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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE SHIITE EMIRATES OF OTTOMAN SYRIA
(MID-17TH — MID-18TH CENTURY)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

BY
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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
AUGUST 2002
Dedicated

to my mother and father
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................... vii

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1
  Sources .......................................................................................................................... 7
  Structure of the Dissertation ......................................................................................... 13

CHAPTER ONE
SHIISM UNDER OTTOMAN RULE: RELIGIOUS THEORY VS. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE ...... 20
  Shiism in Ottoman History and Historiography ......................................................... 21
  Defining Shiism in Ottoman Law and Administration ................................................ 35
  Cultural Shiism in Ottoman Society ........................................................................... 46

CHAPTER TWO
SHIISM IN WESTERN SYRIA UNDER OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION ................................ 55
  Ottoman Fiscal Policies on Shiism in Syria ................................................................. 57
  Heterodoxy and Home-Rule in Lebanese History and Historiography ...................... 63
  The Ḥarāfūsh Emirate of Baalbek and the Bekaa (Eyālet of Damascus) ...................... 78

CHAPTER THREE
MT. LEBANON UNDER SHIITE RULE, 1640–1698 .......................................................... 91
  Shiite Tribalism in Mt. Lebanon ................................................................................. 93
  The Shiite Emirates in the Politics of the Eyālet of Tripoli ......................................... 108
  Shiite Brigands or Ottoman Functionaries? The Ḥamādas’ Itizam commission .......... 117
  Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 130

CHAPTER FOUR
THE CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY, 1685–1698 ............................................................ 133
  Disciplining the Feudatories ....................................................................................... 135
  Consolidating the Jurisdictions .................................................................................. 148
  Controlling the Tribes ............................................................................................... 164
  Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 174
CHAPTER FIVE
BETWEEN DEPENDENCE AND REDUNDANCY: THE DECLINE OF THE SHIITE EMIRATES,
1698-1763 ........................................................................................................ 176
   The Ottoman Abdication of Power in Jabal 'Amil ........................................ 178
   The Isolation of the 'Kızılbaş Mukataa' of Mt. Lebanon ............................. 198
   The Ḥamāda Emirate's Changing Relationship with the Maronites .......... 210
   The Shīhābis' Shiite Subsidiary in Baalbek .............................................. 223

CONCLUDING REMARK .................................................................................. 237

DOCUMENT APPENDIX .................................................................................. 245

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................. 272
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: WādiʿAlmāt, Lebanon ................................................................. 243
Figure 2: Mansion ruins in Farḥat, WādiʿAlmāt ........................................... 243
Figure 3: Ruins in Farḥat, WādiʿAlmāt ....................................................... 244
Figure 4: Jubab al-Ḥumr, eastern flank of Mt. Lebanon .............................. 244
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a microhistory of some of the smaller tribal dynasties or "emirates" that dominated the coastal highlands of western geographic Syria in the 17th and 18th centuries. It traces the rise and fall of the Ḥamādas, Ḥarfūshes and various other families as mukataacs, agents formally invested by the Ottoman state to tax and police the rural hinterland districts that were not amenable to direct government control. The interest of these emirs lies in the fact that they and the communities they represented were patently of the Twelver Shiite faith. Their integration into the administrative structures, and their regular interaction with state authorities, of the nominally Sunni Muslim Ottoman Empire therefore raise a number of questions.

Historians of the Ottoman Empire point to a seemingly systematic persecution of Shiites and other heterodox groups, including pantheist mystics and officials associated with the court, Imāmī (Twelver Shiite) scholars from southwestern Syria, and the Kızılbaş tribesmen of Anatolia whose loyalties were believed to lie with the enemy Iranian Safavid Empire. In the 16th century, the religious and judicial elites in Istanbul framed what may be considered the Empire's official stance against heresy, legitimizing the killing of Kızılbaş and Rafizis¹ and thus giving a legal foundation to warfare and

1. The two terms, meaning literally "red-head" and "refusenik," were used pejoratively for Shiites of various denominations in the Ottoman Empire. Their historical origins are discussed in the relevant Encyclopedia of Islam entries. Note on transliteration: For the sake of simplicity, names and technical terms proper to Ottoman administrative usage are rendered here in modern Turkish spelling. The Arabic transliteration system of the Journal of Near Eastern Studies has been applied to personal and geographic names more widely known in their local Arab context, except when quoted directly from Ottoman documents, e.g. "Ḥarfuş-oğlu" for "Ibn Ḥarfūsh."
inquisitions against Muslims of Shiite faith. Indeed, the Ottoman chancery continued to invoke this policy two centuries later, in clashes with the periodically refractory Shiite emirates of Syria, openly denouncing and prosecuting them as “accursed Kızılbaş whose elimination is a religious duty.”

It is our contention that these episodes of violence against groups or individuals labeled as “Kızılbaş” provide only a one-sided (though dramatic and well-publicized) picture of Ottoman Shiism, an imbalance which can be corrected or nuanced by a more long-term, socio-political examination of a Shiite community under actual, day-to-day Ottoman administration. This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the Shiites of western Syria, and specifically their emiral leaderships, were not subject to systematic proscription and persecution in the Ottoman state; on the contrary, in the 17th century they were actively sought out by the government authorities, their confessional affiliation notwithstanding, to rule a vast provincial territory inhabited by both Shiites and other communities on account of their status as preeminent local tribal notabilities. It was then in the course of the later 17th and 18th centuries, however, that the Shiite emirs were routinely branded as brigands, subjected to more intensive punitive campaigns, divested of many of their landholdings and placed under the tutelage of newer, more successful regional leaderships. We intend to show that this process of marginalization was again not the product of a timeless anti-Shiite religious impulse, but rather followed from the Ottoman regime’s long-term efforts to rationalize and reform the empire’s governing structures in the early modern period.

The story of the Syrian Shi’a’s declining fortunes under Ottoman rule is less one of persistent sectarian prejudices, though these too played a role, than one of changing paradigms of provincial administration. Imperial policies on heterodoxy, tribal control, and provincial tax-farming did set the general parameters of the Shiite emirates’ range of
action in the Syrian hinterland, but how families such as the Ḥamādas and Ḥarfūshes then managed to establish and exercise their rule within these parameters must ultimately be explained in terms of local society and politics. The reasons why the Shiite emirs flourished in the late 17th century, a period of key imperial reforms under the Köprüli viziers, but failed to maintain and consolidate their autonomy in the 18th century, an era of wide-ranging administrative decentralization, emerge from the unique system of sectarian-based feudal rule in the mountain region that subsequently became the state of Lebanon. This study, being based on a close reading of unpublished and largely unutilized Ottoman divan documents from both Istanbul and the provincial capital of Tripoli (and Sidon), seeks to illuminate the complex rapport between imperial sovereign and provincial feudatory, which permitted the Shiites' transitory success within this system. The story of the local Shiite emirates of Syria, in turn, provides one of the most richly documented illustrations of the complex and sometimes ambiguous connection between the Ottoman Empire's religious and political ideology and its socio-administrative pragmatism.

This dissertation is thus also a contribution to the study of ethnic, religious and regional minorities in the Ottoman Empire. The vast and growing literature in this field, it may justly be remarked, continues to focus overwhelmingly on the Christian and Jewish communities and their changing juridical status or rising nationalist aspirations under Ottoman rule. Unlike in contemporary European historiography, where the discovery and extirpation of religious heresy is characterized as one of the very hallmarks

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of “the persecuting society.” 3 there has been little study of the link between sectarian
deviance and political authority in the early modern Muslim empires. Orientalist
scholarship has for perhaps too long posited an essential conflict between rigidly defined
categories of Islamic orthodoxy and heterodoxy. 4 It is only in recent years that historians
have begun to examine the sociological construction of heresy in the Ottoman Empire,
explaining the trials of individual freethinkers or the persecutions of the Anatolian
Kızılbaş in the 16th century in terms of the expansion, bureaucratization and
homogenization of the state. 5 And though these propositions have contributed much to
our understanding of the hypothetical “golden age” of Ottoman imperial power, they
share the disadvantage of seeing the marginalization of heterodoxy in what is now
Turkey as the inescapable and only possible outcome of a linear progression toward state
centralization and modernity. The Syrian Shiite emirates challenge this statist,
teleological point of view with evidence from a territory and an era that are all too often
neglected in Ottoman historiography.

3. Among the most innovative works in this domain are R.L. Moore, The Formation
& Agrarian Cults in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, translated from Italian by John &
Anne Tedeschi (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Kenneth Mills, Idolatry and
Its Enemies: Colonial Andean Religion and its Extirpation, 1640-1750 (Princeton University
Press, 1997).

Studi Orientali 25 (1950), 11-26; Bernard Lewis, “Some Observations on the Significance of
Heresy in the History of Islam,” Studia Islamica 1 (1953), 43-63. Oddly, Lewis’ review of terms for
“heresy” omits rafḍ, the one most consistently invoked by Mamluk and Ottoman authorities when
persecuting Twelver Shiites.

5. Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, “Qızılbash ‘Heresy’ and Rebellion in Ottoman Anatolia
during the Sixteenth Century,” Anatolia Moderna 7 (1997), 1-15; Ahmed Yaşar Ocağ, Osmanlı
Toplumunda Zindıklar ve Müftüler (15.-17. Kültürler) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1998); Taha Akyol,
Osmanlı’da ve İran’da Mezhep ve Devlet (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1999). Much the same fate
befell the Shiite Turkmen in Iran after their participation in the successful Safavid revolution:
“Centralization, in the Safavid context, was tantamount to breaking the spiritual and political
power of the Qızılbash.” See Kathryn Babayan, “The Safavid Synthesis: from Qızılbash Islam to
A corollary aim of this dissertation will therefore be to resituate the Shiite emirates in the historiography of Lebanon, the Ottoman successor state most directly concerned by their legacy. Virtually all past scholarship on the emirates, starting with contemporary 17th and 18th century Christian chroniclers, has tended to portray them as a constituent of an imagined autonomous mountain principality which, under Druze and Maronite sovereignty, defied Ottoman Turkish misrule to recover its ancient national independence in the republican era. Critics have pointed to the essentially sectarian postulates of this “Lebanist” vision of Ottoman-era feudal politics,6 but as yet there has been no separate historical re-examination of the Twelver Shiite rulerships which, at least in the later 17th century, rivaled the power and importance of the better-known Ma‘n and Shihâbi emirs.7 In basing my reading of Shiite history in the region not on the conventional independentist narratives but rather on Ottoman imperial and specifically administrative sources, I wish to show that they did not form part of the “Lebanese exception” so fervently sought after by the Empire’s local and European detractors. The argument can indeed be made that it was only with the Shiite emirates’ marginalization, subjugation and finally violent elimination by the Druze-Maronite condominium in the 18th century that a unified, pan-Lebanese polity could begin to take shape under Shihâbi leadership. The very institution of the local highland emirate, so effectively exploited by the Druze, Shiites and other peripheral groups, was itself an Ottoman innovation, and the Shiite notables discussed in these chapters ultimately disqualified themselves in the


7. Published posthumously in 2002, Sulaymân Žâhir’s (d. 1960) magnum opus Tārikh al-Shī‘a al-Siyāsī al-Thaqāfi al-Dīnī, 3 vols., ed. ’Abdallāh Sulaymân Žâhir (Beirut: al-Aʿlami, 2002) is the first work to my knowledge that includes a complete political history of the Ḥamāda and Ḥarfūsh emirates.
competition for office by failing to adapt to a Europe-oriented modernity on par with their southern Lebanese rivals. Had local circumstances been different than they were, the Shiite emirs might well have continued to benefit from, rather than be broken by, the Ottoman Empire’s progressive consolidation measures.

Rather than an anomaly, the Twelver Shiite and other heterodox tribal emirates of western Syria constituted the very archetype of corporate home-rule under imperial suzerainty in the pre-ideological age. Their successes and failures are therefore best understood in the light of historical theory and interpretive models from Ottoman and, more globally, from early modern European studies. The bureaucratization of government, the rationalization of accounting and tax-levying, the intensification of commerce and other such processes of modernization obtained throughout the European and Middle Eastern worlds, and each can be seen reflected in the changing fortunes of Syria’s local leaderships in the 17th and 18th centuries. Perhaps, however, it is the notion of sozialdisziplinierung (social disciplining) that best describes the situation of the Shiite tribes and the pressure that multiple strata of authority exerted on them over the long term to settle, account and conform. The continuous appeal to proper behavior, on the one hand, and the increased prohibition and segregation of vagrants, rural gangs, sinners or other misfits, on the other, are seen especially by historians of early modern Germany to have defined social change in the age of absolutist rule and territorial confessionalization. Criticized by many as too statist in premise and too diffuse in conclusion, the concept of sozialdisziplinierung may nonetheless bring some

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focus to the patterns of fiscal control, notable rule and population surveillance which, though still only vaguely understood and barely researched in Middle Eastern history, clearly also circumscribed society in early modern Ottoman Syria.

Sources

This dissertation comprises five chapters. The first two explore the theoretical basis for Shiite enfranchisement from the imperial and local perspectives; the following two provide a narrative history of the Ḫamāda emirate until the punitive campaign of 1694; and the final chapter compares the different fates of the Ḫamādas, the Ḧarfūshes, and the three lesser emirates of Jabal ṬĀmil in the 18th century.

The range of textual sources used for this study reflects our concern to embed the history of the Shiite emirates in both the early modern Ottoman imperial and the Syro-Lebanese provincial context. Indigenous Shiite literature is exclusively theological and prosopographical, and though it has been mined repeatedly for references to Shiite social thought, scholarly curricula and personal networks, it falls short on explaining the Shi'a's rapport with the outside world. The Shiite tribalists left no literary heritage of their own. Local oral tradition is of extremely limited use for a period that stretches back three centuries, and private family papers appear to exist only in very small numbers for late Ottoman times. A source which could not be sufficiently exploited for the present study, but which holds the promise for copious incidental references to Shiite feudatories, is the archival collections of Maronite religious institutions in Lebanon and

the United States. Extensive use has been made of contemporary or near-contemporary
Christian narrative chronicles, though always in the understanding that these sought to
legitimize Druze-Maronite rather than Shiite feudal rule.

The backbone of this dissertation is thus the unpublished Ottoman archival
documentation of the relationship between the Shiite emirates and the imperial and
provincial administrations. These documents can be divided into three branches:
executive, fiscal and judicial. The first consists mainly of extraordinary decrees issued by
the grand vizierate to the provincial authorities of Tripoli, Sidon or Damascus. These
orders, preserved in the “registers of important affairs” (umur-i mühimme defterleri,
abbr. MD), were very often promulgated in reaction to specific political crises and thus
afford us an acute insight into the imperial government’s handling of rebellion, heretical
activity, banditry, and fiscal abuse in the outlying reaches of its territory. This accounts
for the continuing popularity of the 16th-century mühimme decrees as a subject of
scholarly articles and published compendiums. For this study, the mühimme defters 39
to 164 as well as the supplement (zeyl) volumes 9-14 & 16 were researched at the Prime
Ministerial (Başbakanlık) archive in Istanbul; together they cover the period from 1580
to 1766, albeit with significant lacunae.

A key volume of mühimme decrees from 1661-63 found to contain the earliest
Ottoman references to the paramount Shiite emir Sirhan ibn Ḥamāda was consulted at
the Sächsische Landesbibliothek in Dresden, where it has made its way since apparently

11. See Şimün ‘Abd al-Masīh, "Arshīf al-Mashā’īkh Āl İṣfān Kafr Saghāb (Jubbat
Basharrij): Taṣawwur al-Wazīfa al-Iqtiṣādiya-siyyāsiya fi Tārikh Shamālī Lubnān al-Ḥadith 1766-

12. Ahmet Refik, Onaltıncı Asırda Râfizilik ve Bektaşilik, new ed. by Mehmet Yaman
(Istanbul: Ufuk Matbaası, 1994); Baki Öz, ed., Alevilik ile ilgili Osmanlı Belgeleri (Istanbul: Can
Yayınları, 1995).
being taken as war plunder from the retreating Ottoman army at Vienna in 1683.  

Copies of sultanic orders in Turkish also appear in the Islamic court records of the provincial capitals. The first five volumes of evamir-i sultaniye for Aleppo (1690-1747), preserved today at the Markaz al-Wathā’iq al-Tārīkhīya (Center for Historical Documents) in Damascus, were found to contain only incidental references to the Shiite-inhabited parts of Syria; unfortunately the Damascus evamir from this period are no longer extant. In Tripoli as in most smaller Arab centers, the Turkish evamir are mixed in with the Arabic civil şeriye court proceedings. The first 18 volumes of Tripoli court records (1666-1768, with major lacunae; abbr. Tripoli), consulted in the two copies held by the Literature Faculty and the Social Sciences Faculty libraries at the Lebanese University in Tripoli, turned up several transcripts of Turkish imperial orders concerning the Hamāda emirs. Interestingly, none of these duplicate orders registered in the imperial mühimme defterleri.

Volumes 15-25, 40, 50 & 60 of the Başbakanlık’s şikayet defterleri (abbr. Şikayet) or “complaint registers” were also examined. Originated in the mid-17th century, şikayet decrees are more narrowly concerned with financial injustices than the somewhat more intelligible mühimmes, and constitute a still largely untapped source for the study of

13. Hans-Georg Majer, “Fundstücke aus der vor Wien verlorenen Kanzlei Kara Mustafa Pașas (1683)” in Klaus Kreiser & Christoph Neumann, eds., Das osmanische Reich in seinen Archivalien und Chroniken: Nejat Gökünc zu Ehren (Istanbul: Franz Steiner, 1997), 115-22. However, the mühimme defteri is mistakenly identified on p. 120, fn. 19 as Eb. 358; it should read Eb. 387. The Dresden manuscript Eb. 358 appears to be an ahkam defteri, covering the period 1067-81 AH (1657-78) and containing a high number of orders relative to Syria.

Ottoman social history.\textsuperscript{15} They remain uncatalogued and the volumes thus far consulted, covering select periods between 1691 and 1712, represent only a portion of the series that is relevant to this study. Likewise perused were individual registers of fiscal office assignments (\textit{ahkam defterleri}) and select documents from other Başbakanlık classifications (Cevdet, Ali Emiri) as indicated in the bibliography.

While the executive documents can offer colorful details on contingent political events in Syria from the Sublime Porte's perception, Ottoman tax cadastres (\textit{tapu-tahrir}) provide a normatively long-term picture of population, productivity and income distribution throughout the empire. Scholars familiar with the evolution of the Ottoman bureaucracy, however, have warned against relying on these registers as comprehensive demographic and statistical material.\textsuperscript{16} The tax surveys incorporated only those villages and income sources earmarked for a designated pension expenditure (usually timars, i.e. military prebends) at a specific moment in time, making it imperative to compare sets of data across several periods and with records of other fiscal assignments for the area in question, such as religious endowments (\textit{vakif}) or the royal privy purse (\textit{hass-i hümâyûn}). In her pioneering studies on Ottoman taxation in Syria, Margaret Venzke has used the cadastres effectively to demonstrate the non-uniformity and flexibility of tax regimes following the 1516 conquest. Despite the appeals to unalterable custom expressed in the provincial tax codes (\textit{kanunnames}) that were prefaced to each \textit{tapu-tahrir}, the Ottomans did not hesitate to overturn Mamluk taxation practices, rotate


timar-holders more quickly, and essentially undermine the tax-exempt status (serbestiyet) on numerous vakıfs when this served the purpose of consolidating the central accountancy’s control over provincial revenue.17 With the decline of the timar prebendal regime, the compilation of tapu-tahrirs was also abandoned. Researchers who have excerpted the 16th-century cadastres for Tripoli have paid little regard to the Shiite-inhabited rural districts.18 For the present study, the provincial kanunnames published in Ahmed Akgündüz’s multi-volume compendium were consulted,19 as were ten detailed tapu-tahrir surveys (TT) for Tripoli and Sidon, which are held separately in copy form at the Başbakanlık or included within its maliyeden müdevver (MM) classification. Only the last of these are contemporary to the timeframe covered here.

The third category of Ottoman documents that pertain to the Shiites is the civil court registers from the provincial capitals Tripoli and Sidon. Rich in anecdotal detail, şeriye records have long constituted the premier source for Ottoman social historiography, and historians in recent years have paid particular attention to the recourse taken to the Islamic court by non-Muslims, women, and other reputedly voiceless minorities. The value of legal records for our study lies in their presentation not of emergency governmental directives or anonymous fiscal structures, but of regular, institutionalized contacts and negotiations between the emirs and the higher state authorities. All contemporary Tripoli court registers, as outlined above, were consulted


for tax concession contracts, lawsuits, sales deeds and other notarial documents relevant to the Ḥamādas of Mt. Lebanon. Numerous scholarly contributions have been written on the basis of the Lebanese University’s copy of these records, and its pagination system has been retained here. For the southern Lebanon, a single original register from 1699-1703 as well as a fragment from 1763, only recently rediscovered and salvaged by Professor Ṭalāl Majdhub, were consulted and integrally copied at the Sunni Islamic Court of Sidon. These materials were not exploited in Antoine Abdel-Nour’s pre-war studies on commerce in Ottoman Sidon, and still await a systematic analysis. A lone document on the Ḥarūfūsh emirs of the Bekaa Valley was located in the ṣerīye court records of Damascus (Center for Historical Documents, Damascus) from a reference provided by Dr. Brigitte Marino.

None of the Ottoman archival materials were compiled with a view to explaining tribal-sectarian forms of local government as attempted in the present dissertation. The documents out our disposal are only intelligible in the historical framework provided by imperial Ottoman histories and local Lebanese chronicles from the period. Virtually all of the latter were composed by Christian clerics, often in the context of bitter inter-

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ecclesiastical disputes.23 The fundamental importance of outside viewpoints on this society is thus patent, and our study utilizes the standard array of published European travel literature concerned with the region. It also draws on the reports of French consular officials in Tripoli and Sidon in the 18th century. Reflective of France’s imperial interests, this literature could be surprisingly cool toward her local Christian protégés. A voluminous selection of consular, marine and commercial correspondence was published by Adel Ismail in the 1970s,24 but virtually all documents dealing with Shiites had to be researched at the Archives Nationales (CARAN) in Paris.25 No other European nation matched France’s diplomatic presence in Tripoli and Sidon, but future studies on the Syrian Shi’a might also gain from examining British correspondence from Aleppo at the Public Record Office and the Vatican archive of the Propaganda Fide, neither of which could be consulted in the scope of the present work.

A cross section of 35 original texts used in this dissertation has been reproduced in transcription or in translation in the appendix.

**Structure of the Dissertation**

Scholarly literature on the Shiite emirates of Syria remains scarce. The net for original sources was cast wide in the present study, and the fundamental questions concerning Shiism within Ottoman society derive directly from these sources or, just as often, from


25. Research on the repatriated consular archives at the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Nantes) was discontinued in light of their limited interest for local societal conditions in this period.
their silence. The first chapter introduces the general problem of Ottoman religious ideology and the seeming paradox of Shiite tribal rule under Ottoman sovereignty. It attempts to trace the Empire’s “official” stance against Shiite heresy through a variety of authoritative 16th-century texts, particularly the chief jurisconsult Ebu Su'ud Efendi's *fetvas* against the Kızılbaş, which would provide a legal fundament for persecuting undesirable sectarians throughout later Ottoman history. The formal discourse of anti-Shiism is then contrasted with the practical tolerance, and at times even open embrace, of ambiguously pro-Shiite sentiment at various levels of Ottoman court and popular culture. Actual denunciations for heresy, the chapter argues, were related to specific, well-documented but inherently rare instances of social or political conflict, particularly with Shiite Iran. The heterodox emirates, a system of tribal self-rule encouraged and institutionalized by the Ottoman state in peripheral areas where it could not easily extend direct authority, represent one of the best and most extensively documented examples of the Empire’s functional accommodation of Shiism within its borders.

The second chapter therefore begins with a review of Ottoman fiscal and administrative policies toward the Shiites of Syria after the 1516 conquest. For the most part, the Ottomans maintained the taxation practices of their Mamluk predecessors, for example preserving customs on Shiite pilgrims to the shrines of Iraq. However, due to the difficulties inherent in controlling the rural highland areas, the Ottomans instituted *iltizam* tax-farming under local notabilities in these regions several decades before the system was adopted elsewhere in the empire. As a result, the heterodox (Druze and Shiite) inhabited areas of Mt. Lebanon and the Shūf were governed from early on by local tribal chiefs enjoying a nominal military rank and recognition from the Ottoman state, rather than by centrally-appointed military governors. Lebanese historiography has attempted to cast the Druze emirate in particular as the historical expression of
independent nationhood and resistance against Turkish misrule, but from the Ottoman documentation available it appears that the central government actively intervened in local affairs and promoted such self-rule dynasties in order to preserve order and its own fiscal sovereignty in otherwise inaccessible highland and desert peripheries. The Ma'n Druze emirate was in every sense an office of the Ottoman state, and was permitted to dominate the coastal region precisely because it represented Ottoman authority in the hinterland. The chapter ends with a look at the Shiite Ḥarīfūsh emirate of the Bekaa Valley in the 17th century, another authority which was promoted by the Ottomans, despite its confessional affiliation, to govern a tribally-inhabited periphery. The Ḥarīfūshes had been a regionally paramount dynasty since early Mamluk times and even served as patrons of local Shiite shrines and scholars. To the Ottomans they were therefore always leading candidate for local fiscal and gubernatorial offices, including for the military governorship of the sub-province of Homs, to which they were appointed partially to offset the influence of the increasingly hegemonic Druze emirate.

Chapter three introduces the history of the Ḥamāda Shiite emirate of Mt. Lebanon. Habitually represented as interlopers and tyrants in Christian clerical historiography, the Ḥamādas are seen through Ottoman archival documentation to have controlled almost the entire province of Tripoli in the later 17th century, whereby they constituted the most important Shiite polity in the history of Ottoman Syria and Lebanon. While the Shiite presence in the northern Lebanon can be traced back at least to Fatimid times, the Ḥamādas themselves were relatively recent immigrants, and were apparently valued as tax agents by the Mamluk and Ottoman regimes precisely because of their mercenary tribal organization and lack of integration in local society. Practicing seasonal nomadism between their home district of Jubayl and the Bekaa valley, the Ḥamāda clans ranged throughout the Lebanese mountains and were able to bring both
Maronite and older sedentary Shiite areas under their grasp. Their rise as the premier tax-farmer dynasty of the eyalet of Tripoli in the 17th century can be attributed to their astute shifts of alliance between several key Ottoman authorities: Initially associating with the paramount Turkmen emirs of Mt Lebanon, the Ḥamādas then entered the service of the Sayfā dynasty of Tripoli and finally of directly-appointed Ottoman governors when this proved more opportune.

The Ḥamādas’ īltizam contracts, which are recorded in some detail in the Islamic court registers of Tripoli, suggest that the Ottomans favored them as tax concessionaries for multiple districts because as a family enterprise they could ensure the maximum degree of order and monetary revenues over a large area. These same documents also show that the Ḥamādas took frequent recourse to the Sunni court of the provincial capital in more mundane legal matters such as property sales. This working rapport with the Ottoman authorities did not preclude the occasional punitive campaign whenever their tax payments were remiss or they stood accused of tyranny in the exercise of their office. Nevertheless, the Ḥamādas’ consistent reappointment to the tax-farms of rural Tripoli remains as the perhaps most striking example of Shiite enfranchisement in Ottoman history.

This rapport broke down, chapter four argues, in the long social crisis that engulfed the Ottoman Empire at the close of the 17th century. After the unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1683, the empire witnessed a succession of military defeats, fiscal imbalances and a generalized breakdown of law and order in the Asian provinces that elicited a nearly continual state of “rebellion” in peripheral areas such as Mt. Lebanon. Whether such rebellion reflected an actual weakness of the central government, or rather its successful attempts to reassert central control over the tribes and mercenary groups in the hinterland, archival sources offer a picture of constant upheaval by, and punitive
action against, the Shiite emirs of the period. This culminated in a massive military campaign against the Ḥamādas in 1693, following years of complaints about their misgovernment particularly by an upstart class of Maronite entrepreneurs who had begun to secure French support for their own takeover of the rural Mount Lebanese tax districts. For the first time, we see the Druze emirs of the neighboring province of Sidon playing a key role in Tripoli’s politics, as they labor to defend their Ḥamāda confrères against the Ottoman campaign while bringing about their reconciliation with their own Maronite subalterns. This ultimately paved the way for the Ottoman state’s acknowledgement of the Druze emirate’s responsibility for regulating the feudal affairs of the entire coastal mountain district of Syria.

The campaign, this chapter argues, represented not merely a shift of power among several feudatory factions in Mt. Lebanon, but also a shift of administrative method within the Ottoman government structure. Whereas past Ottoman military governors had been blithe to the evident misrule of the Shiite emirs, this period marked the rise of locally-rooted, transregional households of civilian governors who had a more immediate interest in the management of rural feudal conflicts. The campaign against the “Shiite brigands” provided the occasion for the rise of one such household. On another level, the chancery documents relating to the campaign place it squarely within an empire-wide program of tribal settlement and relocation, which was initiated in this period to bring order to and revitalize marginal agricultural territories for the sake of maximizing tax revenues. Though the Ḥamādas were consistently decried as heretics whose extirpation is a religious duty, their conflict with the state authorities at the close of the 17th century must be viewed in the wider context of the empire-wide social crisis and modernizing reforms the Sublime Porte adopted in reaction.
The final chapter provides a comparative look at the emirates of the three major Shiite-inhabited areas of Syria in the 18th century, and argues that their long-term decline can be attributed to the growing power of, and their own dependence on, the Druze emirate and its Maronite subjects in this period. In the southern region of Jabal ʿĀmil, where social leadership was long exercised by scholarly dynasties, the Shiite feudal families were comparatively insignificant and ill-equipped to resist the expansion of the Shihābī Druze emirate. The Ottoman governors, while not directly hostile to the Shiite leaderships, essentially abdicated their own authority in the region and permitted the Shihābīs to assume the role of an interregional tribal taxation and government agency. The southern Shīites’ sole option to avoid integration into the “Lebanese” emirate was thus to ally with the Palestinian commercial baron Ẓāhir al-ʿUmar, under whose patronage Jabal ʿĀmil emerged as the new cultural and political epicenter of Shiite society in the modern period.

The Ḥamādas, on the other hand, at first enjoyed thoroughly collegial relations with the Shihābī emirs, who helped them regain and retain the tax farms of the northern Lebanon despite repeated Ottoman endeavors to expel them. In the process, however, the Shīites became increasingly dependent on the Shihābīs and other notables who guaranteed their tax offices with the Ottoman authorities, yet they alienated the Maronite clerical hierarchy and peasantry that was emerging as the most effective agents of rural Mt. Lebanon's commercial and fiscal development. Failing to recognize these changing realities, the Ḥamādas continued their unenlightened revenue skimming practices and at best cultivated the less powerful, more pliable locally-based Maronite monastic orders. As a result, the upstart Maronite entrepreneurs easily won the Shihābīs’ agreement to eliminate the Shiite emirate and subject all of Mt. Lebanon to the more rational rule of the pan-Lebanese emirate in the 1760s.
Finally, the Ḥarfūsh family of Baalbek appears in Ottoman documentation as the least problematic of the Shiite emirates in this period, in part because they fell entirely within the Shihābī emirate's sphere of influence. The Shihābīs intervened for them on multiple occasions when the state sought to drive them from power, turning the Ḥarfūshes into little more than their own subsidiary governorship in the Bekaa region. From the last third of the 18th century onward, the Ottoman state's abetment of Shihābī preeminence in the western Syrian highlands had progressed to such an extant that there was no more autonomous Shiite emiral system of home-rule to speak of. In all three cases, we witness the growing subordination to, or dependence on, larger and more successful inter-regional political actors, bringing an end to the smaller, family- or clan-based Shiite emirate that had been emblematic of rural Ottoman government only a century before.
CHAPTER ONE
SHIIISM UNDER OTTOMAN RULE:
RELIGIOUS THEORY VS. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE

What was the Ottoman Empire's stance on religion and religious heterodoxy? Students of Ottoman constitutional history have long noted the seeming paradoxes in the definition of its “official” ideology: On the one hand, the state espoused holy war (gaza), Hanefi Islamic law and universal Sunni caliphate as its governing principles; on the other, the highest court officials and even sultans delved into astrology or millenarianism and patronized a wide spectrum of antinomian Sufi mystics. In the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire pursued a fierce sectarian war against the Shiite shahs of Iran and their presumed supporters in Anatolia. Yet the expression of 'Alid loyalties remained an integral part of the imperial religious culture, shared in by Istanbul's intellectual elite, the urban-based seyyid class (descendants of the prophet), and countless rural communities from the Balkans to the Yemen.

The study of the Shiite highland emirates of early modern Syria is particularly instructive of this paradox in the Ottoman view of Shiite heterodoxy. It comprehends the violent punitive campaigns in which they were explicitly rebuked as heretics and deviants by the state authorities, but also the long tenures of individual Shiite notables as state-appointed police and tax collection concessionaries in the rural hinterland. The present chapter contrasts the intractably negative valence placed on Shiism in classical Ottoman discourse with the administrative pragmatism that permitted the emergence of Shiite and other emirates in the late 16th to early 17th century. It argues that the
Ottoman state's policy toward the heterodox groupings and individuals consisted in neither official "persecution" nor "toleration," but on the contrary in its volition—forsaken only in times of crisis—to avoid applying precise definitions, so as not to have to call and thereby delegitimize Shiite heterodoxy by its true name.

_Shii sm in Ottoman History and Historiography_

The dichotomy between nominal Sunnism and popular Shiism in Turkish history, in essence between a high-culture literate and a low-culture charismatic approach to the Islamic faith, is generally traced back to the conversion of the Oğuz tribes in medieval Transoxiana. If some federations (e.g. the Selcuks) early became a pillar of the Sunni caliphal state, the great mass of Turkmens first came into contact with Islam through roaming Sufi missionaries. Rather than preach the legalist-textual traditions of an urban Islamic civilization, these envoys brought a faith replete with mystic divination, saint worship and millenarianism that dovetailed with the naturalist Shamanism practiced by the tribes. The legendary heroism and tragedy of the early-Islamic dissenters 'Ali, Ḥusayn, Abū-Muslim and al-Ḥallāj furnished ordinary peasants and pastoralists with a tangible focus for their religious affectivity in a way that the more abstract _sunna-jama'a_ scholasticism could not. The antinomian dervishes who, sporting body piercings, begging bowls and little else, spread outward from Bukhara and across the Middle East in the 11th-12th century provide some picture of the wild-eyed charismatic Islam current among the Oğuz at the time of their epochal migrations to Anatolia.¹

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¹ See Ahmet Karamustafa, _God's Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Middle Period, 1200-1550_ (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1994).
The so-called "syncretism" of early Turkish Islam has in modern times become the subject of two historiographical debates. For one, the unorthodox elements evident in many later Anatolian movements such as Bektaşi Sufism and Hurufism have led some Turkologists to postulate that Islam was only a "thin veneer" that coated the authentic "kernel" of Inner Asian religious beliefs: Not the rigidity of classical (i.e. Arab) textualism but rather an unfettered steppe spirituality constituted the original and true essence of Turkish Muslimness.² Oriental philologists were more wont to recognize a timeless Iranian or eastern spirituality in all Sufism; classicists have discerned the popular Christianism of Anatolia's Greek populace at the heart of the Turkmen invaders' syncretic beliefs. At stake, in each case, is proving the continuity of national character despite the adoption of a new religious and political system.

Imputing an ethnic basis to the Turkmens' religious outlook, however, tends to obscure the central importance of Islamism and of 'Alid devotionalism in particular. The deification of the Prophet's lieutenant 'Alî ibn Abî Ṭâlib, inherent in all early Imami Shiite thought,³ and the mystical egalitarianism expounded by various segments of the Ismaili Shi'a became one of the foremost vehicles of social protest throughout the Islamic early middle period. All these movements arose from within a political context that was by then entirely Islamicate in culture, discourse and symbolism, in which ethnic Arabs might be the dissidents as often as Persians, Turks and Kurds were part of the orthodox establishment. From 1258 onward, the pax mongolica favored not only the freer development of a high-literary Twelver Shiism, whose legal doctrines in consequence


moved ever closer to those of standard Sunnism, but also the wide dissemination of extremist (ghulāt) 'Alawism and Nizari Ismaili (bāṭini) esotericism. These often indistinct strands of popular Shiism and their Sufi pendants lent a millenarian undertone to numerous socio-economic revolts in the anarchy of post-Mongol Khorasan, Iraq, Syria and Anatolia. Together with the staid 'Alawism espoused by the ahi civic corporations of the Anatolian townships, the tribal followers of Baba Resul or the antinomian Kalendar dervishes in the 13th century formed the raw ideological mass from which the Ottomans would ultimately fashion their conquest empire.\footnote{See Devin Stewart, \textit{Islamic Legal Orthodoxy: Twelver Shiite Responses to the Sunni Legal System} (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1998).}

The second and more portentous debate thus concerns the place of Islam in the Ottoman beylicate's constitution. For many years, orientalists and western historians in general accepted Paul Wittek's thesis that the Ottomans deployed the idea of gaza—expansionist holy war—as an ideological bond to rally the many disparate Anatolian parties for a common drive into Christian Europe. The gaza-thesis was attacked head-on in 1983 by Rudi Lindner in his anthropological study on tribe formation. Arguing that constructed genealogies rather than actual blood-ties gave definition to the Anatolian confederations, Linder dismissed the notion that religion was required or even apt to unite a rural population that indeed remained largely Christian or heterodox Shiite.\footnote{M. Fuad Köprülü, \textit{Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion (Prolegomena)}. Trans., ed. by Gary Leiser (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1993); Ahmed Yaşar Ocağ, \textit{La revolte de Baba Resul: la formation de l'hétérodoxie musulmane en Anatolie au XIIIe siècle} (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989).} While several historians have indicated that the two positions need not be exclusive, perhaps the most elegant synthesis was proffered by Cemal Kafadar in \textit{Between Two

\footnote{Rudi Lindner, \textit{Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).}
Worlds: Islamism very well could and did serve as an early political ideology, in that it remained undogmatic and flexible enough to accommodate mainstream doctrinal as well as charismatic Sufi and even Christian aspirations. The Ottoman frontier ethos, prior to the empire’s consolidation in the 15th century, was defined neither by Sunnism nor Shiism but by a shared “metadoxy.”

This “confessional ambiguity,” as John Woods has aptly described the religious atmosphere prevailing throughout the central Islamic lands, could in fact endure only until the rise of the Safavids. The proclamation of a militant, millenarian Shiism by the Safavid Sufi order of Ardabil in the 1460s, its subsequent influence over the extremist 'Alid Kızılbaş tribes of Anatolia, and their joint conquest of Iran has been explored in countless monographs and need not be resumed in any detail here. In 1501, sultan Bayezid II had a reported 30,000 Kızılbaş removed from Karaman and resettled in the Morea in hopes of stilling their fervor, but continued to seek a conciliation with the Safavids even after shah Ismail seized power in Tebriz and began to persecute Iran’s Sunni Muslims. Bayezid’s failure to deal with Ismail’s repeated provocations led to the coup d’État of his own son, Selim “the Grim,” who moved decisively to restore order among the seditious tribes. On his way to annihilating the Safavid forces at Çaldırı in August 1514, Selim commanded the massacre of 40,000 Kızılbaş and left behind a large


24
part of his army in Anatolia to guard against any further rebellions. He followed up these victories by crushing the Mamluk sultanate in Syria in the spring of 1516, reportedly ordering the killing of untold more Shiites in the Aleppo region. Regardless of whether these massacres are historical fact or historical topos, the Ottoman Empire’s official position on Shiism, as far as the narrative sources are concerned, was set in blood in the early 16th century.

Ottoman-Safavid relations did not improve under sultan Süleyman, but were characterized by perennial warfare over Kurdistan and Iraq. It was after the 1555 treaty of Amasya, the first explicit demarcation of the modern Sunni and Shiite imperial spheres, that the Ottoman government reconciled itself to the geo-ideological rivalry with Iran and began to focus its attention on the sort of state-building and social engineering that would, as this thesis aims to show, ultimately come to weigh more on its domestic heterodox populations. The astounding variety and quantity of chancery archives produced in the second half of the 16th century (and never equaled until the 19th) testify to Süleyman’s and his immediate successors’ resolve to transform the Ottoman polity, substituting administrative for military efficacy, fiscal for territorial expansion, and societal for dynastic discipline. Vis-à-vis religious factions such as the extremist Shiites, Melamis and other deviant Sufisms, this entailed a new vigor in discovering, recording, interdicting, and prosecuting their heterodox activities everywhere. The central bureaucracy’s mühimme defterleri record the persecution and punishment of countless Kızılbaş, often on carefully trumped-up charges and with the involvement of local informants, judges and military officials, particularly in the lead-up to the renewed 1578-79 war against the shah.10

The Ottomans took care to secure proper religious legitimization for these campaigns. In the 14th century, the sultanate had cited the need for a free hand in its holy war in Europe as a justification for subjugating fellow Muslims, i.e. the Anatolian Turkmen beylicates, first. Opposite the Safavids, the Ottomans could furthermore pose as the defenders of Sunni orthodoxy against intra-Islamic sedition. In a fetva or formal legal opinion solicited by sultan Selim in 1512, the jurisconsult Hamza Saru Göre declared the Kızılbaş to be infidels and enemies of Islam and their destruction a religious duty incumbent on all true Muslims. The ruling, which bears close similarities to Ibn Taymiya’s and other classical texts on Shiite sects, explicitly invites “the sultan of Islam” to kill all male heretics without accepting their repentance, and to “divide their wealth, women and children among the warriors of the faith.” The antinomian practices of the Kızılbaş, chief among these the cursing of those Prophet Companions whom the Sunni tradition reveres, were sufficient cause for their excommunication and gave a carte blanche to the Ottoman army command.


12. “O Muslims know and beware, this Kızılbaş faction... deprecates our Prophet’s law and traditions, the faith of Islam and its teachings, and the holy Koran... They worship and prostrate themselves in front of their accursed leaders, and insult Abu Bakr and ’Umar and deny their caliphates... Since these and other utterances and actions against the holy law are known and evident in the consensus of all scholars of Islam and myself, I have... ruled that the aforesaid group are unbelievers and apostates. Any who are inclined to them or accept and abet their false religion are unbelievers and apostates also. To crush them and disperse their numbers is a duty incumbent on the Muslim community. A Muslim who dies [in this undertaking] is in the highest heaven a felicitous martyr; one of theirs who dies is in the bowels of hell abject and dispicable. Their state is uglier and worse than that of the unbelievers, inasmuch as whatever they slaughter or hunt, be it with falcon, arrow or dog, is unclean. Their marriages, whether endogenous or exogenous, are void, and they also may not claim any inheritance... It is for the sultan of Islam to kill their men and divide their wealth, women and children among the warriors of the faith. Let their contrition and penance not be favored and accepted, if they are captured, but let them be killed.” Excerpt from Turkish transcription in M.C. Şahabeddin Tekindağ, “Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikaların Işığında Yavuz Sultan Selim’in İran Seferi,” Tarih Dergisi 22 (1967), 54-5.
A second treatise from the same period by the famous legal scholar İbn-i Kemal is even more universal in its condemnation of Shiism. While repeating the standard injunction that effectively strips all apostates of their Islamic identity, thus permitting their extermination and the seizure of their goods and families, İbn-i Kemal significantly does not utilize the derogatory term “Kızılbaş” specific to the Anatolian ghulât tribes. Instead, he speaks of the duty to combat “a faction of Shiites” that has “conquered many lands of the Sunnis in order to establish their false doctrines.” This referred generally to the Safavids in Iran and their potential supporters in Iraq and Anatolia, but could also serve as propaganda in regions further afield that were more acquainted with mainstream Twelver Shiism. In Damascus, for example, news of Ismail’s military successes were followed by popular Shiite demonstrations on ‘āshūrā-day in the summer of 1501, which the Mamluk authorities prudently chose to suffer. After conquering Cairo some years later, the Ottomans had shah Ismail cursed from the pulpit and circulated rumors that the defeated Mamluk sultan had in fact been a reprehensible Hurufi and Shiite sympathizer. Within a few brief decades, a hitherto widespread, socially tolerable “confessional ambiguity” was giving way to a new state-sectarianism and outright religious persecution in all corners of the Islamic Middle East.

The various fetvas and treatises denouncing the Kızılbaş uprisings in the 16th century establish what later historiography has accepted as the “official” Ottoman policy against Shiite heterodoxy and therefore merit close attention. While both genres draw on earlier religious texts and marshal a theological-juridical vocabulary suggesting a

universal and timeless validity, their subject matters are in fact outspokenly political. The earlier fetvas as well as those of the great şeyhül-İslam Ebu's-Su'ud (d. 1574) all deal specifically with the current Safavid foe.16 The Ottoman scholarly treatises on Shiism, which Elke Eberhard has examined in some detail for the 16th century, likewise bespeak the immediate military concerns on the Iranian front, but remain silent on the much larger and longer-term problem of governing the vast heterodox populations within the empire proper. All share the same basic format: general condemnation of the Safavids; affirmation of the virtues of the rightly-guided caliphs and other Companions; refutation of the Safavids' religious tenets; validation of the sultan's duty to wage holy war against Iran; and, in some cases, a heresiographical history of the Safavid order.17 While Eberhard rightly argues that these works reflected educated Ottoman opinion on Shiism, it should not escape notice that their authors were either salaried government functionaries or, in at least three of the four treatises studied, highborn refugees from Safavid-occupied lands now seeking patronage at the Ottoman court.

The value of these particular treatises thus lies as much in what they ignore as in what they tell of Shiism. Despite their carefully-crafted theological and exegetical arguments against such standard Shiite practices as temporary marriage and reduced podial ablutions, not to mention extremist acts such as deifying shah Ismail, none betray the slightest factual acquaintance with Shiite culture inside the Ottoman realm. The only accusation against the Shiites which might have had any social significance was that of sebb, the ritual cursing of the rightly-guided caliphs and other proto-Sunni Companions


of the Prophet. While doubtless practiced by some of the Syrian mountaineers, there is little evidence the Shiites generally antagonized their Sunni (or Christian) neighbors with religious vituperation. Unlike the Mamluk regime, whose chancery manuals (Qalqashandi, ‘Umari) bespeak a more balanced knowledge of the Imami, Nusayri, Ismaili and Druze communities that came under its administration in Syria, the Ottoman state academics acknowledged and defined Shiism exclusively in the legal terms that justified violence against Safavid Iran and its fifth column of Anatolian Kızıldaş.

These tracts have preserved the voices of bureaucrats and intellectuals who sought to imbue the Ottoman state with a certain ideological identity at some critical junctures in the 16th century. Numerous other treatises are extant from the following decades that have not undergone nearly the same degree of scrutiny and remain for the most part unedited and dispersed in manuscript libraries. While their analysis unfortunately is beyond the scope of this dissertation, three different passages will be highlighted to close this section that may suggest a changing awareness and greater nuance in describing domestic Shiism on the part of 17th-century Ottoman scholars.

The epistle addressed by the Ottoman şeyhül-İslam Mehmed Esad Efendi (d. 1624) to shah 'Abbas' tutor around 1616 is doubtless the best-known anti-Shiite polemic from this period. Forming part of a longer peace-time correspondence between the two, this treatise was partially translated and included in Paul Rycaut's Present State of the Ottoman Empire in 1666.19 For the most part, Esad Efendi reiterates the themes of


cursing; the Shiites' failure to attend communal prayers; ablutions; and other points of doctrinal disagreement, and reasserts his sovereigns' right to battle heretics to the death despite the peace treaty of 1590. Especially noteworthy for our purposes is that the șeyhül-İslam chooses also to draw a parallel between the Safavid Shiites and the Druze heterodox community of Syria:

It has now come to light that you have not contented yourselves merely to be Kızılbaş, but you now also go the way of the Druze. In consequence, those sorts of people's blood and killing is declared licit.20

Though ultimately extracted from Fatimid Ismaili Shiism, the Druze religion has a long tradition of de-emphasizing sectarianism, and no accusations of cursing the Prophet's Companions seem ever to have been raised against the Ottoman-era Druze. It was rather that in the previous decades, the Druze tribalists of the western Syrian coastal range had begun to make a name for themselves as tax rebels and fearsome warriors. Punitive campaigns organized by the Ottoman governors, to be discussed in the next chapter, were routinely legitimized by Damascene religious scholars as a war against heresy or at least against heretics.21 By the early 17th century, the simple fact of the Ma'n emirate's political importance in the Shūf mountains southeast of Beirut had, in the minds of pious state officials, established the Druze as the most notorious schismatics within Ottoman borders.

Another unpublished treatise professes an unprecedented interest in the historic role of the Syrian Twelver Shiites in the formation of the Safavid state. Anonymous and

20. Ibid., 114: “Lakin şimdii şöyle istima olundu-ki ol yalnız Kızılbaş ıken kanaat itmeyüb haliyen Dürzi tarafına sülık etmiş siz ana binaen bu fetva-yı şerif kavlince bu makule olanların kanı ve katli halaldır diyü buyurmuşlardır.”

undated, the Süleymaniye manuscript Risale der Redd-i Revafiz appears from the context to be one of the very few polemical works composed in the later 17th century. With searing irony and blistering rhymed prose, the author recalls how sultan Selim “pulled Ismail’s twelve-pleated crown taut around his head so that the world became narrow and black to his eyes,” paving the way for Murad III to “annex to Islamdom countless towns and countries of the territory under their sway, for the greater glory of the well-protected domains” in the 1580s. However, the Kızılbaş were not exterminated and “over a century later,” the honorable Companions were still being “cursed and defamed from the tops of the pulpits and minarets and in every corner of the bazaar.” The most novel aspect of this indictment, however, is the author’s acknowledgement of a 16th-century Shiite scholar from Jabal ‘Amil (in what is today southern Lebanon) as the leading religious ideologue of the early Safavid Empire:

Because of the excessive strife and conflict and continual bloodshed in the Persian lands at the beginning of the 10th century [16th, C.E.], the Sunni community in that area declined and its members and followers were faced with dispersion... The people of those lands, their corrupted souls being inclined to strife and dissolution, took from among the vilest of humans that ever-so corrupt şeyh of Erdebil, Ismail son of Hayden, as their commander, and brought iniquity and rebellion upon the community of the faith. From Jabal ‘Amil near Damascus, that quarry of Shiism and springhead of heresy, the damned Rafizi Abd al-Al, commander of the cantankerous and high-priest of error, joined Ismail and supported and helped to propagate this false teaching. Calling himself their şeyhül-Islam, he became the şeyh of unbelief.  

22. Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, ms. I. Serez 1451, fol. 3a-b: “Mie-i aşire evavinde bilad-i Acem’de kesret-i kital ü vefret-i fitne u ihtilal sebibi ile ol diyarda olan el-hi Sünnet ve’l-cemaa inkiraz ve etba u eşya anak tefferrick ariz olub... Ol diyar ehalisinin dil-i fasidleri fitne ü fiveada maal olmağın erazî nasdan bir niçe el-hi fesad Erdebil şeyhi şeyh Hayder-oğlu Ismaili serdar edinîb ümmet-i din üzerine bâgy u huruc eylediler. Şam-î Şerîf kurbinde Cebel-i Beni Amil’den ki kan-î Şia u menbi-i Rafzdir serdar-î el-hi cidal kûve-i eimme-i dalal Abdûl-înam bir Rafizi-i melun Ismail’e karin ve ol mezheb-i batlî ısaatda zahir u muin olub şeyhül-Islamları namına şeyhül-kûfr oldı... Ulema-i el-hi Sünnet ve’l-Cemaat’i katl-i amm etmek ile irk-î el-hi Sünnet binhinden münkati olub bakiyeti’s-suyuf olanlarla dahî havf-î can u mal ve bim-i katl-i el-hi iyalden teşeyyu eylediler. Eğerse sultan Selim Şah... sai-i beliğ ü himmet-i bi-derîg idib Ismail’in tacını başına dar ve alemi gözine teng u tar eyledi. Ve sultan Murad Han... ikdam-î tam idib havze-i hamlilerinde olan memalik-i mahruselerinin abrûyunandı niçe bilad u bikai ve diyar-î İslamiye’ye muzaf eyledi. Lakin vicud-i basis u nefs-i habislerini sahib-i rûgzardan kal u kam ve hakk u ref müyesser olmayub ila’l-an yüzylıdan mütecaviz ki ala ruusi’l-aşhad-i menabî u menar,
The historical event referenced in this passage is the recruitment of 'Ali al-Karaki (d. 1534), a Syrian Twelver Shiite scholar resident in Najaf, to formulate and institutionalize an Imami theory of rule in Iran after the Safavid takeover. A close network of friends and family, including his son 'Abd al-'Ali (d. 1596) for whom the lineage was subsequently known, also left Jabal 'Amil to eventually form one of the most prominent schools of juridical and political thought in Isfahan. Although Shiite Lebanese biographers today proudly indicate the scope of their forebears' influence in the Safavid Empire, this 17th-century treatise provides the arguably earliest evidence of the Ottoman state authority being cognizant of their political significance and recognizing western Syria as a “springhead” of Shiism.

The image of Shiism was subject not only to change but also to controversy within the Ottoman scholarly class. As early as 1589, the bureaucrat and historian Mustafa Ali had criticized his colleagues' preoccupation with the Safavids' religious outlook and pleaded for greater Sunni-Alevi harmony. From the mid-17th century we have evidence of a far more acrimonious dispute over the heretical nature of Shiite religiosity. Around 1655, a treatise seems to have circulated which defended or at least qualified the heterodoxy of the Kızılbaş tribesmen in sociological terms. No longer extant, the echo of

ve guşê-i bazaarde sebb-i sahabê-i keram ve kazf u lan-î Ümmi-l-Müminin Ayşê-i Sadika, ve şetm ü tan-î eimme-i din, ve bağz u adavet-i ulema-i ehl tayin iderler.”


this piece can be found in a polemical rebuttal which itself has attracted very little scholarly attention thus far. *Al-Yamānīyat al-Maslūla ‘alā ʾl-Rawāfiḍ al-Makhdūla* ["Yemenite swords uptaken against the heretics godforsaken"] is extant in a 99-folio Arabic manuscript at the Bibliothèque Nationale (Richelieu) in Paris as well as in an untitled 12-folio summary contained in a manuscript compendium at the Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, where it is wrongly attributed to the renowned 16th-century fundamentalist Birgevi Mehmed. The author of the main treatise is clearly identified as Zayn al-ʿAbidīn Yūsuf ibn Muḥammad al-Kūrānī (Gorani), an otherwise obscure scholar who, like the majority of Eberhard’s subjects, may well have been another refugee from Safavid-occupied Kurdistan. The Berlin ms. was "written" by (*katabah wa-ḥarrarahā*) a certain mollā Ḫusayn al-Ghurābī (a distortion of Gorani?), whom Ahlwardt identifies as its mid-18th-century copyist, but on closer inspection it appears identical in content matter with the longer Paris ms. Both versions are dedicated with effusive praise to sultan Mehmed son of İbrahim, the conqueror of Baghdad, and his grand vizier Ahmed Paşa, dating its composition to the period 1661–76.

The text makes no mention of the Kızılbaş but seeks to elucidate the beliefs of "the reprehensible Shiʿa" and explain past scholars’ reasons for excommunicating them from Islam (*takfir*). For while "some scholars excommunicate these unbelievers, others excommunicate the excommunicators, and... reckon that the actual occurrence of such crime is rarer than a vulture’s egg and as distant as the night stars." The author sets out to correct this misperception in a lengthy if rather conventional five-part exposé: After

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arguing for the scholars’ duty to pass independent judgment (iṣṭihād) on heretics, the first chapter provides an exhaustive heresiography of the proverbial 72 errant sects of Islam based on classical literature. The subsequent two chapters lay out the textual proofs of the Shiites’ heresy and the judgments rendered against them by the classical scholars of Sunnism. The fourth and final chapter defend the fetvas of past Ottoman scholars that legitimized the persecution of the Kızılbaş and the Iranian wars against the attack of the still unidentified 17th-century voice of moderation.

The nature of this dissent and the resulting controversy become most evident in the conclusion, where the author states categorically that “whoever rebukes or finds fault with them over their fetvas, like one of our contemporaries, is wrong...” He freely admits that some of these late great scholars defended the original Safavids and their tribal followers, and

excused them as esotericists who do pronounce the dipartite shahāda [creed] and pray to Mecca and so forth, only that many of their common folk who live in tents do not know the shahāda, nor how to pray, nor the direction of Mecca, like dumb beasts without religious restraint or moral discipline...

The author rejects this sociological reasoning, maintaining that the Kızılbaş are infidels if only because they hold true Muslims to be such, though he does seem to acknowledge that unbelief is mitigable: “It is certainly correct that those who are ignorant are closer to salvation than those who are in error.”

If Shiism was consistently portrayed in Ottoman scholarly literature as beyond the pale of righteous Muslim behavior, there could still be varying opinions on what practical consequences this entailed. The sort of writings outlined in this section, and particularly those of the 17th century which await a more rigorous investigation, suggest that the Ottoman impression of Shiism was not always as static and undifferentiated as

29. Ibid., fol. 39a-40b.
some polemicists intended. This is not to say that there was outright advocacy of
tolerance toward the heterodox, but there was a willingness to contextualize and even
qualify their religious belief by their socioeconomic marginality—much as some modern-
day historians cited in the introduction have begun to do. The Ottomans’ awareness of
the relationship between tribalism and unorthodoxy would be as central to their
management of the Syrian Shiite emirates as the somewhat rigid academic dichotomy of
correct belief and unbelief. If and when the authorities chose to invoke the vocabulary of
Shiite heresy (rafid/rafiz) and excommunication (tekfîr) depended not simply on the
timeless legal categories established by the self-interested scholarly class, but on
professional concerns of imperial bureaucrats and on the contingencies of provincial
government. It is to the changing function of religious discrimination and persecution by
the Ottoman bureaucratic apparatus that we turn to in the following section.

Defining Shiism in Ottoman Law and Administration

Which view of Shiism, the romantic ‘Alawism of a pastoral culture, or the malignant
heresy of a state enemy, came to dominate in Ottoman political thought? In this as in
many other regards, the late 16th century can literally be taken as the “definitive” period
in Ottoman history. The reforms initiated by Kanuni Süleyman in the later part of his
reign and by his immediate successors reoriented not only the military, judicial and
administrative institutions but also the very ideological foundations of the Ottoman
state. Süleyman’s most lasting contribution was doubtless the standardization and
codification of sultanic law, yet as Cornell Fleischer has shown, his image as “lawgiver”
was largely an identity manufactured by contemporary advocates to veil the fact that he
had initially presented himself as the messianic world conqueror and renovator of the

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faith. History has generally accepted that his successors, in dismantling the appanage-based military meritocracy in favor of a ballooning central army, chancery and financial bureaucracy, ushered in an era of weak leadership, nepotism and fiscal misappropriation that led inexorably to the empire’s decline. Here too, the contrasting definition of Süleyman’s period as the ideal performance of the one true “classical system” of rule was first and foremost a literary construct of contemporary critics who resented these reforms and the fallout on their own professional careers. Just as the notions of Ottoman “justice” and the “golden age” must be judged in the political context in which they were originally expressed, so too must the standards of orthodoxy and heresy be measured against the juridical and administrative concerns they address. The sublimation of Ottoman society’s confessional ambiguities into a precise dichotomy of acceptable and unacceptable belief, it may be argued, denoted not so much a real shift toward religious intolerance in this period as a bureaucratic strategy for greater social control.

There is little question that the individual most responsible for the legal categorization of heresy was Ebu’s-Su’ud Efendi, the leading jurist of Süleyman’s age and, from 1545, mufti of Istanbul. Until his appointment, the muftiship had been politically influential but the Ottoman judiciary remained under the control of the military judges of Anatolia and Rumelia. Once consecrated şeyhül-İslam (the title by which incumbents were subsequently known), Ebu’s-Su’ud oversaw the emergence of a


separate office of systematized fetua-issuance became the lynchpin of the entire Ottoman legal system. As a personal subordinate of Süleyman, he was responsible for bringing the dynastic law codes (kanun) into harmony with Islamic law (şer'), a task that both lent the sultan greater religious legitimacy and molded key aspects of the Hanefi legal tradition to better suit the needs of absolutist government. Among his most significant innovations was the controversial approval of investment interest on cash vakıf endowments, but his decisions became normative for many domains of Ottoman civil and criminal law as well.32 Ebu's-Su'ud's subtle reworkings of Hanefi law to enable increased government surveillance of and intervention in private contracts, police investigations and commercial transactions, constituted a key pier of Ottoman sozialdisziplinierung in the early modern period.

Ebu's-Su'ud's fetuas placed religious sanctions on a wide range of behavior deemed deleterious to public order. This covered such obvious cases as drunkenness and frivolous oaths, but also affected areas of particular concern to heterodox Muslim communities. Popular observances of the Hizir-St.-Elias feast, celebrated especially by Balkan Alevis, were prohibited, and anybody who could not name the Prophet or who disdained prayer and Islamic judicature was deemed an unbeliever and could, depending on the circumstances, be severely punished, forcibly divorced, or executed.33 Outright denigrations of the faith and its prophets or claims to be Jesus were tantamount to zandaka (atheism) and invariably punished by death.34 Ebu's-Su'ud systematization of

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33. Düzdağ, Şeyhülislâm, 178-9, 186.
34. Ibid., 179-80.
unbelief, apostasy and heresy, Ismail Üstün has shown in an important but still unpublished dissertation, became key to the prosecution of enemies of the state.35

Istanbul in fact witnessed a number of spectacular heresy trials beginning in the late 15th century. In his broad-ranging new study on the mentality of intellectual protest in the Ottoman Empire, Ahmed Yaşar Ocak has demonstrated in detail how the discovery and persecutions of leading court scholars and Sufi mystics for counter-state ideas (karşılık düşünce) accelerated precisely in the period when the empire reached the peak of its consolidation.36 Creative minds such as Molla Lutfi, a leading religious scholar at Bayezid II’s court, easily fell prey to accusations of materialism and free-thought when jealous colleagues grew suspicious of their rationalist philosophical proclivities. In the early 16th century, the proto-şeyhül-İslam İbn-i Kemal had prominent followers of a secretive, Christian- and Hurufi-inspired Jesus cult in vogue even within palace circles prosecuted and executed for heresy. Ebu’s-Su’ud was then already making a name for himself as an uncompromising persecutor of antinomian Sufi sects such as the Bayramis and Gülşenis, both suspected of subscribing to an extreme materialist pantheism that equated all existence with divinity (vahdet-i mevcud).

