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HISTORIC OMAN TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
FROM 600 A.D. TO 1995:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAKING, REMAKING AND UNMAKING
OF A SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION IN THE ARABIAN GULF

by

Aquil A. Kazim

submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
in
Sociology

Chair:

Samih K. Farsoun
Jung Siegenthaler
Gay Young

Dean of the College
3/19/96

Date

1996

The American University
Washington, D.C. 20016
This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my father, Abdul Fattah Kazim Al-Mulla, and to my mother Maryam Khalifan bin Khalifa.
HISTORIC OMAN TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
FROM 600 A.D. TO 1995:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAKING, REMAKING AND UNMAKING OF A SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION IN THE ARABIAN GULF

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ABSTRACT
This study is a socio-discursive analysis of Arabian Gulf society, with emphasis on what is now the contemporary U.A.E. It covers four periods: the Islamic period (600 A.D. - 1500 A.D.); the transformational period (1500-1820); the colonial period (1820-1971) and the contemporary period (1971-1995). Socio-discursive analysis is used in treating each of these periods. This means that the emphasis is on the social formation, or the political, economic and cultural structure of Arabian Gulf society that arose during each period, and on the discourses, or the socially constructed power relations arising in Arabian Gulf society during each period. As Arabian Gulf society is analyzed for each period, Arabian Gulf society is examined both in relation to previous periods and in terms of how it interacted with the global system, or other societies, surrounding it during each period.
However, this study avoids treating the periods and stages through which Arabian Gulf society passed in terms of the pre-oil/post oil, or the pre-colonial/post-colonial model. Instead, it analyzes Arabian Gulf society during each period in relation to its own construction, in relation to continuities and discontinuities from previous periods, and in relation to other societies within the global system of each period with which Arabian Gulf society interacted. This study assesses how each period’s socio-discursive formation has been able to transform and reproduce itself, and how the contemporary socio-discursive formation has done so in relation to its predecessors.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This introductory chapter is divided into five sections, namely Statement of the Problem, Methodology, Review of Literature, Organization of the Study and Significance of the Study. This chapter provides basic information as to the subject matter of this study, its importance, the approaches and sources used in the analysis, and how it is organized.

Statement of the Problem

The United Arab Emirates is a federal union which consists of seven emirates, which were united on December 2, 1971, the date that the U.A.E. became independent from the United Kingdom. After gaining its independence, the U.A.E. joined the United Nations, becoming the 132nd member. The U.A.E. also joined the Arab League, and other international organizations.

The U.A.E. is located on the Arabian Peninsula, along the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The U.A.E. is bound by Qatar and Saudi Arabia to the West, by the Sultanate of Oman and Saudi Arabia to the south, by the Arabian Gulf to the north, and by the Gulf of Oman and Oman to the east. The emirates comprising it are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharqah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm al-Quwain. Abu Dhabi is the
largest emirate in area and population, and the wealthiest in terms of resources. Abu Dhabi City is the capital of the U.A.E. Dubai is the second largest in area and population, and Dubai City is the U.A.E.'s most important commercial entrepot. Sharqah is the third largest emirate in population and area. It is important as a commercial area because of its ports along the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. It is also important as an agricultural and cultural center. Ras al-Khaimah, the fourth emirate in area and population, is important for its agriculture. Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah are the three smallest emirates in area and population. Fujairah is the only emirate which does not have ports along the Arabian Gulf, although it has them along the Gulf of Oman. It is also an agricultural area.

The total population of the U.A.E. for 1995 is estimated at over 2 million persons. The total area of the U.A.E. is 82,880 square kilometers. While the U.A.E. won its independence as a state in December, 1971, the construction of the society that lives within that state began thousands of years before the date of independence from the U.K. The political, economic and cultural constructions that make up U.A.E. society today were constructed, transformed and re-constructed over thousands of years of history. These constructions include the strata that comprise U.A.E. society (mercantile, agrarian and tribal). More recent historical
constructions include the seven emirates that comprise what is now the U.A.E. The region that became the U.A.E. itself was identified by a series of different names over history as well. Until 1820, it had been part of an entity called historic Oman. Under British colonialism, it was known as Trucial Oman, as differentiated from the Sultanate of Musqat and Oman. To understand U.A.E. society today, it is necessary to investigate all of its constructions, in terms of how and why they came about, transformations they underwent, and why and how they have continued, been reconstructed, or have discontinued.

This study is a socio-historical (political, economic and cultural) analysis of contemporary U.A.E. society. This study covers four main periods, namely, the Islamic period (600 A.D.-1500 A.D.), the transformational period (1500-1820), the colonial period (1820-1971), and the contemporary period (1971-1995.) The Islamic period refers to the period encompassing the rise of Islam, and the construction of the Islamic Umma, or Islamic community, of which historic Oman, or the region including the U.A.E. and the Sultanate of Oman today, was a part. The transformational period is the period of Portuguese, Dutch, and British penetration of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf. The colonial period is the period of British colonization of the area that became Trucial Oman, and today is the U.A.E. The contemporary period is the period
that followed the U.A.E.'s attainment of independence from the British.

The coverage of each period is itself divided into several chapters, and each chapter contains an introduction, a conclusion, and presents certain main arguments. While the main aim of this research is to understand how contemporary U.A.E. society is reproducing itself, the main theme of this study is that to understand this society and its reproduction of itself, it is necessary to examine it as a society that not only contains constructions of its own, but also contains continuities from previous periods. In addition, certain elements of previous periods have been selected and reconstructed to articulate within contemporary U.A.E. society, both to facilitate its reproduction and to maintain power relationships within it. A second theme of this study is that social movements have been constructed within the contemporary period that are engendering a dynamic of change within it. However, these social movements, too, contain elements that have continued from previous periods, and have selected and reconstructed other elements from previous periods to facilitate social change. Still other elements contained within these social movements were constructed in relation to the contemporary global system.

However, a third theme of this study is that in order to understand the contemporary period, the elements of
previous periods have continued into it or were selected to articulate within it, and the components of the social movements at work within it, it is necessary to examine each period in terms of its own context, and within its own global system. Only then is it possible to understand why and how certain elements from previous periods continued into the contemporary one while others did not, and how and why other elements from previous periods were selected to articulate within the contemporary one while others were not. Therefore, along with the contemporary period, each earlier period that this research covers is examined within its own global system, in terms of how it was constructed, how it reproduced itself, and in light of its relationship to previous periods. This means that each period is also analyzed in terms of continuities and discontinuities from previous periods that it contained as well.

This study analyzes the Islamic, transformational, colonial and contemporary periods as socio-discursive formations, rather than as mere historical periods. The term "socio-discursive formation" is a compound term comprising the concepts of "social formation" and "discourse". Social formation is the political, economic and cultural constructions or structures of a given society during a certain period of time. Several social formations can co-exist within a given society.
The concept of the social formation has been given many different applications by various authors. Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, for example, developed the social formation concept in relation to Western societies in Reading Capital. Althusser developed this concept in other works. Nicos Poulantzas developed Althusser's social formation concept further in Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, and in Political Power and Social Classes. John Taylor applied this concept to Third World societies in From Modernization to Mode of Production. Other authors have done similar work. Bryan S. Turner, for example, applied the concept to Arab societies in Marx and the End of Orientalism, as did Nadia Ramsis Farah in the article "The Social Formations Approach and Arab Social Systems," published in Volume 10, No. 3 of the Arab Studies Quarterly, and Elia Zureik in "Theoretical Considerations for a Sociological Study of the Arab State," Arab Studies Quarterly, Volume 3, No. 3. All of these authors see the social formation concept in terms of economic, ideological and political structures. (This research will replace the term "ideological structure" by "cultural structure" or "construction.")

The term "discourse" refers to socially constructed power relationships within a given social formation. This concept, too, has been given varying treatment by different authors. Two authors who dealt with the discourse concept,
however, are particularly important from the standpoint of this research. These authors are Michel Foucault and Edward W. Said, and they respectively treated the discourse concept in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings* and in *Orientalism*. These two works are important because they cover the application of the discourse concept both on the micro level (Foucault) and on the textual level (Said). For Foucault, the discourse concept related to how certain groups, such as the mentally and physically ill, criminals, etc. have been marginalized and excluded as "others". For Said, the discourse concept relates to how orientalists over the past three hundred years have textually constructed the Occidental "self" through the construction of the Oriental "others." in a misrepresentative way.

In this study, the concept of the discourse is applied both on a micro and on a macro level, and refers not only to intertextual relations, but also to the political, economic, and cultural relations that have been constructed as manifestations of, and as means for perpetuating, the power relationships between segments of a given society during a given period of time. In these power relationships, a given segment of a social formation gains and perpetuates its power over another by first differentiating "self" (itself) from "others". The segment seeking or possessing power over the second is then able to construct itself as "superior", by
constructing the other segment as "inferior." This makes the social formation, itself, an outgrowth of this discourse. A *socio-discursive formation*, therefore, is a social formation analyzed in terms of the power relationships contained within it. It is a social formation analyzed in terms of the concept that segmentation and socio-economic differentiations contained within it have been constructed discursively, or within the contexts of power relationships. Each socio-discursive formation also engenders its own *counter-discourses*, or social movements that are aimed at undermining it.

In this study, the term "socio-discursive formation" will be used instead of the term "society." This is because merely referring descriptively to society is insufficient for this study's purposes. Viewing society as a socio-discursive formation, in contrast, facilitates analysis of it in terms of how social formations have been constructed, along with the segmentation, and socio-economic differentiations characterizing them.

It is now necessary to provide some reasons why the periods of this coverage were designated and divided in the way that they were. It is also appropriate to discuss the significance of each period. This study refers to the periods being analyzed as "socio-discursive formations," and the analysis is divided among four; the Islamic, the
transformational, the colonial, and the contemporary. Each of these socio-discursive formations is treated individually because it is characterized by its own set of social formations and discourses. Each one differs markedly from the others in terms of discourses characterizing it, and in terms of its political, economic and culture structures. However, each socio-discursive formation is also treated in terms of continuities and discontinuities from previous ones articulating with it, or failing to do so. By investigating each period as a socio-discursive formation, this research was able to analyze each period in terms of its own global system, discourses, and political, economic and cultural constructions or structures.

This study begins with coverage of the Islamic socio-discursive formation (600 A.D.-1500 A.D.) in relation to the pre-Islamic one. This approach is appropriate because of the significance of the rise of Islam in the Arabian Gulf region, both in relation to previous socio-discursive formations, and to those that followed it, including the contemporary one. Analysis of the Islamic socio-discursive formation is also necessary for understanding what changes the transformational socio-discursive formation brought about, and what elements of the Islamic socio-discursive formation continued or discontinued once the transformational socio-discursive formation had begun. Counter-discourses that were constructed
within the Islamic socio-discursive formation are also analyzed, in terms of how and why they were constructed, and how and why they continued or discontinued.

The significance of the transformational socio-discursive formation (1500-1820) for the Arabian Gulf was appropriate to investigate because of the global changes that characterized this period. This socio-discursive formation, as defined by the chosen time period, was chosen in reference to the changes it brought about in the Arabian Gulf as well. It was in light of this reality that this research assessed how and why this socio-discursive formation and its counter-discourses were constructed, as well as which elements of this socio-discursive formation and its counter-discourses had continued into the colonial one, which had not, and how and why.

The colonial socio-discursive formation (1820-1971) was also chosen for analysis in relation to the Arabian Gulf both because major changes occurred during these years in the Arabian Gulf in relation to the transformational period. This justified further investigation of how this socio-discursive formation and its counter-discourses had been constructed, what its own constructions and counter-discourses were, and how and why they came about. The significance of this socio-discursive formation in relation to the transformational one regarding the Arabian Gulf also indicated the importance of
analyzing those elements of it that had continued into the contemporary period, those that had not, and how and why these continuities and discontinuities occurred.

The contemporary socio-discursive formation (1971-1995) because it marked the end of the colonial one, and therefore was characterized by its own set of constructions. This fact indicated the necessity of investigating these constructions, and the factors that had engendered them. It was also necessary to assess which characteristics of this socio-discursive formation were actually continuations of previous ones, which had been selected and reconstructed by this socio-discursive formation to articulate with it for the purpose of its reproduction, or for the purpose of reinforcing its power relationships, and which elements of previous socio-discursive formations and their counter-discourses had failed to continue once the contemporary one began. This research also assessed why and how these continuities, discontinuities, and reconstructions had occurred.

Methodology

This study uses socio-discursive analysis in its approach to the society of the U.A.E./Arabian Gulf region. This means that this study analyzes the construction of this society's political, economic and cultural structures in relation to the socially-constructed power relations that were operating in that society within the given socio-discursive
formation. The socio-discursive approach also allows this study to identify the counter-discourses that were constructed in relation to these power relationships.

This study takes several approaches in its analysis of the U.A.E./Arabian Gulf region’s four socio-discursive formations. One approach that this study uses is the socio-historical one. This means that the long history of this region is segmented into the four periods (Islamic, transformational, colonial, and contemporary), and each period is defined as belonging to certain time period and space parameter. However, this study is socio-historical, rather than merely historical, because each of these periods is analyzed as a distinct socio-discursive formation. Specifically, this means that this study examines the political, economic and cultural constructions, the discourses and counter discourses, and the strata underlying the constructions for each period.

In addition, this study uses macro-analysis because as well as analyzing each socio-discursive formation’s elements, it covers each of the four socio-discursive formations as totalities, placing them within the global systems of their time periods. At the same time, this study uses micro analysis, in that each socio-discursive formation’s strata are analyzed. This study also uses a comparative approach in its analysis. This means several things. Firstly, it means that
within each of the four socio-discursive formations, elements of a given socio-discursive formation are compared. For example, within each period, one area of the U.A.E./Arabian Gulf region is compared with others economically, politically, culturally and discursively. The strata characterizing a given socio-discursive formation are similarly compared, as are ethnic groups, genders, etc. Also within each of the four socio-discursive formations, the society of the U.A.E./Arabian Gulf region is compared with other societies within the global system of each period. Secondly, the comparative approach is applied in that one socio-discursive formation and its counter-discourses is compared with others in order to trace the continuation of elements of one socio-discursive formation into its successor, or their discontinuity.

Review of Literature

Sources that are used in this study's coverage of the Islamic socio-discursive formation include Arabic works from the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period, some of which had been translated by Europeans into English during the transformational and colonial periods. These works were written during different periods of the Islamic socio-discursive formation, and included the writings of merchants, travelers, geographers, navigators, etc. Use of most of these works has required searching them carefully for specific, and usually short, descriptions of historic Oman or the Arabian
Gulf region and its mercantile cities, its trade, its products, and the social strata that existed in the historic Oman/Arabian Gulf region at that time.

Examples of these Arabic sources are mentioned and briefly described below: Volumes I and II of Ibn Haukal’s *Surat al-Ardh* describes the main cities in the Arabian Gulf/historic Oman region, as well as commercial regulations, etc. Volumes I and II of Al-Idrisi’s *Kitab Nuzhat al-Mushtaq fi Ikhtiraq al-Afaaq* also contain descriptions of the cities in the Arabian Gulf, and their sources of income. Some of Al-Idrisi’s descriptions cover social strata in these cities. He also describes the historic Oman/Arabian Gulf region’s commercial connections with other regions within the Indian Ocean. Al-Muqaddasi’s *Kitab Ahsan al-Taqasim fi M’arifat al-Agalim* also discusses cities in historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf, their sources of wealth, tariffs, and commercial regulations, and describes commercial connections between the cities of this region with those of the rest of the Indian Ocean trade system. Ibn Batuta’s *Rehlat Ibn Batuta* is another source which describes the industries and strata that existed in the cities of the historic Oman/Arabian Gulf region. Hormuzi’s *'Aja‘ib al-Hind* refers to the different islands, trading cities, and seas within the Indian Ocean commercial system. This book is significant for this study because the author was from Hormuz, one of the main mercantile cities in
the Arabian Gulf during the later Islamic period. Ahmad bin Majids *Kitab al-Fawa'id fi Usul al-Bahr wa al-Qawa'id*, another source written by an author from historic Oman, is a detailed description of navigation in the Indian Ocean, and offers a critical review of previous works dating from as far back as antiquity on this topic.

Most of the classical Islamic works are descriptive, and are therefore useful sources of straightforward information, rather than analysis, concerning the historic Oman/Arabian Gulf region during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period. Many furnish information about the region from a commercial standpoint, which is important for understanding the Islamic socio-discursive formation. There are also some works written during the transformational period by authors from historic Oman about the Islamic period. Some of these have also been translated into English. A notable one is Sirhan bin Sa'id bin Sirhan's *Kashf al-Ghummah al-Jam' li Akhbar al-Umma*, published in English as *Annals of Oman*, which describes the various dynasties that ruled the various regions of historic Oman during the Islamic period, what their rule was like, and conditions in historic Oman under them.

European sources about the Islamic socio-discursive formation written during the colonial period (1820-1971) are mainly the work of missionaries, colonial policymakers, etc. In this study, these sources are used very critically, because
of their tendency to degrade the Islamic period in order to upgrade their own civilization. In order to do this, many project conditions in Europe onto historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf in particular, and onto the Umma in general. An example of this sort of projection is their assumption that conditions of the constructed "dark ages" in Europe prevailed in the Umma during that period. Another characteristic of these colonial period works about the Islamic socio-discursive formation work is their ongoing tendency to judge the historic Oman/Arabian Gulf region's environment in relation to Europe's, instead of understanding the region in relation to its own socio-discursive formation. Most important, because most of these works were written in relation to the colonial political agenda, they described the historic Oman/Arabian Gulf region in such a way as to justify the colonial penetration. This meant that these colonial period authors studies the history of the region and then rewrote it so as to make it appear that it was colonialism that had been the "civilizing force" in the historic Oman/Arabian Gulf region. Specifically, these authors often refer to colonialism as having ended certain unacceptable practices that they implied or claimed had "always been there before".

Works fitting this description include the chapters on the Islamic period in Sir Arnold Wilson's *The Persian Gulf: An Historical Sketch*; in S.B. Miles' *The Countries and Tribes of*
the Persian Gulf, in Robert Landen's *Oman Since 1856: Disruptive Modernization*, and in Donald Hawley's *The Trucial States*. One notable characteristic of these particular works is a redundancy among them. This is because most of them used Sir Arnold Wilson's and S.B. Miles' books as their main sources.

Some books written after 1971 about the Islamic period, also reflect the limitations of their colonial predecessors, because they have uncritically used colonial period works as their main sources. One work suffering from this limitation is Alvin J. Cottrell's anthology, *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey*. Other sources for this study that were written during the colonial period about the Islamic socio-discursive formation include articles in periodicals such as *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, *Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies*, *The Islamic Quarterly*, *Islamic Culture*, *The Geographical Journal*, and the *Journal of World History*.

Because of the shortcomings of so many of colonial period's works covering the Islamic socio-discursive formation, this study uses them not only in conjunction with the classical Islamic works discussed above, but also in conjunction with many contemporary works written by Arab authors, and some by non-Arabs who are not hampered by colonial biases. Some of the important contemporary works
that are sources for this study are described below: Mohammed Najib Abu Talib’s *Al-Sir‘a al-Ijtima‘i*, for example, covers the various social struggles that arose during the Islamic socio-discursive formation, and especially those of the Abbasid era (these, in particular, impacted historic Oman). Al-Aqili’s *Al-Khalij al-‘Arabī fi al-‘Usur al-Islāmiyyah* specifically covers the rulers, social changes, trade patterns, etc. of historic Oman and the rest of the Arabian Gulf region during the 600-1500 A.D. period. Many other good studies are found in the anthology *Dirasat ‘an Tarikh al-Khalij al-‘Arabī wa al-Jazirah al-‘Arabiyyah*, about the commercial cities of Historic Oman, and the trade regulations that were in force in the Arabian Gulf region during the Islamic period. Mustafa Shakir’s *Mawsu‘at Duwal al-‘Alam al-Islami* describes the rulers of the different Islamic polities of the 600A.D.-1500 A.D. period, and historic Oman’s relations with the rest of the *Umma*. Amin Isma‘il’s *Al-‘Umaniyun, Ruwad al-Bahr* is particularly useful because it contains a chapter which focuses upon historic Oman itself, along with its mercantile cities. This study also uses articles in many Arabic periodicals for its coverage of the Islamic period. Notable sources of articles include *Dirasat al-Khalij wa al-Jazirah al-‘Arabiyyah, Al-Wathiqah*, and *Al-Abhath*.

Sources by Arab authors available in English that are
used in this study include George Hourani’s *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times*, which focuses upon the role of Omani seafarers in Indian Ocean trade. Topics covered included shipbuilding, relations with China, India and Africa, and the development of the Islamic trade enclaves in the Indian Ocean trade system. Kamal Salibi’s *A History of Arabia* is a detailed source of information on tribalism in the Arabian Peninsula. Three other sources that provide information on the Islamic socio-discursive formation in general - its rulers, the role of merchants, its cities, and life within it in general are Mahmood Ibrahim’s *Merchant Capital and Islam*, Albert Hourani’s *A History of the Arab Peoples*.

There are also works by non-Arab authors which are significant for this study because of the details they provide about the Umma from a commercial and political standpoint, because they provide a framework for understanding the Indian Ocean commercial system, and because they also contain some information about historic Oman’s trade, urban life, and agriculture. These sources include K.N. Chaudhuri’s *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean*. This source is a vital one because its chapters on the Islamic period provides analysis of the Indian Ocean trade system as one structure, of societies within this system as part of that structure, and the role of Islam within this structure. One limitation of
this work, however, is the fact that it emphasizes the structure of the Indian Ocean commercial system more than it does the different strata underlying this structure. Philip D. Curtin’s *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History* is another source which is important for understanding the Indian Ocean commercial system.

D.S. Richards’ anthology *Islam and the Trade of Asia* contains many chapters providing information on commercial cities and their strata during the Islamic period, as well as on trade patterns and commercial regulations of that time, the development of the Umma’s commercial enclaves in the Indian Ocean, the spread of Islam in the Indian Ocean region, and the nature of the commenda trade system. Abraham L. Udovitch’s *Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam* focuses more closely upon the commenda system. Andrew M. Watson’s *Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World* is important for this study because of the insights it provides about the connection between agricultural transformations that occurred within the Umma’s lands after the rise of Islam, and the Umma’s industries during the Islamic period. This book also provides information about historic Oman’s role in the Umma’s agricultural development. J.C. Wilkinson’s *Water and Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia* focuses more closely upon historic Oman’s water system, land tenure system, agricultural taxation, etc. in its chapter’s on the Islamic period.
Fernand Braudel’s *History of Civilizations* focuses more closely upon industrialization within the *Umma*, and analyzes the *Umma* as part of a global system. Janet Abu-Lughod’s *Before European Hegemony: The World System, A.D. 1250-1350* examines the workings of this global system. For this study in particular, this book is useful because it covers changes that were occurring within the *Umma* during the 1250-1350 period. Understanding these changes facilitates understanding their impact upon historic Oman.

Some of the sources mentioned in relation to this study’s coverage of the Islamic period are also used as sources for the transformational period (1500-1820). Coverage of this period in this study not only covers the Indian Ocean region and the lands of the *Umma*, but also covers European societies that were penetrating the Indian Ocean, and their impact upon historic Oman. Because of the scope of this period in terms of area and issues, and because of the length of its duration, this study uses a multitude of sources in covering it. Therefore, only a few are highlighted below.

R.B. Serjeants *The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast* covers the initial Portuguese penetration of the Indian Ocean and its impact upon the cities of historic Oman’s coast. Ashin Das Gupta and M.N. Pearson’s anthology, *India and the Indian Ocean: 1500-1800* provides detail about the nature of Portuguese hegemony in the Indian Ocean, and also covers the
penetration and ascent of the Dutch and English. This source also provides information about the cities of historic Oman under Portuguese rule. Sanjay Subrahmanyan's *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700* focuses on the profits that the Portuguese made in the Indian Ocean, analyzes the relationship between the Portuguese penetration of the Indian Ocean and the decline of the Mediterranean Sea as a trade avenue, and also covers Omani activities in relation to Portuguese hegemony. M.N. Pearson's *Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat: The Response to the Portuguese* and C.R. Boxer's *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire: 1415-1825* are two more sources that examine the workings of Portuguese hegemony in the Indian Ocean. Pearson, in particular, focuses upon the methods that the Portuguese used to rule the Indian Ocean and to preserve their hegemony there. Auguste Toussaint's *History of the Indian Ocean* covers the reaction of Egypt and the Ottomans to the Portuguese penetration of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf.

Two other books by C.R. Boxer, *Dutch Merchants and Mariners in Asia: 1602-1795* and *Jan Compagnie in War and Peace: 1602-1799* focus upon Dutch ascendency and hegemony in the Indian Ocean following the decline of the Portuguese. Three sources, out of many more, are also useful for understanding British ascendency and hegemony in the Indian Ocean and in the Arabian Gulf. The first is K.N. Chaudhury's *The English East India Company: A Study of an Early Joint
Stock Company, which covers the development of the English East India Company, and its penetration of the Indian Ocean. Niels Steensgaard’s The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century provides analysis and statistics of the economic nature of both Dutch and English penetration of the Indian Ocean, focusing on the products that the Dutch and English East India Companies sought from the Indian Ocean region. Abdul Amir Amin’s British Interests in the Persian Gulf focuses specifically upon British aims in the Arabian Gulf, and how they achieved them.

Three other sources provide a global picture of the transformational period. However, each has its specific focus as well. The first of these, L. S. Stavrianos’ The World Since 1500: A Global History analyzes the European incursion into the Indian Ocean in relation to developments in Europe, and the colonization of the Americas. Alan K. Smith’s Creating a World Economy: Merchant Capital, Colonialism and World Trade uses a similar approach, but covers these topics in greater detail. James D. Tracy’s anthology The Rise of Merchant Empires contains articles that allow a comparison and a contrast of Portuguese, Dutch and English methods of penetration and economic hegemony in the Indian Ocean. These articles provide statistical details about the nature of Portuguese, Dutch and English control of the Indian Ocean Trade system, and the rise and decline of the Portuguese and
the Dutch in relation to each other and to the English. However, this book needs to be consulted in conjunction with other sources for an accurate analysis of European penetration of the Indian Ocean. The reason for this is that some chapters express a questionable viewpoint about European motives for penetrating the Indian Ocean and obtaining commercial monopolies there. Other chapters fail to distinguish between the activities of mercantile societies that were indigenous to the Indian Ocean within that commercial system, and those of the expanding European empires.

Concerning the impact of European penetration of historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf during the transformational period, this study uses several sources, both in Arabic and in English. Examples of these sources are provided below: Ahmad Mustafa Abu Hakima’s *History of Eastern Arabia: 1750–1800* is an important source because of its comprehensive coverage of developments that took place in the Arabian Gulf region in relation to European hegemony there. Among other things it covers the decline of certain tribes in the region, and the rise of certain new mercantile groupings. Zakariyah Qasim’s *Al Khalij al ‘Arabi fi ‘Asr al-Tawasu‘ al-Urub al-Awwal*, another source that this study uses, provides information on the rise of social movements in the historic Oman/Arabian Gulf region in relation to European penetration, and the linkages
of these movements with other societies in the Indian Ocean region. It also covers the rise of tribal and mercantile groupings in historic Oman during the transformational period.

Qadri Qal‘aji’s Al-Khalij al-‘Arabi: Bahr al-Asatir is another source that provides comprehensive information about the impact of European penetration on the Arabian Gulf region. It covers the period beginning with the initial Portuguese incursions, and ending with the English penetration. The chapters of another anthology, Al-Tajarib al-Wahdawiyyah al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mu'asirah: Tajribat Dawlat al-Imarat al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah, also contain articles and accompanying discussion concerning the impact of European penetration on the Arabian Gulf region, and the reaction of the region’s people to this penetration, especially in relation to the Dutch and British. Faisal Abdallah’s anthology Al-Khalij al-‘Arabi is another source that covers the damage that European penetration did to the historic Oman/Arabian Gulf region, and specifically treats the initial division of historic Oman in relation to British penetration. Madawi Al-Rasheed’s Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty focuses upon changes in the interior of the Arabian Peninsula that took place during the transformational period.

For its coverage of the colonial socio-discursive formation (1820-1971), this study uses some of the sources
mentioned above. However, many additional ones are added to these both because of the length of the colonial period, and because of this period's various aspects, which require it to be divided into two parts. For the colonial period, three types of literature are available. The first category consists of works written by European missionaries, travelers, and British colonial personnel themselves. These are mainly written from the British colonial viewpoint, or in some cases, were actually meant to justify British colonialism. Although these sources are useful because they provide insight into the colonial mentality, they are used critically in this study because of their misrepresentation of society in the historic Oman/Arabian Gulf region.

Important themes of misrepresentation characterizing J.B. Kelly's works, such as Britain and the Persian Gulf and Eastern Arabian Frontiers, for example, include the portrayal of indigenous mercantile forces in the Arabian Gulf as "pirates", and the portrayal of inter-tribal relations as always entailing warfare until British colonialism was able to "pacify" the region. In fact, distortions like these characterize most of the works written by Europeans about the colonial period. Examples include Sir Charles Belgrave's The Pirate Coast, George N. Curzons's Persia and the Persian Question, and sources mentioned previously such as Sir Arnold Wilson's The Persian Gulf: An Historical Sketch S.B. Miles'
The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, Robert Landen’s Oman Since 1856: Disruptive Modernization, and Donald Hawley’s The Trucial States. The volumes of C.U. Aitchison’s Treaties and Engagements Relating to Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and of J.G. Lorimer’s Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia are also written from the colonial perspective, however these two works are useful as archival works, because of the official documents (including treaties), statistics and reports that they compile concerning Arabian Gulf and Trucial Oman prior to 1945. It is still necessary, though, to view the treaties, documents, and statistics critically, and to identify the elements of the colonial agenda that underlie these two archival works.

This is more easily done if they are used in conjunction with other works covering Trucial Oman during the colonial period, many of which have been written by Arab authors who are critical of colonial Agenda. Works of this type include Sultan Muhammed Al-Qasimi’s The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, which deconstructs the British colonial myth about piracy in the Arabian Gulf during the late 1700s and early 1800s. Articles and books by Rosemarie Said-Zahlan, who used and re-interpreted data from the British Archives about Trucial Oman, provide much information about other political and economic aspects of British colonialism in the Arabian Gulf. One of this study’s important sources is her
The Origins of the United Arab Emirates. Mohammed Morsy Abdullah's *The United Arab Emirates* not only uses and re-interprets data from the British Archives for analysis of the colonial socio-discursive formation, but also uses interviews that the author conducted with people who lived in Trucial Oman during the Colonial Period. Frauke Heard-Bey’s *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition* is also useful for its specific information about Trucial Oman during the colonial period, but its weakness lies in its over-emphasis on the tribal socio-discursive formation.

Obeid A. Butti’s dissertation, *Imperialism, Tribal Structure, and the Development of Ruling Elites*, is helpful for the analysis of the pearl industry. Articles in the anthology *Al-Tajarib al-Wahdawiyyah al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mu‘asirah: Tajribat Dawlat al-Imarat al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah*, and the accompanying discussions of the articles published in this anthology, cover many aspects of British colonialism in Trucial Oman, such as the colonization process and the imposed treaties, from an Arab perspective. One source which is particularly rich in information about life in Trucial Oman during the colonial period is the three volume work by Abdallah Abd al-Rahman, *Al-Imarat fi Dhakirat Abna‘iha: Al-Hayat al-Iqtisadiyyah, wa al-Thaqafiyyah*, two volumes of which are used in this study. These volumes contain scores of interviews that the author conducted with people
from different social strata who lived in different regions of Trucial Oman during the colonial period.

Other sources used in this study provide insights into the later colonial period (1945-1971). Among these sources are Abdallah Omran Taryam’s *The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates*, and Mohammed T. Sadik and William P. Snavely’s *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems and Future Prospects*, which provides much statistical data about the later colonial period. Mana al-Oteiba’s *Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates* provides information about both the early and later colonial periods. Subjects covered include both the pearl industry and the development of oil production. Muhammed Mutawwali’s two volume work, *Hawdh al-Khalij al-'Arabi*, provides general information about the economic and trade situation in Trucial Oman under the colonial socio-discursive formation. K. G. Fenelon’s *United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey* is another source that this study used for insights into Trucial Oman’s economy during the later colonial period. John Duke Anthony’s *Arab States of the Lower Gulf* also provides such information.

Mohammed Matar al-‘Asi’s *Masirat al-Ta‘alim* and Mohammed Hassan al-Harbi’s *Tatawwur al-Ta‘alim* specifically focus upon Trucial Oman’s educational system during the colonial period. Sir Rupert Hay’s *the Persian Gulf States*
provides information about British colonial administration in Trucial Oman between 1945 and 1971. Despite the usefulness of this book’s information, it is also written from a colonial perspective, and is therefore used in conjunction with other sources. Fred Halliday’s *Arabia Without Sultans*, among other sources, was useful for the insights it provided into the social movements that arose in the Arabian Gulf region in relation to colonialism, while Seyyid Nawfal’s *Al-Awdha’ al-Siyasiyyah li-Imarat al-Khalij al-‘Arabi wa Janub al-Jazirah* covered the rise of Arab Nationalism in the Arabian Gulf region, in relation to colonialism, and the role of Arab Nationalism in Trucial Oman’s development. Fred Halliday’s work, though extremely informative, does suffer from the shortcoming of overemphasis on class issues as factors in Arabian Gulf social movements, while ignoring other socio-historic, regional, and global issues that contributed to the rise of these movements. Among journals, the *Middle East Economic Digest (MEED)* is particularly useful for tracing development projects that were initiated in Trucial Oman during the late colonial period. Other periodicals that provide information about colonial Trucial Oman’s economy, colonial administration, social strata, and policies included *The Middle East Journal, Journal of Gulf and Arabian Studies*, and *Arabian Studies*.

For coverage of the contemporary period, this study
makes use of government statistics, as well as books, and articles in periodicals and anthologies written during the contemporary period. Among these sources, statistics are particularly important for this study's analysis of the contemporary socio-discursive formation. Statistics used in this study come from the annual reports for various years of such government bodies as the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Information and Culture, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, as well as the different Economic Departments. Information about the Jebel Ali Free Zone came from Jebel Ali's own publications.

Some of the books and articles that are written about the political, economic and cultural structures, the labor force, and social strata in the contemporary U.A.E. are listed and briefly described below: Nader Furjani's anthology, Al-'Amalah al-Ajnabiyyah fi Aqtar al-Khalij al-'Arabi, for example, contains many articles about the development of the U.A.E.'s labor force. Abdal-Razak al-Faris' article about the U.A.E.'s labor force, and the published discussion concerning it, are particularly useful. For insights into the contemporary U.A.E.'s political structures, this study uses Enver M. Khoury's *The United Arab Emirates: Its Political System and Politics*, Ali Mohammed Khalifa's *The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation*, and Hassan Hamdan al-Alkim, *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates*, among other
sources. Iskandar Bashir's *Dawlat al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah: Masirat al-Ittihad wa Mustaqbalahu* contains more information about the U.A.E.'s political system, as well as a copy of the U.A.E.'s Provisional Constitution, some of whose sections this study uses for its coverage of the contemporary U.A.E.'s political structure.

Among the sources consulted concerning social changes within the contemporary U.A.E. are Mohammed Abdallah al-Mutawa's *Al-Tanmiyah wa al-Taqhyir al-Ijtima'i fi al-Imarat*, and many works by Rashid Muhammed Rashid. This study also consults articles from many issues of *Shu'un Ijtima'iyyah* about gender, and other social issues. Also consulted in this capacity were articles published in *Shu'un Ijtima'iyyah*’s six volume anthology entitled *Dirasat fi Muytama' al-Imarat*.

**Organization of the Study**

This dissertation is divided into four main parts. Each part, in turn, is divided into several chapters. The first part covers the Islamic socio-discursive formation (600 A.D.-1500 A.D.), which is treated in Chapters Two, Three and Four. Chapter Two provides a general picture of the Islamic period. Chapter Three covers the transformation that historic Oman underwent with the rise of Islam in relation to the previous period, and in relation to changes within the Islamic socio-discursive formation. It also covers the Islamic socio-discursive formation's counter-discourses. Chapter Three also
examines the mercantile socio-discursive formation in historic Oman in relation to the general Islamic socio-discursive formation. Chapter Four examines historic Oman’s agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations, both in relation to the mercantile one and to the general Islamic socio-discursive formation.

The second part of this dissertation covers the transformational socio-discursive formation (1500-1820), and it is divided into Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Five analyzes the Portuguese penetration of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf, and the impact of this penetration upon historic Oman’s mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations. This chapter also covers the counter-discourses that were constructed in historic Oman in relation to the Portuguese penetration. Chapter Six treats the subsequent Dutch, English, and to some extent, the French penetrations of Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf, their impact on historic Oman’s three socio-discursive formations, and the counter-discourses that their penetration engendered.

The third part of this dissertation covers the colonial socio-discursive formation (1820-1971). The many aspects of this socio-discursive formation are covered in two different periods. The first period (1820-1945) is treated in Chapters Seven and Eight. Chapter Seven analyzes the colonial discourses that were constructed in relation to colonial
penetration. It also treats the impact of colonialism on historic Oman’s three socio-discursive formations, and the construction of Trucial Oman out of historic Oman. Chapter Seven also investigates the pearl industry, and generally analyzes the process by which Trucial Oman became integrated into the colonial global system. Chapter Eight looks at the new mercantile socio-discursive formation in Trucial Oman that was constructed within the colonial socio-discursive formation, as well as the social movements that rose in relation to the transformations that occurred within Trucial Oman’s mercantile socio-discursive formation, and in relation to changes in British colonial interests.

The second half of the colonial period (1945-1971) is covered in Chapters Nine through Thirteen. Chapter Nine analyzes the changes in the British colonial discourses, policies, and administration in Trucial Oman, along with the impact of these changes on Trucial Oman’s three socio-discursive formations. Chapters Ten, Eleven, and Twelve cover the specific effects of colonialism on the various regions of Trucial Oman, as well as the transformations that these regions underwent during the 1945-1971 period. Chapter Thirteen focus on the rise of counter-discourses to colonialism, both within Trucial Oman and in the Arabian Peninsula in general. This chapter also covers the establishment of the United Arab Emirates.
Part four of this dissertation, which is divided into three chapters, focuses upon the contemporary period (1971-1995). The first chapter, Chapter Fourteen, treats the political and economic constructions of the contemporary U.A.E. Chapter Fifteen investigates the construction and makeup of the contemporary U.A.E.'s labor force, and the social stratification constructed within the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. Chapter Sixteen analyzes the contemporary U.A.E.'s cultural constructions. Chapter Seventeen is the concluding chapter, and it presents a summary of the study.

Significance of the Study

This study is mainly significant because of its thrust and approach to the study of society, in this case, the society of the contemporary U.A.E. The central theme of this study has been that societies, or social formations, are socially constructed over a series of historical periods, and an understanding of this construction process requires an analysis of the power relations characterizing each period. In turn, an understanding of each period and its role in this construction process requires an understanding of a given period's particular constructions, and the transformations within that society that occurred within its duration. Analyzing the significance of these constructions and transformations requires looking at them socio-discursively,
or in terms of the power relations and counter discourses that were operating during each period. This analysis also requires placing society within each period’s larger context. Specifically, this entails analyzing a society’s reproduction of itself, and the transformations occurring within its constructions during each period, in relation to the larger context of its interaction with other societies within each period’s global system. Since this approach provides insights into the impact that other societies within each period’s global system have upon the society in question, it also clarifies the nature and significance of constructions and transformations within that society during each period.

A second theme of this study makes another aspect of its approach to the study of society significant. This theme concerns the analysis of a society’s contemporary political, economic and cultural constructions, and emphasizes that understanding these constructions entails much more than assessing their present characteristics. Understanding these constructions also requires investigating whether these structures are constructions of the present period itself, whether they are continuations of a previous one, or whether they were selected from a previous period and reconstructed to accommodate the present one. In general, this study’s significance lies in its emphasis on the complexity of society. It demonstrates that a given society is more than a
sum total of its present constructions, and also more than its history. Instead, this study shows how a society’s present and past constructions and power relations need to be analyzed together and in relation to each other, and in relation to other societies within the global system.

Concerning the U.A.E./Arabian Gulf region, the significance of this study lies in its emphasis on the fact that the people living in this region have always formed a society. In relation to this fact, this study focuses upon construction and de-construction of the political, economic and cultural structures that characterized that society during different periods, but also focuses upon the construction and de-construction of social strata underlying these constructions. Within this framework, the U.A.E./Arabian Gulf region is taken through each period (Islamic, transformational, colonial and contemporary). Within each period, the region is scrutinized in terms of economic, political and cultural constructions, discourses and counter-discourses, and underlying social strata. For each period, these political, economic and cultural constructions, discourses and counter-discourses, and underlying strata are analyzed in term of how and why they had been constructed. Then, they are treated in relation to the question of whether they were constructions of that period, continuities into that period from a previous one, or chosen aspects of a previous
period, reconstructed to accommodate the period in question. In addition, each of these constructions, discourses, counter-discourses and underlying strata is looked at socio-discursively, which means that its construction and deconstruction are both analyzed in terms of power relationships that were operational in the region during that period. Finally, during each period, the above-mentioned characteristics of the U.A.E./Arabian Gulf region's society are analyzed in relation to their interaction with other societies within that period's global system.

Aside from the details it enables this study to provide on the U.A.E./Arabian Gulf region's society itself, this approach is significant because in showing the role of the U.A.E./Arabian Gulf region in relation to other societies within each period, it provides an analysis of the period itself, in relation to its own transformations and in relation to other periods. More significantly, the analysis of the Islamic, transformational and colonial periods that this approach has provided facilitates an understanding of the contemporary period, both in terms of its own transformations and in terms of the interaction between the U.A.E./Arabian Gulf region and other societies. In addition, looking at the contemporary U.A.E.'s society from the vantage point of having traced the region's construction process through three historical periods before the contemporary one at least
enables some speculation as to how U.A.E. society may develop in the future.

A final aspect of this study's significance is that its socio-discursive investigation of society could be applied to other Arab-Islamic societies, and, partly or wholly, to other societies in general. This is plausible regarding Arab-Islamic societies because they passed through a series of socio-discursive formations that resemble some of those that the U.A.E/Arabian Gulf region faced. For other societies, this approach can be applied because they, too, passed through a series of socio-discursive formations, each of which had its own political, economic, and cultural constructions, discourses and counter discourses, and social strata underlying the constructions that continued or discontinued in relation to these different socio-discursive formations.
CHAPTER TWO

THE ISLAMIC SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION: 600 A.D.-1500 A.D.

Introduction

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part generally covers the Islamic socio-discursive formation during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period. In contrast with the more frequent approach of treating the *Umma* (Islamic society) as a community of believers, equal before God regardless of race, ethnicity, class or gender, this part of the chapter establishes that the *Umma*, like other societies, comprised a series of political, economic and cultural structures (social formations), and socially constructed power relationships (discourses). For this reason, this research treats the entire 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period as a socio-discursive formation and establishes that within this period, the Islamic socio-discursive formation underwent a series of transformations. The second part briefly covers Islamic civilization and identity, and relates this concept to the changes that the Islamic socio-discursive formation underwent during this period.

The purposes of this research are served by devoting considerable coverage to the *Umma* and its social history
because during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period, historic Oman was an integral part, politically, legally, culturally, and economically, of the greater Islamic Umma. This means that developments within historic Oman occurred in relation to the Umma, and also influenced the Umma. Developments within the greater Umma influenced historic Oman as well.

Coverage of Islamic civilization in relation to the concept of identity is also important, because this treatment sheds light on how the Islamic socio-discursive formation reproduced itself, and particularly importantly, how historic Oman’s identity as part of the Umma was constructed. In particular, the treatment of the Islamic socio-discursive formation, and of historic Oman in relation to it, is pivotal because the contemporary U.A.E. retains its Islamic identity. It is impossible to understand the transformations that the contemporary U.A.E.’s identity underwent without understanding historic Oman’s construction in relation to the Umma. To understand the continuities and discontinuities of socio-discursive formations that were constructed in periods subsequent to the Islamic one, it is necessary to understand the Islamic socio-discursive formation, and historic Oman within it.

Historic Oman itself, in relation to the Islamic socio-discursive formation, will be treated in Chapters Three and Four. Separate treatment of historic Oman will provide the
opportunity for a detailed focus on historic Oman's unique dynamic as part of the Umma. However, such a focus would not be possible without detailed coverage of the Umma itself, the Islamic socio-discursive formation, and its transformations that this socio-discursive formation underwent during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period. All of these transformations, after all, affected historic Oman. It is also important to emphasize that historic Oman's own socio-discursive formations (mercantile, agrarian and tribal) were constructed and underwent transformations in relation to the changes occurring within the broader Islamic socio-discursive formation during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period.

This chapter will serve two main purposes. Firstly, it serves as a background for a better general understanding of historic Oman, and secondly, it facilitates the understanding of the contemporary U.A.E. in relation to historic Oman as part of the Islamic socio-discursive formation between 600 A.D. and 1500 A.D. Furthermore, it is impossible to appreciate the meaning of the transformations that historic Oman was to undergo during the transformational period, during the colonial period, or to appreciate the development of the social movements in historic Oman, crucial Oman, or the contemporary U.A.E. without understanding the nature of historic Oman's society during the Islamic period. Neither is it possible to appreciate the continuity and discontinuity of
aspects of Islamic identity in historic Oman, trucial Oman, or the contemporary U.A.E. without understanding how this Islamic identity was constructed during the 600-1500 A.D. period. It is equally impossible to appreciate the transformations that the various strata and classes of the region underwent as it changed from historic Oman, to Trucial Oman, to the contemporary U.A.E. without understanding how these strata and classes were constructed during the Islamic period.

The central argument that will be presented in Chapter Two is that the Islamic socio-discursive formation underwent several transformations during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D., as interpretations of Islam changed in relation to the rise and decline of different Islamic polities, denominations, and dynasties. But all of these transformations occurred within Islam, and this is why the Islamic socio-discursive formation is being treated as one entity. Even the Mongols adopted Islam after the 1200s, and established a dynasty adhering to Islam's precepts.

A second point that Chapter Two will underscore is that once it was constructed, the Umma developed an identity by which it differentiated itself both from pre-Islamic societies, and from other civilizations with which it came into contact. Without awareness of the pre-Islamic period, or contact with other civilizations, the Umma could not have developed its own identity in relation to either.
The Islamic Period in General: 600 A.D.-1500 A.D.

It is important to emphasize that the Islamic socio-discursive formation underwent several transformations during the period under review, so that each of the major periods discussed below was characterized by a specific dominant socio-discursive formation.¹ During Islam's early years, between 622 and 632 A.D., the year of the death of the Prophet Mohammed, Islam was a small political entity existing within the Arabian Peninsula alone. Within it, the Prophet Mohammed was both a spiritual and a political leader. Economically, the merchant class of Mecca was the dominant class,² and the Hejaz coast along the Red Sea (that part of the Arabian Peninsula in which Islam had taken hold), was dependent upon long-distance trade. Mecca itself was a trade center, mainly exchanging goods with both the Fertile Crescent and with Yemen.

Following the the death of the Prophet Mohammed, the Islamic socio-discursive formation underwent political,

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¹ Two recent works cover in detail the different social formations characterizing Islamic society between the time of the Prophet Mohammed and the end of the Abbasid era. These are Mohammed 'Abid Al-Jabiri's Al-'Aql al-Siyassi al-'Arabi (The Arab Political Mind) (Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1990), and Fawzy Mansour's The Arab World (London: Zed Press, 1992), Chapter Two.

² See Mahmood Ibrahim, Merchant Capital and Islam (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), for a discussion of the social structure of the Umma in Medina during Islam’s early years.
economic, and cultural changes. The Islamic Umma was now led by the Prophet Mohammed's successor, the Caliph Abu-Bakr al-Saddiq, who was chosen by the Umma as a leader, but was not considered a prophet. However, the Caliphate remained a spiritual, as well as a political, leader. Islam had expanded into the Fertile Crescent, Egypt, and Persia by this time, and economically, the Umma had become more dependent upon tribute paid by the various districts of the Umma. It was at the end of this period, in the year 661, that Islam divided into two denominations, Sunni and Shi'i. This happened because the Umma had not clarified the process of leadership succession.

During the Umayyad period, (661-750 A.D.), the Umma's capital city moved from Medinah to Damascus. Politically, it was ruled by the Umayyad extended family within the Quraish extended family. Rule was by hereditary succession, and the Caliphate, or head of the Umma, was now a political leader, using Islam as an ideology to propagate Umayyad family rule. Economically, the Umma was still dependent upon tribute, but the merchant class played a much more important role.\(^3\)

The Abbasid period lasted from 750-1258 A.D., and is, itself, divided into two periods. This is because by the tenth century, the political power of Abbasid rule became nominal only. The Mongol conquest and destruction of Baghdad, the Abbasid capital, under Hulagu Khan in 1258 ended the

\(^3\) Ibrahim, Merchant Capital and Islam, p. 191.
Abbasid era.⁴ Although the Abbasid Caliph was a Quraishi by
descent, the most important factors in the reproduction of
Abbasid rule were the Caliph's popular acceptance as
"representative of God on Earth", and the support of the
caliphate from an economically and socially powerful stratum
consisting of landlords, wealthy merchants, and scholars.⁵

Rule was by hereditary succession, and the Caliph was a
political ruler using Islam as an ideological base. In the
tenth century, the Abbasid Caliphs remained the nominal rulers
of the Umma, but in reality, what was once a unified Islamic
empire had broken down into many different polities, sometimes
based on ethnicity (mainly in Persia) and sometimes based
within a specific Islamic denomination, such as the Fatimid
rule in Egypt, which lasted from 969 to 1170 A.D. Some of
these polities became quite powerful, including the Fatimid
regime, the Ayyubid regime of 1170 A.D. to 1260, and the
Mamluk regime of 1260 to 1517. Like the Fatimid regime, these
two latter polities were based in Egypt.

It is important to mention here that each of the above
described socio-discursive formations characterizing the
different periods of the overall Islamic socio-discursive

⁴ The Timurids, who were dynastic successors of Hulagu
Khan, ruled Persia and Central Asia, adopted Islam and under
their rule, the cities of Central Asia became important
Islamic cultural and trade centers during the 1300s A.D.

⁵ Al-Jabiri, Al-'Aql al-Siyassi al-'Arabi (The Arab
Political Mind, p. 323.)
formation contained its own discourse, or set of power relationships, which engendered segmented identities and socio-economic differentiations. For example, the merchant class was dominant economically in the early Islamic social-formation. Political and cultural domination of early Islamic society, however, was in the hands of the Prophet Mohammed and his Companions, and the discourse of differentiating the Islamic period from the pre-Islamic period was used to reproduce this socio-discursive formation.

In the social formation prevailing under Umayyad rule, the merchant class gained in importance economically, but the tribute that the Caliphate, itself, collected was equally important. The discourse used here for the reproduction of Umayyad family rule was one that differentiated between Arabs and non-Arabs, and relatives versus non-relatives of the Prophet. During the Abbasid period, by contrast, the feudal landowing stratum had become even more important economically than the mercantile stratum was. The discourse used for the reproduction of of Abbasid rule differentiated between Muslims and non-Muslims. (See below for more details.)

The socio-discursive formation of each period of the larger Islamic socio-discursive formation reproduced itself by means of its particular segmented identities and socio-economic differentiations. Within the socio-discursive formation for each period, there developed several counter-
discourses as challenges to that socio-discursive formation. For example, the rise of the Abbasids began as a counter-discourse to the Umayyad socio-discursive formation. Similarly, the Zunj uprising, and the rise of the Qarametah movement were counter-discourses to Abbasid rule. (See below for additional coverage.) Each of these counter-discourses, however, used Islam, the ideology of the Umma, as its underpinning, and used its particular interpretation of Islamic teachings in opposition to the socio-discursive formation it was challenging. The development of these counter-discourses within the Umma during each period led to the decline of one Islamic socio-discursive formation, and to the rise of the next.

The most powerful differentiation upon which the discourse of the early Islamic period was based was that between the Islamic and pre-Islamic periods. This differentiation represented the adoption of Islam as an improvement over pre-Islamic beliefs, and promised believers a better life and salvation for having adopted Islam. Other socio-economic differentiations within the Umma upon which this discourse was based included that of Muslim versus non-Muslim, and the different socio-economic strata, such as peasants versus landowner, merchant versus non-merchant, and free versus non-free person. Other differentiations were between immigrants from Mecca (Muhajirun) versus native
Madinans (Ansar), or were based on gender.\textsuperscript{6}

The differentiations mentioned above, based upon kinship to the Prophet, gender, religious affiliation, the distinction of Meccan versus Madinan, etc. continued within the socio-discursive formation characterizing the early period of the Rashidun (Rightly Guided) Caliphs' administration immediately following the Prophet Mohammed's death. However, during the Caliph Othman's rule, the differentiation of relative of the ruler versus non-relative became important.\textsuperscript{7}

The many important differentiations upon which the discourse of the Umayyad period was based were continuations

\textsuperscript{6} For further treatment of the gender-based socio-economic differentiation, see Judith Tucker, "Gender and Islamic History," in \textit{Islamic and European Expansion: The Forging of a Global Order}, ed. Michael Adas (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), and Leila Ahmad's \textit{Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of Modern Debate} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Tucker discusses the intersection between social status and gender in early Islam, and during other periods. Ahmad demonstrates how the position of women actually improved during the era of the early Islam, but changed again during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, as Islam came to interact with the the cultures of peoples who had been under Byzantine or Sassanid rule. Fatima Mernissi, in her book entitled \textit{Al-Harim al-Siyassi (The Veil and Male Elite: A Feminist Interpretation of Women’s Rights in Islam} (New York: Addison Wesley Publishing Co., 1991) deals with the development of gender relationships, and their reproduction, during this period. Judith Tucker, as editor of \textit{Arab Women: Old Boundaries, New Frontiers} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), writes extensively on the important observation that gender relationships within Islamic societies, now and over history, have varied greatly in rural versus urban areas, and in nomadic areas versus the former two.

\textsuperscript{7} Further analysis of the socio-economic differentiations present in the society of the early Umma is provided Chapters five and six of Ibrahim's \textit{Merchant Capital and Islam}. 
of those which had prevailed under early Islam. However, the most important differentiations that developed during the Umayyad socio-discursive formation were as that of Umayyad extended family member versus non-member, and that of Arab versus non-Arab. (This included Arab Muslim versus non-Arab Muslim, and generally meant that Arabs enjoyed a privileged position in relation to non-Arabs under the Umayyad socio-discursive formation.\(^8\) It was the counter-discourse that this differentiation engendered that contributed to the decline of the Umayyads and the rise of the Abbasids as rulers of the Umma. The reason for the development of this counter-discourse was that as Islam expanded into the domains of non-Arabs during the Umayyad period, it Islamized a greater number of non-Arabic speaking individuals and communities, who came to support the rise of the Abbasids as a counter discourse to the Umayyads, as a result of the unequal relationship between

\(^8\) There are many interesting recorded instances in which Arab Christians and Arab Muslims within the Umma cooperated in battles for the expansion of Islam. One such example was the naval battle of Dhat al-Sawari between the Muslims and the Byzantines. Not only were Coptic designers and workmen in Alexandria among those who built the ships that the Muslims used, but Coptic sailors actually manned the ships during the battle. See George F. Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), pp. 57-59. Also, with the expansion of the Umma’s trade as Islam expanded, the economic position of Arab Jews in the Umma was also transformed. Whereas under Byzantine rule they had largely been peasants and craftsmen, by Umayyad times, they had become integrated into the merchant class. S.D. Goitein, "The Rise of the Near Eastern Bourgeoisie in Early Islamic Times," Journal of World History 3, (1957): 603.
Arabs and non-Arabs at that time. Another external power relationship, that of the Umma versus its adversaries, manifesting itself in the ongoing Umayyad war with Byzantium, was also a factor that weakened Umayyad rule.

It was within the discourse of Abbasid rule that differentiations based on socio-economic stratum became particularly important. Abbasid society was divided into three main strata, namely, the ruling circle, the middle class (consisting of landlords, merchants, scholars, military officers, etc.), and the commoners (peasants, laborers, small craftsmen, small shopkeepers, unemployed, beggers, petty criminals.\textsuperscript{9}

Under the Abbasid social formation, the long-distance merchants, large landowners, and scholars were the dominant strata politically, economically and culturally. Later in the period of Abbasid rule, the large landowners attained more economic privilege and political power than the long-distance merchants enjoyed. As this landlord stratum enhanced its economic privilege, political power, and cultural influence in relation to the commoners, i.e. peasants, laborers, small shopkeepers, etc, this unequal relationship engendered a counter-discourse to Abbasid rule. One manifestation of this

\textsuperscript{9} Al-Jabiri, \textit{Al-‘Aql al-Siyassi al ‘Arabi (The Arab Political Mind)}, p. 323.
counter-discourse was the Zanj uprising in 868 A.D. Another was the rise of the Qaramata social movement within Islam early in the tenth century. There were many other social movements that arose during the latter part of the Abbasid era. The period of the decline of Abbasid rule late in the ninth century saw the continuation of the power relations within the Islamic discourse, based on such factors as wealth, gender, denomination and ethnicity, along with the

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10 The Zanj uprising was an outgrowth of the vast differentiation that had developed between the commoners and wealthier strata in Abbasid society. Their leader, Ali ibn Mohammed, claimed to be a descendent of the Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib and Fatima, daughter of the Prophet Mohammed, but the Zanj belief system actually leaned toward Khawarijism rather than Shi‘ism. Among other things, the Zanj used Qur‘anic teachings, and statements from the Prophet Mohammed to stress their belief that Islam meant equality among believers, and to attack the acute socio-economic stratification that had developed within Abbasid society. Between 868 A.D. and 883 A.D., the Zanj movement was able to wreak considerable economic damage upon Abbasid rule, as they constantly attacked key trading cities like Basra, and were briefly in control of the trade routes leading into that city. (Mohammed Najib Abu-Talib, Al-Sura‘al-Ijtima‘i fi al-Dawlat al-Abbasiyyah (Social Conflict in the Abbasid State) (Basusssa, Tunisia: Dar al-Ma‘arif lil-Taba‘a wa al-Nashr, 1990), pp. 202-212.

development of new discourses within each smaller polity that formed in the wake of the Abbasid regime’s decline. The differentiations characterising each particular socio-discursive formation over Islamic history notwithstanding, it is important to emphasize that in relation to external threats, such as the Byzantines, Crusaders or the Mongol invasions, Islam as an identity dictated that even rival Islamic polities unite in relation to these threats.

An analysis of the Umma’s socio-discursive formation demonstrates that the Umma, throughout its history, was actually characterized by a series of socio-discursive formations, and that the counter-discourses that arose in relation to these socio-discursive formations as they underwent transformations remained within Islamic culture, which is to say that they posed their challenge to the established socio-discursive formation by means of their own interpretations of Islam. The transformations that Islam’s socio-discursive formations underwent, and the counter-discourses that arose in relation to them, reflected Islam’s need for new interpretations and ongoing transformation in the

\[\text{It is also important to mention that within each discourse, or set of power relationships characterizing an Islamic period or society, even the interpretation of Islamic precepts changed to fit each discursive relationship. See Mohammed Arkoun, Al-Islam, al-Ikhlaq, wa al-Siyassah (Islam, Ethics and Politics) (London: Al-Saqi Books, 1993), and Aïn Huwa al-Fikr al-Islami al-Mu'aser? (Where is Contemporary Islamic Thought? (London: Al-Saqi Books, 1993).}\]
face of changes in each socio-discursive formation.

Analysis of the Umma’s socio-discursive formation also reveals that several social formations, and a multitude of cultural discourses simultaneously articulated within it. Social formations articulating within the Islamic socio-discursive formation included mercantilism, which was dominant until the decline of Abbasid rule, agrarianism, tribalism, tributary social relations, and later, feudalism (this social formation was to gain in strength during the Abbasid period). Cultural discourses within the Umma’s socio-discursive formation were religiously, ethnically and politically based. These included different interpretations of Islam such as Sunnism, Shi‘ism, and their various denominations. Other religiously based cultural discourses included various Christian and Jewish denominations. Ethnically based cultural discourses included Arab, Persian, Turkish, Kurdish, and Berber, etc. Politically based cultural discourses included the Qaramatah polity, the Zanj uprising, the Fatimid Caliphate, etc.

Islamic Civilization and Identity: 600 A.D-1500 A.D.

The cultural, philosophical, and scientific achievements of Islamic civilization, as well as the changes Islamic civilization underwent during this period, occurred in relation to the various socio-discursive formations characterizing the Umma between 600 and 1500 A.D. Islamic
civilization's achievements all served the reproduction of, and occurred within, each of these socio-discursive formations during this period. For example, Islam's ability to bring peoples of various ethnic groups and races together as part of one Umma, through its basic teaching that among individuals, communities, ethnic groups and races who had accepted the oneness of God, a derived oneness of humanity existed, facilitated the spread of Islam, which in turn, ensured the political and economic cohesion of the Umma in relation to other civilizations with which it interacted. This was also one of the affects of Islamic civilization's grammatical perfection of the Classical Arabic language, and its universalization for use throughout the Umma and even beyond it.\^{13}

Another important development that Islamic civilization achieved was its position as a global trade center, straddling three continents. Islamic civilization's dominant position in global trade held until the 1500s. This situation was due to several factors. Firstly, the Umma strengthened its economic cohesion, and differentiated itself as an economic entity from others by developing its own financial, legal and


administrative system by 696 A.D. Measures that the Umayyad Caliphate took to strengthen this economic cohesion included the establishment of a monetary system in place of the old Byzantine and Sassanid ones that the Umma had inherited,¹⁵ and the minting of a distinct set of coins bearing the Qur’anic monotheistic message.¹⁶

Another measure that helped to strengthen the Umma’s economic cohesion was the establishment of various governmental Diwans, or departments. These included the particularly important Diwan al-Barid (Postal Department), and Diwan al-Kharaj (Department of Taxation).¹⁷ (See below for further coverage.) The expansion of the Umma’s frontiers, so that its domains extended from Sind in Western India to central Spain by middle of the eighth century was another factor that enhanced the Umma’s economic cohesion and stability, since it enabled Islamic civilization to link Mediterranean trade routes to those of the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea. This meant that the Umma’s economy developed, and was perpetuated by, internal and external trade routes connecting the Umma internally, and with other

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civilizations, respectively. For example, Islamic trade routes connecting Asia, Africa and Europe enabled inventions like the compass and paper to take hold, and later to be produced in the the domains of the Umma,\textsuperscript{18} before being exported to Europe from there.\textsuperscript{19}

Specifically, Islamic Trade routes extended overland from Mediterranean ports to China, from Gulf ports to the Red Sea, and also across the Indian Ocean to East Africa, India, the Indonesian archipelago, and China. Commodities that the Umma produced and exported included grains, fruits, indigo, leather, glassware, metalware, paper, pottery, and cotton, wool, silk, and muslin cloth.\textsuperscript{20} From Europe, the Umma imported timber, resins, salt, and fur.\textsuperscript{21} Indian Ocean trade circulated such goods as porcelain, silk, sandalwood, spices,

\textsuperscript{18} By the end of the eighth century, Baghdad had its first paper mill. By 900, A.D., Cairo had built one, and by the twelfth century, paper was being manufactured in the Maghrib region and in Islamic Spain. See Adas, \textit{Islamic and European Expansion}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{19} For detailed treatment of specific role of Mamluk Egypt in the diffusion of technology from Asia and the Muslim world into Europe, and the pivotal role this diffusion played in engendering the European Renaissance, see Janet Abu-Lughod, \textit{Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D.1250-1350} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).


incense, cotton textiles, and metal goods. Some of the items imported into Islamic lands from Asia were even re-exported to Christian Europe, with which the Umma enjoyed a trade surplus, via Islam's Mediterranean ports.

The Umma also differentiated itself from the other economies with which it came into contact, and from the pre-Islamic one, by devising its own code of economic laws. These laws pertained to relating to the monetary system, commerce, agriculture (treated in detail later) and taxation. The Umma devised its monetary system in 698 A.D., when the Umayyad Caliph Abdul Malik replaced the gold Byzantine Solidus, and the Sassanid silver Dirham as legal tender within the domains of the Umma by the gold Dinar and the silver Dirham.\textsuperscript{22} One of the important commercial practices that Islamic commercial law instituted was Qiradhan. Under this arrangement, an investor entrusted a chosen agent with a sum of money, in gold and silver, for the sale and purchase of goods. Instead of charging interest, the investor concluded an agreement in advance with his agent concerning the division of the profit that the agent earned from the sale of the purchased goods.\textsuperscript{23}

Concerning internal revenue, the Umma levied three main

\textsuperscript{22} Rahman, A Chronology of Islamic History: 570-1000 C.E., p. 59.

taxes upon those living within its domains. The Zakat tax was paid by all Muslims with an amount of personal wealth exceeding a set minimum, and the proceeds of this tax were distributed among the needy. The Jizya tax, by contrast, was paid by Christians and Jews, in return for protection by the Umma, and freedom of worship. A land tax was levied on those who cultivated land. Taxation levied upon Non-Muslims amounted to a somewhat higher percentage of taxable wealth than did that levied upon Muslims. The Umma forbade Muslims to charge interest in business, while Christians and Jews were allowed to do so.

After the rise of Islam, improvements in agricultural techniques within the Umma's domains, including irrigation and shipping techniques, enabled commercialized agriculture to develop, and this made foodstuffs, and other primary products, important export commodities. The surplus generated by both internal and external trade routes enabled great urban centers to be built within the Umma's domains, and with this development grew the demand for agricultural food produce, secondary products derived from agricultural goods, other manufactures, and luxury goods. Within these urban centers, important industries developed to meet these demands. Items produced by these industries included milled grains, iron, wooden goods, glassware, and textiles, such as cottons, and

dyes (derived from indigo).  

The expansion of the economy of the **Umma** helped it to construct socio-discursive formations characterizing wealthy, highly urbanized societies. The activities of the **Umma's** large intellectual stratum during much of the 600-1500 period was both an outgrowth of this socio-discursive formation, and one of the factors that helped to reproduce it. For example, intellectuals, through their writings about commerce, helped to reproduce the merchant stratum. Among these are Ibn Khurdadbih, Abu-Zaid, Al-Mas'udi, Al-Tabari, Al-Muqaddasi, Al-Wajdi, Ibn Ishaq, Al-Idrisi, Ibn Hawqal, Ibn Battuta, and Ibn Majid. These authors not only witnessed the workings of internal and external trade in Islamic civilization as travelers, but also participated in it as astronomers, geographers, or as commercial consultants.  

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26 As an example, Ibn Khurdadbih provides detail about trade routes within the **Umma** and to Southeast Asia in his work *Kitab al-Masalik (Book of Trade Routes)*, and also about the products of Southeast Asian lands. Abu Zaid and Al-Mas'udi, as additional examples, both wrote about the ports and products of China. Abu Zaid edited a book entitled *Akhbar al-Sin (News of China)* whose information about Chinese ports he updated by questioning various travelers there. He also mentions the rebellion in South China toward the end of the 800s A.D., during which the leader Huang Ch’ao besieged and sacked Canton and foreign merchants were expelled in 878 A.D. Foreign merchants in other ports of South China fled. This rebellion ended the existence of the Islamic enclave in Canton, and it also reduced the volume of direct trade between the **Umma**, (particularly historic Oman, and the other Gulf port of Siraf,) with China. Trade between the **Umma** and China
Sheibani, of Baghdad, was the author of a business manual, entitled *Kitab al-Kasb (The Book of Profit)*, and, at the same time, a co-founder of the Hanafi school of Islamic law. Among other things, *Kitab al-Kasb* emphasized that making a decent living was not only permissible in Islam, but was actually a religious duty.\(^{27}\)

Aside from being important commercially, Islamic urban centers were also intellectual and cultural centers. The stratum of philosophers, scientists, mathematicians and physicians that grew out of the *Umma's* urban socio-discursive formation also served to reproduce that socio-discursive formation. Firstly, the high status that each Islamic socio-discursive formation conferred upon scientists, mathematicians, physicians, and philosophers, and the manner

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\(^{27}\) S.D. Goitein, "The Rise of the Near Eastern Bourgeoisie in Early Islamic Times," *Journal of World History* 30, no. 3, (1957): 530. Goitein also mentions the existence of at least ten thousand biographies of Muslims notables who lived prior to the Crusades. These biographies not only discuss their subjects' literary and intellectual achievements, but also describe their occupations and economic positions.
in which they passed on their knowledge, provided an avenue of social mobility to those students who attached themselves to the masters of these subjects. In addition, mathematicians like al-Jabra and physicians like Ibn Sina met practical needs within Islamic urban centers. The diverse schools of philosophy and the many interpretations of Islam, particularly evident in Baghdad and Andalusia, also served the socio-discursive formations of these places and times in that they kept Islam from becoming so monolithic and doctrinaire as to incur a rash of splits. The fact, for example, that the debate between Ibn Rushd of Andalusia and Al-Ghazzali of Baghdad could occur without the excommunication from the Umma of the partisans of either philosopher is testimony to the tolerant intellectual climate prevailing in many of the socio-discursive formations characterizing the Umma during the 600 A.D. to 1500 A.D. period. Mobility within the Umma’s intellectual stratum enabled certain individuals to enhance their social status and prestige through their studies with a given scholar. Movement among the Umma’s scholars was such that once a work was completed in one part of the Umma, it came to be read and used throughout. 28 This characteristic strengthened the intellectual stratum of the Umma across the various prevailing socio-discursive formations, because it ensured the constant introduction of ideas, and communication

among all of its members.

The arts, too, were an outgrowth of the Umma's urbanized socio-discursive formation, and poetry and architecture played their roles in its reproduction. There were innovative poets such as Abu Nawas, and Bashshar of Baghdad. There were also poets such as Mutannabi, a panegyric court poet who could change allegiances, and who also wrote poetry of his own reflecting his pessimistic outlook. Literary panegyrist, who wrote poetry for their livelihoods in praise of patrons who were sometimes rulers, certainly contributed to the reproduction of the ruling stratum.

Islamic architecture helped to reproduce the socio-discursive formation of the Umma both in terms of the Umma's identity in relation to other cultures, and internally. The unique style of Islamic architecture distinguished it not only from that of other cultures contemporary with the Umma during the 600-1500 period, but also from the architecture of pre-Islamic times within the Umma's geographic area. In addition, the mosques built from Sind in Western India to Andalusia associated Islam with beauty and spiritual wealth. The architecture of mosques even reproduced Islamic teachings in

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that the walls, Mihrabs, and courtyards of Mosques often featured Qur’anic Ayahs as calligraphic adornment. Classical examples of Islamic architecture from this period include the Alhamra in Granada, the Alcazar in Seville, the Great Mosque of Qairawan in Tunisia, and the Ibn Tulun Mosque in Cairo, the Great Mosque in Damascus, and the Dome of the Rock-al-Aqsa complex in Jerusalem.

The music that the Umma developed between 600 and 1500 A.D. was another art form that reinforced the identity of the Umma both in relation to other cultures with which it came into contact, and to pre-Islamic culture within the Umma’s geographic area. Some of this music also reinforced Islamic teachings. This was true of the music composed within the Umma during this period which was based on Qur’anic rhythms. Its performance often began with praise to God and to the Prophet Mohammed.

Such philosophers and scientists as Al-Farabi, Al-Kindi, and Ibn Sina were also active in the field of music. They wrote works about musical theory which treated music as a branch of mathematics. Mainly, theoretical works dealt with the analysis of intervals, scales, and related melodic modes of music as a practical, performed art also helped to reinforce Arab identity in relation to the other cultures with which the Umma had come into contact, and was incorporating into its society. This can be seen in the fact that in the
Court of tenth century Baghdad, poetry, including that written in the traditional gasidah form, was often set to music and sung to instrumental accompaniment. The ʿOud, a long-necked lute, was popular for such accompaniment.\footnote{Trevor Mostyn and Albert Hourani, eds. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988), s.v. "Islamic Musical Theory," by Owen Wright, pp. 243-244.}

Even the Umma’s cuisine during the 600-1500 A.D. period was both an expression of, and a reinforcer of, Islamic identity in relation to other cultures. Firstly, although the Umma’s cuisine incorporated the culinary traditions of the many other cultures with which Muslims came into contact, it remained unique in relation to that other cultures. Baghdad in particular, developed its own high cuisine, as it had become a center of commerce, science, and literature, by virtue of its being a cultural, political, and economic center. In addition, Muslims distinguished themselves from non-Muslims by means of Islam’s dietary laws. Within the Umma, cuisine was the subject of many books written in Arabic. One such culinary author was Ibrahim ibn Al-Mahdi, of Baghdad. In addition to those from Baghdad, culinary manuscripts from Syria, Egypt, and the Andalusian-Maghrebi region were in circulation by the end of the thirteenth century.\footnote{Mostyn and Hourani, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa, s.v. "Cuisine," by David Waines, pp. 240-243.}
Generally, the cultural developments in Islamic civilization arose within the socio-discursive formations that were constructed as the Umma expanded geographically, politically and economically. These cultural achievements also served to facilitate the reproduction of these socio-discursive formations as well. This has been seen in the relationship between literature, science, architecture, poetry, and the other arts on the one hand, and the reproduction of social status, political power and economic privilege within the Umma on the other. An example of this relationship can be seen in the works of many intellectuals about the cultural, political and economic conditions of lands in which merchants of the Umma were conducting long-distance trade. These works helped the mercantile stratum to reproduce itself by providing it with information. Mohammed Sheibani’s Kitab al-Kashf even legitimized profitable trade as a religious duty. Politically, merchants paid taxes to rulers, and the rulers, in turn, provided security, which generally facilitated commerce. In addition, court poets who write panegyrics to rulers reinforced the legitimacy of these rulers. All three of these strata, therefore, played a role in the reproduction of the Islamic socio-discursive formations that prevailed during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period.

In addition, Islamic civilization’s cultural achievements constructed and reinforced the Umma’s identity,
both in relation to the past and in relation to other cultures. This can be seen in the distinct hallmarks of Islamic architecture, music, and literature. It can also be seen in architecture’s reinforcement of the *Umma*’s identity, and in poetry’s and literature’s use of, and perfection of, the Arabic language, which, itself, was central to the cohesion and identity of the *Umma* in relation to the pre-Islamic past, and to other civilizations with which it came into contact. As they reinforced the *Umma*’s identity, these cultural activities also facilitated the reproduction of the Islamic socio-discursive formation.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has treated the *Umma* as socio-discursive formation, i.e., a society which, like other societies, contained a series of political, economic and cultural structures (social formations), and socially constructed power relationships (discourses). This approach contrasts with the more frequent one, in which the *Umma* is simply treated as a religious community in which all adherents to Islamic theological beliefs were equals, irrespective of race, ethnicity, class, or gender. This chapter has demonstrated that, once the *Umma* was constructed after the rise of Islam, the *Umma* formed its own socio-discursive formation, in which the *Umma* differentiated itself both from societies that had existed prior to Islam, and from other civilizations with
which it came into contact. This chapter has also shown the transformations that the Islamic socio-discursive formation underwent during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period. This was because as Islam expanded, different segmented identities developed within the Umma. This led to changes in interpretations of Islam, and the rise of counter-discourses within the Umma, which, in turn, led to the rise of new power relationships, and the decline of previous ones. However, this chapter has emphasized that all of these transformations took place within the Umma, and that is why this chapter covers the rise and expansion of Islam as one overall socio-discursive formation. The Umma as such, throughout the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period, differentiated itself from both pre-Islamic societies, and from other civilizations with which it came into contact, and therefore is treated as a unified whole. This research covers the construction and expansion of the Umma as such because an understanding of the Islamic socio-discursive formation as such is essential to the understanding of historic Oman as a part of the Umma during the 600-1500 A.D. period, and the impact of changes within the overall Islamic socio-discursive formation upon historic Oman. This will be the focus of Chapters Three and Four.

The second part of this chapter focused upon Islamic civilization and identity. The purpose of this focus was to show that the Umma constructed a civilization with a
particular identity in relation to other civilizations with which it came into contact. This identity was expressed in the Umma's unique political, economic and cultural structures. Manifestations of this identity could be seen in Islamic law, government system, art, architecture, language, literature, etc. These political, economic and cultural structures were all part of the Islamic socio-discursive formation, and contributed to its reproduction of itself. Historic Oman, as part of the Umma, shared this identity, and this will be seen in the next two chapters, which examine historic Oman's own political, economic, and cultural structures. It would not be possible to understand historic Oman without first examining the Umma of which it was a part.

It is now appropriate to examine historic Oman, during the 600 A.D. to 1500 A.D. period in relation to the greater Islamic socio-discursive formation, and also as component of the various socio-discursive formations characterizing the Umma over its history.
CHAPTER THREE

HISTORIC OMAN DURING THE ISLAMIC PERIOD (1)

Introduction

This chapter is divided into two parts, and is related to the fourth chapter in content. These two chapters cover the Islamization of historic Oman, and establish that historic Oman contained three socio-discursive formations, namely, the mercantile, the agrarian, and the tribal. These three sectors of historic Oman’s society, are treated as socio-discursive formations here because they each contained a set of economic, political and cultural structures (social formations), and socially constructed power relationships (discourses). Each of these socio-discursive formations within historic Oman underwent transformations in relation to the pre-Islamic period and in relation to changes occurring within the greater Islamic socio-discursive formation.

The first part of this chapter specifically covers the Islamization of historic Oman, and the transformations historic Oman as a whole underwent within the Islamic socio-discursive formation of 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. The second part treats historic Oman’s mercantile socio-discursive formation within the Islamic period, and the transformations that this socio-discursive formation underwent in relation to both the
pre-Islamic socio-discursive formation, and in relation to the larger Islamic socio-discursive formation. The following chapter will cover historic Oman's agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations.

There are several reasons for devoting the first part of this chapter to the analysis of historic Oman in relation to the Umma as a whole during the Islamic period (600 A.D. - 1500 A.D.). Firstly, it is important to treat the Islamic socio-discursive formation within this period as one entity because the rise of Islam was a turning point in historic Oman, and also in the history of the Gulf and Indian Ocean areas. It brought about fundamental transformations in the cultural, economic, and political structures of both historic Oman and the Gulf area. Secondly, historic Oman was part of the Umma. Therefore, developments within the overall Islamic socio-discursive formation affected historic Oman. Similarly, there are developments within historic Oman itself that had their affects upon the larger Umma.

Examining historic Oman within the Umma also sheds light upon historic Oman's own, unique, dynamic within the Umma, but more importantly, allows for a relational understanding of the period of transformation, as well as the colonial and contemporary periods, all of which will subsequently be treated. Thirdly, in treating historic Oman during the transformational, colonial and contemporary periods in relation to what historic Oman was during the Islamic
period, this research will be able to demonstrate how some of the political, economic and cultural structures that were constructed in historic Oman during the Islamic period continued to articulate within the transformational, colonial and contemporary socio-discursive formations there. Additionally, this research will demonstrate how other structures discontinued as a result of the transformational and colonial socio-discursive formations which subsequent chapters will examine.

This chapter will emphasize that it is impossible to understand historic Oman itself, Trucial Oman, or the contemporary U.A.E. without understanding historic Oman in relation to the Islamic socio-discursive formation during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period. It is also for this reason that this research goes into some detail about historic Oman's mercantile socio-discursive formation, since later chapters will, among other things, examine this important socio-discursive formation, treating its continuities and discontinuities during the transformational, colonial, and contemporary periods.

This chapter presents four arguments. Two of these arguments will be presented in the first section of this chapter. The first of these is that the spread of Islam into historic Oman was facilitated by the fact that the Arabs of historic Oman had developed an identity in relation to their Sassanid rulers during Sassanid rule. The power relationship
between the Arabs of historic Oman and their Sassanid rulers led to the rapid spread of Islam into historic Oman, which was linked culturally, and economically to the rest of the Peninsula. The second argument is that once historic Oman became Islamized, the power relationship within its society changed, and historic Oman underwent several transformations in relation to changes occurring within the larger Islamic socio-discursive formation.

The other two arguments will be presented in the second section of this chapter. The first of these two is that historic Oman’s mercantile socio-discursive formation underwent key transformations in the course of historic Oman’s Islamization, in relation to the pre-Islamic period, and also in relation to the transformations that the overall Islamic socio-discursive formation, itself, underwent within the 600 A.D. to 1500 A.D. period. However, the impact of transformations within the greater Umma upon historic Oman’s mercantile socio-discursive formation did not detract from historic Oman’s mercantile socio-discursive formation’s basic Islamic identity throughout the 600 A.D – 1500 A.D. period, because the transformations that took place within the overall Islamic socio-discursive formation still remained within the parameters of the Islamic discourse. The second argument is that historic Oman’s mercantile socio-discursive formation reproduced itself by means of the discourse that it constructed both in relation to its own strata, in relation to
the Indian Ocean mercantile system, and in relation to the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations, which will be analyzed in the next chapter.

**Transformations within Historic Oman During the Islamic Period**

Historic Oman became Islamized within the context of the power relationship between the indigenous Omani Arabs and their Sassanid (Persian) rulers. Islamization also occurred within the context of the Peninsula-wide cohesion brought about by the Arabic language, religion, and trade. Since Mecca was a religious and commercial center for the entire Peninsula, the Arabs of historic Oman had organic connections with that city, and with the rest of the Hejaz through language, religious institutions, and trade in Omani textiles\(^1\) and other commodities. In particular, Omani merchants, along with other peninsular merchants, attended the yearly trade fair in 'Ukaz, in the Thaqif territory, south of Mecca.\(^2\) It was within this context that they came into contact with the message of Islam. Concerning religion, Arabs from throughout the Peninsula customarily gathered in Mecca


for worship of the multitude of gods then represented there. These Peninsular religious and trade practices cemented the connections between historic Oman and the Hejaz, and these connections, in turn, added to the differentiation in identity between Omanis as Arabs and their Sassanid rulers, and later, facilitated the spread of the message of Islam.

Basically, the Sassanid-Omani Arab power relationship was characterized by linguistic and religious differentiation, since the Sassanid rulers, as speakers of Pahlavi, a Persian language, were by definition alien rulers to the Omani Arabs. The religious differentiation aspect of the Omani-Sassanid power relationship manifested itself in the fact that the majority of the Omani Arabs followed a polytheistic religion of their own, and did not identify with the Majusi (Zoroastrian) religion that their Sassanid rulers practiced. Also, although direct Sassanid control of historic Oman was largely confined to the Gulf coast, it was Sassanid policy to protect the position of Persian merchants along both coasts of the Gulf by limiting the commercial activities of Arab traders. In that part of historic Oman under direct Sassanid rule, non-Persian subjects, Arab and otherwise, were taxed heavily. In some areas not under direct Sassanid rule, a Sassanid-appointed Julanda (governor) collected taxes on

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behalf of Sassanid rule. Finally, the ongoing war between the Sassanid and Byzantine empires, which were the two regional powers of that era, was choking off Peninsular trade with the fertile crescent lands.⁴

In 630 A.D., the Prophet Mohammed sent his envoy, Amr ibn al-'As, to meet with two notables from the historic Oman region, the Julandas Abd and Jaifar. Once these two delegates had agreed to accept Islam, there followed a visit by a delegation from historic Oman to Medina. Amr Ibn al-'As remained in historic Oman, and instructed the Arabs there in Islam.⁵

After the death of the Prophet Mohammed, however, some of the Arabs of historic Oman attempted to reject Islam, and one of the reasons for this was that they did not want to pay Zakat to Medina as the seat of the Umma.⁶ They were joined in this rebellion by some Persian-speaking Majasis, and some members of other non-Islamic minorities like the Zutt and the


Sayabija, whom the Sassanid rulers had brought to historic Oman from the Indian subcontinent as soldiers and laborers.\(^7\) Other Arabs joined the Ridda or rejection of Islam because they were dissatisfied with the way the Umma was handling the issue of leadership succession.\(^8\)

After the Ridda, during the administration of the Caliph Omar bin al-Khattab, historic Oman came to be governed by an administrator designated for the position by a Medina-appointed Wali in Basra.\(^9\) During the time of the Caliph Othman ibn 'Affan, the Wali in historic Oman was appointed directly from Medina.\(^10\)

The struggle for power between Caliph Ali ibn abi-Talib and Mu'awiya for the position of Caliph marked the division of Islam into two great denominations, Sunni and Shi'i. During this power struggle, the Gulf region, and historic Oman in particular, sided with the Caliph Ali. As an outgrowth of this situation, after Mu'awiya became the first Umayyad Caliph, most of the Muslims of historic Oman became Khawarij, or "outsiders." This grouping considered itself neither Sunni

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\(^10\) Ibid., p. 70.
nor Shi‘i in affiliation. Basically, Khawarijis believed that neither direct kinship to the Prophet Mohammed nor Quraish affiliation were relevant criteria for worthiness of the position of Caliph. Rather, they considered a one’s appropriateness for leadership of the Umma a question of character and piety.\textsuperscript{11} During the Umayyad Caliphate, historic Oman was again governed by a Wali in Basra.\textsuperscript{12}

At the end of the Umayyad period, around mid 700s A.D., the Obeidi movement within Islam, under the leadership of Abdallah ibn Abadh, developed in Basra as an offshoot of Khawarijism, adopting the Khawariji rejection of hereditary succession as a criterion for leadership of the Umma. Abdallah ibn Abadh and his followers subsequently moved from Basra to interior of historic Oman where the Obeidi community continued to develop. Within this Obeidi community, the leader, or Imam, was elected.\textsuperscript{13} During the early Abbasid period, while historic Oman officially continued to be governed from Basra by an Abbasid-appointed Wali, the Obeidis often elected their own Imam in their part of historic Oman, the interior.\textsuperscript{14}

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\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., pp. 102-103.


During the early 900s and afterwards, many smaller powers arose in the Gulf region, and in historic Oman as Abbasid power waned. An important one of these, which briefly established a polity within historic Al-Bahrain,\footnote{At that time, Al-Bahrain was an area that extended along the Gulf coast and interior from present-day Kuwait to contemporary Qatar. Sometimes, Al-Bahrain extended as far as Julfar (contemporary Ras Al-Khaimah).} and historic Oman in the early 900s A.D. was the Qaramitah movement, which began in Iraq in the late 800s A.D. This movement arose as a political counter-discourse to the Abbasid rule, and as an Islamic counter-discourse to established religious doctrine, since it was a movement of commoners (peasants, laborers and other members of the low strata of Abbasid society). Among other things, their beliefs featured social justice and egalitarianism. Although they initially enjoyed considerable support from the Fatimid movement, then rivals to the Abbasid Caliphs, they lost legitimacy with the Fatimids and with other Muslims when they raided Mecca and carried away the Black Stone within the Ka'aba in 930 A.D.\footnote{Abu Talib, Al-Sura' al-Ijtima'i fi al-Dawlat al-'Abbasiyyah (Social Conflict in the Abbasid State), pp. 170-201.}

The Buwayhids became the de facto rulers of the Baghdad and Persian provinces nominally under Abbasid rule in 932 retaining the Abbasid Caliphs as figureheads. This new regime placed the coastal region of historic Oman under Buwayhid rule in 942, and subsequently defeated the Qaramitah polity in
around 963 A.D.. The Buwayhid state lasted until 1050 A.D.

Coincidental with the final fifty years of Buwayhid rule, and until about 1100 A.D., an autonomous Obeidi polity continued to exist in the interior of historic Oman, with its center at Nezwa. In 1154, another polity which subsequently adopted Obeidism arose in the interior of historic Oman. This was the Banu Nabhani Kingdom,\textsuperscript{17} which lasted until 1616. At the time of the Banu Nabhani Kingdom, the coastal area had become a tributary area to the commercial city-state of Hormuz. The outer frontier area of historic Oman was inhabited by various tribes.\textsuperscript{18}

Briefly, the important points about historic Oman's history have to do with the issues of identity, and the Umma. The speed of the spread of Islam to historic Oman can be traced to the identity of Arabs of historic Oman as Arabs. This identity was constructed in relation to Sassanid rule on the one hand, and on historic Oman's cultural and economic connections to the rest of the Peninsula on the other. The

\textsuperscript{17} In historic Oman, and elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula, the Kingdom was a pre-Islamic form of government that Islam had supplanted, at its rise, with the institution of the Caliphate. The rise of Banu Nabhani Kingdom, and many other kingdoms within the Umma, occurred in relation to the decline of Abbasid rule, and to the general disintegration of central administration of the Umma. It needs to be emphasized, however, that all of these kingdoms adopted Islam, and did not constitute the re-establishment of pre-Islamic political institutions.

second point is that the Islamization of historic Oman made it part of the greater Umma. This means that the changes that occurred within historic Oman after Islamization occurred in relation to the greater Umma's changing socio-discursive formations. Therefore, developments like the rise of Khawarajism, the Obeidi movement, the Qaramata polity, Buwayhid rule, and the Banu Nabhani Kingdom all arose as discourses or counter-discourses within the Umma.

**Historic Oman's Mercantile Socio-Discursive Formation During the Islamic Period: 600 A.D.-1500 A.D.**

An examination of historic Oman's mercantile socio-discursive formation provides insight into one important aspect of historic Oman's relation to the transformations occurring within the Umma, and further clarification of the transformations that historic Oman's own socio-discursive formation underwent after the rise of Islam. Examining historic Oman's linkages with the Indian Ocean\(^{19}\) trading system is also important because it elaborates on an important component of the relationship between historic Oman's mercantile, agrarian, and tribal socio-discursive formations, and the changes that occurred in this relationship during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period. (This will be covered in the

\(^{19}\) Within this context, the term "Indian Ocean" actually refers to a network of maritime trade routes including ports on both the African and Asian coasts of the Red Sea, the Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal, and the Chinese ports along the South China Sea.
following chapter.) Analysis of historic Oman’s mercantile socio-discursive formation in relation to transformations within the broader Islamic socio-discursive formation also provides insight into the rise and decline of commercial cities in the region, into aspects of the changing role of tribalism (see below), and into the construction of identity within historic Oman that resulted from historic Oman’s interaction with other, non-Islamic civilizations.

Indian Ocean trade underwent quantitative and qualitative transformation during the 600s A.D. for two reasons. In the Western section of the Indian Ocean trade system, the rise and spread of Islam expanded the zone of production and consumption affecting Indian Ocean trade so that it now included not only all of the Arabian Peninsula including Yemen, but also Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, Egypt, and much of North Africa. These areas had previously been beyond the range of Indian Ocean trade because they were either outposts or actual provinces of the two great warring empires of the century before, Byzantium and Sassanid Persia. Near the Indian Ocean’s eastern littoral, the Emperor Li-Yuan had founded the T’ang Dynasty in China, which ushered in a period of expansion and economic growth there. This development enhanced China’s integration into Indian Ocean maritime trade, as well as the connected overland trade

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20 Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, p. 36.
routes.  \(^{21}\)

The Arabian Peninsula’s trade, too, expanded after the rise of Islam, both because of the overall expansion of Indian Ocean trade, and on a more localized basis. Once the spread of Islam into the Fertile Crescent had ended the war between Byzantium and Sassanid Persia, and had placed both the Red Sea and Gulf trade routes in Islamic hands, this development transformed these two trade routes from commercial rivals to coordinates within a unified mercantile system. Furthermore, once the Fertile Crescent ceased to be a war zone between Byzantium and Persia, not only did overland trade between Syria and Mesopotamia benefit, but the entire area became a huge, unified market for Peninsular commerce.  \(^{22}\)

As an important trade center, historic Oman dates back to antiquity. One of the earliest documents from Akkad, in ancient Mesopotamia, about historic Oman mentions that ships carrying merchandise sailed from Magan, as historic Oman was then called, and Dilmun (historic Al-Bahrain) to Akkad. Another document, this time Sumerian, from 2050 B.C., mentions Magan as a ship building center, and that Mesopotamia was importing copper from Magan.  \(^{23}\) Other Sumerian records relate

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22 Hourani, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times*, pp. 52-53.

that around 2000 B.C., Magan was importing timber from India.\textsuperscript{24} Throughout antiquity, trading vessels departing from Magan carrying incense, gum arabic, myrrh, and frankincense, were calling at ports elsewhere in the Peninsula, or as far away as East Africa and India, from which they transported spices and perfumes.\textsuperscript{25} Basically, these records of antiquity show that as far back as 2000 B.C., there existed a mercantile stratum in Magan, which engaged in long-distance trade and which generated a ship-building industry, as well as a copper mining industry. Of course, other strata formed within this relationship, such as members of a ship's crew, miners of the copper, etc. This mercantile stratum also traded in gum arabic, myrrh, and frankincense, and in relation to this mercantile stratum, an agrarian stratum cultivated these items.

Sassanid rule, which also encouraged trade and actually tried to unite Red Sea and Gulf trade under Persian rule, also gave historic Oman an important role. Persian merchants traded from the city of Mazun (Suwar), and Arab merchants from historic Oman traded from the city of Dibba, nearby. The local capital in the interior of historic Oman was Towam


\textsuperscript{25} Amin, Al-Umaniyyun: Ruwad al-Bahr, p.11.
(Bureimi). The most important trade commodity at this time was silk.\textsuperscript{26} Other reports mention a highly developed textile industry in Suhar, which means that a manufacturing stratum, and a laboring stratum, also existed in that city, along with the mercantile one.\textsuperscript{27} Ibn Habib, writing in Islamic times, testifies to the importance of Dibba as a trade center during Sassanid times in his work \textit{Al-Muhabbar}, by mentioning that merchants from India and China, along with those from all over the Arabian Peninsula, attended the annual trade fair held in that city.\textsuperscript{28}

With the rise of Islam, historic Oman gained new importance in that the Caliph Othman Ibn Affan used fleets from historic Oman to help spread Islam in Sind, or Western

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp. 16-17.


\textsuperscript{28} Cited in D.T. Potts, \textit{The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity, Vol. II: From Alexander the Great to the Coming of Islam}, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) p. 339. The issue of whether or not Chinese merchants were actually present in historic Oman before the fourteenth century A.D. remains a matter of controversy. Actually the controversy continues around the question of whether or not Chinese merchants were present in the Gulf between the 800s A.D. and the 1400s. Tatsuro Yamamoto, for example, mentions the existence of a Chinese trade route to the Gulf in the 800s, A.D., during the T'ang dynasty in "Chinese Activities in the Indian Ocean before the Coming of the Portuguese., \textit{Diogenes}, Fall, 1980, p. 22. George Hourani, however, argues that it was unlikely that Chinese ships called at Gulf ports that early. See his \textit{Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean}, p. 75.
India. Al-Sind was important to the Umma because once Islam was established there, the Umma gained the ports of al-Daybul and al-Mansurah, which placed it in a better position to trade with eastern Asia. One important impact on historic Oman's trade came from the institution of customs taxes. Islam initially abolished the trade taxes that both the Sassanid and Byzantine Empires had imposed on inter-imperial commerce at all ports and frontier stations to both empires.

Subsequently, however, the Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab extended the principle of the Zakat and Jizya taxes, originally and respectively imposed upon Muslims and non-Muslims who lived within the domains of the Umma, to apply to a new set of taxes levied against merchants passing the Umma's customs stations. (In overland trade, the term "customs station" applied to every city through which merchants passed. In long-distance sea trade, this term merely applied to ports.) The Caliph Omar imposed these taxes because Muslim traders mentioned to him that they were being obliged to pay

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29 Amin, Al Umaliyun: Ruwad al-Bahr, p. 22.

30 Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times, p. 63.

import and export taxes at Indian ports.\textsuperscript{32} This new customs tax on merchandise, called \textit{al-`ashriyyah, al-jabayah, or al-makous}, favored merchants from the \textit{Umma}'s domains in general, regardless of religion, because while Muslim merchants from within the \textit{Umma} were charged two and one half percent of their merchandise's value, and non-Muslim merchants from within the \textit{Umma} five per cent, merchants from outside the \textit{Umma}'s domains were charged ten per cent.\textsuperscript{33}

It is important to emphasize, however, that these taxes were only imposed at customs stations. In the Indian Ocean, all nations enjoyed complete freedom on navigation until 1500 A.D.\textsuperscript{34} This tax reform added to the trade revenues of historic Oman, and of the \textit{Umma} in general.

There was also considerable variation in how these customs taxes were imposed, depending upon prevailing interpretation of Islamic law, the economic situation, preferences for certain goods in contrast to others, etc. at different locations and times during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D.

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\item \textsuperscript{33} Goitein, \textit{Journal of World History} 3, no. 3 (1957): 596.
\end{itemize}
period. For example, S.D. Goitein states that laws about customs duties that differentiated among merchants according to religion were probably not enforced in Fatimid Egypt, or included in the Isma‘ili legal code. He also states that, in order to ensure widespread long-distance trade, Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi eventually issued an edict to the affect that all merchants trading within his domains were to be charged one half of the customs duties, whether Muslim, Christian, or Jewish.\(^{35}\) The island city of Qais, which became an important commercial center in the Arabian Gulf, likewise made no distinctions in terms of the charging of customs duties. (See below.) Cities in historic Oman such as Dibba, Suhar, and Qalat were important customs stations.\(^{36}\) Later, in Umayyad times, the Caliph Abdul Malik facilitated trade further by standardizing the Umma’s currency system in 696, A.D. Islamic law also contained provisions for investment totally on credit, since currency was in gold and silver, and, therefore, a risk to transport in large amounts. Instruments for credit investment included the hawala (transfer of debt), and the suftaja (letter or credit). Islamic legal provisions, and these credit documents allowed investors of good reputation to


purchase in order to sell without any ready capital. Credit partnerships among reputable investors were viewed favorably because they created capital.\textsuperscript{37}

During this time, historic Oman's long distance trade, and that of the rest of the Peninsula obtained further room to expand, as Islam spread further through the Eastern Mediterranean, North African, and Andalusian regions. By virtue of this fact, Islam had coordinated Mediterranean trade with Indian Ocean trade, and had connected the two via the overland trade routes. The fact that political stability also prevailed during these times also helped to ensure economic prosperity.\textsuperscript{38}

One commercial institution, the \textit{commenda} arrangement, took hold because of the expansion of the \textit{Umma\textapos;s} economy and because it did not involve the charging of interest rates, a practice forbidden by Islamic law to Muslims but permitted to Christians and Jews. Within the \textit{Umma}, the commenda agreement was known by three Arabic names; \textit{giradh}, \textit{muqaradha}, and \textit{mudharaba}. (It was mainly known by the first two names in the Gulf, and by the third in Iraq.)

Basically, a commenda agreement was one in which an investor or a group of investors entrusted capital or


\textsuperscript{38} Chaudhuri, \textit{Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean}, p. 44.
merchandise to an agent-manager, who disposed of it in trade, and in return for his time and labor, obtained a designated share in the profit. The agent-manager could dispose of the capital or merchandise without any liability in the event of an unsuccessful transaction.\textsuperscript{39} This commercial arrangement was in use in Islam as early as the Prophet Mohammed's time,\textsuperscript{40} and is discussed in Islamic legal works written as early as the late 700s. The commenda arrangement spread throughout the Umma, and later became a common commercial arrangement in southern Europe. It remained in use in these areas until beyond 1500. Aside from the fact that it did not involve interest, the Qiradh or mugaradha arrangement was suitable for long-distance trade, regional trade, investment in manufacturing, etc. because it enabled investors who had capital but no ready means by which to invest it to pay agents who knew of avenues of investment but had no capital. Generally, the commenda arrangement's function was to enable investors to obtain assistance in performing economic tasks where such assistance was needed. This included situations where a commercial venture required additional capital, a certain amount or type of work, or certain skills and mobility

\textsuperscript{39} Udovitch, in Richards, Islam and the Trade of Asia, pp. 47-48.

\textsuperscript{40} In fact, this arrangement is very likely to have originated in the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula, developing in the context of caravan trade. Abraham I. Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 172.
that the original investor did not have. The commenda arrangement allowed agent-managers of an investor's capital to enter a business partnership and to make a profit on an investment without being liable for interest or in case of a transaction loss, and the holder of the capital to purchase assistance in investing it.

Within the Umma's economic system, historic Oman's trade with India, China and East Africa expanded. As this trade expanded, commercial enclaves containing Muslim merchants, many of them Omani, were established in Malabar (Southern India), Ceylon, Java, Sumatra, Canton and other ports in China, in Somalia, Kliwa, Mombasa and Malindi in northern Kenya, and on Zanzibar and Pemba Islands by the early 700s A.D. Kliwa, as an example, is described by a European traveler in 1500 as being a wealthy city in which the houses were "high like Spain. In this land there are rich merchants, and there is much gold and silver and amber and musk and pearls..." It was the existence of these enclaves in Java and Sumatra that contributed to the spread of Islamization

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throughout the Indian Archipelago (Indonesia) between that time and 1500 A.D. However, these enclaves were not exclusively Muslim, and the Muslim population, itself, was highly diverse. Neither did Muslim merchants attempt to monopolize trade in any of these enclaves.

Along with the Muslim merchants, the trading population of these port cities included Jains, Parsees, Hindus, Jews, as well as Ethiopian Christians, Armenian Christians, and Nestorians from India. Within these enclaves, the mercantile strata was allowed to operate under the governance of their own, chosen officials, and with minimal intervention by the host government in their affairs. Records about merchants from the Umma trading in Malacca mention that they paid a duty of six per cent of the value of their goods, and presented gifts to the Sultan, which were important additions to governmental income, but each foreign mercantile group, including that from the Umma, appointed its own Shahbandar, who safeguarded its interests in Malacca. Foreign merchants in that city also had a voice in certain customs assessments.

45 The Islamization of the peoples of these two islands was the work of the enclaves of Muslim merchants, often from historic Oman, and of Indian Muslims as well. The merchant enclaves, moreover, were constantly absorbing an influx of new traders from within the Umma proper, so that they retained strength of identity as Muslim communities, in relation to non-Muslims. Rita R. Di Meglio, "Arab Trade with Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula from the 8th to the 16th Century", in Richards, Islam and the Trade of Asia, pp. 116-117.

46 Curtin, Cross Cultural Trade and World History, p. 137.
For example, to avoid corruption in assessing the value of the cargo of an especially large and wealthy ship, the local customs judge appointed a panel consisting of local and foreign merchants to make that assessment. Earlier records about the Canton enclave of prior to the 878 A.D. uprising in South China also point out that the T’ang rulers allowed the Muslim merchants to conduct business through Islamic institutions.

The diversity of this enclave, numbered at more than 120,000 in 878 A.D. can be seen in the fact that it comprised not only Muslims, but also Christians, Jews, and Persian Majusi. In addition to the merchants, this enclave also contained a stratum of shipowners and ships’ captains from the Umma. Reports attributed to the time of the Sung emperors, who ruled southern China after 970 A.D., state that most of the foreign trading population there came from the lands of the Umma, and that this population was wealthy, and contributed both to the maintenance of city walls, and the provision of coastguard ships to help protect the ports.

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47 Choudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, p. 113.

48 Ibid., p. 51.

49 Hourani, Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times, p.77.

Sometimes, members of the mercantile strata based in the lands of the Umma established factories within these enclaves. One report unearthed from the Cairo Synagogue's Geniza, dating back to the mid 1100s A.D., for instance, describes a brass factory in Malabar, India, established and run by a Jewish entrepreneur from Tunis. This example shows that the Umma's mercantile stratum engaged in commodity production, as well as circulation, in the Indian Ocean enclaves, and engendered a laboring stratum with the establishment of factories.  

Money changers constituted another important stratum found in all of the Indian Ocean's mercantile cities. Zabaj, in the Indonesian Archipelago, was reported to have as many as eight hundred of them. Clerks, too, were an important stratum in mercantile cities throughout the Indian Ocean system.  

In addition to bringing exports from the Umma to South Asian ports along the Indian Ocean, merchants from the Umma who settled in the enclaves of South Asian cities facilitated the transportation of goods among these cities. One such  

\footnote{S.D. Goitein, "From Aden to India: Specimens of the Correspondence of India traders of the Twelfth Century," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 23, Parts 1 and 2 (1980): 45.}

\footnote{Tibbetts, Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 30, part 1 (1957): 21.}

\footnote{Goitein, in Speculum 29, no. 2, part 1 (April, 1954): 186.}
transportation route was between western Java and China.\textsuperscript{54} It is also important to mention that just as merchants from the Umma within these enclaves operated with freedom from intervention by the host governments, so were they free of intervention from their own rulers. The growth of the Umma’s trade in the Indian Ocean was the work of the Umma’s mercantile stratum, and not of governmental policy.\textsuperscript{55}

Many of the migrants from the domains of the Umma to the mercantile enclaves in the above-mentioned South Asian and East African cities came from the network of urban areas in historic Oman that grew with, and helped to propagate, historic Oman and the Umma’s commerce within the Indian Ocean system during the 600 A.D. to 1500 A.D. period. In historic Oman, the cities of Dibba, Suhar, Julfar, Khasab, Khor Fakkan, and Kalba were international commercial centers with connections to India and East Africa at the time of the rise of Islam.\textsuperscript{56} Many of these cities continued in this capacity until 1500, developing trade with China in addition to India

\textsuperscript{54} Tibbets, \textit{Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society} 30, part I (1957): 29.


and East Africa during the 600 A.D. to 1500 A.D. period. Other commercial cities, such as Qalhat, Masqat, and Dhofar grew up later in this period. In all of these cities, the merchant stratum was the dominant one, since these accumulated their surplus through trade. In relation to this stratum, there developed many others.

Most of these cities subsequently became commercially linked to Siraf, the powerful commercial center that developed with the rise of Baghdad. From the 900s to the 1500s A.D., these cities became part of both the commercial and political spheres of influence of the powerful Gulf mercantile cities of Qais and Hormuz. (Siraf, Suwar, Qais, and Hormuz, in terms of their social strata and within the Indian Ocean commercial system, will be examined in greater detail below.) Commodities from historic Oman exported from these various cities included fish, salt, muslin, woolen cloth, copper, pearls, gems, dates, figs, walnuts and pomegranites. Port cities in historic Oman also re-exported goods such as Chinese porcelain, and other goods from elsewhere in the Umma’s domains, such as glassware, certain kinds of cloth, and other produce.\footnote{Chittick, in Unesco, \textit{Historical Relations Across the Indian Ocean}, 1974, pp 15–16; Robert Geran Landen, \textit{Oman Since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 33; and Donald Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, (New York: Twayne Publishers Inc., 1970), p. 55.} Historic Oman’s imports from China, East Africa and India were used for local consumption, and for re-export.
Commodities that historic Oman imported from Chinese ports included porcelain and silk.\textsuperscript{58} Commodities imported from Africa included iron, frankincense, and timber.\textsuperscript{59} Spices, rice, and additional produce were imported from India.

Other important Gulf cities included Basra, important because it connected all of historic Oman’s port cities to the rest of Iraq. Basra was built in 635 A.D.,\textsuperscript{60} supplanting neighboring Uballa, which had played that role during Sassanid times. Siraf, located in the Arabian Gulf, and linked both to historic Oman’s commercial cities and to Basra, was also an important commercial port.\textsuperscript{61}

Prior to the previously-mentioned uprising in South China of the late 800s (see page 15, note 22), during which the siege and sacking of the port of Canton occurred in 878, historic Oman’s ports, along with Siraf, were centers for the

\textsuperscript{58} Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, p. 286; and Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, p. 365.

\textsuperscript{59} Chittick, in Unesco, Historical Relations Across the Indian Ocean, pp. 15-16.

\textsuperscript{60} Al-Elwasi, in al-Shaikhali, Dirasah an al-Tarikh al-Khalij al-'Arabi wa al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah (Study of the History of the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula), p. 29.

Umma's direct trade with China,\textsuperscript{62} as well as its trade with India and the rest of east Asia.\textsuperscript{63} After the rise of the Abbasid Caliphate in 750, Baghdad developed as the hub of the Umma's economy, and this gave the merchants, shipbuilders, navigators, etc. in port cities of historic Oman such as Dibba and Suhar, special importance along with Siraf, because the entire Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf trade avenues were linked to Baghdad. This was both because Baghdad was a large market in itself, and because it was a center of international commerce.\textsuperscript{64} (However, the vastness of the Indian Ocean's own economic system enabled the merchants, shipbuilders, and navigators of historic Oman and the rest of the Gulf to retain importance even after the fall of Baghdad around 1258.)

The strength of both Siraf and Basra as mercantile cities in the Arabian Gulf benefitted historic Oman's mercantile cities during the Abbasid period, because vessels leaving the Gulf from either port had to stop at the port

\textsuperscript{62} Writings of the Obeidi madhab mention that merchants from historic Oman made voyages to China during the early 700s A.D. One of these was Abu Obeida, who lived in historic Oman during that time. Tibbetts, \textit{Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society} 30, part 1 (1957): 13.

\textsuperscript{63} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 56.

cities of historic Oman on the way to and from India, China, and East Africa. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, it was easier to take advantage of the additional navigational momentum that the seasonal monsoon winds provided from these ports.

Secondly, the larger cities along the coast of historic Oman, such as Suvar, were intermediary ports receiving large ships returning to the Gulf from East Africa, India, and China, from which medium sized and smaller ships would carry cargo to Siraf and Basra. The cargo then went to Baghdad or to destinations in the province of Fars (Persia). Siraf, as a shallower port, could receive larger ships if they anchored about a mile from shore, but mainly retained its importance because vessels smaller than the large ships sailing to China and elsewhere in South Asia from other ports in the Arabian Gulf called there, unloading goods from the larger ships crossing the Indian Ocean, and then picking up commodities for re-loading onto these ships. This made Siraf important to the both the Arabian Gulf region and historic Oman’s trade with China, but it retained a secondary


67 Hourani, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Early Medieval Times*, p. 70.
place to the coastal cities in historic Oman in this regard. 68

Aside from taking navigational advantage of the Monsoon winds, ships leaving Siraf en route overseas also stopped in the ports of Musqat and Suhar to pick up additional cargo, and to replenish their supplies of fresh water. 69

The importance of historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf area to both international and regional trade between 600 and the 900s A.D. 70 can be seen in the wealth and power of the long-distance merchant strata of the port cities of historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf during that period. These strata, in fact, were dominant in these cities, economically, politically and culturally, in relation to the other strata. Most obviously, the long-distance merchant stratum's economic dominance could be seen in its members' wealth in relation to other strata. This was significant because within the mercantile-urban socio-discursive formation, it was wealth that was the measure of prestige and power. The economic dominance of this mercantile stratum was also evidenced by in their extensive investments in trade and some manufacture.


70 After the 900s A.D., Baghdad, to which historic Oman's port cities were commercially linked, had begun to lose its political, economic and cultural centrality.
Sirafi merchants, for instance, invested heavily in storage space for merchandise, and it was in relation to them as a stratum that Siraf's extensive market place developed.\(^{71}\) They also used their capital to equip the maritime convoys that traded with India, China and Zanzibar.\(^{72}\)

The industries in which the Sirafi long-distance mercantile stratum invested, in addition to long-distance commerce, included the glassware that Siraf exported in bulk as far as the Indonesian Archipelago.\(^{73}\) Other manufactures included napkins and linen cloth.\(^{74}\) This shows that in investing in these manufactures, the Sirafi mercantile stratum engendered, and reproduced, the development of a laboring stratum as well. The artisan stratum in Siraf was also a vibrant one, as wealthy merchants purchased their crafts to adorn their houses,\(^{75}\) whose elegance was further testimony

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\(^{75}\) Piacentini, in Davies, *Global Interests in the Arab Gulf*, p. 3.
to the economic dominance and privilege of the long-distance mercantile stratum.  

In addition, members of the Sirafi mercantile stratum often owned land holdings in surrounding areas, which means that, together with the long distance commerce and manufactures, they also invested in agriculture. However, it should be emphasized that this stratum accumulated the bulk of its wealth from long distance trade, and that most of this wealth was re-invested in long-distance trade. Investments took the form of commenda ventures, and were also directed toward the mercantile enclaves of other Indian Ocean port cities.

Surviving records of life in Siraf provide some examples of the manner in which this city's wealthiest merchants lived and invested their wealth, and the prestige they enjoyed by virtue of it. One Sirafi merchant, Abu Bakr Ahmad ibn Umar al-Sirafi, owned several storehouses containing precious gems and perfumes. Another Sirafi merchant was reported to be worth around one million dinars, not including additional capital he had invested in commenda ventures.

Particularly significant was the shipowner Abu al-Qasim

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77 Piacentini, in Davies, *Global Interests in the Arab Gulf*, pp. 3-5.

Ramisht of Siraf, not only because his income amounted to millions of dirhams, but because he invested this income in warehouses at ports throughout the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{79} This fact is important to mention because along with testifying to the shipowner's wealth, it also provides some detail as to the economic liaisons that existed between the mercantile strata within the cities of the Arabian Gulf on the one hand, and merchants from the Umma that comprised the enclaves of the other Indian Ocean commercial cities on the other. The mercantile stratum of Siraf maintained other connections with these enclaves through their wakils (representatives), and their sarrafs (bankers), who were present in all of the Indian Ocean ports, conducting business on behalf of merchants living within the domains of the Umma.\textsuperscript{80}

The economic privilege that the long-distance mercantile stratum of Siraf enjoyed also brought it political power, and this political power, in turn, enabled Siraf’s long-distance mercantile stratum to reproduce its own economic privilege. One illustration of the political power of this stratum was the fact that many of its members were qadis. Sometimes, they attained the position of Wali as well.\textsuperscript{81}

Economic privilege and political power also brought

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} Piacentini, in Davies, \textit{Global Interests in the Arab Gulf}, pp. 3-5.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
Siraf's long-distance mercantile stratum cultural prestige. This cultural prestige, too, enabled this stratum to reproduce itself. Siraf's wealthiest merchants reinforced their cultural prestige by means of their contribution to the building, adornment, and upkeep of Siraf's larger mosques, whose architectural beauty testified both to the economic privilege of these merchants, and to their affirmation of their Islamic identity in relation to non-Muslim Indian Ocean merchants. Along these lines, the above-mentioned Ramisht of Siraf also made substantial contributions to the upkeep of the Holy Places in Mecca, and founded a hospice there.\textsuperscript{82}

Finally, an intellectual stratum also developed in relation to Siraf's mercantile stratum, furnishing the merchants with information, in the form of books, about the lands in which they traded. Abu Zaid al-Sirafi, for example, was part of this stratum, compiling and editing Akhbar al-Sin (News of China), which described commercial conditions at various ports in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{83} This intellectual stratum served the mercantile stratum culturally, and thereby facilitated its reproduction.

Under the discourse of wealth as an indicator of political power and cultural dominance, the Sirafi long-


distance mercantile stratum developed a distinct identity within the urban area in relation to the other urban strata. This identity was expressed in the elegance of their houses, in their participation in the governance of the urban area, in their sizeable contributions to the building of mosques and to the upkeep of other religious institutions, etc. On the external level, as Sirafi merchants, along with other merchants from historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf, traded with China, India, and in the Indian Ocean cities containing the commercial enclaves mentioned above, they did so as representatives of the *Umma*, and therefore developed an identity, as a result of interacting with others. This identity was reinforced by the distinct laws and customs of the *Umma*, which its representatives practiced within these enclaves.

The mercantile socio-discursive formation characterizing Siraf also prevailed in Suhar, another mercantile city on the coast of historic Oman, which had been a commercial center during Sassanid rule. The mercantile social relations that had characterized Suhar during Sassanid times continued to prevail after the rise of Islam, but these social relations were to undergo many transformations during the Islamic period, in relation to the Sassanid period. Economic transformations occurred in relation to the changes in the laws of commerce and agriculture that Islam brought. Power relations also changed, in that it was the Arab ethnic
stratum that became dominant over the non-Arab ones. Culturally, Islam became dominant as the shaper of values and beliefs, and even of the arts.

These transformations notwithstanding, it is important to emphasize that many of the basic aspects of social relations in pre-Islamic Suhr continued to articulate within the Islamic socio-discursive formation. For example, the mercantile stratum, very important during the Islamic period, had been important in Suhr during Sassanid rule, as were the producers of textiles and metal goods, who also retained their importance after the rise of Islam. Suhr's connection with long-distance Indian Ocean trade had been established during Sassanid rule as well, but continued and expanded as Suhr gained significance as a commercial center during the Islamic era, and prospered additionally during the mid 900s A.D. Suhr remained an important depot of Chinese trade through the 900s A.D. Its inhabitants included a wealthy merchant stratum, which had formed a guild, and because it was a center of clothing manufacture, it also had a laboring stratum.84

Until the mid 900s A.D., Suhr had all of the features of a major trade center, such as a storage house for imported goods from East Asia that were to be re-exported to Baghdad and other cities of the Umma, and for products from within the Umma destined for export abroad. The city also had a well

84 Amin, Al-Umaniyun, Ruwad al-Bahr, pp. 39-42.
stocked market place where various products for local consumption were sold. Suhar’s economic wealth also translated into cultural wealth, as evidenced by its fine larger mosques, and by the elegance of the houses of the wealthy merchants. Abu al-Qasim Ibn Hawqal, writing in the late 900s, described the large size of Suhar’s mercantile stratum, and referred to that city as one of the wealthiest in the Umma.

Aside from remaining an important commercial center, Suhar also housed a renowned school of Islamic Law during the 1100s and 1200s A.D., which many Sirafis attended, along with many other Muslims from historic Oman and from the Arabian Gulf region. This law school continued to be prominent in the region until around 1500. However, despite the later presence of this law school, Suhar had begun to decline in importance as a commercial center after 965 A.D., when it came under the rule of the Buwayhids, a non-mercantile dynasty ruling Baghdad and Persia between the 960s and the 1050s A.D.

When the Fatimids took Egypt from the Abbasid Caliphate in 969 A.D., and made Cairo their capital, they revived Egypt and the Red Sea’s importance as a passageway for

Ibid.


87 Piacentini, in Davies, Global Interests in the Arab Gulf, p. 17.
intercontinental trade. This ended the Arabian Gulf and Baghdad's dominance of overseas commerce, and also caused certain established commercial cities of the Arabian Gulf and historic Oman to decline, and new ones to rise to prominence. Siraf, for example, lost its prominence as result of several factors. One of them was the decline of the Abbasid Caliphate during the 900s A.D. A particularly important factor was the earthquake of 977 A.D., which severely damaged the city. As a result of these factors, many Sirafi merchants migrated to cities in historic Oman.

