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THE HISTORY OF THE KALMYK KHANATE TO 1724

by Charles A. Riess

Submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of History, Indiana University
This dissertation is accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History.

Barbara Jelavich, Chr.
Charles Jelavich
Rufus Fears
Larry Moses
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Anyone who has ever bothered to complete a dissertation knows that at some point the entire effort becomes a terrible chore which leaves one financially, physically, and emotionally exhausted. It takes a great deal of support to see the project to its end and I want to use this bit of free space to thank a number of people without whom I would never have survived.

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INTRODUCTION

This study concerns the history of the Kalmyks, a West Mongol-speaking people who, in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, moved from Djungharia (an area in the Tarbagatai Mountains and along the Ili River), crossed southern Siberia, and settled in the steppe region of the North Caspian, along the Emba, Iaik (Ural), and Volga Rivers. Although the ethnogenesis of the Kalmyks will be considered, the greater segment of this study will be devoted to the process which resulted in the creation and florescence of the Kalmyk khanate, an era which began in the XVIth century and ended in 1724. Concomitant with the evolution of their khanate, the Mongol nomads established a linkage, the terms of which were in constant debate, with their neighbors the Russians. By 1724, the Kalmyks were established on the steppe, their khan was treated with some deference by the Russians, and Kalmyk cavalry had become an invaluable adjunct in Russian wars. Despite the apparent strength and prestige of the khanate, it was to disappear from Russia in 1771, less than fifty years later. The final portion of this study will reflect the period ending in 1724 to consider if the failure of the khanate to endure can be anticipated in the years of its establishment and greatest power.

Three major considerations constitute the foundation upon which the edifice of numerous geographical, chronological and elements in this study rest. Of these the most central is the Kalmyks themselves. They were a group of Mongol tribes who, adding mixtures of Turko-Tatars (chiefly the detritus of the Golden Horde), fled Djungharia to find new pastures and refuge from the wars then plaguing all the Western
Mongols. Unnumbered other nomadic groups had participated in such a process over the millennia. While securing these basic needs, chieftans of the Torghud tribe created a new nomadic entity and were rewarded with the title of khan. Simultaneously these leaders dealt with the sedentary powers which surrounded and sought control of the steppe. They arranged a modus vivendi which protected them, secured the essential needs of their people, and endorsed the political structure which they had developed. The Kalmyk leaders resisted efforts designed to weaken the power of the khan and bring his people under tighter control. Although the Kalmyks dealt with a number of peoples and states, they established a special relationship with the Russians.

The second primary actor was the Russian Empire of Moscow and St. Petersburg. The Russians had been in contact with the nomads of the Volga region for centuries, but its incorporation into Muscovy came only in the mid-XVIIth century. Russians were beginning to settle along the rivers, to build towns, to bring the plow and to subdue the wild steppe, the ocean of grass upon which nomadic life depended. When the Kalmyks arrived in the region, uninvited, the Russians had made political arrangements with the nomadic tribes already grazing there. Both the Russians and their nomad vassals resisted the Kalmyks. Necessity forced the Volga tribes either to join the Kalmyks or to move away. The Russians eventually accepted the Kalmyk presence and allowed them use of the land and entry into Russian markets. But there
was a price. Initially it was the supply of Kalmyk warriors—ferocious and intimidating irregular cavalry—to oppose Russian enemies in the west and south (the Crimeans, Turks, Cossacks, and Poles) and those within Russia who threatened the political order. As both the khanate and the Russian state grew in power, the basic disagreement as to the nature of their relationship remained unresolved. Were the Kalmyks allies or vassals? In order to answer that question to their complete satisfaction, the Russians worked to control the activities of the Kalmyk khan. They strove to limit his contacts with powers not under Russian control and later they exploited internal divisions in the khanate to control the dynastic succession.

The final consideration is a rather more ambiguous quantity: time. The Kalmyks were a product of the Inner Asian steppe, the cradle of countless nomadic groups. This region, which the sedentary world considered a Pandora's box from which catastrophe regularly erupted, had supported many such groups, entities which the Chinese called "states on horseback." The Kalmyk khanate, thanks to the relative lateness of the period of its creation, was unlike the nomadic states which had preceded it. By the time of the Kalmyks' migration, Inner Asia was surrounded and being progressively ingested by sedentary states seeking the conquest, control and settlement of the nomads' grasslands. The history of the Kalmyk people and state must be detailed against this background. Sedentarists no longer allowed themselves to be victims of nomads. The states of farmers, townspeople,
and bureaucrats sought revenge on the nomads.

This study seeks to account for each of these elements over the period ending in 1724. Due to the limits of space, the entire history of the Kalmyks cannot be presented here. Following a sketch of the policies of the sedentary powers most concerned, the history of Kalmyk development will be considered in three, chronologically based, units. The first of these is the era from their tribal origins in Djungharia to the death of the first "Kalmyk" leader, Kho Örluk (1644). The second is the period of the reigns of Shukur Daichin and Monchak Puntsuk (to 1670) during which the Kalmyks and Russians settled the basic terms of their relationship. The third and final phase is the reign of Aiuka, during which the Kalmyk khanate reached its maximum level of power and influence. This was the same period during which the Russians laid the groundwork for the ultimate dissolution and absorption of the khanate.

Because of the many peoples and languages involved in such a study, a word about spellings is in order. Russian will be transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, except that unnecessary ligatures and diacritical marks, such as those for iotated e and e oborotnoe, will be dropped. For Arabic, Persian, and Ottoman Turkish, the system of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition*, will be used. Chinese words will appear in the Wade-Giles transliteration and Kalmyk and Mongol words will follow Lessing and Krueger.
CHAPTER ONE
INNER ASIA AND THE SEDENTARY POWERS

Introduction

In examining the history of the Kalmyk khanate, one tends to concentrate solely on its political growth and to localize its development entirely within the microcosm of the Caspian steppe and the Russian imperial order. In fact, most of this study does precisely that. But to do so exclusively would rob the Kalmyk khanate of much of its scope and impact; would fail to account for and recognize the conditions which precipitated the Klamyk ethnogenesis and migration; and would ignore the vast theater in which this drama was played. Therefore, before accounting for the minutiae of political events, one should first pause to examine the Inner Asian background against which the Kalmyks figured and consider, briefly, the sedentary peoples with whom they dealt.

Inner Asia

Strained to its geographic maximum, Inner Asia extends from the Pacific to the Atlantic, the Arctic to the Middle East. Topographically and climatically its varied landscapes include everything from the frozen barrens of the northern tundra to the desert sands of the Kyzyl, Ak, and Kara Kum. Settlement in so vast and often hostile a territory has been shaped primarily by these conditions and, secondarily, by the tenacity of those groups willing to wrest a living from it. The ingenuity of the region's natives has produced various life styles;
but this study deals almost exclusively with nomadic pastoralists, the most familiar of Inner Asian peoples. Pastoralist societies depended on the ability to tame and raise animals, from reindeer to camels. Complex social and political systems were produced by various nomadic groups, but Inner Asia remained a world where life balanced precariously between the unpredictable and implacable whims of nature and the regular, vulnerable needs of men. When that tenuous equilibrium was disturbed by a failure in the seasons' cycle or a crisis in the humans' social and political relations, herder and animal alike faced extinction and whole populations were forced to move in order to survive.

However, geographical and social factors are inadequate to define Inner Asia. In order to delimit the region and to give it crispness, one must consider what Inner Asia is not. Its antithesis was the sedentary world which in the east, south, and west surrounded this land of steppe and desert. The precise borders separating nomad and agriculturalist depended on the relative strength of the two peoples and on the sedentarists' need for and use of the land. If one considers herding as the level of social organization precedent to agrarianism, it could then be argued that at one time, millennia ago, Inner Asia included the entire Eurasian continent. However, as groups abandoned the risks of herding for the somewhat more secure permanence of crops and immovable homes, Inner Asia began a long process of shrinking. Agriculture substituted fields for pastures and forests; it replaced
migrating herds with tame flocks and unprotesting grains. The two societies, nomadic and sedentary, were not necessarily in conflict. But the demands of growing populations and expansionistic politics forced them into antagonism as each sought control over the lands and the waters.

When at peace, sedentarists and nomads traded to the mutual benefit of both. Herders bartered and sold their surplus animals, principally horses, cattle, sheep, and camels. Nomadic hunters also brought valuable pelts and caught various fish and fowl otherwise not available in the towns. They served as auxiliary troops in the sedentarists' wars and found a lively commerce in selling their captives to slave traders. Townsmen were rich in grains, raw and milled; they manufactured tools, weapons and clothing; they created and supplied miraculous medicines; and they minted coins to be used where barter was inappropriate. Trade augmented the nomads' mobile wealth. It also served to expand the power of the sedentarist over his wild neighbor, for as trade grew, so did the dependence of the nomad on goods which could be acquired only from the farmer and the manufacturer.

During the early centuries, war between farmer and herder resulted, usually, in nothing more than raids, some of which were protracted, but almost never profoundly changing either the nomadic nor the sedentarist way of life. Due to the hostility of the steppe, townsmen and farmers, unable to be long away from their homes and
fields, quickly withdrew and the signs of their presence soon vanished. The pastoralist, equally adrift among the villages and farm lands, took his booty and withdrew into the steppe. Occasionally, however, nomads tarried among the townspeople. There they found states, often ruled by a nomadic elite but populated chiefly by farmers and villagers, and, attracted by the charms of settled living, lost most of their taste for herding.

Most pastoralists shunned the towns and fixed dwellings. The nomadic mentality, patterned by seasonal migration, was ever steeled to the certainty of moving. If traditional pasturages were threatened by the advances of sedentarists or subject to the expansion of other nomads, an Inner Asian group could, theoretically, go elsewhere. Such a move might, however, dislodge other groups and trigger a billiard-ball chain of migrations that, beginning north of China, would end after several decades in Europe. Traditional Inner Asia was open and the strong or desperate were free to wander it.

However, what once had been true for the Huns, Avars, or Mongols was, by the time of the emergence of the Kalmyks in the late XVIth century, no longer necessarily the case. The free steppe was shrinking rapidly as populous sedentary societies expanded everywhere, fencing the steppe and reordering life with the plow. Sedentarist governments which promoted and protected this process had available to them several possible courses of action. They might drive away or eradicate the nomads; they could also enlist or settle them. Such
policies, formulated in the capital, were difficult to manage where the sedentary presence was little more than a few settlers or soldiers clustered around a sprinkling of villages and forts. Although these extrusions into the steppe impressed cartographers and bureaucrats and served as the basis for territorial claims, they did little, of themselves, to produce effective control. Treaties could name specific mountains and rivers as lines of demarcation and establish spheres of influence. But to the nomads and their ever-hungry herds, treaties, claims, and borders had little meaning. Their stubborn dismissal of such diplomatic conventions presented the governments near them with serious difficulties. Distinctions between domestic and foreign policy blurred when dealing with peoples who, one day, grazed within a country, the next, fought as its ally, and the next, plundered their former friend. In the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, sedentarists and nomads were locked everywhere in the final stages of the struggle for mastery of Inner Asia. Each of the region's sedentary neighbors sought to subdue and dominate the nomad.

China and Inner Asia

No sedentary power had a longer, livelier, or more complex history of relations with Inner Asia than did China. The cluster of states which formed the Chung-kuo ("Central Kingdoms") were, in the sinocentric universe, the point around which huddled the "all under heaven" (t'ien-hsia). The rule of this region fell, by heavenly
destiny \((t\textquotesingle ien-m\textquotesingle ing)\), into the hands of the Son of Heaven \((t\textquotesingle ien-t\textquotesingle zu)\). All peoples, so long as they failed to recognize the cultural, spiritual, and political supremacy of China, were considered to be barbarians \((f\textquotesingle an)\). When the \textit{fan} acknowledged the residence in China of \textit{wei-te} \("majesty and virtue\") , which were incarnate in the emperor, then they could progress to the level of \textit{shu-fan} \("civilized barbarians\") and be incorporated within China. History proved that this attitude was both versatile and adaptable. What began as the Chinese Confucian precept of \textit{wang-che wu-wai} \("the king leaves nothing and nobody outside his realm\") influenced the Mongol concept of the \textit{gur khan} \("universal emperor\") and, altered by Buddhism, passed to the Tibetans and later Mongols as the equivalent of the Indian ideal monarch, the \textit{chakravartin}.

China was regularly threatened by the barbarians from the north. In the \textit{Han shu} (the historical record of the Han Dynasty) Yan Hsiung wrote: "Very different from the barbarians of the three (eastern, southern, and western) frontiers, the northern barbarians are truly the stoutest enemy of China."\(^{1}\) Relations with the northern barbarians were extremely complex. In the popular mind these nomads are best known for raids which left whole regions devastated, thousands enslaved and deported, and even government ministers and emperors as captives. But there was also a highly profitable Chinese-barbarian trade, most often carried on under the aegis of the "tributary" relationship insisted upon by the Chinese. The economic importance of that trade often grew to such monstrous proportions that its interruption would endanger the
underpinnings of the dynasty itself. Furthermore, as suggested by Chusei Suzuki, the need to protect against barbarian inroads and to foster internal cohesion often encouraged Chinese reforms of their own domestic policy.\textsuperscript{2}

After millennia of contact and confrontation, the Chinese developed a number of approaches for dealing with the nomads. A complete discussion of these policies is far beyond the scope and intent of this study, but an overview is helpful for understanding the Kalmuk-Chinese contacts. When China was strong and the "virtue" of its rulers kept aggressively intact, the \textit{fan} could be brought into proper tributary submission. Often they were introduced into the Chinese order by a fictitious familiar bond wherein the emperor acted as father, older brother, etc., to the untutored barbarian. There was also the possibility of marriage between members of the imperial clan (most often females) and certain barbarian notables. As the lament of the Lady Wen-chi indicates ("I was taken on horseback to the ends of the earth; tiring of life, I sought death, but death would not come. The barbarians stink so. How can they be considered human?"), such an arrangement was a terrible sacrifice on the part of the bride.\textsuperscript{3} The emperor assumed the privilege of investing the tributary ruler with his title, usually by sending him a royal seal symbolic of his legitimacy. On two occasions the Ch'ing chose to bestow royal seals on the Kalmuk khans, thereby sanctifying their rule.

Often, however, the barbarians were slow to comprehend the unique status of China and relations evolved along more troubled lines.
The Chinese preferred, as a rule, not to be forced into direct confrontation and would conjure, instead, a situation in which they unilaterally declared the nomads to be vassals and bribed them to keep the peace. Under the Han such a policy was called ho-chin ("appeasement"), while the Sung, a thousand years later, prided themselves for being "generous with gifts without calculating the value of tribute and to grant them honors without making heavy demands . . . ." But such policies severely strained the financial resources of the empire and often encouraged the steady escalation of demands from the "tributary" nomads. Sung bribery did not preserve the dynasty.

While the Chinese expressed their admiration for reliance on enticements such as the "five baits" (wu-erh: silk clothing and carriages, delicious food, entertainments, mansions, showering with imperial favor) to subdue the barbarians, they also resorted to armed force. Han Wu Ti (141-87) sent as many as 100,000 men at a time against the Hsiung-nu. T'ang T'ai-tsung (627-649), after having crippled the T'u-ch'ueh, boasted: "The sons of the Turkic nobles became slaves to the Chinese people, and their innocent daughters were reduced to serfdom. The nobles, discarding their Turkic titles, accepted those of China and made submission to the Chinese khagan, devoting their labor and their strength to his service for fifty years. For him, both toward the rising sun and westward to the Iron Gate, they launched their expeditions. But to the Chinese khagan they surrendered their empire and their institutions." The last significant display of Chinese military power on the steppe was the
obliteration by the Ch'ing of the Dzungar khanate in 1758. It was this conflict which prompted the opening of direct contact with the Chinese and the Kalmyks.

When military action was deemed impractical, the Chinese found other ways to deal with the fan. Some groups could be manipulated internally and split into smaller groups more readily subdued. The Hsiung-nu splintered into five warring groups in 54 B.C. and then coalesced into a northern and southern khanate. The Southern Hsiung-nu were compelled to give their allegiance to the Han (53 B.C.). By 51 B.C., their shan-yu (ruler) Hu-han-yeh was hostage at the Han court. The Northern Hsiung-nu were pushed into modern-day Mongolia where they fell victim to the Hsien-pi, another nomadic group.

The Chinese also turned to other barbarians, both tributary and independent, to patrol the borders and contain threats. This approach, variously known as i-i chih-i, i-i kung-i, i-i fa-i ("using barbarians to govern barbarians" and "using barbarians to attack barbarians") was often, initially, quite successful. The Eastern T'u-ch'ueh were set against the Khitan (697), the Jurchen attacked the Khitan (1122), and the Tatars moved against the Mongols (1161). Such campaigns were cheaper than sending Chinese armies, were often more effective, helped tie barbarians to China as the source of arms and subsidies, and kept the fan busy fighting one another. Unfortunately, this often encouraged the replacement of one barbarian threat with another. The Chinese were delighted at the destruction of the Northern Hsiung-nu by the Hsien-pi. Self-congratulation turned to fright when the Hsien-pi
began to ravage the Chinese borders. The Sung Hui Tsung Emperor (1100-1126) was eager to help the Jurchid destroy the Khitan Liao Dynasty (the revolt lasted from 1115 to 1125). However, the new Jurchid Chin Dynasty (1125-1234) immediately turned on the Sung, captured Hui Tsung (who had already abdicated) and his son the Ch'in Tsung Emperor (1126-1127), destroyed the capital at Kai-feng, carried off the entire imperial court, and forced the Sung to evacuate the whole of north China.

Although many barbarian groups came to dream of imperial power and established their own dynasties within the Chung-kuo, none created a more stunning impression than did the Mongols. They made their spectacular entry into China under the leadership of Chinggis Khan (posthumously honored as the Yuan T'ai Tsu Emperor, 1206-1226) and his grandson Khubilai (Yuan Shih Tsu, 1215-1294). It was the latter who actually conquered the whole of China, including it, for the first time in history, entirely within the bounds of a barbarian empire. The period of the Yuan (1260-1368) has been generally treated by the Chinese as a time of catastrophe, a national disgrace. The Han Chinese were again granted Heaven's mandate when Chu Yuan-chang named himself the Hung-wu Emperor of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). In the dynasty's first years, the Mongols were first pushed back into the steppe and then treated with continuing hostility. The retreating Chinggisids refused to abandon their imperial pretensions and pretended the old days lived on in the person of the khan of the Later Yuan (1368-1634). Many of the Mongols' fellow nomads chose to flaunt their indifference
to these claims and sent to Peking for confirmation of their independence. The Ming mounted a number of expeditions against the Mongols (1372, 1388, 1408, 1409, 1422, 1423, 1424), even capturing the Yuan capital of Karakorum.

Ming Hung-wu (T'ai Tsu, 1368-1398) is credited with the observation: "The expansion of territory is not the way to achieve enduring peace." Even so, throughout his reign and until the death of his grandson, the Yung-lo Emperor (T'ai Tsung, Cheng Tsu, 1402-1424) the Ming continued to jab at the heartland of the Mongols. After 1424, however, the Chinese seldom ventured into the steppe. They chose to repair the Great Wall and entrench within China, relying on subsidized barbarians to keep the Mongols busy. In terms of the Imperial Mongols, the policy was a success. West Mongol tribes, the Oyirad, were led by chiefs who fabricated their own imperial dreams for the steppe. They devastated the Chinggisid line and turned the "legitimate" emperors into no more than puppets. Chinese plans soured, however, when the Oyirad began to strike at China, too. So powerful was the Oyirad Esen-taiji (died 1455) that he caputered Ming Cheng-t'ung (Ying Tsung, 1435-1449).

The Oyirad burst of aggressive brilliance was followed by an equally dramatic eclipse following Esen's assassination. To the dismay of the Ming, the Imperial Mongols revived. The Chinggisids restored their fortunes in the persons of Dayan Khan (1470-1543) and his grandson the Tumed Altyyn Khan (1542-1583). Once again, annual raids by Mongol armies became as predictable as the coming of spring.
The Ming, who had been saved previously as much by the failure of the East and West Mongols to cooperate as by the knife of an assassin, were spared again by the Mongol custom of dividing retainers equally among all sons. Dayan's generosity to his nine surviving sons ended Mongol hopes for a restoration of their rule in China. After two centuries, it must have seemed that China was safe.

But to the north-east lived the Jurchid, who, considering their name a sign of former slavery, had cast it off and chose, instead, to be known as the Manchu. Their rulers remembered the glories of the Chin Dynasty of the Jurchid and formulated their own imperial plan. At the Ming court, which excelled in the appreciation of porcelains and in labyrinthine power struggles, there seemed a total lack of appreciation for the pedestrian necessities of controlling and administering the northern frontiers. Rebellions within China combined with years of disinterest and accumulated to the point that bribes of cash, the bestowal of titles and lucky accidents could no longer preserve the Dragon Throne. On 3 April, 1644, the Ch'ung-cheng Emperor (1627-1644) mounted Peking's Coal Hill and hanged himself. The combined forces of the Manchs, other Tungusic peoples, East Mongols, and Chinese rebels drove the Ming into the south and then out of existence. A seven year-old boy, Fu-lin, became the Ch'ing Shun-chih Emperor (Shih Tsu, 1643-1661) and inaugurated the last of China's barbarian dynasties. For the Ch'ing, the life and politics of the steppe were always of interest and they showed themselves determined not to be supplanted by some other group from beyond the Great Wall.
The Manchu-Ch'ing acted to push back the frontiers of Inner Asia, to prevent dangerous nomad coalitions, and, when possible, to sinicize the barbarians and settle excess Chinese populations in frontier areas. This policy was ambitious and was not completed until the eighteenth century.

The period of this study, ending in 1724, includes only the reigns of the first two Ch'ing rulers, Shun-chih and K'ang-hsi (Sheng Tsu, 1661-1722). In these early years the dynasty was vigorous and the efforts of diplomats and warriors alike brought the Manchu considerable glory. The legendary Chinese strategist and philosopher Hsun Tzu had written, some centuries earlier: "Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this . . . For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." In accord with this precept and in agreement with centuries of Chinese diplomacy, the Ch'ing sought control of the barbarians of the north and west without being forced to squander resources in direct campaigning. The Ch'ing already had established close ties with several East Mongol groups years before the fall of Peking. Nurhachi (T'ien-ming, Ch'ing T'ai Tsu, 1583-1626) opened relations with the Five Khalkas in 1594 and was granted the title of khan in 1607. These acts recognized the communality of Mongol-Manchu interests and life styles, but were not symbols of political submission. Once in control of China, the Ch'ing did not relax behind the Great Wall and leave the Mongols to their own devices. By exploiting the
resentment generated by the excesses of the last Chinggisid khan, the Chahar Ligdan (1604-1634), the Manchu secured the support of the majority of the Inner Mongols (the Tumed, Ordos, and Chahar). The Outer Mongols (Khalka) were hopelessly divided among four rival khans who refused to unite. This fragmentation prevented them from mounting any significant resistance to the Ch'ing and also invited the speculative attentions of their West Mongol cousins, the Djunghar. The raids of the Djunghar Galdan (1676-1697) eventually forced the Khalka to turn to the Manchu for protection. By the 1691 Convention of Dolonnor, the khans and the supreme religious figure of the Khalka, the Jebtsundamba khutukhtu of Urga, were absorbed within the Ch'ing Empire. Fully cognizant of the factors which had driven the Mongols apart, the Manchu fixed by law those elements of Dayan's heritage which proved most useful. All the one hundred and sixty-eight divisions of the Mongols were given permanent boundaries, feudal structures and pasturages. Communications between groups were first channelled through Manchu authorities and the Mongols were encouraged to settle, permanently, around new towns. For the first time, the Chinese successfully established garrisons among the Mongols. No more lethal Mongol confederations would be tolerated north of the Great Wall.

Even though not all the East Mongols fell willingly within the Manchu orbit (revolts continued, sporadically, as late as 1756), it was the Djunghar khanate headquartered in the Ili region that was the prime contender with the Ch'ing for supremacy in the west. The challenge of the Djunghar khanate was too powerful and its ambitions
too high-flying to be ignored.

The foundations of the Djunghar khanate were laid during the life of Kharakhula Baatur khungtaiji (died 1653), whose efforts brought unity to several fragments of the collapsed Oyirad. Soon after his death, however, war broke out among several of his sons. The eventual victor, Galdan, revived faltering Djunghar power and tried to unite all the Mongols against China. His attacks so terrorized the Khalkas that they turned to the Manchu and the K'ang-hsi Emperor himself took the field. The war ended in a Djunghar defeat, treachery within the royal clan, another power struggle, and the flight of Galdan into Siberia, where he died. Tsevan Rabtan (1697-1727), the nephew and betrayer of Galdan, at first soothed Chinese fears by turning his attentions westwards, toward the region around Lake Balkash. But he reawakened Ch'ing concern by becoming deeply involved in Tibet and, finally, by sending his troops there to settle a political dispute. Tsevan Rabtan died in 1727 (by poison) and his Kalmyk wife (the daughter of Aiuka) was charged with his murder. She and her daughters were executed by order of Galdan Tseren (1727-1745), Tsevan Rabtan's son by another wife. The Djunghar khanate continued to trouble China until the Manchu obliterated it in 1758.

The struggle between the Manchu and Djunghar also included Tibet. Thanks to its strategic location, long historic ties, and its position as the home of the form of Buddhism practiced by the Mongols, Tibet was of special interest to the Chinese. From 1682 to 1705, Tibet was ruled by A-bar Sañs-rgyas-rgya-mts'o and his son Nag-dban-ric-c'en,
who bore the title Tisri (regent). Among their most astounding feats of legerdemain, the Tisri kept secret the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama (1682) for fifteen years (until 1697). The family of the Regent lost its position, however, when the Khoshud Latsang Khan (1700-1717) moved from his traditional pasturage in central Tibet and seized Lhasa. The K'ang-hsi Emperor was willing to accept this turn of events chiefly because he feared that a strong Dalai Lama might use his spiritual authority to unite the Mongols and direct them against the Manchu. Latsang took seriously his authority, had himself declared khan, and even assumed Tibetan titles equivalent to those of Chinggis Khan. But Latsang pressed the Tibetans too hard and finally lost their support entirely by having the Sixth Dalai Lama first deported, then assassinated (1706). Next, he attempted to control the location of a successor-incarnation. Most Tibetans and Mongols rejected Latsang's candidate and supported, in his stead, another claimant who was sheltered by the Manchu. Eventually, Tsevan Rabtan of the Djunghar, presenting himself as the champion of faith, sent his forces into Tibet, killed Latsang, and deposed the Khoshud's Dalai Lama. Djunghar expansion in Tibet deeply concerned the authorities in Peking. They forestalled any Djunghar hopes of controlling Tibet's Yellow Church by continuing to protect the boy Dalai Lama. In 1720, after a series of Djunghar outrages, the K'ang-hsi Emperor sent his troops into Tibet to drive out the Mongols and install the Dalai Lama in the Potala. Afterwards, the Chinese assumed the role of powerbrokers in the council which ruled in the name of the child Dalai Lama.
Thus the Ch'ing, especially in the early years of the dynasty, recognized the vital strategic importance of their relations with their Inner Asian neighbors. Deriving from similar backgrounds, the Manchu understood those economic, social and political elements most crucial in the steppe. Usually the Manchu were able expertly to exploit them and keep the borders quiet. Historical precedents demonstrated that inattention to the steppe allowed, even encouraged, the creation of rival centers of power there. When the Manchu were faced by the turbulent and ambitious Djunghar, they looked in several places for allies. The Kalmuks, who were bound to other Mongols, Tibet, and even China by a web of historical, religious, and matrimonial ties were drawn into Manchu plans for the steppe.

Transoxania, Persia, and Inner Asia

Along the southern border of Inner Asia lay the Muslim provinces of Khwarazm (entered on Urgench and Khiva), Mawarannahr (Transoxania, containing Bukhara and Samarkand), and Badakhshan (Tukharistan, centered on Balkh). South and west stretched the Iranian Plateau and the entire Middle East. The routes which had for thousands of years connected this area with China also acted as highways for invaders. Where Iran was protected by the Caucasus, the Zagros, and the Hindu Kush to the west and east, the north was poorly defended by the Syr and Amu Darya. Over the millennia the entire area had been a battle ground between nomad and sedentaryist. The caravan cities of Central Asia never developed a unique approach for dealing with the nomads, but there were
opportunities aplenty.

The basic ethnic character of the population of Central Asia and much of Persia had become increasingly Turkic after the 'Abbāsid caliphs (750-1258) abandoned active governing and allowed power to slip into the hands of local dynasts. The borders of Central Asia collapsed under the pressures of tribes migrating south and west; the Ilak Khans grabbed Transoxania by the tenth century as the Oguz and Seldjūks moved into Persia. The regional struggles for power that developed between local magantes and Turkish mercenaries and their emirs paled, however, in the XIIIth century before the onslaught of the Mongols.

The Mongols were drawn into the region, reportedly, because of the flight there of a rival of Chinggis Khan and the subsequent abuse of Mongol envoys by the Khwārazmshāh. During the following forty years of raiding and warfare, tremendous damage was done in terms of the destruction of property and the deaths of countless townsmen and farmers. The population, which had stood in near equilibrium between sedentarist and pastoralist since Seldjūk times, shifted decidedly in favor of the herder.

Although there was significant improvement in the economy during the Ilkhān period, the dynasty's decline led to a period of renewed warfare. Even the apparent success and glory of Tīmūr-i-lang (Tamerlane) was momentary. Following his demise, the squabbles between his heirs and the arrival of new Turkic groups, especially the Uzbeks, plunged the whole region into another bout of political wars and chaos. The Tīmurids, the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Moghols, Oyirad, and
Safavids warred for almost two centuries before sheer exhaustion and shifts in the attentions of imperial powers finally brought peace. Sunnī regions of Central Asia disengaged themselves from Shi'a Persia. In Bukhārā the Jānid/Astrakhanids (1599-1785) married into the ruling Shaybanid house and established what was, for a time, an energetic line devoted chiefly to discouraging the marauding Kazakhs. In Khīva the Shaybanid/Ibarids (1512-1920) strove to rule a multiethnic state (populated chiefly by Uzbeks, Karakalpaks and Turcomans), but rapidly slumped into a position of reduced power due, chiefly, to the tremendous power of Uzbek clans, especially the Kungrat. In Farghānā (ruled from Kokand) another Shaybanid line led Taṣḥīḥīs, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and others. In the XVIIIth century, Kokand became, for a time a significant power in the region.

In Iran, the end of the Ṭūkhānī was signalled some seventy years of warfare. Out of the confusion the fiercely Shi'tī Safavid family had forged a political and spiritual alliance with the Ak-Koyunlu Turcoman, captured Iran and Irak, and established a militantly Shi'tī state, the rival and counterpoise to the Sunnī states of Central Asia and the Ottoman Empire. The Safavids, who were usually referred to as the Qizilbāš (from the Turkish Kızıl Bāș, "Red Heads," named for their distinctive headgear), remained as shāhs of Persia until 1736. Their attentions shifted from Inner Asia, focused briefly on the Uzbeks of Central Asia, but rested chiefly on the Ottomans in the west. Immense amounts of energy, resources, and manpower were thrown away in the struggle for the control of the Caucasus, Kurdistan, and Irak. Following
the reforms of Shāh 'Abbas I (1588-1629), the military and economic resurgence of Persia faltered and then ebbed away. Rulers became more interested in drink and poetry than ruling. Power slipped into the hands of ministers and powerful tribal chiefs. This was the Persia with which the Kalmyks and the Russians dealt in the XVIIIth century. Artemii P. Volynskii, about whom considerably more will be said later, was sent to Iṣfahān in 1717 to spy out conditions there and to see if there was any direct water route to India. He summarized the sorry state of the nation thus: "Here there is now such a head that he is not over his subjects but is the subject of his subjects, and I am sure that it is rarely one can find such a fool, even among common men, not to say crowned heads. For this reason (the Shah) never does any business himself, but puts everything on his vizier, who is stupider than any cattle, but is still such a favorite that the Shah pays attention to everything that comes out of his mouth and does whatever he bids."8

By the time that the Kalmyks entered the stage of Central Asian and Persian politics, the entire area was in decline. The shift of trade routes away from the caravan cities of Transoxania following the destruction wrought by several centuries of war and the opening of ocean routes by the Europeans had already robbed the region of much of its wealth. Even so, traders from Central Asia continued to move back and forth, providing valuable links between the Caspian and the regions to the south. Squabbles among ruling families there continued to draw the interests of nomads, including the Kalmyks. Persia, which was also sliding into decline, was, initially, of less interest to the Kalmyks.
However, as they became more involved in the imperial designs of Russia, they, too, would participate in the slicing away of Persian provinces in the Caucasus.

The Ottoman Empire And Inner Asia

In the west lay the greatest of the Muslim powers, the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans' ancestors had once been Turkic nomads. Their political power began when the family of 'Osman organized bans settled in the border marches of the Saldı̈r sultanate in Anatolia. There they carved out small, semi-independent principalities along the Byzantine frontier and dedicated themselves to the ghaza, the holy war against the infidel. From rather undistinguished beginnings, the 'Osmanlı ghazi warriors grew in power so swiftly that the Byzantine Empire seemed theirs for the taking. The advent of Timur and the disastrous defeat and capture of Bayezid I İlderim (1387-1402) at Ankara seemed to doom the Ottomans to obscurity. Appearance and reality diverged, however, and in half a century, the Byzantine Empire finally fell to the Turks. In a matter of a few decades, the Ottomans created an empire that spread from the suburbs of Vienna to Cairo and Baghdad.

The great days of the Ottoman Empire drew to a close in 1640 when Murad IV, the last of the warrior sultans died. The era of expansion ended as a time of holding actions dawned. Although the Safavids and Ottomans failed to eliminate one another, their tremendous struggle sapped each to the point of exhaustion. In the west, the resurgent Hapsburgs and their allies reversed the march of Islam and
began to pare away the Ottoman provinces of Europe. In the north began
the war for the control of the Ukraine, the Black Sea littoral, and the
Caucasus. In this theater, on the grasslands of Inner Asia's western
marches, both the Ottomans and the Russians were to unleash their nomadic
allies.

In the Pontic steppe, on the northern shore of the Ottoman lake,
the Kara Deniz (Black Sea), Turkish control depended principally on the
manipulation of a number of turbulent nomadic and semi-nomadic groups.
The lynch pin here was the Crimean khanate, one of the successor states
of the Golden Horde (ended in 1502). The Giray Dynasty, which ruled the
Crimea until its demise in 1783, claimed the special status of legitimate
Chinggisids, deriving ultimately from Urang-Temur (Örêng Tîmûr), the
great-grandson of Chinggis. The Giray were anxious "to show their
legitimacy as heirs of some of the horde's political and territorial
traditions. In the Sixteenth century, the Muscovite grand princes (and
later the tsars) made similar claims to the legitimate inheritance of
these horde traditions. It was felt that the ruler who could make the
best cause for his horde traditions had the best chance of becoming the
ruler of the Golden Horde's territories - the steppe between southern
Poland and Central Asia."

The khans were not autocrats. Real power derived from the
Karaci beyler, the heads of the four great clans (Shirin, Argin, Barin,
and Kipchak), who were members of the Khan's divan and were the actual
suppliers of the khanate's troops. Beneath the great beys were numbers
of local, tribal chiefs (murzas), the securing of whose loyalties was
a major headache for the Girāy.

The final word in the selection of the khan came from Istanbul. After the fall of the Genoese port of Kaffa (Kefe), the coastal towns of the Crimea became a sanjak (province) directly administered by the Turks. The rest of the region was under the authority of the Girāy khan, the ultimate sanction (teyyid-i ipka) of whose selection was the right of the Ottoman sultan, though there was never any formal agreement so stipulating. The turbulent internal politics of the Crimeans forced the Ottomans repeatedly to depose (azil) one khan and nominate (nasip) another. Ferocious on the razzia and at home, the Crimeans were no bargain to rule. Twelve khans sat twice on the throne, four ruled three times, and one khan, Hadji Sēlim Girāy, ruled four times (1671-1678, 1684-1691, 1692-1699, 1702-1704). In the period 1700-1743 there were thirteen changes of rule shared among ten different candidates.11

The Crimeans also controlled a network of steppe vassals/allies from the Danube to Circassia. The most important of these groups was the Nogai Tatars. The Nogai, an off-shoot of the Golden Horde, had migrated west, initially, following the capture of Astra-khan in 1556. They made up about 40% of the entire population of the khanate and controlled most of the land outside the Crimean peninsula. They were divided into several smaller groups. The Little Horde, also known as the Kazyev Tatars, had refused Muscovite suzerainty and settled on the lower Don and Manych rivers in the vicinity of Azov (Azak). The Little Horde later divided into smaller groups. The Azov Nogai remained in the region of Azov; the Kuban Nogai moved to the valley
of the Kuban river; the Kirgiz Nogai settled north of the Caucasus, between the Don and Volga; the Yedikul/Yedichkul/Yedishkul were north of the Crimea and nomadized as far as the Zaporozhian Cossack frontier; the Iambuluk/Janbulak lived along the Black Sea and lower Dnepr (Ozu); while the Yedisan lived between the Bug (Ak-su) and the Dnepr; and the Budjak nomadized from the Dnestr to the Danube. 12

The Nogai frequently fought the Cossacks and Russians, but invented their own rules of conduct. Sometimes they joined the Russians and at other times were in open revolt against the Crimean khan. In 1523, they killed Mohammed Giray I and invaded the Crimea during the reign of Sahib Giray I. Even so, Alan Fisher notes: "Yet the Nogay served a useful purpose for the khanate: They prevented the establishment of solid Slavic settlements in the steppe and provided the Crimean slave markets with a never-ending supply of captives." 13

Farther south and east were the Circassian tribes, the most important of whom were the Cherkess and the Kabards/Kabarday, who lived along the upper Kuban, Kuma, and Terek rivers. These peoples were partially islamicized and their political loyalties swung between the Crimeans, the Cossacks, and the Russians. They were important trade partners, valued soldiers, and matrimonial allies of the Crimeans. As larger numbers converted to Islam, the Cherkess drew even closer to the Crimeans.

There was, then, an impressive number of nomadic and seminomadic tribes against whom Moscow had to war in order to control the Kipchak steppe. In spite of the flawed and undependable nature of loose tribal
confederations, the Ottoman Empire had an effective weapon for securing the steppe. Moscow could survive behind walls, but could not grow. An offensive policy demanded troops as swift, as destructive, and as frankly terrifying as those used by Istanbul. The Russians tried to use the Great Nogai for a time, but they were unreliable. Later they came to rely on the nomads who displaced the Nogai – the Kalmyks.

Russia

Russia And The Steppe

When the Slavic tribes settled in Russia, it was chiefly in the region of dense, mixed forests of pine, fir, and birch. To the south and east the forests thinned, then disappeared, and here began the steppe, the world of the nomad. Situated contiguous to the grasslands that reached from the Carpathians to the Altai, Russia was always involved in the affairs of the peoples living there.

Prior to the Slavic occupation of Russia, the Pontic steppe had been the home of the Cimmerians, the Scythinas, the Sarmatians, the Goths, the Huns, and the Avars, peoples not especially interested in the northern forests. However, once the Russians began to use the north-south flowing rivers for commerce, they came into contact with the Khazars, whose khanate then stretched from the Volga to the Black Sea. Because the documentary evidence is scanty, this period is poorly understood. It is clear, though, that the Russian commercial centers and the Varangian warlords engaged both in trade and in warfare with the Khazars. The life
of Sviatoslav I personifies the period. He sacked the Khazar capital city on the Volga and fought against the Volga Bulgars. He died in a Pecheneg attack as he returned from a campaign against the Byzantines.

After 900, the Pontic steppe came under the domination of the Pechenegs (who controlled the area until around 1040) and then of the Polovtsy/Cumans/Kipchak (who remained until the coming of the Mongols in the XIIIth century). Most of the information available about these two groups comes from the Russian chronicles (supplemented by Byzantine and Arabic sources). Their major interest was military affairs and they contain lists of years in which the Pecheneg or Polovtsy tribes and khans (neither confederation appears to have had a single leader) either attacked or were attacked by the Russians. The most famous example is the Lay of Prince Igor's Campaign (Slovo o polku Igoreve) and which concerns action in 1185. Both the nomads and the Russians actively participated in raiding, looting, and murdering.

Not all their contacts were inimical and that fact is sometimes lost. Often the nomads were the valued allies and auxiliaries of the Russians against the Byzantines, Bulgars, Hungarians, and Poles. They were used in the civil wars which so disturbed the peace of the Rurikid clan. Access to the rich markets of the east and south required crossing the Pontic steppe, the region called the Polovetskaia zemlia by the Russians and the Desht-i Kipchak by the Arabs. Trade with the area's nomads and unhampered passage to Byzantium were important features of Kievan commercial life.

The relations of Russia and the Polovtsian steppe might have
remained unchanged for many years had not the rise to power of Temujin (Chinggis Khan) set in motion peoples and armies all across Inner Asia. Rumors of events in the east reached Russia ahead of the Mongol-Turkic invaders, but the Russians seem to have been unprepared for what was to come. In the Novgorodian Chronicle for 1224, the author wrote:

In the same year, for our sins, there came unknown tribes. No one knew who they were nor what was their origin, faith, or tongue, and some people called them Tatars, while others called them Taumens, and still others called them Pechenegs. Some say that these are the same people of whom Methodius of Patras spoke and that they came from the Yetrian Desert, which is between North and East. Methodius said that at the end of time there will appear those whom Gideon drove away, and they will conquer the whole land from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to the Pontic Sea, with the exception of Ethiopia. Only God knows who these people are or from whence they came. The wise men, who understand the Book, know who they are, but we do not.  

As was the case with many historians in China, the Mongol invasion, its devastation, and the subjugation of Russian princes to the Mongol and Golden Horde khans have been treated as a catastrophe which resulted in two centuries of stagnation and the birth of an Asiatic, despotic political system in Russia. The victory is treated as an abomination and their sack of Kiev (1240) as a particular slight to the might and majesty of Russian culture. The fragmentation of the Kievan state which had preceded the Mongol invasion is regarded as merely unfortunate and Andrei Bogoliubskii's merciless pillage of Kiev (1169) is often regarded as simply unfortunate. Apparently, it is easier to forgive the squabbles of Russian princes than the outrages of Asiatics.

There is no doubt that the Mongol invasion was destructive and that the inclusion of Russia within a Mongol-Turkic empire was a blow to
the pride of Orthodox Russia. In a series of articles, Charles Halperin has done a great deal to reconsider the impact of the Mongols and the Golden Horde and has made in them a number of points about the period. The invaders stayed, for instance, in the steppe. They left the Slavic peoples of the forests basically alone and their presence had little effect on the ethnic makeup of Russia. They demanded tribute and taxes, but never tried to takeover local governments or exterminate the native princely houses. The Golden Horde actually worked toward the unification of Russia by granting a number of privileges to Muscovite princes. The Russian royal apparatus adopted the ideology of the legitimacy of Chinggisid rule, grafted it on the already accepted image of the Byzantine basileus, and manipulated the resulting synthesis for its own political ends. Trade was encouraged and Russia became part of a world empire and was tied to Persia and China in a way that had never before been the case. All religions were tolerated and the Orthodox Church allowed to increase its land holdings.\(^{15}\)

In spite of the beneficial aspects of Mongol domination, the Russians were not enthusiastic about remaining under the power of these "heathens" and the struggle to be free was led by Moscow. The Russian victory at Kulikovo in 1380, though celebrated as a national triumph, did not destroy the "Tatar yoke." Over the next century, Russia was subjected to destructive raids by the nomads and even Moscow itself was burned in 1382. The Golden Horde continued to invest Russian rulers with their authority and collect tribute. But the Horde's days were numbered thanks to internal feuding and the fracturing into antagonistic groups
which those quarrels produced. The invasion of Timur (1395) shook it badly and the establishment of the independent khanates of Kazan (1445) and the Crimea (1446) doomed it. In 1502, the Golden Horde was finally ended, destroyed, not by Moscow, but by the Crimeans.

After the fall of the Golden Horde, Moscow dealt with its remnants; the khanates in Kazan, Astrakhan, and the Crimea, and various tribal groups such as the Bashkir and the Nogai. The entire Volga was annexed by Ivan IV through his conquest of the khanates of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556). Moscow's great rival on the steppe was the Crimea, which, thanks to its association with the Ottoman Empire, acted as the surrogate of the world's greatest Muslim power. The Chinggisids who ruled in Baghchesarai were also the focal point around which gathered those Muslim tribal elements most fiercely opposed to incorporation within the Orthodox Christian Muscovite state. It was to combat the ferocious power of the nomadic armies of the Crimeans that the Russians turned to the Kalmyks.

Russian History, 1584-1724

The history of the Russian state during the development of the Kalmyk khanate also needs to be considered. When the Kalmyks began to move toward Siberia, the Muscovite state, which had grown so powerful under Ivan III (1462-1505) and Ivan IV (1533-1584), seemed to be falling apart. The last Rurikid tsar, Fedor Ivanovich (1584-1598), was a simpleton who failed both to rule and to sire an heir. His clever brother-in-law, Boris Godunov (1598-1605), was elected tsar at Fedor's death. Unfortu-
nately, Boris lacked a sound dynastic claim to the throne; he upset the nobles by his elimination of potential rivals; he alienated the communality by his apparent complicity in the death of Tsarevich Dmitrii Ivanovich at Uglich; and he was plagued by natural calamities. The government and the political order went to pieces following his sudden death. Russia entered a new period of disorder and shame, the Time of Troubles (Smutnoye vremia or, for short, Smuta). The first contacts of the Russians and Kalmyks came during the brief reign of Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii (1606–1610). He tried to balance the demands of the Muscovite populace and the nobility, but he was confronted by the claims of a pretender to the throne and the aggressive interest of an expansionistic Poland in the politics of Moscow. What followed was a period of revolutionary upheaval, civil war, foreign intervention, and Polish rule in Moscow.

When the smoke cleared and the capital had been liberated from foreigners, a national assembly, the Zemskii sobor, elected Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov (1613–1645) tsar. His reign, which was not spectacular, coincided with a period of relative calm which promoted national healing and revival. Mikhail's son, Aleksei Mikhailovich (1645–1676) was an energetic ruler with a strong sense of the absolute authority given him by God. He enacted a new legislative code (the Ulozhenie of 1649) which legalized the stratification of society and the subordination of all its levels to the needs of his state. Church reforms prompted the formation of a significant group of schismatics (the Raskol'niki or Staroobriadtsy) and also curbed the growing power of the Muscovite patriarch. He fought
the Thirteen Years War (1648-1661) for the control of the Ukraine. Finally, Tsar Aleksei encouraged the settlement in Russia of European craftsmen and merchants and began the process of "westernization."

After the death of Aleksei, the reign of his son Fedor Alekseevich (1676-1682) and the dual reign of his sons Ivan Alekseevich and Peter Alekseevich (1682-1689) (under the regency of their sister Sofia Alekseevna) accentuated political insecurities as great families battled for influence and spoils while other groups attempted to halt westernization. The inability of the Regent Sofia to win neither her internal nor foreign struggles let to the assumption of power of Peter Alkseeевич. Until his death (1725), Peter the Great led Russia through a labyrinth of wars and internal restructurings whose exact meaning and nature continue to provide grist for historians.

The Russian Central Administration

The organizational pivot in Russian policy was the central government of the autocracy, located first in Moscow, then in St. Petersburg. At the apogee of the state was the "Most Pious, Most Orthodox and Most Gentle Tsar," the man the Kalmyks called the "White Khan" (Tsagan Xän). During most of this study the tsars of Russia were of the Romanov family. They had been chosen for their exalted position in 1613, following the disruptions of the Time of Troubles. Once elevated to the throne they became absolute rulers "Great Sovereign, Tsar and Grand Prince of all Russia, of Vladimir, of Moscow, of Novgorod, Tsar of Kazan, Tsar of Astrakhan, Sovereign of Pskov, Grand Prince of
Smolensk, Tver', . . . ," rising by decree of the Senate in 1721 to the rank of emperor.  

V. O. Kliuchevskii, among others, has commented on the changed popular appreciation of the tsar wrought by the turmoil and instability of the Time of Troubles. But the altered public image of the tsar was an internal, not external matter. He was the source and pinnacle of power in Muscovy, the physical embodiment of the state. As was typical of most monarchies of the day, acts of state were made in the name of the autocrat, not the government of Muscovy or the people of Russia. When the Kalmyks agreed to join in Muscovite plans, it was promised that they "will be under Our royal high hand (byli pod nasheiu tsarskoiu vysokoiu rukoiu)." All correspondence was dispatched as though from the tsar. The power of the tsar's written word was so great that the Russians demanded a special ceremony whenever the Kalmyk leader received a document from Moscow. In the oath signed in 1677 by Aiuka Khan, one of the Russian stipulations was that whenever "envoys shall be sent from Moscow at the order of His Majesty to me, Aiuka-taisha, . . . I shall receive the gramota standing and, removing my cap, with great honor."  

The tsar was perceived and promoted as the head of state, but the work of government fell on the shoulders of less exalted mortals. However the tsar-emperor did, at times, become personally involved in relations with the Kalmyks. The first recorded instance is a reception held by Tsar Vasilii Ivanovich Shuiskii on 14 February, 1608. In a gramota to the voevoda of Tara, the tsar claimed personally to have spoken with the Kalmyk envoys and to have made dispositions as to their
grazing and the delivery of tribute. 20

Only under Peter I did personal diplomacy reach beyond the occasional acknowledgment of envoys and the dispatch of official gifts. During the Emperor's voyage down the Volga in June, 1722 Aiuka and Peter met aboard the royal galley for dinner. Peter presented the Kalmyk leader and his wife with several valuable gifts. The khan, who was deeply impressed by this gesture, promised Kalmyk troops for Russia's war with Persia and openly regretted that his advanced years precluded his own participation in the coming campaign. Impressed by the results of the meeting, Bell Antermoni, who was an eyewitness, observed: "It is necessary to note that these two powerful rulers concluded this agreement in a very short time, (rather) than (the way) our European plenipotentiaries make use of a dinner." 21

Under most circumstances creating and supervising Kalmyk policy was the responsibility of groups inside the Muscovite bureaucracy. Prior to the Petrine reforms, the state was administered by a dizzying welter of departments (prikaz, palata, izba, dvor, dvorets, tret', chetvert') which had grown in a rather haphazard fashion over the years. There is no need to discuss the history of the Muscovite prikazy here. Suffice it to say that the prikazy, of which there were more than sixty, grew, fed on one another, divided into subdepartments, and eventually were swallowed up by other departments. As inchoate as the prikaz system may now appear, the Muscovite state survived it and the Kalmyks were forced to deal with it.

For Kalmyk affairs the most important office was the Posol'skii
prikaz (Ambassadorial Department), the equivalent of the Foreign Office. It was founded sometime in the mid-XVIth century to deal with foreign governments, their envoys, merchants, and citizens within Russia, as well as with Russians needing to leave the country and even oversaw the postal system. In time the Posol'skii prikaz acquired control of special festivities, the regions frequented by foreigners, some monasteries, and the translators and officials attached to both the government and the Stoganov trading concerns. It even oversaw the Don Cossacks and those Tartars who joined Russian service after the conquest of the khanates of Siberia, Kazan, and Astrakhan.

The duties of the Posol'skii prikaz were so complex as to invite subdivision, even amputation. Initially it created a special chetvert' for the administration of the towns and tribes of Siberia. After 1599 Siberia, Kazan, and Astrakhan were turned over to the Prikaz Kazanskogo dvortsa. This arrangement lasted to 1637 when the Sibirskii prikaz was established to administer Siberia while the lower and middle Volga and Bashkiria continued as the bailiwick of the Kazanskii dvorets.

Normally when dealing with non-Russian peoples Moscow assigned their affairs (dela) to special desks within the prikaz such as the Nogeiskie, Bashkirskie, and Kabardinskie dela. Initially the Kalmyks were lumped under whatever dela seemed momentarily the most germane. In 1635 the Kalmyks were granted their own dela within the Posol'skii prikaz. In 1663, with increasing use of Kalmyk troops against the Crimeans, Moscow organized the Kalmytskii prikaz, which began operations the next year under boiar Vasilii Grigor'evich Romodanovskii. The
non-military functions of Kalmyk relations remained with the Posol'skii prikaz until 1678 when they were transferred to the Prikaz nov'ia chetverti (Department of the New Fourth, evidently to distinguish it from the older chetverti).

The potential for confusion and conflicting spheres of responsibility in such a system are obvious. By the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries a number of separate prikazy were being run by a single boiar, effectively uniting their varied functions. Under Peter I there was a wholesale recreation of the central government. Early in the XVIIIth century the Posol'skii prikaz was renamed the Posol'skaia kantseliaria and in 1716 became the Posol'skaia kollegiia when the collegiate system was adopted. Following more reorganization the Kollegiia inostrannykh del appeared in 1718 and was granted its own regulations in 1720. The College of Foreign Affairs was run by a chancellor (kantsler) who was seconded by a vice-chancellor (vitse-kantsler). Eventually the college was divided into two sections, the first of which dealt with foreign affairs and was subdivided into four special offices (ekspeditsiia) while the second handled mostly financial matters inherited from the Posol'skii prikaz. The College of Foreign Affairs oversaw matters relating to the borderlands of Russia, including the Iaik Cossacks, Malorussia, and the Kalmyks.

The Russian Provincial Administration

Moscow and St. Petersburg were the axes around which the Russian official world spun, but they were far from the steppe, necessitating a considerable delay in the sending and receiving of
information and orders. In the 1720's the average communication took three weeks between St. Petersburg and Astrakhan. A letter and its reply required a month and a half of transport, totally without consideration of its information or the formulation of a reply. Of necessity, then, much of the policy making process devolved on local authorities.

The chief local administrators were the voevody, of whom there were often at least two in major towns, and, following the Petrine reforms, the gubernator (governor). The voevoda was the chief officer responsible for administrative, judicial, and military functions in the Muscovite provinces. Growing out of a military function, the office of voevoda had superseded a number of traditional governing bodies, especially in the north of Russia. In the areas captured from the Tatars where no such earlier bodies had existed, the voevody, without rivals, acquired significant powers. In a number of border cities, such as Astrakhan, Kazan, Tobol'sk, and Tomsk, the voevoda's office (izba) was divided by function in imitation of the prikazy of Moscow. Likewise, in Askrahkan, Ufa, Tobol'sk, and Tomsk the voevody were allowed to carry on diplomatic relations with neighboring peoples. Any steps taken required the eventual approval of Moscow, but viceregal powers were crucial considering the delay in communications. In Siberia the Kalmyks dealt chiefly with the voevody of Tara, Tiumen', Tobol'sk, and Ufa. The voevody of Tobol'sk, the chief town of Siberia, were the primus inter pares of this group. In the west the Kalmyks worked most often through the voevody of Astrakhan. As other Russian towns and frontier posts (ostrogi) were founded in the area, their voevody came under the general direction of
Astrakhan. Thus the voevoda of Chernyi Iar had many of the same administrative powers, but not the foreign policy options of his superior in Astrakhan.

Provincial administrative reform began in the reign of Fedor Alekseevich (1676-1682) chiefly to reduce the authority of the voevody over local taxes. Early in Peter I's reign there were several rather tentative efforts at further modification of the voevoda system. In order to supply the army and defend the nation, Peter created special army districts whose financial autonomy circumvented both local administrators and the money-hungry prikazy of Moscow. After the 1705 rising in Astrakhan, that city and others were granted more local administrative control. Then in December, 1707, the entire country was divided into eight huge provinces (gubernii) whose chief administrator was titled governor (gubernator). Astrakhan was placed in the province of Kazan, among some seventy-one towns and 97,000 households (dvory). The new province of Kazan was entrusted to the tsar's old friend P. M. Apraksin. It was divided into smaller units called provintsii ("counties" headed by a voevoda and totalling about fifty throughout Russia) which were themselves further divided into districts (uezdy). Because Kazan province was so large and included so many non-Russians (besides the Kalmyks there were Tatars, Bashkirs, Udmurts, Mari, and Chuvash), it was redivided into smaller, more manageable units. The Nizhegorodskaya guberniia was created in 1713 and in 1717 the guberniia of Astrakhan was carved from parts of the Kazan and Nizhegorodskaya provinces. With the addition of the Sibmirsk uezd in 1719, Astrakhan guberniia included the towns of Astrakhan, Krasnyi Iar, Chernyi Iar, Iaitsko-Gur'ev, Terki, Saratov,
Tsaritsyn, Syran', Petrovsk, Samara, Dmitrovsk (Kamyshin), Kashpir, and Simbirsk. Its first governor was Artemii Petrovich Volynskii.

The powerful voevoda-gubernator of Astrakhan was the highest representative of Moscow-St. Petersburg with whom a Kalmyk leader was likely to have personal contact and he had, thereby, an excellent opportunity to exercise his influence over the Kalmyks. After December, 1661, contact was most often made during the oath-taking ceremonies at which both the voevoda and the Kalmyk princes were present. When Aiuka Khan negotiated in 1697 with Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn, the voevoda was exceptionally accommodating. He was the perfect host to the khan and his retainers, was willing to dismiss his personal guard, and was relaxed enough not to ramrod the negotiation process. Aiuka was delighted, signing the oath demanded of him and giving his son Gundjab into the keeping of Golitsyn. In 1708, the khan mentioned to Governor Apraksin that he wished they too might enjoy the same friendship and brotherhood. Apraksin avowed that he worked for the same goal, one in their best interests and in those of their mutual lord, the tsar. 22

In at least one instance personal diplomacy went beyond the exchange of pleasantries. In June, 1660 Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich named boiar Prince Grigorii Sunchaleevich Cherkasskii voevoda in Astrakhan. The prince was the son of a powerful Cherkes prince, knew the cultural and economic milieu of the region, and was the friend of the tsar. He took with him his nephew Prince Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkasskii. They successfully negotiated for needed troops and then Prince Kaspulat married the daughter of Shukur Daichin Khan and Aiuka, who was later to become khan, married Kaspulat's younger sister
Abukhna, 23

Just as personal relations could smooth over differences, so personal antagonism could sour them. Astrakhan's first governor, A. P. Volynskii, is a case in point. The son of a judge in the Moscow Sudebnyi prikaz who rose to be voevoda of Kazan, Volynskii made his career in association with Peter Shafirov, Peter I's expert in foreign affairs. His service was devoted to the Russian state and his own future. In order to promote those two interests, he brooked no interference, especially, it seems, from flea-bitten nomads. There were constant complaints from the Kalmyks about his stewardship of Astrakhan. Chakdorzhap, the heir to the Kalmyk throne, complained: "Your governor does not judge our affairs, he only sits, the doors bolted, and does not even allow our envoys in." In the assessment of N. N. Pal'mov:

An abrupt, even cruel man, Volynskii wanted above all to put an end to Kalmyk raids and pillaging immediately, not bothering to penetrate the profundities of the reasons for their arraival or to look more throughly for an explanation of the observed phenomena. According to his understanding and his eyes the Kalmyks were merely "wild rogues"; it seemed to him that it was possible to bridle them, but only by severe repression . . . . The governor put the matter thus, that if a Kalmyk or a Tatar were arrested, that meant he would not have been taken without reason and, as the guilty party, he could be punished. 24

Considering that Volynskii came to Astrakhan during the crucial later years of Aiuka Khan's reign, his attitude and determined meddling in Kalmyk internal affairs not only created difficulties at the time, but also boded poorly for future Russo-Kalmyk dealings.

Beneath the governor were the men who ran the local offices and traveled to the Kalmyk encampments; some of whom were professional
bureaucrats, while others were Cossacks and various sorts of local inhabitants. Very little is known about most of these men and their work except that paper shuffling was often dull and trips into the steppe could be fatal. Many contacts with the Kalmyks were handled by Russian vassals, mostly Tatars, because they understood nomadic life, were familiar with local topography, and could communicate.

In Russia there were plenty of Russians and Tatars who could speak Turkic languages, but the Kalmyks were West Mongol-speakers and the Russians were linguistically utterly adrift. As George Vernadsky noted: "For oral translation on the spot it was possible to find interpreters, so that some border Tatars were able to speak Mongol (or Kalmyk). But as for trained translators who would be able to read and translate Mongol written documents, even though not into Russian but Tatar, it was impossible to find such men in Siberia. At that time there were none, even in the Posol'skii prikaz in Moscow."25 A Tatar would translate from Mongol into Tatar. That would be written down and then translated into Russian. The draft of the Russian reply would later be translated into Tatar and then sent for translation into Mongol on site. The possibilities for misunderstanding both accidental and intentional, were legion, making the jobs of envoys of that day and of historians of this very difficult.

As a group of native born clerks and secretaries developed, the local governmental service showed signs of improvement. Among the first of these professionals was Ivan Savvich Gorokhov. His father had served as envoy to Central Asia in 1641-1643 and had died on the journey. Ivan worked in Astrakhan in 1642 and manned the city walls during the
1650 Kalmyk raid. In 1655 he was sent as envoy to Daichin and Lauzan taishas and in the next year received the oaths of loyalty of some fifty of the taishas' men. He headed two more missions vital to the war effort in 1661 and in 1662 carried Moscow's proposals for a return to Russian suzerainty of the Nogai. He was then made the chief d'iaik (clerk) in the Kalmytskii prikaz.

In spite of, or perhaps because of the determined careerism of Governor Volynskii, V. M. Bakunin was brought into Russian service at Astrakhan in 1720. Reared in Tsaritsyn, where Volynskii may have met their family, Vasilii and his brother Ivan both worked as translators. Bakunin, who could read and write Kalmyk, first copied and translated earlier Kalmyk oaths. Because a fire in the Kazanskii dvorets had destroyed the originals, neither the Senate nor the College of Foreign Affairs had copies of the treaties. Bakunin, who was personally close to Volynskii, must have acted as his expert on Kalmyk issues and by 1726 he had been named the chief secretary for Kalmyk matters. Later he worked in the College of Foreign Affairs and in 1758 returned to the steppe on an official mission to Donduk Dashi. As a result of his journey, Bakunin wrote his famous Opisanie (Description), a major source on Kalmyk history. He was recalled and in 1762 investigated by the Moscow office of the College of Foreign Affairs, Following a quarrel with another envoy.

Even with a group of linguist-civil servants in Astrakhan, the Russians continued to try to find reliable sources of information about events in the ulus. Most often the Russians recruited or coerced local nomads, Central Asian merchants, and even Kalmyks. Local authorities regularly questioned merchants and herders who reached the towns of
Siberia and the Volga. They also created a network of paid informants in the ulus of the khan and his family and regularly arrested and interrogated anyone thought worthy of attention. Even nests of spies and the comments of casual observers were insufficient to the task. Reports came in on their own, not necessarily when most needed, and it is obvious, particularly late in the reign of Aiuka, that Astrakhan was poorly informed.

The Russian Army

Russia's rulers put not their faith solely in the might of bureaucrats. The Volga had been wrested by force from the Tatars and it could be maintained only by continued armed presence. The troops there watched not only the nomads, but also peasants, town dwellers and Cossacks. All were potentially troublesome and when elements from each acted in concert, the results were risings as serious as those of Razin and Pugachev.

Even far into the sixteenth century the main force of the Muscovite army was a cavalry drawn from the pomeshchiki, men rewarded for service with land grants. Armed with bows and arrows, sabres, and lances, the Russian cavalry rode horses bought from the Nogai and operated in large, semi-organized formations. This army began to change as Russia encountered the gunpowder and infantry-dominated armies of Europe. In 1550, Ivan IV created Moscow's first standing army corps and armed it with arquebuses, sabres, and axes and designated it "muskateers" (strel'tsy). These units, which may have been modeled on the Ottoman Janissary corps, numbered over 50,000 in the following century, forming
the backbone of the army. Its members, drawn from the middle service class, were paid in money, grain, and land for their services. The lands granted, exemption from many taxes, and even regimental positions which were inheritable became legal rights enjoyed by the strel'tsy well after the Ulozhenie of 1649.

As the technology and tactics of gunpowder continued to evolve, the military effectiveness of the strel'tsy declined. When reforms threatened their positions, they became staunch opponents of those responsible. Most musketeers found themselves relegated to provincial duty where they served as policemen to put down civil disturbances, coerce peasants, return runaway serfs, and warn of impending Tatar raids. As their military value to the state shrank, the government first ended increases in strel'tsy pay and then actually began to reduce it in the later part of the XVIIth century. The troops, who formed the core of the Volga garrisons, were forced to turn to farming, trade and smallscale manufacturing in order to make ends meet. They were unhappy with the government, irritated by declining prestige, and more interested in making a living than in chasing nomads around the steppe. Besides which, their antique armaments made long steppe campaigns very difficult. As a consequence of the strel'tsy involvement in the risings of 1682, 1698, and 1705, Peter the Great found them of no use and their units disappear after 1710.

Besides strel'tsy the garrisons included, in smaller numbers, elements of the newer army which was used chiefly in the west. The most effective of these was the regular infantry (soldaty) who were better trained and led than the strel'tsy, but who had no special legal status
and were also forced to turn to agriculture to support themselves and pay taxes. The other group was the dragoons (draguny), mounted cavalry designed to act much as did the Cossacks. They were armed with light carbines, a rapier, and an axe and each unit also had a small number of artillery.

In comparing the Russian army to the Kalmyks, several points should be considered. First, the older Muscovite cavalry army had been well suited to warfare on the steppe. It was a mobile cavalry much like that of the nomads. Once this had been replaced, the Russians had to rely on the steppe peoples: the Nogai, the Cossacks, and the Kalmyks. The newer arms were technologically superior to bows and arrows, a fact the nomads appreciated as well. But such superiority was counterbalanced by other factors. The strel'tsy and the draguny were actually hampered by the weapons they used. The older matchlock muskets and many newer flintlocks were cumbersome devices that required time to load and aim; and cavalry carrying them had to dismount in order to fire. Much Russian tactical training was designed for war against European infantry and fortresses, not nomads. Also campaigns in the steppe required long supply lines into regions without shelter or forage. Steppe yurts and herds could be moved quickly, denying even the best infantry sustenance. Finally, many of the men in Russian service, forced to supply their own needs, had turned to farming and trade. Their personal interests lay at home, not on the steppe. Long trips were dangerous, netted little plunder, and took men away from their homes and businesses.
Russian Fortresses and Towns

Considering the limitations of Russian troops on the steppe, one alternative was the creation of strong points whose garrison troops, acting in concert over relatively shorter distances, could be used to interdict the free movement of nomads into settled areas. Along the Volga were a series of towns, Samara, Saratov, Kamyshin, Tsaritsyn, Chernyi Iar, Kransnyi Iar, which had permanent detachments of troops. They protected the towns themselves and outlying settlements and also tried to prevent unauthorized crossings of the Volga, a job significantly harder in the winter when the river froze.

The chief fort was the region's capital, Astrakhan. There had been a major trading point and fort on the Lower Volga since the time of the Khazar town of Itil (Atil). The Russians had captured old Astrakhan (Hadźjī Tarkhān) in 1554–1556 and deposed the local dynasty. In 1558, the town was moved seven miles downstream and reerected on the east bank of the Volga. The kreml' (citadel) and Belyi gorod ("White town", the major section of town) were surrounded by stone and brick, turreted walls. The second major section of town, the Zemlianoi gorod ("Earthen town") was protected by a dirt vallum with wooden walls which stretched over 4400 metres (2070.5 sazheni). After his 1636 visit, Adam Olearius reported a garrison here of nine strel'tsy regiments (polki), about 4500 men. At the time of the 1705 rising, there were two regiments of mounted strel'tsy, three of foot strel'tsy, including the Moscow regiment which had been transferred to Astrakhan after the 1698 rising,
two regiments of soldaty (the Tysiachnyi and Iakhtinskii regiments), and fifty gunners. When fully manned, there were 3650 men in the garrison, but in 1705 only 2475 were actually on duty.

The other Volga towns were actually foreposts of Astrakhan and had considerably smaller garrisons, mostly strel'tsy (before 1710) and were protected by earthen walls. The strongest close fort was Gur'ev at the mouth of the Iaik. It had up to three hundred strel'tsy and seventeen cannon. The Kalmyks were inexperienced at protracted siege warfare, so the Russians could always withdraw to their walls.

Since the tenth century the Russians had built fortified lines (cherty, linni) to cut the routes (shliakhi) used by nomads for raids. These lines included zones of felled trees up to one hundred thirty yards wide, log palisades, and moats and ran, much like the Roman limes, from one post to the next. Similar lines were built east of the Volga, beginning in 1638, to defend against the Bashkir and the Kalmyks. One of these, constructed in the second quarter of the XVIIIth century, ran from Samara to Ust-Uisk, where the Ul and Tobol rivers join. This line separated the Bashkir from the Kalmyks and the Kazakhs and guarded against raids on Russian settlements behind the line. Another, the Iaitskaia, ran from Orenburg, down the Iaik to Gur'ev and included twenty-four small posts. These forts, built in the 1740's on a north to south line, cut nomadic movements from east to west. Once built, the forts (kreposti) and redoubts (reduty) were settled by Cossacks, who were both garrisons and colonists.
Russian Nomadic Vassals

The Russians also relied on several steppe peoples, especially from among the Tatars who had become Russian vassals following the decline of the Golden Horde and its successor khanates. The largest group, the Nogai, nomadized from the Emba to Azov and Samara. They were a confederation of Tatar peoples organized by the Mangyt tribe in 1391 and had exercised considerable influence in the Golden Horde and Astrakhan. Power was divided between the khan, of the house of Nuraddin (ruled 1426-1440), the heir-apparent (known as the nuraddin and commander of the western troops of the khanate), and the kekovat (commander of the eastern troops). Each had an hereditary appanage and a guaranteed percentage of the total revenues of the khanate. Below them were numbers of murzas who also had their own appanages.

When the Russians moved into the Volga in the XVIth century, the Nogai were faced with a serious situation. As they lost vassals to Moscow, especially the western Bashkir, the Nogai princes, who were Sunnī Muslims, divided over the question of the acceptance of Russian suzerainty. Murza Kazy refused Russian overlordship and moved to the Crimea, where the Small Horde established itself. The Great Horde, under Ismail Khan (ruled 1555-1563) and his successors were officially accepted as Russian vassals in 1600.

The tamed Nogai were the most important nomadic allies of Moscow in the lower Volga until the late 1620's and grazed in two large groups, one along the Volga and the other in the Taik-Emba region.
However, in 1628 the Great Horde was torn apart by a struggle between Prince Kanai and other members of the royal family over grazing rights and the control of the ulus. Many Nogai threatened to move to the Crimea. This internal hemorrhage was complicated by the arrival of the Kalmyks, who seized the Nogai pastures and demanded their submission. Moscow found itself in the middle:

The petitioning of the Nogai murzas at the end of 1628 with the expressed desire to become subject to the royal judgment and defense imposed on the government the difficult and unaccustomed for it assignment of the direction of the Horde, and besides that, perhaps most important, the necessity to defend the horde of nomadic grazers against another, the kalmyk horde, moving in from the east. 27

In the region defined by the Volga-Kama-Iaik-Samara rivers lived the Bashkir, who had also once been part of the Golden Horde. The Bashkir were an ethnic amalgam of Turkic, Bulgar-Magyar, Finno-Ugric, and Sarmatian-Alan peoples whose ethnogenesis lasted for a period of several centuries. Following the breakup of the Golden Horde, they had been divided among the Nogai, the khanate of Kazan, and the khanate of Sibir' and had themselves developed into three principal groups called dorogi (from daruga, both a tax official and a district of the Golden Horde). The Kazan doroga, in the west, lay along the Belaia River; the Nogai, in the south, along the upper Belaia and Iaik; and the Siberian in the north, along the Ufa. A fourth division was created by the Russians in the north-west and was called the Osinsk.

The Bashkir, whose home was the mountains and forest steppe, lived a more sedentary life than the Nogai or Kalmyks and developed local industries, especially smithing and the production of weapons.
They, like other tribes, were willing to accept Muscovite overlordship when it suited them, but did not feel eternally bound to the Russians. As Muslims they felt a strong bond with their co-religionists the Crimeans and Ottomans, even helping in their efforts to reconquer the Volga (1662, 1675, 1707). It took the Russians two centuries to force the Bashkir to become vassals. They resisted Russian efforts to settle in their homeland and also fought Kalmyk attempts to acquire grazing there. However even this antagonism sometimes disappeared and, when their grievances coincided, the Bashkir and the Kalmyk took the field together (1662-1664, 1681-1683, 1708).

The last large group of auxiliaries used by Moscow was the Cossacks. First appearing in the fourteenth century, the Cossacks served the Tatars, the Poles, and Moscow chiefly as border guards and light cavalry. There were two types of Cossack, the "fortress" Cossacks who served Russia and were freed of taxes and rewarded with land, and the "free" Cossacks, who lived without loyalty to any government. They first settled in the Ukraine at the Zaporozh'e Rapids on the Dnepr about 1471. Another group, founded on the Don at the beginning of the XVIth century, was joined later by others on the Terek, the Volga, and the Iaik in the late sixteenth century. These groups, ruled by councils of elders, lived off war, brigandage, trade, herding, hunting, fishing, and trapping. Like many nomads, numbers of Cossacks totally eschewed agriculture as an unworthy occupation.

The Cossacks were particularly proud of their independence and were ruled by an elected leader (ataman) who was advised by elected
elders. Most of the political and economic power was in the hands of those longest associated with the band, but the influx of disgruntled Russians after 1649 threatened the stability of the various groups. The older Cossacks, the domovytie (householders), were unhappy at the arrival of poor peasant farmers; the golytboi (naked, landless ones) wanted to farm the land and demanded a part of the political power and the monetary rewards (zhalovan'e) distributed by Moscow. The Cossacks caused the Russians as much grief as any of the Turkic or Mongol nomads.

The Cossacks had much in common with their nomadic neighbors. They lived on the steppe, chiefly as warriors and herders, but in settlements rather than in mobile encampments. They were much sought after as mounted auxiliaries by their sedentary neighbors. Their relations with Moscow were basically within the purview of the Posol'skii prikaz, its subdivisions, and the College of Foreign Affairs. They were bound by oaths, the taking of hostages, and virtually the same conditions as were other nomads. They were kept in line, albeit irregularly, by rewards for fidelity and threats against treachery.

The Cossacks and the Kalmyks first met in Siberia, then continued their contacts along the Iaik, Volga, Terek, and Don. At times they traded together and fought, side by side, against the Crimeans. However, they also raided one another as well. Both turned to Moscow to redress the losses of animals and lives.

Russian Regulation Of Vassalage

The Russian military and its vassal hordes were the most
expensive arms of policy, whereas peaceful interaction was both cheaper and less disruptive. When the Russians chose negotiations over war, the basis of their efforts was the shert (oath), either written or oral. An oath was not unique to Russia; the world's history is fairly littered with promises of loyalty to a liege lord. The tsar's government unfailingly felt that a public, especially written pledge buttressed and legalized the authority of the tsar over his vassals. Sherti were used everywhere. For instance, in 1633 the Altyn Khan in faraway Mongolia swore allegiance to the tsar. He promised in the name of his family, descendents, and vassals, to be an eternal slave, obedient to the tsar. He promised to protect Russians and to attack the enemies of the tsar, sealing his pledge according to the precepts of his faith. In the Caucasus similar oaths were sworn by the Cherkes princes Atsymguk and Tutaryk in 1555 when they sought aid against the Turks. They promised to serve the tsar forever and to be at peace with the Turks only when Moscow was. Prince Tutaryk and a son of Prince Sibok were baptized as well. In 1604, the principal Nogai chiefs, led by Ishterek swore allegiance to the tsar, promising to attack Russian enemies, and agreeing to end independent foreign relations with virtually every Muslim state on the Black Sea and Central Asia. A similar oath is the Pereiaslav' Union of 1654 between Moscow and the Ukraine. Included were allegiance to the tsar, restrictions on foreign relations, and a religious service with prayers for the safety of the tsar.\textsuperscript{28}

The Soviet historian P. S. Preobrazhenskaia, who has studied Russo-Kalmyk relations, characterized the sherti as including the
conclusion of an alliance, disavowal of raiding, the creation of a
vassalage system, and such special terms as necessary. The ceremonial
rites included some sort of religious observance to symbolize the
solemnity with which such an oath was entered. She also asserts that
this sort of oath was used especially for eastern peoples and countries. She is, however, obviously mistaken since the Muscovites included
"Orientals" living on the Dnepr and in the Caucasus in similar oaths.
Whatever the locale, the Russians insisted that before recognizing
territorial arrangements of allowing trade, a people must pledge.

