gallows. Their heads should be ripped off and paraded around on wood
blocks for days as a lesson!”613

The CUP defended itself, denying the genocide, claiming that massive Armenian losses had
never been official policy. Writing from Berlin where he had fled to, Talât claimed in his memoirs
there hadn’t been any systematic massacres and blamed the Armenians for everything that had
occurred to them. In an interview he gave to the British agent Aubrey Herbert after the war,
Talât tried to absolve himself from blame, trivializing the atrocities and juxtaposing them with
Armenian revenge acts.614 Cemal Paşa wrote an article for the Frankfurter Zeitung in an attempt to
rehabilitate his reputation. Cemal wrote about the execution of Çerkez Ahmed that he had
ordered him arrested and court-martialled, the very moment he had heard they had committed
atrocities against the Diyarbekir Armenians and had assassinated Zohrab and Vartkes.615
Cognizant of the fact that exhibiting knowledge of the killings may have an incriminating effect
upon himself, Cemal did not mention that he executed Çerkez Ahmed on direct orders of Talât.
Ziyâ Gökalp too, denied the genocidal nature of the crimes committed during wartime and
refused calling them a “massacre” (kâtâl), rather describing them as a “combat” (mukatêlê).616 It is
noteworthy that during the armistice the massacres were only denied by CUP advocates whereas
many non-nationalists had a propensity to denounce the crimes.

Conversely, in a personal discussion with CUP party boss Mithat Şükru Bleda some time
before the end of the war, Dr. Mehmed Reşid freely spoke his mind about the killings during his
governorship. When Bleda asked Reşid how he, nota bene as a doctor, had had the heart to cause
the deaths of so many people, Reşid answered:

Being a doctor could not cause me to forget my nationality! Reşid is a doctor. But he was
born as a Turk, [...] Either the Armenians were to eliminate the Turks, or the Turks were to
eliminate the Armenians. I did not hesitate a moment when I was confronted with this
dilemma. My Turkishness prevailed over my profession. I figured, instead of them wiping us
out, we’ll wipe them out. [...] On the question how I, as a doctor, could have murdered, I
can answer as follows: the Armenians had become hazardous microbes in the body of this
country. Well, isn’t it a doctor’s duty to kill microbes? 617

On Bleda’s question whether he feared ‘historical responsibility’, Reşid had answered: “Let other
nations write about me whatever history they want, I couldn’t care less”.618

In the turbulent period after the Ottoman defeat, the Istanbul press portrayed Dr. Reşid as
a monster. Süleyman Nazif emphatically wrote that Dr. Reşid had “destroyed thousands of

613 Alemdar, 12 March 1919, quoted in: Sina Akşin, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Millî Mücadele (İstanbul: Cem, 1976), p.199.
615 Frankfurter Zeitung, 9 March 1919.
616 Kocahanoğlu, İttihat-Terakî [n.372], p.41.
618 Mithat Şükru Bleda, İmparatorluğun Çöküşü (İstanbul: Remzi, 1979), p.59.
humans from all groups and religions by massacre”. Much to Reşid’s chagrin, this vivid demonization was persuasive to the Ottoman population. In Istanbul, the horrors of Diyarbekir province became known and dreadful details of Reşid’s ‘reign of terror’ became the talk of the town. On 5 November 1918 the ex-governor of Diyarbekir was arrested and after a brief pre-arrest placed in the maximum-security Bekirağa prison, along with other CUP loyalists suspected of having participated in the persecution of the Armenians. In an attempt to clear his name, the arrogant and proud Reşid agreed on giving an interview two days later, only to find out that the reporter omitted any allusions and confronted him very directly with the crimes he had committed in Diyarbekir, asking:

They say you massacred more than 50,000 women, men, children, innocent people including three mayors, and seized 300,000 pounds worth of gold cash and an equal amount of jewels from them. How exaggerated is all of this?

– Lies, it’s all lies!

Reportedly you employed a murderer named Major Rüşdü Bey as commander of 30 Circassians he had selected from his clan, to have these helpless people killed.

– I don’t know.

It is said you had the mayor of Lice town Girdi Ahmed Nesimi Bey, a distinguished reporter also famous in the world of literature and publishing, and the vice mayor of Beşiri, Suveydizade Sabit Bey of the Baghdad elite, graduate of the School of Civil Service, assassinated when they refused to carry out your order for massacre. What is your defense?

– It’s all slander. Aren’t newspapers the source of defamation and anarchy anyway?

After your predecessor ex-governor Hamid Bey left, it is said you had the helpless people of Mardin massacred without distinction of religion and sect. Were those involved in these events your gendarmes?

– I have no knowledge of these things. Excuse me, if it’ll be like this, I’ll walk away!

In prison, Reşid, vexed by kidney stones, gradually lost touch with reality and became a nervous wreck. His growing isolation reinforced his paranoia of Armenian and English conspiracies. He kept a diary and wrote his memoirs in response to the public disclosures on his governorship in Diyarbekir. Reşid escaped on his way to the bathhouse on 25 January 1919 and went into hiding at a CUP sympathizer. The ensuing odyssey of hiding bolstered his frustration with clandestine life. Underfed, bitter, and desperate, he shot himself in the mouth on the verge of arrest on 6 February 1919.

The British government, whose “greatest concern was to punish officials responsible for mistreating British prisoners of war,” insisted on a trial for the dozens of CUP cadres who had been arrested and incarcerated. On 5 February, a day before Reşid’s suicide, the ‘Extraordinary Court-Martial’ was established in the capital Istanbul. The military tribunal set about several series of trials in which the CUP was accused of “deportation and massacre” (تاجير و تفتيت), specifically of

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621 Hadisat, 7 November 1918.
“robbery of money and goods, burning of houses and corpses, mass murder, rape, persecution and torture”. The court noted that “these were not sporadic incidents but prepared by the forces of a center consisting of the abovementioned persons and whose implementation was ordered through oral and secret orders and instructions,” and that “these militias were employed to murder and destroy the convoys that were subjected to deportation”. Despite the hostile milieu, for about a year the court-martial and its inquiry commissions tried to function as best as they could. “It was able to secure, authenticate, and compile an array of documents, including formal and informal orders for massacre, implicating the Ottoman High Command, the Ministers of Interior and Justice, and the top leadership of the İttihad Party”. However, due to negligence and obstruction by pro-CUP elements in the bureaucracy the last sitting was held on 9 February 1920 and the juridical proceedings were abrogated.

The manhunt for blacklisted CUP officials was extended to the provinces too. One of the first massacrers of Diyarbekir to be arrested after Reşid was the Circassian militia leader Çerkez Harun. Harun was arrested in Diyarbekir city but managed to flee on the way to Istanbul, but he was arrested again around Sivas. Upon arrival in Diyarbekir on 14 May 1919, the Eighth Inquiry Commission ordered the arrest of the militia commanders, at that time de facto in charge of the city. When the police tracked down Yasinzâde Şevki, Halifezâde Salih, and Pirinççizâde Siddik in front of the telegraph office, the latter opened fire on the police in broad daylight and fled to the countryside. Şevki fled to Qitirbil village. Müftüzâde Şeref was besieged in his house but refused to surrender, opening fire on the police that set off a skirmish for four hours. When his father mufti Hacı İbrahim heard of the encounter he rushed to the scene and brokered a deal: the parties agreed that Şeref would lodge a statement at the police station in exchange for his release. The mufti of Cizre Ahmed Hilmi, one of the main organizers of the Cizre massacre, was ordered arrested. However, the influential mufti enjoyed the protection of several powerful Kurdish chieftains of the Cizre region and the government was unable to undertake serious action to arrest him. In the end, the pursuit for the war criminals did not produce much result for the government.