In these cities, too, social relations were such that it was the wealthiest mercantile stratum, engaged in long-distance trade, that was dominant economically, politically and culturally in relation the other strata. The criterion under which prestige was measured continued to be wealth, and it was under this discourse that the long-distance merchants constructed their identity in relation to the other urban strata, and under which this stratum reproduced itself. It is important to mention, however, that although many of Siraf's merchants were emigrating from that city after 1000, enough of a mercantile stratum remained there in the 1100s for Al-Idrisi, writing during that century, to remark about this stratum's wealth and long-distance trade activities in the

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88 Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, p. 111.

Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{90}

As Siraf declined, the city of Qais, which was closer to the Strait of Hormuz, and therefore, closer to the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea trade route, rose. Qais had other advantages over Siraf, besides its location. One of them was that it was a deep water port. Another was that, in contrast to Basra, whose customs taxes were very high under Buwayhid rule, Qais imposed a customs tax amounting to only one dinar for any ship calling at its port.\textsuperscript{91} Qais as a commercial center was established in the mid eleventh century by a merchant family from historic Oman (Julfar) called the Bani Qais.

As Siraf declined, Sirafi merchants began to migrate to other locations in the Arabian Gulf, including Qais, which was rising in importance. Pivotal to this city’s continued rise through the 1200s A.D. were the Tibis, another merchant family with political influence at the Ilkhanid (Mongol) court, and whose commercial influence extended as far as China. Closely linked with the mercantile stratum in Qais was the financial stratum, whose importance is evidenced by the fact that Qais issued its own currency, called the Qasi robe, as central Abbasid power declined in Baghdad. This currency was used in


\textsuperscript{91} Naji, \textit{Dirasah Mugarinah lil-Ahwal al-Tijariyyah}, p. 122
commerce in Cairo, and in other places. There also existed a craft stratum, which among other things, manufactured pottery for export. Many of the inhabitants of Qais were also mariners. Jamal al-din al-Dimashqi (Yakut) also mentions that learning flourished in Qais, which indicates the existence of an intellectual stratum as well.

Aside from its Muslim population, Qais also contained five-hundred Jewish families. Although most of the population consisted of Arabs from historic Oman, Qais also contained a Persian community. The Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela of Spain, a merchant himself, stated that during the 1100s A.D., Qais had grown into a prosperous port where manufactures and produce from India and the province of Fars were exchanged. Yaqut, for his part, wrote in the 1200s about Qais' prosperity by referring to its fine houses, gardens, and well-stocked market place. Qais continued as an important Gulf city throughout the thirteenth century, and Marco Polo, traveling there in about the late 1270s mentioned that it continued to be an

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92 Goitein, "From the Mediterranean to India," Speculum 29, no. 2, part I (April, 1954): 188.
93 Piacentini, in Davies, Global Interests in the Arab Gulf, p. 10.
94 Wilson, The Persian Gulf, p. 100.
95 Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 57.
97 Wilson, The Persian Gulf, pp. 98-100.
important entrepot of trade between Iraq and India. In fact, during the thirteenth century, Qais was one of the most important commercial cities in the Arabian Gulf. Here, too, the mercantile stratum held the dominant position economically, politically and culturally in relation to the other strata.

Dhofar was another city that became important as a trade depot as a result of the decline of Abbasid power. Dhofar rose during the twelfth century, along with Qais, but its importance increased further after 1258, the year the Mongols destroyed Baghdad. This was because of its proximity to the Red Sea, which, as a trade route, had made East Africa and Egypt prominent destinations for Dhofar’s exports and re-exports. East Africa and Egypt also became important sources of Dhofar’s imports. Specifically, merchants of Dhofar re-exported goods coming from China to Egypt, and goods from Qais, with which it traded heavily, to East Africa.

During the 1200s, Qais was facing competition from Hormuz, another rising trade center somewhat closer than Qais was to the Arabian Sea, ruled by another merchant family that had migrated there from the coast of historic Oman. As

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99 Amin, Al-Umaniyun, Ruwad al-Bahr, p. 44.

100 Wilson, The Persian Gulf, p. 104, n. 3. Henri Cordier states that the Hormuzi ruling family migrated there from Yemen, but the name of the ruler under whom independent New Hormuz was established, Rukn al-Din Mahmud Qalhati,
early as the tenth century, Hormuz had been a seaport for the local trade of Kirman and Sistan in the province of Fars, in Persia. Although Hormuz was not as prominent in long distance trade as Qais was, during the thirteenth century, its merchant stratum was trading with India, and the products of the Hormuz region included indigo, wheat, barley, rice and horses. Mineral products included salt, gold, silver, copper, iron, and cinnebar.\textsuperscript{101}

In the early years, and up until the Mongol invasions of the 1200s, Hormuz paid its taxes to the province of Kirman. During the Mongol invasions, the Hormuzi rulers took advantage of this wartime situation by using their coastal location to re-direct seaborne commerce away from the Kirman province in retaliation to Kirman’s high taxes. In 1330, both in order to escape the jurisdiction of Kirman altogether,\textsuperscript{102} and to escape chronic Mongol incursions, the Hormuzi ruler of that time re-established the Hormuz trading center on the island of Jirun. This center was now called New Hormuz. After 1330, the merchant families of the Old Hormuz moved to Jirun Island, and in addition, certain old Sirafi merchant families gave

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., pp. 101-102.

\textsuperscript{102} Landen, Oman Since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society, p. 18.
support to New Hormuz in its ongoing competition with Qais.103

Hormuz became important as a trade center as a result of the Red Sea’s increased importance to Indian Ocean trade after the decline and subsequent destruction of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258. It is therefore appropriate to provide an overview here of the process by which Red Sea trade grew in importance.

The Red Sea’s importance to Indian Ocean trade continued to grow after the Ayyubid dynasty succeeded the Fatimids in Egypt after 1170. Egypt’s Mediterranean location, and its proximity to both North Africa and Europe made its importance to Indian Ocean trade continue to increase. Egypt consolidated its position as the hub of the Umma’s trade on the European front with the Ayyubid and Mamluk defeat of the last of the Crusader Kingdoms after 1270. By defeating the Crusaders and thereby repelling their threats against Egypt, Salah al-Din, the Ayyubid Sultan, had managed to prevent European merchants from gaining direct access to the Red Sea. The Egyptian rulers also encouraged Indian Ocean trade to utilize the Red Sea by issuing special passes to merchant ships which guaranteed these vessels safe passage, and more

103 Piacentini, in Davies, Global Interests in the Arab Gulf, p. 11.
importantly, promised them fiscal advantages.\textsuperscript{104}

The Mamluk Sultan Baybars' defeat of the Mongols at Ain Jalut in 1260, and his final expulsion of the remnants of the Crusader kingdom from Syria and Palestine after 1270, consolidated Egypt's control of Red Sea trade. This meant that European merchants who wanted to use the Red Sea trade route to Asia, which was preferred over that going overland from the Black Sea, had to abide by conditions that Egyptian rulers set.\textsuperscript{105}

The fact that the center of the Umma's trade with Asia, Africa, and Europe had shifted from Baghdad to Cairo also helped to enhance the importance of the European trading cities of Venice and Genoa. The merchants of these cities were able to increase their trade with the Umma because they had obtained trade concessions from Byzantium, from the Crusader Kingdoms, and because of the development, after the Crusades, of their own ship building industries.\textsuperscript{106}

On the Asia front, the most important development was the establishment of the Ming Dynasty in China after 1368.

\textsuperscript{104} Chaudhuri, \textit{Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean}, p. 60.


\textsuperscript{106} For more complete treatment of the growth of Venice and Genoa as maritime trade centers after the decline of Baghdad and the rise of Cairo, see Abu Lughod, \textit{Before European Hegemony}, Chapter 4.
The first Emperor, Hung Wu, encouraged foreign vessels to call at Chinese ports, and the third Emperor, Yung Lo, actually launched six Indian Ocean voyages after 1405 A.D., three of which reached ports in historic Oman, and locations in the Arabian Gulf. The commander in chief of these expeditions was Cheng Ho, a Chinese Muslim.107

It is against the backdrop of these changes in the global trade system that the merchants of New Hormuz prospered and gained significance in Indian Ocean trade. New Hormuz enjoyed the height of its prosperity during the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Along with its proximity to the Arabian Sea, and therefore to the Red Sea trade routes, in comparison to Siraf and Qais before it, New Hormuz owed this prosperity to the excellent harbors its rulers had built.108 Ibn Batutta, writing about his travels in historic Oman in the mid-1300s, mentioned that at that time, New Hormuz was a prominent entrepot for exports from the Umma to the rest of the Indian Ocean trade system, as well as for imports to the Umma from India and China. He also mentioned that many cities in historic Oman were linked to New Hormuz because of


its importance as a commercial center.\textsuperscript{109}

The significance and wealth that New Hormuz gained as a commercial center were such that George Herbert, a British poet of the 1500s, quoted what he called an "Eastern proverb" which stated, "Were the world a ring, Hormuz would be the Jewel in it." Richard Boothby, a British merchant, mentions in a seventeenth century manuscript that Hormuz, in its best days, did more trade than London and Amsterdam combined. John Milton, in \textit{Paradise Lost}, which was also written in the 1600s, also referred to the wealth of New Hormuz.\textsuperscript{110}

In this city, as in the case of the other mercantile cities in historic Oman and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf, the long-distance merchant stratum was dominant economically, politically and culturally. The wealth of this city's merchant stratum can be seen in the fact that shortly after its establishment, New Hormuz had become a prominent commercial center to which other merchants representing all ethnic and religious groups, from various parts of the Indian ocean and the \textit{Umma}, came to trade.\textsuperscript{111} Among other things,


\textsuperscript{110} Wilson, \textit{The Persian Gulf}, p. 101, n. 1.; and p. 149. The line from \textit{Paradise Lost} referred to is

\begin{quote}
High on a throne of royal state, which far
Outshone the wealth of Ormuz and of Ind
Or where the gorgeous East with richest hand
Showers on her kings barbaric pearl and gold.
\end{quote}

(\textit{Paradise Lost}, Book II.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., pp. 105-106.
merchants from the rest of the Indian Ocean came to purchase such Hormuzi exports as spices, musk, aloes, indigo, raw silk, pearls, rubies, lapis lazuli, turquois, and carnelian. Hormuz’ long-distance merchant stratum was also prominent and wealthy enough to have developed its own representation in the Indian Ocean enclaves of merchants from the Umma,¹¹² thereby developing a distinct identity in relation to other cultures it contacted. The Hormuzi mercantile stratum developed this identity because of the specific nature of Islamic commercial law, and of the culture of the Umma.

New Hormuz was also mineral-rich, with deposits of haematite, iron oxide, sulphur, rock salt, gypsum and aluminum ore, which were also exploited for export. The existence and exploitation of these minerals indicate the existence of a mining stratum in this city, which had developed in relation to the mercantile stratum. Hormuzi merchants exported rock salt and iron oxide to China, and imported Chines porcelain for re-export.¹¹³

Further examination of the Hormuzi long-distance merchant stratum provides a significant example of the inter-relationship between the economic privilege and political power in that city. This inter-relationship can be seen in the fact that the Hormuzi government’s main revenues came from


 customs profits. It is also evidenced by the fact that, while merchants never actually attained government posts in Hormuz, their economic privilege translated into political power because the Hormuzi long-distance merchants controlled the city’s customs house,¹¹⁴ and are reported even to have been able to limit the power of the ruler by means of the council that they had formed.¹¹⁵ This description of the social relations in Hormuz is another indicator of the importance of wealth, as a criterion for prestige, and as a conveyor of power, in the urban-mercantile socio-discursive formation in historic Oman and in the Arabian Gulf.

Aside from being a wealthy commercial entrepot, New Hormuz was a multicultural city in which people from India, Fars, and the Arabian Peninsula lived together harmoniously. Its religious communities included Muslims, Christians, and Jews.¹¹⁶ Ma Huan, who in 1413 accompanied Cheng Ho on the Indian Ocean voyages of the 1400s that the Emperor Yung Lo had ordered, returned to China with a detailed description of the city of New Hormuz. He described a city in which the inhabitants practiced the Islamic laws pertaining to the rituals of marriage and burial.


Ma Huan also went into some detail about the other strata comprising the society of New Hormuz. New Hormuz as a society included physicians, artisans of all kinds, and entertainers. Ma Huan also referred to an agricultural stratum when he mentioned that the agricultural area associated with the city of Hormuz produced several kinds of fruits and vegetables. Aside from melons and dates, this land also produced peaches, apples, leeks, carrots, cucumbers, etc.

Ma Huan also visited the Hormuz market place, and there he reported that he saw precious stones from many different parts of the world offered for sale, and utensils made out of jade and crystal. He also found such textiles as velvets, brocade, silks and woolens. (These observations indicate the presence of skilled artisan and laboring strata.) The market place also contained places to buy roast mutton and poultry, as well as all kinds of cereal foods. Ma Huan mentioned that people often purchased cooked food in the market place as an alternative to cooking at home.\textsuperscript{117} New Hormuz was linked both to the cities along the Central Asian silk route and to cities in historic Oman such as Suhar, Khur Fakkan, and Qalhat, all of which functioned as satellites to Hormuz.\textsuperscript{118}

The port city of Julfar also grew in importance as a


\textsuperscript{118} Bouchon and Lombard in Das Gupta and Pearson, \textit{India and the Indian Ocean}, p. 57.
commercial center along with New Hormuz during the 1300. This was because it shared control of the entrance to the Arabian Gulf with New Hormuz.\textsuperscript{119} The wealth of Julfar's long-distance mercantile stratum is evidenced by the extent of its trade with China. The significance of this trade has been demonstrated by the presence of shards of imported Ming porcelain at Julfar's archaeological sites. Another indicator of the Julfari long-distance merchant stratum's wealth is the fact that Julfar also had a pearl industry, whose producers extracted the pearls, an expensive luxury commodity, for export. Julfar's overseas commercial stratum was also large enough to necessitate the existence of a stratum of wholesale commodity dealers in the city, along with a large number of navigators, who were vital to Indian Ocean commerce. Along with being a significant center of overseas trade, Julfar was also an important fishery, with a stratum engaged in that industry.\textsuperscript{120}

One of the Julfari navigators was Ahmad bin Majid, who lived immediately before the Portuguese penetration in 1500 A.D. His father, and grandfather had been navigators before him, on the Red Sea. This particular fact reflects a common

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\textsuperscript{120} Beatrice De Cardi, "Trucial Oman in the 16th and 17th Centuries," \textit{Antiquity} 44 (1970): 291.
pattern in the urban, commercial socio-discursive formation in historic Oman, wherein an individual inherited his occupation from his forebears, and was usually trained in it by his father. Ahmad bin Majid wrote several books on navigation, the first of which appeared in 1462 A.D. One of his most important works was Al-Fawa’id, a major theoretical work on Indian Ocean Navigation, dealing with the history of navigation since antiquity, up to and beyond the Arab achievements in navigation since Abbasid rule. In Al-Fawa’id, Ahmad bin Majid critically reviews previous navigational literature, both pre-Islamic and Islamic.\(^{121}\)

Another city on the coast of historic Oman that arose because of the prominence of Hormuz was Musqat. Musqat replaced Qalhat as an important center for trade with India during the late 1400s mainly because of the patronage of the Hormuzi ruling family.\(^{122}\)

Historic Oman was one of the key ship-building centers for the Umma, and this was another significant role that historic Oman played in the Umma’s long-distance trade.\(^{123}\) In relation to historic Oman’s own long-distance mercantile stratum, a grouping of shipwrights had developed there as far

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\(^{122}\) Houtsma et al., The Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 734.

\(^{123}\) Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, pp. 148-149.
back as antiquity. In fact, the ship-building industry, itself, helped to propagate this long-distance trade, since the merchants of historic Oman imported most of the timber needed to construct the vessels from India and east Africa, along with the cocoanut fiber used to fasten the horizontal planks of the ship’s hull together.\textsuperscript{124} Cocoanut fiber was used to "stitch" these planks together instead of iron nails because the cocoanut fiber could better withstand the corrosive affects of seawater.

Examination of the social relations in all of the above-mentioned mercantile cities of historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf between 600 and 1500 A.D. shows that, along with being part of the greater Islamic socio-discursive formation, these cities comprised historic Oman’s own mercantile socio-discursive formation. Within this socio-discursive formation, the long-distance merchant stratum was dominant not only in terms of economic privilege, but also in terms of political power and cultural prestige. This was because wealth was the discourse under which this stratum was rendered powerful and prestigious, and under which this stratum reproduced itself. This overseas commercial stratum was able to use the discourse of wealth in order to reproduce itself by virtue of its domination of each city’s economic, political and cultural institutions. The long-distance mercantile stratum also used

\textsuperscript{124} Hourani, \textit{Arab Seafaring}, p. 91.
the discourse of wealth as a measure of its prestige and power in relation to other strata, such as craftsmen, laborers, fisherman, shipbuilders, and smaller shopkeepers. (See below.) The long-distance mercantile stratum dominating this socio-discursive formation demonstrated the importance it placed upon wealth, and also its identity in relation to the other strata within this socio-discursive formation, by means of the accumulation of wealth, the building of beautiful, luxurious houses, the cultivation of fine tastes in food and clothing, and in the cultivation of sophistication in the form of cosmopolitanism and familiarity with other cultures.

The interaction between the long-distance merchants of historic Oman and those from other cultures outside of the Umma also enabled historic Oman’s overseas commercial stratum to construct an identity in relation to the merchants of other cultures, both when the latter were encountered inside historic Oman, and in the Indian Ocean enclaves.

The discourse of wealth that the long-distance mercantile stratum had constructed in order to assert its identity permeated the culture, and literally the structure, of historic Oman’s cities, giving them, and the members of the other urban strata, an identity which was constructed as a discourse of superiority to dwellers within the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations, when dwellers within the urban-mercantile socio-discursive formation interacted with them. (See next chapter.) The construction of this urban-
mercantile identity in relation to dwellers within the other two socio-discursive formations also enabled the mercantile socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself.

Another aspect of the identity that the mercantile socio-discursive formation as a whole constructed for its own reproduction had to do with strata comprising this socio-discursive formation other than the wealthy merchants, and with the role of the sea and long-distance trade itself. For example, sailors, and ship handlers of various kinds developed a unique form of music, whose rhythms and words depicted the rise and fall of the waves, the beauty of the sea, the need for courage at sea, the shipbuilding process, etc. This music also showed the influence of the other Indian Ocean cultures with which historic Oman’s sailors, ship handlers, and traders came into contact. Certain crafts related to shipbuilding also developed within the mercantile social formation, and these, too, bore the influence of other Indian Ocean cultures.

In relation to historic Oman’s trade, socio-economic differentiations developed within the populations of the cities mentioned above, and even on the long distance trading ships. In the port cities, aside from the ruling stratum itself, the merchant stratum, which paid taxes to the government ruling each of these cities was dominant, as shown above. Another stratum consisted of the ship owners, who shared the profits of long distance trade with the merchants on a commenda basis. Each port city also had such officials
as Wakil al-Tujar, or the port superintendent who was also a representative of the merchants.\textsuperscript{125}

In historic Oman, this official would serve as advocate for merchants coming to historic Oman from India or China. In other Indian Ocean port cities, the Wakil al-Tujar represented the merchants of the Muslim enclaves that had developed within these cities. Other duties of this official included assisting foreign merchants in collecting debts, storing unaccompanied merchandise in his agency house, or auctioning off goods that preceded their owner to a port if the owner so requested.\textsuperscript{126} The Wakil al-Tujar also concluded agreements on behalf of his merchant-clients with the various rulers controlling overland or maritime trade routes, bought or sold goods on behalf of merchants when mandated to do so, and served as payment intermediary between merchants. Particularly importantly, it was the obligation of the Wakil al-Tujar to ensure the adherence of merchants to the principles of business ethics. In order to be able to execute this task effectively, he had to have obtained the recognition of the religious authorities of his confessional community - Jewish, Christian, or Muslim.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{125} S.D. Goitein, \textit{Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient} 23, parts 1 and 2 (1980): 44.

\textsuperscript{126} Curtin, \textit{Cross Cultural Trade in World History}, p. 113.

Another official found at each port was the Shah Bandar, or the harbor master. The Shah Bandar was responsible for every vessel's abiding by port laws, and also performed many of the functions of the Wakil-al Tujar. These functions included the provision of warehouse space, and the provision of means to carry goods from the ship to port. In addition to these officials, Indian Ocean ports, including those of historic Oman, contained their scribes and clerks in the employ of many of the merchants, and craftspeople connected with long-distance trade, such as ship builders and rope makers. There were also porters, sailing small craft who transported cargo from the large commercial vessels to the warehouses. The Indian Ocean port cities, including those of historic Oman, also contained the owners of factories producing export commodities, and those who worked in them as producers, as illustrated above.

Historic Oman's maritime trade cities contained all of these occupational strata and officials, as well as a variety of coexisting ethnic and religious groups, each continuing to


129 Curtin, Cross Cultural Trade in World History, p. 130.


speak its own language and to practice its own religion. These ethnic groups included Hindus, Baluchis, and Persians, as well as Arabs.\(^{132}\) Religious groups included Muslims, Christians, Jews, Hindus, and Majusis. Stratification also existed aboard vessels. On the large trading ships, the most important person in the hierarchy was the *Nakhudha*, or the captain of the ship, who also decided its itinerary, and occasionally owned it.\(^ {133}\) When he did not own the ship, the *Nakhudha* usually shared the profits with the merchant whose goods he transported on a commenda basis.\(^ {134}\) Equally important was the *Mu'allim*, or the navigator, whose task it was to ensure that the vessel avoided danger en route to and from its destination. Other members of the crew included the chief of the sailors, the mate, the store-keeper, look-outs, the purser, and common seamen.\(^ {135}\)

The various strata listed here, present both in historic Oman's ports and aboard the trade ships, show that socio-economic differentiations existed within historic Oman's


\(^{134}\) Ibid., pp. 151-152.

trading cities. These socio-economic differentiations existed in terms of class, ethnicity, religion, and gender, and they often intersected. (This means, for example, that members of various ethnic groups were distributed among the different classes, as were members of both genders.) A key point to re-emphasize, however, is that despite these socio-economic differentiations, those who were part of the mercantile socio-discursive formation differentiated themselves from those belonging to the agrarian or tribal socio-discursive formation (both of which will be covered in the following chapter) when they came into contact with them, through the identity that the mercantile socio-discursive formation had constructed.

Conclusion

The first section of this chapter has demonstrated that historic Oman's Islamization occurred in relation to the power relationship that existed between historic Oman's Arabs and their Sassanid rulers during the pre-Islamic period. The fact that, as a result of their cultural and economic connections to the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, historic Oman's Arabs had constructed a distinct identity in relation to their Sassanid rulers, facilitated the spread of Islam to historic Oman. Once it had become Islamized, historic Oman's society came to differentiate itself from what it had been during the pre-Islamic period, politically, economically and culturally, although many economic, political and cultural social
relations present in the pre-Islamic socio-discursive formation continued to articulate in the Islamic one.

This study has also shown that historic Oman underwent several transformations in relation to changes that were occurring within the greater Umma under the Islamic period’s different socio-discursive formations, and that in relation to the Umma’s changes, discourses and counter-discourses arose within historic Oman. However, this research has emphasized that all of these discourses and counter discourses arose within Islamic parameters.

The second half of this chapter had focused upon historic Oman’s mercantile socio-discursive formation, and how it underwent major transformations in relation both to the pre-Islamic period, and to Islamization, which incorporated societies extending from North Africa to Sind in Western India into a unified political, cultural and economic system. The Umma’s trade, and therefore, the mercantile stratum of historic Oman, was further strengthened by the reforms in taxation and currency instituted by the Umayyad Caliphate, and by the uniform use of the commenda commercial arrangement for long distance and regional trade, as well as for other forms of investment.

In particular, these developments brought political and economic stability to the Indian Ocean, which development was particularly significant in facilitating the expansion of historic Oman’s trade. In relation to these developments, the
cities of historic Oman became important centers of intercontinental trade, especially with the rise of Baghdad. With the decline and subsequent destruction of Baghdad in 1258, and with the rise of Cairo and its continued importance between 900 and 1500 A.D., cities in historic Oman such as Qalat, and Musqat grew in significance, and Julfar retained its importance with the rise of New Hormuz. However, other cities in historic Oman and elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf, such as Siraf, Qais, and Suwar, declined. This shows that changes in the Islamic socio-discursive formation led to the rise and decline of commercial cities in historic Oman, and elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf. Despite the fact that some of these cities declined, there were also cities in historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf that had flourished with Baghdad’s prosperity, but still retained their significance after it was destroyed.

There were several factors that contributed to this situation. The first was that there continued to exist a well-established and skilled community of merchants, shipbuilders, navigators and seafarers in each of these cities. The second factor was the close connection to enclaves of merchants from the Arabian Gulf in ports throughout the Indian Ocean that merchants from these Gulf cities retained. The third factor was that, despite Baghdad’s destruction, there still existed a sizeable market in the Arabian Gulf itself. More importantly, the Indian Ocean, where historic Oman’s
trade, along with that of other mercantile centers on the Arabian Gulf, had been well established over history, remained a vast market. Finally, the location of many of historic Oman's cities on the Arabian Sea placed them in the position to prosper in conjunction with both Gulf and Red Sea trade.

This chapter has treated mercantile society in historic Oman as a socio-discursive formation because it contained political, economic, and cultural structures. Some of these structures were continuities from the pre-Islamic period, and some were constructed during the Islamic period, but all underwent transformations within the various Islamic socio-discursive formations that arose between 600 and 1500 A.D. Furthermore, within the mercantile cities that this chapter has covered, the mercantile socio-discursive formation reproduced itself as a result of several factors. One of these factors was the fact that the long-distance merchant stratum was able to accumulate wealth, and thereby to dominate these cities' economic, political and cultural institutions. The second factor was that there existed within these cities several discourses concerning class, ethnicity, gender, religion, etc. These discourses were also connected to the general Islamic socio-discursive formation.

In addition, mercantile society in historic Oman, by virtue of its Islamization, formed an identity both in relation to its own, pre-Islamic past, and to other civilizations with which it interacted through long-distance
trade. Finally, historic Oman's mercantile socio-discursive formation constructed its own, unique set of social relations. This enabled dwellers within the mercantile-urban socio-discursive formation to construct an identity which was a discourse of superiority for them, in relation to dwellers within the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations with whom they interacted. The agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations will be the focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORIC OMAN DURING THE ISLAMIC PERIOD (2)

Introduction

This chapter is presented in two parts. The first part examines historic Oman’s agrarian socio-discursive formation within the Islamic socio-discursive formation (600 A.D.- 1500 A.D.), and the second part analyzes the tribal socio-discursive formation characterizing historic Oman within the Islamic socio-discursive formation. This chapter serves as a continuation of the previous one, because it analyzes historic Oman’s agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations as they coexisted with, and interacted with, the mercantile socio-discursive formation, within the larger Islamic socio-discursive formation. Like the previous treatment of the mercantile socio-discursive formation, the treatment of historic Oman’s agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations during the 600-1500 A.D. period is important because these, too, continued to articulate within the transformational, colonial, and contemporary socio-discursive formations, undergoing pivotal changes (continuities and discontinuities) across the corresponding periods.

This chapter will present three main arguments. The first is that historic Oman’s agrarian and tribal socio-
discursive formations underwent changes during the Islamic period, both in relation to the pre-Islamic period, and in relation to transformations within the Islamic socio-discursive formation overall.

Despite the impact of transformations occurring within the greater Islamic socio-discursive formation upon historic Oman's agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations, these two socio-discursive formations retained their Islamic identity throughout the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period. This was because the transformations (discourses and counter-discourses) that occurred within the larger Islamic socio-discursive formation all remained within the framework of the overall Islamic discourse.

The second argument is that the both historic Oman's agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations reproduced themselves by means of the discourses that each constructed, within itself, in relation to the other, and in relation to the mercantile socio-discursive formation. The agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations also reproduced themselves by means of the concrete interlinkages that each had with the other, and with the mercantile socio-discursive formation.

The third argument, to be presented at the end of this chapter, will be that although the mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations all articulated together, and reproduced themselves within the larger Islamic socio-
discursive formation, it was the mercantile socio-discursive formation that played the most important role during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period. At the end, this chapter will also analyze in some detail the precise interlinkages that were constructed among the mercantile, agrarian, and tribal socio-discursive formations.

**Historic Oman’s Agrarian Socio-discursive Formation During the Islamic Period: 600 A.D.-1500 A.D.**

In addition to being a commercial center in antiquity, historic Oman was also agricultural. In fact, historic Oman, along with other parts of the Arabian Peninsula, was producing an agricultural surplus prior to the time that Sassanid rule began.¹ The aflaj irrigation system, which attaches the surface or subterranean flow of water to a distribution system through the construction of wells and tunnels, or ganat (canals), was in use in historic Oman as early as 700 B.C.² One important Sassanid irrigational innovation in historic Oman, which the preceding Acheamenid rule had not instituted, was the building of long channels that brought water from the mountains as a supplement to the well-irrigation of the coastal area. Cultivators in historic Oman also used inverted siphons to exploit the water supplies in the valleys of the


Ghadaf region. Several plants were cultivated as crops in pre-Islamic historic Oman. These included the acacia tree (for gum arabic), the tamarisk tree, francincense, bananas, plantains, the date tree, the almond tree, and cotton.

Land tenure during Sassanid times was related to the fact that after 531 A.D., historic Oman was divided into two main sections. The eastern coastal area, whose main commercial centers were the cities of Suhar and Dama, was under direct Sassanid administration, and the most significant landowners were Persian military lords who owned parcels of land in historic Oman that they had been given as fiefdoms from the Sassanid government, along with other Persian land colonizers. These two groupings also served as instruments for Sassanid administration of that part of historic Oman, and they mainly colonized the eastern, Batina littoral of the Omani coast as part of the Sassanid maritime empire. The ports of Suhar and Dama were also centers at which the Sassanid government collected a tithe. In connection with agriculture in that part of historic Oman which was under

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direct Sassanid control, the Arabs mainly engaged in pastoral herding, transporting, and weaving, although some were settled land cultivators. Cultivators, and probably herders, all paid taxes to the Sassanid government. The direct taxes paid by the cultivators were particularly heavy.\(^5\)

One reason why taxes were so heavy was that the proportional levy on crops that Sassanid rule commonly imposed in historic Oman was assessed before the harvest, in contrast to after the rise of Islam, when taxes were assessed after the harvest. (More about this later.)\(^6\)

The western desert and mountain area, the southeastern area near Qalhat, and the northern area extending from the Sirr region, southward along the Arabian Gulf to the port of Julfar, were outside of direct Sassanid rule. The Arabs in the western area, however, were ruled by the Sassanid-appointed Julanda (governor). The Arabs of the mountain area near Qalhat may have been autonomous, and the Julanda of the northern area had the autonomous right to collect the tithe at the port of Dibba. One important agricultural area in the

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\(^5\) The cultivators lived under the administration of what was theoretically their own system, but the head of this system was a Sassanid-appointed Julanda. The system was probably one in which the cultivators paid their taxes or tribute to the Julanda, who, in turn, paid tribute to the Sassanid administration. Wilkinson, *Water and Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 130-133.

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 146.
northern area was Tuʿam (Buraimi). Crops cultivated included dates, figs and pomegranites.

The rise of Islam, however, revolutionized the existing agricultural system both in historic Oman, and in the rest of the Umma, both through the reformation of the laws and economic practices concerning land tenure, and through reformation of the land tax system. With Islam there also came the acceleration of the introduction of new crops into the domains of the Umma, and the introduction of new agricultural techniques. Other political, economic and cultural transformations that took place were both outgrowths and perpetuators of this agricultural revolution. These factors included the growth of wealthy social strata, urbanization and the growth of industries within the Umma, and the expansion of long-distance and regional trade.

Islamic land taxation laws differed from Sassanid ones in a very important way. Where Sassanid land tax laws had imposed a levy of one sixth to one half of a crop yield on the basis on the nature of the cultivation, Islamic laws of taxation also took the cultivator's general means into

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7 Ibid.

consideration.\textsuperscript{9}

Under the system of land tenure that early Islam instituted, land owned by individuals could be sold, mortgaged, or bequeathed in a will. The owner also had the option of farming it himself or of hiring labor to cultivate it. Individual landowners also had full rights to determine which crops would be grown on their land, without any of the encumbrances that such factors as other peoples' grazing rights, or crop rotation systems, might impose.\textsuperscript{10}

The Prophet Mohammed himself instituted at least one important practice which encouraged and extended private ownership of land within the \textit{Umma}, when he granted parcels of land to some of his Companions, only in exchange for their continued payment of the regular \textit{Sadaga} to the \textit{Umma}. Jurists later came to call this practice \textit{iqta\textsuperscript{a} tamlik}, or the conferring of property rights. The Prophet Mohammed also allowed non-Muslims, such as the Jewish tribes of Khaibar and Banu al-Nadhir, to continue cultivating their lands in exchange for a tax in the form of a percentage of their crops, payable to the \textit{Umma}. This situation set the precedent for the \textit{muzara\textsuperscript{a}} law, which allowed the previously landless to

\textsuperscript{9} Wilkinson, Water and Tribal Settlement in South East Arabia, p. 146.

cultivate a portion of the land owned by someone else, in exchange for payment to the owner of a fixed percentage of the crop. It also began the process for formulating laws governing land tenure on sawad lands, or lands that were added to the domains of the Umma as Islam spread. Some interpretations of Islamic law allowed Muslims the right to actual ownership of parcels of sawad land, while others stated that they only had the right to work these lands.\textsuperscript{11} The Prophet Mohammed also encouraged landlords who could not cultivate all of their holdings to hire labor to do so, or to return uncultivated land to the Umma so that it could be redistributed to those who could cultivate it. Other reforms that the Prophet Mohammed instituted, such as the regulation of the water supply, also facilitated land cultivation.\textsuperscript{12} A later irrigation law made water rights, like land rights, marketable.\textsuperscript{13}

Under the Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab, the law providing iqta tamlik became an official instrument for encouraging individual ownership of land in order to facilitate the general expansion of cultivation. An illustration of this is

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\textsuperscript{12} Ibrahim, \textit{Merchant Capital and Islam}, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{13} Watson, \textit{Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World}, p. 116.
the fact that the Caliph Omar ibn al Khattab actually ordered some land holders who had obtained land to cultivate from the Umma to return that portion of it that they were leaving fallow.\textsuperscript{14} With the spread of Islam, \textit{igta} grants were sometimes allocated from \textit{sawafi} lands, or lands whose owners had abandoned them.\textsuperscript{15}

As Islamic law developed, all four \textit{madhahib}, or Sunni schools of Islamic law, with some variation, also conferred the right of land ownership on those who redeemed ownerless, unused \textit{(mawat)} land.\textsuperscript{16} Producers who invested in such land redemption were only taxed at a rate of one tenth of the land's produce. However, landholders who abandoned cultivable land lost their holdings to the Caliphate.\textsuperscript{17}

The Umayyad Caliphs also made \textit{igta} grants from both \textit{sawafi} and \textit{mawat} lands, but the grantees who were favored were usually relatives of theirs. Sometimes, these grants were large enough to make their beneficiaries large land owners, who made significant improvements on their granted land. One such grantees was Khalid al- Qasri, governor of Iraq for the

\textsuperscript{14} Abd al-Kader, \textit{Islamic Quarterly} 5, nos. 1 and 2 (1959): 5-7.


\textsuperscript{17} Watson, \textit{Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World}, p. 116.
Umayyad Caliph Hisham, who was granted a large tract of land in the wetlands of southern Iraq, an important source of *Iqta* grants. He drained this land and made it cultivable by building canals on it.\(^{18}\) It is possible that it was because of improvements made by *iqta* beneficiaries that over one million canals were built for irrigation in the vicinity of Basra.\(^{19}\) Land purchases also became common under the Umayyad Caliphate, as well as under Abbasid rule, as the growth of commerce provided more capital for both land purchases and development. In part, the Qaramitah movement arose during the Abbasid Caliphate as a counter-discourse to the large landholders in southern Iraq, advocating the confiscation of their wealth by the peasants.\(^{20}\)

Under the Buwayhids and the Seljuqs, the institution of *iqta* took on a new purpose. At this time, it served as a reward to important military personnel for the services they had rendered to the rulers, rather than as a land grant whose purpose was to encourage cultivation. Under these regimes, the nature of the institution of *Iqta* changed because its purpose had changed. Under the Seljuqs in particular, *Iqta* holdings became politico-economic fiefdoms, whose grantees had both economic and political rights over cultivators and

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\(^{19}\) Nadavi, *Islamic Culture* 16 (1942): 73.

peasants, collecting rent from them, recruiting them as forced labor, and often imposing taxes of their own upon them.\textsuperscript{21}

Aside from reforming land tenure laws, the Umma also instituted tax reform laws on land at the rise of Islam. These tax reform laws also encouraged land cultivation by replacing the oppressively heavy taxation system of the late Byzantine and Sassanid empires. The first leader of the Umma to state his concerns that tax levies be kept reasonable was the Prophet Mohammed himself.\textsuperscript{22}

In place of the Byzantine and Sassanid taxes on land, the Umayyad Caliph Abd al-Malik instituted the Kharaj and \textit{\'ushr} land taxes.\textsuperscript{23} The Abbasid Caliphate made further tax reforms by instituting the \textit{mugasamah} tax system during the administrations of the Caliphs al-Mansur and al-Mahdi. Here, producers paid between a tenth and a fifth of the value of their output to the Umma, depending upon the quality of the land, or upon their own wealth. Sometimes the Caliph forgave the taxes of those unable to pay.\textsuperscript{24}

The large landowning stratum that expanded, both during

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., pp. 12-18.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Watson, \textit{Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World}, pp. 114-115.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Watson, \textit{Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World}, p. 115.
\end{itemize}
the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates because of the opportunities for private ownership of land and investment in agriculture that Islamic law offered, instituted many agricultural innovations besides those of qanat construction mentioned above. One particularly important agricultural innovation was the purchase of new crops, many of them from India. Although pre-Islamic Indian Ocean trade had already introduced some of the Indian crops into lands under Sassanid rule, this trend really increased after the rise of Islam, as the wealthy mercantile and agricultural strata developed a taste for new foods to which Muslims had been introduced via the inclusion of Sind within the Umma’s domains after 711 A.D. Merchants engaging in both overland and Indian Ocean trade, along with the wealthier agricultural stratum that was developing, brought these crops into the province of Fars, Iraq, and historic Oman.25

These crops included hard wheat, rice, varieties of sorghum, sugar cane, citrus fruits, mangos, cocoanuts, artichokes, eggplants, and spinach.26 Crops that were brought into historic Oman in particular from India, and then traveled to Syria, Palestine, and Egypt via Basra included certain

25 Watson, in Udovitch, The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900, p. 32.

citrus, such as the sour orange and the "round citron," which Andrew Watson says may have been the lemon. Most of the above-mentioned imported produce came to be cultivated across the Umma by the tenth and eleventh centuries. However, they did not come to be exported to Christian Europe in sufficient quantities for cultivation there until considerably later. Cultivation of spinach, for instance, began in Christian Europe during the 1200s only. Sorghum cultivation began in Italy during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Sour oranges and lemons only came to be cultivated in Italy and Christian Spain during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Cultivation of hard wheat did not take hold in Christian Europe until the thirteenth century, and rice was not cultivated in northern Italy until after 1450.\(^{27}\)

Imported crops generated key changes in agricultural techniques on the holdings of the Umma's wealthier landowners, who could first afford to purchase and cultivate these new crops as greater sections of the urban population came to demand them. These innovations subsequently became widespread within the Umma's agricultural system. One important innovation-engendering characteristic of these new crops was the fact that they were summer crops, in contrast to the largely winter-grown agricultural produce cultivated under

\(^{27}\) Watson, *Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World*, pp. 45, 80, and 83.
Byzantine and Sassanid rule. (This meant that under these regimes, most agricultural land lay fallow during the summer.) In addition, most of the crops that the Umma imported had previously been cultivated in a climate with a greater amount of rainfall per year than that found in most of the Umma's lands. These two characteristics of the imported crops engendered two major changes in the Umma's agricultural techniques. Firstly, they added a second, summer growing season in the countryside, and secondly, they necessitated innovations in irrigation techniques.28

Among the irrigational investments that occurred in lands throughout the Umma was the repair work done on the existing irrigational system, much of which had fallen into disrepair because of neglect and mismanagement under both the Byzantines and the Sassanids. Much additional land was irrigated by means of greater use of underground water sources along with rivers and streams, and the use of lifting devices such as waterwheels and troughs. The new crops, and the additional growing season they brought about, also engendered new, more complicated methods of crop rotation and the matching of soil type to each crop's particular needs.29 The agricultural innovations described above led to the increase

29 Watson, in Udovitch, The Islamic Middle East: 700-1900, pp. 38-41.
in stabilization of rural incomes, the expansion of the rural population, and a general growth in the food supply. In fact, the agricultural surplus produced in the Umma between 700 and 1100 A.D. was also sufficient to meet the needs of such huge urban areas as Baghdad, Samarra, Damascus and Cairo.\(^{30}\)

As the new crops came to be commonly cultivated within the Umma, they generated specific industries, within both rural and urban areas. This was because many of these crops had to be processed before they were consumed, and sometimes this processing required certain scales of production and the utilization of labor with certain skills. Rice and wheat milling were industries that the agricultural revolution within the Umma generated. Sugar refining and cotton processing were two other such industries, and these last two generated additional industries for the manufacturing of confections and clothing. The cotton processing industry also generated demand for dyes, which were made from indigo, another new crop.\(^{31}\)

The agricultural revolution within the Umma was also important because it forged new links between rural and urban areas. Urban areas were significant sources of demand for


\(^{31}\) Watson, in Udovitch, The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900, p. 47.
agricultural produce, and as purchasers of agricultural commodities, incorporated rural areas into the urban, monetary economy. In addition, the new industries that some of the new agricultural crops generated provided the cities with additional commodities for long distance trade.\textsuperscript{32} Also, as the mercantile stratum became wealthier from this long distance trade, they became more inclined to purchase large tracts of land, and to invest in agriculture. Thus the wealthier mercantile stratum also became a landlord stratum.

Two important characteristics of agriculture in historic Oman specifically are related to the development of agriculture in the \textit{Umma}. Firstly, long-distance merchants from \textit{historic Oman} and Siraf played a significant role simply regarding the bringing of crops from Sind into the \textit{Umma}'s domains. Secondly, historic Oman itself served as a way station for both the acclimatization and the transportation of some of these crops, before they became common elsewhere within the \textit{Umma}. This was true of indigenous crops from historic Oman as well as for imports from Sind. Specifically, these indigenous crops included the banana.\textsuperscript{33}

\textit{Historic Oman} came under the jurisdiction of the above-discussed Islamic laws pertaining to land tenure and taxation with the end of Sassanid rule. The land tenure legal

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 47.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 32.
principles applied with the rise of Islam in historic Oman included that of *Iqta*, or land grants for the purpose of cultivation, the right to redeem *Mawat*, or ownerless, non-productive land, and the *muzara‘a* principle, allowing the previously landless to cultivate a portion of land owned by someone else, in exchange for payment to the owner of a fixed percentage of the crop. As mentioned above, cultivators of land paid the *‘ushr* or *kharaj* tax on it, but under Islam, the proportional levy on crops was assessed after the harvest, rather than before it, in contrast to the Sassanid practice. However, it is important to emphasize that application of land tenure laws changed with the different prevailing interpretations of Islamic law in historic Oman. Changes in these interpretations, in turn, reflected changes within the Islamic socio-discursive formation itself.

One of the first things that the rise of Islam in historic Oman accomplished was the expulsion of the *Hanagira*, or large Persian landowners who had been part of the Sassanid administration.\(^{34}\) However, it was under the Obeidi regime, which began after 750 A.D. in historic Oman, that the Arabs began to settle extensively, and to become cultivators of the lands in the agricultural interior of historic Oman in significant numbers. One of the incentives for this

\(^{34}\) Wilkinson, *Water and Tribal Settlement in South-East Arabia*, p. 133.
transformation was probably the above mentioned principle of Islamic taxation law which assessed a cultivator on the basis of his general means, as well as on his manner of cultivation and crop output. Under the Obeidi regime in historic Oman, this meant that durable produce alone, such as grain and dried fruit, was subject to taxation. Produce that served as as forage for livestock, and produce likely to be used for local consumption rather than sold to urban areas, were exempt. Exempt produce included fresh fruits and legumes. Similarly, fishermen, generally classified as poor, were exempt from taxation, while breeders of livestock that yielded products, or were used as agricultural inputs were taxed according to the number of head. Under the Islamic socio-discursive formation in historic Oman, the purpose of these tax laws was not so much the extracting of as much wealth as possible for the enrichment of the rulers, as the provision of a means by which wealthier strata within the Umma contributed to the welfare of poorer ones. But even holdings of taxable output assessed at less than a set minimum in value were exempt from taxation. Furthermore, cultivators who dry farmed, or whose lands were directly watered by rivers or irrigation systems such as Qanats were charged the full land tax, while those who had to bring water to their fields manually or with animal assistance were charged only half of the tax.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., pp. 146-147.
In the part of historic Oman under Obeidi rule, decisions in landlord versus tenant cases concerning agriculture reveal both that it was legal for owners of larger holdings to rent parcels of them out for cultivation, and that many Obeidi legal presumptions were in favor of the tenant. For one thing, a landlord was only allowed to charge a tenant rent in kind for land he cultivated, although water rights could be rented for money. For another, the landlord was responsible for the maintenance of the water supply irrigating a tenant’s holding, and for the provision of fertilizer. Concerning land tenure itself, most of the laws established at the rise of Islam continued to hold in the part of historic Oman under Obeidi rule. For example, individuals could gain ownership rights to mawat land that they cultivated. Land that had fallen out of cultivation for a long time, and whose ownership could not be ascertained met two possible classifications. Either it became the property of the Obeidi Imamate if it was adjudicated to belong to an absentee owner, or it remained untouched until a legal claimant to it appeared, if it was adjudged to belong to deceased owner.36

Land tenure laws established at the rise of Islam also remained intact within the Qaramitah community established in historic Oman and in historic Al-Bahrain during the tenth century, but one extremely important reform that had more to

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36 Ibid., pp. 261-262.
do with land tenure in practice than with Islamic law was instituted, and this was the expropriation of large landowners and the distribution of their excess lands among smaller farmers within Qaramitah domains.\textsuperscript{37} This was because the Qaramitah movement had arisen among landless peasants and small cultivators in Kufa as a counter-discourse to the growth of a stratum of large landowners during the rule of the Abbasid Caliphate.\textsuperscript{38} Another reform that the Qaramitah polity instituted was the taxation levied upon all those who generated income, irrespective of gender or occupation.\textsuperscript{39}

Under Buwayhid rule, which governed historic Oman from 965-1050 A.D., Igta land grants in historic Oman were given to military officers, as rewards for services rendered to the Buwayhid rulers. However, these Igta grants were not hereditary. Buwayhid Igta land grants either supplemented, or supplanted altogether, the officers' salaries, and the military grantees were to pay to the government a certain sum in currency or in kind for their parcel, and were to be responsible for the maintenance of its irrigation. Since most of the beneficiaries of the military Igta did not live on the parcels granted to them, they saw little need to invest in

\textsuperscript{37} Abu Talib, \textit{Al-Sira'a al-Ijtima'i fi al-Dawlat al-Abbasiyyah}, pp.186-189.

\textsuperscript{38} Al-Duri, \textit{Al-Abhath} 22, no. 182 (1969): 10-11.

\textsuperscript{39} Abu Talib, \textit{Al-Sira'a al-Ijtima'i fi al-Dawlat al-Abbasiyyah}, pp. 186-189.
land improvement. In fact, they often refused to make their payments to the treasury, and imposed taxes of their own on the cultivators. Agricultural productivity declined as a result of this situation.\footnote{Al-Duri, \textit{Al-Abhath}, Vol. XXII, No. 182 (1969): 12-16.}

Under the Seljuqs, who ruled 1056-1187 A.D., \textit{Iqta} land grants in historic Oman were given to military officers as complete replacements of salary. Although the military grantees were juridically allowed only to collect rent, they steadily assumed greater and greater political authority over cultivators and peasants, and even developed policies restricting their movement and conscripting them as forced labor.\footnote{Ibid., p. 18.} As was mentioned above, this new application of the principle of \textit{Iqta} substantially changed its nature and meaning, as under early Islam, it had been devised as a means to encourage cultivation, rather than merely as an instrument for collecting rent.

Agriculture in historic Oman prospered for a time under the Banu Nabhan, who controlled the interior of historic Oman from 1154 A.D. to beyond 1500 A.D. In fact, the Nabhani leader, named Falah bin al-Muhsin al-Nabhani, was eventually nicknamed "al-Fallah" or "the farmer", because of his interest in agriculture. Among his exploits was the introduction of
mango cultivation in historic Oman.\textsuperscript{42} Since the Banu Nabhan eventually adopted Obeidism, their laws of land tenure and taxation probably came to resemble those of the previous Obeidi Imamate, rather than those of the Buwayhids and the Seljuqs.

As cities such as Dibba, Suhar, Julfar, Qalhat and Dhofar grew in importance as maritime commercial centers during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period, their mercantile stratum increasingly invested in land purchase and in agricultural improvements. These investments included the purchase new crops from abroad, and the building of \textit{ganat} systems.\textsuperscript{43} These cities were also sources of custom for the agricultural products grown in historic Oman’s interior, particularly dates and other dried fruits, a large percentage of which was transported to the mercantile cities for export. Long-distance merchants of these dried fruits procured them by means of agents who resided in the local trade centers of the interior. Another example of this interdependence between the mercantile and agrarian socio-discursive formations was the fact that imported goods that were first shipped to historic Oman’s port cities were also transported to permanent shops in


\textsuperscript{43} Wilkinson, \textit{The Imamate Tradition in Oman}, p. 25.
historic Oman's larger interior trade centers, where they were sold to cultivators and other villagers.\(^{44}\) Historic Oman's commercial cities also housed factories where many of these products were processed for long distance export trade.

Central to the reproduction of the agrarian socio-discursive formation was the identity constructed within it. The central value around which this identity was constructed was love of the land. Just as the mercantile socio-discursive formation had constructed wealth as a discourse for the differentiation of urban dwellers from cultivators, so did the agrarian socio-discursive formation construct the value of land and cultivation as a discourse by means of which cultivators differentiated themselves from urban dwellers. Crafts, music, food, proverbs, etc. were all expressions of love of the land, and the pride in the ability to nurture livestock and to make crops grow. In relation to urban dwellers, cultivators saw themselves as the true producers of real wealth, as opposed to those who merely consumed it. In relation to people of the Badia, cultivators took pride in the fact that they were real producers, whereas the people of the badia, in their view, were not. Irrespective of the differences in size of landholding among the cultivators, all shared the identity constructed within the agrarian social

formation, centered around the value of love of the land.

The agrarian socio-discursive formation, however, constructed socio-economic differentiations of its own, based on land. Specifically, these agrarian socio-economic differentiations arose around size of land holdings, quality of land, productivity, etc. Land, in terms of size, productivity, etc., was a measure of economic privilege, political power, and cultural prestige within the agrarian socio-discursive formation.

Within historic Omans's agrarian socio-discursive formation, the various strata comprising it underwent significant transformations, both as the pre-Islamic socio-discursive formation gave way to the Islamic socio-discursive formation, and as the Islamic socio-discursive formation itself underwent transformations. Under the pre-Islamic socio-discursive formation, the dominant socio-economic differentiation had been that between Sassanid landlords versus land tenants. Another socio-economic differentiation manifested itself along both ethnic and class lines, and involved Persian settlers of all kinds who were part of the Sassanid ruling apparatus, versus such strata as the landless Bayasirah and Bayadir, whom the Sassanid rulers had brought from India to work as farm labor. In particular, a socio-economic differentiation existed between the Sassanid landlords and the indigenous Arabs who were pastoral or, in
some cases, small landholders.

With the rise of Islam, several new socio-economic differentiations arose within the new Islamic socio-discursive formation, because the component strata, themselves, had undergone fundamental transformations. Firstly, the rise of Islam abolished the old Sassanid landowning stratum. This changed the power relationship between historic Oman's Arabs and what had been Sassanid rule, so that the number of indigenous Arabs cultivating land increased. Islam also encouraged historic Oman's Arabs to settle on the land as cultivators by enacting the above-described laws that encouraged land cultivation. Islamic law also allowed landholders to rent holdings that they, themselves, could not cultivate, to tenant farmers. This engendered the development of socio-economic differentiations among landholders according to size and productivity of holdings. Agrarian socio-economic differentiations intensified during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, during which the urban mercantile strata grew wealthy from expanding long-distance and regional trade, and invested their wealth in large land holdings and in agricultural improvements. This development engendered the growth of a new, large landholding stratum. It was as a counter-discourse to this stratum that the Qaramitah polity formed in historic Oman and historic Al-Bahrain, abolishing large landholders within its domains. (The Qaramitah movement largely consisted
of landless agricultural laborers and smaller cultivators.) The development of this counter-discourse indicated the existence of socio-economic differentiation between large landholders, smaller cultivators, and the landless.

The change in Iqta laws under the Buwayhids and the Seljuqs led to the construction of a new stratum of military officers who became large landholders. The political power that these landholders now had obtained because of weaker central administration intensified the socio-economic differentiations between the Iqta landholders on the one hand, and the smaller cultivators and landless agricultural laborers on the other. This was because holders of Iqta lands seldom lived on their holdings, were now able to impose taxes upon indigenous cultivators (landless or not), and could even restrict their freedom of movement. The Banu Nabhan, in contrast, initially improved the agricultural situation somewhat because of their interest in agriculture as such, and the early years of their administration may have encouraged the expansion of land cultivation again.

Five main points can be made in conclusion about historic Oman's agrarian socio-discursive formation between 600 A.D. and 1500. The first is that the agricultural sector has always been an important one in the economy of historic Oman, producing a surplus and linked to long-distance trade during the pre-Islamic period. The second point is that,
under the Islamic socio-discursive formation, historic Oman's agricultural sector underwent substantial changes in terms of its system of land tenure, land taxation, and certainly in terms of the methods of agricultural production, and produce cultivated.

The third point is that historic Oman's agricultural sector was significant in the bringing about the Umma's agricultural revolution between the eighth and twelfth centuries. Historic Oman served as a way station for transportation to the rest of the Umma of many new crops that were either indigenous to historic Oman, or were imported from the provinces of Sind, and Fars. These crops included hard wheat, spinach, eggplants, citrus, bananas, and sugar cane.

The fourth point is that the changes within the Islamic socio-discursive formation brought about transformations within historic Oman's agrarian socio-discursive formation itself. A major reason for these transformations was the changes that took place in the interpretation of Islamic land tenure and taxation law, in relation to the rise and fall of different dynasties, and as power relationships changed.

The fifth point is that the prosperity of urban areas, and that of the historic Oman's agricultural interior, were interconnected during the Islamic period. The growing wealth of the urban merchant stratum led to investments in land purchase, in agricultural innovations, and in the introduction
of new crops. Conversely, as urban centers grew, they became important sources of demand for this agricultural produce. These sources of urban demand included industrial processing, consumption habits that changed with tastes and preferences, and the fact that some of these agricultural commodities had become exports, as illustrated both in this section and the one on the mercantile socio-discursive formation. As well as being transported by ship, these exports were also transported overland, and this factor, as well as others which will now be examined, linked historic Oman’s mercantile and agrarian socio-discursive formations to the tribal one.

**Historic Oman’s Tribal Socio-Discursive Formation During the Islamic Period: 600 A.D.-1500 A.D.**

In this study, tribalism is analyzed as a socio-discursive formation that underwent transformations during pre-Islamic times, and also throughout the 600 A.D.-1500 period. This analysis contrasts with the more common treatment of tribalism by other sources merely as an extended family affiliation, occurring outside as well as inside of the *badia* (area whose dwellers are primarily livestock-dependent). This research differentiates the concept of tribalism as a socio-discursive formation from the concept of extended family affiliation by calling the latter *nisab*. This means that individuals or families living in an urban or agricultural setting and expressing tribal affiliation, or *nisab*, would be
considered part of the mercantile or agrarian socio-discursive formations, rather than the tribal one.

The tribal socio-discursive formation is essentially pastoral, or totally nomadic deeper in the desert. However, tribal groupings that seasonally engage in subsistant agriculture or fishing, along with pastoralism, are also part of the tribal socio-discursive formation. Tribal groupings located closest to the cities or to agricultural areas are most likely to fit this last description.

Archaeological evidence of the existence of pastoral groupings in the Arabian Peninsula dates back to the period between 3000 and 2000 B.C. These groupings existed concurrently with the urbanized civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Southern Arabia, and interacted with the more settled peoples of the entire Fertile Crescent. Records indicating the domestication of the camel also date back that far, and evidence of the domestication of sheep dates back farther.\(^{45}\) A crucial point to emphasize here is that the tribal socio-discursive formation has consistently been characterized by the out-migration of some participants, and the in-migration of formerly settled cultivators, and even urban dwellers, as cultural, economic, or political circumstances dictated. For example, during antiquity,

pastoral nomads in proximity to agricultural areas frequently became settled cultivators when the opportunity arose. Conversely, such situations as overpopulation in cultivated areas often caused cultivators to migrate to the *badia* and take up pastoralism.\footnote{Salibi, *A History of Arabia*, p. 5.}

Tribal groupings in the desert areas of the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula basically consisted of three main categories. In the first category were the camel-dependent tribes who lived deep in the desert. In the second category were the largely pastoral tribes, raising sheep and goats as well as camels. The tribal groups of the third category, engaging in seasonal subsistence agriculture and fishery, lived closer to villages, cities, and coastal areas than did tribes of the two earlier categories.

The tribal groupings living deep in the desert mainly derived their livelihood from use of the products of the camel itself, such as hair and milk. The pastoral tribal groupings both used the products of their livestock (sheep, goats, and camels), and also traded these products with villages and cities. The pastoral tribes living closest to the cities, villages or coastal areas herded their livestock during the grazing season, and during other times, engaged in subsistant fishing or agriculture.

In all of these categories, each tribe was based within
a certain \textit{dira}, or section of land containing grazing areas and sources of water. In the deep desert area, a large \textit{dira} was important because grazing land and water resources were scarce, and in order to maintain large camel herds, the tribes needed the ample alternative grazing and water sources that a large \textit{dira} provided. A \textit{dira}, however, was not a permanent, juridically-based, domain of a given tribe. Several factors, such as grazing conditions, water supply, alliances with other tribes, the decline or ascendancy in importance of certain overland trade routes, or a tribe’s migration closer to cities or agricultural lands because of expanding opportunities could lead a tribe’s \textit{dira} to be divided, to change in location, or to disappear altogether.

The economy of all tribal groupings was basically subsistant, meaning that most of what was produced was domestically consumed. However, the tribes of each of the three categories were also able to earn some surplus. Tribes that lived deep in the desert did so by charging the \textit{Khuwwa}, or \textit{Atawah} tax to overland trade caravans that passed through their \textit{dira}, carrying trade commodities from historic Oman’s maritime trade cities to other urban areas in the region. These tribes also provided guidance and protection to the caravans, for which they also received certain additional
gifts and earnings. Pastoral tribal groupings earned their surplus by selling the products of their livestock, and sometimes the livestock itself, to villages or to urban areas. Pastoral tribal groupings that seasonally engaged in fishing or subsistence agriculture also earned their surplus through the sale of their livestock and its products to villages and urban areas. They also guided caravans leaving urban areas deeper into the desert, where they would then be guided and protected by camel-based tribes. All of these tribal groupings used the surplus they earned to purchase special goods from urban areas and villages, such as materials for making basic utensils and tools, rice, and spices.

To understand the interconnection that the people of the badia (tribal areas) had with people of agricultural and urban areas, both during pre-Islamic and Islamic times, it is necessary to examine the tribal socio-discursive formation in greater detail. This necessitates further coverage of customs, religious beliefs, and the economy of the badia. The basic structural unit of the badia was the tribe, which was a unit of clans, related by blood, or by assabiyyah, meaning, the fact that they shared the same land, resources, and hardships. The clans, in turn, were consolidations of related extended families. This means that they could all trace their

47 It is important to emphasize that these caravans, as vehicles of long distance and regional trade, were huge. At times, they consisted of as many as one thousand camels.
heritage to a common nisab, or origin. The tribe was the society in which every individual in the badia was nurtured and shaped. However, among the people of the badia, an individual’s tribal identity was understood and expressed in relation to other tribes to which he or she did not belong. Indeed, it was only within the context of the existence of other tribes that the definition and expression of one’s own tribal identity could exist.

During pre-Islamic times, and to some extent, after the rise of Islam, the customs of the badia, and the values they reflected, were related both to the realities of life in the badia, and to the identity that the people of the badia expressed in relation to those of the urban and agricultural socio-discursive formations, as well as in relation to each other. The importance of nisab, or heritage, for instance, stemmed from the belief in the badia that the noblest and the most genuine of Arab tribes could trace their origins either to Qahtan, the ancestor of the Arabs of Yemen and the rest of southern Arabia, or Adnan, the ancestor of the Arabs of northern Arabia. Nisab was also important for the more practical function of knowing the more immediate degree of kinship of one’s own tribe to others, as information upon

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which to base the formation of alliances. These alliances could be important for agreements concerning access to a given tribe's dira for water, grazing, or passage. They could also enable one tribe to obtain the protection of another if necessary. Alliances were also useful for the overall pooling of resources among tribes in times of hardship.

Once a tribe had established itself in a given dira, it had to choose a representative for its dealings with other tribes, and with those who traversed the dira such as caravans. This representative also served as arbitrator of disputes between individuals, clans, etc., within the tribe. This representative was called the za'im al-gabilah, or leader of the tribe, and he was chosen on the basis of the merits of his nisab, and if he showed ability to extend protection, generosity, patience, humility; as well as powers of persuasion, ability to advise, and ability to maintain consensus within the tribe. The process by which the za'im was chosen was also geared toward maintaining the cohesion of the tribe, as each clan within the tribe offered its candidate for the position, and each was considered. The deliberative body for the choice of the za'im was a council consisting of the older and wiser men within the tribe. It is important to emphasize here that the za'im remained tribal leader only with the tribe's consent, and if he lost that consent, another za'im would be chosen. Leadership of the tribe never passed
from father to son.\textsuperscript{49} In fact, the clan from which a za'\im\ was chosen never provided the za'\im\ for more than four successions.

The za'\im\ collected one fourth of the tribal revenues coming from protection taxes and tolls levied on caravans passing through the dira. The rest of this revenue was distributed within the tribe.\textsuperscript{50} The main decision making body within the tribe, concerning both internal and external issues, was the Majlis. As a council consisting of the za'\im, and experienced representatives from extended families within the tribe which usually met nightly, it also served to reinforce tribal cohesion because of the collective nature of its decision-making. Aside from being an institution in which the za'\im\ and other notables within the tribe made decisions pertaining to the dira as a whole, and relations with other tribes, the majlis also served as a body for the arbitration of disputes and the settling of complaints. In addition, poets whose verses were written to extoll the virtues of the tribe frequently presented their works there.\textsuperscript{51}

Aside from the institutions and practices mentioned above, the badia as an environment instilled certain basic


\textsuperscript{50} Hussein, \textit{Hadharat al-'Arab fi 'Asr al-Jahiliyyah}, p. 73.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., pp. 74-75.
values in its people. These values were of utmost importance both because it was the individual’s duty to maintain his or her tribe’s good reputation, and because of the reality of interdependence among the tribes in the badia’s environment. One of these values was that of al-mrouah, or nobility of manner. This value emphasized the importance of assisting others in as many capacities as possible. Another value was that of al-wafa’, or the importance of keeping one’s word. A third value was that of al-karam wa al-dhiyafah, or generosity and hospitality. This value was particularly important because the tribes of the badia were constantly in transit, and therefore reciprocally needed each other’s hospitality and generosity. The value of al-dhiyafah related both to the extension of hospitality to anyone seeking it, including someone from a tribe in dispute with one’s own, and to the value of respect for the stranger. These and other values, along with related customs, fell under the broad category of al-‘urf, or general tribal customs. This phrase related to knowledge constructed by people over time from experience in the badia.\footnote{John L. Esposito, \textit{Islam: The Straight Path} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 6.}

Religious practices in the badia were also constructed within the context of both the environment, and of tribal identity in relation to other tribes. The environment of the
badia, and the common language of the Arabian tribal groupings, forged common rituals, and common beliefs.\footnote{Moroney, in Pridham, The Arab Gulf and the Arab World, p. 6.} One such belief was in the existence of the jinn, an ephemeral evil presence. Another belief was in al-dahar, or destiny. This meant that each individual's deeds were fore-ordained. A third belief was in al-raja'a or resurrection, meaning that those who died returned to life on earth. One of the common rituals was the annual hajj to Mecca, where each tribe worshiped its particular god.\footnote{Hussein, Hadharat al-`Arab fi `Asr al-Jahiliyyah, pp. 172-177.}

This ritual was both a reflection of common belief, and of each tribe's identity in relation to the others, because each tribe had its own particular deity, which served as its protector, and reinforced its identity in relation to other tribes.\footnote{Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, pp. 5-6.} These tribal gods were closely associated with such environmentally significant items as trees, stones, wind, stars, planets and springs.\footnote{Hussein, Hadharat al-`Arab fi `Asr al-Jahiliyyah, pp. 162-172.} However, the Haji also reinforced the identity of the Arabs as such in relation to other cultural and religious groups, such as the Persian Mushus, the Byzantine Christians, and the Jews.
The rise of Islam brought several changes to the nature of the tribal socio-discursive formation in the Arabian Peninsula. Firstly, it ended the worship of the different gods, thereby destroying an important means by which tribes differentiated themselves from each other. Indeed, the entire concept of tribe lost its importance to the concept of Umma, or the unity of all adherents to Islam and the belief in one god. This meant that the Arabs had replaced one identity, that of tribe in relation to tribe, by a new identity of Muslim in relation to non-Muslim. With the expansion of Islam, many tribes migrated to the cities that were now included in the domains of the Umma, or were being established, such as Damascus and Kufa. Another change that Islam brought which affected the tribal socio-discursive formation was the replacement of the taxes that each tribe levied on those who traversed its dira, or sought its protection, by taxes levied by the Umma, whose central administration had become the provider of security. These developments led to a decline in tribalism during the lifetime of the Prophet Mohammed, who encouraged tribes in the badia to settle in the cities. However, tribalism was to re-appear during the Riddah, immediately following the Prophet’s death, to decline again after the Riddah until the waning of Abbasid rule.

The tribes of historic Oman, prior to the rise of
Islam, participated in all of the pre-Islamic Arab rituals, including the Hajj to Mecca for the worship of tribal gods.\textsuperscript{57} After the Riddah, during the period of the first four Rashidun (Rightly Guided) Caliphs, historic Oman came under the administration of the Wali in Basra. This engendered the migration of many of historic Oman’s tribes, such as the Azd, to that city to participate in the spread of Islam to Fars.\textsuperscript{58} In addition, the Azd migrated to Khurasan and to the eastern coast of the Arabian Gulf, between Siraf and the island of Qishm. The motivations for these migrations included both the above-mentioned spread of Islam, and the new economic opportunities that the addition of lands to the Umma presented to many people in the badia. The migrations of tribal groups out of the Arabian Peninsula that the rise of Islam engendered also brought about a demographic gap that led to migrations from other areas to the Peninsular coast of the Arabian Gulf for agricultural production.\textsuperscript{59}

Many of the large, camel-based tribes deeper in the desert were also motivated to migrate to the new Islamic cities, and to other lands added to the Umma’s domain. This was because the central Islamic administration, which lasted

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 170.

\textsuperscript{58} Omar, in Pridham, The Arab Gulf and the Arab World, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 18.
from the period of the Rashidun (Rightly Guided) Caliphs to the decline of Abbasid rule, supplanted these tribes as provider of security and assistance for merchants and others, in exchange for revenue. Specifically, the Umma's administration built huge way stations which offered sleeping accommodations, food and fresh water for merchants and their caravans along the many trade routes traversing the Arabian Peninsula. The Umma's administration also employed people for the upkeep and security of these way stations. Two of the Peninsular trade routes important to this research, one connecting historic Oman with historic Al-Bahrain and Basra, and the other connecting historic Oman with Hejaz, are mentioned as providing these facilities.\textsuperscript{60}

Tribalism regained its importance as a socio-discursive formation during the 900s and 1000s, the period during which Abbasid rule was in decline, because of the migration out of cities like Baghdad and Basra that was occurring. The descendents of many people who had left the Badia for Egypt, Syria, Fars, and particularly Iraq at the rise of Islam to take advantage of new opportunities arising as Islam expanded, and to defend the Umma, now returned to tribalism as a way of life, since the expansion of the Umma had ceased, and since the Abbasid Caliph Al-Mu'ta'assistim, and subsequent caliphs, had

\textsuperscript{60} Aqili, Al-Khalij al-'Arabi fi al-'Usur al-Islamiyyah. (The Arabian Gulf in the Islamic Eras, p. 202.)
adopted the policy of recruiting newly migrated Seljuq Turks to their armies, rather than with people originally from the badia.\footnote{Shakir, \textit{Mu\'jam Duwal al-'Alam al-Islami wa Rijaluha}, pp. 352-353.}

With the decline of central Abbasid government, many of the tribes that had migrated to Basra and Baghdad dispersed, establishing new diras at various locations. The Benu Aqil, for example, established their diras in areas ranging from Iraq and Syria to historic Al-Bahrain.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 331-334.} In the 1000s A.D., the 'Amiri, a subclan of the Benu Aqil, established a dira in historic Oman,\footnote{John C. Wilkinson, "Al-Bahrain and Oman," \textit{Al-Watheeska}, no. 5 (1984): 51.} which continued to exist until beyond 1500. Other subclans of the Benu Aqil, such as the Benu Jirwan, the Al-Jabur, and the Benu Khalid also established diras in historic Oman after 1230 A.D.\footnote{Wilkinson, \textit{The Imamate Tradition of Oman}, p. 81.} After the 1300s, the Al-Jabur became particularly prominent in the Peninsula's desert area, and in part of the coastal area. Their influence reached from historic Al-Bahrain, and historic Oman to parts of Hadhramaut.\footnote{John C. Wilkinson, "Al-Bahrain wa Oman" (Al-Bahrain and Oman), in \textit{Al-Khalij al-'Arabi (The Arabian Gulf)}, ed. Faisal Abdallah, (Damascus: Al-'Abjadiyyah lil-Nashr, 1993), pp. 206-207.}
Within the context of this revival of tribalism, many changes also occurred within the tribal socio-discursive formation in the Arabian Peninsula itself. These changes were related to changes in the Islamic socio-discursive formation. For example, the rise of the Qaramitah polity as a counter-discourse to Abbasid rule, and its domination over historic Al-Bahrain and historic Oman, weakened some of the tribes in that area, the most important of which was the tribe of Benu Qais. With the defeat of the Qaramitah polity by the Buwayhids, there opened a new "vacuum" which engendered the rise of new tribes, such as the above-mentioned Banu Aqil and its subclans, the Banu Thalib, the Banu Salim, and others.  

The revival of tribalism in the Arabian Peninsula brought back many of the old institutions, such as 'Urf (tribal customs established over time), the tribal dira, and the taxes and tolls levied against caravans seeking protection and passage across the dira. However, it is important to emphasize that this revival was not a simple return to the same tribal socio-discursive formation that had existed during pre-Islamic times. This revival took place within the framework of many changes that the different Islamic socio-discursive formations had brought about. Particularly importantly, the tribes forming in the Arabian Peninsula

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66 Aqili, Al-Khalij al-'Arabi fi al-'Usur al Islamiyah, p. 172.
during the tenth and eleventh centuries did not revert to the worship of pre-Islamic gods, but rather adhered to different Islamic madhahib, or schools of thought. Islamic values were also incorporated into the older tribal customs of the `urf. The tribal socio-discursive formation constructed the concept of nisab, or worthy tribal origins, as a discourse by which people of the badia differentiated themselves both from each other, and from people within the mercantile and agrarian socio-discursive formations with whom they came into contact. Under this discourse, people in the badia saw worthy tribal origins as something that made them superior to urban dwellers and cultivators who could not make such claims. The concept of nisab was also the discourse under which the different tribes asserted their specific identities in relation to each other, during the course of their interaction. It was the construction of identity around this concept of nisab that enabled the tribal socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself. In addition to being a concept around which tribes constructed identities in relation to each other, and to people within the mercantile and agrarian socio-discursive formations in the course of interaction with them, the concept of nisab served a concrete function. It was important because belonging to an identifiable, extended family ensured the individual's survival. Consequently, poetry, music, and recounted narratives of all kinds expressed pride in the
origin of one's tribe, and expressed its virtues. One perpetuated the respect that one's tribe commanded by his or her personal conduct, as prescribed in the common body of knowledge called 'Urfit. Those within the tribal socio-discursive formation also manifested their identities in relation to the people of the mercantile and agrarian socio-discursive formations through their unique crafts, and sports, such as falconry.

The concept of nisab also governed the socio-economic differentiations that were constructed within the tribal socio-discursive formation. Firstly, tribes with more prestigious nisab claims attained higher cultural prestige, political power, and often, economic privilege within the tribal socio-discursive formation. In addition, a tribe that had attained a large and important dira, and which gained a reputation because of the protection and guidance it could offer because of its size, and because of the courage and generosity of its members, could construct a nisab over time.

However, other socio-economic differentiations existed within each tribe, within each of the three tribal classifications mentioned above, and among these three classifications in relation to each other. The main socio-economic differentiation that existed within each tribe was that between the Za'Im al-Qabilah and the other members of the tribe. This was because of the larger share of revenues from
taxes and tolls to which the za'im was entitled, and collected. Also, within each camel-based tribe deep in the desert, a socio-economic differentiation existed among families in accordance with the number of camels each family owned, and according to each family’s particular nisab.

Socio-economic differentiations also existed among the tribes within each tribal classification. Deep in the desert, some tribes had larger diras than others. Some diras were situated along important overland trade routes, while other were not. Some tribes possessed a greater number of camels than others, and therefore could establish themselves in larger diras, and offer more effective protection to caravans, etc. Among the pastoral tribes, some tribes possessed more livestock than others, and were therefore able to earn more surplus from selling them. Some tribes had access to better pastureland and more predictable water supplies than others, etc. Among the tribes that raised livestock and also engaged in subsistant fishing or agriculture on a seasonal basis, some tribes had more substantial food supplies than others, or earned more selling goods or occasional services to buyers in agricultural or urban areas. Lastly, socio-economic differentiations existed among the three tribal classifications in relation to each other. Camel dependent tribes located deep in the desert were often able to earn more surplus than pastoral or seasonally nomadic tribes because of
the protection and guidance they offered to caravans. Seasonally nomadic tribes, for their part, earned more surplus than did pastoral tribes, because of their closer locations to urban and agricultural areas, and the greater frequency with which they traded goods and services in these areas. These tribes also earned surplus by providing caravans with extra camels, and helping them to transport goods across the entire trade route to the urban area of destination. These socio-economic differentiations within the tribal socio-discursive formation existed in pre-Islamic times, and during the revival of tribalism that occurred as Abbasid rule declined.

However, it is important to emphasize that the economic differentiations existing within the tribal socio-discursive formation were never as pronounced as those within either the agrarian or the mercantile socio-discursive formation. The reason for this was that the economy of the tribal socio-discursive formation did not generate the quantity of surplus that the agrarian or mercantile economy generated. Another point to stress is that irrespective of the socio-economic differentiations that did exist among or within tribes, all people who were part of the tribal socio-discursive formation differentiated themselves from farmers or urban dwellers when they came into contact with them, because all members of tribes took pride in their possession of nisab, which cultivators and urban dwellers, however wealthy, lacked.
This research treats tribalism as a socio-discursive formation, with its own political, economic, and cultural structures, and discourses. This socio-discursive formation changed as result of the rise of Islam, and also underwent changes in relation to transformations occurring within the larger Islamic socio-discursive formation. The tribal socio-discursive formation was also linked to the agricultural and urban socio-discursive formations within historic Oman. Among other things, this means that the people of the badia were as much linked to Indian Ocean trade as cultivators and urban dwellers were. Both the seasonally pastoral tribes closer to cities and agricultural areas, and the larger, camel-dependent tribes deeper in the desert, provided the service of security and guidance for overland trade caravans. This interdependence could also be seen in the fact that tribes sold crafts, products from livestock, and sometimes livestock itself to both agricultural and urban areas, in order to buy basic goods for their own use, or the materials with which to make them.

The tribal socio-discursive formation, itself, had its variations. Tribes whose diras were located at the closest points to urban and agricultural areas seasonally engaged in subsistence agriculture and fishing. Tribes whose diras were located somewhat deeper in the desert herded sheep and goats, along with the camels they kept. The tribes with the largest
**diras**, located deep in the desert, were dependent upon camels. This research has pointed out three major aspects of the interrelationship that historic Oman's mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations. The first is that all three of these socio-discursive formations co-existed within the larger Islamic socio-discursive formation. The second is that they were interdependent. The third point is that each of these three socio-discursive formations contained its own political, economic and cultural structures and discourses, some of which could be traced to pre-Islamic times, and some of which were constructed in relation to the series of Islamic socio-discursive formations that prevailed in historic Oman during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period.

The interdependence of these three socio-discursive formations enabled each of them to reproduce itself; economically by means of circulation of surplus; culturally by means of the discourses that each constructed in relation to the other two, culturally by means of the discourses that each constructed in relation to the other two,; politically by means of the political power for certain strata in relation to others that economic privilege led to. The substantial interconnection between the mercantile and agrarian socio-discursive formations featured extensive purchases of agrarian products by long-distance merchants for export, or for processing into export commodities. In addition, cultivators purchased spices, rice, utensils, and occasionally, other imported goods from long-
distance merchants. The agrarian and mercantile socio-discursive formations actually overlapped during Abbasid rule in particular, when long-distance merchants purchased extensive land tracts, and invested in irrigation devices, and in the cultivation on newly imported crops on these lands. Through the accumulation and circulation of surplus that this interrelationship between these two socio-discursive formations engendered, each was able to reproduce itself economically. However, it was this very interaction between the mercantile and agrarian socio-discursive formations that enabled each to construct discourses by means of which it constructed an identity, and thereby differentiated itself from the other. The mercantile socio-discursive formation constructed the discourse of wealth both as a guarantor of economic privilege, political power, and cultural prestige among its own internal strata. The wealth discourse, and such accompanying characteristics as luxurious houses, fine clothes, refined tastes and preferences, and substantial knowledge of other cultures through interaction with them was also the means by which all members of the mercantile socio-discursive formation, regardless of stratum, differentiated themselves from members of the agrarian socio-discursive formation, and the device by which this socio-discursive formation reproduced itself culturally.

The agrarian socio-discursive formation, for its part,
constructed the discourse of land ownership at its guarantor of economic privilege, political power, and cultural prestige among the various agrarian strata. It was also this discourse, with its emphasis on agriculture as the creator of real wealth, that served as the means by which all members of the agrarian socio-discursive formation expressed their identity in relation to members of the mercantile socio-discursive formation, and differentiated themselves from members of the mercantile socio-discursive formation in the course of interacting with them. Historic Oman's interior, agrarian regions also developed their own crafts, music, food, proverbs and other folklore as expressions of the agrarian identity, in relation to the mercantile one. These constructions allowed historic Oman's agrarian socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself culturally.

The tribal and mercantile socio-discursive formations were also extensively interrelated, because long-distance merchants depended upon tribes within the deep desert regions for protection and guidance for caravans bringing goods from historic Oman's mercantile cities to other regional destinations. The deep desert tribes, for their part, earned surplus from long-distance merchants for rendering these services to them. The largely pastoral tribes that were located closer to the cities provided the caravans with additional camels as needed, and guidance into the deeper
desert, where the caravan would then come under the protection of a deep-desert, camel dependent tribe. These tribes, also earned surplus from the long-distance merchants for their services, and from the sale of additional livestock to the caravan as needed. With this surplus, both the deep desert and the pastoral tribes would purchase rice, spices, and various utensils from long distance merchants, usually via their local agents in interior trading centers. In addition, many instances occurred in which the mercantile and tribal socio-discursive formations actually overlapped. With the spread of Islam, for example, many dwellers of the badia from historic Oman and elsewhere in the Peninsula migrated to such newly established Islamic cities as Kufa and Basra, as well as to the Persian littoral of the Arabian Gulf, both to defend the Umma and to take advantage of new economic opportunities. With these migrations, dwellers of the badia transformed themselves into members of the mercantile socio-discursive formation. Conversely, during the waning years of Abbasid rule, when the Caliphs were relying more on Seljuq Turks than Arabs from the badia for internal security, many city dwellers re-migrated to the badia.

The surplus that these tribes earned in relation to services they provided to the long-distance merchants and their caravans also enabled the tribal socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself by reinforcing the economic
privilege and political power that certain strata within it enjoyed in relation to others. The tribal za'im, for example, was entitled to a greater share of this surplus than were other members of the tribe. This means of earning surplus also enabled tribes that were located along important trade routes to become wealthier, more powerful, and even more prestigious via the discourse of nisab, than others were. Interaction between the tribal and mercantile socio-discursive formations also enabled the mercantile socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself economically, because without tribal assistance, long-distance merchants would have found it impossible to use the trade routes traversing the deserts of the Peninsula that separated historic Oman from other parts of the Umma.

However, this interaction between the mercantile and tribal socio-discursive formations also enabled each to reproduce itself culturally by means of the construction of discourses through which each expressed its identity in relation to the other, and differentiated itself from the other. The tribally-constructed discourse was that of nisab, or worthy ancestry. Nisab, therefore, was the guarantor of political power and cultural presting within the tribal socio-discursive formation. Nisab was interconnected with economic privilege, as well, since tribes that earned sufficient surplus from the caravan transportation, protection and
guidance that they offered to long distance merchants were able to increase their livestock, expand their diras, and particularly significantly, develop a reputation that could, in itself, be constructed into a nisab.

The discourse of nisab, and its accompanying features such as the value placed on honor, courage, generosity, and respect for the stranger was the device by which all members of tribal socio-discursive formation differentiated themselves from members of the mercantile socio-discursive formation in the course of interacting with them. This was because dwellers of the badia viewed nisab and the accompanying values and customs as attributes that made them superior to members of the mercantile socio-discursive formation, however wealthy, sophisticated, and worldly they might be. It was, therefore, the discourse of nisab, and the superiority with which dwellers of the badia believed that nisab and its accompanying customs and values gave them, that enabled the tribal socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself culturally. The tribal socio-discursive formation also reproduced itself by means of the distinct crafts, music, sports, collected wisdom, and folklore that dwellers of the badia constructed. The mercantile socio-discursive formation, on the other hand, reproduced itself culturally in relation to the tribal one via its contrast of the wealth and sophistication its members enjoyed, with the subsistant lifestyle of the badia.
There was also interaction between the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations. Pastoral tribes frequently sold livestock such as sheep and goats to cultivators, and tribes that also engaged in subsistence farming provided additional, seasonal labor in agrarian regions. Pastoral tribes also purchased produce from cultivators, as well. The fact that there were some tribes that, during certain seasons, became subsistence cultivators is an instance in which the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations overlapped. Other examples of such overlapping occurred throughout the 600-1500 period in historic Oman, since, when opportunities arose, dwellers of the badia sometimes became cultivators. Conversely, in times of agricultural hardship, cultivators frequently moved into the badia. The trade that occurred between members of the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formation also played a role in the economic reproduction of both.

However, it was this interaction between the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations that enabled each to construct a discourse that would enable it to reproduce itself culturally, and to differentiate itself from the other. The discourse of land and the worthiness of agriculture enabled cultivators to differentiate themselves from dwellers of the badia, who, in the eyes of the former, were not productive. The discourse of nisab, on the other hand, enabled members of
the tribal socio-discursive formation to differentiate themselves from cultivators, who could claim no nisab, and therefore, in the eyes of badia dwellers, were neither obliged nor inclined to develop the virtues that accompanied nisab, such as courage, generosity, and respect for the stranger.

The important point to make here is that constructed differentiations in relation to each other notwithstanding, the mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations all coexisted, and indeed, frequently overlapped, in historic Oman, and each was vital to the economic and cultural reproduction of the other two. This makes any implication of antagonism between tribes and cultivators, or tribes and urban dwellers, inaccurate.

**Conclusion**

Both the rise of Islam, and subsequent continuities and discontinuities of the Umma’s various political, cultural and economic structures affected historic Oman as such, because historic Oman had become part of the Umma. To begin with, the Islamization of historic Oman brought about discontinuities of many of the political, cultural, and economic structures that had existed there under Sassanid rule. At the same time, the Islamization of historic Oman also brought about discontinuities of many political, cultural and economic structures within each of historic Oman’s socio-discursive formations (mercantile, agrarian, and tribal) that had existed
in pre-Islamic times.

Changes within the Islamic socio-discursive formation also brought about changes within historic Oman’s political, economic and cultural structures. Developments within the Islamic socio-discursive formation that affected historic Oman included the transition of the Caliphate from Rashidun (Rightly Guided), to Umayyad, to Abbasid administration. Other such developments included the rise of Buwayhid and Seljuq rule, as well as the decline of Baghdad and the rise of Cairo under the Fatimids, Ayyubids and Mamluks. These developments all engendered transformations within the mercantile, agrarian, and tribal socio-discursive formations of historic Oman.

With the rise of Islam, historic Oman became part of the Umma and developed a new identity, as part of the Umma, both in relation to its pre-Islamic identity, and in relation to other civilizations that it encountered, such as that of China and India. This identity manifested itself in the Islamic religion itself, as many merchants and travelers from historic Oman living in enclaves in various parts of South Asia became instrumental in the Islamization of these areas. Conversely, the Islamization of these areas enhanced the prestige of people from historic Oman who traveled to them, as did the general strength of the Umma itself. Historic Oman’s identity as part of the Umma also manifested itself in the
conduct of trade, for which the Islamic socio-discursive formation provided a framework, and in the importance of the Arabic language. Other manifestations of this identity could be found in the construction of historic Oman’s ships, the clothing the people from historic Oman wore, the commodities that were exported, etc. Furthermore, travelers to historic Oman from India, China, and other places could see the manifestations of historic Oman’s identity as part of the Umma in the physical structure and culture of the port cities themselves. Historic Oman’s identity as part of the Umma could be seen, for example, in the prominence of mosques in these cities, as well as in other examples of Islamic architecture and art, in the fact that people spoke the Arabic language, in the currency that was used, and in specific ways that ports were administered.

Along with stressing the identity that historic Oman developed within the Islamic socio-discursive formation, both in relation to the pre-Islamic period and to other civilizations with which it came into contact, this research has examined the historic Oman’s own dynamic. Specifically, this has entailed an examination of the mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations within historic Oman, their transformations in relation to changes within the Islamic socio-discursive formation, and the identities that each constructed in relation to the other two, in the course
of their coexistence and interaction. This research has demonstrated that within the mercantile socio-discursive formation, the importance of wealth was constructed as the discourse by means of which the people of the urban areas differentiated themselves from those of the agrarian areas and the badia. Socio-economic differentiations, primarily based on wealth, were also constructed within the mercantile socio-discursive formation. In the agrarian socio-discursive formation, the importance of land and productivity was the discourse under which cultivators differentiated themselves from people of the badia and the urban areas. Socio-economic differentiations within the agrarian socio-discursive formation were also based on the quantity and quality of land that a person owned. In the tribal socio-discursive formation, nisab was used as a discourse by which the people of the badia differentiated themselves from urban dwellers and cultivators. Nisab was also the central criterion around which socio-economic differentiations within the badia were constructed.

The mercantile, agrarian, and tribal socio-discursive formations within historic Oman that have been treated in this chapter and the previous chapter have been analyzed within the larger Islamic socio-discursive formation, particularly in relation to the transformations that they underwent in relation to those of the Islamic socio-discursive formation. These three socio-discursive formations have also been
analyzed in relation to their own mutual interconnections, and in relation to the identity that each constructed in relation to the other two, thereby reproducing itself in the course of its interaction with them. This sort of analysis is vital for understanding the continuities and discontinuities that historic Oman’s socio-discursive formations underwent during the Transformational Period of initial European penetration. This will be the focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE TRANSFORMATIONAL SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION: 
THE PORTUGUESE PENETRATION OF 1500-1750

Introduction

The 1500-1820 period was characterized by an ongoing 
process by which the Portuguese, Dutch, English, French and 
other Europeans competed with and succeeded each other in 
penetrating the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf, militarily 
and commercially. This period is called a period of 
transformation in this study because of the changes it brought 
about in the Indian Ocean system, and in historic Oman’s 
socio-discursive formation, in relation to the previous 
period. Another reason for calling this period a period of 
transformation is that it was this process of European 
penetration\(^1\) that paved the way for the establishment of 
British colonialism in historic Oman. A third reason is that 
transformations were occurring within the Umma itself during 
this period, as well as in Europe. All of these 
transformations were key contributors to the establishment of 
European hegemony over the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf between 

\(^1\) The term "European Penetration" only refers to those 
European powers that actually were involved in the military 
and commercial penetration of the Indian Ocean system, i.e. 
the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, and the English. It 
does not refer to all Europeans.
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1500 and 1820.

Concerning the Umma, a major division occurred within it during this period with the formation of the Shi’i Safavid polity as a counter-discourse to Sunni Ottoman rule. Also, transformations within the Umma’s socio-discursive formations, and particularly within the agrarian one, were leading to a reduction of agriculture’s previously substantial links with long-distance trade. During this time, the Umma’s mercantile stratum was, itself, declining in significance and wealth, both in relation to European military encroachment and in relation to transformations within the Umma’s socio-discursive formations. The division of the Umma along politico-denominational lines, and the growth of a self-contained, feudal, and tributary socio-discursive formations in place of mercantile socio-discursive formations within the Umma during Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal rule detracted from the Umma’s ability to defend its portion of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf, commercially or militarily, against European encroachments. This was significant because it was precisely the mercantile stratum that came under fire from European naval power.

These changes within the Indian Ocean transformed historic Oman’s mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations. Specifically, some of the mercantile strata that arose during the 1500-1820 period resisted
European encroachments. As for the agrarian socio-discursive formation, it declined during this period. Finally, new tribal groupings arose in historic Oman in relation to the other two developments.

There are several reasons for treating this period as a distinct entity. The main reason is that this period is a turning point in the history of both the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The effects of this transition were economic, political and cultural. Firstly, in relation to the previous period, the European penetration process militarized the trade system in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf. Secondly, European penetration imposed previously unknown practices of hegemony over the high seas on the Indian Ocean system, and thirdly, this penetration changed the direction of Indian Ocean trade. These transformations helped to engender the decline of the indigenous mercantile stratum that had previously conducted Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf trade, along with other ancillary strata to the mercantile one. Consequently, this trade system first fell under the direct domination of the Portuguese Crown, and then under government-chartered European companies, notably the Dutch and English East India Companies. In relation to these developments, the societies of most of the Indian Ocean polities, and specifically that of historic Oman, generally transformed, and significant dynastic changes occurred within historic Oman.
The second main reason for focusing upon the period of European penetration is that many aspects of this period continued into subsequent ones. Clarifying and analyzing the nature of the transformational period's characteristics facilitates analysis of which of this period's characteristics continued into subsequent periods, which discontinued once these periods began, and why and how they continued or discontinued.

The 1500-1820 years will be treated in two chapters. Chapter Five will cover the penetration of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf by the Portuguese between 1500 and 1750. Coverage will include the process and discourse by which the Portuguese established themselves as hegemons in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf, and their effect upon the peoples of historic Oman and the rest of the Arabian Gulf. This chapter will also cover the reactions of these peoples to Portuguese domination.

There are several reasons why the Portuguese penetration period is significant, and needs to be treated in detail. The first is that this penetration fundamentally altered the Indian Ocean system in relation to the way it had operated between 600 and 1500. The second reason is that the Portuguese penetration had concrete effects upon historic Oman, both in terms of effects on its socio-discursive formations, with the construction of new mercantile and tribal
groupings in historic Oman and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf in the wake of the decline of the Portuguese in the region, and in terms of the counter-discourses that the Portuguese penetration engendered there. Thirdly, the Portuguese penetration opened the door for penetration of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf by additional European powers, such as the Dutch, English, and French. These will be covered in Chapter Six. These later penetrations, in turn, ushered in the era of colonialism in historic Oman after 1820, which will be treated in subsequent chapters.

One of the central arguments that Chapters Five and Six will present is that the varied European penetrations of the Indian Ocean between 1500 and 1820 engendered serious transformations in the Indian Ocean system, and these transformations, in turn, affected historic Oman's socio-discursive formations, in relation to what they had been the previous period (600–1500). The second argument is that the European penetration process itself went through transformations during the 1500–1820 period, both in terms of its economic, political and cultural characteristics and in relation to changes within Europe's socio-discursive formation. These changes occurred as one European power rose and another declined during three centuries of competition for hegemony in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf. As these transformations took place, some of the tactics and methods of
European penetration of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf changed as well. The third argument will be that it was Europe’s interaction both with the Umma in general and with the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf civilizations that contributed substantially to the changes in Europe’s own socio-discursive formation, giving the European powers the ability to penetrate the Indian Ocean.

**Discourses and the Penetration Process**

The first Europeans to penetrate the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf were the Portuguese. The discourse that they constructed to justify their incursions into the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf market was their involvement in the war against, and subsequent expulsion of, the Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula. This war ended in 1492, with the expulsion of both Muslims and Jews from Spain. In fact, the Portuguese considered penetration of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf a continuation of this war against Islam, wherein it would be carried on in Muslim lands. Specifically, the Portuguese invoked the popular myth of Prester John, a Christian priest who ruled a vast empire in the East, the location of which nobody could specify, and who, once found, would make common cause with the Christians of the West against Islam. The

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Portuguese hoped to find him and his kingdom in Africa, so that he could assist them against the "Moors" (Muslims).³

The discourse under which the Portuguese were prosecuting their war against Muslims in Iberia, and expanding into the Indian ocean constructed Christians in general, and later, the Portuguese in particular, as Christian "self". This self was constructed as a result of interaction with, and reaction to Muslims, who had to be constructed as "others" (infidels), for the Christian "self" (believers) to exist. Out of this construction the Portuguese formed an identity in relation to these "others". Without interacting with these Muslim "others", the Portuguese could not have constructed this identity as Christian "self". The construction of this identity, therefore, enabled the Portuguese crown to mobilize the people for the expansion of an empire. Under this discourse, the Portuguese, in their plans to penetrate the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf, billed themselves as the liberators of lands and peoples from Muslims or "Moors" (infidels) in the name of Christianity (godliness).

The underlying Portuguese motive for the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf incursion, however, was the control of what they knew to be an extremely lucrative commercial system, particularly the spice trade, by wresting it from Muslim

merchants who controlled it. Awareness of the wealth of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf commercial system came from the fact that in 1487, Portugal sent Pedro da Covilham, who spoke Arabic, to investigate Indian Ocean trade. He covered this region thoroughly, traveling overland from Cairo to Cannamore, Calcutta and Goa in India. Then he traveled down the eastern coast of Africa. Da Covilham then made a second journey, this time from Cairo to the Arabian Gulf. Here, he visited Hormuz, and then headed westward, stopping at Aden and Jeddah. He sent back to Portugal an extensive report about Indian Ocean trade as a result of these journeys. It is possible that Pedro da Covilham had obtained some second or third-hand knowledge of the writings of Arab geographers, such as Ibn Saʿid, who had written about East Africa around the 1200s A.D.

Particularly significant, this Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf commercial system traded a commodity that was extremely precious to Europe at the time, namely, spices, and particularly pepper. These were vital for the preservation of meat during the long European winter. However, access to


this market had come from Asian overland trade routes that culminated at Levantine ports along the Eastern Mediterranean. The Eastern Mediterranean had been an ongoing zone of commercial competition and even battle between Genoa and Venice for this trade monopoly, and during the 1400's, a third contestant, namely the Ottoman Empire, entered this arena, expanding into Constantinople, which became the Ottoman capital in 1453, and into Genoese Aegean holdings -- Samos, Samothrace, Lesbos, and Thasos--shortly thereafter. This led to Genoa's decline as a mercantile power in the eastern Mediterranean. These expansions also brought the Ottoman mercantile stratum into direct competition with the Venetian one.\(^7\) The other spice trade route through the red sea was in the hands of the Venetians, via their trade with Mamluk Egypt.

Commercial realities in the eastern Mediterranean motivated Genoa to seek alternative access to the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf spice trade, and, therefore, to invest capital in the efforts of the Portuguese toward such access. In fact, as an outgrowth of their rivalry with Venice, Genoese merchants forged connections with Portugal as early as 1317,

when they developed Lisbon as a trade center.\textsuperscript{8} It was also during that year that the Portuguese King Diniz enlisted the Genoese in the service of building up Portuguese naval power; incursions into West Africa began during the fifteenth century, and into the Indian Ocean, at the end of that century.\textsuperscript{9} In large measure, Genoese assistance to Portugal in terms of nautical skills proved effective because of the techniques that the former had borrowed from Arab and Chinese ship-builders before them.\textsuperscript{10}

A particularly important development of the mid to late 1400s, which was to ensure Portuguese military might in the Indian Ocean once they got there after 1500 was the spread of heavy, gunpowder-based artillery throughout Europe. Gunpowder, probably a Chinese invention, is initially recorded to have been used in China for defensive purposes as an incendiary, borne by projected arrows to the attacker, which it set alight.\textsuperscript{11} The Mongols under Genghis Khan improved upon


\textsuperscript{10} Smith, \textit{Creating a World Economy}, p. 56.

gunpowder techniques by using lengths of bamboo filled with gunpowder for blowing city gates open. At the end of the 1200s, the Chinese devised a way to house the gunpowder in an unbreakable vessel, from which the exploding gasses would hurl the missile at the chosen target. After gunpowder reached Europe, possibly through Islamic Spain around the mid-1300s, munitions makers developed offensive techniques during the 1400s for hitching the force of gunpowder’s explosion to the launching of heavier projectiles, such as stone cannonballs, for the purpose of battering down defenses during a siege in order to storm a city or fortress.12

Toward the end of the 1400s, European navies began to carry firearms aboard ships. The importance of this development is that Portugal, too, adopted this practice when it began to penetrate the Indian Ocean in the early 1500s.13 This facilitated Portuguese hegemony in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf, not only because the Portuguese were using a recently invented, highly effective weapon, but also because the Indian Ocean had hitherto been a peaceful waterway, none of whose peoples had ever aspired to military domination. It

12 Ibid., and Usama 'Anuti "Hal Ikhtar'a al-'Arab al-Barud? (Did the Arabs Invent Gunpowder?), Al-Abhath 20 (September, 1967): 298-299.

13 Smith, Creating a World Economy, p. 56.
was, therefore, an armaments-free waterway as well.\textsuperscript{14}

The first stage of Portuguese expansion into the Indian Ocean entailed circumnavigating the continent of Africa. The Portuguese already gained familiarity with the terrain of Africa's western littoral south of the Sahara because they had conducted a series of campaigns both as extensions of the anti-Muslim war in Iberia, and for the purpose of procuring African commodities and slaves. Each campaign reached farther south along the coast. The Portuguese captured Ceuta on the Moroccan coast in 1415, and with further assistance from Genoese mercenary bands and entrepreneurs, were able to make their additional African colonies, namely Madeira Island and the Azores, commercially viable.\textsuperscript{15} The Portuguese reached the Gold Coast by 1471, and the mouth of the Kongo River by 1482.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, Bartolemeo Dias completed a voyage around Africa's southern tip in 1487-1488, at the behest of the Portuguese King Joao II.\textsuperscript{17} By the time that Portuguese military incursions in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf really began in the early 1500s, Africa's western littoral was a


\textsuperscript{15} Charles Tilly, \textit{Coercion, Capital and European States} (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 91

\textsuperscript{16} Smith, \textit{Creating a World Economy}, p. 77.

\textsuperscript{17} Toussaint, in Guicharnaud, \textit{History of the Indian Ocean}, pp. 95-96.
source of two major commodities for Portugal—slaves, and gold. In fact, in 1506, gold from western Africa accounted for twenty-five per cent of the Portuguese crown’s revenue.\textsuperscript{18}

In 1498, Vasco da Gama’s squadron of ships circumnavigated the African southern tip, and entered the Indian Ocean. After several unsuccessful attempts, Vasco da Gama’s crew landed north of the city of Malindi, north of Mombasa on the eastern coast of Africa. Vasco da Gama was aware that he had reached east Africa, and knew the names of the ports in India to try to reach, because of the information that the Portuguese Crown had gotten from the travels of the above-mentioned Da Covilham in 1487. However, he did not know precisely how to reach India. After much inquiry as to navigational directions, the Portuguese crew encountered the previously-mentioned navigator from the mercantile city of Julfar in historic Oman, Ahmad bin Majid, whose help they enlisted in piloting them to Calcutta.\textsuperscript{19}

Vasco Da Gama returned to Portugal 1499, and Portuguese policy became evident quickly, as a second Portuguese Indian Ocean incursion in 1500 bore instructions to sink Muslim

\textsuperscript{18} Smith, \textit{Creating a World Economy}, p. 78.

vessels on sight. Da Gama, for his part, was back in the Indian Ocean in 1502, this time with a fleet of twenty-five ships. One of his first activities during this incursion was to overtake an unarmed vessel leaving the port of Calcutta for Mecca with two-hundred to four hundred people performing the Hajj aboard. After locking most of the passengers in the hold of the ship, he set the ship alight on the high seas.

This particular atrocity was to be followed by many others. It, along with the instructions given to the second Portuguese Indian Ocean mission, should be seen as part of Portugal’s overall strategy for penetrating the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf. Portugal’s primary aim, of course, was to monopolize Indian Ocean commerce. This meant destroying the Muslim mercantile stratum that was such an important part of this commerce, and obtaining control of the trade routes by occupying strategic ports. Toward this end, the


Portuguese built their first fort in Cochin, in India. On the East African coast, they built forts at Sofala and Mozambique in 1503 and 1507, respectively.

Pope Alexander II had sanctioned this strategy as early as 1493, when he issued a decree making Portugal the lord of the Atlantic south of Morocco, and of the Indian Ocean. He gave Spain sovereignty over the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico. This papal decree is significant because it added strength to the discourse under which the Portuguese were gaining hegemony in the Indian Ocean. The Pope's voice was what conferred legitimacy upon the Portuguese expansion in the name of Christianity "self", or (believers) while the peoples of the Indian Ocean, the targets of Portuguese firepower, were silent under this discourse, having been constructed as the "others" (infidels).

From 1505 to 1509, Dom Francisco de Almeida had served as the first Governor and Viceroy of Portugal's Indian Ocean possessions. Under his governorship, Portuguese expansion continued. Two major port cities in East Africa, Kliwa and Mombasa, both of which had sizeable populations from historic Oman in their mercantile enclaves, were captured and plundered.

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under Almeida's orders. The port of Kliwa was captured and plundered in 1505, despite the fact that it had offered the Portuguese no resistance. Next came Mombasa, during that same year. This city did resist, and Almeida ensured its capture via a massacre of its inhabitants. 27

Almeida was to be succeeded by Alfonso de Alboquerque in 1509, 28 and the latter began his seizure of several of historic Oman's mercantile cities for the Portuguese crown even before attaining this position. He seized Socotra Island in 1507, in preparation for an assault upon Aden, the gateway to the Red Sea, and then the overland trade routes to the Mediterranean. He also intended to capture Hormuz, the gateway to the Arabian Gulf and the most important commercial center there, in order to wrest both of these important trade routes from Muslim hands. After taking Socotra, Alboquerque then captured historic Oman's ports of Qalhat, Khor Fakkan, Quryat, Musqat and Suhar in preparation for an attack upon Hormuz, the gateway to the Arabian Gulf. Aside from sinking every Muslim ship that he encountered on the way to the Arabian Gulf, he bombarded from his ships, captured and sacked Quryat and Musqat. Khor Fakkan he bombarded, captured, and burned, slaughtering many of the inhabitants, enslaving


28 Serjeant, The Portuguese of the South Arabian Coast, p. 15.
others, and sending away those too old to be enslaved, with
their ears and noses amputated.\textsuperscript{29} Hormuz then was captured
in 1507, but only after putting up fierce resistance. The
ruler of Hormuz subsequently agreed to pay tribute to the
Portuguese crown and also to extend payments toward the upkeep
of Albuquerque’s fleet. The Portuguese also forbade any
Hormuzi vessel to trade in the Arabian Gulf without a pass.\textsuperscript{30}

Albuquerque’s appointment to the position of governor
and Viceroy of Portugal’s Indian Ocean possessions in 1509
enabled him to take steps toward the realization of his
overall ambition, which was the establishment of a vast
Portuguese eastern empire. His plan for achieving this goal
entailed the seizure of more strategic ports in the Indian
Ocean/Arabian Gulf, specifically Malacca, the gateway to the
Far East, Hormuz, which led to the Arabian Gulf, and Aden, at
the entrance to the Red Sea. Toward this end, he consolidated
his control of Hormuz in 1515 by returning there to subdue
that city’s ongoing resistance.\textsuperscript{31} Prior to that year, he had
also captured Goa, a principal Indian commercial port on the
Arabian Sea which became the headquarters of Portugal’s \textit{Estado

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} Donald Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States} (New York: Twayne Publishers Inc., 1971), p. 71.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Wilson, \textit{The Persian Gulf}, p. 116. This practice was a
trademark of Portuguese commercial administration. It, and
Portugal’s other administrative practices will be treated in
greater detail later.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid, pp. 120-121.
\end{itemize}
da India, and Malacca, the gateway to China and to the Indonesian archipelago.\textsuperscript{32} However, Aden, the other key port remained out of his reach. Thus, the port itself, along with the Bab al-Mandeb gateway to the Red Sea, remained in Muslim hands for the entire Portuguese period.\textsuperscript{33}

The above-described brutality which the Portuguese used in these conquests is important to mention, because it, too, was part of the Portuguese discourse in the Indian Ocean. This discourse of "believer" versus "infidel" legitimized the Portuguese massacres of the indigenous peoples that they encountered because this discourse had constructed these peoples as the "others" (infidels). However, underlying this discourse were economic motivations. To achieve their economic objectives, the Portuguese had to end Muslim domination of Indian Ocean commerce, and this dictated a policy of armed force. The idea of entry into the Indian Ocean commercial system by means of peaceful coexistence with all of the other participants was alien to the Portuguese for the simple reason that they had no commodities of their own to offer for exchange there.

The economic motives that underlay the Portuguese discourse are implied by fact that Portuguese encroachments

\textsuperscript{32} Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{33} Pearson, in Das Gupta and Pearson, India and the Indian Ocean 1500-1800, p. 85.
were already having their affects upon Indian Ocean commerce. Mamluk Egypt, for instance, suffered a substantial cut in customs revenues because of Portuguese attacks upon ships carrying spices from India to Red Sea entrepots.\textsuperscript{34} Portuguese activities were also affecting Gujarat and Calcutta, in India, as well as Yemen. For that reason, Kansuh al-Ghawri, the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, and Mahmud Begarha, the Sultan of Gujarat agreed to form a naval force to challenge the Portuguese. This fleet sailed to Chaul, south of Bombay, in 1508, where it defeated the Portuguese, but suffered a reverse at Diu, also in India, in 1509.\textsuperscript{35}

The relative ease with which the Portuguese were able to penetrate the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf commercial system was primarily due to the fact that the polities and societies that were part of the Indian Ocean trading system lacked naval power. As mentioned before, there had been little previous need for such power as all of the polities within this system recognized the each other’s freedom of navigation, and the privilege of ownership for none, concerning the India Ocean itself. Even the Mamluk naval challenge to the Portuguese was largely carried out with ships that Venetian engineers in Suez

\textsuperscript{34} Pearson, \textit{Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat}, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{35} Serjeant, \textit{The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast}, p.15.
had built.\textsuperscript{36}

However, another factor—the rift that had taken place within the \textit{Umma}—was just as significant in ensuring that the Portuguese would remain militarily stronger than any indigenous challenger throughout the 1500s. Specifically, the \textit{Umma} contained two rival polities after 1500, and this rivalry was denominationally-constructed in relation to each other. These two polities were the Ottoman empire, and the Safavid dynasty, established in Persia in 1501. Under the Safavid dynasty, Persia became a Shi'i society. Shi'i Islam was used as an ideological, religious discourse for unifying Persia in relation to expanding Ottoman power. In contrast, the discourse under which the Ottoman empire spread was the representation of itself as the force capable of unifying the \textit{Umma} in specific relation to Portuguese penetration.

Ottoman rule spread to Syria and Egypt in 1514 and 1517 respectively, and to Iraq north of Basra in 1534-1535. Aden and Basra also became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1538 and 1546 respectively. In 1517, Sultan Selim I declared the Ottoman Empire the Caliphate of the \textit{Umma}, and it was recognized as such by the people of historic Oman.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} Toussaint, \textit{History of the Indian Ocean}, p. 104.

The rivalry between the Ottomans and Safavid Persia was something that the Portuguese were able to use in order to maintain their hegemony in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf. In fact, Safavid Persia and Portugal had tried to formulate a policy of mutual cooperation against the Ottomans from around 1508, shortly after the Portuguese first captured Hormuz, until the years following Portugal's unity with Spain in 1580. In relation to this issue of cooperation against the Ottomans, Portugal and Safavid Persia had also signed several agreements concerning commercial relations, and military cooperation.\textsuperscript{38}

Because the Safavids were a military adversary to the Ottomans, the Safawi presence in the Arabian Gulf was probably an important reason why the Ottomans could not expell the Portuguese permanently from either the Arabian Gulf or the larger Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{39} However, the Ottomans did manage to challenge the Portuguese, to win some short-lived victories over them, and to prevent them from entering the Red Sea. One such challenge was the Ottoman siege of Diu in 1538, executed


with some Gujarati help. Ottoman expansions into Basra and Aden, mentioned above, enabled the Ottomans to challenge the Portuguese at later dates. Their expansion into Basra, for example, facilitated their successful expulsion of the Portuguese from Musqat and Qishm in 1551-1552. On the earlier occasion, the Ottomans also managed to lay siege to Hormuz, but they were not able to dislodge the Portuguese from that city. In 1581, the Ottomans once again drove the Portuguese from Musqat, but the Portuguese recaptured it in 1586. Similarly, aside from barring the Portuguese from access to the Red Sea, the Ottoman expansion into Aden enabled them to drive the Portuguese from their holdings in East Africa, with the exception of the port of Malindi, in 1585. However, the Portuguese recaptured Mombasa in 1586.

From the discussion so far, it can be seen that the Portuguese entered Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf commerce under a qualitatively different set of assumptions about Indian Ocean commerce from those held by the societies indigenous to this system. Basically, it is clear that the Portuguese intention was to seize complete control of the Indian Ocean system, and to maintain that control through naval power. Indeed, the

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Portuguese actually claimed the Indian Ocean itself as a possession. Both of these concepts had been alien to the Indian Ocean's existing mercantile societies between 600 and 1500 A.D. Just as the Portuguese premises about Indian Ocean commerce were alien to those of all other participants in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf system, so were Portuguese methods for earning revenue and maintaining hegemony there.

The Portuguese Administrative System

Much of the character of Portuguese commercial administration in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf was constructed in relation to the fact that the Portuguese Crown placed as much emphasis upon obtaining needed revenues from the administration itself as it did upon amassing earnings from Indian Ocean Commerce. The construction of the administration as a revenue-gathering apparatus was, in turn, related to the fact that Portugal had very few commodities of its own to sell in the Indian Ocean.

Once the Portuguese had established the premise that they, alone, were "lords of the Indian Ocean", they

42 The legal fiction by which the Portuguese dubbed themselves "lords of the Indian Ocean is an interesting one. Although by common law the seas were open to all, and this had certainly been true of the Indian Ocean between 600 and 1500 A.D., the Portuguese reasoning was that because this principle was derived from Roman law, it only applied to Christians, and not to Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and other non-Christians. (The Portuguese considered these last three to be "outside the law of Jesus Christ", and therefore outside of Roman law.) The other Portuguese justification for their claims to
constructed a series of regulations by which to maintain this power. These regulations applied to the ships of all other Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf merchants trading there. The regulations included the cartaza requirement, the accompanying obligation to pay customs duties, and the obligation to accept cañila protection. Cartazes were nominally guarantees of protection that the Portuguese obliged all local Indian Ocean merchants to purchase. In actuality, these cartazas were documents of permission, allowing local merchants to trade only along specifically stipulated routes, and in addition, obliging them to call and unload their cargo at Portuguese-controlled ports, where they would then be liable to customs duties.43

Other terms of the Cartaza also included restrictions on the personnel, armaments, and cargo allowed on a ship.44 Among the commodities forbidden as cargo were pepper and other spices, iron, copper and wood. Wood was forbidden because it could be used by challengers of Portuguese hegemony to build

"sovereignty over the Indian Ocean" was based on the fact that no one had previously claimed that ocean as hereditary or conquered property, and therefore, the Portuguese had not usurped anyone's previous title. Pearson, in Das Gupta and Pearson, India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800, p. 83.

43 Curtin, Cross Cultural Trade in World History, pp. 139-141.

44 Pearson, in Das Gupta and Pearson, India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800, p. 84.
ships. Spices were forbidden because they were a declared monopoly of the Portuguese Crown. (This was because the demand for pepper in Europe was so great, and therefore ensured the Portuguese Crown substantial profits.) Portuguese fleets patrolled the Indian Ocean to enforce the Cartaz restrictions, and any ship found to be without a cartaz, or violating the terms of one, could be confiscated or sunk. In fact, the confiscation of vessels that had not purchased cartazas served as additional windfalls to the Portuguese.

The Portuguese responded to the frequent resistance to the cartaza system by organizing cartaza-carrying merchants into convoys, or cafilas, that sailed under the "protection" of Portuguese fleets. This "protection" was granted in exchange for an additional tax. By the 1560s, it had become a standard practice for Indian Ocean merchant ships to travel in cafilas, but in 1596, this practice was made compulsory by a decree of the Viceroy. The Viceroy probably issued this

45 Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, p. 41.
47 Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, p.32.
49 Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, p. 46.
decree in relation to the fact that Portugal found itself increasingly in need of funds because of its involvement in the Spanish war against the Dutch after 1580, when Portugal came under the control of Phillip II of Spain.\textsuperscript{50}

Another important attribute of this cafila system was that it added to the trade constraints that the Portuguese had already imposed upon Indian Ocean merchants. This was because cafilas only traveled along specific routes. Most cafilas came to Goa, the capital of the Estado da India, from the various other Indian Ocean ports. The only other regular one sailed the Cambay-Diu route. A third one occasionally went to Hormuz. Moreover, if a Portuguese fleet customarily accompanying a given cafila were needed elsewhere in the Indian Ocean to put down an uprising, that cafila could not sale. The Portuguese devised the cafila system to serve two purposes. Firstly, it served as a means of extracting additional revenues from Indian Ocean merchants for the "protection" at sea itself, as well as from the custom duties at the compulsory ports of call to which the merchants sailed in these cafilas.

Secondly, it provided the Estado da India with the means by which to prevent forcibly indigenous merchant ships from attempting commerce outside of the Portuguese system.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50} Smith, \textit{Creating a World Economy}, pp. 88-89.

\textsuperscript{51} Pearson, \textit{ Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat}, pp. 46-47.
At the strategic \textit{Estado} ports to which the Portuguese compelled local Indian Ocean merchants to sail, such as Hormuz, Diu, Goa, Cochin, Colombo, Musqat, and Malacca, the revenues from customs duties were often significant for the Portuguese crown,\footnote{Winius, in Hower and Preto-Rodas, \textit{Empire in Transition}, p. 108.} constituting a large percentage of its revenues.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Revenue Collection Points in the \textit{Estado}, 1581-1687 (in Xerafins)}
\begin{tabular}{lrrrrrr}
\hline
Centers & 1581 & 1588 & 1607 & 1609 & 1620 & 1684-87 \\
\hline
Goa & 26.3 & 28.5 & 34.2 & 34.3 & 32.0 & 44.6 \\
Hormuz & 21.3 & 18.2 & 16.6 & 17.9 & 17.1 & N.A.\* \\
Bassein & 17.9 & 14.1 & 10.4 & 9.8 & 10.5 & 21.6 \\
Diu & 15.0 & 17.5 & 18.1 & 19.1 & 17.4 & 7.8 \\
Melaka & 7.0 & 8.3 & 7.4 & 7.0 & 5.1 & N.A.\* \\
Damen & 6.5 & 6.5 & 5.0 & 4.3 & 3.4 & 12.9 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\footnotesize{\textbf{\* Figures are unavailable for Hormuz and Melaka for 1684-87 because neither city was under Portuguese domination by that time.}}
\end{table}


In Goa, for example, customs duties accounted for 63 per cent of the revenues Portugal obtained from that port in
1545. For 1586-1587, over 65 per cent of Portugal's revenues from Damen, Bassein and Goa combined come from customs duties, despite the fact that large sums also come from land taxes.\textsuperscript{53}

Table 5.1 shows the significance of the \textit{Estado da India}'s various revenue collection point ports in terms of actual earnings. In particular, Table 5.1 shows the importance of the Arabian Gulf within the Portuguese commercial system, since in terms of the amount of revenue collected, Hormuz consistently ranks second only to Goa, the capital of the Portuguese \textit{Estado da India}.

The Cape route and the \textit{Estado da India}, separately and certainly when combined, provided significant percentages of the Portuguese Crown revenues, in comparison to the Atlantic empire, which included the Americas and West Africa. This is illustrated in Table 5.2.

\textbf{TABLE 5.2.}

\begin{tabular}{lrrr}
\textbf{Sources of Portuguese State Revenues (Per Cent)} & 1588 & 1607 & 1619 \\
Cape route & 17.3 & 16.3 & 15.0 \\
Estado da India & 26.0 & 24.7 & 26.5 \\
Atlantic empire & 13.0 & 11.4 & 11.2 \\
Other & 43.7 & 47.6 & 47.3 \\
\end{tabular}


\textsuperscript{53} Pearson, \textit{Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat}, p. 32.
An important point to emphasize here is that initially, revenues from the *cartaza* system, the *cafilas*, and customs duties went by law to the Portuguese Crown, rather than to any private mercantile entity. In order to maintain the flow of these revenues, the Portuguese Crown constructed an administrative system that it applied to the entire Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf, which, after all, a Papal decree had rendered a Portuguese "possession."