In the first days of their contacts, thanks mostly to a lack of
translators, the Kalmyks were allowed to take oral oaths. From the first
sherg (June, 1607) to 1655, oaths were sworn either in a Russian town
or in the ulus of a prince, and always used the offices of an envoy,
for the voevoda and the taisha never met. In 1655 the Kalmyks signed
their first written oath which existed in Russian and Tatar versions.
The first sherg actually signed by a Kalmyk prince was in 1657 and it
set the tone for later ceremonies at which both taisha and voevoda were
present.

The fundamental elements of the oaths never changed. First, the
Kalmyks placed themselves under the authority of the tsar, promised to
serve him faithfully and live in peace with him and his vassals. After
1655, the Russians demanded that the Kalmyks serve in Russia's wars, making
Russian enemies their own. They were to live in peace with Russian vassals
and were to have no independent dealings with the Muslim states of the
west and Central Asia. These terms reduced the Kalmyk to the level of
vassals, even "slaves" (khology), as the oaths sometimes called them. But that was true only if the oath was observed. The frequency of _sherti_ hints at what the facts prove, namely that the Kalmyks and other, similar vassals honored their word when convenient and profitable.

The Russians hoped to circumvent Kalmyk double-dealing by holding hostages (amanaty). At Astrakhan, in the kremli were the "amantrye dvory, where the murzas and princes of the Nogai and Kabardians were assembled and where negotiations were carried on with the envoys of Persia, Georgia, Bukhara, Urgench, and the Kalmyk taishas." The insistence on the surrender of hostages troubled all the peoples subject to it. When Cossack rebel Stepan Razin (executed 1671) captured Astrakhan in 1670, one of his first acts, an obvious appeal to the region's native peoples, was the release of all those held captive by Moscow in the amantrye dvory. The Kalmyk princes fiercely resisted demands for hostages; but in 1657, when the Russians could no longer be put off, three Kalmyks, supposedly of distinguished families, were surrendered. Only one was even related to the chief _taisha_, Daichin. Nevertheless, the Russians were delighted by this symbolic victory and the captives were given special quarters, away from the other amanaty. But the Russians were not satisfied with holding only the poor relations of obscure tribal princes and, as St. Petersburg's ability to pressure the khan increased, so did demands for more distinguished hostages. The culmination of the process came in 1741 when Donduk Dashi (ruled 1741-1761) surrendered Asarai, his only son and was, himself, appointed _namestnik_ (regent) of the Kalmyks in return. When the last Kalmyk namestnik
Ubashi was considering a massive out-migration of the Kalmyks in 1771, his advisor Tsebek Dordji urged him to go. Among his many reasons for leaving he concluded his list: "Already it has been ordered that the son of Ubashi become a hostage, and it is certain that three hundred people from the best Kalmyk families live in the capital. This is, evidently, your present situation and in the future there remains one of two choices - either to bear this burden of slavery or get out of Russia and put an end to this calamity."³³

Russian Rewards For Vassalage

In return for oaths and hostages the Russians, using the carrot after the stick, had a number of inducements and rewards for cooperation. The most prestigious was the awarding of titles and legitimizing the right to rule. Originally the chief prince of the Kalmyks bore the title prince (taisha) and was but one of several men with the same title. (The word derives from the Chinese t'ai-tzu, "crown prince" and was also found in the alternate form, taiji.) The chief taisha was granted the title khaan/xan (khan) by the Dalai Lama, but the Russians refused to recognize or use it. In 1697, perhaps in connection with Peter I's naming of Aiuka as guardian of Russia's southern borders during his trip to Europe, Aiuka may have been granted the title of khan by the emperor. That point remains unclear, but it is certain that in 1709 in a letter Governor Apraksin referred to Aiuka as khan and he was always so titled afterwards.

Late in Aiuka's reign the Russians arrogated to themselves the right to name the heir apparent to the khan. They also attempted
to decide who should be khan, but civil war among the Kalmyks made that goal immediately unattainable. Instead, they named Tseren Donduk, the eventual victor in that war, namestnik (regent, vice-khan) and elevated him to khan in 1731, six and a half years later. Donduk Dashi ruled from 1741 to 1761, but was recognized as khan for only the last three years of his life. His successor Ubashi was declared namestnik (heir) of the khan during those last years and became namestnik of the khanate in 1761. After he fled with his people back to China, Catherine II on 19 October, 1771, ended the Kalmyk khanate and excised both the titles khan and namestnik.

The most universally valuable rewards of the Russians were peace, the right to graze, and entry to Russian markets. Without these three, the Kalmyks would have ceased to exist. Peace was always the price for any other reward, but once established, the others came quickly. Grazing and trade blessed all Kalmyks. They also served the khan, since his primary responsibility was securing a home for his people. He also had the right to distribute specific herding areas to his lieutenants.

The right to trade was an element of policy jealously guarded by the central government. Preobrazhenskaia wrote: "The government strove to keep in its own hand the exclusive right for approval or disapproval of trade with the Kalmyks."34 No negotiator, no matter what his rank, could offer concessions on trade without the approbation of Moscow-St. Petersburg. Long delays were the concomitant of tight control, but the policy was effective and indicated that the Russians understood several facts about trade. First, the government appreciated
its vital role in nomadic economies. Second, it grasped the relative budgetary and risk factors inherent in trade, as opposed to military expeditions.

The Russians profited from Kalmyk trade, but especially in the buying of horses. The only native Russian breeds were found in the area of Novgorod Veliki and by the XVIIth century the Russians relied on the import, from the south by the Nogai, of Persian, Arab, and Central Asian breeds. As many as 50,000 head might be brought to the fairs in Moscow, Tver', and Rostov and by the late seventeenth century Russian merchants were selling as many as 10,000 rubles-worth a year, especially when a mounted campaign might call for as many as 60,000 head. However, the influence of the Crimea over the Nogai placed Moscow's chief suppliers in the hands of Russia's most bitter rival.

The Kalmyk horse was not as sleek as the Arabian, but it was strong, adaptable, and not controlled by the Turks. Most were sold directly by Kalmyks to Russian merchants at special fairs, like those of Chernyi Iar (begun as early as 1632), Krasnyi Iar, and Astrakhan. Others were bought first by the Don Cossacks, then sold to the Russians, while still others were bred in special herds by the Tatars of the Manych River and then sold. Even after most of the Kalmyks left Russia in 1771, the Kalmyks remained the chief supplier of horses for the Russian army until World War I. 35

The right to trade purchased at the acceptance of Russian suzerainty was an act between governments. It was "official" trade. Outside of it was "unofficial" trade, which can be defined as that
carried on between Kalmyks and Russian subjects without consent and in places, usually the ulus, beyond the control of the Russian authorities. Horses, cattle, sheep, even humans were valued commodities to Russian merchants and peasants. Manufactured goods were needed by nomads, no matter how the relations of the khan and tsar fared. There existed a thriving commerce which Moscow did not necessarily condone, but was often helpless to stop.

For local authorities the capital's trade policy was difficult to enforce. In 1648 Daichin crossed the Volga and opened trade with the Cossacks. The voevoda in Astrakhan was powerless to prevent it. He complained the next year that he was unable to stop the Tatars from slipping away into the steppe and trading in the ulus. During this same period both Daichin and Lauzan taishas were being denied official trade in Astrakhan.

Unofficial trade did not necessarily run counter to Russian interests. In 1648, the government knew that the Cossacks and Kalmyks traded illegally, but the Cossacks needed horses to fight the Crimeans and the government made no move to stop the exchange. Following that unofficial contact, in 1650 Moscow sponsored a mission from the Cossacks into the ulus. Although it failed in its political goals, the embassy showed that Moscow recognized a door opened by unofficial trade could, one day, be turned to the profit of the state.

Trade and grazing rewarded the general populace of both societies. Other premia accrued to more select groups. One much sought after reward was the royal zhalovan'e (grant), given in money and kind
to the khan, members of his family, or leading nobles in recognition of their service, as an inducement to sign an oath, or as a regular subsidy. At the oath of 1655 the Russians distributed cloth and wine worth twenty-four rubles, thirty kopeks. In 1657, there were fur hats and cloaks worth one hundred forty-five rubles, plus other gifts valued at two to five hundred rubles. By 1661, the fifty-seven chief men among the Kalmyks were presented gifts costing 1,074 rubles, forty-four times more costly than the gifts made only six years before.

Exploits in battle brought the largest and most generous gifts. As thanks for their part in the Poltava campaign, Peter I gave the Cossacks and Kalmyks 20,000 rubles. Usually these larger grants were actually made to the taishas, who then distributed them entirely on their own whims. In August, 1736, Empress Ana Ivanovna rewarded Kalmyk service against the Kuban' and Crimea, writing to Donduk Ombo that: "... as a sign of Our Imperial gratitude and exceptional kindness to you and all the Kalmyk leaders We have ordered for all your life Our Imperial rewards, beyond the rate previously awarded you, monies (worth) 2000 and 500 rubles, milled flour at 1000 chetverti a year."36

Zhanlover'ye could also include ceremonial armour, furs and other luxury items, and might incorporate canons, gunpowder, lead shot, etc. Not only did the royal rewards become a major source of income for the Kalmyk nobility, they also supplied important military material and were a ready lever for the enforcement of Russian policy.

The Russians also conferred the symbols of authority and military insignia. Bestowal of the emblems of power reminded the recipient that
the giver commanded sufficient prestige personally to be able to raise
or legitimize the status of his lieutenant. When Bogdan Khmel'nitskii
swore allegiance to Russia, he surrendered to the tsar the symbols of
his authority as hetman, the banner and the mace. The Russians, to
recognize Shukur Daichin's oaths and service gave, in 1664, a mace
decorated with gold and precious stones, a sabre, a saddle, and other
trinkets. In 1731 when a Chinese embassy arrived to acknowledge Donduk
Dashi as khan, the Russians hurriedly promoted him from namestnik to
khan, awarding him a banner, sabre, and sable hat and coat. They also
pointedly demonstrated to Manchu and Kalmyk alike that Russian, and only
Russian, indorsement of power counted.

The Russians also granted Kalmyk detachments special banners
decorated with religious symbols and pointing to the sacred bonds of
oath and blood linking Kalmyk and Russian. When Daichin was given his
mace, his troops received a splendid banner. On a field, evidently white
bordered in red, were displayed a double-headed eagle, a mounted figure
slaying a serpent (obviously St. George), and a moon (perhaps an allusion
to Buddhism). Russia assured that as the Kalmyk khan led his troops
into battle, he did so dressed in the tsar's chain mail, carrying his
mace, sabre, and pistols, under the banner of Russia's eagle and
St. George.

The final instrument for observation and manipulation of the
Kalmyks was the introduction of a full-time representative at the
court of the khan. Ivan Gorokhov first suggested that six Russians be left
with Monchak in 1660 to guard against the Bashkir. Nothing came of that
plan, but after Bakti Giray's surprise raid in 1715 sent the khan and his wife scrambling to the protection of Astrakhan and cost him his royal treasure, Aiuka agreed to the stationing of stol'nik Dm. E. Bakhmet'ev and six hundred men in the royal ulus. Bakhmet'ev was instructed to try to control Kalmyk foreign relations and see to it that Aiuka was faithful to the tsar. He was replaced in June, 1722 by Lieutenant Colonel Nikifor L'vov, who commanded no troops at all. The responsibility for the khan's personal safety devolved on the governor of Astrakhan. L'vov was to observe the khan's steadfastness and act as mediator in troubles between the Russians and Kalmyks. Further, he was to watch the khan's children, who were expected to be jockeying for position prior to Aiuka's death. L'vov was to see if the designated heir was reliable and, should he prove faithless, to consider another candidate. L'vov was himself replaced in late 1722 by Captain, later Lieutenant Colonel, Vasilii P. Beklemishev, who received similar instructions. Following the death of Aiuka, the power of this agent grew as direct Russian involvement in the political life of the royal ulus steadily increased.

Conclusion

Like all the steppe's neighbors, the Russians had developed a number of instrumentalities for dealing with the Kalmyks. There was a bureaucracy, a regular army, nomad auxiliaries, trade and grazing restrictions, and a grab-bag of gold and trinkets. Both the velvet glove and the mailed fist were available and each was used, but neither was entirely effective. In spite of organization and bursts of interest,
usually fuelled by warfare, Russian policy was often the moment-to-moment
creation of those closest to the steppe, especially the voevoda/gubernator
of Astrakhan. In order to be on the alert against risings of the
Crimeans, Bashkirs, Cossacks, or local peasants, local authorities
created policies eventually accepted and expanded by the capital,
which were increasingly crude and interventionist, stripping the khan
of his powers and wheedling away his internal support with rewards,
offers of Russian armed aid, and the conversion of nomads into
Christian farmers. As the massive desertion of the Kalmyks in 1771
eventually proved, the majority of these nomads was not ready for the
plow, either guiding or pulling it.
ENDNOTES: CHAPTER ONE


2 Suzuki, p. 189.


These four clans were the original group. By the XVIIIth and XVIIIth centuries the Mansur Oglan and Sicuvut/Sicivut had replaced the Argin. Alan Fisher, op. cit., p. 22 and The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1773 (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970), p. 10.

The basis of this computation is Halil Inalcik, "Giray," İslam Anskilopedisi (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basimevi, 1948), cift 4, pp. 783-789. There is general, if not total agreement in dates in Alexandre Bennigsen, Perteu Naili Boratoav, Dilek Desaive, Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Le Khanat de Crimée dans les Archives du Musée du Palais de Topkapi (Paris: Mouton Editeur, 1978), pp. 315-370.


The most valuable of Halperin's articles on this point are "A Chingissid Saint of the Russian Orthodox Church: The 'Life of Peter, tsarevich of the Horde,'" Canadian-American Slavic Studies, vol. 9, no. 3 (1975), pp. 324-335; "The Russian Land and the Russian


18 Materialy po istorii Russko-mongolskikh otnoshenii, 1607-1636 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1959), p. 21. This
particular document dates from March, 1607.

19 Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia II Otdeleniia Sobstvenoi Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Kantselei, 1830), t. II (1676-1688), No. 672, p. 85. Hereafter cited as PSZRI.

20 Materialy po istorii Russko-mongol'skih otnoshenii, 1607-1636, p. 37.


22 PSZRI, t. III (1689-1699), No. 1591, pp. 329-331; t. IV (1700-1712), No. 2207, p. 422.

23 "Rassprosnye rechi v Astrakhanskoii prikaznoi palete uzdenia kniazia Kaspulata Cherkasskogo Khapyka i poslov Daichina i Puntsuka taishi s ikh peregororov, kasaiushchikhsia do vydachi za Puntsuka taishu sestry kniazia Kaspulata, prisylk k taisham ot Krymskogo khana poslov i podarkov i proch.," Astrakhanski Gubernskie Vedomosti, No. 20-21 (1843), pp. 155-167.

24 N. N. Pal'mov, Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov (Astrakan: 1929), ch. 3-4, p. 59.

26 The garrisons sent to this line included families of the Malorossiiskoe Cossacks, some Bashkir, and over three hundred of the Stavropol' Christian Kalmyks. F. Starikov, Istoriko-Statistichekii ocherk orenburgskago kazach'iago voiska s prilozheniem stat'i o domashnem byte orenburgskikh kazakov, risunkov so znamen i karty (Orenburg: Tipografiia E. Breslin, 1891), pp. 61, 77-78.

27 A. A. Novosel'skii, Bor'ba moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami v XVIIom veke (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1948), p. 149.


29 P. S. Preobrazhenskaya, "Iz istorii russko-kalmytskikh otnoshenii v 50-60kh godakh XVII veka," Zapiski (Kalmytskii Nauchno-issledovatelskii Institut Iazyka, Literatury i Istorii pri Sovete Ministrov Kalmyckoi ASSR), vyp. 1 (1960), pp. 60-61. Hereafter cited as Zapiski KNIILI.
There is no way to know how many such oaths were taken, but records of some sort of *shert*, sometimes several during the same year by one or a series of princes, can be found for 1607, 1608, 1615, 1618, 1620, 1629, 1630, 1631, 1632, 1633, 1635, 1642, 1643, 1644, and 1649.

"O drevnykh zdaniiah i drugikh zamechatel'nykh pamiatnikakh drevnosti v astrakhanskoi gubernii," Zhurnal Ministerstva Vnutrennykh Del, ch. XLII (1841), No. 10-12, p. 87.

Donuk Dashi tried to recover his son in 1743 by a written appeal to St. Petersburg. Chancellor Count A. P. Bestuzhev-Riumin pointed out that the young prince could learn Russian, see the administration function and participate, in close association with the governor, in its actual working. Asarai could visit his father and make powerful friends. He was protected from enemies while with the Russians and the Empress herself had written Astrakhan about his proper maintenance. Tragically, even the Russians could not protect him from disease and Asarai died of smallpox that same year in Astrakhan. N. N. Pal'mov, Ocherk istorii kalmetskogo naroda za vremia ego prebyvaniia v peredelakh Rossii (Astrakhan: Kalmetskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1922), pp. 52-54; N. A. Popov, V. N. Tatischev i ego vremia (Moscow: V. Grachev, 1861), pp. 316-318.

Cavalry did not disappear with the introduction of gunpowder.


Yearly stipends were also ordered for members of the royal family and leading nobles. Bakshurg and Galdan Normo, Donduk Ombo's brother and son, each received three hundred rubles a year; Dordji Nazarov, his son Lubzhe, and Bai were each accorded six hundred rubles annually; Lekbei, Serbet, and Batu Chakdorzhapov one hundred rubles. *PSZRI, t.* IX (1733-1736), Nos. 7027, 7103, pp. 949-950, 978-979.

Novoletov maintains that Donduk Ombo's total income per annum was 5000 rubles and 2000 chetverti of grain. He adds that each chetvert' was worth ninety kopeks. That would give Donduk Ombo the generous income of nearly 7000 rubles in grants/salary alone. M. Novoletov, *Kalmyki. Istoricheskii ocherk* (St. Petersburg: V. Demakov, 1884), p. 22.

The only kalmyk banners of which any depiction has been found are for the *Stavropol'skoe kalmytskoe voisko* and are at least a century later. This was a Christianized group and the figures are St. George,
Sts. Peter and Paul, Christ the Saviour, the Mother of God, the Holy Trinity, St. Nicholas, St. Andrew, and John the Baptist. The majority of these have strong symbolic links to Russia, e.g., Sts. George, Peter, Paul, Andrew and Nicholas. Starikov, Istoriko-statisticheskii ocherk, pp. 130-131. Iurii Lytkin reported having seen a Kalmyk banner in the possession of the Khoshūd noion Tsetsen-Djab Tumenev. On one side was shown Daichi Tengri (Daldzhin Tenger), the god of war. He was depicted as riding a horse and wearing full armour and a helmet. At the feet of his mount are various animal emblems of the wealth of the Kalmyks. Iurii Lytkin, "Materialy dla istorii oiratov," Kalmytskije istoriko-literaturnye pamiatniki v russkom perevode (Elista: 1969), note 36, p. 93. The resemblance between the Kalmyk god of war and riches and Russia's St. George is difficult to ignore.

38 The instructions for L'vov and Beklemishev from the College of Foreign Affairs are found in Pal'mov, Etiudy, ch. III-IV, pp. 111-114, 115-116.
CHAPTER TWO

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE KALMYK KHANATE (TO 1664)

Introduction

The first period of Kalmyk history, which ends in 1644 at the death of Ḳho Örlük, began around the thirteenth century in the tribal breeding grounds of Djungharia, the home of the Oyirad tribes. As the result of war and constant competition for pasturage, the Torghūd, an Oyirad tribe led by the clan of Ḳho Örlük, migrated to the west. At times this purposeful and dangerous movement of peoples and herds threatened to degenerate into little more than a stampede due to the persistent hostility of many peoples. After confronting the Tatars and the Russian strongholds of Siberia, the migration and this first period ended with the Torghūd tenuously established in the Emba-Volga steppe—neighbors, part-time vassals, and frequent opponents of Moscow.

Kalmyk Ethnic, Political, and Social Structure

Ethnonyms

When studying a people, particularly one which failed to record much of its own history, ethnonyms can be a useful investigative adjunct. "Kalmyk" has been applied to several Oyirad peoples. In this study, "Kalmyk" will be used for the West Mongols and their vassals who settled in the steppe areas north of the Caspian Sea, many of whom returned to western China in the 1770's. These Kalmyks, originally constituted chiefly by the Torghūd, included numbers of
Dorbet and Koshud tribesmen, as well as other Mongol and Turkic peoples.

Confusion in the use of "Kalmyk" resulted mostly because that name may not have originated with or been used by the peoples to whom it was applied. Since "Kalmyk" is found first in Chagatai Turkic sources as early as the mid-XIVth century (originally in Ibn al-Wardī, later the Zafar-name of Shered al-Din, The Genealogy of the Turks, and the histories of Abd al-Razzak Samarkandi and Sultan Abu Said—all XVth century), it was thought to derive from the Turkic verb kalmak ("to remain"). But who remained and what? Some sources claim the Kalmyks remained isolated from the teachings of Islam, unlike their cousins the Dungans (from ommek, "to return," i.e., returning to God through Islam). Others, including the Kalmyk historian Batur Ubashi Tumen, contended the Kalmyks were those who "remained" behind in 1771 when most of the group fled to China. This derivation is obviously anachronistic. More confusing, the Turkic sources often used "Kalmyk" for all the Oyirad, particularly the tribes of the Djunghar khanate.

Several derivations have been drawn from Mongol. Al. Voeikov (1822) suggested both a Tatar origin (khalimek, "divided nation") and a Mongol one (gol-aimak, kholi-maik, "fiery clan"), from their exceptionally warlike spirit. Paula Rubel reported one Khalka Mongol equated Kalmyk to "spread out," because the Kalmyks went farther west than other Mongols. Karl Menges said it derived from the carts which bore the nomadic yurts. A. Kichikov maintained that the Kalmyk
word *khal'mag/khal'meg* was originally Mongol, meaning "swift, headlong, flying," and referred to their lightning raids against neighboring tribes. Nearby Tatars, who knew the Turkic semi-homophone *kalmak*, adopted it, producing a folk etymology based on their verb, "to remain." They branded all shamanists and Buddhists as those who "remained" without salvation. The Russians learned the Turkic pronunciation and accepted their explication.¹

There is yet a further note on the use of "Kalmyk." Early references to the West Mongols, especially by Russians, often distinguish between the "White" and the "Black" Kalmyks. Most often the "Black Kalmyks" were the Djunghar. The "White Kalmyks," also known as the "Borderland," the "Mountain," and the "Altai Kalmyks," were the Teleut/Telengut, who lived on the upper Ob. However, as L. P. Potapov noted, these people are not even Mongols, but speak a Turkic dialect.² Also, the Volga Kalmyks often referred to their more eastern cousins and rivals (Dorbet, Khoshud, and Choros tribes, depending on the circumstances) as the Chekar and *dal'nye Kalmyki* ("the distant Kalmyks").

The ancestors of the Volga Kalmyks lived in the region around Lake Balkash, Lake Zaisan, and the headwaters and upper reaches of the Irtyssh River, between the Altai and T'ien Shan - an area known as Djungharia. Here nomadized the Dorben Oyirad. There has been considerable discussion as to the proper translation of this ethnonym. Many authors have ventured the name means "The Four Confederates/Allies." Haneda Akira, in agreement with B. Ia. Vladimirtsov, felt
the designation originated with Chinggis Khan's division of the western tribes into four (dörben) tumen, units of 10,000 men. By the fifteenth century, the term was assumed to refer to the four chief tribes then composing the Oyirad (derived from the root oyira, "close relatives"). The Torghūd were one of the four chief Oyirad tribes of the XVIth century and the leaders of the migration to the Volga. The Torghūd, traced descent from To'oril (Toghoril) the Ong (Wang) Khan of the Kerait, a man who befriended and protected the young Temujin (Chinggis Khan) during some of the darkest days of his youth. Paul Pelliot admitted many difficulties in trying to link the Torghūd and Kerait, but felt there was no need to discard completely their relationship. The name Torghūd he traced from the Mongol turghakh (plural, turghaghut, turgh'ut), "guard," and felt it originated in the group's function either in the camp of Chinggis or from some earlier, similar institution among the Kerait.  

A supporting passage in the Secret History of the Mongols (Yuan ch'ao pi-shih) describes Chinggis Khan's night guard as made up of "the most able and distinguished in appearance sons and younger brothers of the noions, the commanders of a thousand, and of a hundred, as well as the sons of men who are free-born." This group, the kevtul, according to U. E. Erdinev, included men from various Mongol tribes, all experienced in warfare and already militarily organized. These men of the Markit (Merkit), Kerait, Bātut (Baghtut), Djunghar, and other tribes later entered history as the Torghūd, named for their former occupation.
Kalmyk Ethnic Composition

It is important to remember that, due to their mobile life style, the ethnic composition of a group like the Kalmyks was fluid and precise identification of its constituents is often difficult. One day's Tatar might the next day be conquered by the Mongols. Was he then a Tatar or a Mongol?

Among the Kalmyks there was considerable admixture of peoples. The major Mongol-speaking elements were Oyirad tribesmen. As the Kalmyks moved west and expanded their influence, they were joined by Turko-Tatar peoples. Expanding south, the Kalmyks swallowed up the Turkmen tribes of the Mangyshlak Peninsula and other Central Asians. Clan and ulus names often remained as the only relics of their earlier affiliation. For instance, Erdinev found in the Erketen ulus souvenirs of the Markit (a tribe conquered and dispersed by Chinggis), the Kerait, and the Djunghar. Elsewhere in the Soviet Union are Kalmyks whose clan names recall the Khoit, the Choros, the Khoshud and Dorbet West Mongols, the East Mongols, the Telengut, the Buriat and Barghut. Others refer to the Tatars generally (Mangad), the Mountain Tatars (Ulyn-khara Mangad), the Black Tatars (Khara Mangad, probably an element of the Nogai), and the Kazakhs. "Kalmyk," a valid ethnonym in the XXth century, might be more usefully regarded in earlier times as a political designation for a West Mongol, Torghud-led, nomadic alliance.
The Kalmyk Language

As indicated, the Kalmyks are part of the West Mongols, a term both geographic and linguistic. The Mongol languages are part of the Altaic group, as are Turkic, Uighur, Kitan, Jurchen, and Manchu. There is a disagreement among linguists as to whether East and West Mongol are languages or dialect groups. Jagchid and Hyer maintain: "Unintelligibility in conversation between dialects, from those in Hulun-buir in the far east to Kalmuck in the far west, is not a serious problem."¹ West Mongol includes Volga Kalmyk, the Oyirad languages, and the Mongol spoken in Afghanistan.

Within the Kalmyk language/dialect are several subgroups, including the Dobet dialects now used in northwest China, the Torghûd dialects of Sinkiang, and the Khoshûd spoken in the Koko Nor region. Most of the Kalmyks of the Volga and Orenburg speak a Torghûd dialect, but the Kalmyks of the Don, known as the Buzava Kalmyks, use a Dorbet dialect.²

There is a question as to when the Kalmyks became literate. The Mongols adopted several writing systems, but all disappeared, except an alphabet derived from the ancient Uighur script (passed via Sogdian, and derived ultimately from either Aramaic or Greek). Tradition has it that in 1646 Zaya Pandita created the West Mongol script known as todo bichig ("clear script") or todo mongol/mongghol ("Mongol script"). It is known that the Mongol-Oyirad law code of 1640 was written down, but the script used remains a mystery. By the mid-seventeenth century
the Volga Kalmyks used the Zaya Pandita script which dropped numerous Mongolian archaisms and more accurately described their language. Even so, it never developed a popular literature, remaining chiefly the province of priests, used for sacred works. The priests, in order to maintain a monopoly on learning, may intentionally have discouraged any wide use of the script. Following the 1917 Revolution, the Kalmyks were cut off from other Mongols by the forced adoption of a series of new alphabets, deriving from either Latin or Cyrillic.  

Kalmyk Social Structure

Kalmyks were divided socially into two large groups, the "classes" so beloved by Soviet writers. The *tsagan yasn* ("white bone") included the nobility (the khan, the *taishas, noyons, zaisangs*, and their families) and the *khar yasn* ("black bone") composed of the commonality. Between the two existed the *erketen* and *dakhkan*, commoners exempted from taxes and some services on the basis of acts of particular merit. Members of the Black Bone owned property and were protected by the law, but were not personally free. They were bound to their *khoton-*aimak-ulus groups and could be traded between princes, be given as bequests to the Buddhist clergy and monasteries and, by the mid-XVIIIth century, sold.

Kalmyk society was organized into two divergent, but related systems. The first, certainly the older, was based on kinship. The primary social unit of the Kalmyks was the family and its agnatic extensions gathered into the *khoton* (encampment). The *khoton* was
made up of family units which resided in felt tents (kibitka, the name by which such subdivisions are usually known); was led by its most senior member; and was considered a single unit with joint legal responsibility and holding all property in common. New khoton could be created at the death of the leader; or at the achievement of majority by a son, who could demand his share of the herds and create his own khoton; or by the legal dissolution of the khoton and the redistribution of its members.

Above the khoton, but also supposedly genealogically based, was the aimak, which consisted of from one hundred to over one thousand kibitka, ruled by the zaisang (zasng). The zaisang might be the descendant of a princely family, a member of a junior line of princes, or a commoner rewarded for conspicuous service. Each kibitka owned its zaisang annual taxes and services (alban) amounting to one tenth its herds to maintain the prince and pay his taxes to his own lord, either another zaisang or the khan.

Above the aimak was the ulus or nutuk, the tribe. As Leontovich noted, "At the last stage of tribal alliance (nutuk or oron) the relationship retains only ties of genealogical tradition - the kin consciousness of the tribe ..." The ulus was ruled by the taisha or taiji, a title which descended in the senior male line, all other male heirs bearing the title noyon. Normally the noyon was the vassal of his family's taisha and ruled a unit of households also called an ulus. Certainly the most powerful centrifugal force at work among the Kalmyk was the neverending urge of noyons and taishas
to create ulus independent of the rule of any suzerian.

Above the various taishas and noyons, supported by them all and ruling a totally independent ulus or oron (the tribal alliance) was the khungtsaiji or the khan. His power depended on the ability to manipulate his vassal princes and to control their urges to create separate establishments. Without forceful leadership, a tribal alliance, once formed, would probably not survive the death of its founder. Division and multiplication of ulus, aimak, and khoton were more the rule than was their conflations and unification.

The second system used to organize Kalmyk society was numerical; however, the information concerning these divisions, drawn from Pallas and Bergmann, is less specific than for the genealogical. The major numerical grouping was the otok (banner), used to organize migrations and warfare and often equated to the aimak. The otok were divided by position into the right wing - the place of honor held by relatives and retainers of the khan - and the left wing - including those peoples added by conquest. Below the otok were units of forty, mentioned most often in connection with tax collections. 11

Kalmyk Religions

There were several religious systems whose beliefs competed for adherents among the Kalmyks. The most ancient practice of the Mongols, one shared by all the peoples of Inner Asia, was shamanism. It sprang, according to Walther Heissig, from ancestor worship in which the spirits of dead members of the clan became earth and sky
spirits, able to act on the behalf of the living. The shaman (boge) and shamaness when possessed by spirits could divine and prophesy, break the hold of demons and ghosts, influence the health of the people, and bless the herds and hunting. 12

Shamans were very powerful among the Mongols. Kokochu' a particularly famous boge, almost destroyed the family of Chinggis and had to be murdered. Originally no more than clan religious spokesmen, under the influence of and in opposition to Buddhism, the shamans organized their beliefs and by the XVIth century developed a "church" with councils, schools for training young shamans, and a pantheon headed by Koke Mongke Tngri, Blue Eternal Heaven. Chinggis Khan claimed to have been designated khan by Tngri and was himself deified as the pre-eminent ancestral and political creator god of the Mongols. Other gods and numerous tngri protected the earth, hearth, herds, destiny, warriors, natural phenomena, even specific breeds and colors of cattle. After the advent of Buddhism, shamans adopted several gods originally Hindu.

Buddhism, which dealt with a similar shamanism in Tibet, spent three centuries both combating and absorbing Mongol shamanistic spirits, practices, and beliefs. Giuseppe Tucci, writing on Tibet, noted: "When Buddhism became victorious these primitive gods did not vanish; some remained as ancestors of the aristocracy . . . others were transformed into Buddhist deities and received through a nominal conversion the task of guarding temples or of watching over the sacred character of vows . . . ." 13
Among the Kalmyks the duality of beliefs was obvious to both Pallas and Bergmann. Kalmyk shamans and shamanesses, though often persecuted by Buddhist clergy, continued to practice, curing illness, blessing herds, even manipulating the weather. Pallas noted that doll/idols (onggoi) were worshipped in the home and the god Daldjin Tengr continued to protect herds and act as the god of war.14

The only world-wide religion which gained general popularity among the Kalmyks was the Gelugpa (Virtuous Way), also known as the "Yellow Sect," from the distinctive color of the monks' robes. Gelugpa Buddhism was a Mahayana ("Great Vehicle") sect which developed in Tibet. The Mongols first converted to Buddhism under Khublai Khan, who had been influenced by the Sakyapa sect priest hPags-pa. After the Yuan retreat from China, Buddhism probably continued to exist among the Mongols, but its influence declined dramatically. Later, the Oyirad leaders Toghan and Esen toyed with conversion to Buddhism, but serious growth began only after the adherence of the Altan Khan of the Tumed in the sixteenth century. He was recognized as a reincarnation of Khubilai Khan and the Tibetan monk who converted him, as the reincarnation of hPags-pa (ultimately of the Bodhisatva Avalokitesvara) and granted the title Dalai Lama. Among the West Mongols it took about fifty years for Buddhism to spread. Its great patron there was the Khoshūd Boibegus, who in 1615 convinced each of the Oyirad tribal leaders, including Khū Örlük of the Torghud, to pledge a child to the church.15

The princely houses quickly adopted Buddhism, accepting the
religion's endorsement of their political power and rewarding the Yellow Sect, its priests and monasteries with lands, herds, and vassals. Among the Volga Kalmyks the Buddhist Church developed a three-layered priesthood (gelng "priest" being the highest level) as well as specialized clerics for administrative, financial, academic, and medical affairs. The Kalmyk religious establishment remained under the authority of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa; his local representative, the khutukhta was the most important lama in the steppe. 16

One modern, essentially hostile author, I. Glukhov, observed that the Buddhist clergy occupied one of the most visible and influential places in Kalmyk daily life and claimed that a Kalmyk "could not take even one step" without the approval of the local gelng. 17 This overstates the case, but there is no question of the power of Buddhism among the Kalmyks. Priests controlled the religious establishment, ran all academic institutions, oversaw the important quasi-science of astrology, and were keepers of the calendar. Of special import was their ability to exorcize demons and make medicines more effective than those of the shamans. One of Aiuka Khan's chief complaints against the Djunghar was that their wars interdicted his supply of Tibetan medicines.

Beyond its functional power, the Buddhist Church enjoyed tremendous religious clout. Every ulus had a monastic establishment, even in the most remote areas. Prior to 1771, the Kalmyk monasteries were mobile affairs composed of a group of felt tents, often separated from the lay living quarters by a wooden fence. The largest
tent rivaled that of the khan and attached to each monastery were numbers of retainers. In 1776, Pallas reported that the high lama of the Torghud controlled eight ulus and as late as 1874, 24,000 people were still bound to the khurul (monasteries) of Astrakhan gubernia. 18

The Russian government and the Orthodox Church failed to break the power of Buddhism and convert the Kalmyks. As Bergmann noted: "The so-called Christians of Saratov have their lamaist holy books, offering utensils and incense, and, though their priests wear worldly clothes and let their hair grow, at meetings in their homes they put on their lamaistic robes and perform lamaistic ceremonies . . . ."19 Buddhism, which was famed for its pragmatism, recognized the White Khan of Russia as the incarnation of the White Tārā (Tibetan - sGrol-dkar, Mongol - Dara "Kha"), the consort of Avalokitesvara and goddess of mercy. That impression was particularly potent when the Russian ruler was female. 20

Christianity, an imported religion like Buddhism, was never particularly successful among the Kalmyks. K. Kostenkov flatly asserted that within fifty years of the Kalmyks' arrival in Russia "among their numbers were a great many desiring to accept holy baptism."21 In fact, that was not to have been the case. Initially the Orthodox Church showed little interest in proselytizing efforts of any kind.

Conversion became politically important in the reign of Aiuka. In his 1680 oath Aiuka promised not to interfere with the decision to
convert. Even the slow progress of Christianity among the Kalmyks became a growing problem, the nature of the dispute depending chiefly on the social origins of the convert. Members of the Black Bone, the herdsmen, hunters, and warriors - all taxpayers, were the sources of the wealth and influence of the nobility. The Russians faced several dilemmas, not the least of which was the moral issue of whether a Kalmyk commoner, once converted, should then be turned back to the ulus of a heathen prince. In difficult economic times the acceptance of runaway Kalmyks by the Russians threatened to open a floodgate of such desertions, destroying the social and political fabric of the Kalmyks. Even though the Russians hoped eventually to transform these Mongol nomads into Russian farmers, the early XVIIIth century was too soon. Russia relied on the ferocity of Kalmyk troops and could not readily absorb several hundred thousand Christian nomads. Considerable pressure from the Kalmyk nobles was exerted on Aiuka to stop the socio-economic hemorrhaging caused by conversions. The Russian government had to decide whether to baptize runaway serfs, thereby sanctioning an act illegal in Russia under the Ulozhenie of 1649, or to turn away those Kalmyks most prepared to accept the Russian way of life.

The second group of converts was the nobility, vital, according to Marc Raeff, for the subversion of any group. The noble converts were rarer and came more slowly, but the Russians were always most anxious to accept them. The first such convert recorded was Tseren, son of Aiuka's rival Dugar, who had been sent to the Russians for
safekeeping. He and probably some of his retainers were converted after 1673. Subsequently he was created Prince Vasilii Dugorov and settled with a group of baptized commoner Kalmyks at Tereshka, near Saratov, in 1700. That settlement was burned by Aiuka in 1704. The next major defection, in 1724, was Aiuka's grandson Baksadai Dordji, who was given the Christian name Prince Petr Taishin. He was then sent into the steppe to nomadize with other converted Kalmyks, and was given a mobile chapel designed by Peter I, books, and a chaplain.

The danger of these noble converts was their possible use as political pawns. Prince Taishin wrote Empress Anna Ioannovna, in 1731, that by Kalmyk law and the promise of Peter I, he, not Tseren Donduk, should be the Christian khan of the Kalmyks. The Russians never foisted off an Orthodox khan on the Kalmyks, but the possibility existed until the khanate itself vanished.22

Shamanism, Buddhism, and Orthodox Christianity were not the only religious choices available to the Kalmyks. In Astrakhan were located several Roman Catholic missionaries who, in the 1730's, managed a few converts, although the exact number is unknown. In 1745, the College of Foreign Affairs insisted that, based on an ukaz of 1735, the Catholics convert no Russian vassal. Catholic Kalmyks were packed off to Stavropol' to be settled with the Orthodox Kalmyks. Later, Moravian Brothers who moved to the Volga at Sarepeta in the 1760's, attempted to convert local Kalmyks, but were generally unsuccessful.

Some Kalmyks, in whose ulus lived Muslim Tatars, accepted Islam. In the 1740's Muslim Kalmyks were ordered to Stavropol' to live among
Orthodox Kalmyks and be converted to Christianity. Muslims found proselytizing among the Kalmyks were liable to be burned. In the 1760's, a group of Muslim Kalmyks returned from living among the Kazakhs and was allowed to live, as Muslims, in the Orenburg guberniia. There they associated with Muslim Bashkir.

Each religion had some political implications. Shamanism, which may have helped the princely lines to establish their power in antiquity, continued to be popular, especially among the commoners. It was tolerated by the princes and the shamans seem never to have threatened the political status quo. Buddhism was more important. The Dalai Lama and his priests endorsed the political standing of the ruling class. The khan's title was the discretionary gift of Lhasa. Buddhist hierarchs were wealthy and held a virtual monopoly on education and scholarly information. Christianity was not popular, but as the religion of Russia, it threatened to forge strong bonds between some Kalmyk nobles and an external patron of their political aspirations. Orthodoxy also acted as a magnet for Kalmyks who wished to change religion in order to escape the Kalmyk social and political systems.

The Kalmyk Political Structure

The pinnacle of the Kalmyk political and social systems was the khan. The Torghud princely line proudly traced itself to the Kerait Ong Khan, who once was the lord of Chinggis Khan. Kalmyk genealogies stressed not the superior-inferior status of that
relationship, but the fact that the two were of the same "bone."\textsuperscript{24} Pallas and the Pelliot genealogy from the Piao chuan accepted descent from the Ong Khan, but differed in the number of generations involved. The Torghūd princes and khans claimed a lineage as old as that of the Chinggisid Mongols, deriving from ancestors equally noble. They did not, however, claim to be Chinggisids themselves.\textsuperscript{25}

The Torghūd, who did not present themselves as Chinggisids to other Mongols, on occasion did when dealing with the Russians. In 1636, when the Russians demanded hostages, the Kalmyks explained that none would be forthcoming, since their princes were the descendants of Chinggis Khan. At the same time they refused to withdraw from Kandaka, an area near Astrakhan, because "from time immemorial the natural places of the Kalmyks (were those) of their ancestor Chinggis Khan." The next year envoys sent to Astrakhan discussed the same issues. Kneeling, they protested the tone of the conversations because they represented the heirs of Chinggis Khan.\textsuperscript{26}

The reasons for this tack are impossible to retrieve, but the Kalmyks may have hoped for special status as Chinggis' heirs from gullible Russians or Tatars. Or they may have tried to establish a claim linked to the period when Oyirad troops reached the Volga in the armies of the Mongols' forefather. Or perhaps they chose to imply that the mantle of Chinggis had passed to a new group of Mongols which planned to claim its inheritance.

The ultimate recognition of the Torghūd princes as independent rulers was the granting and acceptance of the title of khan. The
conferral of political legitimacy through a "promotion" in rank was not a matter unique to the Mongols or Inner Asia. In Europe the Papacy had, at one time, made and broken kings by the distribution of titles, the dispatch of regalia, and the declaration of anathema. Later, the right of intermarriage with royal lines and the subtle gradations of address between monarchs delineated starkly one's relative standing.  

Among the Mongols the title of khan had been, since the time of Chinggis, the prerogative of that ruler's male heirs. The insistence on Chinggisid legitimacy by East Mongols was so strong that many have credited it with destroying the possibility of cooperation with the West Mongols if the price of that cooperation was the replacement of the Chinggisid line by another.

The only "legitimate" Chinggisid khan was the ruler of the Chahar Mongols, a line which died out in 1634. Other Mongols, after accepting Buddhism, found they too could have royal titles, but only when granted by the Dalai Lama. The Altan Khan of the Tumed, the ruler who first "recognized" the Dalai Lama, had much to do with the proliferation of new titles among Mongols. As ruler of the Tumed, the Right Wing of the East Mongols, he fought the Chinggisid Bodi Alakh Khan of the Chahars and forced him to withdraw beyond the Khingan Mountains into Liao-tung. In 1551, he made peace with Darayisun, the next Chahar ruler, and was granted the title of Situ Gegen Khan by him. That was not enough. When the Tumed ruler accepted the authority of the Dalai Lama, he was recognized as the incarnation of the Khubilai Khan. In a stroke, genealogical legitimacy was superseded by
theological legitimacy. The Altan Khan no longer needed the recognition of his rank by his Chahar rival. Several other Khalka Mongol rulers were eventually thus elevated so that there came into being the "Tushiyetu", the Jasaghtu, the Tsetsen, and Sayin Noyon (a title which did not become a political designation until 1725 and then only at the order of the Manchu) khan. Even Ligdan, the last Chinggisid khan, whose line had initially endorsed the Red Sect of Buddhism, took an impressive series of titles emphasizing both genealogical and religious legitimacy. 28

The Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) repaid the crucial military support given him by the West Mongols with titles much like those granted the East Mongols. In 1635, he made the Choros Kharakhula (died circa 1665) the Erdene Ba'atur khungtaiji. His ally, the Khoshud Gushi (1582-1654), who became the protector of the Yellow Church in Tibet, was named the Nomen Khan and is referred to by the Chinese as the "Khan of Tibet," where three generations of his family continued to rule. Ochirtu, the nephew of Gushi, was made the Tsetsen Khan in 1666. In 1679, the Dzungar ruler Galdan was nominated the Boshughtu Khan. C. P. Bawden indicates the importance which this sort of recognition held:

This was a significant moment in the development of Galdan's career, for it was a public declaration that the powerful Tibetan Church was backing him. No previous ruler of his line had held this title, not even the great Kharakhula, and his successors, down to Amursana, were to be satisfied with the lower dignity of taisha. By implication Galdan was now the equal of the line of Genghis, to which he did
not in fact belong, and the potential rival of the Manchu emperor for Mongol loyalties. 29

The Torghūd princes, perhaps as part of a policy by the Dalai Lama to bind powerful rulers independent of the Manchu to his party, were included in the distribution of titles. Shukur Daichin, the successor of Kho Örluk and twice a visitor to Lhasa, was granted a royal seal some time before 1651; but he chose not to use his title with any regularity, probably because of the hostility of the Russian government. The Muscovites pretended that they alone granted titles to their vassals. It was an uncomfortable moment when a quasi-vassal received a promotion in rank from a non-Russian potentate. It is not known if the original grant applied to Daichin's successor, Monchak, but it is clear that he never used the title, depending, instead, on Russia for the recognition of his status. Aiuka, with whom this study ends, received the seal and title of khan from the Sixth Dalai Lama in 1690, though the Russians refused to recognize the grant for several years. After Aiuka, the title remained in the Torghūd royal family, but was granted only at the convenience of the Russian government, not Lhasa. 30

Below the khan, but of the same "bone," were two levels of nobility. The upper nobility, the ike noyod, was comprised chiefly of taishas. Many of this group, especially the junior members of the Torghūd royal clan and the leaders of the Volga Dorbet and Koshūd, possessed herds so large and vassals so numerous as to be rivals of the khan. No Torghūd-Kalmyk ruler was able to assume power without
the support of the *ike noyod* and none made that step without first defeating the challenge of at least one other powerful *taisha*. In the reign of Aiuka the Russian Governor A. P. Volynskii based his Kalmyk policy on balancing the power of the khan against that of his most powerful and influential relatives and vassals, attempting thereby to neutralize all parties concerned.

The lower nobility (*baga noyod*) was made up of the *zaisangs*, a group whose numbers were too great and whose herds and vassals too few to pose a significant threat to the authority of the khan. More likely to be abused by their immediate overlords, the *taishas*, the lower nobility was an excellent source of advisors to the khan and a potential counterpoise to the power of the upper nobility.

The majority of the Black Bone commonality was made up of the *albatu*. Annually they owed one tenth of their herds to their lords and were subject to supplemental dues for the Buddhist clergy and special levies in time of war. With the introduction of currency in the XVIIIth century, dues and fines were sometimes converted into money payments, as recognized by Donduk Dashi's 1740 law code. Services, such as care of the lord's herds, work in his household, and special attention to breeding cattle, were added burdens. Soviet historians have drawn special attention to the increasing abuse of the *albatu* as the chief reason for the flight and conversion of Kalmyk commoners.

The two other groups of commoners originated as retainers of lay and clerical leaders. The first of these was the *ketshiner*
(ketoshiner), from ketshi (servant, minion). Originally a bodyguard in time of war, in time of peace these men became the personal servants of a taisha. As their numbers grew and they lost their original function, the ketshiner became a separate part of Kalmyk society, retaining their functional name and possessing their own herds. The other group, the shebener (shevner, shemner) derived their name from shabinar, the vassals of clerics. The shebener were albatu whose lords donated them for the maintenance of priests and monasteries. Their early presence is attested to by Zaya Pandita who, in 1658, was accompanied by them. Since virtually every Kalmyk noyon possessed a religious establishment, the shebener were found everywhere, living proof of the piety of their lord. Shebener were usually more fortunate than their fellow albatu, escaping the need to serve in the military and avoiding many of the dues owed lay rulers.

Below the Black Bone were the slaves (bo'ol), called iatsyr' ("captives") by the Russians. Slaves played an insignificant role in Kalmyk society and economy and Kalmyks were almost never kept as slaves by other Kalmyks. Only in the 1730's did growing levels of debt force some Kalmyks to sell themselves. Even then, most such Kalmyks were sold either to Central Asian merchants or to Russians as serfs.

Slavery could be political. Since the family was a legal unit, a criminal could condemn his family to slavery. On occasion Kalmyk khans sold the families of defeated rivals, but even this was rare. There is no indication that the Kalmyks aped the imperial
Mongol custom of presenting the sons of powerful vassals as personal slaves (omchu bo'ol) to the Khan.

Slaves were economically important outside the Kalmyk ulus. As a result of raids and wars, the Kalmyks possessed large numbers of captives who could not easily be absorbed by the nomads. At times captives were ransomed. Again and again Russian envoys were sent to arrange for the release of Russian captives (most of whom had first been taken by the Crimeans and then seized in Kalmyk raids in southern Russia) and to prevent the ransoming of captured Crimeans. When Russians captured Kalmyks, especially children, they were sold to merchants as slaves, or, if baptized, as serfs.

The Kalmyks were but the first in a series of dealers through whom the slaves were passed south, to the markets of Central Asia. Boris A. Pazukhin reported in 1699 while on a mission to Central Asia that:

At this epoch the traffic in Russian captives was systematically organized in Uzbekistan. The Calmucks and the Bashkirs made incursions into Russian territory, and carried off the inhabitants of the villages, the streltsi, and the merchants who came in their way. Khivan traders came to the Calmuck and the Bashkir camps and purchased the captives. They were afterwards again sold in Bokhara, Persia and elsewhere. The price of a slave was at Khiva at that time about 40 to 50 rubles. 32

The Russians tried to end this trade, but the taishas were uncooperative. Prisoners were the inevitable product of war, human loot that garnered income. Besides, the slave trade was as old as the steppe. By acts of 1737 and 1744 Kalmyk lords were allowed to sell their fellow
Kalmyks to Russians.

The Kalmyk Economy

The economic life of the Kalmyks depended on three things: herding, hunting, and trading. Of the three, herding was the most significant, requiring both animals and pastures. The extremes of climate required the nomads to secure both summer and winter pastures, as well as spring and autumn ones, moving as often as ten to fifteen times a year to take advantage of the grasses. These changes of pasturage were well scouted, carefully organized, and run with military precision. During the Kalmyk's move west, it was not uncommon to find the princes' herds summering on the Ishim-Tobol and wintering in the Kara Kum. Once established in the Caspian steppe, the southern pastures, which received little snow, were favored in the winter. By May and June the grasses began to die and the herds moved north, along the Volga. The route was reversed as the air chilled in autumn. The right to divide grazing areas was the khan's most jealously guarded prerogative.33

Nomadic states, called by the Chinese hsing-kuo ("moving state") and ma-shang hsing-kuo ("states on horseback") valued the horse for giving mobility, offensive capability, and a quick escape in time of trouble. One proverb from Inner Mongolia says: "The greatest misfortune is for one to lose his father while he is young or his horse during a journey."34

The Kalmyk horse was accustomed to the climate and topography of the Tarbagatai and Djungharia. Mixed with other breeds in Siberia
and the Volga, the medium-sized, thick-bodied Kalmyk horse was noted for its strength, speed and endurance, if not its beauty. Living in areas which often lacked luxurious grazing or which were snow-covered in winter, these horses survived on small amounts of water in the heat and could find grass and other plants under the snow. The rider could also derive sustenance from a mare's milk without impairing her ability to suckle her foal.  

The status of the horse is evident from the Kalmyk vocabulary where U. E. Erdinev found designations for ten age levels, divided by young, male and female animals. A rider could count on his horse's ability to travel up to one hundred verst, approximately one hundred kilometers, without food or rest. Kalmyks were renowned for their ability to train these horses and even the Don Cossacks were reported to defer to them. Horses never lost their importance and Nefed'ev in 1834 found that the Volga Kalmyks kept over 160,900 head.  

As the horse gave locomotion, so the cow and the sheep gave sustenance. The most common breed of cattle used by the Kalmyks was a long-horned variety. As with the horse, the Kalmyks had some twenty-two words to describe the sex and age of cattle. These animals, which required little daily attention from herders, gave meat and milk, were used to pull the Kalmyk tent carts, and transported heavy loads. In 1803, the Volga Kalmyks had over 1,200,000 head of cattle, more than five times the number of horses.  

The other major domesticated animal (there were also goats and
camels) was the sheep. It supplied meat, milk, wool, and the felt to make the yurt and cover its floor. The breed favored by the steppe nomads was the black-faced *Ovis Lati cadvata*, also known as the "fat rump." Found throughout Europe and Asia, it was the largest breed then known, popular everywhere for its size and adaptability. "All the Nomade horde of Asia, the Turcomans, Kirguise, Galmouks, and Mongol Tatars rear it; and indeed it constitutes their chief riches, the number they possess being enormous." In the mid-XIXth century the Volga Kalmyks averaged seven sheep for every man, woman, and child. 38

Besides herding, hunting supplied the nomads with food and other valuable commodities, especially furs. Large hunts were staged to imitate the organization of a military campaign. Chao Hung of the Southern Sung reported that among the northern nomads "children grow up on horseback and everybody learns the techniques of warfare. From springtime to winter, they hunt daily as a livelihood. Accordingly, they have no infantry, but only cavalry." 39 The records show little evidence of the massive hunts called *aba* by the Mongolians. But in 1634, Daichin appeared near Astrakhan with a 10,000-man army. While he decided whom to attack and where, Daichin's host spent several days hunting saigak, a large, horned artiodactyl of the steppe.

Kalmyks hunted with bow and arrow, traps, dogs, and falcons, depending on the game. If the purpose of the hunt was furs, traps were used and the game stalked chiefly in the early winter, when
the pelts were thickest and sleekest. In the seventeenth century Russia's vassal Tatars in Siberia most often complained against the Kalmyks for their disruption of hunting and usurpation of Tatar trapping grounds.

Along with hunting, the Kalmyks fished in the rivers of Siberia and the rich waters of the Volga and Iaik. Usually the Kalmyks made an akhan, a trap of branches which trapped fish swimming upstream. In Siberia the Kalmyks also enraged the local Tatars by breaking in on their fishing grounds. Later, in the west, numbers of Kalmyks became commercial fishermen, attached to fishing stations as serfs of Kalmyk or Russian lords.

Nomad artisans produced goods and tools for local use. But most manufactured items had to be imported, bought with whatever commodities or moneys the nomads could muster. The Kalmyks sold horses, cattle, sheep, goats, and camels, furs and fish, felt and wool, lake salt, and captives. By "selling" their warriors to the Russians, the Kalmyks were rewarded with sums of cash to purchase the wonders of the sedentary world. Most money, however, was in the hands of relatively few. The Kalmyks purchased a wide range of items: tea and most grains, weapons, gunpowder, armour, even caldrons. Most clothing and cloth came from Russia. Central Asia supplied the tents used by the khan and many others to augment the traditional yurt.

Kalmyks were regularly sent to markets with trade goods when on missions from their princes, but no significant mercantile class
developed among them. Trade was usually in the hands of the sedentarists. In markets and on the steppe, most traders were Russians (including professionals, townspeople and peasants) and Central Asian Muslims (usually referred to as "Bukharans"). There were numerous complaints by Kalmyk taishas that their men were taken advantage of by the more experienced Russians. Little could be done about it, however; and considering that the alternative was closing the markets, the Kalmyks were forced to accept their handicap.

The Kalmyks were keenly aware of the routes linking them to the sedentary world. The early stages in the Kalmyk migrations crossed and threatened routes which ran south along the Irtysk (from Tara to Kuldja and from Tara to Turkestan and Bukhara) and those from Tobol'sk, along the Ishim and Tobol, ending in Central Asia. They also endangered the east-west routes from Tobol'sk to China. The Russians had built the Siberian posts in part to control and develop these routes and local authorities must have breathed a collective sigh of relief when the Kalmyks moved west.

At the time the Kalmyks entered the Caspian steppe, land and sea routes converging there linked Moscow with the Black Sea, the Caspian, Persia, and Central Asia; they were older and better developed than those of Siberia. One group of routes began on the upper Volga, dropped south, paralleled the Belaia, joined north of the Sakmara, and crossed the Iaik. One route then followed the upper Ilek, turned east and south, crossed the Kara Kum and led to
Turkestan. A second major route from the Volga, the "Nogai Road" (Nogaiśkaia doroga), began in Samara, crossed the highlands to Isitskii gorodok and then followed the Iaik to the area of Gur'ev. Turning east, the route split into two. The northermost, which ran due east and joined the Kazan-Ufa routes south of Lake Chalkar-Teniz, was known as the "Kalmyk Road" (Kalmyśkaia doroga). The second branch veered south, crossed the lower Emba, and ran to the southern end of the Aral Sea, then on to Urgench and Khiva.

Astrakhan, the major trade entrepot of the Kalmyks, was also the focal point for numbers of routes. Land routes followed the east bank of the Volga, north to Chernyi Iar, Tsaritsyn, Samara, and Kazan. At least two routes led east, along the northern edge of the Caspian to Gur'ev, where they joined the Nogai Road. Another went almost due south along the Caspian, across the Kum and Terek to Tarki, Derbent and Baku, and then by land and sea to Resht, Astrabad, Meshed, Merv, Bukhara, Balkh, and India. By water Astrakhan was linked, via the Volga, to central Russia. Two routes crossed the Caspian to the Mangyshlak Peninsula, touching land at Kabakly and Karagan, depots for caravan links with Khvārazm. This region was conquered by the Kalmyks under Monchak.

To the north, originating in Tsaritsyn and running west, across the Don, to the Crimea and the Black Sea was yet another major trade route. The Kalmyks, by strategic positioning and winning trade privileges from the Russians, secured access to all these lines, their merchants, and markets. The same position theoretically allowed
them, however, to prevent Russian use of those routes.

Kalmyk History

The Oyirad

To find the beginnings of Kalmyk history, one must look first to their antecedents, the Oyirad, a group of originally Turkic-speaking peoples known to the Mongols as the Oi-yin-irgen ("People of the Forest"), who lived northwest of the Altai Mountains. A Persian historian commented: "They do not live, like the other Mongols, in felt tents, they keep no herds, but live by hunting in their immense forests and profess a great contempt for the pastoral peoples."\(^{41}\)

The later Mongol histories posited that both Mongols and Oyirad shared common ancestors for twelve generations (beginning with Kudzugun Sandalitu khagan, a Tibetan king, via Borte-chino' a, to brothers, Duva-sokhor and Dob-mergen). The Secret History reports: "After the death of Duva-sokhor, his four sons, not acknowledging their uncle Dob-mergen as kinsman, reviled him in every way; and, separating, they abandoned him and nomadized away. Thus the special group of the Dorben was created. From here derive the four-tribe Dorben-irgen."\(^{42}\) Dob-mergen's descendants became the Mongols of the steppe.

The Oyirad vanished into their forests and reappeared in the histories in the early thirteenth century when the young Mongol chief Temujin began to unite the Mongol tribes. First they allied with his
rival Jamukha and later joined the Markit to resist him. However, the Oyirad leader Khutukha-beki did not remain in these alliances long and, when Temujin (by this time having taken the title Chinggis Khan) sent his eldest son Jochi to subdue the forest peoples, Khutukha-beki joined him. Chinggis was well pleased; he married Khutukha-beki to the widow of the last Tumet ruler and awarded his two sons with Mongol princesses, the khan's daughter and granddaughter. The Oyirad continued to be honored marriage partners of the imperial Borjigid clan throughout the duration of the Chinggisid empire.

Oyirad troops joined the armies of Chinggis. The great expedition against Transoxania first gathered near their home territories. Records indicate that a century later a group of Oyirad, over 18,000 households, was lived near Baghdad and Mosul. Later, the same Oyirad were dispersed among the Egyptian Mamlukes. The scattering of tribal names across Central Asia and into Russia hints at Oyirad troops having been sent there several centuries ahead of the Kalmyks.

Following their inclusion in the Mongol Empire, the Oyirad and the other Forest people were made vassals of Jochi. At the death of Chinggis (Jochi had predeceased his father), the Oyirad territory was included, with Mongolia and China, in the appanage which eventually fell to the line of Khubilai, the Yuan Dynasty. It was, however, an area with ties to the opposition group led by Arikh-böge, which protested the sedentarist policies of the China-oriented Yuan. Little more of the Oyirad than marriage alliances is recorded during the Yuan florescence; but they reemerged as a major political force.
following the expulsion of the Mongols from China.

The reasons for the inimical division of the East and West Mongols into contending tribal groups involved the inevitable competition for grazing and concomitant power. There is a tale that the Mongol Elbek Khan (1394-1399/1401) was murdered by the Oyirad brothers Batula and Ugechi in retaliation for the murder of their father, Khuukhai Dayo. The two took 40,000 Oyirad and fled the Mongols, swearing undying hatred.43

Whatever happened, the Oyirad, led by Baghamu (died 1434) joined the Ming Yung-lo Emperor in attacking the East Mongols. They secured their base in the west, expanded their control over much of western Mongolia and followed the Irtysh, north, into Siberia. Baghamu's son Toghon Temur continued the growth of Oyirad power. In summing up the status of the Mongols under the sinicized Chinggisids, the Altan tobchi records that Toghon remarked: "They are like camels without a bull-camel, oxen without a bull, herds without a stallion, sheep without a ram."44 Toghon volunteered himself as the needed masculine force and reduced the ineffectual Mongol khans to mere puppets. He seized the Ili valley from the Chagataid Khanate of Moghulistan, twice capturing its head, Vais Khan (1418-1421, 1425-1429). Toghon also extended Oyirad power along the Irtysh.

Following Toghon, his son Esen (1439-1455) brought the Oyirad to the height of their power. His control spread from Hami to Manchuria and in 1449 he captured the Ming Ying-tsung Emperor and killed over 100,000 Chinese troops. Esen continued the policy of
marrying into the Mongol imperial Borjigid clan and was the king-maker of Mongolia. He could not acquire Chinggisid legitimacy by marriage (it descended in the male line) and finally assassinated the Chinggisid khan, attempting to make his own line imperial. However, Esen could not effect so basic a change in Mongolia, having failed correctly to judge the loyalty of the East Mongols to the line of Chinggis. Neither he nor his heirs were welcomed, except at the point of a sword. Esen was assassinated in 1455.

After Esen's death, the Oyirad entered a period of confusion and decline, produced by contesting tribal leaders and the resurgent Mongols. In the east the Chinggisid line had dwindled to a single child, Batu Mongke Dayan Khan (1487-1524). Surviving to maturity through the determination of his older and more experienced wife/protector Mandughai, Dayan reunited and restructured the Mongols. Unfortunately, he did not create a permanently unified Mongolia and, at his death, all the East Mongols were divided among his eleven sons and their sons, from whom all one hundred eighty-three modern Mongol tribes derive. Rampant tribalism reemerged, as powerful as ever. Several of his heirs spent the next half century repaying the Oyirad for their earlier depredations.

Initially the Mongols were led by the Altan Khan of the Tumed, a tribe driven earlier by the Oyirad from their traditional pastures, south, toward the great bend of the Yellow River. In 1552, the Tumed Altan Khan, Dayan's grandson, moved north; he killed the chief of the Khoit, recaptured Karakorum and the Kobdo Plain, and drove the
Oyirad from the region, eventually allowing the Khalka to settle there. The war against the Oyirad continued and in 1562 Khutukhtai Sechen khungtaiji of the Ordos Mongols surprised the Torghud who were then camped far down the Irtysh. He devastated the West Mongols, even killing a great-uncle of Kho Orluk. If Samuel Grupper's linguistic detective work is correct, the Torghud were at that time nomadizing in an area over a hundred and fifty miles farther downstream than authorities had formerly credited them.

The Ordos Khutukhtai Sechen and his lord, Buyan Ba'atur, attacked the Oyirad again in 1572-1573 and 1574, ravaging the Khoit and Choros camped along the upper Yenisei. In the early 1580's, Abadai, the Tushiyetu Khan of the Khalkas (1554-1588), marched west and attacked the Khoshud, the tribe of the ruling khan of the Oyirad. The Oyirad Khanai Khan was slain in the battle of Kobker and Abadai set his own eldest son, Shubughadai, as the khan of the Oyirad. The Khalka prince was utterly unacceptable and was murdered within a few years. Next, Laikhur (father of the first officially recognized Khalka Jasaghtu Khan) attacked the Oyirad in the early 1600's. Eventually he made peace with them at Sira Khulusun and forced them to pay tribute.

The last major phase of the wars of the Mongols against the Oyirad featured the Khalka ruler Sholui Ubashi khungtaiji (1567-1627), a cousin of Laikhur, who had taken pastures in north-west Mongolia, close to the territory of the hard-pressed Oyirad. From here he began a series of campaigns and often enlisted the aid of the Kazakhs (centered in the lower Ili, Chu, Sary-su, and Turgai), who were them-
selves ancient enemies of the Oyirad. Sholoi Ubashi, who founded a short-lived line known as the Khalka Altan Khans (the Zolotoi khan of the Russians and lasting until 1696), attacked the Oyirad tribes. He also swore allegiance to Moscow and had extensive dealings with the Russians. The Altan Khan began his attacks in 1607 and followed with campaigns in 1613-1614, 1617 (when he complained to Moscow about the raids of the Russian "vassal" Khoshūd), and 1619-1623. In the last year, after devastating Kalmyk pastures, he was defeated on the Irtysh. This Oyirad victory was commemorated in the Oyirad epic Mongghol-un Ubasi Khong Tayiji-yin Tughuji, also known as the "Dorbon Oyirid Monggholi Darukhsan Touji Kemeku" (The Defeat of the Mongols by the Four Oyirad). Although there is disagreement as to whether Sholui Ubashi died in this campaign or later, the battle marked the end of the most devastating attacks of the Mongols. That did the West Mongols little good, however, for the Oyirad had themselves already been shattered.

The internal struggles for primacy among the Oyirad tribes and the seventy-years pounding of war divided the Oyirad, encouraging tribes to move apart and seek their fortunes and safety elsewhere. The Torghūd for the most part moved to the north-west. The Dorbed, who lived north of Lake Zaisan, along the Irtysh. They were reputed to share a common ancestry with the Choros/Djunghar and were the overlords of the Khoit, who had borne the brunt of many of the early attacks. Many Dorbed also moved down the Irtysh, both in company with and in competition to the Torghūd. A large number remained
in Djungharia, but others, led by Dalai Ba'atur, moved into Siberia and found their way as far west as the Emba. Their troubles with the Torghūd will be dealt with in greater detail below.

The Choros/Djunghar remained in the region of Lake Balkash and were heirs of the Oyirad dreams of a new Mongol empire. In this role the Choros royal house spread terror from Central Asia to Peking and Lhasa. The Torghūd, at times the allies, the enemies, and the marriage partners of the Djunghar, never successfully disentangled themselves from the pretensions of the Choros. Eventually most of the Kalmyks who fled Russia in 1771, were settled in the lands formerly part of the Djunghar khanate.

The Khoshūd, who had for a time been the royal clan of the Oyirad, continued to play an important role in the affairs of middle Asia. After the death of Khanai, his sons, known to chroniclers as tabun bars ("the five tigers"), moved their grazing. The oldest son, Boibegus, remained in the Oyirad lands, fighting the Khalka Altan Khan and bequeathing pasturage to his two sons. Ochirtu Tsetsen Khan (died 1677) located his ulus on Lake Zaisan and was eventually captured and killed by Galdan Boshoktu Khan of the Djunghar. His half-brother Ablai (died 1674), with whom he had quarrelled, settled on the Irtysh, raiding other Khoshūd and even capturing the former Torghūd ruler Shukur Daichin. The second "tiger," Kundelen Ubashi, moved into Siberia and his ulus eventually found its way to the Volga and joined the Kalmyks already there. The third son, Torobayikhu Gushi Nomen Khan (died 1654) moved to Koko Nor and became involved
in the power struggles in Tibet as supporter of the Yellow Church. With the aid of the Choros, Gushi killed the last king of Tibet and set the Dalai Lama as nominal ruler of the country. One line of Gushi’s descendants controlled Tibet until expelled by the Djunghar in 1717; another ruled in Koko Nor until the Manchu captured the area in 1724.

Russian Siberia at the Arrival of the Kalmyks

As the Oyirad tribes began to move northwest into Siberia they found there indigenous Tatar tribes and the Russians, who had come to Siberia only a few decades previously. In the early XVIIth century, Russian Siberia was underpopulated and poorly explored. Muscovite expansion into Siberia had begun in 1558 with the award of a land grant on the Kama (west of the Ural Mountains) to the Stroganov family. The Stroganov’s power and their hopes for colonization depended chiefly on an influx of Cossacks and runaways who were looking for opportunity, land, and booty. The neighboring region east of the Urals was ruled by a Tatar prince, Ediger, who was a nominal Muscovite vassal. Ediger, however, was dispossessed by the Shaibanid Kuchum Khan in 1563. Kuchum, who ruled the vast region from the Urals to the Ob, continued briefly to dispatch tribute to Moscow, but, tiring of the sham, he began in 1572 to raid the Pern’ district, a part of the Stroganov territory.

The Stroganovs complained to Moscow and Ivan IV grandly awarded them by expanding their grant east of the Urals and including about
half of Kuchum's domain. All that remained was for the Stroganovs to conquer it. They were fortunate because earlier they had given shelter to Ermak Timofeevich, a Cossack from the Volga, who, with his band of robbers, had fled Muscovite legal conventions to seek new fortunes in Siberia. Ermak and his crew were sent against Kuchum in 1579. In 1582 they took Sibir', Kuchum's capital, using the arquebus to break the power of the Tatars' bow and arrow. In 1587, the Russians built Tobol'sk, their capital for Siberia, near the old city of Sibir' and Russian colonization and administration began in earnest.

In the early years, the Russian population of Siberia was chiefly Cossacks and garrison troops and those farmers who tilled the gosudarevaia pashnia, the state fields, growing grain for the local soldiers. Although some of the colonists came away from Russia willingly, many were state peasants transferred there by the government or exiles sent, especially by Boris Godunov, for activities against the crown. The only significant private landholders were monasteries.

Most of the scattered Siberian population was made up of native Turko-Tatar, Tungus and Paleo-Siberian tribes. These peoples were not uniformly happy with Russian rule, thanks especially to the depredations of some outrageously rapacious administrators. On the whole, however, the Russians were found to be less disruptive of their lives than were other, potential landlords, including the Oyirad tribes.
As the Oyirad groups moved down the Irtysh toward the Russian posts, Muscovy was convulsed by the Smuta, the Time of Troubles. In spite of the disruptions within their heartland, the Russian colonists remained entrenched in Siberia. Cut off from much of the turmoil west of the Urals, the administration in Siberia endured, grain continued to be grown, and trappers snared the furs which made the region so valuable. After fifty years the Russians had brought in settlers, built forts, and developed garrisons of tough, experienced fighters. They were well armed, relying chiefly on firearms not yet common among the Oyirad. The Russians knew the land and the people and, despite some lamentable lapses, the local administration did little to interfere with the natives. Local tribesmen, some of whom previously had risen against the Russians, were not pleased by the Kalmyk invasion. The Russians only wanted tribute; the Kalmyks robbed, devastated villages, and seized hunting and fishing lands. Whatever the shortcomings of the Russians, they were preferable to the Mongols.

The Genesis of the Kalmyks

Due to the paucity of records and the varying levels of reliability of contemporary observers, it is difficult to follow the numerous alliances of Oyirad tribal princes or even their geographical position during the move into Siberia and then westward, toward the Volga. It is clear, though, that by the opening years of the XVIIth century there were three princes whose ambition and resources gave them the potential to consolidate and rule the as yet inchoate
Kalmuks. These three were Dalai Ba'atur of the Dorbet, Chokur of the Choros, the Kho Orluk of the Torghud.

The first of these, Dalai Ba'atur (Talai Ianyshev, Dalai Bogatyr) was, initially, the most powerful of the three. His father, who is variously named Uduntai-Bida taisha or Targatu taisha, left Dalai Ba'atur leader of the majority of the Dorbet, aided, evidently loyally, by four brothers and seven sons. He was also the brother-in-law of his rival, Kho Orluk.

When Ivan IV expanded the Stroganov territory by an ukaz of 30 May, 1574, he also gave them permission to trade with a number of neighboring peoples, including the Kalmuks. Historians have been impressed that in this grant is the first mention of the Kalmuks in Russian records, but the Russians themselves did little as regarded their new, Mongol neighbors. As the Kalmuks pushed down the Irtysh, the Russians were too involved in the Smuta to take notice until envoys of Kho Orluk arrived in Tara in September, 1606. Moscow responded the next year by sending representatives into the steppe to secure Kalmuk oaths of loyalty. The first large Kalmuk embassy arrived in Tara in 1607, headed by the Dorbet taisha Kugonai Tubiev. He took the oath of allegiance for himself and the other forty-nine leading princes of the Kalmuks. Kugonai told the authorities that 120,000 Kalmuks were nomadizing to the south, ruled by Dalai Ba'atur and his associates (tovarishchi). The Torghud then nomadizing with Dalai Ba'atur were led by Uruktu (Iuriktu, not mentioned by either Batur Ubashi Tumen or Pelliot), brother of Kho Orluk. The Kalmuks,
pressed by attacks of the Khalka Altan Khan and the Kazakhs, wanted permission to graze on the Om and Kamyshlov (tributaries of the Irtysh).

By late 1607, Dalai Ba'atur's group had been joined by Khö Orluk. The Torghūd leader had apparently decided that separate nomadizing was too dangerous. The Russians became more interested since the area targeted by the Kalmyks was inhabited by vassal Tatars and the addition of more than 100,000 non-allied nomads threatened the Russian position there. Tsar Vasilii Ivanovich ordered Voevoda S. I. Gagarin to invite Kalmyk envoys to Moscow, saying:
"... they should come to Us without any danger and We personally shall reward them. There shall be kindness and hospitality given them with great care and Our rewards (zhalovan'ě) shall be ordered for those who come to Us to be fed and come to be given gifts ... ."\(^{51}\)

This initiative brought, in early 1608, the first Kalmyk envoys to Moscow. The results were an oath of allegiance to Russia, an audience with the tsar, and the first zhalovan'ě from Moscow. The Kalmyks were allowed to move their grazing closer to Tara and were granted limited trading there. When more Dorbet and Torghūd envoys presented themselves in Tara that year, attacks by the Khalka Altan Khan and the Kazakhs had persuaded them to please the Russians by paying tribute of camels, horses, cattle, and sheep. They were then allowed to move farther along the Irtysh and Kamyshlov. The Kalmyks even requested that the Russians construct a forepost on the Om River as a shield against the Khalka. The Russians, ever agreeable to
such a request from a potential client people, agreed. The reaffirmation of that oath in 1609 gave the Dorbet of Dalai Ba'atur limited trading (chiefly cattle) in Tobol'sk, Tiumen', Perm', Kazan, and Moscow; a decision prompted, according to Kichikov, by a serious shortage of breeding and plowing cattle. Kho Orluk joined the arrangement. As Kichikov saw it, these oaths were "the beginning of the entrance of the Kalmyks into the makeup of the Russian state . . . . In the years of Soviet power, freed from the fetters of tsarism, the Kalmyk people, together with the Great Russian nation and other nations of the USSR, in 1959 ceremoniously marked the 350th anniversary of their voluntary entrance into the makeup of the Russian state."

It is doubtful that the Kalmyks realized the momentous nature of the oaths of 1608-1609. They were occupied by the attacks of the Khalka Altan Khan and the Kazakhs, managing, in 1610, to defeat both. Their victories no more than temporary upturns in Kalmyk fortunes. Continued assaults drove the tribes farther into Siberia. When victorious, the Kalmyks sent few representatives to the Siberian towns. When in flight, they turned too easily to plundering, regardless of oaths. Punitive expeditions left the Siberian posts in 1612 and 1613; a stern warning was circulated by Muscovite messengers in 1616.