When the British government realized too many CUP members were escaping from the Istanbul prison, it decided to deport 150 of the most important ones to Malta in May 1919. The citadel on the island was furnished as a prison for three groups of Ottoman prisoners: group

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624 Takvim-i Vekâyi, no.3604, enclosure dated 22 July 1919, transliterated in: Kocahanoğlu, İttihat-Terakki [n.372], pp.515, 519.
627 Bilgi, Dr. Mehmed Reşid [n.209], p.130, footnote 73.
629 Years later, Şevki died in an accident in that same village he had massacred in 1915. When he tried to descend from his mule his foot got stuck in the stirrup and the animal dragged him away, trampling him to death against the rocks. Kutlay, “Acı Gerçekler” [n.548].
630 Beysanoğlu, Diyarbakır Tarihi [n.141], pp.831-32.
631 BOA, DH.KMS 50-2/4, Interior Ministry to Diyarbekir, 4 May 1919.
632 PRO, FO 371/4191, 9 April 1919, reproduced in: Mesut (ed.), İngiliz Belgelerinde Kürdistan [n.450], p.29.
A for officials accused of having perpetrated massacres, group B for officials accused of having condoned massacres, and group C for officials who were not directly involved in the massacres. Among the Malta deportees were some of the key responsibles for the atrocities committed in Diyarbekir. Aziz Feyzi, after Reşid the second most important man in wartime Diyarbekir was arrested on 15 January 1919 and deported with Diyarbekir deputy Zülfü Tiğrel, first to Egypt and then to Malta. On arrival at the island Feyzi was placed in group A, where he spent two years. According to a cellmate, Feyzi was the most optimistic captive on Malta, predicting: “We will drive our enemies into the sea, clang clang, you’ll see”. Ex-mayor of Mardin and Governor of Diyarbekir Ibrahim Bedreddin was deported to Malta in February 1919 where he was surprisingly placed in group C. On 6 September 1921, Aziz Feyzi, Ibrahim Bedri and 14 other inmates escaped from Malta and fled to Anatolia, where they joined the Kemalist shadow-government, at that time on a meteoric rise to national power. The successful escape was a serious loss of face for the British government, for whom the prisoners became a burden. “Believing reconciliation with the Nationalists necessary, the British government in early 1921 dropped much of its policy on war crimes”. It exchanged all remaining Malta captives for British prisoners of war, and accepted Mustafa Kemal as the (new) ‘national leader’ of Turkey.

The main political problem in the aftermath of the war was the territorial integrity of the empire. It was not only the CUP that categorically rejected any Greek and Armenian claims on Anatolia. Therefore, the occupation of İzmir by Greek forces on 15 May 1919 was a catalyst for igniting a massive nationalist protest among all echelons of Ottoman society. After a series of meetings, CUP insiders launched Mustafa Kemal Paşa to the Pontus region on 16 May 1919 to organize the national resistance in Anatolia. Kemal was already a legendary general when he arrived in the port city of Samsun on 19 May. From there he contacted civil servants, army officers, and Special Organization operatives, most of whom were sympathetic to CUP nationalism, and tried to gain them for the nationalist resistance. Kemal then co-organized two conferences, one in Erzurum (23 July to 7 August) and one in Sivas (4 to 11 September), both of which articulated the nationalist message that the Ottoman Empire was an indivisible country. All form of mandate was rejected.

The local branches of the Kemalist movement were made up of existing networks of the ‘Society for National Defence’, in the east renamed to ‘Society for the Defense of National Rights in the Eastern Provinces’ (Vilâyât-ı Şarkiye Müdafaa-ı Hukuk-u Millîye

633 “Deportation of Turkish suspects: Eventual trial by allies,” in: The Times, 5 June 1919.
634 PRO, FO 371/4175/16839, document no.2279/R/1315D, De Robeck to Curzon, 6 December 1919.
637 PRO, FO 371/6531, document no.382, Geneva, 23 September 1921.
638 Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg [n.623], p.161.
With the convention of the Kemalist parliament on 23 April 1920, there were two governments now: one in Istanbul, and one in Ankara, each advocating different policies, accusing each other of treason, and ultimately even condemning each other to death. Perhaps the clearest breach between the two power centers occurred when Istanbul agreed on signing the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920. The treaty provided for an independent Armenia, for an autonomous Kurdistan, and for a Greek presence in eastern Thrace and the Aegean region. The Anatolian resistance interpreted this as high treason and pledged they would never accept the conditions stipulated under the Sèvres treaty. They declared war on the Greek and Armenian armed forces, and began a campaign to marshal as much support as possible for the movement. The ‘War of Liberation’ had begun.

3.4 The Kemalists take control, 1919-1923

Diyarbekir province faced two social and political problems in the interregnum: the revival of the ‘Armenian question’, and a nascent Kurdish activism. The situation in the provincial capital and in the towns at that time was precarious as many inhabitants were insecure about what the future would hold. The pro-CUP urban elite, having enriched itself with Christian property only 4 years ago, was bearing the burden of a guilty conscience. The militia leaders understood very well they were sought because of their involvement in the organization and implementation of the genocidal persecution of the Christians. They were also cognizant of the utterly criminal nature of their actions, for which their categoric denial and resistance against litigation provides sufficient proof. The outbreak of anti-CUP emotion in the imperial capital and the return of dozens of Armenian survivors to the province amplified existing fears of the possible establishment of an Armenian state in the eastern provinces. This fear in turn exacerbated existing hatred of Christians. For Kurdish nationalism, the conditions were very favourable during the armistice period, and nationalist organizations and newspapers mushroomed. Kurdish nationalism simmered throughout a small but active group of Diyarbekir Kurds. They demanded full independence for a Kurdish state comprised of more or less the same eastern provinces Armenian nationalists aspired to rule. An account of the Armenian and Kurdish questions in Diyarbekir needs to address the local dynamics, as well as the way in which the governments of Istanbul and Ankara perceived the two issues.