The chief policymaker in the Portuguese *Estado da India* was, of course, the King and his officials in Lisbon. However, the wide time gap in communication by ship between Lisbon and Goa allowed the Viceroy, or Governor in Cochin, and in Goa after 1515, some independence in its practical application. Assisting the governor was a loosely-organized council, and later in the 1500s, a more formal council of state. The members of these councils were always *fidalgos*, or nobles. The more formal council of state of the later 1500s also contained the Archbishop of Goa, and another official called the *Vedor da Fazenda*, who was the head of a smaller council, formalized in the 1600s, which specialized in financial matters. The Viceroy exerted direct control over financial, external, and military affairs. The Portuguese crown's trade in the Indian Ocean ports was directly supervised by an official called the "factor". This administrative system generated a large stratum of clerks as
well.

There was also a stratum of Portuguese settlers that had originally come to the Indian Ocean as soldiers, but had stayed on to become artisans or traders after their term of service was over.\textsuperscript{54} An active military stratum continued to be part of the population of settled Portuguese in Indian Ocean ports, because they were fortified entrepots that always needed a garrison force.\textsuperscript{55} This brief discussion of stratification within the settled, Portuguese community in the ports of the \textit{Estado} is significant because it shows that while the main discourse in operation within the \textit{Estado}'s socio-discursive formation was that which conferred power upon the Portuguese in aggregate in relation to the native peoples of the Indian ocean, the \textit{Estado}'s socio-discursive formation had also constructed a second discourse, under which one stratum of Portuguese settled society benefitted more than others. The main beneficiaries under this discourse were obviously the Portuguese King, the Viceroy, and the \textit{fidalgos}. More marginal among the beneficiaries were the clerks, the garrison soldiers, and the smaller artisans and traders that they decided to become if they stayed beyond the terms of their service.

\textsuperscript{54} Pearson, \textit{Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat}, pp. 33-35.

\textsuperscript{55} Pearson, in Das Gupta and Pearson, \textit{India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800}, p.85.
Consequences of Portuguese Penetration and Hegemony

Although the above-discussed Portuguese administration was important in terms of the customs and "protection" payment revenues it earned for the Portuguese Crown, the Portuguese also transformed the nature of Indian Ocean system, itself, in the course of their penetration. Firstly and most obviously, Portugal drastically shifted the direction of Indian Ocean commerce. This meant that after 1500, Portugal was taking the bulk of the goods that the Indian Ocean commercial system was exporting to Europe directly to Lisbon, via the southern tip of Africa, for distribution in the rest of Europe.

Statistics show how this transformation affected the traditional trade route up the Red Sea, and thence overland to Mediterranean ports, by which Mamluk Egypt had traded with Venice. For example, during the last years of the 1400s, Venice had been able to obtain a yearly average of 3.5 million English pounds of spices from Alexandria, whereas between 1502 and 1505, this average dropped to one million pounds.56

Other statistics show that between 1496 and 1498, Venice had obtained an annual average of 480-630 tons of pepper from Alexandria, and 90-240 tons from Beirut. However, between 1501 and 1506, this average had fallen as low as 135 tonnes for Alexandria, and ten tons for Beirut. Regarding

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other spices, Venice obtained a yearly average of 580-730 tons of these between 1496 and 1498 from Alexandria. However, between 1501-1506, Venice's liftings from that city sank to a yearly average of 200 tonnes. For Beirut, Venetian merchants took a yearly average of 150-180 tons of spices other than pepper between 1496 and 1498. This quantity had slumped to a mere 35 tons between 1501-1506.\textsuperscript{57}

By contrast, Portuguese spice imports rose from 224,000 pounds in 1501 to a yearly average of 2,300,000 during the 1503-1506 period.\textsuperscript{58} However, as a result of the failure of the Portuguese to penetrate the Red Sea, Venice had recovered a sizeable amount of its Red Sea trade by 1560.\textsuperscript{59}

During the first half of the 1500s, pepper was the overwhelmingly significant commodity that the Portuguese Crown officially brought directly to Lisbon for export to Europe. Between 1513 and 1519, pepper accounted for 80 per cent of the total weight of Portugal's liftings from Asia. Between 1547 and 1548, this percentage had risen to 89. However, for the 1600-1603 period, pepper accounted for 65 per cent of the


\textsuperscript{58} Stavrianos, The World Since 1500, p. 372.

total weight of Portugal's exports from Asia (still a significant percentage, despite the decline). Other spices accounted for nine per cent of the total weight in the 1513-1519 period, and for five per cent during the 1600-1603 period. Ginger, counted as a separate item from the latter, amounted to 7.3 per cent of the total weight of commodities that Portugal exported from Asia between 1513 and 1519, but only 2.5 per cent during the 1600-1603 period. Textiles and indigo did not constitute sizeable Portuguese exports from Asia until after 1587. During the 1587-1588 period, textiles amounted to over ten per cent of the total weight of Portuguese lifttings from Asia. During the 1600-1603 period, this percentage had risen to 12.2. Indigo accounted for 8.4 per cent of the total in 1587-1588, but this percentage dropped to 4.4 for the 1600-1603 years.  

In analyzing the composition of Portuguese exports from the Indian Ocean, however, it is necessary to consider that there developed a private trade sector, alongside the Crown's commercial monopoly, among the Portuguese settlers. This was particularly true during the second half of the 1500s. Pepper was the commodity exported to Europe in the greatest volumes on government ships, as it was a Crown monopoly, but among the private exporters, who became significant enough to provide 27

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60 Subrahmanyan, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700*, p. 166.
per cent of Lisbon’s customs revenues in 1593, Gujarati clothing was the predominant export.\textsuperscript{61}

In addition, bills of lading that have been preserved for Portuguese ships that sailed from the Indian Ocean to Europe between 1587 and 1610 show that while pepper was the commodity that they carried in the greatest volumes, their cargos also contained indigo, lac (a shellacking resin), drugs (camphor, borax, benzoin etc. and textiles and silks, along with other spices. There were also quantities of porcelain, furniture, musk, and precious gems and pearls.\textsuperscript{62}

In addition to shifting the direction of Indian Ocean trade, and to some extent, its composition, the Portuguese also took over the role of intermediary for trade between ports within the Indian Ocean system. Prior to the Portuguese incursion, members of the mercantile stratum from historic Oman, among others indigenous to the Indian Ocean system, had played this role.

Inter-Asian trade actually began to gain significance for the Portuguese early in the 1500s. This was true both for concessionaires to whom the Portuguese Crown extended licenses to take over its monopoly trade routes, and to private

\textsuperscript{61} Pearson, \textit{Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat}, p. 36.

Portuguese traders who developed their own commerce without governmental connections. By the mid-1500s, it had become increasingly common for the Crown to extend contracts to private traders for voyages along monopoly trade routes, and to collect a percentage of the profits realized from such contracts.\(^{63}\)

The increase in private Portuguese trade in the Indian Ocean, therefore, occurred both as individual traders placed their goods on the Portuguese Crown’s ships, and in the form of their placement of commodities on Asian-owned ships, which mainly carried Asian goods to other Asian cities.\(^{64}\) Portuguese involvement in trade between China and Japan is a specific example of how Portuguese merchants came to realize the lucratively of trade within the Indian Ocean system. By 1560, they were able to use capital from the Crown to take over the intermediary role in Sino-Japanese trade from both Japanese and Chinese traders.

By 1580, Portuguese intermediaries were bringing silk, gold, velvet, pottery, lead, and musk from China to Japan, and silver, wheat, lacquered goods and shipping material from


\(^{64}\) Curtin, \textit{Cross-Cultural Trade in World History}, p. 143.
Japan to China. The ports of Macao and Malacca became particularly important as entrepots for commerce between the two societies, so that, during the 1580s, King Phillip II appropriated the sum of 100,000 cruzados toward the costs of maintaining Sino-Japanese trade. This sum came to three times the sum allotted toward the costs of trade between the ports of Malacca, Sao Tome, Goa, and Mozambique.

It was in relation to the profitability of trade between China and Japan that the Goa Viceroyalty began to focus on building the Far Eastern network of commercial voyages between the ports of Maceo, Nagasaki, and the Phillipines. This emphasis, in turn, tended to reduce Portugal’s power to blockade the Bab al-Mandeb entrance to the Red Sea effectively, as did the Viceroyalty’s failure both to curb the maritime power of the North Sumatran Sultanate at Acheh. For all of these reasons, the pepper trade through the Red Sea-Mediterranean trade route underwent a revival between 1560 and 1600. A possible indicator of this revival was reflected in the fall in the European price of pepper in 1579, which was traceable to the considerable supplies coming to

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66 Ibid.

67 Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, p.66.
Venice from Alexandria (20,000 Quintals).  

Another reason for the revival of Red Sea trade was a change in Portuguese policy after 1515, the year of the death of Alfonso de Alboquerque, the then Viceroy of the Estado da India. Under Alboquerque’s administration, the governors in the Indian Ocean ports that the Portuguese had captured, fortified, and supplied with garrisons served a primarily military function. This mainly meant the forcible prevention of the development of any mercantile competitors to Portuguese commercial hegemony, and the putting down of the numerous revolts that took place throughout the Portuguese occupation of the Indian Ocean. In relation to this, and to his belief that Portuguese personnel in the Indian Ocean were there solely to serve the Crown, Alboquerque was totally opposed to the idea of private commerce in the Indian Ocean on the part of Portuguese subjects.

In contrast to Alboquerque, Lopo Soarez, his successor, adopted a policy that allowed Portuguese officials, in the various fortified ports, including military personnel, to

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70 Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, p. 51.
become merchants, and to become more fully integrated into the Indian Ocean commercial system. This was because his emphasis was on the encouragement of peaceful trade, provided that Portuguese hegemony remained unchallenged.\textsuperscript{71}

In this changed atmosphere, the governors in the fortified ports actually began to licence commercial voyages into the Red Sea, hitherto out of bounds as an unconquered, "hostile Muslim area". Indian Ocean governors licensed trade between Red Sea ports and Diu after 1537, Hormuz after 1539, and even Goa after 1556. The governors began to sell permits for these voyages to private individuals, and the general rationale was that the customs duties that these voyages would bring in, would justify policies permitting and encouraging them. In fact, as early as 1514, there are records of ships calling at the port of Diu, laden with copper from the Red Sea, despite the fact that the Portuguese authorities had ruled such trade illegal.\textsuperscript{72} However, tax burdens merchants from the Gulf and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean trade system remained harsh,\textsuperscript{73} and the Cartaza and Cafila requirements remained intact, and even tightened, during the course of the 1500s, and especially after 1580.

\textsuperscript{71} Qassim, Al-Khalij al-'Arabi: Dirasah li Tarikh al-Imarat al-Arabiyyah fi 'Asr al-Tawas'a al-Urubi-al Awwal, pp. 73-74.

\textsuperscript{72} Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat, pp.51-52.

\textsuperscript{73} Qassim, Al-Khalij al-'Arabi, p. 74.
Historic Oman's Mercantilism Under the Portuguese and the Decline of Portuguese Power

The Portuguese penetration had a specific affect upon historic Oman. This was particularly true after the Portuguese consolidated their forces in the port of Musqat and in the rest of historic Oman following their ouster from Hormuz in 1622 (See below). The fact that they were choking off historic Oman's maritime commerce can be seen in the number of ports in historic Oman's coastal area that they continued to control since 1507, and despite the loss of their base at Hormuz. These ports included Julfar and Khasab, and also the coastal towns between Ras al-Hadd and the Musandum Peninsula. The ports in this latter area included Sur, Quryat, Musqat, Muttrah, Sib, Suhar, Khor-Fakkan, Dibba, and Liwa.\textsuperscript{74} One Arabic work, entitled Diary of the Wazeer of San'a in the Yemen, shows that in 1645, the Portuguese were continuing to plundered the ships of indigenous merchants. As a specific example, the Diary describes a Portuguese attack on Yemeni merchants bound for Al-Hasa, Al-Bahrain and Basra, launched from the stronghold at Musqat, and that in general, local merchants were afraid to pass that way.

The diary also comments that the Ocean had generally

become closed to local seafarers.\textsuperscript{75} This situation demonstrated that Portuguese policy pertaining to navigation in the Indian Ocean in general was applied in the Arabian Gulf. This meant that Muslim and Indian ships passing through the Gulf of Oman or the Straights of Hormuz had to carry the Portuguese Cartaza, and also had to call first at Hormuz, and then at Musqat, the Portuguese stronghold in the Gulf after the loss of Hormuz. At either of these bases, Indian and Muslim ships were charged a customs duty of ten per cent of the value of their cargoes at minimum.\textsuperscript{76}

The affects of this policy were such that by the time of the rise of the Y\'arabi movement in 1622, Arab long distance trade conducted from both the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf had declined seriously. In this context, trade conducted from historic Oman itself largely became local, because commerce previously conducted by merchants from historic Oman in the East African, Indian, and East Asian enclaves was being blocked by Portuguese control of the trade routes in the Indian Ocean as such.\textsuperscript{77} Also, because the Portuguese had

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} This document is cited in Miles, \textit{The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf}, p. 198. However, the author of this source does not provide a bibliography for a more complete citation of the \textit{Diary}, itself.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Bathurst, in Hopwood, \textit{The Arabian Peninsula, Society and Politics}, p. 100.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Al-Amin, \textit{Al-\'Umaniyun, Ruwad al-Bahr}, pp. 53-56.
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shifted Indian Ocean trade from the Red Sea to the Cape route leading directly to Europe, and had also taken over inter-port trade within the Indian Ocean itself, Arab traders, including those from historic Oman, lost their role as commercial link between the Indian Subcontinent and the Mediterranean commercial system.\textsuperscript{78} As early as the mid-1500s, this choking off of the Umma from global long-distance trade was compounded by the flow of shiploads of cheap gold and silver from the Americas into the Indian Ocean region, which upset the region's financial structure.\textsuperscript{79}

Many factors contributed to the decline of Portuguese hegemony in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf. One factor was Portugal's failure to control the Red Sea/Mediterranean trade route. This corridor, therefore, came to provide a commercial haven for Indian Ocean merchants who were able to run the Portuguese blockade of the Red Sea. Gujarati ships, for instance, devised an Indian Ocean route that enabled them to avoid Portuguese fleets up to the mouth of the Red Sea, and to enter it with their cargo.\textsuperscript{80}

A second factor was Portugal's agreement to accept annexation by Spain. The main result of this decision for

\textsuperscript{78} Qalaji, \textit{Al-Khalij al-’Arabi}, pp. 356-357.

\textsuperscript{79} Landen, \textit{Oman Since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society}, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{80} Pearson, \textit{Merchants and Rulers in Gujarat}, pp. 98-99.
Portugal pertaining to the Indian Ocean was that Portugal inherited Spain's enemy Holland, which was fighting for independence from the Habsburg Spanish Empire, of which it had been a province. The most significant related development here was Phillip II's ban of Dutch trade in Lisbon. This caused the Portuguese to lose the Dutch as significant customers of Portuguese exports from the Indian Ocean, because the Dutch responded by devising their own means to obtain spices, and other commodities, from the Indian Ocean, bypassing the Portuguese.  

A third factor was the ongoing resistance to their occupation of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf that the Portuguese encountered, first because of the atrocities they committed in the course of their penetration, and secondly because of the economic strangulation they were imposing on Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf societies by means of their harsh taxation, and their prohibitions against indigenous regional commerce. The first instance of resistance was undertaken by a naval fleet launched by the Zamorin rulers of Calcutta in 1506. Early Gujarati resistance in India under Malik Ayaz and Khwaja Safar also occurred around that time. The aforementioned Mamluk-Gujarati and Ottoman challenges

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81 Smith, Creating a World Economy, p. 89.
82 Pearson, in Das Gupta and Pearson, India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800, pp. 87-88.
followed. In certain localities, Portuguese attempts to regulate trade were an outright failure. For example, in 1521-1522, when the Portuguese tried to enforce control over the trade of the Chinese port city of Canton, a Chinese coast guard force defeated them. In 1557, The Chinese government finally permitted the Portuguese to establish an unofficial trade center at Macao. Portuguese tenure in Malacca, for another example, frequently came under military challenge from Johor, Java, and the Muslim polity of Aceh.\textsuperscript{83}

All of these instances of resistance made it necessary for Portugal to expand its military presence in the region, so that, during the 1500s, their chain of fortresses along the Indian Ocean, between Sofala in East Africa and Nagasaki in Japan expanded from the original four of prior to 1515 to forty.\textsuperscript{84} All of these fortresses had to be maintained and protected by garrisons. This reality added to the Portuguese Crown’s expenses.\textsuperscript{85}

The Arabian Gulf, itself, was the scene of one major uprising in 1521 against Portuguese hegemony. This uprising involved Hormuz, Al-Bahrain, Qalhat and Suhar. One of the Portuguese responses to this situation was the sacking and

\textsuperscript{83} Pearson, in Das Gupta and Pearson, \textit{India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800}, pp. 87-88.

\textsuperscript{84} Boxer, \textit{The Portuguese Seaborne Empire}, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{85} Smith, \textit{Creating a World Economy}, pp. 87-88.
burning of Suhar, and the massacre of its inhabitants. Hormuz, Musqat and Qalhat tried again to coordinate efforts in resistance to the Portuguese in 1526. The Portuguese were to face even more sustained resistance to their dominance of the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, with the rise of the Ya'arabi movement which occurred in historic Oman between the early 1600s and 1700s, as will be shown below. It is appropriate to examine the Ya'arabi movement in some detail, not only because of its successful challenge to the Portuguese, but also because it engendered changes in historic Oman’s Mercantile and Tribal socio-discursive formations.

The Rise of the Ya'arabi Movement as a Counter-Discourse to Portuguese Penetration

The Ya'arabi movement can be understood as a social movement in historic Oman which arose in relation to the fact that Portuguese hegemony had led to a general decline in economic activity in historic Oman. This was because the coastal economic activities of the people of historic Oman, seafaring, trade, and fishing, were subject to Portuguese control. This naturally affected the interior and tribal areas of historic Oman, which were economically linked to the coastal area. In relation to this, historic Oman’s

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population declined in general, and particularly importantly, migration from the interior of the Arabian Peninsula to the cities of historic Oman’s coastal area ceased. It was within this context that the Ya’arabi movement arose in 1622, as a force of resistance to Portuguese hegemony in the Arabian Gulf.

The Ya’arabi movement also arose, first in the interior of historic Oman, against the backdrop of the Banu Nabhan Kingdom’s decline. One factor in this decline was that although this dynasty had embraced Obeidism toward the end of the 1400s, it had established itself as a hereditary kingdom at the beginning. Since the concept of hereditary kingship was contrary to Obeidi precepts, there arose within the interior of historic Oman stronger Obeidi groupings alongside, and in antagonism to, the Banu Nabhan Kingdom. There were also other tribal groupings contesting for the old Nabhani realm. These included the Banu Jabur, and the

88 Jamal Zakariya Qasim, "Al-‘Usus al-Tarikhiyyah li-Wahdat al-Imarat, wa Dur al-Ista‘amar fi Tajzi‘atiha. (The Historic Basis for the Unity of the Emirates, and the Role of Colonialism in its Division)", in Dawoud, Al-Tajarib al-Wahdawiyyah al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mu‘asirah: Tajribat Dawlat al-Imarat al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah, p. 112. One particularly concrete example of the demographic affects of Portuguese hegemony in the Gulf can be seen in the fact that in the islands of historic Al-Bahrain, there were 360 villages prior to the Portuguese occupation, but this number had declined to ten by the beginning of the 1700s. Mustafa al-Haj Ibrahim, "Al-Khalij al-‘Arabi bain al-jughrafiyyah wa al-Tarikh (The Arabian Gulf between Geography and History)," in Abdallah, Al-Khalij al-‘Arabi, p. 103.
Al-ʿUmair.⁸⁹ Among the Obeidis involved in this contest was a family from Rostok, a town in the interior of historic Oman known as the Yaʿarabi. As the Nabhani Kingdom declined, and after the election of a series of obscure Obeidi Imams by the ʿUlema (Islamic clergy) between the late 1400s and the mid-1500s, the Obeidi ʿUlema elected Nasir bin Murshid al-Yaʿarabi Imam in 1622.⁹⁰ He accepted the decision of the ʿUlema in 1624.⁹¹ Nasir bin Murshid managed to unify the interior and desert areas of historic Oman under Obeidism, in opposition to the Portuguese occupation of the port cities of the coastal area of historic Oman. Thus, the Yaʿarabis were using Obeidism, and particularly the concept of jihad, as a counter-discourse to the Portuguese occupation of historic Oman’s coastal area.

Yaʿarabi forces ousted the Portuguese from Julfar and Dibba in 1633, but particularly important was their re-taking of Suwar from the Portuguese in 1643.⁹² The recapture of all


⁹¹ Qassim, Al-Khalij al-ʿArabi, p. 128.

of these port cities was significant because it began the process of re-opening the avenues of maritime trade for historic Oman. Historic Oman's fight against the Portuguese occupation continued after Nasir bin Murshid's death in 1649, on through the recapture of Musqat, the last Portuguese holding in historic Oman, in 1654 under the leadership of the new Imam, Sultan bin Saif, whom the 'Ulema had elected in 1650.\(^93\) From 1652 onward in historic Oman the Ya'arabis continued their jihad wrestling the East African ports from Portuguese control, and gaining Mombasa itself in 1665.\(^94\) However, the Ya'arabi-Portuguese war over the East African ports was to continue to the end of the 1600s, because shortly after their defeat at Mombasa in 1665, the Portuguese were able to re-capture it, before the Ya'arabis expelled them permanently from Mombasa and Fort Jesus thirty-seven years later.\(^95\) By the end of the 1600s, the Ya'arabis had also taken Pemba Island, Zanzibar, Patta and Kliwa from Portuguese occupation.\(^96\) During this period, Ya'arabi ships also

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\(^95\) Miles, Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, p. 212; and Risso, Oman and Muscat, p. 13.

\(^96\) Allen, Oman: The Modernization of the Sultanate, p.37.
attacked such Portuguese strongholds in India as Bombay in 1661 and 1662, Diu in 1668 and 1676, and Bassein in 1674. 97 By the start of the 1700s, the commercial influence of the Ya‘arabī polity extended from the Arabian Gulf and the East African coast to much of western India, southern Iraq, and parts of Persia. 98

The Ya‘arabī ability to challenge the Portuguese in Africa and India was traceable to African support for the Ya‘arabī African campaigns against the Portuguese. 99 This ability also stemmed from the historic importance of navigational skills to the people of historic Oman. In addition, many sailors from historic Oman had gained skills in operating, and conducting warfare against, the large Portuguese vessels from having previously served in their crews. Finally, the Portuguese vessels that the Ya‘arabis had obtained once they re-took Musqat provided them with the basis for building a naval fleet of their own that could do battle with the Portuguese, 100 for, it was these captured vessels

97 Subrahmanyan, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, p. 191.
98 Landen, Oman Since 1856, p. 55.
99 The Ya‘arabis had entered Mombasa, for instance, not only as part of their own plans to end Portuguese hegemony, but also because Mombasa, itself, requested assistance from them against the Portuguese. Amin, Al-‘Umaniyyun, Ruwad al-Bahr, p. 59; and Miles, Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, p. 212.
that historic Oman's ship builders, under the Ya'arabis, used as models for improvements on their own fleet. For example, they replaced the method of sewing their ships' hulls together by means of cocoanut cord, by the European method of riveting them with iron nails.  

They also took to constructing larger ships, with broad instead of narrow backs, so that the vessels could now carry artillery. In addition, the friendly relationship between many of the Indian rulers and the Ya'arabis, and in particular, the agreements they had concluded with the rulers of the district of Bhuj, in India's northwest coastal area, after 1707, enabled the Ya'arabis to obtain wood for shipbuilding from India. Still another factor that contributed to the Ya'arabi success, and to the duration of the Ya'arabi polity was the inter-European warfare that prevailed from 1647 to 1763, stemming from commercial rivalry over trade in the Indian Ocean and in the Americas. Between 1647 and 1648, for example, the Dutch were at war with the Portuguese. The Dutch and the English, in turn, were at

101 Landen, Oman Since 1856, p. 54.


103 Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, p. 191; and Qassim, Al-Khalij al-Arabi, p. 114.

104 Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, p. 93.
war between 1652 and 1654, and again between 1665 and 1667, because their commercial rivalry had become so pronounced.¹⁰⁵

After 1672, the Anglo-Dutch war continued, with England allied with France during this phase. However, since France had become a commercial rival to England as well as to Holland in the Indian Ocean after 1650, England found itself in an alliance with the Dutch against the French after 1668.¹⁰⁶ This Anglo-Dutch alliance continued until 1706. By 1740, Anglo-French commercial rivalry over India had intensified, and the two states fought the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) in relation to both this rivalry, and to competition in the Americas.¹⁰⁷ This internecine European situation will be treated in detail in the next chapter. In summation, the rivalry between the English and the Dutch was such that both adversaries were preoccupied with it, both in the Indian Ocean and in the Americas, as well as with French aspirations. This made both the English and the Dutch inclined to let the Ya‘arabi and the Portuguese fight their war, and hopefully, weaken each other.

The commercial freedom that historic Oman had gained


¹⁰⁷ Salibi, A History of Arabia, pp. 154-156.
under Ya‘arabi rule translated into many economic, cultural and political changes in the lives of historic Oman’s people. Even as early as Nasir bin Murshid’s time, the early oustings of the Portuguese from Julfar and Dibba in 1633 led to an increase in historic Oman’s wealth such that literacy increased. In 1661, the Ya‘arabi ruler Bu al-‘Arab built madaris (schools), and was able to do so thanks to the commercial expansion that the Ya‘arabi victory over the Portuguese at Musqat had facilitated. In the early 1700s, during the rule of Saif bin Sultan, Musqat regained some of its past importance as a commercial center for a united historic Oman. It was a source of such medicinal commodities as aloes and asafoetida; perfumes such as frankincense and myrrh; minerals such as alum and sulphur; and coffee, horses, dates, fish, livestock, and various fruits and vegetables. Musqat was also an entrepot for trade in cereals under Saif bin Sultan, who improved agriculture in the interior of historic Oman by building seventeen aflaj, or irrigational canals, and by planting 20,000 date and 6,000 coconut trees.\(^{(108)}\) It is important to note here that the Ya‘arabi rulers were directly involved in the sponsorship of agriculture, rather than commerce, despite the growth of a

mercantile stratum that led to an increase in historic Oman's external trade during Ya'arabi rule. This was because the Ya'arabi rulers came from the interior, agricultural area of historic Oman.

The stability and prosperity that freedom from the Portuguese constraints of one hundred fifty years brought to historic Oman under Ya'arabi rule engendered the rise of new tribal and mercantile groupings in historic Oman during the 1700s. Among these were the Al-Bu Sa'id, an Obeidi grouping which migrated from the interior of historic Oman to the coastal area, and one of whose members the Ya'arabi ruler appointed to the position of Wali in Suhar.\textsuperscript{109} Two other important groupings were the Al-Qawasim, another significant Arab mercantile grouping who migrated across the Arabian Gulf from the Persian littoral, and the Bani Yas, a tribal grouping from Najd, or the central Arabian Peninsula. The Bani Yas, in contrast to the former two groupings, remained tribal, establishing their own various diras once they settled in historic Oman.\textsuperscript{110} The Utub, another tribal group,


migrated to historic Al-Bahrain from Nejd after 1700. They are significant because they, too, formed a significant mercantile entity in historic Al-Bahrain, which also included Kuwait and Qatar, during the late 1700s.\footnote{At the time of the Utub migration, historic Al-Bahrain was dominated by a strong tribe known as the Bani Khalid. More about this later.}

While this chapter has demonstrated that under Ya'arabi rule, historic Oman regained its unity, and some of its former strength as a maritime commercial power, records also show that in order to strengthen historic Oman and counter Portuguese hegemony, the Ya'arabis had to use some of the very methods of force that the Portuguese had used to gain hegemony in the Indian Ocean. For example, they had to adopt the Portuguese practice of building ships that could accommodate artillery in order to fight their way back into the Indian Ocean merely for a share in Indian Ocean trade.\footnote{This makes James D. Tracy’s statement in the introduction to the anthology he edited, entitled \textit{The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World: 1350-1750} (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993), invalid. The statement in question is, ...Also, the Europeans were not masters of every sea, as the Omanis proved when they took Muscat and Mombasa from the Portuguese and made the former the leading entrepot in the Persian Gulf..."(P. 10). The fact that the Ya'arabis were able to regain a portion of the share in Indian Ocean commerce that they had previously possessed did not place them in a category with such European military powers in the Indian Ocean as the Dutch, the English, or even the declining Portuguese. The Ya'arabis were fighting merely for a share in Indian Ocean commerce for survival, whereas the Dutch, English, Portuguese,
ended up building forts in the cities they had wrested from Portuguese occupation. Furthermore, the Ya‘arabi expulsions of the Portuguese from historic Oman’s coastal area notwithstanding, the Portuguese were still able to deny the Ya‘arabis access to important Indian ports, and in general, the Ya‘arabi war against the Portuguese occupation had been a costly one.

Another important point to make is that the Indian Ocean commercial system into which Ya‘arabi naval successes were able to re-introduce historic Oman was quite different from that of the 600-1500 period. This meant that even though the Ya‘arabi had been able to expell the Portuguese from the ports of historic Oman, they still had to fight them elsewhere in the Indian Ocean. In addition, most of the Indian Ocean commercial system was now divided among other European forces, such as the Dutch Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (V.O.C.), and the English East India Company (E.I.C.), both of which had developed more effective methods of controlling Indian Ocean trade than the Portuguese had used. The Ya‘arabi rulers were hampered from regaining for historic Oman its commercial importance of the 600-1500 period not only because most of the

and French were all vying for Indian Ocean hegemony.


114 Risso, Oman and Muscat, p. 13.
Far Eastern trade was now under the V.O.C. monopoly, but also because India was being taken over by the British. The Red Sea, too, had lost much of its importance as a trade avenue. The activities of the V.O.C. and the E.I.C. in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf will be covered in detail in the next chapter.

The end of Ya'arabi rule in historic Oman in 1749 occurred in the aftermath of a civil war from 1719-1728 over the question of succession to the position of Imam. This civil war involved both partisan factions of the succession contestants from among the Ya'arabi family members themselves, and sections of various tribal and mercantile groupings that were allied with these factions.\textsuperscript{115} Saif ibn Sultan, the contestant around whose succession to the Imamate this civil war had arisen, turned to Nadir Shah, ruler of Persia, during the course of the hostilities, to protect his succession. Nadir Shah's army intervened in historic Oman twice between 1732 and 1737, placing the coastal region under an occupation that was resisted by both the Al-Qawasim, mentioned above, and by the Wali of Suwar, Ahmad ibn Sa'id. Subsequently, heavy casualties obliged Nadir Shah to withdraw from historic Oman in 1747. As a result of having resisted Nadir Shah, Ahmad ibn Sa'id was elected Imam in 1749, and this spelled the end of Ya'arabi rule in historic Oman, and the rise of the Al-Bu

\textsuperscript{115} Bathurst, in Hopwood, \textit{The Arabian Peninsula}, p. 89.
Saidis. (More about this in Chapter Six.)

Kamal Salibi speculates on the possibility that the successional disputes that led to the Ya‘arabi civil war were connected to the ongoing inter-European commercial rivalry in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere during the first half of the 1700s. Some external involvement in this conflict can also be seen in the fact that the Dutch provided Nadir Shah with ships on two occasions for his intervention in historic Oman on behalf of Saif ibn Sultan, and this, in turn, was related to Anglo-Dutch rivalry in Persia. Specifically, the Dutch assisted Nadir Shah because they wanted to strengthen their commercial position in Persia in relation to the British. In addition, they considered Ya‘arabi

116 Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 87.
118 Hawley, The Trucial States, pp. 84-85.

119 The English, too, had an occasion to support Nadir Shah, and specifically, his attempts to make Persia a naval power in the Gulf, by selling him ships after 1734, or facilitating the construction of ships for him in India and elsewhere. The English extended this assistance to Nadir Shah for commercial and political reasons. From a commercial standpoint, the English meant to gain Nadir Shah’s assistance in protecting their factories in Bandar Abbas and Isphahan. In addition, selling ships to Nadir Shah was, itself, a lucrative endeavor. Abu Mustafa abu Hakima, History of Eastern Arabia, 1750-1800: The Rise and Development of Bahrain and Kuwait (Khayats, 1965), p. 35. The English political motivation was that arming Nadir Shah proved useful because he used these arms to attack places that the English wanted to "soften up" for their own onslaught later on, i.e. India. Nadir Shah attacked India, and thereby weakened the latter’s central government, in 1739. Abdul Amir Amin, British
advancements a threat because the growth of the Ya‘arabi dynasty as a commercial power was an encroachment on Dutch hegemony in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the English apparently did not consider Dutch naval assistance to Nadir Shah a threat, as by then, they considered their main commercial rivals in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere to be the French. Another likely reason for the apparent lack of English alarm at Dutch assistance to Nadir Shah was that the British also considered Ya‘arabi strength in historic Oman a threat to their own ambitions. Negotiations between the Ya‘arabi and the English between 1657-1659, after all, had not yielded the English the right to establish a trade factory in Musqat.\footnote{120} Also, subsequently, in the early 1700s, naval confrontations had occurred between English and Ya‘arabi vessels.\footnote{121}

\textbf{Conclusion}

This Chapter has covered the Portuguese penetrations of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf, and their consequences for the Arabian Gulf and historic Oman. The discourse under which the Portuguese penetrated the Indian Ocean was the continuation of


\footnote{120} Risso, \textit{Oman and Muscat}, p. 13.

their war of expulsion of Islam and Muslims from Iberia. The war against Islam in the Indian Ocean was to be prosecuted with the help of the mythical Prester John, and his equally mythical kingdom of Christians of the East. However, underlying this discourse was the Portuguese drive toward control of the Indian Ocean’s commercial system.

Three stages characterized the period of Portuguese penetration. During the first stage, they fought their way into the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf, and established themselves there by force of arms. During the second stage, the Portuguese established a system of trade regulation to ensure that they would maximize their profits by means of the strangulation of most indigenous trade, and by remolding the rest so that it would be profitable for the Estado da India. The third stage was one of decline, as the Portuguese faced indigenous resistance, and external competition from other European powers.

This chapter has also demonstrated the role of the Portuguese in transforming the Indian Ocean trade system to something very different from what it had been between 600 and 1500 A.D. Specifically, the previously peaceful Indian Ocean became militarized. Indeed, it was Portuguese naval power that enabled the Portuguese to penetrate, and then dominate, Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf commerce. It was also the lack of naval power of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf polities that
ensured Portuguese penetration and domination as well, for during the 600-1500 period, there had been no need for weaponry in this commercial system. This was because the universal presumption throughout the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf trade avenue was that the sea belonged only to God, and that all societies were entitled to use it.

Just as significantly, Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf trade patterns, i.e., composition and direction, were fundamentally altered. These transformations affected historic Oman by weakening its indigenous mercantile strata, along with those of the other Indian Ocean societies. Many old mercantile cities of historic Oman and the rest of the Arabian Gulf declined in relation to Portuguese encroachment and domination.

The main argument that this chapter presented about the rise of the Ya‘arabi movement is that although this movement succeeded in liberating historic Oman from Portuguese domination, the Indian Ocean commercial system that historic Oman was re-entering had been fundamentally altered, in comparison to the earlier era of 600 to 1500. In order to survive within this system, ironically, the Ya‘arabi had to adopt some of the methods that the Portuguese had used to penetrate the Indian Ocean in 1500s, albeit for survival rather than for the gaining of hegemony.

The Ya‘arabi movement failed in this endeavor, however,
because not only were they fighting the Portuguese, but they were also up against the other European powers. Despite these realities, the relative freedom to renew long-distance commerce that the Ya‘arabi defeat of the Portuguese gave historic Oman gave rise to the growth of new mercantile and tribal groupings there, and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf. However, each of these groupings was subsequently to develop its own particular role in the Arabian Gulf in relation to further European penetration, mainly on the part of the Dutch and the English.

In order to understand how these groupings assumed these roles in relation to continued European penetration, and how this further European penetration itself eventually led to British hegemony and colonialism in historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf, it is important to cover the development of the Dutch and English mercantile strata that gained strength in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, after the Portuguese decline. Therefore, it is necessary to devote space to the V.O.C. and the E.I.C. as key forces of the continued European penetration of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf region following the Portuguese.
CHAPTER SIX

THE TRANSFORMATIONAL SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION:
THE ANGLO-DUTCH AND FRENCH PENETRATIONS OF 1600-1820

Introduction

This Chapter will analyze the processes and discourses by means of which the Dutch, English and French penetrated the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf after the Portuguese, between 1600 and 1820. It will also compare and contrast the Dutch and English methods and tactics of penetration with those that had been utilized by the Portuguese. First, this Chapter will cover the process and discourses by which the Dutch and the English developed military and commercial power in relation to Hispano-Portuguese might.

Next, this Chapter will analyze the processes and discourses by means of which Anglo-Dutch penetration of the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf took place, in comparison and contrast with those utilized by the Portuguese. Finally, this chapter will examine the effects that Anglo-Dutch penetration had upon the peoples of historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf, with emphasis upon the transformations that occurred within historic Oman’s tribal and mercantile socio-discursive formations.

There are two main reasons why coverage of the Dutch,
English and French phase of European penetration of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf is important. The first is in the course of this penetration, the Dutch, English and French continued the process of weakening the indigenous mercantile strata of the Indian Ocean, including those of historic Oman, that the Portuguese penetration had begun by becoming, in place of this stratum, the direct transporters of goods within the Indian Ocean trade system, and by exporting a greater percentage of Indian Ocean goods to external destinations than the Portuguese had done. The second reason is that Anglo-Dutch penetration culminated in the establishment of British hegemony and colonialism in historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf. The consolidation of British colonialism in the Arabian Gulf and historic Oman will be the focus of chapters covering the Colonial period. Specifically, Chapter Six will analyze the rise of new mercantile and tribal groupings in the Arabian Gulf such as the Al-Bu Sa‘id, the Al-Qawasim, and the Utub, as well as the Muwahidi (Wahhabi) movement, in relation to British penetration. Chapter Six will also treat the consolidation of British dominance in the Arabian Gulf during the 1750-1820 period.

Two main arguments will be presented in this chapter. The first is that the earlier Portuguese penetration of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf had facilitated that of the Dutch and English, now in progress. These new penetrations, in
turn, were to deepen European domination of the entire Indian Ocean system, and culminated in the establishment of British colonialism in historic Oman and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf. The second argument will be that the rise of the Ya‘arabi polity, which occurred in relation to the decline of the Portuguese in the Arabian Gulf, engendered the construction of the new mercantile and tribal groupings in the Arabian Gulf mentioned above, along with the Muwahidi movement. Some of these groupings became adversaries to the consolidation of British hegemony in the Arabian Gulf, while others accommodated it.

An understanding of these new groupings, as well as the Muwahidi movement, is important because it allows analysis of how and why these groups continued into subsequent periods, or discontinued once the transformational period had ended, and how and why. Such an understanding also facilitates examining how and why these groupings may have undergone alteration for incorporation into subsequent period, as socio-discursive formations changed, power relationships changed, along with the social movements.

The significance of the Dutch and English penetrations lies in the fact that they further transformed the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf system, increasing European domination over interport trade within the Indian Ocean, and leading to the export of a greater volume of commodities from there to
European markets. These two developments added to the factors that led to the decline and transformation of historic Oman’s mercantile stratum.

The Formation of the V.O.C. and E.I.C.

After Elizabeth I of England lent her support to the Dutch in their independence bid,¹ Phillip II ordered an embargo against English ships and English merchandise in Spain.² This engendered a wartime situation between the Hispano-Portuguese Empire on the one hand, and England and Holland on the other, which opened the door for both the Dutch Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (V.O.C.) -- General United Chartered East Indian Company of the United Netherlands -- and the English East India Company’s penetration of the Indian Ocean commercial system, and ultimately led to their supplanting Portuguese hegemony there. It is vital to understand the history and nature of these companies in order to understand how they furthered the decline of the indigenous mercantile stratum in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, and in historic Oman. As was illustrated in the coverage of the 600-1500 period, these indigenous strata, including that of historic Oman, had coexisted within the Indian Ocean to form an integrated commercial system consisting both of inter-port

¹ Stavrianos, The World Since 1500, p. 377.

² Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, p. 81.
trade within the Indian Ocean system, and the re-export of commodities to external destinations. The Portuguese transformed this commercial system through the regulations they imposed during their penetration, and thereby began the strangulation of all of the indigenous Indian Ocean mercantile strata. The Dutch and the English penetration of the Indian Ocean both maintained the system that the Portuguese had constructed, and added to it because Dutch and English merchants now took over both interport trade, and export trade from the Indian Ocean system to external destinations. Thus, the Dutch and English came close to destroying entirely the indigenous Indian Ocean mercantile strata, including that of historic Oman.

English merchants formed the East India Company in 1600, whereas in the Netherlands, merchants formed the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie in 1602.\(^3\) The structure of these two companies differed markedly from the Portuguese royal monopoly that had penetrated the Indian Ocean a century

\[^3\] The fact that these companies were not official government bodies does not, however, mean that the English and Dutch governments were not deeply involved with them. Although its funding came from private investors, the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) was aimed at realizing the interests of the United Netherlands' government in the Indian Ocean, and was under government control. While the English East India Company did not operate under this same format, it was chartered by its government, and this charter was what gave the Company a monopoly over all English trade east of the Cape of Good Hope. Curtin, Cross Cultural Trade in World History, pp. 153 and 155.
earlier. Firstly, both the V.O.C. and the English East India Company were joint stock companies, owned by stockholders but managed by professional merchants and administrators.\(^4\) Secondly, the charters of these two companies allowed them to raise their own armies and navies, to fight their own wars, and to conclude their own peace treaties within their zones of operation.\(^5\) This meant that for these companies, the realization of profits was totally in the hands of their own management, with no direct investment by a royal monopoly, in contrast to the Portuguese external commercial system. It also meant that both the V.O.C. and the English East India Company, were solely responsible for the protection of their own spheres of commerce, without any direct connection to the home government. Because of these realities, both companies characteristically used military force both to penetrate the Indian Ocean commercial system and to ensure the establishments of factories or trade entrepots throughout the period of their penetration. For this reason, along with the professional administrators, merchants, and soldiers, these companies also contained staffs of information gatherers who wrote reports about the nature and magnitude of the Indian Ocean market, as well as representatives empowered to conclude

\(^4\) Chaudhuri, *Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean*, p. 82.

\(^5\) Curtin, *Cross Cultural Trade in World History*, p. 151.
agreements for the establishments of factories with Indian Ocean governments.

Neither the V.O.C.'s nor the English East India Company's penetration of the Indian Ocean could have occurred without the development of a strong mercantile stratum in both societies, as both the British and Dutch East India companies were private consortia that English and Dutch merchants formed. Therefore, to fully understand the nature of both Dutch and English penetration of the Indian Ocean, it is necessary to examine how the Dutch and English mercantile strata and cities developed in relation to the Hispano-Portuguese Empire, in the Indian Ocean, in the Americas, and in Europe. This coverage will facilitate an understanding of how the Dutch and English approach to penetration of the Indian Ocean differed from that of the Portuguese, and therefore, how the former two were able to penetrate and dominate what the Portuguese could not in the Indian Ocean, despite their intentions.

The English mercantile stratum of the 1500s had mainly grown up around the export of woolen manufactures. Until the end of that century, the main outlet for these manufactures was the entrepot of Antwerp,⁶ which came under Habsburg rule at the end of the 1400s. During the 1500s, Antwerp became the

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most important commercial center in Europe, replacing Venice in this role. Antwerp became the main distribution center for the Portuguese Indian Ocean spice trade after 1508, because most of Portugal's market for pepper and other spices was in Northern Europe. After 1531, it became a major financiel center, largely because of "New World" silver that Spain kept exporting to Antwerp in an attempt to meet its chronic trade deficit with the latter. In 1531, the merchants in Antwerp established their own stock exchange, in which bankers and financiers for the Habsburg, Portuguese, Tudor (English), Valois (French), monarchies, and merchants from all over Europe, traded. The Low Countries in general, as one of Europe's most prosperous regions, were also the Spanish-Habsburg monarchy's most lucrative source of taxation.

The English mercantile stratum also grew in relation to the opportunities presented to it by Spain and Portugal's failure to develop a sustained manufacturing sector to meet the demand furnished by European settlers in their American colonies. As a result of this failure, after 1560, England began to supplant Spain and Portugal as the supplier of

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9 Smith, *Creating a World Economy*, pp. 87, and 101-103.
manufactured goods to the Americas, even though the goods were still largely carried on Spanish ships, and England was still mainly an exporter of wool textiles.\textsuperscript{10}

The roots of the Dutch mercantile stratum developed in Amsterdam during the late 1500s. This stratum gained additional strength with the Spanish destruction of Antwerp in 1585,\textsuperscript{11} which occurred during the Netherlands' fight for independence from the Spanish Habsburgs' kingdom. By 1585, this kingdom also included Portugal. The destruction of Antwerp served as an impetus to the growth of Amsterdam both because Antwerp was a rival city to Amsterdam, and because this destruction caused many Antwerp merchants, who had been involved both in the Continental distribution of Portugal's Indian Ocean spice exports, and Spain's exports of American silver, to migrate to Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{12}

By 1550, Dutch commerce had grown to the point where Dutch shipping was transporting most of the commodities exchanged between the Netherlands and Iberia (Spain and Portugal). This Ibero-Dutch trade was to continue throughout the revolt of the Netherlands against Spain (1572-1609). Commodities that the Dutch imported from Iberia included New

\textsuperscript{10} Stavrianos, \textit{The World Since 1500}, p. 415.


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 210; and Smith, \textit{Creating a World Economy}, p. 103.
World silver, which, in turn, facilitated the expansion of Dutch trade, along with the building of a large fleet and shipping industry with which to engage both in warfare and expand commerce.\textsuperscript{13} England and Holland formed their identities in relation (opposition) to Spain and Portugal during their competition with the Spanish Empire for colonies, for commerce, and in the Dutch case, for national independence.\textsuperscript{14}

Both Phillip II’s exclusion of English ships from the port of Lisbon, and more importantly, the Spanish blockade of Antwerp during the Dutch Revolt of the late 1500s motivated the English to find an alternative entrepot for external commerce. But the main purpose that the English East India Company was to serve was the provision of import commodities, both for the English market itself and for re-export. This was why one of the first privileges that the Company sought from the English crown was the export of bullion. English merchants trading in the Ottoman province of Aleppo, Syria as part of the Levant Company, which was founded in 1581, saw the potential of Indian Ocean commerce. This was because as early as 1599, these merchants had learned of Dutch ships that had


returned to Europe laden with Asian imports. In fact, the work of the Levant Company had generally served English merchants well as a source of information about Indian Ocean trade and what it had to offer.\textsuperscript{15} The English obtained other information about Indian Ocean trade via the capture of a Portuguese ship sailing the Cape route by the English pirate, Sir Francis Drake in 1586.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, the English gained confidence about their naval powers after the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588.\textsuperscript{17}

Simultaneously with the E.I.C., the V.O.C also grew. It had been formed out of a series of difficult negotiations between a Holland official called the States-General, and several small companies from different parts of the Netherlands which had been founded between 1596 and 1602 for trade in the Indian Ocean. At the end of these negotiations, they consolidated to charter the V.O.C. in 1602. The Netherlands officials present at the negotiations wanted these companies to merge in order to present a real challenge to the Portuguese, and thereby to help safeguard the security of the Netherlands. The merchants and investors in these companies,


\textsuperscript{16} Portuguese ships were facing increasingly frequent attacks by the English along the Cape route toward the end of the 1600s. Phillips, in Tracy, \textit{The Rise of Merchant Empires}, p. 53.

on the other hand, wanted a merger because competition among
the companies was leading to higher prices among Asian
sellers, lower prices on Asian imports that Netherlands buyers
sold, and lower profits for the companies in general.18

Discourses and Penetration: The V.O.C. and the E.I.C.

The Dutch founders of the V.O.C. had accumulated
considerable information on the Indian Ocean trade and on
Portuguese strengths and weaknesses in the Indian Ocean from
Jan Huyghen van Linschoten, who had gone to India as part of
the entourage of the Archbishop of Goa in 1583. During his
thirteen-year stay there, Linschoten was able to document
which products were traded, the general directions of Indian
Ocean commerce, and even information on navigation in the
Indian Ocean, trade winds, and physical features
characterizing the area.19 Also, from the previous Asian
experiences of the small companies mentioned above that made
up the V.O.C., as well as from the report that van Linschoten
had written in 1595, the founders of the V.O.C. knew that the
Portuguese had spread themselves very thinly over the Indian
Ocean area, and were therefore weaker than they pretended to

18 C.R. Boxer, Jan Compagnie in War and Peace, 1602-1799:
A Short History of the Dutch East India Company (Hong Kong:

The entry of both the Dutch and the English into the Indian Ocean was a continuation of their war with the Spanish-Portuguese Crown. These two powers found themselves in an alliance because the Iberian monarchy had attempted to prevent the Netherlands' attainment of political and commercial independence, had blocked off the English trade outlet at Antwerp, and was now preventing Dutch and English entry into the lucrative Indian Ocean commerce. In the aftermath of this war with the Iberian monarchy, the Dutch were to become and remain the dominant naval power in the Indian Ocean until the end of the 1600s. In all, their presence in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf lasted 133 years.21

The discourse that the Dutch used to penetrate the Indian Ocean was based on the reality of their war with Spain and Portugal, which had begun with the Dutch bid for independence from the Spanish/Habsburg Empire. The Dutch constructed the discourse of war to penetrate the Indian Ocean for what were actually commercial reasons, stating that war with Portugal was the only way that they could secure access to Indian Ocean trade, because of the Portuguese monopoly over it.

20 Boxer, Jan Compagnie in War and Peace, 1602-1799, p.2.

The legal discourse that the Dutch used to justify their penetration of the Indian Ocean was an attack by Hugo Grotius, a representative of the V.O.C., on the Portuguese appropriation of the Indian Ocean by papal decree. Grotius alluded to the fact that all Indian Ocean societies had previously enjoyed freedom of navigation there (during the 600-1500 period), and thereby claimed the Dutch right to engage in Indian Ocean commerce.\(^{22}\) However, this section will demonstrate that when Grotius spoke of freedom of the seas, he was really relating to Dutch freedom in relation to the Portuguese monopoly, and not to the desirability of restoring the Indian Ocean to its shared state among the Indian Ocean societies prior to 1500.

Since the Anglo-Dutch war against the Iberian monarchy entailed taking control of Portuguese trade avenues and entrepôts in the Indian Ocean, that also meant attacking indigenous vessels carrying Portuguese Cartazas.\(^{23}\) Thus, both the V.O.C. and the English East India Company adopted the Portuguese practice of requiring indigenous traders to buy "protection" passes, this time from the V.O.C. and the E.I.C., which were really permits for navigation. In issuing these passes, the Dutch actually proved to be more restrictive than


\(^{23}\) Arasaratnama, in Das Gupta and Pearson, India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800, p. 110.
the Portuguese had been. This was because the Dutch issued passes for fewer inter-port trade routes within the Indian Ocean, since they wanted to establish a V.O.C. monopoly along them.\textsuperscript{24}

In addition to requiring passes, the Dutch charged indigenous navigators customs tolls of twenty per cent, which were at least twice as high as those charged by the Portuguese had been. The Dutch also attacked Gujarati (Indian) shipping throughout the Indian Ocean,\textsuperscript{25} in order to obtain a V.O.C. monopoly over inter-port commerce within the Indian Ocean system. One important interport route was that between Surat, the main Gujarati port, and the Arabian peninsula. The V.O.C. wanted control of this route so that it could then sell Gujarati cloth, indigo and pepper, along with commodities from the Indonesian Archipelago and China like cloves, benzoin and radix (both drugs), in Arabia for cash. However, Arabian Peninsula ports like Mocha and Aden were under Ottoman jurisdiction, and the Dutch representative in Istanbul obtained permission for a V.O.C. concession in Mocha in 1618, only to lose it in 1621, because the Ottoman Administrator in Yemen got word that Dutch vessels had captured and plundered the cargo of two vessels from the port in Dabhol, in Western


India, after finding that the vessels were carrying cargo belonging to the Portuguese. At least in the Indonesian Archipelago, however, the V.O.C. was able to obtain a monopoly on commerce in nutmeg, cloves, mace, and cinnamon, which spices Surati merchants had previously carried for sale in West Asia.

During the first half of the 1600s, the Dutch adopted another Portuguese tactic for maintaining possession of Indian Ocean trade routes, namely, the building of forts, or "factories" (agencies) for the V.O.C. This they achieved or, at least, attempted, across an area whose range extended from Nagasaki in Japan to Mocha in Yemen.

The E.I.C.'s initial penetration of the Indian Ocean's commercial system was less profitable than that of the V.O.C. By 1606, the E.I.C. had only established one factory at Bantam, in Java, and furthermore, the E.I.C. only had two commodities to exchange in the Indian Ocean for the spices and other commodities it obtained from there, namely, silver bullion, largely imported from the Americas, and wool. The E.I.C therefore also aimed at diversifying its merchandise by

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28 Boxer, *Jan Compagnie in War and Peace, 1602-1799*, p. 16.
penetrating Indian Ocean inter-port trade, then still being carried out by indigenous commercial forces, albeit under the Portuguese Cartaza system. This meant establishing commercial relations with the Mughal rulers in India,\textsuperscript{29} the Ottoman officials at the Red Sea ports, at which Indian trading vessels frequently called,\textsuperscript{30} and with other local polities.

The E.I.C. established its commercial relations with the Mughal rulers by attacking Surati shipping at the mouth of the Red Sea prior to 1610, and thereby forcing the Mughal rulers to give the Company access to Gujarati trade.\textsuperscript{31} The E.I.C. managed to obtain a Firman from the Imam of San'a and the Governor of Mocha permitting it to trade at Yemeni ports in 1618, during which year the E.I.C. erected a factory at Mocha, which established English shipping between Mocha and Surat.

This happened after an initial denial of this permission to the company between 1609 and 1610. As had happened with the V.O.C. in Mocha, the E.I.C. was denied

\textsuperscript{29} Mughal rule in India was first established in the north of India during the first decades of the 1500s. Largely a land-based power, it reached its height during the reign of Akbar the Great (1556-1605), but continued through most of the seventeenth century.

\textsuperscript{30} Macro, Yemen and the Western World Since 1571, pp. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{31} Arasaratnam, "India and the Indian Ocean in the Seventeenth Century," in Das Gupta and Pearson, India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800, p. 111.
permission for a commercial concession at this port, this time because one of the Company's voyage generals had threatened that city with artillery bombardments. The E.I.C. representative who had been denied the trade agreement in Yemen reacted to this by plundering some additional Indian trade vessels at the mouth of the Red Sea in 1612.  

By 1613, the policymakers of the English East India Company had decided to make the Indian western seabord the company's commercial base, and to develop direct trade linkage between the Indian Subcontinent and Southeast Asia on the one hand, and Europe on the other. As a consequence of this decision, the English East India Company established two trading stations by 1613, at Surat in Northwest India and at Bantam in Java. The trade pattern that the Company developed at this time was such that Indian piece goods were traded in Southeast Asia for spices, which, in turn, were exported to Europe. Toward this end, by 1615, the Company had established factories elsewhere in Java, in Sumatra, and in the Moluccas, as well as in Siam, Borneo and Japan. These factories facilitated commerce from the Bantam center.

In relation to the Surat center, the Company established factories in Persia. The factories in Persian

32 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
33 Chaudhuri, The English East India Company, pp. 16-17.
34 Ibid.
were established because the E.I.C. was unable to sell in India its shipments of woolen broadcloth from the Surat factory. The E.I.C. then decided upon Persia as the market for the woolens, because of the winter climate there. After obtaining a firman from Shah Abbas permitting the entry of English imports into Persia, the E.I.C. established a factory, or trade agency, at Jask, a Persian city in Makran Province on the Gulf of Oman, in 1616. It was initially from this port that the E.I.C. carried out most of its trade with Persia and the Arabian Gulf. One important reason for Shah Abbas' issue of this firman was that he was seeking an outlet for Persian silk exports to Europe. In 1618, Shah Abbas agreed that all silk leaving Persia should, in the future, be sold to the English, and that none should be sent to Europe by way of Ottoman lands, or be sold to the Spanish or the Portuguese. Other commodities in which the English traded in Persia included commodities from India like indigo, steel, tin, and cloth.

35 Amin, British Interests in the Persian Gulf, p. 4.
37 Davies, A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade, p. 96.
38 Wilson, The Persian Gulf, p. 139.
In 1622, Shah Abbas' provincial Governor, Imam Quli Khan, drove the Portuguese from Hormuz with the help of a flotilla of English ships. In relation to this ouster of the Portuguese, the E.I.C. set up its main factory for trade with Persia and in the Arabian Gulf at Bandar Abbas, from which Shah Abbas had expelled the Portuguese in 615. The agreement that Shah Abbas signed with the English East India Company provided that the latter was to receive half of the customs duties levied on all merchandise passing through that port. The Bandar Abbas factory had branches at Isfahan, Shiraz, Basra, and Baghdad. These factories strengthened the E.I.C. inter-port trade linking the Arabian Gulf with India. By the 1620s, the Surat commercial center directly supplied London with calicoes and indigo, and the one at Bantam supplied pepper and other spices. By 1660, the Coromandel coast -- Southeast India -- became London's main source of cotton piece goods.


41 Davies, A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade, p. 97; and ibid.


43 Armajani, Middle East Past and Present, p. 175.

44 Arasaratnam, in Das Gupta and Pearson, India and the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800, p. 111.
Dutch, English, and French Competition for Hegemony

Despite the fact that the Dutch and English had formed a tacit alliance in relation to the Portuguese for penetrating the Indian Ocean, these two powers became rivals once they actually began their penetrations of the Indian Ocean commercial system. This competition between the two intensified after 1622, the year that the E.I.C. moved its Persia/Arabian Gulf factory to Bandar Abbas. One manifestation of this rivalry was the fact that the Dutch refused to pay the customs duties to the English East India Company at Bandar Abbas.\(^{45}\) After the death of Shah Abbas in 1629, the Dutch expanded their commercial influence in the Arabian Gulf. In 1645, the Dutch obtained a license from Shah Abbas II permitting them to purchase silk in any part of Persia, and to export it free of customs duty.\(^{46}\) A subsequent agreement with this Shah that the V.O.C. signed in 1652 went into further detail. It exempted the V.O.C. from paying tolls on imports to and exports from Persia for a value of up to 800,000 Florins per year, provided that the Company purchased from Persia 600 bales of raw silk per year, at a fixed price.\(^{47}\)


\(^{46}\) Ibid., p. 32.

The English lost to the Dutch the Arabian Gulf factories at Bandar Abbas and Basra in the wake of the 1652 outbreak of Anglo-Dutch warfare in Europe, some of whose battles took place in the Indian Ocean.\textsuperscript{48} The V.O.C.'s gain of these factories made it Persia and the Arabian Gulf's chief supplier of pepper, nutmeg, and cloves, and was a major reason for the Company's general commercial success there.\textsuperscript{49} Between 1623 and 1630, the profit that the V.O.C. earned from trade in Persian commodities, mainly silks, amounted to more than one million guilders. This made the Persian trade during those years more profitable than any other Dutch factory in the Indian Ocean system except that in Batavia, in the Indonesian Archipelago.\textsuperscript{50} Records about Dutch imports into Persia and the Arabian Gulf show how deeply involved in inter-Asian trade they were, for these imports consisted of Indonesian spices and pepper, Ceylonese cinnamon, Japanese copper, sugar from India, Taiwan, and Indonesia, and Indian textiles.\textsuperscript{51} By the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch had expelled the E.I.C.


\textsuperscript{49} Wilson, \textit{The Persian Gulf}, p. 163.

\textsuperscript{50} Davies, \textit{A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade}, p. 99.

\textsuperscript{51} Prakash, \textit{The Dutch East India Company and the Economy of Bengal}, p. 172.
from most of the Arabian Gulf.\textsuperscript{52}

The E.I.C. began to reverse its losses to the V.O.C. after undergoing considerable restructuring during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This restructuring began after the English Crown obtained Bombay from Portugal by means of an agreement between the two countries in 1669, and passed it over to the E.I.C. as the Company's new headquarters in 1688.\textsuperscript{53} This was because the 1688 agreement under which the English Crown transferred Bombay to the Company contained provisions that permitted the E.I.C. formally to raise troops, and to maintain civil administration. This changed the Company's status from that of a solely private commercial venture to that of a body acting on direct behalf of the Crown. In 1708, the Company absorbed several other English trade groups that were penetrating the Indian Ocean, and this move strengthened its position there.\textsuperscript{54} This new, amalgamated company was re-named the United Company of Merchants of England Trading in the East Indies.\textsuperscript{55}

The main factor that ensured the E.I.C's vanquishment

\textsuperscript{52} Davies, \textit{A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade}, p. 99.


\textsuperscript{54} Marlowe, \textit{The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century}, pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{55} Savory, in Cottrell, \textit{The Persian Gulf States}, p. 33.
of the V.O.C. in the Indian Ocean was the Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-1674, which had begun with the V.O.C.'s taking the factories of Bandar Abbas and Basra from the E.I.C. In the long run, however, this war exhausted the Dutch, as did another war that broke out between them and the French over territorial ambitions during the 1667-1713 period. In addition, after 1651, the English promulgated the Navigation acts, which provided that no goods could be imported into, or exported from an English colony on any vessel other than an English ship. As a consequence of these developments, the Dutch ceased to be a power in the Indian Ocean after 1750, and only retained the Indonesian Archipelago. Table 6.1 below reflects the growth of E.I.C. of shipping of Asian exports, and the corresponding decline of V.O.C. shipments, of these exports, despite initial successes, in terms of invoice values from the 1661-70 decade to the 1751-60 decade, inclusive.

Aside from exhaustion from warfare with the English, and English legislation favoring English shipping, the Dutch also lost their Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf holdings to the British because of economic differences between England and Holland in relation to sustaining of a large overseas empire. England had at its disposal both greater natural resources than did Holland, and the growing wealth and productivity of all of its American colonies. Particularly important

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contributors among these were the slave-based tobacco plantations of the more southerly of the thirteen colonies along North America's eastern seaboard, and the sugar plantations of England's Carribean holdings.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{TABLE 6.1}

\textbf{DUTCH V.O.C. VERSUS ENGLISH E.I.C. ANNUAL AVERAGE EXPORTS FROM ASIA}
(Invoice Values in Thousands of Pesos)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>V.O.C.</th>
<th>E.I.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1661-1670</td>
<td>980.8</td>
<td>437.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1671-1680</td>
<td>1,299.2</td>
<td>1,215.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1681-1690</td>
<td>1,669.8</td>
<td>1,634.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1691-1700</td>
<td>1,592.9</td>
<td>744.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1701-1710</td>
<td>2,015.8</td>
<td>1,161.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710-1720</td>
<td>2,370.0</td>
<td>2,056.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721-1730</td>
<td>3,176.8</td>
<td>2,723.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1731-1740</td>
<td>2,506.6</td>
<td>2,820.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1741-1750</td>
<td>2,418.7</td>
<td>3,345.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751-1760</td>
<td>3,163.9</td>
<td>3,348.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the Arabian Gulf itself, the V.O.C.'s hold on its factories in Bushire,\textsuperscript{58} Bandar Abbas, and Basra was weakened by British competition, increased taxation levied by Sheikh Nasir, the Governor of Bushire, and deteriorating relations

\textsuperscript{57} Stavrianos, The World Since 1500, p. 424.

\textsuperscript{58} This was the factory that Nadir Shah had granted the Dutch permission to establish in 1747, as a reward for their having assisted him in his invasion of historic Oman during the Yaʿarabi civil war (See below).
with the Ottoman authorities. As a consequence to this situation, the Dutch closed these factories in 1753.59

After the closure of the three Gulf factories, the Dutch tried to preserve their position in the Arabian Gulf by seizing the island of Kharg, fifteen miles south of Basra. In 1753, however, Sheikh Nasir again demanded taxes from the Dutch, who ignored this demand and began building up their Kharg holding as a military fortress, as well as a factory. They also began to expell the indigenous Arab population and replace it by slaves they had brought from Africa, and other Dutch merchants whom they encouraged to settle there. After expelling the indigenous population, the Dutch attempted to take over that population’s various economic activities that they believed would be profitable, including pearl fishery.60

The above-described Dutch activities on Kharg Island engendered resistance by the local Arab population in 1762, under the leadership of Mir Muhanna. This resistance culminated in Mir Muhanna’s forces’ freeing Kharg Island from the Dutch in 1765, and the expulsion of the Dutch during that


60 Ibid.
year.\textsuperscript{61} This marked the end of Dutch presence in the Arabian Gulf. Meanwhile, the British had regained their former holdings in the Arabian Gulf, as illustrated by the fact that, in 1763, the E.I.C. signed an important trade agreement with Sheikh Sa‘dun of Bushire. This agreement, after being confirmed by Karim Khan Zand, gave the British exclusive trading privileges at that port, specifically exempting British vessels importing goods to Bushire, or exporting goods from there, from paying customs duties. The agreement also conferred a monopoly on the trade in woolen goods upon the British, and permitted the British to seize the cargoes of all other traders attempting to bring goods to Bushire without British permission. Finally, the agreement prohibited any other European nation from settling at Bushire as long as the British continued to have a factory there.\textsuperscript{62} The British gained hegemony in the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean both because of their defeat of the Dutch, and because of the local resistance the Dutch faced, as described above.

The French, however, were another competitor that the British faced. The French were able to outlast the Dutch in this region because, like the British, they enjoyed more extensive resources than the Dutch did. In the case of the

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.; and Amin, \textit{British Interests in the Persian Gulf}, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{62} Wilson, \textit{The Persian Gulf}, pp. 178-179.
French, this greater wealth took the form of the prosperity of its colonies in the Americas, particularly the slave-based plantation economies of the Carribean, productive domestic agriculture, and a larger population than Holland had.  

It is important to emphasize, however, that the French presence in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf had never been significant. Their Indian Ocean holding was the Island of Mauritius off the coast of East Africa, on which they established a base in 1715, after renaming it the Ile de France.

In the Arabian Gulf, the French established a factory at Bandar Abbas, and a residency at Basra during the late 1600s, both of which they closed during the early 1700s. (They re-opened the Basra residency in 1755.) On the Arabian Peninsula, the French also managed to establish a short-lived factory at Mocha, in Yemen. During their war with the British during the mid-1700s for a foothold in the Gulf, the French attacked the British factory at Bandar Abbas, but did not succeed in occupying the city. Other French exploits during the mid-1700s included a series of attacks on

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64 Qassim, *Al-Khalij al-‘Arabi*, pp. 170, and 175.
66 Macro, *Yemen and the Western World Since 1571*, p. 12.
merchant ships from historic Oman. They had also planned to establish a factory in Musqat, without success. However, in 1785, they did succeed in opening a consulate there, and in establishing a certain amount of regular trade with historic Oman.

The British were able to defeat the French decisively in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). In the battles of this war that were fought in the Indian Ocean, the British were able to seize the trading stations that the French East India Company had established there by the end of the 1600s at Chandanagar, near Calcutta, and at Pondichery, near Madras, and to march on Bengal. There were two main factors that contributed to Britain's defeat of France in the fight for hegemony in the Indian Ocean. The first was the greater productivity of British American colonies in comparison to those of France, particularly in North America. This had partly to do with the departure for the Americas of many English peasants who were being dispossessed by land enclosure legislation in Britain, enacted to increase the efficiency of wool and foodstuff production in the face of growing urbanization there. This development had not occurred in

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68 Risso, Oman and Muscat, p. 56.


70 Risso, Oman and Muscat, pp. 101-102.
France.

The second factor was the British development of superior naval power to that of the French, thanks to their accumulation of surplus both from their American colonies and from their Indian Ocean holdings. Britain’s shipbuilding industry enabled Westminster to transport troops to the Indian Ocean, and to hamper the French ability to do so.\(^{71}\) During the first three decades of the 1700s, Mughal rule disintegrated.\(^{72}\) It is important to note that the disintegration of Mughal rule also spelled a transformation of European aims in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf from mere control of trade to actual, politico-territorial control. While the French were trying to deepen their encroachments into India by playing upon rivalries among the various minor Indian dynasties that the Mughal decline of the early 1700s had engendered, the British were doing the same thing, so that

\(^{71}\) Ibid., pp. 426-429.

\(^{72}\) A number of factors led to the decline of the Mughul Empire. Firstly, Nadir Shah’s attacks on it in 1739 helped to weaken it, and in the wake of this warfare, taxes rose, making trade less profitable, and dynasties that had been vassals to the Mughuls became independent. Nadir Shah launched this attack after obtaining British help in building up his navy earlier in the 1730s. Power struggles arose within the Mughul nobility itself as well. This situation was worsened by the Afghani attack on northwestern India during 1759-1761. For more detailed coverage of the decline of the Mughul Empire, see Chapter Five of Hermann Kulke’s and Dietmar Rothermund’s *A History of India* (London: Routledge, 1990), and for some discussion of Nadir Shah’s naval buildup and invasion of India, see Amin, *British Interests in the Persian Gulf*, pp. 16 and 15.
the English East India Company gained from those small dynasties it had recruited as English allies to levy taxes in India itself for the maintenance of English troops there. Like the French, the British also trained the troops of the local dynasties they had recruited as allies, so that they would fight those of local French allies. In addition, it was the development of light artillery that carried this Indian Ocean warfare deeper inland. Because of all of these factors, Britain was able not only to seize French holdings, but also to attain control of most of India's coastal and fertile areas by the end of the 1700s.\(^73\)

The British were given further space in which to operate by the fact that with the decline of Mughal rule also came the decline of Surat as a commercial center, and the corresponding decline of the indigenous merchant stratum from the Surat-Gujarati area with which European mercantile forces in the Indian Ocean had been in competition. Some merchants migrated from Surat to Bombay to protect the security of investments and property during the period of Mughal decline, and this enabled Bombay, the headquarters of the British East India Company, to supplant Surat in commercial importance. The decline of Mughal power also spelled the decline of the Indian Muslim merchant stratum in general, and the loss of its

\(^{73}\) Curtin, *Cross Cultural Trade in World History*, pp. 231-232.
important position in the Indian Ocean to its European competitors.⁷⁴

Table 6.2 shows that, in addition to controlling inter-Asian trade via the network of factories that both the V.O.C. and the English East India Companies established, both joint-stock companies also increased the volume of Asian exports from the Indian Ocean that went to Europe in relation to the Portuguese period.

| TABLE 6.2 |
| DISTRIBUTION OF INDIAN OCEAN COMMODITIES |
| EXPORTED TO EUROPE BY THE V.O.C. AND THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY |
| (Invoice Values by Percentage) |

| V.O.C. |
| 1619-21 | 1648-50 | 1668-70 | 1698-1700 | 1738-40 |
| Spices | 17.55 | 17.85 | 12.05 | 11.70 | 6.1 |
| Pepper | 56.45 | 50.34 | 30.53 | 11.23 | 8.1 |
| Sugar | ______ | 6.39 | 4.24 | 0.24 | 3.7 |
| Tea/Coffee | ______ | ______ | ______ | 4.24 | 32.2 |
| Drugs/Dyes | 9.84 | 8.52 | 5.84 | 8.29 | 2.8 |
| Saltpeter | ______ | 2.07 | 5.08 | 3.92 | 2.6 |
| Metals | ______ | ______ | ______ | ______ | 1.1 |
| Textiles/Silk | 16.06 | 14.16 | 36.46 | 54.73 | 41.1 |
| Others | ______ | 0.17 | ______ | ______ | ______ |
| Total | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |

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⁷⁴ Risso, Oman and Muscat, p. 76.
Table 6.2 - Continued

ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1664-70</th>
<th>1696-1705</th>
<th>1731-1740</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>20.01</td>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>9.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>5.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigo</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltpeter</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>62.59</td>
<td>64.53</td>
<td>65.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>13.56</td>
<td>11.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These two companies also changed the composition of these exports from that which had characterized the Portuguese domination. This was because of the role that both joint stock companies had played in engendering changes in European consumer tastes and preferences, and thereby changing the nature of the European market. One commodity group that underwent a significant increase in demand in Europe in relation to the work of the two joint-stock companies was cotton textiles.\(^{75}\) Table 6.2 also shows the shift in significance that key Indian Ocean exports underwent in terms of invoice values for both the V.O.C. and the English East

\(^{75}\) Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, p. 82.
India Company, over the 1600s and 1700s.

Since the discussion above had explained the process by which the British became hegemonic in the Indian Ocean system, in relation, in particular, to the Dutch. However, in order to understand how the British consolidated their hegemony in the Arabian Gulf, it is necessary to examine in some detail the mercantile and tribal groupings that arose there in the wake of the Ya'arabi decline, and the relationships that these groupings developed with the English as the latter deepened their penetration of historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf.

The Rise of Local Mercantile and Tribal Groupings in the Arabian Gulf

As mentioned above, the Ya'arabi success at driving the Portuguese from the Arabian Gulf and from other strongholds in the Indian Ocean occurred simultaneously with Anglo-Dutch rivalry in this region. The Ya'arabi polity that was established after the expulsion of the Portuguese, however, engendered the growth of several new mercantile and tribal groupings in the Arabian Gulf. These groupings were to play specific roles in resisting or accommodating European, and particularly English, penetration of the Arabian Gulf. It is necessary to examine the process by which these groupings were constructed in order to understand them in relation to the deepening British penetration of Arabian Gulf that was to occur during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By the
1760s, as the Dutch and French presence in the Arabian Gulf was declining, the British further expanded their influence there. An examination of indigenous developments that were occurring in the Arabian Gulf region, and the commercial situation there during the second half of the 1700s, will help to clarify the process by which the British consolidated their Arabian Gulf holdings.

As previously mentioned, Al-Bu Sa‘id rule began in historic Oman in 1749 when Ahmad ibn Sa‘id Al-Bu Sa‘id was elected Imam as a result of having successfully resisted Nadir Shah’s intervention in historic Oman during the Ya‘arabi civil war. Ahmad ibn Sa‘id Al-Bu Sa‘id was able to use his successful ouster of Nadir Shah from historic Oman as a discourse to legitimize his rule over historic Oman in place of the Ya‘arabi polity. It is important to examine this dynasty in some detail, because they were subsequently to become a significant mercantile power in the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and were later to form an alliance with the British that was crucial to the consolidation of the latter’s position in the Arabian Gulf.

Ahmad ibn Sa‘id first gained allegiance to his rule within historic Oman proper, and then dispatched a Wali to Zanzibar to assert Al-Bu Saidi control over historic Oman’s East African holdings. He then worked to regain the trade advantages of Ya‘arabi times in 1779 by sending a fleet to
assist the Ottomans in re-capturing the port of Basra from Karim Khan Zand, then ruler of Persia, who had taken it in 1776. As a reward for this assistance, the Ottomans granted a customs waiver at Basra to the Al-Bu Sa'idis. After 1783, the year that Ahmad ibn Sa'id died, Al-Bu Sa'id influence expanded further when the Persian government issued a decree leasing to the Al-Bu Sa'idis the islands of Qishm, Hormuz, and Larak, and the Persian littoral Gulf ports of Bandar Abbas, Jask, and Shamil. After 1785, the Al-Bu Sa'id rulers consolidated historic Oman's commercial ties with the Indian rulers of Mysore, and they permitted Tipu Sultan, ruler of


78 Haidar Ali, the ruler of Mysore in the south of India from 1761 to 1782, was unique among the Indian rulers governing the patchwork of fiefdoms into which the British had been carving up India during this period. He considered the British the paramount threat to the entire subcontinent and fought, with some French assistance, to expel them until his death in 1782. He had been able to extract a favorable peace treaty from the British in 1769, and after his death, his son Tipu Sultan continued the fight until his defeat in 1799, when the British gained control of Mysore. Tipu Sultan's calculation that the French would come to his aid on the eve of their own revolution was one of the factors that contributed to his defeat. Kulke and Rothermund, A History of India, pp. 232-237.
Mysore from 1782-1799, to open a trading post at Musqat in 1785.\textsuperscript{79} By 1800, commercial ties between Musqat and India in general had developed to the point where more than half of the Indian imports going to Bushire and Basra, and the bulk of those bound for Al-Bahrain, were first received at Musqat.\textsuperscript{80} By 1792, Musqat had become the most important trade entrepot in the Arabian Gulf.\textsuperscript{81}

Between 1775 and 1800, in contrast to the previous decade, the British East India Company was facing considerable trade competition in the Arabian Gulf from Al-Bu Sa‘ids, the French, the Kingdom of Mysore in India, other local Indian merchants, the Al-Qawasim, and the Utub. The effects of this competition could be seen in the fact that by 1789, the sale of English woolen goods at Basra had declined to one fourth of what it had been twenty years before, and by 1796, had virtually ceased. This decline contrasted sharply with E.I.C. sales of woolen goods in the Arabian Gulf during previous periods. While during the 1763-1767 period, sales had amounted to a yearly average of 1,407 bales, the average for

\textsuperscript{79} Allen, Oman, The Modernization of the Sultanate, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{80} Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, vol. 1, p. 166.

\textsuperscript{81} Allen, Oman: Modernization of the Sultanate, p. 42.
the 1780/ 81-1789/ 90 period was only 229 bales. The decline occurred because the French had been selling the same goods at cheaper prices. In fact, between 1780 and 1790, British trade in woolens in the Arabian Gulf operated at a net loss, as did its accounts in general from the factory at Basra. During this period, the number of British merchants who were trading in the Gulf in general declined. Gulf trade by local merchants, however, was relatively brisk at the three main ports of Musqat, Bushire, and Basra. Also, while private British traders, along with those of the E. I. C., had found Arabian Gulf trade fairly lucrative during the 1760s and 1770s, during the 1780-1790 period, most of this trade from the Indian side was in the hands of Persian, Arab and Indian Muslim merchants.

82 Charles E. Davies, "Britain, Trade and Piracy: The British Expeditions Against Ras Al-Khaimah," in Davies, Global Interests in the Arab Gulf, p. 34.


87 Davies, in Davies, Global Interests in the Arab Gulf, p. 36; and Kelly, Britain and the Persian Gulf: 1795-1880, p. 57.
merchants had the advantage of lower overall expenditures in running and maintaining their ships, and therefore, lower freight costs. In Mysore, Tipu Sultan facilitated the growth of his own merchant stratum by establishing warehouses for them, and by supplying capital for the establishment of local enterprises. Within the Arabian Gulf, however, the British considered the Al-Qawasim an especially serious threat to their ambitions for a commercial monopoly.

As mentioned above, the Al-Qawasim were an Arab mercantile grouping that had migrated to historic Oman from the Persian littoral during the early 1700s. They first opposed the Al-Bu Sa‘ids after the Ya‘arabi civil war, supporting a faction of the old Ya‘arabi confederation that refused to extend recognition to the newly elected Al-Bu Sa‘ idi Imam, Ahmad ibn Sa‘id. By 1759, Ahmad ibn Sa‘id had obtained recognition from all of the groupings in historic Oman, with the exception of the Al-Qawasim, who were located in Julfar, in the northern Al-Sirr region, which extends from Julfar northward to the border of Qatar. Ahmad ibn Sa‘id,


89 Along with the Al-Qawasim, a tribal confederation, the Beni Yas, settled this region during the 1700. In particular, the Beni Yas settled that part of this area extending from the boundary of Qatar, southward to Dubai, and westward to Liwa, or the Bureimi Oasis.)
however, decided to recognize the autonomy of the Al-Qawasim,\textsuperscript{90} and therefore, despite their initial antagonisms, they were able to unite in relation to certain external threats, such as Karim Khan Zand’s threat to attack historic Oman in 1772.\textsuperscript{91}

The Al-Qawasim established their commercial base by settling in the ports of Julfar (later Ras Al-Khaimah), Sharqah, Khor Fakkan, Dibba, Rams, near Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Fujairah and Umm al-Qawain during the 1700s. The Al-Qawasim then extended their stronghold to Qishm, Qays and Lingah, on the Persian littoral, after 1755. Subsequently, the Al-Qawasim gained control of Charak and Shinas on the Persian littoral of the Arabian Gulf, and of both sides of the entrance to the Arabian Gulf.\textsuperscript{92} This gain came as a result of the weakness of Persia’s naval power after the death of Nadir Shah in 1747.\textsuperscript{93} By the early 1800s, the Al-Qawasim possessed a fleet of over five-hundred vessels. By this time, the expansion of their power placed the Al-Qawasim in conflict with the Al-Bu Sa'ids, and more importantly, with the British. In particular, the British saw Qasimi trade with India as a threat to their monopolistic designs, while the Al-Qawasim saw

\textsuperscript{90} Mohammed, \textit{Al-Qawasim}, p. 79.

\textsuperscript{91} Qasim, \textit{Al Khalij al 'Arabi}, p. 270.


\textsuperscript{93} Mohammed, \textit{Al-Qawasim}, p. 45.
it as a matter of survival. Developing vigorous trade with India, after all, was their means of obtaining such important foodstuffs as rice, and equally importantly, the wood they needed for building their ships.\textsuperscript{94}

The British were able to play upon the Al-Bu Sa‘idi ruler’s need for Indian trade, and that dynasty’s competition with the Al-Qawasim in order to induce Sultan ibn Ahmad Al-Bu Sa‘idi to sign the 1798 agreement with them, and it was also the fact that the Al-Bu Sa‘idis had become the most powerful rulers in the Arabian Gulf that the British chose to conclude this agreement with them to guarantee the exclusion of the French from there. This agreement allowed the British to establish a new factory at Bandar Abbas, and particularly importantly, to fortify it with as much artillery as was deemed necessary.\textsuperscript{95} This agreement further provided that Sultan ibn Ahmad was generally bound to side with the British government in international matters, and specifically that the Al-Bu Sa‘idis were to deny the French and Dutch commercial or other footholds within their domains. Further, the Al-Bu Sa‘idis were to exclude French vessels from Musqat, and to assist the British in the event of a war with France in the Arabian Gulf. The British pursuaded Sultan ibn Ahmad to sign

\textsuperscript{94} Al-Qasimi, \textit{The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf}, pp. 26 and 31.

\textsuperscript{95} Curzon, \textit{Persia and the Persian Question}, p. 423.
this agreement by dispatching ships flying the British flag to cruise the Gulf, as a demonstration of the naval weight behind British arguments.\(^6\) The British concluded a second agreement with Sultan ibn Ahmad Al-Bu Sa'id in 1800, which confirmed the stipulations of 1798, and which also allowed the British to place a political representative at Musqat. As a result, Sultan ibn Ahmad duly informed a French mission that arrived in Musqat in 1803 that he had concluded an agreement with the British barring the placement of a French representative at Musqat, and the French mission withdrew.\(^7\)

The British concluded agreements with other mercantile forces indigenous to the Arabian Gulf besides the Al-Bu Sa'id in order to consolidate their hegemony there. One significant British move was their 1793 agreement with the Utbi rulers of

\(^6\) Al-Qasimi, *The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf*, p. 31. At this time, the interior region, in contrast with the coastal region, of historic Oman rejected those agreements with the British, as well as Al-Bu Saidi rule in general. After this development, the interior region developed a kind of de facto autonomy from the coastal area. Amin Sa'id, *Al-Khalij al-‘Arabi: Fi Tarikhihi al-Siyasi wa Nahdatihi al-Hadithah* (*The Arabian Gulf in its Political History and Modern Resurgence*) (Beirut: Dar Al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1965), p. 46; and Saleh ‘Aqqad, *Al-Tayyarat al-Siyasiyah fi al-Khalij al-‘Arabi* (*Political Currents in the Arabian Gulf*) (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Library Publisher, 1992), pp. 48-51.

\(^7\) The British signatory to the 1798 agreement was a Persian named Mehdi Ali Khan, whom the British Bombay government had appointed as Resident of Bushire. Wilson, *The Persian Gulf*, pp. 231-233.
Kuwait under which they transferred the location of their Basra factory to that city. The Utub had developed mercantile power in historic Al-Bahrain as early as 1758, and their center at Kuwait had become a significant port to which Kuwaiti vessels brought goods from India. It was also a port of call for caravans bound for Aleppo, carrying these goods overland. Kuwait gained additional prominence after 1773, in relation to the decline of Basra in importance on account of the plague epidemic which struck that city during that year. Kuwait's relations with the British East India Company's Basra factory also deepened during this period as Kuwaiti vessels were hired by the British to carry dispatches ultimately bound for Bombay to Musqat.

Karim Khan Zand laid siege to and captured Basra between 1775 and 1779. He had wanted to capture Basra from the Ottomans because that city had taken considerable trade from the Persian littoral port of Bushire after 1770. This attack, like the plague epidemic before it, diverted more commerce from Basra to Kuwait, and further enhanced the relationship of the Utbi cities of Kuwait and Zubara, on the extreme north of

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98 The Al-Utub gained strength in Kuwait in relation to the fact that the Beni Khalid, who also lived in that area, were crushed by the Muwahidun (Wahhabis) expansion into that area during the late 1700s. More about the Muwahidun, and the effects of their expansion upon Arabian Gulf societies, later.

99 Abu Hakima, History of Eastern Arabia, p. 54.

100 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
the Qatar peninsula, with the E.I.C. This was because the British, who had supported the Ottomans at Basra against Karim Khan Zand, chose to unload goods from India at Kuwait or Zubara, rather than at Bushire, for conveyance to Aleppo via Basra. 101 Another important consequence of the Persian occupation of Basra was that many merchants from there migrated to Kuwait, enhancing that city's commercial importance further. 102 After 1776, Kuwait also became the point from which British desert mail bound for Aleppo from the Gulf was dispatched. 103 The development of the cooperative relationship between the British East India Company and the Utub attained full fruition after the Company re-located its factory from Basra to Kuwait in 1793, in the face of the increasing friction between the Company and the Ottoman government. 104

The Muwahidi Movement and its Alliance with the Al-Qawasim

Aside from their economic significance, the above-discussed agreements with both the Al-Bu Sa'id and the Utub were important to the British because they were meant to check

101 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
103 Abu Hakima, History of Eastern Arabia, pp. 96-97.
the expansion of another local social movement that had arisen as a counter-discourse to Ottoman rule and as resistance to British hegemony. This was the emerging Wahhabi movement, which gathered strength during the late 1700s.\footnote{Fuad I. Khuri, \textit{Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 19; and Ali Sultan, "Al-Ist'amar al-Urubi fi al-Khalij al-'Arabi," (European Colonialism in the Arabian Gulf), in Abdallah, \textit{Al-Khalij al-'Arabi}, p. 156.} In order to understand how the British consolidated their hegemony in the Arabian Gulf in the course of fighting this movement's key allies, the Al-Qawasim, it is necessary to examine the principles of this movement, its development, and the reason and manner in which it gained so many adherents in the Gulf in general, and in historic Oman in particular.

The name "Wahhabi", as this movement is known in the West, is actually a misnomer, which denotes its adherents merely as followers of Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), the movement's founder. By contrast, adherents to this movement, which is an interpretation of Islam, call themselves Muwahidun, or unitarians. The Muwahidi doctrine of Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab advocated a return to the Islamic beliefs that the Prophet Mohammed had laid down in the 600s A.D.. These doctrines stress the the oneness of God and advocate the abolition of innovative practices and beliefs that Islam had absorbed during the reign of dynasties that had
followed the early Caliphate, and especially during the Ottoman era. Some of the practices that Abd al-Wahhab and his followers opposed included saint worship, animism, the seeking of blessings, or barakat, from holy men or certain trees, and the building of monuments and shrines over the tombs of Islamic sheikhs. Muslims who engaged in these practices were what the Muwahidi movement called Mushrikun, or people who worshiped God through intermediaries, thereby worshiping something along with God. In this way, they constructed an identity for themselves as true Muslims, in relation to the Mushrikun, whom they constructed as renegades from Islam, or "others" who needed to be induced to return to the fold.

Abd al-Wahhab limited the sources valid for ijtihad, or independent decisions concerning Islamic law by religious personnel, to the Qur'an, the Sunna (the Prophet Mohammed's sayings and deeds), and to the Sirat al-Salaf, or sayings and deeds of the early Caliphs. He also emphasized that one of the most important aspects of Jihad, or defense of Islam, was eradicating from Islam the various, above-mentioned practices by the "others".  

In addition to constructing a discourse of religious philosophy, however, the Muwahidun were constructing a discourse with which they would unify the Peninsula against

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both the Ottomans and against European penetration. Accordingly, Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab saw tribalism in general as an obstacle to such unification, not only because the practices of tribal 'Urf often represented what the Muwahidun considered a departure from Islamic precepts, but also because the concept of nisab itself, which tribes used to differentiate themselves from each other, was viewed as something which fragmented the population.

One important contributing factor to the Muwahidi objections to tribalism and tribal practices was probably the origin of the early Muwahidi leadership, which laid the foundations for the orientation of the movement. Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab's roots, for instance, were not in the badia but in the small agricultural town of Unayna, in Nejd.107 His father, Abd al-Wahhab, had been a Qadhi (Islamic Judge), and also an instructor in and commentator on Hanbali doctrine in larger Nejdi cities of the Al-'Ared region.108 Mohammed Ibn Sa'ud, with whom Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab made an alliance for the spread of the Muwahidi movement in 1744, similarly had his roots in the settled population, specifically in the town

107 Ibid., p. 30.

108 Hanbali doctrine refers to the teachings of one of the four Sunni madhahib, or schools of thought, which developed during the early Abbasid period. These four madhahib are the Shaf'i, Maliki, Hanafi, and Hanbali schools of thought. Ameen Rihani, Makers of Modern Arabia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), p. 238.
of Deraiya, whose population consisted of farmers, craftsmen, traders, and religious personnel. Mohammed ibn Saud's forbears had been Imams in this town since the 1400s.\textsuperscript{109}

The \textit{Muwahidi} movement gained additional adherents in the towns and agricultural villages of Nejd, and their first important act of expansion was their final vanquishment in 1795 of the Bani Khalid tribal confederation, whose center was historic Al-Bahrain, the northern section of the Arabian littoral of the Gulf which included Kuwait. As a result of this defeat, the former Beni Khalid domains of historic Al-Bahrain, including Qatar, Bahrain, and Ihsa (containing the port of Al-Qatif), now came under the \textit{Muwahidi} rule. After that, the \textit{Muwahidun} expanded into much of the coast and interior area of historic Oman.\textsuperscript{110}

The \textit{Muwahidun} reached the Bureimi area of historic Oman around 1795, and there, they became neighbors of the Al-Qawasim, whose center was located along the coastal area of Al-Sirr. Another grouping settling in the area of the Bureimi Oasis was the tribal grouping of Beni Yas, which, as previously mentioned, had migrated there during the 1700s. Part of this grouping also settled at Abu Dhabi, in the Al-Sirr area of the coast of historic Oman in the mid-1700s.

\textsuperscript{109} Rasheed, \textit{Politics of an Arabian Oasis}, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{110} Ahmad Anani, "Gulf Relations with the West: An Historical Survey, (Part II)", \textit{Islamic Culture} 60, no. 4 (October, 1986): 53.
Because the Beni Yas were a tribal, rather than a mercantile grouping, most of them did not adopt the Muwahidi doctrine when the movement spread to their part of historic Oman, allying themselves with the Al-Bu Sa'id instead.\textsuperscript{111} In relation to the Muwahidi expansion, therefore, the Beni-Yas tribal grouping formed a confederation.\textsuperscript{112}

Between 1795 and 1799, the Muwahidi movement gained many adherents from among the Al-Qawasim, who formed an alliance with this movement during those years.\textsuperscript{113} Also during that period, the Muwahidi doctrine began to spread among the people of the coastal and interior areas of historic Oman. Along with expansions into historic Oman, the 1790-1805 years were a period during which the Muwahidun expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula, and into southern Iraq by 1802, entering Karbala during that year. By 1803, and 1805 respectively, the Muwahidun had even managed to enter Mecca and Medina. In Syria, they were approaching Damascus.\textsuperscript{114}

Both the Ottomans and the British came to see these Muwahidi expansions as threats to their control in the region.

\textsuperscript{111} Salibi, \textit{A History of Arabia}, p. 166.


\textsuperscript{113} Qasim, \textit{Al-Khalij al-‘Arabi}, pp. 275-277.

The apprehensions of the Ottomans stemmed from the fact that the Muwahidun had expanded into so much of the Porte's territory. Therefore, after expelling Napoleonic forces from Egypt in 1805, building a modern army complete with artillery, and consolidating his hold in Egypt as the Ottoman Viceroy, Mohammed Ali sent troops into the Arabian Peninsula, captured Muwahidi holdings, and, with the help of his son, Ibrahim Pasha, and European officers,\textsuperscript{115} destroyed the town of Deraiya, the Muwahidi center, thereby ending the spread of the Muwahidi movement in 1818.\textsuperscript{116}

The British, for their part, came to fear the Muwahidun for two major reasons. The first was the sheer strength they had gained during the course of their expansion, and the access to the Arabian Gulf that they had gained once they had reached the port of Al-Qatif. The second reason was the alliance they formed with the Al-Qawasim Confederation as they expanded from Nejd eastward toward the Arabian Gulf coast. (The Al-Qawasim formed a confederation in relation to the British threat.)\textsuperscript{117}

It has been mentioned above that the agreements between

\textsuperscript{115} Anani, in \textit{Islamic Culture} 60, no. 4 (October, 1986): 54.

\textsuperscript{116} Rentz, in Hopwood, \textit{The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics}, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{117} al-Kuwarí, \textit{Oil Revenues in the Gulf Emirates}, pp. 18-19.
the Al-Bu Sa'id and the British of 1798 and 1800 enjoined the
Al-Bu Sa'id to side with the British Indian government in
international matters. Consequently, once the Muwahidin
and the Al-Qawasim had cemented their alliance after the Muwahidin
had expanded their rule to the Al-Qawasim lands, the
commercial alliance that the Al-Bu Sa'id and the British had
constructed in 1798 and 1800 became a military one in
1808. This mainly occurred because the British
considered all the agreements that they had concluded with the
Al-Bu Sa'id useful for consolidating their hegemony in the
Arabian Gulf. For this reason, the British were temporarily
willing to entertain the idea of Al-Bu Sa'id commercial power
in the Gulf, although over the long range, they planned to
undercut the Al-Bu Sa'idis too, and deprive them of their
trade with India, by charging lower customs rates at a
proposed British base harbor between Qishm and Hanjam (two
Persian littoral islands then under Qawasimi rule), than they

118 This commercial alliance that the British had formed
with the Al-Bu Sa'id had its uncertainties. Although Sultan
ibn Ahmad Al-Bu Sa'id sent a message to the Ottoman Wali in
Baghdad, petitioning the Ottoman government for help against
the Muwahidin expansion in 1803, after his assassination in
1804, the next Al-Bu Sa'id ruler, Badr ibn Saif, formed an
alliance with the Muwahidun, but was assassinated, in turn, in
1805. The following Al-Bu Sa'id ruler, Sa'id, reverted to
that dynasty's former antagonistic position toward the
Muwahidun, and entered the military alliance with the British.
Qasim, Al-Khalij Al-'Arabi, pp. 278-280.
allowed at Musqat.\textsuperscript{119}

However, because the Al-Qawasim had not concluded a commercial agreement with the British, they, in contrast to the Al-Bu Sa'id, remained open adversaries to British ambitions, and the British therefore supported the Al-Bu Sa'id in their commercial competition with the Al-Qawasim, which the agreements of 1798 and 1800 had intensified, and which caused some armed conflict between the two Gulf polities after 1805. But it was in response to the Qawasimi alliance with the Muwahidun of 1805, and to their attempts to demand tribute from the British East India Company in exchange for navigational rights in the Gulf,\textsuperscript{120} that the British launched their first attack against the Qasimi Confederation, bombarding Ras al-Khaimah.\textsuperscript{121} In 1808, Lord Minto, Governor General of British India, stated that the "independence of Oman" was important to British political and economic interests in the Arabian Gulf, and authorized the Bombay Government to undertake joint operations with the Al-Bu Sa'id ruler Seyyid Sa'id ibn Sultan, who had been ruling since 1806, to destroy Qasimi power. It was also in relation to the reality of Qasimi commercial strength, and their alliance with


\textsuperscript{120} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 102.

\textsuperscript{121} Qalaji, \textit{Al-Khalij al-'Arabi}, p. 410.
the Muwahidun, that the British constructed the concept of "piracy" on the part of the Al-Qawasim, in relation both to the Al-Bu Sa'id, and to the British East India Company. The "pirate" label that the British affixed to the Al-Qawasim was a manifestation of a discourse in which the British differentiated themselves from the Al-Qawasim, and thereby justified the attacks they launched after 1805. Also, because they were the military power in the Arabian Gulf, the British were able to label one indigenous group, the Al-Qawasim, "pirates", while temporarily dubbing another, the Al-Bu Sa'id, allies, purely as measures for the realization of their own plans. British officials also stated that "support for Oman" was essential if the "Wahhabis" were not to spread their influence over all of historic Oman, and thereby gain access to historic Oman's harbors, and add "Oman's shipping to the pirate fleet."\[122\]

It is important to emphasize, however, that while rivalries between such local powers as the Al-Qawasim and the Al-Bu Sa'id were a reality in the Arabian Gulf, the British entered this alliance with the latter not to preserve "Omani independence," as they claimed, but because they viewed both the alliance, and the war with the Al-Qawasim as necessary steps toward extending their hegemony in the Arabian Gulf. The British agent in Musqat also stated that if the "Wahhabis"

\[122\] Hawley, The Trucial Coast, pp. 102-103.
were to assume dominance in Musqat, this would give them the entire Peninsular coast of the Arabian Gulf, which would subsequently threaten British control of India.\textsuperscript{123}

In 1809, the British launched a second naval attack against the Qasimi strongholds of Ras al-Khaimah, and destroyed fifty of the town’s ships, thirty of them very large vessels.\textsuperscript{124} The British hurried away from Ras al-Khaimah in order to avoid clashing with the Muwahidin, and then made for the Qasimi cities of Lingah, and Laft (Qishm Island), on the Persian littoral. At Lingah, they occupied the city and destroyed twenty ships in its harbor.\textsuperscript{125} They also destroyed several other Qasimi ports on both the Arabian and Persian littorals of the Gulf, along with their vessels.\textsuperscript{126} Among the destroyed ports were Rams, Jazirat al-Hamrah, Sharqah,\textsuperscript{127} and Shinas, which was under Muwahidi rule.\textsuperscript{128} The destruction of the Qasimi vessels is particularly significant, as most of them were commercial ships. British conscientiousness about destroying the vessels underscores the importance they placed upon destroying the Al-Qawasim as a

\textsuperscript{123} Qasim, \textit{Al-Khalij al-Arabi}, pp. 278-280.
\textsuperscript{124} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Wilson, \textit{The Persian Gulf}, p. 205.
\textsuperscript{127} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 104.
\textsuperscript{128} Qasim, \textit{Al-Khalij-Al-'Arabi}, p. 310.
commercial force. This, of course, meant depriving the Qasimi people of their livelihood.

After this attack on the Al-Qawasim, the British Bombay government tried to impose a ban on timber imports to Qasimi lands, in order to prevent the Al-Qawasim from building a new fleet. However, the enforcement of this ban eventually slackened, and as a result, by 1814 the Al-Qawasim had been able to replenish their fleets at Ras al-Khaimah, Shargah, Rams, Laft, Lingah, and Charak.

Several factors enabled the British to launch their final attack against the Al-Qawasim in 1819, and to destroy them, despite the fact that they remained a relatively strong force in the Gulf at that time. The first was the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in Europe, in 1815. This meant the defeat of one of Britain’s major rivals, and freed British troops from European deployment for use along British Indian Ocean trade routes and in the colonies. The second development was the defeat by the British of the Maharata resistance against them in India in 1818. The third, and particularly significant development was Mohammed Ali’s defeat of the Muwahidun during that same year. This last development deprived the Al-Qawasim of their main ally in the Gulf.

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129 Hawley, *The Trucial States*, p. 105


Because of these advantages, the British were able to overpower the Al-Qawasim forces in their ports along both shores of the Arabian Gulf, and destroy most of the Qasimi fleets, including both commercial and war ships. Specifically, after this last attack, Ras al-Khaimah was levelled, and the British divided its vessels that were left undestroyed with the Al-Bu Sa'idis. In addition, fortified houses and towers in the port cities of Rams, Jazirat al-Hamrah, Umm al-Quwain, Ajman, Fusht, Abu Hail, and Shargah, together with their vessels, were destroyed. In all, this amounted to the destruction of 184 ships.132

This defeat of the Al-Qawasim ushered in the period of British colonial rule in historic Oman. During this period, Britain consolidated its hegemony over the area by means of a series of treaties that the colonial authorities signed with the various local groupings (tribal, mercantile, etc.) in historic Oman, and this engendered the division of historic Oman into two main parts, namely, the Sultanate of Oman, and Trucial Oman. Trucial Oman is the section of historic Oman on which this research will focus for the Colonial period.

Conclusion

The period of 1500-1820 was a period of political, economic and cultural transformation for the Indian

Ocean/Arabian Gulf, because it was a period of European penetration, as demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six. The diffusion of information about the Indian Ocean commercial system’s wealth, along with the diffusion of military and seafaring technology, much of which had originated in China or in the domains of the Umma, to Europe, gave the Europeans the desire, and the military wherewithal, to penetrate the Indian Ocean beginning in 1500.

The first penetration was that of the Portuguese, and the discourse under which they penetrated the Indian Ocean was the continuation of their war of expulsion of Islam and Muslims from Iberia. The war against Islam in the Indian Ocean was to be prosecuted with the help of the mythical Prester John, and his equally mythical kingdom of Christians of the East. This chapter also demonstrated how and why the Portuguese penetration transformed the Indian Ocean system in relation to what it had been between 600 and 1500 A.D. Specifically, with the Portuguese penetration, the previously peaceful Indian Ocean became militarized, and just as significantly, trade patterns, i.e., composition and direction, were fundamentally altered. These transformations affected historic Oman, by weakening its indigenous mercantile stratum, along with that of the other Indian Ocean societies.

This Chapter specifically demonstrated that the Portuguese penetration of the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf
occurred in three stages. The first stage entailed Portugal's forcible entry of the Indian Ocean, and its bombardment of several Indian Ocean ports so that the latter would acquiesce to Portugal's establishment of trading posts and eventual monopolization of Indian Ocean trade. The second stage entailed imposition by Portugal's *Estado da India* of a regulatory system on Indian Ocean trade, and its enforcement of this system by means of naval power. The third stage was a stage of decline for the Portuguese in the face of widespread, although un-connected resistance to the *Estado da India* on the part of many indigenous forces, such as the Ya'arabi movement in historic Oman, which Chapter Five also treated.

In covering the Ya'arabi movement, this chapter analyzed its rise in relation to the Portuguese domination of the coastal area of historic Oman, specifically addressing the question of how the Ya'arabi movement succeeded in unifying historic Oman, forming a counter-discourse to Portuguese power, and in driving the Portuguese from historic Oman and places beyond it, such as the East African coast. Chapter Five also covered the decline of Ya'arabi rule, which occurred in relation both to external and internal developments, specifying how and why the transformations that had taken place within the Indian Ocean commercial configuration prevented the Ya'arabi movement from bringing historic Oman
back to its commercial importance of the 600-1500 A.D. period.

Beside the Ya'arabi successes, there were external factors in the decline of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf. These were primarily the penetrations of the Indian Ocean by other European forces who were at war with the Hispano-Portuguese empire. This development was covered in detail in Chapter Six, which focused upon the development of the Dutch and English mercantile strata in competition with Hispano-Portuguese over both the Indian Ocean and the Americas.

In treating the Anglo-Dutch phase of European penetration, Chapter Six analyzed how the Dutch and English mercantile strata established the two joint stock companies that were to be the instruments by which they penetrated the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf. These were the V.O.C. and the English East India Company (E.I.C.) The discourse under which the Dutch penetrated the Indian Ocean was the security of their newly independent Republic, and also the concept of freedom of navigation on the high seas, in refutation of the Papal decree that had "given" the Indian Ocean to Portugal.

The Anglo-Dutch penetration, like the Portuguese, occurred in three stages. During the first stage, these two powers established their domination of Indian Ocean trade by means of the armed might of their two chartered Companies. During the second stage, both the English and the Dutch
established themselves as dominant powers in inter-Asian trade, and established the direct export of Asian goods to Europe. The third stage was one in which Anglo-Dutch competition led to warfare between the two powers, and to the deepening of British, and to some extent, Dutch, territorial penetration of Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf lands. At the end of this stage, the Dutch consolidated power in some places in the Indian Ocean, notably in the Indonesian Archipelago, and the British gained political control of the territories that they were penetrating in the course of this competition, notably India. This British consolidation in the Indian Ocean was to lead to the establishment of British colonialism in Historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf.

Chapter Six also showed that the Dutch and English penetrations of the Indian Ocean featured both continuities and discontinuities with the Portuguese penetration that had preceded them. One discontinuity of the Portuguese penetration could be seen in the fact that both the V.O.C. and the E.I.C. were not crown monopolies but private merchants' consortia, complete with the right to raise their own military forces and to conclude their own peace treaties. Another discontinuity was the transformation in the composition of Indian Ocean exports that went to European markets, as a result of the changes in European consumers' tastes and preferences that the V.O.C. and the E.I.C. had engendered.
(Whereas the main Portuguese export from the Indian Ocean had been pepper, by the middle of the 1700s, the Dutch and British were exporting textiles and other commodities besides pepper from the Indian Ocean ports.) Continuities of the Portuguese penetration included the Dutch and English use of force as a method of procuring trade agreements and factory rights at Indian Ocean ports, and the adoption by both powers of the Portuguese "protection pass" system as a means of impeding local Indian Ocean commerce, and re-molding it so that it would facilitate Dutch and English commercial ambitions, rather than compete with them.

The three-way warfare of the early and mid 1700s between the English, the Dutch, and the French weakened the Dutch and caused them to lose their holdings in most of the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the Indonesian Archipelago, by the 1750s. Local resistance, coupled with this inter-European warfare, also drove the Dutch from their commercial holdings in the Arabian Gulf. By contrast, the British became dominant in the region by then.

Chapter Six also covered the new mercantile groupings, such the Al-Bu Sa'id, Al-Qawasim, and the Utub, tribal groupings such as the Beni Yas, and the Muwahidi movement, all of which had arisen in historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf in relation to British penetration and consolidation of hegemony there. This Chapter also analyzed the relationship of each of
these groupings with the British, who saw fit to fight, or to use, these various groupings in accordance with their strategic assessments of them. The Muwahidun, or "Wahhabis," are treated within this context as a social movement that formed a counter-discourse to both the British and the Ottoman Empire in the Arabian Gulf, and in the rest of the Peninsula. This social movement formed an alliance with the Al-Qawasim and expanded into the Arabian Gulf. Since the Muwahidun constituted a threat to Ottoman rule in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Al-Qawasim posed a threat to British politico-commercial ambitions in the Gulf, the Ottomans ultimately defeated the Muwahidun, and the British the Al-Qawasim. This cleared the path for complete British colonization of the Arabian Gulf including that part of historic Oman which was to become Trucial Oman.

Both Chapters Five and Six show that via these penetrations, the Portuguese, English and Dutch took over the role that historic Oman's mercantile stratum, and those of other Indian Ocean societies, had played not only within the Indian Ocean trade system itself, but also in linking the Indian Ocean commercial system to the Mediterranean one, and to the overland trade routes leading to Central Asia and Africa. In the wake of these developments, the old commercial cities of historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf, such as Suhar, Julfar, Khor Fakkan and Hormuz declined, as a result of the
decline of the Arabian Gulf's long-distance mercantile stratum. With the remolding of Arabian Gulf trade to fit European commercial purposes, new cities, such as Musqat, Bandar Abbas, and Bushire rose. The European takeover of Indian Ocean trade after 1500 led to the strangulation of the indigenous mercantile strata in other Indian Ocean cities such as Kliwa, Surat, etc., and these cities, too, declined as a result. Simultaneously, mercantile strata in European cities such as Antwerp, Amsterdam and London, became wealthy by virtue of Indian Ocean trade, hence, these cities rose.

Particularly importantly, Chapters Five and Six demonstrated how all of the European penetrations that they covered were part of a process that culminated in the consolidation of British colonialism in historic Oman and in the Arabian Gulf. The Colonial period in historic Oman will be the focus of subsequent chapters.
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE EARLY COLONIAL SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION IN TRUCIAL OMAN IN 1820-1945: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTIONS

Introduction

The Colonial Period is actually two periods. The first period includes the years between 1820 to the end of World War II (1945). The second period covers the years between 1945 and the end of 1971, when Trucial Oman gained its independence and became the United Arab Emirates. British colonialism and its political, economic and cultural impacts upon Trucial Oman’s society will be the covered for these two periods. This is necessary because British colonialism constructed an entirely new socio-discursive formation in what became Trucial Oman, in relation to the previous socio-discursive formations that had existed in the region. This new socio-discursive formation contained specific political, economic, and cultural relations, as well its own power relations (discourses).

It is necessary to devote considerable space to the colonial socio-discursive formation in Trucial Oman in order to assess this socio-discursive formation’s contrasts with the Islamic or transformational periods, and to evaluate whether or not aspects of the colonial socio-discursive formation have continued to articulate within the contemporary socio-

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discursive formation of the contemporary U.A.E. It is necessary to treat Trucial Oman's colonial socio-discursive formation as two periods for several reasons. The first reason for this is that British colonialism constructed two different sets of discourses in relation to the two different periods of its domination. The first set of discourses was constructed to justify British colonialism's destruction of indigenous mercantile power in the Arabian Gulf, and to justify the entrenchment process of British colonialism after the wars against the Al-Qawasim. The second set of discourses was constructed to justify the deepening of British colonial entrenchment in Trucial Oman, and to enable British colonialism to reproduce its economic, political and cultural relations in Trucial Oman.

The second reason for treating the colonial years as two periods has to do with changes that occurred in the British administration. Before the end of World War II, Trucial Oman was ruled from India, as a subdivision of the British Indian government. With India's gaining its independence in 1947, this ended. After the end of World War II, the British colonial administration of Trucial Oman became more direct than it had been prior to 1945.

Another reason for dealing with the colonial period in two periods has to do with the global situation. Prior to the Second World War, the U.K. was the global hegemon. After
1945, Britain was replaced in this role by the two new hegemons, namely, the United States and the Soviet Union. Another important reason for covering Trucial Oman's colonial socio-discursive formation in two periods is related to specifics of Trucial Oman's integration into the British-dominated global system. Prior to World War II, British colonialism integrated Trucial Oman into this global system through the pearl fisheries, and through the import of British manufactures into Trucial Oman. Following World War II, this integration took place in several new ways, including British companies' extraction and export of Trucial Oman's oil, series of development contracts that Trucial Oman's Rulers extended to British firms, and the growing import of British consumer goods into Trucial Oman.

The chapters covering these periods will present, and substantiate, several arguments. The main argument will be that, in establishing the colonial socio-discursive formation, the British relied heavily upon the political, economic, and cultural knowledge of the region that they had gained through surveys and research done by missionaries, and by travelers and writers linked to the British East India Company. The British also made it a point to be knowledgeable about classical Arabic writings about historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf region in general, translating many of these into English. This knowledge helped them carry out their
penetration, and enabled them to facilitate this penetration by constructing institutions that were superficially modeled on the actual, traditional ones of the region. Specifically, the British carefully studied such institutions as the mercantile stratum, tribalism, and historic Oman's traditional linkages with other Indian Ocean regions, and then reconstructed these institutions so that they appeared to be continuations of indigenous formations, but had actually become instruments of British penetration. The second, and related, argument will be that British penetration brought about an end to the existence of an already weakened indigenous, long-distance mercantile stratum in Trucial Oman, and engendered the rise of reconstructed tribal and mercantile strata, both of which were linked to British colonialism.

Another argument will be that, since British penetration into historic Oman brought about the construction of a different socio-discursive formation there, it also brought about the construction of counter-discourses within this socio-discursive formation. During the pre World War II period, for example, the re-orientation of Trucial Oman's economy solely toward pearl fisheries led to impoverishment in Trucial Oman because of the decline in historic Oman's long-distance mercantile power. Once the pearl industry, which had become Trucial Oman's main source of export revenues, declined before World War II, this engendered discontent among the
pearl merchants. This discontent was to culminate in the development of the local mercantile Reform Movement of the 1938-1939.

These chapters will also analyze the several factors that led to the development of the anti-colonial movement during the 1950s and 1960s. One factor was the general development of global anti-colonialism, both in its nationalist and socialist forms. The anti-colonial movement in the Arabian Gulf itself was fueled by the growth of anti-colonialism in the Arab world in general, and particularly in the Arabian Peninsula, since the Peninsular anti-colonial movements were specifically fighting region-wide British colonialism. Finally, these chapters will argue that, during the 1820-1945 and 1945-1971 periods, the impact of changes within the Western European socio-discursive formation upon colonized Trucial Oman were particularly profound, since Western Europe was industrializing, and expanding globally, economically, politically, and culturally.

Chapters Seven is presented in three sections. The first section covers the treaties that British colonialism imposed upon each sheikhdom from 1820-1945. The discourses underlying these treaties, and the consequences of these treaties for Trucial Oman's socio-discursive formation will also be analyzed. The second section focuses upon the British colonial administration in Trucial Oman. The third section
analyzes the pearl industry; how it was constructed, how it reproduced itself, and how it declined. Each presented section analyzes an important aspect of Trucial Oman’s colonial socio-discursive formation during the 1820-1945 period.

**British Colonization: Treaties, Discourses and Consequences**

The series of treaties that the various sheikhs of that part of historic Oman that became Trucial Oman signed with the British between 1820 and 1945 were instruments by which the British consolidated their colonial position in Trucial Oman. Each treaty was signed to further a particular objective of British colonialism in Trucial Oman, pertaining to security, trade, resources, concessions etc. This was because the British initially preferred signing a series of treaties with the Trucial Oman sheikhs addressing specific interests over making Trucial Oman an outright British protectorate, and thereby being obliged to exert the effort needed for taking over Trucial Oman militarily, and holding onto it.¹

This section will cover the treaties that the British imposed upon the Trucial Oman sheikhs, the discourse under which these treaties were imposed, and the consequences of these treaties for Trucial Oman’s mercantile, agrarian and

tribal socio-discursive formations. This section will also demonstrate that many of the methods that British colonialism used for controlling the Arabian Gulf were similar to those of the Portuguese of three hundred years earlier. However, the discourse under which the British took control of what became Trucial Oman and the Arabian Gulf after 1820 was very different, both from the Portuguese one, and from that which the British, themselves had been using during the 1600s, when they were in competition with the Portuguese and Dutch. Whereas the Portuguese had used the discourse of Christianity, especially as the adversary of Islam, to penetrate the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf in 1500, British colonialism had first used the discourse of free trade in their competition for a foothold there with the Portuguese and Dutch during the 1600s. After 1820, however, British colonialism switched to the discourse of championing humanitarianism, and the global spread of progress and civilization. This discourse not only facilitated the British colonial penetration of Trucial Oman and the Arabian Gulf, but it also seduced British public opinion into supporting this penetration, especially through its emphasis on the stated British mission of "eradicating piracy, slavery, and local warfare, and of ensuring stability and order." In addition, in constructing the "Others", i.e., the people of what became Trucial Oman, negatively, (as pirates and slave traders), the British were actually
constructing themselves positively in relation to the "Others".

Treaties

The earliest of the treaties that British colonialism imposed in Trucial Oman were signed in the wake of the British defeat of the Al-Qawasim, under the guise of ending "piracy", abolishing "slavery," etc. One of the final treaties, signed in 1892, officially gave the British control of Trucial Oman's external affairs. As shown in the previous chapter, the defeat of the Al-Qawasim and the Muwahidin (Wahhabis) had rendered the British the region's military hegemons, and therefore, there was little resistance to the imposition of these treaties.

British colonialism imposed these treaties as tools for the step-by-step consolidation of their colonization of Trucial Oman, and the colonization of Trucial Oman itself presented several immediate and more long term advantages for the British. The most immediate advantage was that by taking official control of Trucial Oman's external affairs, the British government could implant an apparatus which would ensure that local challenges to British mercantile hegemony, such the Qasimi Confederation of the end of the eighteenth century, could never again rise. Official British control of Trucial Oman also prevented it from uniting with other forces that had previously served as counter-discourses to British
penetration, such as the Muwahidin (Wahhabs), or the Ottomans.

The more long-term advantages to British colonialism that colonization of Trucial Oman offered included, firstly, Trucial Oman’s future potential as a base for fortifying the British hold on India, the largest British colony in the Indian Ocean. Secondly, Trucial Oman, itself, represented a market for British exports, albeit a small one. Thirdly, Trucial Oman served as an important communicational midpoint between British holdings in India to the east, and in Suez to the West. Fourthly, the British viewed Trucial Oman as an important base for preventing other European powers, such as the French, from gaining a foothold in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf. Fifthly, the British had become interested in the potential lucractivness of the pearl fisheries. Later, and more significantly, as the treaties below show, the British became interested in Trucial Oman’s potential oil reserves.

It is important, however, to discuss each treaty in greater depth, in order to expose the discourses that British colonialism constructed to facilitate the imposition of each one. A closer examination of the imposed treaties will also clarify the specific colonial interest that the British were furthering with each one.

The first treaty, signed in 1820, was essentially a
peace treaty between the British and the Al-Qawasim, signed directly after the final British expedition of 1819 against this Qasimi Confederation. As shown above, British warfare against the Al-Qawasim had culminated in the destruction of most of the Qawasimi merchant vessels, and in the levelling of Ras al-Khaimah. After defeating the Al-Qawasim, the British stationed a squadron of vessels at Ras al-Khaimah to ensure the enforcement of this treaty, and to patrol the surrounding coast.\(^2\) However, before signing this peace treaty of 1820, the sheikhs of Trucial Oman (and Bahrain, which then included Qatar) were required to sign a preliminary one, which was significant because it required them to turn over all vessels, towers, and guns to the British, in exchange for British restoration of fishery and pearling craft to them.\(^3\)

The main treaty itself, which the Shaikhs of Ras al-Khaimah, Sharqah, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Umm al-Qawain, as well as Bahrain,\(^4\) signed, branded the Al-Qawasim with the "pirate" label once more, and then enjoined legal Qasimi vessels, and those that the British permitted the other signatories to sail, to fly a specific, red and white flag.


\(^3\) Lorimer, *Gazeteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 570-671.