Such trials were not limited to the imperial capital. The case of Yahyā ibn 'Īsā al-Karakī, who attracted a large following in Damascus before being executed for zandaka in 1610, was among the most noteworthy episodes of persecution in the entire Ottoman period.37 A native of Karak Shawbak in what is today Jordan, Yahyā reportedly began to


36. Ocak, Zıddıklar ve Müfídliler (op. cit.)

propagate materialist atheism after returning from studies in Egypt. He was sentenced to 500 lashes in the district town of 'Ajlūn and thence moved to the capital Damascus where he “drew verminous crowds who cannot discern truth from error or differentiate between reasoning and trickery.” This biography relies on the testimony of Damascene religious scholars, two of whom were instrumental in bringing Yahyā to trial, and one suspects that his thought and the movement it inspired were much more organized than they allow. Yahyā was charged only after the discovery of several lengthy treatises that he admitted to writing; previously one scholar had complained bitterly, “My God, here I am in Damascus, this sort of thing happens, and I can’t find anyone to help me stop it or aid me in repulsing this miscreant’s error!” It is difficult to determine the precise nature of his tenets through the scorn and invective of his critics, but these reportedly included having gone to heaven where he saw several gods, rebuking the mythological Khīḍr (Hızır) for causing ships to sink, writing his works while in supernatural occultation (ghayba), denying the existence of a creator, believing in reincarnation, and declaring the prophets to be ignorant, in addition to a whole catalog of insults and abuses against the one true faith and its representatives.

The hard-line Damascene scholars nevertheless experienced significant problems in bringing him to account. Initially he was committed to a bimaristan asylum rather than to prison, for fear that his supporters would riot and liberate him. His disciples included senior Janissary officers as well as scholars who excused his teachings as

38. Muḥammad Amin Faḍlallāh al-Muḥibbi (d. 1699), Khulāṣat al-Athar fi A’yān al-Qarn al-Ḥādī ’Ashar (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, s.a.), 4:478.

39. Najm al-Din Ghazzī (d. 1651), Lutf al-Samar wa-Qatf al-Thamar (Damascus: Culture Ministry, 1982), 698-707. Ghazzī composed a lengthy ode on Yahyā’s heresy which he presented as evidence at the trial.

40. Muḥibbi, Khulāṣat al-Athar, 4:480.
"esotericism" (ta'wil). The chief judge sentenced him to death for zandaka, but the Ottoman governor first refused to countersign the execution order and suggested banishing him "as one usually does with his sort." The judge and scholars insisted on demonstrating the authority of the religious law, however, and Yahyā was quickly beheaded in the yard of the courthouse, well away from public view. Yahyā’s doctrine of rational doubt, folk beliefs and some popular Shiite elements had clearly touched a cord with an important segment of the Damascene population, but the scholars’ victory was made possible with the legal classification of all these beliefs as zandaka, which carried an unappealable death penalty.

The Ottoman Empire’s strict categorization of heresy left little room for confessional nuances, and Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s authoritative fetvas against Kızılbaşism would be invoked to great effect against the Twelver Shiite emirs of Syria whenever the state required a legal justification for seeking their death. Kızılbaş heretics, after all, could be killed and their women enslaved, regardless of whether they had "drawn the sword on the army of Islam," that is, actively rebelled against the Ottoman authorities, or not.41 Ebu’s-Su‘ud was careful to never explicitly sanction other forms of Shiism. In his sole fetva on the subject (1548), he dodges the question of whether "being part of the Shi‘a and pronouncing the creed" qualifies one as a Muslim by rejecting out of hand the Kızılbaşes’ claim to belong to a proper Shiite sect.42 Colin Imber has argued that "Ebu’s-su‘ud’s distinction between the shi‘a and the kızılbaş would be academic and, in any case, it is virtually impossible to distinguish the various strands of Ottoman shi‘ism."43

41. Düzdağ, Şeyhüslâm, 173-4.
42. Ibid., 174-6.
43. Imber, “Persecution,” 245.
Ottoman heresiographers could no doubt distinguish as well as their Mamluk forebears between the various Shiite sects, but by deliberately effacing these differences and subsuming all undesirable Shiites under Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s definition of Kızılbaş, the state reserved the right to prosecute them at will. The legally ambiguous term “Shi’a” is never encountered in Ottoman administrative sources.

Taha Akyol has neatly summarized as mezhep farka keskinleştirmesi (“the sharp delineation of doctrinal schools”) the process by which both the Safavid and Ottoman states eliminated the grey areas of confessional ambiguity and tolerance in the 16th century.44 Just as the Safavids had taken to persecuting reputable scholars of Sunni Islam in the aftermath of their conquest of Tebriz, so too did the Ottoman administration abandon its Mamluk predecessors’ acknowledgement of quietist Twelver Shiism and equated it officially with the blatant heresies of Kızılbaşism and Rafaż. Socially, the distinction was underscored with a strict interdiction on Sunni-Shiite marriage, which remained in effect until the very end of Ottoman rule.45 The Ottoman chancery’s commitment to the sharpest possible delineation of mezhebs is best illustrated by an episode in which the Iranian monarchy tried to resurrect a peaceable confessional ambiguity and integrate Shiism into the fold of orthodox Islam. In 1736, having dislodged the Safavid dynasty and assumed power in Isfahan in his own name, Nādir Shāh proposed to abrogate the sebb and recognize the Ottoman sultan’s preeminence in

44. Akyol, Mezhep ve Devlet, 68.

the Islamic communion, in return for the incorporation of Imamism as the “Ja’fari” mezheb alongside the four traditional Sunni schools of law.\textsuperscript{46}

The Ottomans would not be fooled, however, and rejected any confessional relativization in a stinging rebuke of Shiism in a 1743 fetwa: In response to the shah’s repeated appeals to Istanbul to “recognize and accept the Ja’fari mezheb as legitimate and count it as the fifth school,” the fetwa notes that there is no such thing as Ja’fari law. “We informed them that the mezheb they propose is the Shiite mezheb... and God knows only one truth and not many.” An examination of their law books (the fetwa names those of two famous Syrian scholars\textsuperscript{47}) and other texts shows that the “Twelver Imāmiya, one of the Shiite schools that is opposed to Sunnism and based on the calumniation and hatred of its patriarchs.” is synonymous with rafz. Any accomodation of Nādir Shāh’s proposal, the fetwa concludes, is tantamount to condoning Shiism and therefore unthinkable.\textsuperscript{48}

What consequences did the unwavering legal condemnation of Shiism entail for the Imami population actually living in the early modern Ottoman Empire? Marco Salati has given a differential picture of the “toleration, persecution and local realities” faced by Shiites in Syria and the Hijaz, contrasting the relatively free movement and sometimes settlement of Imami scholars and pilgrims from the Arab lands, Iran, and even further abroad with the ever present danger of pogroms and political repression by the state authorities. Shiite notable families might even govern townships such as Medina or Lahsa, but always on the condition of practicing taqiya, i.e. dissimulating or at least


\textsuperscript{47} Muhammad ibn Makki “al-Shahid al-Awwal”’s (d. 1384) \textit{al-Lum’a al-Dimashqiya} and Zayn al-Din ibn ‘Ali “al-Shahid al-Thāni”’s (d. 1558) commentary \textit{al-Rawḍa al-Bāhiya}.

\textsuperscript{48} MD 150:52 (1).
deemphasizing their confessional affiliation. Sectarian differences have always constituted a social cleavage on which neither the state authorities nor most Muslim intellectuals wished to dwell, and detailed historical data on inter-confessional relations in the Ottoman lands is sparse. Perhaps no other issue has been used to gauge the possibilities of tolerance and persecution more than the movement of Twelver Shiite scholars between Jabal Ṭâmil and Iran in the 16th and 17th centuries. Due to a wealth of Arab Shiite biographical materials, it has become axiomatic in modern research that the Safavid religious hierarchy was largely built by a class of expert theologians and jurists coming from the southern Lebanon. But how many actually left, and did they do so because they were persecuted in the Ottoman Empire?

In an important revisionist essay, Andrew Newman has sought to explode "The Myth of the Clerical Migration to Iran," arguing that most Syrian Shiites must not have supported shah Ismail's Kızılbaş extremism and expressed their disapproval by consistently avoiding association with the Safavids. More importantly for our purposes, he points to Zayn al-Dīn ibn 'Ali's trip to Istanbul and his official appointment to teach Shiite and Sunni law at a college in Baalbek in 1545 as evidence that the Syrian scholars had no reason to quit Ottoman Empire where they were always free to practice their


beliefs. Devin Stewart, however, has rightly faulted Newman for assuming on no more evidence than past authors that the mere neglect of some Syrians to emigrate to Iran was tantamount to a massive rejection of Safavid Shiism. For his part, he proffers evidence that Zayn al-Din's companion actually dissimulated their confessional affiliation by claiming to be Shafi'i in Istanbul, and recalls that Zayn al-Din himself went into hiding before being arrested in Mecca and mysteriously murdered on the way to Istanbul in 1558. In another article, Stewart describes the trip of the high Safavid official Baha' al-Din al-'Amili back to his native Syria around 1583, where he had to disguise himself as a simple pilgrim and shunned contact with his admirers in Aleppo for fear of discovery by the Ottomans. For Stewart, the practice of taqiya was not merely a de-emphasizing of sectarian dissimilarities, but a vital strategy to avoid detection in the hostile Sunni environment and thus the daily bread of Shiite minorities in Ottoman Syria.

Taqiyya was at all times a religiously sanctioned option (also for Sunnis) for avoiding discrimination and abuse, which Safavid and emigre scholars understandably presented as the norm under Ottoman rule. In practical terms, however, taqiyya meant to the Shiites what the proscription of Shiism meant to the Ottoman administration: a


theoretical principle that had little bearing on their day-to-day rapport. The Ottoman archives yield nothing on the career and murder of Zayn al-Dīn ibn ‘Alī, whom the Shiite literary tradition has since immortalized as “the Second Martyr.” That he emphasized his Shafi‘i credentials in Istanbul is likely; that the Ottomans would seek revenge and launch a decade-long manhunt for an apolitical religious scholar (without it showing up in any chancery or court records) is incompatible with their functionalist approach to local and provincial government.

The harassment and fear that Bahā’ al-Dīn reported suffering on his voyage to Syria, in contrast, is amply substantiated by Ottoman documentary evidence. The resumption of the war against the Safavids in 1578 precipitated a formal ban on all Iranian pilgrim traffic. In February 1581, the governors of Lahsa and Basra in northeastern Arabia were warned that

some of the Kızılbaş trash are currently disguising themselves and coming your way on the pretext of performing the pilgrimage. They convince those guarding the frontier to let them pass, then join the hacc caravan and go to the Holy Sanctuaries intending to foment evil and strife.

After determining the identity of Iranian travelers, all but those entering the “Well-Protected Domains” for commercial purposes were to be turned back at the border. The orders issued concomitantly to the Syrian governors were even more stringent and bespeak an explicit concern with the Safavids’ connection to the Shiites of Aleppo:

Currently, some Shiite heretics from the east are disguising themselves and traveling as merchants to Damascus and from there to Aleppo, where they


57. MD 42:176:554.
mislead and corrupt some individuals devoted to them, and go to the Holy Sanctuaries with the Syrian hacc caravan... Appoint competent spies from among your most trusted men and gather information on these individuals with the utmost expediency. Investigate their situation in public and in secret, and if it is clear that they have come with evil intentions, imprison them securely, immediately inform My noble threshold, and emphatically warn all emirs, judges and governing officers in the region.  

These orders predate Bahâ’ al-Din’s trip to Syria by approximately two years, but show that the Ottoman authorities precisely anticipated how Safavid officials would both travel incognito and carry out their propaganda in Aleppo during the war. The drama of his underground adventure on enemy Ottoman territory, as the circumstances outlined in the mühimme alerts make clear, was a highly contingent rather than a typical vignette of Shiite life in 16th-century Syria.

Cultural Shiism in Ottoman Society

Despite the trend toward sharper authoritative definitions of belief categories and occasional war-related persecutions, there in fact remained a considerable grey area of confessional ambiguity in the early modern Ottoman Empire. Certainly the most striking manifestation of Shiite tendencies within the state structure is the affiliation of the Janissary corps with the Bektaşi Sufi order. Originating among the millenarian heterodox movements of 14th-century Anatolia, the development of the mystical order named for Hacci Bektaş Veli remains shrouded in legend and obscurity but it is clear that members accompanied the Janissaries as chaplains during the earliest campaigns of conquest in the Balkans. Unlike the Mevlevi order, which drew primarily on the high-

58. MD 42:175:553.
intellectual theosophy of Ibn al-'Arabī and evolved in the Persianate court culture of Selcuk Konya, the Bektaṣīs reproduced a Turkish folk religiosity that, while undoubtedly influenced by older Christian and Shamanist elements, expressed itself as devotion to 'Alī and the line of 12 Imams. Its populism, syncretism, and idealization of 'Alī's martial qualities all help explain Bektaṣīsm's appeal to ordinary Janissary soldiers. Until the early 19th century, Janissary recruits swore loyalty to the 12 Imams and Hacci Bektaṣ; the symbol of 'Alī's two-pronged sword Dhūʾl-Faqār, which modern-day Shiites have adopted as the unofficial crest of their confession, was almost certainly propagated throughout the Arab Middle East by the Janissary corps in the Ottoman period.

The history of Bektași Shiism and the Alevi, its modern-day inheritors, has spawned a vast array of scholarly investigations and public debates on religious, ethnic and social identity in the last years. No synthesis of the work done can be attempted here, and the implications for contemporary ideology of the pervasiveness of Shiite loyalties among the empire's military corps still await a thorough study.60 It should be remarked that the Ottoman government quite frequently showed itself to be suspicious of Bektaṣīsm and its sway over the Janissaries. During the Kızılbaş persecutions of the 16th century, many heterodox Sufi institutions and their followers were investigated for heresy too. The Bektași order, though never denounced explicitly, was targeted and its central monastery at Hacci Bektaṣ closed temporarily in 1577-78.61 Yet the spectrum of individual loyalties—from Ottoman state service to Sufi mysticism to Bektași Shiism to Kızılbaş heresy—remained quite fluid. With the suppression (for entirely mundane

60. See Markus Dressler, Die Alevitische Religion: Traditionslinien und Neubestimmungen (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2002).

reasons) of the Janissary corps in 1826, the Bektaşi order was expeditiously declared to be heretical and disbanded. In the great majority of cases, however, the Porte exhibited a benign indifference to religious orders, as summarized in the ruling on a Damascene Sufi and his followers who complained of persecution and exactions by local officials in October 1570: “Inasmuch as the şeyh and his dervishes do not behave against the holy law, they are not to be molested.”62 As with Yaḥyā al-Karakī, the central Ottoman authorities had more at stake in preventing than in fomenting rancor against politically unobtrusive religious currents.

Despite tensions with Kızılbaş Iran and persecutions of individual heterodox scholars, Ottoman society and culture remained permeated with pro-‘Alid sentiment. Throughout rural Anatolia, “Devazdeh İmam” (12 Imam) and other shrines dedicated to saints of the Shiite tradition were sought out by commoners for prayer and intercession and rivaled the official mosques as the focus of popular piety. ‘Alid loyalties also prevailed in the old neighborhoods and mosques of provincial towns such as Ankara, where craft guilds incorporated by the proto-Shiite Ahi brotherhood had secured civil autonomy since Selcuk times. Many popular shrines in Syria which are identified today with Twelver Shiism had no explicitly sectarian identity at all in the pre-national age. The tomb of Imam Ḥusayn’s sister sayyida Zaynab near Damascus, which Baathist Syria and revolutionary Iran jointly developed into a major center of Shiite pilgrimage in the 1990s, is encountered in both Mamluk-era narrative sources and Ottoman documents but never identified as a locus of unorthodox piety. Similarly, the shrine built in Raqqa on the grave of ‘Alī’s supposed companion Uways al-Qarani, already attested in an

Ottoman vakıf appointment from July/August 1729,63 has only in the most recent times been appropriated as an essentially Shiite sectarian site. The shrine dedicated to the same saint in Istanbul (‘Veysel Karani’) in fact served as the repository of the Prophet’s cloak which the sultan’s army regularly retrieved to carry into battle. In the southern Bekaa, the legendary tomb of Noah at Karak Nūḥ came under the custodianship of the Twelver Shiite Murtaḍā clan in the Ottoman period (see following chapter) but was frequented by members of all Islamic and Christian denominations of the region. The Damascene clerical official and mystic ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1731) visited and reported on Karak Nūḥ and numerous other popular shrines during his travels through the Bekaa, but tellingly avoided all mention of the local believers’ confessional affiliations.64

Denying the confessional character of the great Shiite shrine cities of Iraq required a more elaborate balancing act on the part of the Ottoman state. Like the rest of Iraq, Najaf and Kerbela first came under Ottoman control in 1534. Among Sultan Süleyman’s first acts in the region was to order the restoration of the tombs of ‘Ali and Ḥusayn, which was widely interpreted as a conciliatory gesture to the Shiite population.65 The Ottoman state could always point to the elevated rank the early imams also enjoyed within the orthodox Islamic tradition, but it could not ignore the special place afforded them by both Twelver and ghulāt Shiites. According to a report submitted to the Sublime Porte around 1593, for instance, Kızıldaş heretics interrogated in eastern

63. BOA: Cevdet Evkaf 26009.


Anatolia confessed that "our god is Ali" and acknowledged praying in the direction of his and Ḥusayn's tombs rather than toward Mecca.  

Ottoman authorities were repeatedly confronted with the wishes of pious Iranian Shiites to settle in proximity of the sites; even at the height of Ottoman-Safavid tensions in the spring of 1583, the Ottomans thought it judicious to permit the Shiite ruler of Gilan to settle and live out his retirement at the Hazret Ali Asitane of Najaf. Well aware of the sensitive diplomatic and confessional aura of the Iraqi shrines, the central Ottoman administration paid close attention to their upkeep and regular restoration. To judge from the mühimme defterleri and other chancery sources, the last decade of the 17th century and first decade of the 18th in particular witnessed an effort to reform the administration of the Kerbela and Najaf shrines; in 1701 the imperial divan debated and ultimately accepted Isfahan's request to furnish the shrine of the 11th Imam in Samarra with a new sarcophagus, despite the connotations of Shiite Iranian sovereignty over the holy places such a symbolic act would evoke. Referring to the Safavid Sufi shrine of Erdebil, which came under Ottoman military occupation between 1725 and 1730, Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr has suggested that religious endowments suffered from being repeatedly converted between Safavid Shiite and Sunni

66. MD 69:59:115. I am indebted to Prof. Pál Fodor for bringing this item to my attention.

67. MD 36:96:279; for a case of Iranian "Kızılbaş" seeking to settle in Damascus in February 1605, see MD 75:306:644.

68. MD 48:297:874.


management. The available archival sources on the Iraqi shrine cities, however, indicate that the Ottoman administration never problematized their inherently sectarian character and simply administrated the religious endowments as institutions of orthodox Islam.

The problem of confessional ambiguities in Ottoman society is nowhere as evident as in the sectarian identity of the esrafl, the blood-line descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. As the only genealogical nobility in Islam, the esrafl enjoyed a distinct social status and tax exemptions which were jealously guarded by their proper guild organizations; Ottoman court registers are rife with investigations of individuals wrongfully claiming the coveted sherif status. Yet at the same time, the esrafl represented a link to Islam’s ‘Alid heritage and many remained Shiite in a diffuse, non-sectarian sense. The sherifs of Mecca, custodians of Islam’s holiest shrine, subscribed to the politically innocuous Zaydi branch of Shiism until pressured to profess Sunnism by the Mamluk sultans in the late 13th century. In medieval Baghdad, the nакibs or heads of the esrafl corporation were often leading Shiite theologians. Among their chief social functions seems to have been to mediate between the militantly opposed Hanbeli and Twelver Shiite populations of the city. A similar role was performed by later medieval Syrian nакibs such as the ‘Adnān family, themselves scions of a Baghdadi nакib dynasty, in mediating disputes between Mamluk officials and Druze or Shiite communities, and in


getting their own followers to tone down anti-Sunni rhetoric and cursing. The nakibül-eşraf institution in the Ottoman period has only recently been subjected to systematic scholarly investigation; the Alevi popular historian Baki Öz was perhaps the first to point to the seeming contradiction of a “Shiite” office instituted under Ottoman sovereignty.⁷⁴ While it would probably be misleading to characterize the imperial nakibül-eşraf or those of most urban centers agents of a sectarian Shiism, it remains true that the eşraf corporation in many ways represented an officially institutionalized confessional ambiguity in Ottoman society.

Somewhat less ambiguous was the case of the Zuhrawis, a şerifal family with vast landholdings in and around Aleppo who monopolized the post of nakib there from Mamluk to late Ottoman times. Clearly identified as Twelver Shiites in both Shiite biographical and other narrative sources, the Zuhrawis’ confessional identity, naturally enough, drew neither comment nor reproof within the Ottoman bureaucratic establishment where they themselves held office. The only direct evidence we have from this period of their Shiite leanings, as demonstrated by Marco Salati in his ground-breaking work on Shiism and eşraf in Ottoman Syria, was their financial patronage of the Iraqi shrine endowments.⁷⁵ Here as well, the cultural Shiism of an elite provincial family was welcome and wholly compatible with its service to the Ottoman state.

Even the high Ottoman court culture was receptive to literary expressions of ‘Alid loyalties. The Iraqi poet Fuzuli-i Bağdadi (d. 1556) won renown in Istanbul and throughout the Islamic world in sultan Süleyman’s age for his uniquely lyrical, mystical, anguished verse on the effervescence of love and the futility of existence. Fuzuli was born

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⁷⁴. Baki Öz, Aleviţin Tarihsel Konumu (İstanbul: Der Yayıncılık, 1995), 78-89.

in or near Kerbela during the Akkoyunlu period. He was already well-known by 1508, when he tried to curry favor with shah Ismail with a poem that celebrated his notorious wine goblet made of the defeated Sunni Uzbek khan’s skull. Unable to cultivate Safavid patronage, however, Fuzuli found both friends and benefactors among the Ottomans after their conquest of Iraq in 1534. He never left the province of Baghdad, but is known to have excelled in Azeri and Ottoman Turkish, Persian and Arabic. Literary critics from Katib Çelebi onward have qualified Fuzuli and his work as Shiite; Fuad Köprüülü, downplaying his supposed Bektaşi, Ismaili or Hurufi influences, maintained that he simply espoused a mainstream, non-political Twelver Shiism which he perhaps disguised by taqiyya to make his œuvre more palatable to the Ottoman public.

The official censure of Kızılbaşism and Rafizism notwithstanding, Ottoman society remained permeated with pro-'Alid and Shiite sentiment at all levels. In the sense that Shiites would not dwell on their religious divergences when seeking patronage or otherwise interacting with representatives of the Devlet-i Aliye (High State), they may be said to have practiced dissimulation. On the other hand, the Bektaşi-Shiite leanings of the Janissary soldiery, the 12-Imam piety of rural Anatolia and Syria, the confessional valence of the Iraqi shrine cities, and the 'Alid loyalties of esrāf such as the Zuhrawis or littérateurs such as Fuzuli were not hidden to anyone. The Ottoman government functionaries were generally well appraised of their subjects’ confessional affiliations and could choose to thematize them when engaging in the persecution of certain undesirable scholars, fifth-column rebels, or brigand gangs. More often than not, however, they simply chose not to thematize and inflame the confessional divisions immanent to such a widely-dispersed, ethnically and economically segmented society. Though explicit

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76. These details are taken from Abdülkadir Karahan’s article “Fuzuli,” Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: İSAM, 1996), 13:240-6.
religious toleration could not have been reconciled with the state’s formal, Islam-based ideology, there remained ample room for a pragmatic administrative equivocation toward the heterodox sects of the early modern empire. In the interest of keeping the socio-religious peace, surely no one practiced “taqīya” more than the Ottoman administrative authorities themselves.

Ultimately, it becomes difficult to ascribe the early modern Ottoman Empire any “official policy” toward Shiism. The transformation of the charismatic frontier beylicate into a centralized bureaucratic state, and its struggle to define itself vis-à-vis its Safavid rival, did precipitate a normative religious and juridical order that may be called an ideology, but one which never totally excluded socio-confessional non-conformisms. Whether in Istanbul or the provinces, persecutions in the name of religion were usually the result of individual conflicts and jealousies, and did not obviate the pervasiveness of ‘Alid loyalties throughout Ottoman society. The ambivalent rapport between state authority and heretical constituent can be demonstrated most effectively with a long-term look at the opportunities and constraints, the enfranchisement and the disciplining experienced by a heterodox Muslim community under actual Ottoman administration. The Shiite tribal emirates of the western Syria highlands engendered the perhaps greatest literary and archival record of any such community. The history of their growth, chastisement and adaptation is a living illustration of the complexities of imperial ideology and local reality in the early modern centuries.
CHAPTER TWO

SHIISM IN WESTERN SYRIA

UNDER OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION

Since its origins in the dispute over the Prophet Muhammad’s succession, the Shiite religion has crystallized, or had the reputation of crystallizing, resistance, social protest and revolution against the reigning Muslim order. Accordingly, the history of Shiite society under a self-professedly Sunni regime like the Ottoman sultanate has almost always been understood as one of opposition, endurance, and bloodshed, for which salient events such as the martyrdom of individual free-thinking scholars or the deportation of entire Alevi tribes seems to provide ample evidence.\(^1\) Away from the spotlight of histoire événementielle, however, the mundane experience of apolitical Shiite communities under Ottoman rule testifies to the contingency and flexibility of the early modern state’s rapport with its heterodox constituency. From Deli Orman to the Tihama, the Ottoman Empire encompassed countless non-Sunni sectarian groups which formed local majorities, participated in rather than protested against the reigning order, and were quite often co-opted into the structures of local government.

The coastal highlands of geographic Syria are home to the most famous examples of heterodox home-rule under imperial dominion. Since the middle ages, Druze tribal chiefs from the Shūf mountain south-east of Beirut enjoyed formal recognition as

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"emirs" in return for their fealty and tribute to the Ayyubid, Mamluk and Ottoman states. Starting around the 17th century, the Druze Ma'n dynasty took numerous Maronite and other Christian populations from the Shūf and adjoining regions of the Lebanon range into its protection, laying the groundwork for a semi-autonomous commercial and political enclave which the European Great Powers finally sought to detach from Ottoman sovereignty. This union of Druze warlords and Maronite bourgeoisie has become the founding myth of republican Lebanon, generally to the exclusion of other actors whose history was not immortalized in like fashion by contemporary Christian chroniclers and hagiographers. Today's nationalist historiography has conventionally belittled the significance of Ottoman imperial authority, and subsumed all other local rulerships under the single, purportedly ecumenical Druze government of the Lebanon.

The history of the Syrian Shiite emirates challenges the Lebanese narrative in several important respects. In the second half of the 17th century, the Ḥamāda emirs of Mt. Lebanon and the Ḥarūfīsh emirs of Baalbek both rivaled the territorial extent and political power of the Druze emirate of the Shūf. Unlike the Druze emirate (whose incumbents in the 18th century were actually Sunni converts to Maronitism), the Shiites were regularly denounced for their religious identity and subject to persecution as Kızılbaş heretics, making their florescence under Sunni Ottoman sovereignty even more remarkable. Notwithstanding, the documentation analyzed in this thesis suggests that the Shiite emirates also carried the Ottoman state's imprimatur as a tax collection and government concessionary just like the Druze, whose rule over the whole of Mt. Lebanon could in fact only begin with the marginalization and subjugation of the Shiites in the 18th century. The aim of the following chapters is to relate the history of the Ottoman Shiite emirates' rise and fall as an alternative to the hegemonic narrative of the Druze-Maronite mountain refuge that ultimately became Lebanon.
This chapter begins with a survey of the administrative policies the Ottomans adopted toward the heterodox communities of Syria after the 1516 conquest. It argues that the Ottomans initially retained the fiscal practices of their Mamluk predecessors, but soon instituted iltizam tax-farming through local notables as the most efficient way to extend their authority into the inaccessible desert and highland periphery. In the coastal mountains, the Ottomans attempted to maintain a balance among the Druze and other paramount tribal chiefs by a mix of punitive campaigns and official recognition. In the 17th century, several of the major clans attained Ottoman military governorships and were left to dominate the rural districts of Tripoli and Sidon as hereditary taxlord dynasties; the Ma'ns and Shihābis are often recalled today as “princes” of an independent Lebanon. The chapter ends with a look at the Ḥarfūsh emirs of Baalbek, the best-known of the Twelver Shiite feudatories that served the Ottoman state as a rural tax and government concessionary. At first the Ottomans valued the Ḥarfūshes because of their social pre-eminence among the region’s large Shiite population, it will be argued, and withdrew their support in the later 17th century not out of religious considerations but because the Ḥarfūshes proved unable to match and control their Druze rivals on the state’s behalf.

**Ottoman Fiscal Policies on Shiism in Syria**

How did the Ottoman Empire’s stance against Shiite heterodoxy translate into an actual administrative policy on the ground? With the conquest of western Syria in 1516, the Ottomans inherited suzerainty over four numerically significant Shi’a populations: Twelvers, whose “mainstream” Imāmī Shiism Iran adopted as its state religion; Nusayris (Alawites), a ghulāt offshoot of Imamism which has some outward features but no theological origins in common with the Anatolian Kızılbaş; Ismailis, moderate dualists
whom the middle ages had feared as the "assassins;" and Druze, a Manichean offshoot of Fatimid Ismailism whose emirs were particularly reputed for their martial skills. A significant proportion of the Reşwan Kurds, who began to enter northwestern Syria in the 17th century, may also have been Alevi (Kızılbaş). These differences were of some meaning to the imperial heresiographers in Istanbul, who were paradoxically more suspicious of ordinary Twelver Shiism than the others because of its associations with Safavid Iran, but not to the Ottoman administrators charged with actually governing Syria. The majority of these communities remained tribally organized and many, especially those of the Tripoli mountains, practiced seasonal nomadism. They all shared in a religiosity dictated in large degree by the material constraints of rural life: Seasonal migration, poverty, illiteracy, and lack of contact with urban centers of learning meant that the highland Shiites had no exposure to the traditions of Islamic legal scholarship or even mosque worship. Popular religious expression consisted for the most part in the visitation of hilltop sanctuaries dedicated to venerable ancestors, and in the observance of seasonal thanksgiving feasts—things which brought them closer to their bucolic Christian neighbors than to the urban culture of Sunni Islam.

Technically, Ottoman fiscal policy did not discriminate between licit and heretical Muslims. All confessional groups including the Christians were subject to the same state agricultural tax (mirī), which was assessed according to land type rather than social status. In practice, most rural subjects (reaya) were also liable for extra taxes on their persons or households (hane), such as the Christian capitation tax (çizye), which were usually demanded of an entire community as a proportionate lump-sum payment (maktu) rather than collected individually. It is in the second category of status-based taxes that the Ottoman conquerors did enshrine, however briefly, a fiscal policy special to the Shiite sects of Syria. Most of these provisions appear only in the earliest Ottoman
provincial tax codes (*kanunnamen*) for Syria and reflect former Mamluk practice. If their initial adoption by the Ottoman regime implied a certain legal recognition of Shiite sectarian affiliation, their abandonment rapidly thereafter underlines its resolve to homogenize, i.e. eliminate, all social deviance in the provincial periphery.

The Druze are rarely noted as a group. A solitary reference in a Tripoli district *kanunnamen* from Sultan Süleyman’s reign mentions that “there are 40 un-Muslim Druze beğs in the mountains; a misguided folk where each follows his own cult.”² No particular taxes are specified, and the statement probably serves to alert government functionaries to the difficulty of collecting anything in this period of frequent Druze revolts (see below). The small Ismaili community of al-Kahf and Qadmüs, on the other hand, clearly benefited from Ottoman fiscal standardizations. The first *kanunnamen* for Tripoli, prepared in 1519, announces the abolishment of two obscure taxes which were deemed illegal Mamluk innovations: According to Margaret Venzke, one of these dues, the *sarha*, was levied throughout the Nusayri-inhabited highlands.³ However, the reference to its collection from the *evlad-i akil* (the spiritual leaders, akin to the *parfait* in medieval Cathar dualism) suggests that it was limited to the Ismaili sect, perhaps initially as a counterpart to the Nusayris’ *dirhemü’r-rical*. The other tax rescinded in the name of ancient custom in the Syrian Ismailis’ favor, the *resm-i isti[k]rar*, (sedentarization tax?) is likewise of unknown origin and purpose.⁴ The *sarha* was re-established in subsequent *kanunnamen* and then abolished a second time in the later 16th century.⁵

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3. Venzke, “Syria’s Land-Taxation,” 428. This is apparently the same tax that has been been transliterated as “serce” in the published *kanunnames*.
The only reference to a special tax on Twelver Shiites suggests that it too was abolished soon after the Ottoman conquest. A 1526 kanunname for the sancak of Hama and Homs indicates, as part of the dues to be collected at the central lodge (bezistan) of Hama, that for “Rafizis going from the region of Damascus to visit the sanctuary of Ali [in Iraq], it is ancient custom to take four osmani from each.”6 (By comparison, Christian pilgrims traveling southward from the same bezistan were charged only two osmani.) In late Mamluk and perhaps early Ottoman times, it must still have been standard for the government to cash in on Syrian Shiite pilgrim traffic heading northeastward from Hama to the Euphrates and on to the Iraqi shrine cities of Najaf and Kerbela, which were in fact under Akkoyunlu and Safavid administration until 1534. After the Ottomans produced their own revised land tax surveys (tahrîr), however, this tax too disappears from the kanunnames. Further research is required, but it is doubtful that the Ottoman authorities wished to accord the Syrian Twelvers a veritable tax break. Rather, the tendency was to clamp down on all Shiite pilgrim traffic through Syria, particularly in times of rising tensions with Iran, as evidenced by the restrictions placed on Safavid Shiites entering as traders (see chapter one.) While such orders pertained specifically to the war years of the 1580s, they nonetheless also targeted Ottoman Arab Shiites: In March 1582, for example, the chancery advised Damascus to facilitate the entry of Iraqi sheep traders into the province, but to guard lest any Revâfiz use this as an opportunity to go on pilgrimage to the holy cities in Arabia.7

The only group that was singled out on the basis of its sectarian identity and subject to a progressively more restrictive taxation policy was the Nusayris. Mantran &

6. Akgündüz, Osmanh Kanunnâmeleri, 6:671.
Sauvaget first noted the collection of a “people-piaster” (dirhemü‘r-rical) from the Nusayris, which they liken to the capitation tax on Christian subjects. This is indeed how the Ottoman accounting office came to consider the dirhem, but it is unclear if it was originally meant as a tax on non-Muslimness. The oldest kanunname for the region, compiled in 1519 or almost immediately upon the conquest, requires the dirhemü‘r-rical from those village where it had always been collected in the past, but does not refer explicitly to the Nusayris. The revised tax code from Süleyman’s period, however, enshrines a more precise and restrictive policy:

In the villages of [Tripoli] sancaq there is a people known as Nusayris who neither fast nor pray nor submit to any of the Islamic şeriat. In the old accounts register [defter], a part of this sect was assessed a tax called the “people-piaster,” in the amount of one each, and it was collected each year in accordance with the defter. Some of them were not assessed in the defter and they were not levied.

Presently... an appeal was made to the noblest throne and it is my command that it be collected from all of them. Thus on the basis of ancient custom, a person-piaster of 12 [copper] para each from the married men, and six each from the boys who can work and earn independently, is to be registered in the new defter.10

All subsequent defters give the Nusayris’ purported irreligion as the reason for a universal levy of the dirhem, which by the 1570s has climbed to 24 and 12 silver akçes for married and single men, respectively. Despite their repeated reference to “ancient custom” (kanun-1 kadim), the Ottomans seem to have subverted a Mamluk-era tax which was imposed on some highland areas in particular and not on the Nusayri sect in


10. Akgündüz, Osmanlı Kanunnameleri, 7:83 (from TT 1107:9, dated 1547-48).

11. Ibid., 7:791-3 for Jabala; 7:798 for Homs.
general. An individual head-tax of this sort was frequently assessed on members of a tribe; the term "resm-i ricaliye" is indeed used to describe some tribal dues in the Ottoman period.\textsuperscript{12} It seems likely that the Mamluks had intended the tax specifically for those remote villages (Nusayri or otherwise) that were organized by tribe and difficult to assess otherwise. The last available Tapu Tahrir Defter, dated 1645, abolishes the distinctions between married and single taxpayers and demands a collective payment at the rate—inflationary even by the standards of the day—of 100 akçe for every two Nusayris.\textsuperscript{13} It is not immediately clear whether the Ottoman tax raises resulted from dwindling religious tolerance or increasing bureaucratic efficiency—nor indeed if there is a useful distinction to be made between the two.

In other situations, the appeal to "ancient custom" could legitimize the reinstatement of a tax that had apparently fallen into abeyance. The Ottoman state's dilemma between religious correctness and financial allurement is clearly resolved in the latter's favor in a February 1584 order on the Nusayri "heretics" alcohol production:

Most of the [rural districts] of Tripoli are inhabited by the Nusayri faction... who, being heretics [rafiiziler], constantly bring wine [hamr] to sell and trade. A petition was submitted indicating that these people were subject to the wine tax [bac-i hamr], the stamp-tax [resm-i damga] for the province of Homs, and weighing taxes [resm-i mizan] in those places specified, all to the benefit of the [mirf] fisc. I have decreed that, so long as this causes no harm to other tax farms, the new defter shall record that Nusayris bringing wine from the outside to sell are assessed, as per ancient custom, the wine-tax, weighing taxes... and the stamp tax in the province of Homs.\textsuperscript{14}

To conclude, the progressively stricter enforcement of taxes on the Nusayris is unique among the Ottomans' fiscal policies in Syria. As with most newly conquered

\textsuperscript{12} Bernard Lewis, "Ottoman Land Tenure and Taxation in Syria," \textit{Studia Islamica} 50 (1979), 121.

\textsuperscript{13} BOA: MM 842:210.

\textsuperscript{14} MD 52:210:546.
territories, the Ottoman authorities based their first provincial tax codes for Syria on the customary usages of their Mamluk predecessors. These customary laws included several levies which specifically targeted—and thus recognized within a legal framework—local Shiite sects. The Ottomans moved quickly to streamline and consolidate their tax codes, expunging all references to Twelver Shiite pilgrims and Ismaili spiritual leaders, usually by appealing to an even more “ancient,” presumably pre-Mamluk custom (kanun-i kadim) to justify these changes. Only in the case of the Nusayris, whom the Ottoman administration perhaps did not even consider a proper Islamic derivate, did ancient custom legitimize the reinforcement of capitation and wine taxes on a population which, in the strictly seriye sense, was illegal. In all situations, the kanunname emendations were meant to maximize the state’s fiscal control over rural Syria rather than enforce a religious codex.

In practice, as the lone reference to the obstinate Druze beys hints, the state experienced certain difficulties in extending its fiscal sovereignty into rural Syria. With the decline of the provincial feudal cavalry (as heralded by the disappearance of detailed tax cadastres from the mid-16th century onward) and the monetary shocks of the 1580s, the awarding of large cash tax-collection concessions to local notables became the only remotely effective means to extract fiscal benefits from inaccessible, usually unruly coastal highland districts. It is thus to the institutions of the tax farm (iltizam) and the tribal emirate, which together represent the most prominent historical seam of contact between the Ottoman state and the heterodox populations of Syria, that we turn now.

**Heterodoxy and Home-Rule in Lebanese History and Historiography**

Since the 17th century, writers such as the Maronite patriarch Iṣṭfān al-Duwayhī (d. 1704) have built a Lebanist historical narrative around the figure of “the” emir or “the
prince” as one true ruler of the mountain, against whom the Muslim Turkish governors stood as little more than oppressors and foreign interlopers. Modern textbooks have accepted the historical validity of the Lebanese “system,” with the paramount Druze chief heading a fixed hierarchy of feudal lords (shaykh, muqaddam) and governing a politically united Lebanon.15 Perhaps most important, idealists have cast the emirate as the archetype of the non- or inter-confessional Lebanese polity: Uniting Druze tribal lords and the Maronite Church, the emirate is imagined as the defender of all the many heterodox Muslims and Christians who have supposedly always sought out the Lebanon as a mountain refuge against oppression. Internally, as many historians of Lebanon have emphasized since the 1975-91 civil war, the socioeconomic hierarchization of the classical emirate bridged all religious difference, and rifts existed purely along class or universal tribal (Qaysi vs. Yemeni) lines.16 The idea of political mobilization and segmentation on the basis of religious affiliation, as Ussama Makdisi has rightly argued in his thesis on “The Culture of Sectarianism” in Lebanon, is a 19th-century phenomenon: Both European and Ottoman imperialists had every interest in redefining and recreating Lebanon as a conglomerate of intrinsically antagonistic confessional blocs in need of more rational governance.17

However, the historicity of the “classical system” that is assumed to have set Lebanon apart from Ottoman Turkish rule has also undergone some skeptical revisionism since the civil war. The historical-geographical circumscription of “Mount

15. Yassine Soueid, Histoire militaire des Muqâṭa’as Libanais à l’époque des deux Emirats (Beirut: Université Libanaise, 1985), 55-76.


Lebanon" and the nature of the major emirs' political mandate, Kamal Salibi pointed out in *A House of Many Mansions*, remains subject to shifting and conflicting interpretations on the part of modern Lebanon's constituent communities: What Maronites might perceive as a self-evidently separate, organic nation was, in the eyes of Sunni Muslims at the other end of the spectrum, but an integral part of the wider Arab-Islamic Middle East.\(^{18}\) The Shūf feudatories certainly enjoyed a considerable degree of fiscal and judicial autonomy which the Ottomans thought it best to recognize and institutionalize; on the other hand, formal investiture with the emirate (or "beğlik," in Turkish) signified nothing more than pre-eminence among the other government tax concessionaries of the mountain, a rank which the Ottomans accorded or rescinded freely depending on which local faction seemed to serve their interests best. The classical, autonomous "Lebanese system" is perhaps largely the product of 19th and 20th-century Christian ideologues' imagination.\(^{19}\)

Nor was the emirate over the Druze tribes the only such institution of local home-rule in early modern Syria. Since Ayyubid times, the central state had formally invested the leading bedouin chieftains of the Syrian desert as the *amīr al-'Arab*.\(^{20}\) The Arab emirate was the key to ensuring the safety of the *hacc* and other trade routes, and far

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19. In the words of Kamal Salibi, "Lebanese historians have tended to promote [a] Ruritanian image of the Lebanese emirate: they have certainly over-emphasized the dynastic principle involved, over-estimated the antiquity and extend of the autonomy enjoyed by Mount Lebanon under the emirs, and generally exaggerated the degree of Christian-Druze cooperation on which this autonomy was based. Their readers, when they turn to examine the primary sources, are certain to be confused." See "The Lebanese Emirate, 1667-1841," *al-Abhath* 20-3 (1967), 1; also Abdul-Rahim Abu-Husayn, "The Feudal System of Mount Lebanon as Depicted by Nasif al-Yaziji" in Samir Seikaly et al, eds., *Quest for Understanding: Arabic and Islamic Studies in Memory of Malcolm Kerr* (American University in Beirut: 1991), 33-41.

surpassed the Druze emirate in importance before the rising Mediterranean textiles trade brought commercial wealth to the coastal highlands. Few issues so preoccupied the Ottoman authorities in Syria, to judge by the mühimme defterleri, as their delicate rapport with the Abū Rish emirs in the 16th century and the Ḥamd al-ʿAbbās emirs in the 17th and 18th. These desert “princes” were just never incorporated into the founding myths of the modern Syrian republic. Colloquially, the term emir also suffered an inflation of its meaning once the Catholic powers decided that Lebanese feudalists might be strategic allies. Eighteenth-century western travelers often noted that “false princes” came from the Lebanon to Europe to solicit financial contributions at court. Most fundamentally, “emir” indicated a military command, such as vested in the governor of a sancak district. It was applied also to the chiefs of numerous minor tribal groupings, in theory to any which could mobilize a military force to put at the service of the Empire. In the western mountains, for instance, not only the Druze Maʿns but also the Shiite Ḥarfūsh clan of the Bekaa and the Kurdish tax-farmer dynasty of al-Kūra district (Raʾs Naḥḥāsh) in Tripoli are denoted as emirates in official Ottoman documentation.

In 1633, the Ottomans captured and later executed emir Fakhr al-Dīn Maʾn for his perennial insubordination; his sons were taken to Istanbul, where, presumably as Muslims, they attained notable ranks in the Ottoman state bureaucracy. After the last Lebanese Maʾnid emir died without male issue in 1697, the Ottomans were active in securing the recognition of a near relative as his successor. Nominally emirs of the Druze, the Shihābī clan was in fact Sunni and then converted to Maronite Christianity in the course of the later 18th century. The Druze emirate remains one of the more fascinating topics in Ottoman provincial and socio-religious history; it has certainly been
among the most thoroughly explored and debated. The present dissertation focuses on the Twelver (Imāmī) sect of Shiism in western Syria which has received far less attention in Lebanese historiography. Though never invested with a paramount beşlik, the Ḥarfūshes of Baalbek, the Ḥamādas of Mt. Lebanon and the lesser Shiite taxlords of Jabal ‘Amil were powerful allies and/or rivals of the better-known Lebanese feudalists for much of the period under consideration. The study of Shiite home-rule can not only sharpen our understanding of heterodoxy in Ottoman ideology and administration, but provide a different perspective on the development of early modern Syro-Lebanese rural society as well.

What was the Shi’a’s place within the Ottoman-era “Lebanese system?” In the sense that the Lebanese historical identity has traditionally been predicated on the distinctiveness of the Ma'n and Shihi‘bi emirate, the Ottoman-era Shiite experience has been written out of the Lebanese national narrative. The Shiite mountain tribes’ home-rule structures, which we will circumscribe here as emirates in the general sense, frequently conflicted with those of the southern Lebanese Druze or their northern Lebanese Maronite allies, and the historiographical thematization of their distinctive experiences under Ottoman sovereignty is therefore liable to be seen as sectarianist and divisive. On the other hand, the insistence on the non-confessional, timeless nature of the Druze-Maronite compact, the Shiite sociologist and philosopher Ahmed Beydoun has brilliantly argued in Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais, itself reflects an inherently confessionalist perspective on Lebanon’s past. In recent decades, the Shiite confessional community’s growing demographic importance and

21. For the Ottomanist perspective, see M.C. Şehabeddin Tekindag, “XVIII. ve XIX. asurlarda Cebel Lübnan Şihâb-Oğulları,” Tarih Dergisi 13 (1958), 31-44.

political self-awareness has resulted in a general reappraisal of its role as a historical constituent of Lebanese society. Muḥammad ‘Alī Makkī wrote the first history of pre-Ottoman Lebanon to emphasize the past importance of the Shiites; contemporary self-representations typically stress their Lebanese-nationalist stance against French imperialism as well as their Shiite-internationalist integration in the scholarly networks of Iraq and Iran.\textsuperscript{23} The Ottoman-era emirates are a subject of much critical ambivalence. In broad terms, the Shiites too imagine a "golden age" of local feudal autonomy contrasting with the oppressiveness of Ottoman Turkish rule,\textsuperscript{24} but pioneer revisionist such as ‘Alī al-Zayn have likewise denied that Shiite south Lebanon ever formed part of the Ma‘n or the Shihābī emirs’ jurisdiction. Before we turn to the more specific discussion of the Shiite emirates and their relationship with the Ottoman authorities and with their feudal neighbors, the remainder of this section will review the system of tribal home-rule as administered by the Ottoman Empire in the highland regions of western Syria in the 16th and 17th centuries.

The Lebanese mountains, like all of Syria, came under Ottoman sovereignty in 1516 following the defeat of the Mamluks in the battle of Marj Dābiq. The 19th-century emiral court historian Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābī provides an elegant account of Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Ma‘n “the First” thereupon submitting to Sultan Selim’s authority and being named sole emir, but as Kamal Salibi has convincingly shown, this was a pure legend devised to affirm the Ma‘n-Shihābī lineage’s historical claim to the Druze emirate against

\textsuperscript{23} An excellent critical reassessment of the Shi‘a in Lebanese history and historiography is given by Majed Halawi, \textit{A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi‘a Community} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 19-48.

its then most dangerous rival, the 'Alam al-Dīn clan.\textsuperscript{25} There is, not surprisingly, no evidence from the Ottoman side that bespeaks any interest in the factional politics of the highland periphery at this time. The usual scenario was for newly-conquered areas to enter into vassalage to the Ottomans before gradually being annexed, garrisoned, colonized and slowly integrated into the imperial administrative structure.\textsuperscript{26} Despite the suddenness of the Mamluk regime's collapse, the consolidation of Ottoman rule over the Syrian land was no less deliberate. Selim's personal interest in his new territorial acquisition seemed limited to the tomb of the Sufi master Muḥyī' al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī near Damascus, which an apocalyptic prophecy current within Ottoman circles had predicted he would uncover.\textsuperscript{27} After overseeing the restoration of its shrine, he turned the day-to-day management of Syrian affairs back over to Mamluk commanders who had transferred their allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. Only after the secessionist rebellion of the governor Canberdi al-Ghazālī in 1520-21 did Istanbul eliminate the last vestiges of Mamluk sovereignty and begin to Ottomanize the provincial administrative apparatus.\textsuperscript{28}

From the very start, the Ottoman authorities were faced with tribal upheaval in both the desert and mountain hinterland of Syria. Rather than impose direct government, the Ottomans were happy to recognize the pre-eminence and traditional taxation prerogatives of the paramount bedouin or highlander chiefs as long as they


\textsuperscript{26} Halil Inalcik, "Ottoman methods of conquest," \textit{Studia Islamica} 2 (1954), 104-29.


\textsuperscript{28} On the conquest and its aftermath, see Adnan Bakhit, \textit{The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century} (American University of Beirut: 1982).
demonstrated loyalty to the sultanate. In Syria, the Ottomans awarded iltizam tax concessions to select tribal notables for political reasons long before these became the fiscal standard in the rest of the empire. The Druze-inhabited regions of Damascus province, specifically the sancak of Sidon-Beirut, proved particularly recalcitrant toward Ottoman state authority. Frustrated in their attempts to collect taxes or establish a police presence, the Ottomans devastated the Druze highlands in a massive punitive and tax-collecting campaign in 1523-24; in 1545 the Ma'nid tribal chief was assassinated in Damascus. The Druze were not to be reduced, however, and in the next decades they became an ever greater threat to Ottoman security as they acquired muskets from their European trading partners which outperformed the weapons of the Ottoman government forces. Professor Abu-Husayn, to whom we owe a richly detailed tableau of rural Ottoman Syrian politics based on imperial archival sources as well as local chronicles, describes a state of almost constant warfare between the Druze and the Ottomans from 1565 to 1585.

This state of conflict culminated in the 1585 Ottoman invasion of the Shūf mountain. A vast force comprising imperial Janissaries in addition to Egyptian and Anatolian provincial troops put on a great show of Ottoman power, confiscating firearms and forcibly collecting the long overdue taxes. The senior Ma'nid emir fell in battle;
several other chieftains were extradited to Istanbul and only permitted to return some years later. Administratively, the Sidon-Beirut sancak was detached from Damascus ("Ṣam") and annexed to Tripoli ("Trablus-Ṣam" or "Trablus-Ṣam"), a province which was created in 1579 from the northwestern coastal districts of Damascus and Aleppo with a view “to bring[ing] the unruly territory under better control.”

The Ma'ns recovered quickly from the disaster of 1585. Their new clan chief Fakhr al-Din had himself appointed sancakbey of Sidon-Beirut, and soon held most of the Shūf and even parts of Mt. Lebanon further north under sway. His increasing independence and almost treasonous contacts with the duchy of Tuscany caused the Ottomans to briefly drive him into exile in 1613-18, but his power was not definitively broken until he was arrested in 1633 and beheaded in Istanbul. In 1660, the Ottomans finally incorporated the sancak of Sidon-Beirut it as its own province (eyalet), an idea with which they had already experimented before Fakhr al-Din's 1613 flight and which subsequent historians have also interpreted as an attempt to increase the central administration's hold on the Shūf.

To view the partitioning of Ṣam, Trablus-Ṣam and Sayda-Beyrut purely as a reaction to native rebelliousness would be to overestimate the region’s importance in the Ottoman administrative vision. The reorganization of the classical military sancaks into eyalet accounting units was in fact the defining feature of an empire-wide reform in the 1580s. Originally, a sancak had comprised a given number of timars and zeamets,


small territorial prebends awarded on a temporary basis to members of the imperial cavalry in return for their wartime services. Their commander or sancakbeğ might report to a regional super-commander, beğerbeğ, although many sancaks especially in peripheral or tribal areas such as Deyr-i Zor/Rahbe, Jabala, and Sidon-Beirut seem to have reported directly to Istanbul without being incorporated into a larger provincial army. As the feudal cavalry declined in importance, however, the equitable distribution of timar fiefs and sancak commands in the provinces became secondary to the rationalization of imperial tax collection and the financing of a central infantry army and navy which could compete against the modern European powers.

This change of militaro-administrative paradigms, sharpened by the cash reserve crisis and inflationary shocks that hit the Ottoman Empire toward the end of 16th century, had wide-reaching consequences in geographic Syria. The province of Aleppo had continued to form a single “Arabian” accounting unit (defterdarlık-i Arabistan) with Damascus but was detached and incorporated independently in 1567. Aleppo remained linked to the rest of Syria through kin and commerce as well as by the government’s directives to coordinate the yearly hacc operation and local military campaigns (such as the one to be discussed in chapter four), but geographically, administratively and culturally the province was equally close to its Anatolian neighbors. Further east, Raqqa too was constituted as a separate province (with Urfa as its administrative center) around 1586, after being separated from Diyarbekir.36 Over the next century, the governorship of Raqqa became an office of tribal control for south-east Anatolia and northern Syria more than a civilian eyalet in the usual sense. Tripoli, as already stated,

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became an independent eyalet in 1579, though it had already been under separate administration for a brief period after the Ottoman conquest in 1516. Its borders with Damascus continued to fluctuate, particularly in regards to control of the Bekaa Valley. The eyalet of Tripoli comprised an unusually high proportion of heterodox populations, including the Twelver Shiites of Mt. Lebanon and the northern Bekaa in the sancak of Tripoli proper, and the Nusayri Shiites of Hama, Latakia, Hîşn al-Akrād and Jabala. The sancak of Jabala especially was apportioned as timar to veterans of the Ottoman campaign in Cyprus, as indicated in a register of military appointments from 1570-71.37 It is likely that from the imperial perspective, a growing concern with maritime strategies rather than the need for mountain brigand-and-heretic control determined the coastal highland region’s overall importance.

A second, more profound consequence of the imperial reforms was the increasing trend to staff provincial offices not with senior military personal but with regionally-rooted notable households who assured higher cash revenues through efficient management. The most proficient of these gubernatorial dynasties cultivated court access in Istanbul, commercial partnerships with military protectors in the provinces, and their own family patronage networks. They were rewarded with quasi proprietary rights to their districts and even encouraged to invest in international trade in order to enhance their economic viability, a far cry from the former military meritocracy. The Ottoman state actively promoted regional dynasties such as the Jalīlis of Mosul or the Mamluk households in Cairo and Basra so long as they proved capable of maintaining order and maximizing their territories’ tax potential. Where some historians have taken the rise of the notable households as a resurgence of native autonomy and evidence of imperial decline, others have portrayed decentralization as a conscious and effective

37. MD 42, passim.
strategy of administrative modernization. In any event, the ever greater superposition of political office with provincial-scale tax collection concessions ultimately reflected the empire’s new economies of scale.

In Syria, this tendency culminated with the ‘Azm dynasty of Hama, which was permitted to monopolize the three provincial governor posts and other offices for much of the 18th century. There were, however, several precedents of family rulership beginning from the Köprüllü reforms in the 17th century. Grand vizier Mehmed Köprüllü (himself a recent vali of both Damascus and Tripoli) appointed his son Fazıl Ahmed to reassert control over Damascus following a long-simmering Janissary revolt in 1660. The creation the eyalet of Sidon the same year, which the localist historian Duwayhī viewed as the Empire’s response to the Shihābis’ and Ḥamādas’ rebelliousness, was above all meant to provide an appanage to the military commander accompanying Fazıl Ahmed. In the 1690s, as we will see, the Mataraci-oğlu clan, another civilian gubernatorial household with bases in Jabala, Latakia, Damascus and Istanbul, would dominate the Syrian governorships and hacc command, using its trans-regional position to try and eradicate the Ḥamāda emirate.

The promotion of tribal emirates such as the Ma’ns should be viewed in the same context of fiscal administrative reforms. Rather than destroying their local influence in the 1585 punitive campaign, the Ottomans institutionalized and co-opted it to their own ends. While 16th-century archival documents refer to the Ma’ns merely as mukaddems, Fakhr al-Dīn was formally named sancakbeğ of Sidon-Beirut after 1590 in return for


40. Barbir, Ottoman Rule, 62-3.
supervising the recalcitrant Druze taxlords of the Shūf on the state's behalf. Certainly in
the early part of his reign, he eagerly served the Ottoman cause, responding promptly to
orders to repress local (and especially Shiite) rebels, and generously bribing Ottoman
governors upon their accession or again to brush aside faux pas such as his support of
the rebel Aleppine governor Ali Canbolat in 1607. In return, he was awarded the
additional tax-fief (and district governorship) of Safad and, unofficially, of the Kisrawān
in southern Mt. Lebanon. Fakhr al-Dīn enjoyed the protection of the governor of
Damascus until around 1611, when the Ottoman authorities became suspicious over his
political ambitions. 41 On a level below that of the great provincial dynasties, the Ma‘ns
constituted the archetypal Ottoman gubernatorial household; a direct product of the
16th-century imperial reform initiative. As Kamal Salibi remarks,

[T]he emirate, far from being an institution deeply rooted in the Druze political
tradition, began, in fact, as an Ottoman innovation—a fiscal agency subject to
annual renewal, designed to serve Ottoman rather than Druze needs. The Druzes,
in fact, never took their emirs to be more than Ottoman mültexizms. 42

Political careers in the northern Lebanon were similarly predicated on local tribal
leadership and official state patronage. Since approximately the 12th century, when the
Ayyubid regime introduced the military tax prebend ( iqṭā‘ ) into Syria, successive central
governments had recognized and sought to institutionalize the paramountcy of certain
clan notables deemed loyal to the state. In 1305, the Mamluk sultanate settled the ‘Assāf
Turkmens in the Kisrawān mountains as a counterweight to the restive Shiite tribes. The
‘Assāfs then enjoyed the special favor of the Ottoman state, with which they had
maintained contacts even before the 1516 conquest, and they flourished as the premier
taxlord emirate of all northern Lebanon for the remainder of that century. As

government tax farmers, the ‘Assāfs slowly lost their Turkmen tribal character but promoted agricultural development and forged alliances with other local notabilities, including the Maronite Ḥubaysh family and later the Shiite Ḥamādas.43 After the Ottoman administrative reforms of the 1580s, however, the ‘Assāfs increasingly came into conflict with the Sayfā clan in the northern part of the newly-formed eyalet of Tripoli. The Sayfās, long held to be of Kurdish origin but now understood to have separated from the Turkmen Zulkadir-oğulları, established themselves in the northern mountain fortress of ’Akkār around 1528.44 Yusuf Sayfā, rather than the more powerful emir Mansūr ‘Assāf (who, ironically, remained the Sayfās’ tax overlord in ’Akkār) was then chosen to become the first vali of Tripoli in 1579. The Sayfās gained a full monopoly of power after eliminating the last ‘Assāf emir in 1591, but then had to fight constant turf wars against the governors of Damascus and, increasingly, against the upstart Ma’ānid tax farmers of the Shūf.

The Sayfās’ political downfall, however, began precisely with Fakhr al-Dīn’s exile in 1613-18. Having overstepped the limits of his real power by intervening in the Shūf, Yusuf Sayfā had to contend with both a rebel nephew in the north and attacks by his Druze allies, including the newly-restored emir Fakhr al-Dīn who once again enjoyed the Porte’s blessing as a regional counterweight. While Ma’ānid court historians such as Khālidī and Duwayhī claim that Fakhr al-Dīn thus established his dominion over all Lebanon, he was merely serving the Ottomans to break the power of a regional dynasty who had grown too powerful, a fate to which he himself would succumb shortly. Until


1640, the date of their final disappearance, the Sayfās soured in successive liquidity crises and internecine disputes which were actively fanned by the Ottoman governors; their highland tax fiefs were awarded in turn to a new generation of smaller, more pliant collection agencies such as the Ḥamāda emirate.