The few surviving Armenian, Syriac, and other Christians of Diyarbekir were destitute and traumatized after the 1918 Ottoman capitulation. Their land had been seized, their stores had been demolished, their churches had been sacked, and their children had been kidnapped. Mehmed VI’s government in Istanbul, hostile to the CUP, did not persecute the Armenians, and

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senators promised to bring justice to the “brutally massacred Armenians, the deported Arabs, the orphans and widows”. 644 These words were put into practice as the government allowed the Christians to return to their homes and tried its best to remedy the past wrongs. Ahmet İzzet Paşa, ex-commander of the Second Army in Diyarbekir and now Minister of Interior, ordered all local authorities “to deliver Armenian orphans to Armenian community organizations”. 645 A week later he ordered several national decrees for all land and goods to be restored to their rightful owners in the case they had returned to their homes and demanded their property. 646

Where organized Armenian life was weak, relief was offered by the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, later dubbed Near East Relief. 647 As in other cities of the country, an orphanage was set up in Diyarbekir, where Armenian and Syriac orphans were cared for. 648 The government also attempted to help the kidnapped girls and women who were held against their will in Muslim households. An Armenian survivor named Ohannes complained that his wife Populu (who had been converted into ‘Fehmiye’ in the genocide) was being held in the house of Butcher Halil in Nusaybin against her will. Ohannes accused Halil of having massacred his family and kidnapped his wife, thereby demanding his wife to return to him. 649 An Armenian girl named Lucia Ayanakian had been living in the house of the Mardin notable Hacigozuzade, who had either saved her from death or converted her to an additional wife. The Istanbul government found out her mother Zaruhi Tomasian was alive in Diyarbekir and ordered Lucia delivered to her mother. 650

Anyone in Diyarbekir who had committed crimes against the Christians was embarrassed by the Sultan’s policy. Those who were utterly hostile to the non-Muslims in the province, notably CUP remnants, now declared loyalty to the Kemalist movement because of their mutual interests. The Kemalists, too, needed to consolidate their position in Diyarbekir and the existing CUP infrastructure proved ideologically congruent and pragmatically useful. Colonel Mustafa Bey of the noted Kurdish Cemilpaşazâde dynasty (an important actor in the Special Organization militia his supervisor the late Dr. Reşid had organized in 1915) was a capable manager of the intrigues and differences of opinion in the Diyarbekir elite. 651 On 22 May 1919 he convened the first meeting of the notables in the large salon of the town hall. The men agreed on founding a local nationalist resistance faction named ‘Society for Defense of the Nation’ (Mudafaa-i Vatan Cemiyeti). Among its members were deputy Zülfü’s brother İhsan Hamid (Tığrel), mufti Hacı

644 For excerpts of Senator Ahmet Rıza’s speech in the Ottoman senate see: Tunaya, Türkiye’dede Siyasal Partiler [n.64], p.199.
645 BOA, DH.SFR 95/163, Ahmet İzzet to provinces, 18 January 1919.
646 BOA, DH.SFR 95/256, Ahmet İzzet to provinces, 26 January 1919; BOA, DH.SFR 96/195, Ahmet İzzet to provinces, 15 February 1919; BOA, DH.SFR 96/248, Ahmet İzzet to provinces, 20 February 1919.
649 BOA, DH.EUMAYS 27/10, Governor of Diyarbekir Faik Ali to Interior Ministry, 26 November 1919.
650 BOA, DH.SFR 92/209, Directorate for General Security to Diyarbekir, 15 June 1919.
İbrahim (Uluğ), ex-mayor of Maden Dr. Osman Cevdet (Akkaynak), Hacı Niyazi (Çıktıntaş), Mustafa Âkif (Tütenk), Pirinççizâdeصادı (Tarancı), and Cemilpaşazâde Kasım Bey.652 Out of protest against the occupation of İzmir and a possible Armenian state in the eastern provinces, the group sent a telegram to the İstanbul government, containing the following denunciation to Grand Vizier Damat Ferit Paşa: “The eastern provinces are no inherited property from your Albanian father for you to render to the Armenians”.653 The Diyarbekir Society had now taken a stance and had openly flirted with the Kemalists.

It did not take long for an answer to dawn on the Kemalist shadow government. On 1 June 1919 Mustafa Kemal asked the governor of Diyarbekir, Faik Ali Bey, whether a local branch of the Society for the Defense of National Rights in the Eastern Provinces had been founded. Vice Governor Mustafa Nadir replied that no other party than the Freedom and Coalition Party existed in Diyarbekir.654 The Diyarbekir elite now knew enough: they unilaterally had their own organization merge with the Kemalist mainstream and renamed it Society for the Defense of National Rights in the Eastern Provinces, appointing militia major Yasinçâde Şevki leader of the Society. The Diyarbekir elite was now allowed to send deputies to the Kemalist power center, which willingly accepted the allegiance. The Society elected mufti Hacı İbrahim (Uluğ), Nâzım (Őnen), Bekir Sidki (Ocak), and Circiszâde Abdülgani (Göksu).655 This political dichotomy between İstanbul and Ankara caused confusion among local officials. Vice Governor Mustafa Nadir, confronted with two governments giving contradictory orders, on 21 June forwarded Mustafa Kemal’s orders to the İstanbul government and requested instructions on what to do. Istanbul answered: “Mustafa Kemal Paşa has been discharged from office and his movement is illegal. His orders need to be rejected. Immediately report the purpose of the Erzurum congress”.656 However, it was too late for words of reproach since the symbiosis between the Kemalist resistance and the residual CUP elite of Diyarbekir was realized.

Ankara needed the Diyarbekir elite to implement its policy on the Armenians, which was marked by the equation of Armenian claims on Anatolia with ‘western imperialism’. As Mustafa Kemal explained in response to a question on the Armenians: “We cannot prohibit individuals to enter the country. Apart from the Armenians, the Chaldeans and Assyrians want this land too. If we have to provide all of them a homeland there won’t be any left for us. That’s how much land they are demanding”.657 In response to İstanbul’s policy, the Ankara government launched a new

654 Mustafa Kemal to Diyarbekir, 1 June 1919, and Mustafa Nadir to Mustafa Kemal, 8 June 1919, both reproduced in: Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), Nutuk (İstanbul: Millî Eğitim Basımevi, 1973), vol.3 (Vesikalar), appended documents no.3 and 8.
655 Goloğlu, Millî Mücadele [n.651], pp.235-36.
turkification campaign and gradually expelled genocide survivors and returnees southward.\textsuperscript{658} Since efforts to prosecute the Diyarbekir elite had failed, men like Müftüzâde Şeref and (after his escape) Aziz Feyzi regained local power and were employed for this purpose. The campaign began producing results in 1923 and culminated in the expulsion of thousands of Syriacs and Armenians in the summer of the following year.\textsuperscript{659} After this final blow, the number of Armenian families still living in the city could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Anything Armenian had largely been wiped off the political and social map of Diyarbekir province.