Even as relations in Siberia soured, the Kalmyks were probing western pastures and tribes. In 1608 and 1611, their warriors raided Moscow's vassal Nogai of the Emba steppe; and, in 1613, they crossed the Iaik for the first time. The result was the panicked flight of the Nogai toward the Volga, and attacks by their vassals, the
Edisan and Altiul Tatars on one another and on the Nogai. Russian authorities in Astrakhan, for whom the Kalmyks were an unsummoned novelty, were displeased by the introduction of this violently complicating factor which threatened the vassalage network of the lower Volga.

Throughout this early period, Dalai Ba'atur was the most powerful of the Kalmyk princes. The Tobol'sk envoys Tomil Petrov and Ivan Kunitsyn described him in 1616 as ready to be the tsar's vassal and prepared to take whatever pasturage was offered. Petrov, who had found Dalai Ba'atur nomadizing near Ala Kul, reported: "The leading prince of all the Kolmak land is called Bogatyr-dalai-taisha and they call him the tsar of all the Kolmak lands, though he does not call himself tsar." His chief advisors at this time were Kho Orluk and Chokur, but it was also known that a number of princes had chosen either not to join this group or had fled to more distant pastures, especially on the Emba and Iaik.

Dalai Ba'atur's relations with the Russians remained fairly stable, in spite of the fact that on one occasion his gifts to the tsar were rejected because of their poor quality and later his envoys were mistreated and robbed by the voevoda of Tiumen'. In April, 1619, the newly elected Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich used the presentation of a congratulatory embassy from Dalai Ba'atur to welcome the Kalmyks under his protection. There was no mention of tribute or hostages, but there was a distinct foreshadowing of one of the major terms of the later Russian-Kalmyk association. The Russians, only
recently extracted from a Polish war, wanted service: "And you, Bogatyrtäiska, with all your Kolmak Horde, wish to serve Our Royal Highness; you wish to go with all your armed men against Our enemies, wherever Our Royal wishes will send you."\textsuperscript{55}

But Dalai Ba'atur's thoughts were occupied by his own wars with the Khalka and the Djunghar Karakhula. He failed to receive any active support from the Russians, who were also battling parties of Djunghar raiders. Dalai Ba'atur, however, did benefit by the arrival of the Djunghar Chokur. In 1619, Dalai Ba'atur, KhoÕ Orlok, and Chokur allied to attack the Altan Khan of the Khalka and the Kazakhs. When they were defeated, the Kalmyks moved even closer to the towns of the Ishim and Tobol, threatening Tatar fishing and hunting and worrying the Russians by their closeness to the small Siberian posts. The voevoda of Tobol'sk tried to send them away.

"And it is ordered that they are not to be closer to the town... in order that they come no closer to the town and participate in no sort of evil."\textsuperscript{56}

A year later, in October, 1621, the Kalmyk princes swore again to be the tsar's slaves and Boibegus, Dalai, Chokur, KhoÕ Orlok, and Ishim, the Kuchimid pretender to Sibir', promised not to raid the vassal Bashkirs of the Ufa uezd. Ufa's voevoda, O. Ia. Pronchishchev, mixing pride and proper humility, wrote: "And trade, Majesty, I ordered it to be allowed with Russians for the purchase of horses and exchange for rubles. But I could not give them trade, Majesty, before Your Royal command, so that they not pull away from Your
Majesty's goodness."⁵⁷ The same princes concluded peace with the Kazakhs and some Nogai, but the Khalka Altan Khan continued to oblige Dalai's and Chokur's retreat along the Irtish.

At this moment (1625) a major quarrel typical of the nomads erupted over the division of ulus at the death of Chin, a Djunghar, son of Kharakhula, brother to both Chokur and Boibegus. Chokur, supported by Dalai Ba'atur and Khö Örluk, defeated his brother and father, only to be attacked and beaten by Khö Örluk. Chokur was forced to take shelter with Dalai Ba'atur. Khö Örluk moved west, away from the Dorbet main grazing.

One must speculate as to what followed, but Dalai Ba'atur appears to have pressed too hard his self-appointed position as "tsar of the Kolmaks." Soon, Chokur and other Djunghar, Torghüd, and Koshūd princes slipped west to join Chokur's son and a group of Altiul murzas along the Iaik. Dalai Ba'atur could not allow the growth of a group totally beyond his control and, using raids by Chokur on the Nogai and the Karabatynskaia volost' as a pretext the Dorbet ruler attacked the fugitive Chokur and totally destroyed his forces. Dalai Ba'atur boasted of his accomplishment as a true vassal of the tsar, but he had alienated numbers of princes, particularly by acts of signal cruelty such as using the back of one captured prince to make belts. When Dalai Ba'atur's messengers arrived in Moscow in 1630, they expected that their master would be rewarded with the grazing areas formerly controlled by Chokur. The dummy diaki Telepnev and Matiushkin of the Posol'skii prikaz, however, told them:
"That their taishas were to graze in their former places (beyond the Irtysh). And the envoys said: if His Majesty orders them to graze in their previous grounds beyond the Irtysh, then they shall be glad to nomadize in that place."\(^{58}\)

Dalai Ba'atur had beaten Chokur, but he had failed to be rewarded with better pasturage and had opened a new division among the Kalmyks. Chokur fled to the protection of Shukur Daichin taisha, the oldest son of Kho-Orluk, who was already building a considerable following in the west. The Dorbet leader warred against the Torghud in 1635 and 1636, aided by Khoshud and Djunghar allies. He forced Kho-Orluk to move west, but he could not compel Shukur Daichin to surrender Chokur. In late 1636, Dalai Ba'atur made peace with Kho-Orluk and either convinced or coerced the Torghud and several of his brothers to move to the upper Ishim, closer to the Dorbet. Renewed war against Shukur Daichin seemed certain when fate took a hand and Dalai Ba'atur died in 1637.

Following Dalai Ba'atur's death, Dorbet power did not vanish, but the father's division of his ulus among all his sons led to an immediate decline in Dorbet strength. One son, Daichin Khoshuchi, the son-in-law of Kho-Orluk, attacked the Torghud in 1641. As a result, his wife took their seven-year-old son Dalai Solom Tseren and two thousand Dorbet to her father. That group formed the nucleus of the Volga Dorbet. Another son, Daian Ombo, became the chief Dorbet leader and remained in Siberia. He made a disastrous alliance with the Khoshud Kundelen Ubashi and the Kazakh Djahangir. They
attacked the Djunghar Ba'atur khungtaiji, were routed, and in 1649 wound up in the Emba-Syrt region with 20,000 refugees. As shall be seen, they made peace with Shukur Daichin and eventually most joined the Volga Torghud and pledged allegiance to the tsar.

The second major contender for power was Chokur (Chugur, Shokur, Shuker). A Djunghar, Chokur was the son of the powerful prince Kharakhula, brother to Ba'atur khungtaiji and several other princes, and father-in-law of Shukur Daichin. Chokur does not appear in the records until 1616, when Tomil Petrov described him and Khö Orluk as chief advisors to Dalai Ba'atur. Their relationship did not remain as intimate; Chokur moved with a large group of Djunghar to nomadize near Tara, causing a great deal of trouble for those Tatar vassals of the Russians living there. The Tara garrison attacked, killing or capturing many of the Djunghar and sending Chokur back to Dalai Ba'atur.

In 1620, Chokur played a crucial role in creating the Khoshūd-Dorbet-Torghud-Djunghar alliance directed against the Kazakhs and the Altan Khan of the Khalkha. He also helped to mollify the Russians by sending envoys of Ufa and to Tobol'sk to swear allegiance. When the Mongol war soured, particularly after the defeat of Chokur's father, Kharakhula, the Kalmyk allies moved deeper into Russian territory. Chokur convinced his brothers, Ba'atur and Chin to join the allies, adding to Chokur's prestige.

A major blow to Chokur's career came in 1625, when his brother Chin died. The Djunghar princes split over the division of the dead
man's herds and vassals. Kharakhula supported Boibegus and Ba'atur and Chokur opposed them. Evidently, Chokur emerged the victor, but escaped Russian prisoners reported that he and Khō Orluk soon quarrelled and went to war. Chokur lost and, although he continued to be regarded as a leading Kalmyk prince, he was so weakened that he was forced to graze with Dalai Ba'atur.

Some of Chokur's ulus, including his son Dordji, had begun to move west, into the Emba watershed, during Chokur's battle with Boibegus. By 1628, a contingent of as many as 6,000 Kalmyks grazed there and were joined that autumn by Chokur and as many as 1,000 men from the Altuul murzas. The local Nogai, terrified by this concentration, were ready to stampede across the Volga, onto the Crimean side of the river. So major a population move, which threatened to wreck Moscow's arrangement of its Tatar vassals, caused considerable consternation, especially in Astrakhan. The Kalmyks claimed to be ready to pledge their faith to the tsar, but added that they considered the lands between the Emba and the Iaik to have been "Kalmyk grazing from olden times."

On the Emba, where Chokur had been joined by his Djunghar ally Mergentemen (Temenmergen), war parties gathered and attacked the Nogai. Dalai Ba'atur and his Djunghar ally Sungul (Suungur) moved against Chokur. They may have acted to soothe Russian unease over the Kalmyk presence in the west; or they may have wanted to remove a potentially powerful rival; or they may have felt it necessary to clear a path for retreat if another assault by the Altan Khan of the Khalkas
forced them to move quickly. The two sent 11,000 men against Chokur. Dalai Ba'atur's successful attack actually weakened his own position, however, because afterwards Chokur consistently refused the Dorbet assistance, even when they were attacked by the Mongols.

Chokur and Mergentemen endured and remained on the Emba, building their ulus and becoming involved, in 1630, in raids against local Cossacks. Dalai Ba'atur, still working to force a union of Kalmyk princes, sent his troops with those of the Khoshūd Gushi against Chokur. The latter, involved in the siege of a Cossack fort, was caught totally unprepared. Most of his force died or was captured.

This attack ended Chokur's hopes to become chief prince of the Kalmyks. He had correctly read the future as lying in the west, but miscalculated his own strength and the opposition of Dalai Ba'atur. Following his defeat, Chokur fled to Kho Orluk, then to Daichin. The young Torghud prince categorically refused the demands of both Dalai Ba'atur and his own father to surrender Chokur. The Dorbet ruler died in 1636 just as total war threatened. According to Bogoiaavlenskii, Chokur died the same year. However, both Miller and Pozdneev, based on the Erdeniyin erike ("The Precious Rosary," a nineteenth century chronicle), wrote that Chokur separated from Daichin and returned to Djungharia. There he defeated Galdan, his nephew, in 1671, but was captured by the latter 1676 and died, a captive. His son Baga Manji was also killed, but his grandson Khaidu taisha was sent to Tibet and there served the Dalai Lama.
The Career of Kho Orluk and his Family

Of all the princes who contended for pre-eminence, it was the Torghūd Kho "" who survived long enough to create the nucleus of the Kalmyk khanate. Kho Orluk was the son of Juljaghan Orluk "" (Jolighan Orlak, Zulzugan Orluk) 61 and had several brothers, at least one of whom, Uruktu, was counted as a major Torghūd prince in 1607. Kho "" Orluk, a veritable steppe Hapsburg, was allied by marriage to numbers of princes. He himself married daughters of Dalai Ba'atur "" (Dorbet) and Gushi (Khoshūd). His sister was the wife of Dalai Ba'atur. One daughter married Ishim, son and heir of Kuchum, last khan of Sibir', a marriage which greatly upset the Russians, who feared Kalmyk support for a Kuchmid restoration in Siberia. Another daughter, Dara Uba Zalcha, wed Ba'atur khungtaiji of the Djunghar and another married Daichin Koshuchi, son of Dalai Ba'atur. His eldest son, Shukur Daichin, married the daughter of Chokur, and his second son, Elden, the daughter of Koshūd Gushi. In typical steppe fashion, family bound Kho "" Orluk to his allies, as well as to his rivals.

Based on the reports of the Torghūd prince's envoys to Tara in 1606 and Kugonai in 1607, it appears that before 1604, Kho "" Orluk had nomadized with the other Kalmyk princes, allies of Dalai Ba'atur. After that date, Kho Orluk's ulus grazed alone, along the Kamyslov and Ishim, north of his former allies and south of the Russian garrisons. Uruktu, his brother, remained with the Dorbet as

serious unrest among the Siberian Tatars and the eastern Bashkir and were probably as interested in the Torghud leader for that reason as for any other. Ishim's participation in raids against the Nogai in the early 1620's doubtlessly heightened those fears. Even so, Kho Orluk's representatives presented themselves at Ufa and Tobol'sk as regularly as those of any prince to avow loyalty to the tsar and request permission to trade and graze.

Thanks chiefly to the quarrel over the ulus of the late Chin and Kho Orluk's battle with Chokur, the Torghud leader was no longer among the allied princes in late 1625. Kho Orluk moved his herds close by Tara and attempted to get permission to graze in the Om-Kamyshlov region; but the Russians, after Torghud vassals raided fishing and trapping outposts near Tara, thought better of the idea and insisted they move farther south. At this juncture, late in the second decade of the XVIIth century, Kho Orluk's attention was drawn increasingly to the west.

Before examining the Torghud move into the north Caspian steppe, it is valid to consider why this redirection should have occurred. Numerous explanations have been advanced. One, especially popular among Russian nationalist historians, both pre-Revolutionary and Soviet, is that the Kalmyks were part of a plan either to resurrect a Mongol Yuan empire or to organize the western-most flank of the Djunghar Empire. S. A. Kozin, in the early years of World War II, declared that the migration was part of the "political projects and plans of establishing in the XVIIth century . . . a
"Yuan empire." He added that "Batur khunstdzhii, wishing to secure his rear, sent the powerful Oyirad tribe of the Torghud, headed by Khan Kho-Orluk, across the Kazakh steppe and into the borders of the Ural and Volga regions." The result was that "the Volga khanate of the Kalmyks to the middle of the XVIIIth century existed merely as the western defense of the Djunghar Dorben-Oyirad."66

The problem with this spectre of Pan-Mongolism is that there is no proof that such an alliance, free or forced, ever existed. Tribal rulers cooperated to spread Buddhism among other princes, but the enthusiasm of new converts does not automatically equate to a planned revival of the Mongol Empire. The khurultai of 1640, at which most major East and West Mongol princes met, did no more than update an existing legal code. It did not end the warfare among the Mongols nor are there any signs that it united the princes against mutual, outside enemies. There is also no indication that any alliance among the tribes lasted more than a couple of years. Each collapsed predictably, over grazing or ulus divisions. It seems that Pan-Mongol dreams and plots are more the product of national paranoia than of historical fact.

Another possibility is the personal ambition of Kho-Orluk. A product of the unrelenting world of steppe politics, he had learned early the lesson that the strong feed on the weak. The sources indicate that the Torghud chief was willing to ally and become political marriage broker when necessary and equally ready to depart when it was opportune or required by temporary setbacks. Chonov,
who felt personal drive was an important factor, observed that Khö "Orluk wanted "to reestablish the times of the Golden Horde and, on the ruins of the khanate of Batu, form an even more powerful khanate." It is interesting to note, however, that Khö "Orluk was neither the first nor only member of his family to go west and that he did not remain, full time, in the Emba-Iaik region. Whatever his interest in the west, Khö Orluk did not commit himself to build there exclusively.

It is difficult to ascribe to any single man's ambition the power to move thousands of herders far from their ancestral pastures. Nomadic societies are essentially conservative, depending on the predictable cycles of nature for the replenishment of pastures and the sustenance of herds and herders alike. The lands of Djungharia were valued prizes for many nomads, subjects of constant wars and raids, disruptions as dangerous as any period of drought or excessive snowfall. The need to escape wars, the pressures of contending princes and peoples, and the hope of securing safe pastures could bring about the coincidence of personal and "national" interests. M. L. Kichikov has written that among the compelling reasons for the Kalmyk move were the misfortunes of war brought on by the fragmentation of the "feudal" order and the struggle between powerful Mongol chiefs; the defeats suffered by the Oyirad at the hands of the East Mongols and Kazakhs; the general crowding of the steppe and the resultant insufficiency of grazing territory.

There is yet another previously unexplored motive — the
power vacuum created by the collapse of Nogai power following
the Russian seizure of the lower half of the Volga. The Nogai
had failed to resist the Moscovite takeover and had also reduced
their united strength by quarrelling over cooperating with the
Christian Russians. In the History of the Kalmyk Khans the only
reason given for moving is that Kho Orluk, having sent out scouting
parties of reliable men, learned that along the shore of the Caspian
"... these lands were occupied by no one ..."69 That was, of
course, not literally true, but it may reflect what amounted to
"official" opinion that the region was still contestable. Ambition
and need combined in an atmosphere of opportunity.

Kho Orluk was but one of his family members interested in the
west. Both Batur Ubashi Tumen and Gaban Sharab recorded that Kho
"..." Orluk sired six sons (Shukar Daichin, Elden, Lauzan, Sandjin, Senge,
and Kirosan), among whom he divided 1,000 ulus, advising "It is the
good one to whom it does not matter whether he is given many people
or few. Children!, you yourselves manage whether you will be good
or bad."70 The progeny of the Torghud leader learned their lessons
well, for they took their ulus and went out, as their father had
done, and began to find and dominate areas where the grazing was
rich and the enemies not too powerful to resist.

The most active and successful of Kho Orluk's sons was his
firstborn, Shukur Daichin. He is mentioned first in 1629, grazing
near Lake Iamysh, the leading prince of the Torghud then grazing
with the allied Kalmyk princes of Dalai Ba'atur. He was not heard
of again until three years later when he and his father were on the Iaik. In 1633, Daichin began raids against the Nogai and was joined in them by the Emba Altaiul murza Saltanai, who had previously served Kho Orluk. Daichin raided in the environs of Astrakhan and reportedly boasted "The Kalmyks have such men that if they (can) approach Astrakhan in the middle of summer, they (can) sweep up to it with the snows."\textsuperscript{71}

The threat to Astrakhan and the neighboring Tatars grew rapidly. In late April, 1633, about 3,000 Kalmyks trapped a group of strel'tsy and Tatars on the Bol'shaia Uzen', a river which runs between and parallel to the Volga and Iaik. The faceoff between the two lasted an entire day, but the Russians were outnumbered and their Tatar allies did little to aid them. In the end, the Kalmyks promised to return family members taken from the Tatars in an earlier raid and to let the Russians withdraw. The Tatars, however, promised to join the Kalmyks and graze together, effectively removing themselves from the ineffectual protection of Russia and accepting the leadership of their chief tormentor, Daichin. The Torghud prince promised them security and bragged that: "No one will be able to threaten them because the name of Daichin taisha is famed in all the hordes as is that of his father Orluk taisha is in his lands a tsar, just as he, Daichin taisha shall soon become a tsar as well."\textsuperscript{72}

Daichin's independence seems to have alarmed his father and Kho Orluk began to distance himself from his son. In July, 1633, Kho Orluk's envoy took the oath of allegiance for all the Torghud
princes, except Daichin. That year Daichin and the Altiul Saltanai were joined by the refugee Chokur. They renewed their attacks on the Astrakhan area, raiding several Tatar groups, but avoiding Russian defenders. Kanai, the Nogai prince who earlier had agreed to join the Kalmyks, wrote to Daichin, promising to come as soon as the Russians relaxed their strict surveillance. Later in the year Daichin moved through the Astrakhan area with 10,000 warriors. The Tatars were terrified and the five hundred Russians sent to protect them could do nothing. From an intercepted messenger, the Astrakhan authorities learned that Kho Orluk, who had been attacked by Dalai Ba'atur and the Kazakhs, had moved west to within a few days of the camp of his powerful eldest son.

As the quarrel with the Dorbet over Chokur grew more serious, Daichin began to mend fences by opening peaceful relations with Central Asia, the Nogai, and even the Russians. He sent merchants to Central Asia and the Cossacks of Ataman I. M. Zarutskii, negotiated with Astrakhan, and gathered troops (including Nogai, Altiul and Edisan Tatars, Central Asians, and Krigiz) for the coming struggle with Dalai Ba'atur. In a meeting on the Buzan River, Daichin told the Russians that he willingly would attack the tsar's enemies, the Kazyev murzas who lived on the west bank of the Volga. He would even surrender hostages, though not from princely families. In return, he wanted the right to graze between the Iaik and Volga and permission to trade in Russian towns. The Russians were to provide him with regular troops and cannon to be used against Dalai Ba'atur.
Kazemku Artem'ev, the Russian translator for the negotiations, reported that Daichin threatened that if the Russians failed to agree, the Torghūd were also treating with the Nogai and Kzayev Tatars and were prepared to attack Astrakhan itself. Tatars accompanying the Kalmyks justified their presence by noting that they could not find safe pastures with the Russians, but that "in the Kalmyk (lands) the grazing was vast and open; where they wished, there did they graze." Astrakhan sent to Moscow for instructions, complaining that the local garrison was too small to protect the city. Reports reaching the Kalmyks, however, indicated the city was well defended and Daichin chose a desert campaign against the Turkmen.

In 1636, Khō Orluk, who may have despaired of being able to control his son, moved back into Siberia, closer to the Dorbet. He could not convince his son to surrender Chokur, and by 1637, Daichin, freed from fear of attack by Dalai Ba'atur, was preparing a large force, evidently planning to cross the Volga and attack the Crimea's Tatar vassals, with or without the license of Astrakhan. In discussions both in the steppe and at Astrakhan, Daichin and his representatives reiterated his desire to live at peace while attacking the tsar's enemies. He wanted trade, but refused to surrender hostages, even boasting that Kalmyks grazed wherever they pleased. The Russians were equally adamant: the Kalmyks would not cross the Volga (obviously the Russians appreciated the danger of large numbers of Kalmyks and Nogai on both sides of the river, surrounding the city and close to the Crimeans) and they would have to give hostages.
Daichin took his troops into the Kara Kum to winter and wait.

There were five other sons of Kho Orluk who also had ulus and ambitions. None of the others rose to prominence equal to that of Daichin, but the second and third sons, Lauzan and Elden, did become powerful leaders and challenged their eldest brother following their father's death.

In 1628, Dordji, son of Chokur, nomadized on the Emba and opened discussion with the Altiul murzas and Astrakhan about moving farther west. According to Gaban Sharab, that same year Lauzan decided to move west. He did so the next year and defeated several Tatar groups in the process. In 1630, he crossed the Iaik and headed toward the Volga, where he was joined by his father and Daichin. By summer, 1633, the three Torghud taishas were busily raiding the Nogai and Edisan Tatars between the Iaik and Astrakhan. The disruption caused was so great that the Nogai insisted they could not send troops, as they had promised, to aid the Russians against the Lithuanians. That summer, Lauzan and his brother Kirosan attacked the Bukharan town of Savran; they captured nearly two thousand prisoners and having stripped the town of loot, opened a large area from the Iaik to the Syr Darya for Torghud grazing.

As the struggle of the Torghud and Dalai Ba'atur escalated, the family drew together and in 1635, Lauzan and Elden joined their father and brother. After the Dorbet ruler died, Lauzan went to graze along the Emba, where he had been detailed to keep an eye on the Altiul, who seemed ready to return to the protection of Astrakhan.
There is much less information concerning Elden, Kho-Orlud's third son. He appears to have remained more closely associated with the eastern end of the Torghud grazing, staying nearer Tiumen'. He supported his brother Daichin in 1635, but, at the same time, he did not cut all ties with the Dorbet and their allies, due in part to the fact that he was son-in-law to Gushi, Dalai Ba'atur's chief Khoshud friend. Elden acted as go-between for his father, Dalai Ba'atur, and Gushi, becoming Kho-Orluk's host when the latter returned to pastures closer to Dalai Ba'atur in 1636. In 1640, Elden accompanied his father and Daichin to the Mongol khurultai.

Although there is no doubt that Dalai Ba'atur was prepared to use force against Daichin in 1636, he had, employing lamas as intermediaries, become part of a general Mongol effort to quiet the steppe. He had been rejoined by Kho-Orluk and Elden and might have hoped that an accommodation could yet be reached with Daichin. Dalai Ba'atur's death may actually have facilitated the calming process necessary prior to the great convention of East and West Mongol religious and lay leaders that took place in 1640.

The reasons for the convening of a khurultai in September, 1640, are unclear. As has been noted, some historians have credited this meeting to an effort at uniting the Mongols for the re-formation of an empire. However, the closest that the resultant "Great Code" (Ieki Tsaadzhi) came to hatching a plot for mutual action was an oath which declared:
We shall not quarrel among the ranks of the Mongols; we shall not treat those of the same blood as us as we would slaves, even though they have come to us and taken service; we shall not give their daughters in dower; we shall not hand them over to vassals of another bone; we shall not spill their blood. 75

The most pressing political issue of the day was not so much the reconstitution of the Mongol Empire as how to answer the growing power of the Manchu, who had already overseen the destruction of Ligdan Khan of the Chahar, the enrollment of the Inner Mongols, and were in the process of supplanting the Ming Dynasty in China. Although all the Mongols were aware of the political situation, the 1640 khurultai produced no real sense of joint purpose or plans for joint action.

The real instigators of the meeting seem to have been members of the Buddhist clergy, including the Khoshūd Zaya Pandita. Lamas had crisscrossed Inner Asia, working to end the various Mongol quarrels. This may have been at the direction of the Dalai Lama, who was aware that the Manchu were not anxious to become Buddhists (even after the Dalai Lama had sent his envoy, the Ilagusan Khutukhtu, to them in 1637) and may have sought a solidly Buddhist alliance of Mongol princes for possible use in the future. There is also the possibility that Combodorji, the Second Tushiyetu Khan (1594–1655), was interested in garnering the endorsement of all the Mongols for his son, called Gegen ("Brilliant"), who had been recognized in 1639 as a "living Buddha" (eventually being declared the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu by the dalai Lama). The Tushiyetu Khan might have hoped, thereby, to create a Mongol alternative to the
Tibetan-dominated Buddhist Church of Mongolia.

Whatever the deeper motivations, Ḳho Örluk, Daichin, and Elden left the Torghūd pastures in 1639 and arrived at Shibegiin-Ulan-Bara in the Tarbagatai in time for the 1640 meeting. There they met several Buddhist leaders, including Zaya Pandita, and most of the chief Khalkha and West Mongol princes and khans. (Included were the Jasaghtu and Tushiyetu Khans, Erdeni Ba'atur khungtaiji of the Choros and Gushi Nomin Khan of the Khoshūd, Daichin Khoshouchi of the Dorbet, and Chokur). The result was the Great Code, also called the Mongol-Oyirad Code of 1640, which updated earlier legal codes and recognized the social and economic place of Buddhism. There were some marital alliances as a result and Monchak, son of Shukur Daichin, married the daughter of Ba'atur khungtaiji. His new wife remained with her family, bearing Monchak a son, Aiuka, who remained in Djungharia until 1654.

If a Mongol alliance or agreement of peace was actually concluded in 1640, it did not last for long. Any plot to conquer the world dissolved amidst the squabbles of Mongols before it could be effected. The real and lasting product was a code of laws that remained in force on the Volga (although amended and updated by Donduk Dashi in the mid-XVIIIth century) until the outmigration of 1771.76

As the last years of Ḳho Örluk's leadership approached, any review of his contacts with Russia would have concluded that those relations had been consistently uneven, fluctuating with the Torghūd's fortunes elsewhere. Beginning with his first approach to Tara,
Kho Orluk had requested trade and grazing privileges in 1607, 1608, 1618, 1620, 1621, 1623, 1625, 1632, 1633, and 1636. At times the envoys also asked for Russian aid against his enemies. Kho Orluk had given in return numbers of pledges of loyalty and allegiance to the tsar and promises not to disturb the Russians or their vassals. With equal frequency, however, he turned on his fellow Russian vassals to raid their villages, uproot their fishing and hunting, and carry off their families. The first Russian envoys to his ulus, a group of Tatars and Cossacks, never returned to Tara, although their clothes were still in his camp some time later. Kho Orluk, when the opportunity presented itself, took his ulus wherever he pleased and was often associated with the hostile acts of his sons. Ever the pragmatist, Kho Orluk made and broke oaths at his convenience, feinting and dodging, working to build and protect his power. There is no indication that he ever considered his relations with the Russians necessarily more important or more binding than those with the Kazakhs, Bukhara, or the Dorbet. To the Russians his conduct was perfidious; for him, an exercise in Realpolitik.

Following the return from the 1640 conference, relations with the Russians did not improve. In part, this must be attributed to the failure of that meeting to stop the conflict with the other Oyirad tribes. The Dorbed and Koshud continued to demand the recognition by the Torghud of their pre-eminence as they also pushed west, into the Kara Kum and toward the Volga. The Russian authorities, angered by Kalmyk interference with Moscow's vassals, were anxious to
prevent a Kalmyk presence on both shores of the Volga. The Russians never believed the Kalmyks' chief interest was the destruction of Moscow's enemies. They reinforced the Astrakhan garrison and stationed a ship in the Volga to patrol and prevent any unauthorized movement west.

Renewed pressures from the east and the resistance of the Russians in the west demanded a solution. Orluk was growing old and his most vigorous and experienced son, Daichin, departed for Tibet in 1642. Younger sons (Elden, Lauzan, Siunkei) and even grandsons (Daian Erki and Batma) were taking a more active part in decision making. Lauzan, whose career was characterized by its independence, rapidly became the most important prince. His influence and the urgings of hotheaded, ambitious grandsons may have caused the Kalmyks to become more adventurous and aggressive in the 1640's. In 1641, Siunkei sent Astrakhan a letter which suggested a reasoned geographical division of lands between Kalmyks and Russians: "The Volga is your place, and the Iaik is our grazing area; and if our people should try to graze in your place, then you would have to chase them away; and if those of your people should graze along the Iaik, then we will also try to chase them off." 77

Following the departure of Daichin, the tenor of relations became more strident, necessitated, in part, by new attacks from the eastern tribes. In 1642, Daian Erki, Daichin's son, raided near Astrakhan, attacking a unit of strel'tsy. In mid-February, 1643, a large unit of Kalmyks from the ulus of Daian Erki was sighted near
Astrakhan, on the Kutumovka River. A Russian detachment commanded by 
Voevoda Ivan Trakhaniotov attacked. The Russians' Tatar allies 
deserted and joined the Kalmyks, forcing Trakhaniotov frantically to 
call for reinforcements of strel'tsy and artillery. The battle ended 
as the daylight failed and the Kalmyks, accompanied by their new 
allies, vanished with the plunder, moving east, toward the Buzan. 78 
The Russians decided the Kalmyk prince to approach was Lauzan and 
immediately detailed the syn boiarskii Stepan Skaraitin to Lauzan to 
demand the Kalmyks withdraw from the Astrakhan region and surrender 
hostages. Lauzan, whose grazing then stretched from Samara to 
Saratov, refused to move. He even threatened to send Skaraitin to 
the Bukhara slave market.

By 1643, Khö Orluk, fearing another attack from the east, moved 
closer to Samara and nearer the grazing of his sons. On five occasions 
he made overtures aimed at reaching a peaceful living arrangement with 
Voevoda T. Shusherinyi of Samara. But the Russians demanded the 
return of the Tatars who had fled to the Kalmyks the previous year, 
the surrender of hostages, and the removal of the Kalmyks to their 
Siberian pastures. The Kalmyks would not force the Tatars to leave, 
were willing to give up hostages, but could not return to Siberia, 
due to the hostility of the "distant" Kalmyks. 79 In the face of this 
impassé, the Kalmyks and their Tatar vassals began to plan an attack 
beyond the Volga.

The greatest irritant in Moscow's relations with the Kalmyks 
was the latter's meddling with Russia's Tatar vassals. From the
very beginning of contacts with the Russians (1606), the Kalmyks and
the Nogai had been fighting. Only one of these two nomadic peoples
could control the plains and tribes of the Caspian steppe. There were
raids recorded in 1608 (the Kalmyks raided beyond the Iaik), 1619,
1622, 1623, 1628, 1631, 1633, and 1634. Many Nogai fled across the
Volga, into the arms of the Crimean khan. These massive defections
added to the Crimea's reserve of troops, upset the tribal alignments
from the Terek to the Don, and seriously damaged Russia's image as
peacemaker and protector.

Kalmyk attacks shattered what remained of Nogai solidarity and
encouraged Nogai vassals, especially the Edisan and Altiul Tatars,
to raid one another, the Nogai, and even the Russians. In the 1620's
and 1630's, many of the Edisan remained loyal to the Nogai, surrendering
at the hands of both Kalmyks and Altiul murzas. Numbers of the
Altiul, however, readily joined the Kalmyks and were defended by
them. The quarrels of Kho Orluk and Daichin with the Dorbet and
Khoshud were, in part, caused by the Torghud refusal to turn over
their Altiul allies, especially Saltanai murza. The Russians worked
assiduously to reverse the flow of loyalties away from the Kalmyks,
playing on fears that the Torghud would eventually be forced to give
in to the demands of the "distant Kalmyks."

In 1642, several Nogai chiefs who had joined the Crimeans,
argued with their new overlords and decided to return, with 10,000
men, to Astrakhan and Russian suzerainty. Unfortunately for the
Russians, Voevoda Teliatevskii of Astrakhan confined most of the Nogai
chiefs in the Amantnyi dvor and plundered their tribesmen. Nogai and Edisan complaints to Moscow resulted in Teliatevskii's dismissal and assurances of the tsar's continued regard for the Nogai; but it was too late, for they were prepared to join the Kalmyks. When Daian Erki appeared near Astrakhan in February, 1643, it was a signal for the Nogai and Edisan to slip away from the Russian patrols and move to the Kalmyk ulus. Only groups of Iurt Tatars failed to escape and Russian efforts to reassert their authority among the Tatars failed. The Kalmyks seem better to have understood the dynamics of the steepe and presented themselves as better able to protect other steppe peoples. This development truly worried Moscow.

The Kalmyks were also involved in Central Asia. The most critical and painful element in those relations was the Kazakhs. From their arrival in the Semirech'e in the mid-XVth century, the Kazakhs and the Oyirad tribes had enjoyed precious few moments of peace while living as neighbors. Kazakh pastures, west and south of the Oyirad homeland, were attractive points for conquest. Most often, the Kazakhs allied with the Oyirad enemies, especially the Khalka Altan Khan of northwest Mongolia. In 1594, the Kazakh ruler Tevekkul dispatched envoys to Tsar Fedor Ivanovich, and styled their master "tsar of the Kazakhs and the Kalmyks." The Kalmyks' very first contact with Russia (1606) included a request for protection against the Kazakhs. In these early years, before the significant growth of the Djunghar khanate, the Kazakhs most often were victors. There was fighting in 1606, 1609 (internal problems slowed the Kazakhs),
1620-1621, 1627-1629, and 1635-1636. For part of this time, the
Kazakh Djahângîr allied with the Dorbet and Khoshûd princes against
Kho Orluk and several times devastated the Torghûd ulus. In spite
of their efforts, however, the Kazakhs were unable to subdue the
Torghûd and turn them into vassals of the Dorbet or themselves.

Most of the Kalmyk contact with the Central Asians cities
was mercantile, but not all of it. In 1636 the Russian envoy Pavel
Vykhodtsev, sent to talk with Kho Orluk, found him not on the Ishim
River, but in the Kara Kum. The Torghûd prince explained he had moved
closer to the borders of Bukhara to facilitate trade.

When trade was interrupted the Bukharan merchants were plundered
in 1620, a war began with Bukhara and lasted for several years. The
Kalmyks also carried out plundering raids on the cities of the region
(1603 and 1633), taking as many as 1,700 prisoners at a time. They
involved themselves in internal politics as well. In 1641, Siunkei,
son of Kho Orluk, gave refuge to 'Abd al-ğâzi, claimant to the throne
of Khiva, who had been driven out of the city by his brother Isfandar.
The Kalmyks were instrumental in his return and enthronement.
'Abd al-ğâzi ruled until 1663, during which time he wrote his
famous history of the region.

After the defection of the Nogai and Edisan Tatars in 1643,
the Kalmyks began to plan a huge raid across the Volga against the
Kazyev murzas, the Nogai of the Terek, and Kabardia. They hoped to
conquer those Nogai who had run away and to establish a refuge of
safe pastures beyond the reach of the "distant Kalmyks." They knew,
of course, that the Russians would never agree to such a venture and planned their moves in secrecy. First they raised an army of Kalmyks, Tatars, and even Turkmen. The plan called for dividing the army into three groups. The first, led by Lauzan, was to cross the Volga south of Tsaritsyn and attack the Kazyev Tatars of Karasheim murza. Daian Erki, leading the second group, was to move to the Terek and join the Nogai there led by Keikuvat murza. Several days later, the third group, led by Khö Orluk, was to attack in Kabardia. Lauzan was successful in his raid. Daian Erki reached the Terek, but found that his quarry had fled into the mountains. When this element of the expedition attempted to return home, they found the way blocked by Russian troops from Astrakhan. Daian Erki managed to escape, but many of his group were killed or captured. The third group reached Kabardia, but was not welcomed. Rather, they were lured into the mountains and annihilated by a group of Kabardians, Cherkess, Kazyev and Nogai Tatars. Khö Orluk, his son Kirosan, and two grandsons died. Of the 10,000 men in this third group, only one thousand avoided death or capture. 81

The failure of the campaign and the loss of so many warriors left the Volga Kalmyks significantly weakened. They were also suddenly orphaned, threatened with a major political crisis in the wake of the loss of the prince who had been their chief for a half century. His heir was in Tibet and the Kalmyks, instead of capturing better pastures, removing themselves from the attacks of the "distant Kalmyks," and impressing the Russians by their daring, were more
vulnerable to attacks from all sides and faced with the possibility of internal chaos.

Conclusion

Thus ended the first period of Kalmyk history, during which several significant trends had appeared. In less than four decades the Torghūd established themselves as the westernmost of the Oyirad tribes, gradually separating and becoming distinguished from the "Dorbet, Khoshūd and Choros who remained in the east. In the lifetime of a single prince the Kalmyks moved some two thousand miles, transferring their geographical identity from the upper Irtysh to the lower Volga.

As a major part and, perhaps, the primum mobile in the development of the Torghūd Kalmyk, the clan of Kho Orluk demonstrated its ability to organize and move people and herds. If there were other, rival clans among the Torghūd, they disappeared or were neutralized. Only members of the "royal" clan itself would ever threaten the power of the Torghūd ruler. Unfortunately, as Kho Orluk's family emerged as the undisputed leaders of the Torghūd, they did not prove to be always united or successful. Their adventure into Kabardia left the entire people in an extremely dangerous position.

Finally, the Torghūd and the Russians had begun and muddled through forty years of what was an often unpleasant relationship. From the very beginning the single issue between them was whether the two could share the steppe as equals or only as master-vassal. The
Russians, unprepared for the Kalmyks on the Volga, resisted all efforts of the nomads to move farther west and attempted to stop Kalmyk interference in the affairs of their Tatar vassals. But the Russians, better armed, were too few to impose their will, unmodified, on the steppe. Often, the Russians could but interdict trade and hope to reduce Kalmyk influence among the Tatars. Russian administrators may well have been shocked at the weakness of the local nomads, especially the Nogai, and at the ease with which the Kalmyks coaxed and coerced these tribes to join them. Russian trade sanctions, largely amplified by the more eastern Oyirad tribes' attacks, created serious difficulties for the Kalmyks. By 1644, it was clear that, given a choice, the Russians would prefer to live without the Kalmyks rather than with them.

For the first forty years of their relations, the Kalmyk princes regarded the Russians as sources of aid in time of need, but genuine nuisances once the crisis had passed. Torghūd princes, like their cousins the Dorbet, Khoshūd, and Choros, promised on numerous occasions to be faithful vassals of the Russians, but were ever ready to desert that pledge and act in whatever fashion they found then convenient. It was not until after the 1644 debacle that the Kalmyk leaders (chiefly Daichin) realized that the Russians could not be displaced and that the Kalmyk presence in the Caspian steppe required an arrangement with Moscow. Perhaps prior to the 1644 campaign there were other options for the Kalmyks. Following that disaster, however, many of those alternatives vanished and the
Kalmyks, formerly strongly on the offensive, were reduced to a hunted people.
ENDNOTES: CHAPTER TWO

proiskhozhdenii slova 'Kalmyk'," Zapiski KNIIIL, vyp. 5 (1967), pp. 133-134. These explanations by no means exhaust the possibilities. I. G. (also listed as J. G. and I. I.) Georgii, Opisanie (vsekh)
obitaiushchihkh v Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov, ch. IV (St. Petersburg: 1799), p. 6, felt that the name signified "those who had
revolted." Johann Fischer in Sibirische Geschichte von der
Entdeckung Sibiriens bis auf die Eroberung dieses Landes durch die russische Waffen (St. Petersburg: 1768), Bd. I, p. 278 and Howorth in his History, Part I, p. 49 believed the name was Turkic but came from the Mongol fur cap, kalpak. They linked that cap with the pagan Mongols who wore it and who had "remained" uncoverted. D. N. Orlov in "Gorod Stavropol' i ego khramy," Samarskiia Eparhial'nyia Vedomosti, No. 1 (January, 1882), p. 2, ventured that the name equated to "those who had fled," and opinion basically shared by B. Dzhimbinov, Sovietskaia Kalmykia (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1960), p. 7. V. L. Kotvich in his "Russkie arkhivnye dokumenty po snosheniiam s Oiratami v. XVII i XVIII vv.," Izvestiia Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, VI seriiia, t. XIII (1919), p. 791, suggested the Volga Kalmyks called themselves Oyirad. Once on the Volga, they picked up the Tatar name.

2 The Teleuts themselves also used the term "Black Kalmyks," but for their neighbors the Teles. Explanations of "White" include references to the heavy snowfall in the region. Probably the name was a convenient way to distinguish between groups, without a specific initial reference. "Teleuty ili Belye Kalmyki," Sibirskii Vestnik (1821), pp. 1-3; L. P. Potapov, "The Altay," The Peoples of Siberia (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 305.


6 The best information on the use of Kalmyk ethnonyms is U. E. Erdniev, "Problemy," pp. 24-35, from which most of this information is drawn. He has supplemented that article with two others,


8 Jagchid and Hyer, Mongolia's Culture, p. 200; A. Sh. Kichikov, "Ob orenburgskom govore kalmytskogo iazyka," Zapiski KNILI, vyp. 2 (1962), pp. 207-208; idem, "O govore donskikh (Buzava) Kalmykov," Zapiski KNILI, vyp. 5 (1967), pp. 39-41. Arash Bormanshinov maintains that modern Kalmyk is related to Torghud, Dorbet, Bayit, Dzakhachin, Uriankha, Dambi-Olot, and Mingat, all of which may be dialects of Oyirad. He finds there are three dialects of Volga Kalmyk, Torghud, Dorbet, and Buzava. Poppe agrees that the various


11 Paula Rubel, whose discussion of the social and political organization of the Kalmyk makes more sense than any other, feels these indicated attempts to settle the administrative structure from the top down by de-emphasizing genealogical ties of the early days and replacing them with numerical organization, thereby facilitating the absorption of the growing number of non-Kalmyks. Rubel, *The Kalmyk Mongols*, pp. 29-31, 57-65. Both Pallas and Bergmann
included information on the social structure of the Kalmyks before 1771, but often disagreed. Kalmyk law codes, which are quite detailed, ignore most administrative details. The Soviet Ocherki istorii KASSR breezes through descriptions of the Kalmyk social structure, noting chiefly class struggle as opposed to the how and why of organization (pp. 93-99). Kichikov does much the same in "O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh i politicheskikh predposylkah poselenii Kalmykov (chasti Oiratov) v stepyiakh priural'ia i nizhnego povelzh'ia," Vestnik KNAIIL, t. 15 (1976), pp. 16-17, leaving the impression that, due to the nature of the dominant economic forces present in nomadism, no development or growth, excepting the tightening of the "feudal" screws was possible.


15 The lama bSod-nams-rgya-mtsho was the first hierarch named Dalai Lama, but his two predecessors were also accorded that honor posthumously, thereby making him the Third Dalai Lama.

16 Iv. Lytkin in his translation of the "Istoriia kalmytskikh khanov," Kalmytskie istoriko-literaturnye pamiatniki v russkom
perevode (Elista: 1969), p. 7, says that the first khutkhtu among
the Kalmyks was a Tibetan, Inza (Inzen) Rimpoché. M. L. Khíchkov
adds in "K istorii obrazovanii kalmytskogo khanstva v sostav Rossii,"
Zapiski KNIILI, vyp. 2 (1962), p. 45, note 73, that in 1639 the
Dalai Lama sent Zaya Pandita, a Koshūd, to replace him as the Khutukh-
tuin Gegen.

17 I. Glukhov, Ot patriarchl'shchiny k sotsializmu (Astrakhan:
Kalmobkomdat, 1926), p. 104.

18 A description of the typical Dorbet monastery is found in
A. Pozdneev, "Ocherki byta buddhistikh monastyrei i buddiiskogo
dukhovestva v Mongolii," Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo
Geograficheskogo Obshchestva po Otdelenii etnografii, vyp. XVI (1887),
pp. 30-33. Pallas, Samlungen, vol. I, p. 222 and Ocherki istorii KASSR,
p. 78.

19 Benjamin Bergmann, Nomadische Streifereien unter den

20 Henning Haslund, Men and Gods in Mongolia (Zayagan), trans.
Elizabeth Sprigge and Claude Napier (New York: National Travel Club,
1935), p. 247. When Catherine the Great received the Buraits and
other Mongols in official audience, they were justly impressed by the
heavenly surroundings of St. Petersburg's incarnation of the White
Tāra.

21 K. Kostenkov, "O rasprostranenii khristianstva u kalmykov,"
Astrakhanskiiia Eparkhail'nyia Vedomosti, XVIII (1892), No. 16 (August),
p. 469.
It is difficult to gauge the progress of Christianity, but it must have been slow. A consistorial letter of 1736 recorded 2,883 souls, some eight hundred sixty-three kibitkas converted between 1724 and 1735. This occurred chiefly following the appointment of the first priest, the hieromonk Nikodim, to the court of Prince Taishin. He withdrew in 1734, feeling his mission had been a total failure. Conversions were facilitated by the translations of V. M. Bakunin of the Lord's Prayer, the Ten Commandments, and the basic symbols of faith into conversational Kalmyk in 1724. This made them easier to understand for most Kalmyks, but were suspect for not being translated into the literary language used by the Buddhists. Not until 1737 were translations of major portions of the Bible begun. From 1740 to 1764 efforts at conversion were directed through the Kontora novokreshchenskikh del (Office for the Affairs of the Newly Baptised). P. Shestakov, "Nekotoryia svedeniia o rasprostranenii khristianstva u kalmykov," Astrakhanskiiia Eparkhial'nyia Vedomosti XIX (1893), No. 9 (1 May), pp. 250, 255; No. 10 (16 May), pp. 293-296; Protoierei Ioann Savvinskii, Astrakhanskaia eparkhiia (1602-1902 gg.). Obshchee istoricheskoe obozrenie eparkhii, vyp. 1-yi (Astrakhan: V. L. Egorov, 1905), pp. 227-229. Shestakov first pointed out that Prince Dugorov, not Prince Taishin, was the first noble to be baptised (pp. 249-250), correcting the inaccurate assertion of K. Kostenkov, "O rasprostranenii khristianstve u kalmykov," Astrakhanskaia Eparkhial'nyia Vedomosti, XVIII (1892), No. 16 (16 August), p. 472.

Kostendov, "O rasprostranenii," No. 22 (November), pp. 697-698;


25 Pallas, Samlungen, vol. I, p. 57; Pelliot, Notes Critiques, pp. 32-33, Tableau III: Généalogie des Turghut. Batur Ubashi Tumen says in his discussion of the lineage of the Torghud khans: "In the Mongol books there is such a detailed recitation of the descent of the Torghud clan from the Van-Khan (Ong Khan), but I am not in the position to speak clearly about it." Batur Ubashi Tumen, "Skazanie," p. 25.

26 S. K. Bogoiavlenskii, "Materialy po istoriia kalmykov v pervoi polovine XVII veka," Istoricheskie zapiski, t. 5 (1939), pp. 73-74, 76.

27 The religious sanction of titles was important in early European history, e.g., the coronation of Charlemagne and the dispatching of crowns to Poland and Hungary. There was also a rivalry between Rome and Byzantium as to whose recognition made a title legitimate. The tradition was carried on by Napoleon I who troubled to have Pope Pius VII present at his self-coronation. In Russia, the title of Emperor was conferred on Peter I in 1721 by the Senate. Only Holland and Prussia immediately recognized it. Sweden acquiesced in 1723, but the Ottoman Empire, England, Austria (ruled by Europe's only other emperor), France, Spain, and Poland did not concur until as late as 1764.

Khormusda of all within the World, Turner of the Golden Wheel, King of the Law." Quoted in C. R. Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 34. This string of titles linked Ligdan with such historical personalities as the founder of the T'ang Dynasty, Chinggis and Khubilai Khans. The Chakravarti(n) is the "Universal Ruler," a Hindu concept of a king whose rule extends from sea to sea. Among Buddhists it took on the additional ethical concept of one who personifies Dharma (Sanskrit, Dhamma in Pali), law, justice, duty. One of the four great events in the life of the Buddha was the enunciation of the basic principals of life in the Dhamma-Cakkapavattana Sutta, "The Setting in Motion of the Wheel of the Law," a discourse delivered to his disciples. A Buddhist ruler would be expected to continue to imitate his preceptor.

29 Bawden, The Modern History of Mongolia, p. 66.

30 The symbol of the authority of the khan the royal seal.

Pal'mov, hampered by the almost total lack of documents for the period prior to 1713 and from 1715 to 1718, concluded that Aiuka Khan conferred official recognition of his eldest son as heir by granting him, sometime about August, 1713, what was probably the seal first sent by the Dalai Lama in 1690. This act may have been occasioned by the arrival of a new seal, brought from Tibet in late 1712-early 1713 by his envoy Samtan. Pal'mov, Etudy, ch. 1, pp. 41-49.

31 G. O. Avliaev, "K voprosu o 'shebenerakh' i 'ketchinerakh' v sostave kalmytskikh ulusov astrakhanskoi gubernii," Vestnik KNIIIL, No. 9 (1974), pp. 139-142; A. M. Pozdneev, Ocherki byta buddiiskikh


33 Pallas, Samlungen, vol. I, p. 124; Georgi, Opisanie, ch. IV (St. Petersburg: 1799), p. 398. Pallas noted the Stipa pennata, feathergrass, of the Caspian region was one "which the horses ate with avidity." He also records that the area lying between the Akhtuba and the Volga, extending from Tsaritsyn to Chernyi Iar (Tshernoiyarsk) had "for some years past uniformly been the autumnal head-quarters of the Kalmyk Khans, on account of . . . excellent pasturage." P. S. Pallas, Travels Through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire in the Years 1793 and 1794 (London: Printed for John Stockdale, 1812, vol. I, pp. 135, 199, 200.

34 Quoted in Jagchid and Hyer, Mongolia's Culture, p. 22.


38 P. S. Pallas, An Account of the Different Kinds of Sheep found

39 Chao Hung in the Meng-ta pei-lu, quoted in Jachid and Hyer, Mongolia's Culture, pp. 28-29.

40 "Puteshestvie Fedorla Isakovicha Baikova v Kitai s 1654 po 1658 god," Sibirskii vestnik (1820), pp. 113-127. There is evidence in the Sibirskii prikaz to show growing commerce with the Mongols in animals all along the routes leading east to China. Sh. S. Chimit-Dorzhiev, "Iz istorii russko-mongol'skikh ekonomichekikh sviazei," Istoriiia SSSR, (1964), no. 2 (March-April), pp. 137-156.


Kozin, *Sokrovennoe skazanie*, p. 80. The tribal makeup of the Oirad changed over the years. The *Erdeni-yin Tobchi* lists the original members as the Ogalat, the Baghatut, the Khoit, and the Kargut. Pallas listed the Olot, the Khoit, the Tumat, and the Bargh-Burat. After several centuries the four major tribes were the Choros, Khoshūd, Torghūd, and the Dorbet. The Khoit, once vassals of the Dorbet, become the fourth major tribe after the departure of the Torghūd for the west. G. S. Gorokhova, "Materialy ob Oiratakh, soderzhashchiesia v mongol'skikh istoricheskikh sochineniiakh," *Vestnik KIILI*, No. 9 (1974), p. 97; Pelliot, *Notes Critiques*, pp. 6-7. Haneda Akira located references to at least six major tribes among the Oirad dating from as late as the XVIIth century. Haneda Akira, "L'Histoire des Djounghar," pp. 119-126.

Gorokhova, "Materialy," p. 101, quoting the Altan Tobchi. The *Erdeni-yin tobchi* and the Shara Tuji tell rather different stories in which Batula and Ugechi are from different tribes, Batula being a Choros and probably the vassal of Ugechi, a Kergud. The two were most likely linded through anda, an institution of sworn brotherhood used by the Mongols to tie tribal units together juridically.

45 Samuel M. Grupper, "Identifying an Oyirad Pasture," Mongolian Studies, vol. 3 (1976), pp. 91-92. The key issue here is identification of an allied tribe, the Sinbis, with a similarly named tributary of the Irtysh.


47 By the late XVIIth century the Russian population of Siberia was about 25,000 families with 180,000 indigenous peoples. In 1625 there were fewer than 3,000 regular troops, chiefly strel'tsy, and 1,000 Cossacks in Siberia. By 1631 that number had increased to about 5,000 regular troops and 2,000 Cossacks. B. O. Dolgikh, Rodovoi i plemennoi sostav narodov Sibiri v XVII v. (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1960), pp. 615-618; George V. Lantzeff, Siberia in the Seventeenth Century: A Study of the Colonial Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), pp. 69, 77.

48 There is little information on the precise location of the princes and their tribes. The best data are found in the reports of the envoys sent from the Siberian towns. There are other reports by local Tatars and even Central Asian merchants. The Russians were sometimes totally surprised to find the princes in an otherwise unexpected locale. The few early maps of the region are extremely vague about the geography of Siberia. None of the maps in Baddeley is early enough to locate the Torghud in Siberia. The Godunov Map,
the Ethnographic Map of 1673, and Schleissing's Map (published 1694) all show the ulus of Kho Orluk (the "Urliukovii") already in the Taik and Volga regions. Baddeley, Russia, Mongolia, China, vol. I, pp. cxxvi-cxxvii, cxxxviii-cxxxxix, and cxliv-cxlv. The Tabula Russiae of 1614, which Hessel Guérard made for Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich (based on a sketch of Tsetsarevich Fedor Borisovich Godunov) located the Kalmyks (Calmucki) on the east shore of the Caspian, south of the Turkmen (probably an error for Nogai). A. I. Dmitriev-Mamonov and A. F. Zdziarski, eds., Guide to the Great Siberian Railroad (1900), trans. L. Kukol-Yasnopolsky (London: David and Charles Reprints, 1971), between pp 52 & 53. The 1562 Russiae, Moscoviae et Tartariae Descriptio (1562) of Abraham Ortelius and based on the descriptions of Anthony Jenkinson, shows the Kalmyks somewhere far to the east, beyond the Syr Darya and the Ob (which are shown to be the same river, connected by the Lacus Kitaia, "The Chinese Lake"). They are described as living in camps and eating the flesh of all sorts of animals, including snakes. They are also said to worship a piece of red cloth hung from a long pole (rubrum pannum pertica suspensum adorant), which might refer to the sulde, the sacred standard of Chinggis Khan, regarded as the symbol of his protection of the people and the home of his spirit. The great standard of Chinggis, however, was a white flag mounted on a pole with nine tassels or tails. The Ortelius map can be found in Ian Grey, The Horizon History of Russia (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), p. 88.
Tableau I: Généalogie des Dorbat et des Dzoungar. Courant is of little help on this point because he constantly confused Dalai Ba'atur and the Djunghar Ba'atur.


In this first use of zhalovan'e the rewards were divided by rank of the recipients. The five senior princes received crimson and lace odnoriadki (a single-breasted kaftan with long sleeves), another kaftan of kamka (a patterned silk woven in the Orient), and a cap of fox and velvet. The forty-four younger princes, evidently the same group mentioned by Kugonai, were sent odnoriadki of a cheaper fabric (nastrafil') and caps of fox fur. Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, t. II (St. Petersburg: 1873), p. 191.

Kichikov, "K istorii," p. 34.

Ibid., p. 35.


Russko-mongol'skie otnosheniiia, 1607–1636, p. 75.

Ibid., p. 101.

Ibid., p. 108.

Ibid., p. 155.


63 As Bogoiavlenskii correctly pointed out, there has been considerable confusion as to the date and circumstances of the first departure by Kho Orluk. Courant misdated it to 1616 and Kostenkov to 1621. Iakinf/Bichurin ascribed it to the breakup of an alliance with the Djunghar Kharakhula, coincident with the departure of Gushi to Koko Nor. This dating would change the chronology by a decade and create both an alliance and quarrel which probably never existed.


64 Text found in *Russko-Mongol'skie otnosheniia*, 1607-1636, p. 23.

65 Bogoiavlenskii, "Materialy," p. 56.

66 *Russko-Mongol'skie otnosheniia*, 1607-2636, pp. 52-53

67 S. A. Kozin, "Vvedenie," *Dzhangariada* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1940), p. 79; idem, "Vvedenie," *Sokrovennoe skazanie*, p. 60. Others who endorsed similar points of view include Iakinf/Bichurin, *Istoricheske obrazovanie oiratov, ili kalmykov s XV stoletiia do nastoiashchego vremeni* (St. Petersburg: Meditsinskii Department Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del, 1834); V. Bronevskii, *Opisanie Donskoi zemli*, ch. III (St. Petersburg: 1834); A.M.

Pozdneev, "Astrakhanskie kalmyki i ikh otnoshenie k Rossii do nachala nyneshnego stoletiia," *Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodogo Prosveschchenia*,
ch. 244, otd. 2 (March, 1886); E. Chonov, Kalmyki v russkoj armii v XVII, XVIII i 1812 g. (Piatogorsk: G. D. Sukiasiants, 1912);

68 Chonov, Kalmyki, p. 3.
69 Kichikov, "K istorii," pp. 59-60
70 "Istoriia kalmytskich khanov," p. 51.
72 Bogoiaevlenskii, "Materialy," p. 68.
73 Ibid., p. 69.
74 Ibid., p. 74.
76 Kichikov, "K istorii," p. 46, note 79.
77 The possible political implications of the 1640 meeting for the young khutukhtu (who was then only five years old) are ignored in the official biography. Charles R. Bawden, The Jebsundamba Khutukhtus of Urga (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1961.)

78 Bogoiaevlenskii, "Materialy," p. 78.
79 Bogoiaevlenskii called attention to the fact that Kho-Oroluk was, at the time of the raid, in the Inderskii Hills, east of the Iaik. Although Pallas had correctly identified Kho-Oroluk's death

80 Kichikov, "K istorii," p. 49.


CHAPTER THREE

THE REIGNS OF SHUKUR DAICHIN AND MONCHAK-PUNTSUK (1644-1670)

Introduction

The Kabardian catastrophe of Khö Örük's death and the attendant slaughter of his son, grandsons and 9,000 men marked a pivotal moment which could have presaged the total destruction of the Torghûd-Kalmyks. At a blow the single most important prince, the odds-on favorite in the struggle for control, vanished. Shukur-Daichin, his eldest and most powerful son, was in Tibet, separated from his home by warring Djunghar, Khoshûd, Dorbed, and Kazakh tribes. The expedition which ended Khö Örük's life also produced an anti-Kalmyk alliance of Kabardians, Cherkes, Kazyev murzas, and Nogai Tatars. Far worse was the Russian response, namely, a general assault which drove the Kalmyks away from their pasturages and forced them to fall back toward the war-torn east.

The second major period of Kalmyk history, 1644-1670 (the era of Shukur-Daichin and his son Monchak-Puntsuk) is the time when the Kalmyk khanate emerged; the age of Russo-Kalmyk collision, accommodation, and cooperation; and the beginning of the incorporation of the still-forming Kalmyk state into the Russian empire. None of these processes stands alone, but each can best be understood when examined separately. The first element, the creation of the Kalmyk khanate, depended on a single prince's ability to concentrate power, to solve the problem of his primacy, and to pass his power to a successor. The second core issue is the regulation of Russian-Kalmyk relations. This required a series of oaths of allegiance and the participation of the Kalmyks in the wars of Russia against the Crimeans and their allies. Finally, there are the
related issues of trade and non-Russian political relations.

The Early Career of Shukur-Daichin

As has been previously noted, Shukur-Daichin did not spring, fully-armed from the head of his father. As a young and ambitious prince, Daichin, lead his ulus west and established himself as a semi-independent ruler. M. L. Kichikov views this move as the first and deliberately planned step in the creation of a new Torghūd group based in the west.\(^{1}\) Not only did he begin to build a base for future political power, but Daichin also acted as protector of the defeated Chokur, defying the wills of Dalai Baatur and his own father, creating a western refuge for those unhappy with events farther east. He also created serious problems with the Russians by causing panic among the Nogai, alienating their vassals, and even fighting Russian troops. He showed some acumen by blaming his distant father for these misunderstandings.

As a young prince Daichin accompanied his father and brother to the great congress of 1640. His impact on those deliberations was probably minimal, but Daichin became acquainted with the most powerful religious and political leaders of the Mongol world. He returned to Djungharia some two years later while on his way to Tibet. The report of his departure, filed by a Edisan Tatar and preserved in the Kalmytskie dela rather naively reads: "And in that year Daichin-taisha \(\text{went}\) from his own ulus beyond the Iaik, from the most distant grazing places, from the uplands of Aman-Karagai, for prayers according to his Kalmyk faith to Mecca \(\text{sic}\), beyond the Siberian towns."\(^{2}\)
Precisely why Daichin chose this moment to go to Tibet is unknown, but there are several, speculative possibilities. Few authors accept piety as sufficient reason for such an ambitious young man to undertake so long and arduous a trip. Pozdleev, due to his misdating of the event, claimed that Daichin sought the approval of the takeover of his dead father's ulus. However, such an act would be virtually unique and would have set a difficult and potentially dangerous precedent of investiture, particularly uncharacteristic in light of Daichin's previous record of ignoring both his father and various powerful princes. Pal'mov also misdated the event to 1645 and agreed that Daichin had gone to enlist the support of the Dalai Lama in his struggle against the various semi-independent princes of the other Kalmuk ulus. If the archival date of 1643 is correct, then Daichin would appear clairvoyant, anticipating both his father's unexpected death and the ensuing conflict. Kichikov explains the trip as an attempt to secure the Dalai Lama's support for the renewed war against the Dorbed and Khoshūd. Daichin was his father's eldest son, the heir apparent, an experienced warrior, and a figure known to most Mongol leaders. He seemed the perfect choice for so delicate a diplomatic venture. Considering Daichin's later award of the title of khan, it is possible that his father sought the royal title from the hands of the Dalai Lama. Recognition of the independence of Khō Orluk by the Yellow Church would have significantly strengthened the Torghūd prince's position.

Daichin's trip had two significant consequences. In Tibet he came to know personally Ṇag-dban-blo-bzan, the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) and the same man who later elevated Daichin to the rank of khan. More
important, Daichin was not available for the 1644 campaign, a fait which may have saved his life. Moreover, it prevented his association with an adventure that infuriated the Russians and provoked retaliatory attacks on the Kalmyks. Thus Daichin's mission in no way damaged his reputation or power. In 1647, when he returned after a journey through war-torn Djungharia, Daichin found a confused political situation, no other clearly established leader, and a number of crucial problems whose resolution would affect Kalmyk history for many years. This was the perfect opportunity for a man of vision and ambition.

The Establishment of Power

As Daichin prepared his strategy for rebuilding both his personal power and that of the Kalmyks, his first and most obvious need was to bring as many people as possible under his own or a trusted associate's authority. He could acquire the needed human and animal raw materials by gift, bequest, conquest, invitation, or recruitment. Shukhur Daichin did all of these.

Of course Daichin had not begun friendless and alone. He had received ulus prior to his father's death and had used them to convince several Tatar murzas to join him. His power impressed the Russians and in the first volume of the Kalmytskie dela the voevoda of Astrakhan described Daichin as "ruling all the Kalmyk ulus and the Altyul murzas...." Even so, at the 1640 Khurultai, Daichin was not yet listed among the major princes.

In 1644, the Torghūd had no single leader. As the oldest and most experienced son, Daichin could expect to be treated as primus inter pares
and he seems to have been. But ambition and common sense alerted him to the possibility that one or more of his brothers might wish to usurp that position. Depriving potential rivals of their ulus would effectively preempt any such act. The Kratkaiia istoriiia states: "After the death of Khö Orluk his eldest son Shukur Daichin became the chief taisha \(^{\textit{and}}\) slyly took possession of the Nogai Tatars that had been the subjects of his brothers Luzan and El'den."\(^5\)

The process was not so simple nor the finale so immediate, but the result was the same. After quarreling with Daichin, El'den and at least one of his sons, Danzhin, fled east. After 1649, El'den's name vanished from the Russian records. It reappeared only in 1661 when the voevoda of Astrakhan noted that the prince and his son had died that summer in Djungharia. Lauzan, as will be seen, was the most dangerous of Daichin's brothers and the most independent. He was constantly at variance with Daichin's policy of cooperation with the Russians and raided Astrakhan in 1649, allowing his vassal Subantai, a Dorbed, to do the same. Daichin regularly claimed no responsibility for his brother's acts and the Russians several times sent separate envoys to the ulus of Daichin and Lauzan (e.g., Dmitrii Efimov to Daichin and Tomila Seleznev to Lauzan in 1650). There was good reason for the Russians to court Lauzan. A 1650 report claimed that Daichin ruled some 30,000 men and Lauzan another 20,000.\(^6\) This kind of strength made Lauzan a necessary signatory for the 1655 and 1656 oaths.

After the oath of 1657, in which Lauzan is not mentioned, the Russians seem increasingly to have recognized Daichin as the ruling prince of the Kalmyks. It also became evident that the brothers' differences
would have to be settled by arms. In 1658, Daichin moved to seize the Nogai ruled by Lauzan and forced his brother to move east. The next year Lauzan retaliated with a devastating raid and seriously damaged Daichin's ulus and reputation. Daichin soon returned the favor and this time drove Lauzan and his sons Galdama and Dordji east of the Iaik. According to Rychkov: "Lauzan, having quarreled with him (Daichin), left the Iaik and went to the Ora and intended to go to Tibet where the residence of the Dalai Lama was. Then Daichin won over all the Kalmucks under the control of Lauzan." Lauzan was removed as a rival and lost all his power in the Volga theater. Evidently he failed to reach Tibet, too. He and his sons were killed in 1660 by the Khoshūd Ablai taisha, a future rival of Aiuka.

Daichin's power was also augmented by the influx of new ulus, particularly those fleeing the wars of Dzungaria. The most important new arrivals in the Emba-Syrt region were the approximately 20,000 vassals of the defeated Khoshūd Kundelen Ubashi and the Dorbed Daian Ombo. This migration caused disastrous crowding on the steppe. Lauzan, who was then nomadizing the area, was forced west toward the Russians, but Daichin and Kundelen were able to reach an accord and nomadized together. In 1660, the brothers of Daian Ombo, Aiuchei and Aiukei, joined Daichin. At about the same time, Solom Tseren came of age and, as ruler of the Volga region Dorbed, accepted the authority of Daichin.

When Monchak-Puntsuk replaced his father (1661-1662), his position was more secure than Daichin's had been in 1644. Even so, Monchak continued to expand and secure his authority, using methods like those of his father. One of Monchak's brothers, Daian Erke, had been murdered
by Lauzan and his ulus given to Nama Tseren, another of Monchak's brother's. Nama Tseren gave his brother no trouble and is recorded as having sent troops to the Crimea. Shukur Daichin's cousin, Djalba Manzhin, however, was dangerous. His raids helped precipitate Daichin's fall from power and the Russians campaigned against him. When other Kalmyk princes failed to join Daichin, Monchak moved on Djalba Manzhin, arrested him, and sent him to a Russian prison. Monchak eliminated a powerful rival, but he also turned to the Russians for the first time as jailers of those who lost an internal power struggle. That pattern was to be oft repeated. Monchak failed to consider that by turning over such rivals he also placed possible candidates for power directly in the hands of the Russians.

Like his father, Monchak also acquired new ulus from other Oyirad groups. In 1662, the widow of Lauzan, Chechen Kanysh, fled the "distant Kalmyks" (those in the east), bringing with her about one hundred vassals, the pitiful remnants of the 20,000 Lauzan once had ruled. In the summer of 1663, Monchak scored a major triumph when he arranged a meeting between Prince G. S. Cherkasskii, voevoda of Astrakhan, and the envoys of the Khoshūd taisha Kundelen Ubashi and his son Dorzhi. The site, the Ryn Peski, an arid region north-east of Astrakhan, was a frequent meeting place for the Kalmyks. The Khoshūd announced that they: "...want to be in vassalage and in every [Form] of obedience, just as Monchak taisha is." They recognized the authority of the tsar and expressed willingness to send troops against the Crimeans. Kundelen Ubashi also acknowledged Monchak as the leader of all the Kalmyks. This arrangement pleased the Russians and in the next year they recognized Monchak as head of the Kalmyk tribes. It also increased significantly the numbers of people under
Daichin's authority. Allowing for possible exaggeration, the Russian record of the meeting says: "And they, the taishas Kundelen Ubashi and Dorzhi and with them their Kalmyk people, one hundred thousand men, with all their herds have arrived and gone out to graze together with Monchak taisha." Kichikov estimates that the total number of Kalmyks now exceeded 300,000. 9

Accommodation With The Russians

Shukur Daichin managed to defeat his rivals and brought new peoples and herds under his power. Lacking an agreement with the Russians, however, meant that he had no safe place for them to live and graze. Prior to 1644, the Russians seemed interested in solving the Kalmyk problem by driving them away from the Volga, out of the regions Moscow and the Nogai believed belonged to the latter. Since neither Khos Örlük nor any of his sons had had especially good relations with the Russians, the 1644 disaster offered Moscow the opportunity to be rid of the Kalmyks for good. Voevody F. Vokonskii (Astrakhan) and L. Plescheev (Ufa) attacked Kalmyks throughout the Volga-Samara-Taik region. The Kalmyks were forced east and north, into areas with less abundant pastureage. By 1647, some Kalmyks had moved as far as Tiumen'.

As bad as the grazing problem seemed, it worsened in 1649. In Djungharia the war of Ba'atur Khungtaidji (Djunghar) against Kundelen Ubashi (Khoshūd), Daian Ombo (Dorbed), and Jahangir Sultan (Kazakh) was won by the Djunghar. Daichin himself, while returning from Tibet, had been present at the decisive battle of Ukharlik. Subsequently Kundelen
and Daian moved their 20,000 vassals to the Emba-Syrt. As any physics student knows, two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. In spite of the pressures of crowding, Daichin and Kundelen made peace in June, 1649. The Khoshūd joined the Torghūd for grazing, taking the area formerly belonging to Lauzan. The accord, however, did not negate the growing problem of general overcrowding.

Daichin, attempting to find some long-term solution, proposed to the Russians a number of schemes for moving farther west, even as far as the Don. But the Russians continued to oppose any Kalmuk grazing between the Iaik and Volga, let alone along the Don. Faced with Russian obduracy, the Kalmuks had two choices. The first, personified by Lauzan, was one of open hostility. He allowed his vassals to raid the Russians, their servitors, and their vassals. At times Lauzan reverted to diplomacy, but his general belligerence so alienated the Russians that when his envoys arrived at Astrakhan, they were imprisoned.

Daichin, on the other hand, relied on diplomacy. His discussions with I. Onuchin, who had been sent from Astrakhan, are most interesting. Taking care to distance himself from his brother, he explained the Kalmuk position on land. First he emphasized that the lands were crowded and the Kalmuks, desperate: "...for us besides these places (the Volga and Iaik), there is no room anywhere to graze." Second, he emphasized that the Russian attitude about land made no sense. "The lands and the waters are God's and before this [time] this land on which we and the Nogai now graze was the Nogai's, and not the tsar's." It was the Russians who had no claim to the region.
Despite Daichin's efforts at persuasion, his policy at first proved fruitless. Ignoring Kalmyk theological and historical interpretations, Muscovy's position did not change in the early 1650's. The formula for the oaths of 1650, 1651, and 1653 ran: "It shall be [forbidden] for the Kalmyk men with their ulus to graze in the summer and winter beyond the Iaik, to the Volga, and they shall not go to graze in Your Majesty's otchina, nor to Astrakhan, in those places closest [to it] without Your Majesty's order."\(^{11}\)

This persistent disagreement could have continued for years, but the war in the Ukraine in 1654 was the catalyst which sped both sides to a satisfactory agreement. Once the Kalmyks signed their first written oath (4 February, 1655) and pledged eternal obedience, the Russian government was willing to demonstrate that faithful vassalage meant great reward. In April of the same year an ukaz was sent from Moscow to Astrakhan, Kazan, and other Volga towns. The Kalmyks were "allowed to graze along the Volga, on the Nogai (east) side, and along the Akhtuba and the Bel-uzh'ia or close to Our towns, where they wish to graze."\(^{12}\) The Nogai, whose land this had once been, either had been absorbed into the Kalmyk horde or had crossed the Volga to settle in the Caucasus or lower Don. With the stroke of a pen, the Kalmyks had won recognition of grazing rights which, previously, no amount of threats or pleas could secure. Instead, they learned that their troops could, by fighting abroad, buy security at home. The lesson was not wasted on Daichin.

When neither the 1655 nor the 1656 oaths actually produced any Kalmyk troops, the Russians, whose own soldiers were busy in the west,
could not take back the grazing granted the Kalmyks. In fact, Daichin and Lauzan had already requested more. After the shert' of 1657 another royal order was dispatched from Moscow. In it the Kalmyks were allowed "...to graze along the Crimean (west) side of the Volga to Tsaritsyn, and along the Nogai side to Samara. In the winter they are allowed to graze on the monchaki (shore of the Caspian) or in other places."\[13\]

There was one jarring note in the seeming symphony of accord and cooperation. For some unexplained reason, the Kalmyks moved away from Astrakhan in 1658. Only the year before, Daichin and Monchak had brought their ulus to the Volga. The presence of Crimean envoys among the Kalmyks had alarmed the Russians and they assumed that this withdrawal signaled the abrogation of the 1657 oath. They recalled that the Nogai had created considerable disturbance by moving away from Astrakhan to the Crimea in 1632-1634. When the Kalmyk envoy Koshuchi tarkhan arrived in Astrakhan, the dumyhe d'iaiki L. Lopukhin and D. Shubin made clear that Daichin and the other princes could not depend on the favor of the tsar if their grazing were removed from the vicinity of the city. Evidently the Kalmyks were too important to be lost and too independent to be trusted.

Whatever the reason for their unexpected departure, the Kalymks' performance in the 1660's in the war against the Crimeans began to open the region of the Don as Kalmyk pasturage. In 1662 and 1663, there were Kalmyk herds grazing on both sides of the Don. According to Preobrazhenskaja, the records of Voevoda Cherkasskii show that the Russians actually recruited Kalmyks to move to the west side of the Volga. In early 1663
and September and December, 1664, Monchak and other princes were prodded by the voevoda to cross the Volga to the Crimean side,"...so that it will be possible for you to send your men against the Crimea and Azov without delay."[14]

These last concessions by the Russian government put the finishing touches to the settlement of the Kalmyks, their herds, and the issue of territory. In only six years, taking advantage of wars between sedentary powers, the Kalmyks of Daichin and Monchak were propelled from an officially landless people to the honored allies of Russia, possessors of pasturage stretching from the Don to the Emba. Daichin, by fulfilling his princely charge to secure the sustenance of his people and their herds, consolidated his own power and proved that his policy of cooperation with the Russians assured the economic basis for the emerging Kalmyk state.

Centralization of Royal Authority

Another major element in the process of centralization was Daichin's ability to persuade the upper levels of society to accept him as ruler and to endorse his policies. Experience had proven that a prince's family was often an unreliable source of support. Several of Daichin's brothers were rivals for power and were opposed to his cooperation with the Russians. They were disposed of. Daichin did rely on his oldest son Monchak and his nephew Manzhin and often deputized his responsibilities to relatives. For instance, he never personally signed an oath of allegiance and usually his commanders in the field were family members. Even so, Daichin
is recorded as having been less than enthusiastic about allowing any relative to become too powerful. According to Ubashi Tumen, Shukur Daichin said: "I do not understand why parents give their sons a large part of their vassals."\(^{15}\)

Beside the royal clan, the next most logical place to find support was among the nobility. Daichin's general policy, insuring the viability of the Kalmuks as a people, appealed to all lords.