The Ḥamādas, as we will see in the following chapter, rose to regional pre-eminence by astutely flipping their loyalties from their original ‘Assāf protectors to the ascendant Sayfās, and then on to subsequent Ottoman governors once the Sayfās’ star had waned. The argument can be made that, from the imperial perspective, the Shiite Ḥamādas simply followed in a long line of peripheral tribal groupings from outside of Mt. Lebanon to be elevated to local taxlordships. In Tripoli these included not only the Turkmen ‘Assāfs and Sayfās, but also numerous Kurdish clans such as the emirs of al-Kūra and the smaller Mar'ab dynasty of ‘Akkār; in Sidon one might mention the Ma'ns themselves and the Canbolats after their revolt, both of whom converted to Druzism, as well as the Ša’bs, a Kurdish family turned Twelver Shiite (see chapter five) in Jabal ‘Amil. Instead of seeking to institute pure domestically-rooted forms of home-rule, it appears that the Ottoman state sometimes actively preferred alien, almost mercenary tribal factions as their local highland tax concessionaries. Once these became too ensconced and integrated in local society, their ruthless efficiency became doubtful and they were apt to be replaced by newer immigrants. This thesis, if it can be substantiated for other locales and generations of Lebanese feudal politics, might suggest that the Shiites’ heterodox sectarianism not only posed little obstacle, but sometimes virtually recommended them to the Ottoman state authority as an ideal tax and police deputy over a large non-Shiite, non-tribal Syrian highland population.
The Ḥarfūsh Emirate of Baalbek and the Bekaa (Eyalet of Damascus)

The Ḥarfūsh dynasty constitutes the best-known Twelver Shiite feudal emirate in Syro-Lebanese history. A number of monograph studies have described its rule over the city of Baalbek and a portion of the Bekaa Valley, from its origins in pre-Ottoman obscurity to its demise with the land reforms of 1864. The reasons for this comparatively thorough historiographical concern with a Shiite emirate are twofold: Unlike Mt. Lebanon, the Bekaa remains an important locus of Shiite scholarly and pious culture to the present day, a fact which has led to an accrued general awareness of, and interest in, sectarian historiography; and second, the Ḥarfūshes’ clashes with the Sayfā and Ma‘nīd emirs in the 17th century afforded them a place in the event-oriented narrative chronicles of the day which the less well-integrated but ultimately more consequential Ḥamāda emirate lacked. The following section draws on prior studies as well as contemporary documentary sources to review the early history of the Ḥarfūsh emirs. It argues that their deep enmeshment in local affairs, rather than the question of their heterodox religious affiliation, ultimately doomed them to a deleterious dependence on other feudal notabilities in the mid-17th century and therewith to redundancy in the Ottoman administration’s point of view.

The Arabic term Ḥarfūsh, or “street ruffian,” has been brought into connection with antinomian Sufi dervishdom as a possible explanation of the Shiite family’s origins. Very little is in fact known of the Ḥarfūshes’ background. Local legend traces the lineage back to an emir Ḥarfūsh al-Khuzā’ī of the Muḍar tribe, a commander in the 7th-century Islamic conquest of Syria. One branch of the family is known to have


46. Mīkhā‘īl Alūf, Tārīkh Ba‘labakk (Beirut: s.n., 1904), 65.
converted from Shiism to Maronite Christianity in the 19th century; the Ḥarfūshes of Maqarmada village near Qardāḥa, whose degree of affiliation with the Baalbek emirs is not known, today constitutes one of the most important scholarly families of the Syrian Alawite community. The Imām Ḥarfūshes produced at least one scholar of repute in the Ottoman age: The clothmaker and poet Muḥammad ibn ‘Ali ibn ʿAḥmad al-Ḥarfūshī (d. 1649) became a religious functionary in Safavid Iran where, as both contemporary Sunni and Shiite sources note, he fled after being accused of ṭarīq heresy in Damascus.

Baalbek itself seems to have been a modest center of Shiite learnedness in the Ottoman period. Besides the ‘Alīd shrine of al-Sayyida Khūla, Baalbek’s Shiite quarter is home also to a mosque constructed by the Ḥarfūshes near their family grave in 1554/55. Biographical sources tell of a large poetry gathering in the city in 1689/90 that was attended by 11 scholars from the Bekaa and Jabal ʿĀmil; in the 1620s, at least one local kadhī seems to have been Shiite. Most importantly, Baalbek was the patriarchal seat of the Āl Murtaḍā, the Shiite custodians of the Prophet Noah shrine at Karak Nūḥ in the southern Bekaa. The Karak Nūḥ waḥāf endowment was established in 1331 by the Mamluk commander Sayf al-Dīn Tankiz al-Ḥusāmī in concert with the emir Ḥasan al-Ḥarfūshī. The administrative supervision (nīzāra and waṭāya) was assumed by

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49. Allūf, Tārikh Baʿlabakk, 7.


the 'Alwān branch of the Murtadā family, the regional nakib dynasty from Baalbek who, like many Syrian Shiite esrāf, subscribed to the Shafī‘i legal school.52

In 1366, the Murtadās were named supervisors of the newly endowed ‘Alid shrine of Sayyida Zaynab near Damascus, a position which Islamic court records indicate they retained throughout the period under consideration53 and up to the present day. In the Bekaa, they were appointed to the Karak Nūḥ foundation for most of the 18th century and had to contend with interference from the “Druze emirs” (i.e. the Shihābis) in at least one instance that was signaled to the imperial chancery.54 The Damascene cleric and traveler ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Nābulusi, whose travelogues are otherwise famously silent on the Christian and non-Sunni culture he encountered in the Lebanon, describes Noah’s sepulcher and eulogizes sayyid Murtadā at length, after coming to visit and pray with him in October 1700.55 A major earthquake only a few years later, in 1705/06, required the Murtadās to undertake extensive repair works at the shrine.56

In addition to ancient sites of high ‘Alid culture such as Baalbek and Karak Nūḥ, numerous small Shiite farming communities in the Bekaa also fell within the purview of the Ḥarfūsh emirs. The recently-edited journal of the late-Mamluk popular historian Ibn Ṭawq already identifies the Ḥarfūshes as foremen of the Anti-Lebanon mountain village


53. Markaz al-Wathā‘iq al-Tārikhiya, Damascus: Damascus Shari‘ya Court Registers 3m:54:118 (March 1690); 59:160:293a (November 1726); 139:160:171 (April 1753). I am indebted to Astrid Meier (Zurich) for these references.

54. BOA: Cevdet Evkaf 14884; 20088; 22285; 32176.


of Jubbāt ‘Assāl in the 1480s;\(^{57}\) Ibn Ṭūlūn mentions them as deputies (nāʿib) of Baalbek in 1497.\(^{58}\) In the Ottoman period, the Ḥarūfīshes maintained fortresses in Baalbek and Qabb Ilyās as well as in Ra’s Baalbek and Labwa in the northern Bekaa.\(^{59}\) A Thuringian traveler who explored the Bekaa and the Barada valley in the early 18th century remarked on the relative libertinism of the men and women in the Shi‘ite villages there.\(^{60}\)

The region also was (and is) dotted with Shi‘ite popular holy places and pilgrim shrines, such as Nabi Shīt on the road to Damascus and Nabi Ilyā just north of Zahla. Unlike Mt. Lebanon, where little architectural and literary evidence of the Shi‘ite tribal past remains, the area ruled by the Ḥarūfīsh emirate in the Ottoman period could boast of a mature, locally-rooted and multi-faceted Twelver Shi‘ite cultural heritage.

Once again, little is known of the Ḥarūfīshes’ initial relations with the Ottoman conquerors. The rebel governor Janbīdī al-Ghazālī’s lieutenant left a Ḥarūfīsh emir in


charge of Homs after killing the Ottoman subaşı and turning to seize Hama in 1520, but this does not seem to have had any negative consequences for the Ḥarfūshes after the revolt was quelled. We see the Ḥarfūshes involved in transregional affairs for the first time in 1534, when Hāshim al-ʿAjami, the Shiite taxlord of Jubbat Basharrī, sought their protection from the state authorities after killing a local rival who had put several of his Shiite and Maronite villages to the torch. However, his own cousin induced the Ḥarfūshes to betray and kill their guest in return for a promise to murder the paramount ʿAssāf emīr, whose tax-fiefs they would then acquire. Their dreams of extending the emirate into Mt. Lebanon were cut short when the plot was uncovered and their partner executed.

At the time, the Bekaa was divided among several competing múltezims including the bedouin Ḥanash and Furaykh emirs. The latter in particular was characterized by contemporary Syrian historians as one “observant of prayers, a champion of Sunnism, and hateful of the Shiites and Druzes.” The Ḥarfūsh clan, on the other hand, were said to be adherents of “extremist Shiism” (ghulat fi rafḍ), with the notable exception of the emir Mūsā ibn ʿAlî (d. 1607), who was supposedly “the closest to Sunnism.” Did the public perception of the Ḥarfūshes’ heresy influence the Ottoman state authority’s regard for them as local governors and tax concessionaries?

The Sublime Porte typically only took note of autonomous feudal lords when their activities became too burdensome for the tax-paying reaya population, and the provincial executive decrees contained in the 16th-century múhimme defterleri tellingly

61. Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 130; Rāfiq, Bilād al-Shām wa-Miṣr, 121.
64. Muḥibbi, Khulāṣat, 4:432.
never refer to the Ḥarfūshes' and other Shiite emirs' sectarianism. In July 1576, the kад of Zabadānī, the principle town on the pass road connecting Damascus with Baalbek, reported that "Ḥarfuş-oğlu Ali had attacked with 70 or 80 horsemen" and requested help to preserve the villagers from his depredations and tyranny.65 Three years later in the fall, the same emir ‘Alī attacked and plundered some villages near Baalbek, which was apparently not under his jurisdiction at the time, again prompting imperial orders to the governor of Damascus to undertake military action against him and to secure the stolen property.66 Within a few months, the Porte was appealing to the governor of Tripoli to deal with ‘Alī Ḥarfūsh, who was now said to be receiving aid from the Druze emir Fakhr al-Dīn in his revolt in Baalbek.67 This effectively transferred the jurisdiction over the Bekaa for the first time to the newly-constituted Tripoli eyalet, but the arrangement was reversed as early as June 1582 when the valley was again annexed to the province of Damascus.68

The mühimme decrees quite clearly mirror the central administration's ambivalence and growing exasperation with the Syrian highland feudatories, with numerous orders being directed against the Ḥarfūshis, the Ma'ns, the 'Assāfs and the Nusayris in the years immediately before the major 1585 punitive operation. On the other hand, the Ottomans still depended on the heterodox emirs to ward off greater evils: In September 1583, for instance, Turkmen and bedouin brigands attacked the Ḥarfūshes in Baalbek, eliciting an urgent appeal to the once more respectable Ḥarfūsh

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68. MD 47:150:363, 364.
emir to protect the townsmen, and an imperial order to the governor of Damascus to intervene on his behalf in order to restore the peace.  

Professor Abu-Husayn has provided a detailed account of ‘Ali al-Ḥarūfī’s extradition to Istanbul together with other local feudatories after 1585, and of his bitter struggle against the (likewise Shiite) Aqra’ clan for control of Baalbek following his return home in 1588. ‘Ali could not long enjoy the fruits of his restoration before he was lured to Damascus and executed by imperial firman, an act Abu-Husayn argues was motivated not by local intrigues (as the contemporary chroniclers claimed) but by the Ottomans’ misgivings about his “extremist” Shiite heresy and supposed contacts with Safavid Iran: His son Mūsā was permitted to succeed him and was even awarded the district governorship (beleşık) of Homs, therefore, because of his (surely dissimulated) religious moderation.

The argument that religion played a role is really undermined, however, by the fact that the elder Ḥarūfī himself had served as governor of Homs since at least 1582, and officially remained in this post even while detained in Istanbul. This follows from an executive order addressed to him in this capacity in November 1586, which politely requests payment of four years’ worth of back-taxes for Homs. Around the time he returned from exile two years later, in August 1588, an order to the departing governor of Damascus announced that ‘Alī’s iltizam debts were to be considered redeemed by his previous payment of 20,000 florins of personal caution-money. Furthermore, the beleşık of Jabala received a harsh warning only a few weeks thereafter that attacks by his Sayfā  

69. MD 52:20:48; MD 52:32:73.  
70. Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 130-4.  
71. MD 61:104:255.  
72. MD 64:15:40.
kinsmen on the Ḥarfūshes’ interests in the Bekaa in an ongoing blood-feud would no longer be tolerated:

Claiming that Ali [Ḥarfūsh], the district governor of Homs, was the cause of that thug Hasan Seyf-oğlu’s capture and death, the Seyf-oğulları are constantly assembling soldiers and attacking the havass-i humayun villages around Baalbek. Countless people have been killed and goods and possessions stolen, and they and 8 or 900 musket-armed riders and foot soldiers caused great iniquity before the new governor of Damascus (n.) could arrive and they were dispersed. Since they are your relatives, you must have known about this affair and were thus responsible. I have ordered that if… they ever gather again and even think of causing harm to the people of [the Baalbek] region, … you will be held responsible and accountable… Guard and take care that neither the Seyf-oğulları nor anyone else cause damage and harm to this land and region. Whatever happens hereafter, no excuses or pretexts will be accepted from you.73

The Ḥarfūsh emir did not completely escape censure either. The Sublime Porte denounced him again as a tyrant and an oppressor of the poor the following year, though he was still officially appointed to Homs.74 It is clear that the central Ottoman government, rather than mere domestic rivals, precipitated ‘Ali al-Ḥarfūsh’es execution in Damascus a few years later, in 1593. The reasons, however, as indicated by the chancery correspondence, evidently did stem from his tax truancy, oppression and calamitous feudal fights rather than from the abstract problem of his confessional identity.

The Ḥarfūshes’ prolonged conflicts with the Sayfās of Tripoli and then the Ma’ns of the Shūf in the first quarter of the 17th century are amply treated by contemporary Syrian chroniclers as well as by modern historians and need not be resumed in any great detail here.75 ‘Ali’s son Mūsā al-Ḥarfūsh became a loyal vassal of Fakhr al-Dīn Ma’n,

73. MD 64:86:251.
74. MD 66:21:45; MD 66:79:166.
75. See Allūf, Tārikh Ba’labakk, 66-73; Rāfiq, Bilād al-Shām wa-Miṣr, 202-11; al-Ḥamūd, al-‘Askar fi Bilād al-Shām, 165-9; ʿHasan ʿAbbās Naṣrallāh, Tārikh Ba’labakk (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Wafā’, 1984), 226 ff.; Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 134-52; Seyyid Muhammad es-Seyyid Mahmūd, article “Ḥarfūsh,” Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi 16:165-7; and, most recently, the book-length study by Fu‘ād Khalil, al-Ḥarfūshat: Imārat al-
using the alliance with the powerful Druze emir to rid himself of his last domestic rivals (the Furaykh) and assisting him in turn in the decade-long war against their common enemy, Yusuf Sayfā. This partnership came apart in 1607 due to an intra-family power struggle set in the wider context of Ali Canbolat’s great Syrian rebellion. Mūsā al-Ḥarfūsh adopted a wait-and-see approach to the rebellion and even tried to mediate between the rogue Aleppine governor and the state authorities. When this failed, the rebels ravaged Baalbek and replaced him with his own cousin Yūnus al-Ḥarfūsh who, like Fakhr al-Dīn himself, had thought it more advantageous to side openly with Canbolat. A greater conflagration was averted in 1607, when Mūsā died from illness and, with the rebellion already in abeyance, left his venal cousin in unchallenged control of the entire Bekaa.

Yūnus was eager to secure the state’s recognition of his position, and so reversed his cousin Mūsā’s policy, becoming a key player in the provincial authorities’ quest to curtail the increasingly self-assertive Druze emir. By 1617, he was poised to become the new paramount tax- and warlord of the entire western Syrian highland region, after having helped the Ottomans drive Fakhr al-Dīn into exile, negotiated the surrender of the remaining Ma’nid fortresses, suppressed the Sayfās’ supporters, and married his son Ahmad to Fakhr al-Dīn’s daughter in a bid to extend his influence into the Safad and Sidon district. To the Ma’ns’ great alarm, Ahmad Ḥarfūsh promptly broke ground on a splendid new palace in the southern Bekaa and there surrounded himself with the Twelver Shiite notables of Jabal ‘Āmil (see chapter five), marking the perhaps first

Musāwama, 1530-1850 (Beirut: Dār al-Farābī, 1997), 315-55; and Sulaymān Zāhir’s Tarikh al-Shī‘a (op. cit.), 3:13-94.
concrete instance where a Shi'ite emir tried to assemble a confession-based bloc in the struggle against rival feudatories.  

At the same time, however, the Ottomans did their best to undermine his authority by encouraging dissent and rival claims for power within the Ḥarfūsh clan. In the end, Yūnus could not hope to challenge the triumphant Druze emir after he returned from Tuscany in 1618. Despite friendly appearances, their relations deteriorated into a political confrontation that opposed the Ma'ān emirate with its Janissary allies against a regional bloc composed of the Shi'ite emirate, its own Janissary supporters, the Ottoman governor of Damascus, and even the Sayfās of Tripoli. In perhaps one of the most momentous battles in Syro-Lebanese history, Fakhr al-Dīn defeated the combined Ḥarfūsh-Ottoman forces at 'Anjar in November 1623, assuring not only his total mastery over the Bekaa but over virtually all of tribal-governed Syria. The defeated Yūnus had become so irrelevant that Fakhr al-Dīn even left him in possession of Baalbek, but he was formally dismissed and executed by the Ottoman authorities two years later, in 1625. As just another lackey of the Druze emir, he had plainly outlived his usefulness to the state.

The Shi'ite Ḥarfūsh emirate earned no thanks for having sided with the Empire against the Druze rebel. Even once the latter was defeated and executed, the governor of Damascus beat back an attempt by the new clan leader 'Alī Ḥarfūsh to retake Baalbek in the fall of 1636.  

Travelers reported that the citadel of Baalbek remained in ruins for many years after Fakhr al-Dīn's devastations. The first indication we have of the


77. MD 86:74:127; MD 86:76:131; Duwayhi, Tārikh, 262.

78. Ramaḍān ibn Mūsā al-Ṭayyīr (travelled 1634, d. 1684), Rihla min Dimashq al-Shām ilā Ṭarābulus al-Shām, 14, and 'Abd al-Ghānī al-Nābulusī (first voyage, 1689), Ḥullat al-
Hařūšehes' resurgence is a literary reference to a palace built by emir ‘Umar (or ‘Ammār) ibn Ismā‘īl al-Hařūšī in Baalbek in 1667/68, around the time when their Ḥamāda co-religionists were establishing themselves as the premier taxlord dynasty of the mountain.

The family soon fell victim to the same internecine disputes that had dogged them in the past: In 1671, “emir ‘Ali ibn al-Hařūš sought the aid of the Damascus state authorities [daulat al-Shām] and defeated his cousins ‘Ammār, Shadīd and Yūnus, plundered their goods, burnt their houses and seized control of Baalbek country.” A decade later a problem presented itself from a new quarter: Having been awarded the 1680 tax concession for Baalbek, the emir Fāris of the up-and-coming Shihābī clan of Wādī al-Taym (south of the Bekaa) put the Hařūšehes to flight and occupied the region with 2000 of his horsemen. The Shiite folk tradition has preserved the memory of the Shihābis' and their Druze supporters' oppression in the region. The now paramount Hařūš emir ‘Umar thereupon set another important precedent by calling on the Ḥamādas of Mt. Lebanon for help. The united Shiite forces were able to kill Fāris and 50 of his men in a night-time raid on their camp near Yūnīn in the Bekaa, then reached a settlement through the Ma‘nids' intercession that left the Hařūšehes once more in control of Baalbek and indemnified the Shihābis for their chieftain's death. Again the Hařūšehes seem to have become divided among themselves, however, for ‘Umar is noted to have died in 1683 while in exile in the Shiite village of Turzayyā in Mt. Lebanon, where

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79. al-A‘īmī, A‘yān al-Shī‘a, 8:375.
80. Duwayhī, Tārīkh, 366.
he had gone anew to seek the Ḥamāda emirate's protection. His cousin Shadid, meanwhile, was returned as müftezim of Baalbek country.83

The Shiite Ḥarfūsh family, in conclusion, in many respects represented the typical provincial feudatory of the early modern Ottoman period. Since before the conquest, their tribal cohesion and military prowess, their familial and political contacts with similar notable households, and their rootedness in the Twelver Shiite patrimony of the Bekaa Valley (as scholars and protectors of religious shrines) predestined the Ḥarfūshes to act as local government and taxation representatives. In 1516, the Ottomans took over a provincial administration which implicitly recognized the various Shiite sects in Syria through specific taxes. As the Ottoman state consolidated its fiscal grip on the region, it dropped or emended most of the Mamluk provisions concerning identifiably Shiite groups, but soon realized that awarding lump-sum tax collection contracts even to heterodox tribal chiefs would be the only way to exercise its sovereignty over the inaccessible, often unruly highland periphery. The Ottomans thus continued the other Mamluk tradition of formally entitling paramount Arab bedouin, Kurdish, Druze, etc., tribal chiefs with a military command (emirate/beğlik). After the fiscal reforms of the late 16th century, some of the more prominent households were further assigned the nominal district governorship (again called emirate) over the regions they held as tax concessions, such as the Ḥarfūshes in Homs in 1582 or the Ma'ns in Safad in 1591. Often romanticized as sovereign "princes" by later nationalist historians, the heterodox emirs of the Shīf, Mt. Lebanon and the Bekaa really constituted the imperial authorities' right hand in rural peripheral areas that lay outside the effective reach of the provincial governors.

83. Duwayhi, Tārikh, 375.
Like their compeers, the Ḥarfūsh emirs forged transitory alliances of convenience with Ottoman officials, Janissary factions and other tribal blocs regardless of confessional and institutional affiliation, and were never singled out by the state authorities, at least in the 16th and early 17th century, for their Shiite heterodoxy. Nonetheless, the Ḥarfūshes were arguably among the first to pursue a distinctly sectarian agenda, cultivating strategic partnerships designedly with the smaller Shiite dynasties to their southwest and with the rising Ḥamāda emirate to their northwest. Though not comparable to the popular sectarian mobilization that would characterize Lebanese war and politics beginning in the 19th century, it is noteworthy that the Ḥarfūshes, even when bitterly divided amongst themselves, never engaged in hostilities against another Shiite feudal faction in the manner of the mutually antagonistic Druze parties. However, their inability to challenge the burgeoning Ma'nid enterprise, and perhaps their unwillingness to temper other Shiite factions, also made them entirely redundant to Ottoman needs by the mid-17th century. The later Ḥarfūshes' submission to the more powerful Ma'n emirs, combined with their own persistent internecine quarrels, would ultimately leave them dependent on the more dynamic, more mercenary Shiite Ḥamāda emirate of Mt. Lebanon. The fate of the Ḥarfūshes and other Syrian Shiite factions in the later 17th and early 18th century would be largely decided in the Ḥamādas' changing rapport with the Ottoman state, the subject to which we turn in the next chapters.
CHAPTER THREE
MT. LEBANON UNDER SHIITE RULE,
1640-1685

For a time in the later 17th century, the Shiite Ḥamāda emirs governed a territory that stretched from Safita in modern-day Syria to the Futūh district in the mountains southeast of Tripoli. A number of the rural tax-farms remained in their hands until the 1760s, when they were crushed by the Shihābis and went with their tribes into exile. The Imāmī community has all but disappeared from the region today, and the Ḥamādas never became as renowned as the Ḥarfūshes of Baalbek or the scholar families of Jabal ‘Āmil. Yet the history of their emirate—its improbable rise to prominence, its continuous negotiations with the state authorities and its turbulent rapport with its subjects and rivals—stands out as the apex of Shiite political enfranchisement under Ottoman imperial rule.

The Ḥamāda emirate was perhaps the single most important feudal power in the coastal highlands between the demise of Fakhr al-Din ibn Ma’n in 1635 and the rise of the Shihābis in 1698. Lebanese historiography, however, has almost univocally condemned its reign—“l’invasion des Métoualis [Twelver Shiites]... très belliqueux et cruels, qui occupèrent les hautes régions, depuis Akkar jusqu’au Futūh, et, inspirant aux chrétiens une grande terreur, les refoulèrent vers la côte.”¹ “[F]anatiques, rapaces, sans foi ni loi...,” the Ḥamādas “bled the Maronites’ land dry and committed all the crimes

imaginable... Drunk on power and wealth,” they “began to perpetrate the greatest ignominies. Persons, goods; nothing was respected.”2 Often the entire Ḥamāda period rates but a single phrase: “la tutelle onéreuse et tracassière de la famille des cheikhs chiites de la Biqa' septentrionale” inflicted upon the Christians3 and only brought to term by a “national uprising” in the 18th century.4 “The Ḥamādas did not recognize the overlordship of the Lebanese emirs, and their rule in north Lebanon was violent and oppressive.”5

This negative stereotype of the Ḥamādas is not only the legacy of an overwhelmingly Maronite narrative historiography of the period: The image of their savagery is often conveyed in contemporary French consular correspondence as well as in the Ottoman chancery documentation spotlighted in this thesis. Was it justified? The purpose of the following chapters is to provide a first contextualized history of the Ḥamāda emirate, one which tries to explain how it could develop into the strongest Shiite polity in the Ottoman Empire, and why it ultimately failed to maintain itself within the local highland feudal order. Lebanese history has all but forgotten the violence and tyranny of the more successful early modern feudatories;6 that the Ḥamāda emirate was uniformly defined and recorded in terms of its excesses, it will be argued, was already then a prime factor in its delegitimization and eventual elimination.

6. Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leadership, 127-8; Beydoun, Identité confessionelle, 519.
The chapter begins with the prehistory of the Shiite emirate in Mt. Lebanon. While Maronite historiography has conventionally portrayed the Ḥamādas as recent intruders to the region, the first section traces the Shiite tribal presence in the Tripoli hinterland through the medieval period, and describes the Shiite-inhabited rural districts in the early 16th century on the basis of Ottoman tax cadastres. It argues that the Ḥamādas, whose precise origins remain obscure, were in the best position to benefit from the institution of ʿiltizam tax-farming on account of their tribalism and itineracy. Their wars with other factions and their emergence as the dominant tax-concessionary household in the eyalet of Tripoli are examined in part two on the basis of the classical narrative accounts. Finally, part three presents the Ottoman archival record of the Ḥamādas relations with the state authorities. While chancery documents occasionally attack them for tax truancy and excessive tyranny against their subjects, the Islamic court registers of Tripoli permit us to trace a regular, institutionalized relationship between the Shiite emirate and the Ottoman state during the second half of the 17th century.

**Shiite Tribalism in Mt. Lebanon**

Why has the Ḥamāda emirate so consistently been written out of the Lebanese national narrative? Much of the explanation lies in the perception of the Shiites’ ethnic and sociological origins. The myth of the Shiites’ recent intrusion into a rightly Christian Mt. Lebanon derives in essence from the single-volume Tārīkh al-Azmina, compiled by the Maronite patriarch Iṣṭfān al-Duwayhi in 1699. Duwayhī first mentions a “shaykh Ḥamāda" in 1547, stating that he and a brother immigrated from Iran “upon the
conquest of Tebriz," which he dates inaccurately to 1499. The Ḥamādas' own oral tradition claims descent from the Arab Ḥamīr tribe of Kufa, whose ancestor Ḥāni' ibn 'Urwa ibn Mudhḥij was among Ḥusayn’s supporters at Kerbela in 680 C.E. Already around 1700, an anonymous French diplomat reported that their ethnic background is disputed: “Les uns croient qu’ils sont venus de Perse à cause qu’ils sont de la secte d’Ali. Les autres qu’ils viennent que des environs de Saida ou Sidon...”

The origins debate says more about the ideological stakes of Lebanese historiography than it provides factual information on the Shiite emirate of Ottoman Tripoli. Nineteenth-century historians elaborating on Duwayhi’s account imagined the Ḥamādas as natives of Bukhara and erstwhile soldiers of the Iranian shah. This, along with the Persian toponym of the Shiite-inhabited “Kisrawān” and the family ties between Safavid and Lebanese religious scholars, laid the basis for a view which became popular during the Arab national literary revival (al-nahda) of the later century: namely that all Shiites are ethnically Iranian. As Rula Abisaab has suggested with respect to the Jabal Ṭāmil, the depiction of Shiism as intrinsically Persian made it possible to “[allot] specific racial roots to the sectarian communities that composed modern Lebanon so as to construe which of these could lay an ‘authentic’ claim to the land and history of

7. Duwayhi, Tārīkh, 224, 258. Kamal Salibi has suggested the passage refers to one of the Ottoman conquests of Tabriz in 1514 or 1534; see "The Muqaddams of Bšrrī: Maronite Chieftains of the Northern Lebanon, 1382-1621," Arabica 15 (1968), 76.


Nor can the Shiites' own claim to be descended from Iraqi 'Alids be taken as objective fact; the Druze branch of the Ḥamādas of Baqlīn, not fortuitously, claims an ancestry in the Fatimid homeland of North Africa. From an anthropological standpoint, it might be asked if successful clanships did not owe more to strategic intermarriages and tactical religious conversions than to an ostensibly pure and closed tribal or confessional ancestry. The story of two immigrant brothers as founders of parallel taxlord lineages, as Michael Gilsenan has noted, is a standard narrative trope among the established notables of the northern Lebanon.¹²

The Ḥamādas' and other Lebanese Shiites' ethnic ancestry is not addressed in any contemporary administrative materials and will hardly have interested 17th and 18th-century Ottoman authorities. The fundamental characteristic of the Ḥamāda emirate, and also the underlying reason for its deprecation in classical historiography, lay not in its primordial or religious but in its sociological distinctiveness. Unlike the early modern Christian society which Duwayhī and other churchmen strove to preserve in writing, the Shiites of Mt. Lebanon were organized by tribes, most of which practiced seasonal nomadism. Rabāḥ Abi-Haidar identifies three "classes" among the northern Shiite population: the sedentary farmer and merchant families established there since early times; the tribes (ashā'īr) affiliated with the Ḥamādas, who settled in several villages forming a defensive line toward the Kisrawān and other non-Shiite regions in the 15th century; and migrant families noted for their learned culture, who probably came from


Jabal ‘Āmil and settled in the Shi‘ite emirate in the later 17th century.\textsuperscript{13} In fact many semi-nomadic groups like the Ḥamādas entered the Lebanon mountains in the 14th to the 17th centuries, many of Kurdish or other distant origins. They only assimilated slowly into local society, retaining their traditional religion, language and pastoral culture in a tightly-knit, endogamous community. Their tribal order, herdsman skills and mobility also made them into a natural military force, one which the Mamluk or Ottoman state authorities were eager to recruit to police and tax the rural highland population on their behalf. The Shi‘ite Shā‘ir, Ḥarfüsh and especially Ḥamāda clans were among the most effective of these tribal/fiscal operations in the north, and their very success under the Ottoman regime has conditioned a historiographical verdict on the entire Shi‘a which still echoes in the modern Lebanist discourse: "[C]ette communauté ne s’est que fort peu attachée à la terre et est restée sans lien avec la vie paysanne."\textsuperscript{14}

The sociological argument has been put most elegantly by Kamal Salibi, who describes a yearly clash between Shiite goatherds from the Baalbek region and Maronites from Jubbat Basharrī when they followed the retreating snows into the mountain pastures: "[W]ith every spring, the goat war which had gone on in the high Lebanon since time immemorial was resumed, taking the form of a Maronite-Šī‘ite religious conflict."\textsuperscript{15} However, this reinforces the misconception that the Shiite tribes belonged only to the Bekaa Valley. The Ḥamādas did acquire the iltizam for Hermel in the northern Bekaa and ultimately found refuge there in the 18th century, but the Shiite tribal presence in Mt. Lebanon goes back to the high middle ages. The Nusayri sect is

\textsuperscript{13} Abi-Haidar, \textit{La société chiite} (op. cit.), 86-91.


\textsuperscript{15} Salibi, "The Muqaddams of Bšarrī," 66.
known to have migrated from Aleppo to the coastal mountains as far south as the Golan around the turn of the 11th century, before its divergence from Imāmī Shiism was entirely distinct. Numerous population groups, including the Druze and the Maronite Christians, moved to the region in the Fatimid era. Until the Crusader conquest of 1108, Tripoli was governed by the Banū ‘Ammār, a Twelver Shiite qādī dynasty of North African and Sicilian provenance. The ‘Ammarid period is seen today as somewhat of a “golden age” of north Lebanese Shiism, when Tripoli with its legendary library was a leading center of scholarship, and commanded a large Shiite hinterland where the district name “Ẓanniya” (or “Ḍanniye” in local dialect) still recalls to the ‘Alid esotericism of its medieval population.16

Historians have often described the advent of the Turkic military regimes as a “Sunni restoration” in the Middle East after two centuries of Shiite ascendancy under the Fatimids, Buyids and Hamdanids. These states, however, had no policy of imposing socio-religious conformity (a modernist anachronism) throughout Syria. Around 1120, the Turkic Burid ruler Tuğtakım invited Ismaili Shiites to Damascus and facilitated their ensonement in the coastal mountains, mainly to win them as supporters in his struggle against the Damascene Shāfi‘ī establishment.17 The Ayyubids frequently allied with the Ismaili “assassins” against the Crusaders, and apparently settled other Shiite groups on military fiefs in the coastal highlands (see chapter five.) Even the Mamluk sultanate of Cairo, which managed to re-establish a measure of centralized control over the Syrian

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lands in the later 13th century, recognized the local autonomy of the Ismaili emirs, extended them tax reprieves and recruited their services in murdering high-level deserters who had defected to Ilkhanid Iran.¹⁸

Still, as the perhaps earliest of the early modern Islamic states, the Mamluks did introduce social and administrative consolidation measures that were prejudicial to the heterodox population, such as the institutionalization of four official schools of Islamic law (Turk.; mezheb), the suppression of Zaydi Shiism in Mecca and Medina, and the occasional promulgation of rescripts against Twelver and Nusayri communities in the Syrian coastlands.¹⁹ Doubtless the most famous episode in the history of Mamluk-Shiite relations was the series of punitive campaigns launched against the Kisrawān district in 1292, 1300 and 1305. The Kisrawān campaigns, as Ahmed Beydoun has shown, have become one of the most contested issues in Lebanese historiography because of their relevance to the region’s demographic composition. Whereas Maronite historians long appropriated the campaigns as an example of their community’s resistance against Muslim state oppression, others have pointed to the presumed Druze and Nusayri victims and especially to an eyewitness account by Aḥmad ibn Taymīya that suggests the Twelver Shiites were especially targeted.²⁰

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Yet Ibn Taymiya's treatise is unadulterated rhetoric (his claim that books were seized which prove the Shiites' evilness is a topos common most such denunciations) and not evidence for an anti-heterodox policy on the Mamluk authorities' part. On the contrary, the campaigns were precipitated by the Kisrawānīs' revolt against their Druze feudal lords, and their capturing and robbing Mamluk soldiers who had fled a recent Mongol attack. The Druze chiefs also commanded the final, devastating campaign of 1305, but only after a patently Twelver Shiite dignitary from Damascus failed to mediate between the mountaineers and the Mamluk governor.21 In the following years, according to a near-contemporary observer, the state authorities "expelled those who had tarried in the Kisrawān mountains and killed a number of their notables, [but] gave quarter to those who settled elsewhere."22 The Mamluk government could not maintain direct pressure on the region for long, and ultimately gained more from accommodating again with the local Christian and heterodox feudatories. Certainly the most long-lasting consequence of the campaigns was the establishment of the Turkmen 'Assāf emirs as the new paramount feudal faction in the Kisrawān, under whose patronage the Shiite Ḥamādas then rose to power in the 15th or 16th century.

There are no written sources from the later medieval period that could provide an objective picture of Mt. Lebanon society and its situation under Mamluk government. Most historians agree today that the Mamluks' reign favored the expansion of the Sunni community in the coastal cities and of the Druze feudalists in the highlands as far north as the Matn district, while the Shiites remained dominant in the Kisrawān until the


Maronite recolonization push in the 17th century (see below), and did not begin to move north into the primarily Christian-inhabited Futūḥ and Jubayl districts until the 15th century. Such inferences, however, are based only on the oral histories of individual notable families, many of which where in fact split among multiple confessional communities, and permit no conclusion save the obvious absence of any real demographic policy on the Mamluk authorities’ part.23

A source which scholars have not yet sufficiently explored in regards to the social history of rural Syria in the 15th and 16th centuries are early Ottoman fiscal records. These must indeed be used with discretion, not only because they were not compiled as statistical material but also because of the quirks of Syria’s tax regimes. The cizye capitation tax, for example, which elsewhere might provide an indication of the Christian population’s size, was levied as a lump-sum iltizam rather than on a per-household basis in the highlands of Tripoli, and not registered in any special accounts books. The records of avarız, nüzul and sürsat, cash levies imposed on individual tax household-units (avarız-hane) beginning in the later 17th century, are equally uninformative for the eyalet of Tripoli: Unlike in other provinces, Tripoli’s defters record no fluctuation in the tax assessment on the rural districts for the entirety of the 17th and early 18th century. In fact, the key Twelver Shiite mukataas (tax-farms) do not figure at all in the provincial avarız, sürsat or nüzul tax lists. A partial explanation for this may be provided in an accounts log24 compiled in 1641, where a rare invoice for the mukataas of Jubayl and Batrun is included in the neighboring paşalıık of Damascus, complete with an explanatory note that they actually “belong to” Tripoli province. Likewise, all the


mukataas of Sidon, Beirut and Safad are invariably recorded under the province of Damascus in avarz, sursat or other tax registers, even long after that region technically became its own independent eyalet in 1660. Very often, the function for which taxes were earmarked—e.g. the Syrian hajj operation, a competency of Damascus’s vali—rather than simple territoriality determined if and where they were recorded.

A partial impression the Ottomans’ administration of Shiite towns and villages in northern Lebanon can be obtained from the tax cadastres (tapu-tahrir defterleri) for the sancak of Tripoli. The tapu-tahrirs were almost all compiled in the 16th century, when the central bureaucracy still needed to keep precise logs of land use and productivity in order to assign individualized prebends (timar, zemmet) to feudal cavalymen and provincial officials. Later, when the rural prebend system was downgraded in favor of a cash-paid standing infantry army and cash tax-farming, tax parcels no longer were reassessed for each new office-holder, and the tapu-tahrirs gradually disappear in the 17th century. No registers at all appear to be extant for the Kisrawān, which was a sub-district (nahiye) of Damascus and later of Sidon-Beirut and never officially attached to Tripoli.25 In the registers consulted for this analysis, the Ĥamādas’ home villages are spread over three tax precincts, Jubayl country, Munaytra, and the Futūḥ, whereby the latter two are reckoned in some defters as dependencies of the first and their borders fluctuated. (The village Farhat, for instance, is recorded alternately in all three.)26

Though these villages do not necessarily appear in each register but only in those recording a given income type, it can be observed that the majority of all villages in the

25. While governor of Tripoli, Yusuf Sayfa temporarily gained personal control over the Kisrawān by marrying the last ‘Assāf emir’s widow in 1591. The resulting turf wars against the vali of Damascus and the Ma’ans of the Shūf only contributed to his own downfall. See Abu-Husayn, Provincial Leaderships, 21-2.

26. BOA: Two detailed (mufassal) tapu-tahrirs TT 421 (dated c. 1529) & TT 1107 (1547); vakaf registry TT 1017 (c. 1525); two timar registers TT 68 (1519) & TT 548 (Selim II reign 1566-74); hass register (1645/46).
Jubayl, Munayṭra and Futūḥ region were exclusively Christian. However, one important finding is that the villages studied in Rahāḥ Abi-Haidar's anthropological study on the Shi’a of 19th-century Jubayl were indeed already Muslim-inhabited in the early 16th, almost certainly by Shiite Muslims if one takes the villagers' predominantly 'Alid names as indicative of their confessional culture. This conclusion would also corroborate different travelers' claims that very few "orthodox Turks," i.e. Sunnis, lived among the Christian and Shiite sectarians.

Two further observations may be made regarding the continuity of Mamluk and Ottoman fiscal practices in the Shiite region. After the 1516 conquest, the Ottoman state appropriated all agricultural lands as crown domain (hass-i hūmayun), with the exception of some private holdings (emlak) that were mainly set aside for pious endowments. In general, hass could either be allocated to members of the royal household as a private income reserve, or apportioned to provincial government officials and cavalry officers as zeamet or timar prebends. In the Shiite districts, however, hass was seldom re-assigned. While the nahiyes of 'Akkār and 'Arqā in northern Lebanon were divided into hundreds of military prebends immediately following the conquest, we have only a few transient examples of Ottoman soldiers holding timars in the mountains.


29. Various Başbakanlık records also mention emlak in the Tripoli highlands belonging to Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Ma'n and to Yūsuf ibn Sayfā, though none directly in the Shiite zones. On the differentiation between hass and emlak, see Venzke, "Aleppo's Malikan-Divani System."
above Jubayl. A possible explanation for this is provided by the timar assignment book TT 68, which establishes that the entire Futuh district, named in all subsequent Ottoman sources as the “Futuh-ı Beni Rahhal,” was totally under the control of the Raḥhāl tribe well into the first decade of Ottoman rule. Almost every village is noted as “belonging to” (tabī) the unknown but most likely Shiite tribe; the only significant exceptions are a few tax collectorships or timars assigned to Muḥammad Sayfā, Mūsā Beğ Kisrawānī and Shihāb al-Dīn Kisrawānī—evidently local notables from before the conquest. The Banū Raḥhāl are no longer designated as landlords in subsequent censuses and some areas were infrequently assigned to Ottoman soldiers as timar, but most land simply became registered in the abstract as crown domain. The military-prebendal tax regime never came to predominate in the Shiite highlands as it did in other parts of Tripoli.

The second observation concerns the continuity of the Mamluk-era vakf regimes in some of the Shiite villages. The Ottoman conquerors were loathe to abrogate pious foundations established by their predecessors according to Islamic law, and indeed repatriated many volumes of sultanic vakf records from Cairo to Istanbul after defeating the Mamluks there in 1517. In Syria, many rural sites were wholly or partially committed to upkeeping local endowments. The Ottomans seem long to have respected these even when the beneficiaries were old notable families rather than institutions of public welfare. The village of ‘Almāt in the heart of Tripoli’s Shiite country owed its entire tax load (2000 gurūṣ throughout the entire period) to the private family endowment of an emir Qānsūh al-Yahyawi, apparently a Mamluk-era warlord. Ḥajūla, also in the Futuh, paid a sizeable portion of its income tax toward the Āqbāy ibn Abdallāh family vakf; its share rose from 200 g upon the conquest to 300 during Selim II’s reign to 1600 by the mid-17th century. Ḥajūla and several other towns including Lāsā and Majdal ’Aqūra also contributed monies to the upkeep of small defensive bastions (bure) in the area. In the
Munaytra district, several important towns supported religious institutions in the provincial capital. Up to a quarter of Majdal 'Aqūra's taxes went to the Kul Ḥasan medrese in Tripoli. Again there is a steady rise in net payments from the early 16th century (472 g out of a total tax burden of 2850) to the mid-17th century (2000 g out of 12,950), a trend visible throughout the area. Numerous other villages subsidized the Kul Ḥasan institution; Christian-inhabited Hadina, however, is noted in TT 1017 as insolvent on account of the ruinous oppression suffered by its population. A key pillar of this foundation was the Shiite village of Mughayra, whose taxes went not only to the medrese but also to the zaviye (Sufi cloister) of Kul Ḥasan in Tripoli city. Curiously, its contribution to the Kul Ḥasan vakif (which by 1645/46 had risen to a staggering 20,300 g out of a total burden of 22,160) is noted in the final register as abrogated and reverted to the imperial reserve (hass-i hümâyûn). The same holds true for the erstwhile Kul Ḥasan vakif payments from Afqā, another Shiite village.

In conclusion, while the fiscal registers at our disposal are too disparate to allow for numerical calculations, two trends affecting the Shiite districts of Tripoli province are discernable. One is the marked overall increase in tax levies by the mid-17th century as seen in the last detailed tapu-tahrir MM 842. This may reflect either a real rise in prosperity, as the Tripoli region is gradually drawn into the prosperous overseas textile trade in this period, or the refinement of tax assessment and exaction methods at various levels of administration. The second trend is the homogenization of tax regimes. While the earliest defters describe the division of tax monies by imperial reserve, tribal prerogative, private and public vakif endowment, and timar prebend, the last available records show the entire rural tax burden, including monies from recently abrogated vakıfs, as being unified into a single, larger yearly lump-sum charge. If this analysis is accurate, and stands to comparisons with other rural districts in the Syrian and
Anatolian provinces, then we may see reflected in these select fiscal records the general, long-term evolution toward more consolidated tax and authority structures in the Ottoman provincial world. The socially heterogeneous but semi-autonomous tribal emirates that came to dominate the rural highlands in the early modern centuries were the natural beneficiaries of these reforms.

*Iltizam* tax-farming my have been an Ottoman innovation, but the co-opting of local leaders as government agents was not. An anonymous manuscript history from the late Mamluk period raises the intriguing possibility that the Ḫamāda emirs were already invested as tax officials by the Circassian Mamluk regime. The single-copy manuscript, which Professor ‘Umar Tadmuri attributes to the Baalbeki historian Burhān al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Umar al-BIQā‘ī (d. 1480), mentions a long-serving Syrian tax collector by the name of Ibn Ḫamāda, whose heirs were to receive 1,000 *dinars* from the local judiciary in April/May 1471. Ibn Ḫamāda had been murdered by the Mamluk privy-counsel (*kātib al-sīr*) of Cairo, his political rival, who sought to cover up the crime lest damaging complaints come to the sultan’s ears.30

So while it is impossible to pinpoint when exactly the Ḫamādas became established in the Jubayl highlands, it is clear that they were the region’s leading Shiite tribal force by the time of the Ottoman conquest and thus the prime contender for official tax concession assignments. In taking control of the Futūḥ district, the Ḫamādas evicted its original Shiite notable family, the Mustarāḥs, who had to move on to the Bekaa and take up farming. Different Ḫamāda brothers, according to family legend, seized control of the high regions of Jubbat al-Munayṭra, the Jurd Kisrawān and,

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eventually, Jubbat al-Basharrāy (now usually “Basharri”) and the Baalbek region. The clan made the Wādī ‘Almāt in the Futūḥ district, i.e. in the highlands above Jubayl, its home base. Ruins of Ottoman-era seigneurial mansions are still visible today in their erstwhile “capital,” Farḥat.

The ‘Almāt glen, similarly to feudal fortress towns such as Ḫāl above Tripoli and Dayr al-Qamar in the Shūf, provided an ideal refuge on the middle ridges of the Lebanese range about a day’s march from the coast. From such places, the shaykhs could both dominate the coastal towns and trade paths or easily flee into the high mountains if pursued by a government army. Similar to other tribes of the region, the Ḥamāda clans often wintered above Jubayl or in the Bekaa valley, and drove their herds to higher pastures throughout the summer. Such mobility favored clan cohesion and allowed them to remain in contact, and intermarry, with other family branches as well as with the Ḥarfūsh emirs and even the Shi‘ite communities of southern Lebanon. It also enabled them to extend their military domination throughout the northern Lebanon, where the alien and ruthless quality ascribed to them in Maronite sources lent them to the office of tax agent. Their life on the fringes of Syrian Ottoman society is aptly described by a French diplomat who met a group of Ḥamāda riders at the Canobin monastery, seat of the Maronite patriarchate, around 1660:

...[N]ous vimes arriver une vingtaine de soldats armés de bons mousquets. Leur figure nous fit peur. C’étaient des gens secs, halés, maigres, décharnés, les yeux bordés de noir, presque nus. Ils entrèrent d’un air féroce dans le parvis sans saluer personne. Ils nous regardèrent attentivement un assez long temps sans rien dire. Il est certain qu’ils nous auraient bien embarrassés, si nous les avions rencontrés dans ces sentiers étroits, où le moindre faux pas qu’aurait fait un

cheval, l’aurait précipité avec son cavalier dans des lieux où on aurait eu peine à trouver les plus grosses parties de leurs corps: car quoique nous fussions tous bien armés, ces gens accoutumés à grimper les montagnes commes des chèvres sauvages, auraient eu bon marché de nous s’il avait fallu en venir aux mains.

...[L]es sujets de ce prince [Serhhan ben Hhameidié]... sont des corps de bronze; il y avait plus de deux mois qu’ils avaient abandonné leurs villages et leurs maisons, et qu’ils s’étaient retirés sur la cime des rochers, où ils couchaient exposés à toutes les injures de l’air sans en être incommodés. Ce sont des gens d’une force et d’une santé inaltérables, souffrants sans peine les plus grandes fatigues, d’une grande sobriété et d’un courage sans égal. Les janissaires les plus braves et les plus aguerris ne leur feraien pas faire un pas en arrière. Ils se servent du mousquet et du sabre, avec une force et une adresse merveilleuse.

Lorsque la poudre leur manque, ils en font eux-mêmes. Pour cet effet, chacun d’eux porte dans un petit sac du soufre et du salpêtre. Ils font promptement du charbon avec du bois de saule. Ils le pilent avec un bâton dans un creux de rocher, et y mettent la dose nécessaire de soufre et de salpêtre, et font ainsi leur poudre qui est très bonne.

Ils n’étaient venus à Cannobin, que pour sçavoir des nouvelles du patriarche de la part de leur prince, et lui offrir leurs services en cas de besoin.

Leur arrivée nous avait d’abord donné de l’inquiétude, nous avions pris nos armes, on se reconnut, on se parla, on nous fit déjeuner et boire ensemble, et nous reconnûmes que c’étaient de fort bonnes gens.32

The Hamadas’ tribal, mercenary character helps explain both their success and downfall as classical Ottoman taxlords. The semi-nomadic (“konar-göçebe”) lifestyle of the Empire’s desert and mountain tribes became a primary locus of Ottoman sozialdisziplinierung efforts in the early modern period, and the Shiite emirates’ decline, it will be argued in the following chapter, began with a state-wide effort to settle and control the konar-göçer tribes from the late 17th century onward. Many families, and finally the Hamadas themselves, sought refuge on the arid slopes of the northern Bekaa near Hermel after the Shihabî-led push to evict them from the mountain in the 1760s. The Shiite Nasir al-Din tribe, which traces its origins to Bazyün in the Futûh, practices

32. Laurent d’Arvieux (d. 1702), Memoires, ed. Antoine Abedelnour (Beirut: Dar Lahad Khater, 1982), 189-90.
seasonal nomadism to this day in the remote Jubab al-Ḥumr on the eastern flank of the Lebanon; in a sense they constitute the last living remnants of the Ḥamāda emirate.33

*The Shiite Emirate in the Politics of the Eyalet of Tripoli*

There is no precise moment when the Shiite districts of Mt. Lebanon came under the rule of a tribal “emirate.” In 1519, as indicated, the Banī Raḥḥāl had tax sovereignty over almost the entire Futūḥ, but they disappear from the subsequent accounting books. For much of the 16th century, state-appointed tax collectors (sing. ‘āmil), military timar-holders, and tax-farmers (mukataacī) existed alongside one another in the rural outback. The first evidence for a trans-regional Ottoman tax collection franchise comes TT 513, a detailed timar register for 1571/72, where numerous Shiite-inhabited villages and mezraas (outlying farm plots) in the Futūḥ and Munayṭra are recorded as dependencies (der uhde-i) of an “emir Mansur,” i.e. the chief of the ‘Assāf Turkmens (d. 1580).34 Many other towns are assigned to “Ibrahim,” possibly of the Maronite Hubaysh family that was allied with the ‘Assāfs, while interestingly a large number of the Christian towns in the nearby Batrūn, Jubayl and Basharrāy districts are recorded as being under the (fiscal) authority of the villagers themselves. A single mezraa in the Jubayl district, Kafr Rūmā, also fell within emir Mansur’s domain.35 The Greek Orthodox communities of the “Qurnat al-Rūm” tract are said to have shared a certain sectarian and genealogical solidarity with the area Shiites, and many families were later recruited by the Ḥamādas

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34. TT 513:115-24. The date of his death is noted in Duwayhī, *Tārīkh*, 283.
35. TT 513:88.
to farm and settle their lands.\textsuperscript{36} The inclusion of a part of their district in Manṣūr ‘Assāf’s domain suggests that their special relationship with the mountain emirate in fact predated the Shiites’ reign.

By the early 16th century, the Ḥamādas were fast becoming an armed faction to be reckoned with in the Tripoli highlands, and to follow their rise to power it will be necessary to delve somewhat deeper into the tortuous clan wars and local rivalries of the period. As early as 1488, the Za’zū family of headmen (\textit{muqaddam}) in Ḍannīya, who were probably members of the Ḥamāda confederation, took the side of the Jacobite Christian immigrants to the Jubbat Basharri in their struggle against the Maronite notables of the district.\textsuperscript{37} Shortly thereafter, an emir Aḥmad (ibn Ḥasan), who Kamal Salibi suggests may have been associated with the Ḥarfūshes of Baalbek, sacked and pillaged the town of Basharrī.\textsuperscript{38} The motives for this are not known, but it may be inferred that both Shiite dynasties were siding actively with the upstart Orthodox communities against the Maronite establishment at this time.

The Ḥamādas are first explicitly named in the manuscript history of an obscure Maronite vicar, who mentions their kidnapping a daughter of the Christian Korkmaz clan and precipitating a blood feud which resulted in the latter’s flight from the Futūḥ region in 1520.\textsuperscript{39} Their first major intervention in the Christians’ factional fighting occurred in 1547, when the Ḥamāda clan chief joined in the conspiracy to exterminate one of the rivaling \textit{muqaddam} households of Jubbat Basharri, the Maronite community’s classic

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\item\footnotesize 36. Abi-Haidar, \textit{La société chiite}, 73-4.
\item\footnotesize 38. Salibi, “The Muqaddams of Bšarrī,” 76-7, quoting Ibn al-Qilā‘ī.
\end{enumerate}
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mountain stronghold. Once established as rulers of Jubayl and Batrūn, the Ḥamādas naturally became involved in other local disputes. Another anecdote from Lebanese family sources tells of the emir settling a conflict between the two leading families of a village in the Qurnat al-Rūm, one of which had only just immigrated from Ḥammāra in the Bekaa and converted to Greek Orthodoxy.\(^{41}\)

Beyond their tribal integrity, their support of certain Christian factions and their occasionally ruthless mercenary behavior, the Ḥamādas owed their rise to regional pre-eminence to their astute maneuvering between the major political players of the Ottoman Tripoli. They began as subalterns of the above-mentioned Turkmen ‘Assāf emirs, who from their home base of Ghazir in the Kisrawān dominated the entire rural hinterland of the eyalet until the late 16th century.\(^{42}\) The ‘Assāfs had kept a good working relationship with the area Shiites perhaps since Mamluk times. In 1523, emir Manṣūr engaged Ḥāshim al-‘Ajamī, the Shiite shaykh of Lāsā village, as his tax agent for Jubayl, making his cousin the manager of his own private estates.\(^{43}\) Manṣūr came to distrust the Shiites’ influence, however, and tipped off a bloody internecine struggle between the two: In 1534, as we saw above, Ḥāshim was treacherously murdered by the Ḥarfūshes in Baalbek, where he had sought refuge from his cousin; the cousin, in turn, was dispatched at home by the ‘Assāfs’ new Maronite deputies.\(^{44}\)

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40. “Shaykh Ḥamāda” was seriously injured in the encounter. Unable to walk, he and several companions were caught and lynched by the locals. See Duwayhi, Tārīkh, 258; Salibi, “The Muqaddams of Bšarrī,” 75-6.


42. Salibi, “Northern Lebanon”.

43. Duwayhi, Tārīkh, 244; Salibi, “Northern Lebanon,” 156.

44. Salibi, “Northern Lebanon,” 158-60.
The Arabic chronicles, for all their colorful narrative, offer predominantly stylized and often contradictory versions of the Ḥamādas’ family organization and attainment of tax offices. One comical anecdote has a Christian brave thrash an entire company of the ʿAssāf emir’s Shiite retainers: The Shiites, who were known never to eat food prepared by non-believers, had mistreated his brother after he refused to build them a cooking fire one Ramadan evening. Fearing punishment after the bloodied Shiites complained to the emir, the hero bound up his hand and pretended they had worsted him. His ruse did not fool the wise emir—and this is the point of the tale—who rebuked the Shiites for their boorishness and honored the Christian for his valor.45 Another controvertible anecdote about the Shiites’ tyranny concerns an Ibn Salhūb of Qari’a village, the ʿAssāf’s tax agent for Jubbat Basharray in 1573-74, who Patriarch Duwayhi indicates was fired soon thereafter for his excessive use of violence.46 That this tax agent was a Ḥamāda Shiite is indicated by the Ḥamāda-friendly, 19th-century local historian Anṭūniyūs al-ʿAynṭūrīnī—who for his part mentions nothing of a dismissal.47

The closest thing to a “founding myth” of the Ottoman-era Ḥamāda emirate concerns a contract murder in the village Jāj. According to one version of the story, the ʿAssāf emir asked the eponymous Ḥamāda shaykh’s two eldest sons [ʿAlī] Dīb and Aḥmad “Abū Zaʿzū’a” to kill Jaj’s Sunni headmen, the effective rulers of the entire Jubayl district. They refused, arguing that their sister’s marriage to one of the headmen made them in-laws. But Sirḥān (occasionally spelled Sirḥāl), the youngest Ḥamāda, went to the emir surreptitiously and agreed to the assassination in return for his promotion.

46. Duwayhi, Tārikh, 272-3.
47. Antūniyūs Abū Kaṭṭār al-ʿAynṭūrīnī (d. 1821), Muktaṣar Tārikh Jabal Lubnān (Beirut: Dār Laḥad Khāṭīr, 1983), 143.
Together the brothers then ambushed and killed the headmen, thus initiating their reign as Jubayl’s taxlords under young Sirhān’s leadership.48 Another version describes the Ḥamādas’ trick of requesting a goat’s head from the Jājis for an upcoming wedding feast, then assaulting them as they deliberated this strange demand.49 Duwayhi, on the other hand, connects this episode not with the semi-legendary brothers Abū Za‘zū’a, Dīb and Sirhān/Sirhāl and the ‘Assāf emir, but with the brothers Yūsuf and Qānsūh ibn Aḥmad Ḥamāda and governor Yūsuf Sayfā, in 1600.50

Popular historians of Basharrī indicate that Aḥmad “Abū " Za‘zū’a" (i.e. "the lanky" in reference to his youth) was the first Ḥamāda scion invited to rule over the Maronite district in 1654. In ‘Aynṭūrīnī’s account, he was delegated by his paternal cousin Sirhān after the inhabitants requested a seigneur from the house of Ḥamāda, and they agreed that he would govern “as he wished” provided he safeguarded three things: the villagers’ religion, their honor, and their blood.51 In another variant making use of the same story elements, it was the brother Sirhān who was nicknamed “Abū Za‘zū’a” while governor of the Ḍannīya district; his sons then wrested Jubbat Basharrāy from the Abī Sa‘b clan, and “Aḥmad Dīb Ḥamāda Abū Za‘zū’a” was commissioned by the governor of Tripoli with the aforementioned tripartite pledge of governance vis-à-vis the Christian population.52 Somewhat firmer is the near-contemporary account of Duwayhi, who writes that the Ḥamāda chieftain Abū Qānsūh Muḥammad Ḥammān was originally taken into service by the aging and childless emir Muḥammad ‘Assāf when he returned

48. Ibid, 58; Shidyāq, Akhbār al-A‘yān, 192.

49. Abī‘-Abdallāh, Milaff, 169.

50. Duwayhi, Tārikh, 295.

51. ‘Aynṭūrīnī, Mukhtasar, 131; also Buṭrus Bishāra Karam, Qalā‘id al-Marjān fi Tārikh Shamālī Lubnān (Beirut: s.n., 1937), 61-2.

52. Abī‘-Abdallāh, Milaff, 168.
from exile in Istanbul in 1585. The Ḥamādas were invited to settle in a quarter of Ghazīr as his tax agents for nearby Jubayl country, thus effectively becoming the 'Assāf emirate’s heirs-apparent six years prior to its extinction.53

Whatever importance one assigns to these relatively local affairs, it is clear that the Ḥamādas also did not fail to cultivate the true political force in the region: the Sayfā dynasty and other Ottoman governors of Tripoli. Yūsuf Paşa ibn Sayfā, the feudal chief from 'Akkār (north Lebanon) who became the first vahi of the province in 1579, established his unchallenged supremacy over the mountain hinterland in 1591 by slaying the last 'Assāf emir and marrying his widow. Ibn Sayfā dismissed the 'Assāf's Ḥubaysh subalterns, but reconfirmed the Ḥamādas and selected them to administer the rural tax districts on his behalf.54 This seems to support Duwayhi’s contention that it was in fact the Sayfās who hired the Ḥamāda brothers to kill the headmen of Jāj in 1600 to cement their rule in Tripoli. The Ḥamādas remained loyal to the Sayfās in the next decades as they in turn became locked in an epic struggle for political survival.55 In the 1620s, the Ottoman central government began to pare back Ibn Sayfā’s influence with the help of the newly restored Druze emir Fakhr al-Dīn Ma' n and his unmatchable mercenary army. Within a few years, as discussed in chapter two, Fakhr al-Dīn had smashed the Ḥarfūshes and other local principalities, seized control of several mountain tax fiefs in Tripoli province and helped the state drive Yūsuf Sayfā from the capital. In 1625, the Ḥamādas joined Yusuf's son and successor Qāsim ibn Sayfā at Marqāb castle (near Banyas, on the Syrian coast) in a desperate bid to regain hold of Tripoli. The rebels were


54. Duwayhi, Tārikh, 288.

promptly set upon by the newly installed Ottoman vali, and had to purchase their own freedom for 20,000 gold pieces.56

The removal of Fakhr al-Dīn in 1633 ushered in a period of instability as feudatories throughout the region jockeyed for power. The Ḥamādas tried to capitalize on a war between two Sayfā factions by attacking the Shiite Mustarāḥ family in Munayṭra and taking hold of the Jubayl district, but they were sorely defeated in a counter-attack led by the powerful Druze 'Alam al-Dīn clan which had allied with the opposing Sayfā leader.57 Two years later, the tide had turned again: A replacement vali sent from Istanbul ejected the querulous Sayfās and 'Alam al-Dins, and formally assigned the Jubayl and Batrūn tax fiefs to 'Āli and Ahmad ibn Ḥamāda.58 In new-found allegiance to the Ottoman governor, the Ḥamādas mobilized on his behalf when he was to be removed from office only a few weeks later; emir Ahmad ibn Ḥamāda was then murdered by cronies of his erstwhile Sayfā patron in January or February 1637.59 Later in the year, 'Āli ibn Ḥamāda was deputized by the Ottomans to help eliminate the last Sayfā supporters.60

The rise of the Ḥamādas illustrates Kamal Salibi’s contention that the Lebanese emirates were first and foremost Ottoman creatures. A tribe such as the Ḥamādas had to assert its dominance over others through violence, but ultimately depended on official recognition and appointments as the empire’s tax and government deputies. They were neither very autonomous, nor did they represent their confessional community before

56. Duwayhi, Türìkh, 321.
57. Ibid., 331.
58. Ibid., 334.
59. Ibid, 334-5; See also al-Amin, A'yān al-Shi'a 2:582.
60. Duwayhi, Türìkh, 336.
the Ottoman state. To close this section, a word may be said about some of the autochthonous Shiite clans whom the Ḥamādas crushed on their way becoming the Ottomans' chosen taxlords for rural Tripoli.