The second problem the Kemalists faced was the much more serious threat of Kurdish nationalism. In essence, Kurdish politics in the interregnum was marked by competition between the Kemalists and the British for the loyalties of local Kurdish elites. British intelligence officers had noticed that this had led to the creation of two Kurdish nationalisms in Diyarbekir province: one ‘genuine’ nationalist movement advocating an autonomous Kurdish state under British protection, and another, anti-Christian group allied to the CUP and more and more to Mustafa Kemal.\textsuperscript{660} Whereas the first group was made up of Kurdish tribesmen, some clergy, and European-educated Kurdish intellectuals, the second group comprised “Turko-Kurds [who are] convinced that if they shout loud enough, President Wilson will hear and allow them to mismanage Diarbekir by themselves”.\textsuperscript{661} A low-intensity struggle between these two factions had been raging during the war, but with the capitulations the conflict came to the surface. The parties understood their services were needed and did their utmost to secure their interests by bargaining with the Istanbul government, the British, and the Kemalists. Besides this dichotomy, the Kurdish question was strategically connected to the Armenian question and therefore it was in the interest of both the CUP and the Kemalists to use the Kurds as a buffer against a possible Armenia, and vice versa, for Armenian nationalists to use the Kurds as a buffer against Ottoman territorial claims on their national project.\textsuperscript{662}

The Kurdish nationalist movement in the armistice period was headed by the ‘Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan’ (\textit{Kürdistan Teâli Cemiyeti}, KTC), a nationalist committee founded in Istanbul on 17 December 1918.\textsuperscript{663} One of its most active members was Ekrem Cemil (1891-1974) of the Kurdish Cemilpaşazade dynasty, who co-founded the Diyarbekir branch of the KTC. The Cemilpaşazade were torn between pro-Kurdish and pro-Turkish politics, as his own

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{659} Tachjian, \textit{La France en Cilicie} [n.604], pp.254-58.
  \item \textsuperscript{660} PRO, FO 371/4192, document no. 106843, 24 July 1919, reproduced in: Mesut (ed.), \textit{İngiliz Belgelerinde Kürdistan} [n.450], p.66.
  \item \textsuperscript{661} Noel, \textit{Diary of Major E. Noel} [n.282], part 2, p.6.
  \item \textsuperscript{662} According to one source, the Istanbul government had not only allowed but actively stimulated the establishment of a Kurdish nationalist club to counter Armenian-nationalist claims on Eastern Anatolia. Ergin Aytbars, \textit{İstiklal Mahkemeleri: Yakın Tarihimizin Gerçekleri} (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1997), pp.308-9. The Kemalist government delegated the task of quelling Kurdish nationalism to General Kâzım Karabekir. After brief inspections Karabekir noted that “the [Kurdish] question can be handled easily by threatening that Kurdistan could become Armenia”. Kâzım Karabekir, \textit{Kürd Meselesi} (İstanbul: Emre, 2000), p.172. Kurdish nationalists were not reluctant to oppose Armenian claims either. Nuri Dersimi even went as far as to depict KTC chairman Abdulkadir as a Turkish agent who allegedly exploited Kurdish nationalism as an anti-Armenian instrument for his own ends; Dersimi, \textit{Hatratre} [n.504], p.104. Whether this was exaggerated or not, the fact remained that in the interregnum it was in the common interest of both the Istanbul government, the Ankara government, and Kurdish nationalists to preclude the establishment of an independent Armenia in the eastern provinces.
\end{itemize}
uncle Colonel Mustafa Bey was at that time active in the pro-Kemalist resistance in Diyarbekir city. Ekrem began disseminating propaganda among the Kurdish tribal leaders in the province, founded a local branch of the KTC and began visiting chieftains to convince them of the need to rebel against the state in favour of an independent Kurdistan.664 The British government supported an autonomous Kurdistan under British mandate and sent Major Edward Noel to collect intelligence on the feasibility of a Kurdish state. Noel met Ekrem in June 1920 in Diyarbekir and together they toured the region, Ekrem showing Noel around in the hope the latter would foster sympathy for the Kurdish national cause.665 The police department in Kharpur was disturbed by Ekrem’s activities in Diyarbekir and wired a telegram to the Diyarbekir police, urging them to incarcerate Ekrem and take precautions against the KTC. Besides closing the local branch of the KTC in Diyarbekir, all documents were to be confiscated.666

On the international level, Kurdish nationalism was underrepresented in comparison to the Armenians. The Ottoman army officer Şerif Paşa (1865-1951) took on the task of representing the Kurds on the international arena of nations. He signed a pact with the Armenian nationalist Boghos Nubar (1851-1930) which was in essence an anti-Turkish agreement and an attempt to create a joint Kurdo-Armenian lobby.667 Whereas Boghos Nubar headed the Armenian national delegation, Şerif Paşa had declared himself president of a future Kurdistan on 29 July 1919.668 Şerif had published a memorandum for the national independence of Kurdistan, presenting it at the Treaty of Versailles.669 On 31 August 1919, the KTC in Istanbul wrote a letter to the British government. Their chairman pleaded for the Wilson principles to be applied to the Kurdish nation and formulated two concrete demands. First, the Kurdish deportees “who have been victims of famine, destruction, and Turkish assimilation”, needed to be delivered to their native regions. Second, the chairman urged the British government to put pressure on the Ottoman authorities to lift sanctions on Kurdish societies and political parties.670

All of this nationalist liveliness needed to develop into serious action in order for the claims to be taken seriously by adversaries and the great powers. A year before the KTC launched its nationalist campaign, Alikê Battê of the Hevêrkan tribe rebelled against the government. On 11 May 1919 he opened hostilities with a surprise attack on a group of gendarmes, but he was isolated in a barn in Medah village. On 18 August 1919 the (in)famous chieftain died of a mortal wound incurred in the battle, and his body was hung in the Midyat square to serve as a deterrent.671

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664 Ekrem Cemil Paşa, Muhtasar Hayatı (Brussels: Kurdish Institute, 1991), pp.46-47.
665 Noel, Diary of Major E. Noel [n.282], part 3, p.2.
666 BOA, DH.EUM.AY Ş11/24, Elaziz Police Department to Diyarbekir Police Department, 2 June 1919.
668 PRO, FO 371/4192, document no. 126007, 6 September 1919, reproduced in: Mesut (ed.), İngiliz Belgelerinde Kürdistan [n.450], p.87.
next day the governor of Diyarbekir reported his death to the Istanbul government.\footnote{BOA, DH.EUM.AYS 19/6, 19 August 1919, Governor of Diyarbekir to Interior Ministry.} In May 1920, Cemil Çeto, brother of the equally notorious brigand Bişarê Çeto and chieftain of the Pencînaran tribe, rebelled against the Ottoman government. However, conform the usual mechanisms in Kurdish tribal life, their rivals, the Reşkotan tribe, opposed Cemil’s forces and the rebellion was quashed in its incipient phase. Cemil surrendered with his four sons on 7 June 1920.\footnote{Kevirbirî, \textit{Filîtê Qûto} \[n.134\], p.18.} In that same month, the large Millî tribe in the west of the province rebelled when the French army attempted to regain the city of Urfa in the southwest. Their chieftain Mahmud was not really a Kurdish nationalist but had established contact with Major Noel, who considered him an eligible candidate as Kurdish national representative.\footnote{Noel, \textit{Diary of Major E. Noel} \[n.282\], part 2, p.4.} Mahmud wanted to profit from the opportunity and gain local control and power for his tribe. The Millî attacked with 3,000 mounted tribesmen and shortly captured Viranşehir, but the rebellion was subdued and Mahmud’s men were repelled into the Syrian desert.\footnote{Ali E. Toksoy, \textit{Millî Mücadelede Mardin} (İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1939), pp.45-47.} In the end, the Kurdish rebellions did not produce much results due to little perseverance, tribal interests and cleavages, and superior counterforce.