Minor and medium \(^2\) Kalmyk feudalists, separate powerful noions, and even some Nogai and Edisan murzas who were already associated with the Kalmuks were interested in the expansion of their pasturage and trading connections with the settlements of Russia. They became the social support for the centralization of power in the hands of Daichin taisha.

Rather than rely on the most powerful vassals, Daichin chose most of his immediate advisors and subalterns from among the lower nobility. "He surrounded himself with associates who were not distinguished by their noble origins, but were committed to his political course. Separate minor feudalists received the titles zaisang or the appellation darkhan (tarkhan) for their special services to the ruler...."\(^{16}\) But Daichin did not follow this sagacious policy merely to prevent the creation of a rival power base. He told his grandson Aiuka: "For one man it is difficult to master the nine various \(^3\) forms of knowledge, because the life of a man is brief. Having before oneself nine men, each of whom will have mastered one of these branches of knowledge, it is possible to be like a single individual who possesses all nine."\(^{17}\) Daichin sought loyalty and talent; he was willing to reward those faithful to his service and determined to destroy anyone who challenged him.
Bestowal of the Title of Khan

A logical product of the elimination of rivals and the settling of the Kalmyks on the Russian steppe was the general recognition of Shukur Daichin's authority. At the time of KhöÖrlük's death the *Istoriiia kalmytskikh khanov* records that Daichin became first among the Kalmyk princes (*akhalakchi taisha*). Whether this is properly considered a title or recognition of a political reality is uncertain. There is no doubt, however, that some time before 1651 the Vth Dalai Lama conferred on Daichin the title of khan. From the Mongol point of view, the title was a legitimate one and properly derived, but Daichin did not use it with regularity.

Certainly the key to Daichin's reluctance to style himself khan was the antipathy of the Russian government to any title bestowed by another power. Despite this opposition, Daichin did occasionally employ his royal title. The first known instance is a letter to Moscow, dated 1651, in which is included the appellation "autocrat (samoderzhets) of the Kalmyk and Tatars, the lord and possessor of many men." The Russians scrupulously disregarded Daichin's pretensions and he waited a full ten years before trying again. This came only after Russo-Kalmyk relations had been codified by *shert* and Daichin himself was beginning to lose his political control. There are two documents dated 1661. The first carries the inscription *Ene, bichik Daichin Khan Buiiu* ("This is the letter of Daichin khan"). The other, a letter to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, includes the salutation: "You, White Khan, be in good health, as I, Daichin Khan, am here, and together we, the two khans, shall
continue [to be] in good health." Daichin made no claims based on his new title; but by calling himself khan and treating himself as an equal to the tsar, his titular overlord, Daichin certainly unsettled the Russians. Perhaps this, combined with his support for the 1662 Bashkir rising was intended to give vent to his growing displeasure with the Russians.

Depending on the circumstances of the Dalai Lama's award, Monchak may or may not have inherited his father's title. However, he is never known to have styled himself khan, relying entirely on Russia for recognition of his authority. After signing the oaths of 1655, 1656, 1657, and 1661, showing willingness to fight the Crimeans, and bringing the Khoshüd to be Russian vassals, Moscow rewarded him. In September, 1664, Monchak was given a silver mace decorated with gold and precious stones, a sabre, a saddle, and several other trinkets. The mace was the special symbol of authority used by Russia for vassals.

Even though at the end of the period 1644-1670 the question of titles remained clouded, several interesting trends had emerged. First, in the eyes of the Kalmyks' chief religious preceptor the leader of the Kalmyks was sufficiently distinguished to merit the title of khan. Second, in the eyes of the Kalmyks' overlords, any political legitimacy entirely independent of Moscow could not be condoned. Therefore, Daichin's claims were ignored and Monchak was rewarded only after proving himself. Even then, he did not become a khan. Third, in 1644-1670, the matter of titles and their bestowal was not yet crucial to either side. But that was to change. In the future Moscow's insistant monopoly in legitimizing the authority of the Kalmyk rulers would become a powerful tool for
controlling events on the steppe.

The Transferral of Power

The final element in the creation of the Kalmyk state was the manner in which rule passed from one generation to the next. Shukur Daichin had established a degree of independence prior to 1644 and he expanded his authority by solving a series of major problems. The Russians recognized his value as an ally and accepted his position of primacy among the Kalyks. Although his rise to power had been gradual, Daichin's fall was sudden. As early as May, 1661, Ivan Gorokhov reported from the ulus that the Tatars and Kalmyks: "do not obey Daichin or Manzhin..., but they obey Monchak, Daichin's son." In trying to understand this turn of events, Gorokhov talked with Daichin and was told by the taisha that he was growing old and Monchak was in charge of everything.21

Age may have figured in Daichin's decline, but most likely only as it affected his judgement. Perhaps because of Russian insistence on the surrender of amanaty, Daichin chose to support his nephew Djalba Manzhin who was raiding around Astrakhan and along the Terek. But by the 1660's the other leading princes of the Kalmyks were already committed to support the Russians in the Crimea. The assurance of grazing and trading rights and the loot to be won satisfied the chief warrior princes, Monchak and Solom Tseren, and their Tatar allies. When the Russians decided to punish Djalba Manzhin, Daichin prepared to attack Astrakhan. But he found himself virtually isolated.
Daichin's career was not yet over. In a fury he joined the Bashkirs in 1662. When their position became hopeless, Daichin left them and, by 1664, was back on the Russian side. It was already too late. Daichin's power had seriously eroded and Monchak took over the Kalmyks and ruled them until the end of his life.

Such a division between the leader of the Kalmyks and his people was not lost on the Russians. M. L. Kichikov has nicely summarized the situation:

The existence in the south-east of the country of a semi-independent Kalmyk khanate which was also of sufficient military strength conformed to the interests of the Russian state in the XVIIth century. However, the Russian government wanted to have someone more obedient to its will, therefore it did not overlook the opportunity to use the political fall of Daichin taisha to the advantage of his son Monchak (Puntsuk) who seemed more loyal, more devoted to the interests of Russia. The rewarding of Monchak taisha with the attributes of rule and authority had as its goal the strengthening of the influence of the Russian government over the Kalmyks, to strengthen the political and juridical position of the new government of the vassal khanate. 22

An important precedent was set. In spite of Daichin's power and apparent security, his failure to judge clearly the nature of his and his people's relationship to Russia was politically fatal. The advantages of the Russian alliance had already outstripped the ability of the prince to turn personal pique into official policy. Almost by accident Moscow was able to influence the single most important event in the life of the khanate - the selection of its ruler. Once accustomed to such power, the Russians consistently sought to exploit, even expand it.
The Oaths

As indicated previously, the Russian government considered the shert' the chief instrument for regulation of their affairs with the Kalmyks. The earliest oaths (1644-1655) of this second period resemble those which had been made earlier in Siberia. The process normally began with the arrival of an envoy in either a town or an encampment. If he were Russian, the demands he carried usually included withdrawal to the east, the end of raids on Russian towns and vassals, and the surrender of hostages to the Russians. A Kalmyk envoy would try to establish trade, get approval of grazing, or ask help against another nomadic group.

The missions of 1644 and 1645 followed this basic scenario, but also contained some surprises. In 1644, in the ulus of Daian Erke there had been an uprising that probably included most of the common herders. They demanded that Daian Erke, a son of Daichin, make peace with the Russians in order to end Russian raids and acquire safe pasturage. Daian Erke sent a mission to Ufa, promised to be the tsar's true vassal and requested grazing along the uppermost Iaik and the Samara to the upper Belaia. He even promised hostages. For some reason the Russians did not act. However, Daian's uncle Lauzan taisha did. Incensed that his nephew would degrade himself to the point of accepting the orders of commoners and willingly becoming a Russian slave, Lauzan decided to be rid of him. A lama in his service poisoned the unfortunate Daian and his ulus was given to Nama Seren, another of Daichin's sons.
The second mission, in 1645, was based on the long journey of Alferii Kudriavtsev to several ulus. Trying to enlist aid against the Crimeans, he promised a grazing settlement, but only if the taisha dispatched hostages to Ufa and Astrakhan. Lauzan's answer was: "...we know that we would be in bondage.... Our grandfathers and forefathers and our fathers and we have never given amanat.... Such a thing was never commanded of us." When persuasion failed, Kudriavtsev turned to threats and his bullying almost landed him in the Bukhara slave market. Had Daichin's vassals not intervened, that is precisely where Lauzan and Elden planned to send him.

These missions, unusual for their violent circumstances, are typical for the terms demanded and their lack of success. Shukur Daichin, always more the diplomat than his brother, gave Ivan Suslov a friendly and peaceful reception when he visited in March, 1649. Suslov indicated the favor of the tsar could be Daichin's for the asking. Daichin took the unprecedented step of removing his hat in the presence of a royal letter. The signs promised a compromise. Later that year Daichin sent his own envoys to Astrakhan. They promised that the taisha would not remove himself from the protection of the tsar and vowed to attack those who broke their oaths. They requested, in Daichin's name, that the Russians do the same to the enemies of the Kalmyks. Although not an oath, the mission did show the Kalmyks were prepared to negotiate the terms demanded by Moscow.

This spirit of cooperation had been fueled by two events. The first was the arrival of Kundelen Ubashi and the concomitant overcrowding.
Second was Lauzan's attack in Astrakhan in 1649. As a result of the former, the Kalmyks needed land even more desperately. Because of the latter, the Russians sent I. I. Onuchin from Ufa to Daichin. The Russians demanded an explanation for the attack, but did not blame Daichin. Simultaneously they implicitly recognized him as the leading Kalmyk prince, an act flattering Daichin and indicating the Russians were aware of the political situation on the steppe. In return, Daichin released fourteen captives and sent his own envoys to Ufa. There, before Voevoda F. Ia. Miloslavskii, he promised for himself and all the Kalmyks (except Lauzan and those with him) to respect the lands of the Russians. The Kalmyks would not attack the Bashkirs or those who paid tribute (jasak) to the tsar. There would be an exchange of prisoners and the tsar's enemies would be the Kalmyks', too.\textsuperscript{25}

The same year a dual mission was dispatched from Astrakhan. Dmitrii Efimov went to speak with Daichin and Tomila Seleznev to Lauzan. Following their trips, negotiations began in Astrakhan. The Kalmyks wanted to graze on the east bank of the Volga, as well as trade in the Russian towns. The power of the Astrakhan voevoda was limited. He agreed to the Kalmyk request on condition that he receive approval from Moscow and that the Kalmyks give up hostages. Although nothing final could be resolved (the Russians and the Kalmyk envoys needed the agreement of their respective rulers), the Kalmyks promised obedience and vowed to fight to the death the enemies of the tsar.\textsuperscript{26}

These oral oaths were a beginning, but did not resolve the single, major issue: grazing rights. At each meeting the Russians insisted
the Kalmyks keep themselves east of the Iaik, both summer and winter. Raids against the Bashkirs did not diminish significantly. The Russians had not received a single hostage, nor had the Kalmyks joined Russian attacks on the Crimea. Also, the very form of the verbal oaths worked against a permanent solution. Mistranslation and intentional misunderstanding served each party. Who could say with certainty tomorrow what had been promised yesterday? As the problems became more acute, the need for written agreements became clearer—at least to the Russians. Pledges in black and white became the basis of Russo-Kalmyk relations beginning in 1655.

Real accommodation became possible because of a complex war involving the union of the Ukraine and Russia and including Poland, the Crimeans, the Ottoman Empire, Transylvania, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, and various Cossack groups. The full scope of the war's diplomacy and double dealing are beyond this study, but trouble began when Russia and the Ukraine attacked Poland. That campaign captured Belorussia, but also drew in the Crimeans on behalf of the Poles. In 1655, Sweden attacked Poland, nearly capturing the entire country. Moscow, alarmed by a possible union of Sweden and Poland, in 1656 declared war on the Swedes. Some Cossacks were unhappy at the Poles' dilemma and others were alarmed by the power of Moscow. When Hetman Bogdan Khmel'nitskii died in 1657, the Cossacks split. One side joined the Poles, the other stayed with the Russians. The Swedes left the war, but the Poles and Crimeans joined in a new alliance in 1660 and seriously altered the balance of power in the south. The war dragged on until the Treaty of
Andrusovo was signed on 3 January, 1667.

Both the Russians and the Kalmyks were anxious to settle their problems in 1654. The Kalmyks needed land, the Russians were beginning a major war. Negotiations climaxed on 4 February, 1655, in the first written oath of the Kalmyks. Represented by three highranking envoys, the Kalmyk leaders Daichin, Lauzan, Mamseren, Sanzhin, and Monchak promised their eternal allegiance to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and his son Tsetsarevich Aleksei Alekseevich. Voevoda I. P. Pronskii, who had insisted that Daichin come personally to sign the oath, was told that Daichin had gone once again to Tibet. It was also true, though, that Daichin had already declared it unnecessary for him or his family to be present.27

The terms of the treaty were simple. The most important was the promise of eternal obedience (poslushanie) to the tsar. The Kalmyks swore to deal with the tsar's men honestly and without guile. Furthermore, the Kalmyks were not to deal with the enemies of Russia and were to be ready to attack the tsar's enemies without mercy. All raids on the Russians and their vassals were to cease and all prisoners to be given up. Those Nogai, Edisan, and Embulk Tatars who wished to return to their former homes were to be allowed to leave the Kalmyks in peace. In spite of the insistence of the Russians, there was no mention of hostages. Also, as George Vernadsky has noted, the Kalmyks, unlike the Nogai, were called to eternal obedience and not eternal slavery. This, he insists, was the difference between subservience and vassalage.28 If the terminological difference was significant to any party, it endured
only two years.

There are several interesting sidelights to this oath. First, according to Pozdneev, is that the text of the treaty was written only in Russian and Tatar. The new Kalmyk language appeared first in a letter, in 1649, and the Russians did not yet have translators capable of using it. The Kalmyk scribe, however, used the new script when affixing his signature. Second is the elaborate preparations of the Russians to produce the proper psychological atmosphere. Voevoda Pronskii spoke with murzas who had lived among the Kalmyks and inquired about Kalmyk religion. He insisted the oath be taken before the Kalmyk god (burkhan), attempting to produce a ceremony made more powerful by an aura of awe and respect. The Russians themselves observed no special religious formulae, but the Kalmyks swore in the name of the Buddha and elevated and kissed various religious symbols. After the oath taking, the Russians distributed gifts to the envoys and their masters. These gifts, various kinds of cloth and some wine, were, as Preobrazenskaia comments, "quite cheap," worth only twenty-four rubles, thirty kopeks.²⁹ Religious rites and the distribution of largess became permanent parts of the ritual of oath taking.

In spite of the major step which the 1655 oath represented, Russo-Kalmyk relations were by no means settled. The new voevoda of Asktrakhan, Prince V. G. Romodanovskii, began negotiations for another oath in 1656. The documents preserved in the Kalmujskie dela are incomplete and only fragments of the oath itself are preserved. If new elements were introduced in March, 1656, they cannot now be detected. Envoys took the oath
in the names of Daichin, Lauzan, Monchak, Mamseren, and Sanzhin. Perhaps other relatives of the princes were included since gifts were sent to Daichin, his two sons, and some fifty-five of his vassals. What- ever the intent of the oath, the Kalmyks still did not send any troops to join the Russians.

Even after two years and two oaths, Russo-Kalmyk relations remained unsatisfactory from the Russian point of view. Although the Kalmyks had not broken the terms and had accepted the tsar's trinkets, they also had received the envoys of the Crimean khan and still had sent no troops. Such freedom from any responsibility may have pleased the Kalmyks, but it was not what Moscow had in mind. Thus, chiefly at the urging of Voevoda Romodanovskii, negotiations began again. This time, the Russians refused to accept anything short of the personal oath of the Kalmyk leaders. Also, the Kalmyks would have to turn over hostages from good families. Unwilling to leave the question totally in the hands of Daichin, Prince Romodanovskii sent his agent, the Edisan Tatar murza Seiunch Abdulov, to speak with a number of other Kalmyks. Promises of gifts and defense from their enemies were scattered about with great liberality among various minor princes. All that was required of them was that they pressure Daichin to accept the Russian terms.

Daichin was willing to make concessions, but the process was lengthy. Late in March, 1657, Daichin's envoy Dai tarkhan announced that Monchak and Manzhik would take the new oath in person, but hostages were out of the question. According to Daichin: "...they (the princes) will be reproached by the Crimeans, the Kyzylbash (Persians), and their
Kalmyk common people; and they, the Kalmyks, from time immemorial have given amanat to no one."31 Finally, on 30 March, Monchak and Manzhik met the Russian representatives on the Kutum River and signed the oath.

The terms of the treaty were much like those of 1655. The Kalmyks promised to be obedient to the tsar and never to act guilefully. They were not to attack the towns and uezdy (districts) near them, nor were they to plunder or kill Russians or loyal Tatars. Also, the Kalmyks promised to attack the tsar's enemies without reserve and to send any prisoners to Moscow. Finally, all the Nogai, Edisan, and Embuluk murzacs who so wished were to be allowed to leave the Kalmyks and return to the Russians.32

So much for the similarities. There was more to the 1657 oath, many of whose details were spelled out in Moscow at the request of the Kalmyk envoys Kuchuk tarkhan and Bekbasha. First, unlike the oath of 1655, in the new agreement the Kalmyks entered "into eternal slavery." Although the intent of the term kholopstvo was "vassalage," the earlier oaths had not used it.33 Perhaps the Russians sought to emphasize the Kalmyks' dependent position and make even clearer their responsibility to aid the tsar with troops. Second was the surrender of amanat. Hostages had been demanded many times and always the demand had been refused. But this time the Russians applied extensive pressure and obviously threatened to reconsider the 1655 settlement. Daichin acquiesced. He sent the first three hostages: Kulachi taisha ("of his (Daichin's) kin and generation, from his cousins and nephews of the distinguished Kalmyk taisha..."), Bulat Kogurzhinov, and Ergel Mubulov. Also, the
Kalmyks promised to give special hostages for those periods when they campaigned beside the Russians. The treaty provided that, "we, the taishas, and our children and the men of our Kalmyk ulus shall not be in alliance... with the Turkish sultan or the Crimean khan." That promise was extended in Moscow to include active participation in a Russian campaign against the Crimea.  

After the signing, the Russians strove to minimize the pain of stung pride. Voevoda Romodanovskii received the three in Astrakhan and housed them in special quarters, away from other amanat. The Moscow agreement also stipulated the return of the bones of KhöÖríük and his family members. These important relics had fallen into Russian hands with the capture of the Nogai murza Shagin. Gifts were also distributed in much larger quantities than previously. Daichin, Monchak, and Manzhik all received fur hats and cloaks of sable and marten, costing one hundred forty-five rubles. The Moscow agreement also called for the distribution of other gifts worth from two hundred to five hundred rubles.  

Military needs had initiated regular, written oaths and military necessity prompted the next shert'. In 1660, a two-pronged invasion of the Ukraine had been launched. From the west came the Poles and from the south, the Crimeans. The Muscovite army under Voevoda V. B. Sheremetev and the Ukrainians, led by Iu. Khmel'nitskii, were forced to retreat on the small town of Chudnov. There the army was first encircled and then destroyed. The major Russian force in the Ukraine vanished. Armies of Poland or the Crimeans were free to begin a winter
march on Moscow or into the Don-Donets region. Unwilling to miss such an opportunity, the Ottoman sultan Mehmed IV (1648-1687), aided by his talented Grand Vezir Köprüli Mehmed Pasha, sent to Azov a fleet of thirty-three ships, 10,000 men, and large amounts of supplies. From the Crimea came another 40,000 armed men and 10,000 laborers. Along the mouths of the Don and Donets they began to build a series of fortifications. Opposing them were only 3,000 Cossacks and 7,000 Russian soldiers.

In light of so serious a situation, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich sent one of his most trusted advisors, boiar Prince Grigorii Sunchelieevich Cherkasskii, to serve as voevoda of Astrakhan. Immediately the prince sent Ivan Gorokhov to Daichin to convince the Kalmyk prince to attack the Crimeans, "so that the Crimean khan will have to break off contact with the Polish king and will not be able to help him."

Lubricating the machinery of diplomacy were gifts, rich ones. Daichin's share was worth one hundred ninety-four rubles. Monchak, Manzhin, four nephews, and fifty other important men were also given gifts, prorated according to their position. The total cost was 1,074 rubles. In only five years the cost of a treaty had increased nearly forty-five times.

Actual negotiations, in Astrakhan and the ulus, began in February, 1661 and lasted until 16 June, when the oath was signed. Numerous envoys rushed hither and yon, trying to tie together the various interested parties. To help with military affairs, Gorokhov and Cherkasskii used two Don Cossacks, Fedor Budanov and Stepan Razin (the leader of the
1670-1671 peasant revolt).

Preserved in the Kalmytskie dala, 1660 goda, No. 5, are the records of Gorokhov, which, even in extract, make interesting reading. The process of negotiations was rough and Daichin, Monchak, and even Gorokhov voiced numerous complaints. Daichin was concerned chiefly about raids on the Kalmyk ulus by the Bashkirs and Cossacks, also nominal Russian vassals. He was upset that his envoy Urusamb had never returned from Moscow and was especially angry that the tsar sent more money to Russia's enemy the Crimean khan than to him. Gorokhov was piqued initially when Daichin refused to stand and remove his hat when presented with the tsar's messenger. (Daichin swore that he did not act out of pride and settled the issue by having his vassal Esen tarkhan stand and remove his own hat.) Gorokhov also mentioned Daichin's previous commitments and reminded the taisha that the tsar gave gifts as he saw fit. To complain might mean the end of such generosity. In spite of their differences, the two agreed to act in concert against the Crimea and to end Kalmyk-Bashkir raids.

Late in May, Gorokhov began to wrangle with Monchak. Monchak refused to send away the twenty-five Bashkir families living in his ulus and protested the Russians' failure to stop the Bashkir raids. At the same time he admitted to having an envoy of the Crimea in his camp and flatly refused to forward him to Moscow. When many of Gorokhov's protests went unanswered, the Russian threatened the Kalmyk taisha with continued Bashkir attacks. Even though most points of contention were left unresolved, Monchak was eager to attack the Crimea and willing to
sign a new oath. In case of trouble, Gorokhov suggested leaving six Russians in the ulus to help control the Bashkir.\textsuperscript{37}

Using Mongol script, Monchak signed the oath in his own name, that of his father, and for all the Kalmyks. Among the innovations was the specific commitment by the Kalmyks to send troops against the Crimeans that very year (7169, 1669, or 1661, depending on the chronological system used). All captives were to be turned over to the Russians and nothing taken from the Crimeans was to be ransomed by them. Any Russians freed during the campaign were to be sent to Astrakhan or some other close Russian city. The tsar's government promised to reward faithful service and assured the Kalmyks that it would prevent any evil-doing by its vassals.\textsuperscript{38}

In her article on Russo-Kalmyk relations, P. S. Preobrazhenskaia maintains that the June, 1661 oath, which might be considered a military alliance, was "...really demonstrating the vassal relationship of the Kalmyk taishas to the Muscovite tsar."\textsuperscript{39} Such was, of course, the intent of this and other oaths. Each oath was an attempt by the Russians to settle the frontier and control the Kalmyks. Yet no solution proved to be more than temporary. Kalmyk taishas entered into "eternal obedience" and "slavery", were willing to accept Russian wording, to give up a few hostages, and to send troops to plunder mutual enemies. The Russians regarded this as vassalage, but there is no reason to assume that the Kalmyks agreed. Raids did not stop. Bribes of money and land continued to be necessary. Booty was misappropriated by the taishas and they continued to have relations with foreign, even
inimical powers. There is, then, nothing unusual, distinctive, or final about this oath.

Only seven months passed before the next oath was signed. Barely returned from his summer mission, d'jak Gorokhov set out once again. This was the period when Daichin was beginning to lose his power and that fact alone may have convinced the Russians another oath was needed. There had also been fresh clashes with the Bashkir. Kalmyk raiding parties had gone north, attacking the Ufa Bashkir, Usol'skii gorodok, and villages of the Chuvash and Mari. The Kalmyks also violated the June oath by failing to return all the Russians freed in the Crimea.

Little of the negotiations is preserved in the archives, but Gorokhov arranged a meeting between Voevoda Cherkasskii and Monchak, Solom Tseren, Duvar and others on the Bereket River. This conference with the Voevoda began on 6 November and ended 9 December with the signing of the year's second oath. For what must have seemed the thousandth time, the Kalmyks swore to live in peace with the Russians and their vassals. Prisoners were to be returned and the Nogai, Edisan and Embuluk Tatars, if they desired, were to be allowed to go home. Of greater significance are the clauses reducing the independence of Kalmyk foreign relations. "We, the taishas, shall not be in union nor at peace with the Turkish sultan, or the Kyzylbash khan (shah), or the Crimean khan, or the beg of Azov, or the Temriuk, Taban, Beseleinik, or the Kumyk." These enemies of the tsar were to be given neither horses, nor weapons, nor men. The taishas were to have relations with no foreigner not already obedient to the tsar."
This oath remained unchanged for twelve years. What had been accomplished by the last oral and first five written oaths? For the Russians, the oaths were a success. Prior to 1655, relations had been, at best, episodic, lacking continuity, based on chance encounters rather than purposeful regulations. Perhaps the written oaths should be viewed as the products of a slowly emerging bureaucratic mentality within the Russian state. The oaths and appendant codicils spelled out the nature and responsibilities of the Kalmyk vassals. Government officials in Moscow, Astrakhan, or Ufa knew precisely where the Kalmyks were allowed to graze and trade; how many troops they were to send against Russian enemies; and how the Kalmyks were expected to treat Russians and vassals of the tsar.

Beyond the urge to tidy up was the stronger desire to control and limit the range of Kalmyk relations. This policy, although limited in its success, gradually acquired efficacy, rather like an oft-repeated, fervent prayer. From general plans to live as friends, the shertti grew to include giving up hostages and refusing all dealings with anyone not a member of the Muscovite family.

At the same time, however, there is an element of failure inherent in the oaths. Again and again the tsar's representatives demanded an end to raids, the return of prisoners, the surrender of booty, and the freedom of the Nogai. They were compelled to make repeated demands that their Kalmyk allies end relations with Russia's declared enemies. And yet the Kalmyks did not stop talking to the Crimeans and were not to be effectively controlled for another eighty years. Hostages, insurance
made flesh, were not truly significant until Donduk Dashi was forced to turn over his first-born son. Russia could use economic sanctions, it could send out armed expeditions, or it could direct other nomads against the Kalmyks. But to secure the Black Sea-Caspian steppe and preserve its hold on the Ukraine and Belorussia, Muscovy realized the value of the cooperation of these "faithless" nomads. The oaths and attendant bribes draw attention to the inability of Russia, alone, to rule the steppe.

The Kalmyks could view their "slavery" with even greater certainty of reward. They had been forced to surrender total freedom of action. Officially they had become the servants of the White Khan. Hostages were surrendered. But the Kalmyks were well paid. Without oaths, they had no access to Russian lands or trade. Even their Oyirad cousins demanded amanaty, but in considerably larger numbers and including herds and vassal Tatars. After Khö Orluk, it was obvious the Kalmyks could not survive alone. Shukur Daichin and Monchak Puntsuk accepted the sherti and struck the best bargain possible.

Russian-Kalmyk Military Cooperation

The purpose of this study is not to present the campaigns of the Russians and Kalmyks in any detail. That subject must be touched on, however, since for both the stakes were high. The Russians were gambling for empire and the Kalmyks for security. As T. I. Belikov has noted: "It would be difficult to overvalue the meaning of the Kalmyks in the struggle for the defense of the southern and south-western borders of
the Russian state in these years."41

Prior to 1644, the Russians had refused offers of Kalmyk troops to deal with the Nogai. But as the situation vis-a-vis the Crimeans became more tense, Moscow showed greater interest. Kichikov has speculated that Daichin's raid in the winter of 1648 against the Kazyev murzas was intended to signal the Russians that he was prepared to attack allies of the Crimea. The result was contact with the Cossacks and the opening of trade and communications lines to Moscow. Two years later the Russians ordered Daichin for the first time "to call the Kalmyks to war against the Crimea." The envoys were unable, however to locate Lauzan and, after three tries, the plan was dropped.42

Another indication of Kalmyk willingness came in 1650. That year troops of Khan Islām Girāy III (1644-1654) attempted to secure a route from the Don to the Volga, hoping eventually to unite Muslims as far north as Kazan. Moving up the Don toward Tsaritsyn, the Crimeans were halted. According to Voevoda I. Golitsyn of Astrakhan, it was the Kalmyks who turned back the attack.43

After the hullabaloo over the 1655 oath, it was 1657 before arrangements were completed for Kalmyks to enter the war. Almost immediately Daichin, who had promised his brother-in-law Prince Cher-kasskii to act, moved against Azov and the Kazyev murzas. He was quite successful and returned with 18,000 head of cattle, 15,000 horses, and more than 1,000 prisoners, having proven to the tsar his "service and rectitude."44

Despite a promising beginning, most of the period prior to 1660
was spent in dilatory negotiations. The disaster at Chudnov and the Turko-Crimean reinforcement of the Don-Donets prompted an additional push for coordinated action. Fedor Budan and Stepan Razin joined Cherkasskii and Gorokhov in the ulus. By December, Prince Cherkasskii wrote Moscow that Daichin, Monchak, and Manzhin understood their assignments — to attack the Crimea, Azov, Temriuk, Taban and the Lesser and Greater Nogai Hordes. Bits of archival information indicate that both Daichin and Solom Tseren sent out raiders in late 1660. A group of Kalmyks remained in the upper Manych to continue to harass the Kazyev area, especially in the spring, 1661.45

As the taishas fattened their ponies for war in the spring of 1661, they sent envoys to the Don Cossacks to propose a fresh campaign. Budan and Razin returned to the ulus in March and by June there was a general accord for the summer raids. In the treaty of June 16, a number of princes promised to raise and dispatch specific numbers of troops. Daichin, as leading taisha, promised 5,000 men, led by Chekula zaisang and Esen tarkhan. Other major princes (Monchak, Solom Tseren, Manzhin, and Dari Mamsrenev taisha) each sent 1,000. Some other taishas (Dugar and the Dörbed brothers Aiuchei and Aiukei) promised five hundred apiece. Monchak was ready for the coming campaign and, as he signed the oath, is reported to have said: "...just as the paper is glued, so let the Kalmyks and the Russians be together eternally."46 Such enthusiasm doubtlessly warmed the cockles of the Russians' hearts, but the results of the campaign that followed were even more gratifying. One group of Kalmyks joined Prince Kaspulat Cherkasskii in early August and went south,
toward the Terek. Daichin and Monchak sent word ahead to the Nogai murzas that if they did not want to face the Kalmyks and the Russians, they were to move their herds to Astrakhan or the Terek, or join the Kalmyks. By late in the month, Daichin's envoy boasted that the Nogai had divided, one group moving to the Terek and the other joining the Cossacks. In the fall of that year, Voevoda Cherkasskii reported that troops of Daichin and Monchak had attacked the Crimea and Azov. Monchak and Tseren's force in the Crimea killed an old adversary of the Russians, Sari murza, along with 7,000 others, took large numbers of captives and drove off many animals. Manzhin attacked farther east, driving into Kabardia and the Kumuk region against the Greater and Lesser Hordes of the Nogai. The one sour note, reported by the Don Cossack ataman Naum Vasil'ev, was that Daichin divided up the spoils among his own men and did not send it to the Russians.47

As the war dragged on, the raids became regular events. In 1663, troops of Dugar attacked Perekop, burning villages and driving away horses. Solom Tseren's men joined the Don Cossacks, led by Razin, along with Zaporozhian Cossacks and Cherkes to attack Perekop. They did considerable damage, destroyed a major detachment of Crimeans, and captured its commander, Safar Kazi Agha. Another group joined the forces of Voevoda Kosakov and Ataman Ivan Serko of the Zaporozhian Cossacks to attack Hetman P. Doroshenko of the Right Bank and his Polish and Tatar allies. Meeting one success after another, they moved down the Dnepr toward Perekop and freed over a hundred Russians and Ukrainians.48

In 1664, it seemed the war might end. Negotiations between the
Poles and Russians began that summer in Durovichi, but peace proved elusive and the campaigns continued. Most of the Kalmyk troops were sent west to help Voevoda Kosago and Hetman I. Briukhovetskii of the Left Bank and Chief Ataman Serko against the Poles, the Right Bank Cossacks of Hetman Teteria, and the Tatars. There was trouble, however, when Kosago was defeated near Korsun and a general rout ensued. Hetman Briukhovetskii blamed poor supplies and the Muscovite troops for the disaster and was, in turn, charged with having failed to share the supplies sent him among his allies. When not railing, the hetman anxiously asked Moscow for more Kalmyks because: "...the Crimeans have a goodly fear of the Kalmyks." The Kalmyks, however, had little faith in Briukhovetskii. "They (the Kalmyks) will happily serve the Great Lord (Tsar) with Serko in the summer, but they do not wish to serve with the other commander." Through the autumn the hetman continued to request more supplies and more Kalmyks, promising then to press the attack against the Poles.

From May to September, 1665, the year's campaigns were directed against the Poles at Belaia Tserkov and the Crimeans at Perekop. Some 17,000 Kalmyk troops had been sent to join the Russians and the results were even more positive than those of the preceding year. The 10,000 Kalmyks who joined Serko and the Zaporozhians made a series of raids in the Crimea. The remaining Kalmyks, sent to join Briukhovetskii and attack the Poles, also did well. But when the Hetman asked Serko to send his Kalmyks after the conclusion of the Crimean campaign, they refused to go. The Kalmyks still had no faith in Briukhovetskii,
evidently because "...the hetman... himself does not go with them to make war."\textsuperscript{50} The Kalmyks had no use for a leader who commanded but did not fight.

Even though negotiations between the Poles and the Russians began again at Andrusovo in April, 1666, the raids went on. Hetman Briukhovetskii regularly requested that Moscow send more Kalmyks and Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich promised that a royal order had been sent to the taishas. He counseled, however, that the hetman send his own emissaries as well. The Kalmyks appear not to have been as heavily involved in the last days of the Polish war and it finally ended in January, 1667, with a thirteen and a half year truce. Even so, there was still trouble with the Crimeans. The final series of raids for this war was in October, 1668. The Kalmyks joined Serko and groups of Zaporozhian and Don Cossacks. Striking as far as Baghchesarai, they freed an additional 2,000 Russians, killed 3,000 Tatars, and captured about five hundred more.\textsuperscript{51}

Patterns for future military cooperation were set by the campaigns of 1657-1668, just as diplomatic patterns had been shaped by the oaths of this period. The most important lesson of these first efforts was that the Kalmyks could beat the Crimeans at their own game: the extended raid by irregular cavalry. Their prowess and ferocity became something of a legend and the mere threat of Kalmyk troops would prove, at times, as powerful a deterrent as their physical presence. In the Kalmyks Moscow found the perfect counterbalance to the nomads of the Black Sea steppe. Belikov, summarizing the contribution of the Kalmyks
to the effort against Poland, is excessive, but not inaccurate when he writes:

This was the first stage of the war for the unification into a single family of the Russian, Ukrainian, and White Russian nations. Each nation brought some worthy contribution into it. Right along with the Muscovite soldiers were fighting, side by side, Ukrainian peasants and Zaporozhian Cossacks, the glorified sons of the Don and sons of the steppe – the Kalmyks.52

Kalmyk Economic Relations

Although problems of territory and troops muscle forward to grab the limelight in the 1644-1670 period, economic relations, though less well documented, were not insignificant. The Kalmyks had shown an intense desire to trade at the forts of Siberia. Moving west changed their locale, but not their needs.

When Khö "Orlik died, the Russians not only sent out troops, they also closed Ufa to Kalmyk traders. The Kalmyks began to drift back to the west soon after the Russian attacks and the trading agents of several princes reappeared in Astrakhan, Ufa, and even Moscow. When Lauzhan was forced west in 1649, both he and Daichin requested trade in Astrakhan. The voevoda, unable to act alone, refused. Lauzhan, who was not allowed to trade some 3,000 horses, became openly hostile. When permission was granted (21 December, 1649), there were significant restrictions. Lauzhan could trade, provided he grazed east of the Iaik. Trade was allowed only at Astrakhan and, while trading, the Kalmyks had to surrender hostages as a precautionary measure.53 As long as the Kalmyks lacked leverage, Moscow could dictate the terms.
As with other issues, trade problems were solved chiefly by the exigencies of the Polish war. As soon as war began and Moscow saw the potential of Kalmuck cavalry, tax-free trade was allowed in Astrakhan. When Volkov and Gorokhov went on their missions to the ulus they dangled the promise of expanded trade in exchange for troops. Cooperation would earn the right to trade in Ufa, Saratov, and other towns. No troops materialized, the promises went unfulfilled. Once the 1657 oath was signed, the Russians opened Astrakhan, Tsaritsyn, Samara, Saratov, and Chernyi Iar, the most important towns on the lower half of the Volga. Trade with Ufa was also permitted, but only beyond the Belaia. Although trade was tax-free, it had to be carried on outside the city walls.54

Initiated after considerable difficulty, Russo-Kalmuck trade expanded rapidly and more Kalmucks came personally to trade in Russian markets. But the taishas and their agents were no match for the Russian merchants, many of whom had been specializing for years in trade with nomads. The market place was dominated by the Russians and difficulties arose. In 1663, Daichin wrote Prince Cherkasskii to complain that the more aggressive Russians were oppressing the Kalmucks who traded in Saratov and Samara. The prince wrote to the local voevody to demand an explanation. Their replies were that treaties and broadened commercial rights could not stop disputes among traders. In fact, it was suggested that the situation would be simplified if Moscow restricted trade to Astrakhan. Cherkasskii could not support such a recommendation.55

The chief element in non-Russian trade was commerce with Central Asia via the "Kalmuck Road" and the routes of the Aral Sea and across
Mangyshlak. In November, 1646, in spite of unstable conditions in Central Asia, the Kalmyks continued to be in contact with the trading centers there. According to Sheik Baba, an envoy from Khiva, "the Kalmyk taishas have sent their envoys to the tsar of Urgench (the khan of Khiva) so that the men of Urgench would travel to them in the ulus and so that the Kalmyk men would also go to them (the Khivans) for trade." 56

The Kalmyk drive to conquer the Mangyshlak helped to open and hold a series of important trade routes, but their actual use is a matter of conjecture. During the period 1644-1668, seven embassies from Khiva arrived in Russia. Each either entered or departed via Astrakhan and at least six (those led by Kutuch, Nazar Nadyrkulov, Amin Dekhadur, Sheirk Baba, Devlet Muhammed, and Devlet Muhammed Shukurov) are known to have crossed the steppe via the lower Iaik. 57 Undoubtedly they contacted the Kalmyks and the freedom of their travel indicates that the trade routes remained open.

South of the cities of Central Asia lay Persia. Records of Kalmyk contacts are very spotty, but merchants are known to have accompanied the diplomatic missions of Shah 'Abbās II (1642-1667) and contacted the Kalmyks. There is, however, nothing recorded of the specific nature of their meeting.

Kalmyk Diplomatic Relations Outside Russia

The complex military and commercial ties of the Kalmyks were matched by equally involved and wide-spread diplomatic relations. This
fact never pleased the Russians, especially after the oaths of 1655 and 1657 seemed clearly to categorize the Kalmyks as Russian vassals. Significant Russian control of Kalmyk foreign relations was still a century away. In 1644-1670, the Russians were not overly concerned by their ties to other Oyirad tribes, but in matters of empire (the Crimeans and the Bashkir), Moscow was invariably anxious.

By moving west, the Kalmyks had not escaped their bonds of language, religion, and traditional social order and practice. Yet despite such shared interests, the relations of the Kalmyks and other Oyirad tribes were almost constantly hostile from 1644 to 1649.

The Djunghar, like the Torghud-Kalmyk, were passing through a dangerous and significant period in the creation of their steppe empire. Led by Erdeni Ba'atur khungtaiji (1634-1653), the Choros tribe seemed ready to reassert its position of prominence when Erdeni Ba'atur's son and successor was assassinated by his half-brothers in 1671. Not only was there confusion within the royal family, but the preeminence of the Choros was opposed by the other tribes. The Dorbed (led by Dalai Ba'atur and Daian Ombo) and the Khoshud (led by Gushi Khan and Daian Khan), aided by the Kazakhs, seesawed from ally/vassal to enemy back to ally. The conflicts and dislocations of Djungharia were not limited to the Tarbagatai, but reached as far as the Volga and Moscow. For the first three years following Khö Orluk's death, relations between the Volga Kalmyks and the "distant Kalmyks" were generally hostile.

In 1645, while Daichin was still in Tibet, the taishas Shunkei,
Elden, and Nama Seren reported to Astrakhan that they must return to the Iaik and Volga. The reason was the long heritage of bad blood between them and the "distant Kalmyks." That same year Lauzan attempted to settle with the other Ogirad tribes by using diplomacy. They were willing to make peace, but the price was steep: "One thousand souls as hostages (jasyr'), 10,000 horses and 1,000 camels, five hundred Kalmyk men with their wives, children, and homes. Also, the distant Kalmyks asked of Lauzan [that he give] his Edisan [Tatars] to Ba'atur taisha." Unable to accept or refuse these terms, Lauzan sent his envoys next to Astrakhan, declaring his willingness to surrender amanaty to the Russians if they allowed him to move to the Iaik. At the same time he tried to mollify the "distant Kalmyks" by turning over to them "...five hundred good Tatars, five hundred sets of armor, five hundred head of good horses, 1,000 camels, and 1,000 horses of poor quality."58 This failed to satisfy Lauzan's enemies and a new mission reached the Kalmyks in 1646. The envoys, including several lamas, demanded the Torghūd join them, pay tribute, turn over all the Dörbed who had already joined them (about 2,000 families), as well as all their Edisan, Nogai, and Embuluk vassals. Again the Kalmyks promised Astrakhan to be loyal vassals, hoping their submission would allow them to move west. The Russians accepted the proffered submission, but refused to open the Iaik-Volga. Moscow also rejected, however, an invitation from the same "distant Kalmyks" to join them in an attack on the Torghūd.59

Daichin returned home in 1647, but only after having witnessed Ba'atur's great victory at Ukharlik. Although the resultant migration
of Dörbed and Khoshūd pressed the Torghūd, the end of the war in Djungharia also signaled the end of Djunghar plans to force the Torghūd into their political orbit. Contacts continued. Ulus moved west; Elden and Lauzan and their sons fled east; and dynastic marriages were made. Daichin and Monchak married at least three Choros princesses. Apparently two daughters of Daichin wed the Khoshūd Ochirtu Tsetsen Khan and one daughter of Monchak married the Khalka Mergen Khan. Aiuka, the greatest of the Torghūd rulers, was the grandson of Ba'atur khang-taiji and lived in Djungharia until 1654.

Tibet, the omphalos of the entire Mongol religious world, was ruled by the Fifth Dalai Lama during this entire period. He was visited there on two occasions by Daichin. The first time, 1643-1647, his trip, claimed as a religious pilgrimage, was probably a diplomatic mission. The second trip, 1653-1655, has elicited little attention from historians. Also called a "pilgrimage," the timing of this journey is interesting. The Russians were pressing for a written oath and insisting that Daichin sign it personally. In Djungharia, where Daichin's grandson lived, Ba'atur was recently dead and his son Senge the new ruler. Personal contact might have helped quiet the eastern marches of the Torghūd. In Tibet, Daichin may have wanted to thank the Dalai Lama for the royal title granted a few years earlier. The Dalai Lama was, himself, recently returned from his first visit to Manchu Peking (1653) and the powerful Khoshūd Gushi Khan had also come to Tibet from Kōkō Nor. A "pilgrimage" at this moment was an excellent opportunity for Daichin personally to study and appraise the men and factors then active on his
eastern frontier.

During this second period of Kalmyk history, the Tibetan Church made to the West Mongols one of its most important contributions: Zaia Pandita. Born in 1599, the son of Babakha of the Khoshūd, Zaia Pandita was adopted by the powerful Khoshūd prince Boibegus Ba'atur. Boibegus had vowed one of his sons as a priest, but adopted Zaia Pandita, asking that he represent the clan. In 1616, the young priest took his vows and was sent to Tibet, where he was trained by and worked beside both the Dalai and the Panchen (or Tashi) Lamas. In 1639, he was sent back among the Mongols and traveled widely. He arrived among the Torghūd in 1645 and presided at the funeral of Daian's murdered son, Daian Erke. Zaia Pandita often acted as a diplomatic go-between for various princes; but his most important act was the invention or popularization of an Oyirad script, based on Mongolian. Zaia Pandita spent much of the rest of his life translating religious works.

Contacts with the Crimea were not complicated by family ties, but they were as dangerous as those with the Dzungar. The major complicating factor in them was the Russian attitude toward any relations, especially after the Russians had gone to war with the Crimeans.

This period opened with Kalmyk raids west of the Volga, against the Nogai and other Crimean vassals in 1643, 1648, 1650-51. These raids set the tone for the entire period. Reacting as outraged suzerains, Khans Mehmed Girây IV (during his first reign, 1641-1644) and İslām Girây III immediately complained to Moscow. Beside some 20,000 to 30,000 Kalmyks, there had also been Don Cossacks among the raiders. It is
interesting to note that the Crimean khans treated both groups as vassals of the same lord.60

After the war with Russia, the Crimeans tried a new tack. "The Crimean khan changed to covert acts. He hoped to destroy the connections which tied the Kalmyks to Russia and tried on several occasions to win over the Kalmyk ruler Daichin taisha to the side of the anti-Russian coalition." The khan's (Mehmed Giray, second rule, 1654-1666) "covert" efforts were a series of envoys, all of whom endeavored to persuade the Kalmyks that the Crimeans could make a more lucrative offer for their cooperation. During the summer-winter, 1656, the Kalmyks received envoys bearing the proposals of the Crimea and, in turn, sent their own emissaries to the Crimea. The Russians, who were also bidding for Kalmyk troops, were quite disturbed and demanded the letters be turned over to them. The Kalmyks delayed until February, 1657, and, once translated, the letters contained no more than a proposal of alliance.61

Refusing to give in easily, Mehmed Giray sent another letter to Daichin and Monchak in the winter of 1657. Again he offered friendship and alliance. Daichin, who had sworn on oath to the Russians in March, said he could not break it by joining the Crimeans. The next year brought yet another embassy. This one also proposed joint action and was accompanied by gifts and a "Lithuanian" captive to be exchanged for horses.62 Even so, no alliance was forthcoming.

Displaying perhaps more perseverance than perspicacity, Khan Mehmed Giray IV sent out another mission in late 1658. Headed by Zal Agha,
the mission was an impressive one. The Crimeans sent 40,000 gold pieces, one hundred and sixty cloaks of fur (including sable and marten), various satins and silks, a gold tree with small birds, and the promise to turn over Kazan and Astrakhan. The proposal was refused. The taishas averred: "that they...had committed themselves to eternal obedience to the Great Lord (tsar) and they were committed by their faith to the oath and they had given captives...that they did not wish to break their oath, and for them that favours were not necessary." Zal Agha, displeased, prepared to leave and arranged for the Tatars living with the Kalmyks to send their wives and children with him. The Kalmyks were outraged by such a blatant act of interference in internal matters and declared: "The Crimeans have committed a lie, and from now on we neither wish nor shall do them any good."

Even this inauspicious mission did not end the exchanges. The same year another envoy, Karasha Atalik, arrived to propose an alliance, promise more gifts, and add Kasimov to the list of towns promised the Kalmyks. Once again the offer was refused. However, "that the Crimeans not be immediately insulted," the Kalmyks sent their own envoy, Alybai tarkhan, "...for the deception that they might want to be in alliance." The Kalmyks suggested the Crimeans send as new envoys Barakchin and his sons, who had been captured by them earlier. The purpose of this feint is unclear. Perhaps it was intended to lull the Crimeans or to gain the freedom of the otherwise unknown Barakchin. Whatever the deeper intent, the mission had no effect on the war against the Crimea.

Gorokhov was told in 1661 that there were Crimeans in Monchak's
camp. Monchak was proud of the fact and refused to send them to Moscow for questioning; but, he assured Gorokhov that he remained true to his Russian alliance. Three years later, when he had become the leader of the Kalmyks, Monchak received another Crimean embassy. This time the proposal was to join a grand alliance of Crimeans, Bashkirs, and Tatars. Not only did Monchak refuse, but he informed Moscow of the plot, suggesting that the conspirators be checked, the Crimea attacked and that the Russians build a new line of forts on the Don, Volga, and Iaik to prevent Crimean attacks while Kalmyk troops were away campaigning with the Russians. In spite of Russian fears, the Kalmyks, far from being "perfidious," remained true to their alliance against the Crimea.

The Crimeans and Russians were not the only peoples interested in bidding for Kalmyk troops. The Poles, allied to Russia, also knew of the Kalmyk reputation for ferocity, even though they obviously lacked any detailed information about this people. For instance, they normally referred to the Buddhist Mongol taishas by the Muslim term murza. According to a letter of 1647, King Władysław IV (1632-1648) proposed to Great Crown Hetman M. Potocki that a mission be sent to the Kalmyks, headed by Kasper Szymański, a Pole who spoke both Turkish and Tatar. Perhaps because of the king's death the next year, the mission either was not sent or was a failure.

Kalmyk diplomatic contacts with Central Asia and Persia for this period are poorly documented. That might be because of the constant troubles to the north, east, and west of the Kalmyk lands. But the Mangyshlak peninsula, which lies on the north-east shore of the Caspian
Sea, did feature in Kalmyk plans. The peninsula, the junction of trade routes between the Volga and Urgench/Khiva, was populated mostly by Turkoman tribes, chiefly the "Inner" (icgi, coastal) Salur and the "Outer" (tashki, inland) Salur. Nogai attacks, which preceded those of the Kalmyks, had already succeeded in driving away most of the Outer Salur. The Kalmyks moved into the Mangyshlak, probably under Monchak. Once in control, they forced three smaller Turkoman tribes, the Cawdur, the Īgdīr, and the Soinadji, to cross the Caspian and resettle in the north Caucasus.67

Farther south Daichin and the Kalmyks not only contacted the Central Asian trading cities, but also dealt directly with the Safavī dynasty in the person of Shah 'Abbās II, who expanded Persian contacts with the nations around Persia, including the Uzbeks and the Georgians. His timing was interesting for the Ottomans were then occupied with the Venetians in the Mediterranean and Prince György Rákóczi II in Transylvania. Perhaps the Ottoman preoccupation with the west and Kalmyk ties to the Ottoman enemy, Russia, led Shah 'Abbās to send two missions, in 1656 and 1658. Details are unknown, but the Kalmyks returned an answering mission in 1658.68

It is interesting that in the oaths of 1657 and 1661 the Persian shah or Kyzylbash khan is specifically listed as one of the foreign potentates with whom the Kalmyks were to have no dealings. This probably reflects a general fear of Muslim powers rather than any specific fear of Kalmyk collusion in a Persian, anti-Muscovite plot. The Nogai had made the same pledge in 1604.
In the days of Khö "Orlik", the Russian vassal with whom the Kalmyks had most contact was the Nogai. By the time of Daichin and Monchak, most of the Nogai had already either joined the Kalmyks or fled beyond the Volga, usually to the Crimeans. Now the Kalmyks became more deeply embroiled with the Bashkir, who lived north of the Caspian steppe and who were both long-time occupants of their lands and Russian vassals. Early troubles with marauding Kalmyks made the Bashkir enthusiastic participants in Voevoda Plescheev's 1644 punitive expeditions. When the Kalmyks began to move west again, the Bashkir began again to resist them. The Russians tried to solve the problem by intervention. They insisted the Kalmyks surrender all the Bashkirs captured by them and then withdraw to the east. They told the Bashkirs to avoid the Kalmyks and threatened any who disturbed the peace with death. But this firm line did no good. The raids continued. One of the chief topics of discussion between I. I. Onuchin and Daichin in 1649 was the wretched state of Kalmyk-Bashkir affairs. Onuchin insisted the Kalmyks could solve the difficulty simply by moving away, back toward the Emba. Daichin had no intention of making such a move and he countered with the argument that as much as he wanted peace, the Russians in Ufa and their Bashkir allies continued to attack his people, plunder the ulus, steal horses, and kill his kinsmen. The taisha also expressed admiration for the elán of the Bashkir and confessed that he hoped some day to win them over to his side.69 That was precisely the sort of admission to give the Russians precious little comfort.

With the exception of Lauzan, who raided north in 1650 and 1654,
throughout the early 1650's the Bashkir and Kalmyks seem to have had relatively peaceful relations. After the 1655 and 1656 oaths the Russians ordered the Bashkir to stop their raids, but it is difficult to tell how effective these orders were. Daichin's envoy, Ianibek Idilvaev, arrived in Ufa in the fall of 1657, to complain about the Bashkir raids, but the Russians apparently dismissed his complaints.70

The deteriorating military situation in 1660 compelled a new oath for the Kalmyks. During Gorokhov's negotiations with both Daichin and Monchak one of the most insistent Kalmyk demands was Russian protection from Bashkir raids. They argued that it was impossible to send any large detachment of troops against the Crimeans when doing so would leave the Kalmyk ulus open to attack. When the negotiations failed to make progress, Gorokhov played on Kalmyk fears and threatened to unleash the Bashkir. The oath was signed and Voevoda Fedor I. Soma of Ufa ordered the Bashkir immediately to end their attacks. As Ustiugov has noted, until 1661 the government turned a blind eye on the raids against the Kalmyks. But once the Kalmyks proved their military value, Moscow worked seriously to stop the Bashkir, even threatening Bashkir grazing.71

As a result of this abandonment by the Russians, a corrupt local administration, and the pressures of Russian settlements on Bashkir lands, the Bashkir began a series of revolts in 1662. Catching the Russians by surprise, they appealed to the Crimeans, calling them "fellow Muslims" and threatening to open a new front in the Russo-Crimean war. The Kalmyk response to the revolt was typically ambivalent. Approximately 8,000 Bashkir fled south, chiefly to the ulus of Daichin
and Aiuka and the princes refused to send them home or surrender them to the Russians. At one point Daichin, Aiuka, Aiuchei, and Aiukei actually joined the Bashkir, but then each reconsidered and returned to the Russian side. 72

Conclusion

Most historians who have examined Kalmyk history have been drawn to the flashy panache of Khō Orluk or the apparent splendor of Aiuka Khan, finding in one or the other the core of the khanate's creation and influence. But the real watershed for the history of the Kalmyk khanate and its vital relationship with Russia is in the reigns of Shukur Daichin and Monchak Puntsuk.

The Volga-Emba steppe in the third quarter of the XVIIth century was the tilting yard of two, competing powers. The Russians were determined to secure the Volga and the fortress-posts of Siberia. That entailed control of the non-Russian people living in the area. The Torghūd-Kalmyk, pushed west, were involved in a desperate search for pasturage and security. At first crashing head-on, eventually both parties were convinced that cooperation was a more logical and profitable basis for contact. From this cooperation came a series of significant trends which color their relationship for the next century.

There is no great commandment by which nomadic peoples are fated to draw together and create a state. On the contrary, the odds decree that most such peoples will become victims of stronger neighbors, swallowed up, losing their individual identity, their names preserved
in footnotes. The Nogai and Bashkir, divided and pressured by neighbors, failed to succeed to the heritage of the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates. Under Daichin and Monchak, on the other hand, the Kalmyks were transformed from scattered and contending ulus into a viable khanate. That move toward the concentration of power in the hands of one man is the first major trend of the period.

Second and closely related to the first is the Russian alliance. Without it, the Kalmyks would almost certainly have been torn to pieces by the Mongols behind them and the Russians and their vassals to the north and east. Because they recognized the value of cooperation, Daichin and Monchak were able to guarantee their people grazing, trade, and loot. The alliance's value grew so quickly that even Daichin, its sponsor, miscalculated his own power and was replaced by a more "reliable" man.

The third lesson of 1644–1670 was that one learned by the Russians. Although at first anxious to scatter the Kalmyks, the course of international events convinced Moscow of the value of these Mongols. Subsequently, their spectacular performance against the Crimeans and Poles proved that the Kalmyks were the perfect deterrent to the Crimeans, as well a perfect replacement for the weakened Nogai and the untrustworthy Bashkir.

Stepping beyond a policy dedicated to driving away or conquering the Kalmyks, Moscow began to sponsor, encourage, channel and control the creation of the Kalmyk khanate. In order to preserve the Kalmyks as a source of fighting men compatible to Russian needs, the tsar's
government gave gifts, allowed trade, and took advantage of fortuitous political accidents. In doing so, the Russians began to control two of the most important elements in the khanate's internal structure, the transferal of power and the bestowal of political legitimacy. From this base, especially late in the reign of Aiuka Khan, the Russians expanded their control until the khanate itself was threatened with total engulfment.
ENDNOTES: CHAPTER THREE


2Pozdneev is incorrect in his assertion that Daichin departed for Tibet in 1645/1646. He is also totally off the mark in claiming the journey took nine years to complete. A. M. Pozdneev, "Astrakhanskie kalmyki," p. 146. Kichikov, "K istorii," p. 47, note 88.


4M. L. Kichikov, "K voprosu obrazovaniia kalmytskogo khanstva v sostave Rossii," Zapiski KNITLI, vyp. 2 (1962), p. 20. (Further cited as "K voprosu.") In 1640 Daichin qualified as neither an iki noiod ("great prince"), baga noiod ("lesser prince"), nor an olon ami noiod ("prince directing a powerful ulus"). Ocherki istorii KASSR, p. 131.


6Ocherki istorii KASSR, p. 88.


9Ibid., p. 26, note 88; p. 23.

10Ibid., p. 9.

11P. S. Preobrazhenskaia, "Iz istorii russko-kalmytskikh otnoshenii
(Further cited as "Iz istorii")

12 M. L. Kichikov, "O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh i politicheskikh predposyalkakh poseleniia Kalmykov (chast' Oiratov) v stepiakh priural'ia i nizhnego povolzh'ia," Vestnik KNIILI, no. 15 (1967), p. 9; Preobrazhenskaia, "Iz istorii," p. 52. (Further cited as "O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh: politicheskikh predposyalkakh")


14 Ibid., p. 53; Ocherki istorii KASSR, p. 114.


20 Ibid., pp. 23–24.

21 Preobrazhenskaia, "Iz istorii," p. 58.

22 Kichikov, "K voprosu," p. 28.

23 Ibid., pp. 8–9.


27 Ocherki istorii KASSR, p. 115; Preobrazhenskaia, "Iz istorii," p. 62.


Preobrazhenskaiia, "Iz istorii," p. 65.

Ibid., p. 62.

Ocherki istorii KASSR, pp. 115-118.


The bones themselves had been a political football for thirteen years. Shagin, whose wife and children were held hostage by the Kalmyks, had gone to Kabardia and somehow gotten the remains. On his way to exchange them for his family, Shagin and his brother had been intercepted by the Russians and imprisoned in Astrakhan. Through the intervention
of the Kabardian murza Aleguka Shenganukov, he was released, but remained in the Amanatyi dvor of Astrakhan. The bones were kept by the Russians. There is no proof that the "bones and ashes" were ever actually returned to the Kalmyks. Bogoiaevlenskii, "Materialy," p. 82; Kabardino-russkie otnosheniiia, t. I (XVI-XVII vv.), pp. 287, 295, 297; Preobrazhenskaia, "Iz istorii," p. 63, note 1, p. 68.


37Preobrazhenskaia, "Iz istorii," pp. 72-75.

38PSZRI, t. I, no. 300, pp. 531-532.

39Preobrazhenskaia, "Iz istorii," p. 78.

40PSZRI, t. I, no. 316, pp. 540-541.

41T. I. Belikov, Kalmyki v bor'be za nezavisimost' nashei rodiny (Elista: Kalmgosizdat, 1965), p. 16.


44Pal'mov, Ocherk, p. 18; Ocherki istorii KASSR, pp. 122-123.

45Belikov, Kalmyki, p. 22. The sources for these raids are highly scattered and include the Don cossacks, an Embuluk murza, Gorokhov and an envoy from Daichin. In spite of the number of informants, the actual raids are only hinted at. Ocherki istorii KASSR, pp. 123-124.
In reading the same archival materials, Kalmytskie dela, 1660, d. 4, ll. 77-81, Preobrazhenskaia and Kichikov come to different conclusions. They not only read the names differently (Menzhik - Preobrazhenskaia, Manzhin - Kichikov), but Preobrazhenskaia says that Solom Tseren sent only five hundred men, while Kichikov claims 1,000. Since Solom Tseren was the leader of the Dorbed ulus the larger figure is the more likely. Preobrazhenskaia, "Iz istorii," p. 76; Kichikov, "K voprosu," p. 19.


Belikov, Kalmyki, pp. 27-28.

Ibid., pp. 30-31.

Ibid., p. 28.


Preobrazhenskaia, "Iz istorii," pp. 56-57.


60. The letters of the khan to his grand vizier concerning these early raids are reproduced in Bennigsen, *et al.*, **Le Khanat de Crimée**, pp. 185-188.


64. Pal'mov, **Ocherk**, p. 19.

The details of this mission and its background are to be found in Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, "The Unrealized Legation of Kasper Szymański to the Kalmuks and Persia in 1653," Folia Orientalia, tome XII (1970), pp. 9-23. The Poles became familiar with the Kalmuks as early as 1611 when a new edition of the Kronika Sarmacyeŭ Europskij (originally the Sarmatiae Europaeae descriptio of Alessandro Guagnini) was published in Cracow. It included a small section entitled, "Kálmuckich Tátárow Horda" ("The Horde of the Kalmyk Tatars") whose importance grew once the Rzeczpospolita went to war against the Crimeans and lost the battle of Batoh in 1652. The planned mission of Szymański was to carry letters which did not mention the Polish defeat, but depicted the Crimeans as ready for the coup de grâce. The Crown also offered 50,000 thaler and its influence in securing the Kalmyks' position in the Crimea.


68 Ocherki istorii KASSR, p. 103.


72 Alton S. Donnelly, The Russian Conquest of Bashkiria, 1552-
CHAPTER FOUR

THE REIGN OF AIUKA KHAN

(1670-1724)

Introduction

The concluding portion of this study encompasses the reign of Aiuka Khan, the period in which the Kalmyk khanate reached the apogee of its power and influence. The historical and political irony of the period is that the latter portion of Aiuka's rule also signaled the beginning of the rapid decline of royal power and a steady increase in the level of interference in Kalmyk affairs by the Russian government. It is important to remember that in spite of the splendour of Aiuka's ambitions and career there was a simultaneous erosion of royal authority that, after the khan's death, led to Russian manipulation of Kalmyk internal troubles to serve the interests of the Russian Empire.

There were several major developments during Aiuka's reign. First, Aiuka's title and position were unequivocally recognized by all major governments (Russia, China, The Ottoman Empire). Honors and gifts elevated Aiuka to a level of prestige never before enjoyed by a Torghud ruler. Concomitant with Aiuka's acceptance by Russia was an unprecedented level of military cooperation between the two. Aiuka and Peter the Great were contemporaries, men much alike, who gloried in war and cooperated in the almost uninterrupted expansion of the Russian Empire. The Kalmyks furnished troops for every military adventure of the tsar-emperor.

On the negative side, for the Kalmyks, was the development by
the Russians, especially Governor A. P. Volynskii, of policies de-
signed to bridle the power of the khan while leaving, unaffected, the
ability of his people to make war for Russia. To effect such a policy,
whose timing coincided with the khan's old age and inability to curb the
ambitions of his sons and grandsons, the Russians began to meddle in
Kalmyk internal affairs, especially in relations within the royal clan
itself. Finally, the Russians prevented Aiuka from naming a successor
and securing for him an unreduced royal authority. In spite of the chaos
produced by Volynskii's intervention and its ultimate failure, the
Russians emerged from the succession dispute clearly able to determine
the heir of the khan. Once Aiuka was dead, anyone hoping to rule the
Kalmyks had first to secure the support of Russia.

Aiuka's Early Years

Aiuka (1642-19 February, 1724) was the product of one of the
dynastic marriages arranged at the 1640 khurultai. His father was
Monchak Puntsuk and his mother the daughter of the Dzungar ruler
Erdeni Ba'atur khungtaiji, Aiuka's great-uncle by virtue of his marriage
to one of Khö Öliuk's daughters. Monchak returned to the Volga after the
meeting and Aiuka was born and spent the first fourteen years of his life
in Dzungaria. There he witnessed the growing power of the Choros tribe
and the dynamism of his grandfather/great-uncle, who terrorized the
Kazakhs and Bukhara, raided Russian Siberia, extracted tribute from the
Tatar tribes, and helped the Khoshūd establish the Dalai Lama in Lhasa.
He even built a stone capital city at Kubak-sarai on the Imil River.
Courant says of Ba'atur that: "Sometimes in his new capital and sometimes in his camps on the Ili or in the region of Khobdo, he enjoyed receiving with dignity and splendour the envoys of foreign princes and the voevodas of Siberia; the nomad warrior was being transformed into a lawgiving, farming, and trading prince." Nor was the lesson of these early years lost on Aiuka. N. N. Pal'mov maintained that: "One can affirm that he grew up in the diplomatic school of his grandfather. He was a decided supporter of autocratic power; thanks to a taste for action, he managed to concentrate power in his own hands and tightly kept it there. From his first day, fate patronized the rule of Aiuka."¹

Little is recorded of Aiuka's early years on the Volga or of his apprenticeship to his Kalmyk grandfather and father. There are fragments, but no more than pieces of political acts in which he participated. Best known is his marriage into the powerful Circassian family of Cherkasskii, a union affected by his wedding to Abukhan and Kaspulat Cherkasskii's to Aiuka's aunt. As a young prince, Aiuka was granted his own ulus and is known to have taken part in the early events of the Razin rebellion, (1667-1671).

He was watched by many interested parties during this time, for, as the eldest son of the eldest son, it was assumed that at some point in the future, he would rule the Volga Kalmyks.

Perhaps the most insightful information from Aiuka's early years is contained in a few bits of political wisdom which his grandfather Shukur Daichin is said to have passed along. "If you wish to be a
noion, then you must understand the time when to act as an equal to your vassals, when to command them, and when to treat them with charity, like a mother /_does_/_her children." In another remark, which Russian administrators would have found particularly prophetic, Shukur Daichin told Aiuka: "The greatest deceiver is the one who can pretend to be truth(ful) to people."^2

Aiuka Establishes His Authority

In about 1670, presumably at the death of his father, Aiuka became the leading prince of the Kalmyks. The transfer of power was not smooth. In 1669, Aiuka, probably then still heir apparent, was deserted by his relative Dugar; and then, in June, 1670, by another Torghūd taisha, Bok. The two princes may have left to protest the Russian alliance and to show disagreement with Aiuka's refusal to join in the lawlessness and looting of the Razin revolt on the Volga. The two moved to Azov, but returned with several thousand warriors to attack Aiuka, his sons, and their troops. Their pressure probably explains Aiuka's inability to aid in the Russian suppression of the peasant revolt.

As Aiuka reacted to the attacks from the west, a graver threat appeared in the east. Some years before, a daughter of Khō "Orłūk had married the Khoshūd chief Boibegus, bearing him at least one son, Ablai. Boibegus' other son, Ochirtu, later titled the Tsetsen Khan, was the husband of Aiuka's younger sister Dordji Rabtan. At the death of their father, the two half-brothers divided their ulus, Ochirtu remaining
near Lake Zaisan and Ablai moving his 60,000 retainers to the Semi-
palatinsk-Tara area. Ablai quarreled both with his brother and with
the Djunghar ruler Galdan. He was, as a result, forced to move west,
making room either by alliance or conquest. He captured the ulus of
the Dorbet Daian Ombo and allied himself with the Khoshūd and Dorbet
ruled by Kundelen Ubashi and his sons. Together they moved toward the
Iaik, plundering ulus and seizing, among others, the vassals and person
of Shukur Daichin, Aiuka's grandfather. The allies quarreled among
themselves and Zaia Pandita reported that Kundelen Ubashi's sons left
Ablai and moved back to the east, taking Shukur Daichin with them. 4
Ablai moved to the Iaik and wintered there, gathering strength and
planning his march to the Volga. He wrote Moscow demanding he receive
the same subsidies granted Shukur Daichin and Monchak.

Aiuka was in serious trouble. Realizing that Ablai was the more
powerful threat, Aiuka acted with dispatch. First he smoothed over his
differences with Dugar and Bok. Then he secured the aid of Astrakhan
strel'tsy and Iaik Cossacks. The Russians were not anxious to have to
deal with another unknown, but obviously aggressive, Mongol prince on the
Volga. Aiuka was joined by Dugar, his cousin Nazar, and the powerful
Dorbet Solom Tseren, among others. The Kalmyks attacked and, in 1672,
captured Ablai and his ulus. Soon thereafter, Aiuka turned on his
former ally Dugar, seized his ulus and forced both Dugar and Tseren,
his son, to seek refuge on the Terek. 5

By swift and decisive action Aiuka proved in combat the propriety
of his inheritance, quieted the ulus and restive princes, and added the ulus of his defeated enemies to his own. Aiuka's prestige rose among all the West Mongols. In 1674, Solom Tseren, Aiuka's recent ally, came to the Volga and joined the Torghūd with his 4,000-man ulus. By 1671, Aiuka's sister Dordji Rabtan and a group of princes, all seeking respite from the troubles of Djungharia, moved to the Volga. In 1686/7, Tsgan Ba'atur taiji brought a group of "Black Kalmyks" west to settle near Aiuka. Turii Lytkin, describing the Torghūds' chief, wrote:

Aiuki reached his goals: He became the most powerful ruler of the Volga Oirats, he divided the ulus among the nobility, he gave what he pleased to whom [ever he pleased]; at his headquarters were envoys of the ulus rulers in whose presence were appointed the pasturage in the spring and fall where the noions and their ulus were to spend the summer and winter and about which not even one noion was able to raise an argument.

The Regulation of Russo-Kalmyk Relations
The shert' continued to be the basis of Russo-Kalmyk relations during the reign of Aiuka, particularly before 1697. From earlier treaties, the Russians built an increasingly complex and restrictive amalgam of conditions designed both to house and to imprison the Kalmyks within the confines of Russian imperial policy. Much of the fine-tuning in that process was embodied in oaths of Aiuka's reign (1673, 1677, 1683, 1687, 1697, 1708, and 1710). Their salient features included the continued supply of armed auxiliaries for the Russian army, the on-going effort to stop Kalmyk depredations on Russian towns and vassals, and an attempt to gain meaningful control of Kalmyk contact with peoples not
under Russian control. The results were mixed, but the last point, in particular, was a point of significant disagreement throughout the reign.

The first of Aiuka's oaths, signed on 27 February, 1673, was designed to recognize Aiuka's assumption of power and to guarantee the structure of promises made by his two predecessors. The reasons for calling a new oath at that moment were, however, somewhat more complex. As shall be seen below, Kalmyks had fought both for and against Russian government troops in the Razin revolt. At the same time, Aiuka had been engaged against Dugar, Bok, and Ablai. In 1672, the Turks and Crimeans had attacked the Ukraine and been joined by P. Doroshenko, Hetman of the Right Bank Cossacks. Russian appeals to Europe elicited sympathy, but no aid. The Turks moved against the Right Bank and the Crimeans against the Left Bank and the Don-Volga-Caucasus region. In the general confusion and as a result of simmering grudges, the admirable service of I.Serko was lost when he was suddenly deported to Tobol'sk in 1672. The Russian position in the south deteriorated rapidly and the safety of the state demanded troops immediately.

When Aiuka met Astrakhan's voevoda, Bo'iar Prince Iakov N. Odoevskii on the Solianyi pritok, near the city, he promised to support the oaths of his father and grandfather, to be a loyal vassal, to live in peace with the Russians and their vassals, and to have no truck with the tsar's enemies or traitors. He also agreed not to deal with the Persians, the Crimeans, the beys of Azov, or their allies. The Kalmyks would neither trade with nor sell horses to any of the aforementioned.
Envoys from the towns of Central Asia were to be sent to the Russians. Any Tatars who wished to return to direct Russian control would be allowed to do so and no new arrivals would be accepted. Most important of all, the Kalmyks promised to send troops, without complaint, anywhere, at any time, especially later in the year. The Russians, who had suffered grievously from the raids of Ibrahim Pasha, were then planning a spring campaign against the Crimea, choosing that in place of an all-out assault on the Ottoman Empire.

In return, the Russians promised to protect Aiuka's people, who, since the Razin revolt, had been raided by the Bashkir, the Don and the Iaik Cossacks. Trade was to continue, without rancor, and Kalmyk tribesmen were to go directly to Moscow to sell horses, rather than in Tambov, Kasimov, or Vladimir. Also, although ordered to release any Russians, Georgians, Belorusians, or Vlachs freed from the Turks, the Kalmyks were allowed to require payment of a ransom. Kalmyk envoys were allowed to go, without fear, from the ulus to Astrakhan and Moscow to present problems directly to the central administration. Zhalovan'e was guaranteed, but with the caveat that the amount was to be accepted and not grumbled about or haggled over. Finally, the Russians promised that any unbaptised Kalmyks who came to Russian towns would be returned immediately to their ulus. Aiuka pledged for himself, his family and vassals, as well as for the Nogai, Edisan, Embuluk, Malibash, and Kelechin murzas. He asked, if he should fail to perform, that the wrath of God and the fiery sword of the tsar fall upon him.7
Four years later, again on the Solianyi pritok, a new oath was sworn. A number of matters during the intervening years demanded a reaffirmation of the understanding between the Russians and the Kalmyks. Chief among Kalmyk concerns were raids on them by Russian vassals. In the spring of 1675, Aiuka complained to the Russian envoy K. P. Koslov of raids by the Iaik and Don Cossacks. However, Kalmyks, accompanied by Nogai, Embuluk, and Edisan Tatars, had also been raiding Russian villages and fishing stations, carrying off captives and loot. In May, 1675, the Kalmyks noted that the Bashkir had joined in the melee. A letter from Aiuka, dated October, 1675, repeated the charges: "We pledged, giving our souls to you, Great Lord, if there were such plunderings, that the perpetrators, be they from the Russians or from us, and the plunder would be turned over." He went on to say that it was impossible to estimate the value of cattle and horses already lost to the Don Cossacks. 8

The Russians were interested chiefly in troops. The war, which had originally pitted both Russia and Poland against the Ukrainians, Turkey, and the Crimea, had altered radically in 1676. At the Peace of Żurawno, Ahmed Kopruulu "forced the Poles to abandon the war, pay an annual tribute of 220,000 ducats, and surrender Podolia and the western Ukraine, "the last significant territorial gain in the history of the empire." 9 To compound Russian difficulties, on 8 February, 1676, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich died suddenly and was succeeded by his sickly son, Fedor Alekseevich (1676–1682). The Muscovite government was plunged into
confusion as Miloslavskii and Naryshkin factions fought over the spoils; the tsar abandoned governing to his favorites, Ivan Iazykov, Aleksei Likhachev, and Prince Vasili Golitsyn. In 1677, Russia and the Ottomans again went to war and the Turks set about gathering a force reported to be 100,000 men for a massive attack on the Ukraine.

The third reason for a new oath was that since 1673 a number of Dorbet princes, including Solom Tseren, Dol, Baushei, and Aiukai had arrived on the Volga and joined Aiuka. They needed official status in the family of Russian vassals and had to be added to the ranks of those contributing troops to Muscovy.

On January 15, 1677, Aiuka, his brother Yaka Djamso, the newly arrived princes, and Voevoda Prince Konstantine Os. Scherbatov met to sign the second oath. Much of the agreement was an affirmation of the 1673 pledge of allegiance and loyalty. That included the cessation of all raids. Moscow also renewed its efforts to secure control over the Kalmyks' foreign contacts. Any document sent by a foreign prince was to be forwarded immediately to Astrakhan or Moscow. The envoys who carried such communications were to be kept in the ulus, always ready to be sent to the Russians if that seemed necessary. If answers to such letters were required, they would first have to be approved by the Russians. Also, the Russians insisted that the Kalmyk ruler, upon receipt of any royal order, was to stand, remove his cap, and show due reverence to the order of the tsar.