We have already alluded to the Mustarāḥs of the Futūḥ and Munayṭra. According to Duwayhi, these Shiites became heads of the Munayṭra district in 1482 and quickly gained a reputation for “oppressing” the local Christians.61 The Ḥamādas began to clash with the Mustarāḥ clan immediately after they entered Sayfās’ service. In 1593, Qānsūh Ḥamāda managed to kill some Mustarāḥ antagonists in Tripoli city and in other villages, but was felled by a stray bullet while fighting them in Munayṭra.62 In February 1639, as plans were being forged to separate Jubayl, Batrūn and Jubbat Basharrī from Tripoli and attach them administratively to Damascus, Qānsūh’s son Sirḥān Ḥamāda launched a last assault against the Mustarāḥs and killed their clan leader at Mashān village, thereby sealing his own ascendancy over Shiite North Lebanon.63

While the Mustarāḥs represented the older Shiite sedentary population of the Jubayl heights, the Ḥamādas' most immediate forerunner was the small proto-emirate of the Shiite Shāʾirs clan. Little is known of the Shāʾirs’ background. Thought to have migrated from northern Syria around the turn of the 17th century, the Shāʾirs were most likely of Kurdish tribal origin and became steadfast allies of both emir Ismāʿīl al-Kurdi and the Sayfās. From their home base in the village of Tūlā, where they erected a grand palace and a mosque, the Shāʾirs for many years controlled the tax fief of Batrūn and occasionally Jubbat Basharrāy. Local Christian legends concerning the Shāʾirs' savagery in a sense prefigure those about the Ḥamādas themselves:

61. Ibid., 217.
62. Ibid., 288.
63. Ibid., 337-8.
One of them was famous for being rapacious and vicious and for preying on dangerous wild animals. They used to tie him up by day so that he could not set upon passers-by, then let him loose at night. Woe unto them who should venture near the Shā‘ir palace after dark.\(^\text{64}\)

In fact the Shā‘irs quickly found themselves on the defensive against their ambitious coreligionists. Again the Ḥamādas’ expulsion of the Shā‘irs from Batrûn is a subject of considerable historical fancy; one implausible Lebanese account makes Fakhr al-Dīn Ma‘n responsible for installing the Ḥamādas in place of the Shā‘irs because these were allies of his enemy Ibn Sayfā.\(^\text{65}\) Another version reads like a page out of a historical novel:

> The Ḥamādas played a dirty trick on them in order to be able to take their place... They and their followers employed a ruse so that [the Shā‘irs] hosted them every day, once or twice, until they became poor from all the expenditure. They were left with nothing, and had to leave Tūlā and the Batrûn region.\(^\text{66}\)

The Shā‘irs supposedly left and established themselves in Marqab castle further north along the coast, selling their famous palace to the Abī Ša‘bs whom the Ḥamādas had recently evicted from Jubbat Basharrāy.\(^\text{67}\) To go by Duwayhi’s account, however, the Shā‘irs continued to play an important role in the mukattāa politics of Tripoli province. Sirhān became the presiding shaykh of the Ḥamāda clan in 1640 after the death of ‘Alī ibn Qānsūh,\(^\text{68}\) but his accession did not go altogether unchallenged. In the two following years, the now-paramount Druze emir Ibn ‘Alam al-Dīn repeatedly attacked the Ḥamāda villages in the Futūḥ, killing numerous members of Sirhān’s family and temporarily

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\(^{64}\) Abī-Ibrāhīm, “Makhtūt qadīm,” 237, 291. See also Duwayhi, Ṭāriḵ, 311, 338, 347.

\(^{65}\) Abī-‘Abdallāh, Milaff, 166-7.


\(^{67}\) Abī-‘Abdallāh, Milaff, 168.

\(^{68}\) Duwayhi, Ṭāriḵ, 339.
breaking their hold over the Jubayl highlands. In the last instance, he was supported not only by the Kurdish emir of al-Kūra district and the Shā'irs of Batrūn, but also by certain dissident members of the Ḥamāda clan itself.69

Although we have no archival sources for this period against which to check Duwayhi's information and ascertain whom the Ottoman authorities appointed as tax farmers, it appears that the inter-Shiite Ḥamāda-Shā'ir rivalry continued for some time still. In 1651, 'Alī al-Shā'ir and emir Ismā'īl al-Kurdi again fought Sirḥān Ḥamāda, this time over control over the tax fief of 'Akkār.70 Their conflict seems to have been put on hold when the dynamic, reform-minded Mehmed Köprülü was appointed governor of Tripoli and took both emir Ismā‘īl and Sa‘d ibn ‘Alī Ḥamāda into his service (detention might be more accurate) in the capital. In 1655 Köprülü attacked Ismā‘īl and Sa‘d together for having provided insufficient taxes, driving the Kurdish emir into exile in Sidon.71 The Shā'irs, for their part, not only remained contenders for the Batrūn mukataa but even threatened to supplant the Ḥamādas entirely, as we shall see in the following chapter, after the punitive campaign of 1693-1694.

Shiite Brigands or Ottoman Functionaries? The Ḥamādas' Iltizam Commission

Responding to complaints made by the local Sunni religious authorities, the Sublime Porte notified the governors of Tripoli and Damascus in July/August 1690 that

Sirhan and his followers have not contented themselves with getting their hands on the tax farms of Cūbeyl, Batrūn, Zannīye and Cūbbe [Basharrāy] from successive vaļis since quite some time, but they have also usurped the districts of Akkar, Zaviye and Kure. In addition to owing enormous tax arrears, in their

69. Ibid., 340-1.
70. Ibid., 347.
71. Ibid., 350-1.
hands the... property and supplies which the local population owns outside the city has gone to ruin. And how often did they descend upon travelers and the merchant routes to kill and plunder... There has been no end to this sort of depravity and vice. If, in violation of custom, it is again their goal this year to seize the aforesaid tax-farms Akkar, Zaviye and Kure, whose inhabitants are Muslim, in addition to those tax-farms which have long been in their hands and whose people are Druze and Christian, it is certain that the humble commoners from the rural districts will scatter and disperse on account of their oppression... Do not give them... tax farms inhabited by the community of Muhammed in addition to the tax farms they have held previously whose people are Druze and Christian... Do not let them seize and oppress a single tax farm of the... aforesaid in addition to those places they have held since old, and defend the people of Islam from their usurpation and aggression.72

Regardless of the fact that 'Akkār and al-Zāwiya had been under intermittent

Hamāda control for decades, this hūkūm perhaps marks the first instance when the

Ottoman state took exception—albeit very elliptically—to the Hamādas' sectarian

identity. The records of their official tax-farming commissions, needless to say, never

made reference to their Shiism, nor to their habitually abusive exercise of power. Thus
did the Ottoman sovereign view the Hamādas as heretics and usurpers, or as its

legitimate local proxy governors? The answer to this question is central to an

understanding of the later imperial punitive campaigns, as well as the domestic efforts to

eliminate the emirate in the 18th century. Whereas the chancery decrees by their very

nature highlight crises and disjunctures in provincial affairs, the Islamic court records of

Tripoli depict a regular if somewhat ambiguous relationship between the Ottoman state

and the Shiite emirs during their heyday in the 17th century. The final section of this

chapter reviews the full range of available mūhimme chancery correspondence and

ṣerīye court records to show how the authorities were prepared, until the breakdown of

this rapport after 1685, to acknowledge and institutionalize the Hamādas' emirate by co-

opting them into the accepted structures of Ottoman rural administration.

72. MD 100.74.277; MD 100.74.278.
The emirate flowered with the reign of Sirhān ibn Ḥamāda, who became clan chief in 1640 and died (perhaps peacefully, since there is no record of his passing) circa 1685. Both the chancery and Islamic court materials pertaining to the “Sirhan-oğulları” are extant from the 1660s onward, and in the first instance we indeed encounter him as an outlaw. A unique mühimme defteri kept in the Sächsische Landesbibliothek contains a short and otherwise unelucidated order from early March 1661, instructing the governor of Trablus-Şam “to get his hands on and punish the brigand named Sirhan, no matter where he is, whether in the Damascus area or on Ma’n-oğlu’s lands or any place else, by whatever means necessary.”73 While it is always possible that prior hüküms against the Ḥamādas have now been lost, it is certainly not fortuitous that this earliest surviving example originated under the Köprülü vizierate and therewith during the first major imperial undertaking to pacify and restructure rural Syria in the 17th century. After having served as governor of Tripoli province himself, Mehmed Köprülü dispatched Kaplan Mustafa Paşa to Tripoli in 1659 “with a royal mandate against the Ḥamāda household on account of their devastations.”74 The Ḥamādas fled to the Kisrawān with their families and herds, leaving Kaplan to ruin their quarters and villages in the Wādī 'Almāt, expropriate their grain stores in Jubayl and award their tax concessions to their Shiite rival Qaytbāy ibn al-Shā‘ir and others.

The following year, when the grand vizier sent his son Ahmed Köprülü to Damascus to organize a full-scale punitive campaign against the region’s feudatories, the Shihābīs and the Ma’ns all fled the province of Sidon and in turn took shelter with the Ḥamāda emirs in Qamhaz. The Druze ‘Alam al-Dīns and the Shiite Shā‘irs, on the other hand, again sided with Kaplan Paşa, whom Köprülü ordered to storm Qamhaz with

73. Sächsische Landesbibliothek, Dresden: Eb 387 fol. 28b.
74. Duwayhi, Tārikh, 355-6.
5,000 men. Despite his instructions not to damage the local farmsteads, the government forces devastated the entire Munayṭra, Futūḥ, Jubayl and Batrūn region, torching the houses and uprooting the fruit trees of the Ḥamādas, Khāzins and other families. The Maʿnid emir Korkmaz was killed by the vali of Sayda a year later, which for Duwayhī marked the tragic end of the campaign.75 Further documents from the Dresden register suggest, however, that the emirs’ revolt continued well into the spring of 1663. In May, separate orders were sent to the beğlerbeğs of Tripoli and of Safad (i.e., Sayda-Beyrut province) and to the lieutenant governor of Damascus to coordinate an attack on “Maʿn-oğlu Ahmed, his acolyte Sirhan, mukaddem Murad, mukaddem Faris, and all the other Druze brigands,” not only because of their tyranny but, perhaps just as seriously from the imperial perspective, for their failure to deliver taxes on time. Again the Sublime Porte worried that the rebels might flee and hide on each others’ territories, and admonished the provincial authorities “not to declare ‘it’s not my jurisdiction...’” but to chase, capture and punish them wherever they might be found.76

Thwarting the collusion of the various feudal factions can be said to have been the Ottoman state’s primary task in governing the western Syrian highlands. Simple jealousies among the notable households (rather than supposedly ancient tribal affiliations) meant that the authorities always had a ready supply of local allies to help fight and dispossess insubordinate tax-farmers. The 1659-63 campaign was one instance where the Ḥamādas cooperated with the Maʿns and Shihābis of Sayda province, but the opposite could also occur. In October 1675, the Shihābis prepared to contribute 4,000 men to a renewed campaign against the Ḥamādas;77 in August 1680, as noted in the

75. Ibid., 357-60.
76. Dresden Eb 387, fol. 102a (1-2).
77. Duwayhi, Türikh, 369.
previous chapter, the Ḥamādas helped ʿUmar al-Ḥarfūsh ambush and kill Fāris al-Shihābī, who had just seized control of Baalbek with the state authorities’ benediction. In the events of 1684 (to be discussed below), not only the Shihābis but initially also the Maʿns joined the government coalition against the Ḥamādas and ravaged the Munayṭra district before withdrawing.78

In contrast to the violent but infrequent punitive campaigns against the Ḥamādas and their allies, the majority of Ottoman archival sources from the later 17th century concern their commission as official tax farmers. The relevant sets of documents for the years 1667 and 1668, which are comprised in the two oldest extant registers of the Tripoli Islamic court, provide a valuable look at the stipulations and negotiations involved in the formal awarding of the rural tax ʾiltizam and will be considered here in some detail. Duwayḥī is reticent on the Ḥamādas’ expansion beyond the Jubayl/Futūḥ area, noting only Ḥasan Dīb ibn ʿAlī’s reassignment in 1649, presumably to Ḥanīya, and Saʿd b. ʿAlī’s appointment to al-Kūra in 1652.79 It is thus all the more noteworthy that the 1667 ʾiltizam contract includes the six major tax fiefs ʿAkkār, Ḥanīya, Jubbat Basharrāy, Jubayl, Batrūn and al-Kūra—virtually all of Mt. Lebanon—in the Ḥamādas’ domain. The implications of this enormous concession of taxation rights (a total of 120,000 esedī gold coins) and jurisdiction in Tripoli are evident. Like all matters of an overtly political nature, the court proceeding was composed in Turkish; only in the 1720s, when the Ḥamādas no longer held multiple tax-fiefs and apparently ceased to worry the imperial authorities, were Tripoli’s ʾiltizam contracts regularly drafted in Arabic.

78. Ibid., 376.

79. Ibid., 347. Saʿd ibn ʿAlī’s appointment to al-Kūra—38 years before the Sublime Porte denounced this as a usurpation—is mentioned only in the 1976 Jounieh edition, 535.
More important, the 1667 concession recognizes the Ḫamāda family’s corporative rule over rural Tripoli. While the negotiations with the governor at the Tripoli šeriye court were handled by the afore-cited shaykh Sa’d ibn ‘Alī, the actual contract was made out to shaykh Aḥmad ibn Muḥammed. Both, however, are certified as acting on behalf of “the most excellent of peers and notables, šeyh Sirhan.” Legal responsibility for the protection and development of the tax-fiefs and the timely payment of the tax charge was assigned to Aḥmad, but the guarantee for his faithful execution of the is explicitly noted to rest with “šeyh Sirhan, his cousins, and all the Hamade-oğulları.”

The remainder of the document is fairly standard. The iltizam was valid for a full solar year beginning in March, the first month of the Syriac-derived Ottoman fiscal calendar. Payment of 120,000 gurūş in kind was expected in two installments; 3/4 during the “silk season” and the rest in olive oil three months before the end of the year, i.e. in late December. The dues were to be collected on all the district lands including the governor’s crown reserve (havass-i mirmiran), and comprised, in addition to the regular miri agricultural tax, the capitation tax (harac), church taxes (mal-i kenayis) and fines for violent crimes (cūrm-i galiz). In order to ensure the emirs’ full payment and proper conduct, the governor of Tripoli made use of a standard clause in such contracts: Shaykh Sa’d and his family, as well as Aḥmad’s wife and children, were pledged “to live in Tripoli city as hostages [rehn tariktyele] under the... Paşa’s supervision until the aforesaid charge has been fulfilled.” First complications arose the following October, when the governor died and the court had to assign the live guarantors to a deputy’s temporary custody.81

Disputes over family members held as bond in the capital, as we will see shortly, became

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80. Tripoli 1:11-12 (Turkish), dated 12 March 1667.
81. Tripoli 1:114-5 (Turkish).
a major factor in the subsequent breakdown of the Ḥamādas’ relationship with the Ottoman authorities.

The nature of the Ḥamādas’ control over northern Tripoli is further elucidated in a second set of court documents from late August of the same year. These involve the “rental” of 20 villages in ‘Akkār to Aḥmad ibn Qânsūh Ḥamāda, for three consecutive periods or a total of nine years. While some details remain obscure, as is typical for debt arrangements between strong-man financiers and impoverished villagers, the contracts can be summarized as follows: Aḥmad receives title to the villages (and thus their produce) from the elders themselves in return for paying the yearly tax charge to the government múltezim. In addition, he agrees to provide them with draught animals and seed, and, “should either the sublime sultanate or the vali... show mercy,” pass on any tax abatement at the conclusion of the first year. Not indicated in the contract is Aḥmad’s cut, which appears to consist in a discrepancy between the villages’ official tax capacity (11.820 g) and the amount actually to be paid as iltizam (9.970 g); nor the fact that the current tax farmer (who needs forward only half of his receipts to the state anyway) is Aḥmad’s own brother Sirḥān. The benefit to the state in this instance was Aḥmad’s formal undertaking to revive the 20 villages which had supposedly fallen into ruin, retrieve all the peasants who had fled, and thus assure a higher remittance of taxes. While it is impossible to assess from these documents whether the project was successful, or if it mainly benefited the peasants, the government treasury, the tax-farmer, or his entrepreneur brother, it is interesting to observe that, in 1667, the Ottoman state regarded the Ḥamāda family enterprise as an aide in the economic development of the northern Lebanese highlands.82

82. Tripoli 1:61-3 (Arabic).
Similar documents from the following years add more details on the Ḥamādas’ tax farming commissions. In the spring of 1668, Ahmad again received the tax concessions for ‘Akkār, Jubbat Basharrāy and, in a novel twist, for the predominantly Nusayri-inhabited district of Safita. Moneys to be collected included winter and summer levies, harac on fruit trees, a lump-sum on draught animals, taxes on goats, bees and buffalo, monthly dues, festival dues, accession dues, storage and milling dues, wintering taxes for Arab and Turkmen tribes, church charges, criminal fines, and the poll-tax on Christians.83 Meanwhile, the nahiyes of Jubayl country (Bilad-ı Cübeyl, as opposed to the city itself) and Batrūn were awarded to Sirhān’s maternal cousin Dīb ibn Āsī and his own agent Muṣṭafā ibn Nāṣir al-Dīn, with Sirhān himself again standing bond.84

With their tax and government commission stretching all the way to Safita in the ‘Alawite mountains, the year 1668 marks the greatest geographic extent of the Ḥamāda emirate. At the same time, however, the Ḥamādas were experiencing their first difficulties in meeting all their obligations to the state authorities. The district of Kūra, as we have seen, was officially included in Sirhān’s domain, but already in 1667 the actual business of collecting its taxes was sub-farmed to the local Kurdish notables.85 A suit launched against emir Aḥmad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Kurdī, friend to the Shā‘ir clan and in many ways an old nemesis of the Ḥamādas, demonstrates the complex silent partnerships in which the paramount feudatory of Mt. Lebanon often engaged: Having provided the guarantee on Aḥmad’s one-year 22,000 iltizām for al-Kūra, Sirhān brought him to court in March/April 1668 to demand immediate payment of the outstanding amount, “fearing that he would disappear from Tripoli.” Aḥmad retorted that the total tax due

83. Tripoli 2/1:60-2 (Turkish); 2/1:50 (Arabic).
84. Tripoli 2/1:76-7 (Arabic, Turkish).
85. In 1668, the iltizam was awarded to Şahin Ağa; see Tripoli 2/1:59 (Turkish).
had been raised 3,000 g above what it used to be and that he had already submitted 20,140 g in several installments. True, he still owed 1,860 g, but Sirhān himself had tax arrears of 15,000 g on his own territories. He produced a fetva saying in essence "is it permissible for a bondsman to demand a sum back before he himself has discharged it?" The judge, ruling that Sirhān has no legal claim on Aḥmad before the entire iltizam is paid out to the state, dismissed the case.\footnote{Tripoli 2/1:18-9 (Arabic).}

The financial pressure on the Ḫamāda emirate manifested itself in other aspects as well. In July 1667, Mudlij al-Ḥamādī, the sub-mültezim for a single village in the district of al-Zāwiya, brought two brothers to court for refusing to pay their share of taxes. Stating Aleppo as their place of origin and al-Minya as their residence, the two denied being reaya of or owning property in the village concerned. The judge, citing Mudlij's failure to prove the opposite, refused his right to levy taxes on them.\footnote{Tripoli 1:37-8 (Arabic).} The Ḫamādas had more luck with the imperial authorities. In the winter of 1668, i.e. shortly before the end of the fiscal year, a rescript respectfully addressed to Sirhān and Aḥmad Ḫamāda states that while time-honored Ottoman kanun law normally permits the governors' personal agents (kethūda) to levy customary taxes (avaid), these were to be suspended. The kethūdas were not to collect any further avaid in the Ḫamādas' domains so that the standard state agricultural tax (mirī) would not fall short. The mirī itself, Sirhān and Aḥmad are gently reminded, was of course to be paid in full and on time.\footnote{Tripoli 1:154 (Turkish).}

The following year the Ḫamādas were even able to farm out their own tax arrears and thus avoid a potentially dangerous confrontation with the authorities. Sirhān's considerable debt of 12 kise (i.e. 12 bags x 500 gurus) was underwritten by a certain
Muḥammad Abū ‘Udhra who, having failed to deliver the amount to an agent of the Sublime Porte, was imprisoned in the citadel. After a sergeant from the Baghdad Janissary corps arrived in Tripoli to collect, the kadi himself decided to assume the guarantee, paid the sergeant and sprang the Ḥamādas’ unfortunate bondsman from jail.89

However, the Ḥamādas could not stave off their creditors indefinitely. In a violent episode for which we must depend again on the chroniclers Duwayhī and Shihābī, the governor of Tripoli captured Aḥmad ibn Qānsūḥ Ḥamāda when he came to renew his iltizam in 1674, citing the spoliation of the lands in his care. Then he seized Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan Dīb Ḥamāda for having paid insufficient returns on his iltizam for Ḍanniya. The following year, the paşa organized a region-wide punitive campaign against the Ḥamādas and, in late July, managed to attract two Ḥamāda shaykhs to a banquet where they were slain. The Ḥamādas fell burning and pillaging upon the Christian villages of Jubayl, Batrūn and Basharrāy when they learnt of this treachery. In the face of a worsening situation, the Sublime Porte ordered the governors of Sayda and Damascus to step in; by October a large expedition was ready to move against the Ma’ns first and their Shiite allies second.

Good mountain sense prevailed, however. The vali of Sayda, worried about his own tax income, assured Ibn Ma’n in private that he would not be attacked; the Shihābīs, meanwhile, disingenuously told the authorities that the Ḥamādas had indeed passed through their territory but were now gone... Furthermore, the dispute had been over a mere 20 kise of silver, for which Ibn Ma’n could stand bond on the condition that the Ḥamāda hostages were released from prison. Though a full-scale war was thus averted, the Tripoli governor launched a devastating campaign against the Shiite districts of Mt.

89. Tripoli 2/1:48 (Turkish).
Lebanon the following year when he found himself unable to contain the Ḫamādas’ revenge attacks. All the villages of the Wādī ‘Almāt—Farḥat, ‘Almāt, Mashān, Ṭūrzayyā, Ḥaṣūn, Ahmaj and Jāj—as well as Mughayra, Lāsā, Munayṭra and Afqā in the Jubbat Munayṭra and others were torched. Only after the death of grand vizier Köprülí and the rotation of all provincial governors were the Ḫamādas recalled to their traditional tax fiefs in Tripoli, and ordered to care for the reaqa who had had to flee the savagery.90

Court documents from May 1677 indeed record that Sirḥān received the ʾiltizams for Jubayl and Batrūn on much the same conditions as before; his nephew Ḥusayn ibn Aḥmad was reinstated in Jubbat Basharrāy.91 Both had to send their wives to live in the capital as surety. The only noteworthy difference to earlier ʾiltizam conferrals seems to be the new-found concern with physical security: Sirḥān’s contract explicitly makes him

responsible for the safety and protection of travelers passing anywhere between the Nahr Ibrahim and the place called Suk Su as well as of all other subjects, and liable for any damages and harm caused. If it becomes known and confirmed that a man has been killed wrongfully or someone robbed of something in these areas, the aforesaid shaykh Sirhan is held accountable and censurable.92

Similar terms were applied the following year, when Sirḥān again held all three mukataaṣ (Jubayl, Batrūn, Basharrāy) in his own right.93

Isolated episodes of violence with a given vali over the remission of taxes do not seem to have precluded the Ḫamādas’ overall solid working rapport with the Ottomans. While leading emirs such as Sirḥān and Aḥmad did not risk appearing in Tripoli city personally, they conducted regular relations with the state authorities through their agents at the şerīye tribunal. Not only the yearly ʾiltizam conferrals but, as we have seen,

90. Duwayhī, Tārīkh, 368-72; Shihābī, Tārīkh, 736-9.
91. Tripoli 2/2:107 (Turkish).
92. Tripoli 2/2:106 (Turkish).
93. Tripoli 2/2:134 (Turkish).
rental contracts with villagers and lawsuits against business associates or delinquent taxpayers were adjudicated by the government-appointed Hanefi judge and notary. As in all rural areas of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic law’s effective validity extended only as far as grievances were brought in before the local ḵâdi. Beyond his reach, the great majority of civil and criminal cases were decided by tribe, village, or sectarian elders according to their own customary precepts. It is thus noteworthy that the north Lebanese Shiites on numerous occasions actively sought out the Islamic court in Tripoli to notarize sales, divide inheritances, etc. according to state Hanefi law. A few examples of the Ḥamāda’s voluntary recourse to Sunni Islamic judicature, which we propose to present here in closing, help underline the Shiite emirs’ integration in wider Ottoman society.

Two transaction deeds from March/April 1668 record the sale of important properties by members of the extended Ḥamāda clan to local Christians. These documents, potentially a reflection of the financial straits in which the Ḥamāda were beginning to find themselves, provide same rare albeit elliptical clues as to the material life of the Shiite emirs in the 17th century. The first concerns a house in Tripoli sold by Bāz ibn Qaytbāy ibn Ḥamāda to "the deacon’s son Rizzqallāḥ." The property, priced at 150 g with all its amenities, was located in the privileged Christian quarter of Ḥaǧjārīn al-Naṣāra and bounded on the south, east and north by that of a certain emir Muḥammad. Bāz ibn Qaytbāy himself had only purchased this apparently well-appointed estate two years prior from his own maternal aunt,94 when the Ḥamāda family as a whole was enjoying greater liquidity. The second deed involves Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan Dīb al-Ḥamādī’s sale of a sizeable rural estate in the district of al-Zāwiya to a local inhabitant. The property, which Muḥammad had legally purchased from his father and which was

94. Tripoli 2/1:21 (Arabic).
again valued at 150 گ, included “everything the principal owns in the village Basba’al in mulberry trees, olives, grapevines, houses, and unirrigable [salîkh] lands.”

If we reach ahead a few decades, a deed from March/April 1716 documents Ḥusayn ibn Ḥamāda’s sale, with his brother-in-law’s approval, of properties bequeathed to his wife by a previous husband. These included shares of several gardens in ‘Akkār, houses in Tripoli and parts of a buffalo herd grazed at Safita, for a total of 90 گ. A lawsuit from July 1729 refers to a small Ḥamāda estate located on Arwad Island off the coast of Tartus. In this instance, Muṣṭafā ibn ‘Alī Ḥamāda “al-Arwadī” tried to evict a native of nearby Marqab from the house, described as dilapidated but situated on the seashore and adjoined by the local garrison commander’s kitchen garden. He had acquired possession from his own father 12 years ago, long before the current occupant. The respondent testified that he had indeed purchased it only eight months prior from Ḥamāda senior for 8 گ and some wheat, and then restored it at his own cost to render it inhabitable. Unable, after a ten-day recess, to provide evidence of his ownership, Muṣṭafā Ḥamāda was ordered to cease and desist from harassing the Marqabī in his title as lawful proprietor. In June 1731, the court notarized an agent’s sale of properties belonging to Ḥaydar ibn Zayd Ḥamāda, including an unidentified ruined orchard garden, a ruined palace situated on the same grounds, and two wood-roofed houses, for 150 گ.

Members of the Ḥamāda family also stepped before the Ottoman kadi in other matters. In a further installment of the Ḥamādas’ love/hate saga with the Kurdish emirs

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95. Tripoli 2/1:33 (Arabic).
96. Tripoli 4/1:13 (Arabic).
97. Tripoli 5:53 (Arabic).
98. Tripoli 6:12 (Arabic).
of al-Kūra, ‘Abd-al-Salām ibn Ismā‘īl Ḥamāda took emir Ismā‘īl ibn Aḥmad to court in July 1724, claiming to have paid a dowry of 200 ǧ  for the hand of his daughter Zlêxa seven years earlier. The emir acknowledged neither the betrothal nor the payment; upon being interrogated herself, “Zlêxa answered that she did not know a thing about any of this, that she does not consent to marry, that she would not accept him and that she will not leave her village.” Ibn Ḥamāda’s agent was asked to present proof of payment, but retorted that they sought the girl’s hand and not a refund. To the kādi, this was sufficient to invalidate the suit: A lawful engagement would have spelled out a promise to the girl that she cannot be forced to marry against her will, this being the consent of the Hanefī jurists.99 And finally, in a complex inheritance case from September 1745, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī Ḥamāda was appointed legal guardian of his deceased brother Aḥmad’s minor-aged daughter Khadija, and authorized to dispose of her heritage in order to provide for her maintenance.100 The property, jointly controlled by Khadija and her father’s widow Ḥalīma, consisted of an apartment and a large storage vault in the Tripoli harbor district. With the judge’s permission for dissolving the estate, the warehouse was assessed to constitute the minor’s prescribed 3/4 share and, subtractions being made for the deceased’s debts, sold on her behalf for 70 ǧ.101

**Conclusion**

The reign of the Shi‘ite Ḥamāda emirate over 17th-century Mt. Lebanon constitutes somewhat of a historical paradox: On one level, the "Sirhan-oγullari" were the ultimate

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100. Tripoli 8:293 (Arabic).
101. Tripoli 8:295-6 (Arabic).
outsiders in Ottoman Lebanon. As insubordinate tribalists and Shi'ite sectarians, the Ḥamāda emirs embodied a marginal culture which neither the central state authority (beginning with the Mamluks) nor Maronite aristocrats (beginning with Duwayhi) saw as belonging in their vision of local society. Yet at the same time, Shi'ite pastoral nomads had dominated the Lebanon range since the high middle ages, and the Ḥamāda confederacy's martial, endogamous sociology effectively predestined them as inter-regional taxation and police deputies once the Ottoman administration abandoned military prebendaryship in favor of iltizam concessions in rural Syria. The Shi'ite and other heterodox emirates, in short, were nothing but typical of the many peripheral groups that circumscribed the social diversity of the pre-modern Ottoman Empire.

This tension between deviance and conformity, we have attempted to show in this chapter, characterizes the history of the Ḥamādas' relationship with the Ottoman state officials in the second half of the 17th century. The governors of the western eyalets of Syria embarked on numerous missions to bring the Shi'ites to heal when their tax payments were in arrears or their subjects unduly oppressed. However, the archival records of their iltizam appointments suggest also that the state appreciated the Ḥamāda clanship precisely for the order and authority it was able to impose on much of rural Tripoli, relying on them to police, tax, and develop the region economically on its behalf, irrespective of their distasteful sectarian identity. Whereas the literary narratives of Lebanon's history have tended to interpret its feudal regime only in terms of Druze-Maronite sovereignty, the success of the Shi'ite Ḥamāda emirate provides a striking illustration of the ambiguous consensus of power between the early modern disciplining state and its more deviant constituents. The Ottomans had no illusions as to the Ḥamādas' heresy, violence and tax-cheating, yet with rare exceptions they were unable
or simply unwilling to invest themselves in replacing an institution which, in the larger scheme of imperial affairs, functioned passably well.

This consensus, always fragile at best, was not to survive the tumultuous decade-and-a-half of political and social crisis that was precipitated by the empire's catastrophic 1683 Vienna campaign. In Mt. Lebanon, as signaled in a Tripoli şeriye court affidavit from 1 October 1685, long-simmering tensions between the state authorities and the Ḥamāda emirs, and specifically a dispute over their Kurdish sub-contractor's tax arrears in al-Kūra, were let to boil over:

His brother Muhammad was placed as a hostage in Tripoli city as surety for the said amount. Three days ago, while this Muhammad was at the city gate with the guards assigned to him, Sirhan-oğlı [Husayn]'s armed henchmen... came, pulled swords on the guards, took Muhammad and fled. They are hiding with şeyh Husayn and the entirety of state moneys from their commission is lost.102

This was to be the opening shot of a more fundamental challenge to the Ottoman state authority on the Shiite emirs' part, one that ended in the unprecedentedly destructive punitive campaign of 1693-1694. This challenge and its origins in the long-term, structural tensions and strains that befell Ottoman provincial society in the late 17th century are the subject of the next chapter.

102. Tripoli 3:5 (Turkish).
CHAPTER FOUR
THE CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY,
1685-1698

The Shiite Ḥamāda emirate epitomized the Ottoman state's regularization and co-option of tribal self-government structures in the provincial periphery. The central administration was not only prepared to ignore their socio-religious deviancy, but actively promoted the Ḥamādas and similar fringe groups as its taxation and police deputies over extensive rural hinterland areas. This concord between the Shiite emirs and the Ottoman state began to unravel in the critical period of foreign ingression and imperial reform of the late 17th century. The Ḥamādas' attack on Tripoli in September 1685 to liberate the guarantors of their iltizam contracts heralded a full decade of punitive expeditions, counter-raids and generalized instability in the northern Lebanon. The Ḥamādas entered this conflict as the most powerful tax-lord dynasty of the eyalet if not the entire Syrian coastlands; the massive Ottoman military campaign of 1694 left them physically broken and politically dependent on the paramount Druze emirs of Sayda and, increasingly, their Maronite subalterns. This revolt is detailed not just in several local chronicles but in a large extant corpus of Ottoman chancery decrees and at least three imperial histories, making it the perhaps single best documented episode in the history of Ottoman Shiism.

The interest of the Ḥamāda rebellion, this chapter argues, goes beyond the narrative significance of its events, in that it bespeaks several longue-durée ruptures in
the domestic, regional and imperial government of the western Syrian highlands. On the most local level, the heirs and allies of Sirḥān ibn Ḥamāda became drawn into a protracted blood-feud against their Maronite neighbors which elicited official intervention. Though the Ḥamādas regained their tax collector concessions for some time afterwards, the crisis denoted a long-term decline vis-à-vis the French-subsidized Maronite lay notability, in particular the Khāzin family of the Kisrawān, and its efforts to recolonize, develop and control the fertile north Lebanese uplands. The Ottoman state authority, which long recognized the Ḥamādas as its premier medium of fiscal exploitation in the area, henceforth began to engage the Maronite leaders and their self-appointed feudal protectors, the Druze emirs of the southern Shūf range, to assume increased responsibilities for the government of rural Tripoli.

The question of changing jurisdictions, which is discussed in the second section, applies furthermore to the regionally rooted civilian gubernatorial households that were starting to supplant the older military service elite in the Ottoman provincial hierarchy. Seen from the bureaucratic perspective, the great punitive campaign against the Ḥamāda was as much a motor of inter-functionary as of feudal competition. Finally, the wealth of extant chancery documentation demands that the conflict be situated within the larger context of imperial politics. The central administration’s intense new concern with the heretical emirs of the Syrian backwoods, it will be argued, proceeded from an empire-wide drive to quell wartime rural banditry and sedentarize semi-nomadic tribes, rather than from a revived anti-Shiite religious impulse. In this light, the Ḥamādas’ challenge to authority in the period 1685-1699 appears as much the result of the Ottoman state’s march toward administrative rationalization, bureaucratic modernization and societal discipline as of their own truculence.
Disciplining the Feudatories

The Shiites’ insurgency against the state authorities did not begin out of the blue. Duwayhi reports succinctly that the Ḥamādas murdered a shaykh of the ‘Akkār region who was also a nephew of the paşa in 1685 before laying waste to ‘Ashqūt in the Kisrawān and descending on Tripoli to “extricate their hostages from the citadel by the sword.”¹ The Tripoli court archives do not directly corroborate this account. Rather, the copy of a royal decree sent from Edirne on September 19 refers to a complaint, submitted much earlier, that Sirhān was being insubordinate and had again submitted only five sacks of silver for this year’s Jūbāyl and Batrūn tax concessions. He had then fled to “Damascene lands” to seek the help of Aḥmad ibn Ma’n, who therefore had to be explicitly instructed “not to protect” the truant Shiite emir [sahib ẓikrnayub] but to make him pay his arrears.² Duwayhi relates that Ibn Ma’n took the Ottomans’ instructions to heart and torched several Shiite villages of the Futūḥ, but turned down the summons to take the Ḥamādas’ iltizams for himself. In any event, the problem of insufficient remissions was not proper to Sirhān’s tax farm but apparently involved the entire emirate and especially its tax sub-contractors in other districts of rural Tripoli. The Kurdish taxlord of al-Kūra (who owed his office to Sirhān ibn Ḥusayn’s murdering his predecessor³) continued to enjoy the Ḥamādas’ support after he proved unable, as mentioned above, to discharge his iltizam in 1685. Around the same time, a buyunuldu (governor’s order) courteously reminds shaykh Aḥmad of the outstanding debts of the

1. Duwayhi, Tārikh, 376.
2. Tripoli 3:165 (Turkish, addressed to Ibn Ma’n and the kadi of Damascus).
3. Tripoli 3:5 (Turkish).
late taxlord of Ḍannīya, which must also have fallen again under the Ḥamāda emirate's general superintendence.4

Whatever the reasons for the Ḥamādas' sudden recalcitrance, the events of the following spring demonstrated that they would not easily be brought to heel. A court deposition from early May 1686 recounts an extraordinary encounter, following weeks of violence and bloodshed, between Sirḥān ibn Ḥamāda and representatives of the Ottoman state in a village near the capital:

Two months before the date of this writing, as the honorable Paşa was delegated to the bedouin war and headed toward Raqqā, the aforesaid Sirhan had his people and kin and the thugs affiliated with them fall upon the righteous believers. They killed several men and destroyed houses in the districts of Ḥisn al-Ekrad and Zanniye in order to terrorize and intimidate the subjects, and stole and plundered their property, supplies and livestock, tormenting and afflicting a great many folks. All the people of Zanniye have fled and are dispersed and the state tax moneys are lost. Moreover, they came with 5 to 600 archers and wiped out the silkworm and thread of Īlāl, a village belonging to the Haramayn foundation in Zanniye. The men of the environs have disappeared and the silk-growing subjects have scattered...

The ex-Janissary officer İbrahim Çavuş Ağa was appointed and sent to meet with Sirhan in the said village. Asked "what is your aim in oppressing and tormenting the righteous believers?" he answered, "I have the power to improve or to waste, to build or to destroy your land. If, between now and the afternoon prayer, the Paşa's lieutenant [...] does not release our hostages from the citadel and send them safe and sound, I will kill people in every direction. I will wreak havoc and destruction from the county of Ḥisn al-Ekrad to the citadel of Jubayl; I will ruin the silk crop, vitiate the state taxes, and not care about the sultan's reproof or punishment!"

The court deliberated and gave in to Sirḥān's demands in the interest of protecting the rural populace's livelihood.5 Incredibly, the ʿiltizams for Jubayl and Batrūn were reconfirmed to the Ḥamādas a week later.6 Papers filed soon thereafter, all noted to bear the emirs' personal signatures and stamps, again contained first-person pledges of

5. Tripoli 3:64-5 (Turkish).
faithful discharge (also of the Jubbat Basharrāy and ūanniya contracts) and formal undertakings to pay the arrears from two years prior. This unprecedented appeasement policy on the Ottoman provincial authority's part in a sense marked the pinnacle of the Ḥamāda emirate's power.

The Ḥamādas still had outstanding grievances. Late in the year they assassinated more enemies, including the Ra'd family chieftain of ūanniya, before several of their followers were caught and impaled. The immediate occasion for the Ḥamādas' renewed contest with the state, however, was provided by their Ḥarfūṣh allies. Emir Shādīd al-Ḥarfūṣh had also capitalized on the governor's absence, attacking the village of Ra's Baalbek in the northern Bekaa and burning its fortress. This proved to be a miscalculation, and he fled to take refuge with the Ḥamādas when he found himself confronted by a coalition of government troops and hostile feudatories led by the Ra'ds, the Shi'ite Shā'irs, and of course his old nemesis, the Shibābi emir. The coalition pursued him across Mt. Lebanon and ransacked Ḥusayn ibn Sirḥān's lands, including the tomb of 'Umar al-Ḥarfūṣh who had died some years earlier in Tūrza'yā, before the Ḥamāda-Ḥarfūṣh forces could mount a night-time ambush and slaughter 45 of their number. The feudatories, the government soldiers and the Druze, bedouin and Turkmen mercenaries who had joined them all fled to the coast in defeat, Duwayhi relates, leaving the city of Jubayl and its hinterland to be plundered by "opportunist."  

Curiously absent from Duwayhi's account is any mention of the paramount Ma'n emir's role in the war. This gap is filled by an imperial hūkūm to the governor of Sidon, a

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9. Ibid. The Ḥarfūshes' 1686 altercation is one of the few to have found wide reception in the secondary literature. The Shi'ite biographer Muḥsin al-Āmin indicates that emir Shādīd was subsequently banished to Crete; see A'yān al-Shi'a, 7:334-5.
copy of which was forwarded to Tripoli’s kadh after he took the initiative of denouncing Sirhan and his son Hūsain to the Sublime Porte for their unpaid debts and roguery. Besides Ḥūsain and his cousins, the governor of Tripoli had also received orders in the meantime to “move against Ḥarfūṣ-oğlu Şedid of Baalbek,” yet found him to enjoy the backing of not one but two powerful friends:

[T]he brigand Sirhan protected him, picking up his family and all his effects and hiding them. Since they would not foreswear tormenting and afflicting the Baalbek and Tripoli regions, it became necessary to attack Sirhan. One day before they reached the villages where they ensconce themselves in the Jubbayl mountains, they hid the entirety of their families, goods and possessions in villages of the Kisrawān, on the border of Jubbayl, in Ma’n-oğlu’s lands, and sought refuge with Ma’n-oğlu.

The Shiites’ revolt, which evidently had the Druze emir’s support, further appears more calamitous here than Duwayhī’s account allows:

In order to guard their families, they became extreme in their rebellion. Their men split into groups and caused no end of damage and spoliation in the Tripoli area, and absolutely tormented and injured the righteous believers. In addition to completely desolating and ruining the Jubbayl, Batrūn, Jubbat Basharrāy and Danniya districts, they strove to wipe out and vitiate the state tax receipts of all the other areas.

After spies had ascertained that “Sirhan’s grandsons Sirhan and Īsmail, their mothers, all the brigands’ families and the people of Jubbayl and Batrūn in general” remained ensconced in the villages of the Kisrawān, the authorities of Tripoli devised a new stratagem which quickly won the grand vizier’s approval: Blaming the valī of Sidon. Since he was under orders to collect the state taxes from all those within his jurisdiction and not to let anyone prevent this, the decree coolly informs Īsmail Paşa that he will now be held liable for the financial shortfalls occasioned in Tripoli by the emirs’ insurgency.10 Little is directly known of the actual rebellion’s conclusion; but just three months later,

in March 1687, the Ḥamādas once again received the government iltizāms for Jubbat Basharrāy and Ǧanniya.¹¹

For the time being, both the Shiite emirs and the Ottoman provincial officials were content not to push their power struggle further. The Tripoli court registers for the next decades are unfortunately no longer extant, but the Ḥamādas are known to have obtained the yearly tax contracts for the entire Tripolitan hinterland (Jubayl, Batrūn, al-Kūra, Jubbat Basharrī and Ǧanniya) as late as March 1692 and 1693.¹² Nevertheless, the quasi-civil war of 1685-1686 established several precedents which were to have a decisive influence on the subsequent punitive campaign and in the years beyond. For one, the state authorities began more deliberately to promote the Ḥamādas’ local enemies. The Ra’d family was awarded the Ǧanniya mukataa in 1686 and then without interruption from 1693 onward;¹³ the Dandashes were ultimately recompensed for their participation in the anti-Ḥarfūsh coalition with the tax concession for Hermel and ‘Akkār. The Shiite Shā’ir emirs, whom the Ḥamādas had driven from Batrūn a half-century earlier, returned to power there and undertook, together with their long-standing Kurdish partners, to seize Jubayl on the state’s behalf in 1694. Baalbek and other fiefs were temporarily assigned to one of the governor’s (usually Kurdish) military retainers.¹⁴ The Ḥamādas, who had once enjoyed the state’s favor precisely for their tractable, mercenary quality, now found themselves confronted, at the height of their power in the late 17th

¹¹. Tripoli 3:149 (Turkish).


¹³. They were only expropriated by the Egyptians in 1831; see al-Ṣamad, Tārīkh Ǧanniya, 30-1.

century, with a new generation of ambitious outsider clanlords in the ceaseless competition for government tax assignments.

The second shift of long-term significance was the growing presence of the southern Druze emirs in Tripoli eyalet politics. The Ma'ns of the Shūf mountain in Sidon had long been on friendly terms with the Ḥamādas, and stood by them again in the 1685-1686 struggle and indeed through much of the later Ottoman punitive operations. One of the reasons this episode remains so obscure to Lebanese historiography, Professor Abu-Ḥusayn has suggested, is that the author-patriarch Ḥusayn al-Duwayhī conspired to conceal his Druze patron’s equivocal stance in the Ḥamādas’ anti-state insurgency.¹⁵ The Ottoman authorities had of course frequently called on the help of feudal parties from outside the province in past conflicts, e.g. in 1598 and 1616 to subdue the Sayfās, but it can be argued that only in the decade-long battle against the Shiite emirates in the late 17th century were the Ma’ns and then their Shihābī successors systematically given the responsibility for controlling their northern compeers. If this perception is borne out, it could entail a substantial revision of the standard historical narrative of Druze feudal rule extending over two Ottoman eyalets: The all-encompassing “Lebanese emirate” did not incarnate the ancient idea of a trans-confessional mountain principality, but originated on the contrary in a Köprülü-era government plan to quell the Shiite community’s influence in the northwestern hinterland.

Aḥmad ibn Ma’n’s first test came in February 1691, when he received a direct order to join a further regional campaign against the Ḥarūshes. According to identical hūkūms sent to the governors of Damascus, Tripoli, and the sancak of Ajlūn, “the gangster known as Harfuṣ-oğlı Şedid together with the Shiite heretics [Revafiz] from

around Baalbek attacked and pillaged the town and are constantly bent on killing people, ravishing Muslims and perpetrating corruption and brigandage." The narrative sources reveal nothing about what precipitated this new outburst on the Ḥarfūshes' part. Some context is provided, however, by a single entry in an imperial complaints register (şikayet defteri) the following month. The complainant "Mehmed" had held the Baalbek mukataa for the three previous years before Shadid ibn Ḥarfūsh acquired the rights to the town of Baalbek and certain farms and villages and seized the entire tax levy and produce that had accrued by that time, namely 24,000 gurus and three kantars of raw silk thread. Noteworthy for our purposes is less the fact that Tripoli's magistrates were charged to recover this sum than the identity of Shadid's business partners, who between them were withholding 10,000 g of the Baalbek dues: Ḥusayn ibn Sirḥān; his son Ismā'īl; ‘Īsā ibn Aḥmad; Ḥasan ibn Ḥusayn Dīb Ḥamāda; and two Damascene Janissary officers.

The Sublime Porte knew all too well that the savvy Ibn Ma'n could not be relied upon in a matter which involved much more than the "brigandage" of some "Shiite heretics from around Baalbek," and the order addressed to him warns sinisterly against abetting the Ḥarfūshes and their associates:

Beware... if it comes to my royal attention that you are accommodating and hiding just one of these criminals with you, the crushing punishment and the concatenation of sovereign fury that your forefathers [i.e. Fakhr al-Dīn] incurred will happen to you as well!

Not surprisingly, the "Sirhan-oğulları İsmail and İsa" received copies of the same ominous hüküm. Shadid ibn Ḥarfūsh was not apprehended, however, and in late

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18. MD 100:139:531.
November 1691 the governor of Damascus was urged a second time to fight the Revaš in the Bekaa.¹⁹

In the meantime, the central bureaucracy had another concern to bring to the Shūf emir's attention. We have already seen that the governor of Tripoli once received instructions not to award the Ḥamāda family iltizams for 'Akkār, al-Zāwiya and al-Kūra on the specious grounds that these districts were Sunni-inhabited.²⁰ In November 1691, he and Aḥmad Maʾn were forwarded a complaint from "the inhabitants of the Kūra and Ḍanniya districts" that, for a few years now, "the Rafiẓi Kızılbaş crooks have sown corruption with the help of four or five locals, and gradually seized control of the region."²¹ Four months later, the state chancery tried to assemble the first truly inter-provincial punitive campaign against the Shiite emirs, ordering the governors of Tripoli, Damascus and Sidon-Beirut, the kâds and mollas under their authority, Ibn Maʾn, and the district governors of Homs and Safad "to capture and lawfully punish the Shiite heretic brigands living in the mountains of Tripoli."²² Again, there is no indication in the local chronicles that such a police action in fact took place; the Ḥamādas, as stated, re-acquired their usual taxation concessions from the valī that spring and the next. By February 1693, however, the clamor against the Ḥamādas had become so loud that the Sublime Porte felt compelled to launch a more efficacious operation in Mt. Lebanon. The orders sent to the governor of Damascus (of which an original is extant in the Başbakanlık), his colleagues and Ibn Maʾn give no hint that the Ḥamādas had served the state as mukataacis in that region for over 40 years:

¹⁹. MD 102:78:355.
²⁰. See page 118-9.
The Kızılbaş sect that appeared in the Tripoli region and settled in difficult, rocky country has usurped the state tax farms of the area and swallowed the income legally due to the treasury of Islamdom... These brigands neither follow the holy law nor submit to the governors, whence their perfidy regarding the state taxes is as bad as their tyranny and oppression of the humble commoners. Their existence is the reason for the ruin of the land... Correspond with [the other governors] and agree on a precise and known time according to your judgment... and attack the aforesaid faction in the mountains where they live. Arrest all these brigands and give them the punishment they deserve by law.23

Aḥmad ibn Maʾn's growing involvement in Tripolitan feudal politics at the close of the 17th century, and the increasingly fundamental criticism of the Shiite emirate, beg explanation. One noteworthy factor is that the recrudescence of violence after 1683 is reflected not just in imperial chancery correspondence but through popular Maronite accounts as well. Shaybān al-Khāżin, for example, tells that the villagers of 'Ashqūṭ had been forewarned of the Ḥamādas' attack in 1685 and devised a plan: A small party would hide by the road and give a fox-cry when the Ḥamādas passed so as to alarm the others. That night, unfortunately, their courage failed them and they could not utter a sound, leaving the Ḥamādas free to devastate the town.24 Duwayhi's reticence notwithstanding, the rising tensions between Shiite and Maronite communities in the following years are well attested in local sources. In October 1691, i.e. just before the Ḥamādas were ordered expelled from the northern districts, their comrade Abū Mūsā ibn Zaʾrūr was murdered by the inhabitants of Ghosta above Jounieh. The 19th-century historian Manṣūr al-Ḥattūnī, citing an older oral tradition, relates that the Khāżin shaykhs arranged the killing to put an end to his infamous tyranny over the Kisrawān, then sent the gunman to Wādī al-Taym for three years to protect him from the Shiites' revenge.25

25. Ibid., 89-90. See also al-Maʾlūf, Diwānī al-Qatūf, 185-6.
The Ḥamādas' Za'rūr and 'Awjān families indeed began a merciless war against the Khāzins and their supporters, as related, mostly in Lebanese patois, by the contemporary observer 'Awn Kāmil ibn Nujaym:

They came to the Kisrawān and pillaged all of the supplies, hunted the Kisrawānis on their land and reprieved no one they caught. There were herds, supplies and other things on the Kisrawānis' lands and they took it all. They went and caught [n.] when he was in Tripoli and killed him, then turned to the Patriarch in Canobin monastery and mistreated and harmed him, and they hunted the Kisrawānis in the Baalbek region and everywhere their reach extended. Their only dealing with Christians would be to kill them.²⁶

The following year, in November 1692, after the Za'rūrs murdered a Christian notable at Jarājil, "the cry of the Kisrawān fell upon them," i.e. gunshots and yells reverberated around the mountain gorges in the traditional call to arms. Led by the Khāzins, the Maronite villagers set out and ravaged Husayn ibn Sirhān's lands in the Futūh, killing and plundering and threatening further vengeance. When the Khāzins and Ibn Ma'n were asked to support the major Ottoman punitive campaign three months later, 1000 volunteers from the Kisrawān reported for duty.²⁷

This campaign has been examined in two recent articles²⁸ and only those details necessary for the present argument need be repeated or emended here. The chancery bureaucrat Defterdar Şarī Mehmed (d. 1717), who evidently had access to the relevant mūhimmel documents, provides a highly idealized account of the warfare, which in the pen of the vakānūvis (court historiographer) Mehmed Raṣīd Efendi (d. 1735) subsequently became the official Ottoman version of the anti-Shiite campaign:

²⁶. 'Awn Kāmil ibn Nujaym (d. 1696), "Nubdha min Tārīkh Lubnān fi'l-Qarn al-Sābī' 'Ashar," al-Mashriq 25 (1927), 815.

²⁷. Ibid., 816-7.

A memorandum arrived... stating that by the grace of God on High the thread of their association was snapped. Many of them fell prey to the sword, and of their chiefs, Husayn Sirhan-oğlu, his cousins Hasan and İsa, and numerous accursed ones like them, became fodder for the blade of force and destruction. Ma’n-oğlu, their accessory, as well as those brigands spared of the sword, went the way of seeking quarter and swore off the wickedness and insubordination which had been their habit until now.²⁹

The local chronicles tell a more sobering story: The Ottoman and assorted feudal forces devastated the Shiites’ home districts, burning their houses, abducting their women and stealing their livestock. Of the men and their families, some 150 perished not in battle but in heavy snows, as they tried to escape with the help of Shadid al-Ḥarfūsh over the wintry mountain passes and into the Bekaa. The noteworthy disagreement among these sources concerns the role of Ibn Ma’n’s Christian deputies: Duwayhi claims that the Khāzins had a change of heart and now prevented the wholesale slaughter of the surviving Shiites, leading the government army away and claiming they had no permission from the emir to leave the eyalet of Tripoli.³⁰ Ibn Nujaym, on the contrary, indicates that “the Khāzins received great fortunes and benefits” from the jubilant governor of Tripoli, “who invested and conferred them with numerous gifts and pledged his support.” In the late summer, Ḥusayn ibn Sirhān and several cousins happened upon a company of Ksrawānīs who had just repulsed a raid by the paşa’s mercenaries. Thinking them his allies he identified himself (“It’s me, Ḥusayn! Recognize me!”), but instead they pounced on and killed him and some companions. Only in the next year could Ibn Ma’n effect a reconciliation between the Ḥamādas and the Khāzins.³¹

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³⁰. Duwayhi, Tārīkh, 379.

The available historical sources do not allow us to say with any certainty whether Sirḫān Ḥamāda’s sons and successors were indeed so much more belligerent than the founder of the emirate or others. But they do enable us to trace the rise of the Khāzin notables and what Kamal Salibi has termed “the Maronite recolonization of the Kisrawān” in the same time period with some precision. The Shiite emirs’ changing rapport with the Ottoman Maronite community and its Druze protectors in the 18th century is the subject of the next chapter. To close the present section, two words might be said on the Khāzins’ growing self-assurance and political influence in the years leading up to the Ḥamāda revolt in Mt. Lebanon.

The Khāzin family began its ascent with shaykh Abū Nādir al-Khāzin, secretary to emir Fakhr al-Dīn in Dayr al-Qamar. In long years of service to the Ma‘nids, the Khāzins acquired wealth and prestige in their native Kisrawān, investing both in the patronage of Jesuit and other Catholic missionaries to the Levant. When France opened a new trade legation in Beirut in 1656, the choice for vice-consul thus fell on Abū Nawfal al-Khāzin (d. 1679), the Latin pope’s “Prince des Maronites” and “Chevalier Romain.” Professional French merchant-diplomats such as the Chevallier d’Arvieux (the author of the not unsympathetic portrayal of the Ḥamādas quoted on pp. 107-8) were extremely resentful of this appointment, bitterly describing “ce prince de théâtre” as “un paysan grossier” who did more harm than good to their commercial interests and their standing in “the Turks’” eyes.32

The Ḥamādas’ main contact with the Khāzins in these years involved the sale of agricultural properties in the Shiite districts to use for establishing monastery complexes and Maronite settler colonies. Starting in the 1680s, the Khāzins extended their

32. D’Arvieux, Memoires, 150-3.
patronage to the burgeoning new Lebanese monastic order, primarily in order to secure their ascendancy within the Maronite community vis-à-vis the patriarchate.\textsuperscript{33} Though many Shi'ite and Maronite highland communities fostered neighborly mutual relations, for the Khāzīns invoking the Muslim taxlord’s oppression was the surest means of securing continued European support. Versailles intervened both diplomatically and financially to help the Khāzīns purchase the tax collectorships of the regions they were colonizing;\textsuperscript{34} by 1697, Ḥuṣn al-Khāzin (d. 1707) had lobbied successfully to be upgraded from vice- to full consul of Beirut.\textsuperscript{35} His reasons for seeking France’s protection, however, were blithely dismissed by the senior consul at Sidon, who saw Ḥuṣn as a usurper and considered the Maronite “nation” to be

\begin{quote}
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\textit{tirani\'sée aujou\'rd'hui comme elle l’a été depuis environ cinquante ans...} [L.]\textit{es pachas depuis ce temps-là jusqu’aujourd’hui, qui ont commandé à Tripol, ont ordinairement arrenté ce pays aux Amédéens [Ḥamādas], de qui les Maronites du Mont-Liban prétendent être tirannisés. C’est pour cette raison qu’ils leur font payer les droits ordinaires que doivent les terres qui leur arrentent et des maisons qu’ils ont en propriété. Ils paient ces droits tout de même que font les Turcs du pays. Mais ils ne souffrent pas plus qu’eux de ce côté-là. Mais je puis dire... qu’ils naissent avec les plaintes à leurs bouches, car pour bien à leurs aises qu’ils soient, ils ont toujours quelque chose à dire là-dessus, et surtout aux gens qui ne les connaissent point et qui les écoutent, et desquels ils peuvent attraper quelque chose...}\textsuperscript{36}
\end{minipage}
\end{quote}

Not only Versailles but also the Sublime Porte, as we will see, was quite inclined in these years to listen to allegations of tyranny and abuse in the provinces.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[36] Archives Nationales, Paris: Affaires Etrangères (AE) B\textsuperscript{1} (Seyde) 1017:321a-b, Estelle to Pontchartrain, 25 October 1702.
\end{footnotes}
Consolidating the Jurisdictions

The initial campaign against the Shiites was not completed as expeditiously as the Ottoman histories suggest. As late as October 1693, the Damascene scholar and traveler ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī reported from Tripoli that the governor Ali Paşa remained in the field, “battling the pertinacious heretics, the Ḥamāda faction.”37 The Ḥamādas were indeed regrouping, and in May launched a murderous attack against the Kurdish emirs who had taken over the Jubayl and Batrūn fiefs.38 In April, however, an important change had taken place which was to have a decisive impact on the Ḥamādas’ struggle for the next years: The same Ali Paşa was summoned to Istanbul and made grand vizier. In this capacity, he directed his own successor in Tripoli, Arslan Paşa, his colleagues from Aleppo, Damascus and Sidon, the district governors of Kilis, Hama, Homs, Lajjūn and Gaza, feudal contingents from Aleppo, Salamiya, Dayr al-Zūr and Raḥba, Jabala, and Baalbek, and finally the chief inspector (mūfettīṣ) of the Anatolian army to annihilate the Shiites as well as their perceived benefactor Aḥmad ibn Ma‘n once and for all time.39 When, according to the court historian Raṣīd, the Sirhan-oğulları faction... heard and learnt that the vizier and these 20,000 men had reached the places known as Baalbek and the plain of the southern Bekaa, fear and dread befell their insides... They fled into the surroundings and environs... and the many good-for-nothings who were caught received the punishment they deserved. So these regions were cleaned, as was required, of their filth and villainy.40


40. Raṣīd, Ṭūrīkh, 2:225-6; Sārī Mehmed, Zūbde, 484-5.
The long-term causes for the punitive campaign of 1693-1694 lay in the fortunate convergence of local and imperial interests in this period: The Maronite community of Mt. Lebanon began, through dynamic new spokesmen such as the Khâzîn emîrs, to press its claims for pioneer development lands and fairer taxation practices just as the central bureaucracy embarked on a new initiative to revive disused agricultural domains, quell tribal banditry and extend its social and fiscal sovereignty into the furthest reaches of the empire’s provinces. However, it needs also to be underlined that at precisely the same moment when the pan-Syrian troops were being assembled in the Bekaa, the new grand vizier himself was camped at Edirne, preparing the far more crucial—and ultimately fruitless—imperial campaign which set out in late June against the Habsburg-held fortress of Peterwardein on the Danube.\footnote{Raşid, Tarih, 2:256; Silahdar Fundikli Mehmed Ağa (d. 1723-24), \textit{Silahdar Tarihi} (İstanbul: Orhâniye Press, 1928), 2:742-6.} The fact that the central government was now fingerling Ibn Ma’în as the cause of the Shiite emîrs’ misgovernment, and that it was willing to commit so many men and resources to eliminate them at this critical juncture, requires us bring into question some of the personal and career-related motivations of the Ottoman officials involved in the activities of 1693-1694.