Permitted vessels were also ordered to carry documents of registration and port clearance, describing the ship, the size of its crew, its destination, etc., Qasimi and other "friendly Arab" vessels were to present these documents at sea whenever they encountered a British ship. Another significant aspect of this treaty was that, while it labeled as "piracy" any naval actions by natives against the British presence, it did not prohibit British colonialism from taking action against any native forces in Trucial Oman. Nor did it prohibit the sheikhs of Trucial Oman from fighting each other at sea or on land.

Because the treaty of 1820 had limited permitted vessels for Trucial Oman to those for fishing and pearling, and thereby had severely circumscribed the economy of Trucial Oman, fighting frequently broke out among the forces of the various sheikhs during the pearl-fishing season. Fighting also occurred because of the manner in which the Treaty of 1820 constructed the sheikhdoms of Trucial Oman, as territories without specific borders. (More about this later.) This led the British to impose another treaty in 1835, prohibiting maritime warfare among the sheikhdoms for a six-month period. (It was specifically under this treaty that the region comprising the sheikhdoms in question came to be known

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5 Ibid., pp. 245-247.
6 Ibid., pp. 197 and 199.
as the "Trucial Coast." This treaty was renewed on through 1853, when another treaty superceded it.

This latter treaty decreed a perpetual cessation of maritime fighting among the peoples governed by the sheikhs of Trucial Oman, and designated the British government as enforcer of this peace. It further prohibited any signatory's retaliation against a violator of the peace, instead enjoining that signatory to file a complaint with the British government. It is important to note, however, that while this treaty prohibited maritime warfare among the sheikhdoms, it still did not bar their fighting each other on land. This treaty also contained an annex, added in 1864, wherein the sheikhs of Trucial Oman pledged to abstain from any interference with British telegraph installations, and to punish acts of aggression or trespass against such installations on the part of their subjects.

A third treaty of 1838, which the sheikhs of Ras al-Khaimah, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Ajman signed with the British gave the latter the right to detain and search vessels suspected of "carrying slaves," and to confiscate them if

7 Wilson, The Persian Gulf, p. 209;.


slaves were found among their cargo.\textsuperscript{10} A fourth treaty of 1847 reiterated previous provisions giving British government ships the right to confiscate ships "carrying slaves," and also stated that the Sheikhs of Trucial Oman agreed to prohibit the "export of slaves" from Africa or elsewhere aboard their ships.\textsuperscript{11}

The sheikhs of Trucial Oman signed a mutual extradition treaty among themselves in 1879. This treaty particularly pertained to pearl divers and sailors, both of whom were chronically in debt to their employers. (More about this later.) The treaty basically provided that each signatory sheikh was obliged to extradite runaway debtors from other sheikhdoms to the sheikhdoms from which they were escaping, on pain of a fine, plus the obligation to pay the runaway's debts. The British government's representative, called the "Native Agent," was empowered under this treaty to demand the extradition of the runaway, and to preside over arbitrations if facts about a runaway's case were in dispute.\textsuperscript{12}

The Treaty of 1892, that the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, and later, the other sheikhs of Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Sharqah, Umm al-Qawain, and Dubai signed with the British government, officially stamped the British government as the ruler of

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 199.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., pp. 251-252.

\textsuperscript{12} Mann, \textit{Abu Dhabi: Birth of an Oil Sheikdom}, p. 124.
Trucial Oman. Under this treaty, the sheikhs of Trucial Oman pledged that neither they nor their heirs or descendants would enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than the British government. The signatory sheikhs further pledged that, without the consent of the British government, no agent of any other government would be permitted residency in Trucial Oman. Finally, this treaty enjoined the signatories against ceding, selling, mortgaging, or otherwise giving for occupation any part of Trucial Oman to any government other than the British.  

(At various times, the British government signed similar agreements with Bahrain, Kuwait, and Musqat and Oman as well.)

The Sheikhs of Trucial Oman agreed to prohibit the import of arms into their territories in a treaty that they signed with the British government in 1902. A 1911 treaty stated that the sheikhs of Trucial Oman would agree to refrain from responding to any foreign overtures regarding pearling or sponge fishing concessions along the Trucial Oman coast without the consent of the British Political Resident in the Arabian Gulf. In 1922, the Trucial Oman sheikhs signed what was to be a particularly significant treaty with the British government in later years. This treaty simply stated that


14 Ibid., p. 257.
should oil be discovered in Trucial Oman, the signatory sheikhs would not extend concessions to anyone other than a British government appointee.  

Colonial Discourses in Relation to the Treaties

The first treaty, signed between Trucial Oman's sheikhs and the British in 1820, marked the final destruction of what had been historic Oman's long-distance mercantile stratum. This treaty also illustrates that, in legal terminology, the British had destroyed this stratum, represented by the Al-Qawasim, under the guise of fighting "piracy," by constructing the Al-Qawasim as "pirates". In actuality, however, the "piracy" construction was a discourse that officials of the British East India Company presented to the British government in India so as to obtain the materiel needed for defeating the Al-Qawasim, who were challenging British mercantile hegemony in the Arabian Gulf. Through construction of the "piracy" discourse in relation to the Al-Qawasim, the British East India Company officials constructed the Al-Qawasim as "lawless pirates" deserving punishment, and in so doing, constructed themselves as a force of stability and legality, justly suited to "punish the pirates."  

\[15\] Ibid., p. 261.

\[16\] Al-Qasimi, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, p. XV, in "Introduction." This book offers well-documented coverage of this ongoing treatment of the Al-Qawasim, and, in fact, refutes the idea that the Al-Qawasim of the 1700s-1820 can be
the British had signed this treaty with the Sheikhs of Sharqah, Umm al-Quwein, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, and Ajman, the treaty obliged the various sheikhdoms to fly distinct red and white flags which denoted each as a signatory to the 1820 treaty, or, in British parlance, as a "friendly Arab" entity. In this way, British colonialism took the first step toward conferring a separate identity upon each Sheikhdom in relation to all of the others, and this set the precedent for more subsequent segmentation among them in terms of economics, politics and culture.

In requiring "friendly Arab" vessels to carry documents of registration and port clearance, describing the ship, the size of its crew, its destination, etc., the British were using methods that the Portuguese had established before them, except that again, the British had constructed a different discourse in relation to these methods. In specific reference to inspecting local ships, the Portuguese had outrightly stated that this was a measure for the protection of "their" ocean. The British discourse, by contrast, claim that these methods were aimed at "protection" of navigation, and the safeguarding of "free trade" against "piracy", and the general

considered "pirates" at all. Most of the sources cited in the book are British archival documents.

17 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, pp. 284-285.
preservation of "law and order".

British colonialism constructed other discourses in relation to the treaties of 1838 and 1847 as well. Both of these treaties empowered the British to detain and search vessels suspected of "carrying slaves," and the Treaty of 1847 also prohibited the "export of slaves" from East Africa or elsewhere aboard Trucial Oman's vessels. In relation to these treaties, the British used the concept of the "abolition of slavery," however laudable a goal in itself, as a discourse for furthering their establishment of economic, political and cultural hegemony in East Africa.\(^{18}\) This discourse enabled the British government to legitimize its penetration of East Africa by leading the British public to believe that the aim of these treaties was really part of a campaign to "abolish slavery."\(^{19}\) The same pretext served as a discourse under which the British continued to attack merchant ships from Trucial Oman.

It is important to note here that in constructing the Arabs of Muscat and Trucial Oman as "slave traders," not only were the British constructing themselves as humanitarians in contrast, but they were also concealing the Western European origins of, and continuing role in, both East and West African


\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 449.
slave trade during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{20} Between 1760 and 1810 only, for example, the British had exported to their American colonies as many as 1,613,000 slaves from Africa themselves.\textsuperscript{21} In 1772, over one hundred ships sailing from Liverpool were engaged in the slave trade. In 1792, this was true of one out of every twelve.\textsuperscript{22}

It is true that anti-slavery rhetoric became particularly strong in Britain during the 1830s, and an Act of Parliament emancipated all slaves in British colonies in 1838 as Britain’s socio-discursive formation changed from a mercantile to an industrial one. But the anti-slavery discourse had roots other than humanitarian ones. In fact,  

\textsuperscript{20} M.D.D. Newitt points out that the demand for slaves from Eastern Africa began, and grew with the French establishment of coffee, sugar, and wheat plantations on the Indian Ocean islands of Mauritius, Reunion, and Rodrigues that they had taken around 1715. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the demand for slaves that the French plantations had engendered had grown enough for the Portuguese to enter this commerce, shipping many slaves to Brazil. See M.D.D. Newitt, “East Africa and Indian Ocean Trade: 1500-1800,” in Das Gupta and Pearson, India and the Indian Ocean: 1500-1800, p. 219. Even the Al-Bu Sa‘id clove plantations on Zanzibar that the British had used as a pretext for penetrating East Africa largely catered to a European market. Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982), p. 97. Newitt also emphasizes that these plantations had been established in the first place because the French had made East African slave trade so profitable and extensive previously.


\textsuperscript{22} Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: Perigee Books, 1980), p. 162.
the real target of much anti-slavery agitation by British industrialists in the 1830s was the privileged, monopoly status of West Indian shipments of sugar and cotton to Britain brought about by the substantially lower import duties charged at British ports against sugar and cotton imports from the Carribean, in comparison with duties charged for cotton and sugar imports from other sources. Sugar from some other sources, in fact, was a prohibited import at British ports unless it was to be re-exported.

Privileged status for West Indian sugar and cotton imports even continued during a time when West Indian production of both sugar and cotton was declining, but the expanding British cotton textile and sugar refining industries were coming to need increasing quantities of sugar and cotton, which they could obtain from additional sources such as Brazil, the U.S. and India. For this reason, in the rhetoric of British industrialists, the call for free trade was as loud as, or louder than, that for the abolition of slavery in British West Indian colonies.

Indeed, it was this very industrial expansion that made the same British industrialists remarkably quiet about the reality of slavery in the other economies from which they eventually purchased their sugar and cotton, such as Brazil
and the United States. This silence in regard to Brazil and the United States indicates that British colonialism was actually using the slavery discourse as a pretext to attack ships both from Trucial Oman and Musqat and Oman, and to penetrate East Africa, and thereby to dominate these areas, and not as an expression of abolitionist humanitarianism.

Despite the double standards of British industrialists and government regarding slavery, a genuine anti-slavery movement also took hold in other British strata and groupings, as a counter-discourse to the slavery-dominated mercantile socio-discursive formation prevailing in Britain until the early nineteenth century. These strata and groupings included women, industrial workers, and parliamentary representatives from towns whose economies depended upon such non-slave based industries as steel and wool. This counter discourse was fueled by several uprisings by the slaves

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23 For detailed coverage of the economic motivations behind anti-slavery within the British colonies among British industrialists in the 1830s, and their quiescence about purchases from other slave economies in the 1840s, see Chapters Nine and Ten of Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*.

24 Part II of Clare Midgeley’s *Women Against Slavery: The British Campaigns, 1780-1870* (London: Routledge, 1992), covers extensively the role of women in the anti-colonial slavery movement in Britain between 1823 and 1838.

25 Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, pp. 157-161
themselves across the British colonies between 1800 and 1838.  

As stated above, the 1879 treaty that the Trucial Oman sheikhs signed with the British obliged each sheikhdom to extradite runaway debtors to any other sheikhdom from which they were escaping. The debtors at whom this treaty was mainly aimed were pearl divers and other crew members from pearling ships. This treaty was actually a manifestation of a discourse whose underlying purpose was the pearling industry's reproduction of itself. Since the pearl industry depended upon the labor of divers and crew members of pearling vessels, keeping these two groups in debt to the owners of the ships and to pearl merchants served to bind them to the industry. Therefore, the provisions in the Treaty of 1879 making it difficult for divers and pearling ships' crew members to escape their debts ensured the ongoing extraction of pearls, and consequently, the continued profits of pearl merchants, and most importantly, of the Banyan financiers of the

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26 Ibid., pp. 203-207. James Walvin points out that resistance was the norm among slaves in the Americas, occurring from the time of their capture to years after their settlement on American plantations. He also mentions that this resistance took many forms. The major rebellions in the British-held West Indies during the early 1800s took place under the inspiration of the massive slave uprising that led to the independence of Haiti in the 1790s, which, in turn, had been inspired by the French Revolution. Slaves in the British West Indies were also becoming aware of the British abolitionist movement during the early 1800s. See Walvin, Slaves and Slavery, Chapter 7.
industry. These Banyan financiers and pearl exporters, about whom more later, had developed a special partnership with the British, and were protected British subjects.

In addition, the Treaty of 1879 reinforced the segmentation of Trucial Oman because each sheikh signed it separately with the British. This treaty also contained the usual provisions facilitating further British intervention in Trucial Oman's internal affairs. These provisions included empowerment of the British government's "Native Agent" to demand the extradition of a runaway debtor, and to preside over the arbitration of cases where the facts were in dispute. The extradition provisions also constructed additional situations that could lead to disputes between sheikhdoms, and that could consequently serve as pretexts for further British intervention to "solve the disputes." 27

The preceding treaties discussed above led to the 1892 treaty, which gave the British official control of Trucial Oman's external affairs, specifically prohibiting the Trucial Oman sheikhs from ... "entering into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British Government." 28 These individual discourses pertaining to

27 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, pp. 292-293.

Trucial Oman notwithstanding, it was precisely during this 1870-1914 period that around thirty-eight territories in Africa and Asia became British "protectorates" as well. These included Zanzibar, Uganda, Somalia, Lagos and Gambia, as well as Egypt, Sudan, present-day South Africa, Hong Kong, Burma, and the Malay Protected States. (India, Yemen, and many others were already British possessions.)

What was actually happening here was that industrialization throughout Western Europe was constructing a situation in which the latecomers to industrialization, such as Germany, Belgium, Italy and Russia were competing with previously established industrial powers such as France and Britain for territory, natural resources, markets, cheap labor, and investment opportunities, through political, economic and cultural domination of territories outside of Europe. Previously established industrial powers were also engaged in similar competition among themselves. These developments were taking place within the context of changes within the European socio-discursive formation.

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30 For additional coverage of the situation of latecomer countries to industrialization in relation to previously established industrial powers, see Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966).
Britain wrote exclusionary provisions into the treaty of 1892 that it signed with the sheikhs of Trucial Oman in order to secure juridically exclusive British colonial rights there, since under this treaty, each signatory sheikh was prohibited from having any dealings or agreements with, or ceding territory to, outside powers other than Britain. Britain's intention here was to prevent the French, Germany, the Russians, or the Ottomans, who had renewed their interest in Trucial Oman, from claiming it themselves.\textsuperscript{31} In particular, Germany worried Britain because of the building of the Berlin-Baghdad railway, which threatened to facilitate a German penetration of the Arabian Gulf.\textsuperscript{32}

The Treaty of 1892 also prevented the different Trucial Oman sheikhdoms themselves from uniting, or from entering any other mutual agreements, without British consent. Other important attributes of this treaty were that it made Britain

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\textsuperscript{31} Glen Balfour-Paul, \textit{The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies} (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 101. In 1870-1871, in the course of their crushing a second Muwahidi (Wahhabi) state, the Ottomans's re-took control of al-Hasa province, and placed a garrison in Qatar, then part of historic Al-Bahrain. This clashed with British interests both in Qatar, in the rest of historic Al-Bahrain, and in Trucial Oman, as the British had signed a Perpetual Treaty with Bahrain in 1853, and earlier treaties with the sheikhs of Qatar themselves. Briton Cooper Busch, \textit{Britain and the Persian Gulf: 1894-1914} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 24.

the formulatator of Trucial Oman's foreign policy, and ensured Britain's political, economic and military domination in the Arabian Gulf for an indefinite period, as the Treaty provided no date of expiry.33

It was mentioned earlier that the Treaties of 1835 and 1853 prohibited maritime warfare among the sheikhdoms of Trucial Oman without barring warfare on land. The reason for this was that the British did not want maritime fighting among the sheikhdoms to jeopardize the pearling industry, and other British commercial activity. However, land warfare among the sheikhdoms posed no such threat to the British, whose Resident actually made it a practice to give gifts that included gunpowder to the Trucial Oman sheiks that he periodically visited.34

While the Resident was dispensing his periodic gifts of gunpowder to the Trucial Oman sheikhs, private British, French and other European arms traders were importing rifles into Trucial Oman. By 1899, these traders were importing rifles into both Musqat and Oman, and Trucial Oman at a rate of 20,000 per year.35 This was significant because the division


35 Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 139.
of Trucial Oman into several sheikhdoms without borders, and the poverty caused by the destruction of Trucial Oman’s long-distance trade, coupled with the decline of related agricultural production and manufactures, made internecine fighting among the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms more likely. This division and impoverishment also precluded any united resistance to British rule.

However, by 1902, the British decided that any armaments delivered to the population of Trucial Oman might facilitate their resistance of the establishment of a permanent British military presence there.\(^{36}\) During that year, therefore, the British signed a treaty with the Trucial Oman sheikhs which prohibited the import of arms per se into their territories. British colonialism had actually constructed a "peacekeeping" discourse in relation to this treaty, and like its predecessors, this discourse was being used as a pretext to deepen British colonial penetration of Trucial Oman, as evidenced by the "Hyacinth incident".

This incident occurred in relation to a British plan of 1910 to install a British Political Officer, a telegraph station, and a post office at Dubai. The British Political Resident in Burshire, Sir Percy Cox, saw the need for these facilities as urgent, because of increasing British commercial

\(^{36}\) Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 10.
interests in Dubai, and because of the British fear of threats from the French, the Germans, and other industrial powers.

However, despite the fact that Cox pushed for them, the Sheikh of Dubai, Buti ibn Suhail, refused to consent to these installations. In response, Cox used intelligence that he received in 1910 that the coast of Oman had become a "forwarding base for arms" as a pretext for one more attempt to press Sheikh Buti into accepting the British installations. As a means for exerting pressure, Cox made it a point to take the Hyacinth, one of the warships from the British fleet in the Arabian Gulf whose purpose was to "stop arms traffic", with him to the negotiations.37

As part of these pursuasion tactics, a British crew landed at Dubai in December, 1910, and began a search for evidence of the alleged arms traffic. Upon seeing armed men conducting a search for arms in houses and elsewhere around their city, the townspeople resisted, killing five members of the British search party. After inflicting reprisals upon the population, and killing thirty-seven people, the British ordered the Sheikh of Dubai to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000 and to deliver up all arms in Dubai within forty-eight hours. They also told the Sheikh that the people of Dubai would have to accept the presence of a British agent, and a telegraph

station, in the city. The people of Dubai ended up paying the fine, despite the fact that no significant discoveries about arms traffic were made, and despite the fact that the British Political Officer, post office, and telegraph station were not to be installed there until after the First World War.

The final treaty imposed during the 1820-1945 period pertained to oil concessions, and the Trucial Oman sheiks signed it with the British in 1922 — separately, as usual. Under this treaty, the Trucial Oman sheikhs each agreed to extend oil concessions only to personnel appointed by the British government, in the event of an oil discovery. The significance of the Treaty was that British oil companies had discovered oil in Iran near Abadan in 1908, and in Trucial Oman itself, during World War I. The British obviously were ensuring exclusive prospecting rights for themselves when they imposed this Treaty upon Trucial Oman. The oil question will

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be treated in detail in the following chapter.

**Consequences of the Treaties**

All of the treaties that the British imposed on the Trucial Oman sheiks had lasting impacts upon Trucial Oman. Firstly, the treaties permanently divided what had been historic Oman into two portions, namely, Trucial Oman and Musqat and Oman. The latter, too, signed a series of colonial treaties with the British, and underwent similar segmentation as a consequence. Equally significantly, these treaties separated Trucial Oman from the rest of the Arab and Islamic world by implanting British political presence in Trucial Oman, and naval presence in the Arabian Gulf. This precluded such developments as a second merger with the Muwahidin, or the expansion of the Ottoman empire into the region. Thirdly, as mentioned above, the British treaties divided Trucial Oman itself into separate sheikhdoms, conferring an identity upon each in relation to all of the others, and paving the way for further segmentation among the sheikhdoms in terms of politics, economics, and culture.

The British arbitrarily signed these treaties with leaders of mercantile and tribal families that were situated in Trucial Oman’s coastal area at the time, and not with other familial leaders in the interior or in the deep desert. This was because the British were mainly interested in securing the coast, where British colonial interests mainly were at the
time. In signing these treaties with the tribal and mercantile families along the coast, the British reconstructed these families so as to engender their transformation from the indigenous tribal and mercantile leaders they had formerly been to hereditary rulers of a parcel of land. Through these treaties, the British also constructed a heierarchy in Trucial Oman’s society, wherein they bestowed power and prestige upon signatory mercantile and tribal families in relation to other families belonging to the same strata. Finally, these treaties brought about fundamental transformations in Trucial Oman’s tribal and mercantile socio-discursive formations, reconstructing them to serve the British colonial apparatus, rather than to function within what had once been historic Oman’s own socio-discursive formation.

During the 1700s, prior to the first treaty between the British and the sheikhs of what became Trucial Oman in 1820, the Arabian littoral of the Arabian Gulf coast was divided between two local powers, the aforementioned Al-Qawasim and Beni Yas confederations. The Al-Qawasim constructed their confederation as a defensive response to initial British penetration of historic Oman’s coastal area. The Beni-Yas, by contrast, constructed their confederation as a defensive response to an indigenous force, namely, the Muwahidin. The territory of the Al-Qawasim, a maritime mercantile power, extended from Sharqah to Ras al-Khaimah. It also included
part of the coast along the Gulf of Oman, which contained the old mercantile cities such as Dibba, Khor Fakkan, and Kalbah. (By this time, however, these cities had become local agricultural and fishing villages.) The territory of the Bani Yas, who were a land-based, tribal power, extended from Dubai to the boundary of Qatar, along the Arabian Gulf coast. It also extended westward toward Bureimi. The Beni Yas maintained an alliance with the Al-Bu Sa'id who ruled the Sultanate of Musqat and Oman, in contrast to the Al-Qawasim, who remained separate from the Al-Bu Sa'id.

In regard to the Al-Qawasim, whom the British had defeated in 1820 in the war described in the previous chapter, the British replaced their old adversary, Shaikh Hassan bin Rahmah of Ras al-Khaimah with Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr. However, the British refused to sign the 1820 Treaty only with Sheikh Sultan as leader of the entire Qasimi Confederation, signing it instead with several prominent members of the Qasimi Confederation of their own choosing, namely, Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr for Sharqah and Ras al-Khaimah only, with Sheikh Abdallah bin Rashid for Umm al-Quwain, and with Sheikh Rashid bin Hamaid, for Ajman. Thus, by means of the Treaty of 1820, British colonialism divided the Qasimi confederation into three sheikhdoms.\(^{41}\) All of these signatory sheikhs gained British recognition as rulers, or sheikhs of the

\(^{41}\) Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 110.
designated territories making up their sheikhdoms.

Under the 1820 Treaty, the British similarly dismembered the Bani Yas Confederation by refusing to allow Sheikh Shakhbut bin Dhiyab to sign it as sole representative of the Beni Yas. Instead, they signed it with Sheikh Tahnoun bin Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Haza bin Za'al of Dubai, who was not yet in his teens, thereby dividing that Confederation into the Sheikhdoms of Abu Dhabi and Dubai.\(^{42}\) Additional sheikhdoms attained British recognition when other representatives of prominent families signed agreements with them. In 1833, for example, the Al-Bu Falasah section of the Bani Yas confederation migrated from Abu Dhabi to Dubai, out of dissatisfaction with the rule of the then Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Khalifa bin Shakhbut, and established an Al-Bu Falasah sheikhdom there, which the British recognized.\(^{43}\) Ras al-Khaimah became a separate Sheikhdom from Sharqah in 1914, as a result of a dispute among the successors and descendents of Sheikh Sultan bin-Saqr over Ras al-Khaimah's status. This dispute began in 1866, the year of Sheikh Sultan’s death, and ended with the British recognition of Ras al-Khaimah’s

\(^{42}\) Ibid.

separation from Sharjah in 1914.\textsuperscript{44}

The Qasimi confederation was divided once again when the British constructed the town of Kalbah as yet another Trucial sheikhdom, which lasted from 1936 until 1952. The British constructed this sheikhdom in relation to the airline concessions that they were obtaining at that time. (See below.)\textsuperscript{45} Fujairah, also on Qasimi territory, was constructed as a Trucial Oman sheikhdom in 1952.\textsuperscript{46}

The manner in which the division of Trucial Oman into so many Sheikdoms occurred was important for the reproduction of British dominance there, and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf. The fact that the British recognized the representatives of the prominent families with whom they had signed the 1820 Treaty, and subsequent ones as absolute rulers over certain territories, coupled with the fact that these territories were not explicitly demarcated in any of the treaties, led to internecine fighting among the sheikhdoms. That this situation assisted the reproduction of British colonial domination of Trucial Oman could be seen in the fact increased fighting among the Sheikdoms provided the British

\textsuperscript{44} Said Zahlan, \textit{The Origins of the United Arab Emirates}, pp. 49-51.


\textsuperscript{46} J.E. Peterson,"Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia," \textit{The Middle East Journal} 31, no. 3 (Summer, 1977): 302.
with ongoing pretexts to intervene and strengthen their foothold in Trucial Oman, and these interventions resulted in the imposition of additional treaties on the Trucial Oman sheikhs.

Also, because the British treaties with the Trucial Oman sheikhs made maritime warfare, and subsequently, land warfare, "illegal," the British were able to use outbreaks of fighting among the sheikhdoms as pretexts for levying fines against their populations. Frequent incidents of fighting among the sheikhdoms of Trucial Oman also made them all dependent upon the British to play the role of referee, and also afforded those sheikhdoms that were land-based the opportunity to expand at the expense of those that had been mercantile, and had lost their former strength because of British warfare against the Qasimi Confederation.47

Under the British treaties, tribalism in Trucial Oman

47 For coverage of all the internecine wars that broke out among the Trucial Oman sheikdoms after they signed the 1820 treaty with the British, see Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, vol. 1, pp. 689-702; 710-726, and 731-736. For treatment of the expansion of territorial power by land based sheikhdoms, see Mann, Abu Dhabi: Birth of an Oil Sheikdom, pp. 48-65. British treaties signed with notables elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf engendered similar patterns of division and warfare outside of Trucial Oman. For example, C.U. Aitchison outlines the treaties that brought about the division of Oman (Musqat) first into two entities, Oman (Musqat), and Zanzibar, (1861), and the wars that followed these treaties in Treaties and Engagements relating to Aragia and the Persian Gulf, pp. 269-319. Chapter Nine of Landen's Oman Since 1856 covers the official British recognition of the division of Oman (Musqat) into the Sultanate and Imamate of Oman (1920).
underwent a complete transformation, from a socio-discursive formation that had been closely interlinked with the indigenous mercantile and agrarian systems, to a socio-discursive formation that the British reconstructed for the reproduction of British hegemony in Trucial Oman. (This was mainly true of tribes whose *diras* were close to the coastal area during this period.) This reconstruction of the tribal socio-discursive formation occurred in relation to the implementation of the treaties between each individual sheikh and the British, and to the demise of the long-distance trade stratum.

As mentioned above, the ruling sheikhs with whom the British signed the treaties were both tribal and mercantile, and were located near the coastal area. The treaties that the British signed with these sheikhs were imposed in relation to fundamental changes that colonialism was engendering in both the tribal and the mercantile socio-discursive formations in Trucial Oman. Concerning the tribal socio-discursive formation, implementation of the treaties led to the reconstruction of many tribal customs, and the concepts underlying them. For one thing, tribal leadership was changed from something that was internally selected to something legitimized by external power. This happened by virtue of the fact that the British had signed the treaties with a sheikh belonging to a specific family within a tribal confederation,
a procedure which automatically anointed that sheikh ruler of the tribe, and his immediate relations within the tribe as the only eligible heirs. This meant that if the signatory sheikh died, only another male member of his immediate family could be chosen as a successor, with British approval. It also meant that a sheikh could be overthrown by one of these relations for a number of reasons, including British disapproval of his administration. In fact, forcible disposal of sheikhs by their potential successors became common in some sheikhdoms in relation to the imposed treaties. This was because the tribal Majlis no longer served its traditional function of choosing the leadership. This situation represented a substantial departure from the traditional practice, in which the the Majlis, comprising the older, more knowledgeable male members of the tribe selected a za'im, or tribal leader by collective decision, and in which direct hereditary succession never occurred. In addition,


49 In her book entitled, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, Rosemary Said Zahlan presents tables which show how common this practice had become, although she attributes this situation to such factors as the smallness of the ruling families in Abu Dhabi and Shargah. Said-Zahlan also mentions that the overthrow of sheiks was less common in Umm al-Quwain and Ajman. She also states that the forcible disposal of a sheikh never occurred in Dubai, because of the large size of the ruling family, and because of the factionalism within it that the forcible deposition of a sheikh could aggravate, which would have been disasterous for Dubai's commercial community. See pp. 35-37.
under traditional rules, a maximum of only four zu'ama from the same familial grouping within a tribe could consecutively serve as tribal leadership.

The concept of dira also changed. Whereas during the 600-1500 A.D. period this concept had referred to a tribe's dwelling place, which could change for a variety of reasons, the British-imposed treaties transformed the diras into territories where one family had exclusive political power, bestowed upon it by an imposed treaty with the British. However, these territories were not formally demarcated by borders. 50 This meant that the British considered the treaties that they signed with these sheikhs to be binding upon all whom the latter could claim as subjects, i.e., all

50 Petersen, The Middle East Journal 31, no. 3 (Summer, 1977): 302. Although the British colonial authorities had not yet drawn boundaries demarcating one Trucial Oman sheikhdom from another, British colonialism did conclude agreements in 1913 with the Ottomans concerning the boundaries between Abu Dhabi and Najd, which was under Ottoman control, and those between Najd and other areas of the Arabian Gulf under British control, such as Bahrain and Kuwait. In 1914, this agreement came to be known as the "Blue Line Agreement." The 'Uqair agreement of 1922 superceded the Blue Line Agreement, and drew official boundaries between Najd, British-held Kuwait, and Iraq. This was the first instance in the Arabian Peninsula's history in which official boundaries had been drawn which separated one section of it from another. That was because these boundaries were drawn in relation to the oil concessions obtained by British oil companies. For more detail, see Aitcheson, Treaties and Engagements Relating to Arabia and the Persian Gulf, pp. 188-189; Mohammed Rashid al-Feel, "Mushkilat al-Hudud Bayn Imarat al-Khalij al-'Arabi (Problems with the Borders between the Emirates of the Arabian Gulf)," Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 2, no. 8 (October, 1976): 28 and 30; and Al-Aydarus, Al-Tatawwurat al-Siyasiyyah fi Dawlat al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah, pp. 218-227.
who were defined as inhabitants of a given sheikh's territory. Consequently, any transgression of these treaties by an inhabitant of such territory was the responsibility of that territory's sheikh, who was then subject to indemnity charges, which he passed on to the territorial population.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, the treaties gave the British control not only over the sheikhs as rulers, but also over every individual living in the sheikhs' territories, so that any breakage of the treaties on the part of any individual bore consequences for all of the inhabitants.

The concept of \textit{nisab} also lost its importance among tribes in the coastal area of Trucial Oman, because tribal identity was now expressed in relation to a settled territorial area, rather than in relation to other tribes, or to the agrarian and mercantile socio-discursive formations, as it had been during the 600-1500 A. D. period. In addition, tribes with political power were now those which had been selected by the British for the signing of an imposed treaty. The regime of the British-imposed treaties in Trucial Oman transformed the tribal socio-discursive formation so that it reproduced itself by virtue of the sheikhs' obedience to British decrees, and their enforcement thereof within their tribal/territorial populations.

Finally, British colonialism impacted Trucial Oman's

\textsuperscript{51} Lienhardt, \textit{Arabian Studies} 2 (1975): 70.
tribal socio-discursive formation regarding tribal migrations. During the 600-1500 A.D. period, and beyond it, it had been common for tribes to migrate over vast areas of the Arabian Peninsula, to settle beyond it, or to migrate from outside of it into its interior, as necessitated by environmental, economic and/or political conditions. During the 1820-1945 period, by contrast, the tribal migration into and out of the Arabian Peninsula halted, and therefore, so did migration from Trucial Oman’s desert area into the agricultural or coastal areas, or from Trucial Oman to the coastal areas of what became the Sultanate of Musqat and Oman.

As for Trucial Oman’s mercantile socio-discursive formation, it had been seriously weakened by the time of the British treaties, because of the Portuguese, Dutch and English incursions into the Indian Ocean mercantile system during the 1500-1820 period. In what became Trucial Oman itself, the British had destroyed most of Trucial Oman’s commercial fleet during the war against the Al-Qawasim, and had levelled such key mercantile cities as Ras al- Khaimah, and other Qasimi ports along both the Arabian and Persian littorals of the Arabian Gulf. Some of these Persian littoral ports the British seized, and used as bases. The British-Qasimi war culminated in the confinement of the Al-Qawasim to the coastal area of what became Trucial Oman, and in the overall destruction of what was left of historic Oman’s long-distance
mercantile stratum. After the levelling of Ras al-Khaimah, the British completed their destruction of this stratum by means of the provisions in the treaties that further restricted what was left of indigenous shipping in Trucial Oman. These provisions included decrees obliging local ships to fly the red and white flag, to carry documents permitting them to sail, and describing their destination, the size of their crew, and their cargoes. Various other restrictive provisions in the treaties empowered the British to search, confiscate, and to attack local ships. These provisions precluded the reconstruction of any indigenous long-distance mercantile stratum in Trucial Oman.

The fact that the British-imposed treaties were binding upon every individual within a signatory sheikh’s territory was important for the reproduction of British rule in Trucial Oman. This was also true of other factors, such as the division of Trucial Oman into the various sheikhdoms, as well as of the internal chaos and segmentation of Trucial Oman’s society that this division engendered.

It was also the poverty that the Trucial Oman Sheikdoms faced, as a result of the British-imposed containment of their economies under the treaties, combined with the above-mentioned manner in which these Sheikdoms were constructed, that engendered the ongoing situation of warfare among them. Evidence of the decline in Trucial Oman’s
mercantile economy that this colonial containment brought about can be seen in the number of merchant ships, local and long distance, that the Al-Qawasim had in the late eighteenth century, in comparison to the number that they had between 1905 and 1906. The number of large and small non-pearl, non-fishing vessels for long-distance trade that the Al-Qawasim had amounted to 732 ships during the late 1700s. Even though the late eighteenth century was actually part of a period of decline in historic Oman’s long distance trade, (see previous chapters), Trucial Oman’s increased impoverishment could be seen in the early 1900s, when the Al-Qawasim only had forty non-pearl, non-fishing vessels. All of Trucial Oman, in fact, had only 90 non-pearl, non-fishing vessels at that time.

Population statistics also indicate the impoverishment that Trucial Oman underwent during the period of British colonialism. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the aggregate population of the Qasimi areas of Trucial Oman was 390,000. In the early twentieth century, by contrast, this

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52 Butti, "Imperialism, Tribal Structure, and the Development of Ruling Elites," p. 66. These are also the figures given in Al-Qasimi’s, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, p. 31.


population actually fell to 50,750.\textsuperscript{55} In fact, the entire population of Trucial Oman only amounted to 200,000 at that time.\textsuperscript{56} Along with impoverishment, and related emigration, economic displacement, and mortality, the ongoing situation of warfare among the sheikhdoms probably accounts for this drastic population reduction.

British Colonialism's containment of Trucial Oman's economy, and particularly its destruction of the latter's long distance-trade, left Trucial Oman's indigenous population with a fishing industry and agriculture that mainly met demand within Trucial Oman, and to a limited extent, elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf. It also left Trucial Oman with the pearl industry. After 1820, in fact, pearls had become Trucial Oman's most important export, and main source of external revenue.\textsuperscript{57} Because the treaties tailored and remolded Trucial Oman's tribal and mercantile socio-discursive formations so extensively, it is important to examine the British Colonial administration that these treaties implanted. In fact, the series of treaties that the British imposed upon the Trucial Oman Sheikdoms were a part of the process by which British


\textsuperscript{57} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 195-196.
Colonialism deepened its penetration of Trucial Oman.

**British Colonial Administration**

In order to ensure the continuation of its rule, the British constructed an administrative system in Trucial Oman which was linked to the British government in India. Between the 1820s and 1949, the local rulers, sheikhs who had signed the British treaties, were kept in line with these treaties by what the British administration called "Native Agents." An important point to make here is that during the nineteenth century, these "Native Agents" were never Arabs of the Arabian Gulf region, despite their knowledge of the area, and of spoken and written Arabic. Usually, they were Muslims from the Indian subcontinent or from the Persian littoral of the Arabian Gulf, and were chosen for this position on the basis of having proved their loyalty to the British, and their abilities, in some previous service to them. This first chosen agent, if competent, frequently ensured positions as "Native Agents" for many of his male descendants. The

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59 al-Sayigh, *Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies* 18 no. 69 (April, 1993). Al-Sayigh mentions two "Native Agents" in this article, on pages 90 and 109-111, who served the British in other capacities before being chosen for
British frequently obscured a "Native Agent's" identity by giving him a common Muslim title such as "Mullah", or "Hajji". For example, the "Native Agent" in Sharqah who served the British from 1829-1849 was known as "Mullah Hussein." Another, who served from 1850-1866, was known as "Hajji Ya'qub." The others who served until 1890 also bore the title "Hajji" in their official names. After 1890, these "Native Agents" bore the title of "Khan". The year 1937, however, began the period in which an actual British Political Officer began to take over the duties relating to the security of British Rule in Trucial Oman. The British only appointed one "Native Agent" at a time to represent their interests in Trucial Oman. Therefore, this agent, who was responsible for monitoring all of Trucial Oman, wielded considerable power there. The first of these "Native Agents" was appointed in 1825.

that position. She also mentions a family whose male descendants held the position of "Native Agent" for several generations, because of their skills, and their continuously close relations with the British administration and the ruling sheikhs, pp. 95-96. Sayigh also describes circumstances under which "Native Agents" were reprimanded for incompetence. The "Native Agent" Mullah Hussein is an example of this. In 1826, during his tenure, he failed to report that Sheikh Sultan of Ras al-Kheimah had departed that city for Lingah, then a part of Qasimi territory. Since it was the task of the "Native Agent" to report on all comings and goings to, and from Trucial Oman, Mullah Hussein was reprimanded for negligence, p. 93.

60 Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 328.

The station of the British Political Resident at Bushire, to whom these "Native Agents" reported, was first established as a factory under an agreement between a representative of the Bombay Government and the Persian ruler Karim Khan 1763. Its primary purpose at the time was to ensure the duty-free import of British woolens into Persia, but the agreement establishing the Residency also permitted the British to install artillery at the factory.\textsuperscript{62} Originally, this Political Resident was a "native," like the Political Resident Mehdi Ali Khan, who had induced the Al-Bu Sa'id to sign the treaty of 1798 with the British. Subsequently, the Bombay government appointed someone from Britain as Political Resident. After the defeat of the Al-Qawasim in 1820, the Political Resident at Bushire was responsible for representing British political, economic and military interests along the coast of Trucial Oman. Initially, naval backing for the British Political Resident was provided jointly by the Royal Navy and the British East India Company's Bombay Marine until 1863, the year that the Bombay Marine, called the "Indian Navy" after 1830, was replaced altogether by the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{63}

Prior to 1858, the Political Resident at Bushire was


\textsuperscript{63} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, pp. 164-165.
responsible to the British East India Company, which, at the
time, was the main body carrying out British political and
administrative dealings with Trucial Oman. Between 1858 and
1873, the Government of Bombay, an official subdivision of the
British government itself, administered Trucial Oman through
Bushire. From 1873 to 1947, this administration was carried
out by the Government of British India. 64

The "Native Agent" was directly accountable to the
Political Resident in Bushire until 1934, when the British
official to whom he answered became the British "Political
Agent" who was stationed in Bahrain. Now it was this
Political Agent who answered to the Political Resident in
Bushire, who, in turn, was accountable to the British
Government of India in Bombay. This body reported directly to
London. At this time, the British had also appointed other
"Political Agents" whose stations were in Musqat and
Kuwait. 65

Basically, the duty of the "Native Agent" was that of
sending detailed reports about all developments in Trucial

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65 Al-Sayigh, Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies 18, no. 69 (April, 1993): 92-93 and 97. These Political Agents, unlike the first Political Resident Mehdi Ali Khan, and all of the "Native Agents," were British civil servants from the United Kingdom who knew Arabic and Farsi, and were chosen from among those already serving in India.
Oman to the Political Resident in Bushire, and later to the Political Agent in Bahrain, with emphasis on whether these developments affected the treaties and agreements, or British interests. One important duty of this "Native Agent" was the scrutiny of any new ruler, and the presenting of an evaluation of him to the Political Resident or "Native Agent," with emphasis on the issue of whether or not that ruler would adhere to the treaties. A ruler who violated the treaties by building up his sheikhdom's defenses, for instance, was subject to British fines, and even bombardment by British cruisers. The Agent's reports assessing these rulers, and reporting on their plans and activities, therefore, were very important for British policy formulation. However, the ongoing threat of strong British retaliation to defiance usually created an atmosphere of compliance with British rule among Trucial Oman sheikhs. Other duties of the "Native Agent" included the issuing of travel permits and visas, reporting to the Political Resident or Agent about who entered and left Trucial Oman and why, ensuring the safety of British subjects, and even reporting on tribes in the interior of Trucial Oman. Particularly important, the "Native Agent" was assigned to use the knowledge of the people of Trucial Oman that the British believed he had to serve as a liaison between

66 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 290.
British officers and the Sheikhs, and as a general mediator between the sheikhs and the Political Resident at Bushire, and later, the Political Agent in Bahrain. Occasionally, the Political Resident visited the "Native Agent," and in addition, ships from the Indian Navy, the post-1830 name for the East India Company's Bombay Marine, sometimes called along the coast of Trucial Oman to provide a show of force. Donald Hawley points out that it was the reports of these "Native Agents" that provided the British with the bulk of their data about Trucial Oman.

The information that the "Native Agent" provided generally added to British knowledge of the area, and consequently facilitated further British penetration. Although the "Native Agent" also reported to the British about events in the interior of Trucial Oman, and in the Bureimi area, it was the coastal area that mainly concerned the British during the nineteenth century, as it was from there that challenges to their naval and commercial hegemony had previously come. However, British interests in Trucial Oman's interior were to increase during the twentieth century.

As the British imposed more treaties on Trucial Oman,

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68 Hawley, *The Trucial States*, p. 166.

69 Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, pp. 290-291.
and deepened their penetration, the duties of the "Native Agent" expanded. With the expansion of the pearl industry and the related arrival of an increased number of Banyan merchants from India in Trucial Oman after the 1870s (See below), the "Native Agent" also became responsible for monitoring the safety of this group in Trucial Oman, and for ensuring the Banyan merchants' collection of debts from locals. (This activity on the part of the "Native Agents" increased with the decline of the pearl industry in the 1930s.) The "Native Agent" also served as mediator for other problems that arose between locals and Indian migrants, before the British colonial administration appointed a judge for this purpose in the late 1940s.70

After the treaty of 1892, which gave the British government exclusive political power and economic rights in Trucial Oman, the duties of the "Native Agent" expanded further, since the British now needed more specific information about Trucial Oman. The British needed the "Native Agent" for this purpose despite the fact that more of their own troops were now visiting Trucial Oman's coastal area in the wake of this latest treaty.71 Between 1936 and 1948 the British government stationed a British Political Officer,

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71 Ibid., pp. 96, and 102-103.
along with the "Native Agent" in Trucial Oman. He was first there only seasonally, but after 1948, he became a permanent resident in Trucial Oman.\textsuperscript{72} This was because the British were obtaining airline and petroleum concessions during this period, and they needed additional officials, besides the "Native Agent", to facilitate this added British penetration of Trucial Oman. The British colonial administration also continued to need the "Native Agent", however, for the continued provision of intelligence to ensure the safety of the increasing number of British travelers, oil company personnel, etc who were now coming into Trucial Oman. After 1948, increased British penetration precluded further need for the "Native Agents," since the British had directly taken over all activities pertaining to securing British rule in Trucial Oman.\textsuperscript{73}

The British-imposed treaties with the sheiks of Trucial Oman, and British administration, ended historic Oman's long-distance trade when they transformed the area into Trucial Oman. The British colonial administration discussed above ensured that no attempts would be made in Trucial Oman either to revive this long-distance trade, or to engage in any other activity that hampered British political, economic and

\textsuperscript{72} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, pp. 328-329.

\textsuperscript{73} Al-Sayigh, \textit{Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies} 18, no. 69 (April, 1993): 113-114.
cultural hegemony.

Since colonial penetration gave Britain control of Trucial Oman, the British were able, through the Banyan merchant-financiers with whom they had developed a partnership, to reconstruct Trucial Oman's economy as a single-commodity economy through the development of the pearl industry. It was through this industry that the British linked Trucial Oman's economy to the world market, by constructing in Europe a demand for Gulf pearls. Because the pearl sector industry became a central component of Trucial Oman's socio-discursive formation during the 1820-1945 period, it is necessary to examine this industry in detail.

*British Colonialism and the Construction, Reproduction and Decline of the Pearling Industry: 1820-1945*

To understand the importance of the pearling industry to Trucial Oman's socio-discursive formation during the period of British colonialism, it is first necessary to understand how this industry was constructed during that period. The pearl industry had existed in the Arabian Gulf both before and during the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period. Classical Arabic writers, in fact, often referred to the pearl industry and how it functioned. During this period, however, the pearl industry had coexisted with many others in the Arabian Gulf. Writers such as Al-Idrisi and Ibn Batutta also describe a pearl industry which was structured very differently from that
which was established under British colonialism.\textsuperscript{74} The exports of the Arabian Gulf mercantile cities during that period had included agricultural products, crafts, textiles, etc. Historic Oman, in addition to all this, had a prosperous ship-building industry. Because historic Oman was a maritime center on the Indian Ocean, historic Oman’s trading cities were entrepots for the export of the \textit{Umma’s} products, and the re-export of other goods such as Chinese porcelain and Indian spices etc, as well as pearls. However, during the 1820-1945 period, the export of pearls had become Trucial Oman’s only source of income, because of the process by which the Portuguese, Dutch and British penetrations, and the subsequent British colonial process, had shifted trade routes, destroyed historic Oman’s long-distance mercantile stratum, and had engendered the concomitant impoverishment of the agricultural, and even of the tribal strata, as well.

Aside from the fact that pearls had become Trucial

\textsuperscript{74} In his book of approximately 1100 A.D., entitled \textit{Nazhat al-Mushtaq}, Sharif al-Idrisi provides detail about the pearl fisheries that existed in the Arabian Gulf at that time. His descriptions include the personnel involved, the locations of the pearl beds, and the workings of the fisheries. vol. 1, (Port Said: Maktabat al-Thaqafat al-Diniyyah, N.D.), pp. 387-391. Ibn Batuta, writing in the 1300s A.D., also discusses the pearl fisheries in the Arabian Gulf. His descriptions cover the locations of the pearl-diving excursions, the techniques used in pearl diving, the crew on the pearling ships, etc. \textit{Rehlat Ibn-Batuta} (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Almiyyah, 1992), p. 290. Both al-Idrisi and Ibn-Batuttah describe the extensive commerce characterizing the Arabian Gulf during the periods in which they were writing.
Oman's most important export after 1820, the significance of the pearling industry to the economy of Trucial Oman can be seen in both the upsurge in the monetary value of pearl exports between 1744 and 1913, and in the percentage of the male population that it employed. In 1744, for example, the export of pearls from the entire Gulf region amounted to a mere 50,000 English Pounds in value. By 1874/1875, the value of these exports had reached 734,000 English Pounds. For 1903/1904, these exports amounted to 1,434,000 English Pounds. By 1912/1913, the value of the Gulf region pearl exports had surged to 2,000,000 English Pounds. Trucial Oman's total population amounted to 200,000 during the "heyday of the pearl fisheries." This study equates this period with the year 1912-1913, when revenues from pearl exports were at their highest. Until the outbreak of World War II, 80 per cent of Trucial Oman's labor force was in some way involved with the pearling sector, not only as crew members on pearling ships but also as ship builders, vendors of water, rice and spices to supply the ships, etc. The remaining twenty per cent of the labor force worked in agriculture, fisheries, or other types of commerce.

75 Al-Kuwari, Oil Revenues in the Gulf Emirates, p. 8.
Aside from recruiting a significant percentage of the male labor force in general, the pearl industry specifically diverted a large percentage of the male labor force from the agricultural sector. This could be seen in the fact that at the beginning of the pearling season, the large migration of males northward from the agricultural Batinah region and other agricultural regions to Trucial Oman was matched by a reverse, southward migration of women from the Trucial Coast to the Batinah region and other agricultural areas, to participate in the date harvest. This situation indicated that the persoons were directly employed in that sector in the year 1907, as Ghawasin, Siyub, Rawadif, Tabbabin, Nawakhadha, etc. Rosemarie Said-Zahlan, in her article entitled "Hegemony, Dependence and Development in the Gulf," in Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf, ed. Tim Niblock (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 63, states that those directly employed in the pearling industry in 1907 constituted 31 per cent of a total population of 72,000. This translates into 73 per cent of the adult male population, since it is assumed that 50 per cent of this population of 72,000, or 36,000, was male, and that 15 per cent of these, or 5,400 could be deducted as being under fifteen years of age. This figure does not include the considerable number of males below fifteen years of age who worked on pearl ships as trainees. (See below). Nor does it include the merchant stratum of this industry. It is important to emphasize here that no accurate census of Trucial Oman's total population was taken at this time. The British officially counted the population of the coastal region, and also the population directly employed in pearling, but not the population of Trucial Oman's interior area.

77 Richard LeBaron Bowen, Jr., "The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf," The Middle East Journal 5, no. 2 (Spring, 1951): 169. It is also true that many migrated from Trucial Oman's coastal area to agricultural regions during the summer to escape the heat of Arabian Gulf coast cities. Abdallah abd al-Rahman, Al-Imarat fi Dhakirat 'Abna'iha, vol. 2, Al-Hayat al-Iqtisadiyyah (The Emirates in the Memories of its Sons,
recruitment of male members of the labor force into the pearl industry had apparently been so extensive that women had been channelled into working the entire date harvest, including those aspects of it traditionally carried out by males. The increased demand for Gulf pearls in Europe also led to the recruitment of crew members on pearling vessels from the tribal sector of Trucial Oman's economy toward the end of the nineteenth century. 78

The massive recruitment into the pearl industry of male members of both the agrarian and tribal labor force of Trucial

78 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to the United Arab Emirates, p. 200. In this book, Frauke Heard-Bey treats the impact of the pearling industry on Trucial Oman's tribal socio-discursive formation in a strange way, stating that the growing foreign demand for pearls enabled bedouins who participated in pearling cooperatives organized on a tribal basis to earn more cash for investment in extra camels, date gardens, and even in the pearl industry itself. This suggestion of a pearling industry cooperative among the bedouins is an interesting proposition, given the fact that most writing about the pearling industry in Trucial Oman, and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf, emphasizes and re-emphasizes how hierarchical and exploitative it was. Given also that bedouins recruited into the pearling industry would probably have been crew members on pearling ships, it is hard to imagine where they would have obtained sufficient cash to invest in camels, date gardens, or the pearl industry. Pearl divers and other crew members on pearling vessels were almost invariably in constant debt to the Nawakhadh for whom they worked, as is shown below.
Oman during the nineteenth century occurred in relation to the ongoing decline of mercantilism, and correspondingly, the impoverishment of the agrarian and tribal sectors there. This meant that agriculture was now mainly geared toward local consumption, rather than for long-distance export. Nor did the tribal sector continue to play its supportive role for overland long-distance trade of the 600-1500 period, since none was occurring during the colonial era. Thus, both of these sectors had ceased to earn surplus, and male members of the agrarian and tribal labor forces sought employment in the pearl industry, which, during the period of British colonialism had become the only growing sector in Trucial Oman’s economy.  

79 The British colonial process reconstructed the pearl industry so that it was no longer indigenous merchants who sold the pearls within the Indian Ocean commercial system, set the price for the pearls, and invested in this industry. Rather, it was now an external mercantile force, sponsored by the British, that carried out the investment and the pricing, and which now marketed the pearls in Europe, after constructing a taste for them there. This meant that, just as the British used "native" agents as instruments for gaining control of Trucial Oman’s external affairs and internal

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politics between 1820 and 1945, so did the British use natives from elsewhere in the Indian Ocean as instruments for the British gain of control of Trucial Oman's economy. British colonialism was able to fit these selected "natives" into their consolidation of control over Trucial Oman's economy after gaining political control of Trucial Oman, and completing the destruction of historic Oman's long-distance mercantile stratum, by means of the reconstruction of the pearl industry into a major export industry catering to the European and North American markets.

The "natives" from elsewhere in the Indian Ocean who became so prominent in the pearling sector were Banyan merchants from India. These merchants comprised a specific stratum within the British hegemonic structure that had been constructed in relation to the English East India Company's penetration of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf during the eighteenth century. Typically, a Banyan merchant initially had a certain amount of capital to invest, and therefore took the opportunity of attaching himself to an East Indian Company merchant or official, starting with the lower ones in the Company hierarchy, and moving to more important ones as he gained capital and experience. During the eighteenth century, Banyan merchants rose in the East India Company by serving as cross-cultural agents for the commercial affairs of the Company official or merchant, or sometimes by
contributing initial capital to a commercial venture that a Company official entered on his own account, sharing in the profits. Banyan merchants attached to the English East India Company benefitted further during the late eighteenth century because, as company servants, they enjoyed the same exemptions that the British did from tolls charged others who transported goods in and out of the Mughul Empire.⁸⁰ During the nineteenth century, members of Banyan merchant families often became full partners with British entrepreneurs in businesses such as banking, insurance, shipping centers, and commercial agency houses.⁸¹

Banyan merchants increased their activities in Trucial Oman itself after 1869,⁸² as the pearl hunting industry grew, both as a result of increased capital investment, and because pearl exporters created the demand for pearls in Europe, just as the British East India Company had previously created the demand for other Indian Ocean commodities, such as textiles, spices etc. Banyan merchants, both in Bombay and in the Arabian Gulf, served as the main financiers of the pearl industry, because their partnership with British entrepreneurs had given

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⁸⁰ Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History, p. 175.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 249.

⁸² M. Morsy Abdullah, "Changes in the Economy and Political Attitudes and the Development of Culture on the Coast of Oman Between 1900 and 1940," Arabian Studies 2 (1975): 169; and Abdallah Abd al-Rahman, Al-Imarat fi Dahkirat 'Abna'iiha (The Emirates in the Memories of their Sons), p. 82.
them most of the capital, because they enjoyed special protection as British subjects, and because Muslims were forbidden by Islamic Law from charging interest rates.\textsuperscript{83} Pearls became the main export commodity industry in Trucial Oman and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf after 1820, and the peak period for pearl exports began during the 1870s and continued through the 1920s.\textsuperscript{84} Banyan merchants also dealt in textiles, but more importantly, they constituted the highest stratum of the pearl industry both in India and in the Arabian Gulf. In India, and the Arabian Gulf, they served as the financiers of this industry,\textsuperscript{85} by lending money to local \textit{tujar} merchants from the Arabian Gulf, who sold pearls they had bought from smaller merchants to Banyan pearl exporters at the \textit{Muti Bazaar} pearl market in Bombay.\textsuperscript{86} The Banyan merchants also controlled the processes for preparing the pearls for export to Europe, i.e. categorization, polishing, bleaching, drilling, packaging, etc. They exported the pearls

\textsuperscript{83} Abdullah, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, p. 105.

\textsuperscript{84} Al-Kuwari, \textit{Oil Revenues in the Gulf Emirates}, p. 8


\textsuperscript{86} Abdullah, "Changes in the Economy and Political Attitudes, and the Development of Culture on the Coast of Oman Between 1900 and 1940," \textit{Arabian Studies} 2 (1975): 169; and Abd al-Rahman, \textit{Al Imarat fi Dhakirat ‘Abna’iha}, p. 82.
to London, Paris, and New York from Bombay,\(^87\) thereby controlling their price on the world market. The Banyan exporters also unilaterally set the price they paid for pearls that were shipped to India from the Arabian Gulf, or brought there by *tujar* or *tawawish* merchants. *Tujar* or *tawawish* merchants could be local or Banyan. Among the *tujar* merchants, it was usually the Banyans who lent money to the *musagqamin*, or smaller local pearl merchants in the Arabian Gulf, and sold the pearls from the Gulf to the Bombay exporters. Some of the *tawawish*, or pearl merchants who did not own boats, and obtained pearls either directly from the fleets, or from smaller local sellers on shore, were also Banyan.\(^88\) The interest rates that the Banyan *tujar* charged the local *musagqamin* or *tujar* merchants often amounted to as much as 25 per cent.\(^89\)

In terms of the actual workings of the pearl industry,

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\(^88\) Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf*, vol. 1, p. 2236.

pearling vessels were usually owned by tujar merchants or by musaqqamin, although some of them were also owned by nawakhadha, or captains. Sometimes, the nawakhadha would be hired by the tujar or musaqqamin merchants for pearling. The wealthier pearl merchants often owned a large number of boats.\textsuperscript{90} The financial aspect of the pearling industry was conducted in a hierarchical manner. Both the local tujar and musaqqamin merchants borrowed from the Banyan tujar financiers, as mentioned above, and in turn, musaqqamin merchants, then extended advances to the nawakhadha captains of the pearl ships.\textsuperscript{91} The nawakhadha used these advances to make payment advances to the ghawasin, or pearl divers, and siyub, who were responsible for hauling each diver out of the water at the end of each dive. These advances to the pearling ship’s crew took the combined form of coin, rice and coffee. One of these cash advances, called the Salafiyyah, came at the beginning of the pearling season, and served to maintain the diver’s family when the diver was at sea, and the second, called the Tisgam, came at the end of the pearling season, and was for the diver’s family’s maintenance during the off-season

\textsuperscript{90} Mohammed G. Rumaihi, "The Mode of Production in the Arab Gulf before the Discovery of Oil," in Niblock, Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf, p. 54; and al-Oteiba, Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates, p. 10-11.

\textsuperscript{91} Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, vol. 1, p. 2227.
period, when the diver was not working. A third advancement was called the Kharjiyyah, and it served as pocket money for the diver and his family until the next season began, and it was given in anticipation of the diver's commitment of service to the nakhdoha for that season. The size of the sib's advances amounted to a third of those allocated to the ghawas.92

The pearl-diving season normally lasted from May until September, or from June until October, when the waters of the Arabian Gulf were warm enough for diving on a sustained basis.93 The peak season, called al-qhaws al-kabir, or "the great dive", lasted from early June to September. It was during this period that all of the vessels went to the pearl banks, and that the greatest number of oysters was collected.94

On the pearlimg ship itself, along with the nakhdoha, and several ghawasin, or divers, the crew included the majdami, who was second in command and responsible for discipline on the ship; and the siyub, who were responsible for hauling the divers out of the sea by rope after each dive.

92 Rumaihi, in Niblock, Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf, p. 54; and Abd al-Rahman, Al-Imarat fi Dhakirat 'Abna'iha, p. 25.


94 Al-Oteiba, Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates, p. 10.
The largest pearling ships sending divers into the deeper waters had additional crew members. These included rawadif, or assistants to the siyuh, usually young boys who subsequently were trained to be siyuh or ghawasin, as well as jelasin, who were employed to lay open the oyster shells. Each pearling ship crew also included a cook, and tabbabin, or youths who helped the crew to open the oyster shells, and served water and food.\textsuperscript{95} These tabbabin were usually the sons of nawakhadha, ghawasin, or siyuh, who later adopted their fathers’ occupations.\textsuperscript{96} The pearling ship’s crew also included the naham, or singer, whose job was to lighten the work on pearling vessels by singing himself, or leading the other crew members in song.\textsuperscript{97} Usually, these songs were related to pearling, their rhythm reminiscent of the waves, and they also depicted the hardship of the industry, as well as the joy at completing the season.

Each pearling ship was theoretically a profit-sharing venture, but the reality was that the lower strata of the pearling hierarchy chronically remained in debt. A

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., p. 9; and Rumeihi, in Niblock, \textit{Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf}, p. 51.

\textsuperscript{96} The practice of a father’s training his son to take up his vocation was common in the Arabian Gulf during this period. It is referred to in many of the interviews presented in Abd al-Rahman’s \textit{Al-Imarat fi Dhakirat ’Abna’iha}.

description of how revenues in the pearling industry were disposed illustrates this. If a musaggam borrowed money from a Banyan tajir (merchant) and then made a cash advance to a nakhodha, that nakhodha then sold the musaggam the season’s catch of pearls at a 15 to 20 per cent discount, as a repayment of both the sum that the musaggam had advanced, plus what tacitly amounted to interest on the cash advance. The nakhodha then divided these proceeds between himself and the rest of the crew. If the nakhodha owned the ship, his earnings amounted to one fifth of the revenue earned from the sale to the musaggam. Out of the remainder of the total revenue minus the nakhodha owner’s earnings were paid taxes to the ruling sheikh, travel expenses, and the shares due each member of the crew. The monetary value of each individual share was calculated by first determining the total number of shares to be paid to the crew. This was done by multiplying the number of individuals in each crew stratum by the number of shares to which each was entitled. The nakhoda and the ghawas were entitled to three shares each, for example. Each sib was entitled to two shares, the radif and jalis to one share each, and the tabbah to none. The sum of revenue (minus the owner’s one-fifth portion) left after the deduction of taxes to the ruling Sheikh and travel expenses would then be divided by the total number of shares to which the crew members were entitled. That would yield the monetary amount
of each share, and therefore the monetary amount of each payment due each crew member.\textsuperscript{98}

It was the pearl merchants who reaped the profits, while the extracters of the pearls were chronically in debt. The most privileged stratum in this hierarchy were the Banyan tujar financiers and exporters in Bombay. An example of the substantial profits that were made from the exports of Gulf pearls to Europe can be seen in the Kumzar Pearl Case of 1899-1901. Here, a valuable Gulf pearl was sold to local Sharqah merchants for about Rs. 2,668, but once it had been sold to Bombay exporters, it was valued at Rs. 400,000 for sale to

\textsuperscript{98} Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 2232-2233; and Butti, "Imperialism, Tribal Structure, and the Development of Ruling Elites," pp. 119-120. There is some controversy as to what the nakhodha actually made. Mohammed G. Rumaihi, for instance, maintains that if the nakhodha actually owned the boat, he was allowed as much as half of the profit from the sale of the pearls to the musaggam. See Rumaihi, in Niblock, *Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf*, p. 55. C. Dalrymple Belgrave, for his part, states that the captain took one fifth of the total profits from the sale of the pearls irrespective of whether or not he owned the boat. See Belgrave, *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 21 (1934): 451. Both of these points are disputable for several reasons. Firstly, the nakhodha rarely made a profit selling his catch of pearls, since he usually sold them to the musaggam at a discount rate as a form of repayment of the musaggam’s loan to him. Secondly, since the nakhodha was constantly in debt, from having to borrow from the musaggam in order to take care of provisions on the ship, it is unlikely that he was entitled to a portion amounting to much as one half of the total profits from a given catch. Thirdly, it is unlikely that Belgrave’s premise that the nakhodha was entitled to the same percentage of the revenues for the catch irrespective of whether or not he owned the vessel.
Another Gulf pearl was purchased by a certain Miss Barbara Hutton in Paris after 1926 for a price of Rs. 200,000.100

There were also wholesale tujar merchants, local or Banyan, who made the substantial profits from purchasing vast numbers of pearls from both musaggamin and smaller tawawish merchants, and selling to the Banyan exporters at the Muti Bazaar in Bombay. Since, as mentioned above, these exporters charged such astronomical prices for the Gulf pearls they sold to the European markets, they were able to buy pearls from the tujar or larger tawawish merchants at substantially higher prices than the latter two had paid for them. Some of these wholesale tujar merchants, most of them Banyan, also made monetary advances or loans to musaggamin. Merchants who financed the pearl industry could make profits of between 20 and 70 per cent on these loans.101

The musaggamin merchants, for their part, advanced

99 Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, vol. 1, pp. 2243 and 2252. The price at which the pearl in question was sold to the local merchants from Sharqah was $2,000 (Maria Theresa Dollars), which were used in Musqat and Oman during this period. During the years of this transaction, between 1899 and 1901, the rate of exchange between Indian Rupees and Maria Theresa Dollars was $3= Rs. 4


101 Al-Oteiba, Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates, p. 28.
funds to the nawkhadha for the purchase of the ship’s supplies during the pearling season, and sometimes owned several pearling ships. This meant that a given musaggam was both likely to reap tacit interest on the advances extended to the nawkhadha, from purchasing the pearls from him at a discount price, and to obtain back the sum of one-fifth of his payments to the captains for the pearl catches as the owner’s portion. Furthermore, the musaggamin reaped an additional profit in selling the pearls to the tujar merchants.102

The tujar merchants also bought pearls from the tawawish merchants, who were shore-based pearl merchants who did not own pearling ships, and who purchased pearls in order to sell them to other merchants, at constantly increasing prices. All but the smallest tawawish merchants made as much as a ten-fold profit on their pearls with every sale to a larger tawawish. The smallest tawawish merchants bought pearls directly and cheaply from the nawkhadha who had not borrowed enough money to sustain the ship’s food supply for the pearling season. Larger tawawish merchants bought pearls from smaller ones, and the largest ones either sold the pearls to the tujar, or sometimes even went to Bombay themselves to

sell them. Local **tujar** or **tawawish** merchants selling their pearls in India did so by means of a **dallal**, who was usually from the Arabian Gulf, but had settled in Bombay. The **dallal** kept himself familiar with pearl market conditions, and also knew the prices at which different types of pearls could be sold. He earned his commissions both from the Banyan exporters in the **Muti Bazaar** and from the **tujar** and **tawawish** merchants from the Arabian Gulf by linking them together, and mediating between them concerning the price of the pearls.  

Coexisting with the profits reaped by the pearl merchants, Banyan exporters, and Banyan financiers was the chronic indebtedness of the **nawakhadha** and the **ghawasins**. The **nawakhadha** were rarely able to harvest a haul of pearls sufficient to cancel their debts to the **musagqamin**, or to buy more than a bare subsistence for themselves. As mentioned above, the **ghawasins** and **siyub** obtained the **Salafiyyah**, **Tisgam**, and **Kharjiyyah** advances to sustain themselves and their families during the year. However, once the revenue actually earned from the sale of the pearls was divided among the crew,

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103 Al-Oteiba, *Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates*, p. 28.


and the portion owed to the owner of the ship was paid, the ghawas rarely earned enough even to pay the debt he owed to the nakhodha for that year. A ghawas' debt from one season carried over into the next, with a delinquency penalty added on, and this compelled the diver to work for that nakhodha for the second season, during which he usually incurred additional debt. Furthermore, as the divers were usually illiterate, the nakhodha could falsify the amount of the debt so as to make it irredeemable. Sometimes, nawakhadha would falsify the accounts of the most productive divers simply to keep retaining their services. If a ghawas died and left a debt, his sons would inherit it, and this obliged them, also, to become ghawasins.\textsuperscript{106} One author writing in 1924 mentions that as many as ninety per cent of the ghawasins were in debt to their nawakhadha at that time.\textsuperscript{107} Furthermore, the Treaty of 1879, signed by the British with each Trucial Oman Sheikh, provided the extradition of any indebted ghawas who attempted to escape to another sheikhdom.

The nakhodha, too, was constantly in debt, because he had borrowed money from a musaggam in order to supply the pearling vessel, and to give cash advances to the ghawas and sib. In fact, his debt situation usually bound the nakhodha to

\textsuperscript{106} Rumaihi, in Niblock, \textit{Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf}, pp. 54-56.

\textsuperscript{107} Harrison, \textit{The Moslem World} 14 (1924): 167.
the *musaggam* who extended the advance to him in a manner similar to that which bound the diver to the *nakhdha*.$^{108}$

Disputes pertaining to debt were resolved in a special court that the ruling sheikhs established for the pearling industry. This court was under the control of the pearl merchants, who actually presided over it, and it could rule that a *nakhdha* who could not pay off his debts stood to lose his boat and his divers.$^{109}$ As for the *ghawasim*, they never won an arbitration case against a *nakhdha*, because it was in the interests of the pearl merchants that a *nakhdha* pay a *ghawas* as little as possible, in order to enable that *nakhdha* to pay the pearl merchants as much as possible in redeemed debts.$^{110}$

The hierarchical nature of the pearl industry can be seen in its distribution of merchants in relation to the *ghawasim*, *siyub*, and the other strata physically involved in pearl extraction. During the 1903-1913 period, the total number of significant pearl merchants in Trucial Oman was 950.$^{111}$ Out of these, 408 were Indian, 194 of these last

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$^{109}$ Ibid., p. 179.


$^{111}$ Al-Oteiba, *Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates*, p. 28.
being Banyan, and 214 being Khoja, or Indian Muslims. Both the Khojas and the Banyans were British subjects, and therefore enjoyed special privileges and protection in Trucial Oman.\textsuperscript{112} After the merchants, (tuajar, musaggamin, and tawawish) came the nawkhadha. In 1907, these numbered 1,215.\textsuperscript{113} The remaining 20,830 men employed in the pearling industry were ghawasin, siyub, rawadif, jalasin, and tabbabin. These figures show that the overwhelming majority of persons employed in the pearl industry were employed in the lowest strata, and that only a small minority were in the upper strata. It was this majority, and particularly the ghawasin and siyub, who were the most harshly exploited within the industry, not only in terms of indebtedness, as shown above, but also in terms of the treatment that they endured.

For the ghawasin, pearl diving was brutally exhausting work. Aside from facing the possibility of paralyzing stings from jellyfish and devil rays, a ghawas faced constant submersion in seawater, which frequently led to skin rashes,\textsuperscript{114} and even to blindness. Repeated exposure to

\textsuperscript{112} Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, vol. 1, pp. 2379 and 2383; and Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 207, n. 6.

\textsuperscript{113} This figure is calculated on the basis of the number of boats Lorimer states were involved in the pearling industry of Trucial Oman during that year. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, vol. 1, p. 2256.

\textsuperscript{114} Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, vol. 1, p. 2231.
water pressure while submerged, in rapid contrast with ordinary air pressure after the dive, frequently led to suppuration of the eardrums, as well as respiratory hemorrhages. In addition, ghawasin often developed rhumatism and arthritis as a result of constant submersion. Many eventually died from these ailments and from sheer exhaustion. Aside from diving, the ghawas also had to begin the work day by opening the masses of oysters they had gathered the day before, under the direct supervision of the nakhodha, who made sure that the ghawas had no opportunity to filch pearls.\footnote{Bowen, The Middle East Journal 5, no. 2 (Spring, 1951): 175.} The work that the sib did was also difficult. For one thing, it was the sib who propelled the boat, by means of rowing, in the direction of the pearl banks toward which it was to sail, especially if there was insufficient wind. It was also the sib's task to keep pulling each ghawas out of the water after each dive, and to stay right at the side of the ship at all times to do this, as the ghawas would otherwise drown. This meant standing all day in the sun, and submitting one's hands to rope cuts from pulling every few minutes.\footnote{Abd al-Rahman, Al-Imarat fi Dhakirat 'Abna'iha, p. 91.}

The ruling sheikhs obtained a portion of the seasonal revenues from the pearling industry by means of the Nub tax that each sheikh levied upon each pearl ship fishing in the
waters under his jurisdiction. This tax was payable either by the nakhodha or by the ship’s owner. Pearling ships from other towns that called at Umm al-Qawain for provisions needed for the pearling season also paid a Taraz tax to the Sheikh.\textsuperscript{117} The Nub tax was calculated in accordance with the size of the ship, and the Taraz tax, with the size and composition of the crew. Sometimes taxes were paid in kind rather than in cash. When in kind, payment frequently took the form of bags of rice.\textsuperscript{118}

\textbf{TABLE 7.1}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
Abu Dhabi & Rs. 41,960 \\
Dubai & 20,860 \\
Sharqah & 37,644 \\
Ajman & 5,202 \\
Umm al-Quwain & 20,881 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}


The net revenue that each shaikhdom collected for 1906 is

\textsuperscript{117} Butti, "Imperialism, Tribal Structure, and the Development of Ruling Elites," pp. 120-121.

\textsuperscript{118} Lorimer, "Annexure No. 6," \textit{Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia}, vol. 1, p. 2284-2285.
given in the Table 7.1. Because the Trucial Oman sheikhs were earning tax revenues from this industry, they probably had little incentive toward improving agriculture in their sheikhdoms, or trying to maintain tribalism as a viable sector.\textsuperscript{119}

The British role in the pearl industry in Trucial Oman, and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf, was mainly one of protecting the profits of the Banyan pearl exporters and financiers, and of ensuring the pearl industry's continuation. The British did these two things firstly, by extending special privileges and protections to Banyan\textsuperscript{tu}\textsuperscript{j}ar pearl exporters and financiers as British subjects.\textsuperscript{120} Secondly, the British had imposed the above-mentioned 1879 treaty on each Trucial Oman sheikh requiring each sheikhdom to extradite to any other a runaway debtor from the pearl industry. This, too, protected the profits of the Banyan merchants. Finally, the British assigned warships to patrol the pearl banks along the Arabian littoral of the Arabian Gulf, for the prevention of outbreaks of fighting or other disturbances during the pearling season.\textsuperscript{121} It was in the British interest to curb forcibly

\textsuperscript{119} Bowen, in \textit{The Middle East Journal} 5, no. 2 (Spring, 1951): 179.

\textsuperscript{120} Zahlan, in Niblock, \textit{Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf}, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{121} Butti, "Imperialism, Tribal Structure, and the Development of Ruling Elites," p. 94.
strife that was bound to develop among the sheikhdoms around shares in the pearl banks, since pearls were Trucial Oman’s only export commodity. (It has already been mentioned that this strife was rooted in the manner in which the sheikhdoms were divided - without discernable borders - from each other, and in the general poverty that all of the British-imposed treaties engendered in Trucial Oman.) A profitable pearl industry was also important to the British because it ensured the reproduction of the two strata upon which the British relied for the preservation of stability in the Arabian Gulf, namely, the Trucial Oman sheikhs and the Banyan merchants. It also provided employment for the general population which might otherwise develop a form of mercantilism more independent of British colonialism, or might outrightly resist British colonialism.

This study has shown pearls as a commodity sold on the world market embodied a social relationship in which the minority profited from financing the extraction of the pearls and from exporting them, while the majority, who were chronically in debt, did the extractional work, and tasks that were immediately related to extraction. Despite the harshness of work aboard the pearling ships, and despite the fact that those doing this work were a majority within the industry, there was very little collective resistance by the lower strata of the pearl industry, for several reasons, and this
lack of resistance enabled the power relations in the pearl industry to reproduce themselves.

The factors contributing to the maintenance of power relations were economic, political, and cultural. Two particularly important economic and political factors were the reality of constant indebtedness that the lower strata of the pearl industry faced, and the fact that Trucial Oman’s economy, and that of the rest of the Arabian Gulf, did not offer alternative work during this period. The economics of indebtedness bound the ghawasin and siyub to the pearl industry, and ensured its reproduction since when a debtor died, his sons inherited his debt so that they, too, were obliged to work for the nakhodha as ghawasin or siyub. As for the alternative work issue, the political and economic reality of the European penetration process, and British colonization in particular had constructed Trucial Oman’s economy, and that of the rest of the Arabian Gulf, as a producer of a single commodity for the world market. British colonization achieved this with the destruction of Trucial Oman’s long-distance trade work, and with the marginalization of its agriculture. This made escaping to another sheikhdom futile for the ghawasin or siyub, as it could, at best, only result in employment with another nakhodha. Even this form of resistance, however, the British closed off with the imposition of the Treaty of 1879, providing extradition among
the sheikhdoms of runaway divers and other debtors.

Cultural, economic and political realities of segmentation within the pearl industry, and of Trucial Oman into several sheikhdoms, were also factors that helped to preclude consolidated, collective resistance on the part of ghawasin or siyub to their exploitation in the pearl industry. The segmentation of Trucial Oman itself contributed to this situation because the different fleets of pearling vessels represented different sheikhdoms, causing those on the ships to identify with their sheikhdoms rather than with other ghawasin. Segmentation also prevailed among the crew members of each pearling ship as well, because each crew contained individuals from the urban, agrarian, and tribal-socio discursive formations, and these individuals tended to differentiate themselves from the others on this basis. For example, the siyub were mainly from the Badia (desert), while the ghawasin were usually from agrarian and urban areas.\footnote{Mutawwali, *Hawdh al-Khalij al-Arabi*, vol. 2, p. 139.} Segmentation across the industry manifested itself in the fact that the average pearling boat usually had about eighteen crew members only, and that there was insufficient communication among crew members of various boats for the development of consolidated resistance. In addition, the lower strata of the pearl industry were unaware of the extent of their exploitation. Specifically, they knew nothing about the
workings of the upper strata. ghawasin, siyub, rawadif, jalasin and tabbabin were unaware of the vast profits earned by the Banyan pearl exporters and financiers of the industry in Bombay and in Trucial Oman, and only partially aware of the relationship between the nawakhadha and the musaggamin. This was because these members of a pearling ship’s crew had an active relationship with their nawakhadha, but not with any of the higher strata of the pearling industry.

The segmentation on each boat could also be seen in the fact that all of the ghawasin were in competition. In addition, the various members of the crew were paid at different rates. Whereas, as mentioned above, the ghawas was entitled to three shares of a ship’s earnings out of the total number, the sib was only entitled to two, the radif and jalas only to one, and the tabbab to none at all. This made the sib, radif, jalas, tabbab and cook view the ghawas as being privileged in relation to them, and made the tabbab and cook see all other members of the crew as having advantages over him. These differences, too, precluded any consolidation of resistance efforts aboard a given ship.

Although the political, economic and cultural factors mentioned above precluded the development of consolidated resistance to exploitation both in the pearl industry at large, and among the crew members of pearling vessels, other cultural-ideological factors played the dual role both of
legitimizing the power relationships between the upper and lower strata of the pearl industry, and thereby enabling these power relationships to reproduce themselves, and at the same time, constituting a form of individual resistance. These factors were the various myths that were constructed among the lower strata within the pearl industry. This mythology was a mixture of folklore constructed within the pearling industry itself, and a particular interpretation of Islam. The songs chanted by the naham, for example, tended to glamorize the pearling voyage, and to praise the ghawasin and other members of the crew for their skill and strength, because they contained verses about far-away diving places, beautiful pearls, and the skill and strength of the pearling crew.¹²³

Within the lower strata of the pearling industry, there was constructed folklore blaming the sufferings of the ghawasin on supernatural forces such as shayatin (demons), and jan, rather than on the upper strata.¹²⁴ This mythology legitimized the upper strata of the pearl industry in the eyes of the ghawasin, so that they actually believed themselves to be beneficiaries of the controlling strata of that industry, rather than exploited by them. It also constructed the


¹²⁴ For several examples of stories told by Ghawasin about bizarre fates that supernatural forces inflicted upon various members of pearling crews, see Abd al-Rahman, Al-Imarat fi Dhakirat 'Abna'iha, pp. 85-104.
shayatin and jan as "others", to whom the blame for these sufferings could safely be affixed since, existant or non-existant, shayatin and jan had no concrete connections to the pearling industry. At the same time, however, these stories about supernatural forces were sometimes constructed to free ghawasin from the brutally strenuous work they were doing. In one example, a ghawas emerged from a dive stiff and trembling, acting as if possessed by shayatin, and refusing to talk until sundown despite the Mutawwa'\'s continuous reading of the Qur'an over him. When the ghawas finally spoke, it was with the voice of a woman who identified herself as a shaitanah (female demon), and warned the other crew members not to let him dive again, because he had killed her child while fishing. The "shaitanah" warned that if the ghawas submerged again, she would kill him in revenge. However, she also stated that she had no objection to his being made a sib. Obviously, the ghawas had constructed this affair to escape from diving, which was exhausting him and which he was sure would kill him, as it had many others.\textsuperscript{125}

Particularly important, myths circulated among pearling crews about the chance that an exceptional pearl harvest would make them wealthy. The central figure of one such myth was a poor bedouin who began as a pearl diver, earned good shares of the revenues during each season, eventually became a nakhodha,
and then, a pearl merchant selling his pearls in markets like Bombay, Baghdad, and as far away as China.\textsuperscript{126} In addition, ghawasin tended to view the vicissitudes of the pearling industry and its revenues, as well as their exploitation, as the will of God, and entered each pearling season hoping to earn what "God might allow."\textsuperscript{127} Finally, just as the ongoing indebtedness of the ghawasin and the siyub enabled power relationships within the pearling sector to reproduce themselves, so too, did the fact that members of pearling crews made it a point to instill a love for this kind of work in their sons. They did this by bringing them on board pearling vessels for training, re-telling miraculous success stories, such as the one described above, and instilling in their sons the belief that this sort of work was something that only the exceptionally strong and courageous could do.

The Gulf pearling industry began its decline during the 1920s. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Japanese had developed their cultured pearl industry into a global export, and this spelled the demise of the Gulf pearl fisheries altogether.\textsuperscript{128} This overriding factor in the decline of the Gulf pearl industry developed in conjunction with two others, namely, the onset of the Great Depression, and the decreasing

\textsuperscript{126} Daniels, Abu Dhabi: A Portrait, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{127} Al-Kuwari, Oil Revenues in the Gulf Emirates, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{128} Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 197.
yields from the overfished pearl banks. The decline of the pearl industry can be seen both in the decrease in the number of boats utilized for it between 1904 and 1946, and in the contrasting aggregate revenue figures for pearl exports from the entire Arabian Gulf for the peak year 1912/1913, versus those for 1946.

Figures for pearling boat utilization in Trucial Oman state that 1,215 vessels were used in the pearling industry in 1904. For the year 1946, this number had declined to 250, for Trucial Oman, combined both with Qatar and the pearling ports on the Persian littoral. The realized export value for Arabian Gulf pearls in 1912/1913 amounted to 2,000,000 Pounds Sterling. In 1946, that value had plummeted to 62,000 Pounds Sterling.

The decline in revenues from Gulf pearl exports was particularly significant in that it engendered the decline of what was left of Trucial Oman's larger local mercantile stratum. As the pearling industry died out under the impact

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129 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 220.

130 This figure was calculated by adding together the number of boats Lorimer states were involved in the pearling industry of each Trucial Oman sheikhdom during that year. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, vol. 1, p. 2256.


132 Al-Kuwari, Oil Revenues in the Gulf Emirates, p.8.
of the global market for Japanese cultured pearls, the *tujar*,
tawawish and *musaggamin*, all of whom had previously gotten
wealthy as pearl merchants, became bankrupt under the weight
of their debts to Banyan financiers. Declining pearl revenues
now made local merchants unable to send as large a number of
vessels on pearling expeditions for lack of ready money to
supply them, and for declining sales prospects for the pearls
on the world market. The decline in revenues also caused the
local merchants to become deeply indebted to the Banyan *tujar*
and exporters who purchased pearls from them, and who had
extended credit to them. In response to increased Banyan
complaints of non-repayment by the local merchants, The
British Political Resident intervened in Trucial Oman during
the 1920s and 1930s both to force the ruling sheikhs to ensure
that local pearl merchants repayed their debts to their Banyan
creditors, who were British subjects, and to ensure the safety
of the Banyan *tujar* when tensions arose in relation to this
situation.

Tension of this sort arose, for example, in Dubai in
1930, after an influential Dubai merchant named Abdallah Bin
Yusuf lost Rs. 150,000 when his Banyan creditor forced him to
sell his pearls in an unfavorable market in order to remit his
debt. After repaying Rs. 80,000, he was arrested in Bombay,
placed on trial, and prevented from returning to Dubai until
he paid his Banyan creditors the remaining Rs. 31,000 that
they claimed he owed. When the ruler of Dubai threatened to seize all the Banyans there unless Abdallah Bin Yusuf was released, the British Political Resident dispatched the H.M.S. *Lupin* to the Dubai harbor to protect Britain's Banyan subjects. In 1929, another local merchant, Mohammed Bin Bayat, was declared bankrupt because his debt to Banyan *tujar* amounted to Rs. 600,000. Another, Mohammed bin Ahmad bin Dalmuk, was in debt to a certain merchant named Hajji Mohammed 'Ali Zainal in Bombay because of slow sales of his pearls in Paris. To remit this debt, he was obliged to borrow a sum of Rs. 200,000 from a Banyan merchant named Ganshamdeshk, at an interest rate of 36 per cent.¹³³

As for the *ghawasin*, *siyub*, *rawadif*, *jalasin* and *tabbabin*, the decline of the pearl industry caused their displacement from the only steady form of employment that remained available to them, however harsh it was. Thus, they became a marginalized stratum finding casual employment as porters, or in other positions, in relation to the British-controlled import trade.¹³⁴ In some cases, this displacement resulted in their leaving Trucial Oman altogether.

This discussion of the pearl industry illustrates the


¹³⁴ Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, pp. 250-251.
interrelationship, during the colonial period, between British colonialism, the Banyan merchants, the local pearl merchants, and the ruling sheikhs. More importantly, it demonstrates how the decline of the pearl industry in the Arabian Gulf spelled the demise of the most significant section of Trucial Oman’s mercantile stratum during this period. Subsequently, as this stratum declined, the British government intervened more directly in the affairs of Trucial Oman, and correspondingly gave the ruling sheikhs greater power and regular rent payments through concession arrangements. The pearl merchants attempted to counteract this trend through the growth of its Reform Movement of 1938 in Dubai. In order to understand the growth of this reform movement, it is necessary to examine the development of Dubai as a mercantile city, the nature of economic, political, and cultural life there, the specific status of the local mercantile stratum there, and how Trucial Oman’s mercantile, agrarian, and tribal socio-discursive formations came to overlap in that city. These topics will be covered in Chapter Eight.

Conclusion

The three sections of this chapter have demonstrated the process by which British colonialism reconstructed Trucial Oman culturally, politically and economically, in relation to what it had been during both the 600-1500 A.D. period, and the transformational period of 1500-1820. Culturally, British
colonial power differentiated itself from Trucial Oman’s mercantile and tribal groupings by constructing them negatively and constructing itself positively in relation to these groupings. This differentiation occurred through a series of discourses that British colonialism constructed not only to destroy the power of Trucial Oman’s long distance mercantile strata, but also to justify British colonial domination of Trucial Oman. Through these discourses, British colonialism constructed the whole of Trucial Oman as an entity needing external protection and representation. In this way, British colonialism stripped Trucial Oman of all aspects of independence, because it silenced Trucial Oman as a representative of itself, and deprived it of the power to protect itself.

Politically, British colonialism took over the administration of Trucial Oman, and this included jurisdiction over Trucial Oman’s external relations. This meant that British colonialism incorporated Trucial Oman into a larger colonial administrative system, headquartered in Bombay and Bushire. British colonialism also divided Trucial Oman into several sheikhdoms, each one ruled by a sheikh whose family had gained its position as hereditary ruler by virtue of signing the British-imposed treaties. The British colonial administration appointed a "native agent" who was backed by British naval power to safeguard the enforcement of the
treaties in all of Trucial Oman, and this, in turn, reinforced Trucial Oman's political linkages to the larger British colonial administration, headquartered in Bombay and Bushire.

Economically, British colonialism destroyed Trucial Oman's indigenous long-distance mercantile strata, and then linked Trucial Oman to the British-controlled global market through the Banyan stratum, which financed an industry exporting only one commodity, namely pearls. British colonialism also took over Trucial Oman's shipping traffic, making the city of Dubai in particular an entrepôt for British goods. In relation to the decline of the long-distance mercantile sector, the agrarian and deep-desert tribal socio-discursive formations also declined. In addition, the imposed treaties gave British colonialism control over all of Trucial Oman's resources, the significance of which will be discussed in the next four chapters.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE EARLY COLONIAL-SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION IN TRUCIAL OMAN IN 1820-1945: CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION

Introduction

Chapter Eight traces further the affects of British colonialism on Trucial Oman’s socio-discursive formations, with emphasis on Trucial Oman’s main commercial entrepot, Dubai. The first section of this chapter analyzes the rise of Dubai as a mercantile entrepot during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and also the different social strata that were constructed within Dubai in relation to British colonialism.

This analysis also covers the relationship between the ruling Sheikh and the different social strata, by class, ethnicity, religion, tribal affiliation, and gender. Such an analysis of Dubai is necessary for comparing it, as a mercantile city of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with earlier Arabian Gulf commercial cities that flourished during the height of historic Oman’s Indian Ocean commerce during the 600-1500 A.D. period. A detailed understanding of Dubai’s social strata, the impact of British colonialism upon them, their interaction, and their relationship to the ruling sheikh also facilitates an
understanding of why the Reform Movement of the 1930s arose there, and why it ultimately failed.

The central argument presented in this section will be that Dubai became important in colonial Trucial Oman because it had become a port of call for steamers shipping British goods from India or the United Kingdom itself, as well Trucial Oman’s main export commodity, pearls. Chapter Eight’s first section also discusses the affects of British colonialism on the mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations in Trucial Oman, and analyzes their articulation together within colonial socio-discursive formation.

The second section of chapter eight covers the process by which the British continued to penetrate Trucial Oman, in relation to the decline of the previously discussed pearling industry, the oil concession treaties, and to additional treaties imposed for airline concessions. Section two of Chapter Eight covers the discourses constructed in relation to these concessions, the realization of these concessions, as well as the consequences they brought to Trucial Oman. The main argument presented for this section will be that these concessions added new political, economic and cultural dimensions to the power relationship between Trucial Oman and British colonialism, and to that between Trucial Oman’s ruling Sheikhs and the different social strata in Trucial Oman.

The third section of Chapter Eight covers the Reform
Movement of the 1930s in Dubai. It traces the cultural developments in Trucial Oman that contributed to the rise of the Reform Movement, and analyzes the Reform Movement itself, its rise, decline, and legacy in relation to political, economic and cultural changes in Dubai. This section will argue that the Reform Movement arose because of the nature of economic, political and cultural relations in the city of Dubai, as they had developed in relation to the decline of the pearl industry, and in relation to the British imposition of airline and oil concessions on Trucial Oman.

_Dubai as a Mercantile City and Trucial Oman’s Socio-Discursive Formations During British Colonialism: 1820-1945_

Aside from being the location in which a merchant-led reform movement arose, Dubai is significant because it was an important mercantile city both in Trucial Oman and in the Arabian Gulf. Specifically, Dubai became important in the late 1800s and early 1900s because the British were bringing goods there via steamer and also because it became Trucial Oman’s main pearl exporter after the decline of Lingah, on the Persian littoral, after 1902. This section will cover Dubai’s beginnings, and its growth as a mercantile city within the context of transformations that were occurring within Trucial Oman in the early twentieth century. In addition, this section will link Dubai, as an example of one city in Trucial Oman, with the agrarian and pastoral socio-discursive
formations that were articulating in Trucial Oman at the time. This coverage will also allow some discussion of Dubai as a mercantile city of this period, in comparison with the mercantile cities of historic Oman and the Arabian Gulf that had flourished during the years of Indian Ocean commerce in the 600-1500 period, such as Siraf, Suhar, Qais, Hormuz, Dibba and Khor Fakkan.

Dubai may have existed as a minor port of historic Oman. In 1820, Dubai’s Sheikh Hazza bin Za‘al signed the above-mentioned General Treaty of Peace with the British, nominally making Dubai a Trucial Oman sheikhdom. However, Dubai is believed to have remained a dependency of the Bani Yas Confederation until 1833, when a group of migrants from the Al-Bu Falasah section of the Bani Yas confederation in Abu Dhabi settled in Dubai, seceding from the rule of the Abu Falah section of the Bani Yas in Abu Dhabi.\(^1\) The leaders of the Al-Bu Falasah, who became the Dubai Sheikhs upon whom the British imposed their treaties subsequent to that of 1820, were Sheikh Obeid bin Sa‘id and Sheikh Maktoum bin Buti. After Sheikh Obeid died in 1836, Maktoum bin Buti was Sheikh until his death in 1852. Then Maktoum’s brother, Sheikh Sa‘id bin Buti, ruled until 1859. He was succeeded by his nephew, Sheikh Hashar bin Maktoum in that year, who ruled until 1886, and was succeeded by his brother Sheikh Rashid bin Maktoum,

\(^1\) Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf*, vol. 1, p. 772.
who was Sheikh until 1894, when his nephew Sheikh Maktoum bin Hashar became ruler. In 1906, Sheikh Maktoum bin Hashar died, and was succeeded by his cousin, Sheikh Buti bin Suhail, who ruled until 1912. Sheikh Buti bin Suhail was then succeeded by his cousin Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum, the son of Sheikh Maktoum bin Hashar, who ruled until 1958.2

The mention of the names of these rulers is important, both because some of them will be identified in connection with the reform movement of 1938, and because it is important to emphasize that when the British imposed their above-mentioned treaties on the Trucial Oman sheikhs, they made the families of these sheikhs hereditary rulers of the sheikhdoms that the treaties had constructed. This meant that the sheikhs inherited the obligations that the treaties imposed, and were obliged to serve the British because they owed their ruling position only to them.

Dubai as a mercantile city at the end of the nineteenth century needs to be understood in the context of the British installation of regular steamer service in the Arabian Gulf after 1862, first as a mail service, and later as a cargo and passenger service as well. In 1862, the British India Company, a private company receiving subsidies from the British Government of India, won a contract from Bombay for providing mail service between Calcutta, Bombay and Karachi in

India, and Basra and other ports on the Arabian Gulf. The British India Company (B.I.) won this mail contract over its competitors because during the 1850s, it had achieved a dominant position in trade along the Indian coast, and was already receiving British Government of India subsidies. The development of ports of call in the Gulf was important to the British for two other reasons besides commercial ones. The first was that they wanted alternative overland and maritime routes between India and Britain to those that already existed. The first of the existing routes went from the Cape around Africa to Europe, and the second went overland to the Red Sea, prior to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The second reason why the British were interested in establishing Arabian Gulf ports of call for B.I. shipping was that the British wanted to reinforce their presence in the Arabian Gulf by placing additional maritime installations and personnel there in order to prevent Russian penetration of Persia.

Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co., which had managed B.I.'s trade services along the Indian Coast, took responsibility for establishing B.I. operations in the Arabian Gulf. In 1865,

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Mackinnon Mackenzie (MM) & Co. and B.I. established the firm of Gray, Paul and Co. as their agency in Bushire, and Bandar Abbas. MM & Co. and B.I. then established Gray, Mackenzie and Co. as their agency in Basra in 1869. Next, Gray, Paul and Co. established an office in Lingah, a city within Qasimi territory on the Persian littoral of the Arabian Gulf, in 1875. This port served as a transshipment center for traffic to and from Bahrain and Trucial Oman. Subsequently, in 1883, Gray, Paul and Company established an office in Bahrain. This port became especially important to the Company after the decline of Lingah in 1902.\(^5\) Gray, Mackenzie and Co. began its operations in Dubai in 1891.\(^6\)

In order to ensure that the Gulf ports of call for B.I. ships could pay for the imports from Britain, the B.I. began to encourage most of the Gulf ports to develop their own, specific cash commodities for export, mainly by providing the shipping for them. In the case of Bushire, whose imports usually exceeded exports in value between 1865 and the 1870s, the chosen cash commodity was opium, because of the ready market it commanded in Hong Kong, Singapore, and later in Britain and the U.S. Opium trade became especially promising as a result of the rise in poppy seed prices in Europe during

\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 29-30; and 40, 43 and 44.

\(^6\) Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 249.
the mid-1870s, when B.I. steamers began shipping opium from Bushire. In addition, Bushire was important for Gray, Paul and Co. as a significant importer of British goods, such as cotton piece goods, shirtings, copper and arms.\(^7\) For Bandar Abbas as for Bushire, imports predominated over exports in value between 1865 and 1902, and a significant portion of these imports were cotton piece goods from Britain, which were then transported to other cities in Persia and Central Asia. Therefore, this port, too, served as a significant export depot for Persia's opium crop.\(^8\)

Basra was another significant importer of British goods, mainly cotton products and other basics. Basra's date trade was also important to Gray, Mackenzie and Co. during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Gray, Mackenzie and Co. arranged the loading of B.I. ships with dates for export to merchants in Europe, America, and Australia. On the other hand, Lingah's initial importance for Gray, Paul and Company lay in its function as a port of mail delivery.\(^9\) Subsequently, however, Lingah had also become a highly significant pearl exporter, as all of the pearls extracted in the pearl banks of Trucial Oman were exported to


\(^8\) Ibid., pp. 42-43.

\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 41-42, and 46-47.
British India via that port. This began to decline after the end of the pearling season of 1901-1902 because of the effects of the stricter customs regulations that the officials of the Qajar shah, who had taken Lingah from the Al-Qawasim in 1887, imposed after that year. (The Qajar shah had been able to take Lingah from the Al-Qawasim because the British had destroyed them as a commercial power at the beginning of the century, and had placed them under colonial rule.)

Lingah also served as the conduit for Trucial Oman’s imports from British India, until the rise of Dubai as Trucial Oman’s main port after 1902. Lingah’s imports from British India included cloth, coffee, flour and rice. Until 1887, Lingah had been governed under Qasimi administration as a free port. However, Lingah came under Persian Qajar administration after 1887, and in 1902, the Qajar officials governing it reformed the customs laws, and ended the city’s free port status. Between 1887 and the turn of the twentieth century, therefore,

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Lingah gradually lost commerce to Dubai.\textsuperscript{14}

For Bahrain, it was the pearl industry that constituted the most important export, although Bahrain also re-exported the dates, coffee and rice that B.I. shipping brought in.\textsuperscript{15} After the establishment of its office in Bahrain in 1883, Gray, Paul and Company itself shipped a large percentage of Bahrain's pearl exports to India. Between 1866 and 1906, the aggregate value of Bahrain's pearl exports was large enough so that Bahrain's exports actually kept pace with imports in value during this period.\textsuperscript{16}

Dubai began to gain significance as an Arabian Gulf port after 1887, when the port of Lingah, to which it had hitherto been linked, had begun to decline. After 1902, Dubai became a major port of call for steamers, and the chief commercial emporium of Trucial Oman.\textsuperscript{17} In fact, by 1904, steamers were calling at Dubai weekly. This was because the Qajar rulers required high customs dues at Lingah, and also because of the fact that the Sheikh of Dubai, Maktoum bin Hashar, for his part, had abolished the five per cent customs

\textsuperscript{14} Rosemary Said Zahlan, \textit{The Making of the Modern Gulf States} (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 95; and Heard-Bay, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, p. 244.

\textsuperscript{15} Jones, in Lawless, \textit{The Gulf in the Early 20th Century}, pp. 44 and 45.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., pp. 44 and 45.

\textsuperscript{17} Lorimer, \textit{Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia}, vol. 1, p. 774.
duty previously effective in Dubai, and had declared Dubai a free port. With the decline of Lingah, Dubai became a center of trade with the interior Bureimi area, and also a port from which goods coming from British India were re-exported to Persia. In addition, Dubai became a distribution center for imported goods along the Arabian littoral of the Gulf between Ras al-Khaimah and Qatar after 1902. Dubai was also the main supplier of provisions for the interior of the Sultanate of Oman at this time, because the civil war occurring there had blocked off the roads connecting the interior of the Sultanate with the ports of Musqat and Matrah.

It is now appropriate to examine Dubai, and its connections with the rest of Trucial Oman, more closely. The city of Dubai was divided by the Creek into two sectors. Bar Daira, on the northern bank of the Creek, was the mercantile sector. Bar Dubai, on the southern bank, housed government buildings such as the customs house, and the home of the Sheikh. Bar Dubai also housed the Banyan mercantile community, as well as some other Gulf merchants, such as the

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19 Abdullah, *Arabian Studies* 2 (1975): 168. It is important to emphasize here that between 1860 and the turn of the twentieth century, what became the Sultanate of Oman declined steadily. Oman’s long-distance trade, of course, had long since been destroyed. But even local trans-Gulf commerce had been choked off by the advent of steamer commerce during the second half of the nineteenth century. Landen, *Oman Since 1856*, pp. 156-157.
Bastaki, who will be discussed later. Ferries crossing the Creek connected the two sectors.

An examination of Dubai and its place within Trucial Oman first requires identifying the different strata comprising this mercantile city. Secondly, this examination requires an analysis of the interaction among these strata, and related issues such as segmentation and socio-economic differentiation among them (economic privilege, political power, and cultural prestige). Thirdly, it is necessary to discuss Dubai, as a mercantile socio-discursive formation, in relation to Trucial Oman’s agrarian and pastoral/tribal socio-discursive formations, which were articulating at that time.

**The Mercantile Socio-Discursive Formation**

The topmost stratum of Dubai’s mercantile community, and that of the other Gulf entrepots described above as well in terms of economic privilege, consisted of the B.I., Gray, Paul, and Gray, Mackenzie executives, who had developed a monopoly in the supplying of all of the Arabian Gulf ports, Dubai included. It was the B.I. ships that transported most merchandise, whether from the United Kingdom or from British India, to Dubai from Bombay. Dubai’s imports from British India via Gray Mackenzie consisted of rice, coffee, tea, spices, sugar, grain and flour, as well as textiles, cotton
piece goods, various consumer goods, and other manufactures.20 Cloth imports from the U.K. had become so commonplace at all of the Arabian Gulf ports, Dubai included, that by the end of the nineteenth century, the cotton cloth used to make the garments worn by rural people in Trucial Oman was often manufactured in Lancashire, and brought into the Gulf by steamer.21

B.I. shipping, and other steamer lines, were also able to take advantage of the Sheikh of Dubai’s abolition of the five per cent customs tax, so that in 1904, both British and German goods abounded in Dubai’s markets.22 This stratum also enjoyed political power within the framework of the overall British colonial system that was entrenching itself in the Arabian Gulf during the latter half of the nineteenth century, but B.I. and Gray Mackenzie officials did not have political power within the Dubai civil society itself, because they did not constitute and entrenched stratum there. For the same reason, they did not have cultural prestige there, either.

It was the Banyan merchants who served as the local importers of this merchandise once it disembarked the B.I. steamers. The Banyan merchants were able to be intermediaries


21 Landen, Oman Since 1856, p. 80.

between the B.I and Gray, Mackenzie officials on the one hand, and the local Dubai shopkeepers on the other, because of their knowledge of English, and because they enjoyed access to credit sources and supplies in British India. The Banyan merchants ordered most of their goods in advance from Gray, Mackenzie, making a down payment on them to the company as they did so. When the goods arrived, the Banyan merchants would pay Gray, Mackenzie the remainder, as well as customs duties to the Sheikh at port on the goods, in order to be free to market them. The smaller shopkeepers who distributed imports, in turn, obtained them by making a down payment to the Banyan merchant on the total stated value of the goods, and then amortizing the rest of this amount in payments of about 12.5 per cent every Saturday, the first day of the Islamic week. As mentioned above, Banyan merchants also enjoyed privileged status with the British as British subjects. During the nineteenth century, they frequently became partners of British entrepreneurs establishing businesses such as banks, insurance companies, shipping centers, and commercial agency houses. The Indian community in Dubai, Khojah and Banyan, lived in different quarters of

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23 Landen, Oman Since 1856, p. 102.

24 Abd al-Rahman, Al-Imarat fi Dhakirat 'Abna'ija, p. 323. Some of the names that Abd al-Rahman's interviewee on this subject mentions in recounting these details imply that a few of these importers may have been locals, or merchants from the Persian littoral, rather than Banyans.
Bar Dubai near the Al-Fahidi Fort. Banyan merchants settled in Dubai, and elsewhere in Trucial Oman as representatives of British and some Indian companies. In Dubai, they sold textiles in this capacity, and also served as money lenders, providing the pearl industry with most of its credit. As discussed above, it was mainly the Banyan merchants who served as the financiers for the pearling industry, both in Bombay and in Dubai. This was because they had capital through their partnership with the British, and enjoyed special protection as British subjects, and because Islam forbade the charging of interest. The extensive economic and cultural linkages to the British that the Banyan mercantile stratum constructed gave it economic privilege in Dubai, but not political power or cultural prestige there. This was because the Banyan stratum was linked to the British, and not with Dubai's own civil society.

Dubai also had a stratum of local merchants, some of whom were part of the pearl industry as tujar, musaqqamin, and tawawish pearl merchants. Others imported rice, spices, textiles, etc. to Dubai from British India, by way of B.I. shipping. Some of these merchants were related to the Sheikh, and most of this stratum lived in Bar Daira. Two important

25 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 242.

26 Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 105.
individuals from within this local merchant group are Sheikh Mani' bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, and Mohammed bin Ahmed bin Dalmuk. These two figures are important not only because they were the wealthiest of the local Dubai merchants, but also because they were significant participants in the Reform Movement, which will be covered below. This stratum enjoyed economic privilege in Dubai, although not to the extent that the Banyan stratum did. However, the fact that many were related to the Sheikh, the fact that they were Bu-Falasah, as well as the fact that they were local Arabs and wealthy brought them political power and cultural prestige within Dubai's civil society.

There were also strata of merchants from the Persian littoral of the Arabian Gulf, some of whom had migrated there from Lingah, Hinjam, and other points on the Persian littoral, after 1902. Some of the migrants from Lingah and Hinjam were also pearl merchants. Others continued to be conduits for imports from British India, such as cotton goods, to the rest of Trucial Oman, as they had been in Lingah. Other

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27 Abd al-Rahman, Al-Imarat fi Dhakirat 'Abna‘iha, pp. 61-66. This work, a book of interviews, also provides additional names of prominent local merchants in Dubai.

28 Heard-Bay, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 245.

29 Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, p. 408. The local merchants of Lingah were able to conduct goods shipped to that port by steamer across the Arabian Gulf to Dubai and other points in Trucial Oman through the use of local craft.
merchants from the Persian littoral came from Lar, Awadh, and Grash. These settled in quarters of Bar Daira named after the Persian littoral cities they had left, i.e. the Lariyyah, the Awadhiyyah, and the Grashiyyah. Another area of Dubai that migrants from the Persian littoral populated came to be called the Bastakiyyah, after Bastak, a Persian littoral region near Lingah from which this particular group had migrated. The Bastakiyyah quarter’s was on the Bar Dubai side of the creek, close both to the creek, where boats from the Gulf pulled into Dubai, and to the Dubai souq. Some of the Bastaki migrants, who were largely Sunni, were pearl merchants, exporting pearls from Dubai to India that they had purchased from tawawish or from musaggamin. They also imported clothes, food, and various consumer goods from British India to Dubai, and these were delivered via B.I. steamers. The Awadhi merchants, most of whom were also Sunni, specialized in the import from British India of scissors, mirrors, razors, and other consumer goods which they then sold in the Bar Daira and Dubai souqs. Lari merchants, who were mostly Shi‘i, specialized in


30 Abd al-Rahman, Al Imarat fi Dhakirat 'Abna’iha, p. 337.


32 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, pp. 245-246.
importing food from British India, and also some carpets from Iran, to Dubai. Grashi merchants, also Shi‘i, usually had small shops in which they sold sweets that they made on the premises.\textsuperscript{33} The women of the mercantile strata mainly did domestic work such as cooking, sewing, house maintenance, child rearing, etc.

One utilitarian way in which merchants from the Persian littoral of the Gulf continued to express their identity in relation to the other merchants of Dubai was in the architecture of their houses. While most of the other merchants of the city used the higher stories of their coral and clay houses for ventilation during the Gulf summer, houses of merchants from the Persian littoral had wind-towers which rose above the second story of the house and were constructed to trap winds from all directions. This was an architectural device that the immigrant merchants had brought with them from the Persian littoral, and it later became popular throughout Dubai. Merchant immigrants from the Persian littoral also continued to use suruj, a red clay common on that shore, for the construction of the foundations of their houses.\textsuperscript{34} Although this stratum of merchants from the Persian Littoral enjoyed economic privilege in Dubai, there were factors that

\textsuperscript{33} Abd al-Rahman, \textit{Al Imarat fi Dhakirat ‘Abna‘iha}, p. 338.

\textsuperscript{34} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, pp. 245-246.
detected from its obtaining political power and cultural prestige within Dubai's civil society in relation to Dubai's local merchants. Firstly, merchants from this stratum were recent immigrants. This, of course, meant that they were neither related to the Sheikh, nor Bu-Falasah. In addition, some were not Arab, and some were Shi'i.

Pearl divers and various craftsmen, such as masons and carpenters, also migrated from the Persian littoral to Dubai, along with the merchants. These usually lived in houses made of date palm fronds. The pearl sector, and ancillary industries, attracted migrants from elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf, such as the Baharinah, to Trucial Oman. These Baharinah, or Bahraini Shi'is, worked as ghawasins, and also in crafts such as blacksmithing. They were also employed as shopkeepers and petty traders. They lived in a particular section of Dubai called Firiṣj al-Baharinah, or, Section of the Baharinah.

Another stratum of migrants to Dubai came from Zubeir in Iraq. These came to serve as karaniyyah, or accountants and clerks, for Dubai's merchants. In particular, pearl merchants employed them for this purpose, although other Zubeiri migrants were craft makers. A high percentage of the

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36 Heard-Bay, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 201.
Zubeiris were literate. The various strata within this grouping range from ghawasin to craftmakers, shopkeepers, and clerks, which means that their economic privilege levels ranged from low to middle. This was also true of their cultural prestige, with ghawasin and siyub enjoying very little cultural prestige, while the craftmakers, shopkeepers and clerks enjoyed more, because of their frequent literacy in the Arabic language, and their relative economic privilege in relation to the ghawasin and siyub. The fact that some of the members of these middle strata were Shi‘i, however, tended to detract from their cultural prestige in Dubai’s civil society. Members of this grouping, from the ghawasin and siyub to the craftmakers, shopkeepers and clerks enjoyed little political power within Dubai, although this varied in the same direction as economic privilege and cultural prestige. Dubai’s small shopkeepers were Arabs, Persians, and Indians. These sold basic food commodities, textiles, and household goods. Some of these were migrants from India who traveled as deck passengers on the steamer lines during the first years of the twentieth century.

Later migrants to Dubai, most of whom came during the 1930s, included Baluchis who mainly found work as porters, or

38 Izzard, The Gulf: Arabia’s Western Approaches, pp. 242-244.
other marginal employment at the port, and additional immigrants from the Persian littoral, who came because of the severity of the economic depression situation in Iran.\footnote{39} Others may have come to Trucial Oman to avoid Riza Shah’s military conscription. In addition to these, Dubai’s lower strata consisted of local ghawasin, or siyub who were attached to local merchants by virtue of their debt, or worked in some sort of servitude to them between pearling seasons. Sometimes local ghawasin and siyub worked as off-season servants to local merchants simply because they were from Dubai, and needed employment when they were not on the pearling ships.\footnote{40} Other local ghawasin or siyub fished during the off-season. These local ghawasin and siyub, like those mentioned above who were migrants from the Persian littoral, also lived in houses made of palm fronds. Women in these strata worked as domestic servants in merchants’ houses, sold fish or vegetables in the souq, and sometimes worked as itinerent vendors of various products from house to house. These products could include imported or locally made clothing, kitchen items, and other products such as roasted peanuts, hard yoghurt, etc.\footnote{41} This

\footnote{39} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, p. 254.


\footnote{41} Abd al-Rahman, \textit{Al Imarat fi Dhakirat ‘Abna’iha}, pp. 28–29. Although this interview was conducted with someone from Abu Dhabi, the same situation prevailed in Dubai.
group describes various members of the lower strata in Dubai’s civil society. In all cases, they enjoyed little economic privilege. This fact translated into little cultural prestige or political power for any of them. However, some variation in the cultural prestige and political power of these strata existed, because some of them were local while others were immigrants, and because some were Shi‘is while others were Sunni. Gender also gave some members of these strata more economic privilege, cultural prestige and political power than others.

The discussion above has illustrated that the city of Dubai in the early twentieth century contained several classes and ethnic groups, and that the various classes cut across lines of ethnicity and gender. It is important, also, to emphasize that each class, and each ethnic group, constructed its own discourse in relation to other strata and ethnic groups. The various ethnic groups living in the city of Dubai during this period constructed their discourses by means of language, religion, indentification with a town or region from which they had migrated, and even by means of the architecture of their houses. Each class, too, constructed a discourse in relation to others. Mainly, the reality of these different discourses could be seen in the fact that the members of each class, i.e., ghawas in and siyub, pearl merchants, large manufacture importers, small shopkeepers, financiers, etc.
each operated under a distinct set of beliefs, customs, and other cultural norms. Local pearl merchants, for instance, differentiated themselves from other strata through the lifestyle that they constructed in relation to their possessions. Between diving seasons, pearl merchants would hunt outside of the city, or engage in falconry there. They also made frequent trips to Bombay. In the city, local pearl merchants had horses, a sign of material wealth.\(^{42}\) The *ghawasin* and *siyub*, by contrast, would visit small waterfront restaurants between seasons, drinking tea, and playing games like *Tawlah* or cards. They also exchanged stories and narratives.

Within each class and ethnic group, women and men constructed different discourses in relation to each other. The political power and cultural prestige that each class and ethnic group had in relation to both the ruling families and to the British also varied. This fact was to have tremendous significance in relation to the Reform Movement that will be treated below.

Despite the fact that they belonged to different classes and ethnic groups, the people of the city of Dubai constructed a specific discourse in relation to members of the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations, as a result of their interaction with farmers and bedouins. The people of the city of Dubai mainly interacted with people from the

\(^{42}\) Ibid., pp. 327-328.
agrarian socio-discursive formation through the local trade in agricultural commodities, and because some larger merchants also owned land in agricultural areas. Urban dwellers interacted with people from the tribal socio-discursive formation because bedouins sold products of their own in urban areas, bought goods from urban souqs, and also transported agricultural products to cities.

**The Agrarian Socio-Discursive Formation**

While commodities sold in the Dubai souqs such as rice, spices, cotton goods and consumer goods were mainly imports that came into the city via B.I.- Gray Mackenzie shipping, it is important to emphasize that Trucial Oman's agricultural sector produced certain commodities for local consumption, and for sale in Dubai and other Gulf cities during the early twentieth century. Important, locally produced agricultural goods of this sort included tobacco, dates, lemons, mangoes, bananas, pomegranites, water melons, wheat, onions, corn, and other vegetables. Like the mercantile sector, the Trucial Oman's agricultural sector was a stratified one. In the Ras al-Khaimah area, the eastern region, the mountain region, and in what was to become Fujairah, for example, eighty per cent of the date farms were owned by the more prosperous urban merchants. Small farmers owned the remaining twenty per cent. The people of these regions who owned no land usually worked as bayadir, or farm laborers, on the larger farms. These
bayadir earned a monthly wage of about three Rupees. During the pearling season, many of them worked as ghawasin, siyub, or rawadif. Tasks of the bayadir included guiding the flow of the falaj water for irrigation of the date groves, trimming and fertilizing the date trees, and assisting with the harvest during the summer. Tasks of the bayadir also included herding sheep, feeding livestock, and preparing fertilizer.\(^{43}\)

The mountain regions of Hattah, Masfout, Hirah, and the eastern region, were tobacco-farming regions. Tobacco farming could be very profitable, as it was sometimes possible for a tobacco farm to earn as much as Rs. 10,000 per year. Most of the tobacco farms were family owned, and were worked by the owner and his family. A few, however, also employed bayadir, but instead of being paid a wage, the bayadir were entitled to a share in the farm’s profits. Tobacco was usually grown for consumption in the cities of Trucial Oman. It was also exported to Bahrain and to other destinations in the Arabian Gulf. In the Masfout area, where tobacco, dates, corn, and wheat were grown, the land tenure system was such that the entire region was divided into several parts, each of which was farmed cooperatively by a group of ten to twenty people, who would share the profit earned by each land parcel.\(^{44}\)

Mangoes were a third crop that was important for local

\(^{43}\) Ibid., pp. 374-375 and 385.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., pp. 412-413, and 419-420.
consumption. The main mango-growing regions in Trucial Oman were the Masaafi and Batinah areas. From here, the mangoes were exported to a special market in Dubai.45

Some farmers also worked in crafts, such as pottery. In the village of Shamil, in the Sheikdom of Ras al Khaimah, for example, there were several pottery works, many owned by families who also farmed. The ceramics made here were both locally used and sold to cities, particularly Dubai, as basic kitchenware and eating ware. Men mainly made the pots, bowls and plates, but women glazed and decorated them.46 Farming women also commonly wove various household items out of date palm fronds. These included mats, container tops, baskets for transporting dates, fishnets, brooms, etc. The central rod of the date palm frond was often used for making household furniture. Some of these items were made for household use, but others were transported to cities like Dubai and Abu Dhabi for sale in the souqs. Sale of these items often produced a sizeable supplement to the family income.47 In addition to this, it fell to women to do domestic work such as child rearing, cooking, sewing, and house maintenance.

A fish-producing industry also existed within Trucial Oman's agricultural socio-discursive formation, particularly

46 Ibid., pp. 468-472.
47 Ibid., p. 393.
within the Ras al-Khaimah (Julfar) area. This industry entailed the catching, cleaning, cutting, salting and canning, of fish for transportation to Dubai or other cities of Trucial Oman, where it would be sold locally or, if transported to Dubai, exported to Basra, Bahrain, Al-Qatif and other destinations. Like the pearling industry, this industry was a hierarchical, ship-based one. Fishing ships, which usually sailed in the winter, had owners, nawakhadha, equipment suppliers who also supplied equipment for salting the fish, and crew members, who usually were people from agricultural or coastal areas, including ghawasin and siyub who were in between pearling seasons.

The crew members who caught the fish cut, cleaned and then transported them to covered pools for soaking. Each pool was large enough to contain an average of about 8,000 large fish. The crew members of the ships would then leave the fish to soak for six months in a solution of salt water and other ingredients. The profit on each ship's catch would be realized after the salted fish had been sold to a local shopkeeper or export merchant. This profit was divided into six shares, and distributed among the crew members of a fishing ship. The owner of the ship was entitled to one share, as was the nakhodha. The supplier of the equipment both for the fishing ship and for the salting process, however, was entitled to three shares. The final share was
divided among the rest of the crew, which usually consisted of about fifteen ghawasin and siyub. The soaking pool was an asset that usually passed from father to son. Dried fish were also produced, largely in the coastal area, for local consumption or for export to other destinations from Dubai.\textsuperscript{48}

The Tribal Socio-Discursive Formation

Some bedouins, such as those who seasonally migrated from the desert to the Bureimi or Liwa regions, engaged in date harvesting before returning to the desert. Others seasonally fished, or served as siyub or rawadif during the pearling season. An important source of additional income for the bedouins, however, was the gathering of firewood and honey, and the making of Samn\textsuperscript{5} (clarified butter) and cheeses for sale in the cities.\textsuperscript{49} When in the cities, the bedouins would also purchase needed household supplies.\textsuperscript{50} Bedouins from as far away from Dubai as the region near Dibba on the Gulf of Oman also brought livestock, such as sheep and goats, to sell in Dubai. In addition, after the Bedouins had sold their own products in Dubai, or other cities, merchants would hire them to transport imports such as rice to other nearby

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., pp. 299-315.