For the Kemalist movement, Kurdish nationalism was a strategic liability and needed to be quelled. Due to their organic links with the CUP, the Kemalists inherited their suspicion of Kurdish politics from their predecessors, the CUP. Psychological warfare and disinformation campaigns were one side of this policy, and cajolery and recruiting of loyal chieftains the other. After the CUP elite fled on a German submarine, the pro-CUP Ottoman parliament issued a decree for the establishment of a committee, relegated to “write brochures to prove the historical existence of Turks and immigrants in Syria, Iraq, Aleppo,\footnote{Although Mosul has gotten attention from Turkish authors, the case of Aleppo is touched upon by the eccentric Ottoman author Kadir Mısırıoğlu. Mısırıoğlu was disenchanted when the Treaty of Lausanne assigned Aleppo to the Arabs, claiming that Turkish culture was the dominant culture in Aleppo since time immemorial. Kadir Mısırıoğlu, \textit{Lozan zafer mi hezimet mi?} (İstanbul: Sebil, 1971), vol.2, pp.405-24.} and Eastern Thrace, and to collect information on the Kurdish element”.\footnote{BOA, MV 213/30, 26 November 1918.} Turkish nationalists such as Dr. Rıza Nur (1879-1942) and Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) had already proposed to squelch any sign of dissent and solve the Kurdish question through assimilation and deportation. During the interregnum, Dr. Rıza Nur was Minister of Health and Social Welfare in the Kemalist government. He wrote in his memoirs:

\begin{quote}
The Kurdish question troubles me. There’s nothing going on yet but one day they will rise for the national cause. They need to be assimilated. I commenced my research. I requested books on assimilation methods. I located books on Kurds. I sent money to Ziya Gökalp in Diyarbekir and had him research the geographic, linguistic, ethnic, social situation of the Kurds. He sent a report. It was my intention to solve the problem at its roots before it became a Macedonia.\footnote{Rıza Nur, \textit{Hayatım ve Hatıratım} (İstanbul: n.p., 1968), vol.3, p.906.}
\end{quote}
Gökalp’s report on the Diyarbekir Kurds was titled “Sociological Research on the Diyarbekir Tribes,” numbered 99 pages, and was partially published in his own journal Küçük Mecmuası. In this report Gökalp used historical events as evidence for his claim that “as a result of thousand years of common religion, history, and geography Turks and Kurds have united both materially and spiritually.”679 Gökalp further sought to prove that Kurdish was not a language in itself but a dialect of Turkish, which lead him to conclude that the population of Diyarbekir were Turkish.680 However, because it was a glaring fact that most people in Diyarbekir spoke Kurdish, according to Gökalp they needed to be forcefully assimilated: “When two nations sharing religion live side by side, one of them will assimilate the other. This is called assimilation (dénationalisation). Assimilation appears when a nation eliminates an other nation’s language and replaces it by its own language”.681 Gökalp’s theories served as a stepping stone for Kemalist policy toward the Kurds. It is also important to note that again, Diyarbekir was singled out for Turkification: in no other province there was a specific attack on the Kurdishness of the region.

In order for these theories to be successful, they needed to be translated into action. The Kemalists quickly took measures to counter Kurdish nationalism, masking their real intentions and secret agenda. Right after his emission to Samsun, Mustafa Kemal wrote in a telegram to the Diyarbekir notables:

I cannot endorse the theory of Kurds breaking away from the state and forming a Kurdistan under auspices of the English. Because this theory is undoubtedly concocted by the English for the benefit of Armenia. […] I am a staunch supporter of giving all necessary rights and concessions to ensure that our Kurdish brothers have all resources for their freedom, welfare, and advancement.682

British intelligence was aware of this and reported to London that “despite their aversion against the Turks, the establishment of an independent Armenia will drive the Kurds into the arms of the CUP”.683 Indeed, at least in Diyarbekir the local Kurds did not seem to be a threat to neither the Ottoman state nor the Kemalist entity. On 14 October 1919 the Diyarbekir notables wired a joint declaration to the Interior Ministry, pledging that the Kurdish nation had been loyal to the Ottoman sultanate and caliphate for centuries, and rejecting separatism.684 However, Kurdish nationalists like Ekrem Cemil were carefully observed in the city, and in January 1920 the local CUP elite had ordered the Diyarbekir police department to prepare a report on Kurdish and Armenian nationalist activity in the province. The police department sent the report to the

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681 In this article Gökalp refers to the French nation-building process, using the example of the incorporation and assimilation of the Gauls and the Gallic language to demonstrate that similar action needed to be taken against the Kurds and Turkish. His use of the French term dénationalisation is derived from this analogy. Ziyâ Gökalp, “İstimlâl,” in: Küçük Mecmuası, vol.29 (1 January 1923), pp.1-6.
682 Atatürk’ün Bütün Eserleri (İstanbul: Kaynak, 1999), vol.2 (1915-1919), p.388.
684 BOA, DR.AY.Ş 27/136, Diyarbekir clergy, middle class, and municipality to Interior Ministry, 14 October 1919.
Interior Ministry and listed the names of Kurds involved in separatist nationalism. Two months later the Diyarbekir elite reasserted that “the population of Diyarbekir province will live and die for the Islamic caliphate and Ottoman sultanate until eternity”. A similar telegram was issued from Midyat, where a group of pro-CUP notables vehemently protested against Şerif Paşa acting as a Kurdish representative and collaborating with Armenian nationalists. Like the Diyarbekir elite, the Midyat notables declared their unconditional loyalty to the government and the sultanate.

It seemed that Kurdish nationalism was too weak in Diyarbekir to pose a serious threat to the Ankara government. Nevertheless, the Kemalists were not satisfied and did not want to take any risks or take Kurdish loyalty for granted. Mustafa Kemal contacted several chieftains from the Silvan and Hazro regions and praised them for their patriotism, promising them profit and glory in exchange for loyalty. Men involved in the genocidal persecution of the Christians such as the Kurdish chieftain Sadık Bey were particularly interested in further collaboration with the authorities and agreed on supporting the Kemalists. The threat of Kurdish nationalism now no longer needed to be considered with diplomacy. Therefore, Mustafa Kemal ordered Ekrem Cemil arrested and incarcerated in Ankara, where he stayed until late 1922, when the Kemalists emerged victorious. The power the CUP elite and the Kemalists exerted over Diyarbekir province was now total. This situation simmered for a couple of years until Kurdish discontent with Kemalist policy boiled over and caused a rebellion in 1925.