The Russians also demanded troops, but they were willing to pay.
All the Kalmyk princes who took Russian service, including Aiuka, were to receive five hundred ninety rubles a year in zhalovan'e, an offer left open-ended to include any new arrivals from the east.\textsuperscript{10}

Following the second oath, numbers of Kalmyks were sent to the west to join the campaigns around Chirgin and in the Caucasus. The Turkish war was concluded on 13 January, 1681, with the Treaty of Bakhchisarai (also known as the Peace of Radzyń), but all was not well between the Kalmyks and the Russians. Turkish agitation among the Muslim tribes and the restlessness which persisted even after the suppression of Razin preserved an atmosphere of distress along the Volga. Among the Bashkirs this dissatisfaction festered and eventually manifested itself in a series of risings lasting from 1675 to 1683. These are usually known as the Seit Uprising, named for the most famous of the Bashkir malcontents, Seyid Dasir (Seit Sadurov, Seit Safarkhan), and involved the Volga, Kama, and west Siberian regions. Kalmyks, including Aiuka and Solom Tseren, gave aid and comfort to the Bashkirs, and, even worse, began to receive Crimean envoys in the ulus. Kalmyks joined the Crimeans for raids on Penza and other attacks along the Don in 1680. The Don raids had been prompted by on-going trouble with the Don Cossacks. Between 1677 and 1678 their relations had deteriorated so seriously that Lemercier-Quelquejay has termed it "a virtual war."\textsuperscript{11}

Even though the Turkish war had ended in January, 1681, the terms of the peace were not accepted by the sultan until 1682, and in the intervening months, the Russians became alarmed by the Kalmyks' growing
contacts with the Crimeans and their support for the Bashkir. First they sent Aiuka's brother-in-law, Prince K. M. Cherkasskii, to reason with his relative and friend. He reported to the Posol'skii prikaz in early 1681 that Aiuka had promised to stand by his oaths and not be seduced by the promises of the Turks or their allies. The arrival of a Crimean envoy at about the same time prompted the Astrakhan voevoda, Matfei S. Pushkin, to send another envoy to Aiuka in January, 1681. The Russians reminded the Kalmyk leader of his promises. Aiuka agreed to the probity of the Russian position and sent his own man, Darbu, to Astrakhan to promise that Aiuka would not be tempted by the gifts of the Crimean khan. The Kalmyks swore not to make peace and to send all communications of the Crimeans to Astrakhan, via Prince Cherkasskii. Aiuka complained, however, that Bashkir and Cossack raids had been devastating and requested a new oath to settle the problem.12

Aiuka's interest in a new oath lessened, however, as the Bashkir turned from raids on the Kalmyks and redirected their energies against the Russians. Aiuka, his brother Djamso and other taishas, ready to turn each situation to their own advantage, stopped fighting against and began fighting alongside the Bashkir. In summer, 1682, Aiuka and several princes took 4,000 men into the Kazan and Ufa uezdy. Prior to their attack, the Russian voevoda had made a successful raid on the Bashkir of the Ik River and had, seemingly, brought the revolt to an end. The appearance of the Kalmyks, however, split the defeated Bashkir into two groups, one of which insisted on joining Aiuka and continuing the fight.
Moscow was faced with double trouble in the Kalmyk steppe.

Originally concerned by Crimean overtures to the nomads, the Russian government was forced to consider the possibility of total commitment of Kalmyk resources on the side of the Bashkir. The Russians reacted by formulating a two-pronged policy. First, they worked militarily to force the Bashkir north, back into their original lands and away from the borders of the Kalmyk steppe. Secondly, the Astrakhan authorities stepped up efforts to secure a new oath.

Returning to the Solianski pritok, a large group of dignitaries met on 24 January, 1683. The Russians were led by Voevoda Boiar Prince Andrei I. Golitsyn and Prince Nikita I. Primkov-Rostovskii, the Kalmyks by Aiuka, Solom Tseren, and Norbo Zamsa. The terms reflected the unrest of the previous years. After promises to be good vassals of the tsar, Aiuka and his brother Zamso admitted to having participated in raids in the Caucasus, the Ukraine, and Russia, capturing Russians, Bashkirs, and Cheremis, as well as taking considerable loot. The princes promised to punish the perpetrators of the attacks and to free those captured. They also promised that if any Bashkir sought refuge with the Kalmyks, they were to be returned to the Russians.

Otherwise, the Kalmyks promised to have no contact with Muslim rulers and their vassals, particularly the Rumuk. The Russians also wanted the return of certain Iurt Tatars who had left Astrakhan and joined the Kalmyks in 1682. Finally, the Russians promised again that any Kalmyks not already baptised Christians who appeared in the Russian
towns would be returned to their ulus.\textsuperscript{13}

One more "oath" was sworn when Voevoda Prince V. V. Golitsyn issued a gramota dated 19 May, 1687, which graciously accepted Tsagan Ba'atur and his children as vassals of the tsar. They requested permission to nomadize between the Volga and Don, along the Khopr, Medveditsa, and Ilovla Rivers, but the Russians thought better of the idea and ordered they remain on the eastern side of the Volga, closer to the Akhtuba.\textsuperscript{14}

Both N. N. Pal'mov and the Ocherki istorii KASSR have correctly noted that the 1683 oath was actually the finale to the first series of oaths between Moscow and Aiuka. By these sherti, hammered out over a period of thirteen years, the Russians and the Kalmyks finalized for all time the basic principles of their relationship. The Russians demanded and got troops and refused to allow the Kalmyks to involve themselves in the internal affairs of the Muscovite state. They also repeatedly insisted that the Kalmyks stop independent dealings with foreign powers. Since the Kalmyks, although often courted, never actually accepted any offers by Russia's enemies, the intent of Moscow's demands was actually met; the letter, however, was often and flagrantly ignored. The Kalmyks continued to trade with the Russians and to be paid by them. None of the oaths significantly affected Kalmyk internal politics or threatened the position of the ruler.

Also, the Kalmyks remained free to make war and win loot from anyone not already a Russian vassal.

After 1687, the "oaths" were less the official documents of
previous years and more the negotiations and the records of understandings reached in meetings between the Kalmyks and Russian representatives. The first and most successful of these meetings took place in mid-July, 1697, when Prince Boris Al. Golitsyn met Aiuka and his son Gunjab on the lower course of the Kamyshenka River. The meeting, not necessitated by raids or misunderstandings but by the departure of the tsar for Europe, was a veritable love feast. Golitsyn and Aiuka kept one another carefully informed of each other's whereabouts and actions. Golitsyn had the chevaux-de-frise removed from around his encampment and reduced the number of guards so the two men could dine together as friends. They exchanged visits over two days (July 15-17), mixing business with dining and friendly conversations while strolling. Aiuka was so impressed by Golitsyn's behaviour that he gave his son Gunjab into the prince's keeping.

Because the Kalmyks had stopped their raids on Russian territory and had acted as faithful vassals over the last several years, the discussions went smoothly. Kalmyk military interests had turned from Russia to Bukhara, the Kazakhs, and the Karakalpaks. The Russians agreed that if any of the aforementioned Central Asians went to war with the Kalmyks, then Aiuka would be given five pieces of artillery (two polugollanki and three mazhzhary), shot, gunners, twenty pud (about three hundred twenty-eight kilograms) of powder, and an additional twenty pud of powder and ten pud of shot per year. If the Kalmyks were at war with the Crimea or its allies and forced to retreat, they were to be allowed refuge in
Russian towns. The Kalmuks were to live in peace with the Bashkirs and the Cossacks, and Kalmuk trade was to go unhindered. Kalmuks could graze near the tsar's towns on the condition they behaved themselves. Aiuka and his family were to be ferried from Chernyi Iar to Saratov (at the time of changing pastures) at government expense, while the common herdsmen were to move, as before, without interference from the local authorities. Finally, Kalmuks who fled to Russian towns were to be kept there and word was to be sent to Aiuka. If the local voevoda chose to allow them to take Russian service, he would have to pay Aiuka thirty rubles per man.\textsuperscript{15}

This oath, seemingly the height of Russian and Kalmuk understanding, has been treated variously by historians. Pozdneev, ever ready to condemn the Russians for being hornswoggled by a pack of seedy nomads, thought it an absolute triumph for the Kalmuks. He felt that the Kalmuk ruler was smart enough to see Russian troubles (Peter the Great's Azov wars) and used them to his own advantage. Nefed'ev and Pal'mov felt himself that Aiuka rightly considered/the honored ally of Russia outfitted for war by Peter and ready to attack their mutual enemies in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{16} Both views contain a grain of truth. Aiuka was a statesman, not an idiot, willing to profit from circumstances to get what he wanted. The Russians could keep their nomad allies happy and in condition by unleashing them against Central Asia in a war which did not endanger the safety of Russia and might enhance its leverage in the region. Both sides stood to gain from such an arrangement.
Eleven years passed before another such official meeting. Although much had changed in Petrine Russia during those years, even the reformer tsar himself had not altered the adventurous nature of the Kalmucks. When Aiuka Khan met with Petr Matveevich Apraksin, Blizhnyi ministr and Gubernator of Kazan and Astrakhan, in September, 1708, the site was the Danilovka River, a small stream which flows into the Akhtuba and the Volga about two hundred versti from Astrakhan. Apraksin's first chore was to explain that Peter I highly regarded Aiuka and wished to reward the khan with zhailovan'e. Next, he told Aiuka that the new system of gubernii had put Apraksin in charge of the affairs of Kazan, Astrakhan, Terek, Ufa, and all the towns of the lower Volga. If an enemy threatened this part of the tsar's realm, the governor would notify the khan and the Kalmucks would be expected to send troops immediately. They would, of course, be rewarded for loyal service.

Included in the agenda were two fractious topics. First, two of Aiuka's vassals, Chemet, a Torghûd prince, and Monke-Timur, a son of Solom Tseren, had raided Penza, Kozlov, and Tambov uezdy, attacking more than one hundred villages, ruining horse and cattle stations, and carrying off local inhabitants to be sold as slaves. They had acted in cooperation with the Bashkir who had begun another rising in 1705. Aiuka had been sent letters of complaint, but nothing had happened to the guilty and none of the victims had been returned. Secondly, in 1707, Murat, the self-proclaimed sultan of the Chechens, Kumaks, and Tersk Nogai had placed the Russian fort of Tersk under seige. Aiuka had been ordered
to send 3,000 troops under his grandsons Dasang and Donduk to relieve the garrison, but little had happened. Dasang arrived at Astrakhan without troops and Donduk, who brought men, was rewarded, but promptly when home. Murat continued to make the Terek unsafe for the Russians. Apraksin ordered Aiuka to send 4,000 to 5,000 warriors to end the problem.

Aiuka admitted the guilt of Chemet and Monke, but protested that he had no control over their deeds. He immediately sent them letters detailing the immensity of their crimes against the tsar and warning that retribution was at hand. The khan promised to send his own troops against them and assured the governor that soon he would be able to name all those responsible for the raids. As for the problem of Murat, Aiuka was delighted to announce his willingness to avenge the insult dealt the tsar and would send at least 5,000 men, headed by his eldest son, Chakdorzhab, to destroy them.

Finally, the khan asked the governor to send an order to all the towns from Astrakhan to Saratov that in the event of trouble, especially when the Kalmyk warriors were at the front with the Russians, the khan would be sent troops and cannon if attacked by his own enemies. Seven years later, when the Kuban Tatars suddenly attacked Aiuka's own ulus, the Russians did little. The khan would reflect, with great bitterness, on the solemn promises of 1708.17

Aiuka's last oath, signed in September, 1710, still fourteen years before the end of his reign, was concluded with Governor Apraksin on the Danilovka. Apraksin announced that the tsar had been pleased by
the service of the khan and increased the khan's annual zhalovan'ye to 1,000 rubles. Kalmyk troops were granted increased powder and shot. The governor also announced that Chemet and several other princes had promised not to leave Russian service, thus ending the fears expressed in 1708.

The major Russian concerns were the moves of the Crimeans, Bashkirs, (then in revolt), and the Don Cossacks loyal to Ignatii Nekrasov, lieutenant of the recently deceased rebel, Kondratii Afanas'evich Bulavin. Kalmyk taishas were instructed not to cross to the west side of the Volga, near Russian towns, without orders. They would be sent in the autumn to graze near the Don and to deflect any attacks from the Kuban or Don directed against Russian settlements. The governor was also worried that troops which were supposed to have been sent against the Bashkir had not yet departed. Aiuka assured Apraksin that he would gladly winter on the Don and that the troops had actually left three weeks before, but no reports of their adventures had yet reached headquarters.

At the meeting's end, Apraksin again promised that Aiuka was safe from attacks and that all local komendanty had been instructed to protect him from his enemies. Mollified, the khan and his princes accepted the oath. 18

Russian Representatives at the Khan's Court

Russian military assistance to the Kalmyks became a matter of growing concern for Aiuka Khan, especially in the later years of his life, after he had given up his role as actual leader of warriors on campaign.
The idea that so powerful a chief and military ally would, himself, need protection might, at first glance, seem ludicrous. However, it should be remembered that the Kalmyk ulus, like those of other nomads, did not graze together in a single, teeming knot of men and herds. In order to find sufficient grazing, the various ulus were usually widely scattered and many of the warriors from them were in the Crimea, Poland, or Prussia, fighting the wars of the tsar. A sudden attack by other nomads could catch the Kalmyks virtually defenseless. A guarantee of protection for the khan's person, vassals, and property by the Russians became a priority item for Aiuka as age robbed him of some of his youthful confidence.

Both the oaths of 1708 and 1710 raised the issue of security. Each time, Governor Apraksin was anxious to allay Aiuka's fears, promising that all the towns of the Volga were open to him. Although not specifically including the property of the khan in his guarantee, Apraksin convinced Aiuka that he and his were covered by the Russian umbrella.

As early as January, 1713, information reaching the Kalmyks indicated that the Kuban Tatars were preparing a raid against them. Aiuka immediately wrote Astrakhan's ober-komendant, M. I. Chirikov, to prepare men and guns should the khan require his help. By August, the Kuban leaders had gathered from 30,000 to 50,000 raiders, but found their way blocked by Chakdorzhab, his Kalmyk troops, and Russian patrols which had been requested by the prince and stationed at a number of points west
of the Volga. Having lost the element of surprise, the Tatars withdrew, but threatened again in November with another raiding party of 20,000 men. Chakdorzhab and his father sent to Tsaritsyn and Astrakhan, demanding help. Russians and Kalmyks gathered at a point near Cherny Iar, but again the Tatars withdrew. Chakdorzhab wrote the Kuban leaders, warning them he had plenty of troops and Russian allies, too. He told them: "If they (the Kuban Tatars) want to live in peace, they should send an expressly designated murza; but if they should not wish to be at peace, then they should clearly tell us that."¹⁹

In spite of Chakdorzhab's letter, the Kuban Tatars did not seem worried. In February, 1714, Chakdorzhab wrote Chirikov that a new Kuban raid was in the making. Nothing was done by the Russians and, in a sudden raid, the Tatars carried off over two hundred Kalmyk kibitkas. Kalmyk warriors caught the raiders, killed many and recovered their lost tribesmen and herds, but both Aiuka and Chakdorzhab were angry. Chirikov was not unduly concerned by this evidence of Kalmyk vulnerability. Throughout the summer, Karakalpak threats persisted and new rumors were received that the Kuban was planning yet another raid. Chirikov learned of this in August, 1714, but did nothing. That fall, as part of the 1710 agreement, the Kalmyks crossed the Volga to nomadize on the west bank and protect the Russian towns. Aiuka, still alarmed by the Tatars, wrote Chirikov in early September that: "The Kuban is actually not at peace with us and they have said that about the Kalmyk and the Russian people. And concerning this I sent, if you please, to the man in authority in Kazan, that 10,000 mounted men be sent me and,
if that is impossible, 6,000 or even 5,000. But if it would be impossible to send them to me from Kazan, write to His Majesty in Moscow, that these troops be sent before the ice covers the Volga.²₀

Several days later the Khan and his son reported that 30,000 Tatars had gathered and that the Karakalpaks, in apparent concert with them, had attacked the Kalmyks. Since the situation did not improve, Aiuka sent messengers directly to Peter I in October. Chakdorzhab wrote Chirikov and asked for more military supplies. He proposed a preemptive Kalmyk raid on the borders of the Kuban, hoping the result of such an attack would be to force the Tatar leaders to sit down with him and discuss the situation. There is no evidence that the raid took place and in December, 1714, Chakdorzhab finally asked of Chirikov the question that all the Kalmyks wanted answered: "Are you going to give us troops now or not? And are you going to stand behind us?"²¹

As the new year began, the rumors, many coming from the Cossacks of Cherkassk (who were in touch with the Nekrasov group in the Kuban), continued to reach Chakdorzhab and he repeatedly forwarded them to Chirikov, trying to emphasize each time the seriousness of the situation. He even asked the Russians to send their own envoy to the Kuban, hoping that an unequivocal announcement of Russian support would discourage a Kuban attack. But no messengers were forthcoming, neither were extra troops sent out. Why?

The reluctance of the Russians to act lay, according to N. N. Pal'mov, in an unresolved quarrel over the murder of a Russian named
Rezhen by a Kalmyk vassal Tatar named Bai Jungur. Neither the date nor the reason for the killing is known, but Governor Apraksin seemed not overly concerned by it and did little to bring Bai Kungur to justice. The murderer died by 1714, but his crime was not forgotten. In the autumn of that year Prince Aleksandr Bekovich-Cherkasskii (born Devlet Giray Mirza Bekovich) arrived in Astrakhan and determined that Apraksin had been far too lenient in his dealings with Aiuka concerning the killing of a Russian citizen. Bekovich-Cherkasskii, due chiefly to his influence at court, was able to dominate the local authorities, particularly since the governor was in his seat at Kazan. The prince may also have felt that Aiuka was due a dressing down and hoped in some way to reduce his power. A charge of murder against a vassal would do little, but if there were to be a raid from the Kuban, it was just possible that the ulus most easily detached from the Kalmyks would be those of their Edisan and Embuluk vassals. In such a situation Aiuka would be humiliated, his power would be curtailed, and Russia would be rid of a pack of treacherous Muslim herders.

Whatever may have been in Bekovich-Cherkasskii's mind, events took their own course. In March, 1715, the troops of Sultan Bakhtiy-Giray suddenly struck the ulus of Aiuka. His personal property was plundered, his treasures seized, and the khan's herds driven away. The Edisan and Embuluk Tatars also fled with Bakhtiy-Giray. Aiuka and his wife barely escaped. The khan's troops at that time were patrolling the Khivan border and were under the command of Bekovich-Cherkasskii.
Aiuka fled toward Astrakhan and met the prince on the steppe near the city. The prince protected Aiuka, but he refused to attack the Tatars, claiming they were too numerous and had done nothing against the Russians. He even refused to recall the Kalmyks near Khiva because, he explained, he had received no orders to do so.

The effects of this fiasco were far greater than circumstances seemed to warrant. Aiuka was deeply offended and humiliated in the most public fashion. He said of the experience: "When it finally came to war, these Russian troops defended only me, but they did not defend the people, did not reply to my requests, and did not fulfill the mutual agreement of aid." He was to be revenged several years later, but the vendetta against Bekovich-Cherkasskii would, in the long run, work against the khan.

The immediate consequence of the raid was the creation of a special unit of Russian soldiers to guard the khan. According to instructions dated 1715, the stol'nik Dimitrii Bakhmetev was to take three hundred regular soldiers from Kazan and Astrakhan and three hundred irregulars from the Iaik and Grebenskii Cossacks to guard the khan, summer and winter. In case of attack, they were to send to the nearest town for help and to notify the governor in Kazan. However, Bakhmetev had a second duty. Half of his instructions concerned his responsibility to watch Aiuka and his princes, making certain they remained faithful to the Russians and had no dealings with the enemies of the tsar. As Bakhmetev's sixth and final instruction indicated, he was to be an
important source of information: "Whatever else he observes, Bakhmetev, being with Aiuka, shall be expected to write about it to the state Posol'skaia kantselariia, as well as writing about it to whomever it is proper, to the governor of Kazan and the ober-komendant of Astrakhan."\(^{23}\)

St. Petersburg realized that the stationing of Russian troops with the khan presented an excellent opportunity to observe and an unprecedented potential to influence political activities. After all, the Russians had been trying for years to gain control over Kalmuk contacts with foreign powers. A permanent representative would be far more difficult to fool than had been the authorities in Astrakhan, miles from the scene of such meetings. But Bakhmetev, due chiefly to his personality, failed to assume a major role at the court of the khan. Both Aiuka and Chakdorzhab had little respect for him because Bakhmetev showed no enthusiasm for a reprisal raid against the Kuban. By early 1716, Bakhmetev had been transferred from Astrakhan to Saratov. Although still the titular protector of the khan, he was then too distant to be directly involved with events on the steppe.

Major changes were under way in the Russian local government, at that moment, changes which would profoundly alter the Kalmuk relationship with Russia. Plans for the creation of Astrakhan guberniia had been laid in 1717, but only reached fruition in 1719. The new guberniia, which included the entire lower Volga, was entrusted to Artemii P. Volynskii, a man with experience in the workings of the Petrine diplomatic service. Volynskii immediately requested a set of special instruc-
tions from the Senate to clarify his duties. He was told to have good relations with all Kalmyks in order that "from them there be no sort of opposition or animosity, and to work all the more so to bring them into greater faithfulness and obedience on the side of His Royal Majesty."

He was to handle the leaders and important men so that no harm be done the interests of the tsar and so that they have no dealings with any of the enemies of Russia. Volynskii was to be most careful in guarding the ulus of the khan and property from attack. The most important task of all, however, was that he turn his attention and strength to using the previous oaths and agreements "so that everything necessary will be put to the use of His Majesty." 24

The new governor had clear ideas as to what was needed and how to achieve his goals. First he created a group of trusted advisors and subalterns to help him use his post. Brigadier K. I. Evanitskii became ober-komendant of Astrakhan, replacing Chirikov. General Auditor I. V. Kikin was appointed as voevoda of Simbirsk, but was actually sent to Astrakhan to act as Volynskii's aide. He was in place by November, 1719, informing Aiuka of the change in governmental structure and taking personal command of Kalmyk affairs. Volynskii arrived in 1720, bringing with him V. M. Bakunin, a man who spoke and read Kalmyk.

Volynskii did not like Bakhmetev any more than did Aiuka and, in a report to the Senate, charged that the stol'nik "did everything according to their (the Kalmyks') wishes...." 25 The governor's remedy for so lamentable a situation was to take most of Bakhmetev's power and trans-
fer it to Kikin and Bakunin. In July, 1721, Bakhmetev was dismissed altogether. He was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Nikifor L'vov, who commanded an undetermined number of Cossacks. The dragoons formerly included in Aiuka's personal guard were withdrawn in December, 1720, and rejoined their units in Astrakhan. L'vov was evidently not Volynskii's first choice as commander and his tenure was, therefore, short. Volynskii, who probably used his proximity to Peter I during the Derbent campaign to get his way, had L'vov transferred to Moscow in late 1722. His place was taken by Captain V. P. Baklemishev of Saratov. The new commander was not only Volynskii's man, but the governor saw to it that he received only three-fifths the salary paid L'vov. By the time the struggle began for Aiuka's succession, the Russians had in place an apparatus, already staffed, ready to report to the governor and capable of molding events through judicious suggestion or open threat.

Kalmyk Troops as Russian Policemen

When considering the Kalmyk contribution to Russia's military might, the immediate reaction is to think in terms of campaigns outside the country against foreign enemies. However, thanks to the unrest common to the Petrine period, the Kalmyks were significant in terms of their use for the suppression of internal enemies. Since the Kalmyks as individuals and even as a group were not averse to turning the Russian state's discomfort to their own profit, their reliability was inconsistent. Even so, they were called on to help the government in every case
of internal disorder which affected the Volga region.

Aiuka's first activity on behalf of Moscow began prior to his accession. In 1667, the disgruntled, often starving Cossacks of the Don and numbers of runaway serfs, threatened with return to their masters under the provisions of the Ulozhenie of 1648, revolted. The trouble spread to the Volga and found there numerous adherents among the non-Russian peoples of the region, including the Mari, Chuvash, and Bashkir, peoples fearful of the growing pressure from Russian settlers. Even the Kalmyks were not immune, for, as the Ocherki istorii KASSR maintains:

the laboring Kalmyks sometimes openly revealed their solidarity with the revolting peasants and Cossacks. And in individual instances they spontaneously took part in the armed conflict. It seems that the Kalmyk feudalists, as a rule, acted in concert with the feudalists of Russia. These taishas, as a consequence of their internal conflicts, indirectly supported the rebels and sometimes even opened communications with them, but basically followed their own personal, self-interested goals.26

It should be kept in mind, however, that the Kalmyks were not Cossacks nor runaway serfs and their lands were not then targeted for large-scale colonization. Basically, the Kalmyks were ready to take advantage of the situation and entered the fray, often on both sides at the same time, whenever and however seemed most favorable.

During the spring of 1667, in the first stage of the revolt, some Kalmyks, including men from the ulus of Aiuka, joined the Cossack leader of the revolt, Stepan (Stenka) Timofeevich Razin. Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich sent a gramota demanding that these men be caught and punished. That summer Razin turned east and captured Iaitskii gorodok.
When government forces counterattacked, Kalmyks fought for both sides. Some joined the Bashkirs and fell on Moscow's detachments as they marched along the Caspian shore. Others, including 10,000 men led by Daichin, fought against Razin near the mouth of the Laik. In the fall and winter of 1667, while Razin's men awaited the coming of spring, they raided Kalmyk and Edisan encampments on the Emansugu. Since this time Aiuka sided with Moscow, Razin allowed his men to trade only with the ulus of Mergen taisha, his chief Kalmyk supporter. As the voevoda of Astrakhan was being ordered to express the government's thanks for Kalmyk aid, his counterpart in Penza reported that Monchak was prepared to sell Razin the horses which the rebel chief desperately needed for a planned move from the Volga to the Don. That charge was never proven, but it indicated the highly ambivalent attitude of the Kalmyks toward both combatants and the doubts which Moscow had realistically to entertain.

Aiuka became the leader of the Kalmyks during the time of Razin's Persian adventure (spring 1668–May, 1670). Whatever Aiuka's personal sympathies may have been, he could do nothing to prevent Kalmyks from joining Razin when he returned to the Volga. Kalmyks and Bashkirs raided around Samara and as far as Kazan uezd, burning villages, raiding farms, driving off herds and generally terrorizing the populace. The tsar's troops scrambled to defend Saransk and Tambov and tried to prevent the linking of Razin's main force with the Bashkir-Kalmyk group on the Volga. The reports from the Volga towns for June, 1670, indicate the gravity of the Russian position. After driving the local citizens behind the walls of their towns, the Kalmyks were free to raid at will. They would remain,
highly visible, in the neighborhood of the towns, threatening all efforts
to resupply the garrisons. 28

Aiuka's response to the Razin revolt was complicated by his
position within the khanate. Razin infuriated Aiuka by encouraging
the Edisan, Embuluk, and Nogai murzas to join the revolt and throw off
both their Russian and Kalmyk allegiance. Aiuka was prepared to war
on his recalcitrant vassals, doing so in the name of the tsar. But
this created other problems. He upset his allies Dugar and Bok by
his slavish attention to the needs of Russia and they, along with their
vassals and herds, left for Azov. When Aiuka sent 25,000 men to help
the Russians around Astrakhan in June, 1670, Dugar and Bok attacked
them, destroying one detachment and killing the son of the Dorbet chief
Solom Tseren. Following the rebel capture of Astrakhan, Aiuka moved
his ulus closer to Chernyi Iar.

Once in possession of Astrakhan, Razin made a gesture of good will
to the non-Russian peoples of the Volga by disbanding the amanatnyi dvor,
but the act failed to win over the Kalmyk leader. Aiuka drew closer to
Chernyi Iar and took a wait-and-see attitude, keeping open his communi-
cations with both sides.

In August, 1670, Aiuka sent 2,000 warriors to block the route used
by Razin's reinforcements as they moved from the Don toward Tsaritsyn.
His troops encountered 4,000 warriors of Dugar and Bok and were again
defeated. In October, when Razin was forced from Simbirsk by the Russians,
he fled to the Don and tried again to open a dialogue with the Kalmyk
chieftan. He proposed a massive attack in the Ukraine, but Aiuka refused
to cooperate. In 1671, Aiuka finished his business with Razin and his own, former vassals, by attacking and defeating the Don Ataman L. Semenov and his Tatar allies. 29

Although the Kalmyk attitude had been equivocal, their new ruler could point to his attempts to aid the Russians and the losses incurred by him as signs of his faithfulness to the tsar. That his efforts were not entirely acceptable was indicated by the Russian insistence on the signing of a shert', Aiuka's first, in 1673. On the whole, however, the Russians were evidently satisfied by Aiuka's activities. Had they not been pleased, there is some question as to just what recourse would have been open to express that unhappiness, for, by that time, Aiuka was firmly ensconced as leader of the Kalmyks.

The Kalmyks were called upon again in 1700 after the Volga towns received Peter I's order that long Russian-style gowns be replaced by those of German or Hungarian cut. In Dmitrievsk on the Kamyshinka, men of the Don Cossacks, angered by this order, captured the town, its voevoda and his wife, and terrorized the inhabitants for six weeks. They sent men to Saratov and Tsaritsyn to convince others of the justness of their outrage and to agitate for a general revolt.

Prince Dmitrii I. Khovanskii was sent from Astrakhan with 3,000 Kalmyks to end the revolt. When he reached the town, the prince had but to threaten to let loose the Kalmyks and the Cossacks surrendered. The townsfolk, who met him with icons and protestations of having acted only under duress, were forgiven. The Kalmyks, however, had already begun to
sack the town and could barely be stopped. Even so, the damage was so extensive that the settlement was moved across the river, rebuilt, and renamed Kamyshin. 30

The Dmitrievsk rising was but the first flareup in a decade-long series of revolts which troubled the Volga. In mid-summer, 1705, as Peter I fought the Swedes and dreamed of his new capital, his program of reforms and the exactions of local commanders fanned a much larger, more serious revolt. Thirty years after Razin and more than twenty after the strel'tsy rising of 1682, the problems which had prompted those revolts remained. In Astrakhan the focus of dissent was not the Cossacks, runaway peasants, or dispossessed natives, but the garrison of almost 2,500 stel'tsy and regular troops. Following their 1682 rising, strel'tsy regiments had lost most of their military importance and political influence. Thanks to the efforts of Voevoda T. Rzhevskii a major restructuring of trade and taxes threatened their sources of supplementary income, leaving many with the prospect of utter impoverishment. The regular troops, many of whom were impressed peasants from the Volga, feared immediate transferal west to fight for the tsar in his endless wars in Poland. A renewal of revolt, this time led by the tsar's own army, came in July, 1705, after the arrival of a gramota from the Zemskii prikaz ordering the men to exchange traditional garb for western clothes and to shave their beards.

The revolt, which began in Astrakhan, quickly spread to Chernyi and Krasnyi Iar, to the Gur'ev strel'tsy, and to the Terek. But when
messengers were sent to raise the other cities of the Volga and the Don Cossacks, they were rebuffed. In Tsaritsyn they were told:

You have written to us [asking] that we adhere to your alliance, but we do not wish to join your alliance; you have made up your minds with those in Astrakhan, [so then] do it there yourselves. And you have also written to us that there should be coming to us in [our] city a great number of Kalmyks, that they shall take away from us, without payment, our grain, bread, and food; but this has not happened. And you have written to us that we should become [allies] for the sake of the Orthodox religion: but we, by the grace of God, have all Christians in Tsaritsyn and none of the schismatics (raskol) and we do not worship idolotrous gods, and the Cossacks from various stanstii have come to you and they do not with to join in your union and have refused you.\textsuperscript{31}

Without the support of all the major towns on the Volga, or of the Don Cossacks, or of the peasants as a whole, the rebel garrisons were most anxious to secure the help of the Kalmyks. But Khan Aiuka, as before, refused to commit himself irrevocably before assessing the prospects of both sides. Colonel Koretov, who had been sent to him several months before the rising by the royal authorities in Astrakhan, remained in the khan's camp and became an important, pro-Moscow advisor. Aiuka accepted and protected refugees from the towns, including Metropolitan Sampsonii, sent spies into Astrakhan, and stayed in touch with events on the Iaik, Don and Terek. Moscow, anxious to retain Aiuka's support in this matter, sent money and goods. Archival documents show that in early 1706, Aiuka and his chiefs received furs, hides, and foodstuffs worth 7,642 rubles, 13 altyny, 2 dengi.\textsuperscript{32}

While readily accepting the money and advice of Moscow, Aiuka also communicated with the rebels' camp. Throughout August, 1705, during the
important rebel campaign led by Ivan Deriglaz against Tsaritsyn, Aiuka and Chakdorzhab exchanged messages with the mutineers. In fact in early August the envoys T. Dmitrov and P. Palkin returned to Astrakhan convinced that the Kalmyks were ready to come over to their side.

Some Kalmyks, including members of Chakdorzhab’s ulus, actively participated in the fighting. These Kalmyks cared not one whit about tax policies or the sanctity of beards. Joined by Edisan Tatars, bands of Kalmyks appeared near Astrakhan, Chernyi Iar, Krasnyi Iar, and on the Iaik. They stole horses and cattle, seized fishing boats and nets, and prevented the cutting and drying of hay for the winter. Townsmen and merchants panicked and the rebels were forced to divert troops to stop the raids. Since no one could be certain if these were the acts of individuals or expressions of policy on the part of the khan, the mutineers worked particularly hard to punish only those individuals known to have attacked Russians.

By September, 1705, the revolt had stalled. Deriglaz failed to capture Tsaritsyn and the tsar’s forces were preparing a concerted counterattack. Ever larger bands of Kalmyks appeared near the rebel towns and the frequency of raids increased. An even more ominous sign was the departure of those Kalmyks who had, at first, camped near the mutineers’ strongholds. After remaining close to such towns as Krasnyi Iar (some of the nomads had stayed there for from three to five years), they gathered herds and families and slipped away into the steppe. Andrei Khokhlach, who had been leading a punitive expedition against the
Kalmyk raiders, was forced to abandon his task for fear that he might suddenly be cut off and destroyed by his prey.

The rising ended in March, 1607, when the forces of Field Marshal B. P. Sheremetev entered Astrakhan. The Kalmyks had not supported the government outright until the later stages, but the possibility of their hostility had been enough to tie down numbers of rebel troops. In keeping with their past history, as Russian troops took control of Astrakhan, numbers of Kalmyks appeared and managed to plunder several of the city's districts.⁴³

The last call for Aiuka and the Kalmyks to act as Russian internal police was during the rising of Kondratii A. Bulavin and his associate and successor Ignatii Nekrasov (1708-1709). The revolt, which came in the middle of Charles XII's campaign to destroy Russia, was the most severe internal threat to the safety of Peter I and his realm. This rising, like so many others, combined an admixture of several groups grieved by the course of the tsar's government. A number of those involved were peasants and even remnants of the strel'tsy with significant additions of Old Believers horrified by the continuing reign of the Anti-Christ. But the majority of the revolt's strength was drawn from the Don Cossacks, a group whose support of the government and not the Astrakhan garrison had been crucial in 1705. Many of the Cossacks were infuriated by the loss of lands to the central government, by the violation of traditional Cossack liberties, and by the escalation of efforts by Peter I's agents to recapture runaway peasants, laborers, and deserters.
Coming in the midst of the Bashkir rising (1705-1711) and the Great Northern War, the Bulavin revolt was critical in large part because of its location - on the Don and its tributaries, lying across the major supply and communications lines from the Volga to the front in the Ukraine, and close to the naval base at Azov. However, it also came at a time when the Kalmyks were already on a war footing (as troops in the Great Northern War) and when they were securely in the pay and pocket of Peter I. The Cossack appeal for Kalmyk support was ignored. Also damaging to the cause of Bulavin were Cossack plundering raids on the Kalmyks and their vassals. These helped convince most Kalmyks to leave the Cossacks to their fate.

Activity on the Don hampered Kalmyk participation in the war in the west. In late May, 1708, a group of 3,000 Kalmyks commanded by Chakdorzhub was prepared to march to the Ukraine. However, Governor Apraksin was forced to write the tsar that due to the activities of Bulavin’s men, who had moved to the Volga, the troops would have to delay their departure. Bulavin’s lieutenant Lukian Khokhlach had captured Dmitrievsk earlier in the month, had joined forces with Bulavin near Saratov, and, together, they had laid siege to the town. However, the day after the governor’s letter was sent a group of 10,000 Kalmyks, just returned from action against the Bashkir, attacked and killed over two hundred revels. The siege was broken and the attackers forced to fall back toward the Don and along the lower Volga. 34

Bulavin himself died at Cherkassk when he lost control of the revolt
and more conservative elements, led by Ilia Zerhchov, murdered him. The revolt continued under the leadership of Nekrasov, but he was forced to leave Russia and take refuge in the Kuban. A second group held out in the Cossack riparian port of Panshin. A government expedition led by P. I. Khovanskii, governor of Kazan, attacked them in August, 1709. The rebels were routed and Khovanskii's Kalmyk cavalry had a field day, cutting down the fleeing Cossacks on the river banks and following them even into the waters of the Don.

The Bulavin revolt continued to send aftershocks through the Kalmyk world even after its end. A major part of the problem was the Nekrasov refugees in the Kuban. This group, which remained there for decades and eventually migrated into Anatolia, participated in raids against both Russians and Kalmyks. The second problem was the squabble between the Kalmyks and Russians over the division of loot at the end of the revolt. In 1721, Governor Volynskii and Aiuka exchanged letters in which each detailed complaints against the other. One of Aiuka's major accusations concerned the Russian refusal to surrender captured Bulavin supporters who, the Kalmyks felt, should have been turned over as part of the loot. Volynskii insisted that the captives either belonged to the emperor as rebels against his state or were no more than innocent Russians taken, willy-nilly, by the nomads in raids.\textsuperscript{35}

Kalmyk Participation in Russian Military Campaigns

Opportunities to practice war and gather plunder abounded in the
campaigns of Russia against external enemies and were steadier sources of income than those offered by internal revolts and peasant wars. The reign of Aiuka, which coincided with the reigns of Aleksei Mikhailovich (1645–1676), Fedor Alekseevich (1676–1682), the regency of Sophia Alekseevna (1682–1689), and the rule of Peter I Alekseevich (1682–1725), was a period of almost uninterrupted warfare. Limitations of space preclude discussing the campaigns in detail, but their direction and outcome must be noted due to the significance of the Kalmyk contribution to Russian expansion and their import in terms of the income, power, and status of the Kalmyks.

When Aiuka began his rule, Russia had been at peace with Poland since 1667, but the war in the Ukraine persisted, thanks to the rivalries of various hetmen and the ambitions of the Crimeans and Turks. Kalmyks who remained in the Ukraine continued to fight alongside Ivan Serko of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and participated in a major raid on Ochakov and the Crimea. Serko wrote to Voevoda G. G. Romodanovskii of Belgorod: "Kalmyks at Perekop and in the Crimea have visited much misfortune on our enemies."36

For seven years Russia and the Turks remained officially at peace, but each maneuvered for position in the Ukraine by aiding rival factions there. The Turks supported Hetman Petr Doroshenko, who had recognized their suzerainty, while Moscow worked with Serko and Ivan Samoilovich of the Left Bank Cossacks. The Kalmyks were constantly in the field, especially after 1672 when, in a summer campaign, the Turks, Crimeans, and Right Bank Cossacks sent 300,000 men against the Russians. In August,
the Kalmik took four hundred prisoners and over 9,000 head of cattle in a raid on Azov. The next month an additional 3,000 Kalmik were sent to the Don to protect the Russian flank from attack. The result was more raids on the Azov allies of the Turks, the capture of the brother of the pasha of Azov, and a Crimean defeat at Perekop, where "many thousands died, every one living was seized, ulus and villages were destroyed." 37

Aiuka committed himself to sending 40,000 warriors west in 1673 and repeated his pledge in the 1673 shert', but no such vast group materialized. In fact, Aiuka and Solom Tseren never personally campaigned at all and Aiuka's brother Djamso turned back at the Don, taking with him the few troops he had mustered. Other Kalmik units did arrive and were used in two, separate groups: the first, with the Russians and Don Cossacks, was commanded by Prince K. M. Cherkasskii and Voevoda I. S. Khitrovo; the second, under the leadership of Unitai and Mazan Ba'atur (whose military exploits raised him from what were probably common origins to the level of a nearly epic hero), directed 15,000 Kalmik from the Don against Azov and the Crimea. Moscow was pleased with their service and sent Kirill Pushchin to reward Mazan Ba'atur and other Kalmik commanders. 38

The war intensified in 1677 when, following the submission of Doroshenko to Moscow and collapse of relations with Poland, the Ottoman Empire and Russia finally went to war. As Ibrahim Pasha prepared to attack the Ukraine with his 100,000-man army, the call went out for Kalmik troops. By 1678, Kalmik were fighting in the Caucasus and took
part in the battles for Chigirin during the Turks' second campaign to capture the town. Kalmyks and Russians, commanded by Prince Cherkasskii, were credited with having driven the Turks and Crimeans from their strategic base on the heights near the town. In the course of their flight, the troops of Kara Mustafa lost their baggage, cannons, and even their banners. 39

The war ended in 1681. The terms of the Bakhchisarai treaty gave Russia the territory east of the Dnepr and Kiev, but Moscow was not in control of the Zaporozh'e and was forced to continue to pay annual tribute to the Crimea. The Turks promised to control their vassals and stop raids along the frontier, but were unsuccessful. Regent Sophia's reputed lover, Prince V. V. Golitsyn, twice led armies (100,000 men in 1687 and 112,000 in 1689) on campaigns against the Crimea and failed miserably each time. A massive raid on the Ukraine in 1692 netted the Tatars vast booty. Peter I's initial campaign against Azov (1695) failed, but his second (1696), accompanied by 3,000 Kalmyks, succeeded. In 1698, new raids began. The Russians answered by sending troops against Perekop and Kalmyk cavalry to drive the Crimeans away from Tavanskaia krepost' at the mouth of the Dnepr (they captured 4,000 Turks and Tatars) and to raid the Kazyev Tatars. These attacks continued into 1700, but Peter was anxious to disengage himself so that he could attack Sweden. Russia's European allies Austria, Poland, and Venice had already abandoned the tsar by signing the Treaty of Sremski Karlovci (Karlovitz, Karlóca, 26 January, 1699), causing the tsar to remark, bitterly: "In my lifetime
I shall never forget what they have done to me, I feel it, and am come off with empty pockets." Russia signed the Treaty of Constantinople in 1700, retaining Azov, ending the Crimean tribute, and setting up an unfortified zone in the south.

With the end of one war, Peter hurried into another, the Great Northern War (1700-1721). A group of 30,000 Kalmyks and Tatars went to Moscow in January, 1701, to be trained and reviewed by the tsar. In the war's early campaigns the Russian forces were divided into four groups, the fourth of which was made up solely of Kalmyks. Again and again General Fieldmarshal P. O. Sheremetev ordered Kalmyk surprise attacks which panicked Swedish garrisons and netted the Russians prisoners, cannons, and enemy flags. By October, 1702, the Russian forces, significantly aided by Kalmyk cavalry, had captured most of Livonia. During the next six years, the Kalmyks and Russians campaigned throughout the Baltic region. From St. Petersburg, the Austrian resident Pleiër reported in 1706 that Peter had sent Aiuka 100,000 rubles for arming and dispatching a force of 20,000. Although the amounts are almost certainly exaggerated, several thousand more Kalmyks did move west at this time. Even King Augustus II of Poland (1697-1704, 1709-1733) anxiously requested that Peter "give eight mounted regiments and 4,000 Kalmyks." Kalmyk troops, added to the army of Prince A. D. Menshikov, fought at Vidau and Mardefeld. Describing the battle at Vidau, General Rene wrote: "The Kalmyks, positioned in the front, hurled themselves on the right wing of the enemy with such a rage that they were thrown into confusion, and the
entire corps, in which there were 13,000 men, fled in great disorder." 42

In 1708 Charles XII turned his full attention to a Swedish invasion of Russia, a campaign that he was certain would destroy the upstart tsar and force Russia out of the war. As the Swedish army lumbered forward, struggling desperately to rendezvous soldiers with badly needed supplies, the relentless, flying attacks of the Kalmyks were ruinous. At Belin, 6,000 Kalmyks surprised the Ostrograd Regiment, Charles XII's own, broke its formation and almost captured the king. Six days later, Charles' chief lieutenant, Count Adam Lewenhaupt, was trapped and beaten by Tsar Peter. As the survivors fled, Kalmyks and Cossacks burned their bridges over the Sozha River and killed hundreds more Swedes. Chakdorzhab's detachment of 3,000 was delayed by the activities of Bulavin and did not fight at Poltava (June, 1709), but they were ordered to pursue the retreating Swedes and Cossacks of Hetman Ivan Mazeppa as they fled down the Dnepr. The Russian ambassador to Denmark, Prince V. L. Dolgorukii, wrote to Foreign Minister G. I. Golovkin that: "All the officers arriving in Stockholm on the Swedish transports report with one voice, that they endured terrible injury from groups which had been sent out from His Majesty's forces, but especially from the Kalmyks and Cossacks who did not give them any rest." Charles XII was forced to find refuge in Turkey after his campaign ended in disaster. But the stories of the horrors of the Kalmyks persisted among the soldiers returning to Sweden. A Diet was called and met from the autumn of 1713 until April, 1714. One of its chief concerns was to quiet fears that Russians would invade Sweden,
bringing with them, "the child-eating Kalmucks." Peter I was so pleased by their record that he sent the Kalmyks and Cossacks 20,000 rubles to divide among themselves. 43

During the war with Sweden, first the Swedes and then the French and English had worked to involve the Porte and its allies against Peter. Finally, late in 1710, a new war with Turkey began. In January, 1711, 10,000 warriors from the Kuban invaded the Ukraine, but were forced to withdraw when they learned 20,500 Kalmyks had moved in the direction of Azov and Taganrog. The Russian counterstrike, commanded by P. M. Apraksin, lasted into the summer and caused tremendous destruction. In the Kuban region, the inhabitants fled into the hills when they learned that Donduk Ombo, Aiuka's grandson, had arrived with 14,000 Kalmyks and 3,500 dragoons. During that one raid, 11,460 Tatars were reported to have died in battle; 5,000 drowned in the Kuban River; 2,840 were captured; 2,000 camels, 32,200 horses, 227,000 head of sheep, and 120,000 head of cattle were seized. Late in the campaign, Donduk Ombo surprised Djan Arslanbeg murza as he returned, laden with booty from raids on Saratov and Penza uezdy. The Kalmyks obliterated the Kuban force, and only one murza and two common Tatars survived. The booty was recaptured and two thousand Russians were freed. 44

During the rest of the war, the Kuban Tatars bothered no one, but Peter I, trapped in his catastrophic Prut campaign, was forced to make peace with the Turks in July, 1711. Aiuka Khan, for whom the war was going splendidly, was confused by rumours of the tsar's humiliating defeat. He
wrote Astrakhan in March, saying he had heard: "that His Majesty had made peace with the Turkish sultan and since he (Aiuka) was not at peace with the Crimeans and the Kuban, he asked to find out about this." Sadly, Aiuka's thoughts on the tsar's campaign, near capture, and peace treaty are not preserved.

Following the end of the Turkish war, Peter's interest drifted increasingly southward, to the Caucasian front where Russian, Turkish, and Persian borders and interests touched. In Kabardia, where many local princes had been in touch with Muscovy for over a century, there was considerable support for a Russian alliance. In 1711, they appealed to Russia through their envoy, Prince Aleksandr Bekovich-Cherkasskii, against the intrigues of the Kuban Tatars. When Turkish agents reappeared there in 1714, the Russians became alarmed. The neighboring region of Dāghistān, which lay along the northwest coast of the Caspian, was divided between Muslims and pagans into several principalities whose allegiance shifted from Persia to Turkey and back again as the political winds changed. Russian relations with the shāmkhāls of the Kāzī-Kumūk (also known as the Laks or the Lezgians), whose headquarters was at Tarki and to whom belonged Ender (known to the Russians as Andreevskaia derevinia) and Aksai, were already strained. Beyond the mountains were the Christian Georgians. Their lands were centuries-old battlegrounds for the Turks and Persians. At the time, much of Georgia was in Persian hands. Even though several Georgians held prominent positions within the Safavid government, stories of forced conversions to Islam and the legacy of more
ancient hatreds encouraged some Georgian leaders to appeal for aid from Orthodox Russia. Peter was also interested in Persia, where the Safavid Dynasty was tottering toward its demise. Shāh Sulṭān ʿUṣayn (1694–1722) had, like his father, chosen a dissolute life, encouraging government by eunuchs and various strong men. Revolts and attacks by various Afghan tribes, such as the Chalzay led by Mahmūd ʿUṣayn Quli Khān, made the dynasty's end merely a matter of time. Eventually, Mahmūd deposed Ḫusayn and placed his son Tahmāsp on the throne. The new shah chaffed under Afghan control and attempted a revolt. That encouraged both the Ottomans and Russians to declare support for the principle of Safavid legitimacy as a pretext for dismembering Persia.

Russia also had commercial interests in the Caucasus and Persia. A. P. Volynskii was sent to Isfahan in 1715, chiefly to spy out conditions and strategic preparations of Persia. Peter I, in his own hand, had written instructions concerning the information about the Caspian Sea which Volynskii was to make every effort to learn: "And to what places can one go on its (the Caspian's) rivers from out of the sea and if there is not some river from India which empties into this sea."46 Russian merchants gained increased privileges in Persia thanks to his mission and were allowed to trade in several cities along the Caspian coast. Commercial ties with Persia and the Caspian cities were seriously damaged when Chulāḵ Sūrkhay Khān of the Kāzī Kūmūk and Ḥādjī Dāwūd, the ūsmī of the Kaytāḵ and a popular leader, captured Shemaka in 1721. In the process of taking the town, the allies killed three hundred Russian merchants and
looted goods valued at more than a half million rubles.

Added to the rather impersonal political, religious, and economic considerations was the catalytic presence of Artemii Volynskii. He dreamed of grabbing large tracts of the decadent Persian Empire and its trade for Russia. In 1721, his information from the Caucasus and Persia convinced him the time for action had arrived. He wrote Empress Catherine Alekseevna to invite himself to court for the winter. Volynskii went to St. Petersburg and most certainly presented his case for a war in the south. In the spring of 1722, Russia declared for the Safavids and by June, Peter had gathered an army of as many as 100,000 men and a flotilla of ships at Astrakhan.

This was the last war for both the khan and the emperor, the former already too old to take part in any active campaigning. As preparations were being made for the attack, Peter and Aiuka met aboard the royal yacht at Saratov. The emperor wanted 10,000 Kalmyks for his army, but Aiuka at first demurred, promising only 5,000 men. There is some question as to how many Kalmyks took part in the campaign, but some authors have claimed it was as many as 40,000.47

Whatever the number of actual participants, the Kalmyks worked in three areas during the Persian campaign. The first group was to attack the Shamkhalat of the Kāzī Kumūk, at Ender, against whom the Kalmyks had fought in 1719 and who were then led by Sultan Mahmud (Saltamamut) of Aksai, Aidemir, and Kibek. Iaman, one of the Kalmyk commanders, informed them of the planned attacks and advised that they
flee into the mountains. After two attacks, Ender itself was destroyed, but the Russians suffered numbers of casualties and gained little advantage from the operation. The group's efforts ended felicitously when the chief of Tarki, Adil Giray, submitted peacefully to Peter in August, 1722, and surrendered his city.

The second group of Kalmyks was sent to attack Sultan Mahmud of Utemish, who had seized and murdered three Don Cossack envoys of Peter I. Mahmud's chief settlement, Utemish, was razed and many of his supplies burned. The third group of Kalmyks was sent to patrol the Sulak River valley to prevent any surprise attack against the Russian fort at Sviatyi Krest'.

Most of the Kalmyk troops were stationed west of the Volga, north of most of the campaign action in the Caucasus, and along the Caspian. Aiuka nomadized that summer in the region of salt lakes which dot the route south from Tsaritsyn to the upper Sal River. There he watched for raiders from the Kuban. In September, 1722, Aiuka learned that the Kuban Tatars and the Nekrasov Cossacks were planning an assault on the Volga towns. When Aiuka failed to send any large detachments out as patrols, the Russians began to suspect the khan was playing a double game, waiting to see how the war in the Caucasus went before committing his forces. Pal'mov describes him as being "in uncertainty as to which of the rivals for the North Caucasus would achieve military success, and what, in the end would be better for the Kalmyks---to remain in Russian vassalage or to join the Kuban, dreaming [Eventually] of putting aside the Crimea.
and declaring their political independence..."49

Rewards for Service to Russia

Almost ceaseless war was the source of Kalmyk employment which netted the nomads rewards both political and economic. The earliest recognition of Aiuka's position was his nomination in 1697 as protector of the southern borders of Russia. The occasion for this honor was the departure of Peter on his "Great Embassy" to Europe. The tsar wished to travel and learn, but he was anxious about the military climate in Europe. Jan Sobieski had died in 1696 and Poland had lost the major impetus of its anti-Ottoman policy. Louis XIV's machinations were focusing the attentions of Europe's powers on the thrones of Spain and Poland, not on the Turkish Empire. Peter I, after the capture of Azov, hoped to remind his allies of their pledges to him and their own interests in the east. The government of Russia was left in the hands of a three-man regency (Lev Kirilovich Naryshkin, Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn, and Prince Petr Ivanovich Prozorovskii) and the Governor General of Moscow, Prince Fedor Iur'evich Romodanovskii, commanded the important Guards regiments. Tsar Peter seems to have been chary of putting too much power in too few hands. Perhaps that is the most compelling reason for his having added Aiuka to this distinguished company by naming him guardian of the south. Not only was Aiuka made warden of the borders, but he was also delivered virtual carte blanche to make war in Central Asia. The data are inconclusive, but he was most likely also recognized
as Khan, though the first recorded official use of that title by the Russians was not until 1709. As N. N. Pal'mov observed, Peter I referred to Aiuka as his "faithful vassal (vernyi poddannyi)," but there is reason to believe that Aiuka saw himself as nothing less than Peter's ally with whom the tsar regularly signed treaties which ever more finely tuned the precise nature of that alliance.50

Aiuka's second great personal honor came when he and Peter met at Saratov during the preparations for the Persian campaign. The Kalmyk representatives to the meeting included the khan and his Djunghar wife, Darma Bala, plus several children. They were received aboard the royal yacht by both Peter and his wife Catherine Alekseevna. The meetings must have been interesting since the two men, bred to rule and war and both afflicted by family tragedy, were so similar. The two ladies also met and must have had certain similar interests. One, the former Martha Skavronskaya, following a chequered career, had already been crowned empress and would, in three years, become the actual ruler of Russia. The other was already a powerful political presence at her husband's court and was then planning how to extend her power after her eighty year-old husband died.

During the meeting, there were two especially important items on the agenda. First, Aiuka agreed to send troops on the Persian campaign. That issue was the foremost interest of Peter. The khan was rewarded with a jewelled sword and his wife was given pieces of jewelry by the empress. Aiuka, who seemed to take quite a fancy to Peter and who
chaffed at being too old to campaign personally, had a group of Kalmyks gather in a circle and shoot their arrows into the air. The khan then took the spent arrows and his new sword and, showing both to Peter, declared: "This sword and these arrows will always be ready to destroy the enemies of Russia."\(^{51}\)

The second issue, the one of greatest importance to the khan, will be discussed in greater detail below. It was the matter of the succession to the khanate. Aiuka hoped to have his choice of heir accepted by the Russians. But this problem was too complex to be readily solved to anyone’s complete satisfaction and Aiuka left the meeting without the ratification he had sought. The bitterness which the issue eventually engendered put the lie to the apparent closeness of emperor and khan.

Beyond symbolic gestures and titles, the Russians bought Kalmyk service as they had done in the past. They purchased warriors with regular payments, supplies of war materiel and foodstuffs, special awards and loot from campaigns. Zhalovan’е was granted in Aiuka’s first oath (1673), but note was made that the Kalmyks were to accept what the tsar chose to give them. By 1677 Aiuka and all chiefs serving the Russians were promised five hundred ninety rubles a year and were allowed to hold for ransom any Russians rescued from the Crimeans. In 1697, when Aiuka was named protector, he was also given arms to use against Central Asia. In effect, the Russian government granted the Kalmyks both supplies and permission to take whatever loot they could.
In 1710, Aiuka's *zhalovan'ye* was increased to 1,000 rubles and thirty *pud* (at 16.38 kilograms per *pud* in the XVIIIth century, the equivalent of about 1,085 pounds) of gunpowder per year. There were grants of other commodities, usually also granted directly to the khan. These included flour (Aiuka was receiving 2,000 *chetveri* in 1719), iron, steel, wine, etc. He was expected to share with other chiefs, but in July, 1713, the Russians, "in order that they might not become exasperated about this," decided to pay *zhalovan'ye* regularly and directly to other taishas, chieftans and even commoner Kalmyks who served them.52 Such direct payments rewarded service, but they also undercut the power of the khan by circumventing his right to distribute largess only to those servants personally faithful to him. Little note has been taken of this act, but the implications were most serious. Intentionally or not, the Russian government was serving notice to the chief men of the Kalmyk nation that it was St. Petersburg which paid the bills, not the khan.

Russo-Kalmyk Economic Relations

Kalmyk economic ties with Russia remained unchanged during Aiuka's rule, although there was growth in both its intensity and breadth. Herding continued to be the major force in the Kalmyk economy. Among those Kalmyks who left the *ulus* to be converted to Orthodoxy and settle in permanent villages, farming and haying were being introduced. Settled agriculture, however, was not significant among the Kalmyks until the 1760's and even then did not represent any wholesale abandonment of
traditional lifestyles. Growing numbers of poor Kalmyks whose herds were either lost or were too small to support them turned to fishing in the Volga and Iaik.

Regulation of trade and markets continued in the hands of the Russians. The 1673 шерть underscored the continued anxiety of the Russians to guarantee the supply of Kalmyk ponies. Special economic favours were sometimes voted by Peter I. In February, 1719, in connection with the Persian campaign, the Senate ordered local authorities to allow representatives of Aiuka to go to the surrounding towns with trade goods worth up to 3,000 rubles free of duty. In 1723, the Senate also ordered that the Kalmyks were to be allowed to cut whatever trees they needed from the areas of their grazing. Only the oak was to be excluded.

Peter I's demands for the expansion of the country and for his internal building projects severely strained the resources of the whole country. Some Kalmyks became common laborers and were sent, along with men from all over Russia, to help build the new capital. Most of these men, stranded far from the steppe, remained in St. Petersburg the rest of their lives. The chief Kalmyk contribution was not workers, however, but horses. Armies required 60,000 horses plus additional animals to pull the artillery carriages; draught animals were required for building St. Petersburg and the great engineering work for forts at Kronstadt and Petropavlovsk or the Ladoga Canal demanded huge numbers of horses. Peter I encouraged scientific horse breeding. He worked to create
breeding projects in the Kazan guberniia and ordered the cross-breeding of Persian stallions and nomadic mares in Astrakhan. The Kalmyks were under steady pressure to keep their breeding herds active and were encouraged to sell them to the Russians. Aiuka was granted the right to bring horses directly to Moscow and pay no duty at any point. In spite of the seemingly limitless herds, the price of a Kalmyk horse during the period jumped from five rubles to ten and a half.55

Besides horses, the Kalmyks brought increasingly large numbers of cattle, both long and short horn, to the Russian markets, particularly in the region around Astrakhan. I. Lepkhin, writing about Russian agriculture in the area, noted that it received from the Kalmyks "better meat and draught cattle: for the Kalmyk oxen are stronger and heavier than those of the Cherkass and the Kalmyks around Dmitrievsk alone exchange every one of the cattle each year for several hundred thousand rubles."56

Lamentably, few records from this period have been published, but some of those mentioned in the Ocherki istorii KASSR are enlightening as regards trade in the early 1720's. One of the most active trade centers was the Makar'evskaia fair (jarmarka) in Saratov. Princes, including Aiuka, sent men there to sell skins and pelts as well as some Central Asian goods. In turn, they bought manufactured goods such as cloth, dyes, and paper. Russian merchants and even government officials (including D. E. Bakhmetev, commendant of Saratov) sold goods which had been bought originally in the ulus at the fair. Peasants, mostly from
the local uezdy sold Kalmyk-grown hides at the fair. By buying goods on the steppe, all these men, commoner and official alike, avoided the stiff customs duties assessed in the government-controlled marketplaces. In 1720, Kalmyk goods from Saratov alone amounted to 2,944 rubles (the only goods listed were furs, skins, or hides and leather goods). It is impossible to estimate the total value of live animals and animal products added to the Russian economy by the nomads.

Kalmyk Relations with Other Powers

Aiuka continued the Kalmyks' practice of remaining in touch with powers other than Russia. The fact that a "vassal" could and did receive envoys from the sultan of Turkey and the emperor of China deeply disturbed the Russians. As the oaths of Aiuka indicate, the Russians attempted, as they had in the past, to end or at least gain control over these relations. The reign of Aiuka, which was the highwater mark of Kalmyk independence, was a period of particular frustration for the Russians. It appears that St. Petersburg never suspected the breadth of Kalmyk contacts beyond the borders of Russia.

Ties of family, religion, and tradition made the east figure most significantly in the Kalmyks' foreign affairs. Relations with China, Tibet, and other Mongol peoples depended chiefly on the state of Kalmyk-Dzungar relations. Aiuka was himself the offspring of a dynastic marriage with the Dzungars and his sister married a Khoshūd prince. Three of Aiuka's four, chief wives were either Khoshūd or Dzungar women and the
khan regularly married his sons and daughters to Oyirad nobility.

Blood, no matter how thick, was not sufficiently strong to assure good relations with the Djunghar. The Ocherki istorii KASSR summarized relations with Djungharia as "rather weak" during the reign of Galdan Boshkotu Khan (1671-1697) due to the Djunghar preoccupation with the Chinese frontier. That is not accurate. Squabbles among the Khoshūd and the Djunghar first drove Ablai west and forced Aiuka into a major struggle as soon as he took the royal seal. Galdan, who had returned from a career as a priest in Tibet to avenge the murder of his brother Senge and had become the ruler of the Djunghar, embarked on a career of expansion and consolidation that sent shock waves throughout the area once dominated by the Oyirad. A major triumph was his capture, in 1677, of the Lake Zaisan Khoshūd and their ruler, Ochirtu Tsotser Khan. Not only was Ochirtu Galdan's father-in-law, he was, by a different wife, brother-in-law to Aiuka. Dordji Rabtan, the Torghūd wife, was deserted by most of the Khoshūd. She joined one of her husband's envoys and fled to the Volga.

Reaching her brother's ulus in 1676, she spent the next two years inveighing against Galdan and his treachery. In 1678, she and her brother Djamso returned to Djungharia, hoping to gain the release of her husband.

As the years passed, relations between Aiuka and Galdan did not improve. Djunghar attacks on Mongolia ravaged the territory of Aiuka's Khalka brother-in-law. Also, when Tsevan Rabtan, son of the murdered
Senge, proposed to marry a grand-daughter of Ochirtu Khan, Galdan, the young man's uncle, kidnapped the bride-to-be and kept her for himself. Tsevan Rabtan turned to Aiuka and married the khan's daughter, Seter Djab. By the time of the wedding (1698/99), Tsevan Rabtan had revolted and, with Manchu help, had driven his uncle from Djungharia.

Aiuka acted in concert with Galdan's enemies. In 1697, he sent the *zaisang* Dordji Djab into the Altai to track down Galdan. Tsevan Rabtan sent his brother-in-law Sandjab with another 20,000 men to aid in the search. The hunt came to nothing, thanks to Galdan's supporters, who managed to prevent the rendezvous of the two armies. After Galdan's death in Siberia, Aiuka dispatched a three-man delegation to Peking to congratulate the K'ang-hsi Emperor.

Kalmyk-Djungharia relations improved somewhat after the accession of Tsevan Rabtan Zoriktu *khungtaiji* (1697-1727). Family ties were strengthened when Aiuka married Tsevan Rabtan's cousin Darma Bala in 1699/1700. Tsevan Rabtan had married Aiuka's daughter and had used her 15,000-man escort in his search for Galdan.

Despite these favorable omens, all was not sweetness and light between the Volga and Djungharia. Gaban Sharab noted that when Tsevan Rabtan fled his uncle, Galdan, he had but seven followers. Even though an exile, he was able quickly to increase that number to 4,000 *kibitkas*. After having suffered extreme privation and danger, Tsevan Rabtan, once victorious, continued to acquire retainers whenever and wherever possible. In 1700/01, Sandjab, Aiuka's son, quarreled with his father. He left the
Volga and went east to join his brother-in-law, taking 15,000 vassals. His men were welcomed, but Sandjab was arrested and sent back to the Volga and his father. The 15,000 Kalmyks who had joined his flight were added to Tsevan Rabtan's vassals and distributed among his most trusted retainers. Considering Aiuka's care to increase the numbers of his vassals, the loss of 15,000 must have distressed him greatly. 59

The seizure of Sandjab's men soured relations with Djungharia and the resulting brouhaha, plus the dislocation created by Djunghar expansionism, interrupted communications and travel on the steppe. As a consequence, the Manchus detained in Peking Aiuka's cousin Arabzhur who had gone with his family to Tibet on pilgrimage. The Chinese government explained that the route to the Volga, via Djungharia, was too dangerous for Arabzhur's safe return. The result of this Djunghar blockage was the exchange of missions between Peking and the Volga, an issue to be explored in greater depth below.

Djunghar expansion westward also troubled the Kalmyks in other ways. In the 1670's, at the invitation of the Dalai Lama, Galdan had turned Kashgaria into a Djunghar protectorate and reduced the formerly independent local khodjaa to the position of prefects of the khan. Later he added Turfan to his possessions. The Mongolian and anti-Ching adventures of Galdan did much to bring about his ruin. Tsevan Rabtan, who appreciated the significance of Chinese opinion, decided, initially, to concentrate on his western borders, attacking the Kazakhs with special fury and working to end their competition for the pastures of the Ili. The Kazakhs were
divided into three hordes (the Great, the Middle, and the Small), but all remained under the general guidance of Khan Tawke (died 1710). Djunghar attacks on the Kazakhs began in 1698, slackened, and were renewed, with added ferocity, in 1713. In 1723, Tsevan shattered Kazakh unity and totally subdued the Great Horde. Many Kazakhs fled west and north, toward the Emba, Ural, and Ilek rivers—the borders of the Russian Empire, the pastures of the Kalmyks. The migrations of these "Years of the Great Hunger" forced the Kalmyks to confront another, competing tribal alliance desperate for grazing. The struggle lasted many years and cost the Kalmyks their pastures east of the Iaik. The Kalmyks realized that the Djunghar were responsible for the situation, but, at the same time, they were deeply impressed by the power of Tsevan Rabtan.

Djunghar expansion brought an additional hardship on the Kalmyks by disrupting the most direct route from the Volga to Tibet. Priests, pilgrims, and the medicines produced by Tibetan lamas had to be rerouted across Siberia and through China. The significant increase in travel time, the inconvenience and the possibility of Russian or Chinese interference upset both Kalmyk political and religious leaders.60

Despite the trouble with the Djunghars, there is evidence that, late in life, Aiuka began seriously to consider removing the Kalmyks from the Volga and returning them to Djungharia. This theory is based on a 1725 report of rumours sent to Bakunin by his informant in the ulus of Darma Bala coming after the death of Aiuka Kahn. Both Nefed'ev and Pal'mov believed the plan was sincerely considered; but Soviet
authors, such as Batmaev, have generally dismissed it. Several factors could have accounted for such a project. Aiuka had come under the influence of his ambitious Djourghar wife, Darma Bala, who sought to perpetuate her power after the khan's death by being the agent responsible for the delivery of the Kalmyks to her cousin Tsevan Rabtan. Her chief ally was said to be Shukur lama, a Volga Kalmyk trained in Tibet who, when acting as chief administrator of one of the Dalai Lama's own monasteries, was sent to the Volga (about 1720) to replace the aging Bukunchin lama. He was reputed to have brought with him the order of the Dalai Lama that the Kalmyks were to return to the east and join whichever group of Buddhist Mongols they pleased. Bakumin reported: "The Khan Aiuka, his wife Darma Bala, and Shukur lama and Emchi gelung proposed that if they were to move away it would be to the khungtaiji (Tseven Rabtan) who is known to them and they would explain to him the command of the Dalai Lama. They hoped that he, the khungtaiji, would not block the order of the Dalai Lama and would not argue with them as had the khan's son Sanjab."61

In dealing with the proposed out-migration, no authors have troubled to consider political events in Tibet as possible corroboration for the existence of such a plan. Tibet had become a Chinese protectorate only recently and one could speculate that the Dalai Lama, upset by the Chinese constitution of government in Lhasa, had been encouraged by the declining interest of the Manchu in Tibet (after 1723) and had decided to call for a large group of devout Buddhists to move closer in case he
needed their support in the future. Blö-bzan-bskal-bzan-rgya-mts'o, the VIIth Dalai Lama (1708-1757) is known to have grown restive under Chinese domination and was later to be deported to China and detained there for seven years for having supported the anti-Ch'ing faction in Tibet's 1728 civil war. The attitude in Lhasa would easily have been fitted to Aiuka's displeasure with the Russians, who refused to endorse his choice for successor, and with Governor Volynskii, specifically, who openly supported the candidature of Aiuka's grandson, Dasang.

According to Nefed'ev, the negotiations for the return were made a secret adjunct to plans for the marriage of Tseren Donduk, eldest son of Aiuka and Darma Bala, to a daughter of Tsevan Rabtan. Governor Volynskii caught on to the plot only after a Russian patrol had snared Dugar, a Kalmik on his way to Djungharia, when he and his companions attempted to steal a boat near Dmitrievsk for a secret crossing of the Volga. Whatever Aiuka, Darma Bala, and the rest may have intended, the entire plan came to pieces when Aiuka's death in February, 1722, and the struggle among his heirs made any such move impossible.

Relations with Tibet were also lively throughout the reign of Aiuka, a period during which the famed Vth Dalai Lama died (1682); the VIth Dalai Lama, bLo-bzang-rig-hdins-ts'angs-dbyaṅs-rgya-mts'o (1706-1718); Tsevan Rabtan invaded Tibet and killed Latsang (1717); the Chinese invaded Tibet and enthroned the "legitimate" VIIth (or by some counts the VIth) Dalai Lama, bLo-bzan-bskal-bzan-rgya-mts'o. The wars of the Djunghars made more difficult, but did not entirely interrupt
Kalmyk-Tibetan contacts.

Aiuka's first recorded contact with Lhasa was the dispatch, in 1690, of the royal seal for the Kalmyk ruler. The timing of the event is interesting and, like most of these contacts, must be viewed in terms of developments in Tibet as well as on the Volga. Although the Vth Dalai Lama had been dead since 1682, the fact had been kept secret by A-bsr Saňs-rgyas-rgya-mts'o, the Tisri (Sde-srid,"regent") (1679-1703). The child who would eventually be recognized as the VIth Dalai Lama was then only seven years old, hardly likely to recognize the merits of the Kalmyk ruler, no matter how stellar.

Tsepon Shakabpa has noted that the regent was particularly interested in promoting unity among the Mongols. The dispatch of the seal would greatly flatter the khan and serve to announce an active interest in Kalmyk affairs, as befitted the religious preceptor of the western-most branch of the Mongols. Along with the seal were sent special missives to the priests who served the khan. In assessing the importance of this gesture, Iurii Lytkin observed: "They valued the attention and blessing of the Dalai Lama; of the religion via whose representative gave with his recognition and blessing the moral support of their right to rule."

Aiuka did not ask the permission of Russia to accept the honor or the seal. In turn, the Russians waited to recognize the validity of the act for at least seven and, perhaps, nineteen years.

As noted previously, Aiuka probably received a new seal from Tibet
in 1713. N. N. Pal'mov believed its arrival signaled Chakdorzhab's reinstatement as heir, after he had lost that position in 1701 following a quarrel with his father. Once again, the timing of the act is interesting. At this time Latsan Khan in Tibet was lobbying to have his candidate Nag-dbañ-ye-ses-rgya-mts'o recognized as the legitimate spiritual leader of Tibet. The Khosūd tribes at Koko Nor had refused to accept him and the State Oracle of Tibet (the Na-sh'ūi ch'o-je of the De-yang ta-tsān Monastery) had recognized a child then living at Koko Nor as the true reincarnation of his predecessor. A "reinvestiture" of Aiuka was most likely another instance where a lay leader attempted to use his influence in the religious realm to buttress secular power.

The most complicating factor in Kalmyk-Tibetan relations was the wars of the Dzungars. Aiuka complained in 1714 to the Chinese envoy Tulisen that: "Since the free route via the southern lands is cut, his (Aiuka's) men are not able to go at this time into Western Tsang (where the Dalai Lama lives) and he cannot receive any of the medicines from there." Even so, contact did continue and a number of Kalmyks, such as Shakur lama, were sent to Tibet to study or to make pilgrimage.

The best known Kalmyk pilgrim was Arabzhur, who, with his mother, sister, and five hundred retainers left for Tibet in 1698. Pozdneev indicated that they were also directed to bring holy men back to the Volga. Lytkin noted that the mission was made only after the death of Galdan and was to thank the Dalai Lama for having named Aiuka khan. There is some merit to Lytkin's comment since the legitimacy of the
Dalai Lama's elevation had been accepted only the year before the group departed. They were accompanied by an envoy from Dordji Nazarov, Aiuka's cousin and a nephew of Arabzhur. The pilgrims reached Tibet safely, but the danger of their original route forced them to return via Peking. Since the Manchu stoutly maintained that they could not guarantee the safe return of the Kalmyks to the Volga, they were detained in China. Arabzhur's return was the occasion around which the embassy of Tulisen was sent to the Volga in 1714 and will be dealt with in greater detail below. Arabzhur himself profited little from the negotiations between the Manchu and the Kalmyks. In fact, he seems never to have returned to his homeland. In the 1730's, envoys of Dordji Nazarov found Arabzhur's son, Danzhun, living in China with only two hundred vassals, but carrying the Manchu title of beile.

There were other, though less celebrated, exchanges between Tibet and the Volga during Aiuka's reign. In 1713, Chakdorzhab's senior wife, Djalla (a Djunghar), sent a Khivan agent to Constantinople to purchase necessities for her own pilgrimage to Lhasa. It is unknown if the trip was actually made, but the conditions along the route east would not have been any more settled than at the time of Arabzhur's planned return. Perhaps her status as a Djunghar noble would have assured a smoother trip. Missions in 1718/1719 included twenty-four Tibetans and as many Kalmyks, sent by Aiuka and Chakdorzhab. These groups moved openly and actually stopped in Moscow. The College of Foreign Affairs was interested in events in China and Tibet and the Volga Kalmyks were St. Petersburg's
best source of information.

Aiuka's contacts with the Ch'ing Dynasty were also closely bound to the problems of Djungharia. The Manchu had been genuinely alarmed by Djunghar expansion, particularly since much of that growth coincided with the establishment of their own rule in China and indicated a strong Djunghar interest in regions also coveted by the Manchu. Ba'atur Khuntaiji had not directly threatened China, but Galdan's efforts to conquer Mongolia deeply troubled the Ch'ing, just as Esen had frightened the Ming before them. Manchu arms and the resistance of the East Mongols had caused Galdan to falter; the support of the K'ang-hsi Emperor for Tsevan Rabtan eradicated him totally. But the new Djunghar ruler was no one's puppet and, after securing his western borders, Tsevan Rabtan aroused Chinese fears anew by becoming involved in the caravan city of Hami and by attacking the Chinese-supported Khoshūd rulers of Tibet. The Manchu sought allies for what seemed an inevitable struggle with the Djughar and turned to the Kalmyks.

Aiuka opened contact with Peking in 1699 by sending his envoy Erke getsul, a priest, to congratulate the K'ang-hsi Emperor for the destruction of their mutual enemy Galdan. In the name of his ruler, Erke getsul presented the emperor with a gray horse. Chinese interest in the Djunghar had waned almost as soon as Galdan was gone, but they noted the enmity of the Kalmyk for their cousins. The symbolic gift of the horse was probably even more significant. By Chinese usage, the presentation of tribute, no matter how insignificant, was the necessary recognition of the position
of the emperor and the only way to join the family of peoples overseen by the t'ien-tzu, the Son of Heaven.\textsuperscript{66}

Over the next several years, Djunghar relations with both China and the Volga deteriorated as Tsevan Rabtan, firmly established as ruler of Djungharia, renewed the expansion of his empire. When Arabzuhr arrived in Peking, the Manchu authorities insisted he and his party remain there. They were well treated and even given grazing areas and titles, but they had become pawns in a diplomatic game that continued beyond the lives of those involved in its beginning.