\textsuperscript{49} Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 201; and Abd al-Rahman, Al Imarat fi Dhakarat 'Abna'\textsuperscript{i}ha, pp. 296, and 543.

\textsuperscript{50} Sanger, The Arabian Peninsula, p. 176.
cities and villages.\textsuperscript{51} The women who were livestock herding bedouins did domestic work such as child rearing, sewing needed clothing such as the woolen bisht for the men, and blankets for the household. Their tasks also included general house maintenance, and cooking. Outside of the household, they milked sheep and goats, made samnah, cheese, and hard yoghurt out of the milk, cared for young livestock, sheared sheep and goats, wove tents out of goat hair, etc. While some of these items were for domestic use, many others, particularly the food products, were sold both in agricultural areas and in the cities.\textsuperscript{52}

However, it is important to mention one major change that had taken place within the tribal socio-discursive formation during the early twentieth century regarding the deep desert, camel-based tribes. This was that some of these tribes were now obtaining substantial monetary gifts from the coastal area sheikhs.\textsuperscript{53} This means of earning an income came to supplant the traditional tribal function of providing safety, guidance, additional livestock, and passage rights through their diras to long-distance trade caravans, for trade was now essentially regional, was in fewer commodities, and

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\textsuperscript{51} Abd al-Rahman, \textit{Al Imarat fi Dhakirat 'Abna'iha}, pp. 295-296, and 407.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, pp. 543-544.

\textsuperscript{53} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 201.
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mainly extended as far as Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman. The coastal area sheikhs subsidized these tribes for several other reasons. Firstly, the ruling sheikhs needed the loyalty of the bedouins for the expansion of the territories that they had gained from the treaties imposed by the British. (As mentioned previously, these treaties did not draw borders among the sheikhdoms.) Secondly, and relatedly, the bedouins were needed to protect a sheikh against neighboring, and rival sheikhdoms, and thirdly, they were needed to ensure the internal security of the sheikh’s rule. The ruling sheikhs financed their ability to give gifts to certain important tribes, and to preserve the general security of their rule, by means of taxation, and money from concessions that they later extended to the British.

The Income of the Ruling Stratum in Relation to Trucial Oman’s Colonial Socio-Discursive Formation

Aside from the taxation on the pearl industry, described above, the ruling sheikhs also taxed non-pearl merchants, and the agricultural sector. In Dubai, the Sheikh levied customs taxes on the imports of non-pearl merchants through a tax-farm

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54 Zahlan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, pp. 160-161. Although Said-Zhalan only mentions one example of this here, by the early twentieth century it had become common for the Trucial Oman Sheikhs’ to extend monetary gifts to interior Bedouin tribes, both to ensure their allegiance to a particular sheikhdom and to provide security for the Sheikh. See also Butti, "Imperialism, Tribal Structure, and the Development of Ruling Elites", pp. 203-204.
arrangement, wherein he signed a contract with a particular merchant for that merchant's remission to him of two annas on each imported bundle, pack or parcel.\textsuperscript{55} Trucial Oman sheikhs collected revenues in more informal ways, as well. One of their more informal revenue collection methods was their attendance of a \textit{majlis} of a merchant, or village head, in order to request funds. In return, the Sheikh was expected to provide orderly, just rule, and to see to the security of the subjects.\textsuperscript{56}

In Abu Dhabi, taxation on dates was in kind, and taxes for agricultural products in general, including livestock, were collected by a regional representative of the sheikh called the \textit{Wali}, who usually came from a prominent family in the area, but occasionally could also be a member of the Sheikh's family.\textsuperscript{57} The taxation rate on dates was one \textit{jirab} for a harvest of every ten \textit{jirbat}. In Liwa, one \textit{jirab} equalled 180 pounds, while in Bureimi, one \textit{jirab} equalled eighty pounds. People who harvested fewer than twenty \textit{jirbat} from all of the date trees that they owned were exempt from

\textsuperscript{55} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, p. 249.

\textsuperscript{56} Butti, "Imperialism, Tribal Structure, and the Development of Ruling Elites," pp. 139-140.

\textsuperscript{57} Al-Mutawa', \textit{Al-Tanmiyyah wa al-Taghyir al-Ijtima'i fi al-Imarat}, p. 14.
taxation. The Trucial Oman areas of Bureimi, Liwa, Dhaid and Falaj al-Mu‘alla were the most prolific date producing regions, and the number of date trees that each had made taxation significant for the Sheikh. During the 1892-1939 period, for example, 60,000 date trees grew at the Bureimi Oasis, 33,000 at Liwa, and 25,000 at the Dhaid and Falaj al-Mu‘alla region. Large, important tribes like the Manasir, who owned many date groves in the oases east of Tharwaniyah were also exempt from taxation. Many other tribes in Trucial Oman, mainly among those who lived in Trucial Oman’s interior, such as the Bani Qitab, the al-bu Shamis, the al-Ni‘am, and the Bani Ka‘ab, kept their allegiance to their za‘im only, and did not recognize the authority of any of the Trucial Oman sheikhs. However, in order to gain the loyalty of these tribes, the sheikhs decided to accept this condition, keeping them exempt from taxes as a sort of monetary gift. Other sources of income that the Sheikh of Dubai specifically had were his family’s control of the ferrying service across the Creek, such that no one else was allowed to establish such

58 Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, pp. 203-204.


60 Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, p. 204.

a service,\textsuperscript{62} and the taxi service in Dubai, and between Dubai and Sharqah.\textsuperscript{63} Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum's wife, Sheikha Hussah bint al-Murr, also owned businesses in Bar Daira,\textsuperscript{64} and was prominent enough to have her own \textit{Majlis}, which men actually attended.\textsuperscript{65}

However, despite these sources of revenue, the rulers' revenues were not as great as those of the local pearl merchants. Between the end of the nineteenth century and 1930, the prosperity of the pearl sector gave the local pearl merchants great political power in relation to the sheikhs. This was because the sheikhs' main source of income was the taxation they levied upon every pearling vessel.\textsuperscript{66} Sometimes, the sheikhs also got commissions from the sale of pearls, as well. A concrete example of the importance of the pearl sector to the ruler's income can be seen in estimates about the composition of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Zayid bin Khalifa's 1908 income, 82 per cent of which came from the

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item[63] Zahlan, \textit{The Origins of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 156.
  \item[64] Butti, "Imperialism, Tribal Structure, and the Development of Ruling Elites," p. 220.
  \item[65] Lienhardt, in Hopwood, \textit{The Arabian Peninsula}, p. 229.
  \item[66] Abdullah, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, p. 104.
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pearl industry. Although the British-imposed treaties had theoretically given rulers like Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum of Dubai absolute political power over their subjects, the prominence of the mercantile stratum gave the suggestions of the advisory Majlis that Sheikh Sa'id consulted about most important issues considerable weight. One good example of the power that the Majlis could wield could be seen in the role it played in preventing the installation of a British airline terminal in Dubai. (See below.) Because it was the pearl merchants who comprised the wealthiest local stratum in Dubai and in the rest of Trucial Oman during the early twentieth century, and because it was from them that the greatest percentage of the Sheikh's tax revenues came, the pearl merchant stratum enjoyed more political power and cultural prestige than did other strata, including other mercantile strata. (It is important to emphasize, however, that within the pearl merchant stratum itself, there was variation in an individual's political power and cultural prestige in relation to wealth, nationality, ethnicity, tribal or religious affiliation.)

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During the 1930s, however, two things were to happen that began to erode the economic privilege of the pearl merchant stratum as such in relation to other strata. This loss of economic privilege translated into an erosion of their political power in relation to the ruling sheikhs. The first development was the decline of the pearl merchants' income as a result of the global depression. In addition to this, the Gulf pearling industry was being displaced by the Japanese cultured pearl industry. The second development, was the British imposition of airline and oil concessions on the Trucial Oman sheikhs, under conditions overwhelmingly favorable to the British. The British were able to impose both the concessions and the conditions accompanying them because this was a time when both merchants and the ruling sheikhs of Trucial Oman faced acute financial shortages.

**British Colonialism: Discourses, Realization and Consequences of the Airline and Oil Concessions**

As the pearling industry declined, the Trucial Oman sheikhs faced the loss of an important source of income, namely, the tax revenues from the pearling industry. It was these revenue losses that presented the British with an opportunity to deepen their penetration of Trucial Oman by offering the sheikhs rent for airline and oil concessions. It was also these revenue losses that induced the sheikhs to seek new revenue sources by accepting British airline and oil
installations in Trucial Oman, along with the conditions that the British imposed concerning them. However, in order to understand the issue of British concessions in full, it is necessary to examine the discourses used for the realization of these concessions, the means by which the British achieved these concessions, and the consequences of these concessions.

The airline concession agreements were imposed upon the sheikhs during the 1930s, and they all concerned permitting the British to construct civil or military air installations in the various sheikhdoms, including landing facilities, petrol and oil stores, and rest-houses. The discourse that the British used for stating their need for airline installations in the Arabian Gulf was their need of a safe flight route connecting Egypt with India across which they could transport aircraft for military purposes,69 since World War I had proven to them, and to most other countries, the potential of aircraft as a weapon.70 British military personnel also stressed the advantages that a Cairo - Karachi air route would present to civil postal services and commerce


as a time-saver, in contrast with steamer and rail traffic.\textsuperscript{71}

The Third British discourse for the airline concessions was that of maintaining a competitive stance with the Germans, who had first established an airline service from Berlin to Teheran by way of Russia in 1924, and then extended this service from Teheran to Baghdad.

In 1929, after signing a temporary agreement with the Iranian government, the British were able to establish a Cairo-Karachi service whose Arabian Gulf stops included Bushire and Bandar Abbas.\textsuperscript{72} In 1932, however, the Iranian government decided against extending its overflight lease to Imperial Airways, Ltd. and this was what turned British eyes toward the Arabian littoral of the Gulf. Specifically, the British were interested in having the air route run by way of Kuwait, Bahrain and Trucial Oman, so as to retain its parallelism with the Bushire-Lingah-Jask line that the Iranian government was cancelling. The British also considered the Arabian littoral more advantageous than the Persian one because of its many inlets for boats, its flatter terrain. Another important factor for the British was the fact that they viewed the Trucial Oman sheikhs as being less likely to cancel British basing and overflight leases to their


\textsuperscript{72} Marlowe, \textit{The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century}, p. 249.
territories, as the Iranian government had just done, both because of the imposed treaties in general, and specifically because of the segmentation among the sheikhdoms that the British-imposed treaties had constructed.\textsuperscript{73}

By 1930, the Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) had succeeded in setting up a landing strip and rest house in Bahrain. In Musqat, they set up another landing strip, and also a wireless and telegraph station. They established a third landing area in Kuwait in 1931. In addition, they arranged for refuelling and mooring facilities in Musqat Cove. However, the British also wanted additional civil and military facilities in Trucial Oman for the Cairo-Karachi air service that they were planning. These facilities included a place for the storage of oil and petrol, for which they chose Ras al-Khaimah in 1929, because of its creek and its flat terrain.\textsuperscript{74} Aside from the British discourse about the suitability of Trucial Oman ports of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah as flying boat bases, there was the broader discourse that the British used concerning their need for the Trucial Oman ports, as well as Kuwait, Bahrain and Musqat for facilities. This was that having additional installations in Trucial Oman would strengthen the overall British presence in the Gulf. The British wanted to

\textsuperscript{73} Zahan, \textit{The Origins of the United Arab Emirates}, pp. 93–97.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
maintain their strength throughout the Gulf in order to maintain their commercial monopoly there, and in order to strengthen their political and military position in relation to other powers. However, the underlying British motive for these facilities in all of Trucial Oman’s ports was the plan to explore for the oil that they knew was there, since oil had been discovered in Iran near Abadan in 1908.

Here it is important to reiterate that the 1922 treaty that the British had imposed upon the Trucial Oman sheikhs had stated that, in the event of an oil discovery in Trucial Oman, the sheikhs were to extend concessions only to representatives of the British government. An oil discovery in 1908 in Iran near Abadan, the fact that British geologists had concluded that there was oil in Trucial Oman after exploring there before 1920, and the fact that a British syndicate had obtained an oil exploration concession from the Sheikh of Bahrain in 1925 fueled British interest in further prospecting in, and the extraction of crude oil from, Trucial Oman. (See above.)

However, the British often found the realization of their airline concessions more difficult than they had planned. Sheikh Sultan bin Salim of Ras al-Khaimah, for example, refused to give his consent to the installation of the fuel storage facilities in his sheikhdom until the middle of 1930, despite a wealth of British attempts to pressure him
into an agreement. The British tactics included taking advantage of the segmentation among the sheikhdoms that the British-imposed treaties had constructed in Trucial Oman, since the British also tried to persuade the sheikhs of Dubai and Umm al-Quwain to try to discourage Sheikh Sultan bin Salim from his refusal, and to orchestrate a boycott by these latter two rulers of Ras al-Khaimah. The British also made more outright threats to bombard the city of Ras al-Khaimah once again. Despite the fact that the British Government of India had vetoed the British Political Resident Hugh Biscoe's proposal to issue such a threat formally, 75 the understanding among the people of Ras al-Khaimah was that a British bombardment of the town was imminent, because six British warships surrounded the city. This threat brought back memories of the devastating bombardments of Ras al-Khaimah during the early nineteenth century British war against the Al-Qawasim. As a result, the people of Ras al-Khaimah evacuated the city for the mountain region, and stationed an armed defense force of their own in the city to fend off an attack. In addition to the bombardment threat, British forces took forty pearling vessels, together with their crews, hostage for one month, even threatening to deport them all to

75 Ibid., pp. 95-96.
the U.K.76 However, Sheikh Sultan bin Salim finally capitulated to British demands later in 1930, accepting the presence of British fuel storage facilities, and the replenishment of the stored supply. He even agreed to appoint a guard to protect these facilities, and accepted responsibility for the safety of the "Native Agent" and his dependents.77

After the fuel storage facilities, the next installations that the British wanted in Trucial Oman were airports with nightstops. At the end of 1931, both Ras al-Khaimah and Dubai were considered possible candidates for these installations, but in both places, British Political Resident Biscoe encountered stiff opposition. In fact, opposition to the construction of the airport was so widespread in Ras al-Khaimah that Biscoe eliminated that city as a possible site, turning to Dubai instead.78 However, the installation of an Imperial Airways, Ltd. terminal in Dubai did not materialize, either, both because Sheikh Sa'id Al-Maktoum was ill at the time,79 and because many of his relatives, together with many of Dubai's merchant notables

76 Abd al-Rahman, Al Imarat fi Dhakarat 'Abna'ihā, p. 283.


78 Ibid., p. 97.

79 Peterson, Defending Arabia, p. 23.
comprising the Majlis, objected. These two groups wanted to prevent Dubai from becoming a British political center, and from outright British occupation.

Tactics that the British used to induce the Sheikh of Dubai to agree to the installation of the Imperial Airways terminal included bringing in Sheikh Ahmad al-Jaber of Kuwait as mediator, and offerings of payments.  

The British did finally build an airdrome-nightstop in Dubai 1937, as part of the flying boat service from Alexandria to Gwadur, on the Indian littoral of the Gulf of Oman, that Imperial Airways established in 1937. In 1932, the British managed, with the help of the "Native Agent", to induce Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr of Sharqah to allow Imperial Airways build an airdrome in his sheikhdom, and to guarantee the safety of the passengers and the Imperial Airways staff despite the opposition of Sharqah’s people. In exchange for this agreement, Sheikh Sultan received a rental payment from the British of Rs. 25,000 per year. Another provision of this agreement was


81 Peterson, Defending Arabia, p. 23.

82 Zahan, The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, p. 100.

that the B.I. steamer that regularly called at Dubai would now also stop at Sharqah.  

The next installation that Imperial Airways needed to complete its route along the Arabian littoral toward India was an emergency landing strip, for which the British chose Kalbah, a part of Sharqah which lay on the Gulf of Oman, as a location. The Sharqah Wali in Kalbah, Sa‘id bin Hamad al-Qasimi, initially refused to allow the construction of this installation when he was first approached in 1932. In response, the British used all of the above-mentioned tactics, including attempts to pit the local leader of neighboring Fujairah against Kalbah, and the outright threat of force. In the end, Imperial Airways got its landing strip in 1936, when the British agreed to declare Kalbah independent of Sharqah, making the former the seventh sheikhdom in Trucial Oman, with Sa‘id bin Hamad as its sheikh.  

Sheikh Shakhbuz of Abu Dhabi initially objected to the

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Dhabi: Dar al-Fikr al-Jadidah, 1986). Rosemarie Said-Zahlan, on the other hand, calculates that the Sheikh of Sharqah was paid Rs. 800 per month for the placement of thirty-seven guards at the airdrome, Rs. 300 as a monthly rent, Rs. 500 per month as a personal subsidy, and a fee of Rs. 5 for every airplane landing at the airdrome, with the exception of R.A.F. aircraft. See The Origins of the United Arab Emirates, p. 100.


R.A.F.'s installation of a fuel storage tank at Sirr Bani Yas when the former first approached him in 1930, and then installed it anyway, without his consent. However, the R.A.F. obtained Sheikh Shakhbut's formal assent to the fuel tank, and to other facilities, such as emergency landing strips both at Sirr Bani Yas and near Abu Dhabi itself, a flying-boat anchorage, and additional fuel storage tanks in 1935 in exchange for meeting the Sheikh's request for the bringing in of geologists who were to search for artisan wells in Abu Dhabi. In addition, the British paid Sheikh Shakhbut a lump sum of Rs 5,000 for the concessions. However, Sheikh Shakhbut refused to consent for the construction of a petrol store for the R.A.F., because that particular facility had not been mentioned in the 1935 agreement. Furthermore, he charged that the R.A.F.'s petrol installations were ruining Sirr Bani Yas. Sheikh Shakhbut nonetheless gave his consent to the construction of the petrol store, too, after the British Political Resident threatened to prevent Abu Dhabi's pearling fleets from going to the pearl banks. The British Political Resident issued a similar threat in 1937 to Sheikh Ahmad bin Rashid of Umm al-Quwain if he or his people offered any resistance to the construction of a nightstop for Imperial Airways' flying boat service between Alexandria and Gwadar.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 104-105.}
forerunners and facilitators of British acquisition of the oil concessions in Trucial Oman in 1935 and afterwards. The British began the process of gaining long-term oil concessions in Trucial Oman by creating a subsidiary of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company called Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., for operating concessions in the Arabian Gulf. As a second preliminary step toward attaining long-term oil concessions, in 1935, this company attained exploratory options in Ras al-Khaimah, Sharqah, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai for two years. In 1936, Ajman also agreed to extend an option to Petroleum Concessions. 87 Leading the negotiation for the Ras al-Khaimah option as representative of the British company was "Hajji" Abdullah Williamson. 88 It was the 1932 discovery of oil in Bahrain by Standard of California that propelled British companies toward seeking oil concessions in Trucial Oman. In fact, one major motive of theirs had been to sign oil concessions with each of the Trucial Oman sheikdoms in order to preclude Standard Oil of California (SOCAL's) attainment of concessions there. In December, 1936, Ajib Khan, an Indian Muslim serving as an agent for SOCAL visited Trucial Oman secretly in an attempt to gain concessions there for the U.S. company. 89

87 Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 66.


89 Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 67.
The British encountered considerable difficulties in inducing the sheikhs of Dubai, Shargah, Abu Dhabi, and Ras al-Khaimah to sign concessions with the company they constructed for this purpose, Petroleum Concessions, Ltd. This was because, despite British insistence that the Trucial Oman sheikhs were obliged to refuse oil concessions to all competitors with designated British companies under the imposed Treaty of 1922, the Trucial Oman sheikhs were aware that the British, themselves, had offered better terms to the Sheikh of Kuwait in 1932, in exchange for oil concessions, for example. In this instance, the Sheikh of Kuwait was given free reign to decide whether to extend a concession to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which the British government held controlling interest, or the U.S. Gulf Oil Company. In 1934, the Sheikh of Kuwait gave the concession to a half U.S. and half British company that had been formed to operate it. More importantly, the Trucial Oman Sheikhs were aware of the fact that Standard of California would offer them more generous payments for concessions it obtained in their territories than the British were offering.

The first of the long-term oil concession agreements

\[90\] Ibid., p. 64.

was signed between the British concern Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., and Sheikh Sa'id al-Maktoum of Dubai in May, 1937. The duration of this concession was to be seventy-five years, and Sheikh Sa'id was to be paid Rs. 60,000 upon signing the agreement, and an additional Rs. 200,000 with the discovery of oil in commercial quantities. In addition, Petroleum Concessions was to pay Sheikh Sa'id an annual rent of Rs. 30,000. Once oil was discovered, this assessment was to be raised to Rs. 90,000. The Company was also to pay the Sheikh of Dubai one Rupee for every ton of oil produced and sold, and two Annas per 1,000 feet of natural gas.\(^{92}\) The terms of this concession contained political provisions that safeguarded both the position of the British political authorities, and British strategic and other interests. These provisions also placed the production and resources of the company at the disposal of the British government in emergency or wartime situations.\(^{93}\) Later in 1937, the Sheikh of Sharqah signed a seventy-five year agreement with Petroleum Concessions, Ltd.\(^{94}\) The monthly payments that Petroleum Concessions, Ltd. awarded to the Sheikh of Sharqah for the concession amounted

\(^{92}\) Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 70.


\(^{94}\) Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 71.
to Rs. 700. In 1939, Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., signed its concession with Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi. Under this agreement, the yearly royalty that Petroleum Concessions was to pay to Sheikh Shakhbut was initially to amount to Rs. 100,000 per year, but was to double after the discovery of oil. The agreement also provided a payment of three Rupees per ton of oil produced. This oil concession also explicitly named Petroleum Concessions, Ltd. exclusive owner of "all substances produced." The Sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah signed a concession agreement with Petroleum Development Trucial Coast, the successor to Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., in 1945, as did the Sheikh of Umm al-Quwain. The monthly payments that the British awarded to Ras al-Khaimah for this concession amounted to Rs. 700.

The British used several tactics during the 1930s to prevent rival oil concessionaires, such as SOCAL (U.S.) from penetrating Trucial Oman, and to force the Trucial Oman sheikhs into signing oil concession agreements with Petroleum

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96 Al-Oteiba, Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates, p. 39.

97 Mann, Abu Dhabi: Birth of an Oil Sheikdom, p. 76.

98 Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 211.

Concessions, Ltd. The imposed Treaty of 1922 barred the sheikhs from signing such agreements with any companies other than British ones, and the British authorities enforced that treaty by denying entry into Trucial Oman to anyone who was not a British subject, and by issuing precise criteria as to the rules that a British company should follow while in Trucial Oman, and in order to qualify for approval of an oil concession from the government. Firstly, all employees of a British company seeking an oil concession in Trucial Oman had to possess British passports. Secondly, the company was obliged to procure the British government’s permission to seek a concession in Trucial Oman. Thirdly, once it had obtained its concession, the company was obliged to obtain the approval of this concession allocation from the British government, and to obey the regulations put forth by the Resident Agents. The ruling sheikhs were then obliged to protect the operating companies while they worked in Trucial Oman.  

Specifically regarding agreements with Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., Lt. Col. C.T.W. Fowle, the British Political Resident at that time, threatened Trucial Oman Sheikhs who hesitated, or tried to refuse, to sign oil concession agreements with that company with confiscations of their travel papers, together with those of their subjects.

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100 Ibrahim, in Dawoud, Al-Tajarib al-Whadawiyyah al-'Arabiyyah al-Mu'asirah, pp, 184-185.
Additional threats included the destruction of a sheikhdom's pearling and fishing vessels. In Abu Dhabi, for example, Fowle used hearsay that he had received on one instance of slave trade in that sheikhdom to withhold Sheikh Shakhbut's travel papers, and those of his subjects. This was in response to the sheikh's initial refusal to agree to an oil concession in an attempt to gain better terms than Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., was offering. That Fowle was reconstructing this slave trade issue as a ploy by which to impose the Petroleum Concessions oil agreement upon Abu Dhabi can be seen in his reliance upon rumor, and in the fact that he chose to gather no substantiating evidence, in all likelihood because he knew that none existed.

The British chose these tactics for specific purposes. The significance of threatening to sink or confiscate pearling or fishing vessels is obvious, because it was blatantly aimed at peoples' livelihoods. The confiscation of travel documents is equally significant, because it was by means of these papers that the British issued that local pearl merchants were able to sell pearls in Bombay. In addition, confiscating travel documents prevented sheikhs or their representatives from leaving Trucial Oman in order to meet representatives of

101 Ibid., pp. 185-186.

alternative oil concessionaires, who might offer better terms than those outlined by Petroleum Concessions, ltd. Finally, resurrecting the slavery issue was a well-established discourse under which the British legitimized their actions in Trucial Oman in general, this time in relation to these recent threats, whereas before, they had used this discourse to legitimize the treaties.

One important consequence of both the Imperial Airways concessions and the Petroleum Concessions agreements was an increased British presence in Trucial Oman. The Imperial Airways agreements marked a deepening British penetration in Trucial Oman because initially, Britain’s main interest had been the forcible destruction and suppression of what was left of Trucial Oman’s mercantile power, and secondly, the preservation of Britain’s own monopoly in the Gulf through the installation of government agents, the relationship that the British constructed with the Banyan stratum, and the building of the B.I. steamer shipping lines. With the installation of airdromes, and the nightstops, fuel stores and wireless transmitters that came with them, the British had installations on land to protect, and subjects using them. Of necessity, this led to a growth in the British presence in Trucial Oman itself. The oil concessions, recently approved during the 1930’s, gave the British government even more of a stake in Trucial Oman’s internal developments.
Along with these new physical and economic stakes that Britain was developing in Trucial Oman, the relationship that the British had with the ruling sheikhs was also changing. This was because both the airline and the petroleum concessions entailed direct British payments to the Trucial Oman sheikhs. Small though these payments were in terms of monetary amount, they represented a new source of income for the sheikhs, where they had previously been deeply interconnected with the local mercantile stratum for revenues.

In addition, the British petroleum concessions represented a new kind of commercial enterprise establishing itself in Trucial Oman, for Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., was to enjoy unique freedom of operation there. This was because aside from collecting annual payments and royalties on the concession itself, and per barrel produced, the Trucial Oman sheikhs who signed these concessions were to have no influence on the rate at which oil was to be extracted, the extent to which it was to be developed, the destinations to which it would be exported, or the uses to which it would be put. Particularly important, the sheikhs were to have no influence on how oil was to be priced, and the directions in which the earnings were to be allocated. Nor were they to enjoy the benefits of the foreign exchange that the sale of this oil would earn, except within the circumscribed context of royalty
and rental payments from Petroleum Concessions, ltd.\textsuperscript{103}

It was against this backdrop that the reform movement of 1938-1939 developed in Dubai, and in other mercantile cities of the Gulf, such as Kuwait and Bahrain.

\textbf{British Colonialism, Cultural Reconstruction \newline And the Reform Movement of 1938 in Dubai}

The immediate backdrop against which the 1938 Reform Movement in Dubai arose was the decline of the pearling mercantile stratum in terms of political power, economic privilege, and cultural prestige. It was this stratum that formed the core of the reformed movement because of the losses it was facing in all of these areas at that time. However, in order to understand the development and nature of this movement, it is necessary to examine the political, economic, and cultural transformations that were occurring in Dubai (and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf), between the turn of the century and 1938. In Dubai, many of these changes had been engendered by the pearl merchant sector, and in that city, as well as elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf, these transformations helped to create the atmosphere in which the reform movement developed. These transformations mainly occurred in relation to developments in Dubai's cultural institutions, such as the education system, and in relation to the fact that the people

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of Trucial Oman had generally increased their contact with surrounding areas in the early twentieth century, despite British success at sealing off the area during the nineteenth century.

It is possible that Britain's preoccupation with World War I during the 1914-1918 period made it more difficult for the British to enforce this isolation. However, there were three major infrastructural factors that contributed to a cultural awakening that mainly occurred within the pearl merchant stratum of Trucial Oman after 1900. These were the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the development of steam shipping, and the British-installed postal system, all of which connected Trucial Oman and the rest of the Arabian Gulf to India, Egypt, etc. during the second half of the nineteenth century. These developments actually engendered a limited rebirth of the external connections that had characterized historic Oman during the 600-1500 A.D. period. But the limitations of these reconstructed connections lay in the fact that what had once been historic Oman was now divided, with the Trucial Oman portion under British colonialism, and in the fact that it was by means of the British India Company, and not historic Oman's own long distance overland or maritime merchants, that commodities, people, and ideas were circulating. Indeed, the entire Arab world was under one form

104 Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 106.
or another of colonialism at the time.

Specifically, the postal system, which had routes connecting Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq, as well as Egypt, to the Arabian Gulf carried Egyptian and other Arabic newspapers, literary magazines, and journals such as the nationalist Al-Fath to Dubai and to other Gulf destinations. Bombay, too, became a center influencing the development of cultural life in Trucial Oman and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf, because the pearl industry had engendered the growth of a prosperous community of Gulf merchants in that city during the early twentieth century. This community was important enough for such reformers as Rashid Ridha, Hafiz Wahba, Amin al-Rihani, 'Abd al-Aziz al-Tha'alibi, etc to spend time there. It was also the location to which the British banished political opponents to their rule such as Talib Pasha Naqib from Basra, and 'Abd al-Wahab al-Zayyani from Bahrain. Bombay also had an Arabic printing press, which was extremely important since, during the colonial period, there had been none in the Arabian Gulf before World War I. Bombay also had three bookshops selling Arabic publications.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 106-107.} The Bombay community thus served as a meeting point and information center for intellectuals, writers, reformers and merchants from all over the Arabian Gulf concerning events and political developments in that immediate region, and also elsewhere in
the Arab world.

The profitability of the pearling industry enabled wealthier pearl merchants from the Arabian Gulf to establish many new educational institutions in Trucial Oman between 1900 and 1938. These activities helped the pearl merchants gain cultural prestige, along with the political power and economic privilege they already had. The schools that these pearl merchants established were significant because they represented a different type of institution from the traditional ones that also continued to exist in Trucial Oman during the colonial period. These earlier schools, called mutaw'a or katatib, were actually rooms in the instructor’s house in which the pupils, boys and girls at primary grade level, mainly learned to read the Qur’an and Hadith, along with some writing and basic arithmetic. At these schools, the pupils sat on the floor.  \[106\] By contrast, the schools that the wealthier pearl merchants established between 1900 and the 1920s period offered a much more expanded and varied curriculum, and classes were held in actual school buildings complete with chairs and tables. One such school was the al-Ahmadiyyah in Dubai, which offered literature, Islamic Law, Interpretation of the Qur’an, Mathematics, and calligraphy. Others among

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these schools included the al-Falah, al-Salimiyyah, and al-Su‘adah, also in Dubai, all of which offered similar curricula to that of the al-Ahmadiyyah. However, al-Salimiyyah, and al-Su‘adah, both smaller than the al-Ahmadiyyah, did not offer literature.\textsuperscript{107} In Sharqah, pearl merchants founded schools such as al-Taimiyyah, which was subsequently called al-Islah, and al-Nabudah. Al-Taimiyyah’s curriculum included English once it became al-Islah as well as the subjects that were taught at al-Ahmadiyyah.\textsuperscript{108} In Abu Dhabi, pearl merchants established the Ibn Khalaf school, whose curriculum was essentially religious. Among the subjects taught were Fiqh (Islamic Law), Tafsir (Qur’anic Interpretation), reading, and writing. Other schools that pearl merchants established in Abu Dhabi during this period included al-Oteiba, al-Waswas, and Bin Karam.\textsuperscript{109}

In all of these schools, the teachers were paid formal wages by pearl merchants, and many of them came from places outside of Trucial Oman, such as Najd, Hejaz, Lingah, Qishm, and Basra, especially the Zubeir area. Classes were held at these schools during regular hours, and papers, books, and

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, pp. 22-38.


\textsuperscript{109} Al-‘Asi, Masirat al-T’alim, pp. 21-22.
slates for the students to write on, were purchased by pearl merchants. At the Taimiyyah, particularly promising students were sent out of Trucial Oman for further study, and students coming from outside of Sharqah were offered free accommodations and board. This school also had a small library.\(^{110}\)

The innovations in curriculum and approach to education that these schools presented contributed to the cultural and political ferment that was taking place in Trucial Oman between 1900 and 1938. For example, some of the students who journeyed outside of Trucial Oman to continue their studies were taught by a scholar named Ibn Mani', at his school in Doha. Ibn Mani' emphasized the teachings of the Islamic reformers Mohammed Abduh and Rashid Ridha. Ibn Mani'’s students often obtained positions as qadhis, teachers, businessmen, and poets during the 1930s.\(^{111}\) Another instance of this influence occurred during the Ottoman wars in the Balkans in 1912-1913. In this instance the "Native Agent" in Trucial Oman reported that Sheikh ‘Abd al-Latif ibn Ibrahim al-Mubarak, who was director of the Al-Oteiba school at Abu Dhabi, had visited Dubai and had successfully urged the inhabitants to collect Rs. 43,000 worth of subscriptions in


\(^{111}\) Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates*, pp. 111-112.
aid for the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{112} In 1927, the British dismissed another educator, this time Mohammed bin Faisal, who had taught at the Taimiyah at Sharqah, from his subsequent position as gadhi there, for expressing opinions in favor of the Tawhidi (Wahhabi) movement in Najd, from whence he had come.\textsuperscript{113} Students also attended the nationalist and literary celebrations that were held in Dubai in honor of the visits of the nationalist writer Amin al-Rihani and the nationalist leader ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Tha’alibi of Tunisia. These two personages visited Dubai during the post-World War I period, at a time of revolts against the British and French mandates in Iraq and Syria respectively. The Palestinian cause also aroused great support among the educated youth of Trucial Oman. In response to the 1930 Palestinian Islamic Congress in Jerusalem, two young educated men, Mubarak al-Nakhi and Ibrahim al-Midfa’, gave nationalist speeches at the main mosque in Sharqah, and money for Palestine was collected.\textsuperscript{114}

Along with the changes in the education system described above, journals and newspapers and radio broadcasts from outside of Trucial Oman also had considerable influence on political opinion there. Although the British had been

\textsuperscript{112} Abdullah, \textit{Arabian Studies} 2 (1975): 175-176.

\textsuperscript{113} Butti, "Imperialism, Tribal Structure and the Development of Ruling Elites," pp. 151-152.

\textsuperscript{114} Abdullah, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, pp. 111-112.
able to regulate the physical entrance to and exit from Trucial Oman of people since 1820, they were not able to stop media penetration during the 1900-1938 period. The Cairo newspapers, al-Mu'ayyad and al-Liwa, for instance, both of which described the Ottomans as leaders of Islam and defenders of the faith up to the end of the First World War, had subscribers in Trucial Oman. As a second example, one important immigrant from the Persian Littoral, named Khajah 'Abd al-Rahim, subscribed to the Calcutta-published newspaper Al-Habi al-Matin, which advocated Islamic unity.¹¹⁵ Radio services whose broadcasts penetrated Trucial Oman in the late 1930s included British Arabic services, Radio Berlin, and King Ghazi's radio station from Baghdad. (King Ghazi was a liberal nationalist).¹¹⁶ All of these radio services provided news broadcasts, and thus served as an additional connection to the rest of the Arab world, and to points beyond it for a growing number of people in Trucial Oman.

It is important to emphasize reform movements in the Arabian Gulf that developed prior to the one in Trucial Oman, notably in Iraq and Kuwait, influenced the Reform Movement in Trucial Oman. The Reform movement in Iraq had been growing there since 1930. The most important position of Iraqi reform

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 111.

movement during the 1930s had been one advocating a minimization of cooperation with British policy in Iraq.\textsuperscript{117} The Iraqi Reform Movement, as well as Iraqi newspapers and journals, in turn, affected the growth of a reform movement of Kuwait. The Kuwait Reform Movement, which, in 1938, and with the support of one of the members of the ruling family, formed a Majlis of local notables, achieved certain objectives, but did not change the basic structure of Kuwait's government. The Reform Movement in Kuwait also emphasized negotiations with the British about the institution of these objectives, rather than attacking the British presence in Kuwait outright.\textsuperscript{118}

The objectives for which the Kuwaiti Majlis managed to obtain the Sheikh's signature included the placement of the spending of Kuwait's revenues (not including the Sheikh's personal income), under the Majlis jurisdiction. Other objectives included education reform, infrastructural reform, improvement of security services, and Judiciary reform. Despite the fact that this Majlis was basically non-confrontational with the British, the British objected to the implementation of provisions giving the Majlis ultimate legal


\textsuperscript{118} Rumaihi, \textit{Journal of Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies} 1, no. 4 (1975): 32.
authority concerning the Sheikh’s official decisions.\textsuperscript{119}

However, it was not only the British who presented opposition to important measures promulgated by the Majlis. Other opposition came from indigenous strata who were excluded from its aims. These included the Shi‘i community, which then comprised one third of Kuwait’s population, but had not been granted any Majlis seats. The Majlis, itself, was divided over the issue of relations with Iraq. The Sheikh dissolved the Majlis later in 1938, the same year in which it had been formed.\textsuperscript{120}

Despite the short duration of its Majlis, the Kuwait Reform Movement inspired the movement in Trucial Oman, which arose at about the same time. The movements in both Kuwait and Trucial Oman arose in relation to similar factors, the most important of which was the decline of the pearl industry after 1927. This meant that the previously powerful pearl merchant stratum in both places lost its political power in relation to the ruling family, as the British Administration strengthened its position in both places by virtue of the concessions it had imposed. The decline of the pearl industry also resulted in the economic decline of the pearl merchant stratum, as the rise of another mercantile stratum in both cities was simultaneously occurring. This latter stratum

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., pp. 37-38.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., pp. 39-40.
consisted of the distributors and re-exporters of goods that B.I. steamer shipping was bringing into both Kuwait and Trucial Oman. This development in Dubai has been treated above.

In Trucial Oman specifically, the decline in economic privilege and political power that the pearl merchants suffered translated into a decline in cultural prestige as well. The most blatant manifestation of this last development was the fact that so many of the above-mention schools that they had established earlier in the century closed down for lack of funding between 1927 and 1938.\textsuperscript{121} However, these schools, along with the newspapers, periodicals, radio broadcasts, and other cultural changes had still been important factors in the construction of the backdrop against which the reform movement in Trucial Oman arose.

A more immediate factor in the rise of the Reform Movement in Trucial Oman was the fact that it had the support of one member of Dubai’s ruling family, namely Mani‘ bin Rashid. This fact was also a manifestataion of a schism within the Al-Bu Falasah family, specifically concerning those who supported Sheikh Sa‘id bin Maktoum, versus those who supported his cousin Mani‘ bin Rashid’s claims to the title of Sheikh. However, the most important reason for Mani‘ bin Rashid’s support for, and leadership of, the Reform Movement

\textsuperscript{121} Abdullah, Arabian Studies 2 (1975): 173.
in Dubai was the fact that he, himself was a pearl merchant, and had married the daughter of Ahmed bin Dalmuk, who had been Dubai's wealthiest local pearl merchant.\footnote{Rosemarie J. Said, "The 1938 Reform Movement in Dubai," \textit{Al-Abhath} 27, nos. 1-4 (December, 1970): 248 and 250.}

The first open clash between Mani' bin Rashid and his supporters on the one hand, versus Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum and his supporters on the other, occurred in 1929, with Mani' bin Rashid advocating that Dubai cancel its treaties with the British. Supporters of Mani' bin Rashid then proclaimed him Sheikh of Dubai. However, the British supported Sheikh Sa'id's retention of power, and his opponents were obliged to show their obedience to him toward the end of that year.\footnote{Abdullah, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, pp. 126-128.} But despite this British support, Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum was involved in several additional clashes with supporters of Mani' bin Rashid between the 1929 coup and the rise of the Reform Movement in 1938.\footnote{Said, \textit{Al-Abhath} 32, nos. 1-4 (December, 1970): 251-253.} A final one, which occurred in May, 1938, ultimately resulted in a takeover of certain towers in the town on the part of the Al-Bu-Falasah who were supporting Mani' bin Rashid, and the town became two armed camps, one of them quartered in Bar Daira and the other in Bar Dubai.\footnote{Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, p. 255.}
The Al-Bu Falasah in Daira, who supported Mani' bin Rashid, together with certain notables, then presented Sheikh Sa'id with a list of demands which included a budget and civil list, arrangements for health and sanitation services in the city, a Watch and Ward service, re-organization of customs, fixed monetary allowances for members of the ruling family, and the abolition of the monopolies that the Sheikh, his wife and his son held regarding landing cargo from ships, ferries, taxi services, etc. The supporters of Mani' bin Rashid also demanded the establishment of a representative council, or Majlis, with administrative powers, modeled on the aforementioned one that had been established in Kuwait.126

Meanwhile, a British sloop had pulled into Dubai harbor to protect British property and subjects. Through the "Native Agent" Abd al-Razzaq al-Mahmud, the British also tried to arrange a truce by pressing Sheikh Sa'id to comply with some of these demands. However, the Sheik of Ras al-Khaimah, in an attempt to settle the crisis locally, blamed both the Mani' bin Rashid and the Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum factions for going to the British Political Agent for reconciliation, and suggested that the negotiations begin again, with him presiding. The British responded to this suggestion by warning him not to intervene in "matters that did not concern

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him," ordered him to return to Ras al-Khaimah, and threatened to drive him there in an R.A.F. vehicle if he did not comply.\textsuperscript{127} By October, 1938, Sheikh Sa'id finally signed an agreement with the opposition which established a consultative council, or \textit{Majlis}, in Dubai.

Sheikh Sa'id was appointed President of the \textit{Majlis}, which also consisted of fifteen other individuals chosen by a group of Dubai's notables. This agreement also stated that the expenditure of the State's income was to be approved by the \textit{Majlis}, and that only one-eighth of these revenues were to be allocated to the Sheikh. Other issues that the \textit{Majlis} tackled included that of regulating the customs service, setting the salaries of customs employees, and deciding upon the amount, and manner of collection, of import duties. A Council of Merchants was to oversee these functions, and the \textit{Majlis} also established a Municipal Council to initiate and implement improvements on port facilities, roads, hygiene, and security. Manil bin Rashid was made Director of Education, and during his term, three schools were re-opened.\textsuperscript{128} As security measures, the \textit{Majlis} appointed desert and market place patrols.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{127} Said, \textit{Al-Abbat} 23, nos. 1-4 (December, 1970): 257 and 258.

\textsuperscript{128} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, pp. 255-256.

The Majlis introduced several new concepts of government in Dubai while in power. Mani' bin Rashid, for example, frequently used the term wajibat wataniyyah, meaning "national duties," in his correspondence with Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum, in his capacity as spokesperson for the Majlis. Majlis members, for their part, took to speaking of their obligations to "our country" (baladina) as taking precedence over individual desires. The Majlis members also referred to the new government as harakat al-islah (reform movement). The British reacted to all this by reiterating to Mani' bin Rashid that they recognized only Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum as ruler, and that they would not permit the Majlis to usurp his treaty obligations.130

Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum's reaction to the institution of the Majlis was firstly, to construct a counter discourse of his own to the concepts that it was introducing. He answered the Majlis' emphasis on "national duty" to "our country" by emphasizing that the Shari'a alone provided legitimate guidelines for changes within the state.131 Secondly, Sheikh Sa'id refused to attend any Majlis meetings after the first two, although Mani' bin Rashid continued to inform him of the

130 Ibid., pp. 258-259.
131 Ibid., p. 259.
agenda, and to request his presence.\textsuperscript{132} Sheikh Sa'id also continued to hoard funds that the Majlis claimed belonged to it for planned projects.\textsuperscript{133} However, the main clash between Sheikh Sa'id and the Majlis came about when Sheikh Sa'id refused to place revenues from the British airline and oil concessions at the Majlis' disposal for plans to enlarge the port of Dubai, and for urban beautification. Majlis members retaliated by passing a new resolution in March, 1939, limiting Sheikh Sa'id's income to a flat amount of Rs. 10,000,\textsuperscript{134} out of which was to come his personal expenses, and other allocations, such as the traditional subsidies he paid to Bedouin tribes.\textsuperscript{135}

When Sheikh Sa'id rejected this resolution, the Majlis attempted to enforce it by occupying Bar Daira, and the situation deteriorated into one of armed conflict. Sheikh Sa'id cleared the way for his armed troops, mostly Bedouins, to launch an open attack on the Majlis by constructing a wedding of his son Sheikh Rashid to Sheikhah Latifah, a daughter of one of the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi who had migrated

\textsuperscript{132} Abdullah, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{133} Heard-Bay, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 256.

\textsuperscript{134} Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{135} Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 256.
to Dubai. After getting permission from the Majlis to let armed men enter Bar Daira for the traditional gun salute and other festivities, the armed "wedding guests" used this opportunity to attack members of the Majlis, and to spread the firefight throughout the city. When Mani bin Rashid sent his son to report this attack to the "Native Agent", the latter refused to intervene. Mani bin Rashid continued to fight for preservation of the Majlis for three days, after which he escaped to Sharqah under the cover of his daughter San'ah's gunfire.\textsuperscript{136} The British Political Residence ended this affair by having Sheikh Sa'id set up a second, cosmetic Majlis, only five of whose fifteen members had belonged to the previous one. In June, 1939, the British Political Agent ordered Mani bin Rashid and his supporters moved to Ras al-Khaimah, as a measure for stopping all further activity against Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum from Sharqah.\textsuperscript{137} Shortly after being transferred to Ras al-Khaimah, Mani bin Rashid then went into exile, living in India until after the outbreak of the Second World War. In India, he produced one of the earliest maps of the pearling area in the Arabian Gulf. He died in Hirah, in the Shaikhdom of Sharqah during World War II.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{136} Abdullah, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, p. 132.

\textsuperscript{137} Said, \textit{Al Abhath} 23, nos. 1-4: 262.

\textsuperscript{138} Abdallah, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, pp. 106 and 133.
The main reason why the Reform Movement in Dubai was unable to hold the power it had obtained in 1938-1939 had to do with the manner in which this Movement was constructed in relation to the segmentation and socio-economic differentiation prevailing among the classes and ethnic groups in the city of Dubai in 1938. This reality precluded the Reform Movement's successful penetration of all of civil society, and kept the Movement's base narrowly confined to the declining pearl merchant stratum.

As demonstrated above, the Reform Movement began as a reaction on the part of Dubai's pearl merchants to their loss of economic privilege in relation to other strata during the 1930s, and particularly in relation to newer mercantile strata that were involved in the import and re-export of goods from British India to other Gulf destinations. This Movement also began as a reaction by the pearl merchants to their loss of political power in relation to the ruling family, which was ceasing to be so dependent upon the pearl merchants for revenues. This was because of both the decline of the pearling industry, and the growing importance of revenues the Sheikh was being paid by the British in the form of airline and oil concession rentals.

This Movement could not penetrate the other strata because it could not transcend the ongoing segmentation prevailing in the city of Dubai. The ascendant merchants
importing and re-exporting goods from British India, for instance, had little interest in joining a reform movement led by members of a rival mercantile stratum, especially given the prosperity that this rising mercantile stratum was enjoying under the status quo. The ghawasin, and siyūb, as another example, had even less reason to identify with a movement led by pearl merchants. Nor did the members of the Majlis show any inclination to share power with members of these other strata.

There was also the issue of the discourse that the Reform Movement constructed for its operations. The concepts that the Movement was introducing through its discourse were new at best, and alien at worst, to the rest of civil society in Dubai. Thus, Sheikh Sa‘id was effective at confronting the Movement’s discourse, which featured such concepts as "our country" and "national duties" with his own counter-discourse, which featured references to the Shari‘a, which appealed to many segments of Dubai’s civil society. This counter-discourse enabled Sheikh Sa‘id to play the role of defender of Islam in relation to the liberal ideas that the Reform Movement was introducing.

Particularly important, the Majlis alienated the tribal component of civil society by reducing its subsidy in limiting Sheikh Sa‘id’s income and access to revenues, and by failing to formulate provisions for continued subsidization of the
bedouins as a security force. Instead, the Majlis attempted to replace them with a security force of its own, leaving the giving of monetary gifts to the tribes to the Sheikh. This was decisive in the defeat of the Reform Movement, because Sheikh Sa'id was able to rally them very easily against the force that was depriving them of an important source of income.

Most importantly, behind Sheikh Sa'id was British colonial power. The British insisted that the Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum was the only legitimate ruler that they would recognize. Nor would they permit the implementation of any Majlis resolution that interfered with the supremacy of the British treaties. Given the Reform Movement's narrow base within its own civil society, and the power of British colonialism, it is hardly surprising that the Reform Movement in Dubai ultimately met defeat.

Nevertheless, the Reform Movement left its impact upon both Trucial Oman and the rest of the Arabian Gulf, at least in two specific ways. Firstly, Shaikh Sa'id did adopt the idea of keeping a Majlis as part of Dubai's government, on an advisory basis. More importantly, however, the Reform Movement in Dubai affected the development of that in Bahrain, which in contrast to its predecessor, did penetrate civil society. In Bahrain, the most significant inroads that this Movement made were among students and oil workers. Students,
for example, demanded that the educational system begin to
turn out graduates who were capable of working effectively for
the government or for the oil industry, so that both would be
less dependent upon foreign employees. Oil workers, for their
part, demanded the right to unionize, as well as an end to
both unsatisfactory employment conditions in the oil industry,
and its general Bahrainization. 139

Conclusion

Chapters Seven and Eight have illustrated and analyzed
the process by which British colonialism penetrated and
reconstructed Trucial Oman to facilitate British cultural,
political and economic domination of the Arabian Gulf between
1820 and 1945. Politically, through a series of treaties,
Britain gradually came to dominate Trucial Oman's external
politics, to silence Trucial Oman as a representative of
itself, and to become Trucial Oman's external representative.
Internally, Trucial Oman came to be governed by an
administrative hierarchy which British colonialism
constructed, in which "Native Agents" played a key role.

Chapters Seven and Eight have also demonstrated the
process by which Trucial Oman came to produce and export a
single commodity, namely pearls, which were the product of an

139 Rosemarie Said-Zahlan, "The Impact of the Early Oil
Concessions in the Gulf States," in Lawless, The Gulf in the
Early 20th Century, pp. 73-74.
industry whose chief financiers and exporters, the Banyan merchants, were partners of British colonialism. Through the pearl industry, and also as an importer of British manufactured goods through the British India steamer lines, Trucial Oman became linked to the then British-dominated world market.

This analysis of the 1820-1945 period has also demonstrated how culturally, British colonialism succeeded in sealing off Trucial Oman from the rest of the Arab-Islamic world, and from the rest of the world at large, until the early twentieth century. At this time, Trucial Oman regained some of its links to the Arab Islamic world, and to places beyond it, through steamer shipping, the postal system, radio broadcasts, and through newspapers and journals from various parts of the Arab world.

The consequences of British penetration of Trucial Oman were also treated in this two chapters. These consequences included the total destruction of Trucial Oman’s long-distance trade, the remolding of tribalism, and the reduction of the agrarian socio-discursive formation to a sector that primarily served local demand, and served external trade only to a limited extent. Other consequences included the rise of new classes to replace the long-distance mercantile stratum that had been so significant in historic Oman during the 600-1500 A.D. period. These included pearl merchants, and
importers of British manufactures and semi-manufactures. Cities also rose and fell under British colonialism. The Qasimi cities of Julfar (Ras al-Khaimah), Shargah, Lingah and others on the Persian Littoral of the Arabian Gulf declined, while Dubai rose as a result of becoming a port of call for British India (B.I.) steamers, an importer and re-exporter of British manufactures and semi-manufactures, and an exporter of pearls.

Finally, the underlying foundations of the political, economic and cultural relationships among the different classes, ethnic groups, and religious groups within Dubai's civil society were examined in these two chapters, as were the foundations underlying relations between the genders. This analysis also covered the changes in these relations which came about as a result of such factors as the decline of the pearling industry, and the imposition of the airline and oil concessions. Dubai's Reform Movement emerged as an important embodiment of the changes that were occurring in all of these relations. The chapters that cover the continuation of the colonial period--1945 to 1971--will treat the process by which British colonialism deepened its penetration of Trucial Oman. Further, they will describe and analyze the significant economic, political and cultural transformations that Trucial Oman underwent as a consequence of the deepening colonial penetration.
CHAPTER NINE

THE LATER COLONIAL SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION IN TRUCIAL OMAN: 1945-1971

Introduction

The 1945-1971 period was one in which the British colonial socio-discursive formation in Trucial Oman underwent substantial transformations, mainly because the British developed new priorities and ambitions there. Chapters Seven and Eight demonstrated that British interests in Trucial Oman and the Arabian Gulf during the 1820-1945 period had been in the consolidation of the U.K.'s commercial monopoly there, and conversely, the containment of indigenous long distance mercantile strata that could otherwise compete with them, such as the Al-Qawasim.

In relation to these interests, British colonialism constructed several discourses, which underlay the treaties that the British imposed upon Trucial Oman. As a result of these imposed treaties, Trucial Oman was divided into several sheikhdoms. British colonialism also developed an administration in Trucial Oman which was linked to the global British colonial hierarchy. In addition to establishing and safeguarding its commercial monopoly in the Arabian Gulf. However, British colonial interests broadened in Trucial Oman
and the Arabian Gulf between 1870s to the 1920s. These interests now included the prosperity of the pearl industry, and the enhancement of the special relationship British colonialism had developed with the Banyan stratum that was financing this industry. At the time of the height of the pearling profits, and beyond that time as well, the British also developed a lucrative import trade of manufactures and semi-manufactures via British India Lines (B.I.) and the Grey Paul-Grey Mackenzie shipping company, with the main entrepot in Trucial Oman being Dubai.

During the years following the 1920s, British colonialism developed additional new interests, one of the most important of these being the extraction of crude oil. During the 1930s, British oil companies signed oil concession agreements with the different Trucial Oman sheikhdoms, and several new discourses were then constructed in relation to these agreements. British-constructed discourses, policies, and administrative practices changed as the focus of British colonial interests in Trucial Oman changed from gaining a monopoly on long-distance trade, to the pearling industry and the export of goods to Dubai, and finally to crude oil and development projects in Trucial Oman. These changes in British colonial discourses, administration and policies during the 1945-1971 period will be the focus of this chapter.

It is also important to consider that there were global
as well as local factors that contributed to the transformations that British colonialism in Trucial Oman underwent during the 1945-1971 period. Specifically during this period, British colonialism in Trucial Oman had to operate within a framework that contained such realities as independent India and Pakistan, an end to their hold on the Suez Canal, the entry into the Arab world of multinational corporations based in rival industrial states, the growth of social movements like Arab Nationalism, and a worldwide growth of the anti-colonialist movement in general. In relation both to their changing priorities, and to the new regional and global realities listed above, therefore, the British constructed new discourses, instituted new economic, political and cultural policies and administrative practices in Trucial Oman; and deepened their penetration of it, for the preservation of their hegemony there.

There are two arguments that this chapter will present. The first is that once India and Pakistan became independent in 1947, it became clear that British colonialism was remaining in Trucial Oman because of its specific interests there, which were completely unrelated to India. Hence, British colonialism had to construct new discourses to legitimize its continuing penetration of Trucial Oman. The second argument is that as British colonial penetration of Trucial Oman continued and deepened during the 1945-1971
period, the policies that the colonial administration set, particularly the drawing of juridical borders, intensified the development of identities among the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms in relation to each other, and in relation to other states, including those in the Arabian Gulf region.

The 1945-1971 period will be analyzed in relation to the previous period (1820-1945). Additionally, the analysis of British colonial discourses, administration and policies during the 1945-1971 period will facilitate the understanding of the economic, political and cultural changes occurring within Trucial Oman’s sheikhdoms in relation to the changes in British colonialism during this period. Analysis of British colonialism during the 1945-1971 period, and related transformations within the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms during this period, is also significant for an understanding of the contemporary U.A.E., since an understanding of the contemporary U.A.E. requires, among other things, an assessment of which political, economic and cultural constructions of the late colonial period continued into the contemporary socio-discursive formation of the U.A.E., and which ones did not, and how and why.

This chapter will be divided into five sections. The first section will focus upon the discourses that the British used to justify their continued and deepening presence in Trucial Oman. The second section will examine the particulars
of British administrative policy and practice in Trucial Oman during this period, placing special emphasis on changes in British administrative policy during the 1945-1971 period in relation to policy instituted during the previous one. The third section of this chapter will cover the segmentation of the Arabian Gulf region (Trucial Oman in relation to its neighbors) and of Trucial Oman itself that occurred as a result of the drawing of juridical borders by British colonialism. The fourth section will treat the segmentation of the inhabitants of Trucial Oman’s sheikhdoms in relation to each other that developed as a result of British policies toward each one. The fifth section will discuss the segmentation that developed among the inhabitants of the different Trucial Oman sheikhdoms in relation to the increasing diversity in their economies that British policies helped to construct.

The Colonial Discourses: 1945-1971

One of the ironies of the Arabian Gulf is that during the 1950s, precisely when the British were beginning to pull out of so many of their other colonial possessions, they were actually entrenching themselves more deeply in Trucial Oman. The imposed treaties of the 1820-1945 period were foundations for the British-constructed discourses that legitimized and helped to reproduce British colonial entrenchment in, and control over Trucial Oman, internally and externally.
The series of discourses constructed in relation to Trucial Oman's internal affairs was based upon the Treaty of 1922, which prohibited Trucial Oman's rulers from extending oil concessions to any companies other than British ones, and subsequently was related to the development of Trucial Oman's infrastructure during the 1950s and 1960s. A series of oil concession agreements that the British imposed upon the Trucial Oman sheikhs between 1937 and 1945 followed this Treaty, granting the British company Petroleum Concessions Ltd., the right to prospect for, and to exploit oil throughout Trucial Oman. In relation to the placement of oil installations and company personnel in Trucial Oman, the British added to their military entrenchments in Trucial Oman and constructed a discourse justifying their "protection" of such installations and personnel. The British were also able to construct a second discourse among the Trucial Oman rulers of need for these oil concessions, because of the royalty payments that the Petroleum Concessions Ltd. company was extending to each sheikhdom per year. The British constructed a third discourse for justifying their increased involvement in Trucial Oman's internal affairs after 1946, when they obtained jurisdiction over, and therefore the "obligation" to "protect" non-Muslims and non-natives who were living in
Trucial Oman. ¹

The British constructed a fourth, and even more important discourse for justifying and reproducing their deepening penetration of Trucial Oman in relation to the boundaries between the sheikhdoms that they took to drawing, in order to ensure that each oil concession that Petroleum Concessions, Ltd. had obtained from a given ruler was juridically within the boundaries of the appropriate sheikhdom. Since the entire concept of set boundaries between states was alien to the entire Arabian Peninsula’s indigenous socio-discursive formation, once boundaries were drawn, conflicts arose among sheikhs concerning tribal loyalties, and differences and conflicts among tribal groupings occurred as the newly-imposed boundaries hampered the continuation of the dira system in the badia. This situation engendered the British colonial construction of a fifth discourse under which they became the "maintainers of order and stability" among the sheikhdoms. Specifically, the British emphasized that they were needed to keep these differences and conflicts among sheikhdoms and tribal

¹ Glen Balfour-Paul, *The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Relinquishment of Power in her Last Three Arab Dependencies* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 145-146. One of the pretexts for this discourse was the fact that the number of British subjects living in Trucial Oman gradually increased after 1946.
groupings from erupting into internecine fights. Under this discourse, British colonialism constructed such political apparatuses as the police and defense forces of each sheikhdom, and for Trucial Oman as a whole. British officers occupied the top positions in both of these forces, which had been constructed to ensure British rule.

A second series of British-constructed discourses were related to Trucial Oman's economic, political and cultural development. By destroying what was left of historic Oman's mercantile sector in 1820, and strangulating historic Oman's indigenous economy during the rest of the nineteenth century, British colonialism had kept Trucial Oman isolated from historical changes, occurring both in the West and in many non-Western societies, such as the two Industrial Revolutions of the nineteenth century, and the post World War II development of service and consumer economies, and multinational corporations. Thus, when Trucial Oman's rulers began to use oil revenues for the initiation of development programs during the 1960s, British colonialism and the U.K. firms under contract for these programs were able to construct several discourses contrasting their economic political and cultural "superiority" as a "modern nation" with the

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2 J.E. Peterson, "Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia," The Middle East Journal 31, no. 3 (Summer, 1977): 301-302; and Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, pp. 300-302.
"backwardness" of Trucial Oman. This discourse manifested itself in infrastructural development, the development of Trucial Oman's political and security apparatuses, and even in the altered appearances of cities like Abu Dhabi Town and Dubai City. This British discourse was constructed in relation to the fact that the kind of development in which British firms were involved in Trucial Oman required an specific kind of expertise that the British technicians had, but which the people of Trucial Oman lacked, because of the isolation from historical developments that British colonialism had imposed upon them.

Thus, the British were able to cite the highways, port installations, and power plants that their firms were installing as testimony to their economic "superiority," in relation to the fact that there had been none of these post World War II, "Western-style" installations in Trucial Oman before. The British government bureaucracy, British military organization, and even British military uniforms that the U.K. had imported into Trucial Oman were similarly cited, as was the architecture of the new high-rise buildings that British contractors were erecting in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, modeled on the high-rise buildings erected in the U.K. during the 1960s, along with the wide, mid-twentieth century "Western-style" streets that were planned. In citing the architecture and planning that they had imported to Trucial Oman through their
planners, architects and contracting firms as testimony to the "superiority" of their culture in relation to that of Trucial Oman, the British colonial administration portrayed the high-rise buildings and wide streets it had constructed as well planned, and "generally superior" to the indigenous architecture of Trucial Oman described above. The British were able to construct this discourse of the "superiority" of their architecture all the more easily as during the 1960s and the early 1970s, traditional quarters of Dubai City, for example, were facing deterioration as immigrant workers began to crowd into them, as rural locals migrated to the cities in search of employment, and because funds were insufficient for the renovation of these quarters.

Abu Dhabi underwent complete rebuilding under the British development plans, and therefore, by 1971, it looked different from the cities of the other emirates, and certainly differed in appearance from locations in the Badia or in agricultural areas. British tourists also reinforced these discourses when they looked with self-satisfaction on the various manifestations of "progress and modernization" that British firms had brought to Dubai and Abu Dhabi, in contrast to the deteriorating traditional quarters of Dubai city, and other Trucial Oman towns. The "modern" buildings that British colonialism erected in Abu Dhabi and Dubai also enabled British colonialism to contrast these two cities with the
"backwardness" of the smaller emirates to the North, such as Ras al-Khaimah, or Fujairah.

The discourse of British "superiority" was also constructed demographically, and in terms of economic privilege. The development projects described below brought in British managers at top and mid-level in banking, in the construction industry, and in the oil industry. In relation to this influx of British employees of the private sector, the colonial administration's employees, including the police, military personnel, and government bureaucrats, also increased. This influx established English language as one of the dominant languages in Trucial Oman, in which planning, development, and some government tasks were conducted. The establishment of the English language as a dominant language in Trucial Oman during the 1960s and the early 1970s also constructed a barrier against the participation of locals in those higher levels of the private or government sectors where knowledge of English was necessary.

The recently-arrived British private and governmental sector employees joined the earlier members of the colonial administration to form a distinct, self-contained British community in Trucial Oman, existing within the same cultural setting that prevailed in the U.K., complete with

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supermarkets, boutiques, pubs and churches. Within this self-contained community, the British residents of Trucial Oman were able to construct, and reproduce, the discourse of their cultural "superiority" to the indigenous people of Trucial Oman surrounding them. This discourse also manifested itself in the existence of exclusively British clubs and beaches, and was constructed to reinforce the British identity of this community in relation to the rest of Trucial Oman, or the "others".

The third series of discourses was constructed in relation to the Treaty of 1892, which prohibited the sheikhs of Trucial Oman from having any dealings with external powers other than Britain, and which empowered the British to "represent" Trucial Oman concerning the latter's external affairs. Because of this Treaty, the British were able to construct discourses concerning regional, global, and internal "threats" against which Trucial Oman required "protection." British entrenchment constructed this series of discourses in order to justify British actions concerning the "protection" of Trucial Oman itself, or the "safeguarding of its internal stability and resources," and thereby to reproduce the British presence.

One such discourse concerned the 1948 Iranian claim to the Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands, which respectively belonged to Sheikhdoms of Ras al-Khaimah and Sharqah. The discourse that
the British constructed in reference to these Iranian claims constructed apprehension among the Trucial Oman rulers about the possibility of further Iranian threats. The British constructed a similar discourse in relation to Saudi claims on Bureimi in 1955, and to British intervention in Bureimi against the Saudis, which constructed British colonialism as the only force that could forstall "further Saudi claims" to territory within Trucial Oman.

Under this same set of discourses, in 1957, the British used Trucial Oman as a base for intervening on the side of Sultan Sa'id Bin Taimur against a movement that had arisen in the interior of the Sultanate of Oman during the late 1950s to liberate the interior of Oman from Sultanate of Musqat, and from British presence (See below). The British were to use this movement as a pretext for the construction of a discourse about still other "threats" to sheikhly rule in Trucial Oman, this time emanating from the interior of the Sultanate.

After 1965, the British were to use the Dhofar Liberation Front, treated in detail below, as a pretext for

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another discourse about its being a "threat" to the Trucial Oman rulers. The British constructed another discourse about this movement after 1967, when it adopted scientific socialism as its political discourse, namely, that the the Popular Front for the Liberation of Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), as it was now called, was part of the "worldwide Communist threat" to "British stabilization", and to Trucial Oman’s oil. Cold war politics also enabled the British to add to this discourse a related one about "Soviet threats" to the Arabian Gulf in general, and therefore, to the Trucial Oman sheikhs.⁷ This discourse also continued to place Britain in the role of "preserver" of "stability" in Trucial Oman, and portrayed Britain as the "protector" of local rulers.⁸

The British were able to construct these discourses because under the Treaty of 1892, the sovereignty over Trucial Oman’s external affairs resided with them. This allowed the British to construct discourses exaggerating, and sometimes fabricating entirely, "external and internal threats" to the Trucial Oman rulers. This Treaty of 1892 was also the foundation for an additional discourse that the British constructed in reference to the Arab League. Here, British colonialism blocked the Arab League’s plans to establish an

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⁷ Yapp, in Cottrell, The Persian Gulf States, pp. 94 and 96.

⁸ Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 45.
office in Trucial Oman in 1965, and constructed other Arab countries as potential "colonizers" of the Arabian Gulf region, and more importantly, as "spurious claimants" to Trucial Oman's oil revenues, while portraying British colonialism as the "protector" of Trucial Oman's integrity. In concrete terms, the British used this discourse to justify increasing the troops they were stationing in Trucial Oman.9

Under this series of discourses, the U.K. also maintained that because the 1892 Treaty had granted Britain the sole authority to speak for Trucial Oman, it was valid for Britain to appoint itself Trucial Oman's representative before the U.N. Anti-colonialism Committee of Twenty-Four in 1966, and to claim that the U.K's presence in Trucial Oman was beneficial and protective, rather than colonial. The purpose of this discourse was to ensure that Trucial Oman actually "spoke" through Britain, with Britain's voice in the name of British interests.

Economic development and social welfare were fundamental themes under which the British constructed a fourth set of discourses claiming that they had brought "progress" and "modernization" to Trucial Oman, as evidenced

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by the amount of building occurring in Abu Dhabi and Dubai in relation to development projects launched after the 1960s. (See below.) The appearance of all of the new buildings, and the busy atmosphere denoting such major transformation made it easy for many in these two Emirates to forget that it was Trucial Oman’s rulers, rather than the British, who had extended the contracts to the British companies for these projects, and that these projects had been financed by Trucial Oman’s oil and commercial revenues, and not by British sources. It was also easy to forget that the British had expressed interest in development projects in Trucial Oman only after the 1960s, after oil exports had begun and significant revenues were available for contracts with British companies.

Despite their different emphases, all of these British-constructed discourses had one central purpose, namely, ensuring the reproduction of the British presence in Trucial Oman for the preservation of the U.K.’s political, economic and cultural interests. Specific functions that the construction of these discourses served included the protection of the British oil concessions and the profits that British companies made from the global sale of this oil, and safeguarding the contracts that British firms were obtaining in Trucial Oman. These discourses, however, would have had little impact upon Trucial Oman’s rulers without the backing of the British colonial administration.
Colonial Administration and Practices

The deepening of British penetration of Trucial Oman between 1945 and 1971 took place in relation to several realities. Aside from the necessity of bolstering with policy the discourses mentioned before, the British deepened their entrenchment in Trucial Oman because they had oil concessions to protect, as well as the increasing number of British subjects who were coming into Trucial Oman as oil company, military, administrative, other commercial personnel, or as tourists. All of these realities necessitated changes in British methods of administration.

Whereas during the 1820-1945 period, for example, the British merely placed a "Native Agent" in Trucial Oman for intelligence purposes, in order to ensure the implementation of the imposed treaties, during the 1945-1971 period, the British needed a more complex administrative apparatus. The first change that the British made in their Colonial administration of Trucial Oman was their replacement of the "Native Agent" with a Political Agent, who came from the U.K., and was first stationed in Sharqah, before that position's station was transferred to Dubai in 1953. A Political Officer, directly subordinate to him, was stationed in Abu Dhabi.¹⁰ After 1961, this Political Officer came to be ranked

as a Political Agent as well. The Political Resident to whom the Political Agent answered had moved headquarters from Bushire to Bahrain in 1946. The Political Resident also now answered directly to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, and not to Bombay, since by 1947, India and Pakistan had gained their independence. Assisting both the Political Resident and the Political agent were a number of lesser officials.

Like the "Native Agent," the Political Agent's task was to maintain close contact with the sheikhs, and to make the British government's will known to them. The Political Agent also conducted Trucial Oman's external affairs. After 1952, the Political Agent's tasks also included presiding over the Trucial States Council, formed during that year. This body was composed of the Trucial Oman sheikhs, and was basically a consultative body whose sole power was that of providing recommendations on issues facing the sheikhdoms collectively. Issues concerning which the Council could make recommendations


14 Ibid., p. 143.
included those of economic development, jurisdictional matters, the issuing of travel documents, education and public health. In 1958, the Council formed committees on agriculture, education and public health, and in 1964, a fourth committee, called the Deliberative Committee, which comprised two delegates from each sheikhdom, was established. The function of this Committee was to examine and prepare proposals for the Council. After 1965, the Political Agent remained a member of the Council, but it was now chaired by one of the Rulers who had been elected to that position.\footnote{Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation, pp. 25-26. This was a development that occurred in relation to the growth of Arab Nationalism as a political discourse in Trucial Oman and elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf Region. More about this below.}

This was probably a cosmetic change that the British introduced, in relation to the growth of Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism in the region at the time. (See below.)

Another of the Political Agent's tasks included the administration of justice in Trucial Oman,\footnote{Stanford Research Institute, Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula, p. 143.} as Judge of "Her Brittanic Majesty's Court for the Trucial States," which claimed authority over British subjects, British-protected persons, and non-natives living in Trucial Oman. This court had been subordinate to the British judicial system in India
prior to 1949,\textsuperscript{17} but the Trucial States Orders-in Council, promulgated in 1949, 1956 and 1959 under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, formally made all persons in Trucial Oman other than locals subject to the British Court for the Trucial States. The Trucial Oman rulers gave their formal consent to this court's jurisdiction over non-local residents of Trucial Oman in 1950.\textsuperscript{18} Areas of the Political Agent's judicial authority included inquests, probate, and the registration of persons and companies, despite the fact that many Political Agents had gotten no legal training.\textsuperscript{19} However, a magistrate based in Bahrain also tried some of the cases involving British subjects and other non-locals. Appeals from the Court for the Trucial States were made first to the Chief Court for the Persian Gulf, and then to the Full Court for the Persian Gulf. This last court was presided over by British judges or lawyers of at least nine years' standing.\textsuperscript{20}

Civil cases involving a person under the jurisdiction of the rulers' courts versus one under the jurisdiction of the Political Agent were heard in a Joint Court. A British

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{17} Herbert J. Liebnesy, "Administration and Legal Development in Arabia," \textit{The Middle East Journal} 10 (Winter, 1956): 35.

\textsuperscript{18} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial Oman States}, p. 179.

\textsuperscript{19} Stanford Research Institute, \textit{Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula}, p. 143.

\textsuperscript{20} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial Oman States}, p. 179.
\end{flushleft}
Assistant Judge and an appointee of the ruler presided over this court, and decisions could be appealed to a higher Joint Court, presided over by a Judge of the British Court, together with the ruler. Criminal cases were heard by the court in the defendant's jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{21}

Trucial Oman locals were tried by the rulers' courts for civil and criminal offenses. In some sheikhdoms, a Qadhi presided over the rulers' court, and in other cases, this task fell to the ruler himself. Cases were tried in accordance with Shari'a, or, in remoter areas, in accordance with 'Urf. In Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the rulers' courts applied the law according to the Maliki school. In rulers' courts in Sharqah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman and Umm al-Quwain, however, the Hanbali school of law predominated. Courts in Fujairah operated under the Shafe'i school of law. Along with Shari'a, rulers' courts also applied legislation that came from the rulers' proclamations.\textsuperscript{22}

One change occurred in Trucial Oman's court system in 1960, with the promulgation of the Trucial States Transfer of Jurisdiction Regulation, which placed foreigners who were nationals of Arab or Muslim states under the jurisdiction of the rulers' courts. This new regulation did not, however,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 180.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 179.
\end{itemize}
apply to subjects of Commonwealth countries. This regulation was promulgated in relation to the growth of Arab Nationalism as a political discourse in the region. The impact of Arab Nationalism upon Trucial Oman's colonial structure, and upon Trucial Oman's various strata, will be treated below.

The Political Resident, to whom Political Agents were subordinate, was generally responsible for the implementation of the imposed treaties in Trucial Oman, and elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf. He was also responsible for negotiating amendments to air agreements, and for enforcing existing provisions about them. In addition, he was empowered to enforce regulations over the non-native community, over which Britain claimed jurisdiction, relating to customs, imports and exports, air navigation, and the acquisition of land. The Political Resident also served as an appellate judge for the Arabian Gulf's British-administered courts. A particularly important task of the Political Resident was to safeguard British economic interests in the Arabian Gulf, and particularly the interests of British oil companies. Finally, the Political Resident was also responsible for supporting the Political Agents in Trucial Oman and in the rest of the Arabian Gulf in local crisis resolution.

23 Ibid., p. 180.

The British colonial administration had to institute at least some projects explicitly aimed at improving social welfare in Trucial Oman, in view of the fact that during the 1960s, British companies were reaping profits from the sale of oil abroad, and British contractors were building infrastructural installations which were profitable for them in the short term, and for other businesses, largely British, in the longer term. Consequently, the Trucial Oman Development Office, which had originally been established to manage an agricultural trial station at Diqdaqah, was re-established in Dubai in 1965, with broader duties. These included the continued provision of agricultural services based in Diqdaqah, but also the establishment of trade and technical schools, the expansion of health services, the development of resources, and the development of public works. For these purposes, the Trucial Oman Council established the Trucial Oman Development Fund under the jurisdiction of the Trucial Oman Development Office in 1965.25 One of the circumstances that induced the British colonial administration to establish this fund was the fact that the Arab League had offered to extend assistance to Trucial Oman during the 1964-1965 period. Abu Dhabi contributed the bulk of this Fund’s monies between 1965 and 1971, as its oil revenues increased.

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The establishment and workings of this Fund will be discussed in detail below.

For the defense of this colonial order in Trucial Oman, the Political Agent relied upon the support of an armed, mercenary group that the British had formed in 1951, and had dubbed the "Trucial Oman Levies." This unit was formed to take over most of the functions of the previous police force, which had consisted of the sheikhs' personal bodyguards, and other, British-led, local police units. The Trucial Oman Levies unit was based in Sharjah, officered by the British, and financed by them as well. The tasks of this unit first included the preservation of internal security, maintaining stability among the sheikhdoms, and protecting oil survey parties. The commander of this force reported to the


29 Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation, p. 24-25.
British Political Agent. In 1957, the number of recruits accepted increased the size of the Trucial Oman Levies, and the unit’s tasks came to include the "defense of the Trucial States against external aggression," along with the preservation of internal security. During that year, the "Trucial Oman Levies" unit was renamed the "Trucial Oman Scouts." 

During the 1950s, the Trucial Oman Scouts grew and developed so that the force contained rifle companies, fire support units, transport and maintenance units, signal and medical groups, a training depot, and a boy's squadron and school. Under British rule, the Scouts acted as a peacekeeping force in territorial disputes among the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms arising from oil concessions, but also saw action in ousting the Saudis from the Bureimi Oasis in 1955, and were involved in combatting the forces in the Sultanate of Oman's interior who were seeking independence from Musqat in 1957. (More about all of these issues later.)

After 1966, Sharqah became an important base for other British military units as well, as the British had begun to build it up during that year in anticipation to the end of their hold on Aden. In 1968, Sharqah housed a battalion of

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30 Nyrop, Persian Gulf States, p. 405.
31 Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates, p. 25.
32 Ibid.
the army component of the British Task Force headquartered at Bahrain. The R.A.F. also had one of its jet fighter squadrons based there. The British Navy maintained a squadron of three destroyer escorts, and six coastal minesweepers which used all of the Arabian Gulf ports as home ports.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{The Segmentation of Trucial Oman through the Drawing of Borders}

One of the most important mechanisms that the British had at their disposal for protecting their political, economic and cultural interests - and specifically, their oil concessions - in Trucial Oman, however, took the form of boundary drawing among the sheikhdoms. Not only did the drawing of specific boundaries among the sheikhdoms ensure that oil concessions would remain in the hands of sheikhs who were becoming increasingly dependent upon the British for protection and economic support, but it also, and literally, worsened the fragmentation of all of Trucial Oman, geographically, politically, economically and culturally.

To understand why and how the drawing of boundaries by the British, both among the sheikhdoms and between Trucial Oman and its neighbors was so significant for the consolidation of British hegemony in Trucial Oman and the rest of the Arabian Gulf, it is necessary to focus first upon the transformations that the institution of boundaries among the

sheikhdoms engendered within Trucial Oman’s tribal socio-discursive formation. Central to this issue is the understanding that the very concept of juridical, political boundaries between regions was an alien one to the entire Arabian Peninsula. As has been demonstrated earlier, during both the Islamic and Transformational periods, tribal groupings migrated not only between the regions of historic Oman and historic Al-Bahrain, but also across the Arabian Peninsula, and into the Fertile Crescent. In addition, tribal groupings in historic Oman frequently settled in agricultural areas, and joined historic Oman’s agrarian socio-discursive formation.

Similarly, agricultural and even urban groupings sometimes found it necessary to migrate to the Badia, and to join historic Oman’s tribal socio-discursive formation. The British-imposed boundaries changed all this, locking tribal groupings into tiny, British-constructed sheikhdoms, arbitrarily making them subjects of a sheikh whom British colonialism had constructed as a hereditary monarch through the imposed treaties, and blocking tribal groupings from access to lands they had historically used as part of their Diras elsewhere in the Arabian peninsula.

These boundaries, whether dividing one Trucial Oman sheikhdom from another or dividing Trucial Oman from a neighbor, also arbitrarily divided tribes between and among
states and sheikhdoms, thereby halting the migrations that had historically occurred among members of the tribal, agrarian and mercantile socio-discursive formations. The institution of borders in Trucial Oman also segmented tribal groupings within themselves, destroyed their historical connections with other tribal groupings, both within Trucial Oman and outside of it.

The concept of being a subject of a ruler was also alien in the Badia, because, as demonstrated earlier, the Za‘im of a tribe had never previously been a hereditary ruler, but rather, someone chosen by a tribal council, on the basis of his merits. A Za‘im gained the esteem of his own tribe, and of other tribes on the basis of his reputation for generosity, justice, courage, wisdom, etc. But the people of the Badia had never known a government wherein they became subject to a hereditary ruler merely by virtue of living within his boundaries.

The second alien concept that the British introduced into the Badia in drawing boundaries among the sheikhdoms was the concept of land as private property, i.e., belonging to one, and therefore not belonging to another. While this concept functioned within historic Oman’s mercantile and agrarian socio-discursive formations alike during both the Islamic and the Transformational periods, it was alien to the Badia because the desert, like the Indian Ocean itself, was an
avenue that everyone could traverse freely, and not something that anyone settled on and worked, such as agricultural land, or something that produced commodities that could be sold, like boats, minerals, spices, produce, or textiles.

In drawing the boundaries among the sheikhdoms and between states, however, the British rendered Badia land the property of the sheikhs and other rulers to whom they had assigned it, for the actual purpose of ensuring that this land, and the oil resources that it held, remained British property. Particularly in Trucial Oman, this applied because the British had imposed the oil concessions on the sheikhs of the coastal area, and not on the people of the Badia, or of the agrarian socio-discursive formation. Through these concessions with the Trucial Oman sheikhs, therefore, the British were able to expand the geographic range of their concessions, adding to them land in the interior, agrarian areas and in the Badia. Thus, these lands became exclusively British property, from which the latter could extract oil and other resources for the concessionary period, whose duration was usually seventy-five years.

The Demarcation Process Between Trucial Oman and its Neighbors

As mentioned previously, the process by which the British drew boundaries to differentiate their holdings in the Arabian Peninsula from those of the Ottomans began in 1913.
This process continued, culminating in the drawing of clear-cut, juridical boundaries between Trucial Oman and its neighbors shortly after World War II. British colonialism found these boundaries necessary for the protection of the oil concessions their companies had obtained in Trucial Oman. This is illustrated by the fact that one border dispute which was directly related to oil concessions arose between the Sheikdom of Abu-Dhabi and Saudi Arabia.

This dispute began in 1949 when Aramco surveyors penetrated too far to the east of Qatar for the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, who complained to the British about Saudi encroachment upon the Sheikdom, via Aramco. Britain, representing Abu Dhabi, or more accurately, the Petroleum Concessions Company (Petroleum Development - Trucial Coast), then staked counterclaims on the territory in question to those of the Saudis.

The Saudi claim was, in part, based on the argument that many tribes in the area had joined the Muwahidi (Wahhabi) movement during the nineteenth century. In the early 1950's, the Saudis bolstered this claim by sending a political representative, and some armed retainers, into the region of the Bureimi Oasis. The British then ousted Saudi forces by dispatching the Trucial Oman Levies (Scouts) to Bureimi. In 1954, an agreement to set up an arbitration tribunal about the Saudi-Abu Dhabi border was signed. This tribunal met in 1955,
but the issue remained unsolved during the Colonial period (1945-1971).  

Determining the border between Qatar and the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi was much easier, as both sheikhdoms were under British control, and more importantly, had signed oil concession agreements with the British Petroleum Concessions Company. However, initially, Abu Dhabi claimed an uninhabited strip of land in Qatar called Khaur al-Udai, on the grounds that a section of the Bani Yas Confederation, the Qubaisat, had lived there between 1869 and 1880, before returning to Abu Dhabi. After 1871, Khaur al-Udai had come under the influence of the Ottomans and of the Qatari rulers. However, in 1872, the British Government of India had approved its Political Resident’s decision to include within Abu Dhabi’s boundaries the Sheikhdom’s holdings along the coast down to the vicinity of Khaur al-Udai. This dispute was settled in 1952, when the British induced Qatar to send a proposal to Abu Dhabi for the division of Khaur al-Udai, to which Abu Dhabi agreed.

In the case of the Sultanate of Oman, the British had to settle the borders of the former with Sharqah, Ras al-

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35 Ibid., pp. 224, n. 1; 261.

Khaimah, Ajman, Abu Dhabi, and Fujairah. This process also began shortly after the end of World War II. The Sultanate of Oman's dispute with Sharqah and Ras al-Khaimah stemmed from the fact that some of the tribes that the Sultan claimed as his subjects, as far south of the Bureimi Oasis as Dhank, has been part of the Qasimi Confederation, and were therefore claimed by the Sheikh of Sharqah. After the time of the Qasimi confederation, the Sheikh of Sharqah had obtained the loyalty of the northern Shuwaihiyin section of the Bani Ka'ab tribe. The Sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah was also unwilling to negotiate borders with the Sultan of Oman through British intermediaries. The difficulty in drawing a border between the Sheikhdom of Ajman and the Sultanate of Oman stemmed from the Bani Ka'ab's desire for independence from both. The British therefore made Wadi Hadf, the Bani Ka'ab dira, a neutral zone between Ajman and the Sultanate.

In order to set boundaries between the Sultanate of Oman and Abu Dhabi, the British had to settle claims between the Bani Ka'ab, Al-Bu Shamis, and Na'aim tribes on the one hand, and Sheikh Zaid on the other. These tribes were able to settle their claims with Sheikh Zaid, and Sheikh Zaid, in turn, was able to settle boundaries with the Sultan of Oman. The Duru and Awamir tribes, however, were a more difficult case for the British. In the case of the Duru, the British simply ruled in favor of the Sultan, claiming that Duru
contentions about their *dira* were too extensive. As for the 'Awamir case, the Sultan of Oman recognized the Umm Al-Zumul well as an Awamir well within Abu Dhabi, but did not publically relinquish his claim to it.  

The Drawing of Boundaries Among the Trucial Oman Sheikhdoms

The actual process by which the British drew clear-cut, juridical boundaries among the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms began in 1954-1955. Julian Walker, an official whom the Political Resident in Bahrain had assigned to carry out the work necessary for frontier arbitration relates that the method that the British used to determine the frontiers of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms was one of data collection from the people of Trucial Oman themselves. This was because there had been no previous history of frontiers and boundaries in the region, and therefore, the British had to construct them on the basis of oral data that they were able to gather.

In agricultural areas, the data that the British used pertained to such questions as which sheikh received payments of *Zakat*, or taxes, on crops and livestock, or fees for the

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distribution of water.\textsuperscript{38} Land holdings in a any given area were also assigned to Sheikhdoms merely on the basis of which sheikhdom their owner came from. Thus, Dibba, with a population of 2,500 people at the time, was divided among Fujairah, Sharqah, and the Sultanate of Oman.\textsuperscript{39} In the Badia, the British took into account the Trucial Oman sheikhs' claims to the loyalty of certain tribal groupings, and also surveyed various tribal groupings concerning the sheikhs to which they stated allegiance. Where claims among rulers were in dispute, the British arbitrarily set demarcations on the basis of what local people told them, and also resorted to such comprehensive colonial sources as Lorimer's \textit{Gazetteer}.\textsuperscript{40}

There were some situations, such as that pertaining to the drawing of the boundary between the Sheikhdoms of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, in which no sheikh enjoyed complete influence over nearby tribal groupings. In such situations, the British dictated where the demarcation line between the sheikhdoms would be drawn. Some of the largest tribes in the Badia never stated allegiance to any Trucial Oman sheikh, wanted simply to remain in their \textit{Diras} under their own \textit{Za'im}, and were

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., pp. 176-177.


\textsuperscript{40} Walker, in Schofield and Schofield, \textit{The Middle East and North Africa}, pp. 176-177.
uninterested in any agreements with oil companies. These tribes, too, were arbitrarily assigned to a sheikhdom by the British just the same.  

The most obvious consequence of the institution of the British-constructed boundaries among the sheikhdoms and among the Arabian Peninsula states was the fragmentation of the tribal groupings involved. This occurred because while the boundaries drawn were very much in harmony with the needs of the Petroleum Concessions Oil Company, they were devastating to Trucial Oman’s tribal groupings.

With the institution of these boundaries, virtually each tribal grouping in Trucial Oman found itself divided into parts that were sealed off from each other. Tribes that had existed as one unit within a given dira now found their members divided among the various sheikhdoms, and often among the various Arabian Peninsula states. Table 9.1 below illustrates the segmentation of Trucial Oman’s tribal populations among the various sheikhdoms. The division of tribes among several Arabian Peninsula states outside of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms after the boundaries were instituted, can also be seen in several examples. It was particularly common for Trucial Oman tribes to have segments in the Sultanate of Oman.

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41 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, pp. 300 and 302.
### Table 9.1

**Trucial Oman’s Tribal Segmentation in Relation to Boundaries by Sheikdom in 1968**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Abu Dhabi</th>
<th>Dubai</th>
<th>Sharqah</th>
<th>Ajman</th>
<th>Umm al-Ras al-Qubais</th>
<th>Fujairah</th>
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<td>38</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Na'aim</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najadat</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagbiyin</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qawasim</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>3,592</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bani Qitab</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quwaid</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahairah</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu Shamis</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharqiyyin</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>8,372</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunajj</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bani Yas</td>
<td>4,597</td>
<td>3,913</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z'aab</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2,366</td>
<td>256</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The British-constructed boundaries placed a large number of the Al-‘Ali, for example, in Oman. The Al-‘Awamir, as another example, were placed in Oman, Saudi Arabia (Rub al-Khali), and Aden (Hadhramout). Segments of the Dhawahir were assigned to the interior of Oman. The Manasir tribe had segments in Yemen, and also as far north as Transjordan and Iraq. Both the Na‘aim and the Bani Qitab also had segments in Oman, as did the Shihuh.\footnote{Aydarus, Al-Tatawwarat al-Siyasiyyah fi Dawlat al-Imarat al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mutahhidah, pp. 17-34.}

It was the British Colonial institution of fixed, juridical boundaries, both between Trucial Oman and its neighbors on the Arabian Peninsula, and among the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms themselves, that brought about the geographic segmentation of the affected tribes. These boundaries sealed Trucial Oman off from the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, and particularly from the rest of historic Oman, and artificially divided Trucial Oman itself into sheikhdoms. In addition to this, however, a look at a map of Trucial Oman itself, after the British had instituted the boundaries, shows that the sheikhdoms, themselves, were not only constructed to accommodate the British oil concessions, but also in such a way as to ensure, even further, their weakness, and thereby, to ensure the reproduction of British hegemony. Most of the sheikhdoms that the British constructed with the institution
of these boundaries were not constructed as contiguous units. Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah, for instance, consisted of two main separate pieces each. Fujairah, Sharqah, and a small fragment of Ajman lay between Ras al-Khaimah’s main pieces. Between Fujairah’s largest two fragments lay a smaller, easterly fragment of Sharqah, the southern fragment of Ras al Khaimah, and a third land parcel shared by Sharqah and the Sultanate of Oman. The two main fragments of Sharqah, for their part, were interrupted by pieces of Fujairah and Ras al Khaimah.

Ajman was also divided into several tiny pieces, the largest of which contained the city of Ajman on the Arabian Gulf. The second piece, far to the east of the first, lay on the boundary between a fragment of Sharqah and a fragment of Fujairah. The third fragment, far to the south of the other two, straddled the border of the Sultan of Oman, and immediately adjoining it was another land parcel shared between Ajman and the Sultanate of Oman. In addition, both Sharqah and Fujairah had several tiny fragments straddling the boundary of the Sultanate of Oman, which was, itself, divided into two main pieces; the larger one extending from the southern boundary of Trucial Oman southwest along the southern rim of the Arabian Peninsula to the border of Aden (Yemen), and the smaller piece extending from the northern boundary of Trucial Oman to the Strait of Hormuz. Dubai’s main fragment
straddled the Arabian Gulf, but that Sheikhdom also included a tiny parcel far to the east, bordering the Sultanate of Oman. Between these two parcels lay a section of Sharqah, the Sultanate of Oman, the tiny fragment shared by Ajman and the Sultanate of Oman, and another tiny fragment belonging only to Ajman. Although Abu-Dhabi remained a contiguous unit, the British-constructed boundaries divided the important agricultural Buraimi Oasis between it and the Sultanate of Oman. 43

Segmentation of Identity Among the Trucial Oman Sheikhdoms

British penetration after 1820, and the entrenchment of British colonialism that followed the conclusion of World War II first eroded the identity of the people of Trucial Oman as part of historic Oman, replacing it with an identity as people of Trucial Oman in relation to other Arabian Peninsula polities. Internally, however, this Trucial Oman identity was, itself, being segmented so that the people of each sheikhdom were coming to identify as, and to be identified as, subjects of that Sheikdom rather than as people from Trucial Oman as a whole. This was significant because during the 1945-1971 period, sheikhdoms like Abu-Dhabi and Dubai became significantly more prosperous than sheikhdoms like Sharqah,

Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah, by virtue of trade and the exploitation of oil, and by virtue of the fact that they were larger than the five northern sheikdoms.

While British colonialism constructed institutions such as the Trucial Oman Council, Trucial Oman Scouts, and the Trucial Oman Development Office and Fund that would tend to centralize the identity of the people of Trucial Oman in relation to their neighbors, the colonial administration simultaneously segmented the identities of the people of the various sheikdoms in relation to each other through a series of steps. This series of segmentation steps began during the 1820-1945 period, and continued during the 1945-1971 years. The first step was the construction of these sheikdoms itself, instituted by colonialism included the imposition of the first of the British treaties of 1820, which brought into existence the sheikdoms of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharqah, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and later, Fujairah, and appointed a sheikh as the ruler of each one. Under these treaties, each sheikdom was also assigned its own, specific flag, which it continued to fly until 1971, and which symbolically reinforced its identity in relation to the others. British colonialism instituted further segmentation measures during the 1945-1971 period of colonialism. It was during this period that the British colonial administration drew clear-cut borders for each emirate. Subsequently, each emirate issued its own
passport, and even its own postage stamps. Giving each Trucial Oman sheikh the power to issue his sheikdom's own passports and postage stamps helped to accelerate the fragmentation of Trucial Oman, because it reinforced primary identification with a particular sheikdom, rather than with all of Trucial Oman, both on the part of the ruler and on the part of the subjects. During the 1820-1945 period, by contrast, subjects were issued British travel documents when they could obtain them, and basically considered themselves as belonging to Trucial Oman as a common entity.\textsuperscript{44}

During the 1945-1971 period, while the Trucial Oman Scouts unit was consolidating its role as both an external defense and an internal security force, each emirate also developed its own police force, complete with a distinct uniform for each sheikdom. These police forces were all commanded by British officers, but they still represented another way in which the Trucial Oman sheikdoms instituted their separate identities in relation to each other. Dubai established its own police force in 1956, and Abu Dhabi followed suit in 1957, inaugurating it as the Abu Dhabi Defence Force in 1965. The rulers of Sharqah and Ra\'l al-Khaimah also established police forces during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{44} Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates: 1950-1985}, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{45} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 176.
In addition, the larger sheikhdoms also adopted their own anthems and color guards, with distinct uniforms for each sheikhdom.

The Trucial Oman sheikhdoms also came to construct differentiation among themselves in terms of the currencies they adopted. During the 1820-1945, all of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms used the British Indian Rupee as currency, because Trucial Oman was administered by the Government of British India. After India won its independence in 1947, all of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms then adopted a special Gulf Rupee. During the 1960s, however, they began to adopt separate currencies. Abu Dhabi, for instance, adopted the Bahraini Dinar, while Dubai adopted the Qatari Dubai Riyal.

Segmented identity among the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms in relation to each other was also reinforced by the fact that they developed diverse educational systems. Abu Dhabi, for instance, adopted the Jordanian curriculum, while the northern emirates, including Dubai, adopted the Kuwaiti curriculum, which was based on that of Egypt. (Trucial Oman’s educational system between 1945 and 1971 is treated in greater detail below.)

**Displacement and Economic Diversification**

Simultaneously with the deepening of British colonial entrenchment during the 1945-1971 period came a period of economic and cultural stagnation within Trucial Oman in the
wake of the collapse of the pearl industry before World War II. As the pearling industry declined, the people making up the different strata that had been involved in it -- merchants, Ghawasin, Siyub -- became displacees, just as agriculturalists, indigenous long-distance merchants, and craftspeople had previously been displaced by the decline of long-distance trade and the growth of the pearling industry.

However, with the decline of the pearling industry in the 1930s, many who been part of strata that had been linked to that industry found themselves without alternative employment. Others, by contrast, found their way into employment that was linked to the oil industries that were developing elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf. Bahrain began producing commercially significant quantities of oil in 1934.\textsuperscript{46} Oil had been discovered in commercial quantities in Saudi Arabia in 1938, and throughout the 1950s, Aramco, the operator of the Saudi oil concession to U.S. companies, was expanding its operations.\textsuperscript{47} Kuwait had begun producing significant quantities of oil in 1946 and Qatar in 1950.\textsuperscript{48}

Trucial Oman's economic and cultural stagnation between

\textsuperscript{46} Benjamin Shwadran, \textit{The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers}, (New York: Praeger, 1955), p. 375. See Table XII.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 299. Shwadran describes the early expansion of Aramco, and the impact of this expansion on various other economic sectors of Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province in Section Four of this book.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., pp. 389 and 391. See Tables XIV and XV.
1946 and 1971 caused a great out-migration from the region. During the peak of the pearling industry, Trucial Oman’s population was estimated at 200,000. By the end of the Second World War, emigration reduced the population to 100,000, or half the previous number. 49

One nearby destination from which people from Trucial Oman migrated was to Kuwait. There, they found employment in the oil industry, government departments, or in the private sector. Most found work as laborers in the oil sector, or at Kuwait’s port, but others sometimes found clerical or professional employment, depending upon their backgrounds and skills. 50 Emigrants from Trucial Oman also chose to go to Al-Hasa, in Saudi Arabia. 51 Al-Hasa was the site of Aramco’s concession from the Saudis. Bahrain and Qatar were other destinations. While the development of the oil sector was a major reason for emigration to these destinations by Trucial Omanis, 52 there were other factors involved. One of these was the unsettled situation within Trucial Oman that the British imposition of boundaries, described above, had brought

49 Al-Oteiba, Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates, p. 6.


51 Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 134.

about. Another was the scarcity of educational institutions in Trucial Oman during the late 1940s and early 1950s in the wake of the decline of the pearling industry. (As mentioned above, the decline of the pearl industry caused many of the schools that pearl merchants had founded to close.)

Certain emigrants from Abu Dhabi, for instance, migrated to Qatar to receive primary and secondary education, and then found employment there. The issuing of passports by the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms was another factor facilitating emigration.

Aside from generating this extensive out-migration from Trucial Oman, the decline of the pearl industry impacted all three of Trucial Oman's socio-discursive formations intrinsically, as the decline of historic Oman's long distance commerce before it had done. The pearling sector of the 1820-1945 period had not only provided the main source of employment for people from the agrarian and even the tribal socio-discursive formations, but had also linked the mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations through the income it generated. It was the pearling industry that had generated the income which was necessary for the purchase of agricultural goods by Trucial Oman's mercantile

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55 Taryam, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 34.
socio-discursive formation. Income earned by members of the agrarian socio-discursive formation, in turn, provided the food supply of the mercantile socio-discursive formation and, in part, that of the tribal one. This income also provided certain employment for members of the tribal socio-discursive formation concerning the transportation of agricultural goods to the cities, etc. Consequently, the decline of the pearling sector meant the decline of all three socio-discursive formations, and this situation was what prompted the out-migration from Trucial Oman during the 1940s and 1950s.

A particularly significant contributor to the above-mentioned segmentation of identity among the emirates in relation to each other was their development of highly diverse economies during the 1960s. This economic diversity was due both to the vastly differing sizes of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms at the end of the 1950s, and to the vast differences in resource endowment among them. Abu Dhabi, the largest Sheikdom in terms of land, for example, developed an economy based on oil exports. Dubai, despite its lack of oil resources and its small size, developed an economy based on international commerce, because it had been playing the role of commercial entrepot since the late 1800s. By the end of the 1960s, flourishing economies had made Abu Dhabi and Dubai the largest of the emirates in terms of population, as well. Table 9.2 shows the variation among the emirates in terms of
land (settled in 1960) and population, as of 1968. A population estimation for 1970 is also given.

While Abu Dhabi had begun to prosper from oil exports after 1962, and Dubai from its mercantile role, the other emirates remained dependent upon the agricultural and fishing sectors. This situation was significant because it contrasted with that of the 1820-1945 era, wherein the economies of all of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms were based on the pearl fisheries. Once the pearl sector declined, there followed a period of stagnation in all of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms during the 1940s and 1950s. It was during the 1960s that the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms began to develop diverse economies in relation to each other.

Table 9.2

AREA AND POPULATION OF THE TRUCIAL OMAN SHEIKHDOMS
AS OF 1968 AND 1970 (EST.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sheikhdom</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Sq. Miles)</td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>46,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>59,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharqah</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>31,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras al-Khaimah</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>24,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujairah</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>9,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm al-Quwain</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajman</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Trucial States Council, Census Figures, 1968
It is now appropriate to provide some detail, including statistics, about the economic differentiation among the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms that developed during the 1960s, because this information reflects a situation in which sheikhdoms such as Abu Dhabi, which became wealthy, gaining considerable economic privilege, political power, and cultural prestige in relation both to the immediate past and to other sheikhdoms, particularly the smaller northern ones. For one thing, Abu Dhabi came to be the largest of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms during the drawing of the borders. For another, Abu Dhabi's relative wealth, in comparison to the other sheikhdoms, allowed it to begin to purchase armaments and to build up the strongest defense force among the sheikhdoms during the 1960s. Economic privilege and political power also allowed the ruler of Abu Dhabi to penetrate his sheikhdom's civil society, and to reproduce his family's rule, through social welfarism and consumerism. Subsequently, Abu Dhabi's ruling family was similarly able to penetrate the civil society of the other Trucial Oman sheikhdoms. While such sheikhdoms as Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Umm al-Quwain, Ajman and Sharqah were to reap some benefits from the wealth and development of both Abu Dhabi and Dubai, in relation to those two, they basically remained impoverished during the 1960s. Table 9.3 illustrates how each of the Sheikdoms was faring in terms of revenues by the mid-1960s and afterwards.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Fujairah</th>
<th>Sharqah</th>
<th>Ras al-Khaimah</th>
<th>Umm al-Quwain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil Concession</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamps and Other</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Concession</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Revenue</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*One Bahraini Dinar = U.S. $ 2.10*
TABLE 9.3 - Continued

**Ajman**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil Concession</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The meagreness of the revenues of the sheikhdoms mentioned above contrasts to some extent with the revenues of Dubai, and more markedly with those of Abu Dhabi. This difference stems from the fact that, during the 1945-1971 period, the sheikhdoms described in the table above neither had significant mercantile centers nor oil. As the tables above show, in the cases of Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Sharqah, oil concession revenues ended after 1966 altogether. In many other cases, oil concession revenues were even more meagre than those that the sheikhdoms earned from their own marginal industries. These industries consisted of the issuing of passports, on the part of one of the smaller sheikhdoms, and postage stamps. There were also some sales of fish and agricultural products. Sharqah earned some additional revenues from a concession for the exploitation of red oxide,
found on Abu Musa Island, that the Sheikh had extended to a British company, Golden Valley Colours Ltd. The Sheikh collected a small royalty from red oxide exports.\textsuperscript{56}

The postage stamp industry mainly catered to the interests of philatelists in Western countries. Subject matter depicted on the stamps usually ranged from portraits of British Prime Minister Churchill and President Kennedy of the U.S. to events like the Tokyo Olympic Games and space research. Much more rarely, the stamps would carry depictions of subjects that were directly related to the sheikhdoms of issue. After 1966, the Sheikh of Sharqah used a British company, the Middle East Stamp company, to print and market the stamps. Umm al-Quwain, Ajman and Fujairah first enlisted the Barodi Stamp Company, and then J.H. Stanlow of New York for this service.\textsuperscript{57}

The above mentioned passport industry of one of the smaller sheikhdoms served the demands of people from outside of Trucial Oman who wanted to migrate for employment to places that were beginning to benefit from oil wealth, such as Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. Most of these migrants were Iranians from the Persian littoral of the Arabian Gulf who wanted to pose as Trucial Oman subjects in order to facilitate the


\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 94 and 95.
finding of employment in Abu Dhabi or in Saudi Arabia.\footnote{58}
Table 9.4 provides figures for the revenues of Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

\begin{center}
\textbf{TABLE 9.4}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{AMOUNT AND SOURCES OF THE REVENUES OF TRUCIAL OMAN SHEIKHDOMS: 1966-1968}
\textbf{(Millions of Bahraini Dinars)}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lrrr}
\hline
\textbf{Dubai} & & & \\
Source & 1966 & 1967 & 1968 \\
\hline
Duties & 1.10 & 1.60 & 2.80 \\
Oil Concessions & 0.19 & 0.31 & 0.31 \\
Stamps, etc. & 0.10 & 0.13 & 0.17 \\
Municipal Rev. & 0.21 & 0.28 & 0.45 \\
Total & 1.60 & 2.32 & 3.73 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{TABLE 9.4 – Cont’d}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lrr}
\hline
\textbf{Abu Dhabi} & & \\
Source & 1967 & 1968 \\
\hline
Oil Royalties/Taxes & 49.60 & 71.60 \\
Customs Duties & .30 & .50 \\
Other & 3.12 & 1.62 \\
Total & 53.02 & 73.72 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{center}
\end{center}
\end{footnotesize}

\footnotemark[58] Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 34.
These two tables show that Abu Dhabi’s revenues were much higher than those of the other sheikhdoms, and this was because of the beginning of oil production in 1960. For 1967 and 1968 respectively, petroleum revenues and taxes accounted for 93.6 and 97.1 per cent of Abu Dhabi’s total revenue as a result of increased production by those years. Dubai’s earnings, too, were somewhat higher than those of the other sheikhdoms. This occurred in relation to Dubai City’s role as a mercantile entrepot. Customs duties accounted for 69 per cent of Dubai’s total revenue in 1966 and 1967, and 75 per cent in 1968.

In showing the differences in revenue quantities and revenue sources for each Trucial Oman sheikhdom, the tables above express how acute the economic differentiation among them was, and how important a factor it was in the segmentation of identities among Trucial Oman’s people by sheikhdom. It is now appropriate to examine the sheikhdoms of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and the remaining northern sheikhdoms of Sharqah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al- Khaimah, and Fujairah, more closely. Dubai as a mercantile entrepot will be examined in Chapter Ten. Abu Dhabi as an oil producer will be examined in Chapter Eleven. Chapter Twelve will cover the five remaining northern emirates in relation to Dubai and Abu

Dhabi.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the changes in British colonial interests that brought about changes in British colonial discourses and the colonial administration in Trucial Oman changed during the 1945-1971 period in relation to the 1820-1945 period. Chapter Nine has also demonstrated how the British colonial administrative apparatus helped to reproduce British colonial rule in Trucial Oman through its backing up of the discourses that British colonialism had constructed. One important theme of the British colonial discourses of the later colonial period was that of the ongoing external threats that Trucial Oman supposedly faced. British colonialism was able to construct these discourses because in imposing the treaties of the nineteenth century upon the Trucial Oman sheikhs, British colonialism appointed itself the representative of Trucial Oman.

This chapter has also demonstrated how Trucial Oman became a loosely connected grouping of sheikhdoms with fixed, juridical boundaries, in which each of the sheikhdoms had constructed a separate political, economic and cultural identity in relation to the others. British colonialism’s drawing of boundaries had also brought about the segmentation of the Arabian Gulf region at large, so that Trucial Oman constructed an identity in relation to its regional neighbors.
One argument presented here was about the consequences of the drawing of boundaries on Trucial Oman's three sociodiscursive formations. In the badia, tribal groupings found themselves divided within by the borders drawn for Trucial Oman sheikhdoms and for other Arabian Gulf polities. Furthermore, the drawing of boundaries halted their ability to expand their diras and to migrate as conditions dictated. The coastal urban area, for its part expanded into the deep desert region as a result of the drawing of boundaries, because once the boundaries of a sheikhdom had been drawn, that sheikhdom's authority officially extended to lands and people that the boundary included, as well as to resources. The boundaries drawn among the sheikhdoms themselves were drawn so that the sheikhdoms were fragmented geographically within, as was that area of the Sultanate of Oman abutting Trucial Oman. This regional fragmentation was constructed to necessitate British presence for the "maintenance of order" in Trucial Oman. Additionally, agricultural areas, such as Dibba, and the Bureimi region found themselves divided among sheikhdoms and even among different Gulf polities.

Additional consequences of the drawing of boundaries included the fact that some emirates ended up with more resources than other, and that each emirate began to construct an identity of its own in relation to the others. These developments will be examined more thoroughly in the next
three chapters. In general, a consequence of the impoverishment that characterized Trucial Oman during the late colonial period was massive out-migration. Chapters Ten, Eleven and Twelve provide detail about political, economic and cultural particulars that were constructed within each Trucial Oman sheikdom in relation to the others, within the late colonial socio-discursive formation.
CHAPTER TEN

DUBAI AS A MERCANTILE CITY IN THE LATE COLONIAL PERIOD: 1945-1971

Introduction

The following three chapters cover Dubai, Abu Dhabi and the northern sheikhdoms (Sharqah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah). These chapters will continue to trace transformations within Trucial Oman during the 1945-1971 period in relation to the 1820-1945 period. Specifically, they will demonstrate that Trucial Oman’s sheikhdoms each began to change politically, economically and culturally in relation to changes in British colonial interests, in relation to the other ones, and in relation to their own makeup and natures during the 1820-1945 period. After the British-imposed treaties constructed the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms, the development of the pearling industry gave the pearl merchant stratum the greatest economic privilege and cultural prestige within Trucial Oman’s civil society, as well as political power in relation to the ruling sheikhs.

However, after the 1930s, the pearling industry declined, and the rulers’ most significant revenue sources became airline and oil concessions and customs, rather than taxes from the pearling industry. This meant that the pearl
merchant stratum's political power in relation to the ruling sheikhs declined, and that stratum was replaced by a new mercantile stratum closely connected with the import of goods via British steamer lines. These transformations during the 1930s took place simultaneously with the political, cultural and economic changes that occurred as a result of the deepening of British colonial penetration of Trucial Oman. The following three chapters will further trace the impact that the transformations that Trucial Oman's civil society underwent during the 1930s had upon Trucial Oman's civil society between 1945 and 1971.

The significance of the subject matter that these three chapters will cover lies in its provision of greater detail about the transformations that occurred in the Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and in the northern sheikhdoms of Trucial Oman in relation both to the earlier colonial period, and in relation to the changes that took place in the British colonial discourses, apparatuses, and interests during the 1945-1971 period. The developments that occurred in this latter period are also significant because they provide insights into the continuities and discontinuities of various aspects of the later colonial socio-discursive formation into the contemporary one.

These three chapters will present three main arguments. The first is that during the 1945-1971 periods, the Trucial
Oman's sheikdoms' rulers were strengthening themselves economically, politically and culturally in relation to other strata within their sheikdoms' civil societies, as a result of the revenues that they were obtaining from sources independent of these internal strata. Sources from which the Trucial Oman sheikhs were now obtaining revenues included commercial customs, oil revenues, and external assistance. However, the magnitude of these revenues varied greatly among the sheikdoms. This variation in revenue, along with other factors, contributed to the sheikdoms' development of diverse economic, political, and cultural structures. However, welfarism, consumerism, and certain constructed discourses enabled the rulers of all of the sheikdoms to penetrate their respective civil societies, and thereby to reproduce their rule.

The second argument is that the diversity of the economic, political and cultural structures that the different Trucial Oman sheikdoms constructed fostered both segmentation and interdependence among them. The third argument is that the transformations that were taking place within Trucial Oman's civil society also helped to reproduce British colonial rule, in terms of continued British control of resources, in terms of the large role extended to British companies in Trucial Oman's development, through the extension of development contracts to British firms, and in terms of the
political stability that welfarism and consumerism within Trucial Oman were able to provide.

Chapter Eight demonstrated how Dubai developed as a commercial entrepot after the decline of Lingah in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Chapter Eight also showed that while Dubai had been an important pearling entrepot during the early colonial period, by the time of the decline of the pearl merchant stratum by the 1930s, Dubai already had another mercantile stratum, whose prosperity was based upon the import and re-export of external goods into and from Dubai. Chapter Ten will continue to trace the development of Dubai as a commercial entrepot in relation to the changes that had taken place in British interests and ambitions in Trucial Oman, in relation to the deepening of British penetration of Trucial Oman, and in relation to changes that were occurring in other Trucial Oman sheikhdoms.

The specific transformations within Dubai that Chapter Ten will examine will include changes within Dubai’s political structure, within Dubai’s economic structure, and within the sheikhdoms’s cultural structure. In addition, Chapter Ten will analyze the specific strata that developed in Dubai in relation to these changes. Finally, Chapter Ten will analyze how the social order in Dubai reproduced itself, both in relation to these changes, and in relation to the deepening of British colonial penetration.
One purpose of this examination will be to analyze Dubai during the 1945-1971 period in relation to what it had been during the earlier part of the colonial period. Another purpose that this coverage will serve will be that of comparing Dubai’s political, economic, cultural structures and social strata of the later colonial period with those of the other sheikhdoms. This chapter’s analysis of Dubai will also make it possible to assess which aspects of the earlier colonial period had passed into the later one, and which had not. This coverage will also facilitate assessment of which aspects of the colonial period passed into the contemporary one, which did not, and how and why.

Political and Economic Administration in Dubai

During the 1945-1971 period, the city of Dubai continued to maintain itself as a mercantile city. While most of Dubai’s mercantile strata remained interconnected with British colonialism as importers of British goods, and of other commodities brought in by the British India shipping lines, these strata underwent substantial transformations during this period in relation to the growth of Dubai’s government revenues, to changes in Dubai’s administrative system, to development projects being implemented in Dubai, and to the influx of immigrant labor. Between 1930 and 1957, the decline of the pearl industry had engendered stagnation in Dubai, as it had elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf. Beginning
with 1957, however, Dubai entered a period of growth as a re-export entrepot. Dubai's economic and political administration both facilitated its growth as a re-export entrepot, and was constructed in relation to this growth. This section and those below will cover the transformations that occurred in Dubai's political and economic administration, in its development plans, in its trade, in its education system, and in its demographic composition and social stratification (in relation to the influx of immigrant labor).

Sheikh Rashid bin Sa'id began instituting developmental projects in Dubai before he actually assumed power in 1958, the year of his father, Sheikh Sa'id's death in Dubai, after ruling for more than forty years. However, Sheikh Sa'id had given Sheikh Rashid considerable authority since 1939. This was because the reform movement, the clashes between himself and the reformers, and the aftermath of the reform movement's defeat had weakened Sheikh Sa'id physically. At the end of the 1940s, Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum and Sheikh Rashid were able to initiate several projects which enhanced Dubai's commercial importance in the Arabian Gulf, which it had earned

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as a redistribution center for European importers such as Gray and Mackenzie, and because of its own mercantile strata, discussed in Chapter Eight.

Sheikh Sa'id and his son wanted to facilitate the continued growth of Dubai as a center for all of these mercantile strata, who influenced his decisions in this direction. At the same time, Sheikh Sa'id's administration was also accommodating the deepening of British colonial entrenchment that was occurring in Trucial Oman. (During the 1945-1971 period, the economic aspect of the deepening of British penetration had become particularly important. It not only took the form of expanding activities in the oil sector, but also manifested itself in Dubai's extension of numerous contracts to British companies for various development projects.) Specific administrative measures that Sheikh Sa'id and Sheikh Rashid took included cooperating with the British in the establishment in 1947 of a branch of The British Bank of the Middle East in Dubai.3 This bank enjoyed a monopoly in Dubai until 1963, when Sheikh Rashid chartered the National Bank of Dubai.4 Another of this measures was the

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establishment of Al-Maktoum Hospital, which had been a joint project between Sheikh Rashid and the British. 5

Other important administrative developments that added to Dubai’s importance during after 1945 were the 1948 establishment of the British postal authority’s jurisdiction over the Dubai Post Office, which the British Government of India had opened in 1941, the establishment of Dubai as the seat of the above-mentioned Trucial Oman Council in 1952, 6 and Dubai’s replacement of Sharqah as the seat of the British Political Agent in 1953. 7

Further changes included the establishment of the Dubai Police Force in 1956, the establishment of a court system, and the organization of the Customs Service. Dubai’s Police Force was set up under the command of a British officer, Major P. Lorimer, who was succeeded by one Major J. Briggs. Although Major Briggs remained the commander of this police force, shortly after 1962, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, one of the sons of Sheikh Rashid, obtained title as its official head of the Department of Police and Public Security after completing his training in Britain. 8 This Police force grew steadily

5 Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 134.
7 Stanford Research Institute, Area Handbook for the Peripheral States of the Arabian Peninsula, p. 133.
8 Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 136.
between 1956 and 1968. For the court system, in 1956, Sheikh Rashid appointed a Qadhi from Aden as judge for the trying of cases ranging from criminal offenses to traffic violations. But in 1968, the Sheikh appointed a Palestinian with British legal training, Ahmad Bitar, as Judge for Dubai's Traffic Court. The first head of Dubai's customs service, Sayyid Mahdi Tajir, was appointed in 1956. He had been seconded to Dubai from the Bahrain Customs Department, and in 1960, a British financial expert named W.R. Duff took charge of the Customs Department. Sayyid Mahdi Tajir became Director of the Oil Department and the Emiri Court in 1962. During that year, W. R. Duff was supplanted as head of the Customs Department by Ahmad bin Sulayyim, from Dubai, who studied in India, and was, therefore, fluent in English.

In 1957, the Dubai Municipal Council was re-established on the advice of an Iraqi expert on government, and in 1961 Sheikh Rashid granted the Council a new charter and issued legislation concerning the Council's functions, on the advice of a Sudanese expert on government. Under the new charter, the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman of the Council were to be elected by its membership, and this membership was also to elect the Council's standing committees. After the death of the first elected Chairman, Haj Ali bin Al-Oweiss, however,

9 Hawley, The Trucial States, pp. 246 and 248; and Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 136.
Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid, another son of Sheikh Rashid, was named permanent Chairman.\(^\text{10}\) (He also became head of the Department of Health and Medical Services.)\(^\text{11}\)

The membership of the Council consisted of Councillors representing different sections of the Dubai community, each serving a two-year term. The Ruler reserved the right of final approval on all of the Council's decisions. The Dubai Municipal Council had the right to sue and be sued as a body, as well as the right to conclude contracts and to own land. It was also empowered to issue orders for the administration of the town and to administer Dubai's development plan, which Sheikh Rashid had commissioned and which a British consultant, John Harris, had drawn up. All of these powers, however, were subject to the Sheikh's veto.\(^\text{12}\) Aside from external trade customs, the Council also derived revenues from assessment rates it charged on ships and dwellings based on their annual rental values. Other revenues came from licences, building permits and market fees.\(^\text{13}\)

In addition to serving as supreme head of the Dubai Municipal Council, Sheikh Rashid served as Chairman of the Board of a private joint-stock company for the supply of

\(^{10}\) Hawley, *The Trucial States*, pp. 246-347.