The Ottoman interregnum was marked by the power struggle between Istanbul and Ankara and the threat of independent Armenian and Kurdish states. The CUP continued its mission to create a homogeneous state and transmuted into the Kemalist movement. This meant that the ‘War of Liberation’ was in fact the climax of a decade of intensive Turkification by successive CUP governments. As has been noted, already in 1914 there were plans to continue fighting in case of a defeat, and in 1917 Talât had literally called the war “a war of independence and liberation”. A breakthrough in this deadlock was reached when the Kemalists ‘gained the right’ to form a nation state: on the one hand they skillfully monopolized all means of violence, on the other hand they were accepted by the western-led system of nation states by virtue of their outward national presentation. Even though all the CUP wanted was to retain what was left of the Ottoman Empire, it had homogenized the country in the time span of a single decade and laid the foundations of a unitary nation state, the Turkish Republic. Neither the Armenian, nor the Syriac,

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685 BOA, DH.EUM.AYS 29/104, Diyarbekir police department to Interior Ministry, 7 January 1920.
687 BOA, DH.EUM.AYS 33/74, Midyat notables to Interior Ministry, 1 March 1920.
688 For two telegrams sent by Mustafa Kemal to Kurdish chieftains in Diyarbekir see: Beysanoğlu, “Mütareke” [n.628], pp.79-80.
689 Cemil, Muhtasar [n.663], pp.57-58.
nor the Kurdish question was considered a priority and thus, not touched upon any longer. For Diyarbekir province it meant that for the time being, the province had been successfully turkified.
Conclusion

This thesis has addressed Ottoman state policy in Diyarbekir province during the dictatorial rule of the Committee for Union and Progress. From 1913 on, the CUP carried out several campaigns of ethnic cleansing and genocidal persecution, the human cost of which ran in the hundreds of thousands. The internal campaigns ran parallel to the external war effort with the Great Powers, especially on the eastern front against Russia. It was no coincidence that most of the direct killing of non-combatant Ottoman Christians occurred in the eastern provinces, where the threat of a Russian invasion backed by ‘Armenian insiders’ was most immediate in the paranoid minds of the CUP dictators. However, the deportations and persecutions were mostly autonomous processes and only partly linked to the ebb and flow of the war. The initiation and conduct of the persecutions were generally in the hands of Interior Ministry civil bureaucrats, not military personnel of the Ministry of War. The Ottoman province Diyarbekir has served as a platform for exemplifying these policies at the local level. For a compact overview of the essentials of this thesis, a brief recapitulation of its main arguments is in order.

The two dominant paradigms in the historiography of the late Ottoman Empire can be characterized as a nationalist paradigm and a statist paradigm. According to the first paradigm, the phenomenon of nationalism led to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Centrifugal nationalism nibbled at the imperial system for several decades until the empire crumbled into nation states. Due to their relatively early acquaintance with nationalism, the main force behind this nationalist disintegration was often located among minority groups such as Ottoman Serbs, Albanians, Greeks, and Armenians. As a result of minority separatism in the Balkans and North Africa, the Empire became more and more turkified in the 19th century. In this interpretation, the CUP too, was a nationalist movement that from the 1900s reacted to the minority nationalisms by pushing for the establishment of a stronger Ottoman state. In practice this meant homogenizing the country by force: eliminating and assimilating discordant minorities. In 1923 it succeeded when a unitary Turkish nation state rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, the persecutions were a self-fulfilling prophecy, induced by the CUP. This interpretation is often backed by comparative considerations by juxtaposing CUP policy with the Tsarist wartime policy of nationalization and deportation.

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691 Kemal Karpat, An inquiry into the social foundations of nationalism in the Ottoman state: From social estates to classes, from millets to nations (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, 1973); William W. Haddad & William L. Ochsenwald (eds.), Nationalism in a non-national state: The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977); Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914-1923 (New York: Routledge, 2001).

692 This has often led to moral accusations: Salâhi R. Sonyel, Minorities and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1993).


694 In Turkish textbooks this is reflected in the Kemalist motto that “the Turks were the last people to break free” from the Ottoman shackles.

government sought to free itself from the alleged domination of foreigners and ‘internal enemies’, aimed at Russifying the empire.\footnote{696 Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The campaign against enemy aliens during World War I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).}

Albeit not totally diametrically opposed to this paradigm, the statist paradigm emphasizes the imperial and strategic context, claiming that the CUP’s political agenda was dominated by retaining what was left of the Empire and regaining formerly lost territory. Therefore, the deportations were the CUP’s guarantee to have a Muslim demographic majority just in case they had to negotiate over territory after the war. By considering the problem from this angle, the ethnic campaigns can be seen as the result of calculated plans to obviate external meddling in Ottoman minority affairs by ‘abolishing’ the minorities. The deportations and massacres were thus borne out of the contingencies and exigencies of war and state security, and the CUP merely improvised and reacted to external and internal pressures.\footnote{697 Donald Bloxham, “The Armenian Genocide of 1915-1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy,” in: Past and Present, no.181 (2003), pp.187-89.}

Most of its decisions and measures ran counter to a purely nationalist program and reveal a much more utilitarian approach, at times plain Realpolitik. According to the statist paradigm, the CUP dictators were by no means stalwart believers in ideologies of nationalism or racism.\footnote{698 Michael Reynolds, “Ottoman Strategic Objectives in World War I and the Myth of Panturanism,” paper presented at the conference Identities of Revolution, Nation, and Empire: Political Ideas, Parties, and Practices at the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1922, Salzburg (Austria), 15-17 April 2005.}

This study has attempted to challenge both of these paradigms by emphasizing that they are not mutually exclusive, nor that all of their differences are completely reconcilable. The paradigms have often developed out of multiple induction: by singling out CUP policy toward one aspect of Ottoman society or one ethnic group and theorizing from then on. When CUP leaders like Talât and Doctors Bahaeddin Şakir and Nâzım monopolized the future of the empire by applying their ideas, they not only expedited the political and social modernization of the Ottoman state, but also conditioned themselves to respond inventively to all future reactions. When İAMM/AMMU planners realized they bit off more than they could chew by ordering an other mass deportation in 1916, that of the Ottoman Kurds, they postponed the campaign in 1917 and left it to a later date to sort it out. Talât never lived to see the deportations of Kurds in the 1920s and 1930s, but the snowball had started rolling. Besides these arguments, it is also important to differentiate in the power structure of the CUP dictatorship. The totality of CUP internal policy suggests that it was driven both by short-term political steering, and by unshakable long-term convictions. The former, rational and calculated, often contradicted the latter, irrational (both in the economic and in the popular sense) and at times absurd. The Turkification of the Ottoman medical community is a good example of this apparent contradiction: at the same time the Interior Ministry began persecuting and liquidating Armenian doctors, the War Ministry was trying to cope with severe lack of medical staff for sick and wounded Ottoman soldiers at the
front. This example of a self-destructive crisis situation is not easily caught in either two paradigms. Part of the answer lays in the tension between Enver Paşa and Talât Paşa, who both had their own agendas: Enver most of all yearned to win the war, whereas Talât set out to turkify the country with all the coercive power he could muster. This leads us to the dynamics that center and periphery played in the events of the period.

Most of the deportations were micromanaged by Talât, others by his subordinate Ali Münif. One would need to take a much closer look at Talât’s specific role and the nature of the power he exercised with respect to the persecution of the Ottoman Armenians, which accumulated to full genocidal proportions by the summer of 1915. Even with the extant primary documentation on the secretive nature of the bureaucratically organized destruction of the Armenians, one cannot keep from seeking to unearth the ‘true’ intention behind the thousands of telegraphic orders he issued, some of which are deceptive enough to fool the historian. Even so, all such inconsistencies notwithstanding, the sheer magnitude of the campaign doesn’t leave a shred of doubt about the hostile intention of the policy. 699 Talât’s micro-managing qualities and cunning intelligence, coupled with calculating tact and extraordinary talent for political self-preservation need more research. 700 Every other step in the radicalization of existing measures was spurred by Talât. Dr. Reşid’s appointment was a vitalizing force underlying the existing program for mass destruction, not as a palliative.