There is no indication of contacts between China and the Volga during the next nine years. In 1710, Aiuka finally sent a mission, headed by Samtan, to Peking. A Russian representative, Unter-ofitser Surovtsev, accompanied them. The mission was accepted by Peking, but accomplished nothing regarding Arabzhur. The K'ang-hsi Emperor commented: "The proofs you have given of your zeal and sincerity by sending Sa-mo-t'an and others to China, to offer presents and make complimentary inquiries, are highly applauded by his Majesty, though he laments the trouble they have cost you...."\textsuperscript{67} The Chinese sent the Kalmyks home, promising to send their own envoys to the Volga to settle the problem.

N. N. Pal'mov, without citing evidence supported by documents, asserted that it was no secret that Aiuka was growing restive under Russian control and was prepared to move back to the east. Pal'mov felt that at this time Aiuka was trying to decide whether to join Tsevan Rabtan or submit to the Chinese and await their decision as to
the assignment of pasturage. This charge is impossible to prove without any supporting evidence, but it is obvious that the Chinese would have been interested in the khan's plans. The addition of several hundred thousand nomads to the human resources of the Dzungars would have had serious repercussions for the Manchu. At that moment Tsevan Rabtan was beginning to meddle in the affairs of Tibet and had gone so far as to invite the Dalai Lama to live in Dzungaria. It was to prevent a Dzungar capture of so important a figure that the VIth Dalai Lama was on his way to Peking when assassinated in 1706. The deportation, intended to secure the position of Latsan and lessen Dzungar influence, actually proved counterproductive. The monks of the Yellow Church were so enraged by the murder that they appealed to the Dzungars as protectors of the true religion and asked their rescue from the Khoshūd ruling in Tibet. As the possibility of direct Dzungar intervention in Tibet grew, the Chinese began to identify possible allies for the coming struggle. The Kalmyks needed to be prevented from joining the Dzungars and were to be encouraged to remember their disputes with Galdan and Tsevan Rabtan.

On June 23, 1712, the first official Chinese mission to visit Europe departed Peking for the court of that renowned European prince, Aiuka Khan. The group of six bureaucrats and twenty-six servants was headed by Tulisen, a Manchu whose career had been in eclipse for the last seven years, following his failure to raise enough sacrificial cattle for the Board of Rites. Tulisen carried with him an edict outlining his duties and the goals of the
mission. He was to inquire after the khan's health and to arrange for the return home of Prince O-la-pu-chu-erh (Arabzhur). The details of the return of the former pilgrim even then could not be settled because a separate Chinese mission to Tsevan Rabtan had not returned before Tulisen's departure. The most important question, that of possible joint military action against the Djunghars, was to be broached with only the most opaque circumspection. Rather than propose such an alliance, Tulisen was to deny utterly that any hostile action was even intended.

Should he (A-yu-kee) express to you a wish for our assistance in any hostile operations against Tse-vang-Rabdan, you are by no means to make any promises or to listen to any proposals of that nature, but are thus to reply:—
"Tse-vang-Rabdan is upon very friendly terms with his Imperial Majesty. He frequently sends envoys with complimentary enquiries, and they are always received at court, and honored with presents and other marks of imperial favor. As to his strength and resources, he, no doubt, is weak, straitened, and helpless in the extreme; but our most excellent master does not therefore desire to make war against him and subdue him. The affair you propose is one of the greatest magnitude, and one in which it would not be proper for us to concur. You may, indeed, if you choose, lay the matter before his Sacred Eminence, but it is our opinion that our Emperor, desiring nothing more than that all nations under heaven should enjoy peace and tranquility, has no intention whatever of occasioning to Tse-vang-Rabdan any disturbance. Indeed, we can pledge ourselves that this is the case. 69"

In spite of this elaborate denial, there is no question that virtually everyone, including the Russians, knew exactly what Chinese intentions toward the Djunghar were.

There was also the possibility that the Cha-han Khan (Peter I) might wish to see the envoys. If that were the case, Tulisen was to
recall the shameful acts of the Russian ambassador in Peking and work to avoid emulating him. Peter was to be lectured on the Confucian system of government and be assured that if his border troops were needed in Europe, China had no desire to attack Russia. If the Russian ruler needed weapons, Tulisen was to feign ignorance, since Chinese law forbade their export. The envoy was to keep his eyes and ears open and was absolutely forbidden to accept gifts.

The trip to the Volga required almost two years, far longer than the distance itself demanded. The Chinese were detained by the Russians at Selinginsk from August, 1712, to February, 1713. The Russian officials explained that without orders from the tsar or even instructions from Aiuka, they could not let them proceed. Tulisen made no charges of intentional obstruction by the Russians. He commented to Governor Gagarin of Tobol’sk that even though the Russians sent merchants to China, "the Cha-han Khan has not yet sent us any messengers with tributary offerings: wherefore we do not now send any messengers to him, but direct the present mission exclusively to the residence of the Khan A-yu-kee." 70

The question of the delay has met with varied treatments by historians. In his biography of Tulisen, Fang Chao-ying found no reason to fault the Russians for the excessive delay. The Chinese government did not agree, however. In 1771, the Ch’ien-lung Emperor, celebrating the migration of the Kalmyks from the Volga to China, reviewed the history of relations with the Kalmyks and Russians. He wrote:
Sheng-atsu Jen Huang-ti (K'ang-hsi) my grandfather, wishing to be instructed in the real reasons which would cause Aiuka to move himself away from his home like that, himself sent an envoy, the mandarin Tulisen, and others to assure him (Aiuka) of his protection in the case that he should wish to return to those countries which he had inhabited before. The Russians, to whom Tulisen had applied for permission to cross their country, obtained without difficulty permission to proceed through; but the Russians did not give him any clarification about the person he sought and he was three years and several months in fulfilling the object of his mission.

The comments of the Chinese emperor give credence to Pal'mov's suspicion that Aiuka had declared his willingness to leave Russia before Tulisen's mission ever left China. Naturally, Pal'mov also felt that the delay was intentional, designed to give St. Petersburg time to formulate a policy for the visit. He wrote that the Chinese were accompanied by Trade Commissioner P. R. Khudiakov to the border and that he had learned the real reason for the mission was to create an offensive alliance with the Ch'ing. His report, supported by information from Russians (Count Vladislavich and I. Glazunov) in Peking, was forwarded to the Capital. The problem was then turned over to Governor Apraksin in Kazan. He was to try to keep two powers with which Russia was at peace from attacking a third, with which the Russians were also at peace.71

Considering the number of possible actions which might have resulted from the Chinese mission (alliance with China, war with the Djunghars, migration of the Kalmuks), the actual end products were miniscule. Following a second delay, in Saratov, the embassy reached the Khan's camp on the 11th of July, 1714. There were several meetings with
Aiuka and receptions of the emissaries by Darma Bala, Chakdorzhab, and several other members of the royal family. Although the subject of Arabzhur was broached, no decision was made as to his return home. All agreed that the southern route was closed due to the problems with the Djunghar, the Kazakhs, and the Karakalpak. Aiuka said that Russian permission would be required for Arabzhur's return via Siberia and promised to send envoys to Peking after that permission had been obtained. Since the process would be time consuming, the khan suggested that the Chinese return home without it. There may also have been a dynastic marriage arranged during the trip. Several authors have maintained the bride was intended for the Son of Heaven himself, but that seems highly unlikely since neither Tulisen nor any documents of Aiuka mention so distinguished an alliance. N. N. Pal'mov held that the bride was meant for one of the Mongol rulers tributary to China. One daughter of Aiuka and Darma Bala did wed the ruler of the Koko Nor Khoshud. 72

During their discussions, Aiuka asked a number of questions about the people, climate, soils, and occupations of China. At this distance it is impossible to know if this were simple curiosity or information gathering for deciding whether to return to the east. Aiuka made one comment which indicated that he had considered a move to China. "Although I live far away from your country, you see by my hat and my cloak that I hardly differ from you at all; compare us to the Russians and see how great a difference there is between us and them by our dress and by our hats, and by our language, and in all facets of our lives."73
The Chinese left Aiuka on 24 July, 1714, and returned to China via Kazan, Tobol'sk, Tara, and Tomsk, reaching Peking on 26 June, 1715. In their official report of the journey made to K'ang-hsi, the envoys did little more than recount the trip. The only communication from Aiuka, couched in extremely respectful terms, said that he had always wanted to visit the Chinese emperor for "the contemplation of such sublime perfection... and actually to behold the heavenly countenance...."

Since he could not, the emperor's kindness in sending his representatives "has thus conferred new lustre and dignity on my kingdom: the mountains and the vallies as well as all living things, seem to partake of the universal joy." Within a year the Dzungars attacked Hami and were soon at war with China. Aiuka did not make common cause with the Ch'ing or return to the east. He knew that any lengthy contact with China would be at the sufferance of the Russians, by virtue of their control over the route east. However much he might have been interested in the Chinese, in 1714 the Kalmik khan was not ready to exchange his Russian ties for Chinese ones.

The Kalmicks were also quite busy in the south during Aiuka's reign. Their most immediate neighbors, the Turkmens, Kazakhs (Kirkiz-Kazakhs), and the Karakalpaks, were, like the Kalmicks, nomads in need of grazing and protection. Aiuka struck into the Mangyshlak Peninsula, apparently duplicating the feat of his father by subduing the Turkmen tribes there (1689-1690). According to Pozdnev, it was the glory
resulting from this campaign that caused the Dalai Lama to grant Aiuka the royal title. This was no mere raid, but conquest. Nearly three decades later, the Turkman Shidamet Sultan was still sending Aiuka tribute. The Kalmyk rule of the area helped put the Russians in touch with the peoples living there. In 1717, Shidamet Sultan wrote to Chirikov in Astrakhan: "Aiuka Khan is a friend of yours and we are at peace with him and are ready to do good to him in all things. We live in Mangyshlak and are neighbors with him; through him we have become the enemies of Khiva and through him we hope for your kindness." 75

Some of the Turkmen of Mangyshlak were apparently moved across the Caspian and into the Kumuk region following the Persian campaign of the early 1720's. Others joined the Kalmyk ulus and remained ethnically distinct as late as the 1730's. 76

Relations with the Kazakh were difficult chiefly because Dzungar attacks forced them to flee west, into Kalmyk pastures. This was especially true of the Middle and Small Hordes. Relations were already sufficiently disturbed so that the 1697 oath included promises of aid against the Kazakhs and Karakalpak. The Russians were aware of the moves of the Kazakhs and by the 1720's recognized the severe pressures exerted by their movements into the regions east of the Volga. In 1722, an order of the Senate confided that the Kazakhs, especially the Small Horde, were planning to take over the entire area between the Emba and the Volga. The next year Aiuka sent envoys to Abulkhair Khan, then camped on the Temir with 40,000 men. The Kazakhs threatened to use their
men to get whatever grazing they wished. At this juncture, however, the Kalmyks and the Dzungar renewed attacks on them and, once again, put the Kazaks in severely strained conditions. Since Aiuka was reportedly considering a plan to move to Dzungaria, he may have been acting to clear a path east. But Aiuka died and the project was dropped. The Russians, to whom the Kazaks had appealed for protection were too busy to pay them much attention. It has also been suggested that at the time the Russians were even more concerned that any pro-Kazakh acts on their part would result in Dzungar attacks on Russian frontier posts.77

The Karakalpak occupied the northeast shores of the Aral Sea and divided their pasturages into a southern region, close to Bukhara, and a northern one, on the Emba. After Aiuka's campaigns against the Turkmen, the Karakalpak were also attacked and beaten by the Kalmyks. Kuchuk Khan, their leader, was killed and his son, Murat, fled to the Bashkir. There he was elected khan of a section of the Bashkir and planned to join the Crimeans in a war against Russia. Instead, he chose first to pursue personal revenge by securing the aid of the Iaik Cossacks for an attack on the Kalmyks. Eventually the Cossacks changed their minds and the Bashkir deserted him. Murat went first to Constantinople and then to the Kuban. He fell into Russian hands in 1708.

The situation of the Karakalpak worsened when the Dzungar attacked the Kazaks and forced one and all to move into the easternmost Kalmyk pastures. They were met there with force. In 1714, perhaps in league
with the Kuban, the Karakalpak attacked the Kalmyk ulus. Their assaults
drew Kalmyk attention and warriors away from the west where the Kuban
was preparing an attack. In September, 1714, Chakdorzhab wrote to
Chirikov: "The Karakalpaks have brought war on us; we go with our troops
against them and you should be guarding our people." Although the
Karakalpak evidently gained very little from these raids, they did help
clear the way for the Kuban.

Kalmyk relations with the cities of Central Asia remained a mix
of trade, peace, and war. Although emissaries, merchants, and goods
from Russia and Central Asia continued to pass through the Kalmyk
lands, the turbulent political situation, especially in Khiva (where
nine rulers occupied the throne from 1687 to 1716) invited the interven-
tion of the Kalmyks and the Russians. In 1683, Aiuka, between campaigns
against the Turkmen and the Karakalpak, sent troops into Khivan terri-
tory. The 1697 oath promised him supplies should he war against Bukhara.

Ironically, it is not direct Kalmyk dealings with Central Asia
that constitute the chief event of the reign of Aiuka, for the Russians
were also interested in the region. As their ally/vassal, Aiuka was
drawn into Peter I's plans. As early as 1708, the Russians planned an
expedition south, but Aiuka, using his closer contact with the region
and his better sources of information, warned Chirikov in Astrakhan that
the Bukharans, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, and Khivans were prepared to resist
any such probing with force. Peter the Great, delayed, but refused to
abandon his plan and continued to dream of gold and paths to the riches
of India. He hoped to secure the eastern shore of the Caspian, build a fort at the mouth of the Amu Darya, and make both Khiva and Bukhara into Russian vassals. Plans were completed in 1714 and Aiuka sent an envoy to Jadyger Khan of Khiva (1714) to explain the Russian mission. The khan could not have afforded, however, to be too truthful. Early in 1716, Aiuka's nemesis Prince Aleksandr Bekovich-Cherkasskii, seconded by Prince Mikhail Zamanov, took charge of the expedition. The 5,000 men moved south, building forts along the Caspian shore and then taking the overland route toward Khiva. Their reception, which had been preceded by letters from Khan Shirghazi of Khiva (1715-1727) expressing doubts as to the propriety or peaceful nature of the mission, was less than enthusiastic. Met first by armed force, the Russians seemed to have overcome local objections when Shirghazi, swearing an oath on the Koran, promised peace. The khan insisted, however, that for the sake of convenience and supply the Russians break into five groups, each to be billeted in a separate town. Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskii rather stupidly agreed. In late spring, Khivan troops went from town to town, seizing all the Russians and killing the officers. Princes Aleksandr and Mikhail were executed in the presence of Shirghazi Khan and their heads, stuffed with straw, were put on public display. Even though the Russians demanded the return of the captured soldiers and Cossacks and imprisoned the Khivan envoy Vais Mambet (who died in prison), only a few men ever saw home again.

The fiasco would be better relegated to a study of Russian–
Central Asian relations were it not for the question of Aiuka's role. It will be recalled that Bekovich-Cherkasskii had figured prominently in the Russian reaction to the Kuban raid on the Kalmyks in 1715. Aiuka had sufficient reason to seek revenge on the prince, but one must ask if, as some authors have claimed, Aiuka was directly responsible for the destruction of the Khivan expedition.

M. Novoletov repeated a story first mentioned in an article by S. M. Solov'ev that Husayn, Shah of Persia, paid Shirghazi 20,000 rubles for the death of Bekovich-Cherkasskii. That story never gained many supporters, however. More popular is a version in which Aiuka, following the Kuban attack and the nomination of Bekovich-Cherkasskii, sent a Turkman agent to Shirghazi to explain that the expedition did not seek friendship and cartographic information but the immediate and complete subjugation of Khiva. Once warned, the Khivan ruler acted to defend himself, even going so far as to break his sacred oath. This version, by the way, comes directly from Shirghazi himself and was given to a Russian representative at his court several years after the event. It was considerably enlarged by various rumours, especially those gathered by one Cossack visitor to Khiva. 79

Since the truth cannot be known, the proper distribution of complicity in the affair cannot be made. Aiuka had sufficient reason to want Bekovich-Cherkasskii dead. It is also true that the Khivans probably already doubted the sincerity of the Russians. Three years before the Khivans had gathered troops to resist another such expedition
and it was Aiuka who then acted to diffuse the situation. Although
the Khivan ruler had changed twice in the interim, there is no reason
to believe they had lost their grip on reality and concluded that
Peter I was merely a curious neighbor.

What was more significant was the Russian perception of the true
nature of the disaster. Aiuka was never confronted by Russian suspicions
of his complicity and had no opportunity to defend himself. Peter the
Great seems to have believed him guilty for the failure of the expedition
and, although he took no overt action, his attitude toward Aiuka changed.
Thus, in 1722, when Aiuka attempted to secure the succession, Peter I
remembered the Khivan disaster and determined to put someone more his
creature on the throne as the next khan of the Kalmyks. 80

The Persian-Kalmyk exchange of envoys also continued during Aiuka's
reign and the breakup of the Safavid regime. The purpose of these
missions is unknown, but such contacts were, according to the oaths of
Aiuka, to be under Russian control. The first recorded mission was in
1710, when Aiuka and the shah sent envoys, each to the other. These
missions came as the eastern borders of Persia were coming under attack
from the Chalzay Afghans, but there is no demonstrable connection
between the two events. Persia's political situation continued to
decline over the next several years. In March, 1717, Aiuka informed
Chirikov that he had sent a three-man mission to Persia. It is probably
these Kalmyks whom John Bell encountered in Resht that same year.
Chakdorzhab sent his own envoys in 1719. On their return, the men were
arrested and detained in Astrakhan by Governor Volynskii. Chakdorzhab
officially requested their release in November, 1721. No doubt the
The chief reason for their detention was their possession of recent observations on the political conditions in Persia. Volynskii was then plotting Russian manoeuvres there and needed as much accurate information as became available. Aiuka is not known to have had any further contact with Persia.81

In examining the history of Aiuka's reign, one might readily conclude that most of the contact between the Kalmyks, Crimeans, and Turks came at the point of a sword. But that would be misleading. Although the parties often enough met in combat, there are certain documents preserved in the Ottoman Nameh-i Humayun which indicate that Aiuka Khan was in contact with the Porte and claimed to be willing to consider propositions which would have ended his Russian alliance and brought him to the side of the Ottoman sultan.

Thanks to the detective work of Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay in the Ottoman archives, a number of documents have been published which indicate that Aiuka was playing his own diplomatic game. In a letter of 1703/1704 on the occasion of the enthronement of Ahmed III (1703-1730), Aiuka, through his envoy, a Nogai Muslim named Ish Mehmed Aga, congratulated the sultan and promised "to be eternally the friend of the friends of the Padishah (Ahmed III) and the eternal enemy of his enemies." What is more, the letter continued: "During the reigns of your late father (Mehmed IV, 1648-1687) and your late brother (Mustafa II, 1685-1703)...we have promised and taken an oath never to fail in our duties toward them." The obvious implication of such a
remark was that Aiuka had sworn fidelity to both the tsar and the sultan. Aiuka added: "Oh Padishah! I have always been faithful to the oath of old times; I am fixed in my attachment to my pledges; I have submitted and am obedient to your orders. I shall not cease to serve you from afar as a servant devoted to you always." Was this the guardian of Russia's southern borders speaking? For the Ottomans this was a most unusual situation. As Lemercier-Quelquejay noted: "To our knowledge this is a rare instance in which an independent, non-Muslim power, firmly adhering to its Buddhist faith, had voluntarily and formally placed itself under the protection of the Ottoman Padishah, who was, at the same time, the Caliph, that is, the supreme spiritual head of Islam. For according to Koranic law, the Buddhists were considered 'pagans' (Bot-perest = 'Adorers of idols'), who had to be converted or destroyed."82

The Ottoman reply, dated 8 September, 1704, addressed Aiuka as the sovereign (hakim) of the Kalmyks and promised him both benefits and assistance if he should serve the Ottomans faithfully. The Kalmyks were taken under the protection of the sultan and Aiuka was recommended to enjoy good relations with the Muslims of the region, particularly Khan Hadji Selim Giray I, then in his fourth reign (1702-1704) in the Crimea. The suggestion was also made that Aiuka send his own envoys to the Crimea to establish direct, amicable relations.

Kalmyk-Ottoman contacts were again in evidence as the Great Northern War reached its critical stage. A letter dated March, 1709,
answered a Kalmyk mission led by Mehmed Salih, a Nogai. The khan's letter is not extant, but from the grand visier's reply, one can assume that the Kalmyks reaffirmed their loyalty, as demonstrated by their refusal to meet the envoys of the Cherkes, a people then in revolt against the Crimea. In 1710, another Kalmyk mission, led by Pehlevan Kuli Beg, arrived with news of the Bashkir revolt (1705-1711). Aiuka Khan averred that he had not helped the Russians against the Bashkir, but had aided his Muslim neighbors. His envoy also informed the Porte that his master planned soon to join an alliance of the Bashkir, Karakalpak, and Kazakh to fight the Russians and serve the sultan. Aiuka was pleased to note that he and Devlet Giray II (1708-1713, his second reign) were in perfect accord. The message of the khan, which had not been committed to paper, included the interesting caveat that if Kuli Beg did not bring back a written reply confirming his exact retelling of the khan's message, then his head was forfeit.83

Sadly, the archives have not given up any earlier letters, such as the oaths to Mehmed IV and Mustafa II, and there is no later correspondence, either. What could Aiuka's purpose have been? It is possible that he was unhappy with his Russian alliance, yet his troops were fighting alongside Peter I against the Swedes. When he first wrote, the Bashkir were quiet, so Aiuka had nothing particular to fear from an alliance of Muslim tribes. By the time of the 1710 message, the Bashkir were in revolt and Aiuka was firmly on the side of St. Petersburg. Relations with the Kazakhs and Karakalpak were quiet, and there are no other indications that the Kalmyk chief was planning to
join them in a grand, anti-Russian alliance. Perhaps Aiuka wanted no more than to open lines of communication. After all, he was from "afar" and could not easily be included in the Ottoman Empire. But he was the close neighbor of the Crimeans and the Bashkir and may have hoped that his strategic position would gain favors, such as subsidies, from the Porte. That his acts were treasonous was clearly understood by him. Otherwise, why send his last missive depending entirely on the memory of his envoy? Whatever his game, Aiuka seems to have avoided Russian detection. Although some messages from the Kalmyks to the Crimea and the Caucasus were intercepted, there is no indication that the Russians ever suspected his contacts with Constantinople. Their reaction had they learned of his submission to the sultan can only be imagined.

Kalmyk relations with the Kuban deteriorated after the arrival there of the Nekrasov refugees and the end of Peter I's last Turkish war. They became particularly bad after 1713 and no amount of threats or proposed discussions could dissuade Bakhtı Ǧirāy from his 1715 raid on the Kalmyks. As has been noted, the Russians were in no hurry to see the Kalmyks' fickle Tatar vassals returned to Aiuka's control. Bakhmetev urged the Kalmyks to accept their loss, for, he warned, an attack on the Kuban would merely elicit an answering raid on the Kalmyks.

Regardless of Russian wishes, in 1716 word reached Tsaritsyn that a new attack by the Kuban and the Crimea was planned. Fears were dissipated when internal squabbles split the Tatars into two groups.
Bakhtī Girāy was opposed chiefly by the Great Horde of the Nogai and the Cossacks of Nekrasov. Confronted by internal opponents, Bakhtī Girāy turned to the Kalmyks for aid. Aiuka was delighted to be of service. He found a way for redress of his 1715 humiliation and was also revenged on the Russians. The price of Kalmyk cooperation was the return of their lost vassals as well as those Tatars who had left Astrakhan and Russian control and moved to the Kuban. The Russian authorities in Astrakhan were pleased by the prospect of the return of their vassals and did not oppose Chakdorzhab's campaign alongside Bakhtī Girāy. They even supplied ammunition. The campaign began in January, 1717 and included 30,000 Kalmyks. As a result, a group of 15,000, including Embuluk, Edisan, Kilichin and Astrakhan Tatars, plus some Nekrasov Cossacks, was returned to the Volga. After a delay, the Russians were presented with their former vassals and the Cossacks. Many of the Tatars turned over to the Kalmyks resisted returning to the ulus. Over the next years, small groups continued to slip away into the steppe and try to return to the Kuban. Others sought refuge in Astrakhan. When a group of Kumūk and Khundrov Tatars was captured in 1722, they were given directly into the control of Astrakhan.

Aiuka's revenge was not yet complete. Once the Kuban problem was solved, Chakdorzhab, with about one hundred and seventy other Kalmyks, guided Bakhtī Girāy's men into Saratov and Penza gubernii. After waiting until he was certain the news could be of no help, Chakdorzhab informed the local authorities that 10,000 Tatars were planning to
attack. When contacted about the threat and asked to send troops, 
Aiuka, recalling the Russian reaction in 1715, demurred. As he wrote 
Evanitskii in 1719:

Does Your Grace have such an order that if some 

enemies come against us or against you that you 
shall stand behind us or we stand behind you? 

And if there is such an order, why is it that you 
do not stand behind us? So if there is not 
such an order...Your Grace should write to 
his Royal Majesty that such an order be delivered. 

We live together and should stand, one behind the 
other. You should write about this to his 

Royal Majesty immediately, for there are such 
enemies.84 

Problem Areas in Russo-Kalmyk Relations 

As doggedly as the Russians attempted to limit and oversee the 
relations of the Kalmyks with other powers, they obviously failed. In 
spite of the military cooperation between the two, the Ottoman corres-
pondence and the Chinese embassy, among others, clearly indicate that 
Aiuka refused to accustom himself to being anything less than the 
valued ally of the Russian tsar/emperor. The dichotomy in these inter-
pretations could not be resolved in Aiuka's lifetime, no matter what 
was pledged in solemn oaths. 

As unsettling as the foreign problem may have been, the most dis-
ruptive situations came between the Kalmyks and Russians in their direct 
dealings with one another. Especially troublesome were the Kalmyk 
attacks on Russian settlements, their support for the Bashkir, the 
conversion and settlement of Kalmyk vassals by the Russians, and Aiuka's
difficulties in dealing with Russian authorities, especially Governor Volynskii.

As the oaths of allegiance have indicated, there were numerous instances when some Kalmyks, even members of the royal ulus itself, attacked Russian settlements. The circumstances of such raids varied, but usually they came as part of some more general disturbance. Thus villages were plundered and burned during all the peasant risings, in cooperation with the Crimeans, and during the Bashkir revolts. It is possible to find Kalmyk attacks on Russian lands in 1669, 1670, 1671, 1672, 1673, 1675, 1676, 1681, 1682, 1683, 1700, 1705, 1706, 1707, 1708, 1709, and 1710. The areas hardest hit were the uezdy of Kazan, Tambov, Ufa, Orenburg, and Penza. Also, other Russian vassals, both those then loyal and others in revolt, were victimized. The Cossacks of the Don and Iaïk and Bashkir were especially popular targets.

The Russian government was incapable of permanent, effective control of the fitful peoples of the region. Pillage was a traditional part of the economic life of the Bashkir and the Kalmyks, as well as the Cossacks. Oaths of loyalty and pledges of good conduct, although demanded in all seriousness, could not stop the sporadic cycles of violence which swept the region. Thanks to Petrine foreign policy, the energies of these peoples could often be channeled against Russian enemies. However, none of these peoples could be consciously honed for war and then be expected suddenly to forget the urge to pillage simply to please the tsar-emperor.
As had been the case with Aiuka's predecessors, relations with the Bashkir were the most troublesome of those with any Russian vassal people. Kalmyks and Bashkir were convenient targets for the other's raids; but both could, at times, join to vent their frustrations on their Russian overlord. However, once the Kalmyks sensed the value of cooperation had been exhausted, they would return to their Russian allegiance and help to crush the revolt of their erstwhile allies.

The first instance of Bashkir-Kalmyk trouble came in the 1675-1683 Seit Uprising. Bashkir appeals to their neighbors, especially the Crimeans, went unanswered since the Muslims of the Black Sea were already at war with Russia and too preoccupied to be of help. In the course of the rising the Kalmyk ulus was raided by Bashkirs, Don and Iaik Cossacks. Complaints to Moscow availed little. The 1676 oath promised that all Russian vassals would live together in peace. But in spite of that promise, the homes of the Kalmyks, who were required for service in the Ukraine, repeatedly came under Bashkir attack. In 1681, Aiuka demanded a new oath as protection against such hostile acts.

That same year, Aiuka, evidently convinced that the Russians could not act effectively to protect him, joined the Bashkir to raid into the Kazan and Ufa regions. The raids were so severe that travel in these regions became particularly difficult. Only armed caravans and flotillas were considered safe. In 1682, Aiuka and his brother Djamso met with Bashkir leaders and planned a two-pronged attack.
with the Kalmyks moving from the south to cross the Zakamskaia cherta (fortified line). A local voevoda reported: "Aiuka and other taishas joined by their warriors, attacked the Kazan and Ufa uezdy, sending their men with the enemy Bashkir and Kazan Tatars...and with them came Kalmyk and Tatar warriors numbering up to forty thousand... and from their ulus the Kalmyks sent their wives and children beyond the Iaik, to places more distant."85

At this juncture the Russians under Voevoda A. M. Korkodinov defeated the Bashkir on the Ik River. One group of Bashkir sought to settle their difference with the Russians, while another vowed to fight on, aided by Aiuka. The khan, who probably saw this as an opportunity to extend his control over numbers of Bashkir, demanded concessions from them and treated their representatives poorly. The Russian authorities also realized that Kalmyk support was the most critical factor prolonging the revolt. Envoys were sent to the Bashkir to remind them: "Aiuka taisha with his men brought war to the Ufa uezd and enticed you to change your allegiance and to cause much destruction, just as you, in the past years, have suffered much destruction on their, the Kalmyks', part."86

Suddenly Aiuka abandoned his attempts to subdue the Bashkir and the revolt faltered. It did not end immediately, however. Trouble flared anew in 1683 and some Kalmyks returned to support the Bashkir. One taisha, Didubak, probably the son of Bok, spent the winter of 1683 on Lake Chrtakly, near the Uren' River, with as many as 40,000 men.
Most Kalmyks, however, joined Aiuka; who had decided to aid the Russians. They terrorized the Bashkir settlements and soon the Seit Rising was finished. As Alston Donnelly noted: "The lack of sources prevents any final determination of the reasons for the Kalmyk change of policy. By 1683 Bashkiria had been 'pacified' largely because of Kalmyk assistance."87

The restive Bashkir did not long remain quiescent. Two factors exacerbated the general turbulence of the Volga region. First there were the demands for tribute and horses that resulted from the Great Northern War. Later, the Crimeans and Turks, the Bashkirs' natural Muslim allies, went to war again with Russia. Garrisons, drained by the need for manpower in the west, were poorly manned and the Bashkir tried once again, beginning in 1705, to be rid of their masters. That revolt ended quickly enough, but in 1706 trouble broke out again. One Bashkir group appealed to their coreligionists and selected Murat, supposed son of the Karakalpak khan, as their ruler. His career, brief and erratic, included attacks on the Kalmyks and Russians. Other Bashkir threatened Kazan coincidental to, but separate from the Bulavin revolt. The Bashkir rising, which continued to 1711, was characterized as much by its internal divisions and lack of coherent leadership as by any successes. As in the past, the Kalmyks played a waiting game until such time as a pattern of victories assured the winner.

In 1708, Mongke-temur taisha and a detachment of Kalmyks
originally dispatched to help the Russians against Sweden, suddenly returned home. On the way, possibly in concert with the Bashkir, but most probably simply taking advantage of the situation, they raided the Penza and Tambov gubernii. Over a hundred settlements were torched and the slave markets of the south received fresh shipments of captives. When Governor Apraksin sent to find out the reason for the raids, Aiuka denied any knowledge of them and promised to have them stopped. A. P. Pozdneev charged that such raids coming during the Bashkir rising proved: "the Kalmyks not only had no sense of their ties to Russia, but, on the contrary, with each year more obviously displayed their differences with her."88

In accordance with the 1708 oath, Aiuka promised to send Russia troops, but they never arrived. When he swore again, in 1710, the Kalmyk leader renewed his pledge. In the year of the Iron Tiger (1710) a group of 5,000 Kalmyks attacked the villages of the Bashkir eastern doroga. The result was chaos and the natives soon abandoned their revolt. While the emperor was busy with the Turks and Cossacks in the west, the Kalmyk policemen of the empire were quieting the Bashkir once again.

It is true that the Russians had numerous, legitimate complaints against the Kalmyks. Russian villages burned and peasants and cattle were driven away. Kalmyk leaders dealt with the enemies of Russia, failing to live up to commitments solemnly pledged. Some equivocated on occasions when internal enemies threatened the tranquility and
order of the state. Bureaucrats and historians alike have felt justified in typifying the Kalmyks as "bad allies rather than vassals of Russia." 89

But that is the Russian point of view. What about the Kalmyks'? Did they, or at least their leaders, have legitimate complaints against the Russians? Might it not be true that since Russians have written most of the histories, that their complaints have been considered major, while those of the nomads have been treated as relatively trivial? The Kalmyks believed they had a series of serious grievances over their treatment by the Russians. Certainly the most significant problem was the handling of runaways. The loss of Kalmyk and Tatar vassals drained the economic life's blood from the khan and his retainers. Without vassals, there were no herders and no warriors. Animals meant food and trade; warriors captured loot and earned rewards. Their loss weakened the power of the khan and threatened the stability of the entire economic order.

Both Kalmyk aristocrats and commoners could be enticed into conversion and settlement by the Russians, but the reasons for leaving the ulus and the impact of that desertion varied according to social status. Politically, the more significant convert was the aristocrat. As Marc Raeff has observed:

Moscow would attempt to enroll the services and loyalty of an influential segment of the non-Russian society. This could be done by suggesting that they move away to new lands where they would be granted privileges and estates
such as the 'Czardom' of Kasimov; or individuals would be attracted into the service of Moscow by appropriate promises of rewards. Even after moving away, these people retained ties to their original society and could be of use in undermining it like a fifth column. In itself, their departure weakened their homeland, especially since they frequently constituted the more active, ambitious, and energetic military leadership. The eventual conquest of the territory then became a foregone conclusion.90

The earliest recorded aristocratic convert was Tseren, son of Dugar, who, following his father's defeat by Aiuka, accepted Christianity and the new name of Prince Vasilii Dugorov sometime after 1673. In 1700, he and a group of converted Kalmyk retainers were given a village, complete with church, at Tereshka, above Saratov. Aiuka Khan was not pleased and decided to make an example of the town. In 1704, while Peter I was occupied with the sieges of Narva and Dorpat, Aiuka ordered the town destroyed and the commoner Kalmyks returned to their ulus. Defiantly he declared to the Russian government that "to take back his slaves was a right he always had."91

Only one other aristocratic convert joined the Russians during the lifetime of Aiuka, but he was also politically significant. In the spring of 1724, Baksadai Dordji, the son of Chakdorzhab and grandson of the khan, with his wife and three hundred and forty-four kibitkas of retainers, was baptised in the church of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment and in the Church of St. Isaac of Dalmatia in St. Petersburg. The emperor acted as godfather to Baksadai with senators and sovetniki from various colleges and kontory sponsoring others in the group. The Kalmyk taisha took his sponsor's name and became
Prince Petr Taishin, his wife becoming Princess Anna. The emperor made them a special grant of a thousand rubles and five hundred chetverti of grain. Much of their lives as rulers of the converted Kalmyks falls after the death of Aiuka, but Prince Taishin insisted that Peter I had promised him at his conversion to support Petr's candidacy as khan of the Kalmyks. He and his wife first settled at Astrakhan and, in 1725, were given pasturage between the Don and Volga. He remained extremely active politically and eventually forced the Russians to remove him from the immediate environs of the unconverted Kalmyk ulus.

The second, larger group of converts was drawn from the common herders, the "Black Bone." There were several reasons for their defection. As Soviet historians have enthusiastically detailed, the common Kalmyks, though supposedly free men, were little more than serfs and were more and more often being sold by their Kalmyk lords to Russians as serfs. The demands for tribute, animals, and warriors to fuel the Russo-Kalmyk war machine grew with each new adventure of the tsar-emperor. The introduction of money dues in place of animals and service forced many herders to sell themselves into slavery in order to pay. Life away from the ulus, especially with the Cossack regiments, promised considerably greater freedom and a steady income of loot and rewards. Conversion to Christianity was a modest price to pay. Some historians of the tsarist period ascribed a genuine interest in Christianity as the reason for flight, but the evidence of contemporaries indicated that religion was the motive for few.
Many were lured by promised financial rewards; others had committed some crime and fled Kalmyk justice; while some had contracted a disease, especially smallpox, and were thrown out of the ulus to fend for themselves. Under such circumstances, the sincerity of the conversion and its lastive effect were not impressive. Most relapsed into their pre-conversion life styles and even secret Buddhism at the first opportunity. "Those friends and inhabitants of the same village or khutor who were now converted to Christianity were, by tomorrow, after having left for the depths of the steppe, enemies, predators on their not so long ago friends, having forgotten totally about the faith they shared."92

It is not known when the first Kalmyks came to Russian towns, but the 1673 shert' promised that the Russian authorities would send back any Kalmyks who were not already baptised. Although the Kalmyks have often been accused of being faithless vassals, the Russian government was none too scrupulous in keeping its own word. The situation was particularly ironic considering that under the provisions of the Ulozhenie of 1649, runaway peasants were liable for return to their rightful masters in perpetuity and lords who accepted runaways were subject to a penalty of ten rubles per year per peasant. By encouraging defections, the Russians violated the spirit and the letter of their own laws and oaths.

In 1686, the government authorized the enrollment of fifty-one families of Kalmyks in the Belgorodskii polk and set up a system of
special rewards for Kalmyk warriors who chose service. Zaisangs were to receive fifty rubles a year and ordinary Kalmyks from seventeen to thirty-eight rubles. There was also a special allowance of grain. The Cossacks who were not bound by the Russian codes, accepted two hundred families for settlement on the Don the same year.

Once begun, the flight was impossible to stem. In 1690, three zaisangs took eight hundred warriors to settle on the Don. The Cossacks, claiming to know the refugees' fate if returned to Aiuka, readily sheltered them. Impressed by Kalmyk prowess, the Cossacks four years later began granting fifty rubles a year to any Kalmyk who joined them. According to N. Maslakovets, there were only about six hundred Kalmyks living with the Cossacks. In 1695, the Kalmyks in the Belgorodskii polk were transferred to the Iziumovskii polk and sent to fight the Crimeans. Peter I was truly pleased with their performance and ordered at the end of the second Azov campaign (1696) that those Kalmyks who had been with him transfer their settlement to Chuguev, to the suburb of Osinovka. He was anxious to enlist as many veterans as possible for permanent residence in the Ukraine and directed that those Kalmyks remaining there be paid fifteen rubles a year more than any Cossack. The same year, Baakhan taisha applied for and was granted permission to leave Aiuka and settle with the Cossacks on the Don, near Cherkassk.93

Aiuka declared his impatience with the difference between Russian promises and reality to Prince Golitsyn. As a result, the 1697
oath included provisions for the handling of runaway Kalmyks. Should families or individuals flee to Russian towns, they were to be held there while both Aiuka and the Russian government were notified. If the Russians decided to accept them into service, Aiuka was to be paid thirty rubles for each. The continuing need for troops made their acceptance the more likely alternative. Peter I wrote to the governor of Azov in 1706: "For protection from the Kuban, increase the number of baptised and unbaptised Kalmyks as much as their maintenance can be afforded by local revenues."\textsuperscript{94} In spite of the resistance of the princes, the numbers of settled Kalmyk families grew over the next several years, especially near Chuguev and on the Don.\textsuperscript{95}

The plan for compensation for lost vassals only temporarily calmed the Kalmyk leaders. As the years passed, families continued to slip away. Continued complaints finally resulted in a compromise promulgated by an ukaz of 25 January, 1717. The Russians were ready to accept Kalmyk soldiers, but they realized they could not afford to give offence to the princes who commanded the majority of them. Peter I noted that since 1714 the Don Cossacks had sent back to the ulus several groups of Kalmyks who had come to them. (In 1714, they returned twenty-five men, in 1715, fifteen.) Serious problems had developed, however, in 1715 when Aiuka's envoys demanded the return from the Don of two groups of Kalmyks. The first, five kibitkas, claimed to have served with the Cossacks for some years before having been forcibly carried off, back to the ulus of Chemet taisha, in 1709.
Such long-time servitors *(starozhilye kalmyki)* had the right to return to the Don. The other group, led by Serke Mergen *taisha*, could not be given back because they had expressed a desire to convert and settle at Chuguev. In 1716, a similar problem arose over a group of one hundred Kalmyks. After sorting out their service histories, thirty men and their wives were allowed to remain, having proven they either had served there or had been with the army at Riga and in Poland. Peter I announced that he had ordered runaway Kalmyks no longer to be accepted by the Cossacks or the Russians. However, "those Kalmyks belonging to you who leave your *ulus* and wish to become Christians, and ask about baptism, it would be impossible by the law of Christianity not to receive such Kalmyks or to refuse holy baptism...." The only pretext under which Kalmyks would be accepted was that of conversion. The tsar also made provision for separating these Kalmyks from their unconverted brothers. "By Our Royal Highness' order, it is forbidden for newly converted Kalmyks to go into the Kalmyk *ulus* and incite other Kalmyks; and, henceforth, those Kalmyks who themselves, by their own wish, come and ask for baptism, in order that you, Our vassal, not be annoyed by them, will be commanded not to settle along the Volga in proximity to your *ulus*, but will be sent for settlement and baptism to other Russian towns." Later that year the Kalmyks were ordered to move elsewhere for settlement, especially around Kiev.96

The problem was by no means solved, for the Kalmyks prepared to make no more than a token conversion could still leave the steppe and
join the Russians. Though the distinction may have been lost on Aiuka, Peter I had acted to reduce the tension. He did make conversion the only criterion for acceptance. Also, the decree of 1717 apparently discarded the rule of *cuius regio, eius religio* in the conversion process. The statement that "Kalmyks who themselves, by their own wish...." decided to convert implied that whole ulus could not be forced into Christianity merely at the whim of the prince. Peter also resisted pressures for additional zeal in conversions from within the Orthodox community. Even though the Holy Synod decided in 1719 to press more actively for the proselytizing of non-Russians, Peter did nothing to support their work among the Kalmyks. Twenty years passed before the Russian Church made any significant effort in that direction.

The second grave problem afflicting Russo-Kalmyk relations actually encompassed a number of aggravations: insults to the status of the khan, lack of equal justice, raids and thefts. As a set, they might best be summed up in a single name—Artemii Petrovich Volynskii. It is neither fair nor entirely accurate to blame all these ills on a single man, but Astrakhan's first governor and the Kalmyks' khan did not often agree on problems or their cause. Volynskii has often been typified as intolerant, arrogant, and greedy. His avarice is reported to have reached such levels that he stole a jewelled chasuble, worth 100,000 rubles, from Astrakhan's Troitskii Monastery. Whatever his sins and personal failings, Volynskii was a no-nonsense administrator who refused to let anyone confound his plans for Astrakhan and the
empire. When he arrived at his post in the last years of the khan's life, Volynskii found that relations with the nomads were, by his reckoning, in disarray. He determined to reorder the lower Volga and, as a result, took an active, virtually adversarial, position in nearly every confrontation. He was heartily disliked by both the khan and his heir, but was quickly recognized as a power which could not be ignored.97

As many authors have noted, Aiuka "felt himself and conducted himself in his relations with the Russian tsars much more like an ally, scarcely reliable, of the tsars than a vassal of Russia."98 Why should he have felt otherwise? His title had been granted by the highest spiritual authority in the Mongol world. It had been recognized by the emperor of China, the Ottoman sultan, and the Russian tsar. He had been declared guardian of Russia's borders and had, time and again, dispatched his troops in support of his ally, the tsar. Aiuka's men had subdued numerous tribes and been many times victorious in the field.

Conversely, the Russian government regarded the problem differently. The oaths of allegiance made clear that Aiuka was a vassal and all royal orders referred to the khan as "Our Vassal." Even so, protocol for this vassal's communications with his overlord had not been pressed until Volynskii became governor. Over the years Aiuka had made a practice of sending his letters and edicts to the local authorities in the form of an ukaz (order, command). In 1719, Governor Volynskii began to return such decrees to the khan, informing him that as the local representative of the Kalmyks' suzerain, he could not
accept orders in any form from a vassal. In October, 1721, Lieutenant Colonel Divitsiak was sent to Aiuka to discuss the matter further. On behalf of the governor, Divitsiak informed the khan that: "In His Royal Majesty's country, no one is obliged to listen to his (Aiuka's) commands." He also assured the Kalmyk ruler that other administrators would follow Volynskii's lead and reject any similar correspondence.

Aiuka, who was probably startled at the obduracy of Volynskii and the breadth of his threats, gracefully extricated himself by explaining that in Kalmyk the Russian words ukaz and prikaz indicated something far less portentous than "command." The Kalmyks recognized only the orders of god and his Imperial Majesty. "I am utterly worthless and cannot order. When ukaz is written in my letters, that is not an order, but only means that my order is to give it to someone to be sent. Report all this to the governor, so that he will write to me; and if he orders me to write, then my ukaz to him is only a letter...but there will not be a quarrel over this, for it is not fitting to quarrel about this."99

Several historians have endorsed Volynskii's actions. A. M. Pozdneev, for example, bridled that the Russians for so long had accepted the arrogance of such communications, declaring that this usage violated those of old Russia and was degrading (unizhavshaiia). N. N. Pal'mov, on the other hand argued that Aiuka was and had been the guardian of the borders of Russia, a position which had neither
been given to nor taken over by the governor. "Considering the disposition of things, it would not follow to regard the attack of Volynskii as one of the unfortunate methods of the Russian administration for treating with the Kalmyk khans; rather in this incident only the excessiveness of the pride and pettiness of Volynskii can be seen, not his diplomatic abilities." It is unfortunate that Aiuka's thought on the matter and his resentment over such treatment are not preserved.

Kalmyk leaders were also convinced that the governor cared not one whit for their views or their demands for equal justice in instances involving Russian misdeeds. In September, 1721, Aiuka and Volynskii began an exchange of letters in which the khan demanded redress for wrongs done the Kalmyks. Volynskii, for whom suspicion of guilt was automatically tantamount to conviction, was not interested in how his predecessor Prince Golitsyn had handled such matters. When Aiuka's envoy Dendjin brought the khan's complaints that Kalmyks seized by rebels, Bashkirs, and even Russian soldiers had not been returned to the ulus, the governor chose to attack rather than conciliate. He compiled a list of Kalmyk misdeeds going back as far as 1717, but concentrating on the years 1719-1721. The list included virtually every sort of crime: murder, enslavement, extortion, theft of money and animals, destruction of property. Volynskii even included the monetary loss for each act, totaling over 2,600 rubles and including 1,089 rubles stolen from the father of the Kalmyk translator V. Bakunin. The miscreants
included Kalmuks and vassal Tatars and came from every part of the horde, including the royal ulus. The governor was quick to point out that the list was by no means exhaustive and had been compiled solely from records in the Astrakhan archives and reports by various army and Cossack officers.

Aiuka did not retreat, but renewed his charges, adding to them the complaint that Bikelishev, who was charged with the adjudication of quarrels, refused to deal with any matter predating his assumption of responsibility. He hid behind the excuse that all such matters depended on orders from the governor and College of Foreign Affairs. The khan noted, as well, that none of the local authorities in the towns of the Volga would act in any way to secure justice for Kalmuks mistreated by Russian soldiers.

The problem was, at its core, unsolvable. Each side saw itself as the aggrieved party. Governor Volynskii seized the opportunity to drive home his contention that it was the Kalmuks, not the Russians, who bore the full burden of guilt in virtually every instance. For instance, when Russians were accused of stealing Kalmuk horses but could not be named individually, the governor ignored the charge. Kalmuks were almost never specifically identified, but the governor was always willing to equate accusation with guilt, individually and for the group.

No list of the grievances of the Kalmuks against their Russian overlords could be considered complete without mention of the involvement
of the Russians in the debacle that surrounded the last two years of Aiuka's life. The final point of Aiuka's reign should have been the moment he passed the rule of the khanate to his successor. But the Russians refused to accept his nominee and openly supported rebels. Aiuka Khan was by no means unaware of Astrakhan's and St. Petersburg's activities. He must have reflected with a strong sense of the ironic on his treatment by his ally and lord.

Aiuka and the Royal Clan

On all levels and for both "bones", Kalmyk society was organized around the clan. For Aiuka Khan, family was, at times a political blessing and, at others, a curse. He was twice married to Khoshud princesses and once to the cousin of the Djunghar ruler. He made a dynastic marriage to the powerful Cherkasskii family, was brother-in-law to Ochirtu Khan and father-in-law to Tsevan Rabtan of the Djunghar. His son and heir, Chakdorzhab, was married to a Djunghar, a Khoshud and a Dorbet, becoming a veritable microcosm of the Oyirad.

The impact of these alliances is difficult to gauge in non-biological terms. Ties to the Princes Cherkasskie probably helped smooth some of his dealings with the Russians. Politically, his Djunghar bride was certainly the most significant figure at court. She proved ambitious and highly effective in persuading the khan to her opinion. After the death of Chakdorzhab, she was even able to convince Aiuka not to name one of her own sons as heir, but Donduk Ombo, his
grandson by a Khoshůd wife. She felt, evidently that being queen mother would not ensure her position. But, married to Donduk Ombo, she could continue to wield real power by manipulating her young husband. She is also credited with pressing for a return to Djungharia, hoping to impress her cousin Tsevan Rabtan and ensure her future influence there. By the Russians she was regarded as highly dangerous and merited close attention.

Darma Bala's influence especially displeased Governor Volynskii because of its highly inconvenient direction. The khan was less troubled by his wife than by his sons and grandsons. By various wives and concubines, Aiuka sired at least nine, perhaps ten, sons. Their ambitions and disagreements with one another and their father haunted Aiuka through at least the last quarter century of his life. By the end of his reign, several of the khan's grandsons were also jockeying for power and the potential mathematical combinations for jealousies, alliances, and cabals within the circle of his immediate family grew exponentially.

Chakdorzhin was Aiuka's oldest son, his logical heir and one of the most experienced Kalmyk commanders. Aware of his position, Chakdorzhin often corresponded with the Russian authorities and became well known to many of them. Relations with his father were at times very bad and, in 1701, a major crisis erupted, evidently concerning Chakdorzhin's wife. The royal ulus quickly split into two camps.
Some supported the khan; others, probably looking to the future, supported Chakdorzhab and defied Aiuka. Gunjab, half-brother of the heir, supported his father and decided to arrange Chakdorzhab's assassination. Both gun and plot misfired; Chakdorzhab was wounded and Gunjab fled to Saratov where he asked Russian protection. Aiuka immediately immured himself in a second town. Chakdorzhab, citing the danger to his life, took his supports, including several brothers, to nomadize east of the Iaik.

Peter I could ill afford the ruin of his nomad cavalry by the fratricidal urges of the Khan's family. The Great Northern War was in its opening stages and there were rumors of preparations for a major Swedish invasion. Bojar Boris A. Golitsyn visited the steppe and the refuges of the khan and his son, trying to make peace. He succeeded and his repairs of Aiuka's family lasted for the next twenty-three years. Probably as a part of this quarrel, Sanjab, who had joined Chakdorzhab, took his 15,000 kibitkas to Djungharia.

As expected, Chakdorzhab was named heir apparent by Aiuka. There had been two such designations, the first prior to the 1701 argument and the second in August, 1713, when Aiuka passed the seal first sent by the Dalai Lama to his son. As the khan grew older and less active, especially after about 1710, he turned over greater and greater power for the running of everyday affairs to Chakdorzhab.

Chakdorzhab was, himself, a family man and at some point divided his vassals among his sons. To the sons of his first wife, he gave to
the eldest, Dasang, one thousand kibitkas. His two other sons by the same mother, Baksadal Dordji and Nitr Dordji, received five hundred and two hundred kibitkas, respectively. Various other sons received four hundred kibitkas, including Batu, son by a concubine. Chakdorzhab, who expected to receive the royal ulus upon his succession, kept 4,000 kibitkas for himself. He insisted that all his sons nomadize together and give special deference to Dasang, the oldest. He even awarded Dasang with his own, special seal. Chakdorzhab treated his oldest son as his father treated him, giving rise to Dasang's belief that he would be khan at the death of his father. First, however, Chakdorzhad had to become khan. The heir, following custom, had given each son a personal establishment and the opportunity and base from which to shape events to his own, best interest.

Although Chakdorzhab was a fine warrior and may have become a great khan, he never had the opportunity. Alcohol, for which the Mongols showed inordinate weakness, destroyed him. Chakdorzhab's health, impaired by the effects of excessive drink, finally collapsed in February, 1722, and the heir apparent became the heir defunct. With him vanished the certainty of the succession. 103

The Succession Crisis

After Chakdorzhab's death, the lure of power called forth virtually every divisive element in the khanate and threatened to unravel the fabric of the political system itself. Foremost among these was
the lack of vigorous, effective leadership. After a long, distin-
guished and active career, Aiuka Khan, then eighty, had, for a decade,
absented himself from the actual direction of the khanate. Instead,
he had depended on his son and heir. His authority and prestige remained
great, but had lost much of their lustre through disuse. His sons and
grandsons were no longer children, but men drawn into a serious strug-
gle for the power to determine the khanate's future. Indeed the second
divisive element was the traditional desire to provide ulus for sons,
daughters, and wives, creating numerous potential power bases. After
more than a century the royal clan was no more unified than it had
been under Kho-Orluk. Only a powerful khan could keep those separa-
tist urges under control. The third element was the Kalmyks' overlord,
Russia, which had its own aims to pursue. These goals were not neces-
sarily coincidental with those of the khan or even in the interest of
the Kalmyks. The khan's Russian "allies" not only objected to the
khan's plans for the succession, but also strove to exert maximum in-
fluence on the process of selection and confirmation, hoping to install
whatever candidate seemed most compliant to Russia's imperial needs.

Customarily, the oldest son was heir to the majority of the
father's property, even though all children normally inherited some
portion of the estate. As Jachid and Hyer have pointed out, among the
imperial Mongols "succession to Khanship was not on the same basis as
a son's succession to clan leadership. The throne was not part of the
property that was passed on to a particular son."104 In the past, the
Kalmyks had not been faced by the problems attendant to the pre-decease of the heir. Generally, if the first son died, inheritance was horizontal (from brother to brother by age) rather than vertical (from father to son to grandson). When Chakdzorzhab died, Aiuka was prepared to follow this custom by nominating his oldest, surviving son, Tseren Donduk (probably his sixth son, his child by Darma Bala), as successor. The man's mother resisted. Darma Bala recognized that Mongol custom supported interregnal regency by women, usually widowed mothers. However, she also knew her power as a regent was finite. She decided to influence her husband to name his grandson, Donduk Ombo, as heir. The khansha is credited with planning to marry him and extend, even increase, her power.

When Aiuka and Peter I met in 1722 at Saratov to feast and discuss the Persian campaign, Aiuka requested that Peter support his nominee, Tseren Donduk. The emperor surprised his old ally and "faithful vassal." Peter, convinced that Aiuka had had treasonous dealings with other powers and had contrived the failure of the Bekovich-Cherkasskii expedition, decided to find his own, more trustworthy candidate to lead Russia's Kalmyks.

Some days after the meeting in Saratov, the emperor, while in Astrakhan, made his own nomination to Governor Volynskii. Peter's proposal, contained in a secret report, was that Dordji Nazarov, great-grandson of Shukur Daichin, nephew of Arabzhur (in Peking), and cousin of Aiuka, be the next khan. Dordji Nazarov was probably
the most powerful Kalmyk lord of the eastern marches and nomadized on the Iaik. His position there, however, had been lately threatened by inroads of the Kazakh and Karakalpak. These peoples, driven northwest by the Djunghar, had moved into the Temir River region. By August, 1723, the 40,000 Kazakhs of Abulkhair Khan were attacking both the Russians and the Kalmyks. St. Petersburg was highly concerned because they depended on the Kalmyks to protect the sparsely settled eastern edge of the empire. But as the attacks grew in ferocity and frequency, Dordji Nazarov had begun to withdraw to the west.

Peter I had decided he could not trust any of the members of Aiuka's immediate family, but he did not choose to go beyond the royal clan entirely. He may have chosen Dordji Nazarov because of his power in the east and because he had not been implicated in any earlier, treasonous acts. He might also have hoped to prevent Dordji Nazarov's desertion to the Djunghars. Given his location, the prince was closest to his eastern cousins and must have been aware that the Djunghar seemed the only people capable of stopping the Kazakhs. Whatever his reasons, Peter ordered Volynskii to notify the prince of his selection and order him to deliver to Astrakhan his son as hostage. "Peter recognized Dordji Nazarov, a relative of Aiuka, as the best of his heirs and A. P. Volynskii was charged by the government to take all measures to see to it that Dordji Nazarov became khan." 106

The khan, the Khansha, and the emperor had each selected a
different candidate. But the list of possible contenders was, by no means, exhausted. Chakdorzhab, before his death, had given a special seal to his oldest son, Dasang. This guaranteed his accession to Chakdorzhab's position as head of his own family, but Dasang assumed it conferred on him status as heir to the entire khanate. As soon as his father died he wrote to Astrakhan and St. Petersburg to stress his allegiance to Russia and ask for supplies. He asked to have an audience arranged with the emperor during his next visit to Astrakhan and was later to testify that when such a meeting did take place (Peter spent a month in Astrakhan following the end of the Persian campaign), the emperor vowed to put him "in the place of your father."\(^{107}\)

Dasang pretended to be fully confident of Russian support. In accordance with the wishes of their late father, the sons of Chakdorzhab brought their herds together. Dasang, attempting to exert his authority as khan-elect, seized the herds of his half-brother Donduk Dashi. The result was the immediate fragmentation of his family and the unalterable opposition of all Dasang's half-brothers to his candidacy.

Although Dasang's younger brother Baksadai Dordji had no special genealogical claim to the throne, he may have planned his own candidacy soon after the death of his father. It was not until late 1723, however, that he became an active contender. After his brother's cause faltered, Baksadai Dordji announced his intention to convert to Christianity. He and Aiuka both thought that his reward might be the
seal of the khan. In a letter to Empress Anna Ioannovna, dated 6 June, 1731, Prince Taishin (Baksadai) recalled his conversation with the emperor at the time of his conversion: "'What you wish of me, that shall be entirely done,' and I told His Majesty that I wished to be khan, in the place of my dead grandfather; and His Majesty deigned to reply: 'What I can do, that shall I do.'"

By June, 1723, the contending candidates had estimated their own and their rivals' strength and potential for success. The result was the alliance of all those opposed to Dasang's claim—the khan, his wife, Donduk Dashi, Donduk Ombo, Batu, Danzhin Dordji (another son of Chakdorzhab), and probably Tseren Donduk. Dordji Nazarov remained entirely on the sidelines. If the allies hoped for surprise, they failed. Dasang informed Astrakhan of the cabal against him and asked to be allowed to send envoys directly to St. Petersburg to beg aid from the emperor.

On the 11th of June, Governor Volynskii recommended the embassy of Dasang to St. Petersburg and expressed a willingness to support him temporarily. In explaining his position to the College of Foreign Affairs, Volynskii enunciated his own policy, a corollary to the emperor's. The governor believed the struggle on the steppe was a family referendum on Aiuka's power and the proof of his power would be the khan's ability to impose Tseren Donduk as next khan. Volynskii hoped to manipulate that struggle so that the result would be a
"balance" whereby "the royal power will not be as independent" and the various, disunited princes would each be forced to serve Russia more faithfully in order to secure his own position. Should any one person be allowed to concentrate power in his hands, as Aiuka had done in the past, then it would be difficult to separate him from it in the future. For the moment, since Dordji Nazarov remained a questionable entity, Volynskii was ready to support Dasang, introduce instability, and play for a stronger position in the future.

Aiuka also made plans and decided how to handle his grandson. In September, 1723, he sent Shakur Lama and Gabila, Dasang's stepmother, accompanied by Beklemishev, to Dasang. The khan ordered that Donduk Dashi's kibitkas, seized earlier, be turned over to Gabila. He promised that he would then unite the herds of Dasang, Donduk Dashi, Batu, and Danzhin Dordji. The final discussions for the proposition would, due to the age of the khan, have to be conducted in the royal ulus. Dasang agreed, feeling that the khan was effectively recognizing his claim by promising to amplify his power. He secured Volynskii's permission, and, escorted by troops commanded by his brother Nitr Dordji, went to see his grandfather.

Once Dasang reached his camp, Aiuka revealed his real intentions. The disputed kibitkas would not go to Gabila, but to Aiuka. Furthermore, before any other discussion, Dasang was ordered to dismiss his troops and retain only ten warriors as bodyguard. The khan refused
to deal with anyone threatening his own security. Shakur lama advised Dasang to leave immediately, since Aiuka's troops were arming and he was in great danger. Once Dasang had fled, Aiuka wrote the emperor to complain about his grandson's behaviour and the dishonor he had brought on his grandfather.

Governor Volynskii learned of the impasse on 15 November when Dasang requested that Russian troops be sent to the prince's grazing area on the Bereket, a small stream emptying into the Akhtuba. Dasang already feared an attack by the Khan's troops. The prince's own men were scattered among the autumnal pastures and he needed supplies, especially powder and shot, as well as reinforcements. Volynskii agreed to dispatch five pud of shot and five of gunpowder, but advised Dasang's messenger to say nothing to anyone, "so that from the khan's side no one finds out about this." Volynskii was not prepared to endorse anyone openly. He could continue to pretend to be an honest broker while secretly supplying his own candidate.

Aiuka also turned to Volynskii. His envoy, who arrived soon after Dasang's, announced that the current quarrel was between Dasang and his half-brother and concerned the former's theft of the latter's herds, not the succession. It was a family matter, not a question of state. Aiuka asked Volynskii, to whom Dasang was sure to turn, to help to mediate the problem, to prevent all-out war, and to await the final disposition of the emperor. Should conflict begin, Aiuka asked that Russian troops fire on the instigators, no matter who that might
be. At the same time, the khan, who seemed to be coming under more pressure from Darma Bala to support Donduk Ombo, sent instructions to his own troops to follow the orders of Donduk Ombo. He then commanded his sons Galdan Danzhin and Tseren Donduk to join the allied princes.

Volynskii sent Dasang the men requested on the 20th of November. Captain Bruce commanded two companies from the Ingermanlandskii and Astrakhanskii battalions; fifty dragoons and a hundred Don Cossacks were also sent, commanded by Lieutenant Lopukhin. The groups' armaments included two cannons. The governor wrote Tseren Donduk, Donduk Ombo, Donduk Dashi, Batu, and Danzhin Dordji to explain that they could war against Russia's enemies, but not against Dasang. The quarrel would have to be settled by the khan or by themselves, but not by force of arms. Should the problem worsen, Volynskii would be forced to report both it and the malefactors to the emperor. He drew particular emphasis to the dire consequences of such disobedience for Tseren Donduk and his hopes to inherit his father's throne. He then wrote Aiuka and agreed to try to mediate the problem, but announced that any attack on Dasang must be viewed as an assault on Russian authority.

Two days later, Volynskii reported to the Senate and the Colleges of Foreign Affairs and War. According to him, "in these quarrels all is the work of Aiuka Khan, who, seeing that his son Tseren Donduk is weak, wants to get attached to him (someone) strong ... therefore he creates factions among his grandchildren and sows
ennity between them in order purposely to divide and weaken them."
Volynskii adamantly continued his chief theme that no matter what
turns the war against Dasang took, Aiuka was the root cause and chief
instigator of it all. "As the chief commander for going against
Dasang, it is his son Tseren Donduk, who can do nothing without his
(Aiuka's) leave." The governor decided to throw Russian resources
behind Dasang chiefly to defeat his grandfather rather than to defend
the prince. Volynskii was so determined as to the necessity of this
that he proposed personally to take the field. Volynskii told the
central authorities that he had begun secretly stockpiling arms and
supplies and had already instructed General-Lieutenant M. A.
Matiushkin that soon both of Krasnyi Iar's battalions would be sent
into the steppe. Beklemishev's report of his meeting with Dasang was
forwarded to the College of Foreign Affairs and the governor dis-
patched a personal report to the emperor.

On the morning of November 23, 1723, Governor Volynskii set
out by boat from Astrakhan. The next day he learned that Donduk Ombo
and Galdan Danjin had already attacked Dasang, killing about one
hundred men and wounding many more. From captured raiders it was
learned that Donduk Ombo was receiving his instructions from the khan.
The captives reported that the khan was gathering an army of 10,000
men to be led by Donduk Ombo, Bokshira (his brother), Galdan Danjin,
Donduk Dashi and Bodong (half-brothers of Dasang), Gunga Dordji (son
of Cheter, Damrin and Khulakhaichii (brothers of Iaman). Soon they were
to be joined by Tseren Donduk.

Captain Bruce, who accompanied Dasang during the battle, probably saved the prince's life and prevented total disaster by sending word to Donduk Ombo that the governor was coming. Once Donduk Ombo was sure that this was the case, he withdrew, promising to await Volynskii's arrival. When Volynskii joined Dasang, he learned that Donduk Ombo would not come to his camp to negotiate and also learned that the letters he had sent from Astrakhan had been refused by every prince. Sensing the growing danger, Volynskii sent Dasang's family, brothers and two thousand men to the greater safety of Krasnyi Iar.

Donduk Ombo contacted Volynskii on November 25th. He assured the Russians that the quarrel was entirely a matter of his lost kibitkas and declared that if the governor had come to settle that dispute, then the fighting would stop. A meeting place, near the mouth of the Bereket, was agreed upon. Captured Kalmyks, however, told the Russians that Donduk Ombo's forces totalled 20,000 men and that the prince planned to divide them in half. One group would move against Volynskii and Dasang while the other half, led by Bodong, would attack Dasang's retreating ulus. The governor, obviously outgunned, began a strategic withdrawal, down the Bereket, toward the ulus encampment of Dasang. When word arrived from Donduk Ombo that he guaranteed the safety of the governor, but wanted to meet with Beklemishev before actually speaking to Volynskii, the governor sensed a trap. He was certain the Kalmyks planned to capture his lieutenant and use him as
a bargaining chip. More messages from Donduk Ombo asked why the governor was running away and why he wanted to involve himself in the quarrel between princes. As messages were passed, the two forces drew closer, until only five verst (about five kilometers) separated them. Both sides began to prepare for battle.

There was no battle. It was agreed that on the following day Baksadai Dordji and four raisangs would meet Batu and an equal number of men. Beklemishev would join in the first meeting and, later, Volynskii. After a night raid on Dasang's ulus, the princes carried off six thousand of his vassals and withdrew into the steppe. Captured Kalmyks told Volynskii that Tseren Donduk had reached Donduk Ombo with a special escort and instructions from Aiuka "that all Kalmyks go to Donduk Ombo and that what he orders done is to be done without contradiction." The main point in the instruction was to attack Dasang. It seems clear that Aiuka had decided to put his support fully behind his grandson, not his son.

As Volynskii withdrew toward Astrakhan, he wrote Aiuka. The governor stressed his dismay at recent events and continued to promise to mediate. He did not openly blame the khan for the trouble, but urged him to bring his sons and grandsons to peace. He reiterated that the price of continued conflict was the loss of the emperor's favor. Volynskii's tone could not disguise the serious condition of the Russian candidate. Three-quarters of Dasang's ulus had been lost and he could muster perhaps 3,000 warriors from his remaining 2,000
kibitkas. His vassals were constantly shadowed by a detachment of Donduk Ombo's assigned to snatch up all stragglers. Although allowed to cross to the west bank of the Volga for safer pasturage, Dasang's group was in dire need of provisions in December's growing cold. Dasang himself feared that his desperate people might abandon him and join the enemy. His Embuluk and Edisan vassals had already fled to the comparative safety of the Kuban. Even though dragoons were sent to act as Dasang's personal guard, he and many of his retainers panicked as rumors of a new attack circulated.

Dasang continued to turn to Governor Volynskii for support. He asked "for the posting of troops as a guard against the Kalmuks with cannons among the towns closest to them." He was sent fifteen chetverti of oats, five thousand snoopy (sheaves) of hay, six chetverti of milled flour, and a quantity of tea. In spite of the aid given him, Dasang was tremendously alarmed when he learned that both Volynskii and Matlushkin were leaving for the capital. He felt deserted, even though the governor had placed him in the care of General Major Prince Iu. Iu. Trubetskoi. In a letter to Trubetskoi, Volynskii explained how important it was to save Dasang from falling into the hands of Aiuka and allowing any prince to become too strong because "then it will be difficult to force them into good order and true allegiance."113

After the terrible November raid on Dasang, the prince's brother, Baksadai Dordji, decided the time had come for him to act.
He went to Volynskii as they camped on the Algar River and announced that he had decided to convert to Christianity. Volynskii had been in the process of urging Dasang to go to the capital and ask personally for the aid of the emperor. But Dasang felt that neither he nor his brother Nitr Dordji could be spared. He had suggested that Baksadai Dordji go in his stead. The trip north and the conversion could be comfortably joined. When Aiuka learned of his grandson's plan, he suddenly changed his own tactics. He held back his 15,000 men near Astrakhan and wrote to Dasang suggesting negotiations. The kahn was worried on two accounts. First, he felt that a grandson at court might give an added perspective which would convince the emperor to turn totally against Aiuka. Second, since the Russians were willing to pay for conversions, there was the possibility that Baksadai Dordji's price would be the khanate. Aiuka decided to lull one grandson with promises of peace and intercept the other on the way north. In January, 1724, the khan settled groups of troops at several points to watch and wait.

Governor Volynskii planned to take Baksadai Dordji with him when he went to St. Petersburg. He worried, however, that Aiuka planned to capture his grandson and that Donduk Dashi was preparing to raid the remnants of Dasang's ulus. Following the raid, Donduk Dashi would flee to the Kuban. He would also furnish Aiuka with the alibi that everything had been done without his knowledge or approval. Volynskii had no intention, however, of giving up the prince's
conversion. He felt the act would serve the best interests of Russia and also highlight the success of his administration on the Volga. Conversations convinced him that Nitr Dordji and other zaisangs were considering following Baksadai Dordji's example.

Reality interrupted Volynskii's dreams long enough to make him aware that there were too many Kalmyks and too few Russians to guarantee Baksadai Dordji's safe delivery to St. Petersburg if he accompanied the governor. After Volynskii left Astrakhan on the 19th of January, he was twice intercepted by groups of Kalmyk warriors. They claimed to be riding picket, guarding the person of the khan; but both detachments asked about Volynskii's suite and the whereabouts of Baksadai. Volynskii had already made plans to send Baksadai Dordji to Simbirsk, then Moscow, and finally to St. Petersburg.

On the steppe, envoys of Dasang brought word that Aiuka, Tseren Donduk and Donduk Ombo were willing to discuss the situation. Dasang decided to send his uncle Bar as his representative to the talks on Kruglyi Island, near the khan's pasturage. V. M. Bakunin, who went to Dasang's camp, warned the prince he needed the permission of those Russians currently overseeing Kalmyk affairs (Trubetskoi, Brigadier Vl. P. Sheremetev, and Colonel F. L. Mitrifanov). The Russians believed that Bar, who was known to have disapproved of Dasang's conduct and who demanded absolute power to settle the dispute, would actually damage the position of the Russian protege. But Dasang felt otherwise. He was convinced that the allied princes, led by Donduk Ombo, were planning to move west, beyond the Don. They hoped
to be able to escape the emperor's anger by appealing to the local governors, including Prince B. A. Golitsyn, to act as intercessors with Peter. They could reestablish contact with St. Petersburg and avoid having to deal with their enemy, Governor Volynskii. Dasang was sure that the negotiations led by Bar would delay that plan and the alliance would eventually fall to pieces. He also believed it was imperative that he act immediately. The Russians countered by arguing that the Kalmyks would never be allowed to cross the Don and, no matter what Donduk Ombo did, the quarrel would have to be settled in accordance with imperial will, not Bar's.

Negotiations did not stop the fighting. Dasang's ulus had recrossed the Volga in January. The Russian commander of the operation, Major Viny, realizing that Donduk Ombo had brought 8,000 warriors to disrupt the crossing, put out the rumor that Embuluk and Edisan Tatars from the Kuban planned to attack the royal ulus during the prince's absence. Donduk Ombo was forced to turn back. The reprieve proved temporary. On January 30th, they returned, attacking Dasang's men and capturing his step-mother, Zashiga. Nitr Dordji managed to save the day with a counter attack, but Dasang was ruined.

At this moment, the original candidate of the Russians, Dordji Nazarov, appeared near Krasnyi Iar. He had moved away from the Kazakh attacks to join his grazing with that of the Khosūd Donduk. To this point, Dordji Nazarov had done nothing to accept or resist the claims of Dasang. He had not surrendered his son to the Russians nor agreed to his own nomination by the emperor. No matter how
attractive the prospect of becoming khan, Dordji Nazarov realized that his nomination would surely unite the entire royal family against him. Declining it, on the other hand, would anger the emperor.

Once he reached the Volga, Dordji Nazarov began secret negotiations with Dasang. He proposed that Dasang come and join his grazing. The reason for Dordji Nazarov's invitation is unknown, but Dasang's wife and Bar actively supported the proposal, arguing that Dasang had no one else to whom to turn. But the Russians became suspicious, evidently fearing a loss of control over both men if they should join causes and move away from the Russian garrisons. They set up patrols on the land routes east and began to register all boats belonging to the Iurt Tatars in order to prevent any large scale movement across the river. They hoped to be able to prevent any one from moving west, to the Crimeans, or east, to the Djunghars.

In February, 1724, the situation on the steppe was no more settled or less confused than at any point during the last year. Dasang continued to claim his rights, but he no longer had any power base other than that furnished by the Russians. Tseren Donduk, still powerful, had lost his father's support and become a second level contender. Donduk Ombo now enjoyed the support of both the khan and the khansha, but he had upset the Russians by attacking Dasang and he was rumored to be prepared to flee either to the Crimea or Kabardia, the home of his wife Dzhan. Dordji Nazarov refused to commit himself to anything. A new element had been injected with the conversion of Baksadai Dordji. Volynskii was in St. Petersbourg, but his policy of "balance" had not
settled the succession, weakened the khan, or brought peace.

Conclusion

On February 19, 1724, Aiuka Khan, a tired, old man of eighty-two, died. If one were to rate his career, the khan would receive mixed marks for his performance. In 1672, a volume of portraits of world leaders was published in Moscow. Beside Pope Clement IX, Emperor Leopold, Louis XIV, Charles II, and Mehmed IV, there is pictured, on the last page, an obviously oriental ruler. The face, almost certainly not drawn from life, closely resembles those of the rulers on Bukhara, Urgench/Khiva, and the Crimea which precede it. It is thought to depict Aiuka but is far more a portrait of his power and position as a significant and independent political leader than a physical likeness. There is no doubt that under Aiuka's leadership the Kalmuk khanate achieved a level of strength and respect singular in its history. Aiuka was recognized as khan by the Dalai Lama, the K'ang-hsi Emperor, and Peter the Great. He was named official protector of the borders of the Russian Empire and was the much sought after ally of rulers in Asia and Europe. To his credit, in spite of several opportunities to throw off his Russian allegiance, Aiuka never chose to do so. He remained, by his own reckoning, a loyal and, at times, undervalued and abused ally.

However, in the glitter of bribes, titles, and praise, Aiuka probably lost sight of the flaws which riddled his khanate and may have become too confident in handling his most crucial relationship,
that with Russia. Aiuka was his own worst enemy. Although capable of charm and tact, too readily he acted with determined independence and projected an image of unreliability which the Russians could not tolerate. By dealing too often, both in secret and in the open, with powers beyong the control of Moscow-St. Petersburg and by failing to act with consistency when the internal order of Russia was endangered, the khan established a pattern of placing his ambitions before the needs of the Russian state.

Inside the khanate Aiuka never solved his problems with the royal clan. Challenged at his accession, he fought with his sons during their maturity, and died with his family fragmented over the succession. The common custom of dividing vassals among heirs had provided the ambitious the opportunity to establish an independent power base. In the reign of Aiuka, however, a new and powerful variable—the Russians—was brought into play and the quarrels of the khan's family were turned to the advantage of imperial policy. Aiuka realized, too late, that the khan was not able to impose his choice of successor without the concurrence of Russia.