\(^{11}\) Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 136.

\(^{12}\) Hawley, *The Trucial States*, pp. 246-347.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 247.
electricity in Dubai, which had been established in 1957.\textsuperscript{14} The shares for this Company were owned by local merchants.\textsuperscript{15} Sheikh Maktum bin Rashid, another son of Sheikh Rashid, assumed the presidency of the Dubai Lands Department when it was established in 1960. For the administration of this body, the Sudanese government seconded a land settlement and registration expert, Sayyid Ahmad Adam, to Dubai to serve as Registrar of Lands.

Sheikh Rashid then appointed a Lands Committee of five local notables, whose purpose it was to settle questions of land title by scrutinizing old title documents, visiting the land parcels under dispute, and hearing claims. When the members of the Lands Committee believed that plot ownership cases were settled, they would then send a summary of the case to the Ruler, who then issued a certificate of title to the land. A Land Registry was subsequently established, which held registration records containing information about land ownership, leases and mortgages. Among other things, the existence of this Land Registry facilitated the extension of commercial credit, as banks and merchants could now be certain of title to the property on which they were assisting

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesubscript{14} Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 20; Hay, \textit{The Persian Gulf States}, pp. 120 and 122; and Abdullah, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, p. 134.

\footnotesubscript{15} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, p. 260.
\end{footnotesize}
investment.\textsuperscript{16}

Two other departments were created in Dubai in 1961. These were the Water Supply Department and the Postal Department. A British engineer, Eric Tolloch, who had supervised the installation of the water supply in Dubai, continued as Resident Engineer for the Department. As for the Postal Department, it was reorganized in 1964 when a British official from the General Post Office was sent to Dubai for that purpose.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to the Councillors, the Dubai Municipal Council had paid officials and employees. One of these was Sayyid Kemal Hamza, whom the Sudanese government seconded to Dubai to take up the position of Town Clerk in 1960. (The holder of this position later came to be known as the Director of the Municipality.) In addition, a British municipal engineer was appointed in 1961.\textsuperscript{18}

The growth of Dubai's banking sector occurred concurrently with the growth of its importance as a commercial entrepot. The third major bank to be chartered in Dubai, after the British Bank of the Middle East and the National Bank of Dubai was First National City Bank of New York. (This bank had obtained special permission from the U.S. Treasury to

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 247.

\textsuperscript{18} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 247.
deal in gold—see below.) By 1970, just before independence, there were eighteen banking houses represented in Dubai, three of which were British, two Pakistani, two Iranian, two from the U.S., one Jordanian, and three locally chartered.¹⁹

Just as Dubai’s government had expanded the sheikhdom’s administrative bureaucracy in relation to growing revenues, so also did the government embark upon development projects. These will be discussed below, in relation to British colonialism.

Dubai’s Development Projects

Sheikh Rashid’s administration proceeded with development projects the very year Sheikh Rashid assumed power. In 1958, Dubai’s joint stock electric company extended a contract to the British firm Kennedy and Donkin for the preliminary study and the installation of electrification in Dubai.²⁰ By 1961, Dubai had begun its electrification program,²¹ and in 1969, Sheikh Rashid’s administration extended a contract to the U.K’s Pirelli General Cable Works for the installation of high voltage power lines which would link Dubai’s power station with the regions of Al-Ras, Al-Murar, and the airport, all in Bar Daira. Under this

¹⁹ Fenelon, The United Arab Emirates, pp. 84-85.

²⁰ Abd al-Rahman, Al Imarat fi Dhakarat ’Abna’iha, p. 347.

²¹ Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 245.
contract, Pirelli was also to supply a 500 meter submarine cable to carry power to Al-Rafah.  

One of the most important projects of Sheikh Rashid's administration was the improvement of the Dubai port, which began in 1961. For this project, Sheikh Rashid borrowed funds from Kuwait to pay the British contracting firm, Sir William Halcrow & Partners, to deepen the port by means of dredging, and to build breakwaters. Sheikh Rashid's government also extended the customs areas of the Dubai port, improving their services.  

As congestion at the port from external commerce worsened during the 1960s, and as industrial enterprises like the Mc Dermott and Oilfield Supplies Company based themselves along the creek, Sheikh Rashid's administration made further improvements on the Dubai port in 1965. This work included the construction of a new wharf and stacking area. Halcrow and Partners was also conducting a study for the complete conversion of Dubai's port into a deepwater facility. In August, 1967, Sheikh Rashid's administration signed a contract with the British firm Richard Costain Ltd. to do this work. 


24 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 263.  

Halcrow and Partners served as the consultant for this project, and Lloyd's Bank (U.K.) provided a loan for it. Other loans were to come from the British Bank of the Middle East. The financing of this and other projects by British banks and other corporations took place in anticipation of oil revenues that would come from the 1966 discovery by the Dubai Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Continental Oil, which in 1963 acquired a 50 per cent share in a joint venture with Dubai Marine Areas, another operating oil company largely owned by BP. This joint venture began exploring for oil in that year, and discovered commercial quantities of oil in the offshore Fateh field on its Dubai concession in 1966. Costain civil engineering won a second contract for improving the Dubai port in January, 1969. This contract entailed increasing the number of deep water berths that Dubai's port had.

Halcrow and Partners also drew the plans for improvements along Dubai's creek. These improvements were related to the expansion of Dubai's port, and included the extension of the Customs area along the Bar Dubai bank, and

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29 MEED (January 19, 1969): 143.
the reclamation of land along the Creek through the narrowing
of the channel. In fact, the sale of parcels of reclaimed
land along the Creek proved a source of some revenue for
Sheikh Rashid’s administration, since this land legally
belonged to the government of Dubai. The sale of this land
actually paid for some parts of the overall port scheme, such
as the dredging and deepening of the Creek, because the demand
for this land was so great. Both foreign firms and local
merchants were eager to purchase land on which to build
apartments, hotels and offices, or, in the case of some
locals, for speculative purposes. This reality made the value
of reclaimed land a factor in feasibility considerations for
subsequent marine projects in Dubai.\(^\text{30}\)

Sheikh Rashid’s administration also established the
Dubai State Telephone Company, for which Sheikh Rashid also
served as Chairman of the Board. The main shareholder for
this company was a British firm, International Aeradio Ltd.,
with Sheikh Rashid holding the remaining shares.\(^\text{31}\) One of
Dubai’s earlier public telephone connections was with Britain-

\(^{30}\) It is important to mention that foreign companies that
purchased land parcels were prohibited from using them merely
as speculative assets. Instead, it was expected that foreign
firms would take out leases on the land holdings and build
offices, apartments or hotels on them. Hawley, *The Trucial
States*, p. 244; and Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United
Arab Emirates*, pp. 261-262.

\(^{31}\) Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab
Emirates*, p. 260.
- this connection had been in operation since 1964— but in 1967, Sheikh Rashid's administration expanded Dubai's telecommunications by commissioning the British Cable and Wireless Company to supply a communications link between Bahrain and Dubai, as part of a plan for telephone connections among all of the Gulf sheikhdoms. Suppliers of the equipment for the Dubai-Bahrain telephone connection project included the British Marconi Company and the British General Electric Company. In 1970, Plessey Telecommunications (U.K.) was to supply Dubai with a new telephone exchange system. British Marconi Company also provided the supplies for Dubai's television station, for which Sheikh Rashid's administration obtained financial assistance from Kuwait.

The government of Dubai was able to obtain financial assistance from Shaikh Ahmad ibn Ali of Qatar for the provision of piped water, the asphalting of Dubai's streets, and the construction of a new bridge connecting Bar Daira to Bar Dubai during the late 1950s. The bridge connecting Bar Daira with Bar Dubai was completed in 1962. Piped water came to Dubai and most surrounding villages in 1968, after the

33 MEED (October 5, 1967): 667.
36 Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, p. 135.
discovery of a large supply of fresh water at the Al-Awir Region, fifteen miles south of Dubai. After this discovery, a wellfield was built, pumps were installed, and a pipeline to Dubai and storage tanks were constructed.\textsuperscript{37}

Another project was Dubai's airport, whose first terminal building was completed in 1960.\textsuperscript{38} In 1968, Sheikh Rashid's administration extended a contract to Costain Civil Engineering (U.K.) for additions to Dubai's international airport. Britain's Lloyd's Bank was extending loans for the project, in conjunction with Standard Bank. This financing had the backing of the British Export Credits Guarantee Department. Another British firm, Norris Air Conditioning, was providing the electrical and mechanical engineering services for the additions to the Airport in conjunction with Phoenix Electrical. Costain Civil Engineering won a second contract for Dubai's airport in November, 1970, under which the firm was to construct a new runway and taxiway, and was to install a new lighting system. Lloyd's Bank and Morgan Grenfell were lending Dubai funds to cover the cost of this project, again under the guarantee of the British Export Credits Guarantee Department.\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{37} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, pp. 244-245.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., pp. 244-245.

\end{flushleft}
Sheikh Rashid's administration's plans for Dubai included the building of additional hospitals, so, in 1969, the government of Dubai extended a contract to Bernard Sunley (U.K.) for the construction of the Rashid Hospital. For this project, Dubai borrowed from the British merchant bank Morgan Grenfell. Still another British firm, Norris Air Conditioning, was providing the mechanical engineering services for this project, under a 1970 contract. Metal Sections, a company affiliated with the British Tubes Investment Group, won a contract in August, 1970 to supply steelwork for the roof structure of Rashid hospital, which was then undergoing expansion.\(^{40}\)

Sheikh Rashid's administration's development schemes did, indeed, enhance Dubai's growth as a commercial entrepot. In addition, the Dubai government was able to develop new sources of revenue via these development plans. However, the British were the most significant beneficiaries here, since Dubai's development plans not only meant the extension of contracts overwhelmingly to British firms, as shown above, but also made the city more accommodating to British companies. The British also reaped profits from the financing of these projects, as British banks were important lenders to the Dubai government. All this meant that British corporations made

profits in Dubai as contractors, financiers, and as transnationals using Dubai's facilities and accommodations. Even funds borrowed from other Gulf sources for these projects ended up in the coffers of British contractors, since the borrowing occurred for the financing of development projects. Because Dubai and the other Trucial Oman sheikhdoms were British colonies during the 1945-1971 period, they had little choice other than to extend development contracts to British firms. In addition, the British firms were able to profit from their ready-made monopoly in Trucial Oman because of sheikhs' use of actual or anticipated oil revenues, or borrowed oil-generated funds from neighboring sheikhdoms for development projects. The use of actual oil revenues figured particularly significantly in the case of Abu Dhabi's development, as will be seen below.

Dubai's External and Regional Trade

While Sheikh Rashid, was implementing the various development projects mentioned above, Dubai's external trade was also growing. Dubai's import trade, which amounted to 3 million Pounds Sterling in value in 1958, rose to 6 million Pounds Sterling in 1960. It jumped to as much as 42 million Pounds Sterling in 1967, and to 81 million Pounds Sterling in 1969.\(^{41}\) This meant that those mercantile strata in Dubai

\(^{41}\) Fenelon, The United Arab Emirates, p. 65.
which had already established themselves as importers and distributors of the goods that the British India lines steamers brought to port in Dubai grew during the 1957-1971 period. This was because Dubai was maintaining itself as a re-exporting entrepot for certain commodities.

A brief discussion about the specifics of Dubai's imports reveals that Dubai, as a port within the Indian Ocean system, had now chiefly become a destination for European goods. This contrasted with the pre-1500 and Tranformational Period role of older Arabian Gulf mercantile cities, wherein they were first entrepots for the export of the Ummay's own variety of commodities, and later, for the inter-exchange of Indian Ocean products within the Indian Ocean system, albeit through Portuguese, Dutch, and English commercial monopolies. A few figures about Dubai's imports also show how important consumer goods from Europe had become between 1945 and 1971, and how relatively little Dubai imported from elsewhere in the Indian Ocean system.

Dubai's leading source of imports was the U.K. between 1962 and 1965. The second source was Japan, which took the lead from the U.K. in 1966. Switzerland became a significant source of Dubai's imports after 1964, taking the lead from Japan in 1967, mainly because of the upsurge in Dubai's

42 Hawley, Dubai and the Trucial States, p. 363.
import of Swiss watches. Other, less significant suppliers of goods to Dubai included India and Pakistan, Holland, West Germany, the United States and Italy. Table 10.1 presented below, shows which country was the main supplier of commodities from given categories for 1967, and therefore describes how closely linked to the industrial countries Dubai had become as an importer of consumer and capital goods.

**TABLE 10.1**

**DUBAI’S IMPORTS BY COMMODITY CATEGORY AND SUPPLIER FOR 1967**

(Millions of Qatari Dubai Riyals)

($1= Q.D. Riyals 3.947$)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Goods</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Material</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Goods</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity Category</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Malaysia-Singapore</th>
<th>Pakist.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machinery</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Material</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Goods</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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During the 1945-1971 period, Dubai was both exporting Trucial Oman’s own goods, and re-exporting imports from India, the U.K., etc. Figures for 1967 and 1968, although

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43 Fenelon, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 67.
incomplete,\textsuperscript{44} show that the monetary value Dubai's re-exports was substantially greater than that for Dubai's exports of Trucial Oman's indigenous goods during those two years. In 1967, figures for Dubai's re-exports show an aggregate amount of BD (Bahraini Dinars) 40.5 million, while Dubai's exports of Trucial Oman's goods amounted only to BD 563 thousand. For 1968, Dubai re-exported BD 64.9 millions' worth of goods to some of its destinations, while its exports of Trucial Oman goods amounted approximately to BD 900 thousand. Indigenous exports included dried fish, tobacco, and dates. These goods mainly came from the Ras al-Khaimah area. Their destinations mainly included Ceylon, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Re-exports included watches, clothing, electronic equipment, construction equipment, and foodstuffs.\textsuperscript{45}

Table 10.2 shows some of the destinations to which Dubai's re-exports went by monetary value for 1967 and 1968. Dubai's re-exports to India and Pakistan mainly consisted of watches, electronic equipment, and clothing. To Iran, Dubai mainly re-exported watches, clothing and foodstuffs. Dubai mainly exported foodstuffs and construction equipment to Abu

\textsuperscript{44} The aggregate figures given for Dubai's re-exports during 1967 and 1968 are not totals because they do not include all destinations. However, even with these omissions, they show that Dubai's re-exports were far greater than its exports of indigenous Trucial Oman goods.

\textsuperscript{45} Mutawalli, \textit{Haudh al-Khalij al-'Arabi}, vol. 2, pp. 524-525.
Dhabi.\(^{46}\) One of the reasons why Dubai re-exported such a high volume of goods to Abu Dhabi is that customs duties for goods in transit to that Sheikdom were assessed at a mere 2 per cent.\(^{47}\)

**TABLE 10.2**

**SOME DESTINATIONS OF DUBAI’S RE-EXPORTS.**
(Millions of Bahraini Dinars)
One Bahraini Dinar = $2.10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India and Pakistan</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Trucial Oman</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining in Dubai of which consumer goods</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 10.2 also shows that BD 17.2 millions worth of imports remained in Dubai in 1967, and BD 9.3 millions of this sum, or slightly less than half, was in consumer goods. For 1968, out of a sum of BD 26.8 millions’ worth of imports remaining in Dubai, BD 11.3 millions, or about 42 per cent, was in consumer goods. These figures indicate two trends. Firstly, they indicate the postwar significance of consumer

\(^{46}\) Ibid., p. 524. For additional countries to which Dubai’s re-exports went in 1967, see Hawley, *The Trucial States*, p. 365.

\(^{47}\) Fenelon, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 66.
goods within the global economy. Secondly, they indicate that consumer goods had become significant within Dubai's society, because the British presence had constructed a desire for them, and because the employment generated by Dubai's growth had enabled Dubai's population to purchase them. In order to facilitate trade and provide further services for exporters and importers, Sheikh Rashid opened a Chamber of Commerce in Dubai in 1965.48 By 1960, shops and many houses had telephones and piped drinking water.49

After 1945, Dubai also became the entrepot for the re-export of another commodity. This commodity was gold, which the British, who had obtained it from Southern Africa and other places, transported to Dubai by air after it was ordered by members of a group of twelve large merchants in Dubai. These merchants then sold 75 per cent of the gold in India and Pakistan. The gold commanded such a high price in independent India and Pakistan because the governments of these states had barred the entry of gold imports as a currency-stabilization measure immediately following independence from Britain. In addition, the inflation that India's currency had suffered both during World War II and after India and Pakistan had gained their independence increased the demand for gold, and

48 Ibid., p. 66.

49 Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 20; and Hay, The Persian Gulf States, pp. 120 and 122.
this, too, contributed to the high price gold commanded in those two countries.\textsuperscript{50} This situation prevailed throughout the 1960s as well. In 1967, for example, the price of gold in Dubai was $35 an ounce, while in India, by contrast, gold was sold at $68 an ounce.\textsuperscript{51} These twelve merchants then sold the remaining 25 per cent of the gold to retail merchants and goldsmiths, many of them Banyans, who owned shops in the Dubai \textit{Soug al-Dhahab} (Gold Market).

Several British firms supplied the gold to Dubai. These included Sharps Pixley, Mocatta and Goldsmid, Samuel Montague and Bullion Exchange.\textsuperscript{52} The intermediary through which the gold was channelled into Dubai was the British Bank of the Middle East's Dubai branch, which was opened in 1947. The small group of Dubai merchants who actually transported the gold to India and Pakistan would borrow money from the bank to finance their ventures at an interest rate of about 20 per cent, and would then place their orders for the gold with the Bank. Once the gold had arrived in Dubai, the bank would store it, for a service charge of twenty cents (U.S.) per ten-

\textsuperscript{50} Mutawwali, \textit{Haudh al-Khalij al-‘Arabi}, vol. 2, pp. 525-530.

\textsuperscript{51} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 205.
tolah bar. In 1966, the gold that was channelled through Dubai from the U.K. and Switzerland amounted to ten per cent of the total gold mined by the non-Socialist world.

Dubai became an entrepot for gold during the mid-1950s, but the British had actually been re-exporting gold to Kuwait and Bahrain during the 1940s, and up until the mid-1950s. From Kuwait and Bahrain, it was re-exported to India by a small group of merchants, who could sell it at a profit because of demand for gold caused by the currency inflation situation in India. The British Bank of the Middle East, which opened its Kuwait branch in 1941, and its Bahrain branch in 1945, was directly involved in gold trade from these ports, as well, before transferring its operations to Dubai in the mid-1950s. (Kuwait and Bahrain were also under British colonialism at that time.)

In the case of Kuwait and Bahrain, as in the subsequent

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53 Mutawwali, Haudh al-Khalij al-‘Arabi, vol. 2, pp. 525-530. The 20 per cent interest rate figure is considered likely because in one of the interviews that Abdallah Abd al-Rahman included in his book entitled Al Imarat fi Dhakirat ‘Abna’iha, the interviewee states that in 1957, when the Sheikh of Sharqah allowed the Middle Eastern Bank Ltd. to open a branch in Sharqah, this bank charged an interest rate of 15 per cent. The interviewee also mentions that this rate was much lower than that charged by the British Bank of the Middle East, which had to lower its own interest rates because of the competition it faced from the Middle Eastern Bank Ltd. pp. 355-356.

case of Dubai, the Bank imported the Gold from British suppliers in response to orders, and then stored it before distributing it to the customers, who paid cash for it and re-exported it to India. The Bank also lent money to these merchants for their export operations. Once these merchants had sold the gold in India, they deposited the proceeds in the Bank as well.55

Both the British Bank of the Middle East and the gold trade operation that it was financing transferred to Dubai in the mid-1950's, after Kuwait and Bahrain had begun to export oil, and those who had previously found employment in the gold trade sector found work in the growing, and more secure oil industry. Dubai was logical choice for the gold trade industry because it had become a free port, and because it had not yet developed its own oil sector. In addition, Dubai had an airport, and substantial mercantile linkages to India that had been developed during the years of the pearl industry. Moreover, some members of the strata both in Dubai and in India that had forged these linkages during the height of the pearl industry needed alternative employment now that the latter was in decline, and were well suited for incorporation into the gold trading sector.

It is possible to draw an analogy between

transformations occurring in Dubai's external commercial sector during the two halves of the colonial period, and transformations that had taken place within the British colonial administration. As mentioned above, the British administration had relied upon the "Native Agents" during the 1820-1945 period, but had replaced them with Political Agents from the U.K. after 1945. Similarly, the financiers of the pearl industry in Dubai had been Banyans, while for the gold trading sector, they were the officers of the British Bank of the Middle East.

In the mid-1950s and afterwards, trade brought increasing revenues to Dubai. These revenues, coupled with external assistance, enabled the government of that sheikhdom to begin establishing elementary and some secondary schools. The fact that these schools were government-established made them different in many ways from the schools that had been established by private financing during the early 1900s. The expansion that Dubai's educational system underwent during the 1950s and 1960s is discussed in the section below.

**The Development of Dubai's Educational System**

It is important to examine the development of Dubai's education system during the 1950s and 1960s, because of the changes in curriculum that occurred in all of Trucial Oman's schools. The growth of Trucial Oman's education system during this period is also important to analyze because it developed
concurrently with the growth of anti-colonialism and Arab Nationalism there. In fact, the development of Trucial Oman's education system at that time both impacted, and was impacted by, the growth of anti-colonialism and Arab Nationalism both in Trucial Oman and elsewhere in the Arab World.

Dubai opened its first general education school, was actually a re-opening of the old "Ahmadiyyah," in 1955, under a new curriculum. This school was opened during that year with Kuwaiti government assistance. The Dubai government opened a second school in Dubai in 1957-1958 called the "Sa'idiyyah," at Sheikh Rashid's house. Two additional schools for girls, called "Khawlah Bint al-Azour," and "Al-Khansah" were established in Dubai in 1959. A fifth general education school, called "Al-Maktoum," was established in 1959. This school was also sponsored by the Kuwaiti government. A sixth school, "Al-Sha'ab," sponsored jointly by Dubai merchants and the Dubai government, was opened in 1959-1960. Dubai's first secondary school was opened in 1961, under the sponsorship of the government of Qatar. The religious community, the government of Dubai, and individual citizens helped to erect and open a religious school in 1957. The Kuwaiti government rebuilt the school in 1960, and from then on, the school was called "Al-Mahad al-Dini," or "the

56 Al-'Asi, Masirat al-Ta'alim, pp. 59, 62, and 67-77.
57 Al-Harbi, Tatawwur al-Ta'alim, p. 44.
Religious Institute."\textsuperscript{58}

Kuwait began to give more extensive assistance to the development of education in Trucial Oman after 1963, when Kuwait opened the Kuwait Office in Dubai in 1963, for the purpose of facilitating the development of education and health care in Dubai, Sharqah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah. One of the activities of the Kuwait office was the furnishing and distribution of textbooks to the schools in these emirates, and the payment of teachers whom the Kuwaiti government had sponsored.\textsuperscript{59}

While some of the teacher at these schools were locals, many others, both in girls' and boys' schools, were sponsored by the Qatari, Kuwaiti, and Egyptian governments. Most of the teachers obtaining external sponsorship were Palestinian or Egyptian. The curriculum offered at the Dubai schools was based on that of Kuwait, which, in turn was modeled on the Egyptian curriculum. One important change occurring within this school system pertained to the dress code. Male students now wore trousers and shirts, while females wore uniforms. Formal regulations of other kinds were also in force. For example, the school day began at a precisely set time, and ended that way as well. A specific time period was allocated


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., pp. 59, 62, and 67-77.
to each subject, and classes were separated by level. In addition, the schools formally administered exams, and the school, itself, was hierarchically run, with a director at the top, and assistant directors under him. The directors were directly responsible to the Dubai Education Department, which worked in coordination with the schools' various sponsors, such as the Kuwait Office. Dubai's schools also had sports, camping, theatre and other cultural programs.\textsuperscript{60} Dubai's school system was similar to that of the other northern emirates. Throughout the 1960s, the number of schools, teachers and students increased in Dubai.

Increased government revenues in Dubai, along with external assistance, enabled Dubai's government to tackle other aspects of development, as demonstrated above. In relation to the development projects they initiated, British contracting firms came to require increasing numbers of workers, and preferably those who would work for the lowest possible wages. Hence, the initiation of these development projects engendered an influx of foreign workers. In relation to this influx, the composition of Dubai's population underwent changes from the way it had been during the 1820-1945 period, in terms of ethnicity, nationality, class, religion etc. This transformation of Dubai's labor force, the

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., pp. 73-76; and Harbi, \textit{Tatawwur al-Ta'\'alim}, p. 45.
new social stratification within Dubai's civil society, and the relationship between these two factors and the reproduction of Dubai's social order, will all be covered in the following section.

Labor Force, Stratification and Reproduction

As growing numbers of foreign workers began to enter Dubai in search of employment in the various development projects that were being implemented, they changed the ethnic, religious, and class composition of Dubai's population, and thereby altered Dubai's system of stratification in relation to how that system had been during the 1820-1945 period. It is for this reason that it is so important to examine this phenomenon thoroughly. Not only did the influx of foreign workers alter Dubai in terms of ethnic, class, religious composition and culture, but it also changed the manner in which the social order in Dubai was able to reproduce its political power, economic privilege, and cultural prestige.

The influx of foreign workers took place because the largely British companies to which the Emirate's government extended the development contracts needed cheap labor to implement these development projects, and therefore, obtained much of it from among the large number of workers in India and Pakistan displaced from their jobs during the contemporary era. Other immigrant workers came from Iran, Europe and from other Arab countries. By 1968, immigrant labor accounted for
50 per cent of Dubai's population. The percentage of the labor force that immigrant labor made up was considerably higher.

The development projects of the 1960s also impacted the distribution of the labor force among Dubai's economic sectors. It is important to describe in some detail the composition of these different sectors of the labor force, both in terms of the occupations they actually comprised and their demographic makeup. This examination is appropriate because it provides a sense of where immigrant workers were placed in the labor force, both in relation to locals, and to the British colonial strata. A detailed analysis of Dubai's labor force provides insight into the changes that occurred within this labor force in relation to the 1820-1945 period, and into the changing role of the ruling stratum. It also provides some information that is helpful for determining why the anti-colonial movement in Dubai and the rest of Trucial Oman, which will be covered below, developed in the way that it did.

The sectors employing the largest percentages of the labor force, whose total was 24,014 persons in 1968, were construction, retail and wholesale trade, transportation and

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communication, government services, and other services. The percentages of the labor force for which these sectors accounted were 16.8 per cent, 18.5 per cent, 17.3 per cent, 15.2 per cent, and 15.4 per cent respectively. By contrast, the agricultural and fishing sector only employed 6.7 per cent of Dubai's labor force, while the manufacturing, mining and quarrying sector employed 6.4 per cent.\textsuperscript{62}

The construction sector mainly consisted of British contractors who were working under contract on the large, infrastructural development projects mentioned above. The two largest construction firms working in Dubai in the late 1960s were Costain Construction Company and Taylor Woodrow International.\textsuperscript{63} These development projects included airports, port facilities, roads, and hotels. However, there was also a small stratum of local contractors some of whom had been tawawish pearl merchants, who built houses, and some of the schools established in the smaller, northern sheikhdoms (more about these below.)\textsuperscript{64} Unskilled immigrant construction workers were employed both by the large British contractors, and by the small stratum of local builders. Many of these

\textsuperscript{62} Sadik and Snavely, \textit{Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates}, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{63} Anthony, \textit{Arab States of the Lower Gulf}, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{64} Abd al-Rahman, \textit{Al Imarat fi Dhakirat 'Abna‘iha}, pp. 263-264.
construction workers were from Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{65}

The fact that 18.5 per cent of Dubai’s labor force was employed in the wholesale-retail sector shows the continuation of Dubai’s local merchant stratum, which developed in relation to Dubai’s replacement of Lingah as an entrepot for the Gray and Mackenzie Lines during the early 1900s. The large size of this stratum indicates the continued importance of Dubai as a regional entrepot for imported goods. This stratum benefitted during the 1945-1971 period, because improvements made on Dubai’s port during Sheikh Rashid’s administration facilitated the import of more goods. This merchant stratum was a continuation of that existing in Dubai during the 1820-1945 period, because sons usually inherited this vocation from their fathers. Therefore, the diversity of Dubai’s merchant stratum that was discussed in relation to the earlier colonial period continued during the second half of that period.

This diversity continued to manifest itself in the fact that not retail and wholesale merchants were both local and immigrant, the immigrant portion having increased in relation to Dubai’s economic and demographic growth. The new immigrant merchants mainly came from India, Pakistan, Iran or Afghanistan. Some were also Pathanis from parts of Pakistan or Afghanistan. The Indian and Pakistani immigrant merchants

\textsuperscript{65} Anthony, \textit{Arab States of the Lower Gulf}, p. 164.
frequently sold clothing, electrical appliances, or cameras, while the Iranian immigrant merchants frequently established grocery or sweet shops. Afghani immigrant merchants frequently sold household tools. The Pathanis sold plastic manufactures such as suitcases and handbags. There were also goldsmiths and gold dealers, many of whom were Banyans. (These last had previously been financiers, tujar merchants, or had worked in the Muti-Bazaar in Bombay during the years of the pearl industry.)

The local portion of Dubai's merchant stratum continued to include merchants of Arab and non-Arab origin. Aside from serving as agents for the import of various foreign goods, local merchants also served as land brokers (During the previous period, these last had been dallalin, or brokers for the pearl merchants.) Dubai's mercantile stratum benefitted from the influx of immigrant labor during the 1960s, because this influx made the population of Dubai grow. This increase in the population of employed workers, in turn, increased the demand for retail goods, and consequently, for wholesale ones. The influx of immigrant labor also engendered the growth of many foreign-run retail businesses to serve the needs of the immigrant population. These included Iranian, Indian, or Pakistani-run restaurants, laundries, bakeries, barber shops, etc.

The stratum of workers in the transportation and
communications sector mainly developed during the late 1950s and 1960s. Its large size for 1968 is related to the fact that in particular, it grew in relation to the development contracts that Sheikh Rashid's administration was extending to foreign, largely British, companies. In contrast to the construction workers, the workers of this sector had certain skills, and were frequently literate.

The large percentage of the labor force employed in government services during the late 1960s is a manifestation of the growth of the government bureaucracy in relation to Dubai's development. Concerning this bureaucracy's breakdown, the top government officials during the 1945-1971 period included of Sheikh Rashid's sons (see above), and British officers heading up the police and defense forces. This top stratum also included British advisors to the government, town planners, health administrators, port administrators, customs chiefs, and heads of the water, sewage and electricity services. British administrators also headed the Technical Training School.66

Some non-local Arab immigrants, like those mentioned earlier in this chapter, also obtained high positions in the government of Dubai. Other non-local Arabs, particularly Egyptians and Palestinians, found positions as teachers in the schools Dubai had been building during the 1950 and 1960s (See

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66 Ibid., p. 161.
above). Additional non-local Arabs found clerical employment in the government bureaucracy, because of their knowledge of Standard Arabic. Some locals from Dubai had migrated to other locations in the Arabian Gulf for their education, and consequently were able to obtain high government positions, while others became slightly lower-echelon assistants in the different government departments. For courts that had jurisdiction over Dubai locals, some locals who had obtained enough religious schooling became Qadhis.

During the 1945-1971 period, the size of the bedouin stratum in all of Trucial Oman had decreased so that bedouins now accounted only for five to fifteen per cent of the population. Since their socio-discursive formation no longer functioned as it previously had in Trucial Oman, in Dubai as in other sheikhdoms, most bedouins now found employment as rank-and-file policemen, or members of the defense force.\(^{67}\) The government of Dubai also employed a large number of Indian and Pakistani mid-level supervisors, secretaries, and clerks.\(^{68}\) Some who had previously been employed as ghawasin or siyub also found marginal employment as servers of coffee and tea to government workers.


\(^{68}\) Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, p. 164.
The "other services" category, accounting for 15.4 percent of the labor force, included employees of the banking sector, accountants, clerical workers for other businesses, port stevedores, longshoremen and other port workers, carpenters, electricians, street sweepers, etc. Banking sector employees included the largely British managers and bank officers, and also local, Indian and Pakistani tellers, mid-level supervisory personnel, clerks and secretaries. Indians and Pakistanis were frequently found in these occupations because they had learned English under the British colonial administration. Indians and Pakistanis also frequently served as accountants, and in clerical and secretarial capacities for other businesses. Stevedores and longshoremen were frequently Baluchis and immigrants from the Iranian littoral of the Arabian Gulf. Other dockworkers included largely Omani or Yemeni sailors who lived on, load and unloaded local Arab ships. Carpenters and electricians were often Indian Sikhs.  

As the figures above show, the agricultural and fishing sector employed a much smaller percentage of the labor force than did the other four sectors. This situation contrasts sharply with that of the 1820-1945 period, during which the agricultural and fishing sector, on a seasonal basis, employed

69 Ibid., p. 164.
the same people who made up the vast percentage of employees in the pearl industry. The smallness of Dubai's agricultural and fishing sector during the 1945-1971 period also contrasts with the strength of this sector in the sheikhdoms of Sharqah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah. This demographic makeup of this sector continued to consist almost entirely of locals. The small mining sector, by contrast, largely employed foreign workers, mainly because the concessionary oil companies preferred immigrant workers to locals, whom they would have to pay higher wages, and who constituted a potential political threat. 70 The administrators of this sector were British, and one Bahraini, Sayyid Mahdi Tajir became Director of Dubai's Oil Department in 1962, as mentioned previously.

Aside from providing labor needed for the development projects that were underway during the 1960s, the influx of foreign workers also had a cultural impact upon Trucial Oman's society. This was because the rapidly increasing population of immigrant workers generated the establishment of businesses and community features to meet the needs of the different immigrant communities that were growing up in Trucial Oman. These businesses and community features included Indian,

Pakistani and Iranian restaurants and shops; and Indian films shown in the "Al-Watan" cinema. Other businesses included Indian, Iranian and Pakistani journals; and Hindu temples. The Iranian community had also opened its own hospital and school. There were also Indian, Iranian, and Pakistani banks. In addition, the immigrant workers from these various communities brought with them their language, and mode of dress. The life style of these immigrant workers, however, differed according to the stratum of the labor force to which they belonged, and according their nationalities. Economically and politically, these immigrant workers remained tied to their home countries, continuing to send money home, and to monitor events in their home countries. All of these cultural manifestations constituted means by which immigrant workers retained their identity by country, both in relation to other immigrant worker communities, and to locals.

Despite the fact that immigrant workers had a considerable cultural impact upon Dubai's society, they had no political power within Dubai's civil society. Although they benefitted from welfarism and consumerism in Dubai, mainly because of the relatively higher wages they earned there in relation to those of their home countries, they were not permitted to form unions.\(^\text{71}\) Furthermore, those who immigrated to Dubai from British Commonwealth countries were within the

\[^{71}\text{Ibid., pp 359-360.}\]
jurisdiction of British administrative courts.

As they had done to the distribution of Dubai's labor force among the emirate's economic sectors, the development projects that Dubai's government implemented effected the distribution of the labor force according to the economic status of its members. A very small percentage, 3 per cent, was unemployed. Almost as small a percentage, 5 per cent, were employers. The largest percentage, 71 per cent, worked as employees and a moderately sizeable percentage of the labor force, 19 per cent, was self employed. Three per cent of Dubai's labor force worked as unpaid family workers.\(^7^2\)

The stratification of Dubai's labor force can also be seen in the various levels of education that its members had attained. The largest stratum, accounting for 66.3 per cent, had obtained no general education at all, and mainly comprised the bottom, unskilled rank that largely worked in construction. A much smaller stratum, accounting for 18.6 per cent of the labor force, had obtained primary education, which allowed them to obtain positions requiring rudimentary literacy, such as transportation of goods by truck. A smaller stratum, comprising 11.4 per cent of the total labor force, had completed secondary education, making them eligible for clerical positions. The smallest stratum had completed higher education. This stratum accounted for 3.6 per cent of the

\(^7^2\) Ibid., p. 29.
total labor force, and its members were eligible for employment in the professions.\textsuperscript{73} Despite pronounced stratification within Dubai's labor force, it is important to note that all of the other emirates rank lower than Dubai in terms of the percentage of their labor forces that obtained education at any level.

Aside from the cultural impact that the influx of immigrant workers had on Dubai, the other important point to raise about Dubai's labor force during the 1945-1971 period was that the local merchant stratum, still sizeable at that time, had lost the relative political power it had within Dubai's civil society, and in relation to the Sheikh during the 1820-1945 period. This was because this stratum furnished a smaller portion of the Sheikhs' revenue during the 1945-1971 period than they had in the earlier period. During the 1820-1945 period, the Sheikh had obtained most of his income from taxing the pearl merchant ships, and from export and import duties, whereas during the 1945-1971 period, the Sheikh's funds not only came from British oil and airport concession revenues, but also came from borrowing from neighboring, oil producing sheikhdoms such as Qatar and Kuwait, and from British banks against the expectation of future oil production.

Other sources of revenue for the Sheikh included customs taxes revenues brought in by the expanded port of Dubai, the ruling family’s investment in electricity, water, and telephone services, and some local shareholding in these utility companies. Because a smaller percentage of the Sheikh’s revenues now came from the mercantile stratum, the Sheikh became less dependent upon this stratum, and as a result, this stratum lost much of the political power it had enjoyed during the 1820-1945 period in relation to the Sheikh. However, the mercantile community continued to delegate representatives to the Sheikh through Dubai’s Chamber of Commerce, or by other means. In this way, the mercantile stratum retained some influence on the Sheikh’s economic and political decisions. In this context, though, local merchants held more power than immigrant merchants did, and among local merchants, power held was determined by factors such as ethnic background, wealth and nisab. However, the lower local strata enjoyed minimal political power.

Dubai’s economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s enhanced the political power and cultural prestige of the Sheikh in relation to the local merchant stratum, and also facilitated the penetration by the Sheikh of Dubai’s civil society through the development of social welfarism, and a

74 Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, p. 159.
75 Ibid.
government bureaucracy. Another factor that helped this order in Dubai to reproduce itself was a new discourse that was being constructed there, alongside the British one that placed the British in a position of "cultural superiority" to locals. This new discourse was being constructed within the context of the influx of immigrant labor during the 1960s, and it placed locals from Trucial Oman in a position of being politically more powerful to the immigrant workers. This influx of immigrant labor strengthened the identity that locals constructed in relation to the immigrants. Still another discourse helping the order in Dubai to reproduce itself was being constructed involving Dubai in relation to the Northern sheikhdoms. In this discourse, Dubai was portrayed as being "superior" to these other sheikhdoms because it had become more economically privileged than they were, despite the fact that like the other northern sheikhdoms, it lacked oil. Particularly importantly, the people of Dubai themselves saw themselves as being better off than they had been during the 1940s and 1950s, when many had migrated from Trucial Oman in search of employment. Finally, the existing order in Dubai was able to reproduce itself because Dubai's society had become very fragmented with the coming of the immigrant labor force. This made each section of Dubai's society too self-contained in its identity in relation to others, by ethnicity, class, or gender, to be able to unite with others to challenge
the status quo.

Furthermore, each segment of Dubai’s civil society benefitted from Dubai’s growing economic prosperity during the 1960s. Despite the fact that the primary beneficiaries of such infrastructural projects as the expansion of Dubai’s port, the construction of airports, and the building of roads were the British firms, these projects also engendered an expansion of business for local concerns, because they generally facilitated the import and circulation of goods. The intelligensia benefitted from Dubai’s development projects and general economic growth because these developments enabled its members to find employment in the government bureaucracy. As for the ‘Ulema, the advantage they reaped from Dubai’s economic growth was related to the fact that as prosperity grew, the government adopted a policy of building mosques and assigning members of the ‘Ulema to them. Other members of the ‘Ulema obtained positions within the local court system. The tribal stratum, too, benefitted from the expansion of Dubai’s government sector because they were able to find positions within the police force, and as guards of the Sheikh, and in other parts of the government bureaucracy.

(In Dubai, however, the tribal stratum was much less significant than it was in Abu Dhabi, mainly because Abu Dhabi contained the geographic area of Trucial Oman where most of the tribal groupings lived. For this reason, the concept of
tribal nisab had less significance in Dubai as an eligibility criterion for certain government positions than it did in Abu Dhabi, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter.) Even immigrant workers benefitted from living and working in Dubai, in relation to the wages and living standard that they faced in their home countries. Immigrant workers tended to compare their wages and living standards in Dubai with those that they would have retained in their home countries because they were not integrated into Dubai's civil society, but rather, remained culturally, politically and economically linked to their home societies.

Conclusion

This chapter traced the development of Dubai as a mercantile city, in relation to the fact that a mercantile stratum, oriented toward imports and re-exports, had already been constructed there at the end of the 1820-1945 period. This chapter also traced changes in the aims of British colonialism during the 1945-1971 period in relation to the previous one. Whereas during the earlier period, British colonial interests had mainly been in the prosperity of the pearl industry, during the later period, British interests had diversified to include Dubai as an entrepot for British imports, as a banking center, and as gold trading port.

This chapter also examined the role that the government of Dubai played in accommodating both this import-oriented
mercantile stratum, and diverse British colonial interests by borrowing money against anticipated oil revenues, and using revenues for infrastructural development projects, most of whose contracts were extended to British firms. These developments also enhanced Dubai as a mercantile center, not only for Trucial Oman but also for the Arabian Gulf. Chapter Ten also examined the growth of Dubai’s governmental bureaucracy, which occurred in relation to its growth as a commercial port. In fact, many government departments, such as the Municipality, the Land Department, the Commerce Department, the Police and the courts were established in direct relation to commercial needs.

Chapter Ten also focused upon how the infrastructural developments that were implemented in Dubai occurred in relation to the influx of immigrant labor, because of the demand for additional labor that the infrastructural projects generated. The related process, in which infrastructural development engendered the expansion of the government bureaucracy was also analyzed, as was the expansion of the government bureaucracy’s own contribution to the expansion of Dubai’s labor force. The expansion of Dubai’s labor force, in turn, strengthened the mercantile stratum because of its effective demand for consumer goods.

In addition, Chapter Ten demonstrated how the expansion of the government bureaucracy provided employment for the
growing intelligensia that the expanding education system was constructing, as well as for some members of the tribal and agrarian socio-discursive formations.

Dubai's social order was able to reproduce itself because many strata benefitted from the development projects that the government of Dubai was implementing, and because of the security that the expanding government bureaucracy provided. Another factor was the segmentation that developed within the entire labor force in relation to ethnicity, gender and nationality, etc. Segmentation in relation to nationality had been engendered by the influx of immigrant labor. A third factor was the fact that this segmentation had engendered socio-economic differentiation within the labor force itself. Fourthly, many immigrant workers constructed a discourse wherein they compared their wages, purchasing power, and benefits to those that they would have attained doing similar work in their home countries. The fact that they considered themselves part of their home countries' civil societies, rather than that of Trucial Oman, made them see their work and living situation in relation to that of their compatriots, rather than in relation to that of more prosperous locals. Finally, people of Dubai, themselves constructed a discourse in which they saw their work situations, living standards, etc. in relation to the period of economic stagnation of the 1940s and 1950s.
Dubai was not to produce oil in commercial quantities until after 1969, and the revenues from this oil were not to figure significantly until the end of the colonial period. By contrast, the oil sector became a significant source of revenue for Abu Dhabi even at the time of the decline of the pearl industry, because this decline left the payments that sheikdom received from the oil concession, small though they were, an important stream of incoming funds. Later in the 1960s, revenues earned from oil production itself became significant. These issues are examined more closely in Chapter Eleven.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
ABU DHABI AS AN OIL PRODUCER IN THE
LATE COLONIAL PERIOD: 1945-1971

Introduction

Chapters Seven and Eight covered the process by which the British imposed their Oil Treaty of 1922 upon the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms, and how British companies obtained oil concessions in the 1930s. Chapter Eleven will trace the development of Abu Dhabi’s oil industry itself. (No other sheikhdom developed a substantial oil sector.) The focus of this chapter will not be upon Abu Dhabi’s oil industry as such, but upon this industry as an aspect of the colonial socio-discursive formation. Specifically, this will mean dealing with the issues of who controlled this oil industry, the uses to which oil revenues were put, and how and why, and how the disposal of oil revenues reproduced the social order in Abu Dhabi, and the British colonial socio-discursive formation there.

This approach will facilitate an analysis of the extent to which British companies reaped benefits from their oil monopoly in Abu Dhabi, both in terms of direct revenues and in terms of how the Abu-Dhabi government itself utilized its portion of the revenues. The main issue covered will be that
of how the Abu Dhabi government’s disposal of its oil revenues brought about changes in that sheikhdom’s political, economic and cultural structures, in relation to the deepening British colonial penetration of Trucial Oman. One transformation within Abu Dhabi that will be analyzed in relation to the government’s disposal of oil revenues will be that which occurred in Abu Dhabi’s labor force during the 1945-1971 period in relation to the earlier colonial years. Another will be the development of social stratification in Abu Dhabi during the 1945-1971 period. This chapter will assess how these transformations, and related changes, contributed to the reproduction of the social order in Abu Dhabi.

Analyzing Abu Dhabi according to this approach not only allows for treating it as another case study of British colonial economic profit, but provides insight into Abu-Dhabi’s own development in relation to what it had been during the earlier colonial years. This approach also allows a comparison of Abu Dhabi with the other Trucial Oman sheikhdoms during the 1945-1971 period, and permits the assessment of those aspects of Abu Dhabi’s earlier colonial socio-discursive formation that had passed into the later one, along with those that had not. This chapter’s analysis of Abu Dhabi will also provide insights into aspects of Abu Dhabi’s colonial socio-discursive formation that had passed into the contemporary one, those that had not, and how and why these continuities or
discontinuities occurred.

The Development of the Oil Sector

The discovery of oil by concessionary oil companies in Abu Dhabi benefitted the oil companies, the colonial strata entrenched there, and the ruling family. The concession provisions enabled the oil companies to obtain the oil very cheaply, and to sell it at a profit on the world market. Abu Dhabi's own revenues from these oil concessions were also increasing, however, and this meant higher revenues for the ruling family, which, in turn, was able to reproduce its political power and cultural prestige by initiating economic development projects, political and administrative changes, and social welfarism in the Sheikhdom from which the people benefitted. This, in turn legitimized the ruling family and enabled it to reproduce its political power and cultural prestige.

British colonialism was further strengthened during this period because the contracts for these development projects were largely extended to British companies. These companies, in turn, employed British subjects in their managerial posts in Abu Dhabi, and thereby caused an influx of British subjects into Abu-Dhabi. Through these development projects, the ruling Sheikh was able to reproduce his family's rule because of many people found employment in Abu Dhabi.

The development of the oil sector had a specific
economic, political, and cultural impacts. As Abu Dhabi’s economic strength grew, this impacted not only Abu Dhabi’s own society, but also those of the neighboring emirates, mainly through the aid that Abu Dhabi’s ruling sheikhs extended to the Trucial Oman Development Office. This utilization of economic strength added to Abu Dhabi’s political power in relation to the other emirates.

Table 9.4 showed that Dubai obtained the bulk of its revenues from customs duties in 1967 and 1968. The same table showed how important oil royalties were to Abu Dhabi by those years. Oil was discovered in Abu Dhabi in 1958, and production began in 1960. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the British oil company Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., a subsidiary of the British Iraq Petroleum Company,¹ imposed the first oil concession on Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi in 1939, for a duration of seventy-five years. (Petroleum Concessions Ltd., was called Petroleum Development Trucial Coast after 1939.) Before the imposition of the 1939 concession, Sheikh Shakhbut and other Trucial Oman sheikhs had been prohibited from extending oil concessions to any oil concerns other than British ones under the Treaty of 1922.

Petroleum Development Trucial Coast (PDTC)’s Abu Dhabi concession agreement of 1939 permitted the company to explore

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for oil both in Abu Dhabi's onshore and offshore territories. Under the concession agreement's terms, PDTC was to pay the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi an annual royalty of the equivalent of $25,000 until oil was discovered, at which time this payment was to be doubled. Once production of oil had started, PDTC was to pay Abu Dhabi the equivalent of 67 cents per ton, or less than 10 cents per barrel. This agreement was not to be revised until 1966.

Oil exploration in Abu Dhabi, and in the rest of Trucial Oman, ended with the outbreak of World War II, but resumed after 1945. As mentioned above, PDTC discovered oil in commercial quantities in Abu Dhabi in 1958, with production beginning in 1960, and exports beginning in 1962. In 1962, PDTC changed its name to Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company, although its ownership remained the same, and in 1966, the original concession agreement between the Company and the government of Abu Dhabi underwent some revisions. The rate of payment for produced oil, for instance was raised from 75 cents per ton to 12.5 per cent of posted prices. Royalty payments also came to be counted as expenses, and not as income tax credits. Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC) was also obliged to pay the Abu

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2 Al-Oteiba, Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates, p. 38; and Mann, Abu Dhabi: Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom, p. 93.

Dhabi government an income tax of 50 per cent of its net profit, and adopted a timetable for the relinquishment of concession territories. The final revision of the agreement before Trucial Oman obtained independence and became the United Arab Emirates provided that the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company would provide natural gas to Abu Dhabi's power station and water desalination plant.  

Aside from ADPC, whose operations were onshore, the other significant petroleum company operating in Abu Dhabi was Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd. (ADMA). This company, whose shares were divided between British Petroleum (BP) - two thirds- and Compagnie Francais des Petroles (CFPA) - one third - gained its offshore concession in the wake of a dispute between Sheikh Shakhbut and the PDTC (later ADPC) concerning Abu Dhabi's extension of concessions offshore to a non-British company. The dispute began in 1949, when Sheikh Shakhbut signed a concession agreement with an independent U.S. company, International Marine Oil Company (IMOC). PDTC challenged Sheikh Shakhbut's right to extend this concession, claiming that the concession area was beyond the boundary of Abu Dhabi's territorial waters. In actuality, this was a discourse whose aim was to prevent Sheikh Shakhbut from extending an oil concession to a non-British company. However, both arbitration and litigation before a special, 

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4 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
British-established body ultimately found in favor of Sheikh Shakhbut. One year after the finding which pronounced the concession to IMOC legal, though, the latter relinquished its concession and was replaced, in 1953, by ADMA.

The terms of the concession agreement that Sheikh Shakhbut signed with ADMA provided a duration period seventy-five years, for oil exploration on approximately 12,000 square miles. Despite the fact that Aramco had recently negotiated a 50/50 profit sharing agreement with Saudi Arabia, and Shell Oil had concluded a similar agreement with Qatar, Sheikh Shakhbut’s agreement with ADMA only yielded him a 20 per cent share in ADMA’s profits, based on a price of $1.47 per ton of oil, or 21 cents (U.S.) per barrel. In addition, ADMA was to pay the government of Abu-Dhabi 75,000 Pounds Sterling in rent for the concession area, and another 37,500 Pounds Sterling as an advance payment against future profits until the export of crude oil began. ADMA discovered offshore oil in 1956, began producing it in 1960, and first exported it in

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5 Mann, Abu Dhabi: Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom, pp. 80-81, and 89-91.

6 K.G. Fenelon places the equivalent of one long ton (2,240 lb) of oil at approximately 7.45 barrels. Estimating seven barrels in one short ton of oil, the set price per barrel is calculated to be 21 cents (U.S.). The United Arab Emirates, pp. 36-37.

7 Al-Oteiba, Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates, p. 47.
1962.\textsuperscript{8}

Two provisions of the 1953 agreement between ADMA and the government of Abu Dhabi changed in 1966. Firstly, ADMA was now obliged to pay the Abu Dhabi government an income tax of 50 per cent of its net profits, instead of the previous twenty per cent. Secondly, ADMA agreed to relinquish unexploited parcels of its concession area according to a timetable.\textsuperscript{9}

These changes in the Abu Dhabi government’s agreements with ADPC and ADMA were in line with the resolutions that OPEC, founded in 1960, had passed during the 1960s.\textsuperscript{10} These resolutions doubtlessly influenced the government of Abu Dhabi, despite the fact that it did not join the Organization


\textsuperscript{10} OPEC was founded by five oil-producing countries, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran and Kuwait, as a counter-discourse to the actions of concessionary oil companies operating within them. The specific event that served as the catalyst for the formation of OPEC were two instances, in 1959 and 1960, where concessionary oil companies unilaterally lowered posted prices for crude oil in response to the oil glut of the late 1950s. Despite increased volumes of crude sales, these price cuts disrupted the budgets of the producing countries. Oteiba, \textit{Petroleum and the Economy of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 100. For more details about the founding of OPEC, and the gradual gains that the OPEC members, once organized, were able to gain from the concessionary oil companies during the 1960s, see Mana Saeed Al-Oteiba, \textit{OPEC and the Petroleum Industry} (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975).
until 1967, and despite the fact that the Abu Dhabi government implemented these revisions of its oil concession agreement later than other oil producing countries had done in regard to concession-holding oil companies.

As ADPC and ADMA relinquished parts of their concession areas according to their revised agreements with Sheikh Shakhbut, the Abu Dhabi government extended concessions to new companies, toward the end of the colonial period. For example, the government of Abu Dhabi extended an onshore concession to Italy’s Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) in 1967, as well as to the U.S. companies Phillips Petroleum and Aminoil. During the same year, the Japanese Maruzen Daikyo Nippon mining group gained an offshore concession from the Abu Dhabi government, and the Mitsubishi Group gained onshore concessions in 1968 and 1970. Although these new concessionaires did not produce oil until after the end of the colonial period, the agreements they concluded with the Sheikdom of Abu Dhabi are significant because their terms were markedly more favorable to the Abu Dhabi government than those it had signed with ADPC and ADMA had been.\footnote{El Mallakh, \textit{The Middle East Journal} 24, no. 2 (Spring, 1970): 138-139.}

The Maruzen Daikyo concession, for instance, was only similar to the revised 1966 ADPC (formerly PDTC) concession agreement in that it provided an expensed royalty of 12.5 per
cent of the posted price. However, the other payments to the government of Abu Dhabi that the Maruzen concession provided were much higher than were those of the ADPC concession agreement. Under the 1939 provisions of the ADPC concession covering these payments and remaining unaffected by the revisions of 1966, ADPC was to pay the Abu Dhabi government an annual royalty amounting to the equivalent of $25,000 until oil was discovered, and then twice that amount per year afterwards. The Maruzen concession, by contrast, obliged the company to spend $8 million on exploration during the first eight years, and also charged Maruzen a bonus payment to Abu Dhabi of $1 million within sixty days of signing the concession agreement, another $2 million within sixty days of the commercial discovery of oil, and a third $2 million once exports had reached a rate of 200,000 barrels per day. In addition, by ten years, Maruzen Daikyo was to have relinquished 75 per cent of its concessionary land holdings. Upon repayment of some of the exploration expenses to Maruzen, Abu Dhabi had the option of obtaining 50 per cent interests within six months of commercial oil discoveries.\(^\text{12}\)

For Mitsubishi, the initial required payment to the Abu Dhabi government was a minimum of $24 million during the first eight years. In contrast to the ADMA concession, whose duration was seventy-five years, that of the Mitsubishi

\(^{12}\) Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 219-220.
concession was only thirty-five. Royalty payments were assessed at 12.5 per cent of the posted price. As production increased, royalty payments were to rise to a rate of 14 per cent. In addition, seventy five per cent of the concession area was to be relinquished within a period of eight years after signature. Under the Phillips concession agreement, Phillips Petroleum was obliged to spend a minimum of $12 million on drilling and production during the first five years of the concession. The government of Abu Dhabi was also to receive a tax payment of 50 per cent of the concessionaire’s profits, royalties were to be assessed at a rate of 12.5 per cent of the posted price, and Phillips was to be charged a rental until the commercial discovery of oil.\footnote{Ibid., p. 219-220.}

\textbf{Abu-Dhabi’s Oil Revenue}

It is important to emphasize that the oil agreements between the government of Abu Dhabi and the ADPC and ADMA companies were a dimension of British colonialism’s entrenchment there. This can be seen in a comparison of the figures for the dollar value of Abu Dhabi’s oil exports between 1962 and 1968, with those for the actual payments to Abu-Dhabi during that period, shown in Table 11.1.

Table 11.1 shows the importance of oil for British colonialism in Abu Dhabi by illustrating the British oil
companies' annual earnings from the export of Abu Dhabi crude, versus the Abu Dhabi government's annual oil revenues. Table 11.1 shows a tremendous difference between the former and the latter up to the years 1966 and 1967, when the above-mentioned revisions of the terms of Abu Dhabi's concession agreements with the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC) - formerly PDTC., and with Abu Dhabi Marine Areas (ADMA) came into effect.

**TABLE 11.1**

DOLLAR VALUE OF ADMA AND PDTC'S (ADPC's) OIL EXPORTS FROM ABU DHABI VS. ABU DHABI'S OIL REVENUES (1962-1968)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Exports (Barrels)</th>
<th>Dollar Value* (U.S.$)</th>
<th>Abu Dhabi's Revenue (U.S.$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>5,412,258</td>
<td>9,633,819</td>
<td>1,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>18,060,696</td>
<td>32,148,038</td>
<td>6,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>67,894,098</td>
<td>120,851,494</td>
<td>11,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>102,096,746</td>
<td>181,732,207</td>
<td>30,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>132,494,740</td>
<td>235,839,985</td>
<td>96,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>137,681,023</td>
<td>245,072,220</td>
<td>110,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>181,326,566</td>
<td>322,761,287</td>
<td>153,300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The figures for dollar value of Abu Dhabi's oil exports are an approximation, arrived at by multiplying the annual number of barrels exported by ADMA's 1962 posted price per barrel of oil, established at $1.78. (The term "posted price" is the price per barrel of crude oil established by the concessionary oil companies as a basis for calculating income tax obligations to the host government.) The posted price, multiplied by the number of barrels of crude exported, provides a notional annual income for the concessionary company.14

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Table 11.1 above shows that even though payments to the Abu Dhabi government revenues accounted for a larger percentage of the British oil companies' revenues from the export of Abu Dhabi crude in 1966-1968 than they had during the earlier years, the concessionary oil companies' incomes were still noticeably greater than were those of the Sheikdom. Just as importantly, the concessionary companies were unilaterally regulating both price and production level of Abu Dhabi's oil, thereby keeping the price low, and production levels high. This remained the case even after Abu Dhabi had joined OPEC in 1967.

### TABLE 11.2

**DESTINATIONS TO WHICH ADPC AND ADMA EXPORTED ABU DHABI CRUDE (1966-1968)**

**Barrels per Day**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>55,300</td>
<td>16,300</td>
<td>35,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>114,600</td>
<td>75,400</td>
<td>100,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>86,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>20,200</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>12,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>361,400</strong></td>
<td><strong>381,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>495,400</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Incl. others)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 11.2 above shows that ADPC and ADMA found substantial markets for the oil they extracted from Abu-Dhabi
at the low posted price of $1.78. The destination for the British companies’ exports of Abu-Dhabi’s crude oil were Britain, France, Germany and Australia. In gaining control over the vast oil reserves of Abu Dhabi, and other Gulf sheikhdoms, Britain was able to reconstruct its economy from its wartime destruction. It was also able to enhance its economic prestige and political power in relation to other states.

It is important to mention that because Abu Dhabi was a British colony, even as ADPC’s and ADMA’s concessionary payments to the government of Abu Dhabi were increasing after 1966, much of this revenue was to find its way back to the bank accounts of British companies. This was because British companies monopolized Abu Dhabi’s development contracts from the 1950s until 1970, when Abu Dhabi’s government began to diversify its project partners, in relation to British government’s 1968 announcement of its plans to withdraw from Trucial Oman. British companies also monopolized the development contracts extended by other Gulf governments during this period, and this trend also enhanced Britain’s economic privilege and political power in relation to other states.

Prior to 1966 Abu Dhabi’s oil revenues were very low, as Table 11.1 illustrates. In fact, during the period between 1962, the year that Abu Dhabi’s oil exports began, and 1970,
the government of Abu Dhabi’s total oil revenue amounted to BD (Bahraini Dinars) 396 million. While the government of Abu Dhabi received 81.9 per cent of this total, this did not occur until after 1967.\textsuperscript{15} The initial reality of low oil revenues, coupled with Sheikh Shakhbut’s gradualist and basics-oriented vision of development for Abu Dhabi’s development, accounted for Abu Dhabi’s low development expenditure for the years between 1962 and 1966, in contrast to subsequent expenditures under Sheikh Zaid’s administration. Development expenditure under Sheikh Shakhbut’s administration mainly went to the development of such infrastructural basics as the water supply, roadbuilding, ancillary installations for hydrocarbons, electric power, and facilities for the public sector, all of which Abu Dhabi had lacked during the 1820-1945 period.\textsuperscript{16} The following section will show that in relation to growing government revenues, Abu Dhabi’s administrative bureaucracy also expanded.

\textbf{Abu Dhabi’s Politico-Economic Administration}

In order to understand the nature of development expenditure in Abu Dhabi, it is necessary to examine briefly

\textsuperscript{15} Al-Kuwari, \textit{Oil Revenues in the Gulf Emirates}, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{16} Arnold T. Wilson, in \textit{The Persian Gulf}, written during the 1920s, states that, in general reference to British activities in the Arabian Gulf, "...we made nowhere...any attempt to establish schools or colleges, or to assist the inhabitants to develop local industries, or to fit them to take their place in a rapidly changing world..." p. 12.
the administrative system that developed there, both under Sheikh Shakhbut and under Sheikh Zaid. Among Sheikh Shakhbut's public administrative measures were the development of Abu Dhabi's police force in 1957. Sheikh Shakhbut appointed a British commandant, Mr. C. Stokes, for this police force in 1959, and established the Abu Dhabi Defense Force in 1965.\footnote{Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, pp. 248-249.} Sheikh Shakhbut also participated in the activities of the Trucial Oman Council, and in the Trucial Oman Development Fund (more about this below.) His measures concerning Abu-Dhabi's economy and public utilities included the extension of the oil concessions mentioned above, and the laying of foundations for the establishment of Abu Dhabi's infrastructure.

One of Sheikh Shakhbut's earliest steps in this direction was his request to Kuwait for an advisor for the planning of an administrative structure for Abu Dhabi Town. In 1960, Kuwait sent its Director General of the Department of Social Affairs and Labor, Sayyid 'Abd Al-Aziz Al-Sar'awi as the head of its advisory mission to Abu Dhabi. The Al-Sar'awi mission helped to plan a system of health and social services for Abu Dhabi, and for customs, labor affairs, public works and passports, modeled on that which the Sheikh of Kuwait had
already initiated.\textsuperscript{18}

Although his administration had extended a substantial number of contracts to British firms, especially considering the meagreness of government revenues under his rule, the British helped to depose Sheikh Shakhbut and exile him to London in August, 1966,\textsuperscript{19} after thirty-eight years of rule, and to replace him by his younger brother Sheikh Zaid, who hitherto had been the Wali of Bureimi for Abu Dhabi.\textsuperscript{20} One event that helped to contribute to the atmosphere in which Sheikh Shakhbut was deposed was his dispute with ADMA, and his dismissal of its representative, whom Sheikh Zaid re-instated.\textsuperscript{21} Generally, Sheikh Shakhbut was hesitant about imitating other sheikhdoms like Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar in executing massive spending projects such as airports, roads, and harbor works merely at the behest of British advisors and companies.

Since it was unclear to him that massive, accelerated development spending on these projects would actually be useful to Abu Dhabi, he opted for a more gradual approach to

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\textsuperscript{18} Taryam, \textit{the Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 47.
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\textsuperscript{21} \textit{MEED} (August 19, 1966): 387.
\end{flushright}
development. This probably led to other clashes with British consultants whom he had hired, and dismissed in 1965.\textsuperscript{22} It was failure to cooperate with the British that led to Sheikh Shakhbut's deposal.\textsuperscript{23} It is also likely that the British were motivated to contribute to Sheikh Shakhbut's deposition because they naturally wanted British companies to obtain as many contracts in Abu Dhabi as possible, especially as Abu Dhabi's oil revenues increased, so that monies that British oil companies had paid for the Abu Dhabi oil concessions could be recycled back into the U.K., and so that the U.K. could reap as much advantage as possible out of Abu Dhabi's rising oil revenues.

The British found a favorable candidate for the position of sheikh of Abu Dhabi in Sheikh Zaid because, among other things, they had worked with him in 1955 during his term as Wali of Bureimi in ousting the Saudi force from the Bureimi Oasis.\textsuperscript{24} However, despite the fact that he was the favored candidate of the British for the position of Ruler, Sheikh Zaid did gain genuine indigenous support from the population of Bureimi under Abu Dhabi's control, an important section of


\textsuperscript{23} Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 137.
sheikhdom's population. He had gained this support during his as Wali of Bureimi, a position to which Sheikh Shakhbut had appointed him in 1946.\textsuperscript{25} In fact, the alliance he forged with the Bureimi population during his tenure as Wali was an important reason why Abu Dhabi had become the largest emirate by the time the boundary was drawn, and oil was discovered, during the 1950s.\textsuperscript{26} Sheikh Zaid won the loyalty of the Bureimi population in a number of practical ways. These included the distribution of agricultural implements among the semi-nomadic farmers of Bureimi, the repair and rebuilding of many aflaj (irrigation canals), the building of new canals that brought additional water from the nearby Al-Hajjar and Khafit mountains to the Al-‘Ain region of Bureimi, and the improvement of the water distribution system through the digging of wells, and other measures, so that it could be communally shared. Sheikh Zaid also built a market in Al-‘Ain, which facilitated the Bedouins' ability to sell and buy products. Along with gaining him the support of the Bureimi population, these measures also earned Sheikh Zaid the support of most members of his own Al-Nahayan family as a candidate


\textsuperscript{26} Frauke Heard-Bey, "The Gulf State and Oman in Transition," \textit{Asian Affairs} 59, part 1 (February, 1972): 19.
for the position of Ruler.  

Upon assuming power in August, 1966, Sheikh Zaid emphasized his intention of initiating a greater number of large development projects than had his elder brother. These projects were to include the building of a deep water harbor, an international airport, roads, and hospitals. Aside from various infrastructural and town planning projects, Sheikh Zaid also intended to build up Abu Dhabi's defense force. His plans for the defense force included increasing the number of men in its infantry, and equipping them with modern weapons and armored cars. Sheikh Zaid also intended to build an air force wing to the infantry, and to acquire a fleet of coastal defense boats.  

The pace at which Sheikh Zaid was attempting to develop Abu Dhabi can be seen in the fact that expenditure for each year between 1967 and 1970 approached oil revenues in quantity, and sometimes surpassed them, as demonstrated in Table 11.3.

Another reason for the magnitude of Abu Dhabi's expenditure in relation to oil revenues depicted in the table was the administrative bureaucracy that Sheikh Zaid built up during his administration. This bureaucracy was meant to serve the ambitions of the Abu Dhabi government in terms of


development planning, and it was also a means that Sheikh Zaid used to employ important members of the Al-Nahayan family who aspired to government positions, and needed to be placated. In September of 1966, Sheikh Zaid issued Decree No. 3, which created a series of Departments making up Abu Dhabi’s administrative bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{29} One of these departments was the Department of Finance, which was established with assistance from British financial specialists. These specialists prepared Abu Dhabi’s first published budget in 1967. Sheikh Zaid established a Civil Service Commission during that year as well.\textsuperscript{30}

Other established Departments included the Departments of Education, Health, Water, Development and Public Works, Customs, Agriculture, Municipalities, Justice, Electricity, Labor, Information and Tourism, Posts, Telecommunications, Civil Aviation, and Petroleum Affairs.\textsuperscript{31} Sheikh Zaid appointed members of his family as heads of most of these Departments. Sheikh Khalifa bin Zaid Al-Nahayan, Sheikh Zaid’s son and heir apparent, was made Head of Defense, Viceroy in the Eastern Province (Bureimi), and Head of its Courts.

\textsuperscript{29} Sadik and Snavely, \textit{Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates}, p. 160.

\textsuperscript{30} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, pp. 248-249.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., pp. 248-249.
Several of the sons of Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifa Al-Nahayan, who were Sheikh Zaid’s cousins and were of appropriate age, were appointed as heads of other Departments. Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed Al-Nahayan, for example, was appointed Head of the Departments of Education, Health, Public Works and Ports. Another cousin, Sheikh Mubarak bin Mohammed Al-Nahayan was given the positions of Head of the Departments of Police and General Security, Nationality, Passports and Residency. Still another cousin, Sheikh Tahnoun bin Mohammed Al-Nahayan was acquired the posts of Head of the Departments of Agriculture, Animal Resources, and Labor in Al-‘Ain Town. Sheikh Saif bin Mohammad Al-Nahayan, yet another cousin, was appointed Head of the Abu Dhabi Municipality. A fifth cousin, Sheikh Khalifa bin Mohammed Al-Nahayan was made head of the Electricity Department. A sixth, Sheikh Surur bin Mohammed Al-Nahayan got the position of Head of the Justice Department. The two other sheikhs, Sheiks Mohammed bin Khalid and Ahmad bin Hamid, were appointed Head of Departments of Finance, Customs and Ports and Head of Departments of Labor and Social Affairs, Information and Personnel respectively.\(^{32}\)

In 1968, Sheikh Zaid issued the Emiri Decree, which established the Supreme Planning Board. Under this decree, Sheikh Zaid became the president of the Board. Also appointed

\(^{32}\) Sadik and Snively, *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*, p. 160.
to it were the Head of Development, the Deputy Head of Finance, the Head of Labor and Social Affairs, the Head of the Diwan al-Amiri (Bureau of Government), and the Head of Planning and Coordination. Nine other citizens became members of the Board as well. Once the Board was established, Abu Dhabi's Five Year Plan was drawn up, approved and promulgated by Emiri Decree Number 5 in 1968.\textsuperscript{33} Abu Dhabi's bureaucracy continued to grow between 1966 and 1970. By 1970, there were 33 governmental Departments and other government units directly attached to the Ruler.\textsuperscript{34}

Abu Dhabi's ambitious development projects created an atmosphere that encouraged the families of many who had emigrated from Abu Dhabi in relation to the decline of the pearling industry, and to the general poverty that prevailed there in the aftermath of World War II to return. Many of these emigrants, or their sons, who had obtained higher education in Qatar,\textsuperscript{35} in the rest of the Gulf, or abroad, were equipped to fill important posts in Sheikh Zaid's administration. One member of this group was Ahmad al-Suweidi, whose education earned him an appointment as chairman of the Emiri court in 1967. Another was Mani al-Otaiba, who was appointed Chairman of the Department of Petroleum.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} Heard-Bey, \textit{Asian Affairs} 59, no. 3 (1972): 313.
third was Mohammed Habrush al-Suwaidi, who became Deputy Chairman of Finance.\textsuperscript{36}

Sheikh Zaid’s administration also re-organized the Municipal government into Town Planning, Engineering, and Lands sections. There was also a Fire Brigade, Public Health, and Trade Licences Office. But besides constructing government bodies, the Abu Dhabi government was also formulating laws and regulations. In 1968, for instance, work had begun on the drafting of a Penal Code, a Code of Criminal Procedure, and Civil Codes. This was taking place at the time of the British announcement of plans to withdraw from the Arabian Gulf.\textsuperscript{37}

Sheikh Zaid’s administration also developed and expanded law enforcement and security apparatuses, such as the Police and Defense Forces. Personnel were appointed to the Police Force, which was then under the command of Sheikh Mubarak bin Mohammed Al-Nahayan, Sheikh Zaid’s cousin. These appointments included an Iraqi officer, who was appointed Deputy Chief of Police, and a number of British and Jordanian officers as well. Sheikh Zaid’s administration also developed further the Police Training School. By 1968, Abu Dhabi’s Defense Forces had expanded so that they consisted of a Scout Car squadron, three Rifle Squadrons, a Guard squadron, a troop

\textsuperscript{36} Abdullah, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, pp. 138-139.

\textsuperscript{37} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 249.
of 81 millimeter mortars, a combined Headquarters Squadron and Signal troop, a Transport and Workshop squadron, and a Transport Depot. The Naval section of the Defense Force was established in 1968, and an Air Wing was planned. Until 1969, the Commander of Abu Dhabi’s Defense Force was Colonel E. B. Wilson, a British Officer who had served in the Trucial Oman Scouts. Many of the other officers of the Defense Force were also British.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{TABLE 11.3}

\textbf{ABU DHABI’S OIL REVENUES VERSUS EXPENDITURE}

\textbf{1967-1970, (In Bahraini Dinars).}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Annual Oil Revenue & Oil Revenue Spent \\
\hline
1967 & 48,617,000 & 40,737,000 \\
1968 & 72,800,000 & 76,717,000 \\
1969 & 90,875,000 & 103,642,000 \\
1970 & 110,577,000 & 96,440,000 \\
\hline
\textbf{TOTAL} & \textbf{322,869,000} & \textbf{317,536,000} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


Table 11.4 shows in detail Sheikh Zaid’s administration’s actual allocation of total oil revenues for the period of 1967 and 1970. The fact that almost 40 per cent of Abu Dhabi’s oil revenue was allocated toward capital expenditure shows the importance of development projects in Sheikh Zaid’s administration. Within the capital expenditure category, "Communications and Transportation" were allocated

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., pp. 249-250.
the largest share. Under the "Communications and Transportation" heading are included airport building projects, and those for expanding shipping ports. Allocations to the current expenditure category were brought to the level of 33.6 per cent of the grand total by administrative governmental expenses and particularly by the expansion of the military, which, alone, under the heading "Law and Order", took up almost 14 per cent of Abu Dhabi's oil revenues.

Another fiscal development of Sheikh Zaid's administration was the 1967 establishment of the Abu Dhabi Investment Board, headed by Sir John Hogg, Deputy Chairman of the Glyn Mills British bank. The purpose of this Board was to find ways of investing that portion of Abu Dhabi's revenues that had been allocated to the ruling family.39 By August, 1967, a portion of these funds had been invested in British gilt-edged securities, U.S. and French equities, and eurodollars.40 Investments such as these were later to become a significant means by which Abu Dhabi disposed of its oil revenues. However, a particularly important area toward which Sheikh Shakhbut's, and particularly Sheikh Zaid's, administration allocated increasing oil revenues was the implementation of development projects in Abu Dhabi, most of whose contracts were extended to British companies.

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### TABLE 11.4

**Allocation of Abu-Dhabi's Total Oil Revenue:**

1967-1970

(Thousands of Bahraini Dinars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Percentage of Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CURRENT EXPENDITURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>11,863</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>44,974</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pub. Utilities</td>
<td>4,263</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commun. &amp; Transp.</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin. &amp; Other</td>
<td>46,249</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL CURRENT</strong></td>
<td>108,076</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXPENDITURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CAPITAL EXPENDITURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>20,450</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pub. Utilities</td>
<td>27,276</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commun. &amp; Transp.</td>
<td>38,161</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>6,108</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>28,752</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin. &amp; Other</td>
<td>7,959</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL CAPITAL</strong></td>
<td>128,706</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXPENDITURE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RULING FAMILY</strong></td>
<td>80,753</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESERVE FUND</strong></td>
<td>4,937</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>322,472</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Al-Khuwari, *Oil Revenues in the Gulf Emirates*, p.140.

**Development Contracts**

In 1962, the year that oil exports from Abu Dhabi began, Sheikh Shakhbut appointed the British firm of Scott, Wilson, Kirkpatrick & Partners, along with Sir William Halcrow
& Partners, as consultants for the drawing up of an overall development plan for Abu Dhabi Town. These two companies formed the consulting consortium called Abu Dhabi Consultants, which designed and supervised all development projects initiated in Abu Dhabi between August of 1962 and the end of 1963. Sheikh Shakhbut renewed this consortium's contract for this work until December, 1963, despite counter-offers from a German firm.

Specific development projects that Sheikh Shakhbut initiated at that time included the laying of a freshwater pipeline extending from wells at Al-Sa'ad, near the Bureimi Oasis, to Abu Dhabi Town, the construction of a jetty at Abu Dhabi's port, the construction of two water distillation plants, and the bringing of piped drinking water to the Al-'Ain region. Sheikh Shakhbut also constructed two schools, a power station, and a beginning road system for Abu Dhabi Town. Most of the companies that constructed these infrastructural facilities and supplied the equipment for them were British firms. Pauling and Company (U.K.), for example,

41 Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 242.
43 Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 242.
45 Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 242.
signed a 1964 contract with Sheikh Shakhbut’s administration for digging wells and installing pumping stations at freshwater sources at Al-Sa‘ad, as well as for the actual laying of the pipeline from Al-Sa‘ad to Abu Dhabi Town for the drinking water supply. This pipeline was completed in April, 1965. In 1966, another U.K. firm, Aiton and Co. Ltd., won the contract for supplying a multi-stage flash evaporator for this project.

In the hydrocarbons area, Wimpey & Co. was the main contractor for a cold stripping plant that Abu Dhabi Marine Areas (ADMA) was building in 1964. The pre-fabricated buildings that the government of Abu Dhabi was building for the public sector during that year were being supplied by still another British firm, Coseley Buildings Ltd., and they included a hospital, a customs and administration building, a hostel for Police, and a hotel. In addition, Hawker Siddeley of the U.K. designed and supervised the civil engineering work for Abu Dhabi’s electric power station, as well as providing the supplies for this project. The construction of this electric power station was completed in

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46 *MEED* (July 12, 1964): 336; and (May 7, 1965): 212.
49 *MEED* (July 31, 1964): 361.
April, 1965.\textsuperscript{50}

Because Trucial Oman was still under British colonialism, Sheikh Zaid's administration, like that of Sheikh Shakhbut, overwhelmingly extended development contracts to British companies until late in 1969, a few months after the British had announced their plans to withdraw from Trucial Oman. For this reason, the 39.9 per cent of Abu Dhabi's oil revenues allocated to development projects (capital expenditure) mainly found its way into the accounts of British companies during the 1966-1970 period as well. Most of the Abu Dhabi government's contracts for weaponry also went to British firms during those years, giving U.K. companies most of the 13.9 per cent of the grand total making up the "Law and Order" category as well. In fact, Britain became important enough as a supplier of equipment, and development-related services for Ahmad Obaidli, a former advisor to Sheikh Zaid, to open a London office in early 1968, which was to represent Abu-Dhabi's interests in the U.K. Mr. Obaidli was also to act as Abu Dhabi's purchasing agent in London in his capacity as head of this office.\textsuperscript{51}

Abu Dhabi's development projects of the 1966-1970 period, under Sheikh Zaid's administration, included the building of harbors, airports, power stations, desalination

\textsuperscript{50} MEED (May 7, 1965): 212.

\textsuperscript{51} MEED (January 15, 1968): 30.
plants and other water works, hospitals, etc. The British firms that carried out most of Abu Dhabi's development projects included Hawker Siddeley Electric, Ruston and Hornsby, and the Ruston Engine Division of English Electric Diesels. All of these firms supplied both Abu Dhabi's power stations and their equipment, as well as the equipment for power distribution. Other U.K. firms, such as C.A. Parsons, British Insulated Callender's Cables, and the British GEC-AEI Group supplied cables, transformers, and other equipment to Abu Dhabi's power distribution network, and Ewbank and Partners served as Sheikh Zaid's consultants about the development of Abu Dhabi's electric power and seawater desalination plans. A Scottish firm, Weir Westgarth, supplied Abu Dhabi's seawater distillation plants, which were to be integrated with the town's electric power station. 52

For water projects, Turners Asbestos Cement Company (U.K.) supplied the pipe for the pipeline which was to carry water from the Sa'ad wells at the Bureimi Oasis to Abu Dhabi Town. Sir Alexander Gibb and partners served as consultants for a study related to Abu Dhabi's overall water resources, and Tarmac Civil Engineering conducted a related study concerning Abu Dhabi's subsoil. In other infrastructural

52 For more details on the various development contracts that Sheikh Zaid's administration signed with British companies during the last years of the colonial period, and in relation to growing oil revenues, see MEED, all issues, 1965-1970.
plans, Pauling and Company built the road connecting Abu Dhabi town to Bureimi. Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners also served as consultant for the proposed expansion and improvement of Abu Dhabi's harbor. Sheikh Zaid appointed Brian Colquhoun and Partners as the consulting firm for Abu Dhabi Town's sewage project. In communications, Sheikh Zaid appointed Frank Smith, who had been seconded to Abu Dhabi from the British communications group Cable and Wireless, as director of Telecommunications. The Plessey Telecommunications Group of Britain built electronic telephone exchange systems in Abu Dhabi. The Thomson Organization, also of the U.K., established a television station in Abu Dhabi, and served as a consultant for the expansion of television service to Al-'Ain as well.

In construction, British firms such as the Humphreys Company built housing in the town of Al-'Ain, and Coseley Buildings, another U.K. firm, provided hospitals and a medical center in Abu Dhabi Town and in Al-'Ain. Mills Scaffold Co. was involved in the construction work for Abu Dhabi International Airport's terminal, and Brian Colquhoun and Partners of London served as the consultant for the construction of Abu Dhabi's international airport. Kelly and Surman, yet another British company, served as consulting

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53 Ibid.
architects for the building of kindergarten schools in Abu Dhabi. The U.K. firm James Munce Partnership designed a new town planned for Abu Dhabi, near Al-‘Ain called Zayed. In 1970, however, Sheikh Zaid’s administration began to extend contracts to firms other than British ones for such key projects as the expansion of Abu Dhabi Town’s port.\(^{54}\)

Sheikh Zaid’s administration extended a substantial portion of its defense contracts to British companies as well, as the following examples indicate. Abu Dhabi’s defense force was commanded by a British officer, Lt-Col. Wilson. By June of 1969, Sheikh Zaid’s defense force had purchased fifteen "Saladin" armored cars from the U.K., and three naval patrol boats. For the air wing of Abu Dhabi’s defense force, the U.K. supplied two Britten-Norman Islander aircraft in 1968. Colonel Wilson was also involved in selecting Jordanian officers for the training of Abu Dhabi’s soldiers. These Jordanian officers were training their Abu Dhabi counterparts in 1969. In June, 1969, Abu Dhabi had four lightly armed diesel-powered patrol boats that the defense force had ordered from the U.K’s Universal Shipyards (Solent). In May, 1969, and December, 1970, Sheikh Zaid’s administration ordered mobile radio equipment from Pye of Cambridge for use by the

\(^{54}\) For more details on the various development contracts that Sheikh Zaid’s administration signed with British companies during the last years of the colonial period, and in relation to growing oil revenues, see MEED, all issues, 1965-1970.
police force.\textsuperscript{55}

Hawker Siddeley Aviation supplied Abu Dhabi with two Hunter Jets in 1970, and the defense force planned to purchase other refurbished aircraft from British stocks.\textsuperscript{56} However, by the fourth quarter of 1969, Abu Dhabi's government acknowledged that it had incurred a budget deficit of BD (Bahraini Dinars) 15.15 millions for that year by dismissing several dozen civil servants. There had also been a six month moratorium on the authorization of large development projects. Sheikh Zaid had also attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain British loans. For this reason, Sheikh Zaid's administration planned to allocate only 11 million Pounds Sterling of the total 1970 development budget of 43 million Pounds Sterling to new projects, spending the rest on projects already being implemented.\textsuperscript{57} This lengthy discussion of development and defense contracts that Abu Dhabi's government extended to British companies during the 1960s shows that the sale of extracted oil was only one way in which British businesses profited from their colonization of Trucial Oman. The massive number of development contracts extended to British companies


\textsuperscript{56} MEED (March 13, 1970): 317.

\textsuperscript{57} MEED (October 31, 1969); and (November 7, 1969): 1382.
demonstrates that the colonization of Abu Dhabi was also profitable to the British, because the imposed treaties had given the U.K. exclusive control over Trucial Oman's external affairs, which translated into a monopoly on external economic matters.

_Abu-Dhabi's External and Regional Trade_

Abu Dhabi's main export, discussed above, was crude oil. It is important, however, to examine Abu Dhabi's import statistics, particularly those for 1969 and 1970, because they reiterate the importance of development projects to Abu Dhabi by showing that a large percentage of Abu Dhabi's import bills for these two years went to the purchase of capital goods, despite the drastic reduction of total import expenditures in 1970. (This occurred in relation to the previous year's deficit.) Consumer goods, too, figured significantly in Abu Dhabi's 1969 and 1970 import bills, accounting for a higher percentage in 1970 than in 1969.

Specifically, for 1969, the capital goods category, containing machinery, vehicles, building materials, spare parts, pipes and pipe fittings, electrical goods, cement, steel bars, oilfield equipment and cables accounted for approximately 37.6 million Pounds Sterling of Abu Dhabi's import bill, or 63.4 per cent of the total (59.3 million Pounds Sterling). The consumer goods category, which includes foodstuffs, household furniture, conditioners, textiles,
household appliances, cigarettes and tobacco, alcoholic beverages, and medicines, accounted for approximately 10.6 million Pounds Sterling, or 18 per cent. For 1970, capital goods accounted for 21.9 million Pounds Sterling, or 62.0 percent of the total of 35.3 million Pounds Sterling. Consumer goods accounted for 7.7 million Pounds Sterling, or 21.8 per cent of the total.\(^{58}\)

The importance of the U.K. as a source of Abu Dhabi's imports can be seen in the fact that for the June, 1967 to June, 1968 period, Britain supplied 40 per cent of them. The dominant British export was machinery. For 1969, U.K. imports accounted for 33.7 per cent of Abu Dhabi's total of 51.86 million Pounds Sterling, or 17.46 million Pounds Sterling. While these statistics indicate that in 1969, the U.K. was still one of Abu Dhabi's major suppliers, they also indicate that the U.S., too, was coming to enjoy some significance. Ranking second for that year, the U.S. supplied a share amounting to 19.3 per cent of the total, or about 10 million Pounds Sterling.\(^{59}\) While the above-mentioned development projects had a considerable impact upon Abu Dhabi's import patterns, it is also important to mention that Abu Dhabi's

\(^{58}\) Fenelon, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 142. The conversion rate from Dirhams to Pounds Sterling that Fenelon gave was 1 British Pound Sterling = approximately 10 Dirhams. See "Note on Currency."

development plans also included the expansion of the educational system during the 1960s. The following section discusses the Abu Dhabi's development of its education system during this period.

**Abu Dhabi's Education System**

Formal education actually began in Abu Dhabi in 1958, when two general education primary and elementary schools opened. One was called "Al-Falasiyyah," and the other was called "Al-Butin." A third school opened in Al-`Ain city in 1960, called "Al-Nahayaniyyah." These schools were sponsored by Abu Dhabi's Department of Education. In 1963, a girls' school opened in Abu Dhabi. Also in the early 1960s, Abu Dhabi's government opened a religious school in Al-`Ain called "Al-Mahad al-`Almi al-Islami", or "Institute of Islamic Studies." With the implementation of the 1968-1972 Five Year Plan under Sheikh Zaid, more than thirty schools were built in Abu Dhabi, in contrast to the two schools the sheikhdom had in 1958. Government measures to encourage student attendance included the provision of free transportation, school uniforms, supplies, and midday meals. In addition, parents were paid a special allowance for every child in school. Under the 1968-1972 Five Year Plan, Abu

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Dhabi allocated BD 12,400,000 for education in its budget.\textsuperscript{62} In contrast to Dubai’s curriculum, which was modeled on that of Egypt via Kuwait, Abu Dhabi’s schools operated under a Jordanian curriculum. Most of the teachers were Jordanian or Palestinian, but some were also from Trucial Oman.\textsuperscript{63}

Just as Abu Dhabi’s education system underwent transformations during the late 1950s and 1960s, in relation to the 1820-1945 so also did Abu Dhabi’s labor force change in relation to its previous composition. This section provides an analysis of the transformations that Abu Dhabi’s labor force underwent in relation to the sheikhdom’s development, along with the social stratification that occurred within Abu Dhabi’s civil society. Both of these factors will then be connected to the reproduction of Abu Dhabi’s social order.

\textbf{Labor Force, Stratification and Reproduction}

Even more than in the case of Dubai, Abu Dhabi’s development projects engendered an influx of immigrant workers, so that by 1968, they accounted for 56 per cent of the population, and a considerably higher percentage of the labor force. Most of them were male, as by 1968, 75 per cent of Abu Dhabi’s population was male. Immigrant workers largely came from independent India and Pakistan, as well as from

\textsuperscript{62} Al-‘Asi, \textit{Masirat al-Ta’alim}, pp. 60-61.

\textsuperscript{63} Al-Harbi, \textit{Tatawwur al-Ta’alim}, pp. 24-25.
Iran, Europe and other Arab countries. It is important to mention here that during the 1960s, Abu Dhabi had adopted a policy aimed at controlling the influx of certain Arab groups, such as Omanis from Dhofar, where the guerilla warfare against the Sultanate and the British was being waged (See Chapter Thirteen). Yemenis who were not exiles from the Peoples’ Democratic Republic of Yemen (see Chapter Thirteen), which also arose from an anti-colonial war against the British, were also restricted. Jordanians, however, were preferred because of their expertise as teachers and officers, and also because at the time, the Jordanian regime was friendly toward the British.

The sector employing the largest percentage of Abu Dhabi’s labor force (40.1 per cent of a total of 29,284 persons in 1968) was construction, and the large amount of construction work that the above-described development projects generated accounts for the magnitude of this percentage. By contrast, the agricultural and fishing sector employed 7.8 per cent of the total labor force in 1968, while the manufacturing, mining and quarrying sector merely employed 3.0 per cent. Government services employed 15.5 per cent of the labor force, but only 7.1 per cent of the labor force

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64 Abu al-Hajaj, Dawlat al-Imarat al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah, pp. 262-263.

65 Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, pp. 140-141.
worked in the transportation and communications sector, and 8.3 per cent were employed in oil.\textsuperscript{66}

In Abu Dhabi, the large construction sector was needed for the vast number of development projects, in relation to which the whole city was being rebuilt. Most of the contracts for these projects went to British companies which were seeking cheap construction labor. As a result, most of the managers, consultants, engineers, etc. were British. The construction workers themselves, like those of Dubai, were largely non-Arab immigrants, namely, Pakistanis, Baluchis, and Iranians.\textsuperscript{67} They were usually unskilled and illiterate, and earned low wages.

The government sector ranked second in terms of the percentage of Abu Dhabi's labor force that it employed in 1968. As mentioned above, the top stratum of Abu Dhabi's government sector consisted of Sheikh Zaid's male relatives, who were appointed heads of most of Abu Dhabi's government Departments, such as Health, Defense, Justice, Education, Public Works and Ports, and Agriculture. As mentioned above, certain university-educated individuals coming from such prominent mercantile or tribal families as the Suwaydis, Otyabah's, Habrush's, or al-Kindis were appointed to head up

\textsuperscript{66} Sadik and Snively, \textit{Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates}, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{67} Anthony, \textit{Arab States of the Lower Gulf}, p. 141.
the Oil Department, the Diwan al-Amiri (Government Bureau), or to other important positions pertaining to development. The government sector also employed British advisors, and British officers for the Police and Defense forces. These last two forces also employed Jordanian officers.

It has also been mentioned that the teachers employed in the growing educational system were Jordanian, Palestinian, or locals. Some locals were also employed by the government as lower level bureaucrats, clerks or as tea or coffee servers in government offices. (Many of these last had previously worked in the pearl sector as Ghawasin or Siyub). Some of the government clerks were also Indian immigrants. The rank and file of the Police and Defense forces, and the special guards for the ruling family were usually bedouins. As mentioned above, the bedouin stratum accounted for a declining percentage of Trucial Oman’s population by 1968. Employees in the oil sector consisted of British managers, and of unskilled workers, the majority of whom were immigrants, although some were local. Immigrant workers were preferred over locals because they could be paid lower wages, and because they did not pose a political threat to the oil

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68 Ibid., pp. 133-134, and 138.

69 Chanim and al-Sha'ar, Al-Istratijiyyah al-Qaumiyyah, pp. 40-41.

70 Ibid., p. 39.
companies' presence.\textsuperscript{71}

Transportation and communication sector employees consisted of the British managers of the telephone company, workers on the telephone installations, and drivers of trucks, busses, and taxicabs. Sheikh Zaid appointed one of his cousins as head of the Telecommunication's Department, and also appointed a British director. Immigrant workers in this sector included Indians and Pakistanis, who were considered useful because of their knowledge of English. However, many Arabs were also employed in Abu Dhabi’s communication's sector, because Standard Arabic was also a needed. The installation workers and drivers were mainly immigrant workers from Pakistan and India, by virtue of the fact that immigrant workers constituted such a high percentage of the labor force, and since most Indian and Pakistani immigrant workers were unskilled or semiskilled.

All of these strata grew up in relation to the economic, political and cultural transformations that were taking place in Abu Dhabi during the 1960s. In addition to these strata, Abu Dhabi's economic and demographic growth, engendered an increase in the demand for imported capital and durable consumer goods. This generated the growth of a small merchant stratum in that sheikhdom, as agents for the import

\textsuperscript{71} Anthony, \textit{Arab States of the Lower Gulf}, p. 138; and Al Tabataba'i, \textit{Al-Nidham al-Itahadi fi al-Imarat al-‘Arabiyyah}, pp. 355-356.
of European goods. However, the growth of this mercantile stratum began after Abu Dhabi discovered oil, and began to use oil revenues for development projects. This situation contrasted with that of Dubai, whose present mercantile stratum had been established in relation to the decline of Lingah in the late nineteenth century. Although the Abu Dhabi mercantile stratum was small and weak in comparison to that of Dubai (politically influential merchants in Abu Dhabi numbered fewer than twenty, and the Chamber of Commerce was the only organization that represented their interests), a few months before the establishment of the U.A.E., Abu Dhabi merchants succeeded in inducing the ruler to levy a ten per cent surcharge upon all goods that were not directly imported into Abu Dhabi from their places of origin,\(^{72}\) as a protectionist measure against the Dubai mercantile stratum, through which most goods passed en route to the rest of Trucial Oman, and to the Sultanate of Oman’s interior, as mentioned above.

As can be seen in the percentage of the labor force it employed, the agricultural socio-discursive formation continued to articulate in Trucial Oman during the 1960s. The highest position within the agricultural hierarchy went to another of Sheikh Zaid’s relatives, who was appointed head of Abu Dhabi’s Department of Agriculture. The family-run orchards characterizing Trucial Oman’s agricultural socio-

discursive formation continued during the 1945-1971 period, but during the 1960s, Abu Dhabi's growing population, and its increasing diversity, had engendered a growth in the demand for food and had channelled that demand into a wider range of agricultural products. This engendered the development of larger, commercialized government-owned farms, which increased the acreage used for agriculture to meet this expanding demand. This, in turn, necessitated the hiring of more agricultural laborers, including Egyptian and Jordanian managers.  

Many of these laborers were Pathanis from Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan. On occasion, the proprietor families of the orchards mentioned above would also hire up to six agricultural laborers.

Besides all of the others, there also developed a service sector in Abu Dhabi to accommodate the increasing population, and particularly, the increasing immigrant worker population. This sector employed workers in the restaurants, bakeries, barber shops, newsstands, and entertainment places which catered to the different ethnic groups. The workers in these establishments were also immigrants.

A slightly higher percentage of the Abu Dhabi labor force, 4 per cent, was unemployed than was that of Dubai. In

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74 Ibid.
addition, employers in Abu Dhabi comprised a slightly smaller percentage of the labor force, 2 per cent, than they did in Dubai. Employees, however, comprised a larger one, at 82 per cent.\textsuperscript{75} The fact that employers accounted for a smaller percentage of the labor force in Abu Dhabi than they did in Dubai is related to the fact that government employment was much more extensive in Abu Dhabi than in Dubai, and because Dubai had a much larger grouping of small, mercantile employers than Abu Dhabi did. Unpaid family workers in Abu Dhabi also accounted for a smaller percentage of the labor force, 1 per cent, than they did in Dubai.\textsuperscript{76}

Statistics on the different levels of education that members of the Abu Dhabi labor force had attained by 1968 are also an indicator of stratification within that labor force. For example, in 1968, 77.9 per cent of this Emirate's labor force was illiterate. It was from this grouping that most of the bottom stratum of Abu Dhabi's labor force, such as construction workers, came. Because they were largely unskilled, workers in this stratum earned wages at the lowest levels, in relation to the rest of the labor force. By contrast, the percentages of labor force members with any general education at all were very small. Only 10.7 per cent of the labor force, for instance, had completed primary

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. 29.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
education in 1968, and were, therefore, eligible for jobs requiring a rudimentary knowledge of reading, such as the transporting of goods. Only 8.8 per cent of Abu Dhabi's labor force had completed secondary school, and could consequently obtain clerical work. A mere 2.6 per cent had completed higher education making them eligible for work in the professions.\textsuperscript{77}

During the 1960s, many welfare measures were instituted, benefitting much of the labor force. These measures included workmens' compensation; subsidies to orphans, the widowed, the disabled and the elderly; free health care; free desalinated water; and subsidized housing which bedouins often obtained free. The 1968-1972 Five Year Plan stressed the development of education. As mentioned above, not only did this Plan make education free, but it also had the education system provide pupils with free transportation, supplies, midday meals, and uniforms. In addition, the parents of the pupils were paid an allowance for each child in school.\textsuperscript{78}

Along with locals, immigrant workers in Abu Dhabi enjoyed the right to workmen's compensation, and to free health care. Employment itself was guaranteed them,


\textsuperscript{78} Anthony, \textit{Arab States of the Lower Gulf}, p. 139
especially since most came to Abu Dhabi by means of contracts with private companies, households, or with the Abu Dhabi government. The children of immigrant workers or small non-local merchants could also take advantage of Abu Dhabi's free education system. Thus, in any given elementary school class, one usually found Indian, Pakistani, Iranian and Arab children intermixed. Through participation in Abu Dhabi's education system, the children of immigrant workers became incorporated into Abu Dhabi's civil society from being educated in the local, government-run schools, since Abu Dhabi needed to increase its population and labor force. In relation to the education that they were receiving in Abu Dhabi's schools, the children of immigrant laborers constructed new identities for themselves, both in relation to the other pupils with whom they interacted, and in relation to their parents, since in constructing this identity, these children had to combine their ethnic identity with the fact that they were living within Abu Dhabi's civil society. (This situation contrasted with that of Dubai, where the immigrant workers sent their children to schools of their own.) However, immigrant workers as a group lacked political rights, including the right to


unionize.  

The status-quo in Abu Dhabi was able to reproduce itself firstly because the ruling family had been able to use oil revenues to construct economic, political and cultural apparatuses. These provided security through the defense and police forces, and also initiated development projects such as the building of ports, airports, roads, hospitals, and schools. Through development projects and welfareism, the ruling family was able to penetrate all of the strata of Abu Dhabi's civil society, and to integrate them with the political, cultural and economic apparatuses that had been constructed. This ensured that all of these strata would support, or at least not resist, the status-quo.

Some of the strata undergoing this integration process included the different tribal groupings of Bureimi region, many of whom had been autonomous, under the leadership of their own zu'ama, or tribal leaders, before Sheikh Zaid won their support through his above-mentioned measures as Wali of Bureimi. Once Sheikh Zaid bin Sultan al-Nahayan became Abu Dhabi's ruler, he provided many members of these groupings with employment as the rank and file of the police force, the defense force, and as his special guard. He also initiated welfare projects on their behalf, such as the building of low-

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cost housing, in new towns such as Madinat Zaid, and also in Abu Dhabi town. Other welfare benefits extended to members of tribal groupings included health care and education. In addition, the wages that members of tribal groupings earned in the Police and Defense forces allowed them to accumulate additional possessions, and to join the consumerist culture that was taking hold in Abu Dhabi.

Farmers were also being integrated with the social order in Abu Dhabi that Sheikh Zaid’s administration was constructing. In their case, this integration came by means of the agricultural development measures that this administration initiated, such as the digging of new wells, the bringing of piped water into rural areas, and the building of roads to facilitate the marketing of agricultural commodities in cities and towns. Schools, too, enabled the children of farmers to gain enough education to bring them mobility concerning the choosing of an occupation. Like the members of the tribal groupings, farmers also benefitted from free health care.

Abu-Dhabi’s above-mentioned merchant stratum was constructed during the 1960s to be an agent for the import of mainly Western consumer goods, and capital goods such as construction equipment, building materials, and other durables. Because this stratum owed its existence to the kind of development Abu Dhabi’s government was undertaking in
relation to the use of growing oil revenues, it was already integrated with the status quo. As this stratum prospered, it also became part of growing consumerism in Abu Dhabi.

As for the intelligensia, its integration with the order being constructed in Abu Dhabi occurred by means of the employment that most of its members were able to find in the government bureaucracy, often at high levels, as mentioned above. This was especially true of those who had obtained higher education abroad, and whose families belonged to certain tribal or wealthy mercantile groupings. The high salaries that these officials earned integrated them into the consumerism that Abu Dhabi was now offering as well.

This prosperity, from which all strata within Abu Dhabi’s civil society, and the immigrant labor stratum, benefitted, precluded the growth of a significant social movement based on widespread discontent. This reality not only enabled the order in Abu Dhabi under Sheikh Zaid’s administration to reproduce itself, but did the same for British colonialism. Another cultural factor contributing to the reproduction of both the local order and British colonialism were the realities of segmentation and the many discourses that were constructed to enable these realities to reproduce themselves.

Firstly, the power relationship inherent in British colonialism enabled, and was assisted in reproducing itself
by, the fact that within the colonial framework, the British constructed themselves as "superior" to the "others", or the locals. This discourse was constructed in relation to fact that British subjects in Abu Dhabi had the backing of Britain's armaments, and to the positions of power that they held in Abu Dhabi, in comparison with everyone else there, as administrators, businessmen, planners, advisors, training personnel, and officers.

Because they were citizens of Abu Dhabi, and were therefore eligible for more prestigious and better paid positions in both government and business than immigrant workers were, locals were able to construct a discourse of their own "superiority" in relation to immigrant workers. In contrast to the locals, immigrant workers were placed in Abu Dhabi through temporary contracts. In addition, since they were part of Abu Dhabi's civil society, locals had greater political power and cultural prestige in Abu Dhabi than did immigrant workers, who remained part of the civil societies of their home countries.

Segmentation existed among locals, and among immigrants as well. Among locals, it manifested itself in terms of nisab, class, religion, ethnicity, gender, and membership in the tribal, urban or agricultural socio-discursive formation. Locals with a prestigious nisab, for example, were eligible for more prestigious and better paid positions in the
government bureaucracy than were locals without the nisab advantage. This was particularly true in view of the fact that members of tribal groupings had become so important for Abu Dhabi’s defense and internal security, and were selected for key positions in the government bureaucracy. In addition, urban dwellers in general benefitted more extensively from welfarism and consumerism than rural dwellers did. Those with higher education generally attained higher economic status and cultural prestige than did those with less, especially if they came from a family with a prestigious nisab. Another discourse gave locals of Arab origin, or whose families had immigrated to Abu Dhabi long ago greater economic privilege, political power, and cultural prestige than locals of non-Arab origin, or whose families had immigrated to Abu Dhabi more recently. Other manifestations of segmentation among locals pertained to religion, and gender. However, locals in aggregate all saw themselves as beneficiaries from the status-quo under Sheikh Zaid’s administration in comparison with conditions in Abu Dhabi during the 1940s and 1950s after the decline of the pearl fisheries. Abu Dhabi’s locals also saw themselves as more economically privileged than their neighbors, either in other emirates or in the Sultanate of Oman.

Segmentation among non-locals manifested itself in terms of class, ethnicity, and religion. Concerning class,
some held more skilled and higher paid positions than others. In addition, urban immigrant workers benefitted from welfarism and consumerism to a greater extent than did rural ones. Regarding ethnicity, Non-local Arabs generally attained better positions, more highly paid positions in Abu Dhabi than did non-Arab immigrants. Concerning religion, some immigrants were Muslim while others were Hindus or Christians; among Muslims, some were Sunni and others Shi'i. Segmentation also existed among non-locals in regard to gender. However, immigrant workers in aggregate all considered themselves more economically privileged in Abu Dhabi than they would have been had they remained in their home countries.

**Conclusion**

Chapter Eleven examined Abu-Dhabi’s oil industry not in itself, but within Trucial Oman’s colonial socio-discursive formation. Specifically, this included coverage of how British companies exploited the oil concessions that they had controlled since the 1930s so that by the 1960s, they controlled the production, pricing, and marketing of Abu Dhabi’s oil. Chapter Eleven also demonstrated that the profits that British firms made on Abu Dhabi’s oil were far larger than the revenues that Abu Dhabi obtained. This chapter also examined the changes that occurred in this relationship, examining OPEC as a counter-discourse to the oil companies’ monopoly over oil production and pricing. In the
wake of the development of OPEC, this chapter showed how Abu Dhabi was able to obtain more favorable concessions by diversifying concession extensions during the later colonial period.

Chapter Eleven also examined the Abu Dhabi government's use of oil revenues, and how this use of oil revenues reproduced both the social order within Abu Dhabi and the colonial order. These development projects benefitted many local strata in Abu Dhabi by providing commercial facilities, employment, expansion of the government, etc. At the same time, this disposal of oil revenues was helping to reproduce the colonial order, because most of the contracts for these projects were extended to British firms. These firms brought their own planners, architects, engineers and managers, and therefore, the implementation of these development projects constructed a new British stratum in Abu Dhabi. The implementation of these development projects also contributed to the influx of immigrant labor into Abu Dhabi, because the construction and related work that these projects required necessitated the hiring of additional laborers. In relation to these development projects and their requirements for additional labor, Chapter Eleven also demonstrated how a new mercantile stratum was constructed in Abu Dhabi to accommodate the service and consumer needs of the expanding labor force, and particularly, the immigrant workers.
Chapter Eleven also examined the issue of welfarism, another use to which oil revenues were put. Welfarism was a significant factor in the reproduction of Abu Dhabi's social order because through oil revenues, the Abu Dhabi government built schools, housing, hospitals, and provided healthcare benefits and other subsidies. This chapter also covered the process by which oil revenues enabled the Abu Dhabi government to penetrate the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations. Examples of these penetrations included the extension of subsidies to farmers, and the building of roads, wells and water pipelines to facilitate crop cultivation and marketing. Bedouins were hired by the government to serve as guards and police, and they were also provided with subsidized housing. The government also penetrated the urban socio-discursive formation by providing employment for members of urban strata that no longer functioned, such as siyuh and ghawasin, as well as for educated individuals that were returning to Trucial Oman with the end of the previous economic stagnation period.

During the 1960s, the use of its oil revenues enabled Abu Dhabi's government to become more economically privileged, and therefore more politically powerful than the other emirates were. Abu Dhabi's government was able to reproduce this political power via the penetration of the other emirates through contributions to the Trucial Oman Development Fund,
and through the buildup of its armed forces. Through both of these measures, Abu Dhabi’s administration constructed the sheikdom as source of economic prosperity, and guarantor of security for the other emirates, especially the smaller, northern ones, which will be the focus of Chapter Twelve.
CHAPTER TWELVE

THE NORTHERN EMIRATES IN THE LATE
COLONIAL PERIOD: 1945-1971

Introduction

As Chapters Six and Seven showed, the northern sheikhdoms had been part of the Qasimi mercantile confederation during the late 1700s and early 1800s. During both the early and later colonial period, this confederation was divided into several small sheikhdoms. This process began with the destruction of Qasimi mercantile power in wars of the early 1800s, and continued on through the 1945-1971 period, during which the sheikhdom of Fujairah was constructed.

By the 1950s, there were five northern sheikhdoms, namely, Sharqah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah. Like Abu Dhabi and Dubai, these sheikhdoms had been integrated into the global market through the pearl industry. After the pearling sector declined, they suffered economic stagnation along with Abu Dhabi and Dubai. However, they did not emerge from this stagnation through the development of a mercantile stratum for imports and re-exports, as happened in Dubai, and unlike Abu Dhabi, neither did they have oil resources.

This chapter will focus on how and why these sheikhdoms
developed political, economic and cultural structures during the 1945-1971 period, both in relation to the deepening of British colonial penetration, and in relation to changes that were taking place in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. This chapter will also analyze how the social order in these emirates reproduced itself. Analyzing these emirates not only allows an understanding of their development during the later colonial period in relation to the earlier one, but also allows comparison between the northern sheikhdoms on the one hand and Abu Dhabi and Dubai on the other. This approach to examining the northern sheikhdoms also provides insight into aspects of the 1820-1945 colonial period that continued into the later one, as well as those that did not, and insight into aspects of the colonial socio-discursive formation in general that passed into the contemporary one in the northern emirates.

**Arab League Assistance and the Colonial Response**

In contrast to Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the smaller, northern Emirates lacked both a mercantile stratum linked to foreign imports, and an oil sector. As discussed previously, the northern emirates had been part of the Qasimi mercantile confederation which the British had destroyed in 1820, when they began their penetration of what became Trucial Oman. During the first half of the British colonial period (1820-1945), the northern emirates, along with Abu Dhabi and Dubai, had developed pearling as their most significant industry.
After the decline of pearling at the outbreak of World War II, all of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms entered a period of economic stagnation, but Dubai was subsequently able to maintain itself as an entrepot for imports and re-exports, and Abu Dhabi began exporting oil after 1960. The Emirates of Sharqah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah, by contrast, mainly relied upon agriculture and small fisheries which mainly produced for local consumption.

In aggregate, British development expenditure on Trucial Oman was very meagre, and mainly took the form of assistance to a few individual projects, both prior to and after the implementation of the first and second Five Year Plans of 1956-1961, and 1960-1965. Prior to 1956, the British engaged in some limited water well drilling in Ras al-Khaimah, restored some Aflaj canals in the Bureimi region, extended assistance to the building of the Dubai hospital (Other funds for this came from the Sheikh), and extended some funds toward the building of a trade school in Sharqah. During the 1956-1961 Five Year Plan, which the British Political Agent devised, and the Political Resident endorsed, British assistance to Trucial Oman only amounted to an expenditure of 313,129 Pounds Sterling. Under this plan, the British built Dubai’s police force, set up an agricultural trials station and training school near Ras al-Khaimah, initiated a small agricultural credit fund, founded a trade school in Sharqah,
and began a teacher training program for a small number of Trucial Oman male students in Bahrain. The second Five Year Plan of 1960-1965, to which the British administration allocated 550,000 Pounds Sterling, featured the establishment of a trade school at Dubai, which the Sheikh of Dubai partially financed, further hospital improvements, and some anti-erosion aid to Sharqah.\footnote{Hawley, The Trucial States, pp. 226-228.} Since these British initiated projects remained self contained and small in scope, their impact upon Trucial Oman as a whole, and certainly upon the northern emirates, was limited. It was in relation to this reality that the northern emirates sought assistance from the Arab League. Their attempts at procuring such aid, and the British response, are covered in the following section.

Although the northern Emirates of Sharqah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah were able to develop governmental structures with some similarities to those of Dubai, they were not able to achieve comparable economic development. The tables at the end of Chapter Nine showing the revenues of all of the Trucial Oman emirates indicate that Dubai was able, during the 1960s, to earn sizeable customs revenues as a mercantile entrepot, and that Abu Dhabi, for its part, earned its revenues from oil exports during this decade. They also show the impoverishment of the other emirates. As mentioned previously, Sharqah, Ras al-
Khaimah, Umm al-Quwain, Ajman, and Fujairah, had no oil and did not become mercantile centers. This left them with having to earn external revenues out of oil and airport concession rents, and the issuing of postage stamps. However, these emirates, and particularly Ras al-Khaimah, did have some agriculture as well as local fisheries, some of whose produce was exported through Dubai, and through Ras al-Khaimah Port itself.

In response to the fact that British development expenditure on Trucial Oman had been so meager, and to the fact that the needs of the northern sheikhdoms remained so acute, the rulers of the northern sheikhdoms requested economic aid from the Arab League. In 1964, the Arab League responded to these requests by sending a mission to visit Trucial Oman to assess needs, and by setting up a committee consisting of four representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to manage development funds. The people of Trucial Oman showed their own fervently nationalistic sentiments by greeting the visiting Arab League Secretary General Sayyd 'Abdul-Khaliq Hasuna with demonstrations and other gestures. The Arab League's next step was to send a delegation of technicians from several Arab countries to Trucial Oman to assess Trucial Oman's development needs. This

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2 Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 48.
delegation emerged with a series of proposals, including one for the construction of roads connecting all of Trucial Oman’s sheikhdoms, and others for the installation of a telephone system, along with an electrification system for all of Trucial Oman. Health and education services were to be expanded and extended to each Emirate, and agriculture and the economy were to be developed. The Arab League technicians estimated that this plan would cost 4,917,650 Pounds Sterling, and for the first year, costs were estimated at 1 million Pounds Sterling. Monies for expenditures for implementation of the plan during the first year were to be collected from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt. Additional collected monies that exceeded the first year’s expenditure amount were to be used for development projects planned for subsequent years.³

The British engaged in a variety of tactics to forstall the Arab League’s efforts in Trucial Oman. First, the British encouraged the Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and the Sheikh of Qatar to pursuade other Gulf rulers not to accept Arab League aid. British officials in the Gulf even managed to induce the sheikhs of Bahrain, Qatar, and Dubai to pressure Saudi Arabia not to make its pledged contribution to the Arab League’s

³ Nawfal, Al-Awdha’ al-Siyasiyyah, pp. 192-199.
proposed special fund for the development of Trucial Oman.\textsuperscript{4} By contrast, the rulers of the northern emirates of Ras al-Khaimah, Sharqah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah all accepted the Arab League plan despite the fact that the British were pressuring them to abide by the imposed colonial treaties, and to reject Arab League assistance. As an example, Sheikh Saqr al-Qasimi of Sharqah not only agreed to accept Arab League assistance, but also challenged the very validity of the colonial treaties, and further announced plans to allow the establishment of an Arab League office in his emirate.\textsuperscript{5}

The British then took measures to counter this move. As the first measure, the British Political Resident and Agents stationed in Bahrain, Qatar and Trucial Oman met with all of the Trucial Oman rulers, as well as with those of Qatar and Bahrain in March, 1965 to establish a council for development funds in March, 1965. The idea here was that if the Arab League chose to extend financial assistance to the Trucial Oman Emirates, the channel for these funds would have to be the British-controlled Council. The Council then resolved to open an account called the Fund for the Development of Trucial Oman. This British-controlled Fund,

\textsuperscript{4} Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{5} Nawfal, \textit{Al-Awdha' al-Siyyasyah}, pp. 212-218 and 220-223.
alone, was to be the authorized recipient of monies contributed toward the development of Trucial Oman. As a second measure, the British deposed Sheikh Saqr al-Qasimi, and sent him into exile, on the return trip of the same plane that had carried the Arab League representatives into Trucial Oman to establish an office there. Sheikh Saqr was replaced by his nephew, Sheikh Khalid, who had been a merchant in Dubai.

The British then handed the sheikhs of Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Fujairah and the just-appointed Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed al-Qasimi of Sharqah, identical cables that the British Agent's office in Dubai had prepared, which they were each to send separately to the Arab League. Each cable stated that the Ruler sending it could only accept Arab League assistance if such assistance were channeled through the Development Bureau which the British had established. The Arab League did not accept these terms. Later, however, individual Arab countries contributed directly to the development of the different emirates.

6 Ibid., pp. 202-203.
7 Nawfal, Al-Awdha' al-Siyasiyyah, pp. 231-232.
8 Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation, p. 106.
9 Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 49.
The Trucial Oman Development Office and Fund

Although the British had temporarily succeeded in keeping the Arab League out of Trucial Oman, they did find it necessary to take additional measures to ensure the flow of some sort of assistance to the Trucial Oman emirates, as a substitute for the Arab League assistance that they had temporarily blocked. One of these measures was the establishment of the Trucial States Development Office in 1965. Actually, this body had existed previously as an attachment to the Political Agent's office in Dubai. In 1965, however, the British attached the Development Office to the Council of Rulers, and assigned the President of the Council to preside over the Development Office as well. Despite the fact that the President of the Council of Rulers of Trucial Oman presided over the Development Office after 1965, the Development Office itself was staffed by British personnel until the end of the colonial period in 1971. Until that year, British personnel also headed the Office's technical education, fisheries, agriculture, public health, public works, and finance departments, although they were assisted by a limited number of local personnel from Trucial Oman or from other Arab countries.\(^\text{11}\) Many of the British personnel had worked for the British government in similar capacities in

\(^{11}\text{Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 52.}\)
colonies and ex-colonies such as Sudan, India, Hadramaut, or East Africa.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1965, the Council of the Trucial States approved a resolution which established the Trucial States Development Fund, to which monetary contributions to the Trucial States Development Office were to be credited. The purpose of this Fund was to ensure the efficient coordination of development efforts by the emirates. This Development Fund was to be used both for the implementation of capital projects, and for the maintenance and running costs of of installations already constructed. Another of the Development Fund's functions was to provide a subsidy for the poorer emirates, which had no individual budgets designed to pay for the ongoing costs of such installations as water distillation plants, and electric generators. Water and electricity were services that were provided to customers at low costs.\textsuperscript{13}

The British sought to enlist contributions to the Development Office, via the Fund, from sheikdoms like Abu Dhabi, which was now exporting oil, Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{14} Table 12.1 shows the contributions that Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar and the U.K. made to the income of the Trucial

\textsuperscript{12} Heard-Bay, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, p. 324.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 322-323.

\textsuperscript{14} Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 52.
States Development Office.

**TABLE 12.1**

**Sources and Amounts of Contributions to the Trucial States Development Office**
(1965-1970—In Bahraini Dinars)

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<tr>
<td>SOURCES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>266,625</td>
<td>666,600</td>
<td>1,819,762</td>
<td>337,662</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>333,250</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>53,298</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>322,720</td>
<td>266,600</td>
<td>196,768</td>
<td>278,597</td>
<td>114,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Cap.</td>
<td>399,900</td>
<td>533,199</td>
<td>85,725</td>
<td>257,175</td>
<td>171,000</td>
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</table>


Table 12.1 indicates that Abu Dhabi was consistently the largest contributor to the Trucial States Development Office after 1966, the year Sheikh Zaid took power. The actual amounts of its yearly contributions vary widely, however. Abu Dhabi’s contribution for 1968, for example, is very small, in relation to its contributions for both preceding and succeeding years. This was a consequence of the above-mentioned budget deficit that Abu Dhabi faced during that year. By contrast, Abu Dhabi’s contribution for 1970 was
its largest, since it was made on the eve of independence, and in anticipation of the unification of the emirates into one country.