It is inconceivable to understand the persecutions without highlighting the dynamics between national policy versus local agency. For this reason, Talât’s relationship with governor Dr. Mehmed Reşid was a question central to this thesis. It is an example of the evolution of CUP policy against proclaimed ‘internal enemies’, notably the Armenians. When the persecution gained genocidal momentum, between 20 and 30 May 1915, it is likely that Talât wired the doctor-governor one or an other euphemistic order to ‘act ruthlessly’. He certainly did not grant Reşid carte blanche to eliminate all Christians, considering the future reprimands. The rabidly anti-Christian Ottoman patriot Dr. Reşid interpreted the order as a license to kill all Armenians and Syriacs living under his jurisdiction. It is interesting to note that of all the Ottoman governors involved in the ethnic policies, none were rebuked for their cruelty and fanaticism like Reşid was – even if the persecutions ran more or less parallel in different provinces. 701

Therefore, Talât’s telegraphic reprovolutions unveil a secret in the definition of the scope of the persecutions. The reproval “do not destroy the other Christians” was basically synonymous to the speech act “do...
destroy the Armenians,’’ and reveals Talât’s tacit approval of Reşid’s anti-Armenian actions. Naturally, Talât formulated his argument without compromising himself in a written order.

The experiences of the various ethnic and religious groups in the province have largely been ignored in late Ottoman history. This study has also sought to counteract this negligence by directing attention to the experiences of other ethnic groups in the Ottoman Empire, focusing on Diyarbekir province, the pièce de résistance for CUP policies of Turkification. Diyarbekir was a hub in the maze of deportations of Armenians and Kurds, and saw some of the most brutal massacres in the summer of 1915. It becomes clear that in the massive destruction process during World War I, not all perpetrators were Turks and not all victims were Armenians. Certain Kurdish chieftains, Arabs and Circassians also joined in on the mass violence, whereas Yezidis, Syriacs, and Kurds were subjected to persecution as well. Then again, certain Kurdish subtribes and several notable families were integrally deported to central and western parts of Anatolia, where a substantial part of them perished from lack of nutrition and contagious diseases. The maelstrom of violence, counterviolence, and multiple victimization arises out of a clear context.\(^{702}\)

Contextualizing the deportations and massacres of the Ottoman Armenians with respect to other victim groups is important for understanding the bigger picture of CUP ethnic policies. At least on paper one could compare the broader CUP program of deportation and settlement, and the Generalplan Ost.\(^{703}\) In this analogy, the Armenian Genocide was ‘merely’ part of the general CUP plan of ‘internal colonization’ or ‘social engineering’, as the twisted road to genocide of the Jews in Nazi Germany was ‘merely’ part of the Generalplan Ost.\(^{704}\) Men like İAMM/AMMU director Şükrü Kaya in the Ottoman Empire and Adolf Eichmann in Nazi Germany were not only the supervisors of the deportation of Armenians and Jews, respectively, but were also responsible for the settlement of ethnic Turks and Germans, respectively. The ethnic deportations followed a clear nationalist logic as they geared into each other, pushing into a ‘total project’ toward the utopia of a country free from non-Turkish cultures and peoples.

\(^{702}\) In the Ottoman border provinces that were occupied by the Russian army, many thousands of Muslims were massacred by Cossack and Armenian nationalist militias out of animosity and revenge. Mark Levene, “The Changing Face of Mass Murder: An Ottoman Case Study,” paper presented at the conference Violences extrêmes, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (Paris), 29-30 November 2001, p.9. A sensible and dispassionate account, analysis, and contextualization of these acts of mass violence still awaits inquiry. At the time the historiography and memory of these instances of mass violence are mostly in the hands of discursive communities advocating Turkish-nationalist arguments.

The key notion in this interpretation is the presence of elements of construction, besides the obvious elements of destruction in CUP population policy. The elimination of the Armenian population left the state an infrastructure of Armenian property, which was used for the progress of Turkish settler communities. The Kurdish deportations too, were part of a plan to reconstruct the Kurds as Turks. The fate of the local elite of Diyarbekir attests to this two-track approach. There were two reasons why local beneficiaries of the genocide became local elites in the new, reborn national state.705 First, because they were supported by Mustafa Kemal on ideological and situational grounds. Second, because there was simply no other elite left. The pre-war Diyarbekir elite consisted of Christians and practically all of them had been killed. Until recently, researchers have only begun to scratch the surface of the elements of construction and destruction in the Ottoman provinces. It is known that Armenian traces on Diyarbekir culture were wiped out, even through its music.706 Armenian, Kurdish, and Syriac material and immaterial culture was appropriated by the Turkish government and re-used for its ends.707 The perpetrators and their families profited from the genocide. After 1923, entire generations in Diyarbekir were educated and provided for by the starting capital of Armenian property, acquired in 1915. The Pirinççizâde dynasty became even richer and are now one of the most influential families in Diyarbekir city.708 However, at the present time there is very little research on this transformative program of social engineering, let alone systematic comparative studies with Nazi or Soviet policies. These remarks are therefore tentative and only serve to point in a new direction and open new avenues of research.

A final comment about the consequences of the ethnic policies is in order. Once the CUP set about it in the one-way street into the direction of a nation state, it also adapted itself to the western-led global order of nation-states.709 That mass political violence and state terror had been utilized for this ends seemingly did not do Turkey much harm, according to the perpetrators. Retrospectively it even seemed that a Turkish nation state was inconceivable without the genocidal persecution and expulsion of the Christians, and the deportation, assimilation, and

705 Unlike in the collapse of many dictatorships, the Ottoman Empire seemingly never saw an empire-wide popular movement for a “day of reckoning” (bijljtesdag, ‘axe day’), to punish everybody who had collaborated with the criminal regime.


708 Aziz Feyzi became very rich in the genocide, acquiring both movable and immovable property. He had seven children, all of whom were highly educated. His son Ali Fethi Pirinççıoğlu was educated at Robert College in Istanbul and became correspondent for the semi-official newspaper Cumhuriyet in the 1940s. Interview with Aziz Feyzi’s granddaughter Yasemin Pirinççıoğlu, in: Cemal A. Katyuncu, “Sultan Süleyman’ in torunu,” in: Akşyon (24 Şubat 2001), p.325. Perhaps the most notorious massacrer of the province, Pirinççizâde Sıtkı, acquired a tremendous amount of wealth and could afford to send his son Cahit to Paris for advanced study. Sıtkı Jr. would then become one of the most read Turkish poets in the Republican era, Cahit Sıtkı Tanrancı (1910-1956). For selected poems see: Cahit Sıtkı Tanrancı, “Poetry,” in: The Literary Review, vol.5, no.1 (1961), p.86. Neither Ali Fethi Pirinççıoğlu, nor Cahit Sıtkı Tanrancı ever reflected on the criminal nature of their father’s careers, as opposed to others such as Hans Frank’s son who bitterly condemned his father. Niklas Frank, Der Vater: Eine Abrechnung (München: Berelsmann, 1987).

settlement of the Muslims. It was this very argument that was used by the perpetrators to justify their policies in the first place.