The claim that the administrative sub-division of Syria into the eyalets of Şam, Trablus-Şam and Sayda-Beyrut reflected an Ottoman design to curb the heterodox emîrs of Mt. Lebanon and the Shûf was discussed in chapter two, which concluded that the tribal emirates were offices rather than adversaries of the Ottoman state. The great punitive operation against the Ḥamâdas provides evidence that multiple provincial jurisdictions tended to hamper the state’s efforts to control refractory feudatories; it also presents itself as a key historical catalyst for the consolidation of jurisdictions, in the context of the late 17th-century imperial administrative reforms, of both local feudal and
regional gubernatorial regimes. The present section attempts to show how the Ottoman state's promotion of a pan-Lebanese Druze emirate on the one hand, and of pan-Syrian ruler households (akin to the later 'Azm dynasty) on the other, can trace its origins in part to the endeavor to quell the Ḥamāda rebellion at the close of the 17th century.

The Sublime Porte, as we have seen, expressly requested Aḥmad ibn Maʾn to assume responsibility for the Ḥamādas' comportment, in recognition of his special patronage relationship with the Maronites of Mt. Lebanon. His equivocation in this regard, motivated in part by his comradely loyalty to the Shiite feudalists, must be considered a key factor in Ali Paşa's extraordinary perseverance in fighting the Ḥamādas even after he became grand vizier. The imperial orders issued during his vizierate place the blame for his own failure to eliminate the Ḥamādas while governor of Tripoli squarely on Ibn Maʾn's shoulders:

It was learnt that Maʾn-oğli Ahmed, who is based in the mountains of Sidon-Beirut, is not minding his own affairs but is supporting the accursed Kızılbaş... who live in the mountains of Tripoli and all the other villains in the area, and these brigands are constantly wrecking villages and oppressing Muslims in the Tripoli highlands... It is clear and evident that so long as that wellhead of depravity and tyranny, the aforesaid Maʾn-oğli, has not been punished, the evil and sedition of the accursed corrupters will not be repulsed.42

Ali Paşa's personal bitterness toward the Druze emir comes to light most clearly in our third Ottoman narrative source. The author of the single-manuscript Tevarih-i Sultan Süleyman remains anonymous, but from his lengthy-first hand account of the Hungarian campaign command it is evident that he was a close associate of the grand vizier.43 Accordingly, the Tevarih version of the Tripoli campaign, unlike Raşid's and Sari Mehmed's flourished summaries, is an entirely subjective account from Ali Paşa's

42. MD 105:10-11:32.

viewpoint. The focus is on the 1693 operation which Ali led personally: After he was appointed vali of Tripoli, Ali went up into “the Sirhan [lit., wolf] mountains” to look into the inhabitants’ state of affairs, and found out for himself that

Some, evidently a plentiful group, are their [i.e. Kızılbaş] followers. Resisting them is difficult. It was reluctantly decided to turn them a blind eye... But others indicated that they are weary of the tyranny of their rule though unable to do anything about it. If Ma’n-oğlu were to stand aside, it would be easy to repulse the Sirhanids...

44

Ali Paşa thereupon wrote to Ahmed ibn Ma’n in the hope of convincing him, as a previous governor of Tripoli had tried and failed to do in 1685, to take over the Hamâdas’ tax farms.45 The Druze emir feigned submission and even supplicated the Paşa to “do justice” and avenge “the numerous men of our tribes” whom the “Sirhan-oğulları killed unwarranted,” perhaps a reference to the Kîsrawâni victims of the recent Shiîte-Maronite vendetta. The anonymous history says nothing further of his failure to support the governor, only that Ali, as grand vizier, once more turned his attention to “that leaven of villainy, Ma’n-oğlu, and their other acolytes and riff-raff” and mounted a final effort to annihilate the rebels.46

Remarkably, the campaign of 1694 confirmed rather than undercut the principle of heterodox home-rule. Duwayhi, in a rare reference to Ibn Ma’n’s insurgency, indicates

44. Ibid., 95.

45. Ibid. The letter, which is not comprised in the mühimme defterleri nor in the court records of Tripoli and Sidon, is quoted or paraphrased as follows: “Your father and forefathers prospered and flourished under the Islamic Kingdom, and your relatives and kinsmen always found refuge in the High State and impunity from the sultan’s fiery blade. Now, you too shall prove obsequious and faithfully defend and assist the people of Islam. The tax farms of the area are assigned and transferred to you, whereby increased kindness and beneficence is expected of you. You will attain all you wish for and find the favor not even your ancestors enjoyed. But if you too swerve from the path of obedience, and follow the Sirhanids’ fancies, and snap the thread of submission with tyranny and corruption, your deeds will soon be punished with the help of God.”

46. Ibid., 96.
that his seven tax farms in Sidon province were rescinded and awarded to his archenemy, Mūsā ‘Alam al-Dīn of the Yamanī tribal bloc, who joined the Ottoman expedition and went to seize the Ma‘nīd capital at Dayr al-Qamar. An important detail which Duwayhi neglects, in his steadfast effort to present the Qaysī bloc as the only legitimate rulers of the Lebanon, is revealed in the Ottoman patents of Mūsā’s appointment: “The beği̇lik,” which is explicitly noted to cover the four (Druze) districts Shūf, Jurj, Matn and Gharb, but not the (Shiite and Christian) districts of Kisrawān, Marj-‘Ayûn (Jizzīn), and Qlīm Kharnūb, was transferred together with all seven tax collectorships to the rival Druze chief. The document furthermore attests that Mūsā ‘Alam al-Dīn, already recognized as an emir in the strictly tribal sense, was also awarded the rank of sancakbey of Safad in 1694, thus becoming perhaps only the third local feudatory, after the Fakh al-Dīn Ma‘nī himself and the Ḥarīfūsh emirs of Homs, to formally hold an Ottoman military district governorship. The great Ottoman punitive campaign may have aimed at the incumbent, but at the same time it validated the institution, of the Druze tribal emirate in the western Syrian highlands.

The ‘Alam al-Dīns’ fortunes were to be short-lived. In March 1695, Aḥmad ibn Ma‘n incited a revolt in his former territories which forced Mūsā to flee to Sidon. The French consul there reported that Ibn Ma‘n had initially taken refuge with the bedouins near Damascus, but continued to enjoy such popularity that his replacement lived in constant danger of assassination. At first, the Sublime Porte promised yet another

47. Duwayhi, Tāri̇kh, 380-1.

48. MD 105:9:28, dated early June 1694. MD 105:6:17 appears to be a draft of the same hukûm.

expedition to eject Ibn Ma’n and to “wipe the entirety of the Shiite heretics and depraved brigands off the face of the earth,”50 and advised Mūsā to conciliate his subjects with tax abatements.51 By then, however, the aging sultan Ahmed II had died, occasioning Ali Paşa’s dismissal from the grand vizierate in May. The governor of Sidon, always eager to win powerful and generous friends, paid an accession gift on the Ma’nids’ behalf and persuaded the Porte that the tax farm revenues would surely increase if they were henceforth left in their possession. By August 1695, the new regime in Istanbul had resigned itself to the status quo, and issued Aḥmad ibn Ma’n a writ of forgiveness—on the condition that

he remain occupied with his own affairs; serve in loyalty and uprightness; not patronize the Kızılbaṣ, the heretical Shiite brigands and other corrupters in and around Tripoli; not harm the villages and wayfarers in the environs; pay the yearly remittance from the Şuf, Kisrevan and the associated tax farms of which he has taken hold, in its entirety, to the valîs; and proscribe and repulse the heretical Shiites and other brigands of the region.52

As to the “Kızılbaṣ and heretical Shiites” themselves, Ibn Nujaym relates that the entire district of Tripoli hunted after the Ḥamādas through the fall of 1694. Several members of the family met their end in the jails of Sidon, “from the narrowness of their confinement,” captured while fleeing south to shelter with their coreligionists in Jabal ‘Amil. “All this,” the author concludes, “happened to the Ḥamādas in a single year on

lavoit obligé dabandonner son pays, et sestoi refugié parmy les arabes qui sont au della de Damas, les peuples lon rapellé et ont chassé laurte hemir qu’on avoit mis a sa place, qui sest refugié icy aupres de nostre Pascha. Il atand que tous les autres aient joint celuy de damas pour le restablir. Les peuples sont sy forts idolatres du prince contre lequel on va faire la guerre, et sy fort rebutes de celuy quon veut favoriser, quil est tres dangereux pour luy que dans une sedition ou ces peuples sont naturellement portes, on ne lasasine.”

50. MD 106.22-23.39; MD 106.23.40.
51. MD 106:24:43.
52. MD 106.239.854.
account of Ali Paşa." The Ḥamādas would naturally not recover as easily as the Ma'ns, though already the following year they engaged in a skirmish against the Shā'ir notables in their old fief of Batrūn. By February 1696, they or their followers succeeded anew in attracting the Sublime Porte's attention: The "accursed Kızılbaş" were, apparently with reinforcements from Jabal 'Āmil, terrorizing wayfarers and peasants in the "Sirhan mountains" of Tripoli, only this time they are explicitly described in the mühimmes as "subjects of Ma'n-oğlu's government." Consequently, the Druze emir himself received a stern warning to interdict their activities in the north:

You are bound and obliged to the to defense and protection of the people of your country and to the control and disciplining of this sort of brigands. The harm inflicted on the poor and the weak through their evil and wickedness is attributable to your disregard and negligence!

The Ḥamādas' reign over rural Mt. Lebanon, the next chapter will show, did not expire with the punitive campaign of 1693-1694. While we have no documentary evidence for when precisely they were reappointed as government tax concessionaries, Duwayhi reports in the last pages of his chronicle that Bashīr al-Shihābī, who inherited the Druze emirate with the Ottomans' blessing after the death of Aḥmad ibn Ma'n, "interceded with the governor on the Ḥamādas' behalf so that they returned to their homelands" in 1698, and "bonded their governorate against any despoliation and grievance." The responsibility given to the Shūf emirs for controlling the Shi'ite mültezims of Tripoli province must therefore be seen as the most fundamental

54. Ibid., 820.
consequence of their 15-year challenge to Ottoman authority. As early as September 1685, the Sublime Porte had offered the Ḫamādas' fiefs to Ahmad ibn Ma'ān, knowing him to enjoy the trust and support of the local Maronite population and hoping he might deliver more tax moneys than the unpopular Shi'ite agents had been able. In the subsequent years of violence, the state demanded the paramount emirs' military aid against the rebels, going so far, under the vindictive Ali Paşa, to turn its weapons against Ibn Ma'ān personally when he tried to stay aloof from the war. Yet it could not do without the emiral institution itself, and made the control and discipline of the northern Shi'ites the very precondition for rehabilitating Ibn Ma'ān in 1696. This cross-border jurisdiction was further consolidated with the new Shi'ihābī emirate, which, having effectuated the Ḫamādas' restoration in 1698, assumed the legal bond (kefalet) for the faithful discharge of their iltizam commissions. On the local level, the consequences of the long struggle between the Shi'ite emirs and the Ottoman authorities were therefore doubly momentous: the strengthening of the Druze emirate of the Shūf; and its acquisition of a direct political and financial stake in the feudal affairs of the eyalet of Tripoli.

If the Ottoman state had a clear interest in widening the jurisdiction of its designated feudal representative in the rural hinterland, it was equally concerned to consolidate the jurisdictions of its provincial governors. As discussed earlier, the constitution of the eyalets of Tripoli in 1579 and especially of Sidon in 1660 were meant to provide appanages for high Ottoman officials, not to control mountain outlaws. The events of 1693-1694 provide a lively illustration of how the administrative sub-division of Syria could in fact pose obstacles to the pursuit of rebel fugitives. As we have already seen, the Khāzins reportedly refused to pursue the Ḫamādas into the Bekaa valley in the winter of 1693, alleging that they had no authorization to cross the Damascus/Tripoli boundary. The Sublime Porte evidently worried about the rebels absconding to other
jurisdictions. The campaign preparations of June 1694 included orders to the provincial governors of both Tripoli and Sidon to “have the harbors on these coasts and elsewhere watched, as is required, and seize and punish canonically any of these thugs who arrive intending to flee by boat.”\(^{58}\) A similar hüküm was sent a few weeks later to the bey of the desert sancak Dayr al-Zûr and Raḥba, telling him to capture and extradite to Tripoli any of Ibn Ma’n’s “Kızılaş followers” who might come his way.\(^{59}\) The order was reiterated in November to the vali of Sidon as well as to the imperial müfettiş Tursun Mehmed Paşa (see below).\(^{60}\)

The problem of jurisdictions is also raised by the 19th-century historian Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābi, who asserts that the northern Bekaa was attached to Tripoli in 1692 to enable the governor to apprehend Ḥamāda rebels attempting to flee there.\(^{61}\) This claim (which belies the Khāzīns’ supposed apprehensions about crossing provincial borders) can in fact be corroborated, and nuanced, with recourse to the Ottoman şikayet (finance complaints) registers. An entry from April/May 1694 recalls that Ali Paşa wrote to the Sublime Porte while still governor of Tripoli, asking for (and receiving) permission to take the lucrative Baalbek mukataa away from Damascus and annex it to his province, “in order to prevent and repulse attacks on the poor subjects by the Rafīzī brigands who have taken over the Tripoli area.”\(^{62}\) The exchange, tellingly enough, makes no mention of the Baalbek tax farm’s actual tenants, i.e. the Shiîte Ḥarfûsh emîrs. For Ali Paşa, in any

\(58\). MD 105:8:25.

\(59\). MD 105:9:29.

\(60\). MD 105:14:38; MD 105:18:46.

\(61\). Shihābi, Tārīkh, 743.

\(62\). Şikayet 17:129:626.
event, the benefits of territorial aggrandizement must have outweighed the added bother of having to deal with even more “Rafizi brigands” now.

The realignment of territorial jurisdictions thus requires the events of 1693-1694 to be considered in more detail from the perspectives of competing Ottoman administrators. The anti-Shiite campaign was of course not Ali Paşa’s private initiative, but the varying degrees in which Ottoman valis chose to implement imperial directives is suggestive of a fundamental difference of personal application and, most critically in this period, of a changing paradigm of Ottoman provincial administration. The government decrees promulgated under Ali Paşa’s vizierate, while not overtly critical of his predecessors, pin the ex-governor’s reputation on his unprecedented success in battling the Kızılbaş enemy.

Despite the valis’ circumspection, perseverance and attention, the elimination and extirpation of these godforsaken ones did not come to pass. With their banditry continuing unabated, my most honorable commander, my proudest marshal [etc., etc.] Ali Paşa was assigned... last year to uproot and extirpate them, and with the help of God on High, most became fodder to the blade of death and destruction. Those who were spared of the sword found neither repose nor the force to sow corruption anew.63

His lead role in the (rather dubious) victory against the Ḥamādas in 1693 is also emphasized by the court historiographers Raşid and Sari Mehmed, and of course in the Berlin anonymous history:

Camp was pitched near Tripoli and an army assembled, and with foresight and wise counsel, they set out into the Sirhan mountains... Glory be to God on High, the authors of sedition and insurrection were destroyed by the army of righteousness, the heaven-succored host. Those arrogant impious rebels’ impure bodies became smeared with the blood of justice.

Previous vaquis of Tripoli, in contrast, “had deemed fit, perhaps even with happy hearts” to leave the Ḩamādas the tax farms which they had seized illegally.\textsuperscript{64}

Why would these ex-governors have been less adamant about persecuting the Shiite emirs? An answer is suggested by comparing their professional career paths and ambitions with those of someone like Ali Paşa. Among the three Ottoman eyalets comprising Syria, the governorship of Damascus was traditionally the most prestigious and often served as a springboard to higher office in the asitane, the imperial capital. Its incumbent in 1692, as the first inter-regional campaign was called against Ḥusayn ibn Sirḥān Ḩamāda, was Gürçü Mehmed Paşa. A career soldier, Mehmed was already famous in his native Georgia before entering the Ottomans’ service. In Damascus he distinguished himself by quelling a Janissary revolt, and later married into the royal family.\textsuperscript{65} The second governor who received orders to fight the Ḩamādas in March 1692 but evidently neglected to do so was Kavanoğlu Ahmed Paşa of Sidon. Originally from Russia, Ahmed was captured as a child and reared in the Inner Court (Enderun) of the Ottoman palace. He held several important beşlerbeşlik governorships besides Sidon, married into the Köprülü vizier family, and worked his way higher to become nişancı, deputy vizier and, in 1703, grand vizier.\textsuperscript{66}

The key figure in the failed campaign was of course the paşa of Tripoli, Bozkulu Mustafa Paşa. Mustafa was again a product of the Inner Court and graduated as the sultan’s ceremonial sword-bearer before becoming Ottoman grand admiral. Appointed to Damascus in 1688/89, he proved ineffective against the Janissaries but succeeded all

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Anınam Osmanî Tarihi, 95.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Süreyya, Sıcill-i Osmani, 1064. The Syrian governors’ careers are discussed in more detail in Winter, “Shiite Emirs,” 224-7.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} Mehmed Süreyya, Sıcill-i Osmani, ed. Nuri Akbayar & Seyit Ali Kahraman (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1996), 213-4.
\end{itemize}
the same in marrying into the imperial household.\textsuperscript{67} He was dismissed from Damascus in favor of Gürcü Mehmed and demoted to Tripoli, but was soon rehabilitated and, "in deference to his former rights, and being one of the [grand vizier]'s fellow palace servants," named campaign deputy in the summer of 1692.\textsuperscript{68} It is by no means clear that he ever went to Tripoli personally in the interim, for the local Arab chronicles consistently identify the governor in this period as "Mehmed." Whoever was in charge in Tripoli, the Ḥamādas were reconfirmed in their iltizam commissions in 1692, and Mustafa's marching orders against them and against the rebellious Ḥarfūshes of Baalbek and the Nusayris of Latakia\textsuperscript{69} went unheeded. This apparently caused Bozoklu Mustafa no harm, and he was promoted grand vizier in March 1693. His court connections could unfortunately not preserve him from palace intrigues, and he was ejected and imprisoned a year later for dereliction of duty (supposedly spending too much time hunting.) The intercession of his princess wife, however, secured him another reprieve and an appointment to Sidon, where he continued to blissfully ignore imperial orders against the area Shiites, exerting himself only, as indicated above, to effect the beneficent Druze emir's rehabilitation in 1695.

Bozoklu Mustafa, Gürcü Mehmed and Kavanos Ahmed may be said to have represented the old guard of Ottoman provincial rulers. Assigned for two years or less to any one beğlerbegilik on their pilgrimage up the stations of imperial authority, traditional soldier-bureaucrats of their type had neither personal roots nor professional investments in the domestic life of their assigned provinces, but depended entirely on court favor and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Süreyya, \textit{Sicill-i Osmani}, 1190-1.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Raşid, \textit{Tarih}, 2:189.
\item \textsuperscript{69} MD 100:140:532; MD 102:61:275.
\end{itemize}
esprit de corps for their rapid advancement. As foreign converts and/or products of the palace schools, they had little intrinsic interest in minor local problems of tax truancy, banditry, or much less heresy. However, the fiscal reforms of the late 16th century and, perhaps even more so of the Köprülü period, witnessed the gradual replacement of this socially disinterested military service elite with engaged, locally-established managerial professionals as provincial governors. The micro-event of the 1693-1694 campaign succinctly epitomizes this longue-durée shift in Ottoman administrative modes: Ali Paşa, whose career path and opportunities differed radically from those of his predecessors, perforce had entirely different motivations in pursuing such disciplinary action against a handful of Shiite malefactors.

Ali, a scrivener from Thrace, made his life in the Ottoman financial bureaucracy where he twice obtained the post of chief defterdar.\textsuperscript{70} As a freeborn Muslim, neither bearing arms nor marrying an Ottoman princess was a viable career option. However, the changing requirements of imperial administration in this era meant that civilian bureaucrats might now rise to the highest echelons of power too. The governorship of Tripoli was, astoundingly, the first and only provincial posting of Ali’s career, serving as his stepping stone to the grand vizierate in April 1694. To Ali, authority in Tripoli bore a completely different meaning and possibility than to Bozoklu Mustafa. Soon after his appointment, as we have seen, he used the long-simmering Shiite disturbance to press for the annexation of the Bekaa tax district to his own dominion. Notwithstanding the real need to quiet the Ḥamādas, Ali Paşa’s singular preoccupation with extirpating rebels, to the point of confronting the powerful Druze emir of Sidon province, also denotes his ulterior motive of establishing a reputation for uncompromisingness and

\textsuperscript{70.} Süreyya, \textit{Sicill-i Osmani}, 294-5.
military verve. His fervor in campaigning until late in the fall of 1693 and his ongoing attention to the Ḥamādas after becoming grand vizier in April 1694 go in the same direction.

Above all, Ali sought to build himself a supporting party to offset his lack of local notability and palace affiliation. One method was to place retainers and lesser tribal chiefs such as the Küra Kurds and the Shā'irs in the tax offices wrested from the Ḥamādas. Most important, however, was his strategic partnership with the Mataraci-oğlu (Ibn al-Maṭaraji) household of Jabala. Diverse sources agree that Ali selected Arslan Mehmed ibn al-Maṭaraji to succeed him in Tripoli in 1694 specifically with a view to continuing his anti-Shiite crusade.71 The 19th-century historian Ḥaydar al-Shihābī may have been conveying a widespread if inaccurate impression when he characterized Arslan as “Ali’s mamluk.”72 Arslan had no administrative experience whatsoever when he became beğlerbeği of Tripoli, but could count on the support of his brother Kaplan, who had succeeded their father as ruler of Latakia. Arslan was said to be proficient in Islamic jurisprudence,73 and perhaps shared with Ali Paşa a personal disdain for the heterodox Muslims with whom he was intimately familiar in western Syria. For his services, Kaplan was made vali of Sidon and shared the pilgrimage command with his brother; Arslan was appointed to Damascus and returned once more to govern Tripoli, “having no equal in keeping the Arabs under discipline.”74 If, as Karl Barbir has argued, the Mataracis constituted one of the first major governor dynasties of Syria,75 they owed

72. Shihābī, Tārīkh, 743.
74. Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, 324; Raṣid, Tarih, 2:479.
this situation in large part to Ali Paşa’s efforts to build himself a broad inter-regional coalition in the spring of 1694. The decrees issued by Ali Paşa from the distance of his Balkan command post, which bound all of Syria from Kilis to Gaza to Arslan’s leadership in a great military enterprise, bespeak an overriding political project more than a simple quest to tame the Shiite emirs of Mt. Lebanon.

If the civilian administrators Ali Paşa and the Mataracı-oğlus had a much greater stake in the persecution campaign than their slave-soldier colleagues, it is precisely the latters’ military skills that they lacked. As early as June 1694, Arslan was advised to turn to the professional commander Tursun Mehmed Paşa, müfettiş of the central and left wings of the Anatolian army, “should you notice yourself to be short in means and provisions, and lacking the power” to undertake the mission.76 The Sublime Porte does not seem to have awaited his cue, but immediately sent orders to Tursun Mehmed to complete his troop mobilization for the upcoming European war and hurry by to “keep an eye on the said governor” and his already faltering military venture.77 Unfortunately, the Anatolian general does not seem to have shared the grand vizier’s enthusiasm for waging war in Mt. Lebanon. In early November, the Ottoman chancery upbraided Arslan for not confirming Tursun’s arrival to take charge: “News from you has been expected and anticipated but to this moment there still has not been any sign or indication from you. You are guilty of negligence and carelessness!”78 A few weeks later, a dispatch from the şikayet department rebukes Tursun himself for not yet having reported to his new

77. MD 105:10-11:32.
78. MD 105:15-39.
assignment in Syria, requesting “a correct and objective report” on the developments as soon as possible. 79

Unsure of the campaign’s situation, the central chancery began to reissue orders to all the authorities of Syria, chiding them for their inaction and ordering them to coordinate with Tursun Mehmed. 80 A hükûm to the governor of Damascus implores him to join the campaign himself rather than merely sending his kethûda. 81 Another to Sidon seems, from our vantage point, almost tragically oblivious to the identity of the new incumbent—Bozoklu Mustafa—and his abysmal record in hunting the heterodox. 82 When combined with the Arab chronicles’ reports of only limited fighting, it becomes clear that Ali Paşa’s great anti-Shiite crusade found no support from outside his own camp. In December, a final angry hükûm went out to the campaign leaders. Tursun Mehmed, since given the rank of vali of Aleppo, is now also accused of negligence for not reporting any progress. He is admonished one last time to finish the job, turn authority back over to Arslan and return to his original post in Anatolia, so that he may prepare the next imperial campaign to Hungary which was being planned for that spring. 83

After Ali Paşa was removed from office in May 1695, the plans for a renewed campaign to “wipe the entirety of the Shiite heretics and depraved brigands off the face of the earth” 84 were completely abandoned. Of its designated commanders, İsmail Paşa

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79. Şikayet 17:559:2530.
80. MD 105:14:37; MD 105:16:41; MD 105:17:43; MD 105:18:44.
81. MD 105:17:42.
82. MD 105:14:36.
83. MD 105:35:136; MD 105:35:137.
84. MD 106:22-23:39; MD 106:23:40.
of Damascus retired from active duty and went on to defect to the Safavids in 1701; the complacent Bozoklu Mustafa was promoted again to the governorship of Damascus before finally returning to the imperial capital, in 1697, to serve two more terms as deputy grand vizier. The civilian Mataracı-oğlu household, for its part, was allowed to monopolize the top provincial posts until Arslan’s death in 1704, prefiguring the establishment of pan-Syrian dynastic rule with the ‘Azms in the 18th century.

**Controlling the Tribes**

The Ḫamādas’ challenge to the Ottoman state and the ensuing 1693-1694 campaign operated on several parallel levels: In personal terms, the year 1685 marks the disappearance of the great emir Sirhān, whose successors were perhaps less able to steer the emirate through the hazards of feudal politics than he. To their misfortune, furthermore, the following years were attended by the Khāzins’ rise to prominence in the region, as they exploited France’s growing financial and diplomatic benevolence to resettle Maronite farming and monastic communities in the Shiite-controlled highlands. And then to compound matters, disputes among the notable clans which once were settled locally began in precisely these years to attract the special attention of the Ottoman provincial authority, where a new class of civilian governors began to rely on rural managerialism for their own career advancement. To end this chapter, however, we must also consider the 1693-1694 military operation in the larger context of Ottoman imperial policy-making. The Sublime Porte’s directives in these years, while attacking the Mt. Lebanon emirs specifically as heretics, actually frame a much more mundane, though no less ideological discourse of societal disciplining. The last great "Kızılbaş

85. Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmani, 832.
campaign" in Ottoman history, this section argues, ensued from the early modern empire's programs of brigand control, mercenary demobilization and tribal settlement rather than from a renewed religious impulse.

The Ḫamādas' sectarian identity is thematized to an unprecedented degree in the hüküms prompting the 1693-1694 campaign. They are consistently denounced as "Revañiz" or "Kızılbaş brigands," and the preambles of orders issued later in 1694 refer to them almost invariably as "accursed Kızılbaş whose destruction is an incumbent religious duty." Their victims are the reaya, i.e. the Ottoman sultan's "flock," who are sometimes also characterized as obedient "Müslimn" despite the fact that most will have been Maronite Christians. The anonymous Berlin history tries to underscore the confessional nature of the Ḫamādas' rebelliousness by explaining that "the Revañiz sect considers it their duty to battle and fight the people of Islam."86 Moreover, a noteworthy phrase included in only the lengthier May/June 1694 hüküms attests that "Ali Paşa... was appointed to uproot and eliminate them on the basis of my imperial command promulgated last year as per a noble fetva."87 Of course the Ḫamādas themselves were never explicitly the subject of an Ottoman fetva; the reference is rather to the still valid ruling of the famous şeyhi‘l-İslam Ebu’s-Su‘ud, which sanctioned the killing of anyone qualifiable as a "Kızılbaş," over a century and a half earlier.

Why then did the Ottoman state choose this moment to proscribe the Shiite "heretics" whom it had employed as tax concessionaries for more than 40 years? Prof. Abu-Husayn, taking Duwayhi's claim of the Ḫamādas' Iranian origins at face value, surmises that "As a clan whose loyalty went to the Shiite Safavids of Persia, the

86. Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, 95.
87. MD 105.5.10; MD 105.6.17; MD 105.9.28; MD 105.10.32.
traditional enemies of the Sunnite Ottomans, and who were themselves of \textit{Kızılbash} origin, the Himadahs apparently seized the opportunity of the disastrous military involvement of the Ottomans on the Hungarian front, following the failure of their siege of Vienna in 1683, to stage their rebellion against the Ottoman government in the territory of Tripoli.\textsuperscript{88} While there is little doubt that the 1683 campaign and the ensuing financial and social crises occasioned numerous “rebellions” throughout Anatolia and Syria, relations with Safavid Iran can almost certainly be excluded as a factor in the treatment of the empire's Shiites at this time. By the early 1600s, according to a later imperial historiographer, the Ottomans had realized that continued warfare against the Iranian Shiite population was futile and concentrated instead on trying to bring down the Safavid house.\textsuperscript{89} After the death of sultan Mehmed IV in 1640, Isfahan and Istanbul nevertheless began a regular exchange of embassies; in the 1690s the Safavid \textit{shah} was instrumental in restoring Ottoman sovereignty over Basra following its seizure by the Musha'sha' Arabs.\textsuperscript{90} The argument can be made that the two empires enjoyed the friendliest ties in their history precisely in the years of the Syrian Shiite upheaval. The export of Iranian silk through Izmir and Aleppo peaked in the decades around the turn of the century\textsuperscript{91} and numerous Ottoman diplomatic manuals attest to the cordial political relations between the two courts. The highly successful Ottoman embassy of 1689 was repayed by the Iranian governor Kelb Ali Khan who, after traversing Anatolia in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Abu-Husayn, “Unknown Career,” 244.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} ‘Abbās Ismā‘īl Šabbāgh, \textit{Tārikh al-'Alāiqāt al-'Uthmāniya al-İrāniya} (Beirut: 1999), 166-71; 196-7.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Rudolph Matthee, \textit{The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600-1730} (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 223-5.
\end{itemize}
winter of 1691-92, caused something of a stir at Istanbul harbor with an elephant he had brought as an accession gift for the new sultan. Writing in a later time, the chronicler Silahdar Mehmed (d. 1723/24) felt obliged to characterize him as “a biting-mutt scoundrel of an unshaven Kızılbaş heretic pimp,”92 but evidently the Ottoman court did not feel that way then. Kelb Ali was allowed to proceed to Edirne where he was lodged in a serail and wined and dined by the grand vizier. In February 1692, just days before the first inter-regional campaign was ordered against the Ḥamādas, the khan was admitted to the sultan’s presence to offer his letters, the elephant, and a long inventory of other precious exotics which he had brought from Iran for the occasion.93

The Ottoman authorities resorted to the symbolism of religious righteousness in denouncing the Syrian “Revaфиз” and “Kızılbaş,” yet it is interesting to note that they almost never applied the terms to individually named emirs such as Sirḥān or Shadīd Ḥarfuṣh. Furthermore, as argued above, the campaign marks the first time when the task of supervising the northern feudatories was explicitly given to the Druze emirs of the Shūf, who were either patently heterodox themselves (i.e. the Ma’ns) or held an office specifically created for the Druze sectarian community (the Shihābis). The state authorities were well aware of the Lebanese feudalists’ confessional identities, but had little interest in delegitimizing individuals on whom they had to rely as their local proxies. Though the Ḥamādas were relieved of their Sunni-inhabited fiefs in the summer of 1690, as we have seen, the imperial hūkūms neither explicitly condemn them as heretics nor divest them of their other landholdings. The insistence on their “Kızılbaş” and “Revaфиз” identity in later decrees invokes Ebu’s-Su’ud’s legal justification for killing

92. Silahdar Tarihi, 2:620.
93. Ibid., 2:620-2; Raṣīd, Tarih, 2:182.
Shiite rebels, and underscores the gravity of the crime that really concerned the Ottoman administration: " eşkiyalık," i.e. "brigandage" or simply "tyranny" in the wider sense. The very fact that the Shiites were identified with brigandage suggests that their challenge to authority was understood as a social rather than as a devotional problem.

Historical criminology describes both rural banditry and its repression as a key attribute of early modern state consolidation. With respect to the Ottoman Empire, Karen Barkey has argued that

Bandits... were brought together by societal elites for the interests of these elites. Banditry was thus an artificial social construction that became a threat, was used as a pseudo-threat, or was co-opted into the governing machinery of the state depending on the needs of the ruling class. Its rebellion did not represent collective action in the traditional sense since it did not attempt to destroy the social structure of society; it simply wanted to derive as much utility from society as possible. It manipulated the interstices of the system, having no proclaimed ally or enemy and no significant ideology.

The Ottoman state's need for large infantry armies in fact gave rise not only to tax-farming under autonomous feudal lords, but also to the recruitment of tribal and mercenary gangs who virtually ruled Anatolia when the regular soldiery was away on campaign, and whose demobilization and disarmament then increased the pool of potential criminals or led to outright revolts. Istanbul regularly attempted to curb the influence of these so-called Saruca and Sekban companies by sending special recruiters-cum-brigand fighters (müfettiş) to Anatolia. Beginning with the Celali rebellions of the early 17th century, the Ottomans also tried a more innovative technique: a general


96. These müfettiş for Anatolia included Tursun Mehmed, who was then diverted to fight the Hamadas.
mandatory conscription (nefîr-i 'amm) of the non-military subject population. Civilian militiamen (il erleri) would be recruited locally by the town or village notables, then registered by the state kadıs for armed service against local bandit groups.97 During the debilitating war against the Habsburg Empire from 1683 to 1699, nefîr-i 'amm draftees were even deployed on the European front, but their main contribution was in thwarting the 1688-89 rebellion of Yeşil Osman Paşa, who with his Anatolian “Türedi” (“rabble”) mercenaries mounted the only serious attempt to overthrow the Ottoman sultanate itself in the early modern period.98

It is thus significant, given the real danger posed by Yeşil Osman and his private army, that the Sublime Porte branded the far less dangerous Ḥamāda rebels too as “Türedi brigands” in November 1691,99 and chose to call a nefîr-i 'amm throughout Syria when the focus of the punitive campaign shifted to the Druze emir Ibn Ma'n. The chancery decrees from the spring of 1694 ordered the mobilization not just of all provincial forces “not assigned to the imperial campaign” plus the private household armies of the region's governors, but also, “by way of a general conscription, the civilian militiamen capable of war and battle, and sufficient men from the provinces of Tripoli, Sidon-Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo, as well as those il erleri under their government able to bear arms.”100

It is of course doubtful if civilian draftees from the cities could achieve much against the Ḥamāda emirs in Mt. Lebanon; in November, at any rate, Istanbul issued

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100. MD 105:5-7; 10-11 (numerous orders).
new orders to deploy the local (yerlü) Damascene Janissary division as well. The earlier decrees probably served in the first instance to legitimate the participation of local feudatories seeking plunder or revenge against the Ḥamādas. Nonetheless, the designation and arming of reaya-class subjects to combat minor rebels, a job strictly reserved for the professional askeri class and their retainer households in the classical Ottoman social dichotomy, does bespeak a more basic, long-term shift in the state’s relationship with its subjects. The formulation of an imperial tribal settlement plan at the end of the 17th century is indicative of this changing vision of provincial administration, and arguably the key to understanding the punitive actions of 1693-1694.

The struggle between the desert and the sown has of course characterized much of the Middle East’s demographic history, where successful state-building has always depended in large measure on a sovereign’s ability to push back or subjugate and assimilate the tribal nomads of the desert and steppe frontiers. Like the Ayyubid and Mamluk regimes before it, the Ottoman Empire coaxed, enticed, threatened or coerced untold pastoral collectives to resettle in newly conquered frontier marches, pioneer agricultural zones and strategic roadways. In the 18th century, to judge by the şikayet and mühimmme records, the deportation of Arab and Kurdish rebels to newly developed agricultural sites in the underpopulated north-east became the overriding theme of Ottoman imperial policy in the Syrian provinces. According to Cengiz Orhonlu, however, it was in the last decade of the 17th century that the Ottomans developed an express program of tribal surveillance and settlement (îskan siyaseti) in response to the

101. MD 105:17:42; MD 105:18:43.
102. These points are developed further in Winter, “Shiite emirs,” 230-5.
103. See also Yusuf Halaçoğlu, XVIII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İskan Siyaseti ve Aşıretlerin Yerleştirilmesi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988).
refugee crisis and social breakdown touched off by their first significant territorial losses in Europe. On the basis of contemporary iskan registers, he has sought to show how tax incentives and land assignments were instituted by the Sublime Porte—precisely in the years 1691-1696—with the aim of reviving disused farmlands and ending tribal depredations against the tax-paying agriculturist population.\(^{104}\)

While Orhonlu’s iskan siyaseti should be taken more as general orientation than a fixed government policy, it is not fortuitous that the Ottoman campaign against the Ḥamāda emirate falls squarely within the initiative and timeframe he describes. The chancery authorities’ underlying concern, to judge by the tenor of the first decrees against the Shiites, was that “the humble commoners from the rural districts will scatter and disperse on account of their oppression.”\(^{105}\) The hüküms relate with apparent compassion how the “Kızılbaş” and “Rafizi bandits living in the Tripoli highlands” had taken to afflicting the local villagers, “transgressing on their properties and goods, seizing their crops, leaving their folk and families hungry and abject... They are unable to preserve their folk and families or guard and dispose as they wish their property, supplies, beasts, livestock, farms and fruit trees.”\(^{106}\) The real issue, however, was the damage ultimately being caused to the state purse:

The impoverished reaya are unable to pay the miri tax and most have left their homes and quit the land. The fate of those who stay is worsening, for they do not have the resources and ability to pay the miri... In the measure that aforesaid brigands refuse to pay the miri and oppress and tyrannize the impoverished reaya, their presence in these regions is the cause for the start and perdurance of upheaval and the reason for the [ruin] of the land. It is necessary to repulse their tyranny and oppression of the impoverished reaya as well as their excuses and

\(^{104}\) Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Aşiretlerin İskanı (İstanbul: Eren, 1987); see also his Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Derbend Teşkilati (2nd. expanded edition. Istanbul: Eren, 1990).

\(^{105}\) MD 100.74.277; MD 100.74.278 (op. cit.)

sluggishness concerning the mirî tax, and eliminate their presence from these regions.\textsuperscript{107}

It therefore comes as no surprise that the Sublime Porte also sought to extract the maximum fiscal advantage from the military operation itself. The officially advertised aim of the campaign might have been to “to render the country prosperous and to better the conditions of the faithful,”\textsuperscript{108} but in fact Arslan and Tursun Paşa received precise instructions on confiscating, if necessary on pain of torture, the defeated tribalists’ possessions for the benefit of the state:

Seize all the mobile and stationary goods that are to be found; their cash, effects, beasts, livestock and all of their property and stores, whatever there is, for the tax registry, the accountancy, and the fisc. In addition to this, investigate and discover the money buried and hidden in the places where they live or camp... and in [other] sites you might think of and suspect, by whatever means necessary, [interrogating] the captured men and those people who know. Dig up the suspected places. Widen the search and efforts and have it found. Seize it for the fisc, and report to and appraise my august throne with a register.\textsuperscript{109}

Notwithstanding, the central authorities had held out hope for a long time that the refractory emirs could be reformed rather than annihilated, another indication that it was not their religious identity that was at stake. One of the earlier hûkûms allows that “the reaya will disperse and scatter if, besides a few of the aforesaid brigands being taken and imprisoned in the Tripoli citadel, they are not also punished.”\textsuperscript{110} While “punishment” generally implied the executing governors’ discretionary right to kill the Shiites as “Kızılbaş,” various degrees of chastisement were in fact conceivable. As we have seen, the detention of clan members in the provincial capital was meant to ensure the tax farmers’ compliance with their iltizam commissions. The Tripoli authorities

\textsuperscript{108.} MD 105:7:18.
\textsuperscript{109.} MD 105:8:24; MD 105:16:40; MD 105:18:45.
\textsuperscript{110.} MD 102.180.708.
commenced the final part of the 1694 campaign by killing their Ḥamāda hostages,\textsuperscript{111} which suggests that they had still hoped for a peaceable solution until then. Two decrees from late 1691, one against the Ḥamādas and the other against Nusayri bandits in the Latakia district, stipulates the mere banishment of those individuals not deserving execution, their names to be registered in the chief account books.\textsuperscript{112}

The radical solutions that Ottoman-Islamic law demanded for dealing with the Kızılbaş found no echo in the pragmatism of the empire's provincial administration. The reign of heterodox tribal feudatories in the desert and mountain periphery may have contradicted Ebu’s-Su'ud’s precepts but, as we have seen, was a welcome and actively supported component of Ottoman rural governance in Syria. A changing power ratio between Shiites and Maronites in Mt. Lebanon, on the one hand, and the classical military beğlerbeğliks and the civilian gubernatorial dynasties, on the other, conspired against the Ḥamāda emirate at the close of the 17th century but did not undermine the principles of emiral rule or Shiite enfranchisement as such. On the contrary, the Syria Shiites became as much a part of the empire’s ambitious social engineering as any other tribal constituency. Thus, as a February 1691 order to the valis of Tripoli and Damascus concerning Shādīd Ḥarfūsh makes clear, the Shiites were subject to Ottoman ışkan siyaseti despite a religious identity which technically should have earmarked them for “elimination:”

Propose to and convince the Revafiz living in the villages in the mountain passes near Baalbek... to surrender these brigands to the people of the [afflicted] villages, and to leave the high mountains themselves and collectively descend to the [Bekaa] plain, settle and mind their own affairs... For those who evict the aforesaid brigand from their homes and leave the...high mountains, descend to the plain and keep to their own affairs, so much the better. As for those who aid

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\textsuperscript{111} Ibn Nujaym, “Nubdha”, 818.

\textsuperscript{112} MD 102.61.274; MD 102.61.275.
the brigands and hinder their surrender, and who continue to inflict evil and villainy on the Muslims, their blood can be shed legally; punish them.\textsuperscript{113}

The Sublime Porte's offer to the area Revafiz still stood ten months later, after the first campaign to capture their emir Shadid had failed.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The same characteristics which, on the one hand, recommended the Ḥamādas and the Ḥarfūshes as classical tax concessionaries (itineracy, mercenariness, tribalism) on the other hand made them prime subject candidates for of the state's social engineering projects in the Köprülü reform era. In a comprehensive new study on settlement and migration in the 16th century, Hüseyin Arslan concludes that the central authority, even where it could not impose absolute control, was generally successful in disciplining and steering rural population movements to its own advantage and without regard to ethnic and confessional affiliations.\textsuperscript{115} The undertaking to survey and settle marginal rural groups, which gained new momentum in the late 17th-century crisis years, was of course not unique to the Middle East. To cite one example, the \textit{iskan siyaseti} as described by Orhonlu, Halaçoğlu and others has a pendant in the \textit{peuplierungspolitik} deployed after 1648 in Brandenburg-Prussia, another early modern power endowed, just like the Ottoman state, with a highly bureaucratized central administration and an extensive and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{113} MD 100:137:521; MD 100:140:532.
\item \textsuperscript{114} MD 102:78:355 (op. cit.)
\item \textsuperscript{115} Hüseyin Arslan, \textit{Osmanlı'da Nüfus Hareketleri (XVI. Yüzyıl): Yönetim, Nüfus, Göçler, İskânlar, Sürgünler (Üsküdar: Kakanş Yayınları, 2001) 362-4.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
ill-secured pioneer frontier.\textsuperscript{116} If the Ḥamādas were decried as godless “heretics” by chancery officials in 1694, this did not alter the underlying fact that the punitive campaign arose out of an empire-wide socio-economic reform policy, occasioned by an unprecedentedly costly engagement in Europe, to get mercenary rebellion, tribal banditry and peasant land-flight in hand and to revive desperately needed sources of agricultural income. The Ottoman state’s action against the Shiite chieftains of Syria cannot be summarized more aptly than in the terminology of early modern European sozialdisziplinierung: “a policy of heightened control and resistance against those sectors of the underclass who were not reckoned among the “beneficent classes” [“nützlichen Ständen”], in view of yet making them, as far as possible and with force if necessary, reasonably useful members of society; or failing this, to monitor them and isolate them from upright society through persecution and punishment.”\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{116} See Günter Vogler, Absolutistische Herrschaft und ständische Gesellschaft (Stuttgart: Ulmer Verlag, 1996), 169-73, 205.

\textsuperscript{117} Wolfgang von Hippel, “Die Gesellschaftsordnung in Deutschland zur Zeit des Barock,” quoted in ibid., 96.
CHAPTER FIVE

BETWEEN DEPENDENCE AND REDUNDANCY:

THE DECLINE OF THE SHIITE EMIRATES, 1698-1763

"The age of the ayan" is how Ottoman historiography has come to view the 18th century, as local religious notables, tribal leaders and civilian governor dynasties assumed the reigns of government in an increasingly decentralized provincial administrative system.¹ From their baroque, "tulip era" inspired palaces in Damascus and Dayr al-Qamar, the 'Azīm governors and the Shihābi emirs, the main beneficiaries of the new regime in Syria, presided over an extended period of commercial, cultural and architectural florescence that has come to epitomize the Ottoman era there as a whole. Scholarly debate has long been preoccupied by whether ayanlık channeled early nationalist stirrings or rejuvenated Ottomanist allegiances, whether it symbolized imperial decline or administrative adaptability, but has not in essence questioned its vector toward a triumphant, teleological "modernity" in the Middle East. This last chapter, in examining the social and ultimately political marginalization of the Shiite emirate in western Syria, seeks to illuminate not the achievements but rather one of the great institutional failures of 18th-century Ottoman notable rule.

¹ Yücel Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ayanlık (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1994); Bruce McGowan, "The Age of the Ayans, 1699-1812" in Halil Inalcık & Donald Quataert, eds., An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914 (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 637-758.
There is, of course, no precise moment when the system of Shiite tribal self-rule ceased to function in the Syrian highlands. The Ḥamādas, who have been the main focus of this dissertation, retained their traditional tax fiefs for two generations after being rehabilitated under the auspices of the Shihābī emirate in 1698. In some ways this period marked the apex of the Shiite emirate, as the Ḥamādas became unassailable in their situation as Ottoman taxlords of Mt. Lebanon and arrantly dominated the Maronite peasantry and patriarchy. At the same time, their inability to forge new partnerships with the upstart Maronite commercial and landed monastic bourgeoisie left the Ḥamādas increasingly isolated from an important subject population, which began to see the Shūf emirs of Sidon as its principal agent of communal security and development. By 1763, Yūsuf al-Shihābī had reconciled himself to the idea of evicting the Ḥamādas from their tax farms, and headed the first of several Maronite revolts which would bring about the definitive end of Shiite rule in rural Tripoli over the next decade and disperse large sections of the Shiite tribes in northern Mt. Lebanon. Remnants of the Ḥamāda family would participate (together with the Ḥarfūshes) in the insurrection against the Egyptian occupiers in 1840, and from their base in Hermel they indeed remained active in Lebanese politics well into the republican era. The eclipse of their distinctive, semi-autonomous rule under Ottoman sovereignty, however, must be related directly to their growing political dependence on, and social alienation from, the Maronite subjects and their Shihābī patrons over the course of the 18th century.

In Baalbek, by contrast, the Ḥarfūshes retained official favor and tax authority for much of the 18th and 19th centuries, falling victim only to the imperial land stature reform in 1864. The price of their continued incumbency, however, was a total subordination to the Shihābī household which, as late as 1680, had been no more than a
commensurate rival for control of the northern Bekaa tax concession. By the mid-18th century, this chapter will argue in closing, the Ottoman state authority recognized the Ḥarfūsh emir as the primary representative of the Twelver Shiite community in Syria in his capacity as an agent of the Shihābis. We begin, however, with the district which has received little attention here thus far, though it would emerge in the 18th century as the societal and political epicenter of the Imāmī confessional community of Syria if not the entire Arab Middle East. Jabal ʿĀmil, the ancient hub of high-Shiite scholasticism, witnessed the rise of local feudatory households much later than the tribal periphery of Mt. Lebanon or the Bekaa, and perhaps only then in reaction to the threatening encroachment of the nearby Druze emirate. By 1766, the Shiite emirs of Jabal ʿĀmil too were under the tutelage of a rising regional dynast, the Palestinian cotton baron Zāhir al-ʿUmar, but succeeded therewith in preserving their community’s independence from the centralization efforts of ambitious Ottoman administrators and Lebanese princes for another century-and-a-half.

**The Ottoman Abdication of Power in Jabal ʿĀmil**

Once again there are few reliable sources on the history of Jabal ʿĀmil, the native Shiite name for the coastal massif southeast of Sidon, prior to the 18th century. Local legend traces the origins of its Imāmī community back to the missionary efforts of the 7th-century ascetic Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, but in the absence of narrative chronicles such as those of the north-Lebanese ecclesiarchs, its pre-modern social history perforce remains obscure. Beginning in the middle ages, an impressive assortment of theologians from the villages of Jabal ʿĀmil gained renown throughout the Shiite academic world,

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2. See page 88.
and contemporary historians have mined their writings for the odd reference to their curricula, scholarly networks and social situation under Mamluk or Ottoman rule. The Qipchaq Mamluks at one point thought to proscribe Shiism in the region, resulting in a brief inquisition and causing numerous Shiites in Beirut and the coastlands to dissimulate their religious beliefs. On the whole, however, there is little evidence that the successive Sunni Islamic regimes bore the politically quiescent Shiite communities of the southern Lebanon any ill intent. If a number of notable scholars did leave to seek Safavid patronage in the 16th century, Shiite biographical sources equally tell of immigrations to Jabal ‘Āmil from outside the Empire and of frequent exchanges with the Twelver communities of Jubayl, Damascus, Iraq, Mecca and Yemen during the period under consideration. One member of the illustrious Ḥurr al-‘Āmili family is noted to have served in the court of Jubā‘ in 1676; another apparently had connections with the Ottoman authorities of Sidon and is described as a friend of governor Osman Paşa in the 1720s.

The religious practices of the common inhabitants are, by their nature, only seldom attested in the literary sources, but shrine worship and other popular devotions evidently flourished under Ottoman dominion too. Among the oldest mosques in the region is that built by the ‘Alī al-Ṣaghīrs in Hunīn in 1752/53, while several others date


6. Ibid., 10:288.

7. Ibid., 8:16.
from the 1760s. The shrine of the ancient mystical prophet Khîdr in the village of ‘Aynāthā was extensively restored during sultan Süleyman’s reign; a shaykh from the same village rebuilt the larger Sham’ sanctuary on the coastal plain near Tyre around 1688. A glance at a 16th-century Ottoman tapu cadastre for Sidon shows that many villages stood under the fiscal responsibility of the villagers themselves, with the incomes from ancillary farms frequently reserved for family vakıfs or the upkeep of small local sanctuaries such as Ḥadrat Shu‘ayb al-Nabī in Shaqīf.

A Khîdr/St. George shrine located outside of Jabal ‘Āmil, just beyond Beirut, and venerated by the local Shiites and Greek Orthodox alike was at the centre of a bizarre power struggle between the Ottoman state and the Ma‘nîd emir in the mid-17th century. D’Arvieux relates that a recent pasa of Sidon, eager to establish his Islamist credentials, had expropriated the ancient church on the site and turned it into a mosque. For this act, the local Christians and “Turks” were agreed, Saint George visited an early death upon him. A May 1662 entry in the unique finance (ahkam) register preserved in Dresden provides a less pathetic if no more objective account: The Khîdr maqâm had been a mosque in ancient times, before “the infidels, relying on the [presumably Crusader] conquerors, made it into a church.” It was converted back and forth several times, being reconsecrated as a mosque as late as 1633/34, i.e. directly after emir Fakhr al-Dîn’s last stand. Eleven years later, however, “it again became a church through the support of Ma‘n-oghî Mûlham and the custodian’s brother Hasan.” Determined to oppose the

10. Ibid., 5:467-8; 6:192.
11. TT 559:66, 258 (three separate entries.)
12. D’Arvieux, Mémoires, 159-61.
Christian-friendly Druze emirs on every front, the Ottoman state endeavored to remove the shrine from the sphere of popular religion altogether. On the recommendation of the city’s Sunni religious notables, the Sublime Porte declared the Khidr maqām to be a Muslim place of worship where official Friday prayers were henceforth to be held.\textsuperscript{13}

Conflict with the European “infidel” provided the Ottoman state authority with a further occasion to ostensibly take the Shiite populace of Jabal ‘Āmil under its wing. As French consular reports make clear, piracy represented the perhaps greatest threat to the Mediterranean provinces’ security in these years. In June 1713, the inhabitants of the Bishāra fief in the southern Jabal petitioned the governor of Damascus\textsuperscript{14} for help after Tuscan corsairs attacked an Ottoman vessel anchored under their care in the port of Tyre. The paşa, invoking a treaty which banned such acts inside coastal waters, used their complaint to demand heavy restitutions from the French government.\textsuperscript{15} In another incident just two months later, Maltese pirates kidnapped a child from a beach between Tyre and Acre, again prompting the local chiefs to seek the Ottomans’ help: “Le Pere de cette petite fille avec les Cheiks de Becharé sont accourus a Seyde et y ont beaucoup pleuré devant Ibrahim Pacha menaceants de saisir a leur péage toute les français qui y passeront.” The French consul was prevailed upon to intervene and ransom the girl at the valli’s expense.\textsuperscript{16}

The paucity of documentary sources on the Jabal ‘Āmil Shiites’ indigenous leaderships is partially indicative of the fact that they provided the Ottoman chancery

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} Sächsische Landesbibliothek, Dresden: Eb 358, fol. 96a.
\item \textsuperscript{14} The governor of Damascus was endowed with far-reaching police competencies in Sidon in this period.
\item \textsuperscript{15} AE B\textsuperscript{1} 1019 (Seyde), fol. 182a, 185a-b.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid., fol. 195b-196a.
\end{itemize}
with much less headaches than the Ḥamāda and Ḥarfūsh emirates. In the northern portion of the mountain, the rule of Shiite feudal families is barely attested before the second half of the 17th century, when the entire sancak (viz. eyalet) of Sidon-Beirut-Safad had been apportioned as iltizam. Of the three principal Shiite feudatories, the Munkar family of Jubā', hometown of the illustrious Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī and Zayn al-Dīn al-Shahīd ʿulamā’ dynasties, had been notable religious scholars themselves before accepting the Ottoman tax concession for the Iqlīm Shawmar and Iqlīm al-Tuffāḥ districts. The Munkars are first mentioned in 1613/14, when Fakhr al-Dīn ibn Maʿn ransacked their homes in al-Kawtharīya after villagers had purportedly complained of their oppressive rule. In 1617, the Munkars and other local Shiite shaykhs pledged their support to the new sancakbey of Safad who replaced the exiled Maʿnid emir. Later that same year, the Munkars (as well as the ʿAlī al-Ṣaghīr and Dāghīr shaykhs) responded enthusiastically to Aḥmad Ḥarfūsh es instauration of a new palace in the southern Bekaa, before the Maʿns enjoined the senior Ḥarfūsh emir not to trespass into their sphere of influence. The lesser Shiite chieftains of the south were evidently keen to win allies against the increasingly domineering Maʿnids, and thus took the fateful decision in 1638 of sheltering the ʿAlam al-Dīn emir during a bitter inter-Druze power struggle. As a


18. al-ʿAmin, Aʿyān, 3:174 (emir Ahmad ibn Manṣūr al-Munkarī, d. 1748); 7:315 (Sulaymān al-Munkarī, d. 1734/35); al-ʿAmin, Khiṭṭaṭ, 211-2.


20. Duwayhi, Tāʾrīkh, 310.

21. Shihābī, Tāʾrīkh, 655; see also page 86-7 of the present dissertation.
result, Mulham Ma'n attacked and destroyed the Munkar village of Anšār in the Shawmar district, leaving scores of Shiite villagers dead.\textsuperscript{22}

Another mountain district, Jizzīn, was a noted centre of Shiite scholarship in the Middle Ages and then came under the authority of a local 'mukaddem household related to the ‘Alī al-Šaghīr clan. By the 18th century, however, Maronite colonists brought by the Ma'ns from Tripoli had largely displaced Jizzīn’s Shiite population, and were beginning to move on into the Tuffāḥ as well. The 'mukaddems of Jizzīn were reduced to poverty and no longer figure in our period.\textsuperscript{23}

The second minor emirate of the north, the Ša'b family, was based in the castle of Shaqīf Arnūn near Nabaṭiya and had a markedly different background: Like several of the mercenary 'mukataacas in Tripoli province, the Ša'bs were of Kurdish nomad origin, and never integrated into the traditional scholar networks of Jabal 'Āmil.\textsuperscript{24} They are presumed to have fought what serves in essence as the founding myth of Shiite autonomy in Jabal 'Āmil: the 1666 battle of Nabaṭiya. Though mentioned in none of the contemporary chronicles, local tradition maintains that Aḥmad Ma'n tried to seize the town after the Matāwila rebelled against his authority, and suffered a brutal military defeat. The following year, the Shiites also routed a force sent by the governor of Sidon to support the Shūf emir.\textsuperscript{25}

The northern ‘Āmilīs supposedly lived in constant tension and preparedness against their hostile neighbors in these years, their capacity for self-defence being

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{23} al-Zayn, \textit{Li‘l-Bahth}, 255-6, 328.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} al-Amin, \textit{A‘yān}, 7:331; 8:349.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Riḍā, "al-Matāwila", 287; Sulaymān Zāhir, "[Asmā'] Qurā Jabal ‘Āmil," \textit{al-Trfān} 8 (1922), 657.
\end{itemize}
exemplified by the story of a shepherd who, shooting at animals one night, led the adjoining villages to fear an imminent attack. Throughout the night, the Shiites' sa'ut, the gunshot alarm, rang "from Jubā' on the slope of Mt. Lebanon to al-Baṣṣa on the border of Acre. We had not yet seen dawn, when thousands responded and assembled and the horses were readied for war." Modern historians such as Muḥammad Jābir Āl Ṣafā have taken these tales as proof of the Jabal 'Āmil's unshakable unity and perseverance, under the guidance of its enlightened feudal lords, to maintain its independence from an Ottoman "Lebanon." The revisionist 'Alī al-Zayn, in contrast, has rightly questioned whether the Ma'n emirs ever possessed any formal suzerainty in the Jabal 'Āmil against which the Shiites should have rebelled.

By far the most prominent Shiite "emirate" of Jabal 'Āmil was that of the 'Alī al-Ṣaghīr clan, which controlled the four mukataas south of the Litani River known as the Bilād Bishāra. The "Lands of Bishāra" were possibly named for an officer of the Ayyubid sultan Salāḥ al-Dīn, under whose authority the coastal highlands were first apportioned as military appanages (iqtā') in the 12th-13th century, although Mamluk sources suggest the Banū Bishāra may in fact have been one of the dominant Shiite tribes of the area. By the time of the Ottoman conquest, the Bishāra lands were subject to the Shiite Sūdūn seigneurs of Qānā, whom local historiography traces to a Circassian officer of the Mamluk sultanate in Cairo. They were annihilated in 1639 by Ḥusayn al-Ṣaghīr,

27. Āl Ṣafā, Tārīkh, 104-14.
29. Hūnin, Ma'raka, Qānā & Tibnīn.
whose grandfather had purportedly already held lands in government commission. At a wedding in 'Aynāthā ten years later, his kinsman 'Ali al-Ṣaghīr massacred a rival notable household, the Āl Shukr sayyids, and thus established a one-family Shiite rulership over the southern Jabal 'Āmil that would survive until the tyrannical rule of Cezzar ("the Butcher") Ahmed Paşa in the late 18th century.

The emirate soon fell into disarray, however, when Ḥusayn and his son Ḥasan died within a year of each other, in 1655 and 1656, and the governor of the newly constituted eyalet of Sidon inaugurated his reign in 1661 by launching a war against the Shiite feudalists. 'Ali al-Ṣaghīr and several of his sons were killed in the subsequent fighting, with the last son dying suddenly in 1679/80.35 There seem to have followed some crisis years in the Bishāra lands, during which social leadership was again exercised by lesser notables such as the Zayn scholars of Bint Jubayl, who for instance had to fend off a major Palestinian incursion in 1683/84.36 The Shihābis of Wādī al-Taym in turn launched a devastating raid into the Bilād Bishāra in 1693.37

Yet unlike the Shiite shaykhdoms of the northern Jabal 'Āmil, which were hard-presssed to withstand the burgeoning Shūf emirate, the 'Ali al-Ṣaghīr enterprise was ensconced enough in the four southern districts to constitute one of the ineluctable
pivots of feudal power in its own right. French diplomats noted that "le Chek des Metuais" paid the substantial aggregate sum of 85 sacks of silver (i.e. 42,000 gurus; compared with the Druze emir's 150 sacks for the Shūf and Kisrawān) for the Bishāra iltizam including the plain of Tyre.38 ‘Alī al-Zayn has pointed to the fact that the ‘Alī al-Šaghīrs were the only local Shiite power not exposed to the Ma‘nids' revenge attacks after Fakhr al-Dīn's defrocking in 1613, and asked provocatively if they did not owe their victory over the Shukrs and their continuing supremacy in Jabal ‘Āmil to a silent understanding with the paramount Druze emir.39

It is in any event no surprise that the Ḥamādas who escaped the Ottoman assault on Mt. Lebanon in 1694 fled south to seek asylum with the powerful new clan leader Mushrif ibn ‘Alī al-Šaghīr. Mushrif's renown is still alive today in the south Lebanese folk tradition, which ascribes him a capital city ("Mazra‘at Mushrif") on the coast north of Tyre containing vestiges of a palace and mosque built by him around 1697.40 The latter was not even used by the local population, as per legend, because of Mushrif's reputation as an ungodly tyrant.41 Just over a year after the Ḥamādas' flight, the Sublime Porte found it necessary to instruct Sidon's vali to hinder "the Kuğlaš thugs subject to Ma‘n-oğli's government" from crossing north into Tripoli where again they would author ruin and destruction.42 In late May 1696, the Druze emir himself received an explicit warning that such acts were found to be occurring "either with your support and backing or with

38. AE B1 1020 (Seyde), fol. 137b.
40. al-‘Amin, Khīṣat, 293; Āl Sulaymān, Buldān, 403–6.
42. MD 108:81:317; see also page 154.
that of şeyh Müşrif, the refuge of villainy for the Kızılbaş crooks living near the Sidon tax farms” and were henceforth to be interdicted.  