Finally, Aiuka was troubled by time, the enemy of all nomadic peoples as they struggled against the sedentary world. Aiuka shared the political stage, to his misfortune, with men like Peter the Great and Artemii Volynskii. These were men as determined as he; men whose priorities and aspirations would tolerate no rivals or wavering allegiances. Also, Aiuka lived too long for the good of the Khanate. As he aged, the khan allowed much of his power to pass to others,
namely his wife and his heir. But the khan outlived his first son, and in Chakdorzhab's death, the khanate lost an experienced leader and the only man whose right to the throne was widely accepted. Darma Bala's influence removed the khan's second choice as heir and, instead, nominated a third, compounding a feeling of indecision and prompting further confusion within the royal clan.

But the Russians were not universally successful in their dealings with the Kalmyks, either. They plainly failed in what was, at the outset of Aiuka's reign, their chief goal: the take-over and control of the foreign contacts of the Kalmyks. Although the Russians could make travel more complicated, even dangerous, the Kalmyk khan continued to exchange envoys and become embroiled in the affairs of states outside Russia. The Russians were even faced with the special irony of depending on Kalmyk contacts for much of their news of China, Tibet, Djungharia, and Persia.

The Russians also failed to employ the succession crisis as a means for the capture of the khanate itself or for creating a "balance" between rival princes. Of the three potential contenders (Dasang, Baksadai Dordji, and Prince Taishin) for the throne who may have enjoyed the support of Peter I, Governor Volynskii, or both, none ever became khan. The result of Russian interference was not balance, but confusion. In the chaos of the last months of Aiuka's reign, there were rumors of planned defections either to the Kuban or to Djungharia. It appeared that the Russians might be in danger of losing the services of the Kalmyks altogether.
However, there were enough successes from the Russian point of view to have made their dealings with the nomads profitable and to have foreshadowed the future of their relationship. First, the Kalmyks continued to participate in Russian wars aimed at expanding the empire. Even though specifically "Kalmyk" national interests were served only marginally in these wars, neither the khan nor his vassals ever balked to any significant degree at service for the tsar-emperor in the Crimea, Poland, or the Caucasus. Rewards for service, even at the price of conversion, were great enough to exaggerate tensions within the ulus and induce growing numbers of Kalmyks to leave their traditional hearths and settle with the Russians.

The greatest development for the Russians was the realization that to make the Kalmyk khanate work in Russia's interest, they would need a greater presence at court, as well as the deciding voice in the selection of the khan. In the past, the question of the succession had been left to the Kalmyks themselves. But the needs of empire no longer allowed such latitude. Volynskii's concept of a balance was correct, but it did not oppose the interests of the khan against those of his chief vassals. Rather, it juxtaposed the khan's power against the needs of the empire, with the scales constantly tipping in favor of the latter. The groundwork for the structuring of this balance was laid during the reign of Aiuka. The khan's power over his retainers was weakened by the payment of zhalovan'e directly to the princes. His personal security and prestige were, at Aiuka's
insistence, placed in the hands of a Russian guard. The privacy of the khan's court was lessened by the introduction there of a permanent Russian representative/agent. In the last days of his reign, the Russians worked to decide for Alika the question of who would succeed him. By supporting rival princes and playing at mediation, the Russians prolonged the succession crisis and, although they failed to secure the khanate for any of their candidates, they did come away with the power to resist the imposition of anyone not willing to be accommodating to Russian interests.
Endnotes: Chapter Four

1 Courant, L'Asie central, p. 46; Pal'mov, Ocherk, p. 21.


4 It appears that later Ochirtu captured both Kundelen and Shukur Daichin and they were sent to Tibet. Lytkin, "Biografiia," pp. 194-195.

5 Pal'mov, Etiudy, ch. 3-4, p. 10. A letter from the Don Ataman F. Ivanov in Krest'ianskaia voina pod predvoditel'stvom Stepana Razina. Sbornik dokumentov, t. III (podavlenie vosstaniia kazn' S. Razina i pozdneishie otgoloski dvizheniia [s ianvaria, 1671 g.]) (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1972), No. 134, pp. 144-145, reported in August, 1671, that Aiuka, Dugar, and Bok were jointly nomadizing near the Don in the region of the Manych. They were also said to have attacked a group of Malibash and Embuluk (Anbuluk) Tatars who had left Aiuka and gone to
the "Nogai Hills." Bakunin, "Opisanie kalmytskikh narovod." p. 195;
Lytkin, "Istoriia kalmytskikh khanov," pp. 62, 66. Ablai was held
captive by Aiuka for some time and then sent to Tsaritsyn to be cared
for by the Russians. Aiuka eventually took back Ablai. He is recorded
as having died on the Sala River. However, Pal'mov claims that he was
actually killed in 1672 by Aiuka. Dugar and Tseren were sent to
Astrakhan. Later Tseren converted to Christianity and became Prince
Dugarov. Lytkin, "Materialy dla istorii Oiratov, "Kalmytskie istoriko-
literaturnye pamiatniki v russkom perevode (Elista: 1969), p. 85; idem,
"Istoriia kalmytskikh khanov," p. 66, note 18; Ocherki istorii KASSR,
t. I, p. 138; Bakunin, "Opisanie kalmytskikh narodov," p. 195; Pal'mov,
Etiudy, ch. 3-4, p. 10.

8 Ocherki istorii KASSR, t. I, p. 140.
9 Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-
10 PSZRI, t. II (1676-1688), No. 672, pp. 80-86. The ritualistic re-
ception of royal orders caused no trouble for the Kalmyks. However,
when it had been introduced among the Nogai some seven decades earlier,
there had been considerable uproar. S. K. Bogoiaevskii and I. S.
Riabinin, "Smutnoe vremia moskovskogo gosudarstva, 1604-1613 gg. Akty
vremenii mezhdutsarstviia (1610 g. 7 iunia - 1613 g.)," Cheteniia
Obshchestva Istorii i Drevnei Rossii, (1915), kn. 4, p. 13.

Cherkasskii's biographer, Likhachev, noted considerable success for the prince in the late 1670's as he dealt with Kalmyk-Cossack problems. But, after 1678, Likhachev totally lost track of Cherkasskii and gives no details on his activities until the time of his death. E. Likhachev, "Kniaz Kaspulat Mutsalovich Cherkasskii," p. 217.


Ibid., No. 1245, p. 858.


Pozdeev, "Astrakhanskie kalmyki," p. 152; Neved'ev, Podrobnye svedeny, p. 30; Pal'mov, Ochër, p. 27.

PSZRI, t. IV (1700-1712) No. 2207, pp. 419-422.

Ibid., No. 2291, pp. 547-554.

Pal'mov, Etiudy, ch. 3-4, p. 23.

Ibid., p. 25.


Pal'mov Etiudy, ch. 3-4., p. 42.

Ibid., p. 49.
25 Ibid., p. 35.
26 Ocherki istorii KASSR, t. I, pp. 138-139.
28 Ibid., Nos. 120, 121, 123, 135, pp. 172-175, 191.
29 Ibid., t. II (avgust, 1670-ianvar', 1671), ch. II (vosstanie na iuge i volneiia v drugikh oblastiakh russkogo gosudarstva) (1959), No. 17, pp. 94-95, No. 77, pp. 100-101; t. III, No. 128, pp. 138-139.
33 Ibid., pp. 130-134, 193-195; Pozdneev, "Astrakhanske kalmyki, p. 152.
34 Kalmyk troops had been summoned in February, but did not collect until May, 1709. According to Governor Apraksin's letter to the tsar, their route took them directly through the centers of the revolt, from Kamyshenka to the Don gorodki then to the uplands of the Don and its tributaries the Medveditsa, Buzuluk, and on to Izium. Pis'ma i
bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo (Mосcow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1952),
t. 9, vyp. 2, p. 672. The troops of Chakdorzhab, which eventually
numbered 3,300, were slowed on the march west by the campaign of
Stol'nik I. Bakhmetev, then in the process of destroying a unit commanded
by Bulavin.

35 Pal'mov, Etiudy, ch. 3-4, pp. 61-82.
36 Akty otnosiashchiesa k istorii iuzhnoi i zapadnoi Rossii, t. IX
37 N. S. Smirnov, "Rossiia i Turtsiia v XVI-SVII vv.," Uchenye
zapiski Moskovskogo Gosudarstvenogo Universiteta, vy. 94 (1946), t. II,
p. 122.
38 Belikov, Kalmyki v bor'be, p. 38; K. Kostenkov, "O rasprostran-
enii Khristianstva u kalmykov," Astrakhanskiiia Eparkhial'nyai Vedomosti,
XVIII (1892), No. 13-14 (1-16 July), p. 387; M. Kichikov, "O kalmytskom
39 Akty iuzhnoi i zapadnoi Rossii, t. XIII (1677) st. 151, pp.
650-652.
40 B. H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire (Hamden,
41 I. I. Golikov, Deiania Petra Velikogo, mudrogo preobrazovatelia
Rossii (izdanie vtoroe) (Mосcow: 1837), t. II, p. 228.
42 D. P. Buturlin, Voennaia istoria pokhodov rossiian v XVIII
stoletii (St. Petersburg: 1820), ch. 1, t. II, p. 78.
43 Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo, t. 8, vyp. 2
Belikov, *Kalmyki v bor'be*, p. 68, N. A. Smirnov in *Politika Rossi na kavkaze v XVI-XIX vekakh* (Moscow: Sotsial'no ekonomicheskaia literatura. 1958), p. 62, claims that only 5,000 were killed in the Kuban attack and 22,000 were taken prisoner. Following the destruction of Djan Arslanbeg near the mouth of the Kalaus River, two funeral mounds (kurgany) were erected. The Kalmyk dead were buried on the battle site and the Tatars on the Manych River. The mounds, called the Bairin-mol gol and the Toib-gol, respectively, were still visible a century later. Novoletov, *Kalmyki*, p. 9.

Novoletov, *Kalmyki*, p. 11.


Peter I, in a letter dated 25 September, 1722, and posted from his new fort of Svatoi Krest' on the Sulak, reported to the Senate that he had dispatched, "under the command of the Don Cossack Ataman Ivan Krasnoshchekov one thousand Don Cossacks and forty thousand Kalmyks."

Belikov, who quotes the letter in *Kalmykt v bor'be*, p. 71, believes this number was too large. V. Bakunin, who was translator for Lieutenant Nefed Kudriavtsev of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment and commander of a portion of the Kalmyks, says only 3,730 were present. Bakunin, "Opisanie," p. 124. However, P. G. Butkov in *Materialy dlia novoi istorii Kavkaza s 1722 po 1803 god* (St. Petersburg: 1869), pp. 14-22,
claims that 5,000 showed up. Novoletov in *Kalmyki*, p. 14, accepted the 40,000 figure, but emphasized that the theater of their chief employ-
ment was in the north, guarding against sudden attacks from the Kuban or Crimea. Pal'mov, *Etiudy*, ch. 3-4, p. 96, felt that Peter I had placed at his disposal as many as 40,000 Kalmysks, the majority of whom were to act as guards against the Crimea or in the Caucasus.

48 In May, 1723, the Russians captured Togu, a Kalmyk who had been used as an envoy to Ender. The story of his capture and interrogation is found in Pal'mov, *Etiudy*, ch. 3-4, pp. 99-101. Among other things, he revealed that Aiuka had had dealings with these enemies of Russia. The khan felt they were properly Kalmyk, not Russian, vassals. He had received from them, as a mark of their respect, three dogs specially trained for hunting wolves and rabbits.

49 Pal'mov, *Etiudy*, ch. 3-4, p. 110.

50 Pal'mov, *Ocherk*, p. 29.


52 PSZRI, t. V (1713-1719), No. 2702, p. 49; Pronshtein and Kiashko, *Vspomogatel'nye istoricheskie distsipliny*, p. 51. Besides the official *zhalloween'e*, Aiuka received other gifts. Friedrich Wever, the ambassador of Hannover (1714-1721) reported in 1714 that Prince Aleksandr D. Menshikov had sent the khan an English coach. "Now one of the wheels being broken, this ambassador was sent to ask the Prince to let him have another wheel. The ambassador told us that his master gave
audience to the envoys of his neighbors in this coach and that on solemn
days he dined in it." Friedrich Christian Weber, The Present State of

53 See Pala'mnov, Etiudy, ch. V. pp. 20-45; U. E. Erdniev, "K istorii
Zemlepol'zovaniia v Kalmykii," Vestnik KNIILI, t. 15 (1976), pp. 27-30;
A. I. Karagodin, "K voprosu o kharaktere chastnogo zemlevladeniiia v

54 A. Leopol'dov, "Letopis' saratovskoi gubernii," p. 428 PSZRI.

55 Merder, Istoricheskii ocherk, pp. 37-38.

56 I. I. Lepekhin, "Zapiski puteshestviia akademika Lepekhina,
Polnoe sobranie uchenyh puteshestviia po Rossi, t. III (St. Petersburg: 1821), p. 481.

57 Ocherki istorii KASSR, t. I, p. 145.

58 Lytkin, "Istoriia Kalmytskikh khanov," pp. 63-64, note 16. According
to the "Biografiia Zaia Pandity," p. 198, some of the advisors of
Ochirtu had counselled him to join his brother-in-law on the Volga. He
decided to wait at Zuldus where the fodder was sufficient for his 10,000
retainers. Galdan surprised and captured him there in mid-winter.

Grousset, Empire of the Steppes, p. 527, maintains that Ochirtu was
killed in the attack, but there is no evidence to support this. Lytkin
loses track of Dordji Rabtan after 1678. The Chinese envoy Tulisen
mentions that Dordji Rabtan (To-erh-chi La-p'u-t'an) received the Chinese
envoys on July 5 and July 11, 1714, in the camp of Aiuka. He also
mentions that the Chinese emperor twice showed special courtesy to her daughter Tsagan Samo (Ch'a-han Sa-mu), the wife of Chakdorzhab (Sha-k'e-t'u-erh-ch'a-p'u). Tulisen, Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars in the years 1712, 13, 14, & 15; by the Chinese ambassador, and published, by the Emperor's Authority, at Peking, trans. Sir George Thomas Staunton (London: John Murray, 1821), pp. 165-166, 172, 174-175.

Gaban Sharab relates: "Sandjab argued with his father Khan Aiuka in 1699 and in 1700 went to nomadize in Djungharia, whither he arrived in 1701, in the first month of spring, called in Kalmyk Tsagan Sara, that is, February, with 15,000 kibitkas of people from his ulus, and at his arrival there, Zoriktu khunstaiji seized his ulus for himself, putting him (Sandjab) under guard and returning him to his father, Aiuka Khan, on the Volga." Gaban Sharab, "Skazanie," p. 150. There were probably two trips to Djungharia for Sandjab. Lytkin in "Aiuka - Khan kalmytskii," pp. 133-134, posits a single journey. His translation of Gaban Sharab makes the flight correspond with a second trip, made in 1704. Lytkin, "Istoriia kalmytskikh khanov," p. 71, note 23. Sandjab probably went to Djungharia first as escort for his sister. His second trip came in 1701, after he had taken Chakdorzhab's side in an argument with their father. The brothers took their herds to the Iaik for safe grazing. Chakdorzhab and his father were reconciled, but Sandjab fled east.

Aiuka complained of this to Tulisen in 1714. The khan revealed
that he was afraid to try to send any large group to Peking because the Russians might act to close the route through Siberia and stop the Kalmyks' sending "Tributary offerings and respectful wishes to your sublime court." Tulisen, Narrative, p. 171.

61 Pal'mov Etudy, ch. 1, pp. 51-54.

62 Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 127. According to Pozdneev, "Kratkaia istoriia," p. 10, Aiuka received his title after the conquest of the Turkmen of Mangyshlak and the renown which came to him as a result. Lytkin, "Istorii Kalmytskih khanov," p. 70, mentions fighting with the Kazakhs and Turkmen, but does not tie the award of the royal title to these campaigns. Bakunin, "Opisanie," p. 198, insisted the title was granted only after Aiuka had defeated Ablai and secured his position. Nefed'ev, Podrobnye svedeniia, p. 28, agreed. It is clear from these various opinions that no one event prompted the award. That may be indirect evidence that the real reason was more involved with Tibetan politics than events on the Volga.


64 Pal'mov, Etudy, ch. 1, p. 41.

Kochev'jak. Perevod s kitaiskago (St. Petersburg: P. O. Iablonskii, 1895), tab. 1.

66 The priestly status of Erke is not specified, but getsul was the second level of the priesthood, preceding gelung. Erke probably died on his return trip. In 1714, the Chinese envoys acknowledged his (Ke-li-k'e K'o-shin) presence at court, but had no news of him after his departure. Tulisen, Narrative, p. 169.

67 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

68 Pal'mov, Etiudy, ch. 1, p. 15.

69 Tulisen, Narrative, pp. 10-11.

70 Ibid., p. 96.


72 Pal'mov, Etiudy, ch. 1, pp. 20-22. Novoletov, Kalmyki, p. 10, states: "In 1714, an embassy from China arrived to ask that his (Aiuka's) daughter marry the emperor...."

73 Pal'mov, Ocherk, p. 33. The English translation of Tulisen does not make the speech of the khan as pointed. Tulisen, Narrative, p. 171.

74 Tulisen, Narratove, pp. 206 & 207.

75 Novoletov, Kalmyki, p. 15.

76 V. V. Bartol'd, "Ocherk istorii turkmenskogo naroda," Socheniia
t. II, ch. 1 (Obshchие рабо́ты по и́стории Средне́й Азии) (Москов: 

77 "Киргиз-Ка́саки большио́и, среднего́, и ма́лого о́рды," Сибирский 
вестник (1820), ch. 9, kn. I-III, pp. 111-117.
78 Pal'mov, Etiudy, ch. 3-4, p. 25.
79 Novoletov, Kalmyki, p. 16; Solov'ev, "Петр Вели́кий на Каспи́ском 
море," Vestnik Evropy (1868), t. II, p. 169. He did not repeat this 
version in his Istoriiia Rossii, kn. IX, t. 18, p. 353, where he endorsed 
the story that Aiuka warned the Khivans. As might be expected, Pozdneev 
fully supported the plot of Aiuka in his "Астраханскіе калмы́ки," p. 154.
80 Pal'mov, Ocherk, p. 40; idem, Etiudy, ch. 3-4, pp. 171-181;
81 Novoletov, Kalmyki, p. 12; Pal'mov, Ocherk, p. 30; idem, Etiudy, 
ch. 3-4, p. 55, note 43.
82 Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Les Kalmuks de la Volga." pp. 73 & 68.
83 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
p. 155, branded the whole episode "duplicity" (obman).
85 Gregorii I. Peretsiakovich, Povolzh'e v XVII i nachale XVIII v. 
(Ocherki iz istorii kolonizatsii kraia) (Одесса: A. P. Zelenyi, 1882), 
p. 288.
86 Ocherki iz istorii KASSR, t. I, p. 142.
89 Kostenkov, "O rasprostranenii khrіstianstva," p. 386.
92 Kamenskii, "Kratkaia istoriia astrakhanskoi eparkhii," p. 22.

The Mongols as a people displayed particular fear of smallpox. "One of the most serious taboos among the Mongols is their avoidance of people with smallpox. Should a person contract this dreaded disease, even their parents, brothers, wife, and children hide and it is necessary for the ill person to be cared for by a Chinese. Should there be no Chinese to care for the person, their family places necessities at a certain location and the ill person takes the food after they have left. In the case of a husband or wife who contracts smallpox, they avoid contact with each other even after recovery until they hear the sound of thunder....However, because Mongolia is cold, there are very few people who contract smallpox....They regard the inner territories [China] as the land of the house of fire and avoid remaining there very long because they fear contracting smallpox."  

Hsiao Ta-Heng, Pei-lu Feng-su (The customs of the Northern Barbarians) quoted in Jagchid and Myer, Mongolia's Culture, p. 157.

93 Ocherki istorii KASSR, t. I, pp. 149 & 150; N. Haslakovets, Fizicheskoе i statisticheskoе opisanie kochev'ia donskikh kalmykov (Novocherkassk: General'nyi shtab polka, 1872), ch. 1, pp. 13-14; D. I. Bagalei, Ocherki iz istorii kolonizatsii stepnoi okrainy Moskovskogo gosudarstva (Moscow: 1887), pp. 530-531; A. Kul,
"Istoricheskie svedeniia o kalmikakh, kochuiushchikh na zemle Voiska donskogo," Svernyi Arkhiv, No. 6 (1824), ch. 9, pp. 304-305.

94 Golikov, Deiania Petra Velikogo, t. III (1837) p. 190.
95 In spite of the strong urge to take service with the Cossacks, the enlistment records for Chuguev indicate that few Kalmiks succeeded in reaching the area. In 1710, there were only forty-seven families there. By 1712, there were fifty families, a total of one hundred nineteen men and one hundred sixty-eight women. Bagalei, Ocherki iz istorii kolonizatsii, pp. 530-531. In June, 1716, the Senate ordered that twenty-one families of Kalmiks who had arrived in Chuguev be baptised and sent immediately into service. The same was ordered in January, 1717, for another group of Kalmik families. Ocherki istorii KASSR, t. I, p. 150.

96 Pal'mov, Ocherk, pp. 34-38; Shestakov, "Nekotorye svedeniia," p. 254, postulated that it was from one of these Kalmiks that Ieromonakh Nikodim, later chief missionary and chaplain to Prince Taishin, learned Kalmik while serving in the Kiev-pecherskii Monastery.
97 Pal'mov, Ocherk, p. 31.
98 Savvinskii, Astrakhanskaia Eparhiia, p. 113.
99 Pal'mov, Ocherk, p. 31.

100 Pozdneev, "Astrakhanskie kalmiki," p. 155; Pal'mov, Ocherk, pp. 31-32.
101 Pal'mov, Etiudy, ch. 3-4, pp. 61-82.
102 The most accurate listing, based on Lytkin, Novoletov, and Pal'mov,
includes: Chakdorzhab, died 1722, was married three times and had a number of concubines. Araptan, perhaps a son by Darma Bala, died sine prole by 1714. Sandjam also died without heirs. Gundjab left heirs, including Donduk Ombo, and was dead by 1714. Kundelen died by 1714 without leaving legitimate progeny. Tseren Donduk eventually followed his father as khan of the Kalmyks, but died in 1741 without heirs. Galdan Danjin, another son of Darma Bala, left no heirs. Baran Tseren, another of Darma Bala's progeny, died sine prole in 1721. According to Novoletov, Kalmyki, p. 14, Aiuka's ten sons were Chakdor-Dzhab, Araptan, Shabdar, San-Dzhab, Gun-Dzhab, Tseren-Shunu-Louzan (certainly a mistake for Aiuka's grandson, the child of Tsevan Rabtan the Djunghar and the khan's daughter), Gundeleng, Tseren-Donduk, Galdan-Danzhin, and Baaryng. His information was drawn from archival documents dated 1723. Pallas in Samlugen, t. 1, following page 58, gives the children of Aiuka as Tschakdordshap, Araptan (died without heirs), Sandship (died without heirs), Sedershup (an error for Seter Djab, a daughter), Buntar (had one daughter), " Galdanshap (one daughter), Laousan Dzhab (one daughter), Gundshap (male heirs), Ziodesamsa (one daughter), Gundeluf'(one son), Tscheren Donduk (two children, probably daughters), Galdan Danshin, and Baarong. " Batur Ubashi Tumen in the Lytkin translation, p. 141, gives only five sons: Chakdor Chzhab, Gun Chzhab, San Chzhab, Tseren Donrub, and Galdan Danchzhin. Gaban Sharab, also in Lytkin, p. 141, lists five sons: Chakdarzhap, Gundzhip, Tserin, Donriup (obviously a mistake for Tseren Donduk), and Galdan Dandzhin.

103 Alcoholism was a constant problem among the Mongols, often with
political implications. The Great Khan Ögödei died in 1241 of a stroke suffered after hunting and then drinking a great deal. In the Jasagh/Yasa, reputed to have been a law code, Chinggis Khan reportedly wrote:

A drunkard is like one who is blind, deaf, and crazy; he cannot even stand straight, but is like a man hit on the head. Regardless of the talent or training which a man may have, these things are useless to the drunkard, for all he will receive from others is insults. The ruler who is addicted to wine can never undertake a great enterprise. A general who likes wine can never control troops. Whoever it is who may have this vile habit, it will certainly lead to disaster. For the person who cannot refrain from this habit, it would be better for him if he would get drunk only three times a month. If only once, this would be better. However, best of all is total abstinence. But where can I find such a man?

Abraham Constantine Mouradgea d'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchinguiz-Khan jusqu’a Timour Bey ou Tamerlan* (The Hague and Amsterdam:"


105 When Chinggis Khan died, his first son, ""
by six months, but would probably not have succeeded his father due to doubts about his paternity and a widening breach in their personal relations. Although his heirs became the khans of the Golden Horde and his son Batu (died 1256) was the leading broker in the elections of khans, none of his descendants ever became Great Khan. The second son, Chagatai (died 1242) and his heirs ruled Transoxania and Turkestan, but were also passed over for the office of Great Khan. The title went, by the choice of Chinggis, after confirmation of a khurultai, to his third son, ""
Ögödei (1227-1241) and then to Ögödei's oldest son, Guyuk (1246-1248).

After the latter's death, the imperial designation devolved on the children of Tolui, who, as youngest son of Chinggis, had been regent
after his father's death and guardian of the gholomte, the family hearth in Mongolia. His oldest son, Mongke, became Great Khan (1251-1259) and was followed by his brother Khubilai (1259-1294) and Khubilai's heirs in China.

106 Pal'mov, Ocherk, p. 40.
107 Pal'mov, Etiudy, ch. 3-4, p. 120.
108 Ibid., p. 139.
109 Ibid., p. 123.
110 Ibid., p. 125.
111 Ibid., pp. 128-129.
112 Ibid., p. 133.
113 Ibid., p. 136.
114 Portrety, Gerby, i Pechati Bol'shoy Gosudarstvennoy Knigi (St. Petersburg: S. Peterburgskii Arkheologicheskii Institut, 1903), p. 97.

The leaders depicted were: Clement IX, Emperor Leopold, Charles VI of Spain, Louis XIV of France, Charles II of England, Christian V of Denmark, Michai Wiśniowiecki of Poland, Charles XI of Sweden, Nicholas of Georgia, Ferdinand II of Tuscany, Domenico Contarini of Venice, William III of Orange, Johann Georg II of Saxony, Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg, Jacob of Kurland, Sulaymān Shah of Persia, Mehmet IV of the Ottoman Empire, an Indian prince (perhaps Temir Aksak), Abdul Aziz of Bukhara, Navsham Beg of Urgench, and 'Ādil Girī of the Crimea. Obviously none of these rulers was a vassal of the Russians. To include Aiuka in the list would indicate that in 1672, no matter how many oaths had been signed, there was no doubt as to the independent status which he enjoyed.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE LAST YEARS OF THE KHANATE

(1724-1771)

The Successors of Aiuka

Before drawing conclusions from the first decades of the Kalmyk khanate, it is useful to look, very briefly, at the history of the Kalmyks after 1724. The trends set in motion during the last several years of Aiuka's life accelerated and, as the Russians continued to take an active role in Kalmyk politics, each succeeding khan was forced to accept greater restrictions on his and the khanate's political freedom and rely more heavily on Russia for the recognition of and continuance in his rule.

After Aiuka died, the Kalmyks had no khan. Each of the government's candidates was removed from contention: Dasang was ruined by the war with his half-brothers, Baksadai Dordji had converted, and Dordji Nazarov, pleading that he wished to remain in his own ulus and could not muster enough support to survive the struggle against his opponents, refused to become khan. Donduk Ombo fled to the Kuban, taking large numbers of vassals with him. Darma Bala remained on the steppe and enjoyed considerable support from other Kalmyk chieftans, but was opposed by the Russians. Of all the possible heirs, Tseren Donduk had the least general support and, as a suspected alcoholic, was widely held to be the weakest contender. The Russian government, which certainly counted on his being the most malleable candidate available, chose Tseren Donduk. After a careful and cleverly negotiated series of discussions, Governor Volynskii secured Tseren Donduk's
recognition by most of the Kalmyk chiefs.

But the new Kalmyk leader was not named khan. Instead, after he swore, on 20 September, 1724, to serve the emperor faithfully, not to be the friend of the emperor's enemies, to be a fair judge and to eradicate crime, he was named namestnik (guardian, regent, deputy) of the khanate.¹ Tseren Donduk was eventually named khan, but only after a Chinese embassy arrived in Russia to recognize his accession and to seek an anti-Dzungar alliance with the forces of the Yung-cheng Emperor (1723-1735). The Russians detained the Chinese until they named Tseren Donduk khan on 17 February, 1731. Four months later the khan took his oath of allegiance to Empress Anna Ioannovna (1730-1740) in the presence of Governor I. P. Izmailov:

I, Tseren Donduk, khan of the Kalmyks, give my word and swear according to my faith, before the Burkhan (Buddha), that I swear to Her Sovereign Highness, Anna Ioannovna, Empress and Autocrat of All the Russias...(who) has today entrusted to me the khanate and the chief command over all the Kalmyk peoples to serve faithfully, as becomes a vassal, and to do all to fulfill her orders, and to hold to all those things that my father Aiuka Khan promised by swearing his own oath. In concluding this, my oath, placing Shakdja-Muni-Burkhan (Śakyamuni Buddha, the historic Buddha and the last of the seven earth-dwelling Buddhas) to my brow, I apply my seal.²

No amount of Russian windowdressing could make Tseren Donduk into an effective ruler. The children of Chakdorzhab, who were briefly at peace with one another after Bakunin's negotiation, soon split again over the proper division of their late father's ulus. First Dasang and Nitr Dordji attacked Prince Taishin. Then, after Nitr Dordji almost had accomplished the murder of Bakunin, Dasang turned on his brother, killed him, and sent the body to Governor Volynskii. His
treachery further discredited Dasang among the Kalmyks, but he was again protected from retribution by the Russians. In the Kuban, Donduk Ombo gathered 20,000 warriors and began to raid into the steppe. Governor Volynskii, hoping to keep Tseren Donduk weak and dependent on Russian aid, refused several Kalmyk princes permission to join their grazing with that of the royal ulus. His decision (1725) divided the Kalmyks into two groups: 14,000 kibitkas settled along the Don and 20,000 kibitkas remained on the Volga with Tseren Donduk.

Except among the Russian administrators, the namestnik/khan enjoyed little support. His chief defenders were his brother Galdan Dandjin, his cousin Donduk Dashi, and his mother, the redoubtable Darma Bala. Donduk Ombo, realizing the lack of support and ineffectiveness characteristic of Tseren Donduk, attacked him late in 1731 and returned to the Kuban with 15,000 kibitkas from the khan's ulus. The Russians attempted to intervene, but their 14,000-man expedition under I. F. Briatinskii could not force Donduk Ombo to stop his raids or to make peace and return to the Kalmyk steppe. When a new Russo-Turkish war threatened in 1735, the Russians needed peace among the Kalmyk and plenty of cavalry for the front. Donduk Ombo was already the most powerful Kalmyk leader and, on 7 March, 1735, the Russians named him "chief leader" (glavnyi upravitel') of the Kalmyks. Tseren Donduk was removed from office. In justifying the deposition of the khan, the Russian government explained: "This Tseren Donduk, upon receiving the khanate, proved himself totally weak, and became a drunkard, and because of this he could not keep the Kalymk nation (which) was in his charge in all good harmony and in
necessary faithfulness."³

After having prepared for eleven years to rule, Donduk Ombo took the royal seal (he was named khan in March, 1737) as the most powerful and wealthy of the Kalmyk princes. By his agreement with the Russians, Donduk Ombo was allowed to keep all the kibitkas he had ruled while in the Kuban (estimated at some 80,000 people) and joined with them the royal ulus on the Volga. The new ruler's relations with the Russians were usually excellent. Donduk Ombo responded enthusiastically to the call to war, rendering sterling service in the Crimea and the Caucasus. His attacks into the Kuban were particularly noteworthy and one raid ended in the destruction of Eski/Kopyl, the fortress-palace-capital of the Kuban's Bakti Giray. A single campaign in 1736 left 15,000 Tatars dead and another 35,000 prisoners. A grateful empress rewarded the khan and his family on several occasions with moneys, grain, and various luxury goods.

Like his predecessor Aiuka, Donduk Ombo was regularly troubled by the royal clan and the question of the succession. The khan was determined to be rid of all rivals, real and imagined. His autocratic urges pushed him to seize ulus and ruin all those likely to oppose his wishes. He refused to be reconciled with Donduk Dashi, who previously had supported Tseren Donduk and the Russians, and eventually forced the Russians to resettle the prince on the Samara River, near the territory of Princess Taishina and away from the rest of the Kalmyks. The khan next attacked the family of Dordji Nazarov, seizing control of many of their vassals, giving Lubzha, Dordji's son, no choice but to become his chief opponent.
Lubzha died in 1737 and the khan soon provided a new leader for the opposition. Donduk Ombo's second wife, the Kabardian Dzhan, a Muslim, was determined that one of her sons would become the next khan. Donduk Ombo gave in to her wishes. In 1737, he abruptly demoted his original heir, Galdan Norbo (his son by another wife and one of the Kalmyk's best commanders) and named Randul, Dzhan's eldest son, his heir. Donduk Ombo even sent to Tibet to secure the Dalai Lama's blessings. In 1738, responding to Kazakh attacks in the east, the khan unwisely sent Galdan Norbo and a large force to meet the invaders. The disgruntled former heir turned on his father and, joined by a number of taishas and noions who were fed up by the khan's high-handed rule, became the chief of the opposition. Virtual civil war erupted. Donduk Ombo was compelled by the strength of the opposition to turn to the Russians for support. St. Petersburg, fearing massive defections by the Kalmyks to Dzungaria or the Kuban, attempted to negotiate a settlement. Peace was made and, one by one, the khan's opponents were either arrested and imprisoned by the Russians or killed by the khan. Donduk Ombo's last years were a time of chaos and, at his death in 1741, a new civil war broke out.

Again the succession and family discord threatened to destroy the khanate. Dzhan, possessed by her determination to secure the succession of Randul, acted with chilling ferocity. Her troops raided the ulus of Galdan Dandjin, the son of Aiuka and Darma Bala and chief rival of Randul. The prince was captured and both he and a son of Dordji Nazarov were executed. Not only did Dzhan refuse to end her attack when commanded to do so by the Russians, but she dared to attack a detachment of Russian troops.
The Cabinet of Ministers considered her and her son utterly unacceptable: "It is impossible for Dzhan to be allowed to rule the people because she is a Muslim and will always be on the side of the Kabardians and could presently turn all the leaders to the Kabardian side; beyond this, the scandal must be admitted that Donduk Ombo, bypassing the Russian court, asked about the khanate for his children from the Dalai Lama." Darma Bala, Aiuka's widow, reappeared on the steppe and, at her urging, the Russians recognized Donduk Dashi as the only viable alternative to Randul. Dzhan fled to Kabardia, twice invited Nādir Shah of Persia (1736-1747) to invade Russia, and finally surrendered to the Russians in 1744. She and her children (Randul died in the mountains) were sent to St. Petersburg, converted to Christianity, and became the Princes Dondukov.

Donduk Dashi was named namestnik on 4 September, 1741 and became khan on 20 February, 1758. To secure the support of the Russians, Donduk Dashi agreed to and signed an oath which finally surrendered virtually all his freedom to carry on foreign relations. He promised: "...not to have friendship or exchanges with enemies, whatever be their nation or faith, and likewise not to make diplomatic exchanges with other foreign nations without an ukaz and, if such foreign envoys arrive, to explain this condition of his vassalage to them and give them answers as shall be ordered by the Russians." He was not to allow the return to the ulus of any converted Kalmyks and, "as a mark of eternal faithfulness to give over for keeping in a Russian town his son Asarai." In a period of only seventeen years, the divisive competition within the royal clan had reduced the khan clearly to the status of vassal.
Donduk Dashi was soon embroiled in a protracted struggle with the Russians and members of the royal clan for the control of the ulus of the late Tseren Donduk, Galdan Danjin, and Donduk Ombo. The Russians, fearing that he might become as powerful as Donduk Ombo had once been, frustrated his designs by dividing the ulus among several princes. But the new namestnik persisted in plotting against his rivals and both his success and failures threatened to shake the khanate to pieces. Within three years of his accession, Donduk Dashi, never able to satisfy his ambitions and chafing under Russian control, was rumoured to be considering flight to Persia, Central Asia, or Djungharia. Darma Bala was also said to be toying with the idea of escape to Djungharia or even to China. Their plans had to be reconsidered in the mid-1750's by the Chinese destruction of the Djunghar khanate and the flight to the Volga of over 10,000 kibit-kas of Torghud, Djunghar, Khoshud, and Khoit refugees.

Relations of the Kalmyks' last khan with the Russians were not especially good. He did meet the empress in St. Petersburg and was named khan in 1757 as a reward for his loyalty and good government. But these were the high points. The khan's attitude toward Russia was gravely altered by the imprisonment of his son. Although guaranteed that Asarai would be well cared for and educated by the Russians, the khan pressed a number of petitions for his son's release from Astrakhan. The Russians were unmoved and then, unexpectedly, Asarai contracted smallpox and died. Donduk Dashi also quarrelled frequently with Governor V. N. Tatishchev and his successors over the progress of conversion and settlement of Kalmyks and over the rapidly mounting pressures of Russian peasants hoping
to settle the steppe. The khan began to fear a plot to arrest and depose
him, so he avoided the Russian towns. In 1752, he was so angry over Rus-
sian policy that he ordered all Kalmyks to ignore Russian taxes and duties
and also commanded that all Kalmyks employed in the highly lucrative Russian fishing industry return to the ulus posthaste.

Donduk Dashi died in 1761. At the time he was named khan (1757),
Donduk Dashi's second and only surviving son, Ubashi, was made namestnik
of the khan, in essence, the Russian endorsement of his status as heir.
Even so, at the death of the khan the succession was disputed. Tsebek
Dordji, son of the disinherited Galdan Norbo, claimed seniority and
attempted to enlist the support of both Empress Elizabeth Petrovna (1741-
1762) and the Christian Dondukov family. Failing that, he withdrew to
the Don-Kuban region, hoping to use it as a base of operations against
Ubashi and, as had Donduk Ombo, be called back by the Russians as khan.
Tsebek Dordji was called back, but he was not named ruler of the Kalmyks.

St. Petersburg acted to support the eighteen year-old namestnik
against Tsebek Dordji's challenge, but also sought further to dilute the
royal power. The most significant step was to dictate the makeup of the
khan's personal council, the zargo. Such councils existed in all the ulus
and were made up of the closest advisors of the local chief. The khan's
zargo, by virtue of its immediate access to the person of the ruler, was
the most important of all. Formerly, the zargo's members were drawn
only from the khan's ulus and included whomever the khan chose. In 1762,
the Russians mandated that the zargo be constituted of three representa-
tives of the khan's ulus, one from the shabiner, and four from ulus of
other zaisangs. It was also to have room for a Russian officer. All
decisions of the council were submitted to the khan for confirmation,
but, in the event of his disagreement, the khan's veto was not conclu-
sive. In 1765, an imperial rescript named Tsebek Dordji to the zargo.
He was granted a special subsidy and set in such a position by the Rus-
sians that he was obviously the most potent rival of the namestnik. The
Russians added new ingredients to the political stew in 1763, when they
sent Princess Dondukova (Dzhan) and her son Prince Aleksei (Dod'bu) to
the steppe as the leaders of the Christian Kalmyks. They were given
the large Bagatsokhurov ulus and the Russians built them a permanent
residence at Enotaevsk on the Volga. Princess Dondukova made clear her
plans to run, in cooperation with her son, all Kalmyk affairs. Her out-
spoken determination increased the fears of many Kalmyks that the Russians
were preparing to impose a Christian khan.

The rule of Ubashi continued for ten years, a period during which
his dissatisfaction with the heaviness of Russian direction grew steadily.
Tsebek Dordji worked assiduously both to discredit Ubashi in the eyes of
the Russians and to encourage the namestnik's dissatisfaction with St.
Petersburg's interference. Kalmyk troops were called to and participated
in the Turkish War which began in 1768, but Ubashi was afraid to leave
his ulus lest raids by the Kazakhs or Cossacks ruin him. Even so, Kalmyk
troops loyally devastated the Kuban and forced the wavering Kabardian
princes into alliance with Russia. The arrogance of General of the
Artillery I. F.de Meden so angered Ubashi that he left the campaigns in
1770 and did not return.
Once Ubashi returned to the steppe, a number of forces combined to convince the namestnik that thoughts of leaving Russia should be converted from day dreams to reality. Tsebek Dordji, who saw no prospect for his advancement over Ubashi, felt he might be rewarded by the Ch'ing Ch'ien-lung Emperor (1736-1796) if he were instrumental in directing the Kalmyks to China. The Buddhist clergy, upset by the ominous turn which Russian conversion efforts had taken, supported the idea and the VIIith Dalai Lama (1758-1804) designated a two-year period as auspicious for their departure. Even though the plan to leave was reported by Kalmyks to Governor Beketov of Astrakhan as early as 1767, the government in St. Petersburg refused to believe it. In secrecy, Ubashi gathered as many of the Kalmyks as possible, using the pretext that he planned an attack on the Kazakhs. On January 4, 1771, the namestnik announced to his troops that the empress ordered him to send his son and those of five nobles as hostages and turn over a thousand Kalmyks as recruits for the Russian army. He declared that he could not do this and must leave Russia in order to protect his peoples and their laws. The next day they left and eventually fought their way past the Kazakhs to settle north and west of Turfan and south and east of Ala Kol. Ubashi is estimated to have taken from 30,000 to almost 60,000 kibitkas with him, leaving behind nearly 13,000 kibitkas, mostly those still on the west bank of the Volga who could not have been warned of the move for fear of alerting the Russians to their plan. Those who survived the terrible journey east were settled in western China, but were broken into small groups so as not to become another powerful Mongol khanate. The Kalmyks who remained
in Russia occupied only lands on the west side of the Volga. The pastures on the east bank were turned over to the Kazakhs. The title of khan of the Kalmyks was forever abolished by Empress Catherine the Great in October, 1771.

Conclusions

The history of the creation and evolution of the Kalmyk khanate and its relationship with Russia permits drawing some conclusions. The later years of the Oyirad confederacy and the early years of the Kalmyk khanate may conveniently serve as a paradigm for the histories of many nomadic peoples. When the ethnonym "Kalmyk" first came into currency, its appearance was not the product of a sudden intrusion into the steppe by an utterly foreign people nor was it the result of chthonic parturition. However the name Kalmyk was used, it was applied to peoples already present on the steppe, but recognized to have evolved into a new and recognizable group. As had happened countless times before, the loosening of the ties which held together their confederation resulted in the shifting of populations and the weakening of whatever central authority had persisted. Various elements of the Oyirad set out to find new pastures and greater safety. These migrations led to their physical relocation and the creation of new tribal states in Djungharia, north-east Tibet, and on the Volga. The fabrication of a West Mongol khanate on the Volga did not proceed as if prescribed by divine ordination. It depended on the statesmanship and generalship of the Torghud princes
Khö Örlük, Shukür Daichin, and Monchak Puntsuk. The paucity of available records for the earliest period makes it impossible to assess the impact of individual genius exhibited by these men; however, it is clear that the early Kalmyk leaders understood the urgency of their situation, managed to reach an agreement with the Russians, expanded their own power, and took the leading roles in the coalescence of the Kalmyk people.

But the Russians also knew the steppe and had numerous opportunities to display skills honed over years of dealing with nomadic peoples. The Russians were not, however, without problems. Muscovy was hampered at times by disruptions within its own governmental apparatus and by a tendency to react rather than adhere to some sort of long-term plan. In the early stages, the Russians did not even have someone capable of translating directly into Kalmyk and were forced to rely on Tatar intermediaries. Also, the Russians, both alone and in alliance with other nomads, were clearly incapable of delivering a military strike which would either force the removal of the Kalmyks from the Caspian steppe or reduce them to docility.

The history of Russian dealings with the Kalmyks indicates, however, that the Russians were familiar enough with the nomadic economy and lifestyle to follow a general policy based on the advantages accrued through their position on the steppe. Their power to disrupt grazing and to seal off local markets was used as both enticement and punishment. Had the battle for the Ukraine not intervened, the Russians might have forced the Kalmyks away from the Volga or subdued them more quickly.
The troubles of the southern and western borders necessitated a solution of their difficulties and presented the Russians with an opportunity to deflect the fury of the Mongols by channelling it against Moscow's enemies. Peace between the Russians and the Kalmyks was found to be both cheaper and more productive than war.

In less than three-quarters of a century, the power of the Kalmyk rulers reached its zenith in the person of Aiuka Khan. Renowned as a fighter and acknowledged as the tsar's lieutenant, Aiuka was the nomadic chief personified. He rid himself of his enemies; he increased the numbers of his vassals and herds; he directed his warriors against his enemies. By affirming the pacts of his predecessors with Russia and capitalizing on Russia's need for soldiers, Aiuka used the Russians as props for his power, as suppliers of munitions and moneys, and as jailers for his failed opponents.

Aiuka's contemporary was one of Russia's most distinctive tsars, Peter I. He was Aiuka's equal in talent and determination. Peter recognized the value of his Kalmyk alliance, working to preserve it in spite of Kalmyk breaches of faith. He made no attempt to substitute himself for Aiuka and resisted the urge to allow Kalmyks to leave their ulus wholesale. He was prepared, however, to exploit opportunities, as in Raeff's scenario, for the conversion of certain key members of the nobility. He also planned to limit the future likelihood of Kalmyk doubledealing by capturing the machinery for the naming of the khan. Although not entirely successful initially, after the death of Aiuka, the Russians were in a position so that no khan could take the royal seal without the approval of St. Petersburg.
In drawing conclusions as to the khanate's failure, it may be helpful to venture beyond an entirely historical framework. One can typify the major contending forces - the Kalmyks' khan and the Russian administrators - as managers, men whose professions were the ordering and direction of states, peoples, and policies. By judging their performances, it may be easier to understand how one failed and the other succeeded.

Peter F. Drucker in Managing for Success defines the task of management in economic terms. His approach, however, is relevant in understanding a venture that required performance and results. According to Drucker, the manager's first task is to understand the business, to analyze its resources, and to determine its needs as precisely as possible. The second requirement is to get results by using resources and manipulating opportunities. Drucker believes that solving problems within a business only restores normality and may eliminate some restrictions. Growth and development, however, exist outside the business and cannot be attained if the restoration of internal normality is the sole product of management. Using this rather simple framework, one can inquire how well the Kalmyks and Russians solved internal problems and recognized and took advantage of crucial, externally generated opportunities.

There is no question that the Kalmyk rulers understood their business, an amalgam including the organization of various groups of tribes and their movement to a point where adequate pastures and relative safety could be found. Their efforts neither went unchallenged nor were
they always successful, but the Kalmyks reached the Caspian steppe and
organized well enough to ward off the attacks of various inimical par-
ties. They extended their control over several other nomadic groups
and reached an understanding with the major sedentary power interested
in the region. In doing all this, the Torghūd princes and khans used
their greatest resource, the Kalmyk fighting man, to secure the group's
basic needs. By contributing the services of Kalmyk cavalry, the khans
won the use of the Volga steppe, were rewarded with zhalovan'ē and loot,
and were allowed to trade in Russian markets. The herds of the Kalmyks
also brought profits, especially after the Russians came to depend on
their uninterrupted supply.

If the exploitation of opportunity is accepted as a major criterion
for evaluating performance, one might ask if there were alternatives to
the linkage with Russia which were, mistakenly, not taken. When the
pressures of the Mongol wars broke apart the Oyirad peoples, only the
route to the northwest, along the unsettled stretches of the Irtysh, was
readily available to the Torghūd. Ming China was a possible alternative,
but it lay beyond barriers of mountains, desert, and hostile Mongol
tribes. Besides which, the interests of China lay elsewhere at the time.
Routes south and west, leading into Kashgaria, Moghulistan, Transoxania,
and Persia were also blocked by natural barriers and hostile nomads,
particularly the Kazakh. There were, therefore, alternatives in direction,
but the relatively unsettled forests and steppes of Siberia were easily
the most attractive.

Once they occupied lands claimed by Russia (both in Siberia and
the Caspian steppe), the Kalmyks did not have to cooperate with Moscow. There were, for instance, several large, nomadic groups with whom they could have made common cause. If the records are accurate, the Kalmyk leaders did consider throwing off their Russian allegiance and joining their lot to that of the Djunghars, the Crimeans, the Bashkir, or even the Kazakhs. But they never did. P. S. Preobrazhenskaia, in a comment typical of many historians, explained that fact by arguing that: "Historical experience showed the Kalmyks that only in cooperation with Russia could they receive more favorable conditions for their growth and defense from their enemies." Although the comment is essentially correct, Preobrazhenskaia and others have failed to explain why the Kalmyks should have found security in alliance with a sedentary people, with whom they had little in common, as opposed to nomads with whom they shared so much.

In part the Kalmyk choice resulted from an antagonism among the nomads which had been built over years of hostility, as well as the fact that in the later days of the khanate their prospective allies all suffered dramatic declines in their power. The East Mongols had forced the Kalmyks to move west in the first place. The terrible attacks of the Khalka khans had finished the unity of the Dorben Oyirad and had soured relations between the East and all of the West Mongols. Later, Djunghar attacks into Mongolia continued the tradition of war. Even the khurultai of 1640 failed to patch the shattered Mongol unity. The weaknesses and divisions of the East Mongols were carefully exploited by the Manchu. They were successful to the point that the Mongols were, piece
by piece, pacified and drawn into the orbit of China.

Relations with other Oyirad tribes were hampered by distance as well as by the often unfriendly relations among them. The Kalmyk and Djunghar royal houses intermarried and remained in contact with one another, but their individual ambitions made serious cooperation impossible. Each willingly housed refugees from the other; both were ready to strip the other of vassals and herds. Djunghar expansion disrupted Kalmyk contact with China and Tibet and forced the Kazakhs and others to move west and compete with the Kalmyks for grazing. Behind the scenes, the Manchu, who were constantly either at war with the Djunghar or planning another campaign against them, exploited the divisions between the two. The Russians also worked to keep the Djunghar and the Kalmyks apart, but at peace. In the thirty years following the deaths of Aiuka and Tsevan Rabtan, constant wars, internal divisions, and the enmity of the Ch'ing Empire brought the absolute annihilation of the Djunghar state.

Union with any other nomadic people would have to have been made with non-Mongol, Turkic groups. Each of these (the Kazakhs, Crimeans, or Bashkir) shared the common cultural ethos of nomadism with the Kalmyks, but not language, history, or religion. The Kazakhs had been rivals of the Oyirad for control of the pastures of the Ili and Chu. During the Kalmyk move west, the Kazakh were sometimes enemies, occasionally allies. Later, after savage Djunghar raids, the Kazakhs, refugees desperate for pastures and asylum, pushed west toward the Kalmyk territories. Their situation, which imitated that of the Kalmyks a century earlier, did not make them attractive partners, however. By the last years of Aiuka's
reign, the Kazakhs, who at one time had requested Kalmyk protection, were becoming the most powerful and dangerous rivals of the Kalmyks. By the 1730-1740 period, the Kazakhs, this time imitating the success of the Kalmyks, turned away from nomad alliances to St. Petersburg as guarantor of their possession of the steppe. The Russians realized the value of antagonisms, using them to help control the entire steppe. As the College of Foreign Affairs noted: "If the Kalmyks show some opposition, then it is possible to turn the Kirghiz (Kazakhs) against them, or if the Kirghiz-Kaisaks should do anything, to send the Kalmyks and the Bashkir to pacify them. It is possible to maintain better control without sending any Russian armies."8

With the Bashkir, the situation was similar. By the time of the arrival of the Kalmyks, the Bashkir were in the process of being enclosed within the borders of Muscovy. There was no central political authority and the various dorogas regularly worked at cross purposes. The Kalmyks and the Bashkir frequently struggled with one another and were gleefully used by the Russians to police each other's conduct. Although there were alliances between them, these never outlived the orgy of looting exposed Russian settlements. When Aiuka had the opportunity to secure the allegiance of several Bashkir groups, he threw the moment away by demanding submission, not alliance. The practice of constantly jockeying for advantage over each other guaranteed that the Kalmyk-Bashkir relationship would never mature.

Relations with the Crimeans followed a similar pattern. When the Kalmyks arrived on the Volga, they upset the tribal balance of the whole
region. Some tribes were subdued by them, but others, chiefly Nogai, fled to the west, into the arms of the Crimea. The Muscovites quickly recruited the Kalmyks for their wars against the Crimeans, establishing the pattern of conflict in Kalmyk-Crimean relations which persisted for over a hundred years. There were numerous attempts by the Crimeans and their Ottoman overlords to enlist the support of the Kalmyks, but none succeeded. The Crimean khan, who was the vassal of the Ottomans and the object of constant intrigues by various powerful clans and associated tribes, was not able to project a particularly inspiring image of stability. Internal confusion, constant political change, and the implacable opposition of Russia made cooperation with the Crimeans unlikely.

The Torghūd leaders, as political and economic managers, could set aside antagonisms for the sake of advantage. Several times they fought the Bashkir, but could as easily cooperate with them. Aiuka warred against the Crimea, but also pledged his faith to the Ottoman sultan and vowed cooperation with the Girāy. The Kuban raiders of Bakti Girāy humiliated Aiuka. Within a couple of years, however, the Kalmyk khan was the mainstay of Bakti Girāy's power. Even after years of intermittent conflict with the Djunghar, Aiuka was willing seriously to consider moving east to join his cousins.

There were two factors, beyond mere antagonism, which prevented any significant or long-lasting realignment of forces on the steppe. The Kalmyk rulers were willing to take advantage of some opportunities, but only for the sake of momentary advancement. When the Kalmyk joined
the Bashkir, especially under Aiuka, they did so for immediate plunder, evidently not considering the advantages of long-term cooperation. When the moment was gone, so was the perception of the mutuality of interests. The Kalmyk khans moved hither and yon, dividing energies and forces, grasping, often willy-nilly, at whatever opportunity was then profitable.

Beyond the failure to plan was a more elemental reason why the Kalmyks never joined their nomadic cousins. In the Zafer-name, Tamerlane who was then pursuing Toqtamish of the White Horde, reached the Ulu Tau Mountains, above the Sary Su and Turgai Rivers. He stood, "and beheld with wonder those vast plains which in their verdure and extent resembled the sea."\(^9\) The steppe grasslands were the verdant ocean on which nomadic peoples based their entire economic, social, and political lives. Control of them gave power over the herds and peoples nourished thereon. Dominion equated to power over their resources and the lines of trade and communication which crisscrossed them.

More than embittering historical encounters, competition for the steppe and the power deriving from its control kept the Kalmyks and others of their cultural ilk far apart. From Mongolia to the Crimea, all nomadic tribal systems competed for pastures. It is difficult to cite examples of steppe nomads who freely united and readily agreed to the mutual division of land and the sharing of power. Far more common was the subjugation of one tribe by another and the forfeit of political power by the loser's rulers. Acculturation was quick, but was the accommodation of the defeated to the ways of the victorious. For the Kalmyks to have joined any other nomadic people, the two would not have met as equals. As N. N.
Pal'mov noted, when Aiuka considered the possibility of migration to Djungharia, he was concerned for his own position after the Kalmyks' arrival. How could he continue as khan? What kind of relationship would he have with the khunhtaiji? What sort of grazing would his people be given? These were not his problems alone. In spite of Darma Bala's enthusiasm for the project, all the Kalmyk taishas and nobles faced the possibility of either loss or gain in herds and riches once the Torghud khan joined his Djunghar cousin.

As one looks at the steppe in the early XVIIIth century, it is clear that only the great sedentary powers (China, Russia, the Ottomans) had any real success in bringing together nomads, organizing, and in some fashion systematizing the relations of the tribes with one another. To the nomads, left alone, competition, not cooperation, was the harsh fact around which their lives revolved.

As interesting as it may be to speculate on the results of a nomadic union involving the Kalmyks, it never happened. Instead, the Kalmyks chose to make their living arrangement with the Russians, both parties having taken advantage of opportunities which permitted a settlement of their mutual differences. The result was so thorough an intermingling of the destiny of the Kalmyks with that of the Russians that only the physical removal of the khanate from Russia could break it. The maturation of that special relationship has occupied much of the preceding study and it is in the complexities of this association that one must seek the reasons for the collapse of the khanate.

There were a number of failures by the Kalmyk leaders during the
creation of the khanate which left their political system exposed to various forms of disruption. The most crucial weakness was the royal clan. No leader came to power without first having to fend off at least one rival. Some, like Ablai, were adventurers from outside the khan's immediate family. But the royal clan always fielded at least one contender, at least one prince unwilling to accept the nomination of the new ruler or prepared at some point in the reign to gamble for a larger role in the khanate.

Challengers were able to pose a genuine threat only because of the continuing tradition whereby ulus were divided among heirs, chiefly male, during the life of the father. Out of kernels such as these, the ambitious built miniature khanates and mounted their programs to seize even greater power. The period including the rules of Khö Orluk, Shukur Daichin, and Monchak Puntsuk can be viewed as a time of building, a period when such rivalries could be excused as part of the difficulties which paralleled the consolidation of power. By the time of Aluka, the khanate had hit its full political stride. Even the greatest Kalmyk khan did nothing to delay the division of his herds among his heirs and could not stop the resultant internecine rivalries or the concomitant weakening of the khanate itself. He named and trained an heir, but diluted his own power by alienating vassals from royal control. Chakdorzhab did the same thing, distributing his ulus among his children. When both the heir and the khan died, the squabbles of the royal family over their legacies allowed the Russians to gain significant leverage over the internal workings of the khanate and the royal clan. Stopping such struggles was beyond the power
of every Kalmyk khan. When only the Russians proved effective at their regulation, St. Petersburg acted to manipulate and restructure the Kalmyk khanate.

More damaging to the continuance of the khanate is the fact that even Aiuka could no more guarantee his people's right to graze and trade than could his great-grandfather a century before. Although the Kalmyks were solidly associated with the north Caspian steppe, their possession of the land depended on the good will of the Russian government. Significantly, when the Kalmyks first moved to the region, the Russian level of settlement had been quite small. But the presence of farmers and townspeople and soldiers had grown steadily and with increasing rapidity as population pressures drove ever larger numbers of land owners and peasants into the lower Volga. No leader could secure the source of his power, the land, without the license of Russia. As farmers' demands for the land increased with the population's growth, Kalmyk possession of the steppe became more tenuous. The khan was helpless to do anything to rectify the situation.

When Aiuka died, the condition of the Kalmyks was unchanged from that at the tribes' arrival on the Volga. After a century of tenancy, the Kalmyk khans had failed to secure to themselves, and only themselves, power over the land. Perhaps had they united the nomads of the region, together they could have driven out the Russians and controlled the steppe. But that scenario is entirely hypothetical and, as already noted, not even particularly likely. The Kalmyk rulers were allowed to rent the lands on which they grazed, but the Russians never willingly would have
allowed ownership to pass to anyone else. Denied control of the land, the Torghūd princes were never assured of their political control. The Russians, who bestowed pastures, trade, and other incentives, were entirely willing to replace anyone who proved unreliable.

The second party in the Kalmyk khanate, the Russians, was long experienced in dealing with steppe policies and recognized that nomadic groups shared a communality of needs. From the earliest days in Siberia, records indicate that the Russian administration instinctively linked grazing rights and trading privileges to Kalmyk recognition of the pre-eminence of Russian authority. Although the Russians could make such demands, they were not always in a position to enforce them. In the early XVIIth century it was not possible for the Russians to subdue completely all the peoples living on territories claimed by Muscovy. It was, however, feasible for them to send Cossacks, vassal Tatar tribesmen, and some Russian regulars to disrupt grazing. Or they might simply close the city gates, forbidding access to markets. The Kalmyks were excluded from trade in the towns and cut off from the export of more advanced armaments and other military supplies needed for the wars against other nomads. Such an approach was, for the Russians, extremely cost effective. As time passed, the Russians also turned their own needs to Muscovite advantage by becoming the largest employer of Kalmyk man-power. The Russians kept the Kalmyks busy fighting Russian wars and became the source of all kinds of financial rewards, incentives, and bonuses. Also, the Russian government was the clearing house and mediation board for the conflicting claims to lands and the redress of injuries
suffered at the hands of other vassal groups: the Nogai, the Bashkir, and the Cossacks of the Don, the Volga, and the Iaik.

The Russians actually benefitted from being absentee landlords. The khans were responsible for the day-to-day maintenance of order on the steppe. It was they who, in most instances, decided on the allocation of lands, herds, booty, and zhalovan'e. When the khan exercised his authority he risked angering those excluded, overlooked, shortchanged. The Russians remained distant and uninvolved in this process. The growth of the power of the khan and his efforts to tighten control over his unruly vassals highlighted the value of the distance and bounty of the Russians. As a result, a trickle, then a stream of Kalmyks deserted their ulus and took service with the Russians. By the end of Aiuka's reign, the pace of recruitment of Kalmyks, nobles and commoners, had already become alarming. Even though this flight was tenaciously resisted by the khan and slowed by the tsar, Russian service was so attractive that numbers of Kalmyks, whose thoughts may have paralleled those of Henri IV of Navarre, agreed that it was "surely worth a Mass."

The Russians, not the Torghud princes, were the rulers of the Kalmyks. They controlled the pastures and markets of the lower Volga and knew how to use both to get what Russia needed. The khan, though named protector of the southern borders, recruited troops for the tsar more often than he used them himself. At first he was allowed to control the disbursement of Russian largess, but he was subsequently removed from that position. In the end, he was not allowed even to name his own successor. If Drucker's assessment of good management is applied here, the
Russians did far better than the Torghūd. They better understood the situation and better used their resources. More often they recognized potential for gain and attempted to exploit opportunities to wring concessions from the nomads.

It would, of course, be foolish and inaccurate to take the analogy of contemporary management practices too far. The Russian state was not a smoothly run operation whose decisions were based on any consistently applied principals of management understood by all those concerned. During the period covered by this study, the Russian government was involved in a lengthy era of change, both evolutionary and catastrophic. Gradually it was becoming less an extension of the person of the tsar and more a bureaucratic operation patterned on models modified by the requirements of the Russian autocracy. It was subject to the intense rivalries of individuals and families and depended on the character of the tsar/emperor for its final definition and direction. Even so, it commanded the reserves of experience gathered over centuries of contact with nomads. After 1724, in spite of troubled years and in-fighting at the court in St. Petersburg, those resources continued to direct the exploitation of moments of Kalmyk weakness so that the khans rapidly lost latitude of action.

The third essential element mentioned in the introduction, that of Inner Asia in a changing world, fits into the Drucker analysis as the most significant condition in which the Kalmyks and Russians conducted their affairs. The antipathy of nomad and farmer is as old as the realization that the two could not readily share the land. Four thousand years ago
in a Sumerian logomantic literary debate entitled "The Wooing of Inanna," the goddess of love is courted by a farmer (Enkimdu) and a shepherd (Dumuzi). "'Oh my sister, let the shepherd marry you...his cream is good, his milk is good,...everything his hand touches is bright.'" The goddess, who resisted the entreaties of the shepherd, wished at first to marry Enkimdu, "the man of dike, ditch, and plow." But the shepherd persisted, pointing out the value of the products of his herds. First, he won the hand of Inanna. Next, Enkimdu surrendered, turning over his fields to Dumuzi. "'I against you, shepherd, against you...why shall I strive? Let your sheep eat the grass of the riverbank, in my cultivated lands let your sheep walk about, in the bright fields of Erech let them eat grain, let your kids and lambs drink the water of my Unun (the name of a canal)." \[11 \] Forty centuries later, Rogers and Hammerstein composed "The Cowmen and the Farmers Should be Friends." This spirited musical exchange in Oklahoma almost ruined the show's picnic and pointed out that the millenia had done little to secure amity between the two groups.

For many years the competition of nomad and farmer had favored the former. Cultivators, tied to their fields and crops, had been a natural resource regularly plundered by raiders from the steppe. But the evolution of societies, governmental systems, agricultural methods, and medicines made possible the burgeoning of population among the sedentaryists. Agriculturalists had an insatiable desire to capture and transform the land. As the centuries passed and their numbers grew, the war between nomad and cultivators swung in favor of the latter. Technological advances, especially military ones, assured the farmers of a supremacy in
hardware which the nomads could never match.

The southern reaches of the Volga were only one region among many where the lands of the nomads brushed against the borders of an expansionist sedentary state. There were few towns and little of the land was given over to agriculture. Even after Muscovy had ingested the various Tatar entities spawned in the fall of the Golden Horde, the sparse settled population clung to the river banks, tethered, tenuously, to civilization by the river's lines of communication and trade. The pressures of colonization, which already troubled the Mari, Chuvash, Bashkir and some of the Siberian Tatars farther north were not yet in evidence on the Kalmyk steppe when the Mongols first arrived. But that would change. By the late 1660's, after the building of the Zakamskaia liniiia and the signing of the Peace of Andrusovo, the region was less exposed to nomad raids. The pace of settlement quickened; Moscow granted lands and serfs to the Russian gentry and aristocracy (especially those who had been displaced in the west) and to large monasteries. Growing numbers of peasants fled, usually illegally, from the crowded central regions to the vacant steppe. By the reign of Peter I, the government of Russia suggested and sponsored ambitious plans for settlement and the exploitation of the region's soils and warmer climate. Volga towns like Saratov, which openly admitted that much of its cultivated land was extravagantly wasted, were allowed to expand into the steppe. More farmers, more plows, more forts, more soldiers divided and tamed the grasslands. The Kalmyks, like the Crimeans, Kazakhs, Nogai, Bashkir, and even the Cossacks were forced to compete ever more fiercely for access to the diminishing steppe. As the
open grasslands were transformed into the regular furrows of farm lands, the nomads were set against one another by sedentary states anxious to annex whatever land remained unadministered. The policies of agriculturalists profited from the competition of nomads. When the period under consideration in this study ended, the loss of territory by the Kalmyks was still a crisis in the making. Five decades after Aiuka's death, the khan's great-grandson acknowledged the irreversible deterioration of the khanate's position. His solution was the last of the great nomadic migrations of Inner Asian history.
ENDNOTES: CHAPTER FIVE

1. PSZR1, t. VII (1723-1727), No. 4660, pp. 423-424.

2. PSZR1, t. VIII (1728-1732), No. 5699, pp. 382-383. Sakyamuni (Sage of the Sākya clan) was a title given to Gotama, the historic Buddha.

3. PSZR1, t. IX (1733-1736), No. 6705, pp. 490-491. The former khan was sent to St. Petersburg where he died in 1741.


5. Pal'mov, Ocherk, pp. 50-51. Novoletov in Kalmyki, p. 29, mistakenly dated this written commitment (revers) to October.


CHAPTER SIX

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Introduction

Over the last two centuries, a number of works have dealt with the Kalmyks, but the majority of this literature was devoted to linguistic, ethnic, and social issues, matters not necessarily germane to the study of the history of the Kalmyk khanate or its relations with other powers. Logically, most of the work done has been produced by those most deeply affected by the Kalmyk presence, namely, the Russians. Frequently these authors have questioned what use the Kalmyks have been to Russia, either imperial or Soviet. The meaning of that relationship to the nomads and its effects upon their social, economic, and political history have been issues relegated chiefly to journal articles with a narrower focus. It is valuable to review briefly the sources and literature to help understand both the history and current status of the work in the field. Because of the broad nature of this study and the inclusion of factors covering several centuries and numerous cultural and political systems, it would be impossible to survey all the literature which has been consulted during the process of research and writing. This essay will look at only those works found most valuable.

There is a large mass of archival materials extant and located in the Soviet Union dealing with the Kalmyks. Unfortunately, however, most such material remains unpublished and generally unavailable. There have been several excellent guides to archival and printed materials published. The earliest is V. L. Kotvich's "Russkie arkhivnye
dokumenty po snosheniiam s Oiratami v XVII i XVIII vv.," Izvestiya Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, VI seriya, t. XIII (1919), pp. 791-822, 1071-1092, 1199-1214. The scope of the study is vast, but it follows the pre-Soviet archival system and is, therefore, now limited in its usefulness. An excellent compilation of over nine hundred and fifty published works on the Kalmyks is found in Konstantin Khristenko, Ukazatel' literatury o kalmytskom narode (1728-1916 gg.) (Stalingrad: "Stalingradskaja Pravda," 1941). The most current bibliographical essay, already nearly thirty years old, is Nikolaus Poppe's "Stand der Kalmuckenforschung," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. LII (1955), heft 3 and 4 pp. 346-379. This account includes work on the Oyirad and the Volga Kalmyks by both Soviets and Western scholars. Denis Sinor's invaluable Introduction a l'Etude de l'Eurasie Centrale (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963) includes a short section on Kalmyk history as well as materials on the Mongols and the Oyirad. A Soviet evaluation of chiefly Russian works can be found in M. M. Batmaev, "K istoriografii politicheskogo polozheniia kalmytskogo khanstva v kontse XVII-pervoi chetverti XVIII vekov," Vestnik KNIILLI t. 15 (1976), pp. 140-157. The article points out the shortcomings of bourgeois historians and praises the objectivity brought to the field by Soviet historians. The most recent Western article, which draws attention to the Oyirad and Kalmyk sources, is John R. Kreuger's "Written Oirat and Kalmyk Studies," Mongolian Studies, vol. II (1975) pp. 93-113.
Archival Materials

Among the considerable archival fondy in the USSR those preserved in the Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (TsGADA) in Moscow and the Arkhiv Leningradskoe otdelenie Instituta istorii Akademii nauk SSSR (LOII) in Leningrad include the records of most of the prikazy, kolegii, and gubernii or Russia. In the case of this study, the most valuable collections are the Posol'skii prikaz and its dela. The Kalmytskie dela (begun in 1616) includes oaths, envoy reports, directives to and from the local authorities, and rumours picked up on the steppe and in the Russian towns. Here also are the Kirgiz-kaisatskie dela, the Nogaiskie dela, the Bashkirskie dela, and the Kabardinskie dela. Other records in TsGADA include those of the Razriadnyi prikaz (Department of Military Affairs), the Senate (fond Senata), and the fond Kamer-kolegii (College of Mining), with information on trade. Significant collections in LOII are those of local administrators in the fond Astrakhan'skoi prikaznoi palaty, including many of the governor's papers, and the dela Senata po Orenburgskoi gubernii, with numerous references to the later period of Kalmyk history.

A third, potentially valuable source is the collection of archives found in the Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Kalmytskoi ASSR in Elista, KASSR. Most of the materials here deal with the later period of Kalmyk history and are of no special use here. However, two fondy, the Upravleniia kalmytskim narodom, a group of administrative records, and the dela Kalmytskogo lamaistkogo dukhovnogo upravleniia, religious
endowments and practices, may contain information of value. They are rarely quoted, however, and their true worth remains unknown.

Published Source Materials

Considering the large numbers of archival documents in the Soviet Union and the praiseworthy efforts of scholars there to publish them, it is sad that no volume of purely Kalmyk papers has been published. There are, however, any number of sources for materials concerning the Kalmyks so that original documents are available. The Kalmyks devoted much of their own literary output to sacred, not historical, works. The few histories which do exist, although often mythic or anecdotal in character, are useful in any work on Kalmyk history. The Djanghar, the Kalmyk epic poem, forms a background for the Kalmyk view of their traditions. A handsome edition, published immediately prior to the Kalmyk World War II diaspora, is that of Semen Lipkin, trans., Dzhangar, *Kalmytskii narodnyi epos* (Moscow: "Khudozhestvennaia Literatura," 1940).

There are several histories of the Kalmyks, the earliest being the 1734 *Tale of the Oyirad* by Gabam Sharab, a compilation of genealogical lists tracing tribal lines back to Chinggis Khan. It was a major source for several later histories. The second Kalmyk work is Batur Ubashi Tumen's *Tale of the Dorben Oyirad* which also relies heavily on genealogical information but which stretches its chronological scope back to the Buddha and forward to 1819. Better known is the *Oyirad ulus'un togodzhi*, better known by its Russian title, the *Krataia istoriia kalmytskikh khanov* (*A Short History of the Kalmy Khans*). It covers the
period 1618-1775 and approaches its subject in a generally chronological pattern rather than relying on a series of who-begat-whom tables. A brief history which adds little to the aforementioned works, The Origin of the Torghud, the Toregut Rarelr or Torghoud(iyin) gharulgha, was found preserved at the Shara Suma monastery and published by Henning Haslund-Christensen, Men and Gods in Mongolia (Zayagan), trans. Elizabeth Sprigge and Claude Napier (New York: Dutton, 1935). Additional comments on this text, a transcription and retranslation are found in John R. Kreugler, "New Materials on Oirat Law and History, Part two: 'The Origin of the Torghuts,'" Central Asiatic Journal, vol. XVIII, no. 1 (1974), pp. 30-42.

The most important translator of the Kalmyk histories was Iurii Lytkin who published in Astrakhan all the major works during the nineteenth century, except for the work of Gaban Sharab. The "Skazanie o Derben-oiratak, Noin-Batar-Ubushi Tiumen'," appeared in Astrakhanskie Gubernskie Vedomosti, chast' neofitsial'naia, (1859), nos 43, 47, 50, (1860), nos. 11-13. The same journal carried the "Istorii Kalmytskikh khanov" in its chast' neofitsial'naia in 1860, nos. 19, 26, 33, 39, 44, 47, 49, 51-53, but included only about one-fifth of the entire work (covering the period to 1710). Another work, the Materialy dlia Oiratov (Materials on the Oyirad), whose provenance is unknown and which may be a conflation of a number of historical fragments, also appeared in the Astrakhanskie Gubernskie Vedomosti, chast' neofitsial'naia, (1860), nos. 45-46, (1861), nos. 7-8, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 26-29. All the translations by Lytkin, including the remainder of the "Istorii Kalmytskikh khanov" and the translation of Gaban Sharab, were included in Kalmytskie
istoriko-literaturnye pamyatniki v russkom perëvode (Elista: 1969) by
the Kalmytskiy nauchno-issledovatel'skiy institut iazyka, literatury i
istorii. This volume also included a translation of the "Biography of
Zaya Pandita" and a number of other fragments. Iurii Lyткин did a great
service by attempting to translate the Kalmyk histories, but his efforts
were seriously flawed, evidently by his inability properly to understand
the texts. There are numerous inconsistencies, some of which reflect,
no doubt, the state of the originals, as well as spots where the trans-
lation is virtually gibberish. The "Short History" also was translated
by A. M. Pozdneev, another eminent Orientalist, in "Kratkaïa istoriia
More recent translations, in English, were produced in the doctoral
dissertation of Mr. Steven Halkovic, Jr. of Indiana University.

There are two versions of the biography of Zaya Pandita, a
Khoshūd who became the most distinguished representative of the Yellow
Church among the Oyirad and Kalmyks. The standard publication is
Ratnabhadra, Rabjamba caya bandida-yin tughuji saran-u gerel kemeu ene
metu bolai. Corpus Scriptorum Mongolorum, vol. 5, no. 2 (Ulan Bator:
1959). Another version, including appendices, is that of Zh. Tsoolo,
ed., Biography of Caya Pandita in Dirat Characters. Corpus Scriptorum
Mongolorum, vol. 5, fasc. 2-3 (Ulan Bator: 1967). The biographies of
Zaya Pandita and his translations of sacred texts are examined in Stephen
A. Halkovic, Jr., "A Comparative Analysis of Zaya Pandita's Bibliography
Another text which exists in two versions and is the story of a battle dating from the early years of the Oyirad is found in Lama G. Galsanov, trans., "Istoriia Ubashi-khuntaidzhi i ego voiny s oiratami," Trudy Vostochnogo otdeleniia Arkheologicheskogo obshchestva, ch. IV (St. Petersburg: 1858) and in S. A. Kozin, "Oiratskaia pesn' o razgrome khalkhaskogo Sholo-ubashi-khuntaidzhi V 1587 g., "Sovetskoie vostokovedenie, t. IV (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, 1947).