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Interview conducted with an anonymous Armenian family (Lice district) in Dutch in Amsterdam, February 2003.

Interview conducted with Temel family (Derik) in Kurdish in Bremen, 21 March 2002.

Interview with Antanik Baloian, unpublished manuscript titled “Antanik Baloian’s Story,” by Nelson Baloian.

Interview with Noyemzar Khimatin-Alexanian by Linda J.P. Mahdesian.


Interview with Margaret Garabedian DerManuelian by George Aghjayan in Providence, RI, February 1990.

Interview with Abdallah Goge (approximately aged 110) of B’sorino village (Midyat district, Mardin province), conducted by Sabri Atman in Aramaic, in Gronau (Germany) on 17 February 2004.

Interview with a Veli Dede (aged 90) of Holbiş village (Kâhta district, Adıyaman province), conducted on 22 July 1990 in Kurdish by a Hacı Ibrahim.

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Diken, Şeyhmuş (2003), *Diyarbekir diyarım, yıtırmışım yanarım*. İstanbul: İletişim.


Yalçın, Kemal (2003), *Seninle güler yüreğim*. Bochum: CIP.

Internet


<http://www.neareast.org/>

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Translation

coded telegram

Sublime Porte
Ministry of Interior
Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants
Department for Settlement
General: 219

To the chairmanships of the assortment commissions of
the provinces of Urfa, Adana, Ankara, Erzurum, Bitlis, Haleb, Hüdavendigâr, Diyarbekir, Sivas, Trabzon, Mamuret-ul Aziz, Konya,
the districts of İzmit, Eskişehir, Niğde, Kastamonu, Kayseri, Urfa, Ayn-teb, Maraş, Karesi, Canik.

In order to preclude that establishments such as factories and stores and workshops left by the Armenians are left unoccupied they should be transferred to Muslim establishments under suitable circumstances, and it has already been reported that facilities and support will be given for this cause. These should be rented to Muslim aspirants and required support should be given. 16 May 1916.

minister
Talât

Explanation

The Turkification or nationalization of the Ottoman economy was one of the main components of wartime CUP policies. All foreign-owned enterprises needed to be taken over by Muslims, willingly or unwillingly. The genocidal persecution of the Armenians facilitated the government-sponsored confiscation of entire branches of professions previously dominated by Armenians. Having destroyed the Armenians, their economic infrastructure was thrown open for exploitation by CUP loyalists. In this telegram Talât officially ordered a nation-wide decree for transferring previously Armenian-owned establishments to Muslims. The telegram was also sent to Diyarbekir, where Tirpandjian’s silk factory was confiscated by Müftüzâde Hüseyin.
Appendix 2: DH, SFR 87/40
**Translation**

*coded telegram*

Sublime Porte  
Ministry of Interior  
Directorate for General Security

To the provinces of Haleb, Diyarbekir, Musul, Mamuret-ul Aziz, Bitlis,  
to the district of Urfa.

The immediate arrangement and dispatch of a report on the condition of the number of Syriacs in the province/district and how many of them have been deported together with the Armenians.  
4 May 1918.

in name of the Minister,  
assistant clerk  
Ali Münif

**Explanation**

This telegram is one of the few instances in which the Ottoman government at the most central level was specifically interested in the Syriacs. Talât seems to have delegated the task of surveilling the Syriacs to his direct subordinate Ali Münif. From 1917 on they were even allowed to travel freely through the empire for commercial ends. It seems that the CUP leadership did not perceive the Syriacs as a threat, probably because the latter consisted mostly of politically unorganized peasants and artisans. Their religious leadership obeyed the government and avoided any conflict of interest at all costs. Since there were no Syriac-nationalist equivalents of the Dashnak and Henchak parties, the Syriac population was perceived as sufficiently emasculated by the CUP.
Appendix 3: DH,ŞFR 86/45
**Translation**

**coded telegram**

Sublime Porte  
Ministry of Interior  
Directorate for General Security  

To all provinces  

It is requested with special importance that a detailed report is prepared and in any possible way sent on the names and dates and manner of conversion and names of the family members and familial relations to the head of the family of those converted Armenians currently in the province/district and what kind work they have been doing and their condition and movement before and after conversion and how they are known in the locality. 3 April 1918.

minister  
Talât

**Explanation**

As the war is drawing nearer to an end, Talât shows special interest in the fates of the Armenian converts and orders them surveilled by local intelligence officers. The fact that he requests very precise information from all over the Empire exemplifies his micro-managing qualities. However, very little research has been conducted on (forced) conversion during and after the genocide. Important issues such as factual descriptions of the experiences of the converts, provincial and local differentiation in their experiences, their relationship with their Muslim neighbours and the government, and persecution and discrimination in their afterlives still lay unanswered.
Appendix 4: Family tree of Y.A.
**Translation**

**CİNGİL SONS** (Jangulian family)

NURI (ASTUR) – ANNA  
(carpenter)  
Ziver village (central Palu)

- **FINDIK**  
  (AGHAVNI)  
  this means ‘dove’
  
- **FERIDE**  
  (DIKRANI)  
  her husband: Kamber

- **AZIME**  
  (DIKRANI)

- **SAIT**  
  (GARABED)
  he had 2 sons, one of whom was named after his uncle Arminek

- **FINDIK**  
  (AGHAVNI)  
  this means ‘dove’

- **FERIDE**  
  (DIKRANI)  
  her husband: Kamber

- **AZIME**  
  (DIKRANI)

- **SAIT**  
  (GARABED)
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- **FINDIK**  
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- **FERIDE**  
  (DIKRANI)  
  her husband: Kamber

- **AZIME**  
  (DIKRANI)

- **SAIT**  
  (GARABED)
  he had 2 sons, one of whom was named after his uncle Arminek

**Explanation**

This document shows the family tree of the Jangulians from Palu. It was written down by Lütfiye and Mahmut’s son Y.A. in the 1980s. When Y. set out to research his family history he found out that some of his ancestors bore two names: one Muslim name, and one Armenian name. They survived the genocide by converting to Islam and seeking asylum among a Zaza family, with whom they intermarried. At that time Y. realized he was part Armenian. He is now interviewing his grandmother Feride (Aghavni) and writing a detailed family history. The family tree clearly shows converted Armenians as ancestors: Astor converted to Nuri, Aghavni to Feride, Dikrani to Azime, and Garabed to Sait. It is only one example of the hundreds of families that attempted to stay alive by converting to Islam and seeking asylum among Muslim acquaintances. Very little research has been conducted on their fates. Y. is now 32, married, and works and lives in Elaziğ. Out of privacy reasons his name was undisclosed.
Maps

Map 1: Diyarbekir province in the Ottoman Empire

Map 2: Diyarbekir province and its towns
Map 3: Diyarbekir province and some of its Kurdish tribes

Map 4: Diyarbekir province: some major massacre sites
Map 5: Diyarbekir city plan

no.39: Melek Ahmed Mosque
no.44: Syrian-Orthodox Mother Mary Church
no.46: Sincariye seminary
no.48 & 69: Caravanserai-prison, later Kervansaray Hotel
no.53: Cahit Sidkî Taranci Museum
no.54: Ziyâ Gökalp Museum