The totals for the entire 1965-1970 period place Abu Dhabi’s contribution to the Development Office at more than 70 per cent of the total. Abu Dhabi’s total contribution to the Development Office for this period was BD (Bahraini Dinars) 7,290,649, as compared to that of Qatar, which was BD 333,250, and of Bahrain, which amounted to BD 53,298. Britain’s total contribution was also much lower than was that of Abu Dhabi, at a total of BD 1,178,685.15

Abu Dhabi’s large contributions after Sheikh Zaid took power in 1966 placed the Development Office itself in a better general position to initiate development projects in Trucial Oman as a whole.16 At the same time, since the Development Office’s monies were largely allocated toward the financing and subsidization of projects and services in the northern emirates,17 Abu Dhabi’s large contribution to the Development

15 Sadik and Snively, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, pp. 188-189.

16 Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 53.

17 In 1969, for example, the Trucial States Development Council’s total expenditure amounted to BD 1,843,500. Out of this total, BD 1,144,000 was allocated to the Sheikhdoms of Sharqah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. Another BD 689,000 went to inter-sheikhdom expenditures, and only 10,500 went to Dubai. MEED (May 9, 1969): 593.
Office engendered a relationship between Abu Dhabi and the northern emirates wherein the latter provided Abu Dhabi with labor, while Abu Dhabi provided them with funds. This economic relationship, in turn, enabled Abu Dhabi to attain political power over and in relation to these emirates. Because there was no systematic method of revenue collection in in Trucial Oman prior to independence in 1971, the magnitude of the Development Office's revenues was largely determined by the size of the contribution that Sheikh Zaid's administration decided to make. An outgrowth of this situation was that Sheikh Zaid became an informal authority to whom developers directly turned for funds. This, too, gave Sheikh Zaid political power in relation to the other Sheikhs.\(^1\)

The administration of the Development Office included an executive committee, whose members were nominated by the rulers. In 1970, just before independence, this executive committee's membership had expanded to twenty-eight, with four sitting for each emirate. The executive committee discussed and approved the development budget, studied projects prior to implementation, and considered the specific needs of each emirate that were brought to the attention of its members. The executive committee also established sub-committees for handling financial and administrative matters, planning and

\(^{18}\) Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 54.
implementation, public health, technical education, agriculture, fisheries and co-operatives.\(^{19}\)

**TABLE 12.2**

**Total Development Allocations of the Trucial States**

**Development Office**

*(1965–1970)*

**In Bahraini Dinars**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>ALLOCATION</th>
<th>PER CENT OF TOTAL DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tech. Education</td>
<td>411,925</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1,130,248</td>
<td>14.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1,029,632</td>
<td>13.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>261,515</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbors</td>
<td>328,525</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trunk Roads</td>
<td>1,706,062</td>
<td>22.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Roads</td>
<td>178,184</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town/Village Water</td>
<td>1,196,411</td>
<td>15.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>1,196,411</td>
<td>15.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>99,036</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Development</td>
<td>149,757</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>51,894</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>5,683</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,668,482</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 12.2 shows the development expenditures toward which the Trucial States Development Office allocated its funds. The largest allocations were to health, agriculture, trunk roads, town and village water supplies, and electricity. It is important to mention that the Development Office became

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 53.
an instrument for the recycling back into the accounts of British companies of Abu Dhabi's oil revenues which had been allocated to the Council, as it was British firms that won most of the development contracts in the northern sheikhdoms, just as they had in Dubai and Abu-Dhabi. Health projects that the Trucial States Development Office initiated after 1965 included the establishment of small hospitals in Ras al-Khaimah and Dibba.\textsuperscript{20} By 1968, the Development Office, with the help of Kuwait, had financed the equipping of the Ras al-Khaimah Hospital with forty beds and a dispensary. Other dispensaries and clinics were also opened in Sharqah, Khor Fakkan, Ajman, Fujairah, in other towns in that sheikhdom such as Dhaid Jazirat al-Za‘ab, and in the sheikhdom of Umm al-Quwain by 1968.\textsuperscript{21} By 1968, the medical personnel in Trucial Oman that the Trucial States Development Office was employing included twelve nurses, ten nurses’ assistants, and sixteen health assistants.\textsuperscript{22} In 1967, a malariologist from the World Health Organization (WHO) visited Trucial Oman and found that malaria accounted for close to fifty per cent of the illnesses in the Fujairah and Kalbah regions. A WHO team arrived in 1969

\textsuperscript{20} Fenelon, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{21} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial Oman to the United Arab Emirates}, p. 326; and Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 233.

\textsuperscript{22} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 233.
to complete a follow-up survey on this situation.23 After the completion of this survey in 1970, the Development Office established a malarial control unit in 1970, which determined locations in which malaria was endemic, breeding grounds for mosquitos, the effectiveness of various insecticides, etc.24

In the Agricultural sector, the Development office emphasized experimental projects and studies rather than assistance and subsidies to individual farmers.25 Experimental projects included improvements upon the experimental agricultural station in Diqdaqah, in the Sheikhdom of Ras al-Khaimah, so that by 1970, the station had permanent offices, a veterinary clinic, an agricultural school, a mechanical workshop, stores and stables, and substantial acreage used for experimental gardens. This acreage included 60 at Diqdaqah itself, five at Falaj al-Mu‘alla, and seven at Kalbah. At these experimental gardens, farmers could purchase seedlings, seeds, fertilizers and insecticides at cost price, and could rent agricultural machines. Cattle were also imported in 1969. Goats and poultry were also raised at Diqdaqah to be sold to local

23 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to the United Arab Emirates, p. 325-326.

24 Fenelon, The United Arab Emirates, p. 28.

25 Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 54.
farmers.\textsuperscript{26}

The Development office hired veterinary officers and surgeons based in Ras al-Khaimah, Diqqaqah, and Sharqah. Other services initiated included meat inspection. In 1968, the Development office initiated the Milaijah irrigation scheme near Jabal Fayah in Sharqah. Here, three hundred acres of land were irrigated, and planted with fruit trees, vegetables, and alfalfa, and the plan was to turn this land over to semi-nomadic bedouins. The development office also established an agricultural school at Diqqaqah in 1967, which ran a two-year agricultural course for students who had completed intermediate schooling. In 1970, five students were graduated from this school, and they found employment with the Development Office.\textsuperscript{27} The Development office also supervised the completion of hydrological surveys. One of these was initiated shortly after the formation of the Development Office, and a consulting firm was hired to undertake that survey. In 1968, the Development Office oversaw the completion of a well-boring and testing program covering ninety wells.\textsuperscript{28} The British firm of Sir William Halcrow and Partners, for example compiled a series of hydrological

\textsuperscript{26} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirate}, pp. 327-328.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 328.

\textsuperscript{28} Fenelon, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, p. 29.
yearbooks for the development office.

The University of Durham became involved in soil surveys in the northern sheikhdoms in 1967, when it published an assessment of soil in those regions.\textsuperscript{29} This survey found considerable variation among the soils of the region, but also mentioned that fine silt was common in all of them. Other recommendations included plant diversification, and overhead, rather than channel irrigation.\textsuperscript{30} Road construction feasibility studies were also made for sandy, rocky or mountainous terrain, and fishing surveys were also conducted.\textsuperscript{31}

The Development Office financed the completion both of water and electrification schemes in Umm al-Quwain, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, and the eastern coastal ports in 1968.\textsuperscript{32} The Office had hired the British firm Kennedy and Donkin as the consulting engineer and production supervisor for the electrification of Trucial Oman. For the installation of 22 miles of power lines toward Trucial Oman's electrification, the Development Office hired another British

\textsuperscript{29} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to the United Arab Emirates}, p. 329.

\textsuperscript{30} Fenelon, \textit{the United Arab Emirates}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{31} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to the United Arab Emirates}, pp. 327-328.

\textsuperscript{32} Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 54.
company, British Insulated Callender's Construction in 1969.33

For its section of this electrification project, Sharqah ordered four 1,000 Kilowat diesel alternators from the U.K. firm English Electric Diesels in November, 1968.34 In September, 1969, Sharqah ordered a complete, self-contained power station and water pumping system from the U.K.'s Dawson Keith Electric in September, 1969. This portion of Sharqah's section of the Trucial Oman electrification project entailed linking Sharqah's water supply development to electrification. The installation of this power station was nearing completion in April, 1970.35 Also during 1969, Fujairah ordered power lines from British Insulated Collender's Construction, part of which would link Ghufra to Hosn Dibba.36 Ras al-Khaimah's power station was to be built by a Dutch firm, under a 1970 contract. For the installation of this facility, the three Stork Werkspoor diesel generators were to be added to other, previously installed generators made by Brush Electrical Engineering (U.K.). A transmission line attached to the power station was to provide electric power for the townships of

33 MEED (September 12, 1969): 1138.
34 MEED (November 22, 1968): 1178.
36 MEED (September 26, 1969): 1194.
Rams, Jazairat al-Hamra and Diqdaqah. 37

By 1968, town water supplies had been installed at Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Sharqah, and Diqdaqah. 38 The Office also financed improvements on port and coastal security. Other projects that the Development Office financed included the mapping of the Trucial Oman area, and the compiling of statistical data on population and water resources. 39 British companies also conducted geological surveys to determine if Trucial Oman contained mineral deposits in which British companies could feasibly invest. J.E.C. Greenwood, a firm which was affiliated with the Institute of Geological Sciences in London, for instance, undertook Trucial Oman’s first mineral survey in 1966. 40 Greenwood conducted this survey in the mountain region. It did not, however, reveal large, commercially workable mineral deposits, but it did indicate traces of nickel, copper, platinum, bauxite, magnesium and asbestos. 41

Concerning roads, the first project to be executed by the Development Office was the road between Dubai and Sharqah.

37 MEED (March 20, 1970): 347.
38 Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 241.
39 Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 54.
40 Heard-Bey, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates, p. 329.
41 Fenelon, the United Arab Emirates, p. 29.
This road was opened in October, 1966. The Development Office also built road from Sharqah to Khan. The firm of Halcrow and Partners prepared a study on the feasibility of a road between Sharqah and Dhaid in 1967, and the Development Office initiated the first stage of this project. As a first stage of this project, British engineers opened up mountain passes on the coastal stretch between Dibba and Khor Fakkan. Tracks, culverts and gradients were constructed with the intention of asphalting them later. The Development Office also studied the possibility of building a road connecting Ras al-Khaimah, Manamah and Dhaid with the al-‘Ain and Bureimi areas.\footnote{42} 

In education, the Development Office took over from the British government the financing of the technical education in Trucial Oman after 1965.\footnote{43} Specifically, the Office took responsibility for meeting the expenses of the Trade School at Sharqah, the one at Dubai, and a newly established Trade School at Ras al-Khaimah in 1967. In 1967, the Sharqah school was taking in 48 students for a three year course, but by 1968, this number had risen to 104.\footnote{44} This school had developed linkages with the U.K. in 1965 for students seeking further technical education. By the beginning of 1969, 298

\footnote{42} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to the United Arab Emirates}, p. 330.  
\footnote{43} Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 53.  
\footnote{44} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 237.
students from all of Trucial Oman were receiving technical education.\textsuperscript{45} The Trucial States Development Fund initiated a General Scholarship Program in 1967, the object of which was to educate students for the Public Service. By 1968, twenty students were studying in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, or the U.K. under this program.\textsuperscript{46} The Development Office did not involve itself in general education, as that was being done by means of assistance from Kuwait, and also Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt.\textsuperscript{47}

Other projects that the Trucial States Development Office undertook were town improvements like housing, which were being constructed in Fujairah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Sharqah and Ras al-Khaimah. In addition, telephone systems were being installed in Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman and Umm al-Quwain, and sea-protection measures were being installed at Ma‘aridh. The Council was financing port improvements like jetties at Ras al-Khaimah and Khor Fakkan, and the building of wharves at Ajman and Umm al-Quwain.\textsuperscript{48} The supervisory contract for widening the Ras al-Khaimah Creek, whose purpose was to facilitate shipping from to Dubai, was extended to the

\textsuperscript{45} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, pp. 331-332.

\textsuperscript{46} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 238.

\textsuperscript{47} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, pp. 331-332.

\textsuperscript{48} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 241.
British consultant engineering firm Halcrow and Partners, although the work itself was being carried out by an Austrian company under a 1968 contract.\textsuperscript{49} The British company Tarmac Construction won the contract for the improvement of Sharqah's port in October, 1969. Work to be done included dredging, the building of retaining walls, and the construction of a wharf and an oil tanker berth. Sir William Halcrow & Partners served as the consulting engineer for this project.\textsuperscript{50}

Outside of the Development Office, other Arab countries made their individual contributions to development in Trucial Oman. Saudi Arabia, for example, financed the construction of a trunk road between Sharqah and Ras al-Khaimah, at a cost of more than one million Pounds Sterling,\textsuperscript{51} while Kuwait built and equipped many primary, intermediate, and secondary schools. Kuwait also provided twenty-six physicians and eighty-five nurses and pharmacologists to Trucial Oman in 1968.\textsuperscript{52} Egypt had established an education mission in Sharqah as early as 1958,\textsuperscript{53} and contributed teachers.\textsuperscript{54} In 1968,

\textsuperscript{49} MEED (April 8, 1968): 268.

\textsuperscript{50} MEED (October 10, 1969): 1258; and (April 24, 1970): 498.

\textsuperscript{51} Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 52; and Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{52} Hawley, \textit{the Trucial States}, pp. 233, and 235-236.

\textsuperscript{53} Heard-Bey, \textit{From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates}, p. 319.
Saudi Arabia opened an office in Dubai and made contributions toward educational development in Trucial Oman. The United Nations also made its contributions. As an example, its Technical Assistance Board supervised a water survey. The U.N. Special Fund also included Trucial Oman in its Locust Project. In 1966, the World Health Organization (W.H.O.) completed a maternity and child welfare survey for the Trucial Oman Development Council, and in 1967, the U.N. Development Program carried out a survey about possible additional aid to Trucial Oman.\(^{55}\)

**Administrative Developments in the Northern Emirates**

As mentioned above, the northern Trucial Oman sheikhdoms developed administrative structures that bore some resemblance to those of Dubai. Shargah, for example, established a municipality in 1961, followed by a Lands Department. Shargah's Police Force, established in 1967, was commanded by a British officer. A court of law was established in 1968 under a judge, whom the British had given jurisdiction over traffic violation cases during that year under the Trucial States Traffic Regulation of 1968. All other legal matters remained under British jurisdiction.\(^{56}\)

\(^{54}\) Hawley, *The Trucial States*, p. 234.


\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 250.
The Municipality of Sharqah was the office that administered most of projects for the development of the sheikhdom during the 1960s. This office also coordinated local government activities, and had its own departments, such as engineering and planning. These were responsible for the upkeep of buildings and roads, the administration of health and agricultural policy, the maintenance of accounts and the treasury, and the development of new regions of the Sheikdom. Sharqah’s local court system was such that prior to 1968, a single Shari'a court was responsible for adjudicating all disputes in the Sheikdom, but in 1968, the judicial system was re-organized as the population diversified. While the Shari'a court continued to adjudicate matters pertaining to the personal status of Muslims, the new Court of Jurisprudence dealt with many civil and criminal claims of public right involving non-Muslims.

Because the economic development that Ras al-Khaimah underwent during the 1960s was sparse in relation to that of Abu Dhabi or Dubai, the development of its bureaucracy was not extensive. However, Ras al-Khaimah’s Municipality and Land’s Department was set up in the early 1960s, and a British municipal engineer was appointed at that time as well.

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58 Ibid., p. 174.
Municipality’s responsibility included overseeing the economic development that was occurring in Ras al-Khaimah.\textsuperscript{60} Ras al-Khaimah’s police force was established in 1967, under the overall command of one of the sons of Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammed, the then ruler, but under the immediate command of a British officer.\textsuperscript{61} The Sheikhdoms of Ajman and Fujairah were difficult to administer because of their geographic fragmentation, which had came about with the drawing of the borders between the Sheikhdoms in the 1950s. This situation sometimes resulted in overlapping claims between Ajman or Umm al-Quwain and other emirates concerning villages, and the right to collect taxes from certain migratory tribal groupings.

The significant governing bodies of the Sheikhdoms of Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah were their municipalities.\textsuperscript{62} Ajman and Umm al-Quwain also established small police forces in 1968, and Umm al-Quwain established its municipality in 1968 under a Sudanese director.\textsuperscript{63} In all of the northern sheikhdoms, alongside the municipality there continued to function the Ruler’s \textit{Majlis}. This institution mainly existed to hear the complaints and cases of people from

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{60}] Anthony, \textit{Arab States of the Lower Gulf}, pp. 192-193.
\item[\textsuperscript{61}] Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 250.
\item[\textsuperscript{62}] Anthony, \textit{Arab States of the Lower Gulf}, pp. 205-206.
\item[\textsuperscript{63}] Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 250.
\end{itemize}
the tribal socio-discursive formation. It was functional in the northern sheikhdoms on account of the small size of their populations.

The Education System in the Northern Emirates

Despite the fact that the Trucial Oman Development Fund did not make allocations toward general education, and also despite the fact that the northern emirates had smaller administrations and more modest revenues than Abu Dhabi or Dubai had, the former did manage to establish schools for general education during the 1950s and 1960s. Some of the funding for the establishment of these schools came from the contributions of other Arab countries, as mentioned above.

During the 1945-1971 period Sharqah was the earliest of all of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms to open institutions for general education. With the help of the government of Kuwait, for example, Sharqah opened two general educations schools in 1953 and 1954. Each of these two schools was named "Al-Qasimiyyah," but one was for girls while the other was for boys. Kuwait supplied the books and teachers for both of these schools. Classes at these schools were given in morning and evening shifts, and the curriculum was based on that of Kuwait, which, in turn, was based on that of Egypt. An additional school opened in Khor Fakkan in 1955-1955, under Kuwaiti sponsorship. In 1961, Kuwait sponsored the opening of a secondary school in Sharqah called "Al-‘Aruba", or
"Arabism". After 1961, the number of schools, students and teachers in the smaller emirates increased.64

During the 1960s, Sharjah's schools held yearly cultural and sports events which gathered together the students of Dubai and the smaller emirates. Ajman's first school was opened in 1958, and in 1959, Dubai contributed to that school's expansion. In 1967 and 1968, Ajman opened a girls' school called "Al-Khadijah," During that same year, Sheikh Zaid opened "Al-Mahad al-'Almi al-Islami," or "Institute of Islamic Studies" in Ajman. Ras al-Khaimah opened many schools. The first, opened in 1956, was a general education primary school called "Al-Qasimiyyah." In 1956 and 1958, Ras al-Khaimah opened two elementary girls' schools called "Khawlah" and "Hind". In 1964, Ras-al Khaimah's secondary school opened, and it was called "Al-Sadiq." These schools were established by Ras al-Khaimah's own Education Department, but the Emirate also got some assistance from Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which helped Ras al-Khaimah to open an Islamic school, "Al-Mahad al-Islami," during the early 1960s. Qatar's assistance was especially important because Qatar provided the textbooks, and sponsored many of the teachers financially. The Emirates of Fujairah and Umm al-Quwain also established schools during the 1960s, and in all of the smaller emirates, the number of students,

64 Al-'Asi, Masirat al-Tal'alin, pp. 80-82 and 85-89.
teachers and schools increased over the decade.\textsuperscript{65}

It is important to note that in all of the Emirates, the establishment of schools offering general education did not begin until the mid-1950s at the earliest. Furthermore, the establishment of these schools was undertaken without British assistance, despite the fact that Trucial Oman was under British colonial domination. As demonstrated above, assistance came from Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Because the different sheikhdoms had not been able to establish general education schools until the mid-1950s, the majority of Trucial Oman's population was still illiterate by 1968. As of that year, in all of Trucial Oman, illiteracy rates for males ranged from 66 per cent for males between fifteen and twenty years of age, to as much as 95 per cent for males over seventy-five years of age. For females, illiteracy rates ranged from as high as 84 per cent for those between fifteen and twenty years of age, to fully 99.6 per cent for those over seventy-five years of age.\textsuperscript{66} In addition to these schools offering general education, there continued to exist some katatib, or basic religious schools during the 1945-1971 period.\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{65} Ibid.
\bibitem{66} Sadik and Snavely, \textit{Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates}, p. 68.
\bibitem{67} Harbi, \textit{Tatawwur al-Ta\'alim}, pp. 49-52.
\end{thebibliography}
Despite the low literacy rates demonstrated above, all of these schools had a noticeable cultural impact on Trucial Oman's civil society. Since many of the teachers came from Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine, they brought with them information, and analysis of events occurring throughout the Arab world. This reality led schools to begin to impart anti-colonialism, Arab Nationalism, and awareness of the Palestinian issue to Trucial Oman pupils. As will subsequently be demonstrated, these developments in education were important contributors to the growth of the anti-colonialism movement against British domination of Trucial Oman.

**Labor Force, Stratification, and Reproduction in the Northern Emirates**

In contrast to that in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, the development situation in the northern Emirates of Sharqah, Umm al-Qwain, Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah, and Ajman only generated a minimal influx of immigrant workers. Sharqah was a relative exception because of the above-mentioned development projects that were being implemented there during the 1960s. In Sharqah's case, immigrant workers accounted for 27 per cent of the total population in 1968, whereas in Ras al Khaimah, they only accounted for 7 per cent. In the remaining northern emirates, immigrant workers accounted for a mere 2 per cent of
the total population.\textsuperscript{68}

Despite the fact that their government bureaucracies were not as elaborate as those of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, in some of the northern emirates, government service workers accounted for a sizeable percentage of the labor force. Sharqah, for instance, employed 17.1 per cent of its labor force in the government sector. In Ajman, this portion amounted to 17.8 per cent, and in Ras al-Khaimah, to 14.6 per cent. In Umm al-Quwain, government service workers amounted to 11.9 per cent of the labor force. In Fujairah, by contrast, this portion came to 4.6 per cent.\textsuperscript{69} The government sector included workers in the municipality, employees of the police force, and teachers, and the administrators of the various government departments along with their advisors.

In Sharqah, relatives of the Sheikh headed such departments as that of Internal Security, Petroleum and Mining, Ports, and the Municipality. In addition, members of the prominent Al-Madfa' and Taryam families also held important positions within the government administration. Positions that members of these families held included that of head of the Ruler's Secretariat, Assistant Director to that body, Director of the Customs Department, Director of the


\textsuperscript{69} Sadik and Snively, \textit{Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates}, p. 34.
Department of Petroleum and Mining, Director of Labor, and Director of the Education Department. As in other Trucial Oman sheikhdoms, there were British officers who headed up the police force, which also employed individuals from tribal groupings within its rank and file. There were also British advisors to the government for administration and development projects. As mentioned above, the education system employed Egyptian and Palestinian teachers, and other government offices also employed a few non-local Arabs in advisory positions.

The Sheikh of Ras al-Khaimah was the head of the small government bureaucracy of that sheikhdom. British personnel served in the Special Branch Police Force, and as the principal officers commanding Ras al-Khaimah’s Defense Force.\textsuperscript{70} As mentioned above, individuals from tribal groupings were employed as the rank and file of the Police Force, and the educational system employed Egyptians, Palestinians and locals as teachers. The government bureaucracy was also small in the sheikhdoms of Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah. In each of these sheikhdoms, the municipality constituted the main government body. British expatriates served as advisors and consultants to the Rulers of these Sheikdoms, concerning matters of internal security and finance. As in the case of the other sheikhdoms, the

\textsuperscript{70} Anthony, \textit{Arab States of the Lower Gulf}, p. 197.
education systems of Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah employed Egyptian, Palestinian and local teachers, and bedouins were employed as the rank and file of the Police Forces.

Retail and wholesale merchants constituted 18.5 per cent of Dubai's labor force in 1968, as mentioned above. In relation to Dubai, the retail and wholesale mercantile sector accounted for a much smaller percentage of the labor forces of the northern sheikhdoms. In Sharqah, for example, this sector accounted for 9.5 per cent of the labor force. For Ajman, it accounted for 12.3 per cent. In Umm al-Quwain, 9.7 per cent of the labor force was employed in the wholesale-retail mercantile sector. In Ras al-Khaimah, this share amounted to 6.2 per cent. In Fujairah, this share amounted to 2.2 per cent.71

Although Sharqah had a wholesale mercantile stratum, it was overshadowed by that of Dubai. For this reason, during the 1960s, many Sharqah wholesale merchants had become branch managers or importers for enterprises headquartered in Dubai. Indian and Pakistani merchants also owned medium-sized trade establishments, both in Sharqah Town and in Khor Fakkan. Iranian merchants were active in Sharqah's fruit and vegetable market. Local merchants, along with Indian, Pakistani and

71 Sadik and Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, p. 34.
Iranian ones, were associated with the Sharqah Chamber of Commerce, but local merchants carried the most weight within this body. The Chamber of Commerce was the chief instrument that local merchants had for exerting some political influence upon the Ruler.

Wholesale merchants linked to the agricultural sector were important in Ras al-Khaimah, as that sheikhdom sold much of its produce to Dubai. The growth of Dubai, economically and demographically during the 1960s, increased the demand in Dubai for Ras al-Khaimah’s produce, and also for the services of the wholesale merchants in Ras al-Khaimah who transported the produce to Dubai. Some of these wholesale merchants also brought manufactures and other goods from Dubai back to Ras al-Khaimah, where they sold them to various shopkeepers and villages there. In the Sheikhdoms of Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah, the wholesale and retail mercantile sector was small. There were, however, some importers of basics from Dubai who sold these goods for local consumption.

The service sector also accounted for a small percentage of the labor forces of the northern sheikhdoms. While Dubai’s service sector accounted for 15.4 per cent of Dubai’s labor force, Sharqah’s service sector only accounted for 7.5 per cent of that sheikhdom’s labor force. The

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73 Ibid., p. 209.
service share of Ajman's labor force amounted to 7.6 per cent, 7.9 per cent of Umm al-Quwain's labor force, 5.5 per cent of Ras al-Khaimah's labor force, and 2.5 per cent of Fujairah's labor force. Because a certain number of immigrant workers settled in Sharqah, Ajman, and Umm al-Quwain, along with a few others who settled in Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah, other immigrants and some locals opened restaurants, grocery stores, bakeries, barber shops etc. to accommodate them. The service sector also included employees of the hotels and rest houses that had been established in Sharqah to accommodate British military personnel, and airplane passengers. These hotels were owned by locals or by Indian immigrants. Indian immigrants also sometimes served as managers for them.

Some Sharqah locals were employed on British army bases and airbases. There was also a small banking sector in Sharqah, where four banks were operating in Sharqah. One of these banks was the British Bank of the Middle East. However, the banking sector of Sharqah only accounted for 0.7 percent of Sharqah's labor force, and was insignificant in the other northern sheikhdoms as well. The manufacturing and

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74 Sadiq and Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, p. 34.
75 Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, p. 181.
76 Ibid., p. 182.
mining sectors also took up insignificant percentages of the labor forces of the northern sheikhdoms, since few if any manufacturing concerns were established within them, and since they had no significant oil or other mineral reserves that were discovered and exploited during the 1960s.

Since these emirates did not have sufficient revenues for implementing development programs such as those of Abu Dhabi or Dubai, larger percentages of their labor forces remained employed in the agricultural and fishing sectors in 1968. In Sharqah, this quantity amounted to 23.5 per cent for agriculture and fishing, and this was relatively low because a certain number of development contracts were being implemented in that sheikhdom. In Ajman, the percentage of the labor force in agriculture and fishing jumped to 35.8 per cent. For Umm al-Quwain, it was 49.3 per cent, as it was for Ras al-Khaimah. However, for Fujairah, it was as high as 77.7 per cent.\textsuperscript{77}

The significant agricultural areas of the Sheikdom of Sharqah were Al-Dhayd in the interior, and the eastern region of the Batinah Coast. The most common form of agriculture was date cultivation,\textsuperscript{78} but there was also extensive cultivation of limes and mangos. In fact, Sharqah was nearly self-

\textsuperscript{77} Sadik and Snavely, \textit{Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates}, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{78} Anthony, \textit{Arab States of the Lower Gulf}, p. 182.
sufficient in many staple crops, fruits and vegetables. Boat builders in Sharqah also built small craft for use in the fishing sector, although the building of the larger vessels that had characterized regions of historic Oman that were under the pre-1820 Qasimi Confederation was no longer common. Some fishermen and boat builders also engaged in agriculture during the 1945-1971 period.\textsuperscript{79}

Ras al-Khaimah’s significant agricultural area was its coastal plain, where there also existed a fishing stratum.\textsuperscript{80} Linked to the farming stratum was a local mercantile one, which transported and sold a variety of produce from the coastal and Diqdaqah areas in Dubai and elsewhere in Trucial Oman, and sometimes exported it to Musqat.\textsuperscript{81} This local merchant stratum was a continuation of the similar one of the 1820-1945 period that was treated above.

In Ajman, the Masfut region continued to be the an important agricultural area, as it had been during the 1820-1945 period. Farmers there continued to cultivate not only dates, but also wheat, onions and tobacco. This last crop Masfuti farmers would dry, transport, and sell in Dubai.\textsuperscript{82} Tobacco and dates were also cultivated in Fujairah, as were

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., p. 183.

\textsuperscript{80} Tomkinson, The United Arab Emirates, p. 165.

\textsuperscript{81} Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, p. 196.

\textsuperscript{82} Tomkinson, The United Arab Emirates, p. 162.
mangos, limes, and various kinds of vegetables. The raising of livestock by tribal groupings also continued in Ajman, Fujairah and Umm al-Quwain, as did the local fisheries. Some farmers in these three sheikhdoms hired seasonal laborers, usually bedouins or fishermen, whom they paid in kind. Members of the fishing sector usually built their own small craft, and did their fishing by means of a large net which extended from the shore to the craft. Some fishermen could occasionally barter the surplus of a given catch for such other foodstuffs as dates or rice.  

As mentioned above, the construction sector had employed as much as 40.1 per cent of Abu Dhabi's labor force. By contrast, construction employed 23.8 per cent of Sharqah's labor force. This quantity diminished further for the other northern emirates, amounting to 15.0 per cent for Ajman, 12.0 per cent for Ras al-Khaimah, and Umm al-Quwain, and 10.4 per cent for Fujairah.  

Construction workers, in contrast to some seasonal agricultural ones, were paid wages, rather than in kind.

In Sharqah, as elsewhere in Trucial Oman, most of the construction were immigrants from India, Pakistan, or Iran. A smaller number of Indian and Pakistani construction workers

84 Sadik and Snively, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, p. 34.
could be found on the few construction projects underway in Ras al-Khaimah. Baluchis and Pathanis from Pakistan and Afghanistan also constituted the majority of the small number of construction workers found on construction projects in Ajman. Immigrant workers also operated heavy machinery, and served as engineers and supervisors in the construction sector in Fujairah.  

The transportation and communication sectors combined employed 12.8 per cent of Sharqah's labor force in 1968, 8.0 per cent of Ajman's, 6.9 per cent of Umm al-Quwain's, 9.3 per cent of Ras al-Khaimah's, and only 2.1 per cent of Fujairah's.  

Transportation and communications services, such as the telephone company, were installed through the Trucial Oman Development Fund, which was controlled by the British colonial administration. Therefore, while the rulers of the different northern sheikhdoms were usually the heads of these transportation and communications offices, just as they headed up the rest of the government bureaucracy, the topmost managers, advisors and planners were British. Transportation and communications services also employed Indian and Arab technicians and engineers. Locals were also employed as operators, clerks, drivers, maintenance personnel, and in

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85 Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, pp. 183, 199, 211.

86 Sadik and Snavely, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, p. 34.
other capacities.

Concerning the status of members of the labor force, greater percentages of the labor forces of the Emirates of Sharqah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah were self employed than were those of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. For Sharqah, this quantity amounted to 23 per cent. For Ajman, it was 31 per cent. For Umm al-Quwain it was 32 per cent. For Ras al-Khaimah it was 38 per cent. This quantity was as high as 50 per cent for Fujairah. This was because foreign companies obtained contracts for very few development projects in these emirates, and as a result, larger percentages of the labor force remained self-employed within the agricultural sector, on small, family held farms, or retained self-employment as fishermen or shopkeepers.  

Concerning other characteristics of the labor forces of the northern emirates, smaller percentages of the labor forces of these emirates were employees than were those of the labor forces of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Employee status accounted for 69 per cent of Sharqah’s labor force, 54 per cent of Ajman’s and Umm al-Quwain’s, 48 per cent of Ras al-Khaimah’s, and 33 per cent of Fujairah’s. These statistics, too, reflect the scarcity of development projects in these emirates, as development projects were usually large scale, and implemented

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87 Ibid., p. 29.
88 Ibid., p. 29.
through contracts with large British firms. This situation, particularly prevalent in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, tended to take sections of the labor force away from the more precarious status of self employment, and channel members of the labor force into wage-based employment.

General education institutions in the northern sheikhdoms were mainly in urban areas, and large percentages of the labor forces of these emirates were employed in agriculture and fishing. This reality affected the 1968 education level statistics for these emirates; the percentage of the labor force for all of these emirates reaching any level of education was markedly lower than that for Dubai or Abu Dhabi. In Sharqah, 83.7 per cent of the labor force had obtained no general education. This percentage rose to 88 per cent for Umm al-Quwain, to 90.1 per cent for Ras al-Khaimah, to 91.1 per cent for Ajman, and to fully 97 per cent for Fujairah. For primary education, the percentages were 9 per cent for Umm al-Quwain, 8.9 per cent for Sharqah, 5.4 per cent for Ras al-Khaimah, 3.9 per cent for Ajman, and only 2.1 per cent of Fujairah’s labor force had obtained primary education. In 1968, Only 5.7 per cent of Sharqah’s labor force completed secondary education, but the other northern emirates ranked even lower. This quantity amounted to 3.6 per cent for Ajman, 3.2 per cent for Ras al-Khaimah, 2.2 per cent for Umm al-Quwain, and .9 per cent for Fujairah. Only minute percentages
of the labor forces of these smaller emirates had completed higher education in 1968. In Sharqah, this group comprised 1.6 per cent of the labor force. In Ajman, it was 1.3 per cent, in Ras al-Khaimah 1.1 per cent, in Umm al-Quwain, .7 per cent, and in Fujairah, none of the labor force had completed higher education. The main reason for this was that institutions of higher education had not been established in Trucial Oman during the 1950s and 1960s. For the pursuit of higher education, students from Trucial Oman went to Kuwait, Baghdad, Cairo, Beirut, and Jordan. During the 1960s, they were also going to Damascus and Moscow.

There are several factors that enabled the social order in the northern sheikhdoms to reproduce itself. One factor that legitimized the ruling sheikhs of these emirates was the Qasimi legacy of resistance of British colonialism during the early 1800s. Pride in this legacy was shared by sheikhs and citizens alike in the northern emirates. Another contributing factor in this reproduction was the fact that the northern emirates were segmented and small. This ensured the Rulers' ability to penetrate their civil societies politically, economically and culturally. A related factor was the institution of the Majlis. Because the northern sheikhdoms


were so small, this institution could actually enable the ruling sheikhs to be in direct contact with merchants and tribal groupings, and therefore to act upon, or at least respond to, requests and complaints promptly. Each northern sheikhdom also developed its own government bureaucracy and police force. These bodies not only ensured internal security and administrative cohesion for the northern emirates, but also provided employment for certain members of the intelligensia (in the case of the government bureaucracies), and for members of tribal groupings (in the case of the police forces).

Dubai and Abu Dhabi also played a role in the reproduction of the social order in the northern sheikhdoms. Dubai provided an outlet for the agricultural and fishing produce of the northern sheikhdoms, and also served as a supplier for consumer goods and other demands. Abu Dhabi, for its part, funded many development projects in the northern emirates, both through its contributions to the Trucial Oman Development Office, and through direct contributions to individual sheikhdoms. Abu Dhabi also provided employment for many from the northern sheikhdoms in relation to its extensive development measures. Other Gulf countries and sheikhdoms, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain provided employment during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s for many who emigrated from the northern emirates. These countries and
sheikhdoms also contributed to development projects in the northern sheikhdoms, and especially to those within the area of education.

Despite the fact that the northern sheikhdoms remained impoverished in relation to Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the assistance that Abu Dhabi and the other Gulf countries and sheikhdoms extended to the northern emirates generally enabled their populations to see their living standards as having improved in comparison to what they had been during the 1940s and 1950s, at the decline of the pearl industry. Different segments of the populations, however, benefitted more in relation to others, as can be seen in the stratification that existed in the societies of the northern sheikhdoms.

Within each of the northern sheikhdoms, the mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations continued to function during the 1945-1971 period. They functioned in relation to each other, since people from farming areas and people from the badia areas of the northern sheikhdoms met in the cities of the northern sheikhdoms to exchange goods. This interaction among the three socio-discursive formations helped to enable the status quo in these sheikhdoms to reproduce itself.

The three socio-discursive formations actually continued to interact in Trucial Oman as a whole between 1945 and 1971, for when people from the badia migrated into cities
like Dubai or Abu Dhabi, they brought the institution of nisab with them. Nisab, in fact, was institutionalized both in Abu Dhabi and Dubai so that it became a determinant of cultural prestige in relation to other inhabitants of these cities, and in relation to immigrant workers.

During the 1945-1971 period, the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations articulating within Abu Dhabi and Dubai functioned in a different manner from those of the northern sheikdoms. In Abu Dhabi, the agrarian socio-discursive formation had come to include some immigrant workers, as well as employees and managers of government-established farming cooperatives. Although the population of the badia was small in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, people from the tribal socio-discursive formation who migrated into the cities still identified with the badia, and used the institution of nisab as a criterion of cultural prestige. The mercantile socio-discursive formation, too, now articulated in relation to an influx of British firms, Western capital goods and consumer durables, and within a new setting created by infrastructural development projects.

The new ways in which the three socio-discursive formations had to articulate in relation to each other enabled the government administrations of the sheikdoms to penetrate each one, since each one had developed new linkages with the government during the 1945-1971 period. Many people from the
badia, for instance, had migrated into the cities and found employment as guards of the Sheikh or as rank and file in the defense or police forces. Agriculturalists sold their produce in the cities, and also obtained government subsidies for various agricultural improvements. Members of the mercantile socio-discursive formation benefitted from the infrastructural development projects that were being instituted such as the expansion of ports, the building of roads, etc. Particularly significant were the benefits that the social order in Trucial Oman now offered the children of farmers, bedouins, and urban dwellers alike. First among these benefits were the educational opportunities. These educational opportunities predisposed youth coming from all three socio-discursive formations to develop similar consciousness, and provided them with opportunities for social mobility. Other benefits included that the social order in Trucial Oman now offered included employment, health care, housing, and access to the increasing selection of consumer goods that were being imported into Trucial Oman with the growth of development there.

Conclusion

Chapters Ten, Eleven and Twelve demonstrated that during the 1945-1971 period, the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms developed diverse economic and political administrations, and also developed different sources of income. British
colonialism benefitted from the political, economic and cultural transformations that were occurring in all of Trucial Oman during the 1945-1971 period, and in particular, from transformation in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. These benefits included the profitability for the British of the control over the production, pricing and marketing of crude oil, lucratively of the development contracts that British companies obtained in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, as well as the salaries that British personell obtained from working in Trucial Oman under the colonial administration.

In relation to the deepening British colonial penetration, Chapter Ten showed that Dubai continued to be a mercantile entrepôt, while Chapter Eleven traced Abu Dhabi’s development as an oil producer during the 1945-1971 period. Chapter Twelve demonstrated that in contrast to Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the northern sheikhdoms developed neither an extensive mercantile stratum nor an oil industry. Instead, they received assistance from the Trucial Oman Development Fund, as well as assistance from other Arab countries.

These chapters further analyzed how each sheikhdom's administration was able to reproduce itself by penetrating its own particular civil society, and how Abu Dhabi was able to go beyond its own civil society, penetrating that of the northern emirates as well, by means of its contributions to the northern sheikhdoms individually, and also to the Trucial Oman
Development Fund. The ability of each sheikhdom’s administration to reproduce itself developed in relation to each sheikhdom’s construction of its own political, economic and cultural apparatuses. This reproduction was also facilitated by the development of welfarism and consumerism within each sheikhdom in relation to development projects, the creation of employment opportunities, and in relation to the influx of immigrant labor. The development of social stratification within each emirate was another facilitating factor helping each sheikhdom’s administration to reproduce itself.

The fact that such sheikhdoms as Abu Dhabi and Dubai enjoyed greater economic growth than did the northern sheikhdoms translated into a discourse of "self" versus "others" that the governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubai were able to construct in relation to the other emirates. This discourse specifically enabled the Abu Dhabi and Dubai governments to construct their sheikhdoms as entities that were economically and politically "superior" to the northern sheikhdoms. The northern emirates, for their part, constructed a discourse of their own concerning Qasimi pride in sustained resistance to British penetration. Finally, the social order within each sheikhdom was reproduced by the fact that within each sheikhdom, there developed discourses concerning class, stratum, nisab, ethnicity, nationality,
gender, etc. In addition, the discourse constructed in relation to the greater prosperity that most inhabitants of Trucial Oman enjoyed during the 1960s, in contrast to the economic stagnation of the 1940s and 1950s after the decline of the pearling industry, helped the social order in Trucial Oman to reproduce itself during the 1945-1971 period.

These chapters also showed how Trucial Oman began to develop linkages with the rest of the Arab world during the 1945-1971 period, both in relation to the development projects that the sheikhdoms' governments were initiating, and to the development of cultural structures such as the education system. Infrastructural projects such as the development of ports, and airports, also strengthened Trucial Oman's linkages with the rest of the Arab world by facilitating the circulation of newspapers and periodicals from other parts of the Arab World in Trucial Oman. Growing consumerism, in relation to which many people in Trucial Oman purchased radios, also facilitated the circulation of the message of Arab Nationalism. As for the education system, its growth during the 1945-1971 period brought about the influx of Palestinian and Egyptian teachers, and this, too, made the people of Trucial Oman more conscious of developments in the rest of the Arab World. As a result of these changes, the people of Trucial Oman developed increasing antagonism toward British colonialism, and also developed a greater predisposal
toward the idea of the unification of Trucial Oman’s sheikhdoms into one entity. The withdrawal of British colonialism from Trucial Oman, and the unification of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms to form the United Arab Emirates will be the focus of Chapter Thirteen.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN


Introduction

This chapter will focus on the withdrawal of British colonialism from Trucial Oman in relation to the development of the anti-colonial movement in the Arab world, in the Arabian Peninsula, and in Trucial Oman itself. This chapter will also analyze the unification of Trucial Oman, as well as the failure of greater unity among all of the Arabian Gulf emirates to occur. Additionally, this chapter will demonstrate some of the ways in which the anti-colonial movements that arose in the Arabian Peninsula during the 1945-1971 period differed in construction from earlier movements and confederations which resisted European penetration in the Arabian Gulf, such as the Ya‘arabi movement, Mir Muhanna’s expulsion of the Dutch, the Muwahidi movement, and the Al-Qawasim. These earlier movements had arisen in relation to earlier penetrations of the Arabian Gulf by the Portuguese, Dutch and English, who had mainly been interested in gaining control of Arabian Gulf-Indian Ocean commerce, and therefore concentrated on gaining control of the Arabian Gulf waterway, and its coastal areas. These powers did not, however, gain
control of the agricultural interiors of Arabian Gulf lands, where most of the population was settled. This allowed such large movements as the Ya‘arabi movement and the Muwahidi movement to develop in the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. The Ya‘arabi movement was able to unite historic Oman against the Portuguese, and the Muwahidi movement was able to unite the Arabian Peninsula against the British. While both the Ya‘arabi and Muwahidi movements had used the discourse of Islam as the means for uniting their followers against European penetration, the anti-colonial movements of the 1945-1971 period used the global discourses of (Arab) Nationalism and Scientific Socialism for the building of anti-colonial unity. These discourses, however, were based on ideas that had been brought into the Arab world from outside.

Methods of European penetration of the Arabian Gulf, too, had changed during the twentieth century in relation to those of prior to the 1820-1945 period. Thus, anti-colonial movements arising in the twentieth century Arabian Gulf now faced a colonialism that had fully penetrated the lands of the Gulf region politically, economically and culturally, and had segmented the Arabian Peninsula into a series of entities, each of which was individually linked to the world market through the import of consumer and capital goods, and the export of crude oil.

Because of colonialism’s comprehensive penetration and
segmentation of the Arabian Peninsula at this time, movements such as the one founding the third Muwahidi polity (Saudi Arabia) could not re-unite the Peninsula to oust British colonialism. Rather, it had to accept the status-quo, including the juridical borders that the British were drawing during the early 1900s. The Obeidi movement that arose in the interior of Oman during the early twentieth century, and again in the 1950s, was defeated by the combined forces of the British, and the Sultanate of Musqat.

In relation to these realities, the anti-colonial movements that arose in the Arabian Gulf during the 1945-1971 period adopted discourses that were different from those of previous movements resisting European penetration. These new anti-colonial movements also differed from their predecessors in terms of their successes and failures. It was in relation to the comprehensiveness of British colonial penetration of the Arabian Gulf during the twentieth century, and to the anti-colonial movements that arose during the 1950s and 1960s to challenge this penetration, that the United Arab Emirates was established in 1971. It was also in relation to British colonial penetration that the what had been historic Oman and historic Al-Bahrain came to be divided into several, segmented states. The significance of this chapter’s presentation is that it demonstrates the differences between the anti-colonial movement arising in the twentieth century Arabian Gulf with
those that arose before. In addition, this chapter's presentation clarifies the process by which the British withdrew from the Arabian Gulf, and by which the United Arab Emirates was established. Further, coverage of the anti-colonial movements that arose in the 1950s and 1960s in the Arabian Peninsula is necessary for understanding the contemporary U.A.E., because among other things, understanding the contemporary U.A.E. requires assessing which discourses from these anti-colonial movements continued into the contemporary period, and which ones did not.

This chapter will be presented in four sections. The first section focuses upon and analyzes the British discourses for withdrawal from the Arabian Gulf. The second section treats the anti-colonial movements that arose as counter-discourses to British colonialism in Bahrain, Aden, the Sultanate of Musqat and Oman, and Trucial Oman. All of these movements are covered not only so that they can be compared and contrasted among themselves, but also in order to show the impact that they had, in aggregate and individually, upon the British withdrawal from Trucial Oman itself, and the formation of the United Arab Emirates afterwards. The third and fourth sections treat the historic, economic, political and cultural factors that led to the establishment of the United Arab Emirates, along with those that account for the failure of greater Gulf unification tomaterialize.
The Anti-Colonial Movement
and the Myth of Peaceful Withdrawal

Early in 1968, Prime Minister Harold Wilson (Labor Party) announced the planned, peaceful withdrawal of British forces from the Arabian Gulf by the end of 1971.¹ The reason that the British government gave for this decision was economic. The British government had been pruning the U.K.'s defense expenditure, partially in relation to the 1967 devaluation of the Pound from $2.89 to $2.40. During this period, the U.K. had faced an increase in its trade deficit, and the currency devaluation had been a condition for its obtaining a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that year in 1967.² (One contributor to the increase in the trade deficit had been the rising costs of shipping oil from the Gulf to the U.K., brought about by the closure of the Suez Canal in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.)³ In addition, some British policymakers were advocating the re-channeling of defense expenditure into nuclear, rather than conventional defense, and correspondingly, the paring down of

¹ MEED (January 29, 1968): 63. The Labor Party actually came to power in October, 1964, waiting four years before it declared the U.K.'s intention to withdraw from the Arabian Gulf region. It was changing conditions in the Arabian Peninsula, rather than the Labor Party's supposed progressivism, that dictated this withdrawal, as can be seen in the examples of Bahrain, Yemen, and Oman provided below.


³ Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, p. 468.
conventional forces, as expressed in the Sandys White Paper of 1957. One feature of this argument was emphasis on the failure of British conventional forces during the tripartite attack by France, Britain and Israel upon Egypt in the Suez War of 1956. The British also faced problems in repressing the anti-colonial movement that had arisen in Aden during the late 1950s, as will be shown below. 4 Other policymakers argued that since the overthrow of Sukarno in Indonesia in 1965 had enabled the British to pull troops out of Singapore, this meant a reduction in the Arabian Gulf’s importance to the British as a security base, since the Arabian Gulf had been militarily linked to Singapore. 5

However, in order to understand in full why the British withdrawal from Trucial Oman and the rest of the Arabian Gulf came about, it is necessary to get beyond the British discourse. First of all, it is important to emphasize that World War II had ended Britain’s hegemony, since in the post-War era, the U.K. was facing challenges from the two new hegemons, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Indeed, British economic dependence upon the U.S. had increased, as underscored by the Marshall Plan, and by other developments. Moreover, many of Britain’s colonies were being penetrated by U.S.-based multinational corporations. In Trucial Oman itself, for

4 Petersen, Defending Arabia, p. 81.
5 Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, p. 468.
example, the British oil concession monopoly was being undermined by a growing U.S. and Japanese oil interests. U.S. companies in particular were pressing the British to leave their colonies, in order for U.S. companies to gain access to the markets that these colonies would provide. But it is important to stress that there were political and cultural, as well as economic factors that dictated the British withdrawal decision.

In addition to these economic factors, the rising global anti-colonial movement was further weakening British hegemony between 1945 and 1965. As a result of this movement, the U.K. had lost India, its largest colony, along with many others. The United Nations, established at the close of World War II, also served as vehicle and forum in which liberated countries could challenge colonialism, particularly through such organizations as the Non-Aligned Movement. This was especially true after 1960, when the U.N. adopted Resolution 1514, which advocated independence for all countries still under colonialism.6

Within the Arab world itself, British hegemony was being eroded by the fact that many former Western European colonies were gaining independence. Furthermore, the Palestinian issue, embodied in the 1948 Arab-Israeli Conflict,

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helped to fuel the rise to power of Arab Nationalism in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and other Arab countries. After 1948, in these three countries and elsewhere, Arab Nationalism was eclipsing Islamist and liberal movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd Party in Egypt as the dominant political discourse.

Despite British domination, and success at isolating the Arabian Gulf region, there, too, the political discourse of Arab Nationalism had been gaining strength since the 1950s. The Arab League was an important means by which Arab Nationalism challenged British colonialism in the Arabian Gulf during the 1960s. As an example, this organization had challenged Britain's moves to prevent its representatives from establishing an office in Trucial Oman by taking the case to the United Nations. This issue was being considered by the U.N. anti-colonialism Committee of Twenty-Four in 1966. Arab Nationalism was also to play a crucial role as a political discourse within Trucial Oman itself, both culturally and politically, as a challenge to British colonialism.

While these global and regional factors were contributors to the British Labor Party's decision of 1968 to withdraw from Trucial Oman, particularly important were the

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7 Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates, p. 163.
8 Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 60.
challenges that British colonialism was facing elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula, notably in Bahrain, Yemen, and the Sultanate of Oman. In Yemen in particular, the U.K. completely lost the benefits it had reaped from the colonial infrastructure it had installed there. It was in Britain’s interest, therefore, to leave Trucial Oman before the situation erupted into one of armed confrontation. Specifically, it was in the U.K.’s interests to preserve and reproduce linkages with the economic and political apparatuses that British colonialism had constructed there.

British colonialism had constructed its political and economic linkages with Trucial Oman through the conclusion of oil concession agreements, through trade and through such development projects as the building of ports, airports, and other infrastructural installations, many of which had been constructed under contracts that the various emirates extended to British companies. A timely British withdrawal from Trucial Oman could ensure that British oil concessions remained intact, and that British companies would be hired for the maintenance, expansion, and improvement that the infrastructural installations would require as society grew, and as its standards changed. Furthermore, Trucial Oman’s economic structure was now providing sufficient employment and social welfare in Trucial Oman to ensure the legitimacy and reproduction of the political power of the ruling stratum.
British also intended to use its withdrawal from Trucial Oman as a means of preserving and reproducing its linkages with its constructions within Trucial Oman’s political structure, including the Police and Defense Forces. A British withdrawal before the eruption of an armed, anti-colonial insurrection in Trucial Oman would not only contribute to the security, stability and reproduction of the emirates’ rulers, but would also ensure that security apparatuses like the police forces of each emirate, and Abu Dhabi’s Defense Force, would continue to purchase British weaponry and employ British advisors for training as they expanded. The U.K. had a concrete example of this scenario in Kuwait, from which it had withdrawn in 1961, since Kuwait’s social order had maintained its stability and reproduction, had retained its economic and political connections with the U.K., and had remained free of the development of any social movement that might threaten this stability or these linkages. By contrasts, in colonies where the British attempted to maintain their presence, such as Bahrain, Aden, the Sultanate of Musqat and Oman, the British faced an anti-colonial movement. It is necessary to understand the development and nature of these anti-colonial movements in the Arabian Peninsula in order to understand why the British found it advantageous to withdrew from Trucial Oman in 1971. In the following passage, the anti-colonial movements in Bahrain,
Aden, the Sultanate of Musqat and Oman will be analyzed, as will the anti-colonial movement in Trucial Oman in relation to them. Such an analysis will provide the means to compare and contrast these movements, and to determine the impact they had, individually and in aggregate, upon the anti-colonial movement in Trucial Oman.

The anti-British Colonial movements in Bahrain, Aden, and the Sultanate of Musqat and Oman went through three stages. In the first stage, these movements generally focused upon concrete but limited economic and political demands pertaining to labor conditions, or particular aspects of British policy. In the second stage, which began with the rise of Arab Nationalism after Abdel-Nasser came to power 1952, these movements became explicitly anti-colonial. In the third stage, these movements began to take up arms against British colonialism, and Marxist and Maoist tendencies within them gained strength during the 1960s, because of the Soviet Union’s anti-colonialist policy, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the decline of Arab nationalism.

The Anti-Colonial Movement in Bahrain

In Bahrain, the anti-colonial movement developed in relation to the fact that this Sheikdom began exporting oil in 1934. Oil revenues in building schools and development projects helped to give rise to a nascent Bahraini intelligencia and working class during the 1930s. The above-
discussed role of both of these strata in the Reform Movement of that time constituted the first stage of the Bahraini anti-colonial movement. The significance of the working class as a participant in the Bahraini anti-colonial movement stemmed from the fact that this class' population in Bahrain was relatively large in relation to that of other emirates. This was true, in part, because during the 1950s and early 1960s, Bahrain was serving as a base both for British colonial military installations, and for British companies operating in the Arabian Gulf region.  

The Bahraini anti-colonial movement entered its second stage during the 1950s and 1960s, when the working class and intelligencia began to express identification with Arab Nationalism, and to take action in relation to developments considered significant across the Arab World, such as the construction of Israel in 1948, the tripartite attack on Egypt in 1956, and British attempts to induce Bahrain and other Gulf Emirates to join the Baghdad Pact. The Suez attack sparked militant demonstrations during which the demonstrators attacked oil installations, overwhelmingly the property of British oil companies. The British suppressed these demonstrations violently, and with mass arrests. Within Bahrain, the anti-colonial movement attempted, with some success, to unite Sunni and Shi'i Bahrainis within the

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9 Ibid., pp. 28 and 29.
movement, where the British had hitherto exerted efforts to keep members of these two denominations divided.

Other manifestations of nationalism within the Bahraini anti-colonial movement of the 1950s was the movement's 1954 call for the unification of all of the Arabian Gulf emirates, as a preliminary step toward the overall unification of Arab countries, and for stronger ties with Abdel-Nasser's Egypt, and the more locally oriented demand that oil companies advance Arab workers to technical grades.\(^{10}\) One of the achievements of the Bahraini anti-colonial movement during the 1950s was the expulsion from Bahrain of the British advisor to the Sheikh, Charles Belgrave in 1956.\(^{11}\)

During the 1960s, the efforts of Bahrain's anti-colonial movement intensified. In 1963, the movement held demonstrations in support of the closer ties that Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were attempting to forge among themselves, in which women participated for the first time. By 1965, several parties had formed in Bahrain, including a Ba'athist Party, and a Socialist Party. Both of these parties, along with many others, participated in Jabhat al-Quwat al-Tagadumiyyah (Front of Progressive Forces).\(^{12}\) The Jabbah's participation in the

\(^{10}\) Ibid.


\(^{12}\) Ibid., pp. 23-24.
1965 strike by the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) workers marked the entry of the Bahraini anti-colonial movement into the third phase. This strike occurred as a long-range manifestation of the buildup of anti-colonial militancy engendered by the above mentioned events of the 1950s and early 1960s, and also by the success of the anti-colonial movement in Yemen, and its growth in Oman. (See below). Another development helping to engender the strike was the increase in the British presence in Bahrain dating back to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis of 1961. More immediately, the 1965 strike occurred because Bapco had staged two large layoffs earlier in that year.

In 1965, the BAPCO workers’ strike became a general strike supported by secondary school students. During this strike, the Jabbah voiced many demands on both the British and the Sheikh concerning labor rights, the right to form parties, and the release of all those imprisoned or expelled in connection with the strike that had ousted British advisor Belgrave. Other demands included the firing of British employees from BAPCO, and a lifting of the "state of emergency" ruling that had been in effect since 1956. Repression of the Bahraini anti-colonial movement grew when Bahrain became the new center of Britain’s Middle East Military Command in the aftermath of the expulsion of British
troops from Aden in 1967.\footnote{Halliday, \textit{Arabia Without Sultans}, pp. 458-459.} It is important to mention that the Bahraini anti-colonial movement's third phase was less pronounced than was that of the anti-colonial movements in Aden or Oman, as the Bahraini movement did not actually take up full-fledged guerilla warfare against British colonialism.

The Anti-Colonial Movement in Aden

The British had been building up Aden as a fortress base during the 1950s and 1960s to counteract the effects of the liberation of the U.K.'s other Arab World and Indian Ocean colonies, i.e. India, Egypt, Sudan and Kenya. However, the British buildup in Aden occurred concurrently with the growth of the anti-colonialism movement there. In its first phase, the Adeni anti-colonial movement consisted of cultural and political clubs, and a nascent Arabic language press that advocated reforms such as the development of an educational system and improvement of the status of women.

The Adeni Association, founded in 1950, advocated cooperation with the British for the implementation of constitutional reforms, which were to lead to independence for Aden within the British Commonwealth. Other groups founded between 1950 and 1955 came to advocate independence for all of South Yemen, and one journal called \textit{Al-Fajr (The Dawn)} advocated the independence and unity of South Yemen, and
eventual unity of the South with North Yemen.\textsuperscript{14}

Anti-colonial Yemeni groupings entered the second phase by beginning to develop a pan-Arab consciousness from the mid-1950s onward, in the wake of the Franco-British-Israeli tripartite attack on Egypt in 1956, and also as the Algerian independence struggle intensified. One Arab nationalist group, the South Arabian League, was founded in 1954, prior to the Suez war that had proved such a catalyst for the growth of Arab Nationalism in Aden. The agenda of the South Arabian League was to liberate South Yemen from British rule, to eliminate the British base in Aden, and to ensure that the Yemeni people reaped the benefits from Yemeni resources, and to unite North and South Yemen as part of an overall plan for ultimate Arab unity.\textsuperscript{15}

During this second phase, the Adeni anti-colonial movement also took up unionization of workers in the city of Aden. These workers were largely migrants from rural areas in Yemen. In 1956, a consolidation of these urban workers' unions, the organization Al-Mu'tamer al-'Ammali (The Workers' Congress) was established. This organization was basically

\textsuperscript{14} Halliday, \textit{Arabia Without Sultans}, p. 192.

nationalistic, and it called strikes in support of President Abdel-Nasser during Suez War of 1956. The Adeni labor movement also protested the British import of workers from other British colonies into Aden as an attempt to segment Aden's labor force, and the fact that workers had to seek employment through a middleman, or mugaddam.\textsuperscript{16} There also developed a local branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM).\textsuperscript{17} During this phase, the deepening of relations between Egypt and North Yemen, and the influx of Soviet weapons to North Yemen also intensified anti-British colonial militancy.\textsuperscript{18}

Initially, anti-colonial, nationalist organizations such as the South Arabian League (SAL) were opposed to taking up arms against British colonialism. The Peoples' Socialist Party (PSP), which developed out of the Mu'tamer al-'Ammali, also originally opposed the idea of armed insurrection, but then embraced it as the British continued to refuse to meet demands for independence, and as they became more repressive. In 1965, SAL and PSP merged to form the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South (OLOS).\textsuperscript{19}

While the Adeni anti-colonial movement was progressing

\textsuperscript{16} Halliday, \textit{Arabia Without Sultans}, p. 194.

\textsuperscript{17} Peterson, \textit{Defending Arabia}, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{18} Halliday, \textit{Arabia Without Sultans}, p. 193.

\textsuperscript{19} Peterson, \textit{Defending Arabia}, p. 95.
through its second stage during the later 1950s, it was at the same time entering the third. This development was marked by the emergence of the National Liberation Front (NLF). This group had originally appeared in the 1950s as a coalition of a local branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) and some other groups. The NLF began guerilla actions against the British relatively early, and developed a competitive relationship with the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, (FLOSY) which had grown out of attempts to unify the NLF with the OLOS. While this merger did not materialize, some Nasserist members of the NLF did join the OLOS and as a result, the OLOS reconstituted itself as the FLOSY.20

The Adeni movement against British colonialism entered its third phase in earnest in 1963, when armed insurrection against British colonialism began in the Radfan region, outside of the city of Aden, near the North Yemeni border. The British launched air strikes against the Radfan tribal groups that began this uprising, but the overthrow of the monarchy in North Yemen, the introduction of Egyptian troops there, and the growth of the NLF brought the challenge to the British beyond the Radfan region.

The growth of the anti-colonial movement throughout Aden also made the Radfan tribes part of an organized guerilla movement. Since the guerilla forces were making the

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20 Ibid., p. 95.
recolonization of Aden by the British impossible, the U.K. tried to engineer a withdrawal that would leave Aden to a government of what the British called the "South Arabian Federation." This withdrawal was to allow the British to retain their military base in Aden. However, by 1964, the anti-colonial movement had gained such strength throughout Aden that the new Labor government chose, instead, to forge an agreement with what it considered some of the more "moderate" anti-colonialists. When this maneuver failed, the British again assumed forcible control of the government of Aden, but by then it had become clear that the main task for the British was to devise a graceful way of withdrawing.

The "Defence White Paper" of February, 1966, announced that the British withdrawal would occur in 1968. All British hopes of leaving Aden with a state structure that would guarantee the U.K. some concessions were, by this time, eclipsed by the fact that the NLF was becoming the dominant political force in Aden, the FLOSY having been defeated decisively in relation to Egypt's defeat during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. It was to the NLF, therefore, that the British were obliged to leave Aden in 1967.\(^{21}\) This situation contrasted sharply with the British withdrawal from Kuwait in 1961, in which they had been able to leave behind a politico-economic structure that was more favorable to them.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., pp. 95-98.
The Anti-Colonial Movement in the Sultanate of Musqat and Oman

The success of the anti-colonialist movement in Aden helped to engender the development of the anti-colonialist movement in Oman. However, Omani resistance to British colonialism actually began its first stage as early as the 1913. This resistance led to the separation of the interior of Oman, which was ruled by an Obeidi Imam, from the Sultanate of Musqat, under the Treaty of Sib in 1920. In 1928, the government of British-India also recognized the Imamate of Oman under the Treaty of Sib. However, the British did not consider the provisions of this Treaty to apply to its oil concession agreement with the Sultan of Musqat, and this decision was central to the latter part of the first stage of the Omani anti-colonial movement. Since the Sultan of Musqat and Oman's oil concession agreement with the British had given Petroleum Concessions, Ltd, and other British oil companies prospecting rights in all of Oman, and had obliged them to pay royalties for the entire concession to the Sultan of Musqat, in 1953, the British Political Resident in Bahrain rejected the Imam of Oman's demand that he be considered a party to the concession. The discourse that the British used to escape oil royalty obligations to Imam Mohammed bin Abdullah Al-Khalili was a fiction to the effect that the Treaty of Sib applied

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22 Ali Fayadh, Harb al-Sha'ab fi 'Uman (Peoples' War in Oman) (Beirut: Al-Ittahid al-'Aam, 1975), p. 45.
only to trading matters and transportation between the Sultanate of Musqat and the Imamate of Oman.\textsuperscript{23}

In 1954, as a result of the British decision, Omanis began to resist the efforts of exploration parties from Petroleum Concessions, Ltd. in the interior. Imam Mohammed bin Abdullah Al-Khalili also, tried to rectify this situation by applying unsuccessfully for membership in the Arab League just before he died in early 1954. However, Imam Ghalib bin Ali, who succeeded Imam Al-Khalili, managed to gain the support of both Egypt and Saudi Arabia against the British in 1954, when he began his resistance campaign.\textsuperscript{24}

This development marked the beginning of the second stage of the Omani anti-colonial movement, as Egypt had begun to support Imam Ghalib bin Ali as an anti-colonial force. Saudi Arabia, for its part, supported Imam Ghalib bin Ali because Riyadh was locked into a dispute with the British and with the Emirate of Abu Dhabi over the Bureimi Oasis.\textsuperscript{25} Imam Ghalib bin Ali then began a campaign both against British rule over the interior of Oman, and against the Sultan of Musqat's claims to that region, in response to which the British


\textsuperscript{24} Taryam, \textit{the Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 26.

\textsuperscript{25} Hawley, \textit{The Trucial States}, p. 261; and Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 25.
dispatched the Trucial Oman Scouts, and the Sultan, too, sent troops. By 1958, the British were facing a full-fledged, nationalist uprising in Oman's interior, whose troops were Egyptian-trained. Imam Ghalib's uprising also got support from other Arab nationalist forces, including those in Trucial Oman and elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf region. All of these forces eagerly followed developments in the fighting, and sometimes actively aided the uprising. The British, meanwhile, escalated their efforts to crush the uprising, dispatching troops from Aden, Sharqah, and Bahrain to support both the Sultanate's troops and the Trucial Oman Scouts.\footnote{26 Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 26.}

This escalation enabled the British to defeat Imam Ghalib's uprising in 1959.\footnote{27 Payadh, \textit{Harb al-Sha'ab fi 'Uman}, p. 79.}

Despite the fact that Imam Ghalib did not actually form a Government in Exile, other Arab States continued to demand the right to self determination for Oman, and the United Nations heard Oman's case several times. Despite the British military defeat of Imam Ghalib's uprising in Oman's interior, this uprising had its impact upon the region, mainly in exposing British practices in putting down the uprising, and in adding to the growth of anti-British sentiments in the Gulf and in the rest of the Arab World, where anti-British
colonialist demonstrations and other activities were becoming common among workers' and students' organizations.\textsuperscript{28}

Economic, political and cultural factors converged to engender the rise of the Front for the Liberation of Dhofar in 1965. It was in the course of the development of this Front that the Omani anti-colonial movement passed from its second stage to its third. The main economic factor contributing to the growth of the Front was the fact that Oman, unlike the rest of the Arabian Gulf, was not experiencing the developmental changes that were occurring elsewhere in the Gulf in relation to the use of oil revenues (i.e. the building of schools, hospitals, airports, and electricity installations, and the growth of employment opportunities. In fact, many Omanis had found employment elsewhere in the Arabian Gulf region because of this development trend, had witnessed the development trends elsewhere in the Gulf, and were able to contrast economic conditions in the rest of the Arabian Gulf with those in Oman.

Politically, Omanis were affected by realities of British colonialism, and by Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur's exceedingly reactionary rule. Culturally, Omanis, like others in the Arabian Gulf, had been awakened by the growth of Arab Nationalism. But the Omanis also found successful anti-

\textsuperscript{28} Taryam, \textit{The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 27.
colonial revolution in Yemen to be a particularly strong influence.

The initial declarations that the Front for the Liberation of Dhofar issued in 1965 show that at that time, this movement was a Nationalist one, as the anti-colonial movements in Bahrain and Yemen before it had been. The first Declaration of June, 1965, for example, called upon the people of the countryside, the badia, and the cities to unite in armed struggle against British colonialism for freedom, dignity, equality and Arab unity. The 1965 Declaration also urged the Arab masses, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf, to take up armed struggle against British colonialism in unity with the Front.\textsuperscript{29}

The Front grew and developed between 1965 and 1968, it changed its name to the "Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf." The organization then reconstituted itself along scientific socialist lines, now calling upon the poor people in particular to join the fight against British colonialism in the entire Arabian Gulf. The Front also declared its solidarity with progressive forces in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, and called upon these forces, and the socialist countries for support. Specifically for the

Arabian Gulf region, the Popular Front's objectives included the development of a self-reliant economy, the use of technology for the development of agriculture, the development of heavy industry through import substitution, electrification, the development of transportation, the eradication of illiteracy and disease, the full involvement of women in the revolution and development processes, and the general democratization of society.³⁰ Late in 1969, there developed another anti-colonial organization, this time in the interior of Oman, which was called the "Democratic National Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf." This new organization first worked in cooperation with the Popular Front, and in 1970, merged with it to form the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf.³¹

The Omani anti-colonialist movement was able to score certain achievements before beginning to decline after 1970. It did, for instance, manage to gain control of most of Oman's Dhofar Province, with the exception of Salalah and a few other coastal towns.³² Among specific Dhofari strata, the Popular Front was able to recruit students, workers, and even some Omani soldiers, who frequently came from the more impoverished

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³⁰ Ibid., pp. 19-21.


³² Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates, p. 167.
Dhofari strata themselves. The workers that the Popular Front was able to recruit were Dhofaris who had migrated to other parts of the Arabian Gulf region after the discovery of oil, and had found employment in the unskilled, oil or construction sectors.\(^{33}\)

One of the reasons for the Popular Front’s initial Dhofari success was that Dhofar had been the wellspring of the Omani anti-colonial movement, and the cadre of the Front for the Liberation of Dhofar who later became part of the Popular Front had been Dhofaris from the smaller, more impoverished tribes,\(^{34}\) operating in their home territory since 1965. Furthermore, the anti-colonial movement in Dhofar had been able to establish schools and clinics in many villages after 1968. The movement also organized farmers into cooperatives, maintained \textit{Aflaj} irrigation canals, and built reservoirs. Women, too, joined the movement, and participated as political leaders, fighters, teachers, nurses, and as delegates representing the Popular Front externally.\(^{35}\) Thirdly, the Popular Front’s emphasis, after 1968, on the construction of a self-sufficient economy, the technological development of agriculture, and the development of heavy industry were all


\(^{34}\) Halliday, \textit{Arabia Without Sultans}, p. 331.

\(^{35}\) Fayadh, \textit{Harb Al-Sha‘ab fi Oman}, pp. 158-165.
ideas that appealed to the Dhofaris as steps toward the betterment of their living standards.

The Omani anti-colonial movement was also able to recruit support from Yemen in particular, and also from elsewhere in the Gulf, establishing a presence in Kuwait and Bahrain by the end of 1970. At that time, the movement was also getting help from China, Iraq, and the U.S.S.R. The Popular Front's political and military successes in gaining control of most of Dhofar also inspired the formation of the previously-mentioned National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf in 1970. This organization carried the campaign against British colonialism, and for the overthrow of Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur further into Oman, launching attacks against army camps in the center of the Sultanate. It was the initial successes that both the Popular Front and the National Democratic Front scored that led to the replacement of Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur with his British-educated son Qabus in July, 1970. It was with this development, however, that the strength of the Omani anti-colonial movement began to wane.

Sultan Qabus bin Sa'id realized that in order to defeat the Popular Front, he would have to lure from its appeal the many Dhofaris whose support it had won. He took several steps

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36 Khalifa, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 167
37 Peterson, *Defending Arabia*, p. 100.
in this direction, the first one being the extension of pardon to all surrendering members of the Popular Front. Subsequently, he launched a comprehensive program of road, school, irrigation well and health facility construction. The building of schools and hospitals was a significant move since not a single school or hospital had been opened in Oman during the entire British colonial administration. By contrast, in 1972, official Omani statistics show that 30,000 children, or twenty per cent of the Sultanate’s children of primary school age, were studying in primary schools in Oman. Sultan Qabus launched this civilian program with an escalation of the military campaign against the Popular Front, and both of these programs were financed by the revenues that the Sultanate obtained from the oil exports that had become significant in 1968.

Preparations for this offensive included the overhauling and enlargement of the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF), so that Sultan Qabus could begin an offensive against the Popular Front in 1971. British companies were significantly involved in both the military and civilian

38 Fayadh, Harb al-Sha‘ab fi ‘Uman, p. 194.
40 Allen, Oman, the Modernization of the Sultanate, p. 95.
41 Peterson, Defending Arabia, p. 100.
campaigns. The British had been heavily involved in the Sultanate’s battle against the Popular Front since 1968, providing both military personnel and weapons. In October, 1970, Sultan Qabus began to order war materiel from the British.\(^\text{42}\) For civilian projects, for example, British firms such as the consultant Halcrow & Partners and John R. Harris were commissioned to build a new port at Mutrah, and to construct new housing.\(^\text{43}\) Oman’s imports also rose under the rule of Sultan Qabus, to over 55 million Pounds Sterling in 1972 from the 4 million Pounds Sterling in 1966. Imports of cars and trucks increased by more than 600 per cent during this time period, and for electrical goods, the increment amounted to 280 per cent.

Britain benefitted from this trend, since it resulted in Britain’s leading Oman’s other suppliers with a 27 per cent share in the market.\(^\text{44}\) Other reforms that Sultan Qabus instituted included the freeing of prisoners from Sultan Sa’id’s prisons, and the repealing of many of the previous regime’s oppressive laws. All of these reforms caused many cadre of the Popular Front to leave the movement, and to take advantage of the pardons that Sultan Qabus was offering.\(^\text{45}\)

\(^\text{42}\) MEED (October 9, 1970): 1180.

\(^\text{43}\) MEED (October 16, 1968): 1211.

\(^\text{44}\) Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, p. 305.

\(^\text{45}\) Fayadh, Harb al-Sha’ab fi ‘Uman, pp. 199-200.
Sultan Qabus also constructed a discourse of his own, which successfully countered the Omani anti-colonial movement. He was able to use the national newspaper that his regime established, Al-Watan (The Nation), and the radio stations he had set up in Musqat and Salalah,\textsuperscript{46} to launch a propaganda war against the Popular Front which the latter had no effective way of countering. Sultan Qabus’s most effective weapon in this propaganda war was his ability to construct the Popular Front as an enemy of Islam. Popular Front members, it was charged, were Communists and therefore infidels who did not believe in God and Islam, and, indeed, were trying to destroy religious belief. Sultan Qabus’ propaganda also asserted that Popular Front members did not believe in traditions, or in nationalism. Furthermore, and worst of all, the women in the Popular Front were immodest and corrupt.\textsuperscript{47}

Qabus’ discourse was successful among most of Oman’s people for several reasons. Firstly, the concepts of scientific socialism, which the Popular Front had adopted as its ideology in 1968, were accepted only by a few in the Arab world as a whole, and virtually unknown in Oman. Arab Nationalism, also a new concept in Oman, was nonetheless considerably more successful than scientific socialism was there, because its discourse spread to Oman and the rest of

\textsuperscript{46} Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, pp. 301-302.

\textsuperscript{47} Fayadh, Harb al-Sha‘ab fi ‘Uman, p. 200-201.
the Arabian Gulf because of radio broadcasts and periodical issuing from Egypt, Syria and Iraq. More importantly, elementary, middle and secondary schools established in the Gulf region recruited teachers from these countries, and from among the Palestinians. In addition, despite its newness, Arab Nationalism was able to appeal to the people of the Gulf because of the language, culture, geography and history that they shared with other Arabs.

By contrast, the Popular Front was faced both with the strangeness of the concepts of scientific socialism to most of the people of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, and with their lack of ability to develop media that could disseminate the discourse of scientific socialism beyond Dhofar. More importantly, the Popular Front managed to alienate many people, and to preclude their joining the anti-colonial movement, as can be seen in its emphasis on the centrality of the working class, which was very marginal in Oman. The Popular Front also emphasized the feudal landlords, and the comprador class were the main enemies of the Omani people, when Omani land tenure was largely characterized by extended family holdings, worked by family members. A feudal landlord class was virtually non-existent in Oman at this time. As for the comprador class, in Oman, it mainly consisted of small importer merchants in coastal towns such as Musqat, or in the interior. The latter purchased modest amounts of imported
goods from Dubai, and then sold them in souqs (markets) in the interior.\textsuperscript{48} Oman's import figures for 1966 indicate how small the comprador class in Oman probably was after 1968, and before Sultan Qabus came to power. In 1966, Oman only imported 4 million Pounds Sterling worth of goods,\textsuperscript{49} and it is likely that a large percentage of this amount accounted for equipment that the British directly imported, for oil concessions and other infrastructural work, and for arms that Sultan Sa'id purchased.

Finally, the Popular Front leadership managed to make active enemies of surrounding rulers by explicitly stating that scientific socialism was its ideology. Within the original Front for the Liberation of Dhofar, this leadership had been able to take advantage of Saudi differences with both the British and the Sultanate of Oman over Bureimi, which were pronounced enough for the Saudis actually to send a limited amount of arms to Dhofar via the Rub al-Khali.\textsuperscript{50} Once this leadership of what became the Popular Front stated its

\textsuperscript{48} Popular Front, Watha'iq al-Nidhal al-Watani, 1965-1974, p. 28. The document reproduced on this page, entitled "Man 'um A'da' al-Sha'ab, wa Man hiyya al-Tabaqat al-Wataniyyah? (Who are the Enemies of the People, and which are the National Classes?)" shows how the Popular Front identified the classes of Omani society.

\textsuperscript{49} Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, p. 305.

\textsuperscript{50} Ray L. Cleveland, "Revolution in Dhofar, Sultanate of Oman," Middle East Forum 47, nos. 3 and 4 (Autumn and Winter, 1971): 100; and Khalifa, The United Arab Emirates, p. 165.
allegiance to scientific socialism, however, it succeeded in bringing Sultan Sa‘id bin Taimur, and later, Sultan Qabus, to form an alliance against it with King Faisal. In affixing the scientific socialist label to the Omani anti-colonialism movement, the Popular Front leadership also to bring the Shah of Iran into the fray as supplier of troops and arms to Sultan Qabus, since the Shah’s alliance with the U.S. had placed him in the role of local guard. Aside from supplying troops and arms to the Sultan of Oman, the Shah was also able to stop the Peoples Republic of China from supplying arms to the Popular Front by playing upon Sino-Soviet antagonisms. Iran was also able to make the cessation of Iraqi military assistance to the Popular Front a provision of the Algiers Treaty of 1975. The Sadat regime and Kuwait also got involved by successfully urging South Yemen to consider its own economic difficulties, and to cease its assistance to the Popular Front in light of them. Meanwhile, by 1974, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf had narrowed its strategy, renaming itself the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.

Its failures notwithstanding, the Popular Front in Oman, together with the Yemeni and Bahraini anti-colonial movements, did succeed in serving notice upon the British that it was time for them to withdraw from the Arabian Gulf, especially if they wanted leave their economic and political
constructions in the Gulf intact. Britain's announcement of its withdrawal plans in 1968 in relation to the Yemeni, Bahraini and Omani challenges was also an important reason why the anti-colonial movement in Trucial Oman did not enter the third stage. However, there were other, more internally-based reasons for this, which were economic, political and cultural. In order to understand these reasons, it is necessary to elaborate upon the characteristics of the first and second phases of the anti-colonial movement in Trucial Oman.

The Anti-Colonial Movement in Trucial Oman

The first phase of anti-colonialism in Trucial Oman had actually started with the Qasimi resistance to British strangulation of historic Oman's Indian Ocean trade in the early nineteenth century. This phase continued to include the Reform Movement of the 1930s, treated earlier. The second phase of Trucial Oman's anti-colonialist movement began in the 1950s, when, like its Bahraini counterpart, this movement began to link itself to the forces of Arab Nationalism. One element that demarcated the first stage of the anti-colonial movement in Trucial Oman from the second was the fact that the Reform Movement of Trucial Oman, like that of Iraq and Kuwait, was not explicitly anti-colonial. As stated previously, the Iraqi Reform Movement had merely advocated a reduction of cooperation with the British. The Kuwaiti Reform Movement, for its part, had emphasized the obtaining of reforms from the
Sheikh concerning the government budget, education, the judiciary, and the improvement of security services, and did not attack the British presence at all. While the Reform Movement in Trucial Oman did express certain sentiments against the British colonial presence there, it, too, mainly focused upon governmental reform.

In contrast to the Reform Movement, the second stage of the anti-colonial movement in Trucial Oman made the British withdrawal one of its central demands, and was closely linked to Arab Nationalist forces outside of Trucial Oman, in particular, deriving inspiration from Nasser’s Egypt and from the Palestinian cause. There are several factors that led Trucial Oman’s anti-colonial movement into a second, nationalistic phase. Firstly, the Iraqi and Kuwaiti Reform Movements that had inspired the Reform Movement in Trucial Oman had taken root in two Arab countries that were still under British rule at the time. In fact, at that time, all of the Arab countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, were under Western European rule. By contrast, the second phase of Trucial Oman’s anti-colonial movement grew under the inspiration of the regimes of politically independent Arab states. Furthermore, the Reform Movement of the 1930s grew under the leadership of the moribund pearl merchant stratum, while Trucial Oman’s anti-colonial movement entered its second stage under the leadership of a growing intelligensia, with
the participation of some government bureaucrats and even some members of the ruling strata.

Changes in Trucial Oman’s education system during the 1950s and 1960s played a great role in nurturing this intelligencia. Trucial Oman’s emirates, with the exception of Abu Dhabi, had adopted Kuwait’s educational curriculum, which the Kuwaitis, in turn, had adopted the Egyptian educational system that the Nasser regime had developed. Egypt actually sent many teachers to Trucial Oman, and Palestinian teachers came to Trucial Oman to teach as well, bringing the discourse of Arab Nationalism with them, together with specifics about Egypt and Palestine. Media bearing the Nationalist message, such as radio and periodicals, also fueled the growth of Trucial Oman’s anti-Colonial intelligencia. The most influential radio station was Cairo’s Sawt al-‘Arab (Voice of the Arab). Influential periodicals included Al-Musawwur, Al-Ahram, Rose al-Yussuf, and Al-Hilal.51 Sawt al-‘Arab played a particularly important role here, both because of the strength of its signal, and because the majority of Trucial Oman’s population was illiterate, as statistics above have shown. An important characteristic of the second stage of Trucial Oman’s anti-colonialist movement was the impact of Nasser’s speeches on both teachers and students, which led

them to form a core of the anti-colonialist movement in Trucial Oman. In more than one of his speeches, he reiterated his belief that the educated strata would lead the Arab Nation's fight against imperialism, that Arab students bore a special obligation to the Arab nation, and that they were crucial to rebuilding the Arab nation so that it could enjoy strength in relation to the rest of the world.⁵²

Both male and female students in Trucial Oman, therefore, participated in demonstrations in 1956 supporting Egypt and attacking British colonialism, both as an occupier of Trucial Oman and as a participant in the tripartite aggression against Egypt after Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.⁵³ Trucial Oman students, and members of many other strata also participated in demonstrations supporting the 1958 decision by Egypt and Syria to form the United Arab Republic. Participants carried portraits of Nasser despite warnings from some rulers against this.⁵⁴

One example of the importance of education to the second stage of the anti-colonial movement in Trucial Oman was an early anti-colonial demonstration that occurred in relation


⁵⁴ Al-Alkim, The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates, p. 7.
to the expulsion of a Palestinian school teacher who had been sent by Kuwait to act as Principal of the Al-Ahmadiyyah school in Dubai in 1956. At the Al-Ahmadiyyah school, this principal formulated a curriculum which included a speech at the beginning of the day combining the exposure of British colonialism with coverage of developments in the rest of the Arab World. This speech was stirring enough to attract large gatherings of listeners from outside of the school each day. These gatherings, in turn, soon attracted British surveillance, and within six months of the beginning of this teacher’s tenure as the Al-Ahmadiyyah school’s principal, the British detained and exiled him. The demonstration that was held in relation to this expulsion was dispersed by means of water hoses and truncheons.\(^55\)

Aside from participating in anti-colonialist demonstrations, Trucial Oman students formed Omani Students Associations outside of Trucial Oman and the Sultanate of Oman, whose constitutions emphasized that Trucial Oman and the Sultanate of Oman were actually one country that British colonialism had artificially divided, and that Oman, itself was part of a greater Arab Nation. The first Omani Students’ Association was established in Kuwait in 1957. Associations were established in Cairo and Moscow in 1963. The Baghdad,

Damascus and Beirut branches of the Association were established in 1963, 1965 and 1970 respectively. The goals of the Omani Student Associations included the support of Oman's independence from the British, the spread of national culture among students, and the support of the Dhofari Liberation Front, as well as all other Arab national movements for independence and self-determination.  

Although students constituted an extremely important contingent of the Trucial Oman anti-colonial movement's second stage, even the rulers became involved in certain instances. For example, the rulers of the Emirates of Ajman and Fujairah extended support to Imam Ghalib's fight during the late 1950s for independence for Oman's interior from both the Sultanate and the British. In fact, the support that the Sheikh of Fujairah's heir apparent was extending to Imam Ghalib's resistance was such that the British arrested him. 

Trucial Oman's population in general remained actively supportive of anti-colonialist and Arab Nationalist causes during the 1960s, as can be seen in the fact that Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, of which the Dhofari movement became a part in 1965, developed several underground

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57 Hawley, The Trucial States, p. 175.

58 Nawfal, Al-Awdha' al-Siyasiyah, p. 43.
branches throughout Trucial Oman during the decade. During the late 1960s, the PFLO also obtained supporters from within the population of Ras al-Khaimah. Underground operation in Trucial Oman was necessary because of British prohibitions against the establishment of political organizations by the local population. In 1972, Sheikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi discovered that supporters of the PFLOAG had infiltrated both the army and the civil service in Abu Dhabi, and in neighboring emirates. Most of those arrested in Abu Dhabi in relation to this discovery were from educated, prosperous strata.

Concerning other issues in the Arab world, between 1961 and 1967, several demonstrations were held in Trucial Oman opposing the dissolution of the 1958 unification of Egypt with Syria, advocating unity between Egypt, Syria and Iraq (1963), and in support of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Besides demonstrating, males of fighting age volunteered to fight against the Israeli attack. In 1964, Sheikh Saqr enlisted the aid of the Trucial Oman scouts in

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61 Anthony, Arab States of the Lower Gulf, p. 146.

dispersing a gathering of pro-Nasserist demonstrators, whose sources of inspiration were not only Egyptian schoolteachers, but also dissident members of the Al-Qawasim. In fact, three of Sheikh Saqr's brothers and their families were exiled in relation to this incident.⁶³

Cultural events, too, became anti-Colonial activities as Trucial Oman's anti-colonialist movement progressed through its second stage. These events included productions of anti-colonial plays about the situation in other parts of the Arab World. Nationalist poetry was also published and recited. Cultural activities like these frequently ended with demonstrations, as people leaving them took up anti-colonialist and pro-Nasser chants, and frequently threw rocks at passing British vehicles.⁶⁴

All of this anti-colonial activity in Trucial Oman during the 1950s and the 1960s ultimately had its impact both on the external and internal policies of the ruling sheikhs. In 1961, for example, both Abu Dhabi and Dubai established offices for the administration of the boycott against Israel. In 1964, as mentioned above, most of the Sheikhs of Trucial Oman agreed to accept Arab League assistance, and some also pledged to allow the Arab League to open offices within their


emirates. In this context, Sheikh Saqr of Sharqah had actually challenged the validity of the British imposed treaties.\textsuperscript{65}

The impact of Arab Nationalism and the local anti-colonialist movement was also demonstrated by Abu Dhabi's 1967 participation in the 1967 oil boycott of countries considered supportive of Israel, and Abu Dhabi's extension of financial assistance to Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and to Al-Fatah in 1967 and 1968.\textsuperscript{66} In 1969, Abu Dhabi's ruler pledged to cooperate with the Arab League by contributing an initial amount of the required capital to the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund. Abu Dhabi also contributed to the UNRWA.\textsuperscript{67} The ruler of Dubai, for his part, extended financial assistance to King Hussein in 1968, and also imposed a ten per cent surtax on land transactions, a five per cent surtax on hotel bills and cables, and a tax on airline and cinema tickets. The proceeds of these taxes were appropriated to the Palestinian cause.\textsuperscript{68} This, in turn, legitimized the Trucial Oman rulers in the eyes of other Arabs, including those in

\textsuperscript{65} Nawfal, \textit{Al-Awdha' al-Siyasiyyah}, p. 26.


\textsuperscript{68} \textit{MEEED} (May 17, 1968): 438-439.
countries whose governments were antagonistic toward them, such as Egypt.

Concerning external developments, the escalation of the anti-colonial movement's activities was also responsible for the repeated placement of Arabian Gulf question on the agenda of the United Nations anti-colonialism committees. This situation then brought the Arabian Gulf question to the attention of United Nations member states that followed anti-colonial policies. Britain, however, continued to insist that the Gulf situation was not a colonial issue, and specifically, that the Gulf emirates themselves were not British colonies but independent states under special treaties guaranteeing British protection. On June 8, 1966, the British reiterated this position in a cable they sent in the name of the rulers of the Gulf emirates to the U.N. Anti-colonialism Committee of Twenty-Four. British objections notwithstanding, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution on December, 18, 1968 deploring Britain's refusal to..."stop dominating Oman..." and condemning the foreign exploitation of oil resources without the people's consent.  

It is now appropriate to focus upon the reasons why Trucial Oman's anti-colonial movement did not enter a third  

69 Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, p. 60.

70 Al-Alkim, The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates, p. 8.
stage, as those of Bahrain, Aden, and Oman had done. These reasons were economic, political and cultural. Important economic factors included the transformations that British concessions and oil revenues were engendering within Trucial Oman’s economy. Revenues from oil and trade enabled the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai to institute welfare projects, as well as to engage in massive construction projects that provided employment and business opportunities within these two emirates. Employment and mercantile prosperity also engendered the beginnings of consumerism in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. This prosperity extended to the other emirates via the ruler of Abu Dhabi’s contributions to the Trucial Oman Development Fund after 1965. This situation contrasted with that of Bahrain, where oil revenues had been sufficient to engender the development of a working class, but not for massive development and welfare projects. Aden had no oil at all, and Oman was not to discover significant amounts of oil until 1968. Another economic reason, related to the first, was the failure of an indigenous working class to develop in Trucial Oman. Instead, for the implementation of the development projects described above, British companies brought in workers from Pakistan, India, and Iran the extension of labor contracts. These workers were not part of Trucial Oman’s civil society, and retained connections to and identification with their home countries. By contrast, in
Bahrain and Aden, a working class had developing around both the port and petroleum sectors in Bahrain, and around the port and construction sectors in Aden. Furthermore, workers both in Bahrain and Aden had formed unions in the early twentieth century.

The development of Trucial Oman's governmental and security apparatuses was an important political factor that prevented the development of a third stage in the anti-colonial movement there. Besides establishing the Trucial Oman Scouts, the British had established a military base inside Shargah, and had developed a well-equipped police force for each emirate. In Abu Dhabi's case during the 1960s, British companies were selling arms to the ruler for the development of a defense force. The Scouts, the police forces, and Abu Dhabi's Defense Force all proved effective in preventing the Trucial Oman anti-colonial movement from entering a third phase both because of their sizes in relation to the small populations of each emirate, and because of the segmentation that the border demarcations had brought about within Trucial Oman's population.

In addition, elements of the local population, particularly from the badia, were being recruited into local police forces of all of the emirates, and into Abu Dhabi's Defense Force. Other elements of the local population, including many Arab Nationalists, were recruited into the
government bureaucracy, which was expanding in relation to growth in government expenditure on development and welfare. While a similar security apparatus to the one in Trucial Oman had developed in Bahrain, it was pitted against a considerably larger, and territorially unsegmented population. Nor did a government bureaucracy develop that was extensive enough to offer employment to vast numbers of educated locals. As for Oman, the rule of Sultan Sa‘id bin Taimur was so repressive that the development of some sort of opposition to it was a likelihood. Assisting factors here were the fact that Oman’s population was unsegmented, and large, and that the Sultanate had not developed an extensive government bureaucracy for the recruitment of educated locals. Aden’s population, too, was large in relation to the size of the colonial apparatus established there. Despite the fact that the population was segmented in terms of its allegiance to various sheikhs and Imams, the city of Aden served as a center of recruitment and dissemination of information for the anti-colonialist movement which connected it to the entire population.

The main cultural reason for the failure of Trucial Oman’s anti-colonial movement to enter the third phase was the fact that Arab Nationalism was the sole element of this movement. Once the British had declared their intention to leave the Arabian Gulf by 1971, there were no further issues for the anti-colonial movement to tackle. In Yemen, by
contrast, the growth of the unionized labor movement, and the ascendancy of the National Liberation Front over FLOSY carried the anti-colonial movement into the more globally oriented discourse of scientific socialism and anti-imperialism. Bahrain's vocal unionized labor movement also ensured the spread of the anti-imperialist, scientific socialist discourse there. As for Oman, the influence of Aden on nearby Dhofar was considerable. In addition, the anti-colonial movement in Oman called for the overthrow of Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur as well as the expulsion of British colonialism. This ensured that in Oman, the anti-colonial movement would reach a third stage aimed at abolishing local inequalities, reactionary indigenous rule, and relating these two local realities to global ones. Furthermore, in Aden, Bahrain and Oman, Arab Nationalism declined among some sections of the population because of the 1967 defeat of Egypt and Syria in the Arab-Israeli war of that year. In other instances, some individuals and groups still identifying with Arab Nationalism incorporated certain ideas of scientific socialism into the Arab Nationalist discourse. The withdrawal of the British from Trucial Oman in 1971 ushered in the formation of the United Arab Emirates. It is now appropriate to go into some detail concerning how the U.A.E. was formed, along with the political, cultural and economic ramifications of this development.
The Formation of the United Arab Emirates

Precisely to preclude the development of a third phase in Trucial Oman’s anti-colonial movement, the British withdraw from there in 1971. On December 2, 1971, what had been Trucial Oman became the United Arab Emirates. The U.A.E. was the eighteenth Arab League member, and the one hundred thirty second member of the United Nations. Unification finally occurred as a culmination of debate dating back to 1968 on the nature of federation among the Trucial Oman emirates, Bahrain and Qatar. There are several factors that led to the unification of Trucial Oman. The historical basis for this unification was the fact that this northeastern section of historic Oman had been known as Sirr, and had gained autonomy from the Sultanate of Oman after the decline of the Ya‘arabi polity, and the rise of the Al-Bu Sa‘idi polity in the mid 1700. During this period, the Sirr region was dominated by the Al-Qawasim and Beni-Yas Confederations. Under the imposed treaties of 1820 and afterwards, British colonialism dubbed the Sirr region the "Trucial Coast," or Trucial Oman.

These treaties cemented the separation of Trucial Oman

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71 For detailed coverage of all the issues that the Trucial Oman emirates, Bahrain and Qatar covered concerning unification, see Taryam, The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, chapters 3, 4, and 5. Along with the other issues pertaining to unification, Taryam covers the immediate internal and external political reasons why Bahrain and Qatar did not become part of this union.
from the Sultanate of Oman, and segmented Trucial Oman into several sheikhdoms, but also laid the foundations for unity among the Trucial Oman emirates. This was because the same series of treaties had been imposed upon each emirate, and because all of the Emirates were subject to the British Government of India. Furthermore, they all shared an economy based on the pearl fisheries, and were also interconnected on the basis of tribal interrelations. Their cultures, and government structures, were also similar. The Trucial Oman emirates were further interconnected as British colonialism deepened its entrenchment in Trucial Oman, establishing the Trucial Oman Scouts, the Trucial Oman Council, and the Trucial Oman Development Office during the 1950s and 1960s.

The question of the use of oil wealth also laid foundations for the unification of the Trucial Oman emirates. Oil wealth made Abu Dhabi wealthier than the other emirates, and once Abu Dhabi began making regular, and generous donations to the Trucial Oman Development Fund after 1966, the dependence of the emirates of Sharqah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah upon Abu Dhabi grew. This situation provided these smaller emirates with a concrete argument for unification. Aside from gaining economic power over the other emirates, Abu Dhabi also gained political power in relation to them, as its oil wealth had allowed it to develop its defense and police forces.
Another factor leading to unification, though, was the factor of Arab Nationalism, whose influence had induced the British to transfer the leadership of the Trucial Oman Council from the hands of their Political Agent to the hands of the Trucial Oman rulers, on a rotating basis. The British also set up the Trucial Oman Development Fund in order to upstage Arab League attempts to establish one in Trucial Oman. Arab Nationalism also inspired the growth of the student movement in Trucial Oman, which helped to popularize sentiment in favor of unification of the emirates, as did the fact that many of these nationalist students eventually found positions within the government bureaucracies of the various emirates.

Aside from laying the foundations for unification of the Trucial Oman Emirates through the installation of their colonial administration, the British also helped to foster this unification through their discourses they constructed after 1945 to reproduce their colonial hold on Trucial Oman concerning external "threats" to Trucial Oman that were supposedly coming from Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Iran. (The Iran case is particularly interesting in that Iran actually did occupy Ras al-Khaimah's Islands of Greater and Lesser Tunbs, and Shargah's Island of Abu Musa on December 1, 1971, one day before the U.A.E. was to gain its independence, which meant that the British were still responsible for the defense of the
two emirates' islands.)  

72 These British discourses, and the actual situation with the Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands, helped to strengthen the identity of the people of the U.A.E. in relation to others, as did the influx of foreign workers during the 1960s under British contracts extended in relation to development projects in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. But despite the factors that predisposed the sheikhdoms of Trucial Oman to unite, forming the United Arab Emirates, wider unity among all of the Arabian Gulf sheikhdoms did not occur. Neither did historic Oman show any sign of re-uniting. It is now appropriate to discuss the reasons for these situations.

The Failure of Greater Gulf Unity to Occur

There also several factors that precluded the forging of a greater unity among the Arabian Gulf emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman. These factors are historical, political, economic and cultural. The historic reason why unity among the Arabian Gulf emirates, including the Sultanate of Oman, did not materialize was the historic political division that had existed between the polities in the region of historic Al-Bahrain, comprising Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Al-Hasa (Saudi Arabia) on the one hand, and the polities of the historic Oman region, comprising Trucial Oman and the Sultanate of Oman, on the other. The political separateness of these two regions

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dates back to antiquity, when the first one, (historic Al-
Bahrain in this study), was known as Dilmun, and the second
(historic Oman in this study) was called Makan. During the
rise of Islam, Dilmun came to be known as al-Bahrain, and
Makan came to be known as Oman. Although both regions were
now part of the Umma, they retained a degree of governmental
separateness even within this context, because the Umma had
appointed a separate Wali for each. This governmental
separateness remained the case for the two regions through
most of the Islamic period (600 A.D.-1500 A.D.), despite the
fact that migration between the two areas was common, as was
the expansion of one into the other. This was because during
those centuries, there had never been a clearly delineated
border between them.

During the Transformation period (1500-1820), the Al-
Bahrain and Oman regions both underwent internal segmentation.
This process began during the period between the Ya`arabi
defeat of Portuguese hegemony in the Arabian Gulf in the mid-
1600s, and the decline of the Ya`arabi polity in the 1750s,
when several mercantile and tribal groupings migrated into the
two regions from the interior of the Arabian Peninsula and
from the Persian littoral of the Arabian Gulf. These
groupings included the Al Utub, which settled in what are now
Bahrain, Kuwait, and part of Qatar. They also included the
Al-Qawasim and the Beni Yas, who settled in the Sirr area of
the Omani coast. The Al-Bu Sa'id settled in the area of Musqat, and a group of tribes affiliated with the Obaidi sect settled in Oman's interior. The expansion of the Muwahidi movement into the Arabian Gulf during the second half of the eighteenth century led to the defeat of such large tribes as the Beni Khalid, and to the rise of the Al-Utub as a mercantile power in place of the Beni Khalid in Kuwait and Bahrain. As the Muwahidi movement expanded into Oman, it allied itself with the Al-Qawasim, and engendered the consolidation of the Beni-Yas confederation, an adversary of both, which then formed an alliance with the Al-Bu Sa'id.

Once the British replaced the Portuguese and the Dutch as the European hegemons in the Arabian Gulf in the late 1700s, they concluded treaties with both the Al-Bu Sa'id and the Al-Utub as measures to combat both the Muwahidin and the Al-Qawasim. Once the Ottomans had defeated the Muwahidin, and the British had defeated the Al-Qawasim, the British imposed treaties upon sheikhs whom they constructed the rulers of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms in the Sirr region of the Omani coast, which the British now called "the Trucial Coast". Thus, in signing their treaties with the Al-Bu Sa'id and with the sheikhs of Trucial Oman during the 1800s, the British divided Oman into two segments (It actually consisted of three counting the Obaidi groupings in the interior).

Similarly, in signing two separate treaties with the
Al-Utub of Kuwait and Bahrain, the British constructed two new sheikhdoms in the Al-Bahrain region, dividing it in two. In the early 1900s, the British signed third treaty with another tribal grouping in the Al-Bahrain region, the Al-Thani of Qatar. After the signing of these treaties, the sheikhdoms in what had been historic Al-Bahrain and historic Oman became entities into themselves, each developing its own government, and during the 1900s, the British Colonial administration constructed specific boundaries for each one. Economic differentiation also began during the first half of the twentieth century. Whereas during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, both regions were linked to the global market through the export of pearls, the discovery of oil in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar in the early twentieth century, and the use of oil revenues for development strengthened the rulers of each of these sheikhdoms in relation to other strata within their societies, and also in relation to those rulers whose sheikhdoms did not have oil. This situation led to the development of distinct political and cultural apparatuses within each sheikhdom. These political apparatuses included the police force, defense forces, and government bureaucracies. Cultural apparatuses included education systems, radio, official newspapers, etc. These developments, and others, such as the devising of a currency system for each one, the composition of an anthem for each, the design of a
specific flag for each one, and the issuing of distinct passports in each sheikhdom, were all means by which these sheikhdoms constructed identities in relation to each other.

Many factors precluded unity between the Sultanate of Oman and Trucial Oman. While the British colonial administration was officially drawing the Sultanate's borders, they were also assisting the Sultanate of Musqat in putting down the interior Imamate's bid for secession. This situation, and the Sultanate's use of its oil revenues after 1967, strengthened the Sultanate's ruling stratum in relation to other strata within the Sultanate, as well as in relation to the interior. During the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, the Sultanate developed its own political and cultural apparatuses, such as the police, defense forces, government bureaucracies, and in the late 1960s, an education system. The Sultanate of Musqat also expressed its own identity in relation to other Gulf polities through the composition of its own anthem, the design of its own flag, and the issuing of its own passports, etc. Trucial Oman, for its part, also had strong forces keeping its sheikhdoms in cohesion with each other, despite the segmentation among them discussed above. The sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi, itself, became one of the forces of this cohesion, after it began to allocate some of its oil revenues toward the Trucial Oman Development Fund. The sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi became the most economically
privileged, and politically powerful of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms. By contrast, the other sheikhdoms, particularly the five smaller northern ones, were small in terms of area and population, and economically impoverished. This enabled Abu Dhabi to become dominant over them. Within this context, Trucial Oman also developed as a self-sufficient polity with a clear-cut identity in relation to the other Gulf sheikhdoms.

The Arab Nationalist movement’s penetration of the Arabian Gulf during the 1950s and 1960s, and the fact that some of the rulers of the Gulf sheikhdoms met in 1968 to discuss the prospect of unification did not lead to unification of the Gulf sheikhdoms. Unification failed to materialize despite the efforts of such forces as the Omani Student Association, whose goal was to unite all of historic Oman as a preliminary step toward greater Arab unity, and the Bahraini Student Association, whose objective was unification of the entire Arabian Gulf in preparation for general Arab unity. While these forces, and others like them, were able to influence the Arabian Gulf rulers so that at least some of them met to discuss the idea of unification, in actuality, each Gulf polity had by then constructed its own identity in relation to the others, and also had developed its own political, economic, and cultural apparatuses. Furthermore, each ruler was able to penetrate his own sheikhdom’s civil society through the government bureaucracy, which offered
employment to many citizens, and also through social welfarism and consumerism. In light of these circumstances, the Arabian Gulf rulers were disinclined to forfeit individual power and legitimization in favor of a local unity scheme whose success was uncertain.

**Conclusion**

When the British penetrated Trucial Oman, they constructed several discourses to justify this penetration. As this study has demonstrated, these discourses were constructed around myths which British colonialism used to align public opinion in the U.K. with its activities, and to ensure that armaments and other support for penetration of Trucial Oman and the rest of the Arabian Gulf remained forthcoming. This study has also analyzed the discourses that British colonialism constructed to reproduce its entrenchment in Trucial Oman. British colonialism even constructed discourses in relation to its withdrawal from Trucial Oman, namely, to the effect that this withdrawal had been peaceful.

However, this Chapter has demonstrated that the British withdrawal from Trucial Oman actually occurred in relation to the anti-colonial movements that had arisen throughout the Arabian Gulf, and which had gained support from the rest of the Arab World, from the global anti-colonialist movement, and in international fora such as the United Nations. Chapter Thirteen also showed that the British realized that a timely
withdrawal from Trucial Oman was to their advantage, in light of the lessons of both Aden and Kuwait. The Aden scenario was one that the British sought to avoid, because British attempts to retain Aden as a colony forcibly had only fueled an armed, anti-colonial movement and culminated in the de-construction of the economic, political and cultural linkages with the British empire that British colonialism had constructed in Aden. The Kuwait scenario, by contrast, demonstrated that it was possible to withdraw from the Arabian Gulf, but to leave segments of it in the hands of governments that wanted to maintain political, economic and cultural linkages with the U.K.

Additionally, Chapter Thirteen showed how the anti-colonial movement taking hold throughout the Arabian Gulf, and the British withdrawal, led to the establishment of the United Arab Emirates, despite the fact that British colonialism had segmented Trucial Oman into seven emirates, each with its own flag, boundaries, police force, passport, postage stamps, anthem, and police uniform. Each emirate had also developed its own economic and political apparatus. Along with Chapter Thirteen, this study itself has generally shown that there were historical, economic, political and cultural factors that contributed to the unification of the Trucial Oman sheikdoms as the United Arab Emirates. Chapter Thirteen, and the other chapters covering Trucial Oman’s colonial socio-discursive
formation, have also demonstrated that the segmentation in the Arabian Gulf that British colonialism engendered was a major reason why the unification of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms was not extended to include Oman and the other Arabian Gulf emirates. It was also true that by this time, each Gulf emirate, and the Sultanate of Oman, had formed its own identity in relation to the others, and had its own linkages to the world market, through the export of crude oil, and the import of capital and consumer goods.

The chapters that cover the contemporary period (1971-1995) will trace Trucial Oman's subsequent developments as the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). Chapter Fourteen, the first of these, focuses upon the U.A.E.'s political and economic constructions. Chapter Fifteen examines the social stratification that arose from these political and economic constructions. Chapter Sixteen, the last of these, focuses upon the U.A.E.'s cultural constructions. Treatment of the contemporary U.A.E. will also relate the U.A.E's identity formation to the new global system.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION: 1971-1995
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTIONS

Introduction

The chapters covering the late colonial period of 1945-1971 analysed the rise of certain important phenomena which were to continue into the contemporary period (1971-1995). These included the establishment of the United Nations, the formation of transnational corporations, and the rise of the anti-colonial movement. This period was also characterized by the fact that many societies that had formerly been part of colonial empires were gaining independence and were joining the United Nations as independent states, and were forming identities once they interacted with other states that were also being constructed during that period.

These phenomena occurred in the Arab/Islamic Umma as well. The Arab/Islamic Umma was now divided into many independent states, each of which was developing its own economic, political and cultural structures. Each of these states was legitimized by its admission to the United Nations, and formed an identity through interaction with other states and in relation to them. (Palestine was the only exception, because British colonialism’s construction of the state of
Israel on Palestinian land precluded physical nationhood for the Palestinian people. Now, however, they, too, are in the process of constructing a state on part of their land.)

Chapter Thirteen demonstrated how historic Oman and Al-Bahrain were divided during the colonial process, and consequently became a series of small states at independence, each forming its own political, economic and cultural structures, and each forming identity in relation to the others by virtue of U.N. membership and interaction with the other states. Manifestations of this identity also included each state's possession of defined boundaries, of flags, passports, etc. Chapter Thirteen demonstrated that Trucial Oman became the U.A.E. in relation to the end of the colonial process. This chapter also showed how and why unity among the newly-independent Arabian Gulf states, or even between Trucial Oman and the Sultanate of Musqat, did not materialize.

The chapters covering the late colonial period also examined the process by which multinational corporations penetrated Trucial Oman, first through oil concessions, and then through other methods such as banking. The chapters focus on late colonialism also showed that the dissolution of the British monopoly in Trucial Oman was an important factor in the acceleration of multinational corporations' penetration of Trucial Oman. It is true that the U.A.E. as an independent state formed an identity in its interactions with
other states, and in relation to them. But for the U.A.E. to continue to exist as a state, its identity had to reproduce itself. This necessitated the U.A.E.'s formation of political, economic and cultural structures with which the component strata of its society could identify as U.A.E. citizens in their interactions with other peoples. Chapters Fourteen, Fifteen, and Sixteen, therefore, will focus upon how the political, economic, and cultural structures of the U.A.E. came about, how the strata making up U.A.E. society were constructed, and how these political, economic and cultural structures have been able to reproduce the social order within the U.A.E. These chapters will also focus upon the U.A.E. in relation to new globalism. This will include an assessment of the role of multinational corporations in the contemporary U.A.E., as well as that of other elements of new globalism, such as immigrant labor, tourism, etc. Chapters Fourteen, Fifteen and Sixteen will cover political, economic structures, social stratification, and the cultural structure of the contemporary U.A.E.

Chapter Fourteen, which covers the political and economic structure of the contemporary U.A.E., is divided into four sections. The first section will cover the political construction of the contemporary U.A.E. The second section will focus upon the contemporary U.A.E.'s economic and social development. The third section will cover trade, and the
fourth will cover the development of Free Zones in the U.A.E.

In analyzing the political construction of the contemporary U.A.E., the first section of this chapter will relate this political construction to that of Trucial Oman during the colonial period. It will trace those elements of Trucial Oman’s colonial socio-discursive formation that have continued into the U.A.E.’s contemporary socio-discursive formation. Similarly, this section will cover elements of Trucial Oman’s colonial socio-discursive formation that discontinued once the contemporary socio-discursive formation had begun. Thirdly, this section will analyze those aspects of the contemporary U.A.E.’s political makeup that are constructions of the contemporary socio-discursive formation itself. Finally, this section will demonstrate the role that the contemporary U.A.E.’s political construction plays in the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.’s socio-discursive formation, and how it ensures the continued political cohesion of the contemporary U.A.E.

The remaining three sections will cover the economic constructions of the contemporary U.A.E. These economic constructions will be analyzed in terms of whether they are continuities or discontinuities of Trucial Oman’s colonial socio-discursive formations, or whether they are constructions of the U.A.E.’s contemporary socio-discursive formation. These sections will also demonstrate the role that these
economic constructions, too, play in the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, and in the continued cohesion of the U.A.E.

Section Two of this chapter, which will cover economic development, and the development of welfarism in the U.A.E. This section will also analyze the role of the public and private sector in the development of the contemporary U.A.E.'s infrastructure, and the specifics of the U.A.E.'s industrialization and its agricultural development.

Section Three of this chapter will cover trade. This section of the chapter will further analyze the particular transformations that occurred within the contemporary U.A.E., including transformations in the role of Dubai and the development of other commercial cities. Other transformations examined will be those in actual goods imported and exported, the destinations and origins of exports and imports, and how and why this transformations occurred. The significance of analyzing the contemporary U.A.E.'s trade patterns lies in the fact that such analysis provides insight into the contemporary U.A.E.'s linkages to the new global system, and the growth of consumerism within the U.A.E. in relation to these linkages. Section Four will analyze the new phenomenon of Free Zones in the U.A.E. The significance of these Free Zones is that they are significant avenues of linkage to the new global system for the U.A.E. They are also channels by means of which
multinational corporations have penetrated the U.A.E. market.

Besides providing insights into political and economic continuities and discontinuities from Trucial Oman's colonial socio-discursive formation, analysis of the U.A.E.'s political and economic constructions makes it possible to understand the U.A.E.'s social stratification, as well as cultural changes that have occurred within the U.A.E. These aspects of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation will be treated in Chapters Fifteen and Sixteen.

**The Contemporary U.A.E.'s Political Construction**

Once the U.A.E. gained its independence in December, 1971, the seven emirates comprising it united and formed a federal government. This government, itself, represented a continuity from the Trucial Oman's colonial period, since the hereditary rule that had been established in each sheikhdom during that period continued as the government of each emirate, and as a component of the federal government. It is important to devote some space to coverage of the workings of this government, because of the role it, along with the private sector has played as owner of sources of income, investor, and employer. Another important role of the U.A.E.'s federal and local governments has been that of recycler of revenue through expenditure policy (development and welfare measures).

The federal and local governments were able to assume
these roles because of their control over natural resources such as crude oil and natural gas, land, customs earnings, and profits earned from investments. These government roles were actually continuations and expansions of the roles that the governments of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms had assumed during the 1930s, when their incomes began to come from sources other than tax payments from indigenous strata.

Government revenues from concessions and particularly external trade became increasingly important to Trucial Oman during the 1960s. These revenues were to become even more important during the contemporary period of 1971-1995. As income and expenditure increased, government ministries grew in size, and in function. In relation to this expansion, the government both penetrated civil society more deeply, and recruited personnel more extensively from it. These two factors contributed to the contemporary U.A.E.'s political structure's reproduction of itself, as they had done to in the case of the political structure of Trucial Oman during the colonial period. It is now appropriate to examine the contemporary U.A.E.'s government more extensively, both in terms of its own constructions, and in relation to the political structure of Trucial Oman during the colonial period.

One particularly important feature of the contemporary U.A.E.'s government structure is that in contrast to the
situation in Trucial Oman, the contemporary U.A.E.'s Federal Government exercises jurisdiction over the seven emirates. However, these emirates also continue to have their local governments, and to be differentiated in relation to each other in terms of political power, economic privilege, and cultural prestige.

The Federal Government consists of the Federal Supreme Council (FSC), the President and Vice-President of the Union, the Federal Council of Ministers (FCM), the Federal National Council (FNC), and the Federal Supreme Court. Within these five bodies, the political power is shared among the seven emirates, albeit unequally, in relation to each one's wealth, size and population.

The Federal Supreme Council (FSC's) membership consists exclusively of the sheikhs of the seven emirates, including the President and the Vice President of the U.A.E. Since independence, these last two, have also been the Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai respectively. (The provisional Constitution) of the United Arab Emirates provides that the President and the Vice President must be re-elected every five years by members of the Federal Supreme Council. According, Sheikh Zaid Al-Nahayan of Abu Dhabi, and Sheikh Rashid bin Sa'id Al-Maktoum of Dubai were re-elected as President and Vice President of the U.A.E. between 1971 and 1990. In 1995, Sheikh Zaid continues to be President of the U.A.E., and the
current Sheikh of Dubai, Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid al-Maktoum is now Vice President.¹

The Federal Council of Ministers is the government body in which all of the U.A.E.'s legislation originates. This Council consists of the Union's Ministers of Justice, Commerce and the Economy, Energy and Petroleum, Agriculture, Defense, Education, etc. All of these ministers are appointed by the Supreme Council, subject to the final approval of the President of the Union.² Within this Federal Council of Ministers, there are power relationships, because some emirates get more representation among the ministries than others, in relation to their wealth, size and population.

In the Council of Ministers serving as of 1979, Abu Dhabi had seven representatives, three of whom were sheikhs (i.e. members of the Al-Nahayan family). Dubai ranked second,

¹ In 1990, Sheikh Rashid bin Sa'id Al-Maktoum died, and his son, Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid al-Maktoum inherited the position of Sheikh of Dubai, and automatically became Vice-President as well. In 1995, the Al-Maktoum family selected Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid's brother, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, as Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid's heir. A year before Sheikh Rashid died, Sheikh Shakhbut, brother of Sheikh Zaid, who had ruled Abu Dhabi from 1928 until his deposition in 1966, died at the age of 86 in the Bureimi region.

with five representatives, three of whom were sheikhs (i.e. members of the Al-Maktoum family). Sharqah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Ajman had three representatives each. In the case of both Sharqah and Ras al-Khaimah, one representative was a sheikh (Al-Qassimi). Ajman’s representatives, however, were all non-sheikhs. Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah had only one representative each on the Council of Ministers. In the case of Umm al-Quwain, that representative was a sheikh, but the representative of Fujairah was not.³

The Council of Ministers that was appointed in 1990 had a greater total number of members than that of 1979. The 1979 Council of Ministers had had twenty three members, but in 1990 the number of members had increased to twenty seven. The number of sheikhs, however, remained at nine. The ranking order in terms of number of representatives for each sheikhdom remained the same in 1990, but the makeup of the representation of some sheikhdoms underwent changes in relation to the 1979 situation. Dubai’s delegation, for instance, increased from five to six members, but three of these remained sheikhs. Sharqah’s delegation increased from three to four members, none of whom were sheikhs, in contrast to 1979, when Sharqah’s delegation had included one sheikh. Ajman’s delegation decreased from three to two members, but

whereas none of these had been sheikhs in 1979, one was in 1990. The fact that the percentage of members of the Federal Council of Ministers who were sheikhs decreased in the 1990 council in relation to that of 1979 reflects that, while being from one of the ruling families, and nisab continued to retain importance as a criterion for an appointment to the Council of Ministers, wealth, experience and education had also become factors, especially when they intersected with nisab among a person’s qualifications.