If the Ma‘n dynasty had long been in league with the Ḥamāda and Ḥarfūsh emirs in the north, and at least with the pre-eminent ‘Alī al-Ṣaghīrs in the south, the succession of Bashīr Shihābī to the beṛlık in 1698 heralded a profound reversal of fortunes for the Shiite feudatories of Ottoman Syria. Various explanations have been advanced for the choice of the Sunni emir of Wādī al-Taym to occupy a state office specifically designed, at least in origin, for the Druze tribes of the Shūf, including the Ottoman government’s supposed preference for an orthodox Muslim incumbent; or the scheming of European imperialists to have their protégés in power in Lebanon. The scope of the present dissertation does not allow for a closer examination of Ottoman policy toward the Druze emirate, though an impression can be obtained from a glance at the mühimme decrees pertaining to the transfer of authority around the turn of the 18th century. Soon after Aḥmad Ma‘n’s death in September 1697, the Sublime Porte formally bestowed the Shūf and Kisrawān mukataas on “the exemplar of the tribes and the clans” Ḥaydar al-Shihābī, an under-aged matrilineal grandson of the last Druze emir. He was quickly supplanted by his regent, Bashīr al-Shihābī (the sororal nephew of Ibn Ma‘n). Bashīr died in 1706, poisoned, according to family history, by his own cousins in the aim of restoring Ḥaydar. Sultanic patents were indeed reissued to Ḥaydar, now aged 16, and copied to all the regional governors, which repeatedly stress his filiation with the long-

43. MD 108:259:1093.
44. al-Zayn, Li‘l-Baḥth, 378-88.
46. Shihābī, Tārikh, 750-1.
deceased Ma'nid taxlord but no longer mention the institution of the Druze emirate.\textsuperscript{47} As late as 1721, imperial \textit{hüküms} were still addressed to him personally as "Ma'n-oğli Mir Hayderü's-Şihabi."\textsuperscript{48} While the Ottoman state authorities might initially also have banked on the youthful Ḥaydar to be a more tractable subordinate, their persisting invocation of his Druze ancestor's name suggests that they made dynastic continuity and stability the primary criteria for wielding the paramount tribal chieftainship.

For the Shiites of Jabal 'Āmil, the state-condoned fusion of the Ma'nid with the Shihābī houses into a single regional super-emirate meant subordination to a new organ of feudal governance of unprecedented local coherence and influence. Bashīr Shihābī's power over the Syrian \textit{valīs}, to which the Ḥamādas owed their reprieve in 1698 (see page 155-6), was in essence bought at the expense of the lesser taxlords of the rural highlands. Early that summer, he responded to an urgent appeal for help from the governor of Sidon, Kaplan Paşa (brother of Arslan Paşa of Tripoli), to attack Mushrif ibn 'Alī al-Ṣaghīr, who stood accused of having "killed some government men and planned a revolt" in the Bīlād Bishāra. Bashīr's reportedly 8000-man strong army arrested the Shiite emir, his brother Muḥammad and their companion Ḥusayn on their farm north of Tyre, delivering them into Kaplan's hands in the capital. The \textit{paşa} immediately had Ḥusayn impaled and the two 'Alī al-Ṣaghīrs divested of their lands and imprisoned, and entrusted emir Bashīr with the government of Sidon province from the lands of Safad to the Mu'āmalatayn bridge [the Kisrawān's northern boundary]. He thus came to enjoy immense favor, not only with his honor Qablān Bāshā but with his brother, and he intervened with him on the Ḥamādas' behalf so that they returned to their homelands."\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47} MD 115:194; MD 115:589-91 (numerous orders).
\textsuperscript{48} MD 130:118-9.
\textsuperscript{49} Duwayhi, \textit{Tārikh}, 383-4.
There is little agreement among historians as to the importance of this episode. The classical Shiite accounts tell that Mushrif died some years later in captivity; the Shihābī family history relates only that emir Ḥaydar awarded the Bishāra fiefs to his Druze subaltern Mahmūd Harmūsh in 1707, after crushing the ‘Alī al-Ṣaghīr, Şa’bs and Munkars in a second battle of Nabaṭiya. The few Ottoman documentary sources available suggest that the spread of Shihābī hegemony over the Jabal Āmil might have been more of a long-term process than the result of one or two events. By a stroke of luck, the rural iltizam contracts for the spring of 1699 are preserved in the oldest extant register of Sidon Islamic court records. The şartname for the Bilād Bishāra is made out to a previously unattested ‘Alī Ḥājj Aḥmad, suggesting that the southern fiefs remained in the hands of local notables—most probably a scion of the ‘Alī al-Ṣaghīr clan—even after Mushrif’s capture and imprisonment in Sidon. More noteworthy, however, is the fact that already at this early stage, the Shihābis were acquiring vested interests in the Shiite fiefs: The tax contracts simultaneously awarded to Bashīr and Mansūr Shihābī for the Safad and Marj’ayūn mukataas spell out that they are also responsible for the collection of certain customary dues outside of these jurisdictions proper, including the tax on draught buffalo in both Bishāra and Shaqīf.

Equally important is the extent of control the Shihābis were acquiring in the northern Jabal Āmil, which had not been implicated in the ‘Alī al-Ṣaghīr upheaval.

50. For a critical appraisal, see al-Zayn, Li’l-Baḥth, 374-6, 394-7; Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābī, Lubnān fi ‘Aḥd al-Umara’ al-Shihābīyīn, ed. Asad Rustum & Fu’ād Afrām al-Bustānī (Beirut: Lebanese University, 1969), 1:9; Soueid, Histoire militaire, 2:372-6. A “Mehmed Ḥarmūsh” is cited in Ottoman chancery documents as sancakbeğ of Homs and Hama as early as March 1668; see BOA: Cevdet Dahiliye 12818 & 12876. The Harmūshes’ divestment in 1709/10 was their proximate cause of their battle against the Shihābis at ‘Ayn Dāra.

51. Sunni Islamic Court of Sidon, register 1:5 (Turkish).

52. Sidon 1:6-7 (four documents, Arabic).
the Shihābī emirate would inherit the Maʿns’ still partially Shiite-populated district of Jizzīn is a foregone conclusion;53 among the more striking finds in the Sidon şeriye records is the proof that in 1699 Kaplan Paşa also transferred to it the full iltizams for Shaqīf and the Iqlîm Tuffāh.54 It is yet an indication of the Shihābis’ incrementalist policy that the two native Shiite tax farmers were neither completely expelled nor maintained as mere sub-contractors, but reduced to sharing a single mukataa concession: Muḥammad ibn Nāṣir al-Dīn Munkar was initially permitted to retain the Iqlîm Shawmar, one of the family’s two original fiefs, but received a new şartname for only half its dues after the court recognized that the other part "has passed into the care of Sulaymān ibn shaykh Şa’a."55

Evidence that Mushrif ibn ‘Alī al-Ṣaghīr did not in fact survive his contest against emir Bashīr and the state comes from an astonishing December 1705 şikayet order to the governors and qādis of Damascus and Sidon-Beirut, asking them to investigate and avenge an attack on 17 villages in the Bishāra district from nearby Qanṭara. So many goods had been stolen (whence an inventory was to be compiled and submitted to Istanbul) that the peasants had completely abandoned the land, causing a tax shortfall of 30,000 gurus. The perpetrators are described as the former tenants of the mukataa who had recently been expelled for "insubordination," namely Mushrif’s successors ‘Alī Hājj Aḥmad and Aḥmad Naṣṣār, Mikhāīl ibn ‘Alī Maṣṣur al-Munkar, and Sulaymān Şa’a.56 It is not immediately clear who or what pushed the leaders of all three Shiite districts in Sidon to mount a joint revolt so soon after their last induction as government tax

53. Sidon 1:10 (Turkish, Arabic).
54. Sidon 1:8–9 (three documents, Turkish).
55. Sidon 1:28 (Turkish; two related documents in Arabic).
56. Şikayet 40:675:3047 (volume also classified as MD 114/1).
concessionaries, though other sources indicate that ‘Alī Maṣūr al-Munkar (senior) had been captured and killed as early as 1701/02.57 In any event, the Sublime Porte evidently became concerned again, as in 1696, over the southern Shiites’ contacts with their confrères elsewhere in the region. In April 1706, as the Tripoli authorities prepared to mount a new offensive against the Ḥamādas in Jubayl and Batrūn (see below), the governor of Sidon received a separate order
to block and tie up all the trails and passages, so that none of the Kızılbaş in the Sidon-Beirut mountains can come to these brigands’ aid, and also so that during the extermination, none of them [the Ḥamādas] can flee to emir Bashîr, their supporter.58

If the Ottoman chancery had ample reason to fear that the Ḥamādas owed their revived capacity for defiance to the Shihābī emirs, these could hardly be suspected of fraternization with the Sidon-area Shiites. Native sources paint a picture of nearly continuous warfare over the next decades: Ḥaydar, as indicated, began in 1707 with an attack on Nabaṭīya, and is remembered personally for killing one Imāmī religious scholar and wrongly imprisoning another during his reign.59 His cousin Qāsim, according even to the Shihābī family history, “wrought numerous injustices” on the Bilād Bishāra which he acquired as Ḭiltizam in 1712; Ḥaydar brought an army of 1000 to ravage al-Qurayya village and the adjoining districts of Shawmar and Shajif in 1718/19.60 In 1730 he launched an even more devastating raid on all three Shiite districts, according to the contemporary report sent by a northern Lebanese monk to his superior, in which

57. al-Zayn, Liʿl-Baḥth, 402.
59. al-Zayn, Liʿl-Baḥth, 402; al-Amin, Ayān, 8:16.
hundreds of locals were killed or taken into slavery.61 The famous emir Mulḥam, on the other hand, pursued a more nuanced disciplinary strategy vis-à-vis the Jabal ‘Āmil Shiites. In 1732 he obtained the tax rights to Shaqīf and the Bishāra lands, buying himself Sulaymān ʿAʿb’s fealty by assigning him the former, and abducting Naṣṣār ibn ‘Alī al-Ṣaghīr and murderously baiting his brothers until they agreed to pay ransom and sub-lease the latter.62 Eight years later, when the valū of Sidon or his mercenaries assassinated the master of Shaqīf Arnūn castle together with his family, his surviving brother Ḥaydar al-Fāris actually “fled to the Druze lands to seek refuge with emir Mulḥam.”63

In 1743, however, Mulḥam committed the greatest slaughter ever seen in Jabal ‘Āmil before the reign of Cezzar Paşa. The governor of Sidon ostensibly commissioned this operation after the Munkars and ʿAʿbs had proved remiss in paying their taxes and impinged on neighboring mukataas. In any event, a delegation of Shiīte notables had been able to placate him with gifts and promises of loyalty. But the Shihābī emir refused to retract his mobilization, annihilated the combined Shiīte forces in a cataclysmic battle outside of Anṣār, and then reduced the village itself to ashes and put its inhabitants to the sword.64 A contemporary Christian source speaks of 1500 Shiīte dead, though the Christian families of Anṣār were miraculously spared.65 The following year, the Shiites

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63. al-Amin, Aʿyān, 3:60; Shihābī, Lubnān, 1:31.

64. Shihābī, Lubnān, 1:31-2.

65. Mīkhāʾīl Burayk (d. after 1782), Ṭāʾrikh al-Shām, 1720-1782, ed. by ʿAḥmad Ghassān Sabānū (Damascus: Dār Qutayba, 1982), 55-6.
were able to counter with an attack on the Marj'ayün district, where they inflicted a serious defeat on the Shihābis' Druze army, but were held off from an incursion into the Shūf by the governor of Sidon.66

Traditional Shiite historians such as Āl Šafā have, not surprisingly, viewed this endless sequence of clashes as Jabal ‘Āmil society's desperate struggle to preserve itself against Ottoman Turkish tyranny and Druze-Maronite encroachment.67 Mas‘ūd Dāhir, in contrast, has rejected such motivations as misleadingly confessionalist, and proposed a class-based reading of the 18th-century violence. Recalling that it was ultimately the peasants of all backgrounds who paid the heavy price of warfare between their rivaling liege lords, Dāhir interprets the ‘Āmilis’ “uprisings” [intifāḍāt] as the first manifestation of popular resistance to the centralization of economic and political power in a single pan-Lebanese feudal regime.68 Yet what is so striking from the Ottomanist perspective, given the profound structural significance of the consolidation of the Shihābi emirate, is the silence of both provincial and imperial authorities in its regard. The Ottoman administration can be seen to have played a direct, interventionist and disciplining role in Sidon feudal politics throughout the Ma‘nīd period and up until emir Ḥaydar's succession. In 1711, however, the Shihābis exterminated two rival ayan households in a battle at ‘Ayn Dāra, thus attaining, much to the chagrin of the regional governors, uncontested supremacy among the Jabal Durūz (Druze Mountain) tribes. Thereafter it appears that the state gave up any further hopes of micro-managing local rural affairs and resigned itself, much like in the sphere of provincial governorships, to recognizing


67. Āl Šafā, Tāriḥ (op. cit.)

and institutionalizing the factual dynastic rule of a single regional hegemon. The Sidon government’s abdication of executive authority in rural affairs is reflected in the periodic and inconsequential orders to the governor of Damascus in this period to check the “tyranny” of emir Ḥaydar in the Jabal Durūz fiefs.\textsuperscript{69} Both were nearly powerless to control even the lesser feudatories of the Sidon highlands. The state tax farms were again divided among several local households by 1714, for example, when the vali of Sidon received an imperial hūkūm requesting the prompt payment of the province’s tax arrears. These consisted disproportionately in past dues on the Shiite districts of Bishāra, Shaqīf and Shawmar, which the local shaykhs had apparently balked at remitting to the governor of Damascus originally charged with their collection.\textsuperscript{70}

The sole matter in which the Ottoman imperial authorities took a consistent and active interest, to judge by the mūhimme decrees, was the rise of Zahir al-ʿUmar al-Zaydānī in Galilee. Of Arab bedouin provenance, Zahir al-ʿUmar was able to establish himself as ruler of Tiberias in the early 18th century, whence he brought the fledgling cotton cash-crop industry of northern Palestine under his control and set about to rebuild the ancient port city of Acre into an international export terminal.\textsuperscript{71} As early as fall 1734, he aroused the Sublime Porte’s ire for usurping power in the sancak of Safad;\textsuperscript{72} by July 1742, the governors of Damascus and Sidon were under instructions to extirpate
his rogue commercial principality.\textsuperscript{73} The fact was that Žāhir al-‘Umar, whom even the French merchant-diplomats honored as the "gouverneur d'Acre,"\textsuperscript{74} was the quintessential self-made 18th-century ayanlık ruler. It was perhaps inevitable that the Shiites of Jabal Āmil (despite having dealt him a painful blow in a 1720/21 battle in northern Palestine\textsuperscript{75}) came to depend on Žāhir as a counterweight to the increasingly forward Shihābī emirate.

From the 1740s onward, the Ottomans' and the Shihābīs' enmity vis-à-vis the Shiites must be seen in light of their concern to contain Žāhir al-‘Umar and his territorial ambitions in rural Sidon. The governor of Damascus, for example, was sent a special unit of bombardiers and sappers from Istanbul to destroy Žāhir's fortress in June 1743.\textsuperscript{76} Shihābī reports that he began the campaign by ravaging the Bilād Bishāra, Shaqīf and the Tuffāḥ districts on his march south;\textsuperscript{77} a contemporary Damascene observer, on the other hand, suggests it was the paşa's Druze irregulars who attacked the Shiites against his wishes.\textsuperscript{78} When a full-scale war erupted between the Jabal Āmil and the Shihābī emirate in 1750, it was Žāhir's forces who helped the Shiites stand their ground. The origins and precise sequence of events are lost in the disparate and sometimes contradictory narrative accounts from both sides, but the following composite emerges: A retaliatory feud between adjoining Shūf and Jabal Āmil villages (originally over a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{73} MD 149:40-3; MD 149:53; MD 149 56-7 (numerous orders).
\item \textsuperscript{74} Philipp, Acre, 36.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Shihābī, Lubnān, 1:17; Rīdā, "Matāwila," 287-8.
\item \textsuperscript{76} MD 150:38 (3).
\item \textsuperscript{77} Shihābī, Lubnān, 1:32.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Ahmad al-Budayrī al-Hallāq, Ḥawādith Dimashq al-Yawmīya, 1741-1762, ed. Ahmad 'Izzat 'Abd al-Karīm (Cairo: Maṭba‘at Lajnat al-Bayān al-‘Arabī, 1959), 42-4.
\end{itemize}
stolen donkey) brought the Munkar chief to ambush and kill two Janbulāṭ Druze at the Awwali river, on the two districts’ boundary. In response, the emir Mulḥam himself sacked the Shiite town of Jubā’ and massacred hundreds of its inhabitants, many of whom had sought refuge in a nearby religious shrine. Around the same time, a joint army of Shiites and Żāhir al-’Umar’s men, possibly commanded by shaykh Żāhir al-Naṣṣār, wiped out a second Shihābī company in the vicinity of Marj’ayūn. Mulḥam proceeded to ravage the entire Shaqīf and Tuffāḥ region; in October, however, he broke off his raid into the Bilād Bishāra when the Shiites again sought the backing of Żāhir al-’Umar.79

It would in fact take the Galilean 15 more years before he won the paramount feudatories of Bishāra as constant and steadfast allies in his quest for regional hegemony. The story of his vanquishing then befriending shaykh Nāṣīf Naṣṣār introduces what the southern Lebanese tradition remembers as a golden age of freedom and prosperity before the horror of Cezzar Paşa’s rule; it need not be retold here.80 In the intervening period, the Ottoman state struggled to maintain a modicum of central authority in the Sidon hinterland. As elsewhere in Syria, indeed as elsewhere throughout the Empire, its resources were limited, and it could hope for little more than achieving a strategic balance between two ayan dynasties which both commanded huge tribal followings and pursued independent commercial relations with Europe. The provincial authorities of Sidon and Damascus continued to complain bitterly of the emir Mulḥam, “long known for being stubborn and contrary,” and the tax shortfalls they suffered “on

79. See references and analysis in al-Zayn, Li’l-Baḥth, 440-53.
account of the quantity and rebelliousness of the Druze faction at his side." As to Žāhir al-‘Umar, the Sublime Porte terminated his "rebellion" the only reliable way it knew: It declared him to be the lawful ruler of Acre. Whether this had any consequences for the Shiites in their continuing fight against the Shūf emirs is uncertain, and in any case did not interest the authorities. A January 1765 chancery decree details the attack by Žāhir’s son ‘Alī on 16 Marj’ayūn villages, without indicating that it was almost certainly undertaken once again at the behest of his local Shiite allies.

What was the Ottoman state’s attitude toward the Shiite feudalists in this clash of the great inter-regional ayanlūks in 18th-century coastal highland Syria? The court documents which would permit us to trace the further evolution of the Shiite-Shihābi struggle for the Jabal ‘Āmil are unfortunately no longer extant. The last available court register fragment pertaining to our period dates from May 1763, and notes the conferral to an otherwise obscure “shaykh Ḥusayn” of again only half of one of the smaller rural mukataas in Sidon. Whatever reservations the Empire theoretically had toward the Matāwila, their exercise of authority in the southern districts was preferable to none at all. Perhaps the best overall summary of Ottoman policy toward the Shiites of Syria is presented in an imperial hūkūm from the darkest years of war and upheaval in Jabal ‘Āmil. In February 1754, just before the end of the fiscal year, the imperial chancery noted with alarm that the Bishāra, Shawmar and Shaqīf fiefs in Sidon-Beirut remained vacant because the previous tax farmers had refused to renew their iltizam commissions. No matter how often he tried, the valī had informed Istanbul, “whether with kindness,

81. MD 154:52 (2); see also MD 148:35 (1-2).
82. See, e.g., MD 160:58 (2).
83. MD 164:138 (2).
84. Sidon 2:1 (Arabic).
goodwill and coaxing, or with threats, warnings and severity,” he was unable to “engage those who had for so long contracted the iltizams every year.” The Sublime Porte, thus “informed of all their ridiculous excuses for their inability to assume the iltizams, and of their desire for a reduction of the iltizam fee,” ordered the governor to not yield a single akçe but “to bring the previous tax farmers and... assign them the iltizams no matter what.” In the new year they were again to be invested, and their accounts examined under the Damascene governor’s authority and Mulḥam al-Shihābī’s supervision, and any amount they had levied in excess would be returned to the peasants on the land. Further orders for disciplinary action would be issued, the edict concludes, if these, our veteran Shiite tax farmers of Jabal ‘Āmil, refused to serve the Empire as specified.85

The Isolation of the “Kızılbaş Muktaa” of Mt. Lebanon

Despite the mobilization of thousands of Syrian government troops, despite the promotion of Tripoli’s governor to the grand vizierate, despite the freezing death of hundreds of Shiite rebels in 1693 and the dispersal of the remainder throughout the coastal mountains in the fall of 1694, the great Ottoman punitive campaign against the Ḥamāda emirate produced only limited long-term results. In 1696, as we have seen, the Sublime Porte complained that the “Rafzi brigands” were beginning to return from exile in Jabal ‘Āmil, and two years later the Ḥamādas were reinstated in the Jubayl and Batrūn tax farms.86 There is little to suggest that they had been effectively disciplined or chastised. Maronite Church historians recall the following decades as a period of unprecedented oppression in Mt. Lebanon; in 1706, after the Ḥamādas not only

85. MD 156:77:231.
86. See page 154-5.
defaulted on their taxes but also robbed a silk caravan heading from Sidon to Aleppo, the new governor of Tripoli again intoned the familiar, plaintive refrain: “So long as they are not struck and punished, it is evident that the state income will be lost and people and tax farms ruined.”

Yet at the beginning of the 18th century, the Ottoman state showed itself to be nearly powerless against the Shiite highlanders. Its abdication of authority in rural Syria, this section argues, was so entire as to establish the Ḥamāda emirate as a hermetic outlaw republic in the Ottoman territorial imagination. Contemporary French consuls remarked that the valis had no revenues from Mt. Lebanon other than what the Ḥamādas felt like giving him; “ils en chassent les agas et les soldats et commandent en souverains sur les X.tiens...” The Ottomans surrendered all the rights and duties of government to the Shiites within their mountain realm, which was originally circumscribed in the iltizam contracts as extending from the Ibrahim River, the southern limit of the Futūḥ heights, to “the place called Şūq Şū”, presumably in the northern Jubayl district, and later “from the defile of Muşayliḥa to the Mu‘āmalatayn bridge.”

In 1686, as indicated, Sirḥān could threaten to desolate the entire region from Ḥiṣn al-Akrād to Jubayl. To contemporaries, it was evident that Ottoman jurisdiction did not extend into the Ḥamādas’ dominion. In 1740, for example, the Sublime Porte complained that “İsmail, known as the Kızıldaş şeyh” was forever providing bandits a haven from the law. Orders had been sent throughout the region to apprehend and re-

87. Şikayet 40:722:3234 (op.cit.)
88. AE B1 1114 (Tripoli), fol. 116a (28 August 1705).
89. Tripoli 2/2:106 (May 1677, Turkish) and Tripoli 2/2:134 (April 1678, Turkish).
90. E.g. Tripoli 12:145-6 (March 1752, Arabic).
91. Tripoli 3:65 (Turkish); see page 136.
extradite some criminals who had escaped from Tripoli, yet Ismā‘īl gave them shelter for several days when they fled to him, before permitting them to escape once more.92

Muṣayliḥa castle in the narrow valley just north of Battrūn and the citadel of Jubayl were perceived as the main defensive bulwarks bounding the hostile Shiite emirate. An incidental court record from September 1750 signals the appointment of a new bōlūkbaşı (commander) to the “company of soldiers guarding the Musayliha tower and bridge derbend in the district of Beyrut [sic; should be Betrun],...,” whose unique service consisted in “protecting wayfarers passing the said spot on the road to Sidon and Egypt from the Kızılbaş brigands.”93 (This was before the castle passed into the control of the Ayyūbī emirs of al-Kūra in the later 18th century94 and, according to the German traveler Burckhardt, that of the Ḥamādas themselves in the 19th century.95) The crusader-era citadel of Jubayl near the southern limit of the Shiīte territory acquired a similar boundary function. In May 1731, for example, the Ḥamādas’ iltizam contracts were negotiated in the citadel, as presumably neither the shaykhs nor the Tripoli court officials would venture across the de facto border.96

Within these territorial limits, the Shiites’ lawlessness was, quite literally, legendary. Of all the inhabitants of Mt. Lebanon, one French consul reported,

les amediens [Ḥamādas] seulement ont une forte inclination pour le vol, ensorte que quand on est obligé de passer sur leur terres, il faut estre tellement accompagné qu’on soit en état de pouvoir leur resister, ils sont asses bons soldats, et il ne leur manqueroit que d’être bien disciplinez pour faire des prodiges.97

92. MD 147:84 (2).
93. Tripoli 11:88 (Turkish).
94. I am grateful to Prof. Hashim Ayyoubi for this information.
96. Tripoli 6:6-7 (Arabic).
97. AE B' 1116 (Tripoli), fol. 92a (1726).
In northern Lebanese folk history, the Ḥamādas are remembered today as the cruelest of all feudal lords and the only ones who dishonored the peasant women.\(^{98}\) Sometimes it seems as if the Ḥamādas’ iniquity became a simple legal trope, for instance in a 1731 șeriye court case where custody of a black mule, which the defendant (a former Egyptian nākiḥ) had purchased in Baalbek, was awarded to the plaintiff who swore it had been stolen in a recent Ḥamāda raid.\(^{99}\) The specter of Shiite sedition underpinned what appears to have been an outright political plot against a Tripolitan religious official in the spring of 1713: In a petition to the Sublime Porte, the kâdi denounced the former deputy nakibü'l-eşraf of Tripoli for “always interfering, uniting with the depraved Kızılbaş, inciting them, and constantly pushing them to kill and rob the reaya and other righteous believers.” The deputy had defended himself against these accusations in an official complaint and asked to be reinstated, but the Sublime Porte, convinced it had found the man personally responsible for the Shiites’ desolation of the Tripoli countryside, assented to the judge’s request and ordered him imprisoned in the island fortress of Arwad.\(^{100}\)

The degree of the Ḥamāda emirate’s removal from Ottoman jurisdiction is reflected in a 1710 mukataa register, one of only two from the eyalet of Tripoli to have been preserved at the Başbakanlık. The Jubayl, Batrûn and Bashârî tax fiefs are listed as being assigned, “since the days of their forefathers,” to literally “shaykh İsmail Hamade the Kızılbaş,” his brother and his cousin, with “Ma’n-oğlu Hayder Şihabi” posting the bond for their discharge. Due to the latter’s revolt that year, the payments had fallen into

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98. I am grateful to Dr. Youssef Mouawad for this information.
100. MD 121:1:2.
arrears; Ismāʿīl was oppressing the poor villagers and “does not listen to reason when he is urged to.” Only a few pages later, the same register indicates that nobody had taken the contract on the Jūbayl town mukataa since all of the inhabitants had fled the Shiites’ depredations and no revenues could be expected. The governor, deeming the fortress to be “essential for protecting the land and sea routes,” instead supplemented its Janissary guard with 20 of his own men. Not many of these were still alive one year later, when the second mukataa register appraised Istanbul of the deteriorating situation in Tripoli:

[Şeyh Ismail] continues his highway robbery and despoiling travelers of their goods. One day, in a moment of the occupants’ inadvertence, he conquered the citadel of Cübeyl lying on the passage between Tripoli to Beirut. Castle-warden Yusuf and 15 Muslims fell martyr. Our kethūda was dispatched to repulse their harm and villainy and take the tax-farm in charge for the year 1123, but the said faction persisted in its atrocities and drove all the inhabitants with their beasts and livestock to the Kisrevan mountain. They themselves took refuge and hid in inaccessible caves and canyons at the summits of this same mountain, and blocked in the inhabitants and prevented them from returning.

The French consul at Tripoli provides a slightly different account: Shaykh Ismāʿīl indeed descended upon Jūbayl “and cut the commanding officer with 12 or 13 of his soldiers to pieces;” but only after the kethūda had set out and laid waste the Ḫamādas’ mansions and 70,000 mulberry trees. Rumors that the valī himself would take the field were received with scorn on the diplomats’ part:

S’il est bien conseillé il n’en fera rien, car il seroit batu. Si son [kethūda] lorsqu’il avoit prés de 4000 hommes s’étroit attaché a les detruire au lieu de couper des arbres il en seroit venú a bout et auroit conservé [100,000] Écus de rente par an.

103. MM 3348:3.
104. AE B1 1114 (Tripoli) fol. 359b-60a (5 August 1711).
This latest uprising, moreover, had ensued from a skirmish with the paşa’s retainers in the summer of 1710 rather than in coordination with the Shihābis.\textsuperscript{105} While Lebanese historiography has portrayed the 1711 battle of ‘Ayn Dāra as the culmination of a national revolt under a unified Shihābī leadership, it may be more accurate to view the two episodes as separate tribal conflagrations that attended the general recession of imperial authority from the coastal highlands. There is little doubt, nevertheless, that the Ḥamādas owed the impunity with which they continued to terrorize the eyalet of Tripoli to the Shūf emirs’ mediation. Numerous Ottoman mühimme decrees make reference to the fact that it was the Shihābīs’ intercession and cash surety that enabled them to recover their iltizams despite an imperial prohibition.\textsuperscript{106} The logic, articulated plainly in one later decree, was straightforward:

The Ķızılbaş mukattat of Tripoli constitutes a tax-farm, and each year the governors gave it in iltizam to Ismail Ḥamāda, one of its inhabitants, with Ma’n-oglu Mir Hayder’s guarantee. With emir Hayder’s surety, this mukattat has been legally entrusted to the aforesaid Ismail, on the assumption that the people from the surrounding villages are safe from having their properties stolen and plundered when it is conceded to him in iltizam.\textsuperscript{107}

The Ottoman authorities were to be cruelly disappointed again.

In March 1717, the Druze emir stepped in to avert a major clan war after the assassination of shaykh ‘Īsā Ḥamāda in a conspiracy uniting the Ottoman governor, the Ra’ds of Żanniya, the Kurdish emirs of Kūra and the Mar’abis, a smaller Kurdish dynasty of ‘Akkār whose fiefs the Ḥamādas had been trying to seize.\textsuperscript{108} Much to the glee of the

\textsuperscript{105.} AE B\textsuperscript{1} 1114 (Tripoli) fol. 289a (2 August 1710).

\textsuperscript{106.} This is also affirmed in the consular report AE B\textsuperscript{1} 1019 (Seyde) 288a (4 February 1714).

\textsuperscript{107.} MD 130:415 (3).

local population, the senior Ḥamāda chieftain, one of his sons and a dozen Shi'ite (and Maronite) confederates were killed in the nighttime stealth ambush on the monastery where they were to have parleyed with the Mar'ābīs; the surviving captives were executed in Tripoli and their heads forwarded to Istanbul. Through Ḥaydar al-Shihābī's moderation, however, the Christian notables and the valī quickly agreed on the smooth succession of 'Īsā's son Ismā'īl, thus forestalling further instability and possible military action in the highlands.¹⁰⁹ French diplomats, at first concerned over the negative impact on their trade a wider conflict might entail, noted with satisfaction that
cet événement est cause d'un trouble qui finira bientôt, car le Pacha de Tripoly ne fait de grands préparatifs de guerre que pour obliger Ismain, autre p[rinci]pal Chek des Amiediens... d'en venir a un traité de paix sous la caution de l'Emir des Druses dépendant du Gouvernement de Seyde et chés lequel leldt. Chek Ismain s'est refugié parce que ces rebelles sont tous d'accord pour leur propre conservation.¹¹⁰

In 1720, Ḥaydar al-Shihābī stopped the valī from launching a war after he had sent two expeditions a year for the past three years and still not been able to collect the "Kızılbaş faction's" overdue taxes. Reinstated yet again with the Shihābis' blessing, the Ḥamādas waited for the government forces to depart on cerde, the annual pilgrimage relief campaign, then attacked and pillaged the Žanniya district. The paşa’s son was sent to besiege them in Batrūn for 20 days to enforce payment of the dues, whereupon the Ḥamādas resorted to the act of disobedience which the shaykhs of Jabal ‘Āmil used to great effect some years later: They refused to renew their ʿiltizam commissions altogether for the next year, meaning in essence that they would not even feign to remit the taxes they levied from the peasants anyway. Orders for a new campaign to bring “these bandits


¹¹⁰  AE B1 1020 (Seyde) fol. 140b-141a (21 March 1717).

204
clambering on the rock ledges of rebellion" back down to "the main-street of submission" went out to Damascus, Sidon, and, at the Tripoli governor's insistence, to emir Ḥaydar himself.  

The Shihābīs, however, much like the Ma'ūnīs before them, seem also to have provided their Shiite colleagues cover whenever they were being pursued by a state army. In May 1727, the Sublime Porte rediscovered that "the Banī Ḥamāda brigands have forever been wishing to lay hands on the Jubayl, Batrūn and Jubbat Basharri fiefs." This time, during a punitive expedition "near the border to the place called Kisrawān in Sidon," which significantly is characterized as "their native country [yurtdarı]," they had "crossed into Sidon lands and started to ensconce themselves in the villages of the said Kisrawān."112 The Shihābīs' role as lords of the Kisrawān is not directly alluded to in this particular instance, but just two years later "Hamade-oğlu Kızılbaş İsmail" was firmly back in power in Jubayl. This follows from a new hükûm whereby the Sublime Porte, thinking it a likely possibility that he would again capitalize on the governor's departure on cerde to resume his sedition, ordered the preemptive mobilization of the lieutenant commanders of Tripoli and Latakia.113 Simply rescinding İsmâ'il the Kızılbaş's tax collection franchise was, in the circumstances of the day, just not a practicable option.

It is an open question why the Shihābīs found it in their interest to back such an obstreperous client feudatory as the Ḥamāda clan had become by the 1720s. At any rate, it can be argued that the Shiites' growing dependence on the southern Druze emirate

111. MD 130:117-9 (three orders). The cerde was the Tripoli governor's yearly assignment to meet the returning hajj caravan and relieve the Damascus governor of its command. See Barbir, Ottoman Rule, 170-4.

112. MD 134:86 (2). Predictably, the governors of Sidon and Damascus received instructions to deliver them to and support the Tripoli authorities any way possible; see MD 134:86 (3).

113. MD 135:387 (2).
carried within it the seeds of their own demise. For one, they managed by their
callousness not only to alienate the Ottoman authorities, several feudal clans and much
of the Maronite peasantry and church hierarchy of Tripoli, all of whom once were or
could have become valuable allies. Beginning around this time, they also became mired
in the sort of intra-family conflict that had been so deleterious to the Ḥarfūsh emirate the
previous century and which would have been unthinkable under the tight leadership of
Sirḥān or ʿĪsā Ḥamāda. After ʿĪsā’s murder, his sons and nephews disputed the
succession in Jubbat Basharri until they divided the district on amicable terms into six
sub-fiefs.114 Just a few years later in 1721, however, the ḥūkūms cited above report that
the now paramount shaykh Ismāʿīl sent two letters to the government in Tripoli giving
the reason for their renewed insubordination: “I will not take the tax-farms. I have fallen
out with my family and relatives.” If this estrangement was perhaps somewhat contrived,
a contemporary Christian chronicler tells of a more serious rift in 1728: The sons of ʿĪsā
again began a feud against their cousins in the Jubbat Basharri district, where the latter
enjoyed the support of numerous local friaries as well as of the Maronite patriarch
himself. What followed was a generalized fracas between the Jubayl/Batrūn and
Basharrī branches with the monks caught in between, the outrages against them
apparently going so far that one Ḥamāda shaykh, after the monastery where he had
come to kill an enemy friar slammed its door in his face, beat up the monastery donkey

parked outside. In 1738, renewed strife between Iṣmā‘il Ḥamāda and his cousins in Basharrī caused one faction of monks to try and destroy the others’ priories.

Interestingly, there are virtually no Ottoman chancery records on the Ḥamāda emirate in the subsequent decades and none on its extirpation in the 1760s. One may speculate that the Ottoman authorities, much like in Jabal ʿĀmil, continued to relinquish the practical management of Tripoli’s feudal affairs to the increasingly independent and responsible Shihābī emirate. Fortunately, the Tripoli Islamic court registers are extant again from 1731 onward, and these afford us a valuable look at the changes in the mechanics of the Ḥamādas’ ʿiltizām conferrals since their late 17th-century heyday. In March 1731, the five cousins put aside their differences to swear surety for “our uncle and father” shaykh Iṣmā‘il’s super-ʿiltizām on the Jubayl (city and country), Batrūn, Basharrī and Hermel fiefs. But relations with the Ottoman authorities were rarely to be characterized by much trust in the subsequent years. Perhaps the most noticeable change from earlier negotiations is that the Ḥamāda shaykhs no longer ventured into the capital to take out their contracts. For the ʿiltizāms on Jubayl and Batrūn, an itinerant ʿṣeriye court was held either in Jubayl castle or in a Shiite highland village where the shaykhs

115. Ibid., 226. The Ḥarfūsh family was also reported to have been drawn in at one point; see correspondence al-Labūdi to Iskandar, 21 September 1728, in Fāh, Tārikh al-Rahbānīya, 1:167.

116. Labūdi to Yuwāṣāf, 20 August 1738, in Fāh, Tārikh al-Rahbānīya, 2:248. Iṣmā‘il subsequently took control of Jubbat Basharrī himself; see Labūdi to Sam‘āni, 31 August 1738, ibid., 2:449.


118. Tripoli 6:5-6 (These and all subsequent ʿiltizām-related documents are in Arabic.)

119. The exception to this was the occasional Ḥamāda delegation from Hermel in the northern Bekaa, the family’s present domicile whose ʿiltizām is first attested in March 1731.
presumably felt safer from the arm of the law. Beginning in the 1740s, the sessions were occasionally convened in a Kūra village or "on the banks of the Badhīdh river, on the border of these districts," an area held by the Kurdish emirate which remained on tolerably good terms with the local Shiites, and which functioned as a neutral ground between the state and the Ḥamāda emirate.  

The Kurds of Kūra also served as go-betweens in other capacities. In 1738, they hosted Mūsā Abū Sirḥān Ḥamāda as the governor's security hostage for the Jubayl fief, until they were requested in August to bring him to the citadel in Tripoli for safekeeping. The Kurdish emir thereafter provided a cash surety on the Ḥamādas' tax-farm. This may constitute the turning point when the Ottoman state no longer accepted family hostages or goodwill declarations on the Shiḥābī emirs' part, but systematically insisted on a cash bond (kafāla/kefalet) to be written into each new iltizam contract. Besides the Kūra Kurds, these bondsmen also included some notable feudatory households with wider political agendas: In Hermel, for example, the kafāla was posted for many years by an ambitious taxlord of Ḥiṣn al-Akrād, Sulaymān Āghā, nicknamed "Iki Kapuli" perhaps in snide reference to his dual service to the Tripoli and Homs prefectures. Second, in March 1759, Nāṣif ibn Ra'd bonded four individual Ḥamāda shaykhs with partial tax contracts on Jubbat Basharrī. The Sunni Ra'd dynasty, as we have seen, supplanted the Ḥamādas in the Žanniya fief two generations

120. Tripoli 8:172 (March 1745); 12:144-7 (March 1752); 15:32, 98-9 (March 1757).
122. Tripoli 7:130.
123. Tripoli 7:5 (March 1738); 8:170-1 (March 1745); 8:329 (March 1746); 14:236 (March 1756).
earlier and participated in the murder plot against shaykh ‘Īsā in 1714. In the 1760s, however, they would emerge as one of the Ḥamāda emirate’s principal partners in the struggle to resist the Shihābī emirates’ increasing impingement on their interest sphere in the northern Lebanon.\textsuperscript{125}

The Shihābīs themselves are listed but once as the Ḥamādas’ iltizam guarantors, in a March 1749 contract negotiated, tellingly enough, outside of Tripoli’s jurisdiction in Beirut.\textsuperscript{126} By far the majority of the Ḥamādas’ iltizams in this period were in fact underwritten by groups of local shaykhs from the Maronite villages under their dominion. While the Shihābīs, as the perhaps single most powerful Syrian regional force in the age of ayanlık rule, had played a vital role in preserving their Shiite peers from the Ottoman state authority’s perennial wrath, they were still more sensitive to the overriding importance of the welfare of the Christian communities of Mt. Lebanon, and of the commercial and capital resources these could mobilize through their contacts with Europe. This is not the place to delve into the micro-history of the Shūf emirate’s road to independence and the Shihābī dynasty’s conversion to Maronite Christianity in the later 18th century. If the punitive campaign against the Ḥamādas in 1693-1694 opened the door on the Sidon Druze emirate’s ingress into Tripoli feudal affairs, then its consummation was marked by Yūsuf al-Shihābī responding to Maronite pleas to come and terminate Ḥamāda rule the 1760s. In the intervening years, the Shihābīs afforded the Shiites a period of secure, though arguably undeserved and ultimately unproductive sovereignty in the northern highlands. In order to understand the reasons for their

\textsuperscript{125} al-Šamad, Tārikh al-Danniya, 29-35.

\textsuperscript{126} Tripoli 10:262.
failure as *ayanlik* rulers, it is to their changing relationship with the local Christian population that we must turn next.

**The Ḥamāda Emirate’s Changing Relations with the Maronites**

The displacement of the Ḥamāda emirate, it was already argued in regards to the 1693-1694 punitive campaign, must be examined in the context of the Khāzin and other lineages’ rise to Eminence, the Maronite recolonization of the Kisrawān and other highland areas, and the spread of the Lebanese Order in the later 17th century. As early as the turn of that century, local chronicles mention the Khāzin clan buying up properties from “Mitwalis” left destitute by a recent Ottoman punitive campaign: “Both Christians and Mitwalis signed the deeds, and the Mitwalis became tenants on the land bought from them.” 127 This land acquisition accelerated under shaykh Abū-Nawfal al-Khāzin, vice-consul of France in Beirut since 1662 and architect of numerous settler colonies in central Mt. Lebanon. If the Ḥamāda emirs actively promoted the settlement of Christian farmers on some of their lands and valued their agricultural expertise and investment, the net effect of Maronite leverage and Ottoman discipline on the Shiite mountaineer society at large was clear even to contemporary observers: “The Mitwalis became poor and were severely supervised by the authorities.” 128

Recent studies by Richard van Leeuwen and Joseph Abou-Nohra have emphasized the long-term social and political significance of the Maronite monastic communalization of the northern highlands, without, however, addressing the


128. Ibid., 154.
indigenous feudal order which it in effect supplanted.\textsuperscript{129} Doubtless the most significant contribution in this regard remains Mas'ūd Dāhir's study on the historic roots of confessionalism in Lebanon, in which he describes the growing concentration of religious endowment properties (vakīf) in the hands of a French-sponsored Catholic gentry at the origin of an inherently class-based sectarian struggle.\textsuperscript{130} Perhaps the one drawback of this otherwise judicious structuralist approach is its insistence on rational class interest rather than on parochial inter-personal loyalties as the determinant of political action. This section winds up the story of Ḥamāda rule with a close reading of the both the şeriye records of their iltizam conferrals and French consular reports, and argues that their ill-fated embroilment in certain intra-Maronite disputes, rather than their confrontation of the ecclesiastic community as a whole, be considered a key factor in the Shiites' socio-political marginalization in 18th-century Mt. Lebanon.

We have already seen with respect to the intra-Ḥamāda quarrels of 1728 and 1738 that the Maronite notables of Jubbat Basharri took active part in their liege lords' politics. There is little reason to doubt that the Ḥamādas (like other tax-farmers) could be rather illiberal in the discharge of their duties, but they nonetheless remained dependent on their subjects' overall welfare and cooperation, and to some extent had to include them in the process of government. In 1726, for instance, when the governor of Tripoli launched a fierce campaign specifically against the patriarchal monastery of Canobin (apparently at the instigation of the Patriarch's own nephew\textsuperscript{131}), the Ḥamādas


\textsuperscript{130} Mas'ūd Dāhir, al-Judhūr al-Tārikhiyya li'l-Mas'ala al-'Aṭīfiyya al-Lubnāniyya, 1697-1861 (Beirut: Ma'had al-Inmā' al-'Arabi, 1981).

\textsuperscript{131} See Fahd, Tārikh al-Rahbāniyya, 3:42-7.
convened a large outdoor assembly in order to consult with all the local shaykhs on how to answer the state’s demand for extraordinary tax remissions.\footnote{132}

The Islamic court records can furnish us with further insights on Maronite notables who participated in one form or another in the Ḥamāda emirate’s tax-farming venture. After 1740, the guarantors of the Ḥamādas’ tax contracts were, with the few exceptions cited above, almost invariably the Christian (dhimmi) shaykhs of the villages under their control, who were thus made to share the burden of assuring the timely and full payment of their tax farmer’s obligations. It is unclear if these lesser village notables derived any personal benefit or leverage over the Ḥamādas from this not inconsiderable responsibility. For larger creditors such as the Shihābi emirs themselves, certainly, the argument can be made that their investment in the Ḥamādas’ iltizam debts provided them with both the incentive and the justification for intervening proactively in northern rural affairs. The Shiite emirate’s impotence vis-à-vis increasingly assertive creditors perhaps explains, more than any supposed Druze-Maronite “national” initiative, its subjugation and violent elimination over the next decade. By March 1763, shortly before Yūsuf al-Shihābi expelled the Ḥamādas by force, the Tripoli archives indicate that he had already been transferred formal title to all their traditional tax fiefs in his own name.\footnote{133}

A more minute, if admittedly somewhat speculative, enquiry into the Ḥamādas’ relations with certain Maronite notables is suggested by the şeriye documents for those 18th-century iltizams which were still negotiated in the capital city. While it was normal for a dozen or more Maronite village shaykhs to act (not necessarily of their own volition) as the Ḥamādas’ bondsmen, the contracts especially for the Jubbat al-Basharī

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{132} Zinda, \textit{al-Tārikh al-Lubnānī}, 65-6.
\item \footnote{133} Tripoli \textit{17:214-5}.
\end{itemize}
fief name several individuals who provided the emirate many years of service as its legal proxy (wakil) at court in Tripoli. We presently have no way of knowing through what means they were recompensed or how they stood to the Shiite feudalists’ enemies. There is anecdotal evidence of Christian families engaged in durable professional relationships with the Shiite emirates. A 19th-century biographer, for example, relates the story of the Maronite shaykh of ‘Āqūra (Jubayl district), Yūsuf ibn al-Khūrī Jirjis, who fled to the Ḥarfūsh emir of Baalbek in 1702 after a rival hired Ismā‘īl Ḥamāda to kill him. Ismā‘īl, seeking first to consult with his Shiite confrère, was so taken by the the shaykh’s culture and refinement that he immediately took him into his service and brought him back to his original post.134 In what appears to be a partial variant on the same tale, a shaykh Yūsuf Daḥdāḥ from ‘Āqūra was in the employ of the Ḥarfūsh emirs as secretary (yazıci) when the Ḥamādas recruited him and his sons in 1703 on account of their proficiency in Turkish. Through their many years of service to the emirate they acquired land titles in Jubayl, the Futūḥ and the Kisrawān which, however, they were forced to sell in the 1760s as the Ḥamādas foundered in debt. Thereafter the Daḥdāḥ sons joined the service of the triumphant Shihābī emirs and emigrated to Dayr al-Qamar.135

Not much can be said about the Ḥamādas’ court deputies on the basis of the iltizam contracts alone. The fact that the Shiites emirs were systematically represented by Maronite spokesmen in the Sunni Islamic court of Tripoli in the 18th century is perhaps already the single most noteworthy feature of this arrangement. Further research in the family or monastic archives of northern Lebanon may yield more information on the identity and motivations of Maronite notables who at one point threw

134. al-Shidyāq, Akhbār al-A‘yān, 90.
135. Anṭūniyūs Abū Khattār al-‘Aynūrīnī (d. 1821), Mukhtāṣar Tāriḵ Jabal Lubnān (Beirut: Dār Lahād Khāṭīr, 1983), 64-5; Ḥattūnī, Nubdha Tāriḵiyya 139, 141-2.
in their lot with the Shiite emirate. Several Christian *wakils* are cited in the registers with such regularity that their advocacy of the Ḥamāda tax-collection enterprise cannot be attributed to mere bureaucratic habit. In Batrūn, where the Ḥamādas’ bondsmen usually included Muslim as well as Christian village elders, it was almost always a *dhimmi* shaykh who represented them before the *kādi*.

The Jubbāt al-Bashārrī sīef remained subdivided among several Ḥamāda cousins, each with his own team of proxies at court. These naturally included the Maronite headmen of the principal towns Ehden and Zghorta, but also of formerly Shiite-inhabited villages such as Ḥaṣrūn and Tūlā. Among the Ḥamādas’ longest-serving *wakils* were Sulaymān Abū Ni‘ma and his successor Mikhā‘īl walad al-Shidāq of the small village of ‘Ayn Tūrīn. While it might be hazardous to deduce a personal affinity for the Shiite emirs, it must be noted that the sole Maronite history to laud the Ḥamāda family for the justice of its rule over northern Lebanon comes from the pen of another shaykh of that village, Anṭūniyūs Abū Khaṭṭār al-‘Aynṭūrīnī (d. 1821). Needless to say, all of these proxies lost their position once the *iltizams* passed into the Shihābis’ hands. By this time, the great Druze emir needed not represent before the Ottoman judge. The *şeriye* tribunal of Tripoli rather came to him, and convened in his palace at Dayr al-Qamar, in March 1763.

Laconic though it may be, the evidence from the Tripoli Islamic court suggests that factional rivalries within, and patronage alliances across, confessional boundaries

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136. Tripoli 7:45-7 (March 1737); 7:214 (March 1739); 7:290, 321 (March 1740); 10:27 (March 1748). The sole exception of a Muslim *wakil* is mentioned in 7:301 (March 1740).

137. Tripoli 10:27 (March 1748); 12:154 (March 1752); 14:295-6 (March 1756); 15:210 (March 1759).

138. ‘Aynṭūrīnī, *Mukhtasār* (op. cit.) According to local legend (ref. Youssef Mouawed), the author was boiled in oil for his critical stance toward the Shihābi regime.

139. Tripoli 17:215.
determined the Ḥamādas’ relations with the Maronite community more than the religious dichotomy. Evidence from the French consular archives, on the other hand, can provide some lively insights into intra-Maronite ecclesiastic disputes in which the Ḥamādas supported one group over another. While more research on this relationship remains to be done from the Maronite Church’s perspective, the Ḥamādas seem fairly consistently to have taken the side of local Mt. Lebanese interests against factions such as the Aleppine Branch of the Lebanese Monastic Order or the Khāzin family of the Kisrawān who were seen as interfering in the local community from the outside. The consuls of Tripoli and Sidon generally regarded the Church as an encumbrance of their own commercial activities, despite France’s formal protection of levantine Catholicism, and could therefore be surprisingly cool and detached in their appraisal of Maronite churchmen and lay notables. Even within the French diplomatic corps there was a factional split between Lyon-based merchants, who tended to be more supportive of the Jesuit and Lebanese missions in Mt. Lebanon, and the Marseilles-based merchants who had notably little sympathy for the Catholic hierarchy. If the Ḥamādas eventually lost the political, as well as the historiographical favor of the Maronite community of rural highland Tripoli, we will argue in closing, this can be traced to their allegiances with bested Maronite parties as much as to their purported “oppression” of the community as a whole.

The most patent case of Ḥamāda involvement in Church politics is their role in the election of two new patriarchs at the beginning of the 18th century. As was alluded to earlier, shaykh ʿĪsā Ḥamāda rode to Canobin monastery one day in September 1703 after the governor of Tripoli had requested an early payment on the year’s tax charge. When Iṣṭān al-Duwayhī refused to advance him his share, according to the French sources, he was “outragé et frappé au visage a coups de pentoufles par le Cheik Aysse Chef des
Amediens et Gouverneur pour ainsy dire du Mont Liban."

Huṣn al-Khāzīn arrived on the scene soon thereafter with 600 to 700 retainers to take the aging patriarch away into their more or less coercive "protection" in the Kisrawān, with emir Bāshīr Shihābī intervening to narrowly avert a full scale Shiīte-Maronite clan war. Upon Duwayhī's death soon thereafter, the Khāzīns insisted on holding elections for a new patriarch under their auspices in the Kisrawān to ensure that "les amediens ne favorisassent quelque évêque quy les auroit peu gagner pour l'argent..., et ce faire elire par force, ce qui est arrivé autres fois." It was only in October 1705 that the Ḥamādas ended their boycott of the Khāzīns' patriarch-elect. The French vice-consul reported with considerable self-congratulation that he so impressed shaykh ʻĪsā with France's esteem for this institution that the latter sent his son and 40 Shiīte horsemen to provide the patriarch a guard of honor upon this return to Canobin. But by the end of the month this primate too was dead, with his nephew paying the Ḥamādas 300 piastres in an attempt secure his own election by the local clergy and notables before the Khāzin faction could reappear. The situation was diffused after the Khāzin shaykhs sent ʻĪsā a personal letter, and the French consul convinced him that the Shiītes' withdrawal from Canobin would enhance their candidate's chances of election.

140. AE B1 1114 (Tripoli) fol. 136a (13 October 1706.)

141. AE B1 1017 (Seyde) fol. 407a-b (7 May 1704.)

142. Ibid., fol. 467a (29 October 1704.)

143. AE B1 1114 (Tripoli) fol. 136a-b (13 October 1706); see also Yūsuf Daḡhir, Baṭārikat al-Mawārina (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1957), 60-3.

144. AE B1 1114 (Tripoli), fol. 126b, 123a (misbound), (26 October 1705).

145. Ibid., fol. 123a-b (26 October/7 November 1705); ibid., insert after fol. 126 (6 November 1705).
In the summer of 1710, the French were called upon to recover a large sum of money which the recently deposed patriarch “Jacques” (Ya’qūb ‘Awād) had left with monks of the Lebanese Order to hide from his Khāzin-backed rivals. Too late: Shaykh ʿĪsā had uncovered its hiding place, assuring the vice-consul “que non seulement le G. Seigneur avec toute sa puissance, mais encore Mahomet ny Aly de la secte dont il est ne luy feroient pas rendre cette somme.” Nor would the French official implore the emir, he advised the hapless Maronites: Both the hiding spot and the deposit receipt for the money had, after all, been provided to shaykh ʿĪsā by the patriarch’s own nephew!\textsuperscript{146}

Perhaps the best example of the Ḫamādas’ involvement in ecclesiastic politics is furnished by the twisted events that led to the assassination of ʿĪsā in 1717. The contemporary Aleppine friar Aghūţīn Zinda characterizes his killing as godly revenge for having profaned the vakṭf endowment of the Zghorta village church in an episode that traumatized the Christian community and established more than any other the Shiites’ reputation for tyranny: In early 1716, word reached shaykh ʿĪsā that a Jesuit postulant had deposited 1000 piastres (i.e. gurus) with a French merchant in Tripoli before sailing for France several years prior, a sum to which the taxlord claimed a right of inheritance. When they failed to collect it from the merchant, the Ḫamādas despoiled the church of its liturgical instruments and imprisoned the bishop, several curates and the Jesuit’s entire family, reportedly threatening to have the men killed, the women and girls raped, and the boys circumcised.\textsuperscript{147} The French traders and missionaries agreed quickly among themselves to fulfill ʿĪsā’s ransom demands, though not without

\textsuperscript{146.} Ibid., fol. 289a-b (2 August 1710); Fahd, Tārikh al-Rahbāniyya, 1:78-9; ʿAynṭūrīnī, Mukhtaṣar, 150.

\textsuperscript{147.} Zinda, al-Tārikh al-Lubnāni, 15-8; AE B1 1115 (Tripoli) fol. 5a-8a, 43a-47a (3 February 1716); fol. 3a-4a, 48a, 49a (12 March 1716); fol. 50a (2 April 1716).
recriminating over the Jesuit’s angry contention that he had been asking for the return of that money for the past five years.^{148}

If this episode already did little to endear ‘Īsā Ḥamāda to his Maronite subjects, further French consular correspondence suggests an even more contorted motive for his murder than either the feudal conflict in ‘Akkār or the cause of divine justice evoked thus far. This affair begins with the deposition of Patriarch Jacques in 1710 by reason of his “inceste avec sa propre soeur, et une niece, sodomie, bestialité, et homicides en la personne d’un de ses Religieux qui l’avois surpris in flagranti delicto avec sa soeur.” He was placed under arrest in Canobin for fear that he might “seek the protection of the Ḥamāda shaykhs... and that his example might push the members of his family to mahomedanism.”^{149} By late 1712, however, the pope had mandated Jacques’ reinstatement in the Maronite patriarchy, a decision which the French diplomats anticipated would be very difficult to enforce vis-à-vis the Khāzins and the agitated local community.^{150} Upon returning to Mt. Lebanon after 3½ years of penance in February 1714, Jacques therefore studiously avoided the Kisrawān, instead paying his respects to Ismā’īl Ḥamāda in Jubayl and continuing from there to ‘Īsā’s palace in Jubbat Basharrī, where he was lavishly fêted and entertained.^{151}

The Khāzins were incensed over this breach of protocol, especially when the Ḥamādas reinstalled their pliant new ally in Canobin and “comencèrent à obliger les Maronites du mont Liban leurs sujets à reconnoistre leur Patriarche de gré ou de

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148. AE B’ 1115 (Tripoli) fol. 53a-54a (25 August 1716); fol. 41a-42b (15 April 1717).
149. AE B’ 1114 (Tripoli) fol. 285b (30 June 1710).
150. AE B’ 1019 (Seyde) fol. 136a (10 October 1712); fol. 288a (4 February 1714).
151. Ibid., fol 274a-b (Italian; 1 February 1714); see also Fahd, Tarīkh al-Rahbānīya, 3:264-7.
force. The Jesuits insisted the pope's decision be respected, the Kisrawān Maronites went into open mutiny, sending an Aleppo-order monk to enlist the Ottoman governor's aid to evict the primate once more. The vali in turn hired the Mar'ābī feudatories of 'Akkār with 200 men to mount an assault on Canobin monastery in April 1714, and unprecedented act which, according to the French vice-consul, could only have been precipitated by the Khāzins' vehement refusal to see the Shiites' patriarch reinstated over their own. This venture was thwarted by bad weather. Three years later, however, 'Īsā Ḥamāda lay dead at the hands of the same 'Akkār emir, among other things martyred, to inject some pathos into the story, for the sake of the Catholic pope and the legitimate Maronite patriarchy...

In 1725, the renewed ejection of Jacques from the patriarchy, on the one hand, and the conferral of the 'Akkār tax fief to the Khāzins, on the other, resulted in another full-scale clan war between them and the Ḥamādas. For much of the period under consideration, it can be said that the battle for feudal supremacy in Mt. Lebanon was intrinsically linked to the struggle for the loyalty of rival ecclesiastic or monastic factions. The topos of Shiite misgovernment, which has dominated later Christian Lebanese historiography, was a direct product of these disputes, and eventually helped determine the Shiḥābis' intervention against their erstwhile confrères and clients to take control of the northern-most fiefs of Tripoli themselves in the 1760s. As early as 1706, some

152. AE B'1114 (Tripoli) fol. 456a-459a (22 March 1714).
153. AE B'1019 (Seyde) fol. 305a-b (Italian; 18 March 1714).
154. AE B'1114 (Tripoli) fol. 460a-462b (25 April 1714).
Aleppine-branch friars endeavored to "open a monastery outside the despotic Ḥamādas' lands" in Druze-controlled country;\textsuperscript{156} in 1720, others proposed to the Apostolic See that French moneys be used to purchase the tax concessions in the Shīhābis' name and "liberate north Lebanon from the Ḥamādas' oppression."\textsuperscript{157} Contemporary sources hail Yūsuf al-Shīhābī as a veritable savior of the downtrodden Christians of Mt. Lebanon in 1766, crediting him with

the revival of the lands of Jubayl and Batrūn, and the reassurance of its people who had fled it because of the Shīites' tyranny and their ruining the lands. What pain and hardships and toil and misery did the friars endure for the sake of building these monasteries and reviving these ruined properties, and defending them from the deprivations of the Shīites who had no sympathy for them in these works...\textsuperscript{158}

Other sources, however, paint a more variegated picture of the Ḥamādas' support for Maronite church institutions. In 1713 'Īsā Ḥamāda himself is recorded to have rented lands in 'Akkār to the burgeoning Lebanese Order;\textsuperscript{159} other agricultural properties were sold or even given in trust to Maronite cloisters such as Dayr Kafīfān and exempted from taxation.\textsuperscript{160} Ismā‘īl Ḥamāda was a much respected acquaintance of the Maronite abbot and historian Tūmā al-Labūdī (the latter once narrowly prevented several Ḥamāda

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 1:85-6, 3:251; see foundation document for Mār Yūḥannā monastery in Rashmiyyā in Luwīs Bulaybil, Tāriḵ al-Rahbāniyya al-Lubnāniyya al-Mārūniyya (Cairo: 1924), 2:50-2.