The Kalmyk-Oyirad law codes, which date from the 1640 meeting of the Mongol princes, have been rather frequently published and are an excellent source for the study of the development of the social, economic and political orders. The best versions are found in F. I. Leontovich, K istoriia prava russkh inorodtsev. Drevnie mongolo-kalmytskie ili oiratskie ustav vzyskanii (Tsaadzhin-Bichik) (Odessa: G. Ul'rikh, 1879), also published as Drevnie mongolo-kalmytskie ili oiratskie ustav vzyskanii (Tsaadzhin-Bichik) (Odessa: G. Ul'rikh, 1879). The codes have also appeared in K. F. Golstunskii, Mongolo-oiratskie zakony 1640 goda, dopolnitel'nye ukazy Galdan-khun-taidzhiia i zakony, sostavlennye dla volzhskikh kalmykov pri kalmytskom khane Donduk-Dashe (St. Petersburg: 1880) and in V. A. Riazanovsky, Customary Law of the Mongol Tribes (Harbin: Artistic Printing House, 1929), idem, Mongolskoe pravo (preimushchestvenno obychnoe). Istoricheskii ocherk (Harbin: 1931). Other works on Kalmyk law include N. Basnin, "O drevnom kalmytskom ulozhenii," Iuridicheskii Vestnik, No. 3-5 (1876), pp. 56-79 and M. I. Gol'man, "Russkie pervody i spiski mongolo-oiratskich zakonov 1640 g., Mongol'skii sbornik. Ekonomika, istoriia, arkheologii (Moscow:

Other publications which involve Kalmyk sources include "Kalmytskii narodno-istoricheskii rasskaz" in Drevniaia i Novaia Rossiaia, No. 3, t.2 (1877), whose author is not listed; the translation by S. V. Lipovtsov entitled "O perekhod Turgutov v Rossiiu i obratnom ikh udalenii iz Rossii v Ziungariiu" in Sibirskii Vestnik (izdavaemyi Grigoriem Spasskim), (1820), ch. 12, kn. 10, pp. 167-188, kn. 11, 189-194, 205-210, kn. 12, 211-226; the "Materialy dlia kalmytskoi istorii," in Donskiia Eparkhial'niaia Vedomosti, (1875), Nos. 14, 18, and 20. I. I. Iorish authored Materialy o mongolakh i buriatakzh v arkhivakh Leningrada.

Istoriia, pravo, ekonomika (Moscow: Nauka, 1966). Other works whose authors are known include A. M. Pozdneev, Skazanie o khozhdenii v Tibetskii stranu Malo-Dorbotskago Baza-Bakshi: Kalmytskii tekst s perevodom i primechaniliami (St. Petersburg: 1897); N. P. Shastina, "Pis'ma Lubsan-taidzhi v Moskvu. Iz istorii russko-mongol'skikh otnoshenii v XVII v.," Filologiiia i istorii mongol'skikh narodov, pp. 275-288; Ir. Zhiteitsevi, Predmetnyi ukazatel' k istoricheskomu otdelu arkhiva Glavnogo Kalmytskogo Upravleniiia v g. Astrakhani s 1708 po 1836 g. Otchet o deiatel'nosti Petrovskogo obschestva po izucheniiu Astrakhanskogo kraia za 1889 g. (Astrakhan: 1891). The interesting account of the Swedish soldier I. H. Schnitzer can be found in "Zapiska shvedskogo kapitana I. Kh. Shnitseva, kotoryi byl u kitaiskikh pos-
lannikov byvshikh v 1714 godu u Aiuki-khana v provozhatykh,"

Ezhemesiachnye sochineniiia k pol'ze i uveseleniiu sluzhashchie
(November, 1764), pp. 6-31 and was republished as "Zapiska shvedskogo kapitana Shnitsera o poseshchenii kitaiskim posol'stvom v 1714 g. kalmytskogo khana Aiuki, "Astrakhanske Gubernskie Vedomosti, No. 39 (1843), pp. 8-25. Among the anonymous articles dating from the last century are "O kalmytskom khane i ego rode. Ukazatel' Geograficheskikh, Statistichekikh, Istoricheskikh i Etnograficheskikh materialov v 'Stavropol'skoi Gubernskoi Vedomosti,'" Prilozhenie k izvestiiam Kavkazskogo Otdela Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva (St. Petersburg: 1876); "O poddanstve kalmytsikh taishei," Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khramiashchikhsia v Gosudarstvennoi Kollegii Inostrannykh Del, ch. 3, Nos. 37, 53, 181 (Moscow: 1822); O poseshchenii Petrom Velikim kalmytskogo khana Aiuki vo vremia ego prebyvaniia v Astrakhani v 1722 g. Sostavil Ivanov, M. (Astrakhan: 1912); "Obshchii vid Astrakhani, opisanie kirgiz i kalmykov," Astrakhanskiye Gubernskie Vedomosti, No. 51 (1876); "Pis'mo astrakhanskogo voevody Iv. Volkova k kalmytskomu khana Aiuka," Vremennik obshchestva istorii i drevnostei Rossiis'kikh, No. 5 (1850); and "Rassprosnye rechi v Astrakhanskoj prikaznoi palate izdenia kniazia Kaspiulata Cherkasskogo Khapyka i poslov Daichina i Puntsuka taishi s ikh peregovorov, kasaiushchikhia do vydachi za Punetskuy taishu sestru kniazia Kasipulata, prisylkok k taisham ot Krymskogo khana poslov i podarkov i proch.," Astrakhanske Gubernskie Vedomosti, Nos. 20-21 (1843).

Any number of works issued by the Russian government and various academic groups and commissions, especially the Archeographic Society, have appeared, especially in the period before the 1917 Revolution. The
two great compilations of Russian governmental documents are the
Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov, khraniashchikhsia v
gosudarstvenoi komissii inostrannykh del, 40 volumes (Moscow: 1813-1828)
and the Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, 45 volumes
(St. Petersburg: 1830). The latter has been used in this study, es-
pecially volumea I (1649-1675), II (1676-1688), III (1689-1699), IV
(1700-1712), V (1713-1719), VI (1720-1722), and VII (1723-1727). An
interesting addendum is the Arkhiv Gosudarstvennogo Soveta (St. Peters-
burg: 1869). Highly valuable segments are to be found in the Akty
istoricheskie, sobrannye izdannye Arkeograficheskoi komissiei, 5
volumes. Of special interest are: "Tsarskaia gramota, verkhoturskomu
voevode o strozhaishem zaprete prodavat' i promenivat' porokha i
svintsa kalmykam," t. 4 (1842); "Otpiski astrakhanskim voevodam iz
Tsaritsyna o pokhode donskikh kazakov s kalmykami pod Azov," t. 4;
"Otpiska tsariu Verkhovskogo voevody Ivana Koltavskogo o vestiakh pro
bashkirtsev i kalmykov," t. 4; "Voevodskaya pamyat' astrakhanskomu
tamozhnomyu golove Petru Nikonovu o tom, chtob ne prininat' k zapiski v
tamozhnie knigi kalmytskich iasyrei," t. 4; "Otpiska astrakhanskikh
voevod Donskogo voiska atamanu Naumu Vasil'evu o vstupenii Kalmykov v
russkoe poddanstvo," t. 4; "Voevodskaya pokaznia pamyat' astrakhanskomu
streletskomu golove Prokofiiu Shibanovu o privedenii k sherti kalmytskich
taisheii," t. 4; "Otpiska Karginskoi slobody prikazshchika Feofilova i
starosti Kholkina o zamyslah kharevicha Devlet-Gireia, Kuchumova vnuka
i kalmytskich taishei," t. 4; "Otpiska samarskogo voevody Ivana Butur-
lina v Astrakhan o zamyslah kalmykov itti voinoi pod Ufu," t.4;
"Tsarskaia gramota kuznetskomu voevode Styinu o. peregovorakh s chernymi kalmykami," t. 4; "Svedneia o kalmykah," t. 4; "Tsarskaia gramota astrakhanskomu voevode kniaziu Primakov Rostovskomu o dozvolenii nakhodiashchimsia v Astrakhani moskovskim strel'tsam zanimat'sia ploshchadnym pis'mom, naravne s tamoshnimi ploshchadnymi pol'iachimi i byt' na Kose i Kalmytskom Barare Khodokami," t. 5 (1842); and "Pamiat' verkhoturskogo voevody Mikhaila Tolstova prizkazshchiku Kalmyshesveskoi slobody o vestiakh pro kalmykov," t. 5. During the period 1846-1872, the Archeographic Commission published another twelve volumes, the Dopolenia k aktam istoricheskim, sobrannym i izdannym Arkheografi-cheskoiu komissieiu in St. Petersburg. The articles of interest here are: "O priniatii mer protiv Kalmykov," t. 2, Nos. 62 and 63 (1846); "Otpiska astrakhanskikh voevod kniazei Ivan Pronskogo i Vasiliia Volkonskogo o nepriiaznennykh deistviakh kalmykov i o peregovorakh s ikh taishami," t. 3 (1848); "Akty o nabegakh kalmykov na Tiumenskii uzed," t. 5 (1853); "Chetyre otpiski Tobol'skogo voevody kniaziia Ivana Repnina i prizkazshchikov o nabeghe kalmykov na Verkhoturskie i Tobol'skie uezdy," t. 6 (1857); "Otpiska kuznetskogo voevody Grigoriia Volkova Tomskomu voevode o vestiakh pro kalmykov i kirgizov," t. 7 (1859); "Akty, otnosiashchiesia do voiny donskikh kazakov s kalmykami" t. 7 (1859) "O kalmykah," t. 7, Nos. 47 and 49; O Kalmytskoi istorii" t. 8, No. 29 (1862); "Otpiska insarskomu voevode Vasiliiu Norovu o nabegakh na russkie goroda kalmykov," t. 8; "Gramota astrakhanskim voevodam o napravlenii k kniaziu Kaspulat Cherkasskomu i k kalmytskim taisham Aiuka
i t.d.gramot," t.8; "Akty o snosheniakh i voennych deistviakh s kalmykami, kirgizami i bashkirtsami," t. 10 (1867); and "O Kalmykakh," t. 10.

The last major collection of pieces on the Kalmyks is the Akty otnosiashchiesia k istorii iuzhnoi i zapadnoi Rossii, published in fifteen volumes between 1846 and 1892 at St. Petersburg by P. A. Kulish and then later republished by the Akademiia Nauk SSSR's Arkheograficheskaia komissiia (1976). The volumes most consulted are II (1599-1637), III (Vremia B. Khmel'nitskago) IV (1657-1659, vremia Vygovskago), V (1659-1665), VI (1665-1668), VI (1657-1663; 1668-1669), VIII-X (1669-1672), XI (1672-1674), XII (1675-1676), XIII (1677), XIV (Vremia G. Khmel'nitskago, dopolnenia), and XV (1658-1659), (vremia Vygovskago, dopolnenia).

There are other works which draw upon the archives and, especially, on the accounts of various first-hand witnesses to various acts during the period covered by this study. They include: "Puteshestvie Fedora Isakovicha Baikova v Kitai s 1654 po 1658 god," Sibirskii Vestnik (1820), ch. 11-12, kn. 7-12, pp. 113-136, 137-158 and the "Primechaniia - Izdatel'ia k puteshestviu v Kitai Feodora Isakovicha Baikova," pp. 159-166; "Prodolzhenie zapisok puteshestviia akademika Lepskhina," Polnoe sobranie uchenykh puteshestviia po Rossii, t. IV (St. Petersburg: 1822); "Liubopytne voruvzhenie goroda Tobol'ska protiv nashestviia kalmytsvo v 1646 godu. (Vypisano iz Letopisi Sibirskoi, sochinennoi Il'ei Cherepanovym)," Sibirskii Vestnik (1821), ch. XIV, kn. 5 (May), pp. 1-6 Materialy po istoriko-statisticheskому opisanii Orenburgskogo kazach'ego voiska, vyp. 1 (Orenburg: 1901);
G. Bell' Antermoni, Izvestii o puteshestvii v Persiiu, v gorod Derbent, pri Rossiiskoi armii, pod predvoditel'ztvom Ego Velichestva Imperatora Petra I v 1722 g. Astrakhanskii sborniki, izdavaemyi Petrovskim obschestvom issledovatel'ei Astrakhanskogo kraia, vyp. 1 (Astrakhan: 1896); A. F. Pisemskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenni (Putevye ocherki), t. 6 (Moscow: 1895) and izd. 3, t. 7 Kalmyki (St. Petersburg: 1911).

There are a number of other collected documents and memoires which highlight specific periods of Kalmyk history. A number of official communications are included in the volumes entitled Krest'ianskaia voina pod predvoditel'ztvom Stepana Razina. Sbornik dokumentov, t. I (1666-iun', 1670 gg.) (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1954), t. II (avgust, 1670-ianvar', 1671), ch. II (vosstanie na iuge i volneniiia v drugikh oblastiakh russkogo gosudarstva) (1959), t. III (podavlenie vosstaniia kazn' S. Razina i pozdeishie otgoloski dvizheniiia s ianvaria, 1671, g.) (1972). For the period of the reign of Peter the Great, the emperor's papers contain a number of references. They can be found in Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo, 11 vols. (St. Petersburg, Petrograd, Moscow: 1887-1960), especially in t. 7, vyp. 2 (1946), t. 8, vyp. 2 (1951), t. 9, vyp. 1 (1950), vyp. 2 (1952). Also serving the same period and topic are segments of I. I. Golikov, Deianiia Petra Velikogo, mudrogo preobrazovatel'ia Rossii (izdanie vtoroe) (Moscow: 1837), t. I and II. Other works of specific value include A. I. Dobrosmyslov, ed., Materialy po

Kalmyk rulers and numbers of their vassal princes were involved with peoples and governments from all around the borders of Inner Asia. Unfortunately, Kalmyk relations with these non-Russian regions are far less well documented than those with Russia itself. Contacts with China, which became particularly active in the reign of Aiuka have been made available thanks to the efforts of two men. The first of these was N. Ia. Bichurin (Father Iakinf) who was stationed in Peking and published several works on the history of the Oyirad-Kalmyk tribes. Unfortunately, although Bichurin/Iakinf made a number of Chinese works available through his translations and study, he regularly adopted the official Chinese attitude that all nomads were troublesome, filthy bandits whose depredations disturbed the peace of the Son of Heaven.
Despite such flaws, his works, *Opisanie Chzhun'garii i Vostochnogo Turkestan'a v drevenm i nyneshnem sostoianii. Perevedeno s kitaiskogo* (St. Petersburg: Karl Krai, 1829) and "Istoricheskoe obozreni Oiratov ili Kalmykov s XV stoletiia do nastoiashchego vremeni," *Zhurnal Ministerstva Vnutrennykh Del*, (1833), ch. 8, nos. 3-4, ch. 9, nos. 5-8, have continued to draw the attention of historians of the region and are too often quoted.

Of far greater value is Paul Pelliot's *Notes critiques d'histoire Kalmouke* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1960), a work published posthumously. Originally designed to supplement the work of John Baddeley (see below), Pelliot's oeuvre includes the Ch'ien-lung Emperor's historical sketch of the Djunghar, segments of the *Piao Chuan* on the Djunghar, the Torghūd, comments on the Kerait and the Torghūd, and the return of the Torghūd to China. Also there are extensive notes and elaborate genealogical tables of the Oyirad tribal rulers drawn chiefly from information in the *Piao Chuan*.

There are two other published Chinese sources relevant to this study. The first is the translation of the *I-yu lu*, the record of the Chinese envoy Tulisen to the court of Aiuka Khan in 1712-1715. His account of the trip across Russia and his meeting with the Kalmyk ruler has been translated several times and into several European languages. The most available version is the *Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars, in the years 1712, 13, 14, & 15; by the Chinese Ambassador, and Published, by the Emperor's Authority, at Pekin*, trans. Sir George Thomas Staunton, Bart. (London:

Any number of Mongol sources have been published for the period covered by the rise and destruction of the Oyirad and the creation of the Djunghar and Kalmyk khanates. Surely the most famous source for the Mongol Empire is the "Secret History of the Mongols" a Chinese compilation based on Mongol sources. It has been translated several times, although for the purposes of this study the versions used most often were S. A. Kozin's Sokrovennoe okazanie (Iuan'-chao-bi-shi) (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1941), the translation by Francis Woodman Cleaves, The Secret History of the Mongols (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1892), and Marian McKellar and Denis Sinor translation of Paul Pelliot's Conqueror of the World: The Life of Chingis-Khan (New York: Viking Press, 1966). C. R. Bawden has published two particularly useful translations, The Mongol Chronicle Altan Tobci (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1955) and The Jebtsundamba Khutukhutus of Urga (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1961). A. M. Pozdneev published in 1883 the Mongol'skaia letopis' "Erdeniin erikhe" s poiasneniiami, zakliuchaiushchimi v sebe materialy po istorii Khalkhi s 1636 po 1736 g. (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademia Nauk, 1883) and P. S. Popov translated the Men-gu-iu-mu-tszi. Zapiski o Mongol'skikh Kochev'iakh. Perevod s kitaiskago (St. Peters-

From the point of studying the development of the Kalmyk-Russian relationship, the most useful work is a two-volume compilation of diplomatic documents dealing with north-west Mongolia and the Oyirad tribes entitled *Russko-Mongol'skie otnosheniia, 1607-1636*, *Sbornik dokumentov* (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 1959) and *Russko-Mongol'skie otnosheniia, 1636-1654*, *Sbornik Dokumentov* (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 1974). Not only are the documents helpful, but both volumes have excellent notes and indices. In addition there are several articles on Djungharia with valuable source materials for Kalmyk-Djunghar contacts. They include S. Lipovtsov, "Obozrenie Zjugarii," *Sibirski Vestnik* (1821) ch. XIII, kn. 2 (February), pp. 1-22, kn. 3 (March), pp. 23-38, ch. XIV, kn 4 (April), pp. 39-54, ch. XVI, kn. 20 (December), pp. 55-78; A. Maksheev, "Karta Dzungarii, sostavlenaia shvedom Renatom vo vremia ego plena u kalmykov s 1716

In the case of other regions and peoples with whom the Kalmyks had dealings, the major source of documents is collections published mostly after 1917 in Russia. For the Kazakhs, there are Materialy po istorii Kazakhskikh khanstv XV-XVII vekov (Alma Ata: "Nauka" Kazakhskoi SSR, 1969) and Kazakhsko-russkie otnoshenii v XVI-XVIII vekakh. Sbornik dokumentov (Alma Ata: "Nauka" Kazakhskoi SSR, 1961).

Secondary Works

As the preceding pages have indicated, there is a vast amount of primary literature available for the study of the Kalmyks. That rather considerable mass of documents and memoires pales, however, when compared to the abundance of secondary literature which has been published about the Kalmyks, their social, political, economic, and religious life. Before listing by category and discussing those works of greatest value in the preparation of this study, it may be helpful to examine the trends which have manifested themselves as authors over the last two centuries have written about the Volga's Mongol community. The nomads have never wanted for champions or detractors as their own life style and relationships with other peoples have been characterized.

The earliest writers on the Kalmyks, both Russians and Europeans, were products of the Enlightenment and the Romantic Era, scholars and dilettants, who travelled and collected information on the territories seen and the exotic peoples encountered. The most famous early visitor to the Kalmyks was P. S. Pallas, a member of the Russian Academy whose peregrinations through southern Russia provided material for a number of works published in the late XVIIIth century. His notes on the flora and fauna make interesting supplemental reading, but it is chiefly in two works that he printed his observations on Kalmyk life, traditions, and history. The first of these, the "Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Volkerschaften"
was published in two volumes in St. Petersburg, 1776–1801. The second work is the single volume *Travels Through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire in the Years 1793 and 1794* (London: Printed for John Stockdale, 1812). Pallas' work forms the foundation for virtually all scholarly study of the Kalmyks since his day and it is required reading for anyone interested in the Kalmyks or their customs. His genealogical information is a valuable addendum to other historical works on the Kalmyks, but it suffers due to Pallas' difficulty with the language and his frequent errors caused by an inability to distinguish names from titles, etc. Rather similar material is to be found in G. F. Miller's *Topografiia Orenburgskaia, to est, obstoistel'noe opisanie Orenburgskoi gubernii* (St. Petersburg: 1762). Another interesting compendium of information is I. G. Georgii's *Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov*, ch. IV (St. Petersburg: 1799). A highly observant visitor to the Kalmyks was the German Benjamin Bergmann who spent two years collecting chiefly social and economic data for his *Nomadische Streifereien unter den Kalmucken in dem Jahren 1802-03* (Riga: 1804-1805). Another, although less valuable work of the same general period is Vasilii Fedorovich Zuev's *O kalmytskom narode, kochuiushchem v prezhde byvshei Astrakhanskoi gubernii* (St. Petersburg: 1785).

Although the urge to visit and collect did not vanish with the nineteenth century's dawning, there appeared, gradually, historians of the Kalmyks. The presence of such men also heralded the development
of points of view as to the worth of the nomads themselves and their contributions to the growth of Russia. Most of these men agreed that the Russian government had found it expedient to call upon the Kalmyks to protect the Empire's southern flank and, upon direction, even to expand its borders. They differed, however, in characterizing the nature of the services rendered by the nomads. The first group, basically hostile to the Kalmyks, felt they had been untrustworthy raiders who actually pursued their own, selfish ends and who had been the implacable enemies of Russian settlement of the lower Volga. As the years passed, men of this ilk also came to view the Kalmyks as the westernmost tentacle in a treacherous scheme of the Mongols to reestablish the empire lost with the passing of the Yuan Dynasty. The same group tended to portray the Russian government as easily fooled by the sham loyalty of the nomads to the point of being shamelessly used, criminally incompetent, and no match for a pack of louse-infested Orientals.

    Perhaps the "father" of this group was N. Ia. Bichurin. Not only did he accept the Chinese attitude toward the Kalmyks, he also wrote that the Kalmyks were always ready to swear oaths of fealty without the slightest intention of keeping them. He, like his fellows, felt deeply that the Kalmyk preparedness to put their own interests above those of Russia was perfidy, indeed. Bichurin/Iakinf's attitude was seconded by K. I. Kostenkov in Statisticheskie svedeniia o kalmykakh kochuiushchikh v Astrakhanskoi gubernii (Astrakhan: 1886) and in his
"O rasprostranenii khristianstva u kalmykov," Astrhanskiia Eparkhial'nyia Vedomosti, XVIII god (1892), nos. 13-14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23. Kostenkov, who had lived among the Kalmyks, described them as wildmen, who were effectively controlled by Russia only after the majority had returned to China. That migration ended two centuries of shockingly bad manners on the part of the nomads.

The most famous member of this group was A. M. Pozdneev, a distinguished Orientalist who left both published and unpublished materials which dealt chiefly with linguistics and philology. He translated some of the Kalmyk historical works and wrote the historical study "Astrakhanskie kalmyki i ikh otnoshenie k Rossii do nachala nyneshnego stoletiia," Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo proveshchenia, ch. 244, otd. 2 (March, 1886), pp. 140-170, as an answer to the work of M. Novoletov (see below). Pozdneev was upset at Novoletov's kid glove treatment of the Kalmyks and set out to present the real story of Kalmyk relations with Russia. He felt the tsars' governments had been distinguished only by their ineptitude and willingness cheerfully to reward treachery. The Kalmyks had done little of benefit for Russia, but had always been ready to exploit and despoil her. Pozdneev found no reason to commend the Kalmyks for their service.

Among others in this group of pre-Revolutionary historians was a church scholar, Archimandrite Gruii, né Stepanov. In his Filosofiiia buddizma (Kazan: 1908) and especially in the Ocherk po
istorii rozprostraneniia khristianstva sredi mongol'skikh plemen.
T. I, ch. 1, Kalmyki (Kazan: 1915), Gurii expressed equally negative feelings. He was certain that the progress of the Empire had been slowed by Kalmyk efforts to retard the settlement of the Volga region. What was worse, they had failed to convert in any significant numbers to Orthodox Christianity. Gurii seemed baffled that they preferred to remain shamanists and Buddhists. Along with Gurii went E. Chonov in his Kalmyki v russkoi armii v XVII, XVIII i 1812 g. (Piatogorsk: G. D. Sukiasiants, 1912). Not only did Chonov give the Kalmyks short shrift (he suggested they first joined the Russians for combat in 1678), he also wrote that Khō' Orluk sought to revive the bad old days of the Golden Horde by recreating the steppe empire of the heirs of Batu. Since any such project in the Volga region would have run contrary to Russian imperial aims, it became, necessarily, evil.

There was another group, one whose basic attitude toward the nomads was more positive. According to their thinking, the Kalmyks were not the enemies of Russian settlement and were not constant participants in the spinning of anti-Russian webs. Among this group figured N. Nefed'ev, author of the Podrobnye svedeniia o volzhskikh kalmykakh, sobrannye na meste (St. Petersburg: 1834). His book, like many others, was more ethnographic than historical in content, but in discussing the past, Nefed'ev's stay on the steppe had brought him to conclusions other than those of Kostenkov. Nefed'ev recognized that the history of Kalmyk relations with Russia, both government and
colonists, had been troubled. Despite that and the fact that the nomads sometimes had thoughts which put their interests ahead of those of the Empire, Nefed'ev concluded that the Kalmyks had properly discharged their duties as vassals.

The better known member of this group was M. Novoletov, famous because of his *Kalmyki*. *Istoricheskii ocherk* (St. Petersburg: V. Demalov, 1884). Novoletov's work, which deals chiefly with the period after the death of Aiuka, relied heavily on previously uncited archival sources and published, secondary works. He maintained that the Kalmyks had been the allies of the Russians, not their vassals and cited Russian documents to prove that St. Petersburg had recognized the fact. Aiuka Khan was an independent ruler who sometimes fought with his Russian allies, but who also came increasingly to understand the advantages of Russian protection. However, Novoletov also suggested that by the last years of his life, the khan had become so upset by crude and escalating Russian interference that he considered returning his people to Djungharia.

After the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, new considerations were brought to bear on Kalmyk history and a cadre of Soviet historians began to tackle the problems of Kalmyk participation in or resistance to the Russian state. In general, especially since World War II and the collapse of relations between the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China, the newer histories have emphasized the voluntary nature of the alliance of Kalmyks and Russians while drawing sharp contrasts with the fate of the Djunghars at the hands of the Chinese.
There has also been an attempt to draw the emphasis away from the deeds of individuals and to emphasize the Marxist bent for understanding history in the "objective" economic factors which determine the acts of nations. As M. M. Batmaev noted in his "K istoriografii politicheskogo polozheniia,": "The historians of Kalmykia began to work on such problems as the reasons for the departure of a part of the Oyirad from Djungharia, the social structure of pre-revolutionary Kalmykia, the classes and class opposition, and the position of the laboring masses." (p. 148) While the attitude is one with merit, the standard Soviet history of the Kalmyks, the Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR. Dooktiabrskii period (Moscow: "Nauka", 1967), noted: "In the sources, unfortunately, there are few observations on the situation of the popular masses and concerning class warfare in Kalmyk society." (p. 146)

Of course Soviet historians did not simple spring to life by the will of the Party and the years before World War II were dominated by men trained before installation of the new attitudes. Representing the school of Bichurin was S. A. Kozin in his Sokrovennyi skazanie and his introduction to the Kalmyk national epic (Dzhangariada (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1940). Kozin emphasized what has been called the "Pan-Mongol" interpretation of Kalmyk history. According to him, the Oyirad tribes dreamed in the XVIIth century of reestablishing the Yuan dynasty and Ba'atur khungtaidji sent Khö Örlük west to secure that region for the new empire. He maintained that as late as the mid-XVIIIth century
(effectively to the end of the Djunghar khanate), the Kalmyk khanate was nothing more than the westernmost area of Djungharia.

Kozin has been excoriated by later Soviet writers chiefly for failing to see that the Russians and Kalmyks were naturally drawn together by mutual interests, chiefly economic. B. Ia. Vladimirtsov in his famed *Obshchestvennyi strol Mongolov: Mongol'skii kochevoi feodalizm* (Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1934) made what has become the classic statement of Marxist economic determinism in the social order of the Mongol nomads, including the Kalmyks. According to Vladimirtsov, there existed among the nomads an economic, social and political order much like that of feudal Europe. Although there is considerable value in Vladimirtsov's study, it is also difficult to equate agrarian feudalism to systems of steppe tribal and clan federation and vassalage. Even so, the basic tenets of Vladimirtsov, which fit in quite nicely with standard Marxist theories of economic and political progressions, continue to appear in Soviet historical work on the Kalmyks.

The really important historian of the period prior to World War II was N. N. Pal'mov. His *Ocherk istorii kalmytskogo naroda za vremia ego prebyvaniia v peredelakh Rossii* (Astrakhan: 1922), which is a general history of the Kalmyks, and the *Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov* ch. 1-5 (Astrakhan: 1926-1932), a series of studies of specific periods or trends in Kalmyk history, remain indespensable. Pal'mov might be named a representative of the
Novoletov school, a supporter of the Kalmyks. The Ocherk, which appeared soon after 1917, is treated with suspicion by some Soviet scholars and is charged with remaining basically "bourgeois." In it Pal'mov concluded that the Kalmyks had done their duty to Russia. They considered themselves, properly so, the allies of the tsar, not his slaves. Aiuka, who did at times act hostilely, was not the enemy of Russia, in spite of the serious provocations of local authorities. By the time of the publication of Etiudy, most of which deals with the post-1724 period, Pal'mov had begun to change his tune. Rather than emphasizing the centripetal forces that brought the Kalmyks into the Empire and allowed them to enjoy the fruits of the Revolution, Pal'mov dwelled on the extensive international dealings of the Kalmyks, indicating that they were not nearly so bound to the Russian state as others had suggested. He also indicated that they were Russian allies, but that the acts of the greedy and selfish Governor Volynskii had pushed them too far. The loyal allies of the Ocherk became the wronged neighbors of the Etiudy. Pal'mov went so far as to suggest, based on the evidence of a single letter, that Aiuka had been absolutely serious in his consideration of a plan to move all his people out of Russia and back to Djungharia. He blamed the Kalmyk dissatisfaction squarely on Russia, a power which had restricted Kalmyk freedoms and had intervened blatantly in Kalmyk internal affairs.

The other significant work from this period is S. K. Bogoiaev-lenskii's "Materialy po istorii kalmykov v pervoi polovine XVII veka," Istoriicheskie zapiski, t. 5 (1939), pp. 48-101. Bogoiaevlenskii's
work, which continues to be the only detailed study of the early period of Kalmyk history, is based on the detailed culling of archival records for references to the Kalmyks as they fought their way across Siberia and into the Volga-Caspian steppe. These efforts were not entirely satisfactory and later work has helped to clear up some points of confusion, but without Bogoiavlenskii's efforts, the years to the death of Kho Orluk would still be little more than fragments.

Following the war and the Kalmyk diaspora and recollection, a number of excellent works by younger Soviet historians have appeared. These works have relied heavily on unpublished archives and tend to stress the communality of Kalmyk and Russian interests. The first of these articles, based on the TagADA archives, is P. S. Preobrazhenskia's "Iz istorii russko-kalmytskikh otnoshenii v 50-60-kh godakh XVII veka," Zapiski KNILLI, vyp. 1 (1960), pp. 49-83, followed by her "K voprosu o sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniakh kalmykov," Istorii SSSR, No. 5 (1963), pp. 69-93. Preobrazhenskia's articles, which tend to keep history and dogma apart, signal the beginning stages of Soviet historians' awareness of the needs of nomads for pasturage. For her, the prime factor which impelled the Kalmyk move west and which eventually caused the Kalmyks to enter the Russian Empire was pasturage. Competition in the east was too strong for the Torghud chiefs to overcome. They could do little better in the west until they came to an understanding with Russia. The Russians were involved in the Polish wars. They needed men and animals for combat and looked anxiously for peace on the southern borders. They
were natural partners.

An even more prolific author is M. L. Kichikov (Ochirov) who has published three articles: "K istorii obrazovaniia Kalmytskogo khanstva v sostave Rossii," Zapiski KNII LI, vyp. 2 (1962), pp. 31-60; "K voprosu obrazovaniia kalmytskogo khanstva v sostave Rossii," Vestnik KNII LI (Elista: 1963), pp. 3-28; and "O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh i politicheskikh predposylkah poseleniiia kalmykov (chast' Oiratov) v stepiakh priural'ia i nizhnego povolzh'ia," Vestnik KNII LI, vyp. 15 (1976), pp. 5-26. Kichikov has also drawn quite extensively on archival materials and each of his articles has included historical insights, although the 1976 work concentrated on the social and economic makeup of the Kalmyks. Kichikov strives most diligently to point out the shortcomings of earlier historians, taking special pains to pooh-pooh authors like Kozin, who had endorsed the idea of a new Mongol Empire led by Torghüds, as well as Pal'mov, who is found wanting for his emphasis on the ambitions of individuals and for suggesting the Kalmyks seriously considered leaving Russia. He also uses Vladimirtsovian buzz-words emphasizing the "feudal" character of Kalmyk life and is anxious to tie the nomads firmly to Marxian economic determinism in passages such as: "The complexity of the territorial problem, on which depended the very life of the herding society of the Kalmyks, lay in its positive resolution, which depended not only on known objective historical conditions, but also on subjective factors, that is, on the growth of Russo-Kalmyk relations." ("K voprosu obrazovaniia kalmytskogo khanstva v sostave Rossii," p. 4.)
Much of this criticism is based on the ritualistic use of standardized formulae typical of Soviet history. Kichikov's work draws on a wide variety of sources and stresses with even more force than Prebrazhenskaia the importance of the resolution of the grazing issue for the survival of the Kalmyks as they entered the Volga region. Kichikov has clearly seen that the needs of the Kalmyks for refuge and pasturage fit nicely into the requirements of Moscow for warriors. The meshing of these needs allowed the two parties to strike a mutually advantageous bargain, one which Kichikov, like other Soviet historians, equates to the "voluntary entrance" of the Kalmyks into the makeup of the Russian empire.

As has already been mentioned, the 1960's saw the publication of the "official" history of the Kalmyk ASSR, the Ocherki istorii Kalmutskoi ASSR, in two volumes, one pre- and the other post-1917. As might be expected, this work strongly emphasizes the "feudal" nature of Kalmyk society, the voluntary union of the Kalmyks to Russia, and the fact that the best hope for the Kalmyks, both past and present, continues to lie with the peoples of the Soviet Union. Most of the sources used here are secondary, but there are numbers of references to archival materials and interesting efforts to explain the evolving nature of Kalmyk society, especially as the result of contact with Russia.

There is one other product of the 1960's that is useful, T. I. Belikov's Kalmyki v bor'be za nezavisimost' nashei rodiny v XVII, XVIII i pervoi chetverti XIX v. (Elista: Kalmyogizdat, 1965).
Here is chronicled the participation of Kalmyk troops in the building of the Russian Empire. Belikov takes great pains to remind his readers that the Kalmyks, like the Russians, Ukrainians, and others fought not so much for the creation of an empire as for the freedom of a great, multi-ethnic state whose advantages could be found nowhere else. As is so often the case in Soviet literature on the subject, there is the feeling that the Kalmyks were blessed by some sort of prescient knowledge which kept them on the side of Russia. Certainly, Belikov pictures the Kalmyks as faithful allies who most often balked, not out of disloyalty to Russia, but because the commanders set over them by the Russian government were incompetent. Belikov has done much to help to rectify the rather poor picture of the Kalmyks given by Chonov.

Sadly, few western historians have tackled the problem of the Kalmyks either directly or as an adjunct to the study of the Russian frontier. One of the earliest works dealing with the Kalmyks is Thomas de Quincey's *Revolt of the Tartars or Flight of the Kalmuck Khan and his People from the Russian Territories to the Frontier of China* (London: 1837). This rather lurid account is de Quincey's fictionalized version of Bergmann's study of the Kalmyks and deals mostly with events coming after those germane to this study. The earliest historical work on the Kalmyks is Henry Howorth's *History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century. Part I, The Mongols Proper and the Kalmucks* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1876). Howorth made considerable effort to refer to Mongol and Arabo-Persian sources for his information and his work continues to be read and
cited. However, much of his material was contradictory and many of
the theories postulated by him have since been proven incorrect.

Maurice Courant in L'Asie Centrale aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles:
Empire Kalmouk ou Empire Mantchou? Annales de l'Université de Lyon,
Nov. Serie, fasc. 26 (Lyon: A. Rey, 1912) attempted to deal with the
Djunghar-Manchu struggle for preeminence in the Eurasian heartland.
His work is most helpful since it draws upon Wang Hsien-ch'ien's
Tung-hua-lu, but devotes precious little space to the Volga Kalmyks.
Silence on the Kalmyks does, however, help to point out the absurdity
of the argument that the Volga and its Mongol khanate were merely the
western flank of the Junghar-led revival of the Mongol Empire.

At the close of the second decade of this century, John F.
Baddeley published his Russia, Mongolia, China, Being some Record of
the Relations between them from the beginning of the XVIIth Century
to the Death of the Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich A.D. 1602-1676 Rendered
mainly in the form of Narratives dictated or written by the ENVOYS
sent by the RUSSIAN TSARS, OR their VOEVODAS in SIBERIA to the Kalmuk
and Mongol KHANS & PRINCES; and to the EMPERS OF CHINA with Intro-
ductions, Historical and Geographical Also a SERIES OF MAPS showing
the progress of Geographical Knowledge in regard to NORTHERN ASIA
During the XVIth, XVIIth, & early XVIIIth Centuries, 2 vols. (London:
Burt Franklin, 1919). Baddeley's splendidly titled book is a
compilation of all sorts of reports and maps which help to trace the
movement of the Kalmyks westward. It also contains a considerable
amount of very confused material indicative of the state of affairs
when Baddeley wrote. It was this book which Pelliot hoped to supplement and correct by publishing his *Notes critiques d'histoire Kalmouke*.

Certainly the best general history of Central Asia is Rene Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1970). This volume, translated by Naomi Walford from the 1952 edition of *L'Empire des Steppes*, covers the entire history of Inner Asia as recorded in Mongol, Chinese, Persian, Arabic, and Western sources. Unfortunately, due to the grand scope of the work, there is not nearly enough space devoted to the Oyrad and the Volga Kalmyks.

Several more recent, published works have added considerably to the scholarship available in the West on the Kalmyks. There is a number of valuable articles in the *Kalmyk-Oirat Symposium*, Kalmyk Monograph Series, No. 2 (Philadelphia: The Society for the Promotion of Kalmyk Culture, 1966), edited by Arash Bormashinov and John R. Krueger. Included are articles on a variety of topics. Historically the most useful are G. V. Vernadsky's "Istoricheskaia osnova russko-kalmytskikh otnoshenii," pp. 11-48 and N. N. Poppe's "Rol' Zaia-Pandity v kul'turnoi istorii mongol'skikh narodov," pp. 57-70, both of which are followed by a brief English summary. Vernadsky offers valuable information on the early contacts between Russians and Kalmyks. He posits that the Kalmyks failed to establish a really independent status in Russia due to their own internal divisions which made combat against the organized Russians impossible,
especially since Kalmyk relations with other steppe peoples, potential allies, were almost always hostile. Poppe's article gives a general appreciation of the meaning of the contributions of Zaya Pandita to the culture and advancement of the Kalmyks.

An excellent study of Kalmyk society, much of which is devoted to the twentieth century Kalmyks living in America, is Paula Rubel's The Kalmyk Mongols: A Study in Continuity and Change (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1967). In developing the background for modern Kalmyk society, Rubel gives considerable information on Kalmyk history and traditional society. She also makes several speculations as to the evolving social political structures whose development was cut short by the 1771 outmigration and the subsequent dispersal of the Kalmyk peoples.

The preceding paragraphs have attempted to detail the general trends and a number of the most important works in the study of the history of the Kalmyk khanate to the death of Aiuka Khan. There are a great many other works which have been useful, to varying degrees, in the writing of this study. The most effective way to present them is to divide them into categories according to general topic.

Those general works on the Kalmyks include: D. Anuchin and A. Pozdneev, "Kalmyki," Brokgaus-Efron Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar', t. XIV (27) (St. Petersburg: Brokgaus-Efron, 1895), pp. 57-64, one of the most readily available nineteenth century accounts of the Kalmyks; V. V. Bartol'd, "Kalmyki," Sochineniia, t. II, Obschchie raboty po istorii Srednei Azii, ch. 1, Raboty po istorii Kavkaza i Vostochnoi...
Evrop'y (Moscow: Vostochaia Literatura, 1963), pp. 96-101, a very brief treatment of the Kalmyks; Baron F. Biuler, "Kochuiushchii e osedlo-zhivyushchii v astrakhanskoii-gubernii inorodtsy," Otechestvennye Zapiski, t. XLVII (1846), No. 7 (July), ch. II, pp. 1-28, No. 8 (August), ch. II, pp. 59-125, a basically anthropological study of the Kalmyks; A. Kul, "Istoricheskie svedeniia o kalmykkakh, kochuiushchikh na zemle Voiska danskogoi," Severnyi Arkhiv, No. 6 (1824), ch. 9, pp. 280-342, a study of those Kalmyks who moved west to settle with the Don Cossacks; N. Masiakovets, Fizicheskoe i statisticheskoe opisanie kochev'ia danskikh kalmykov (Novocherkassk: General'nyi shtab polka, 1872-1874), similar to, but considerably broader than the work by Kul; G. Z. Minkin, "O feodalizme u kalmykov," Revoliutsionnyi Vostok, No. 1 (17) (1933), pp. 16-32, an attempt to fit the Kalmyks into the standard Marxist schema of economic development; Pavel I. Neboli'sin, Ocherki byta kalmykoi: Khosh'outovskogo ulusa (St. Petersburg: Karl Krai, 1852), an interesting account of the Khosh'ud who remained in the Volga region with references to their past history and traditional practices in hunting and trade; A. Popov, "Kratkaia zamechaniiia o privilzhskikh kalmykkakh," Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia, ch. XXII (1839), otd. II, pp. 17-46, a very general approach to the Kalmyks as a people; I. Ravinskii, Khoziaistvennoe opisanie Astrakhanskoi i Kavkazskoi gubernii po grazhdanskomu i estestvennomu ikh sostoianiiu v otnoshenii k zemledeliu, promyshlennosti i domovodstvu, sochinennoe po nachertaniiu Vol'nogo Edonomiceskogo obshchestva (St. Petersburg: 1809), a general account of the progress of sedentary economies among
the natives of the Volga region; A.I. Voeikov, "Opisanie Kalmytskago naroda," Syn Otchestva, ch. 75 (1822), No. V, pp. 207-226, No. VI, pp. 243-267, No. VII, pp. 293-308, a very interesting early account of the Kalmyks; and Irodion A.I. Zhitetskii, Ocherki byta Astrakhanskikh kalmykov. Etnograficheskie nabliudenia, 1884–1886 (Moscow: M. G. Volchaninov, 1893), another general work which was an expanded edition of the author's Astrakhanskie Kalmyki–Nabliudenia i zametki (Astrakhan: 1892).

with whom they were most often in contact after settling in the Volga region; N. L'vovskii, "Proiskhodzenie i istoriia kalmyk Bol'shederbetovskogo ulusa," Uchenye zapiski Kazanskogo universiteta, kn. 5-6 (1898), a study of one of the ulus which remained in Russia after the outmigration; Ts. D. Nominkhanov, "Mongol'skie elementy v etnonimike i toponimike Uzbekskoi SSR," Zapiski KNIILI, vyp. 2 (1962), pp. 266-271, a good example of the historical conclusions which can be drawn from the ethnic elements preserved in the names of peoples and places; A. Pavlov, Ob aziatskich narodekh, obitaiushchikh v iuzhnoi Rossi, i t. d., ob indeitsakh, vodvoriushikhsia v Astrakhani, i o kalmykakh, kochuiushchikh v astrakhanskoi stepi (St. Petersburg: 1845), an interesting, though quite dated survey; I. P. Potapov, "The Altay," The Peoples of Siberia (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), one of the newer, brief studies; D. N. Sokolov, "Orenburgskie kalmyki, etnograficheskie zametki," Izvestiia Orenburgskogo otdela Russkogo geograficheskogo obschestva, t. 21 (1909), pp. 152-170, a summary of the ethnographic history of those Kalmyks who settled in what was to become the Orenburg province; "Teleuty ili Belye Kalmyki," Sibirskii Vestnik, (1821), ch. 13, kn. 1 (January), pp. 1-8, ch. 16, kn. 10 (October), pp. 9-14, kn. 11 (November), pp. 15-20, one of the earlier notices on the people known as the White Kalmyks.

There is also a large amount of literature devoted to linguistic issues. Since many of these volumes are either dictionaries or grammars, their function will require no amplification. Arash Bromanshinov, Kalmyk Manual (American Council of Learned Societies,
izucheniiu istorii kalmytskogo iazyka (Moscow: "Nauka" Glavnaia Redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1975), the latter is a particularly interesting guide to the derivation and use of numbers of terms found in Kalmyk, Classical Mongol, and numbers of other languages of Central Asia and Siberia; Nicholas Poppe, Introduction to Mongolian Comparative Studies (Helsinki: 1959); G. J. Ramstedt, Kalmuchisches Wörterbuch (Helsinki: Suomalais-Ugrilainen Seura, 1935); Garma D. Sanzheev, Grammatika kalmytskogo iazyka (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1940).

Much of the material for Kalmyk social structure has already been noted in works of either a general nature or in studies such as those dealing with Kalmyk laws. A few studies should be added to these others. Among them are: G. O. Avliaev, "K voprosu o 'shebenerakh' i 'ketchinerakh' v sostav kalmytskikh ulusov astrakhanskoi gubernii," Vestnik KNIILI, No. 9 (1974), pp. 139-154, concerning the development of two special social groups within the Kalmyk and the remnants of those groups to be found among the Kalmyks who remained in Russia; and I. I. Orekhov, ed., Iz istorii kul'tury dorevoliutsionoi Kalmykii (Volgograd: 1967), a collection of essays on Kalmyk culture and society. Two other interesting works with historical value are I. G. Kovalev, Kalmytskii narodnyi ornament (Elista: Kalmytskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1970) and A. G. Mitirov, "Ornament Mongol'skikh narodov kak istoriko-etnograficheskii istochnik," Vestnik KNIILI, No. 10 (1974), pp. 149-159, which both deal with the use of folk art as historical and ethnographic sources.

There are a number of volumes and articles which deal with
specific areas of the Kalmyk economy, most especially herding. Among those used the most helpful have been: Sh. S. Chimit-Dorzhiev, "Iz istorii russko-mongol'skikh ekonomicheskikh sviazei," Istoriiia SSSR (1964), No. 2 (March-April), pp. 137-156, on the east-west trade lines which the Kalmyk migrations threatened; U. E. Erdniev, "K istorii zemlepol'zovaniia v Kalmykii," Vestnik KIILLI, t. 15 (1976), pp. 27-38, on the growth of agriculture among the Kalmyks; idem, "Skotovodstvo u kalmykov v XIX-nachale XX vekov," Zapiski KIILLI, vyp. 4 (1969), pp. 20-46, with some interesting statistical information on herd sizes and tradewith the Russians; "Kalmytskie ovech'i stada," Ezhemesiachnye izvestiia Vol'nogo Ekonomicheskogo obschestva, No. 183 (1789), t. 2, pp. 6-19, with observations on Kalmyk sheep herds; A. I. Karagodin, "K voprosu o kharaktere chastnogo zemlevladeniiia v Kalmykii," Vestnik KIILLI, t. 15 (1976), pp. 39-51, on the growth of agriculture among the Kalmyks; K. Kostenkov, "Zametka o skotoprogonnykh dorogakh v Astrakhanskoi gubernii," Astrakhanskye Gubernskye Vedomosti, No. 27 (1869), pp. 22-38, on cattle production; P. Kuleshov, "Stepnye porody krupnogo rogatogo skota: Kırğızskogo, kalmytskogo i ukrainskogo," Zemledel'cheskaia gazeta, No. 20 (1877), pp. 68-79, also on the raising of large horned cattle by the Kalmyks; Materialy statistiko-ekonomicheskogo i estestvenno-istoricheskogo obsledovaniia kalmytskoi stepi Astrakhanskoi gubernii. 2 vols. (Astrakhan: 1910), chiefly statistical information on the numbers of animals and the specific herding patterns of the remaining Volga Kalmyks with some information on the historical nature of tenure in the Astrakhan guberniia; Ivan
Merder, Sbornik svedeni o torgovle loshad'mi v Rossii (S prilozeniem karty konskoi torgovli i punktov konskikh iarmarak) (St. Petersburg: Mesnik i Riman, 1891), interesting information on the patterns of trade in horses which developed between the Kalmyk herders and the Russian government; P. S. Pallas, An Account of the Different Kinds of Sheep found in the Russian Dominions, and among the Tartar Hordes of Asia (Edinburgh: T. Chapman, 1794), background material on the sheep raised by the Kalmyks in the XVIIth and VIIIth centuries; "Skotovodstvo u kalmykov," Zemledel'cheskaia Gazeta, No. 33 (1868), pp. 16–27, on Kalmyk cattle herds.

Kalmyk shamanism has been dealt with only marginally over the years and the best sources on it remain the observations of men like Pallas. Buddhism, on the other hand, has received considerably more attention. Any effort to discuss it must include, however, at least some studies of the Buddhism practised in Mongolia and Tibet. An interesting, but very difficult volume to find is Naiman B. Badmaev's Domashne-religioznyi byt privolzhskikh kalmykov (Astrakhan: 1899).

Two recent works devoted to the importance of and contributions by Zaya Pandita are both the products of Andrei V. Badmaev: Rol' Zaia Pandity v istorii dukhovnoi kul'tury kalmytskogo naroda (Elista: 1968) and Zaia Pandita (Elista: 1967). A series of observations preserved in Astrakhan make up the heart of I. Cherkasov's O lamaizme (Otryvok iz rukopisnogo sochineniia o drevnom sostoianii Astrakhanskogo kraia) (Astrakhan: 1856), which can also be found in the Astrakhanskie Gubernskie Vedomosti (1856), Nos. 45, 46, 49, 50. An excellent
An excellent and recent study of the political influence of the Buddhist Church among the Mongols is Larry William Moses' The Political Role of Mongol Buddhism (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977).

A long series of articles intended to explain the Buddhism of the Kalmyks was published under the title "O Buddisme" in the Donskiia Eparkhail'niia Vedomosti (1871), No. 5-7, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19; (1872), Nos. 6, 7, 12, 15, 17; (1875), Nos. 1, 2, 5, 14-17. A. M. Pzodneev published an account of the Buddhist monastic system as set up among the Mongols and including information on the Kalmyks in "Ocherki byta buddiiskikh monastyrei i buddiiskogo dukhovenstva v Mongolii," Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva po Otdeleнии etnografii vyp. XVI (1887), pp. 7-46. Giuseppe Tucci's observations on Tibetan Buddhism found in Tibetan Painted Scrolls, vol. II (Rome: 1949) are useful for tying the practices of Lhasa with those of the Volga. A brief, but informative study of the persistence of Buddhism among the Kalmyks is found in I. Ul'ianov's Astrakhanskie kalmyki, ikh domashne-religioznyi byt i obshchestvenno-religioznye nuzhdy (St. Petersburg: "Gerol'd," 1910).

Missionary efforts by the Russians were the focus of most writings on religion prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. Opinions of these authors divided into basically two schools. One group felt that the Kalmyks were making a genuine effort to find their way into Christianity. The other felt that after more than a century and a half the Kalmyks had shown almost no real interest in giving up shamanism and Buddhism and would probably never become Christianized in any significant
numbers. Besides Archimadrite Guri, who was discussed earlier, writers on the Kalmyks and Christianity include R. G. Ignat'ev in "Pokhodnyi ikonostas i tserkovnaia utvar", pozhalovanny Petrom Velikim, v Orenburge," Obrazovanie i promyshlennost', N. 10 (1872), concerning the first converts and the mobile chapel given by Peter the Great for use in the Kalmyk steppe; F. M. Iushtin, "Obozrenie meropriiatii pravitel'stva k rasprostraneniiu khrisianstva mezhdu kalmykami," Prilozenie k Astrakhanskiia Eparhial'nyia Vedomosti (1883), Nos. 21-24 (10 November-25 December), pp. 1-62, a detailed study of the spread of Christianity among the nomads; N. T. Kamenskii, Kratkaia istoriia Astrakhanskoii eparkhiia (Astrakhan: I. Perov, 1886), a good general history of the Astrakhan eparchy which concluded that the spread of Christianity among the Kalmyks was no slower or less productive than it had been among the Jews or the Armenians living there; K. Kostenkov, "O rasprostranenii khrisianstva u kalmykov," Astrakhanskiia Eparhial'nyia Vedomosti, XVIII (1892), Nos. 13-14 (July), pp. 381-404, No. 16 (August), pp. 469-478, No. 18 (September), pp. 539-553, No. 20 (October), pp. 624-634, No. 22 (November), pp. 697-702, No. 23 (December), pp. 735-743, an excellent, highly detailed study of the work of various missionaries, Bible societies, and the Russian government to convert the Kalmyks; Ia. Lebedinskii, "O vvedenii prepodavaniia tatarskago i kalmytskago iazykov v Astrakhanskoii dukhovnoi seminarii," Astrakhanskiia Eparhial'nyia Vedomosti (1891), No. 5 (March), pp. 106-109, No. 10 (May), pp. 210-218, an article which concluded that the Russian church authorities made little effort to prepare seminarians with a working
knowledge of Kalmyk until the early years of the XIXth century; Iv. Lepekhin, "O kalmytskakh kreshchenykh," Zapiski puteshestviia. Polnoe sobranie uchenykh puteshestvi po Rossii (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1821), the early observations of Lepekhin on the state of the converted Kalmyks; N. I., "V kakom godu posledovalo otkritie Astrakhanskoi dukhovnoi seminarii?," Astrakhanskiia Eparkhial'nyia Vedomosti (1892), No. 1 (January), pp. 4-9, traces efforts to open a local seminary for the conversion of the Kalmyks to their final success in 1777; N. N. Pal'mov, Iz Astrakhanskoi tserkovnoi stariny (Astrakhan: Gubernskaia tipografiia, 1911), reprinted articles from the eparchate's newspaper about the ecclesiastical history of the Astrakhan region; I. Popov's Kriticheskii obzor glavneishikh osnovo polozenii lamaizma s tochki zrenia khristianskogo uchenia (Kazan: 1900), a fascinating volume on the approach taken by missionaries for the conversion of the Kalmyks; Protoierei Ioann Savvinskii, Istорicheskaia zapiska ob astrakhanskoi eparkhii, 2 vols. (Astrakhan: 1903), a churchman's history of the Astrakhan region; idem, Astrakhanskaia eparkhiia (1602-1902 gg.). Obshchee istорicheskoе obozrenie eparkhii, vyp. 1-yi (Astrakhan: V. L. Egorov, 1905), the history of the Astrakhan eparchate with particular attention to missions among those "foreigners" living in the region; P. Shestakov, "Nekotoryia svedeniia o rasprostranenii khrisianstva u kalmykov," Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnago prosveshchenia (1869), No. 10 (October), otd. 4, pp. 123-143, reprinted in Astrakhanskiia Eparkhial'nyia Vedomosti (1893), No. 9 (1 May), pp. 249–262, No. 10 (16 May), pp. 291-301, valuable observations
especially on the career of Ieromonakh, later Arkhimandrit, Nikodim
and his assistants who began the efforts of the Church to live in the
steppe and convert and control the Kalmyks.

The most important studies of the Kalmyk legal codes have already
been noted above. To them should be added M. I. Gol'man, "Russkie
perevody i spiski mongolo-oiratskikh zakonov 1640 g.," Mongol'skii
sbornik. Ekonomika, istoria, arkheologiiia (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk
SSSR. Institut vostokovedeniia, 1959), a study of all the extant
copies of the Mongol laws and the various translations of them which
have appeared over the years; N. Basnin, "O drevnom Kalmytskom ulozhenii,"
Turidicheskiia Vestnik, (1876), Nos. 3-5, pp. 15-41, a general survey of
the 1640 code; and S. Sagaev, "Pravo feodal'noi Kalmykkii vtoroi poloviny
XVII veika," Vestnik KNILL, No. 3 (1968), pp. 157-165, which pounds
home the theme that the Kalmyks who voluntarily joined the Russian
Empire, were already saddled with a legal code which divided that
nomadic society into antagonistic, feudal classes.

The final category is those articles and books which deal mostly
with historical issues. There have been precious few publications
devoted exclusively to historical periods and characters. Among the
most helpful are: A. A., "Istoricheskiiie svedeniia o kalmytskom khane
Aiuka i ego rode," Samarskie Gubernskie Vedomosti, (1867), Nos. 9-10,
pp. 54-72, a brief history of the Kalmyks on the Volga; I. Bentkovskii,
Khronologicheskii ukazatel' istoricheskikh svedeniia o kalmykakh.
Sbornik statisticheskikh svedeniia o Stavropolskoi gubernii. No. 7
(Stavropol': 1876), a brief guide to the Kalmyk settlement of what
became Stavropol' province; Vasilii Bobrov, "Kalmytskii vladelets Aiuka khan," Astrakhanskie Gubernie Vedomosti, No. 24-25 (1843), No. 5, chast' neofsial'naia, pp. 172-194, a biography of the most famous of the Kalmyk khans; M. Kichikov, "O kalmytskom geroe Mazan-Batyre," Zapiski KNITLI, vyp. 4 (1964), pp. 75-76, concerning the career and apotheosis of one of the most successful Kalmyk commanders in the Russian campaigns against the Crimeans; Iu. Lytkin, "Torgoutovskii Aiuki-Khan," Kalmytskie istoriko-literaturnye pamyatniki v russkom perevode (Elista: 1969), pp. 62-79, a brief, but heavily footnoted biography of Aiuka; "O nashestvii kalmykov na Kabardu," Zakavkazskii Vestnik, No. 21 (1847), pp. 43-60, one of the earliest discussions of the ill-fated raid of Kho Órluk in 1644; "Osvobozhdenie isyrei plennykh u nashikh kochevnikov kirgizov i kalmykov," Severnaia Pchela, No. 123 (1862), pp. 15-26, a discussion of one of the major bones of contention between the Russians and the nomads, namely, the freeing of captives; I. P. Pan'kov, Iz istorii stavropol'skih turmen i kalmykov v 17-18 vekakh (Novye materialy) (Chardzhou: Turkmenskii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii Institut imeni V. I. Lenina, 1960), a brief account of the Kalmyk and Turkmen settlements in the Stavropol' area in the North Caucasus region; "Rassprosnye rechi v Astrakhanskoi priaznoi palete uzdenia kniazia Kaspulata Cherkasskogo Khapyka i poslov Daichina i Puntsuka taishi s ikh peregovorov, kasaishchikhsia do vydachi za Puntsuka taishu sestry kniazia Kaspulata, prisylk k taisham ot Krymskogo khana poslov i podarkov i proch.," Astrakhanskie Gubernskie Vedomosti, No. 20-21 (1843), pp. 155-167, dealing chiefly
with the relationship which developed between Prince Cherkasskii and the royal clan of the Kalmyks.

Where relations with Russia's other powers are concerned, the available literature is extensive and would require volumes to list. The selections included in this essay do no more than highlight the tomes which have been consulted and do little more than scratch the surface of those studies which have been published.

There are three reference works which have been quite valuable and should be mentioned immediately. The first is Charles E. Gribble's A Short Dictionary of 18th-century Russian/Slovarik russkogo iazyka 18-go veka (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Slavica Publishers, Inc., 1976), one of the very few works devoted to the XVIIIth century vocabulary. Another is A. P. Pronshtein and V. Ia. Kiashko, Vspomogatel'nye istoricheskie distsipliny (Moscow: "Prosveshchenie," 1973), an invaluable guide to measurements of time, distance, weight, and monetary value for the whole of Russian history. The third is Sergei G. Pushkarev's A Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms from the Eleventh Century to 1917, ed. G. Vernadsky and Ralph T. Fisher (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), a most helpful volume for quick clarification of the development of a number of terms and offices.

Many histories of Russia have been written, but very few do more than mention the Kalmyks, if that. Normally, only those sufficiently detailed to deal with specific regions of the history of campaigns touch on the role of the Kalmyks. Three such works have been of greatest value here. The first is the massive Istoriia Rossii s
древнейших времён (новое издание) by S. M. Solov'ev and published in Moscow by the Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literaturny.
The volumes used here have been kniga V, t. 9 and 10 (1961), kniga VI, t. 11 and 12 (1961), kniga VII, t. 13 and 14 (1962), kniga VIII, t. 15 and 16 (1962), and kniga IX, t. 17 and 19 (1963). Also of considerable use has been the Ocherki istorii SSSR, the great Soviet history of Russia published at Moscow by the Institut istorii of the Akademiia Nauk SSSR. Those volumes consulted for this study were Period feodalizma, Konets XV v. - nachalo XVII v. (1955), Period feodalizma, XVII v. (1955), and Period feodalizma, Rossiia v pervoi chetverti XVIII v., Prebrazovaniia Petra I (1954). The third is George Vernadsky's The Tsardom of Moscow, 1547-1682, Vol. 5, parts 1 and 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).


When this study was first planned, the chief thrust of the research was to be directed at learning how policy was made in Russia and what sorts of attitudinal frameworks were present in decision-making process. Without extensive archival use, however, such a plan was impossible. Sadly, there is not a large body of literature which helps in the fleshing out of general policy trends within the imperial Russian government. Of those which did prove useful, the best were: D. I. Bagalei, Ocherki iz istorii kolonizatsii stepnoi okrany Moskovskogo gosudarstva (Moscow: 1887); L. S. Burchinova, "Kolonial'naia politika tsarisma v Kalmykii v russkoi istorigrafii," Vestnik KNILI No. 3 (1968), pp. 5-25, a Soviet study which concludes that pre-Revolutionary historians of the relations between Russia and the Kalmyks collected plenty of information but failed to see the economic benefits of incorporation of the Kalmyks, i.e., a source of animals and an effective pacification of large areas which could later be colonized; N. G. Apollonva, "K voprosu o politike absolutizma v natsional'nykh raionakh Rossii v XVIII v.," Absolutizm v Rossii (XVII-XVIII vv.). Sbornik statei (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), a general evaluation of Russian expansion into non-Russian regions underlining the exploitative nature of the central government's policy.

For information on the workings of the Russian administration, its various prikazy, kollegii, gubernii, etc., some of the best
materials are in M. S. Aleksandrov, *Gosudarstvo, biurokratiia, i absoliutizm v istorii Rossii* (St. Petersburt: 1910), on the workings of the late XVIIth and XVIIIth century; A. P. Barsukov, *Spiski gorodovikh voevod i drugikh lits voevodskogo upravleniia Moskovskogo gosudarstva XVII stoletiia* (St. Petersburg: 1902), an especially helpful guide to who was where in the XVIth century; S. A. Belokurov, *O Posol'skom prikaze* (St. Petersburg: 1906), the best history of the chief office for foreign relations in pre-Petrine Russia; S. K. Bogoiaevskii, *Priaznye sud'i XVII veka* (Moscow-Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1946), a considerable amount of information on the prikaz system; N. F. Demidova, "Biurokratizatsiia gosudarstvennogo apparata absoliutizma v XVII-XVIII v.," *Absoliutizma v Rossii (XVII-XVIII vv.)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), pp. 206-242, a helpful study of the changes and growth of the Russian government during and after the period of Peter I; M. A. D'iakonov, *Ocherki obshchestvennogo i gosudarstvennogo stroia drevnei Rusi* (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1926), a guide to the earlier years of the development of the central governmental system of Russia; V. D. Nazarov, "Iz istorii vnitrenei politiki Rossii nachala XVII v.," *Istorii SSSR, 12, No. 4* (July-August, 1967), pp. 106-114, a look at the early years of the Romanovs and the changes within the government after the Time of Troubles; N. V. Ustiugov, "Evoliutsiia prikaznogo stroia russkogo gosudarstva v XVII v.," *Absoliutizm v Rossii (XVII-XVIII vv.)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), pp. 134-167, another of the studies of the changes within the governmental structure of Russia included in the highly valuable study *Absoliutizm*
Matters of Russian trade, both with the Kalmyks and through Kalmyk lands can be explored in Kapitan Bocharnikov, *Kratkoe opisanie Rossiiskago Torga, Otpravlyaemago sukhim putem s Kitaem, Bucharieiu, Kalmykami, Kurliandieiu, i Pol'shei" (St. Petersburg: 1782); A. Chulushnikov, *"Torgovlia moskovskogo gosudarstva s Srednei Azii v XVI-XVII vekakh," Materialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi, Turkmenskoi SSR, ch. I (Torgovlia s moskovskim gosudarstvom i mezhdunarodnoe polozenie Srednei Azii v XVI-XVII vv.) (Leningrad: Akademia Nauk SSSR, 1932); Ivan Merder, *Istoricheskii ocherk russkago konevodstva i konnozavodstva* (St. Petersburg: Edvard Mettsig, 1868), idem, *Sbornik svedenii o torgovle loshad'ni v Rossii (S prilozheniem karty konskoi torgovli i punktov konskikh iarmarok)* (St. Petersburg: Mesnik i Riman, 1891); Pavel Nebolsin, *Ocherki torgovli Rossii s stranami Srednei Azii, Khivoi, Bucharioi, Koxanom (so storony orenburgskoi linii)* (St. Petersburg: 1856); Esper Es. Ukhtomskii, *Ot kalmytskoi stepi do Buchary* (St. Petersburg: V. P. Meshcherskii, 1891).

Additional information on the Russian army, its structure, and campaigns can be found in D. P. Buturlin, *Voennaia istoriia pokhodov rossiian v XVIII stoletii* (St. Petersburg: 1820); D. I. Evanitskii, Ivan Dmitrievich Serko – slavnyi koshevoi ataman voiska zaporozhskikh nizovikh kazakov (St. Petersburg: 1894); R. I. Kozintseva, "Astrakhanskie strel'tsy v poslednie chetverty XVII v. (Opyt izucheniiia skazok astrakhanstev)," *Voprosy voennoi istorii Rossii, XVIII i pervaya polovina XIX vekov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), pp. 359-368; S. L. Margolin, "K voprosu
ob organizatsii i sotsial'nom sostave strelets'kogo voiska v XVII v.,"
Uchenye zapiski Moskovskogo oblastnogo pedagogicheskogo instituta, No.
27 (1953), pp. 63-69; Iakov Markovich, Dnevnya zapiski malorossiiskogo
podskriabia general'nogo Iakova Markovicha (Moscow: 1859); "O
persidskom pakhode pri Petre Velikom. Zapiski proshlogo veka,"
Russkii Arkhiv t. 3 (1899); Polozhenie o komplektovanii voisk loshad'mi
pri privedenii armii v polnyi sostav vo vremia voiny v primenenii k
Kalmykam Astrakhanskoi gubernii (St. Petersburg: German Goppe, 1903);
S. M. Solov'ev, "Petr Velikii na Kaspiiskom more," Vestnik Evropy (1868),
t. II, pp. 163-182.

The Kalmyks were most deeply involved with two areas of Russia,
Siberia, where they first moved from Djungharia, and the Volga-Don
steppe, where they settled. Both regions have been dealt with by any
number of authors, chiefly Russian, and from the secondary literature,
the most valuable pieces of information on Siberia at the time of the
Kalmyk arrival are found in V. A. Aleksandrov, Russkoe naselenie Sibiri
XVII-nachala XVIII v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1964); S. V. Bakhruhin,
Izbrannye Raboty po istorii Sibiri XVI-XVII vv., ch. 1, Voprosy Russkoi
kolonizatsii Sibiri v.XVI-XVII vv. (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1955);
idem, "Sibirskie sluzhil'ye tatary v XVII v.," Nauchnye trudy, t. III,
ch. 2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1955), pp. 86-171; P. N. Butskinskii, Zaselenie
Sibiri i byt pervykh ee nasel'nikov (Khar'kov: 1889); B. O. Dolgikh,
Rodovoi i plemennoi sostav narodov Sibiri v XVII v. (Moscow: Akademiia
Nauk SSSR, 1960); Johann Fischer, Sibirische Geschichte von der Entdeckung
Sibiriens bis auf die Eroberung dieses Landes durch die russiche Waffen

Studies of the Volga-Don area include Nikolai A1. Firsov, Inorodcheskoe naselenie prezhegnego Kazanskogo tsarstva v Novoi Rossii do 1762 g. i kolonizatsiiia zakamskiikh zemel' v eto vremia (Kazan: Universitetskaiia tipografiia, 1869); N. B. Golikova, Astrakhanskoe vosstanie, 1705-1706 gg. (Moscow: Moskovskii Universitet, 1975); Iv. V. Got'ye, "Zametki po istorii zashchity iuzhnoi granitsy Moskovskago gosudarstva," Istoricheskiia izvestiia izd. Istoricheskim obshestvom pri Moskovskom universitet, No. 2 (1917), pp. 47-57; N. L. Ianchevskii, Kolonial'naia politika na Donu torgovogo kapitala moskovskogo gosudarstva v XVI-XVII vv. (Rostovna-Donu: 1930); A. Leopoldov, "Letopis' saratovskoi gubernii, so vremenii prisoedineniia sego kraia
k Rossii do 1821 goda," Zhurnal ministerstva vnutrennikh del, ch. XXXIX (1841), No. 3, pp. 223-278, 411-442; "O drevnykh zdaniakh i drugikh zamechatel'nykh pamiatnikakh drevnosti v astrakhanskoi gubernii," Zhurnal ministerstva vnutrennikh del, ch. XLII (1841), No. 10-12, pp. 78-108;
D. N. Orlov, "Gorod Stavropol' i ego khramy," Samarskija Eparkhial'nyia Vedomosti, XVI god, No. 1 (January, 1182), pp. 15-24; Gregori I. Peretiatkovich, Povelzhe v XVII i nachale XVIII v. (Ocherki iz istorii kolonizatsii kraia) (Odessa: A. P. Zelenyi, 1882); M. Samsonovich Rybushtkin, Zapiski ob Astrakhani (Moscow: 1841); P. Semenova, ed., "Rossiia" - polnoe geograficheskoe opisanie nashego otechestva. Plemen srednego i nizhnego Povelzha i Zavolzha, t. 4 (St. Petersburg: Karl Krai, 1901); A. N. Shtyl'ko, Illiustrirovannaja Astrakhan: Ocherki proshlago i nastoiashchego goroda (Saratov: 1896); Spravochnik khronologicheskogo prechnia sobytii, otnosiashehkhia k mestnosti nyneshnei Orenburgskoi gubernii, s poloviny XVI v. do nastoiashchega vremeni (Orenburg: 1894); I. V. Zhukovskii, Kratko obozrenie dostopamiatnykh sobytii Orenburgskogo kraia, raspolozhennykh khronologicheskii s 1266 po 1832 god (St. Petersburg: N. Grech, 1832).

For those powers beyond Russia, i.e., the Mongol tribes, China, Tibet, Central Asia, the Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Turkmen, Bashkir, Nogai, Kabardians, Ottomans, Crimeans, and Cossacks, there is also a considerable literature. Among the works of greatest value here on the Mongols have been Haneda Akira, "L'Histoire des Djounghar aux 16e et 17e siècles, Origine des Eleutes," Ural-Altaische Jahrbucher, vol. 42 (1970), Nos. 1-4, pp. 119-126; V. V. Bartol'd, Ocherk istorii Semirech'ia.


For Central Asia and the tribes living there and on its fringes there are G. E. Kotanaev, Kirgizskie stepi, Sredniaia Azia i Severnyi Kitai v XVII i XVIII stoletiiakh. Zapiski Zapadno-Sibirskogo Otdela Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obschestva, No. 14, vyp. 1 (1893); A. Popov, Snosheniia Rossii s Khvoiou i Bukharoiu pri Petre Velikom (St. Petersburg; Imperatorskaiia Akademiia Nauk, 1853); A. A. Preobrazhenskii, 'Iz istorii snosheniia russkogo gosudarstva so Srednei Aziei,' Istoricheskie Zapiski, t. 36 (1951), pp. 269-286.

On the Kazakhs there are E. B. Bemakhanov, Prisoedinenie Kazakhstana k Rossii (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1957); N. I. Guev, Kazakhstan (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1936); Alfred Hudson, Kazak Social Structure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); 'Kirgiz-


For the Bashkir there are Arkheologii i etnografii Bashkiri, Vol. IV, Materialy nauchnoi sessii etnogenezu bashkir (Ufa: 1971); Alton S. Donnelly, The Russian Conquest of Bashkoria, 1552-1740 (A Case Study in Imperialism) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Rail G. Kuzeev, Proiskhozhdenie Bashkirskogo naroda: Etnicheskii sostav, istoriiia rasseleniia (Moscow: Nauka, 1974); Sergei I. Rudenko,


For dealing with the Caucasus, especially Kabardia there are P. G. Bur'kov, *Materialy dlia novoi istorii Kavkaza s 1722 po 1803 god* (St. Petersburg: Karl Krai, 1869); *Istroia Kabardy s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei* (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1957); *Sbornik materialov dlia opisaniia mestnostei i plemen Kavkaza*, vyp. 4 (Tiflis: 1909); N. A. Smirnov, *Politika Rossii na Kavkaze v XVI-XIX vekakh* (Moscow: Sotial'noekonomicheskaia literatura, 1958); George Vernadsky, "Russia, Turkey, and Circassia in the 1640's," *Sudost-Forschungen*, XIX (1960), pp. 134-145.

The final group is the Cossacks, who, thanks to their unruly nature and frequent state of revolt throughout this period were not
SIMPLIFIED GENEALOGY
- TORGHUD -

Ong Khan
(Kerait)

Urchete Bura Zulzagan Ölük Goroi Mankhai

Bele Ibel Elden Beleer
Erdeni

Dalai Ba'atur=daughter (Dorbed)
(daughter of Gushi, wife = Khö Ölük = wife (daughter of Dalai Ba'atur, Khoshūd) (died 1644)

Lauzan Chechen Shunkei
(murdered 1660) Kanysh
(to Volga 1662)

Galdama Dordji
(d. 1660) (d. 1660)

Elden=daughter Kirosan
Gushi (Khoshūd)
(d. 1644)

Sanzhin
daughter = Daichin = Ba'atur
(Ishim) Khoshuchi unh-
(Sibir') (Dorbed) taiji
(Dunjghar)

wife = Shukur Daichin = wife
(daughter of Chokur, (died 1667) (daughter of Ba'atur khungtaiji,
Djunghar) (1644-1662) Djunghar)

Djalbo Daian Iaroslav
Sapralbair Mansyreir Djaltasan
Erki (murdered 1644)

Nama Tseren

Nazar Arabzhur
Dordji
(died in China)
Namarov (refused khanate 1724)
DJUNGHARIA AND WESTERN MONGOLIA, ca. 1625
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HONORS AND AWARDS: Alpha Chi
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                      The Nation State and Religious Minorities (1976)

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sible for the coordination of staff and liaison with Soviet personnel and governmental ministries in pursuance of a multi-million dollar contract involving New York Graphic Society (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Time, Incorporated), Control Data Corporation, the Ministry of Trade of the Soviet Union, and the Hermitage Museum.

DISSERTATION; "The History of the Kalmyk Khanate to 1724"

Chairman of Committee: Barbara Jelavich

An examination and analysis of the foundations and growth of the strategically important Kalmyk-Mongol khanate in the Iaik(Ural)-Volga steppe, along the south-eastern borders of the Russian Empire in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. Researched in the Soviet Union and the United States, it places the khanate in the context of the changing world of Inner Asia and examines in special depth relations with the Russians. Particular attention is paid to the efforts of tribal leaders to gain control over disparate nomadic peoples in order to weld together the basis of a traditional nomadic khanate. Contrasted with the creation of a Kalmyk people and khanate is the struggle to reach and keep an accord with the Russians, the titular rulers of the area in which these Mongol tribesmen had settled. Kalmyk rulers considered themselves the allies of Russia and were granted by Moscow/ St. Petersburg rights to pasturage, trade, supplies, subsidies, and, initially, significant political independence. They, in turn, gave significant aid in the securing of the southern borders of Russia and dispatched large numbers of irregular cavalry to support Russian imperial expansion in the Caucasus, Ukraine, and Europe. Kalmyk rulers continually angered the tsars' government by allowing raids on Russian settlements and by establishing independent relations with powers beyond the borders of the Empire. The Russians, who were determined to reduce the Kalmyks to the status of loyal vassals, employed first oaths, then the manipulation of internal Kalmyk political rivalries to promote the sedentarization of the nomads and to encourage the weakening of the power of the khan. By the end of the study, in 1724, one can clearly see that, despite the growing resentment of the Kalmyks' khan, Russia had already established the mechanisms with which it would subvert the khanate and eventually absorb it within the Empire.

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