\textsuperscript{157} Buṭrus al-Ṭayyāḥ, "Risāla Tuḥaddithu Thawra fi Tāriḵ Lubnān." Awrāq Lubnāniyya 8 (1957), 364.

\textsuperscript{158} Bulaybil, Tāriḵ al-Rahbāniyya, 2:276-8; see also diverse citations in Fahd, al-Rahbāniyya al-Lubnāniyya, 1:87, 2:490-1, 4:352.

\textsuperscript{159} Fahd, al-Rahbāniyya al-Lubnāniyya, 2:489.

\textsuperscript{160} Abī-'Abdallāh, Milaff, 121-2; 228. Dayr Kafīfān also received lands belonging to 'Umar Ḥamāda after the family's eviction from Mt. Lebanon.
shaykh with whom he was traveling from lynching monks of a rival group for him\textsuperscript{161}), magnanimously reinstating a disgraced metropolitan at his request in 1735.\textsuperscript{162} In 1754, Ḥaydar and Ḥusayn Ḥamāda issued the local ("Baladi" or "Jabalī") branch of the Lebanese Order patents that ensured them complete and exclusive control of the most important monasteries of Jubbat al-Basharri.\textsuperscript{163} In Batrūn, shaykh Ismā‘īl’s brother Ḫūburī supervised the bequest of the garden village of Ḥūb, described as "an earthly paradise," as a tax-exempt foundation. The land fell into ruin after the donor’s death when some relatives, backed by the Khāzins, challenged the will. Ḫūburī of his own initiative then invited the friars to return and revive the land which was theirs by right, thus effectively embarrassing the Khāzins into giving their consent also.\textsuperscript{164} The Ḥamādas’ patronage of the Baladi monastic faction is evident right up until the end of their rule: Just prior to an October 1763 synod at which the Lebanese Order was sworn to eternal indivisibility, Sulaymān Ḥamāda paid tribute to the separate congregation of Baladi priors by taking away the Mār Anṭūniyūs monastery from their Aleppine rivals and giving it to them.\textsuperscript{165}

Shiite “tyranny” was thus very often a question of perspective. Seen from afar, the later Ḥamādas essentially continued to govern and tax the rural Mt. Lebanon districts much as their illustrious ancestor Sirḥān had done a century earlier. Their methods were

\textsuperscript{161} Labūdī correspondence, 6 November 1737, in Fahd, \textit{al-Rahbāniyya al-Lubnāniyya}, 2:118–9.

\textsuperscript{162} Labūdī to Yuwāsaf, 15 November 1735, in ibid., 2:349–50.


autocratic and sometimes rapacious, but no more so than the Ottoman authority expected of them, and for that matter of the other tribal notabilities which it elevated to state tax officer status. The Ḥamādas became victims of the changing perception of local home-rule in 18th century Mt. Lebanon, failing to evolve and forge a more equitable partnership with the rising Maronite entrepreneurs as the Ma’ns and especially the Shihābis accomplished in the eyalet of Sidon. The Druze emirate, by fostering the Maronites’ expansion into the Shūf and (through its Khāzin subordinates) throughout the once Shi’ite-controlled Kisrawān and Futūh highlands, turned to full advantage the triple opportunities presented in the 18th century by European patronage of Levantine Catholicism, inter-Mediterranean commercial development, and Ottoman politico-administrative decentralization. The Ḥamādas were holdovers from another Ottoman era, a “classical” age of mercenary rural taxlordship, ill-adapted to the new horizons and possibilities of 18th-century provincial ayyāń ḫ rule.

The story of the Shihābis’ final war against the Ḥamāda confederation, as far as it can be reconstructed from the few narrative sources available,166 gains nothing from Ottoman administrative documentation and need not be retold in detail here. According to the reverend Yūsuf Dibs (d. 1907), the Ottoman authorities appointed Yūsuf al-Shihābī to the Ḥamādas’ ʿiltizams (in March 1763, as we have seen) in the aim of establishing him as a counterweight to his own brother, the emir Mańṣūr. Yūsuf quickly earned the gratitude of the local Christian population when he came to drive the Ḥamādas from Jubayl and Batrūn; the following year, the inhabitants of Jubbat Basharī called on Mańṣūr to deliver them from their feudal masters too.167 In 1766 (or 1769168),

166. Ẓāhir, Tārikh al-Shi’ā, 3:146–51.

the Ḥamādas actually received support from a Tripoli government army in their increasingly desperate struggle against the over-powerful Shūf emirs, but were again beaten. Five years later, they were driven back from an initially successful attack on Yūsuf’s lieutenant emir Bashīr by local Christian troops from Basharrī. This defeat resulted in a massive exodus of Shiites from their old homelands in Munayṭra and the Wāḍī ‘Almāt to seek refuge in the coastal areas of al-Kūra and the Qalamūn, where they continued to be harassed and slaughtered by the Shīḥābī and Maronite forces. With this, the elimination of the autonomous Shiite emirate of Tripoli was perfect. Many from the Ḥamāda confederation emigrated to the northern Bekaa, and those who remained were henceforth, like their coreligionists in Jabal Āmil and Baalbek, under total Shīḥābī tutelage. In 1788, Dībs notes that the Ḥamādas served emir Yūsuf himself as auxiliaries, participating in an intra-Shīḥābī vendetta against Bashīr, and supporting him in battle against the now most dangerous of regional magnates, “the Butcher” Cezzar Ahmed Paşa.169

**The Shīḥābis’ Shiite Subsidiary in Baalbek**

For much of the 18th century, the Ottoman authorities strove to contain and roll back the Ḥamāda emirate, launching brief punitive attacks when opportune, abrogating its iltizams to award piecemeal to other households such as the Khāzins, Raʿds and Marʿabis when possible, and finally acquiescing in the Shīḥābis’ full take-over in rural Tripoli. Ironically, the Ḥarfūsh emirs of Baalbek also figured among the dynasties to which the

168. Shīḥābī, Ṭārīkh, 802.
169. al-Dībs, Ṭārīkh Sūriyāh 7:399-400; 8:489, 494, 500-4. See also Anonymous, Ṭārīkh al-ʿUmarā’, 119-20; Shīḥābī, Ṭārīkh, 857.
Tripoli government at one point transferred Ḥamāda-held concessions, i.e. in 1756, when Ḥaydar ibn Iṣmāʿīl Ḥarfūsh took the ʿiltizar for Hermel in the northern Bekaa.¹⁷⁰ The reign of the Ḥarfūshes, whom we last encountered as the Ḥamādas' acolytes in the 1690s, would in fact outlast the "Kızılbaş mukattāa" of Tripoli by a century. This section concludes our study of the Shiite emirates with a brief comparative look at the fate of the Ḥarfūsh dynasty on the eve of modernity in western Syria.

The Bekaa valley's administrative situation at the turn of the century shows both important differences and similarities with those of Jabal ʿĀmil and Mt. Lebanon, making it difficult to advance comprehensive explanations for the Ḥarfūsh emirate's longevity. The recession of central authority obtaining in other provinces of the empire was not in evidence in the Bekaa. For various reasons, including the prevalence of crown vakif domains in the valley, the more sedentary character of its local notabilities, and especially the recasting of the Damascus governorate as the premier pilgrimage office of the empire in this time,¹⁷¹ Baalbek and its hinterland arguably came under closer imperial supervision than ever before. In 1699, Feyzullah Efendi, the vastly influential şeyhül-İslam who was then assassinated in the 1703 "Edirne incident,"¹⁷² transformed the Baalbek fiscal estate into a giant vakif bequest for four imperial colleges.¹⁷³ The ostensible aim of this investment was to revive the Bekaa region which had witnessed some of the worst devastations of the previous tribal and Saruca-Sekban upheavals, but already a contemporary Damascene observer implied that another aim was to strengthen

¹⁷⁰ Tripoli 14:236 (Turkish).
¹⁷¹ See Barbir, Ottoman Rule.
¹⁷³ Deed [temlikname] recorded in the Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, ms. Or. quart. 1827, fol. 91b-116b.
the state's grip on the "Mitwali"-inhabited villages from which emir Shadid al-Ḥarfūsh had just been evicted. The Ḥarfūshes' relationship with the vakif administration of Baalbek would become a recurring theme of Ottoman documentation.

On the other hand, in the 18th century the Ḥarfūshes cast their lot early and decisively with their erstwhile Shīhābī foes, and without question owed their long tenure in the Bekaa to the Shūf emirate's abiding support. In the tribal rebellions of 1711, the Ḥarfūshes do not seem to have joined the Ḥamādas who had already been at war with the vali of Tripoli for nearly a year. Instead, they gave the emir Ḥaydar al-Shīhābī refuge when it became clear that the state intended to replace him with a rival Druze household, and provided 2500 troops to enable him to crush his enemies and establish the Shīhābī as the sole tribal rulership of Sidon. The Ḥarfūshes' role in 'Ayn Dāra apparently did not compromise their rapport with the Ottoman authorities. Their paramount shaykh at this time, Ḥusayn, was recognized by the imperial fisc as "the voivode of Baalbek on behalf of the ex-ṣeyhūl-Islam Feyzullah Efendi," in which capacity he shipped the region's vakif incomes in cash and kind (grain and silk) to a partner in Damascus to be forwarded to the imperial capital. Around 1712, Ḥusayn died in his Damascene agent's house (according to the afore-cited documents) or was killed in a popular uprising in a Baalbek garden (according to a local history.) Over the next decades, the archival and narrative materials pertaining to the Ḥarfūsh emirate, though as always disposed to


175. AE B' 1018 (Seyde), 932-3 (23 May 1711).

176. MD 120:168:674 (April 1714); MD 122:78 (2; June/July 1714). These two decrees pertain to the partner's failure to discharge the debts after Ḥusayn's death.

177. See Alūf, Ṭārīkh Baʿlabakk, 75. The year 1724 cited here and in much of the literature is erroneous.
presenting the more conflictual aspects of provincial affairs, offer first a picture of near exemplary government on its part, then a renewed phase of internal factionalism and violence which effectively reduced it to total dependence on Ottoman and Shihābī goodwill.

Soon after Ḥusayn’s death, his cousin Ismā‘īl bought himself into the Damascene valī’s good graces with a substantial gift of cash, horses, mules and other goods in order to be confirmed in the Baalbek iltizam. The few sources available suggest a period of relative peace in the next years. In 1719, he personally supported the hacc pilgrimage with a unit of 200 camels and as many musket-bearing guards. In August 1722, the Sublime Porte noted that when his namesake Ismā‘īl Ḥamāda rebelled and refused to renew the tax lease on Jubayl, he “roused up most of its subjects and sent them to the land belonging to the Kızilbaş known as İsmail Harfüş in the Baalbek district.” The decree, however, stipulated only that the imperial accounts (ahkam) be checked as to where exactly these subjects should be taxed, and assigned no blame to the Ḥarfüş emir for the Shiites’ illicit migration.

Around the same time, the Ḥarfüşes also forged an alliance with the Zughaybs, another (partially) Shiite clan that had recently emigrated from Iraq, to help protect the peasants of the northern Bekaa against increasingly problematic bedouin incursions. The imperial government continued to view tribal control as the most urgent concern of rural government, and from July 1729, we find one imperial hükûm courteously

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180. MD 130:415 (3).
addressed to emir Ismā'il himself, requesting his application in ridding the vicinity of the Arab, Kurdish and Turkmen bandits whose depredations had caused the religious notables of Baalbek to lodge an official complaint in Istanbul.\footnote{182} This was a particularly sensitive situation for Ismā'il, one may infer from similar orders sent to the Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli chanceries, because the key perpetrator in the most recent attack appears to have been his kinsman: The previous month, a certain "emir Ali" had ambushed a caravan of 20 camels and 20 mules bringing merchandise from Damascus in the pass at Zabadānī, imprisoning the traders and muleteers in the nearby village of Madāyā whose mayor was obviously colluding with him. The incident had been reported to the governor of Sidon, who with his two colleagues earned more censure than Ismā'il for their inattention to the security of the region.\footnote{183} In December 1729, however, Ismā'il too drew a serious rebuke for having harbored members of the (most likely Shiite) Najā gang who had been ordered deported to Cyprus for terrorizing the Beirut vicinity.

After these bandits fled to Baalbek, [an] imperial envoy also came to Baalbek and found them there. When he showed you the imperial order and asked for them, you displayed crudeness, saying "They have sought refuge under my protection" and did not deliver them to the envoy, sending him back empty-handed. You are answerable [for this] and reproved. Now this time, when this imperial order arrives, surrender them to the envoy... and don't patronize and host bandits fleeing from Damascus or Sidon or Beirut or Tripoli or Hama or Homs!\footnote{184}

Perhaps it was this episode that launched emir Ismā'il on a more criminal career path. In February 1731, to be sure, a unique sharecropping contract preserved in the Islamic court records of Damascus cites him in the respectable situation of renting the entire town of al-Labwa in the northern Bekaa for three years from its life-time

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item 182. MD 135:392 (1).
\item 183. MD 135:372 (3).
\item 184. MD 136:24 (1).
\end{itemize}}
(malikane) tax-farmer. Just two years later, however, the governor of Sidon received word that Ismā'il had absconded with his entire family and over thirty sacks of money from the Baalbek iltizam, crossing into Sidon, predictably enough, to take refuge with "the Druze emir Mülham." Shihābī backing must again have proved efficacious, for he was back as voivode of Baalbek in the fall of 1734, even if his days were numbered. In a hüküm to Damascus, the Sublime Porte fingered the rapine and injustices committed under Ismā'il's rule as the reason for the supposed desolation of the Baalbek region, screaming literally for his head. An indication of how seriously the Ottomans now viewed his misconduct is that for the first time in years, they characterize it as "arising from his being of the Rafizi mezheb." A parallel order to the governor of Tripoli, where the Sublime Porte feared Ismā'il might attempt to flee, goes even further. Again characterizing the Ḥarfūsh emir as a Shiite heretic, it alludes to "the noble fetva given in respect to this sort of people," a reference once again to the 16th-century juridical opinions of Ebu Su'ud Efendi in regards to persecuting and executing individuals identified as Rafizis and Kızılbaş. Just five months later, a local chronicler could indeed report that the paşa had succeeded in killing the emir after lulling him into security to arrange a meeting.

If Ismā'il had proved a disappointment as voivode of Baalbek, the reign of his sons Ḫusayn and Ḫaydar was nothing short of a disaster. An Arab traveler to the region

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187. MD 140:226 (4).
188. MD 140:311 (1).
189. Ibn Kannān, Yawmīyāt, 461.
reported that the Ḥarfūshes were quelled in 1737, but this cannot have been consequential and the two emirs soon worked together in tormenting the Bekaa: In 1737/38, Ḥusayn sent his brother and various retainers to “rob” the şeyhül-İslam endowment village of Hashshash; five years later he seized 80 sacks of wheat, 45 of barley and another 30 of seed, which the kadi of Damascus notarized as the cause of the region’s tax shortfall. Orders issued in March 1744 to recuperate the stolen goods, however, went unheeded, and at the end of the year the Ottoman authorities were determined to punish the perpetrators and assign the Baalbek tax-farm to someone else.

These orders, however, had apparently still not been put into effect by the spring of 1746, when Ḥusayn committed the greatest outrage against Ottoman sovereignty imaginable: “The thug called Harfuṣî İsmail-oğlı mir Huseyn of the abominable extremist [ghulât] Shiites” persisted, despite that fact that “noble orders were promulgated time and again to eliminate their vice and let right be done,” in “insubordination to the holy law and royal decrees, and openly manifesting the emblems of heresy.” For reasons not explicitly stated, he had been badgering Yahyâ Efendi, the müfti of Baalbek, to devise legal rulings favorable to himself, and then, having failed to achieve this aim, hanged him and expropriated his belongings. This ad hoc execution of an Ottoman religious official caused an outcry of indignation throughout Syria, with

191. MD 150:230 (1).
193. MD 152:169-70.
complaints and descriptions of the Ḥarūfīshes' despotism pouring into Istanbul well into
July and August. Despite all the previous orders, the Sublime Porte at last concluded that
so long as this gangster and his family and relatives remain in office in the
Baalbek voivodeship, the people and inhabitants of this town will not be safe and
free from their tyranny and transgressions... From now on, do not assign the
Baalbek mukataa to this thug Huseyn of the Harfuʿ-oğulları, nor to any relatives
or family or followers of his reprehensible lineage... Give it to someone just.194

In the end, these noble intentions went only so far as to assign the sief to his
brother Ḥaydar. The Ottoman authorities mounted a campaign to catch Ḥusayn and
bring him to justice, but admitted in May 1747 that his whereabouts were unknown.195
By September they had their answer: He had of course sought the protection the
Shihābis. Worse yet, in benefiting from this powerful support he had still
not begun to mind his own affairs, and gathered three or four hundred bandits
and attacked a caravan going from Damascus to Beirut, robbing 100 bags of
goods. Furthermore, he ruined the villages around Baalbek and burned their
provisions, then attacked wayfarers around Baalbek.196

What the chancery decrees fail to mention is that Mulḥâm al-Shihābi himself launched a
full-scale attack on the Baalbek region when the Āzīm governor of Damascus left on the
pilgrimage that fall, evicting his protegé Ḥaydar and in order to reinstall his own protegé
Ḥusayn.197 The only reaction from Istanbul to this renewed contumacy on the Druze
emir's part was a wholly implausible writ of forgiveness issued to Ḥusayn just two
months later:

The ex-mültezim of the Baalbek tax-sief, Harfuʿ-oğlu (may his power be
augmented), sent a petition to my noble threshold, pointing out that as tax-
farmer of the said district, he always paid and submitted the mírī tax to the

194.  MD 152:243 (1); MD 152:254 (1).
195.  MD 153:69 (1). See also al-Budayrī, Ḥawādith Dimashq, 71.
196.  MD 153:120 (2).
197.  al-Dībs, Tārīkh Sūriyah, 7:377-8; Shihābi, Lubnān, 1:35 (the date given here is
incorrect); Zāhir, Tārīkh al-Shīʿa, 3:59, 68, 95.
venerable officials on time and with interest, received its quittances, and never undertook anything against the holy law. Then the sons of the deceased mufti of Baalbek, Yahya Efendi, accused him of murder and petitioned for the return of their belongings... [An officer] was sent who attacked [Husayn] and robbed and plundered all his goods and effects and all he owned, and he had to go into exile. Today, he and his folk and family stand humbled and perplexed, deserving of compassion and benevolence. His crime is forgiven and he is to be burdened no longer.198

The bits about Ḥusayn “of the abominable extremist Shiites” whose tyranny “arises from his being of the Rafizi mezheb” were evidently bygones.

The local population had many reasons to complain of the Ḥarfūsh brothers. A contemporary chronicler reports that the despotic emir Ḥusayn liquidated the village shaykh of Ra’s Baalbek in 1745, leading the patriarch to suspend the priests who had conspired to denounce him.199 The same year, the local Greek metropolitan was imprisoned and blackmailed into raising the cash surety on Ḥusayn’s iltizam concessions, and had to go collecting alms at Homs. He then quit the region and moved his family to Beirut.200 Around the same time, a Christian who had served Ḥaydar for several years as secretary also returned to Beirut.201 In July 1749, as the two brothers were locked in another deadly struggle for control of Baalbek, Ḥaydar’s goons seized a vicar associated with Ḥusayn and beheaded him after he declined the chance to apostatize.202 Local Christian tradition in fact holds the Ḥarfūshes’ legendary tyranny and fiscal rapacity to be the reason for a massive emigration from Baalbek and Ra’s

198. MD 153:169 (2).
199. Rawfā‘ī ibn Yūsuf Karāma (d. 1784), Ḥawādith Lubnān wa-Sūriya: min sana 1745 ilā sana 1800, ed. Bāsillūs Qaṭṭān (s.l., Jarrūs Pars, s.a.), 10.
200. Ibid., 8–9.
201. Shidyāq, Akhbār al-A‘yān, 113; al-Dībs, Tārīkh Sūriya, 8:491.
Baalbek in the 18th century to the newly-founded, more secure city of Zahle on the eastern Lebanese piedmont.203

A more critical examination of the region’s socio-economic history has questioned this monocausal interpretation, pointing out that the Ḥarfūshes were closely allied to the paramount Orthodox Ma'lūf family of Zahle (where indeed Muṣṭafa Ḥarfūsh took refuge some years later204) and arguing that depredations from various quarters as well as Zahle’s growing commercial attractiveness accounted for Baalbek’s decline in the 18th century.205 In any event, the Ḥarfūsh emir’s exactions were not directed against the Christian community per se. In 1754, Ḥaydar ordered the arrest and terrible mistreatment of seven Greek Orthodox notables, but only for the reason that someone maliciously denounced them for their alleged insubordination to a metropolitan who had just been elected with the emir’s blessing. They were released upon the intercession of that metropolitan, who in turn flatly refused the emir’s own request to reverse the informant’s excommunication until he showed true repentance.206 Much like in Mt. Lebanon, the secular Shiite emirs were frequently involved in the investiture of Christian religious dignitaries.207 Their depredations, on the other hand, equally afflicted their own coreligionists. The wealthy Shiite ‘Usayrān family, for example, also fled Baalbek to

203. See, e.g., Alūf, Tārikh Ba‘labakk, 27.
204. Karāma, Ḥawādīth, 48.
205. Alixa Naff, A Social History of Zahle, a Principal Market Town in Nineteenth-Century Lebanon (unpublished UCLA doctoral thesis, 1972), 72-86, 519. In 1792, the Harfūshes joined forces with the Ma'lūf clan to invest Hermel, which had been transferred to them by the Shihābī emir. See al-Ma'ālūf, Diwānī al-Qaṭīf, 227-8.
207. Ibid., 52-3.
avoid expropriation by the Ḥarūfīshes in this period, establishing itself as one of the premier commercial households of Sidon and later even serving as consuls of Iran.\(^{208}\)

In June 1751, a Damascene chronicler reported that the Ḥarūfīshes had eliminated another müfti of Baalbek, burning him and his brother to death and destroying their house and vineyards.\(^{209}\) The same year, two English engineers surveying the Roman vestiges at Baalbek noted that Ḥaydar continued to terrorize the vicinity with his gang. Just as they were finishing their work, word reached them that he finally killed his brother Ḥusayn and replaced him as governor.\(^{210}\) This could not augur well for the Bekaa, and indeed in October 1755, the sultanate issued Ḥaydar a warning, informing him that all three vals of the Syrian region accused him of constant incursions into and despoilations of villages he was supposed to be protecting: “Your yearning for and addiction to this sort of illegal and unacceptable tyranny and oppression has caused the fire of my royal fury to be ignited!” The same order, however, notes that powerful individuals were interceding for him, and he would be left in office on the condition that he “wake from his slumber of remissness,” repent and engage to protect the humble commoners.\(^{211}\) Six months later, as mentioned previously, he was entrusted with the additional tax-farm of Hermel, a dependence of the eyalet of Tripoli.\(^{212}\) The dubious legacy of Ḥarūfīsh rule in the Bekaa was summarized by the superintendent of imperial

\(^{208}\) al-Amin, \textit{A'yān}, 2:497-8; 6:349; personal communication by Khatme Osseiran-Hanna.


\(^{210}\) Robert Wood (d. 1771), \textit{The Ruins of Balbec, otherwise Heliopolis in Coelosyria} (London: s.n., 1757), 3-4. Husayn was ambushed and shot by three gunmen as he left the town mosque, according to al-Budayri, \textit{Hawādith Dimashq}, 157.

\(^{211}\) MD 157:195 (1).

\(^{212}\) Tripoli 14:236 (op.cit.)
vakıfs in a memorandum submitted to Istanbul around 1761: Thirty years since İsmail had to be killed, 12 years since Hüseyin resumed afflicting the region as voivode, 10 years after he was killed by his brother Haydar who proved even worse, the Islamic endowments located in Baalbek were in dire straits. For three years Haydar had not remitted a thing, taking any pretext to interfere with the vakıfs which were technically all free from secular taxation [serbest], and causing the community of the righteous to scatter and abandon the land. Only a renewed Ottoman campaign against the Harfüşhes, the petition concludes, might relieve the situation.213

The pattern of Harfüşhid oppression, Ottoman reproof and Shihâbi intervention could and did continue for many more years and well into the following century. The story of the Harfüş emirate may conveniently be interrupted in the 1760s, when it temporarily became entangled in the process of its sister emirate’s extirpation from Mt. Lebanon. In July 1762, Haydar was accused of uniting with the Hamâdas while the governor of Tripoli was away on the serde campaign to attack Jubbât Basharî, killing numerous Christians, including old men and women, and enslaving their children.214 A parallel order to repulse the Kızılbâş was naturally forwarded to the Shihâbi emirs,215 and in the next years Haydar seems indeed to have lost his overlords’ favor. In 1767, the Hamâdas fled the Shihâbi-Maronite assault on Mt. Lebanon to take refuge in Baalbek. There they were again pursued by Yusuf al-Shihâbi and fled north to Hermel; Haydar was evicted from the Baalbek voyvodalık and fled to shelter with the Shiites of Jabal

213. BOA: Cevdet Evkaf 9176.
214. Tripoli 17:145 (Turkish).
215. Tripoli 17:146 (Turkish).
‘Āmil,\textsuperscript{216} the only ones who, with Zāhir al-‘Umar’s backing, could still offer the Shūf emirs some resistance. This, however, did not alter the underlying fact of the Ḥarfūsh emirate’s vassalage to the Shihābīs, for Yūsuf promptly installed Ḥaydar’s younger brother Muḥammad in his stead.\textsuperscript{217} The Ottoman authorities, we will presume from their silence, again acquiesced in his choice.

The Ottoman-era Ḥarfūsh emirate remains that Shiite feudal institution which has received by far the most attention in classical Lebanese historiography, a situation, it was suggested in chapter two, that is due to its long-term interwovenness with the illustrious Druze emirate’s fate. In the 17th century, the Ḥarfūshes attracted the notice of the Ma‘nīd court biographers and other Christian chroniclers through their valorous if ultimately futile resistance against the emir Fakhr al-Dīn; in the 18th, they owed their renown to the Shihābīs’ unfailing resolve to maintain one or another Ḥarfūsh scion loyal to their cause in power in Baalbek. With their abiding dependence on the Shihābī emirate, the Ḥarfūshes appear on the one hand as that institution of Shiite home-rule which was most integrated into the polity subsequently understood as historical Lebanon. Indeed, after they were divested of their lands in 1864 and partially exiled to Edirne, the Ḥarfūshes that remained behind followed the example of their Shihābī patrons and converted to Maronite Christianity.

One other consequence of this integration extends into present times and must be left for another discussion: Unlike Mt. Lebanon and Hermel, where only a tiny fraction of the Imāmī tribes survived anyway, and Jabal ‘Āmil, which emerged as the social and cultural centre of the modern Lebanese Shi‘a under a multitude of competing feudal and

\textsuperscript{216} Budayrī, Ḥawādīth Dimashq, 162-3; Rāfiq, Bilād al-Shām, 364.

\textsuperscript{217} Karāma, Ḥawādīth, 35-6.
religious leaders, Baalbek remained dominated by a single obsolescent feudatory maintained in place at Ottoman and Shihābī convenience. The abrupt disappearance of the Ḥarfūsh emirate left the Shiite community of Baalbek bereft of any anciently-rooted, indigenous social leadership, making it that much more of a likely venue for the rise of foreign-inspired, ideological mass movements such as Communism, Nasirism and the Ḥizb Allāh in Lebanon’s tumultuous 20th century.
CONCLUDING REMARK

The Twelver Shiite emirates of Ottoman Syria defy an easy historical categorization. In imperial chronicles, they are consistently decried as “Revafiz” and “Kızılbaş,” heretics whose persecution and elimination was a declared principle of Ottoman statecraft since the reigns of sultans Yavuz Selim and Kanuni Süleyman. Yet over the course of the 17th century, an abundance of chancery and provincial administrative documentation highlights their rise as the leading feudal factions, fully endowed with state tax-collection and rural police prerogatives, in the coastal mountain districts of western Syria. Then from the end of the century, the Ottoman state began to withdraw its support from the Shiite feudatories, and they came under sustained pressure to yield to a more powerful inter-regional government proxy, the Druze-Maronite emirate. The history of the Ottoman Shiite emirs thus remains enigmatic, because their sectarian identity did not inhibit their rise within the nominally Sunni imperial administrative context, but in the end conditioned their failure within the nominally non-confessional feudal system of what became modern Lebanon.

In this dissertation, I have tried to explain the mechanics of Shiite tribal home-rule under Ottoman sovereignty by resorting to a long-term, administrative perspective, one which takes neither the imperial legal tradition’s timeless stance against heterodoxy nor the “Lebanist” narrative of local princely independence as fully reflective of the Syrian Shiite highlanders’ true historical experience. Classical Ottoman thinkers such as Ebu Su’ud Efendi did establish a legal framework for religious persecution which remained in effect until the Tanzimat reforms, but when and how the central and
provincial administrative authorities chose to invoke such abstractions depended entirely on the requirements and possibilities of local governance. Ottomanist historians, depicting the persecution of Kızılbaş tribesmen and materialist free-thinkers as a necessary consequence of 16th-century state consolidation, have paid little heed to the heterodox tribal leaders (emirs) whom a strong central government recruited to tax and police the Syrian coastal highlands on its behalf. Conversely, historians of Lebanon have portrayed the Druze tribal emirate's protection of the region's Maronite Church and peasantry as the origin of an autonomous mountain republic, without acknowledging that this condominium was actually predicated on the elimination of the Shiites' influence in the 18th century. This dissertation has attempted to reintegrate the Shiite emirates into both Ottoman and Lebanese history and explain their "rise and fall" in terms of long-term structural change in the administration of the early modern Ottoman periphery.

Its main findings can be summarized as follows: The Shiite and other heterodox emirates were essentially an Ottoman creation of the later 16th century, when the state authority assigned cash tax-farming contracts to local tribal leaders rather than attempting to impose direct rule in remote highland and desert districts. The Ottomans awarded the Ḥarfūsh family of Baalbek the local ʿiltīzam concessions plus a nominal military rank (the district governorship of Homs) in recognition of their social pre-eminence among the Shiite village population of the Bekaa Valley. In Mt. Lebanon, the Ḥamāda family of the Wādī ‘Almāt rose to prominence around the same time as lieutenants of the Sayfā valīs of Tripoli, before being selected, mainly on account of their martial skills and corporative tribal organization, to rule multiple tax-farms in the Shiite- and Christian-inhabited highlands. While local narrative historiographers have long romanticized the Druze emirs as "princes" and demonized the Shiites as violence-prone
alien interlopers in the country, we argued on the basis of both imperial chancery correspondence and the Islamic court records of Tripoli that the Ḥamādas and Ḥarfūshes in every way constituted the quintessential Ottoman rural government proxy in the 17th century.

This ambiguous if stable rapport between the Shiite feudatories and the central state began to break down in the final decade-and-a-half of the century, we argued, due to the prolonged social crisis and ensuing reform attempts occasioned by the Empire's disastrous war in central Europe, as well as the increasingly effective complaints of the rising Maronite bourgeoisie of Mt. Lebanon about the Ḥamādas' misrule. In an effort to contain rampant mercenary brigandage and revive desperately needed sources of agricultural revenues, the Sublime Porte embarked on an empire-wide brigand-fighting and tribe-settlement initiative in these years which was reflected in a major punitive campaign against the Syrian Shiite emirates. The campaign, vigorously pursued by a new class of local civilian governor dynasties, did not completely eliminate the Shiite notables, but subjected them to the authority of the Druze emirate of Sidon, marking the first time the paramount Lebanese tribal feudatory's responsibilities were extended into the Shiite-dominated districts of Mt. Lebanon and the Bekaa.

Meanwhile, France's diplomatic and financial backing enabled Maronite entrepreneurs and monastic orders to colonize and develop large agricultural domains in the mountain under the Druze emirs' stewardship. The Shiites gradually became dependent on the Druzes' political protection and the Maronites' financial guarantees for their tax farms, but failed to recognize and cultivate the rising power of the leading Church and commercial notables. Having outlived their usefulness, as classical-era feudal taxlords, to both local society and to the Ottoman state, the Ḥamādas were easily driven from office and exiled in the 1760s. In the province of Sidon, the lesser Shiite
feudatories of Jabal ‘Āmil had even greater difficulty in staving off the Druze-Maronite emirs’ encroachment, particularly after the Ottoman governorate all but abandoned its responsibility for the rural districts to the Shihābi dynasty in the 18th century. In consequence, they sought the aid of the rising Palestinian commercial baron Zāhir al-‘Umar, under whose protection the Jabal would emerge as the new locus of Shiite autonomy and cultural life until the violent reassertion of central control by the Ottoman governor Cezzar Ahmed Paşa at the end of the century. Finally, it was argued, the Ḥarfūshes of Baalbek were able to survive as the region’s sole Shiite authority because they placed themselves fully under the Shihābis’ charge. Despite frequent Ottoman censure and perpetual internecine conflict, the Ḥarfūsh family continued to enjoy the Shihābis’ confidence and thus governed the Bekaa as the pan-Lebanese emirate’s local Shiite subsidiary. By the last third of the 18th century, the Shiite emirates as paragons of classical Ottoman tribal self-rule had all either disappeared or become redundant under the impact of the Druze-Maronite emirate’s commercial, administrative and societal hegemony in the coastal highland region.

The marginalization, in both real and historiographical terms, of the Shiite tribal elites in the 18th century has arguably had important consequences for regional politics down to the present day. Bereft of a strong, organically-grown communal leadership, the Lebanese Shi’a long proved unable, through the sectarian upheavals of the 1860s, the establishment of the French Mandate over an expanded “Grand Liban,” and indeed up until the outbreak of war in 1975, to clearly define and pursue its interests as an integral confessional bloc along the lines of the other communities which constituted modern Lebanon’s regime of sectarian equilibrium. Must we therefore regard the elimination or subjugation of the Ḥamādas, Ḥarfūshes and other Shiite civil leaderships in the 18th century as one of the early antecedents of sectarianist politics in the region?
The evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that the Shiite emirates were at no time subject to official persecution or feudal violence on the basis of their communal identity per se, even if this identity was occasionally invoked as the root cause of their villainy. Yet the promotion of corporate provincial governorates, the concentration of feudal authority in a single inter-regional emirate, the monetarization of tax-farm bondships, the Empire's tribal settlement initiatives, and other such means of social engineering in the 17th and 18th centuries that we have circumscribed as sozialdisziplinierung must, in the end, be admitted to have affected the Shiite ayanlıks more profoundly than any other confessional community.

The full reasons why the Shiites were put at a comparative disadvantage would require an extensive, critical re-evaluation of the contemporary Druze and Maronite notabilities' changing rapport with the Ottoman state authority in the same timeframe, something which could not be undertaken in the present study. The outlines of an answer, however, are perhaps inherent in the sociological rationale of the disciplining process itself. The essential features of the Shiite mountaineers' communal organization—pastoral nomadism, kin-group violence, popular religiosity and insulation from urban civilization—were those shared for centuries by the Druze, the Maronites and other non-orthodox sectarian groups inhabiting the rugged coastal range. These features, we argued, for a while even recommended their paramount leaders as the Ottoman government's rural tax collection and police proxies. However, the early modern period can be said to have marked a crucial rupture in the valence of the highlanders' sectarian identities. The growth of the Mediterranean textiles trade, European political sponsorship and Ottoman administrative reform provided the Christian and especially Maronite communities of the region with unprecedented opportunities to transcend their mountain-bound isolation and become, with their (real or nominally) Druze
overlords, full-fledged participants in the construction of a distinct social and economic zone under Ottoman suzerainty. The Shiites, on the other hand, never underwent this transformation. At the turn of the 18th century, their insular community and its tribalized, politically illiterate and socially unenlightened leadership represented little more than an archaic survival from the past, a hindrance to both Ottoman and Lebanese hopes for local development and thus the primary candidate for coercive reform and disciplining measures.

Sectarian differentiation, we may remark in closing, was never the aim but a principle side effect of sozialdisziplinierung in western Syria. The Shiite tribal emirates bore the brunt of historical processes which were not specific to either the Islamic world or the Ottoman Middle East. In examining the nearly forgotten rise and fall of the Ḥamādas, Ḥarfūshes and others, I hope to have presented some original documentation and approaches that may benefit future studies in Shiism and revisit and revise my own conclusions. Most of all, I hope to have shown that their ambivalent rapport with central and provincial authority was, and is, an integral part of the story of Ottoman, Syrian and Lebanese society and change in the early modern centuries.
Figure 1: Wādi 'Almāt, Lebanon. Photos by author.

Figure 2: Mansion ruins in Farḥat, Wādi 'Almāt.
Figure 3: Ruins in Farḥat, Wādī ‘Almāţ.

Figure 4: Jubab al-Ḥumr, eastern flank of Mt. Lebanon.
DOCUMENT APPENDIX

1. Sächsische Landesbibliothek, Dresden: Eb 387, fol. 28b
(early March 1661)

1. Şam Trablus beşlerbegisine hüküm yazılmıştır: (Kaplan Paşa’dır)
2. Eşkiyadan Sirhan nam şaki her nerinde ise eğer Şam toprağından ve eğer Man-oğli toprağından ve eğer sair yeredir bi-eyyi vechin kan
3. ele getürüb hakkından gelesin ama bu bahane ile ehali-i kurayî payimal etmekden ve akçe almakdan bi-gayet ihtiraz idersin

2. Sächsische Landesbibliothek, Dresden: Eb 387, fol. 102a (1)
(mid-May 1663)

1. Safed beşlerbegisi Mehmed Paşa’ya hüküm ki:
2. Man-oğli Ahmed nam şaki ve hevadarı olan Sirhan ve mukaddem Murad ve mukaddem Faris ve sair Dürüzi eşkiyasyyla daimen direng ve şekavet üzere oldukları
3. sem-i hümayunuma ilka olunmağın bi-eyyi vechin kan hakkından gelinmek babında ferman-ı alısanım sadar olmuşdur. Buyurdum-ki vusul bulduka bu babda sadar olan
4. ferman-ı celiili’l-kadrim mucebince amel idüb dahi mezburen şakilerin her kabz eyleyen toprağına dahil olurlar ise “kendü ayyakım toprağı değildir” diyü tereddüd etmeyüb
5. bi-la tevakkuf üzerevarı varub insallah-teala cezaları veresin ve bil-cümle bu husus her vechile saña imdad u ianet itmeleri içinin Trablus beşlerbegine
6. ve Şam-ı Şerif mütesellime ahkam-ı hümayunum gönderilib tenbih olunmuştur. İmdı ıktizasına göre anlar ile haberleşüb mezbur şakileri her kabz toprakda olur ise
7. bi-la tevakkuf üzerevarı varub bi-lutfi’lhal-teala ceza u sezaları verüb ihmal u müsamahadan ihtiraz u ihtiyat üzere olasin diyü yazılmışdır. Fi evail-i [Şevva]l sene 10[73].

3. Tripoli 1:154
(1666/67)

1. Kudvetül-emasil ül-akran şeyh Sirhan ve şeyh Ahmed (zide kadrihûma)
2. Mirmiran olanların kethündarı avaid almak memalik-i Osmaniye’de kanun-ı kadim oli-gelmiş ikben

245
4. Tripoli 2/1:48
(13 May 1668)

1. Sebeb-i tahrir-i kitab-ı şeri bu-dur ki:
2. Sabikan eyalet-i Trablus-Şam'a mutasarrıf ve vali-i vilyet iken bi-emri'ılah-teala fevt olan merhum Ahmed Paşa'nın
3. eyalet-i mezburde bin yetmiş yedi senesi malinden kalan mal bakayısını cem u tahsiline taraf-ı saltanat-ı
4. aliyeden mübaşır tayin olunan fahrül-ekarım Ahmed Ağa'nın tarafından husus-ı
   atıül-beyan için vekil olan
5. vekaleti fahrül-emasil İbrahim Çavuş ve fahrül-küttab Mehmed Efendi emir-i
   hac-zade ve Mehmed Beşe ibn
6. Yusuf nam kimesnelerin şehadetleriyle sabite olan bundan akdem mahmiye-i
   Trablus-Şam kadısı olan
7. faziletli Nuh Efendi hazretleri meclis-i şer-i şerifde vekalet ikrar-ı tam ve bast-ı
   meram idüb merhum Ahmed
8. Paşa'nın müddetinde Şeyh Sirhan'in kibelinde ve zimmetinde mal bevakiden on
   iki kise guruş baki kaldukda
9. marû'z-zikr olan on iki kise guruş Ahmed Ağa'ya edaya Şeyh Mehmed Ebu Uzre
   nam kimesne kefil u müteahhid
10. olub bade'l-kefalet meblağ-ı merkumı Ahmed Ağa'ya edaya kadir olmakla
    marifet-i şerle kalede habs
11. eleyüb ve meblağ mesfurı kefil-i mezburdan ahz u kabz Bağdad-ı Darü'l-Cihad
    kalesinde yenicişerîyan
12. mevacibleri ahzi icün işbu hazır bi'l-meclis olan yirimiki bölükden
    mübaşır Yusuf Çavuş
13. yedine teslim u isal ve mezburı habisden itlak itmeğe beni vekil idüb ve hala
    vekaletim hasibıyle
14. salifü'z-zikr olan on iki kise guruş mezbur Ebu Uzre yedindenden ahz ve zeyl-i
    kitabda mestur'
15. ül-esami olan Müslümanin huzurunda muma-ileyh Yusuf Çavuş yedine teslim ve
    mezbur şeyh Mehmed Ebu Uzre'yi
16. habisden itlak eyledim'i diyii ikrar-ı sahih-i şeri ve itiraf-ı sarih-i meri eyledikde
    makarr-ı müşarın-ileyhin vech-i
17. meşruh üzere cari u sadir olan ikramını muma-ileyh Yusuf Çavuş bi'l-muvacehe
    tasdik
18. ve bi'l-müşafehe tahkik itmeğin ma-vaka bi't-taleb li-ecli't-temessük ketb u
    terkim ve yed-i talebe def u teslim olundı.

[Signatures.]

246
(1660s/70s)

“In this treatise, we have explained the majority of the Shi‘a’s beliefs as transmitted in Mu‘tazili books and by able scholars, and we have shown with which Koran-verses and hadiths the imams and scholars have established the fact of their unbelief. We have related how they are infidels and who, among the illustrious scholars of the three [Hanefi, Shafi‘i, Maliki] legal schools... has ruled them to be infidels along with all the proofs. We have established that their present home where they dominate [Iran] is unquestionably the abode of infidelity. This pronouncement is one of the reasons for having composed this treatise.

We have demonstrated that fettvas rendered by recent scholars on these errants were knowledgeable, pious and authoritative, and whoever rebukes or finds fault with them over their fettvas, like one of our contemporaries, is wrong... He deserves leniency for some of his views when he prattles nonsense, for this is not a grave fault that he commits nor an actual injury that he causes Islam. He is not alone in the knowledge that everyone has reckoned these deviants’ forebears among the Muslims, sanctioned their imamate and accepted their shahāda [creed]; and that the scholars have refuted those who declared them infidels and have excused them as esotericists who do say the dipartite shahada and pray to Mecca and so forth, only that many of their common folk who live in tents do not know the shahāda, nor how to pray nor the direction of Mecca, like dumb beasts without religious restraint or moral discipline, just as we have observed them and as others who have observed them report.

It is clear and evident that these distinguished writings were more knowledgeable than others in the holy law and in these deviants’ beliefs. How can his flawed judgement possibly negate their fettvas and disavow their competency to render them? And if he agrees that those who treat the Muslims as infidels are themselves infidels, does he or does he not apply it to them? In the first instance, we take harbour in the superiority of those authors where each was the most learned and singular of his age. For they surely were infidels, and the position of those who excommunicate them is entirely clear in the holy law. And in the second instance, there remains a difference between sin and right-guidedness, and it is the best indicator of unbelief and apostasy. It is certainly correct that those who are ignorant are closer to salvation than those who are in error.”

6. Tripoli 2/2:134
(25 April 1678)

Kazıyıe: Dava-1 meclisü‘-şer-i şerif bi-Trablus
Sebeb-i tahrir-i kitab-ı seri bu-dur ki:

1. Mahmiye-i Trablus-Şam mukataatından Cübeyl nahyesinde mutavattın olan fahru‘l-akran
2. eş-Şeyh Sirhan bin Kansuh nam kimeseninin tarafından husus-ı atiü‘l-beyan için
3. vekil tayin idüb vekaleti Mehmed bin Sadedin ve Ahmed bin Mehmed nam kimeselerin
4. şehadetleri ile sabite olan Şeyh Yusuf Abu Dahir demekle şehir meclis-i şer-i hatir-i
5. lazımül-tazim ve'l-tevkirde bi'l-fil eyalet-i Trablus-Şam'a mutasarrıf ve vali-i vilayet olan
6. Mehmed Paşa (yesser Allah lahü ma yaşa) hazretlerinin mahzar-ı alilerinde bi-
tava ikrar u itiraf
7. idüb eyalet-i mezbura mukataatından Cübyel ve Betrun ve Cübbet Beşerray
nahiyeleri
8. cümle-i tevabi ve levahiki ve sair rüşmat-ı adiyesiyle gayr ez cûrm-i galiz bin
seksen
9. dokuz senesinde vaki Mart ibtidasından bir sene-i kamile değiin müvekkilim Şeyh
Sirhan
10. müşarün-iley Paşa hazretlerinin şartnameleri muecbince otuz dokuz bin esedi
11. guruşa iltizam ve kabul ve der uhde idüb ve bin seksen sekiz senesinde dahi
12. iltizam eyledüğü mukataat-ı merkumanın malinden zimmetinde dört bin guruş
13. cihet-i miriye baki kalmışdı ki min haysü'l-mecmu zikr-olunan mal-i atik u cedid
ile
14. kirk üç bin guruş alub meblağ-ı merkum sene-i mezbura temamından üç ay
15. mukaddem müşarün-iley Paşa hazretlerine temamen u kemalen eda u teslim
itmeğe müteahhid ve Nehr-i
16. İbrahim'den Suk-Su nam mahalle değiin mürum u ubur iden bina-ı sebil ve sair
17. reaya u beraya emn u aman üzere olub ber vechile zarar u gezend isabet
18. itdirmemeğe zamin u kefl olub zikr-olunan mahallerde na-hakk yere adam katl
19. olub veyahud bir kimesnenin birşey serika olunduğu malum ve muhakkak olur ise
mezkur
20. Şeyh Sirhan ana mutalib ve muatib ola ve ben-dahi zikr-olunan hususlar için
21. mezbur Şeyh Sirhan'a kefıl bi'l-mal oldum salifî'z-zikr mal-i cedid u atik olan
22. kirk üç bin esedi guruşı ifa olunacaya deën ehl u iyalım ile
23. müşarün-iley Paşa hazretlerinin taht-ı yedinde rehn tariki ile Trablus şehrinde
24. olmağa taahhüd eyledim" diyü ikrar-ı sahih-i şeri ve itiraf-ı serih-i meri eyledikde
makarr-ı mezbürin
25. vech-i meşruh üzere cari ve sadir olan ikrar fi'l-makar lahü el-muma-iley bi'l-
müvacce
26. tasdik u tahkik itmeğin hazihi'l-vesika li-ecli't-temessük bi't-taleb keteb u terkım
27. ve yed-i talebe def u teslim olunda. Tahriren fi'l-yevmi's-salis fi şehri Rebiî'l-evvel
min şuhuri
28. sene-i tisa ve semanın ve elf min hicreti man (lahû) 'l-izz üş-şeref ve'l-hamdü
lıllah. [...].

[signatures:]
Fahru'l-emacid ü'l-ekarim
Mehmed Ağa (dame
meCdûhû)
wa-'anhum min al-ḥâdirîn
Fahru'l-fuzala eş-Şeyh Mustafa
Hattib bi'l-camii'l-kebir
er-Racîl
Muftizade Fazlullah
Çelebi
İbrahim ibn
Fahru'l-akarin
Mustafa ---
7. Tripoli 3:64-5  
(7 May 1686)

Kadiye:  
Sebeb-i tahrir bu-dur ki:

1. Mahmiye-i Trabslusi’s-Şam muzafatından Cübeyl mukataası bin doksan altı senesinde iltizam ile zabt iden eş-Şeyh  
2. Sirhan ve Betrun mukataası mültezimi olan oğlu Huseyn ve Cübbe-i Beserray mukataası mültezimi olan  
3. Şeyh Ahmed-oğlu Huseyn nam kimesneler sene-i merkuma ibtidasından mukataat-ı merkumanın mal-i mirisi  
4. bi’l-nil Trabslusi’s-Şam eyalette mutasarrıf ve kabız-ı emval olan devletli ve seadetli Ali Paşa hazretlerinin taraf-ı  
5. alilerinden iltizam ve der uhde idüb mal-i miri kesr u noksan getürmeyüb mukataat reayasını  
6. huz u hirasetine cehd u sai olub na-hak yere adam katl olunmayub veya-hud bir kimesnenin şeyi zai olub ise  
7. Şeyh Sirhan zamin ü kefil olub ve mal-i mukatatta sene temamından iki ay mukaddem teslim-i hazine etmeye  
8. müteahhid ve mütekeffil olduğun sicil ve huccet olunub mal-i miri ve zikr-olunan husus icin Sirhan’ın tarafından  
9. Ali bin Mühlüm ve oğlu tarafından Huseyn bin Müblic ve Şeyh Ahmed-oğlu tarafından Kasım bin Hamdan kimesneleri  
10. müşarûn-ileyh Paşa hazretlerinin taht-ı yedinde Trabslusi’s-Şam kalesinde rehni tariki ile vaz itmişken tarih-i kitabdan  
11. iki ay mukaddem Paşa hazretleri Arab seferine memur olub Rakka sempine tèveccüh itmekle mezbūr Sirhan  
12. kavm ve hismleri ve hevalarına tabi olan eskiyayı ibadullahun üzerine taslit idüb reayayı  
13. irhab u tahvif için Hisnül-Ekrad ve Zanniye nahiyelerinde bir-kaç adam katl idüb evlerin yıktub  
14. reayının emval u erzak ve mevâsileri nehb u garet ve halk azim eziyet u mazarret idüb Zanniye  
15. reayası bi’l-külliye perakende u perişan ve mal-i mirisi tatil u zayı itdürüginden ma-  
   ada beş altı  
16. yüz nefer kavas ile gelüb Zanniye nahyésine tabi Haremeyn-i Muhteremeyn  
   evkâfı karyelerinden lylam nam  
17. karyenin ipek boçeği ve eğînleri itlaf idüb etraf u eknaf adamları taýın idüb ipek  
   besleyen  
18. reayayı dağdub cúmllesi meclus-i şere gelüb ilam-ı hal itmekle mezbûrdan sadur  
   olan û书画a û书画eadet  
19. nehy u nasihat itmek icin taraf-ı şerden bab naib Abdullah Efendi ile sabikan  
   yênîçeri zabiti olan  
20. İbrahim Çavuş Ağa’yın taýın u irsul olunuyub mezbûr Sirhan ile karye-i mezbûrede  
   mülakat idüb  
21. ibadullaha itdürünüz cevr u ezîyetden muradûz nedir” diyû sual eyledüklerinde,  
   “Ben vilayetiň tahrib u tamirine
8. Tripoli 3:185  
(25 December 1686)

Kayid bi’l-taleb fi gurreti i Şehr-i Safarul’-hayer li-sene-i 1098.

1. Emirül-ümera el-kiram kebirül-kübera el-fiham zu’l-kadri ve’l-ihatirah sahibül-izz ve’l-ihtisam el-muhtas bi-mezidi inayeti
2. ’l-melik el-allam Sayda ve Beyrut beğerbegisi olan İsmail (dame ikbalühü) tevki-i refi-i hümyun vasil olunacak malum
3. ola ki: Hala Trabulus-Şam kadsı Mevlana Seyyid Mehmed (zide fezayilühü) der-i seadetime arz gönderüb
4. Sirhan’un zimmetinde olan mal-i miri tahsil ve fesad u şekavet üzere olan mezburn oğlı
5. Hüseyn ve amuzadeleri Şeyh Ahmed’in oğlu Hüseyn ve Şedid ve Sad-oğlu Ömer ve Mehmed Kansu[h] nam
6. eskiyeyy el ele getürilüb kale-bend itmek babında mukaddemeh ve hala Sayda valisi olan ilê Man-oğlu Ahmed’e hitaben ferman-ı alıshan sadır olmus iken hala Baalbek nahiyesinde
7. mutavatın olan Harfuş-oğlı Şedid nam şaki hakkında dahi Trabulus-Şam valisi olan Ali Paşa’ya
8. hitaben miiekked ü müsedded ferman-ı ali varid olmagn vali-i müşarileyyh imtisalen li’l-emri’il-ali Harfuş-oğlü’nün
10. üzerine withstand mezbir Sirhan saki sahib çıkub cümle-i mal u ıyali ile yanna alub saklayub
11. Baalbek ve Trabulus nevahilerine zarar u eziyetlerden halı olmadıkları ecilen Sirhan’un üzerine
12. varılmak iktiza olunmakla Cübeyl dağlarında mutazamın olduğu karyeye withstandlardan bir gün mukaddem
13. Cübeyl sınırlarında vaki olub Man-oğlı’nın ıltizamında olan Kısırevan nahiyesinin
14. karyelerinde cümle-i eh ve mal u nevalleri saklayub Man-oğlı’na ıltica idüb iyallerinden
15. emin olduğu ecilen ișyani müstedd olub adamları firka firka idüb Trabulus nevahi[si]nden
16. nice fesad u şekavet ve ibad’ullah’a kemal mertebe eziyet u mazarret idüb Cübeyl ve Betrun ve Cübbetü’l-Beşerray ve Zanniye
17. nahiyesleri bi’l-külliye harab u yebab itdiklärinden ma-ada sair nevahinin mal-i mirisin itläf u izaat
18. itmesine kasd itmekle cümle-i Trabulus’un ayan u eşrafi Ali Paşa’nın taleb u ıltimaslarıyla varub
19. sinur yanında olan Cübeyl kalesine nüzul idüb eşkiyanın keyfiyet-i ahvalleri sual ü tecessüs
20. olundukda fi’l-vaki Sirhan’ın oğlinin oğlı Sirhan ve İsmail ve valideleri ve cümle-i eşkiyanın
21. ehl u iyalleri ve umum üzere Cübeyl ve Betrun reayasi Kısırevan nahiyesinin karyelerinde
22. oldukları sayı u mübeyyen olukda “eskiyanın gailesi ibad’ullah’un üzerinde refer
23. olsun” diyü iki defa davet olundukda davete icabet itmedüğüne bildirdiği ecilen imdi
24. senki Sayda ve Beyrut beşerbeğisi İsmail (dame ikbalühü)’sin mukaddeman varid olan emr-i şerif mucebine
25. tahsili lazım gelenlerden mal-i miriyi taht-ı hükümende olanlardan tahsil itdirrib kimesneye
26. muhalefet itdirmeyesin. Bundan sonra ihmal olunur ise senden tazmin alınırımız [?] olasin
27. diyü feran-ı alişanım sadir olmuşdur. Buyurdum-ki hüküm-i şerifimle [blank] varduında
28. bu babda sadir olan feran-ı alişanım mucebine amel idüb dahi vech-i meşruh üzere mukaddeman varid olan
29. emr-i şerifim mucebine tahsili lazım gelenlerden mal-i miriyi taht-ı hükümende olanlardan tahsil itdirdib
30. min bab kimesneye muhalefet itdirmeyesin şöyle-ki bundan sonra ihmal olunur ise mal-i miri senden
31. tazmin alınırımız olasin. Ana göre ziyade mukayyed u tahsili lazım gelen mal-i miri yerlrü
32. yerinden bi-eeyi vechehin kan tahsil itdirmeğin ihtimam idüb vech-i meşruh üzere [sadır]
33. olan emrimi yerine getüresin şöyle bilesein alamet-i şerifime itimad kulasın

Makarr-ı Kustantiniye-i mahruse.
9. MD 100:137:521
(late February 1691)

1. Şam beğenberği Murtaza Paşa'ya hüküm ki
2. Harfüş-oğlı Şedid nam müfsid Baalbek civarında olan Revafız eşkiyasıyla Baalbek
kasabasını başab nehb u garet edüb daimen katl-i nüfus ve hetk-i araz-i
3. Müslümanm eai olub fesad u şekavetiİl müstemir olduğu arz [ve] mahzar ile der-i
devlet-medarma ilam olunmağın senki mirmiran-ı mumaileyhön şaki-i mezbur
4. refikleriyle bi-eysi veçhip kan ele getirilüb müstehak oldukları cezaları tertib
olunmakla ehl-i İslam üzerinden şer u fesadların def eyleyesin
5. ve destur-i mükerrem müşir-m müfahham nizam'ül-alem Trablos valisi vezir um
Mustafa Paşa (edam Allah-teala icalehü) ile haberleşüb hüsn-i ittifık ile
üzerlerine
6. varub Baalbek kurbinde şab-i cibalde vaki kurada sakın olan Revafızın ehl-i
kurasına eşkiya-ı mezkurini ahz u teslim ve kendüleri
7. ruus-i cibalden kalkub kılliyet ile ovanı inüb sakın olub kendü hallerinde olmak
üzere teklif u ilzam eyleyesin emr-i hümayunum
8. mucebinçe ahd idüb şaki-yı mezkür (beyt)lerinden ihrac ve kendüleri ruus-i
cibalde vaki mevazii terk ve ovanı nüzul edüb kendü hallerinde olurlar ise
9. febiha ve illa eşkiyaya ianet u tesliminden mümanat idüb ve şer u fesadların
Müslümin üzerinden keff eylemezler ise şehan demleri heder olmakla
10. cezaları verüb irk-1 şekavet ve fesadların ol havalinden kat her vechile takayyud ve
ihitimam eylemek babında diyü hüküm yazılmasıdır. Fi evahur-ı Ce[mazi I 1]102.

Corruption from the Vicinity of Tripoli” (translation).
(1103/1691-92, sic)

“In addition to associating with tribes and clans, the brigands known as the Sirhan-
öğulları, of the heretical Shiite group that lives in the towering high, rocky mountains of
the region of Tripoli, had joined in partnership and concord with Ma'n-oğlu, from the
Druze faction which is settled in the areas attached to the tax fiefs of Sidon and Beirut.
This, and their assault and evasion of the tax farmers sent by the governors to manage
some of the fiefs, had been the reason for the shortfall in state income. By persisting to
exploit for themselves whichever fiefs they desired and took, and by continuing to
neglect to pay the miri-tax at the end of the year, their injustice and transgression had
gone over the limit. Earlier, the warden of the aforesaid province, the honourable vezir
his grace Ali Paşa, had communicated and petitioned to the Lotus court. Devotion and
effort in repulsing this sort of attacks being the most important of tasks, a providential
ferman, addressed to the same vezir, had been issued on the matter of drawing the sword
of vengeance to punish them.

So the aforementioned vezir set out from Tripoli, relying on the succour of the
Creator’s favour, and with as many soldiers and troops as he could assemble. He set the
foot of might and vengeance in the mountains of the Sirhan [lit., “the wolf”], and
undertook and persisted to struggle and fight with this gang of brigands.
A memorandum arrived from the aforesaid vezir stating that by the grace of God
on High the thread of their association was snapped. Many of them fell prey to the
sword, and of their chiefs, Husayn Sirhan-oğlu, his cousins Hasan and 'İsa, and
numerous accursed ones like them, became fodder for the blade of force and destruction. Ma'n-oğlu, their accessory, as well as those brigands spared by the sword, went the way of seeking quarter and swore off the wickedness and insubordination which had been their habit until now. Both the fiefs and the subjects were delivered from their grasp and oppression."

11. BOA: Ali Emiri II. Ahmed 392
(mid-February 1993)

1. Destur-ı mükerrer müşir-i mufahham nizamü'l-alem müdîr-i umurü'l-cümhur bil-fikr es-sakib musahhuh-ı mûhamî'l-enam bi'r-reyi's-saib muharrir-i bunyani'd-devlet ve'l-ıkbal müsîyyid erkani's-saadat ve'l-ıclal al-mahkuk bi-sunnuf-ı avatnî'l-meliki'l-ala

2. Şam eyaletinde mutasarrıf olan vezirim Mustafa Paşa (edam' Allah-teala iclelehü) tevki-i refi-i hümayun vasıl olicak malum ola ki: Trablus-Şam vilayetinde olan dağlarda

3. zuhur iden Kızılbaş taifesi sab u sengistan mahallerde tavattun edüb ol havallerde olan miri mukataatı tağallüben zabt ve beytülü'mal-ı Müslümine bi-hiyeli's-şer aid olan mahsulati ekl

4. ü bel eylediklerinden ma-ada ol taraflarda olan reaya fukarasının zulüm ü taaddilleri haddan ezun ve ehl ü iyallerin muhafazaya ve emval u erzak ve devab u mevaşi ve mezruat

5. ve esçar-ı müsemimelerin hırsat ve keyf ma-yeşa tasarrufa kudretleri olmayub zikrolunan eşkiyanın şere mütabaadları ve valilere inkıyadları olmadığından mal-ı miri hususda olan

6. gadırleri ve reaya fukarasına olan zulüm ü taaddileriye kayas olub ol havalide vücudları sebeb-i harabiyet-i bilad u mucib-i ihtilal-i mübaseret ü iyad olub ol havaliden

7. vücudları ref ve reaya-ı fuvarası üzerinden zulüm ü taaddileri ve mal-ı miriye olan gadır u zararlarının defi lazım olduğuün destur-ı mükerrer müşir-i mufahham nizamü'l-alem bil-fil Trablus-Şam

8. valisi olan vezirim Ali Paşa (edam' Allah-teala iclelehü) arz etmekle senki vezir-i müşarunileyhın husus-ı merkum için Trablus-Şam valisi vezir-i müşarunileyh ve destur-ı mükerrer müşir-i mufahham

9. nizamü'l-alem Sayda-Beyrut valisi vezirim Ahmed Paşa (edam' Allah-teala iclelehü) ve Man-oğlu dahi tayin olunmakla sen-dahi maan memur olmuşsundur. İmdî emr-i şerifim verdmiş gibî Trablus-Şam

10. valisi vezir-i müşarunileyh ile haberleşüb münasib gördüğü rey üzere bir muayyen ve malum vaktinde ittifak üzere hareket ve zikrolunduğı üzere tale-i mezberinin sakın ve mümtekkin

11. oldukları dağlara varılıb zikrolunan eşkiyanın cümleşi ahz ve şerle müstehak oldukları cezaları verilüb ol havalide olan reaya fuvarası şer u fasadlardan emin ve emval

12. u erzakları eydi-i tasallutlardan tahlis ve terkey-i ahval-i reaya ve istimar-i kura-ı mukataat ve tevfi-r-i hazine-i Trablus-Şam'a takayyûd u ihtimam olunmak üzere Trablus-Şam valisi vezir-i müşarunileyhin

253
13. arz eyledüğün iftiharül-üméra ve'l-ekabir baş defterdarım olan Ahmed (dame ulüvühü) ilam etmeğin vech-i meşruh üzere amel eylemek babında ferman-ı alısanım
15. dahi senki vezir-i müşarûnîleyhîns emr-i şerîfim vardıği gibi Trabulus-Şam valisi vezir-i müşarûnîleyh ile haberleşme müناسib görüştü rey üzere bir muayyin ü malum vaktide ittifak üzere
16. hareket ve zikrolunduğü üzere taife-i mezburunun sakın ve mütemekkin olduklarını dağılara varlub zikrolunan eşkiyanın cümlesi ahz ve şerle müstehak olduklarını cezaları verilib
17. ol havâli ile olan reaya fukarasının şer u føsadlarından temin ve emval ü erzakları eydi-i tasallutlarından tahlis ve terkiye-i ahval-i reaya ve istimâr-ı kura-i mukataaat ve tefîr-i hazine-i
18. Trabulus-Şam'a takayyûd u ihtimam eyleyüb varid olan emr-i şerîfimin mazmun-ı müنعم ile amil olasın emma mukâyeyd olasın-ki bir bahane ile kendi halinde olan reaya u berayaya bi-gayıri hakk
19. taaddi olunmak ihtimali olmaya şöyle bileşin alamet-i şerife itimad kılın. Tahrîren fi evail-i Cemâziü'l-Ahr sene erba ve mie ve elf.


12. **MD 105:10:31**
(early June 1694)

1. Trabulus-Şam beşlerbeğisi Arslan dame ikhalâhü'ye hüküm ki:
2. Senki mirmiran-ı mumaileyhsin memur olduğu Man-âğı Manuş-ı hususunda senden her vechile basiret ve intihab üzere hizmet memul ve muntazar olmakla
3. sana tenbih-i hümayunum olduğu vech üzere göreym seni ittmam-i hizmete bezl-i kudret ve izz-i huzur-ı fayız-î-l-hubur-ı husrevanemde karin-i istîhsan olacak
4. hidemât-ı cemile vücuda getürmeğe sarf-ı miknet ve her vechile izhar-î gayret ve hamiyet eyleyesin şöyleki bazı esab ve avarız ile fil-cümle eda u tekmilinde usret
5. ve kendinde adem-i kudret müşahede ve mülahaza ider 'сен sol ve orta kolda asker tesyirine memur olan vezirim Mehmed Paşa (edam' Allah-teala
6. iclelehü)'ye acaleten varub irişmek üzere haber gönderesinki vech-i meşruh üzere müşarûnîleyh feerman-ı şerîfim gönderilüb tenbih-i hümayunum olmuştur.
7. Memur olduğu üzere tarafîndan haber vürûdından sonra ol tarafâ vürûdük husus-ı merkum içün sana hitaben sadir olan evamir-i şerîfemi
8. bil-cümle müşarûnîleyh iradet ve hüsn-iâfak ve kemal-i ittihad ü ittifak ile mazâmin-i mûnifesini tenfiz ve icraya idkam ve ihtimam eyleyüb; hasile bi-eeyi vechin kan
(June 1694)

1. Anadolu'nun sol ve orta kollarında asker tesyirine ve eşkıya define memur olan vezirim Mehmed Paşa'ya hüküm ki:
2. Sayda-Beyrut dağılarında ikamet iden Man-oğlı Ahmed kendü halinde olmayub Trabulus dağılarında sakın vacib'il-izale Kızılbaş-ı melaine
3. ve sair ol etrafda olan ehl-i fesade muin olmakla zikrolunan eşkıya Trabulus dağılarında olan karyeleri tahrib ve daimen Müslümane isal-i
4. mazarradın halı olmuadığı mesmu-i hümâyunum oldukda bundan akdem imdad u ianetden men ve melain-i müfсидini ref içün sadır olan evamir-i şerifeye
5. imtisal itmeyüb ve müntebib olmayub ianet eyledügün na ziikrolunan mehazil kal u kam ve izaleleri valilerin rey ü tedbir ve ikdham u ihtimamlarıyla
6. suretpzir olmayub şekavetleri müstemirr ıkken düştür-i ekrem müşir-i efham nizam'il-alem nazım-i menazim'ül-ümem vezir-i azam ve serdar-ı ekremim Ali Paşa
7. (edam' Allah-teala icleheli ve zaafa ikdarehü) sene-i sabıka verilen fetva-i şerife mucebince sadır olan emr-i şerifle kal u kam ve istisallerine memur
8. oldukda bi-avn Allah-teala ekseri tume-i tig-i kahr u helak olub bakıyet-üş-süyuf olanları dahi karar ve bir dahi fesade ıkıddarıları kalmayıb ol havallerin
9. ehalisi şer u şiirlerinden emin olmuş-iken yine bu defa zat-ı mezkur Man-oğlı'nın ianeti ile bir yere müctemi ve imdadi ile takıyeb bulub cibilerlereinde
10. mermuz ve merkuz olan şekavetleri izhar ve adet-i kadimeleri üzere ibadullah'ı isal-i mazarrat ve ates-i bayğı u tuğyanları ışığı bulub mezkur Man-oğlu istizhar ile valileri üzere hümüm ve tahrib-i memlekete mutasaddi olub deñatan mazzarratlara memur olanlar ile mukatele ve eh-i İslaman
11. kirk elli nefer mikdari nüşus katlı ve bu misili nécessaire fesade ictira ve hasaretleri sem-i hümâyunuma ilka olunub menşe-i fesad u şekavet
12. olan mezbür Man-oğlı'nın cezası verilüb ref olmadıkça melain-i müfсидinin şer u şiirlerini mundeği olmayacağı zahir ü mütebeyin olmakla Trabulus-Şam
13. beğişbergini Arslan (dame ikbalıhu) hatt-i hümâyun-ı şevketmakrununla muvan emr-i şerifiyle şaki-i merkmü tümeayyin ü meşhur olan etbaim ahz ve kayd u bend ile
14. der-i devlet-medaruma irsal ve eğer bağı u isyan edüb mukateleye tasaddi ider ise katan tereddi ün olmayub kendiün u hevasına tabi olub fesad
15. u şekavet adet-i müstemmirresi olan eşkıyanın bi-la aman cezaları verüb başlarını der-i devlet-medarme göndermek üzere memur olub ol havalide olan
16. bilad u ibadin temin ü terfi-i alhallericin husus-i merkumun ittamam-i ihtimam ehemm-i mühümatdan olub ziyade asker muhtac olmakda Sayda-Beyrut
17. valisin umuman kapusi halkı ile kethüdası ve mümkelmel ve müstevfi tüfenk-endaz adamlaryla Şam ve Haleb mütesellimleri ve bin nefer tüfenk-endaz ile Kilis
18. voyvodasi ve Hama ve Homs voyvodalari ve Haleb eyaletteinin bil-cümle zuama ve erba-ı timari ve Trabulus-Şam ve Sayda-Beyrut ve Şam ve Haleb eyalettebin
19. serdar-ı ekremim ile sefer-i hümâyuna memur olmayan askeri makulesi ve sair haml-i silaha kadi olan piyade ü süvari il erleri nefir-i amm tarikyale
20. mirmiran-1 numaileyhin yanına tayin ve başka başka evamir-i şerifim gönderilüb tenbih-i hümâyunum ve tekid olunub savn-ı Hakkyla zikrolunan mehzilin izale

255
ü istisalleri aksa-1 mürad-1 hümayunum olub mirmiran-1 mumaileyih bu hususun ittamamında kendüde adem-i miknet müşahede eylediği surette der-i devlet-medarma
23. arz u ilam olunub tekrar ferman-1 hümayunum vüruduna dek müctemi olan askeri tehir ü tevkifi bais-i futur olmakla bu surette mirmiran-i mumaileyhi acaketen
24. tarafına ilam eylemek üzere fermanım olmağın sen-ki vezir-i müşarünlıleyhisin senin hüsn-i tedbir ve tedarikini iftimad-1 hümayunum olmakla imdi emr-i şerifim varduğu dek
25. vech-i meşruh üzere mirmiran-1 mumaileyhin yanına memur olanlara tarafına dan mubahisler gönderüb bir gün mukaddem fermanım olduğu vech üzere mirmiran-i mumaileyhin
26. yanına irls ve bu emr-i mühimmin temsiyetine cidd ü ikdam edüb yine mukaddemen memur olduğu hizmetden gerü kalmayıb Anadolu’nun sol
27. ve orta kollarında sefer-i hümayunuma memur olan tevaif-i askeriyye kemal-i sürat u isticil ile sefer-i hümayunuma sürüb ve zuhur iden eşkiya
28. u ehl-i fesadın şer ü mazarratların def u ref u isticale leyl ü nehar bezli iktidar ve senden memul ve muntazar olan vech üzere sai-i cemili
29. vüçude getürmege sai-i bi-şimar eleyüb ancak mirmiran-1 mumaileyhi tarafına daimen göz köylərək tutub adamlaryla eksik etmeyüb la-bi [sic] takattu haberleşüb
30. husus-1 mezbun istihbardin halı olmayanın şöylelesi bu emr-i mühimmde bazı avarız ve esbab ile suubet [sic] hasıl olmakla gözine göremeyüb
31. memur olduğu vech üzere tarafına arz u ilam ider ise ibra-1 zimmet etmiş olur gayrı bi-avnihi teala husuli senin uhde-i himmetini
32. mürtəbet olur mukaddem den memur olduğu hizmet dahi muattal olmamak için sol ve orta kollun asker tesyirini ve eşkiya defini tarafında
33. mühürülü kağıt ile Genç Mehemd (dame ikbalihüf) tefviz ü sipariş ve her tarafa muhkm tenbih ü tekid ve iktizasinà göre tedariğiğin görüb tekrar
34. der-i devlet-medarma arz u ilam ve haber vüruduna terakkub-1 takrib ile tehir ü tevakkuf idub zinhar fevt-i vakt-i fursat eleyemeyüb cemiyetden
35. perişan olmağın gece gündüz dimeyüb müstevfi asker ile sürat üzere erişüb mirmiran-i mumaileyhi ile şaki-i merkum Man-oğli
36. Ahmed’in üzerine varub ahz ve müteayyin u meşrub olan etbəmi kayd u bend ile der-i devlet-medarma irls ve eğer bağı u tüşyan
37. idub mubahbeye tasaddi ider ise aman vermeyüb kendünün u fesad u şekavetde ala-i-istimrar havadarı eşkiyanın cezaları verüb
38. bașlarını der-i devlet-medarma gönderüb şer ü sürürələr ol-havaliden defe hizmet ve hala Mir Musa’ya verilen hatt-i hümayunumla muanven
39. berat mücibince tayin edüb kendü halinde olan reayın nefisleri ve ehl ü iyal ve evlad u envalleri amin ve salih olub
40. gereği gibi himayet ü siyanet ve Sayda mukataatında şaki-i merkumun nakliyen zabit eyledıği mukataat kudvetil-üməra el-kiram [blank] (dame izzethü)’ye
41. der uhde olunmağın yedinde olan hatt-i hümayunumla muanven berat-i alişanını mucebine zabit u rabt ve istikamet-i alhvaline sai u dikkat ve bu husus için
42. müteşerrif-1 mirmiran-1 mumaileyhi hitaben sadır olan sair evamir-i şerifemin müzafet-i [sic] münifəsin dahı tenfiz ve icraya ve ol-havalinin
43. tənzim ve tensik-i alhvaline dikkat ve her vechiyle izhar-1 gayret ve hamiyet eylesin diyü yazılmışdır. Fi evasit-1 Şeval [1]105.

While governor of Tripoli, the grand vezir [Ali Paşa] had paid great attention to the security of these regions, properly taking revenge of the Shiite heretic brigands known as the Sirhan-oğulları in the mountains of that province and bringing their acolyte Ma'n-oğlu into obedience.

However, a letter came from Arslan Paşa, whom he had appointed beğlerbeği of Tripoli in his own stead, stating that the aforesaid faction was again embarking on its course of transgression and oppression. In order to punish them, it was suggested and recommended to appoint the said mirmiran Arslan Paşa; the beğlerbeği of Sidon; the intendants of Damascus and Aleppo; the feudal lords [zuama] and timariots of Aleppo province; the voivode of Kilis with 1,000 Kurdish musketeers; and, at their head as army chief, the honourable vezir Tursun Mehmed Paşa, designated chief inspector [müfettis] of Anatolia; and to strive and persevere in the matter of punishing the aforementioned brigands as was necessary.

When this faction heard and learnt that the vezir and these 20,000 men had reached the places known as Baalbek and the plain of the upper Bekaa', fear and dread befell their insides. They forsook patience and resolve and fled into the surroundings and environs.

However, they were pursed with utmost haste and expediency, and the many good-for-nothings who were caught received the punishment they deserved. So these regions were cleaned, as required, of their filth and corruption.

15. BOA: Şikayet 17:559:2530
(late November 1694)

1. Tursun Mehmed Paşa'ya hüküm ki:
2. Bundan akdem Trablus-Şam havalisine memur olduğu gibi hidemet-1 aliyemin neye münccerr olub ve ne suret bulduğu
3. bu ana deşin ihan olumnamakla imdi sen-ki vezir-i müşarın-leyhisin emr-i
şerifim verdiği gibi memur olduğu husus umur-1 mühimmeden
4. olmakla şimdiye deşin [---] üzere suret-pezir olduğu malum-1 humayunum
olmak için bir gün evvel ve bir saat mukaddem vuku
5. ve sihati üzere der-i devlet-medarım iılan eyleyesin diyü yazılmışdır.


16. Sunni Islamic Court of Sidon 1:28 (1)
(March 1699)

Hādhihi şurat shartnāmat nusf muqāta’at Iqīlim al-Shawmar bi-nām al-shaykh Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥājj Naṣir al-Dīn Munkar.

1. Here Bekaa-1 Azam, correctly Bekaa-1 Aziz.
Sebeb-i tahrir-i kitab-ı kalem / ve mucib-i tastir-i hitab-ı kism olduğu:

1. Hala devletlü Kaplan Mehmed Paşa Efendimizin mutasarrıf olduğu Sayda ve Beyrut eyaletine tabi İklimü
2. 's-Şevmer mukataasının reayası üzerinde edası lazım gelen mal-i miri ve mal-i [hevats?][] sene-i
3. sabakada olageldiği üzere maa mal-i avarız ve kışlak-ı Arab u Ekrad u Türkman
gayr ez hıssa-ı
4. zeamet ve timar ve evkaf ve gayr ez hıssa-ı defterdar-ı Şam ve gayri ez cerm-i galiz
mukataa-ı mezbure tem[amen]
5. Şeyh Süleyman ibn şeyh Sab'ın uhdesine geçmek ile nısif-ı hıssa-ı darende-i
şartname iftiharü'l-meşayih
6. Şeyh Mehmed bin Hac Nasirüddin yalnız dört bin yedi-yüz elli esedi gurusça
uhdesinden taleb
7. u ragib olub mukataa-ı merkumenin nısfı mal-i mezkur ile taahhud u kabul
itmekle işbu bin
8. yüz on senesi Mart'ı ibtidásından sene-i mezbure temamına deün mukataa-ı
mezburenin nısfı
9. zabt itmek içün işbu şartname tahrir olunub yedine verilmiştir. Gerekliği vech-i
meşruh
10. üzere mukataa-ı merkumenin nısfı zabt u rabt idüb reayalarının üzerinde edası
11. lazım gelen mal-i miri kızüvi külli kadımdenin olageldüğü üzere cem u tahsil ve
ahz u kabz
12. idüb ve tahsil eyledüğü mal-i miri evvel bi-evvel defaatla Divan-i Sayda'ya
gönderüb teslim-ı hazine
13. eleyüb ve teslimatına vusul-i temessüki alub taahhud eyledüğü nısf-ı mukataanın
mal-i mirisi
14. olan dört bin yedi-yüz elli esedi gurus-ı üç rubi Devlet-i Aliye tarafına Sayda'dan
ihrac u ırsal
15. olunan hazine mahallinden eda u teslim ve kursur kalan rubi sene-i mezkure
temamından ıki ay mukaddem
16. bi't-temamu'l-kemal teslim eyledikden-sonra vusul temessüklerin getürüb huzur-
1 karda muhasebesin
17. görüb halas-ı temessük ve kat-ı alakasin [---] hilaf-ı şer u kanun olageldüğü
mugayır
18. reaya u berayadan ziyade bir şey talebiyle zulm ü taaddi eylemeyüb şurut-ı
merkumeyi meri ü müeddeda
19. klub ol babda turuk-ı ahırdan dahil ü taarruz olunmaya. Tahriren fi't-tarihi'l-

17. AE Bı 1114 (Tripoli) fol. 116a-b
(Pouillard to Pontchartrain, 28 August 1705)

 [...] Nous y avons eu depuis un an quatre Pachas, Ibrahim, Aly, Ismael, et Moustapha
avec lequel je vis tres bien, mais j'ay fort regretté Ismael homme d'un merite singulier et
duquel je pouvois tout esperer pour Nos affaires, nous avons eu aussi quatre Cadix, c'est
ce qu'il a augmenté nos dépenses, tous ces changements font assés connoistre le desordre

258
quil y a dans le Gouvernement, le Gd. Seigr. ne scait par ou sj prendre pour chatier ses rebelles dans un tens qu’il est en paix avec tous les Princes chretiens, je vois dans cette belle Province de Sirie et dans la Palestine des Courdes, des Turcomans, des Amediens, des Druzes à deux visages et (qui pis est) un deluge d’Arabes tous munis d’armes à feu, et qui ont pris goust au pillage des Caravanes, et ces rebelles sont Maîtres du pays. Le Pacha de Tripoly n’a de revenu sur le Liban que ce que les Amediens veulent bien lui donner, ils en chassent les agas et les soldats et commandent en souverains sur les X.tiens et sur le Patriarche qui leur fournissent chaque jour leur subsistance, et un droit sans oser se plaindre de leurs concussions, encore est-il un peu mieux traité depuis que j’ai eu occasion au Liban de m’aboucher avec le cheik de ces rebelles [116b] à qui jay fait connoistre que le Roy pour qu’il a un respect infini et dont jls esplai d’entendre les grandes victoires, protegeroi toujours ce Prelat de toute son autorité en donnant ses ordres à son Ambassadeur de le recommander à La Porte. [...].

18. BOA: MM 3347:4
(1122/1710-11)
Mukataaa-ı Cübeyl der uhde-i Kızılbaş şeyh İslma biểnada sene-i kamile an guruş
14300
8152
6148 Teslimat bi’d-defat ila hazine-i merkume.

1. Mukataa-ı mezburda vulat-ı salıfe eeyamdan Cebel-i Şuf mültezimi olan
2. Man-oğlı Mir Hayder Şihabi kefaletiyle Kızılbaş taifesinden Hamada-oğlı
3. Seyh İslma nam şaalsa ilzam oluna gelüb mutad-ı kadime binaen merkumun kefaletiyle mesfura
4. on dört bin üçyüz guruş ilzam olunub meblağ-ı mezburdan sekiz bin yüz
5. elli iki guruş teslim eyledikden-sonra sene ortalında mezbur Mir Hayder’in isyanı
6. sebebiyle mesfur İslma daih tarik-i şekavete salik olub baki kalan altı bin yüz
7. kirk sekiz guruş edadan imtina ve etraf-ı nevahide olan kuraya istila ve devab u
8. mevaşilerin sürüb fukaraya taaddi ve kat-i tarike tasaddi etmekle nasihat olunur ise
9. mütenassh olmayub şekavet ü şenatinda yevmen fa-yevmen ısrarı müşayid
olmakla hala
10. meblağ-ı mezbur zimmetinde kalmışdır.

19. AE B’ 1114 fol. 285b
(Boismont to Pontchartrain, 30 June 1710).

[...] Le patriarche déposé est naturellement enchaîné, de peur que s’il sortit, il n’allait à Constantinople, ou ne recourût à la protection du cheik des amédiens ou de celuy des Druses qui ne demanderoient pas mieux pour manger de l’argent aux maronites: on apprehende encore qu’un homme qui a été capable de commettre inceste avec sa propre sœur, ôt une niece, sodomie, bestialité, ôt homicides en la personne d’un de ses Religieux qui l’avoir surpris in flagrante delicto avec sa soeur, ne pris la resolution de se faire Cure pour continuer ses debordemens et que son exemple, n’attirât plusieurs de ses parents au mahomedisme.
de se faire Cure pour continuer ses debordemens et que son exemple, n'attirât plusieurs de ses parents au mahomedisme.

Le chek des amediens n'a pas été plutôt de retour du voyage qu'il eût allé faire chez les Druses, qu'il m'est venu voir; C'est un vieillard qui a beaucoup de vivacité et d'amitié pour les Sujets du Roy: il m'assura que tant que luy ou les siens gouverneroient le Mont Liban, nos missionnaires pour lesquels j'ajouta avoir une veneration particulière y trouveroient tout l'agrément qu'ils pouvoient désirer.

20. AE B' 1114 (Tripoli) fol. 289a-b.
(Boismont to Pontchartrain, 2 August 1710).

[...]

Les amediens de Gebaide ayant maltraité quelques uns des gens de notre Pacha qu'ils ont rencontrez en chemin de Caibour, il a deja faire partir quantité de bannieres pour aller les en faire repentir, on ne sait point encore sil n'ira point en personne, ayant protesté de vouloir exterminer ces rebelles du G. Seigneur, quoy qu'ils soient en fort petit nombre, il ne laissera pas d'avoir beaucoup de peine a en venir a bout, car outre que les amediens du Mont Liban et d'autres iront problem. au secours des premiers, les pais qu'ils habitent sont si difficiles et si escarpez et ils y sont si faits, qu'ils ne craignent pas un nombre d'hommes de beaucoup superieur a eux: il y a pourtant eu un Pacha anciennement a Tripoly qui en a bien exterminnez avec le secours des Pachas de Seyde, de Damas et d'Alep auxquels nôtre en a demandé.

Le Patriarche des maronites deposé, m'ecrivit il y a quelque tems par un de nos missionnaires Carme dechaussé qui a quelque part a sa deposition, et qui la [289b] veu avec un cible dans le couvent ou il est en penitence au Castrevan, pour me prier de m'emparer d'une somme d'argent qui luy appartenoit et qu'il avoit deposée chez des religieux de sa nation au Mont Liban. Trois des cheks du Castrevan m'ont expedié un cavalier avec la même priere, les derniers allegrent que cette somme appartenoit a la chaise Patriarchale de Canobin. Les uns et les autres sont venus trop tard, le chek Hayssé amedien et gouverneur du Mont Liban les a tous mis d'accord et s'est emparé de cette somme consistant en 2661. p.es. 1/2. en abouquels² dans deux cruehes de terre et ajouté au surplus que non seulement le G. Seigneur avec toute sa puissance, mais encore Mahomet ny Aly de la secte dont il est ne luy feroient pas rendre cette somme, a la restitution de la quelle il ne croyoit pas meme que les plus severes casuistes chretiens pussent l'obliger, puis qu'un des neveux du Patriarche sous le nom duquel il lavoit mise, etoit venu luy reveler l'endroit ou elle etoit cachée, luy avoit remis le billet des depositaires et l'a luy avoit donné a condition qu'il luy en separeroit une portion, qu'il n'avoit pas deviné ou etoit cette somme, qu'il n'evoit jamais oùy parler, qu'il n'avoit fait violence a personne pour s'emparer d'un don gratuit qu'on luy avoit fait et qu'il avoit reconnu le bien faiseur le 200. piastres. Il est aisé de deviner que le neveu craignant que la chastre ou les cheks du Castrevan ne s'emparassent de cet argent, a mieux aymé le donner a ce chek dans [290a] l'esperance d'en avoir quelque portion. Les Evèques et les cheks saisoient depuis long têmes ou il etoit, et est leur faute de n'avoir pas parli plutôt, cest ce que jay repondu aux derniers et qu'il ne m'etoit pas permis d'aller chez le Chek Hayssé avec eux comme ils le souhaitoient pour ne rien avancer. [...]

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2. Ecu d'Hollande.
21. BOA: MM 3348:3.
(1123/1711-12)

Mukataa-i Cübeyl sene-i 1122 vacib an guruş 14300.

1. Mukataa-i mezbura bin yüz yirmi iki senesinde on dört bin üzyüz guruş Kızılbaş taifesinden Hamada-ögli
2. Şeyh İsmail Cebel-i Şuf mültezimi Man-oğlu mir Hayder Şihabi kefaletiyle der uhde olunmuştu.
3. Sene-i mezbura evahurunda merkum mir Hayder tarık-i şekavete salik olmakla mezbur şeyh Ismail dahi merkum
tabiyan şenaiet ü mefsedet izhar idüb sene-i mezburadan zimmetinde lažım gelen mal-i miriyi temamen verildüğinden ma-ada
4. etraf-i nevahiide olan kura üzerine müstevli ve devub u mevaşilerin nehb ve nice
kimesne mi katlı [u] cerh itmekle her cend ke nasihat
5. olundu mütenassih olmayub kat-i tarık ve nehb-i emval-i ebna-yı sebile dahi
tasaddi idüb bir gun ala hin gafletin min ehliha
6. Trabulus-Şam ile Beyrut beyininde memerde vaki Cübeyl kalesi üzerine müstevli olub dizdari Yusuf ile on beş nefer mikdarı
7. Müslimin şehid itmeleriyle def-i mefsedet ü mazarra’tları ve bin yüz yirmi üç
sene sine mahub olmak üzere mukataa-i mezbura yerleşdirilüb
8. ber suret-i ifrag olunmak icin kethüdâzuz kullari irsal olunmuşdu. Taife-i mezbure dahi şenaietlerinde israr ve cümle-i reayayı ve devub u mevaşileriyle
9. Cebel-i Ksrevan tarafına sürüb ve kendiler dahi zirve-i cebel-i merkumda vaki
sabût-l-mürur mağaraları u dereleri cay-penah idilüb ihtifa
10. ve reayânın dahi önlerine sedd olub avdetlerine mani olmalarıyla harir mevsim
hilali olmağın bulunan haslarından kendiler katf u ahz eylediklerinden sonra
11. bakiyet kalan bir mikdar hariri ahz ve avdet eylediler. Lakin mal-i mukataa ala
halihi kalub ve haliyan reayasi dahi
12. yerlerine avdet eylememişdir.

22. AE B' 1114 (Tripoli) fol. 359b-360a.
(Boismont to Pontchartrain, 5 August 1711)

[...]

Depuis le retour du kiaya de la guerre contre les Amediens ces derniers font des
courses assez près de Tripoly. Le cheikh Aismin dont il a coupé m/70. muriers et ruiné un
tres beau serail près de Gebail, est venu dans Gebail même, a pris l'aga qui y comâdoit
pour le Pacha et la coupé en morceaux avec 12. o 13 de ses Soldats. Le cheikh Haissay dont
il a aussi ruiné le serail a Niaka qui gouvernoit du coté du Mont Liban y revient tous les
jours, prend tout ce qu'il peut et ne fait quartier a personne: l'on dit que le Pacha veut
aller lui-même contre ces gens là. S'il est bien conseillé il n'en fera rien, car il sera batu.
Si son kiaya lorsqu'il avoit près de 4000. hommes s'étoit ataché a les detruire au lieu de
couper des arbres il en seraît venu à bout et aurout conservé m/100. Écus de rente par an.
[...]

261
23. MD 121:1:2
(mid-June 1713, addendum 21 October 1713).

1. Trablus-Şam valisine ve [blank] ve [blank] kadılarına
2. ve Avret adası kalesi dizdarına hüküm ki:
3. Trablus-Şam kadısi Mevlana Mehmed (zidet kaza)'yle [sic] ordu-1 hümayuna
4. mektub gönderüb Trablus-Şam'ın ülema u suleha ve emime u hutaba ve ayan
5. ve sair ehalisi meclis-i şera varub Trablus-Şam ehalisinden olub sabikan
6. nakibü'l-şrafı kaymakamı olan Şeyh Mustafa kendü halinde olmayub daimen
   Kızılbaş-1
7. bed-meas ile ittifak u ittihad ve herbar mezburları tahrik ve reaya ve sair
   ibadullahın
8. emvalleri garet ve katlı nüfus itdirmeğe delalet idüb sabikan Trablus-Şam valisi
   ikaz eyledüzü fitne
10. sebebi ile reayanın perakende olmallarına ve mukataatin tenezzüline biais
    olduğündan ma-ada bu sene
11. dahi Kızılbaş taifesini tahrik ve zimmetlerinde olan mal-i miriyi ibtal ve
    iğvasından naşı
12. Kızılbaş tarafında olan mukataat henüz ta füruz kalub mal-i mirinin kesr u
    noksan terettübine
13. biais olduğu sen-ki vezir-i müşarun-ileyhsin tarafına ilam olduğunun haberialdiği
    beş-i mezbur
14. Şeyh Mustafa der akab hilaf-i vaki şişayet ve yine nikabet almak kasdyla bu
    tarafa firar
15. etmekle mezbur islah-1 nefs için bir cezireye nefi olunmak babında hüm-i
    hümayunum verilmek ricasına
16. vaki hüsn-i arz ve ehalisi mahzar etmeleriyile vech-i meşruh üzere mezbur
    bulunduğ mahalde ahz
17. ve Avret adasına nefi ve habs u kalebend olunmak emrim olmuşdur.

[Addendum:]
Avret adasına nefi ve iclası için bundan akdem emr-i şerif sadir olub lakin ahval-i
habsiyiye Rakka kalesinde kale-bend olunduğunda Rakka valisi Mehmend Paşa tarafından
ilam olunmakla mukaddemân sadir olan emr-i şerif gayri mahalle Rakka kalesinde kale-
bell olduğu kaydı u [---] olduğu der-kenar olunmak üzere ferman-1 ali-i şerifim verildi.

(Pouillard to Pontchartrain, 30 August 1713)

[...] Les Corsaires nous suscitent toujours quelques affaires nouvelles, l’autre jour un
Maltois prit entre Sour et Acre une petite fille de deux ans dont les Pere et Mere
s’estoient écarts et fuyaient à la veue des Maltois débarqués en ce lieu la. [196a] Le Pere
de cette petite fille avec les Cheiks de Becharé sont accourus a Seyde et y ont beaucoup
pleuré devant Ibrahim Pacha menacesnts de saisir a leur pégage toute les fransçois qui y
passeront, j’ay cette obligation au Pacha qu’apres ses premiers feux jettés il s’est contenté de mes raisons et ma prié de faire rachetter a ses dépenses la ditte petite fille. [...] 

25. AE B¹ 1019 (Seyde) fol. 274a-b
(Extract from letter of Patriarch Jacques, 1 February 1714).

[...] Hebbi l’honore d’inviergli una mia da Gibaïl nella quale le raguagliavo in non haver roccato il Ketroïano se non di mero passaggio per la marina et hora signi suo a V S Ill.ma. qualmente con li doi Vescovi Chiralla et Elia, col Sig.r. Console Naufel da Gibaïl siamo portati dal Schiek Ismaël ove trovavasi il Sciek Issa li quali si incontrorono e ci fecero molte accoglienze e di la ci portassimo con il Sciek Issa e li Christiani Capi del Monte Libano nel Giobbe in casa di Chek Issa ove fecerò varie allegrezze di Speri, e giochi di cavalli e grosso pasto e mi regalo di una veste di pellicione grande e mi fece accompagnase con il suo figlio grande alla sedia ove si trattenne il Chek Naufel et esso con li Vescovi una settimana intiera a la circonvicina gente christiana tutto giorno vamo e vengano. così anche [274b] havende io sentito una lettera al cassis abdalla cugino del suo Torcimano si porta da me in Canobino con alcuni suoi monaci dimostrando soumissione...

26. AE B¹ 1019 (Seyde) fol. 305a-b
(Extract from letter of Patriarch Jacques, 18 March 1714)

[...] P.S. Soggiongo á S. G. Ill.ma qualmente il poco timorato di Dio Torbey con il curato di Tripoly, et alcuni di Edem, etdi Tripolys et forse con il consenso delle Missionnary, si sono intrapresi una opera diabolica con fao scrivere uno memorialie al Pacha nuovo di Tripoly contro di me dicendo che peo infamita fui deposto, e che col Bracuo della cheiza Romana, e descroi Decreto sono stato rimeso per forsa dei franchi, e che la Natione Maronita non mi accetta pih per hauer datto tante Borse di Mancia, alle corti di Roma, edl francia e tante altri Borse al principe dei Drusi, Amedei e altri capi di Montagna, con altre infamita per per gittarmy in Boua de Tiranni, sia pur sempre lo dato [305b] IDdio che voui erani festaré lutte le loro magagné, falsita e calomnia passate, e sapendo essi la mia pouerta e necessita la mascherano con Borse et Richeze, non temo chi amara il corpo, ma quello che occide il corpo et l’anima, egli getta in gonna...

27. AE B¹ 1020 (Seyde) fol. 140b-141a
(Pouillard to D’Estrées, 21 March 1717)

[...] Le p.er. de ce mois le Pacha de Tripoly a fait adroitement surprendre le Chek aissé a Antoura village éloigné de cette Ville d’environ 4 lieties, ce Chek des amediens, de la secte d’Aly dits Kislibachs a regnu au Mont Liban depuis 30 années et jamais les Pachas toutus puissans qu’ils fussent n’avoient pù sen déaffaire, il fut pris de nuit et sa teste a esté exposée a Tripoly et envoyée a Cons’ple, ses neveux et 20 des siens surent assuy surpris avec luy et ils ont eu le même sort, cet événement est cause d’un trouble qui finira bientôt, car le Pacha de Tripoly ne fait de grands préparatifs de guerre que pour obliger Ismain, autre p’al Chek des Amediens qui est le Maistre du pays entre Tripoly et Barut dans la ville de Gibaïl ou il fait sa residence Bd.re., d’en venir a un traître de paix sous la
caution de l’Emir des Druses dépendant du Gouvernement de Seyde et chës lequel ledt. Chek Ismain s’est [141a] refugié parce que ces rebelles sont tous d’accord pour leur propre conservation. L’Emir des Druses ne vient point a Seyde et il faut que les Pachas envoyent chës luy a Der el Kamar a 6 lieües d’icy, le Cady et ses p’aux agas luy porter la veste d’arrentement et de temps en temps de ses gens pour luy en demander le payemt., cet Emir peut avoir 15 mille ho’es dans le besoin. La guerre du Pacha de Tripoly avec les Amediens fait crier les francois parce que les exporés porteurs de leurs lettres de negoce ne peuvent point aller et venir. Avant peu de jours toute cette guerre sera terméénée et quand il en couste icy 12 testes c’est une bataille sanglante et peu commune, cependant Osman Pacha de Seyde ayant voulu il y a 7 ans monter au Kesroûan y perdit 4 ou 500 ho’es et 200 bourses de l’arrentement.

28. MD 130:117 (1)
(mid-May 1721)

1. Trabulus-Şam valisi vezir Mehmed Paşa’ya hüküm ki
2. Trabulus-Şam múlňatlarından Cübeyl ve Bétrun ve Cübbetü’l-Beşerri
   nabiyelerinde mútemekkin olan Kızılbaş taifesı kadımden bağ y tuğyan ile meluf
   omlarilyla üç seneden berü
3. zimmetlerinde edası lazım gelen mal-i milirleri tahsili için be-her sene üzerlerine
   tarafıñdan ikişer defa asker-i mevfure irsali ile taziyik olundukça tahsili mümkün
   olmaduğundan bin yüz
4. otuz iki senesi ibtidasından dahi üzerlerine vafir asker irsal olunmak üzere iken
   tâife-i merkuma Man-öğli Mir Hayderi’s-Şihâbi tavvussat ve kefaletiyle
   mukataalarını
der uhdı ve sene ahiřinden bir iki ay mukaddem malini edaya taahhüd etmişler
iken ol-vaktinde askeriñden bir mikdarı cerde hizmetine tayın olundukda
mezburlar intihaz-i fursat ile mukataaları
6. etrafında sair mukataata dest-i têtvüllerdi diraz ve Dannîye mukataası
   ehalisinden sekiz nefer Müslüman katlı ve ahar mahalden dahi vafir devab u
   mevaşa sürmeleriyle
7. mezburların def u ref-i şevketleri ve zimmetlerinde olan mal-i mirinin tahsili
   içiñ vafir asker tedarik ve oğluñ Zeynül-Abidin (zide mecdühi) ile tayın ve
   civar(lar)inda vaki Bétrun
8. nam mahalle irsal ve zimmetlerinde olan mal-i miri yımi gün mikdarı mezburları
   mahall-i merkuda taziyik ile tahsil olunub ve iṣüb bin yüz otuz üç senesi
   hulülinde
9. tâife-i merkumann reisi olan Şeyh Ismail Hamada’ñın iki mektubu gelüb
   mazmunlarında “Bu sene mukataata alman. Akraba ve taalukatım ile bozuşdum”
   diyü işar etmekle
10. mezburun bu gene.revísinde eyyam-i maziyede tecriye olunan evza u etvarına
    köyas ile isyan u şevaket kasd-i pasidi olduğu münfehim olduğın bundan akdem
    tarafıñdan
11. kapu-kethûdañ Mehmed (zide mecdühi’ye gelen kaimênde tahrir u inha ve
    Trabulus-Şam kadısı ve ehalisi taraflarından dahi arz u mahzar ile ilam
    olunmuşdı. El-haletü hazihi:
12. taife-i merkume hal-ı ruka-ı itaat eyledikleri müteayyin ve mukataat bi’l-külliyet iltizam itmeyiüb şesad u şehvetleri yevmen fa-yevmen mütezayid ve ol tarihden Beyrut ve Sayda caniblerine
13. ijab u zehab münkât olub bi’z-zarure kuva-ı tedarik ile üzerlerine varmak muktaza olmakla mutad-ı kadim üzere Sayda ve Şam valileri taraflarından imdad u ianet ve Mir Hayder’i Ş-Sihahi dahi bu husus için maiyetiñe memur olmak muhtac idği bu defa dahi kaimeñe ilam olunmağın bu makule pa-nihade girive-i isyan u tuğan
15. olan eşkiyânın tenkil ü guşmâllari cade-i itata irca u iadeleri ve mal-i mirinin tahsili akdem-i umur-i devlet-i aliymenden olmakla ahz u istisali lazım gelenlerin kahr
16. u tedmir ve def u ref-i şesad u şehvetleri emval-i mukataatın tahsilinde rey-i savab-diden üzere amel ü hareket ve bezl-i vüs u kudret eylemek üzere mezkur Mir Hayder’e bir kata
17. ve Şam valisi
18. vezirim Osman Paşa (edam’ Allah-teala iclehü)
19. müstevfi asker ile ve mutad ve kar gözür aşım ve Sayda-Beyrut
20. valisi vezirim Osman Paşa (Ittal’ Allah-teala iclehü) dahi müstevfi
21. asker ile kethüdasını yaniña gönderüb ve imdad u ianet ve temşiyet-i emrine takviyet vermek üzere
22. veziran-ı müsar-ileyhim dahi başka başka evamir-i şerifem isdar u irsal ve bu husus içen
23. mübaşır tayin olunmuşdur. İmdı sen-ki vezir-i müsarünileyhsin veziran-ı mumar ileyhimaya ve mir-i mumarileyhine tarafından dahi
24. hader gönderüb vezir-i müsarileyhimânın irsali feranım olan asakir ve mir-i mumarileyhi yaniña istishab
25. ve ıktizador göre basiret-i intibah üzere hareket ve eğer üzerlerine varılmak lazım gelür ise birden
26. üzerine varub muharebeye tasaddi iderler ise siz dahi muharebe ve bi-avn Allah-teala cemiyetleri
27. tefrik ve mal-i mirisi tahsili lazım gelenlerden bi’t-temam tahsil u tekmil ve edasında taallul
28. ü muhalifet ile isnad-ı bilada bais olanların şerle haklarından lazım geleni icra
29. ve def u ref-i şer u mazarret ve hüsn-i nizam-ı memlekete ihitimam u dikkat ve bezl-i
30. vüs ü kudret eylemek babında feran-ı alışanım sadir olmuşdur
31. buyuruldu. Fi evasit-ı (Rece) [1]133.

29. MD 130:415 (3)
(August 1722)

1. Trablus valisi vezir el-hac Osman Paşa’ya hüküm ki
2. Şenki vezir-i müsarünileyhsin suddie-i saadetime arzuhal gönderüb hala uhdeende olan
3. Trablus-Şam mukataat mülhakatından Kızılbaş mukataası külliyetle mukataa olub be-her sene eslaflı
4. olan vułat mukataa-ı merkumâsi Man-oğlı Mir Hayder kefaletiyle yine mukataa-ı merkum ehalisinden İsmail Hamada’ya iltizam

265
5. idüb ve mukataa-ı mezkure merkuma iltizam olunduğu halde civarında olan kuralar ehalileri malleri nehb u garet
6. olunmakdan memun u emniyet tariki dahi hasil olur diyü mukataa-ı merkuma mezkur İsmail’i tefviz ve merkum Mir Hayder
7. kefaletiyle huccet-i şerife olunmuş mezkur İsmail iltizami yanında kabul eylemeyüb mukataa-ı merkuma reyasının ekserini kahidrúb
8. Baalbek nahiyesinde İsmail Harfuş nam Közilbaşın bulduği mahalle gönderüb mukaddemân ide-geldüğü masiyeti icra’ya tasaddî ile
9. mal-i mirinin tahsili tatile bais olduğun ilam ve bundan akdem düştür-i mükerrer Traplus-Şam valisi vezir Osman
10. Paşa (edam’ Allah teala içlalehû) mukataa-ı merkumanın mali tahsili lazım gelenlerden bi’t-temam tahsil eylemek ve edasında taallül
11. ve muhalefet ile ifsad-ı bilada bais olanların şere haklarından lazım gelen cezaları tertib olunmak babında
12. verilen emr-i şerifim mucebine istista-yi inayet eyledîn divan-ı hümayunumda mahfuz olan ahkam kaydına müracaat
13. olduka vech-i meşruh üzere emr-i şerifim verildiği mestur u mukayyed bulunmağın mukaddemân sadır olan emr-i şerifim mucebine

Fi evail-i Zi[lkade 1]134.

30. MD 134:86 (2)
(early May 1727)

1. Trabulus-Şam beğlerbegişi İbrahim (dame ikbalühü)’ye hüküm ki:
2. Der-i devlet-medarima irsal eyldüüîn kaimen vurud idüb hulasat-i mefhumundan Trabulus-Şam mukataatından Cubeyl ve Betroon ve Cübbetü’l-Beşerri mukataalarına
3. Beni Hamada eskiyasını ma-takaddümünden berü tagallüben vaz-ı yed sevdasında olmalaryla bu sene-i mubarekede dahi meluf oldukları habasetine sürü itdikleri
4. halinde eskiya-ı merkumanın yurduları Sayda topağı Kisrevan tabir olunur sunra karib olmakda üzerine varıldukda Sayda topaçaına geçüb
5. zikr-olunan Kisrevan karyelerinde tahassun iden hataları melhuz olmağın üzerine vardığıda Sayda topaçında mezburları kabul ve himayet olunmayub
tarafa teslim olunmak üzerine düstureyn-i mükerrermeyn müşireyn-i mufahhameyn nizamül’alem Sayda valisi vezirim Abdullah Paşa ve Şam valisi ve mir-i hacçi
6. vezirim İsmail Paşa (edam’ Allah teala iclalehüma)’ya evamir-i şerifem verilmek üzere arz etmekle zikr-olunan şekavet-pişelerden Sayda
7. eyaletine firar ider olur ise kabul olunmaysub tarafına redd ü teslim ve ianetinde olmaların veziran-ı müşarûnilehimaya başka başka başka başka emr-i şerifim isdar
8. u irsal olunmakla sen-ki mirmiran-ı mumaileyhsin eskiya-yi merkuma mal-i mirileri vermeýib adet-i melufaları üzere şekavete tasaddî iderler ise
31. MD 135:387 (2)
(late July 1729)

1. Sayda beğlerbegisi Süleyman (dame ikbalühü)’ye hüküm ki:
2. Emirü’l-ümra el-ekram Trabulus-Şam beğlerbegisi İbrahim (dame ikbalühü)
3. sed-i saadetime arzuhal gönderüb mirmiran-ı mumailiyhin uhdesinde olan
4. Trabulus-Şam mukataat mültezimlerinin Lublub-ı Cübeyl mukataası mültezimi olan Hamadi-oğlu
5. Kızılbaş İsmail fesad u şekavet ve tuğyan u gavayet üzere olub mirmiran-ı
6. mumailiyhin memur olduğu cerde hizmeti ol sene azimetinden sonra Trabulus
7. mukataatına isal-ı hasaret ve ibadullahha taaddi u mazarret itmek ihtiimali olmakla
8. bu makule fesade mubaderet ider ise senki mirmiran-ı mumailiyhsin Trabulus
9. ve Lazkiye’de olan mütesselimlerine ianet ve eşkiya-yı mezburenin taaddillerini def
10. itmek icin emr-i şerifim riza itmeğin sen-ki mirmiran-ı
11. mumailiyhsin şaki-i merkum vech i merşur üzere Trabulus mukataatına hasaret
12. ve ibadullahla isal-ı mazarretine taaddi ider-işe mirmiran-ı mumailiyhin
13. Trabulus ve Lazkiye’de olan mütesselimlerden imdad u ianet ile
14. fesad u taaddisinin men u definde ziyade ikdam u ihtimam eleyüb
15. sernu ihmal u tekasülden bi-gavayet ittika u ihtiraz itmek
16. babunda ferman-ı alişanım sadir olmuştur
17. buyurдум-ki.
Evağir-ı Z[ilhicce 1]141.

32. MD 150:52 (1)
(Summer 1743 fetva)

1. Şah Ismail evladından Acem şahi olan Tahmasb şahi katı ve yerine şah olan Nadir
Şah ehl-i İran’dan ben sebb u rafız ref ve İslam’ı
2. kabul idüb anların beyininde muhtarlari olan mezheb-i Caferi hakk u sahihdir
diyü tasdik ü kabul ve mezahib-i erbaa ki Hanevi ve Maliki ve Şafi’i ve Hanbeli
3. mezahibine bu dahi hamis olmak üzere add u ilhak olunub ve Beyt Allah el-
Haram’ın rükümlerinden bir rükün mezheb-i Caferi erbabına tayin olunması
4. bundan iltimas “ben-dahi Sahra-yı Muğan’da şah olduğum vakt anlar ile bu emrin
husulini taahhud itmişdim” diyyi muktada-yı eimme-i din-i mübin-i Numan bin
Sabit
5. (razi Allah-teala anhu) mezhebi üzere olub hukkm-ı şeri asahh-ı akval-i eimme-i
Hanefiye ile hukme tenbih iderek taklid-i kaza eleylen Sultanü’l-berreyn
6. ve’l-bahreyen Hadimü’l-harameyn eş-şerifeyn Sultanü’l-Islam ve’l-Müslimin
(edam’ Allah-teala lahu yevme’d-din) hazretlerine bir kaç defa faılıcıl ile name
7. gönderüb “Bu mezheb-i Caferi hakdir” diyyi tasdik ü kabul ve “mezahib-i erbaya
hamis olmak üzere add idiyy” diyyi teklif itdikleri
8. mezheb Şii mezhebi olduğu kendüye bas olunan süfera-yı izam ve ulema-yı alam
ilami ile malum oldukdan sonra itikad gibi
9. amelde dahi ind’ Allah-teala hakk vahid olub müteaddid olmamakla mukadamız
olan İmam-ı Azam mezhebinden müellef kütüb-i fikhiyede eimme-i ehl-i Sunnet
10. [va]ktinde meri ü muteber Caferi unvanıyla maruf mezhub tahrir olunmayub ve
tashih-i mezhub-i eimmemizin rey ü tahrirlerine ve anlardan nakl-i sariha
devkufdur
11. diyü öz-i şeri tahririnden ma-ada ladey'l-hacce bast-i müzeyyid ile mahzur-i
şerisi inha olanur" diyü ittifak-1 ulema-yi izam ile cevab-1 şerisi
tastir ve Harem-i Şerif'de vaki mezhub-i erbaaya mahsus erkan ve maharib-i
erbaada evkat-1 hamsede akd-1 cemaat ile salat-ı mektubeyi
edaya kıyam iden imamların birine iktida ile eda-yı salat itmeleri hususı dahi
tahrir olundukdan sonra bade'l-vusul yine şah-ı mezbur
14. name gönderib Mezhub-i Caferi hâdik diyyı tasdık ve kabal ve mezhub-i erbaaya
hamis olmak üzere addiidi ve'l-Araḳ ve Arab
15. ve bazı Azerbaycan memleketlerinden tasarruflarından olan Timur Han'ın istila
itdikleri memleketlere dahi istila ilavesiyle mezhub-i erbaaya
16. mezhub-i Caferi hamıs olmak üzere tasdık ve kabal teklifinde cebr u israr ve kasd-
1 izrar itmeğin mezhub-i mesfur ise itikad
17. u amelde usul ü föruda firka-1 naciye-i ehl-i Sünnet ü Cemaat'te muhalif olub
Ashab-i kiram (rzuwan-Allah-teala aleyhim ecmain) hazaratına tan
18. u kadîh ve buğz u adavete mebni olan mezhub-i Şia'dan İmamiye-i İsna-Aşeriye
farkinası mahsus mezhub olmadığı yerlerinde olub
19. hala anıfâa amel itdikleri Kitab-1 Lüma ve şerhı Ravziyetü'l-Behiye ve sair kütüb-i
Şia'dan müstefad ve bi'l-müşahede hal ü şanlarına udul-i Müslimin
20. ahbarlarından malum olduğundan gayri Caferiye ismiyle telkib olunan mezhub
kütüb-i kelamdan Millel ü Nihal'dan firak-1 mezhub-i Şia'dan madud hal
21. ü şanı ber vech-i tefasîl anda mesdud ve yine mukayyedat-1 kütüb-i usulden
Alaeddin Semerkandi'nin Mizanü'l-Uslul nam kitab-ı mustatabından ve İbn-i
22. Hemam'in tahririnden ve şüruhundan "kale kavm mine'r-Revafız lükabu bi'l-
Caferiye" diyü tashir u tahrir olunub böyle "mezheb-i Şii hâdik" diyyı
tasdık ve kabal ve mezhub-i hamis itdirim inad u israr ve sai bi'l-fesad ile dima-1
Müslimin istihlal ve emval ü iyallerin garet kasdıyla asker çıkub
24. asar-ı rafz ve Şia'ya diyar-i ehl-i Sünnet ü Cemaat'tından alenen icra ve darul'
Islam'a hucum eylereler şer ü fesadların defi için Sultanül-Müslimin
25. zill'Allah-teala fi'l-arzayın hazretleriyle amme-i Müslimin'e mezburlar ile kital
meşru-midur?

El-cevab: Meşrudur.
Beyan buyurlub mesab olalar. Allah-teala alem.
Ketebehü el-fakir ileyh Mustafa (afa anhü).

33. MD 153:169 (a)
(November-December 1747)

1. Şam valisi ve mir-i haccı olan vezirim [blank] Paşa'ya ve Sayda valisi vezirim
[blank] Paşa'ya ve Trabulus-Şam beğerlebegi [blank] (dame ikbalühü)ye ve Hama
ve Homs sancakları mütesellimlerine hüküm ki:

3. A’rāq, apparently a plural for ’Irāq/’Irāqayn.
2. Sabıkán Baalbek mukataasını mültezimi olan Harfuş-oğlu (zide kadrühü) südde-i saadetime arzuhal gönderüb mumaylehy mültezimliği halinde mukatta-i mezburenin mal-i misri
3. mahalline ve faizi ashab-i mülukaneye vakt u zamanıyla teslim ü edasını müşir yedine sened alub hilafl-i şer-i şerif hareket yoğıkken bundan akdem fevt olan Baalbek
4. müftisi Yahya Efendi’nin katli halesi buna isnad ile müftü-i merkumun oğulları şeyh Mehmed ve şeyh Abdurrahman nam kimesner [e] haliden aldıkları mahzar ve arzlar mucebince
5. sadur olan emr-i şerifimle Musa Kethüda nam kimesne üzerine mübaşır taşın olduğu üzerine varub bi’l-cümle emval u eşyasını ve ma-melekini nehb u garet itmekle
6. gurbeti ihtiyar idüb el-yevm ehl ü iyaliyle sefil ü ser-gerdan ve vücuh ile şayeste-i merhamet ü ihsan olmakla cărımı afv olunub fi-ma bad rencide olunnamak
7. içün siz-ki veziran-i müşar ve sair mumalleyhimsiz size hitaben emr-i şerifim sudurum istida itmeğin fi-ma bad kendü halinde olub reaya u beraya ve ibadüllaha taaddi etmemek

34. MD 1566:77:231
(February 1754)

1. Hala Sayda bağlarbeğisi Mustafa Paşa (damet mealici’yêe hüküm ki:
2. Bin yüz altmış altı senesine mahsuban sabikan Sayda valisi müteveffia vezir el-hac Ahmed Paşa’nin ühdésinde olan eyalet-i Sayda ve Beyrut mukataatı iltizamından Bışare ve Şevmer ve Şekif
3. nam mukataatın mültezim-i sabıkları tarafından ilzam u tefevvuzuna râğbet olunmayub henüz ilzam olunmadıkları bundan akdem ihbar u inha olunmakdan naşi mukaddem vezir-i müşarününleyhin huyunda mültezim-i
4. sabıkları sinin-i sabika şart-i iltizama kesr getürilmemek vechile ala eyyi hal tefevvuz eylemeleriçin emr-i şerifim verilmiş olduğudan gayri eyalet-i mezbure mukataatını sene-i merkume
5. ahuruna değin hala zabt eylemek üzere olan el-hac İbrahim (zide mecdü hüyûn’un yerine dahi sabık-1 muharrer üzere mufassal ü meşruh emr-i şerifim verilmişke binaen aleyh mukataat-i mezkureyi
6. öteden berü be-her sene iltizam ide-gelen kimesneleri senki mirmiran-ı mumaalleyhsin gah rîk ve mülâyemet ve istimale ve gah inzarat ve tehdidat ve şiddeti mütezamımın
7. buyurulduña her çend ki davet eylediğiççe bir dürülü mukayed olmayub nice gune-i izar-i vahiye iradyle tefevvuzlarından imtinalarında israr ve bedî iltizamından tenzil dairesinde
8. olduklarını irade u izhar eylediklerini memhur mektubulduña bu defa der-i aliyeme tahrir u ızar itmek ile imdi mukataat-ı mezkurenin sinin-i sabika bedî iltizamlarının
9. bir akçe senin dahi hatt u terettübine kata rıza-yı hümayunum olmamakla ol-
makule illet-i vahiyelerine kata havale-i sem itibar ve tenzil hususına bir vechile rey-i müsaade izhar
eylemektez-im sûf-ün-î sabıkla-nin getür-ündib bi eyyi vechin kan sinin-i sabika mucebince tefevuzz u iltizam itdirilลบ şart-nameleri ahzina ihtimam ve sene-i cedideyi dahi
kezalik tarafından ol-vechile iltizam u ilbas-i hilat eylemeğe sai u idam eyleyesin şöyle ki eger yine takayyûd iderler ise mukataat-i merkume müddet-i vafireden berü zaptılánnda olmakla
hala Şam valisi ve mir-i hacı olan vezirim Esad Paşa (edam’Allah-teala iclellehü)’inin rey u marifeti ve Mir Mülhem Şihabi’nin nezareti ve senin rey u marifetinle hesabları
görülüb bu ane dek kalıl u kesir reyadan her ne ki almışlar ise tahrib u defter ve asl-i bedl-i iltizamlarından fazla zimmetlerinde zuhur iden bi-la kusur reyaya redd itdirileceği
muhawkak olduğünü kendüllere ifham veya ber ca-yı israr u inad olundular ise ber vech-i muharrer emr-i şerifim [i]sdarıcün der-i aliyanem tahrib u ilam eylemek feranım olmağin işbu
emr-i alısanım isdar ve [blank] ile irsal olunmakla vusulinde mazmun-i múnifini ika u tenfize ihtimam u dikkat ve inadlarında israrları takdirinde ber vech-i muharrer [i]sdar-i

35. BOA: Cevdet Evkaf 9176
(c. 1761)

[Notes at top:]
Sahih.
İşaretleri mucebine hüküm buyuruldu.
Dame ma dame el-alem.

1. Devletlü saadetlü iyanetlü merhametlü veliyül’niam efendim Sultanım (dame ma-dame’l-alem) hazretlerinin:
2. Pişgah-i devletlerine arzuhal-i bendeleri oldur-ki: Şam-ı Şerif’de vaki merhum ve mağfur Küçük Ahmed Paşa’nın eylediği imaret ve tekey
3. ve Cami-ı Ümeviye’de ve Mekke-i Mükârreme ve Medine-i Mûnevvere ve Kuds-ı Şerif harem-i şerîlerinde altıar cüz-i Kuran-ı Şerif tilaveti ve bu misillü väcuh-i havaz vafk eylediği
4. mezarı ve basatin ve akaratin ekseri Baalbek’de olub ve evkaf-ı mezkurenin nezareti inayetlü rafetlü utufetlü meşayih-i İslam hazretlerinin
5. taht-ı nezaretlerinde olmağın vafk-ı merhumun zamanından berü ahsen-i vech üzere zabt ve umur-ı vafkî kema hüve hakkühü görüür icken otuz sene mukaddem mağzuben katı olan
6. dağ ve Kızılbaş Haruşoğğl emir İsmail’ın Hüseyn on iki seneden akdem ber takrib ile Baalbek voyvoda oldukda ammeyze zulm ü taaddisinden
7. ma-ada evkaf-ı mezküre min külü vech muaf u müsellem ve serbestiyet üzere olub ancak mütevellileri muhkem zabt ve voyvodalara kadmenden berü dahl u taarruz
8. etmezler iken mezkur Hüseyn türlü türlü taaddi etmekle mal-i vakfa fi'l-cümle kesr u noksan tari olmakla erbab-i cihatın vezafi rikba verilmesi
9. iktiza ider iken on sene mukaddem mezkur Hüseyn'in yine Kızılbaş Karındaşı Hayder zuhu[r] Hüseyn'i katl ve zor-ı destiyle bir takrib ile yerine voyvoda olub ve ibadullahi ba-husus ehl-i Sünnet u Cemaati bi'l-itak zulm ü taaddisiyle perişan ve bir ferd kimesneden havf etmeyüb Karındaşından kat kat ziyade
10. tuğyanyla vakf Allah'ı bi'l-külliye tam ve kendi ü zabt idüb ve mütевelliüre kan mal-i vakfin nusfi ve kan süsli mikkari eşedd-i mihnet eyle-verir iken
11. üç seneden berü bir şey vermeýüb ve mütewelli kaim-makamına bi'n-nefs zabt etdirmediginden vakf Allah'ın azim ihtilal ve azam-hullaline badi oldüğü
12. ezher mineş-şems olmakla merahim-i aliyelerinden mercu ve mutazarrirdir-ki mezkur daği ve Kızılbaş Hayder'in sinin-i sabakadan kesr u noksan ve üç seneden berü bi'l-külliye gasb u ekl eylediği mal-i vakfi tahsil ve min bad vakf-ı mezkure karışmayub ve bir difficulté bahane ile dahl ü taarruz etmeyüb ke'l-evvel
13. kadımden berü vakfin kaim-makamlarına kesr u noksan gelmemek üzere zabt u rabt etdirilmek üzere hala Şâm valisi ve emirü'l-hac olan vezir-i
14. asaf-i bi-nazir bahadur-ı vakt u zaman ve Rüstem-i asr u evan müşettit-i şeml-i ehlü't-tuğyan ve'l-isyân müdebbir-i umuri'l-cümhur bi's-seyfi'l-kati
15. ve'l-reyi's-sati hazretlerine hitaben müekked emr-i şerif-i alısan isdari için işaret-i aliyeleri buyurulmâk babında emr ü ferman-ı lutf u ıhsan
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289


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