The Federal National Council, in contrast to both the Council of Ministers and the Federal Supreme Council, has little legislative power. However, its members can raise certain public issues, discuss the national budget, and monitor how public monies are spent. Like that of the Council of Ministers, the Federal National Council’s makeup reflects the power relationships that exist among the emirates, in terms of size, wealth and population. In contrast to

4 Wizarat al-I’alam wa al-Thaqafah, Dawlat al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah, 1992 (The United Arab Emirates, 1992), pp. 29-30. Two changes took place during subsequent years within the 1990-appointed Council of Ministers. In the first, which occurred in 1992, the Minister of the Interior, Mohammed Sa'id al-Badi from Abu Dhabi was replaced by Hamouda bin Ali, also from Abu-Dhabi. In the second change, which occurred in 1994, Yusuf bin Omair bin Yusuf, the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (Abu Dhabi), resigned. His portfolio was temporary taken over by Ahmad bin Sa'id al-Badi, then the Health Minister, who was also from Abu Dhabi. Business Monitor International Ltd., UAE 1995-97: Annual Report on Government, Economy, the Business Environment and Industry (London: Business Monitor International Ltd., June, 1995), p. 16.
representation on the Federal Council of Ministers, the precise number of persons that can represent each emirate on the Federal National Council is set by the U.A.E.'s Provisional Constitution. However, this set distribution of delegates also reflects each represented emirate's wealth, size, and population. Representatives of an emirate on the Federal National Council have thus far been appointed by that emirate's sheikh for a term lasting two years, although the law gives each emirate the right to choose its own representatives by other means, including election.

For representation on the Federal National Council, Abu Dhabi and Dubai are entitled to eight seats each, Shargah and Ras al-Khaimah are entitled to six seats each, and Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah are entitled to four seats each. The members of the council are usually appointed from among male members of prominent mercantile families, or families with a nisab, coupled with experience and education. Once National Council members have been appointed, they are considered part of the federal government as well as representatives of their emirates, which means that they can discuss issues that pertain to the Union as a whole. The proceedings of the Federal National Council are usually televised, or made accessible to the public in other ways.

5 Khoury, The United Arab Emirates, p. 65 and 66.

6 Ibid., p. 93.
Both the power relations among the emirates, and the differences in political power held by the Federal Supreme Council, the President and Vice President of the Union, the Federal Council of Ministers, and the Federal National Council in relation to each other are reflected in the legislative process. All legislation originates in the Federal Council of Ministers, after which it is directed toward the Federal National Council for enactment, and then must be passed by a majority of five members of the Federal Supreme Council, and signed by the President of the Union. Legislation involving substantive expansion of the powers of the federal government must be passed by a majority of five members of the Federal Supreme Council, and this majority must include the Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. However, legislation only changing the procedural workings of the federal government merely requires passage by a majority of five members of the Federal Supreme Council.

The fact that the Federal National Council does not enjoy legislative powers equal to those of the other legislative bodies is demonstrated by the fact that it can be bypassed in the legislative process if the Federal Council of Ministers determines that there is a need to enact legislation during a period in which the Federal National Council is not in session. This is true despite the fact that the U.A.E.'s legislative process requires proposed legislation is to pass
from the Federal Council of Ministers to the Federal National Council.\footnote{Al-Alkim, \textit{The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates}, p. 23.}

The fifth federal government body, the Federal Supreme Court, has a President, and a maximum of five judges, who are nominated by the Federal Supreme Council, with the approval of the President of the Union. Appointment to the Federal Supreme Court is for life, but judges can resign, or be removed from their position on the Court, in the event of incompetence brought about by advanced age, illness, or some other cause. The Federal Supreme Court's primary functions are not related to the legislative process. Instead, they adjudicate disputes between emirates concerning federal law, or the laws of the emirates involved, hear cases against Federal officials, and interpret the Constitution.\footnote{Ahmad Khalil 'Atawi, \textit{Dawlat al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah: Nashatuha wa Tatawuruha (The State of the United Arab Emirates: Its Establishment and Development)} (Beirut: Al-Mu'assissat al-Jam'alayih lil-Dirasat wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi'ah, 1981), pp. 124-126.}

Concerning the ministries, it is important to mention that each one is hierarchical in structure. In the case of each one, the Minister himself is the one who appoints, or approves the appointment, of anyone on the ministerial staff, from the Deputy Minister to the clerical employees at the Grade Four civil service level. (Any given ministry's
employees are divided into civil service grades ranging from one to four. Grade One includes the Minister, the Deputy Minister, and the General Managers. Grade Two consists of the department heads. Grade Three consists of the division and section heads. Grade Four consists of the clerical employees.)

Between 1972 and 1993, the federal government expanded, and correspondingly, so did the number of ministries. In 1972, there were twelve Federal ministries. These included the Ministries of Planning; Finance, Economy and Industry; Public Works and Agriculture; Labor and Social Affairs; Electricity and Water; Education; Defense; Internal Affairs; Justice; Health; Information and Foreign Affairs.

By 1993, the number of federal ministries had almost doubled. Retained ministries included Finance and Industry; Defense, Internal Affairs, Information, Education, Justice, Health, Foreign Affairs, Planning; Labor and Social Affairs; Agriculture (now including Fisheries) and Electricity and Water. New ministries included Transportation, Islamic Affairs and al-Awgaf (Waqf holdings); Trade and the Economy; Petroleum and Mineral Resources; Youth and Sports; Housing and

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9 See chart in Bashir, Dawlat al-Imarat al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah, p. 56.

10 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
Public Works; Higher Education, etc.\textsuperscript{11}

Regarding the governments of the individual emirates, in addition to being bound by the U.A.E.'s Provisional Constitution, each Emirate has its own local political administration, consisting of the Sheikh, the heir apparent, and the different departments. Departments constructed during the colonial period, such as the Municipality or the Chamber of Commerce, continued into the contemporary period. New departments, such as those of Industry, and the Economy, were constructed during the contemporary period. Each emirate also retains jurisdiction over criminal proceedings,\textsuperscript{12} and over the budget allocations of revenues earned from its own resources,\textsuperscript{13} although the Provisional Constitution also obliges each emirate to contribute a fixed percentage of its annual revenues to the federal government. In practice, these contributions have been cash contributions from Abu Dhabi since independence in 1971, coupled later with contributions from Dubai. In September, 1984, the Supreme Council of the U.A.E. required each emirate earning oil revenues to


\textsuperscript{12} Al-Alkim, The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates, pp. 25-27.

contribute one half of these revenues to the federal government.

In addition to obtaining the contributions of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the federal government also earns an income from its own administrative fees, from profits that the Central Bank and Emirates Telecommunications earn, and from returns on investments. The large contributions of Abu Dhabi and to some extent Dubai to federal government revenues has reinforced the cohesion among the emirates, because these contributions benefit the smaller emirates, and thereby link them both to the larger ones and to the federal government.

Between 1975 and 1980, the federal government gained jurisdiction over many functions that had hitherto belonged to emirate governments. The functions that the federal government took over included the administration of justice, the police force, the armed forces, health, education and information and culture. The federal government also partially took over the administration the U.A.E.'s foreign aid program, although individual emirates continue to extend direct external grants.\(^{14}\) Prior to 1994, each emirate could set its own tariff rates on products, but the federal government took over that function during that year when it

\(^{14}\) Al-Alkim, *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates*, pp. 25-27.
decreed a flat rate of 4 per cent for each emirate to charge.15

Other measures that the federal government instituted early in the contemporary period reinforced the concept of U.A.E. citizenship within the local population, and deconstructed some of the segmentation that colonialism had engendered. These measures included the replacement of the anthems, postage stamps, currencies, uniforms, flags of the different emirates with national symbols (although some emirates have continued to use their own flags on a symbolic basis), and the replacement of passports from each separate sheikhdom with one national passport, although each passport continues to name the emirate of its holder’s birth, and citizenship papers also stated a citizen’s nisab.

The institutionalization of the concepts of citizenship and nisab in the contemporary U.A.E. has continued to influence a citizen’s ability to enhance his or her political power, economic privilege and cultural prestige. Because a citizen’s emirate of birth appears on his or her passport and Document of Citizenship, this influences his or her general status firstly because some emirates have greater political power, and are more economically prosperous, than others. This influences the opportunities that a citizen of one

emirate will have in relation to citizens of others. One manifestation of this is the fact that the more politically powerful and economically prosperous emirates are more heavily represented in federal positions of political power.

The designation of citizens by emirate on their official papers also helps to reproduce political power, economic privilege and cultural prestige within each emirate. This is demonstrated by the fact that citizens of a given emirate are eligible for certain benefits and privileges within that emirate from which other citizens are excluded. These eligibility policies, in turn, were constructed in relation to the fact that each emirate controls its own revenues, and sets its own budget. Each emirate’s extension of certain benefits exclusively to its own citizens helps to ensure the reproduction of that emirate’s administration, since revenues are recycled to employ that emirate’s citizens alone, and otherwise to extend benefits to them.

However, at the federal government level, revenues are recycled to benefit all U.A.E. citizens regardless of emirate of residence. Therefore, civil service jobs, health care, education and other benefits are similarly allocated. These policies help to legitimize and reproduce both the U.A.E.’s federal government and the cohesion of the union because citizens from all emirates are brought together as federal civil servants, and no particular emirate enjoys preference at
that level. At the same time, however, a greater number of federal positions of political power are open to educated citizens of the more politically powerful and more prosperous emirates, in relation to the remaining, smaller ones. This, too, reproduces the political power of the federal government and the political cohesion of the U.A.E. because a central characteristic of the construction of both the federal government and the general cohesion of the U.A.E. is the greater political power of the larger, more prosperous emirates in relation to the others, which ensures the continued linkages of the smaller emirates to the larger and more politically powerful ones.

Nisab, the other attribute influencing a citizen's eligibility to enhance his or her political power, economic privilege, or cultural prestige is significant because citizens possessing a prestigious nisab gain preference when seeking federal or emirate-level positions of political power, which therefore provide economic privilege and cultural prestige as well. In fact, at both emirate and federal levels, possession of a prestigious nisab outweighs the disadvantages some citizens seeking these position face if they come from smaller, less prosperous emirates. This situation ensures the reproduction of the political power, economic privilege and cultural prestige of strata with nisab, in relation to those without, both within each emirate, and in
the Union as a whole.

The U.A.E.'s federal expenditure has reinforced the cohesion of the Union in other ways, besides the jurisdiction that federal ministries have gained over emirate governments, and through the policy of recruiting employees from all of the emirates into federal civil service positions. Some of these additional expenditures have been allocated toward cultural reinforcements of the U.A.E.'s cohesion, such as television, newspapers, and the education system.

As discussed above, the cohesion of the U.A.E. is politically reinforced by the fact that each emirate is represented in the federal government, and therefore in the policymaking process. Federal government expenditure contributing to the Union's cohesion has also covered economic development projects such as roadbuilding, and the installation of a telephone network, as well as subsidies and welfare benefits. Road construction, for example, has facilitated mobility among the emirates' populations, and telecommunications have shortened the distances among the emirates in time and space.

These infrastructural improvements, and others, have also increased commerce and the transportation of goods among the emirates as well. In addition, increased subsidies and welfare benefits have brought a growing number of citizens into the orbit of the federal government, by virtue of their
dependence on it. However, the impact of infrastructural development, welfarism and culture on the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation will be treated in greater detail in subsequent sections.

**Economic Construction and the Development of Welfarism**

It is important to devote some analysis to the contemporary U.A.E.'s economic construction, as well as its political that of its political systems for several reasons. Firstly, changes in the U.A.E.'s economy between 1971 and 1995 are interlinked with many aspects of the growth of the U.A.E.'s political and cultural structure, and the growth of social welfarism and consumerism as well. An understanding of the contemporary U.A.E.'s economic structure also provides insight into the nature of its labor force, the U.A.E.'s social stratification, and the U.A.E.'s interlinkages within the new global system. Finally, coverage of the contemporary U.A.E.'s economy reveals important ways in which the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation has been reproducing itself. The U.A.E.'s contemporary economic construction must also be understood in relation to Trucial Oman's colonial socio-discursive formation, since it was during the colonial period that Trucial Oman's economy was reconstructed to fit into the colonial global system, as an exporter of a single commodity; first pearls, and later, oil. This reconstruction deprived Trucial Oman's people of the means by which to
develop Trucial Oman in relation to their particular needs and aspirations. However, the contemporary U.A.E.'s economy also reflects the discontinuity of many elements of Trucial Oman's colonial socio-discursive formation. This section, and the following ones will specifically cover the contemporary U.A.E.'s economic and social development, its trade patterns, and the development of its Free Zones.

Decision makers in the contemporary U.A.E., private and public, have embarked upon an economic development program that began during the 1960s, and which has continued into the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. This economic development program has been successful enough in providing both employment and an improved standard of living to U.A.E. citizens to be an important aspect of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation's ability to reproduce itself. In the contemporary period, this economic development program has also continued to engender an increase both in the U.A.E.'s population in general, and in its labor force in particular. Specifically, this development program has continued to fuel the growth of the immigrant labor force. Along with the private sector, the U.A.E.'s federal and local governments financed the U.A.E.'s development program. Since it was to the federal and emirate governments that revenues from customs, oil exports, etc. went, it is important to focus upon the changes that occurred in government expenditure on
sectors of the economy that were connected to the development process. It is also important to examine the workings of the U.A.E. federal and local governments because government expenditure, through the institutions of welfarism, contributed to improving the U.A.E.'s living standard in relation to how it had been during the colonial period. Welfarism, along with infrastructural improvements, and subsidies to the private sector (agricultural and industrial) were all means by which the U.A.E.'s federal and local governments helped the contemporary socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself.

In 1972, the U.A.E.'s population was 319,700. In 1980, this population increased to 1,043,000, and by 1988, this population had climbed to 1,639,600. By 1993, the U.A.E.'s population had reached 2,083,100. Figures for the labor force are 144,700 persons for 1972, and for 1980, the labor force numbered 559,960 persons. By 1988, the size of the labor force had increased to 643,700 persons, and by 1993, it had reached 794,400 persons.16

This section will cover the changes that occurred in the various sectors of the contemporary U.A.E.'s economy, and the social developments such as the growth of welfare benefits

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and subsidies. These changes and developments will also be seen in relation to the what Trucial Oman’s economic and social realities had been under the colonial socio-discursive formation. In the next chapter, economic changes that occurred within the contemporary U.A.E. will be discussed in relation to the development of the labor force, and to the realities of stratification in the contemporary U.A.E.’s civil society.

**TABLE 14.1**  
COMPARISON OF OIL EXPORTS OF DIFFERENT EMIRATES  
(Millions of Barrels)  
1972-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Abu Dhabi</th>
<th>Dubai</th>
<th>Sharqah + Ras al-Khaimah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>384.2</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>489.6</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>474.8</td>
<td>146.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>694.0</td>
<td>146.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the 1945-1971 period, oil became Trucial Oman’s chief source of revenue. After independence, oil remained an important source of the U.A.E.’s revenue, and an important contributor to the U.A.E.’s G.D.P, especially prior to 1980. During colonialism, Abu Dhabi had been the only sheikhdom that was exporting oil. After 1971, Dubai, Sharqah, and Ras al Khaimah also became oil producers, although their reserves,
and production and export levels remained modest in relation to those of Abu Dhabi. Dubai began exporting crude oil at the end of 1969, Sharqah in 1974, and Ras al-Khaimah in 1984.\textsuperscript{17} The other three emirates remained without oil resources. Table 14.1 above shows the crude oil exports of Dubai, Sharqah and Ras al-Khaimah in relation to those of Abu Dhabi.

\textbf{TABLE 14.2}

CONTRIBUTION OF OIL SECTOR TO U.A.E.'s GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, AND SHARE OF OIL REVENUES IN U.A.E.'s TOTAL

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
\hline
U.A.E.'s GDP & 16,710 & 109,833 & 89,184 & 128,048 \\
Oil Share Percent & 63.55 & 70,765 & 29,643 & 53,188 \\
 & 64.43 & 33.2 & 41.5 & \\
U.A.E. Rev. & 6,593 & 56,022 & 20,793 & 47,710 \\
Oil Share Percent & 5,934 & 52,050 & 15,425 & 38,496 \\
 & 90.01 & 92.91 & 74.2 & 80.7 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


Table 14.2 illustrates that, while oil revenues continued to account for an important percentage of the U.A.E.'s total revenues between 1972 and 1992, the oil sector

accounted for a considerably reduced percentage of the U.A.E.'s Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.) during those years.

**TABLE 14.3**

CONTRIBUTION OF NON-OIL SECTORS TO THE U.A.E.'S GDP
(Percentage of GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agric + Fish</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuf + Indus</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec, Gas + Water</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce, Hotels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>8.28</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans + Comm</td>
<td>7.37</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insur + Real estate</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel + Soc Services</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Serv*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>36.45</td>
<td>38.15</td>
<td>67.80</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This category, recently included in U.A.E. data, refers to domestic services, and other services in the private sector.

Table 14.3 demonstrates the contribution of non-oil sectors to the U.A.E.'s Gross Domestic Product. The aggregate contribution of these sectors to the U.A.E.'s G.D.P. grew from
about 36.5 per cent in 1972 to 60.3 per cent in 1992. (The contribution had been even higher in 1988, at 67.8 per cent.) The significant increase in the non-oil portion of the G.D.P is explained by the fact that the governments of the sheikhdoms, particularly Abu Dhabi and Dubai, engaged in extensive infrastructural development with growing revenues during the 1960s and 1970s. This infrastructural development continued to some extent between 1980 and 1992, and also facilitated the growth of other sectors of the U.A.E. economy. In particular, this development is illustrated in the growth of the shares of two other sectors in the G.D.P., namely the commerce, hotel and restaurant sector on one hand, and the financial, insurance and real estate sector on the other. The former sector’s share rose from 7.6 per cent of the G.D.P. in 1972 to 11.5 per cent in 1988, and only fell to 10.1 per cent in 1992, while the latter’s G.D.P. share rose from 4.39 per cent in 1972 to 11.1 per cent in 1992.

For the commerce, hotel and restaurant sector, the number of international and national hotels in the U.A.E. combined increased from 33 in 1975, to 189 in 1991. The number of restaurants in the U.A.E. increased from 985 in 1975 to 1,500 in 1985. The value added from wholesale establishments rose from 2,882 million Dirhams in 1975 to
7,585 million Dirhams in 1985.\textsuperscript{18}

For the financial, insurance and real-estate sector, the growth of the U.A.E.'s banking sector had been such that in 1988, there were nineteen national and twenty-eight international banks there. The national banks had established 169 branches, and the international banks, 119. While the number of banks remained the same in 1990, the total number of branches had increased to 317 by that year.\textsuperscript{19} In 1995, there were 47 banks in all in the U.A.E., 28 of which remained foreign. Domestic and foreign banks together had established 300 branches, half of which were in Dubai. Among the foreign banks were the British Bank of the Middle East, Standard Chartered, Citibank, and Lloyds Bank.\textsuperscript{20} The number of insurance establishments in the U.A.E. grew from a total of seventy-one in 1979 (nineteen were national, eighteen were non-local Arab, and thirty-four were international), to 216 in

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1992, where 95 were national establishments, 45 were joint ventures involving U.A.E. and non-local Arab or international capital, 19 were non-local Arab concerns, and 57 were international.\textsuperscript{21}

Additional infrastructural investment also continued during the 1980s and early 1990s, and this also added to the non-oil G.D.P. share. The increase in infrastructural investment is reflected in the growth of the construction sector's contribution to the G.D.P. between 1980 and 1988. It is also reflected in the fact that the transportation and communications sector's share in the U.A.E's G.D.P. increased during the 1980s.

In relation to both of these sectors, the Federal expenditure on communication (including ports, airports, and other transportational facilities) rose from 3.5 million Dirhams in 1972 to 290 million Dirhams in 1977, the peak year. For 1983, this expenditure had declined somewhat to 159 million Dirhams, and for 1992, it was only one million. The reason for this marked rise in communications expenditure, and for the equally marked decline after 1983 stems from the fact that it was during the 1970s, and the early 1980s, that the U.A.E. Federal Government was extending most of its contracts

pertaining to communication expenditure. Figures for the aggregate communication expenditures of the emirates' governments show that collectively, the emirates' governments were embarking upon these projects even more extensively than the Federal Government was. However, the expenditures of the emirates on this sector also began a gradual decline after 1981. In 1977, this expenditure amounted to 3,653 million Dirhams, and remained over 3,000 million on the average until 1981, when it declined somewhat to 2,240 million. For 1985, the emirates' aggregate communication expenditure amounted to 793 million Dirhams. By 1990, it had decreased to 487 million.\(^{22}\)

Statistics given above about communications expenditures of both the federal and emirate governments in aggregate correspond to the fact that the number of seaports in the U.A.E. increased from three in 1975 to ten in 1980 (an increase of seven), but only increased to fifteen between 1980 and 1991. The number of international airports also increased from three in 1975 to four in 1980, and only to five between 1980 and 1991. The road system also expanded, as the distance

of paved roads in the U.A.E. increased from 700 kilometers in 1975 to 2,000 in 1980, but only increased by 200 kilometers more, to 2,200 in 1985, and by 500 kilometers as of 1991, when 2,700 kilometers of highway had been completed. For communications, the number of satellite earth stations in the U.A.E. increased from one in 1975 to three in 1980, and only by one more, to four, between 1980 and 1991. Other increases were in the number of telephone lines, which grew from 26 thousand in 1975 to 116 thousand in 1980, and further to 480.5 thousand in 1991, and in the number of post offices, which increased from 29 in 1975 to 68 in 1991.23

These expansions within the transportation and communications and construction sectors, along with other infrastructural growth during the 1970s and 1980s, are significant because they helped to engender the growth of other industries including manufactures. This is reflected in the fact that the industrial and manufacturing sector's portion of the G.D.P. rose from about 2.7 per cent in 1972 to 9.2 per cent in 1988, and only fell slightly, to 7.6 per cent, in 1992.

The growth of the share of the electricity, gas, and water sector in the U.A.E's G.D.P. shown in Table 14.3 above,

although smaller than that of the sectors mentioned above, also helped to engender the growth of the industries comprising the industrial and manufacturing sector. Total kilowatts of electricity generated in 1979, for example, numbered 4.8 billion. Those for 1991 numbered close to 17 billion. Water production rose from approximately 56.4 billion gallons in 1983 to approximately 89.75 billion gallons in 1991. Consumption of electricity and water approximated the production of both in 1991, at 16.4 billion Kilowatts and 84.36 billion gallons respectively. This growth in electricity generation in the U.A.E., and in water production is related to the expenditure of the federal and emirate governments between the mid 1970s and 1991. The federal expenditure on electricity and water rose from 73 million Dirhams in 1975 to 289 million Dirhams in 1980. It rose again to 465 million Dirhams in 1985, and again to 952 million Dirhams in 1992. The expenditures of the emirates in aggregate on electricity and industry amounted to 1,411 million Dirhams in 1977, and to 1,385 million Dirhams in 1980. This expenditure increased slightly in 1985 to 1,583 million

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Dirhams, but decreased to 618 million in 1990.25

Table 14.3 above also shows growth in the contributions of the personnel and social service sectors to the G.D.P. Much of this growth is explained by the increase in federal government expenditure on cultural, welfare and security apparatuses. Federal expenditure on the Interior, Justice and Defense ministries rose from 296 million U.A.E. Dirhams in 1975 to 7,852 in 1980. Federal expenditure on these ministries remained close to this level in 1988, at 7,951 million Dirhams, and in 1992 at 7,730 million Dirhams. Federal expenditure on the Interior, Justice and Defense ministries covered the Police Force, the Army, the Coast Guard, and the court system, and between 1977 and 1992, this expenditure amounted to one third of total federal revenues. The federal government spent steadily increasing amounts on the Health Ministry between 1975 and 1992. This expenditure was 116 million Dirhams in 1975, rising to 930 million Dirhams in 1980. It remained close to that amount in 1988, at 919 million Dirhams, and again increased in 1992, to 1,048 million Dirhams.25

The aggregate expenditure of the governments of the

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emirates on health declined significantly after 1983. This was related to the fact that it was by 1980 that the federal government took over most of the functions of the emirates' local health departments. In 1977, the aggregate expenditure of the emirates' governments amounted to 226 million Dirhams. Although this expenditure rose to 328 million in 1980, it fell to 86 million Dirhams in 1985, and remained close to that level, at 82 million Dirhams, in 1990.\textsuperscript{27}

One result of this increased health expenditure was that the number of hospitals rose from 19 in 1975 (fifteen government sponsored and four private),\textsuperscript{28} to 42 in 1992 (33 government sponsored and nine private.) Life expectancy also rose markedly. In 1979, it was 47 years of age,\textsuperscript{29} and by 1992, it had risen to 73 years of age for women, and 70 for men.\textsuperscript{30} The infant mortality rate also fell during this period. In 1979, this rate amounted to 138 per thousand.\textsuperscript{31}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Wizarat al-Maliyyah wa al-Sina‘a, figures published in 1993.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Overseas Development Council, \textit{The United States and World Development: Agenda 1979} (New York and London: Praeger, 1979), pp. 156-168
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ministry of Information and Culture, \textit{The United Arab Emirates, 1992}, p. 104.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Overseas Development Council, \textit{The United States and World Development}, pp. 156-158.
\end{itemize}
By 1992, it had fallen to 11.7 per thousand.\textsuperscript{32}

Federal Expenditure on the Education Ministry also rose steadily during these years. For 1975, it amounted to 172 million Dirhams. For 1980 it was 1,221 million. This expenditure increased to 1,590 million in 1985, and again to 2,490 million in 1992.\textsuperscript{33} This increase in expenditure produced certain results within the education system. For example, while there had only been 27,745 pupils enrolled in a total of 66 elementary, middle and secondary government-sponsored schools in 1971, this number rose to 270,517 students in a total of 534 government-sponsored schools in 1992. In addition, there were now 289 private schools in the U.A.E., with an enrollment of an additional 137,057 pupils. The overall illiteracy rate also fell between 1975 and 1992. In 1975 it was 56.8 per cent.\textsuperscript{34} By 1992, it had fallen to 16.8 per cent.\textsuperscript{35}

The aggregate expenditure of the emirates' governments on education decreased noticeably after 1983. This was largely because many of the functions of the emirates' local

\textsuperscript{32} Ministry of Information and Culture, \textit{The United Arab Emirates, 1992}, p. 104.

\textsuperscript{33} Wizarat al-Maliyyah wa al-Sina'a, figures published in 1993.


\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 110.
education departments had fallen under the jurisdiction of the federal government by 1980. In 1977, this expenditure amounted to 203 million Dirhams. Although this figure increased to 349 million Dirhams in 1980, for 1985, local expenditure on education had decreased to 102 million Dirhams. In 1990, it only rose to 154 million.\footnote{Wizarat al-Maliyyah wa al-Sina‘a, figures published in 1993.}

Government emphasis on projects for the construction of housing led to an increase in the number of dwelling units in the U.A.E. from a total of 60,000 dwelling units in 1972 to 320,000 in 1992. By 1992, the U.A.E. government had built and distributed more than 100,000 dwelling units free to citizens. Many of the citizens who obtained this free housing were bedouins, who settled in new villages that the Abu Dhabi government built.\footnote{Ministry of Information and Culture, The United Arab Emirates, 1992, pp. 137-138.} Specific federal expenditure on housing rose from 42 million Dirhams in 1975 to 130 million in 1980. This expenditure fell to 10 million Dirhams in 1988, but rose again to 100 million in 1992. The expenditure of local emirate governments on housing was much higher than was federal expenditure, for all years. In 1977 it was 851 million Dirhams, and it rose to 905 million Dirhams in 1980. It had decreased to 209 million Dirhams in 1985, and further to 155 million Dirhams in 1980. The main reason that the
housing expenditure of the emirates' governments was so much higher than was that of the federal government was that it was the local emirate governments that were implementing housing construction programs between 1977 and 1985. At both federal and emirate levels, however, expenditures on housing decreased markedly in from 1984 into the 1990. The main reason for this was that during those years, both emirate and federal governments had adopted a policy of encouraging the building of new housing merely by allocating land to home builders, instead of providing eligible people with already-constructed new housing.

Figures for federal expenditure on other ministries show steady growth. This was because the federal government was allocating increasing monies for direct financial assistance payments to widows, divorced and deserted women, orphans, the handicapped, and the families of convicts serving prison terms. In 1990, individuals within these categories received 450 million Dirhams in benefits. Beyond this, the federal government has also extended payments to low income families in rural areas. The federal government also extended increased benefits to food cooperatives, citizens' associations of various kinds, to sports clubs, toward the financing of the maintenance and construction of mosques, and

38 Wizarat al-Maliyyah wa al-Sina'a, figures published in 1993.
the payment of staff salaries at the mosques. For 1975, the federal expenditure on all other ministries furnishing these services was 278 million Dirhams, rising to 1,013 million in 1980. This expenditure rose again to 1,608 million in 1988, and to 2,031 million in 1992.

The emirate governments’ expenditure on departments hitherto unclassified, such as those handling social welfare services, also rose between 1977 and 1990, despite fluctuations. In 1977, this expenditure amounted to 185 million Dirhams. In 1980, it had risen to 532 million Dirhams. Despite the fact that this expenditure dropped to 412 million Dirhams in 1985, it jumped to 828 million Dirhams in 1990.

The figures given above about health care, education, housing and social welfare services are important to mention for an analysis of the U.A.E.’s contemporary socio-discursive formation’s ability to reproduce itself. Health care, education, and frequently, housing as well, were free services, and figures about them consequently show the extent of the trend toward welfarism in the contemporary U.A.E. This


41 Wizarat al-Maliyyah wa al-Sana’a, figures published in 1993.
trend contrasts sharply with conditions that prevailed in Trucial Oman during most of the colonial period, during which services like these were not initiated until the 1960s. Welfarism went through modest beginnings during the 1960s, partly in response to the counter-discourses of anti-colonialism that were being constructed throughout the Arab world, including Trucial Oman. The role that this initial implementation of welfare benefits played, however, was simultaneously one of stabilizing the social order, and to facilitating the construction of counter discourses to colonialism.

Welfarism became institutionalized in the contemporary U.A.E. after 1971 both because hospitals, schools, and other social service institutions were lacking, and because the federal and emirate governments were beginning to earn sufficient revenues to start to provide these social services. Furthermore, U.A.E. policymakers knew that welfare measures had been effective in helping Trucial Oman’s colonial socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself, and therefore looked to these measures as instruments for enabling the contemporary socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself, both on Federal and emirate levels.

In Table 14.3 above, Agriculture showed a modest amount of growth in terms of its share in the U.A.E’s G.D.P. between 1980 and 1992. The modesty of this growth figure is related
to the fact that until 1982, the U.A.E.'s own agricultural production was only meeting 27 per cent of local demand for food products. Moreover, figures for 1974 show that out of a total of 50-60 thousand hectares of cultivable land, only 21,554 hectares, or about 39 per cent, was actually being farmed. Furthermore, 85.5 per cent of the cultivated land was worked in the form of small units that met local consumption needs. In addition, during the early 1970s, much of the agricultural labor force left rural areas during this period, as employment opportunities in the cities grew.42 (More about the movement of the agricultural labor force to urban areas in Chapter Fifteen.)

However, the modest growth shown for the 1980-1992 period that Table 14.3 shows can be traced to certain measures that were taken to improve agriculture. One of the most important measures was the bringing of more land under cultivation. Between 1972 and 1992, cultivated land rose from 18,000 hectares to 280,000. The number of small farms, which continued to exist alongside the larger, government sponsored agricultural projects rose in number from 5,000 in 1972 to 19,000 in 1992. Another important measure was the cultivation of date trees, in order to start to decrease the portion of

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desert land in relation to cultivable land. In 1992, the government had instituted a program to plant more than 200,000 new date trees every year. For general afforestation, the government spent more than 10.5 billion Dirhams between 1972 and 1992.\(^{43}\)

Other agricultural measures have included the development of a land distribution and reclamation program, the policy of subsidization of agricultural inputs, and the development of rural infrastructure. Inputs subsidized, at 50 per cent of cost, have included farm machinery and equipment, fertilizer, and general services for livestock raising. Infrastructural government monetary outlays have covered the improvement of irrigation and drainage, and the improvement and construction of secondary roads linking farming areas with marketing centers. Some of the results of these agricultural measures were the U.A.E.'s self-sufficiency, as of 1992, in some winter vegetables. Between 1988 and 1992, red meat output increased by 36 per cent, and the production of milk and other dairy products increased from 48,000 metric tons in 1988 to 80,000 metric tons in 1992. In general, by 1992, the U.A.E.'s agricultural production was supplying 45-50 per cent of the domestic consumption of vegetables, and as much as 87 per cent of the consumption of fresh milk. Poultry and egg

production also increased, so that by 1992, this production was meeting between 20 and 40 per cent of domestic demand. In 1991, the U.A.E. exported 43,000 tonnes of farm produce.\(^{44}\)

The U.A.E. was also self-sufficient in fish production by 1992, to the point where it had begun to export fish during that year. This was related to the government's work at preserving and improving the fishing industry. In 1992, there were 10,500 licensed fishermen in the U.A.E., and the annual catch amounted to 100,000 tonnes. Inputs for this sector that the government currently subsidizes at 50 per cent of cost include boats, nets, motors and winches needed to haul up the catch. Other government measures have included experiments in raising certain fast-breeding species of freshwater fish in saline water at a fish-breeding center in Umm al-Quwain. This center also manufactures its own fish feed. Along with the government, the private sector has also developed fish farms on an experimental basis, for raising shrimp and other varieties of fish.\(^{45}\)

It had been the governments of the emirates in aggregate, rather than the federal government, that have devoted the greatest expenditure toward the agricultural and fishing sector, as the figures indicate. The aggregate figures for the emirate governments' expenditure on this

\(^{44}\) Ibid.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., pp. 118-119.
sector were 148 million Dirhams for 1977, and 180 million Dirhams for 1980. These expenditures stayed close to that level in 1985, amounting to 184 million Dirhams, and then jumped to 385 million Dirhams in 1990. By contrast, the federal government only allocated 26 million Dirhams to agriculture and fisheries in 1975, and 46 million in 1980. This expenditure remained steady, at 42 million Dirhams in 1985, and dropped to a mere 13 million Dirhams in 1992.46

Industries developed during the 1970s and 1980s were mainly petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, aluminum and iron smelting, building materials and fertilizers. These industries were mainly developed by the public sector, although the private sector also accounted for a share of the building materials industries. At the same time, however, the private sector was also investing in lighter manufactures, in response to the expansion of the domestic market. The government assisted the development of lighter manufactures by means of incentives and input subsidies. In 1983, the federal government established the Emirates Industrial Bank, which is now 51 per cent owned by the Ministry of Finance, while the remaining shares are owned by private insurance companies and banks. The Emirates Industrial Bank's function is to provide medium and long term industrial loans for up to eight years'  

46 Wizarat al-Maliyyah wa al-Sina'a, figures published in 1993.
maturity. These loans are funded entirely by federal government monies, and bear an interest rate of only 1 per cent.

The federal government also created a committee in 1990 to encourage international firms that had won defense contracts in the U.A.E. to invest in the local market. Such an investment program materialized in 1993, with the announcement that companies which in aggregate had contracted to sell $4 billions worth of arms and defense services to the U.A.E. would match this sum by equivalent investments in non-oil industries in the U.A.E.'s private sector. Between 1993 and 1995, under the rules outlined by the U.A.E. Offset Group, which is part of the office of the Chief of Staff of the U.A.E.'s armed forces, companies that had won contracts to sell arms to the U.A.E., such as McDonnel Douglas (U.S.), Sikorsly Aircraft (U.S.), Aerospatiale (France), Fokker (Germany), and GEC Marconi and Kestrel Solar Technology (U.K.), agreed to enter joint ventures with local enterprises for solar power development, a commercial aircraft maintenance center, technical and managerial transfer, a four wheel drive vehicle assembly project, and other investments.47

Table 14.4 below shows private industrial groupings and the monetary value of investments in them from public, private

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and international sources. It also shows the number of establishments employing ten persons or more within each grouping.

### TABLE 14.4

**INVESTMENTS IN INDUSTRIAL GROUPINGS IN 1981**
**BY SOURCE OF CAPITAL, AND NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS EMPLOYING TEN PERSONS OR MORE**

(U.A.E. Dirhams)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Internat</th>
<th>Loans</th>
<th>Tot Inv</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>70,074</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>69,025</td>
<td>5,345</td>
<td>185,444</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>276,313</td>
<td>139,015</td>
<td>52,493</td>
<td>242,019</td>
<td>709,840</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text + Clothes</td>
<td>28,746</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>22,714</td>
<td>9,631</td>
<td>61,091</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood + Furn.</td>
<td>34,478</td>
<td>1,788</td>
<td>101,303</td>
<td>54,685</td>
<td>192,254</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper + Print</td>
<td>159,061</td>
<td>99,203</td>
<td>30,281</td>
<td>62,591</td>
<td>373,224*</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petro + Plastic</td>
<td>197,446</td>
<td>77,655</td>
<td>229,566</td>
<td>311,115</td>
<td>815,802</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Prod.</td>
<td>663,945</td>
<td>978,359</td>
<td>633,300</td>
<td>423,456</td>
<td>2,699,060*</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machin. Equip.</td>
<td>312,922</td>
<td>18,150</td>
<td>243,471</td>
<td>228,130</td>
<td>804,923*</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5,290</td>
<td>202,249</td>
<td>9,210</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>218,749</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOT</strong></td>
<td>1,748,295</td>
<td>1,557,419</td>
<td>1,393,363</td>
<td>1,338,972</td>
<td>6,060,387</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Both the paper products and printing and machinery and equipment industrial groupings received government subsidies, along with their other investments. The government subsidies amounted to 22,088 Dirhams and 2,250 Dirhams respectively.


Besides the industrial establishments mentioned in Table 14.4, data from Ministry of Finance and Industry for 1985
showed that there were 7,502 additional industries in the U.A.E. which employed fewer than ten persons. Their aggregate employment accounted for 36.6 per cent of the manufacturing sector's total. More than half of these industries were clothing manufactures, weaving establishments, leather goods manufactures.\footnote{Shihab M.A. Ghanem, Industrialization in the United Arab Emirates (Hants, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1992), p. 65.} By 1992, the number of private manufacturing establishments employing more than ten persons had increased to 1,122. While 80 per cent of these were in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Shargah, 125 had also been established in Ajman by that year. In terms of sector, construction materials accounted for 268 establishments in 1992, one hundred of which were manufacturing cement blocks. The metals fabrication industry accounted for 261 establishments, and chemicals and paints accounted for 171. The number of establishments in textiles and clothing rose from 67 in 1981 to 107 by 1992, those in the paper products industry increased from 65 to 106 between 1981 and 1992, and the number of food and beverage producing establishments rose from 73 to 97 during that period.\footnote{Ministry of Information and Culture, The United Arab Emirates, 1992, p. 90.}

The discussions covering agriculture and fisheries on the one hand, and industries on the other, have shown the extent of the involvement of both the federal and emirate
governments in these sectors. In both of these sectors, the federal and emirate governments have extended subsidies, loans and investments to the private sector for inputs. (The public share in investments in private industries is shown in Table 14.4) The federal and emirate governments have also initiated projects of their own in both agriculture/fisheries and industry. This extensive involvement of the federal and emirate governments in both public and private investment projects in agricultural, fisheries and industry has helped the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself for two reasons. Firstly, the federal and emirate governments were able to penetrate the U.A.E.'s civil society by means of financial involvement in these sectors because they were recycling revenues to subsidize and construct the agricultural fishing and, industrial strata. This, in turn, forged linkages between these strata and the federal and emirate governments, and thereby integrated these strata into the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. Secondly, the construction as such of the U.A.E.'s industrial and agricultural sectors during the years immediately following independence helped to reproduce the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, because the agricultural, fishing and industrial strata tended to contrast the achievements of this period with the previous one, which had been characterized by the widespread impoverishment
brought about by colonialism.

Another aspect of the contemporary U.A.E.'s economy that continued from the Trucial Oman period into the contemporary socio-discursive formation was socio-economic differentiation among the different emirates. This differentiation is indicated in Table 14.5, which shows the various emirates' G.D.P.s. However, after 1980, the differentiation shown in this table was due to the increased share of the non-oil sector in the G.D.P. During the Trucial Oman period, it had been due to Abu Dhabi's role as an oil exporter, as well as to Dubai's role as a commercial entrepot.

**TABLE 14.5**

**THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES’ G.D.P. BY INDIVIDUAL EMIRATE**

1975-1992

(Millions of Dirhams)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>28,194</td>
<td>77,673</td>
<td>51,215</td>
<td>80,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>8,167</td>
<td>26,610</td>
<td>22,827</td>
<td>30,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharqah</td>
<td>2,084</td>
<td>4,388</td>
<td>8,467</td>
<td>10,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajman</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm al-Quwain</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras al-Khaimah</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>3,197</td>
<td>3,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujairah</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>1,957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.A.E. Ministry of Planning, Planning Department, National Accounts for United Arab Emirates, various issues.

Figures given in table 14.5 for Abu Dhabi and Dubai
show that these two emirates consistently had the highest G.D.P.s between 1975 and 1992 in relation to the other five emirates. This was because of the high revenues they respectively obtained from oil exports and from commercial customs, as well as from services and private and public investment profits. Abu Dhabi's and Dubai's high G.D.P.s during this period were also attributable to the directions in which policymakers in these two emirates had been budgeting these emirates' revenues. Both Abu Dhabi and Dubai policymakers emphasized investment in their emirates' non-oil sectors, and this resulted in growth to the extent that it was the non-oil sector that accounted for the largest contribution to the entire U.A.E.'s G.D.P during the 1972-1992 period. (See Table 14.3). This meant that the non-oil sector was also the most significant contributor to the G.D.P.s of Abu Dhabi and Dubai themselves, since it has been these emirates that have made the greatest contribution both to federal and emirate-level investments, and it was in these two emirates that most of the federal and emirate-level investment took place. In recent years, there has also been an increase in investments in Sharqah.

Abu Dhabi's and Dubai's extensive revenues have made their internal investments more extensive than those of the other five emirates. This situation shows a continuation into the contemporary period from the previous period, during which
time Abu Dhabi and Dubai also had greater revenues than the other sheikhdoms, and were therefore making larger internal investments in development projects than were the other sheikhdoms. This economic differentiation among the emirates has led to differentiation in political power, as demonstrated above. This economic differentiation among the emirates is also enhancing the contemporary socio-discursive formation’s reproduction of itself, because the northern emirates remain dependent upon the subsidies of Abu Dhabi in particular, and Dubai to some extent, through the federal government.

**Trade and Commercial Development**

Abu Dhabi was able to channel substantial revenues from oil exports, and later from exports of refined products, certain foodstuffs and manufactures into its development projects, as Dubai did with its earnings from customs, re-exports, and later refined petroleum products and manufactures. But these characteristics of these two emirates’ external commerce were developments that took place during the 1980s. The trade patterns of Abu Dhabi and Dubai of prior to 1980 had been continuations of those set in Trucial Oman during colonial socio-discursive formation, during which Abu Dhabi and Dubai were constructed so that they became linked to the global economy primarily by means of their respective crude oil exports and the re-exports of manufactures.
During the 1980s, crude oil lost much of its significance as an export commodity for the U.A.E., as statistics show. Between 1972 and 1975, oil exports accounted for an average of 99.9 per cent of the aggregate monetary value of the U.A.E.'s exports, excluding re-exports, for each year. Between 1975 and 1978, crude oil exports accounted for a slightly lower average of 96 per cent of the total monetary value of the U.A.E.'s exports, excluding re-exports. In 1980, by contrast, monetary value of crude oil exports only accounted for 85.1 per cent of that of aggregate exports for the year. In 1985, this percentage had slumped to 73.8, and by 1990, it had declined further to 66.4.

Table 14.6. shows the direction of the U.A.E.'s external trade, in terms of exports and imports. While in the early 1970s, the contemporary U.A.E. adhered to a continuation of the colonial pattern, wherein most of its imports and exports came from and went to Western states and Japan, this

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aggregate accounted for approximately even shares of the total monetary value of U.A.E. imports. For the European countries, this share amounted to 38.8 per cent. For the Asian countries, it was 37.1 per cent. By 1988, however, the share of the Asian countries had markedly surpassed that of the European ones, at 44.4 per cent of total monetary value, whereas the European countries accounted for a 34.7 per cent share. In 1991, the gap between the shares in U.A.E. imports from the European versus the Asian countries widened farther, with the Asian countries accounting for 46.8 per cent of the total monetary value of U.A.E. imports, and the European countries claiming a 33.1 per cent share.

**TABLE 14.6**

CHANGES IN U.A.E. TRADE WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES* AND JAPAN 1972–1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Per cent Imports</th>
<th>Per cent Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The U.S. is included in this category.

The Asian countries from which the U.A.E. imported more than one billion Dirhams worth of commodities in 1991 included, in ranking order, Japan, China, India, South Korea,
than one billion Dirhams worth of commodities in 1991 included, in ranking order, Japan, China, India, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The European countries from which the U.A.E. imported more than one billion Dirhams worth of commodities in 1991 included, in rank order, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. The U.K.'s leading position is related to the fact that British economic involvement in the U.A.E.'s economic development, a pattern constructed toward the end of the colonial period, was reproducing itself. The U.A.E. needed British companies for repairs and maintenance work on previously completed projects that British firms had undertaken during the colonial period. British companies were also obtaining new development contracts from the U.A.E. Other countries from which U.A.E. imports surmounted the billion Dirham mark included the U.S. and Australia. 52

Along with these leading countries, the U.A.E. imported various monetary amounts' worth of commodities from virtually every other country in the world. These trade patterns show the degree to which the U.A.E. had diversified its trade partners since the end of the colonial period. Despite the leading position of the U.K. as supplier, Japan, China, Korea,

Taiwan, France, Australia, India, Italy and the U.S. had also become major sources of U.A.E. imports, notably machinery, transportation equipment, and technology. Information about the U.A.E.'s external trade patterns between 1972 and 1992 shows the discontinuity of an important aspect of the colonial socio-discursive formation, namely, British prominence as a crucial Oman trade partner.

Another characteristic of the colonial socio-discursive formation that began to discontinue in the contemporary U.A.E. was the predominance of crude oil as the U.A.E.'s main export commodity, particularly after 1980, as mentioned above. The U.A.E.'s non-oil exports also appreciated in significance as a percentage of the monetary value of the total. In monetary value itself, the U.A.E.'s non-oil exports climbed from a total of 1,721.3 million Dirhams in 1983 to 3,427 million in 1988, and finally to 5,727 million in 1993. The locally manufactured goods category accounted for the largest single share in the U.A.E.'s non-oil exports between 1983 and 1991, as Table 14.7 below illustrates. In 1983, the manufactured goods share amounted to 59.6 per cent, in 1988 it was 59.4 per cent, and in 1991 it amounted to 49.7 per cent. The share in total exports of the miscellaneous manufactured goods category rose noticeably between 1983-1991, amounting to 1.2 per cent in 1983, 12 per cent in 1988, and 19 per cent in 1991. This reflects the above-mentioned development of public and private
industries in the U.A.E. during the 1970s and 1980s.

TABLE 14.7

NON-OIL EXPORTS OF U.A.E. BY PERCENTAGE OF MONETARY VALUE
OF TOTAL NON-OIL EXPORTS
1983-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and Live Animals</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverages and Tobacco</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude, Inedible Materials Except Fuel</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Fuels, Lubricants* and Related Materials*</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Fats, Veg. Oil</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuf. Goods by Material**</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery + Transp. Equip</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Manuf. Goods***</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified Commodities</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excluding crude oil
** This heading refers to locally produced goods. It includes leather manufactures, rubber products, cork and non-furniture wood manufactures, paper products, textiles, yarn and fabrics; iron and steel, non-metallic mineral manufactures; non-ferrous metals, metal manufactures.
*** Locally produced. Includes plumbing, heating and lighting facilities; furniture, handbags and travel goods; clothing, footwear, professional and scientific instruments; photographic equipment, optical goods, watches and clocks;

For percentage of monetary value, figures for total 1992 U.A.E. exports, in comparison to those for 1982 show that in 1982, the monetary value of the U.A.E.'s crude oil exports had accounted for close to 78.9 per cent of the monetary value
of the U.A.E.'s total exports.\textsuperscript{53} By contrast, in 1992 crude oil accounted for 60 per cent of total exports in 1992, petroleum products and natural gas for 10 per cent, and the exports and re-exports of locally manufactured goods accounted for the remainder, or 30 per cent.

The U.A.E.'s imports, shown in Table 14.8, reflect both the above-demonstrated emphasis on development and the trend toward consumerism, generated by the demands of an increasing population, and particularly by the growth of the immigrant labor force.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{U.A.E. Imports, by Percentage Share of Commodity Grouping in Total Monetary Value (1983-1991)}
\begin{tabular}{lrrr}
\hline
\hline
Food and Live Animals & 10.5 & 14.1 & 10.9  \\
Beverages + Tobacco & 1.4 & 1.4 & .9  \\
Inedible Crude Material (Excluding Fuel) & 1.5 & 2.0 & 2.3  \\
Mineral Fuels/Lubricants & 7.0 & 2.8 & 2.1  \\
Animal Fats/Veg. Oils & .3 & .5 & .5  \\
Chemicals & 6.5 & 7.0 & 6.8  \\
Manuf. Goods by Material & 22.2 & 22.5 & 24.7  \\
Machinery + Transp Equip. & 34.5 & 31.8 & 34.5  \\
Miscellaneous Manufacts. & 15.8 & 17.4 & 16.8  \\
Unclassified Commod. & .3 & -- & --  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}


Table 14.8 shows that commodity categories accounting for the largest import shares during the 1983-1991 period were "Machinery and Transportation Equipment," "Manufactured Goods by Material," and "Miscellaneous Manufactured Goods". The magnitude of imports from these three categories also reflects the fact that the U.A.E. had not developed an alternative to importing machinery, transport equipment and many manufactures, despite their own substantial exports of manufactured goods. The "Food and Live Animals" category was also took a significant share in the total monetary value of U.A.E. imports. This also reflected the demand generated by the increase in the U.A.E.'s population, and particularly in the immigrant population.

The aggregate monetary value of the U.A.E.'s re-exports was consistently greater than that of its non-oil exports for the 1983-1991 period. This quantity rose from 3,910.6 million Dirhams in 1983 to 7,499 million in 1988, and finally to 18,288 million in 1993.\textsuperscript{54} The U.A.E.'s numerous seaports and airports, their size and excellent facilities, and their location are all factors that have made the re-export of commodities by the U.A.E.'s mercantile stratum profitable.

Table 14.9 shows that the U.A.E.'s most significant re-exports were commodities from the "Machinery and Transportation Equipment", "Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles", "Manufactured Goods Classified by Materials", and "Food and Live Animals," categories. It was commodities from these groupings that U.A.E. merchants found it profitable to import, and to re-export not only to other parts of the Arabian Gulf region, but also to Iran, India and other destinations in the Arab world, Asia and Western Europe.

TABLE 14.9


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and Live Animals</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverage and Tobacco</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inedible Crude Materials (Excluding Fuel)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral Fuels and Lubricants</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Fats\Vegetable Oils</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuf. Goods by Material</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machines + Transport Equip.</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Manuf. Goods</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassified Commodities</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Statistics also show that among the emirates, Dubai's share in the monetary value of both non-oil exports and in re-exports was the largest between 1987 and 1993, as Table 14.10
illustrates. This table demonstrates that Dubai’s share in the monetary value of the U.A.E.’s total non-oil exports amounted to 51.03 per cent in 1987, as compared to the average share of Abu Dhabi, Sharqah, Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah, which was 12.25 per cent. In 1993, Dubai’s share in the monetary value of the U.A.E.’s non-oil exports was 61.8 per cent, as compared with the average share claimed by Abu Dhabi, Sharqah, Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah, which was 9.47 per cent.

For re-exports, Dubai’s 1987 share amounted to 74.45 per cent of the monetary value of U.A.E.’s total, in contrast with the average share of the other four emirates for that year, which amounted to 8.51 per cent. In 1993, Dubai’s share in the total monetary value of the U.A.E.’s re exports was 56.2 per cent, in contrast with the average share taken by the other four emirates, which was only 7 per cent.

The figures provided in Table 14.10 below indicate the continuation of another trade pattern that had been constructed in Trucial Oman, namely, Dubai’s assumption of the role of trade entrepot in the late 1800s for Trucial Oman’s own exports (mainly pearls), for the import of goods brought on the British India lines, and for the re-export of these goods to other parts of the Arabian Gulf, including the interior of the Sultanate of Musqat and Oman. Ras al-Khaimah’s figures show that it took up a sizeable, if more modest, share in the U.A.E.’s exports, but not in its re-
exports. This indicates another continuation of the Trucial Oman period, namely, Ras al-Khaimah's role as exporter of goods from the agricultural and fishing sectors.

**TABLE 14.10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dubai</td>
<td>51.03</td>
<td>58.04</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>74.45</td>
<td>67.56</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Dhabi</td>
<td>19.42</td>
<td>19.27</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>19.86</td>
<td>18.69</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharqah</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujairah</td>
<td>12.38</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras al</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaimah</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>15.20</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures for Ajman and Umm al-Quwain are not included because the source did not provide them.
Sources: Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Research and Studies Department, U.A.E. (Non-Oil) Foreign Trade Statistics for the Years 1987-1991, and United Arab Emirates (Non-Oil) Foreign Trade Statistics During the Years 1989-1993*

Table 14.10 also shows a discontinuity from the colonial period, namely the development by the other emirates besides Dubai (notably Abu-Dhabi), of re-export sectors. Dubai's commercial role in the contemporary socio-discursive formation also reflects other ways in which the characteristics of the colonial socio-discursive formation have discontinued. One of the most important discontinuities is that the British Indian Steamer Lines company no longer enjoys a monopoly in Arabian Gulf trade, since the U.A.E's
trade partners now include all of the countries in the world.

**Globalization, Dubai, and the Jebel Ali Free Zone**

While Dubai's ongoing role as the main commercial entrepot for the U.A.E. is a continuation of its role in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Trucial Oman, this very commercial role has changed in the contemporary period, in relation to the development of a new global system, which began with the Post World War II development of multinational corporations. During the late 1960s and afterwards, these multinational corporations entrenched themselves as global entities, and diversified their investments. These developments constructed a new global system, in which all parts of the world became closely interconnected in time and space because of the rapid development of transportation, and communication and information technology. In addition to generally interconnecting people and places in the world more closely, the technological developments within this new global system have facilitated the mobility of multinational corporations themselves for the maximization of profits, and minimization of costs.⁵⁵

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⁵⁵ Many works conceptualizing the "new global system" have recently been written. One such work is Jeffry Henderson's *The Globalization of High Technology Production* (London: Routledge, 1990). In this work, Henderson defines contemporary globalization, and specifically analyzes the integration of East Asia into the "new global system." Another source conceptualizing the "new global system" is Leslie Sklair's *Sociology of the Global System* (Baltimore:
In the 1980s and 1990s, the new global system has undergone substantial transformations, mainly because of the transformations occurring within the transnational corporations that are central to its functioning. In contrast to the transnational corporations operating within Trucial Oman toward the end of the colonial period, those operating in the U.A.E. during the 1980s and 1990s have been able to adopt greater flexibility, provide more rapid service, to work with more resources, and to change more quickly according to the dictates of market conditions, both within the U.A.E. and globally.

The development of communication and information technology that occurred during the 1980s was the main factor in these transformations. Via the use of this technology, transnational corporations operating in the U.A.E. and elsewhere have been able to penetrate various segments of a given market according to the information they gather about that segment's tastes, preferences and habits. Moreover, the

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), which covers the culture of consumerism within, and the politico-economic structure of, the new global system. Roland Robertson is one of the many authors attempting to examine globalization from a sociological perspective, in contrast to an economic or political one. He presents this examination in Globalization: Social Theory and global Culture (London: Sage Publications, 1992). This study uses the term "new global system" in relation to the contemporary period because the term "global system" was used in relation to the world in which historic Oman and Trucial Oman interacted during the Islamic, transformational and colonial periods.
information that they obtain about that market segment's needs and wants enables transnational corporations both to provide that segment with a wide array of products, and also facilitates their establishment of a base through which they can expand the market they are serving. The use of this technology has also enabled transnational corporations to provide rapid deliveries of products to the U.A.E. and elsewhere, and the use of communication technology has enabled them to be flexible in the face of changes in the market itself, or in tastes, preferences, or habits. The resources that these companies have besides technology also allow them the ability to make the rapid changes required for functioning in the new global system.

Steps that transnational corporations have recently taken in order to gain proximity to a market that they have chosen to gather information about and penetrate have included the formation of joint ventures with local firms, and the establishment of a presence in a free zone. The specific development that decision makers in Dubai chose in relation to the construction of this new global system was the building of the Jebel Ali Free Zone. A free zone is a parcel of land within an independent country, usually within the area of a seaport or airport, which is set aside for special trading purposes. In a free zone, companies from various nations may set up plants, storage depots, and offices without the
imposition of restrictions by the host country. Companies may also import goods into the free zone, and export them from there without paying customs duties.\(^{56}\) (While Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Fujairah have also either opened or are in the process of building free zones, the one in at Jebal Ali, a port of Dubai, was built first, remains the largest in terms of capacity, hosts the greatest number of corporations, and handles the greatest quantity of goods in relation to other free zones in the U.A.E.)

In 1992, Jebel Ali had 67 berths accommodating various types of vessels, over 15 kilometers of quay, and a container terminal. Jebel Ali could accommodate general cargo ships, tankers and LPG carriers, among others. In addition, its warehousing complex of 1992 included 70,000 square meters of covered storage and 750,000 square meters of paved open space. Four thousand additional square meters of warehouse space were temperature and humidity-controlled to provide cool storage, and Jebel Ali also had a cold store with a capacity of 42,000 cubic meters. These facilities were important for storing foodstuffs, as well as delicate machinery. The Jebel Ali port also operated a licensed trucking service with tractor and trailer units, as well as a variety of support vehicles. Companies importing or exporting goods also had access both to

nearby Port Rashid, which had 35 berths, dry docks, and another container terminal,\textsuperscript{57} and to the Free Zone at Dubai International Airport.

Free zones are a contemporary type of commercial enclave. The Umma's mercantile stratum had established commercial enclaves during the Islamic period (600-1500 A.D.) in Ceylon, Malabar, Canton, Java, Sumatra, Kliwa, Mombasa, Malindi, and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean commercial system. These enclaves were taken over or replaced by the Portuguese and Dutch during the transformational period, and the entire enclave system was superceded by British colonialism, which did not need commercial enclaves since it conquered both land and sea throughout the Indian Ocean region.

The contemporary free zones resemble the commercial enclaves of the Islamic period in that the multinational corporations operating within them are free both from the customs restrictions and from other laws of the host country, as the merchants of the Umma of 600-1500 A.D. before them had been. However, contemporary free zones in today's U.A.E. differ from their commercial predecessors of the 600-1500 A.D. period in that it is transnational corporations from the outside that have been establishing themselves within lands

that were part of the Umma, rather than merchants from the Umma who are extending commercial influence outward.

Contemporary free zones in the U.A.E. also differ from the Portuguese factories of the transformational period (1500-1820), in that these factories had been established by the Portuguese Crown to collect profits for it, so that only Portuguese vessels, and those few other craft that the Portuguese Viceroy permitted, could unload and reload goods at these factories. The U.A.E.'s Free Zones, by contrast, are open to all multinational corporations. A closer examination of the Dubai Free Zone (Jebel Ali) demonstrates, in greater detail, the difference between the contemporary Free Zones, the enclaves of the Islamic period, and the Portuguese factories in the Arabian Peninsula. This coverage will also demonstrate how and why the Jebel Ali Free Zone is an important linkage to the new global system that the contemporary U.A.E.'s decision makers have constructed.

The government of the Emirate of Dubai opened the Jebel Ali Free Zone in 1985, although construction work on the Jebel Ali port project actually began during the early 1970s. The port itself was inaugurated in 1979. Making the port of Jebel Ali a Free Zone meant opening it as a special enclave which would function outside of Dubai's, and the U.A.E.'s customs barriers. Within this Free Zone, international manufacturers and importers were to enjoy special privileges regarding
imports, taxation, infrastructure, and repatriation of profits. Specifically, the Jebel Ali Free Zone was to enable international concerns to take advantage of the U.A.E.'s ports, facilities and location while bypassing the 51 per cent local investment allowance that was required of all international investors in the U.A.E. itself.\textsuperscript{58} Another advantage that investment in the Jebel Ali Free Zone offers include freedom from restrictions on the recruitment of expatriate personnel. This is important because recently, the U.A.E. has issued certain restrictions on such recruitment. Investors in the Jebel Ali Free Zone are also permitted to repatriate 100 per cent of capital and profits, and are free from corporate taxes for the first fifteen years following the establishment of the venture. This exemption is renewable for a second fifteen-year period after the expiration of the first.\textsuperscript{59}

By 1992, more than 480 firms from fifty-six countries had established themselves, or expanded operations in Dubai's Free Zone. Among them were Aiwa, Sony, GoldStar, Xerox, 3M Corporation, McDermott, Shell Markets, Land Rover, Cleveland Bridge, Black and Decker, BP Arabian Agencies, Reebok, AST, Brother, Polaroid, Union Carbide, Mitsubishi Motors, York Air

\textsuperscript{58} Journal of the Emirates Industrial Bank 4, no. 9 (September, 1989): 205.

Conditioners, Schlumberger, Halliburton, etc.\textsuperscript{60} By the middle of 1995, the number of companies that had established themselves in the Jebel Ali Free Zone had risen to 800, and these companies represented over 72 countries. In 1995, companies established at Jebel Ali included Daewoo International, Daewoo Electronics, Honda, Grundig, Hyundai, Nokia Mobile Phones, Nissan, Murata Machinery, Mobil Corporation, Wrigley GMBH, Pioneer Electronic Corporation, Philips, and Johnson & Johnson.\textsuperscript{61}

As of 1989, the majority of the firms operating in Dubai’s Free Zone were manufacturers, engaging in production within the Zone. However, trading firms specializing in particular goods were also operating there.\textsuperscript{62} The main production industry active in the Jebel Ali Free Zone in 1989 was the garment industry, but other firms produced and traded other consumer goods, and staples. Twelve firms in Jebel Ali dealt in food products, for example; four of them were processing and packaging pasta, snackfoods, spices, and some beverages. Other firms produced or traded machinery, electronic equipment, spare parts, or chemicals. Among those active in machinery, fifteen factories were processing scrap

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 1


metal, or were producing such steel products as wire, nail, containers, and oilfield equipment. Among the firms active in the chemicals sector, fifteen were manufacturing plastic products, cosmetics, insecticides and paper. Many manufacturing, trading and service firms operating in the Jebel Ali Free Zone were also active in the oil sector. These firms dealt with petrochemicals, blended products, lubricants and drilling fluids. The service firms generally maintained oilfield equipment. Miscellaneous manufacturers dealt in furniture, jewelry, and cassetts. Other service industries included banks, caterers, translation bureaus, travel agents, vehicle maintenance garages, and warehousing, cargo and marine services.\(^{63}\)

As of 1995, there were 207 factories operating in Jebel Ali, out of a total of 804 establishments. In terms of number, this placed manufacturing establishments at 25.7 per cent of the total, with service industries representing another 15 per cent of the establishments, and warehousing and distributional industries accounting for an additional 23 per cent. However, in terms of investment, industrial investment accounted for 83.2 per cent of the total investments in the Free Zone, or about 9.5 billion Dirhams out of a total of over 11.4 billions. Companies active in the Jebel Ali Free Zone assemble computers, and manufacture computer systems, software

\(^{63}\) Ibid., pp. 206-207.
and programs. Other products manufactured include air conditioners, electric transformers, electronics, cables, household appliances, etc.\textsuperscript{64} Assembly of computers and electronic equipment is an expanding industry in Jebel Ali, as the Free Zone authorities have been attempting to attract more high-tech industries, and are phasing out labor intensive industries such as textile processing, because these last are dependent upon expatriate labor.\textsuperscript{65} Other reasons offered for the emphasis on high-tech industries at Jebel Ali in relation to others are environmental, or relate to the the high added value that accompanies the production of high quality products. Other desired industries include those that utilize the U.A.E.'s resources, and are export-oriented.\textsuperscript{66}

As for the breakdown in origin of the companies, between 1985 and 1988, there were 140 firms operating in the Jebel Ali Free Zone in all. Of the 68 manufacturers, only twelve were U.A.E. national. Forty-one were British. In 1989, most of the garment factories in Jebel Ali were linked

\textsuperscript{64} Abdel Rehman Yousif, "A Glance at Industry in Dubai," \textit{Dubai Industry Bulletin} 1, no. 1 (August, 1995): 6-7. The 1993 and 1995 issues of a document published in Jebel Ali entitled \textit{Who is in the Jebel Ali Free Zone} provide a complete monthly listing of all established firms in the Free Zone, their nationalities, their products or services, and contact personnel in Dubai.

\textsuperscript{65} Business Monitor International Ltd., \textit{UAE 1995-97}, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{66} Mohammed Al-'Abbar, "Liga'(Interview)", \textit{Sana'a at Dubai} 1, no.1 (August, 1995): 3-4.
to firms from India and Pakistan, although some also came from other parts of East Asia.\(^{67}\) By the end of 1994, of the 735 companies established in the Jebel Ali Free Zone representing 70 countries, the largest bloc came from the G.C.C. or from other Middle Eastern countries. But the number of companies from Europe and East Asia, especially Japan, had increased by 1994 in relation to the 1985-1988 period. British companies have continued to be active in the Free Zone, and one of them, P&O, announced plans in 1995 for the construction of an additional warehousing and distribution unit in the Zone to meet growing regional demand.\(^{68}\)

Besides the manufacturing firms, there are also 156 warehousing and distribution companies, 100 service industries, and 160 trading firms established in the Jebel Ali Free Zone.\(^{69}\) The warehousing and distribution industries facilitate the storage and distribution of goods whether manufactured in the Free Zone or imported for re-export by a trading firm. The service industries, for their part, largely consist of banking firms, insurance companies, law firms, delivery companies, and mailing services. The trading companies are firms that import goods from various global

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\(^{68}\) Business Monitor International Ltd., UAE 1995-97, p. 89.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., p. 90.
markets into Jebel Ali for the purpose of storing them for redistribution to various regional markets.\textsuperscript{70}

The importance of the Jebel Ali Free Zone lies in the fact that it has developed as a distribution center for multinational corporations seeking to penetrate the Arabian Gulf-Arab World market. The use of communications technology enables transnational firms headquartered in Tokyo, Seoul, Singapore, New York, Bombay, Frankfort, Beiging, London, Sidney, etc. to obtain information from their branches in the Arabian Gulf/Dubai about tastes, preferences and other market conditions in the region, but it is warehousing and distribution facilities that ensure market penetration itself. Multinational corporations have been able to use Jebel Ali's warehousing and distributional facilities, and with its location within the Arabian Gulf-Arab world market, to their advantage for the penetration of the regional market. Because manufacturing and trading firms had chosen to use Jebel Ali's facilities, and to set up branch offices nearby, Jebel Ali has also attracted banks, insurance companies, transportation services, and law firms.

\textsuperscript{70} The Jebel Ali Free Zone publication entitled \textit{Who is in the Jebel Ali Free Zone}, February, 1995, lists all the manufacturing, trading, warehousing and service firms active in Jebel Ali as of that date. These include foreign firms, local companies, and joint ventures between locals and foreign investors. This publication specifically lists the nationality of each firm, the commodities in which it specializes, and contact personnel.
It is the development that transnational corporations underwent during the 1980s in relation to the development of communications, financial and information technology that have brought about the growth of Jebel Ali. It is the managers and major stockholders of these corporations that are the prime beneficiaries of Jebel Ali as well. But underlying this establishment of so many transnational corporations within the Jebel Ali Free Zone are many other strata. These include low-wage factory laborers such as textile machine operators, and service worker such as box packers, delivery truck drivers, secretaries, clerks, maintenance workers, sanitation workers, longshoremen, electricians, etc. There are also accountants, bank personnel, and market analysts who link a transnational corporation's Dubai office to headquarters through the flow of information.

In relation to this point, it is important to reiterate that along with the benefits mentioned earlier, it is the availability of low-wage, non-unionized labor that has attracted firms to Dubai's Free Zone. In addition, companies operating in the Free Zones have been able to avoid both the tax and environmental regulations that some of their home countries have adopted. It is also possible for firms in the Free Zone to bring in expatriate labor without numerical restrictions, and nor are there any wage parameters set by law. The lack of wage parameters was particularly significant
during the 1980s, when manufacturing accounted for the bulk of capital investment in Jebel Ali, as much of this manufacturing was labor intensive.

The suggested guidelines for wages for various labor categories in a 1993 publication about the Jebel Ali Free Zone indicate that most workers employed in the Free Zone probably earned wages lower than those earned by workers in the home countries of the multinational corporations. The guideline wage for unskilled workers, for instance, was $140-220 per month. For semi-skilled laborers, it was $160-270 per month. The suggested wage for skilled workers was $270-540 per month. Clerical workers were supposed to earn $250-490 per month. For employees in all of these categories, it was assumed that the employers would provide housing. Suggested wages for secretarial workers amounted to $680-950 per month, and for foremen, they amounted to $490-820 per month, with accommodation provided.  

The development of the transportation technology and information technology within the new global system contributed to the mobility of workers, especially from areas that were in relative geographic proximity to the Arabian Gulf, and which were historically linked to the Gulf, like the Indian Subcontinent and East Asian locations. These areas

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were also regions where unemployment was high, and wages were low. All of these factors attracted low-wage workers to the Jebel Ali Free Zone, where wages, though low, were higher than those they would earn in their own countries for doing comparable work.

Within the Jebel Ali Free Zone, two main lifestyles have developed. The first is the lifestyle of the managerial strata of the transnational corporations with establishments in the Free Zone. The second is the lifestyle of the low-wage laborers. These two lifestyles manifest themselves in terms of dress, occupation, housing, and choice of recreational activity within Jebel Ali and Dubai city. (See Chapter Sixteen for more coverage of culture and lifestyle.)

Immigrant workers had been seeking work in the U.A.E. proper prior to the opening of the Jebel Ali Free Zone. But a similar set of reasons to those bringing them to Jebel Ali had brought them to the rest of the U.A.E. in earlier years. The U.A.E.'s labor force as a whole, influx of immigrant labor in particular, not only underlay the above-mentioned economic, social and trade developments that occurred in the U.A.E., but also impacted the U.A.E. culturally. Understanding the composition and activities of the contemporary U.A.E.'s labor force, therefore, makes it possible both to understand cultural trends within the U.A.E., and the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation's reproduction of
itself. The characteristics and composition of the contemporary U.A.E.'s labor force will be the focus of the next chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the contemporary U.A.E.'s political and economic constructions, and how they are continuities from the previous period, or constructions of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. This chapter has also focused on elements of the previous socio-discursive formation that have discontinued at the outset of the present one. The contemporary U.A.E.'s political and economic constructions have also been analyzed in terms of how they have contributed to the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation.

The first section of this chapter covered political constructions in the contemporary U.A.E. Here, it was demonstrated that some elements of previous socio-discursive formations had continued within the U.A.E.'s contemporary political structure. However, this section also argued that the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation has also constructed elements of its own, and that the political constructions of this socio-discursive formation, whether they are continuities of the past or constructions of the present, are helping the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself.
This section demonstrated that three major aspects in the U.A.E.'s political construction contributed to the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. Firstly, the government's control over natural resources gave it the revenues that it used for penetrating civil society, and integrating civil society with the government. Secondly, emirates with more extensive resources than others contributed more extensively to federal government revenues. This situation ensured the cohesion of the Union since through federal government expenditure, emirates with fewer resources were interlinked with the more prosperous ones. Thirdly, the institutions of "citizenship" and nisab ensured the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation and the cohesion of the Union because citizenship maintained the power of each emirate as a specific entity, but against a situation in which some emirates enjoyed more political power than others within the Union. Those emirates with less political power remained interlinked with those having more. The role of the institution of nisab in reinforcing the Union's cohesion and in reproducing the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation was to reproduce the political power, economic privilege, and cultural prestige of certain strata from across the U.A.E., within the U.A.E. as such.

The second section of this chapter treated the
contemporary U.A.E.'s economic and social development. Here, too, it was shown that many elements of previous socio-discursive formations had continued into this one. Those economic constructions of the contemporary U.A.E. that were constructions of the contemporary socio-discursive formation were also analyzed, as were elements of previous periods that had discontinued. This section mainly argued that economic and social development in the U.A.E. had been constructed in a way that ensured the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. Federal and emirate government expenditures on welfarism, education, subsidies, infrastructure, etc. allowed the government to penetrate civil society by benefitting U.A.E. citizens of all strata. The cohesion of the U.A.E. was ensured by the fact that federal government expenditures penetrated all of the emirates, and that Federal infrastructural expenditures on road building, telecommunications, the media, etc. interlinked U.A.E. citizens.

The third section, covering trade, showed how changes in economic constructions of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation were reflected in changing trade patterns. This section also analyzed new developments in the contemporary U.A.E.'s economy as reflected in its trade patterns, and elements of the past that had discontinued. This section demonstrated the extent to which the U.A.E. had
diversified its exports, and its sources of imports, along with showing the importance of Dubai in the U.A.E.’s external trade, despite Dubai’s modest resources in relation to Abu Dhabi. Dubai achieved its status as an entrepot for the entire U.A.E. both because of its mercantile stratum, which the Dubai government accommodated by building port facilities, airports, etc.

In the Free Zone section, it was demonstrated how the role of Dubai as a commercial city had changed in relation both to the new global system and to what it had been under the previous socio-discursive formations. It was mainly demonstrated that the construction of the Jebel Ali Free Zone indicated that Dubai was changing to accommodate the new global system that multinational corporations were continuing to develop, and it was argued that the construction of the Free Zone in Dubai was accommodating multinational corporations which were penetrating the regional market by using communication, information, and transportation technology.

Analysis of the contemporary U.A.E. political and economic constructions, however, only showed some surface-level workings of contemporary U.A.E. society. Underlying these constructions, however, are many different strata, ethnic groups, religious groups, and gender classifications who are involved in the functioning of these political and
economic constructions. Above all, the labor force underlies the functioning of these constructions. The overview of the contemporary U.A.E.'s political constructions, and its economic and social development provide the basis for deeper analysis of these strata, this labor force, how they underlie the functioning of these political and economic constructions, and how stratification and segmentation in contemporary U.A.E. society assist the reproduction of the contemporary socio-discursive formation. The labor force, its stratification, and its segmentation will be covered in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION: 1971-1995
THE LABOR FORCE AND SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Introduction

This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section will cover the development of the U.A.E.'s labor force and its characteristics. The second section will analyze the distribution of the U.A.E.'s labor force among occupational sectors by nationality. The third section will treat the U.A.E. labor force's stratification, by nationality. The fourth section will demonstrate stratification by gender and its intersection with nationality, and the fifth section will cover stratification in accordance with emirate of residence. The sixth section will demonstrate how the stratification of the U.A.E.'s labor force is helping to ensure the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation.

The purpose of this chapter will be to trace the development of the U.A.E.'s labor force in relation to the economic and social developments that were treated in Chapter Fourteen. In analyzing the characteristics of the U.A.E.'s labor force, this chapter will also show which of these characteristics are continuations of the previous socio-discursive formation, which are construction of the present
one, and which characteristics of previous periods discontinued at the outset of the contemporary socio-discursive formation. Lastly, the U.A.E.'s labor force will be analyzed in relation to whether the contemporary socio-economic differentiation and segmentation characterizing it are helping to reproduce the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation. The characteristics of the U.A.E. labor force will also be analyzed in relation to the contemporary U.A.E.'s political and economic constructions, and in relation to the new global system and consumerism. This chapter will also cover the question of whether the new global system, and consumerism are facilitating the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation.

The first section will provide a brief background of the development and growth of the U.A.E.'s labor force, and the role of the U.A.E.'s public and private sectors in its development and growth. This section will also provide basic information on its characteristics, i.e. nationality, ethnicity, and gender. Section two covers the U.A.E. labor force's distribution among occupational sectors by nationality. This section relates the distribution of the labor force among occupation sectors by nationality to transformations occurring within these sectors of the U.A.E. economy, already discussed in Chapter Fourteen. This, in turn, facilitates the understanding of how and why the U.A.E.
labor force has been stratified. Sections three, four and five will measure stratification within this labor force in term of nationality, gender, and emirate of residence. The criteria against which stratification will be measured will be the sector of the economy in which U.A.E. workers are employed in relation to wages, their education level, the occupational categories in which they are employed, and their occupational status.

In this study, the occupational category classification is divided into three levels, upper, middle and lower. The occupational status classification is similarly divided, into the employer, self-employed, and employee levels. Employers are considered those who invest capital and hire labor. The self-employed are those who invest and work in their own businesses, but hire no labor. Employees are those who are hired by those who invest in businesses.

Section six will analyze whether the construction of the labor force, in the U.A.E., within the new global system, and in relation to consumerism is facilitating the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation. The significance of this chapter lies in the fact that an analysis of the characteristics, development and construction of the U.A.E.'s labor force facilitates a deeper understanding of the U.A.E.'s economic, political and cultural structure, as well as the discourses that have been
constructed in relation to these structures.

The Development of the U.A.E.'s Labor force and its Characteristics

The growth of the contemporary U.A.E.'s labor force is actually a continuation of a process that began in Trucial Oman during the 1960s. Under the contemporary socio-discursive formation, this labor force has continued to grow in relation to the overall growth of the economy, demonstrated in Chapter Fourteen. Specifically, as both the private and public sectors of Trucial Oman, and later the U.A.E., accelerated their investments in the U.A.E.'s economy during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the demand for labor grew, and therefore the import of immigrant labor increased during these three decades. It is important to emphasize, however, that the import of immigrant labor reached its peak levels under the contemporary socio-discursive formation, in relation both to the growing revenues available to the U.A.E.'s federal and emirate level governments, and to the expenditure and development policies that were implemented by the U.A.E.'s public and private sectors during the 1970s. Without the labor force in general, and the influx of immigrant labor in particular, the growth in all of the sectors of the U.A.E.'s economy demonstrated in Chapter Fourteen could not have occurred to the extent that it did.

As demonstrated in Chapter Fourteen, the private
sector’s role in the U.A.E.’s development was significant, and so, therefore, was that sector’s role in fostering the influx of immigrant labor to the U.A.E. during the 1970s and 1980s, and in reproducing the immigrant labor force. The significance of the private sector here can be seen in the number of establishments that have been initiated, and in the number of workers that it employed in relation to the public sector. In 1975, out of a total of 18,713 establishments in the U.A.E., fully 16,997, or 90.8 per cent, were privately owned, while only 1,716, or 9.2 per cent, were part of the public sector. For 1980, privately owned establishments numbered 37,267, out of a total 40,454, or 92.1 per cent. Only 3,187 establishments, or 7.9 per cent, were part of the public sector during that year.1 More significantly, only 25,032 workers were employed in public sector establishments in 1980, while private sector establishments employed 298,533 during that year.2

The continuation of the influx of immigrant labor during the contemporary period, in turn, brought about a

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2 Ghanem, Industrialization in the Unite Arab Emirates, p. 45.
continuation and transformation of two further aspects of the late Trucial Oman period. One of these aspects of the previous socio-discursive formation was the segmentation of the labor force, although this, underwent transformations in the contemporary socio-discursive formation. Another aspect of the previous socio-discursive formation was the discourses within the labor force itself concerning class, gender, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and emirate of residence were also traceable to the colonial socio-discursive formation, but these, too, underwent transformations in the contemporary one.

These discourses within the labor force reflected and reinforced segmented identities within the labor force, which, in turn, engendered socio-economic differentiation within the labor force in terms of economic privilege, cultural prestige, and political power. Segmentation and socio-economic differentiation within the contemporary U.A.E.’s labor force stemmed from the fact that immigrant workers came from many different countries, spoke different languages, adhered to different religions, had varying educational backgrounds and skills, and were both male and female. In addition, each immigrant group played a specific role in the contemporary U.A.E.’s society. Furthermore, each immigrant labor grouping constructed its own discourses within its own community in relation to other communities living in the U.A.E. as a result
of interaction with them, and reproduced its own culture while living in a multi-cultural society.

Table 15.1 below provides figures for population and labor force for the 1975-1985 period. (1985 is the year for which the latest census data is available.) This table also divides the labor force for this period according to gender, and into "national" and "non-national" categories. The overall picture of the contemporary U.A.E.'s population and labor force that this table provides serves as a foundation for analyzing the changes that occurred in both between 1975 and 1985, and for examining more deeply the socio-economic differentiation within the labor force in terms of nationality, gender, emirate of resident, stratum and the intersection of these characteristics.

Table 15.1 reveals that the national segment of the U.A.E.'s total population only accounted 37 per cent of the total in 1975, and decreased to 29 per cent in 1985. The national segment of the labor force was even smaller, accounting for 15 per cent in 1975 and decreasing to 10 per cent in 1985. As in the 1960s when it was Trucial Oman, the U.A.E.'s private and public sectors had been investing large amounts of capital in development projects after 1971, because under colonialism, Trucial Oman had lacked a basic infrastructure. The implementation of these development projects required an extensive labor force, as well as
expertise for the planning and maintenance of these projects.

**TABLE 15.1**

THE U.A.E.'S LABOR FORCE AS PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION, AND BY NATIONALITY AND GENDER, 1975-1985. (15 years of age and older)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
<th>Labor Force</th>
<th>% of Pop</th>
<th>Of which nat.</th>
<th>Of which Fem.</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>557,887</td>
<td>293,788</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>45,500</td>
<td>12,157</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,042,099</td>
<td>559,960</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>54,900</td>
<td>28,267</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,379,300</td>
<td>683,825</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>68,300</td>
<td>65,415</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures are for 1984.

One important reason for the influx of immigrant labor to Trucial Oman during the 1960s, and to the U.A.E. after 1971 was that both the Trucial Oman and the U.A.E. governments were extending many infrastructural contracts for road building, and seaport and airport construction, to foreign companies.
These companies sought the low-wage labor from the Indian subcontinent and elsewhere in Asia both to ensure the maximization of profits, and the minimization of costs. In addition, the indigenous population of Trucial Oman/U.A.E. was too small to provide the required labor force. Once these infrastructural projects were completed, they provided a foundation for further expansion, on the part of both the private and public sectors, and also facilitated the arrival of additional immigrant labor. Additional immigrant labor, in turn, generated additional demand, which also made feasible additional industrial expansion, and other economic activity, especially on the part of the private sector.

In addition, further public and private sector economic activity was generated by the fact that accommodation of the rising immigrant population required the expansion of airports and seaports, as well as housing, electricity, water, roads, groceries, bakeries, butcheries, barber shops, restaurants, cinemas, stores for consumer products, mosques, schools, hospitals, police, and other services once it settled in the U.A.E. The construction of these facilities, the production of these goods, and the provision of these services all required additional labor, most of which again had to be imported. In addition, the influx of labor generated expansion of the government bureaucracy, because additional personnel were needed for keeping records, providing police
protection, staffing schooling facilities, etc. Moreover, the increased immigrant population necessitated the import of additional foodstuffs and consumer goods, which, in turn, generated the need for more customs, port, and distributional personnel. This situation, too, added to the requirements for immigrant labor, which, in turn, needed additional housing, community facilities, food, consumer goods, etc. Thus, the influx of immigrant labor into the U.A.E. became a self-perpetuating phenomenon.

The self-perpetuating nature of the immigrant labor influx is also shown in Table 15.1. In 1993, the U.A.E.'s total population had increased to over two million from 557,887 in 1975, as shown above. The labor force had grown to a total of almost 800,000 persons by that year from 293,788 in 1975. Between 1975 and 1985, the non-national population had grown from 356,002 persons to 983,200. The non-national labor force had increased from 238,288 to 615,525 during this period.

Another by-product of the immigrant labor influx was the low percentage of females in the total U.A.E. population. Females accounted for 30.7 per cent of the total population in 1975, and this percentage only increased to 36.3 per cent in 1980. This was because most of the immigrant workers were males between fifteen and fifty-nine years of age. (In 1975, males within these age parameters constituted 85 per cent of
the immigrants that the U.A.E. admitted.)

The percentage of females had increased to 39.9 percent of the population by 1990. This last development occurred because U.A.E. policymakers began to encourage the immigration of female workers for social service occupations. Also, during this period, immigrant male workers began to send for their wives and families after having settled in the U.A.E.

However, it has not only been through its necessity to the U.A.E.'s economy because of its work that the immigrant labor force has enabled the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself. There are several other reasons why this labor force had played that role. Firstly, the labor force itself is segmented because of ethnicity, class, gender, nationality, religion, etc. Each immigrant grouping, therefore, has brought to the U.A.E. its own set of cultural norms, values, and beliefs. Furthermore, immigrants from the various nationality groupings tend to work in different sectors of the U.A.E.'s economy.

Because of the existence of a vast population of immigrant workers, U.A.E. citizens in aggregate, despite their

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differences in terms of ethnicity, *nisah*, status, class, gender, etc., have constructed an integrated identity in relation to the immigrant workers in general. Similarly, the members of the different immigrant groupings have also formed integrated identities both in relation to each other and in relation to U.A.E. citizens. Another continuity from the colonial period that has strengthened these constructed identities among immigrant groups has been the political, cultural and economic linkages that each immigrant group retains to the civil society of its home country, rather than to that of the U.A.E. It is realities of the new global system that have perpetuated these linkages. These realities include easy travel back home, access to newspapers, satellite television programs, radio programs, films, and video cassettes from the home country, and the presence of the home countries' embassies in the U.A.E. These realities also include the availability of long distance telephone communication, international postal services, computerized banking facilities for sending money home, and international shipping services for sending consumer goods home. Within the U.A.E. itself, each community has its own associations, clubs, schools, houses of worship, restaurants, and grocery stores.

In relation to the new global system consumerism within the U.A.E. has grown, and this has been another important factor in the the U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation's
reproduction of itself. The U.A.E.'s public sector has built seaports and airports through which global consumer goods entered the country, as demonstrated in Chapter Fourteen, and the U.A.E. labor force in general ensures an effective demand for these imports because all of its members are wage earners, spending their wages on these goods both for themselves and in the case of immigrant workers, for relatives remaining in their home countries. Because the U.A.E. labor force is tied to the ongoing need for these consumer goods, its members remain tied to their income-providing jobs, which has resulted in a routinization of their work situation. This routinization, in turn, ensures both the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s economy and the labor force's demand for the consumer goods. This situation also reproduces U.A.E. connections to the new global market, because the U.A.E.'s public and private sectors continue to import consumer goods to satisfy the internal demand that the wage labor force presents.

In addition to its magnitude as a market for consumer goods, the U.A.E.'s labor force contributes to the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation's reproduction of itself by virtue of its segmentation. The tables provided below, and the analysis that accompanies them will attempt to demonstrate the extent to which the U.A.E.'s labor force is segmented in terms of nationality, religion, class, gender, and even among U.A.E. citizens, both in terms of each
emirate's relation to the others, and within each emirate. Much space will be devoted to the socio-economic differentiation among members of this labor force as well. The coverage of segmentation and socio-economic differentiation within the U.A.E.'s labor force will provide further insight into the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation's reproduction of itself.

The U.A.E.'s Labor Force: Distribution Among Occupational Sectors by Nationality

Table 15.2 below provides a breakdown of the U.A.E. population by nationality between 1975 and 1980. This table shows how diverse the U.A.E.'s population had become during that period, and particularly important, that the U.A.E. citizens themselves were a minority whose size was decreasing as a percentage of the total U.A.E. population during these years. In 1975, the share of the U.A.E. population for which U.A.E. citizens accounted amounted to 36.1 per cent, while in 1980, it had dropped to 27.9 per cent. In 1985, it fell as low as 17.2 per cent, and only rose to 29.3 in 1990.5

This increment between 1985 and 1990 mainly stemmed a decrease in the influx of immigrant workers. The influx of migrant workers decreased for three main reasons. The first was that the U.A.E.'s public and private sectors were no

5 Al-Paris, Development Patterns and Structural Changes in the Labor Market in the United Arab Emirates, p. 15.
longer implementing as many infrastructural projects as they
had begun between 1975 and 1985. The second was that between
1985 and 1990, the U.A.E.'s public and private sectors began
to invest in machinery and technology for industries, rather
than in additional labor. The third was that between 1985 and
1990, government regulations placed more restrictions upon
both illegal and legal immigration. Contractors seeking to
import immigrant workers now had to justify the need for them
before issuing them permits. Finally, as the influx of
immigrant workers was decreasing between 1985 and 1990, so,
correspondingly, was the local population increasing
naturally, as a result of government policy subsidizing local
population growth, in effect since the early 1970s. This
increment in the U.A.E. citizen population can be seen in the
fact that while the U.A.E.'s total population increased by an
average of 6 per cent per year between 1988 and 1990, the
labor force only increased by 2.2 per cent per year between
1985 and 1990.  

Table 15.2 also indicates an important continuation
from the colonial period, namely, the fact that the largest
immigrant grouping in the U.A.E. came from the Indian
subcontinent. As in the colonial period, contracts for
projects were extended to international companies which

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recruited low-wage labor from areas where free labor was abundant because of the employment displacements that colonialism had caused. Workers from the Indian subcontinent continue to seek employment in the U.A.E. because of the higher wages, freedom from taxation, education opportunities, health care, and other benefits that automatically come with employment there, in contrast to the work situation at home. Furthermore, the U.A.E.'s ongoing infrastructural and industrialization projects promise plentiful, and continuous employment opportunities.

The situation that Table 15.2 has portrayed for the 1975-1980 period basically continued up to 1991, in that immigrants from the Indian Subcontinent continued to constitute the largest grouping obtaining work permits to enter the U.A.E. between 1982 and 1991. In 1982 for example, work permits were given to 72,733 immigrants from India and Pakistan combined, in contrast with the 25,084 persons from the Arab world who obtained work permits. During that year, only 12,503 persons from other Asian countries, along with 7,709 Europeans, with 1,219 persons from the Americas (mainly U.S.), with 297 persons from non-Arab African countries, and with 123 persons from Oceania also obtained U.A.E. work permits. In 1991, U.A.E. work permits were extended to 65,118 immigrants from India and Pakistan combined. This large number contrasted with 9,379 persons from the Arab world, and
with the 20,885 from the other Asian countries who also obtained work permits in 1991. In addition, only 3,460 immigrants from Europe obtained U.A.E. work permits during that year, as did 642 from the Americas (mainly from the U.S.) and 183 persons from non-Arab African countries. Only 149 immigrants from Oceania obtained work permits to enter the U.A.E. in 1991.  

Aside from showing the large portion of the U.A.E.'s immigrant labor force that come from the Indian sub-continent, Table 15.2 also indicates that each immigrant group settling in the U.A.E. brought with it its language, culture, customs, and tastes and preferences. The latter category has ranged from cuisine to dress, music, films, narratives, and even humor. The cultural diversity into which population diversity has translated has affected each immigrant grouping in its interaction both with the others, and with U.A.E. citizens. The effect this interaction has been the formation of integrated identities among the immigrant groups both in relation to each other and to U.A.E. citizens, and among U.A.E. citizens in relation to the immigrant groups. In fact, in the course of this interaction, the immigrant groupings were coming to impact the cultural environment of U.A.E.  

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citizens as much as the culture of the U.A.E. was impacting them, especially since U.A.E. citizens were now a minority within the total population. In relation to this development, U.A.E. citizens developed a strong identity in relation to the immigrant groups. The ways in which U.A.E. citizens asserted their identity in relation to the immigrant groups included dress, and the use of a particular Arabic dialect.

**TABLE 15.2**

**U.A.E. POPULATION BY NATIONALITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.A.E.</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omani</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Arabs</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asians</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Euro. + U.S.</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One of the discourses that immigrant groups have
constructed in relation to each other pertains to religion. The segmentation of the total labor force by religion is illustrated in fact that in 1985, out of a total of 683,825 persons, about 71.6 per cent were Muslim and were divided among the various Islamic denominations. Another 17.5 per cent of the labor force was divided among Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucianists, and about 10.9 per cent were Christians, also belonging to various Christian denominations. This religious discourse has sometimes translated into differences in affinities among the immigrant groupings in relation to each other, and also in relation to the U.A.E. citizens. Pakistani immigrants, for instance, as Muslims, share religious affinities with U.A.E. citizens, and correspondingly differentiate themselves from non-Muslims from the Indian sub-continent. The religious affinities between Pakistani immigrants and U.A.E. citizens are reinforced by such common Islamic practices as prayer, observance of the Ramadan fast, and the celebration of other Muslim holidays. Many immigrants from other Arab countries also share religious affinities with U.A.E. citizens. If Christian, they still shared with U.A.E. citizens the affinities of language, culture, history, etc. Christian immigrant groupings, for their part, reinforced their affinities with each other, rather than with non-

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Christian immigrant groupings or with U.A.E. citizens through the observance of Christian prayer, and the celebration of Christian holidays.

In order to understand the segmentation of the U.A.E. labor force more completely, and the socio-economic differentiation within it, it is necessary to examine more of the specific characteristics of the U.A.E. labor force. Table 15.3 shows the distribution of the labor force among the various sectors of the U.A.E.'s economy between 1972 and 1991. Firstly, this table shows that the percentage of the U.A.E.'s labor force employed in the agricultural and fisheries sector declined from 11.8 per cent in 1972 to 6.1 per cent in 1991. This occurred because of the increased mechanization of agriculture that was occurring during those years, and also because increased education opportunities for the sons of farmers encouraged them to seek employment in the cities. Among other things, this was because employment in the cities offered higher pay, and because the work was less strenuous.⁹ Concerning the fisheries sector specifically, many workers left it for similar reasons, in addition to the fact that in this sector, it was the boat and tool owners who reaped the greatest profits from the catch produced by the fishermen.

Table 15.3 also shows the continuously low percentage of the U.A.E. labor force for which the petroleum and mining sector accounted between 1972 and 1991, despite the fact that this sector was an important contributor to the U.A.E.'s GDP. This is because of the capital intensive nature of the oil industry. The manufacturing sector, by contrast, employed a noticeably increasing percentage of the labor force during this period. This growth was an indicator of the U.A.E.'s diversification of its economy, and of the increasing importance of the manufacturing sector to the U.A.E.'s economy, as explained above. The percentage of the labor force employed in the water and electricity sector also increased slightly for the 1972-1991 period. This increase reflected the need for the expansion of this sector that population growth in the U.A.E., the growth of the manufacturing sector, and the increased mechanization of agriculture had all brought about.

The percentage of the labor force employed in the construction sector, however, declined from 29.5 to 17.6 between 1972 and 1991. This marked decline reflected the fact that the U.A.E.'s public and private sectors were no longer initiating as many large infrastructural construction projects during the 1980s as they had been starting during the 1970s. By contrast, the high percentage of the labor force that worked in the trade, hotel and restaurant sector, and the
increase in this percentage between 1972-1991 was related to
the increase in the labor force (i.e. the influx of immigrant
workers), and to the increase in the population that occurred
as the families of these workers began to migrate to the U.A.E
after 1980.\textsuperscript{10} In addition, the hotel sector grew during the
1980s because part of the U.A.E's diversification attempt
included the promotion of tourism during the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{11}

The small increase in the percentage of the labor force
for which the financial, insurance and real estate sector
accounted is also an outgrowth of the increase in population,
and of the growth in consumerism in the U.A.E. between 1972
and 1991. In addition to this general trend, specific
government policies, such as housing subsidies, along with the
private construction of housing, partially accounted for the
growth in the percentage of the labor force employed in the
real estate sector. Increased numbers of immigrant and local
workers also used banking and insurance facilities, which
explains the increase in financial and insurance institutions
discussed in Chapter Fourteen.

The government sector remained second to the
construction sector in the percentage of the U.A.E.'s labor

\textsuperscript{10} Nader Furjani, "Hajim wa Tarkib Quwat al-'Amal wa al-
Sukan," (Amount and Composition of the Labor Force and
Population), in Furjani, Al-'Amalah al-Ajnabiyyah fi Aqtar al-
Khali' al-'Arabi, p. 25.

\textsuperscript{11} Ministry of Information, The United Arab Emirates,
force that it employed during the 1972-1991 period, as Table 15.3 shows. This was because government personnel, at both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agric &amp; Fishery</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude Oil &amp; Mining</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elect. &amp; Water</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Hotel, Rest.</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transp., Storage,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insur., &amp; Real</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Services</td>
<td>26.5**</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Services</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL LABOR FORCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( IN 000'S)</td>
<td>144.8</td>
<td>288.3</td>
<td>541.0</td>
<td>619.4</td>
<td>717.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures, and therefore derived percentages for 1972 are estimated.
** For 1972, figures include Domestic and Other Services. Percentages may add up to slightly more than 100% because of rounding.

the federal and emirate level, continued to be needed to accommodate the health, housing, education, security and social welfare needs of the increasing population, and for
planning and the maintenance of records concerning the expanding economy. Local and federal government employment also remained attractive because of its high and non-fluctuating salaries. (See below.)

The considerable growth of the percentage of the labor force employed in the domestic and other services sector occurred for two main reasons. The first of these was the breakdown of extended families into nuclear ones during the 1970s and particularly during the 1980s. The government’s policy of offering housing subsidies, and of the actual provision of housing in some cases, led family members to leave extended family homes and to form their own households. Secondly, the government’s policy of encouraging the natural increase in the local population through subsidies also led to the hiring of additional domestic help, as the other members of the extended family were no longer available to help a parent with childcare, cooking, housekeeping, etc. The percentage of the U.A.E.’s labor force employed in the other services sector also increased because more janitors, private drivers, tea and coffee servers, and other cleaning staff were needed for the increased number of hotels, offices, etc. that

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were constructed during the 1972-1991 period. Table 15.4, covering 1980, divides the U.A.E. labor force into four major regional groupings: National (U.A.E.) Arab, Asian, and European. The Arab group included employees from the Arab countries mentioned in Table 15.2. The Asian group included employees from the Indian sub-continent, Iranians, and other Asians (mainly Filipino and Korean). This table illustrates how many workers from these four regional groupings were employed in each sector, thereby showing one aspect of how segmentation by nationality manifested itself in the U.A.E.'s labor force in 1980.

Two general points first need to be made about what Table 15.4. shows. The first point is that members of these four regional groupings were employed in all sectors of the U.A.E.'s economy, although each one was more noticeably represented in some than in others. The second point is that this table underscores the importance of the Asian contingent of the U.A.E.'s labor force to the U.A.E.'s economy, as Asian workers constituted the largest, though varying, percentage of employees in each sector.

However, Table 15.4 also shows that for 1980, Asian workers constituted the largest portion, fully 87.6 per cent, of the construction workforce. They were also heavily represented in the wholesale, retail, restaurant and hotel sectors, comprising 81.5 per cent of that workforce. This is
an outgrowth of the fact that during the 1970s, when the U.A.E. public and private sectors were extending contracts for the major infrastructural projects that were being completed, they tended to hire from the large pool of available, low wage labor on the Indian sub-continent for construction work. Most of these workers were males, and their arrival created a demand which expanded an existing sector of Asian-owned retail, restaurant and services shops. This sector had been constructed during the 1960s, and it largely consisted of earlier-arrived construction workers for the infrastructural projects of the 1960s who had accumulated sufficient savings to open small businesses of their own.

Other sectors employing large contingents of Asian workers in 1980 included manufacturing, gas, water and electricity (79.8 per cent), transportation and storage (77.9 per cent), and agriculture (72.2 per cent). The heavy representation of Asian workers in the former sector can mainly be traced both to the fact that larger manufactures are labor intensive, and to the establishment of a large number of manufactures of all sizes that was occurring in the U.A.E. during the 1970s. But in addition, the water and electricity services were provided to the U.A.E. under contracts with foreign companies, which also preferred to hire low wage labor.

A large percentage of the transportation workers from
the Asian grouping were support personnel at seaports and airports, while others drove trucks and public transportation. In agriculture, the Asian presence was traceable to the fact that the local Trucial Oman governments had begun to hire Asian employees for agriculture projects during the late colonial period. As local and federal government expenditure on agriculture increased during the 1970s, additional Asian agricultural labor was hired. The private sector also hired Asian workers for its agricultural projects.

Non U.A.E. Arabs were most heavily represented in three sectors in 1980. These were the oil and mining sector, where they comprised 35.9 per cent of the workforce; services, where they constituted 31.8 per cent of the workforce; and the financial, insurance and real estate sector, where they accounted for 23.2 per cent of the workforce. During the 1970s, both the international oil firms, and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) were hiring non-U.A.E. Arabs who had been trained as oil experts, and as skilled workers. Non U.A.E. Arabs had also established a number of insurance and real estate companies in the U.A.E. In addition, Arabs from outside of the U.A.E. were hired as accountants, other professionals, clerks, etc. by local, Arab and international banks because of their language and training. In the services sector, non-U.A.E. Arabs worked as civil servants, physicians, schoolteachers, professors, etc.
Table 15.4 shows that in 1980, the European workers were most heavily represented in the oil and mining sector, where they made up 12.6 per cent of the employees, and in the finance, insurance and real estate sector, where they amounted to 9.1 per cent of the workforce. There large representation in the oil and mining sector began during the colonial period, during which they worked as explorers, managers, and supervisors of the oil companies that were first establishing themselves in Trucial Oman. During the 1970s, European employees in this sector, especially British employees, continued to occupy these positions as employees in foreign companies that continued to operate in the U.A.E. The large representation of Europeans in the financial, insurance and real estate sector is also a continuation of the colonial situation, since it was during this period that British banks established branches in Trucial Oman, and brought British managers to run them. After 1971, other international banks based in the U.S. or European countries established branches in the U.A.E., and they, too, hired managers, accountants and secretaries from their home countries.

Table 15.4 also indicates a European presence in the construction and transportation and storage sectors in 1980, where European employees represented 3.5 and 3.9 per cent of the workforce respectively. This situation, too, is traceable to the colonial period. For construction, the governments of
Abu Dhabi and Dubai extended construction contracts to European, and mainly British, companies. During the 1970s, these governments continued to extend many of these contracts to British and other European companies, both for new projects and for maintenance of old ones. Some new contracts were also extended to U.S. companies. Europeans and U.S. workers, therefore, were mainly employed in this sector in 1980 as managers and supervisors. For the transportation and storage specifically, many British workers retained employment as managers and officers in airports and seaports.

U.A.E. citizens were particularly heavily represented in the agricultural and fisheries and in the services sectors in 1980. Representation in the agricultural and fisheries sectors is explained by the fact that most persons employed in agricultural and fisheries have traditionally been locals. The fact that a large percentage of the employees in this sector continued to consist of U.A.E. citizens in 1980 was a continuation of a situation that had prevailed during previous periods.

The large percentage of service sector employees described in Table 15.4 for 1980 who were U.A.E. citizens were actually government civil servants. The employment of locals in the government service also developed within the colonial socio-discursive formation, and specifically during the 1960s, when the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms were developing their
government administrations. The sheikhdom governments began their penetration of Trucial Oman's civil society during this decade by recruiting educated locals for civil service employment. After 1971, the federal government began to expand, and to increase its expenditure on education and development projects. The federal government, too, began to penetrating the U.A.E.'s civil society by means of the recruitment of the increasing number of educated locals for employment during the 1970s. In recruiting educated personnel from each emirate, the federal government also helped to foster unity among the emirates, as discussed in Chapter Fourteen. U.A.E. citizens also constituted sizeable percentages of the mining and oil sector (8.3 per cent); the transportation and storage sector (7.5 per cent); the financial, insurance and real-estate sector (6.7 per cent); the wholesale, retail, hotel and restaurant sector (5.2 per cent); and the manufacturing, gas, electricity and water sector (4.9).

The presence of U.A.E. citizens in the mining and oil sector is explained by the fact that during the 1970s, the emirate governments, particularly that of Abu Dhabi, gained shares in foreign oil firms operating there, and also developed their own, oil companies. As the oil sector expanded, it recruited educated and skilled locals to fill the positions that became available. The U.A.E. citizens who were
employed in the transportation and storage sector mainly worked in the airports and seaports, as clerks, managers, and service employees.

During the 1970s, the U.A.E. public and private sectors both established banks in the U.A.E., and foreign banks operating there also established additional branches, as mentioned above. Some educated U.A.E. citizens were hired by these banks. The sizeable percentage of U.A.E. citizens in real estate in 1980 is explained by the fact that the increase in the U.A.E's population during the 1970s, as well as the construction projects in Abu Dhabi and Dubai described above, drove the price of land up and led some local merchants into the land speculation business.

U.A.E. citizens employed in the wholesale, retail, hotel and restaurant sector, and particularly in wholesale were old merchants who had continued the import and re-export trade in which they had been engaged since the early 1900s. The retail merchants of 1980 were a continuation of the local merchants of imported goods of the early 1900s. These two contingents were particularly prevalent in Dubai. (The continuation of this stratum has been discussed in the trade section of Chapter Fourteen.)

The U.A.E. citizens in the manufacturing, gas, electricity and water sector, and particularly in manufacturing, constituted the rebirth of the stratum of
industrial manufacturers that had flourished during the Islamic period. This original stratum had been destroyed during the transitional and colonial periods, but had arisen after 1971 out of the existing mercantile stratum. During the 1970s, merchants had begun to invest capital in the manufactures mentioned above. However, many investors in manufactures also continued to run mercantile enterprises, as well as construction contracting companies.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{TABLE 15.4}

\textbf{DISTRIBUTION OF U.A.E. LABOR FORCE AMONG THE SECTORS BY NATIONALITY, 1980}

(Workers 15 years of age and older--by percentage.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Nationals</th>
<th>Arabs</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Euro. &amp; Amer.</th>
<th>Tot.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agric. &amp; Fish.</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Oil</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuf., Gas,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec. &amp; Water</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholes., Retail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel &amp; Rest.</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transp./Storage</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin. Ins., &amp;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Est.</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In general, while Table 15.4 shows that members of each regional grouping that it presents found employment in each

\textsuperscript{13} Ghanem, \textit{Industrialization in the United Arab Emirates}, p. 90.
sector, it also shows that members of certain regional groupings are more heavily represented as employees in certain sectors rather than in others. It also shows how large the Asian contingent of immigrant workers has been in each sector. Further analysis of the statistics in this table, in conjunction with other information, provides insight into continued articulation of the mercantile and agricultural and fishery sectors with more recent developments in the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation. While mercantile and agricultural/fishery sectors continue to articulate within the contemporary socio-discursive formation, however, they are also undergoing transformations. Certain elements of the mercantile sector, began to invest in manufactures while still remaining part of the mercantile sector. Elements of the agricultural/fishery sector, for their part, have been finding employment in the service sector, while still continuing to farm and fish.

Table 15.5 provides further insight into the movement of segments of the U.A.E.'s labor force among the sectors of the economy between 1975 and 1985. Specifically, this table shows the the national segment's trends in social mobility among occupational sectors in relation to the non-national segment of the U.A.E. labor force. Table 15.5 also shows the overall increase in the labor force that occurred during this period, which is an indicator of the expansion that the
U.A.E.'s economy was undergoing during the 1975-1985 period, as discussed above. In relation to this economic expansion, Table 15.5 shows the growth of the non-national labor force in relation to the national. Already much larger numerically than the national labor force in 1975, the non-national labor force had more than doubled by 1985, while the national labor force had only increased by half again during the 1975-1985 period.

Statistics about the increase in the national population in comparison to the increase in the national labor force between 1975 and 1985, provided in Table 15.1 show that while the entire national population increased by 194,215 persons during this period, the national labor force increased by only 22,800 persons. There are two important reasons for the small number by which the national labor force increased in relation to the national population. The first reason is that the women in the local population were mainly working at home, and those engaging in such domestic labor and reproduction were not considered part of the labor force. The second reason is that during the 1970s, the federal government was encouraging local family growth by paying subsidies to families for each child born. The outcome of this policy was that by 1985, close to 50 per cent of the U.A.E.'s citizen
population was under fifteen years of age.\textsuperscript{14}

An analysis of Table 15.5 will both reiterate many of the points that were made concerning Table 15.4, and add a few new insights. However, it is important to emphasize that Table 15.5 also shows trends concerning the employment patterns of the national labor force in relation to the non-national between 1975 and 1985. One particularly noticeable characteristic of the entire U.A.E. labor force that Table 15.5 brings out is the U.A.E. labor force’s overall concentration in service sectors, in relation to production sectors. The service sectors in this table, namely electricity and water; wholesale and retail; transportation and storage; finance and insurance; and other services took up 54.3 per cent of the total labor force in 1975. This share had increased to 66 per cent by 1985. This reflects the growth of the service sector in the U.A.E.’s economy.

This service sector grew because both the population and the labor force increased. Specifically, the growth in the numerical count of the total labor force in agriculture, mining and oil, manufacturing, and construction all

necessitated the growth of the service sectors. In addition, the growth of consumerism and welfarism generated growth in the service sectors. Government employment expanded in relation to the growth of welfarism, and the expansion of roads, seaports, airports, and of the retail, wholesale and storage facilities to accommodate the import of consumer goods also generated the expansion of employment in other service industries. Also related to the growth of welfarism and consumerism was the trend toward nuclear rather than extended families, and the federal government’s policy of encouraging family growth. Besides generating an increase in welfarism and an expansion of government services, these domestic developments also generated the growth of the domestic services sector. The growth of the re-export sector also generated the expansion of related service facilities.

There are several other important trends that Table 15.5 illustrates. The first is decline in the employment of members of the national labor force in agriculture and fisheries between 1975 and 1985. (The opposite was true for the non-national labor force in this sector). This trend for the national labor force indicated the social mobility of U.A.E. citizen farmers and fishermen from the agricultural and fishing sectors to other ones, in search of employment opportunities in the city, especially in the government services sector. The trend for the non-national labor force
showed a growth in the agricultural/fishery sector's tendency toward hiring wage labor. Secondly, the employment of both the national and non-national labor force in the oil and mining sector increased during the 1975-1985 period, because of the growth of this sector during the 1970s and early 1980s. Thirdly, the employment of members of the non-national labor force in manufacturing grew markedly. There was also a slight increase in the employment of members of the national labor force in this sector.

As demonstrated above, this increase was due to the growth of the manufacturing sector during the 1970s and 1980s, especially in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. This sector was able to grow to such an extent between 1975 and 1985 because of the infrastructure that the U.A.E.'s public and private sectors had built during the 1970s. Fifthly, the number of non-national workers in the water and electricity sector increased, as did that of the U.A.E. citizen workers to a much lesser extent, and this was because the water and electricity sector was growing to accommodate other growing industries, an increasing population and an expanding labor force during this period. By contrast, the number of U.A.E. citizen workers employed in the construction sector declined between 1975 and 1985, and that of non-national workers employed here only increased modestly. This reflects the fact that by 1985, many of the major construction projects such as roads, airports and
seaports had been completed, as discussed previously.

**TABLE 15.5**

**DISTRIBUTION OF U.A.E. LABOR FORCE AMONG THE SECTORS, NATIONAL VERSUS NON-NATIONAL, 1975-1985**

*(Workers 15 years of age and older—in thousands.)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agric &amp; Fish.</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Oil</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuf.</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec. &amp; Water</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>113.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole &amp; Retail</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transp./Storage</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance &amp; Insur.</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>218.0</td>
<td>265.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL L. F.</strong></td>
<td><strong>45.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>251.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>296.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>68.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>615.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>683.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures, including totals, are rounded, so constituent quantities may not add up to totals. Source: Al-Faris, "Development Pattern and Structural Changes in the Labor Market in the United Arab Emirates," p. 19.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the number of both national and non-national workers employed in the services sector in aggregate increased during the 1975-1985 period, as did the percentage of the entire labor force that this sector took up. However, certain service sectors need to be discussed in greater detail because the increments in the number of workers they employed over the 1975-1985 period were particularly large. The first is the wholesale and retail
sector, whose employment of non-national workers more than doubled between 1975 and 1985. This change was a reflection of the growth, in particular, of such retail services as restaurants, grocery stores, consumer goods stores, barber shops, bakeries, butcher shops, etc. to service the growing immigrant labor force. The second sector is the services sector. This includes government services and domestic ones. Government services account for the substantial increase in the number of U.A.E. citizen workers employed in this sector between 1975 and 1985, since during this period, both the federal and local government was expanding, and was penetrating the U.A.E.'s civil society by recruiting educated citizens for civil service jobs.

The government's provision of civil service employment that paid a higher salary than did employment in the private sector, required a shorter work day, and provided additional allowances remains an important reason why the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation has been able to reproduce itself. U.A.E. citizens tended to prefer civil service jobs since, in the private sector, U.A.E. citizens not only had to compete with on an equal basis with immigrant workers in terms of skill, but were also faced with the fact that immigrant workers were usually willing to accept lower salaries than they were. The tremendous supply of immigrant workers alone
tended to reinforce this situation.¹⁵

**Stratification by Nationality**

Tables 15.4 and 15.5 have demonstrated that members of the labor force from certain regional groupings tended more toward employment in specific sectors than in others, despite the fact that all regional groupings were represented in each one. Table 15.6 adds greater significance to the information revealed to Tables 15.4 and 15.5, because it shows the average wage that workers in these various sectors earned, and therefore the wage differentiation in the U.A.E. by sector. For example, workers in the crude oil sector where much more highly paid, on the average, than were those in the agricultural sector, the U.A.E.'s lowest-paying sector. Workers in the government sector, on the average, earned considerably higher salaries than did those employed in domestic services, the U.A.E.'s second lowest-paying sector. Employees in the finance and insurance sectors earned higher salaries than did those in the manufacturing, construction, or trade, hotel and restaurant sectors.

The significance of the wage statistics that Table 15.6 provides can be seen in conjunction with the statistics provided above about the distribution of the labor force by

regional grouping among the sectors. Europeans, for example, were found to be most heavily represented in the oil and mining sector in Table 15.4. They were specifically working as managers, executives supervisors and operators in the oil sector, which Table 15.6 shows as paying the highest average wage. Europeans were also heavily represented in the insurance sector, another sector paying high average salaries.

The wage differentiation that U.A.E. citizens faced can be seen in the fact that Table 15.4 places their largest concentrations in the services sector, which in their case meant government civil service, and in the agricultural and fisheries sector. While Table 15.6 shows that the government service sector paid high average wages, it also shows that the agricultural and fisheries sector was the U.A.E.’s lowest-paying sector. This is an important reason why Table 15.5 shows that many U.A.E. citizens employed in this sector left it between 1975 and 1985.

Table 15.4 showed that non-U.A.E. Arabs were most significantly present in the oil and mining and services sector. This meant that most members of this regional grouping were employed in the middle or upper middle levels of the oil industry, or as teachers, and other mid-level government civil servants. This data also indicated that non-U.A.E. Arabs tended to be well paid, as the crude oil and government sectors paid high average salaries. Asian workers
are so numerous in the U.A.E. that they are found in every sector. However, Table 15.4 showed them to be most significantly represented in the construction and wholesale, retail, hotel and restaurant sectors, two of the U.A.E.'s lower-paying sectors.

**TABLE 15.6**

**AVERAGE YEARLY WAGE BY ECONOMIC SECTOR**

1975-1991

(In thousands of Dirhams)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude Oil</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>122.9</td>
<td>178.0</td>
<td>148.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Mining</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elect. &amp; Water</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Hotel, Rest.</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transp., Storage,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, Insurance</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Services</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Services</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.A.E. Ministry of Finance and Industry, figures published in 1993. Figures in Table 15.6 calculated on the basis of the wage bill and the number of workers in each sector.

It is important to emphasize, however, that stratification also existed within each sector, and this was partly because in each sector, personnel with varying levels of education were employed. The education level factor intersected with the nationality and wage level within each
sector in determining the rank of each individual. Table 15.7 provides more data about the distribution of the national and non-national members of the U.A.E. labor force among the education levels.

Table 15.7 shows that for the 1975-1985 period, more than 50 per cent of both the U.A.E.'s national and non-national labor force was illiterate or barely literate. Because this illiterate or barely literate segment of the U.A.E.'s labor force was so large, its members found employment in all of the sectors mentioned in the tables above. This means that even within the sectors that paid higher wages, there was pronounced stratification. Within any sector, these illiterate or barely literate employees were to constitute the stratum earning the lowest wages. In addition, for each year in the 1975-1985 period, for the entire labor force, the percentage of workers in the labor force decreased markedly as their level of education increased, so that the employees who had attained higher levels of education only accounted for a tiny minority of the labor force. This data about education level differentiation further indicated wage differentiation in all employment sectors, as it was workers with higher levels of education who were likely to hold upper level occupations, and consequently, to earn higher wages in any of these sectors.

The second point that Table 15.7 illustrates is that
the illiterate and barely literate workers accounted for a slightly decreasing percentage of the labor force between 1975 and 1985. Related information about this trend can be found in Table 15.5, whose data show that construction workers, whose work required no education, accounted for a decreasing percentage of the total labor force between 1975 and 1985, while workers in the manufacturing sector, the government sector, and the insurance and financial sector accounted for slightly increasing percentages of the total labor force during this period. Correspondingly, Table 15.7 also shows that the percentage of the labor force for which workers with education ranks of Preparatory Certificate or higher accounted grew between 1975 and 1985. All of these statistics indicate that the U.A.E.'s economy was undergoing transformation, in relation to changes in the levels of education of the labor force. They also indicate that U.A.E. policy of fostering education was producing some results.

Several important points can be derived from Table 15.7 about the national labor force in particular. Firstly, the table shows that the percentage of the national labor force that fell within the illiterate/barely literate classification declined markedly between 1975 and 1985. This further indicates the results of the U.A.E. federal government's policy on education promotion. Secondly, however, the table shows that the illiterate/barely literate
contingent of the national labor force still comprised a 56.7 per cent share in the total U.A.E. national labor force by 1985. This shows that wage differentiation was a reality for workers who were U.A.E. nationals as well as for non-national workers. This was true because illiterate and nearly illiterate employees could only be employed at the lowest wage levels in any sector.

A third point that Table 15.7 illustrates is that while the illiterate/barely literate contingent of the national labor force was declining, the grouping within it achieving education levels of Primary Certificate to Secondary Certificate was increasing as a percentage of the U.A.E. national labor force. Workers from this grouping tended to find middle-to low-middle government civil service positions. This trend, too, reflected the U.A.E. government’s policy of promoting education, and it also showed that the U.A.E.'s government sector was expanding, in relation to the expansion of the population, the economy and social welfarism, and needed more workers at these levels.

The percentage of the national labor force obtaining higher education constituted a stratum that grew significantly between 1975 and 1985. This was because the U.A.E. had opened its university in 1976, and because the U.A.E. federal government was sending students abroad for higher education. Despite this significant growth rate, however, the percentage
of the national labor force with higher education remained very small, and members of this group tended to obtain upper level positions, (managerial and professional) mainly in the government, but sometimes in the private sector.

As for the non-national labor force, its illiterate and near-illiterate contingent also declined as a percentage of the total non-national labor force between 1975 and 1985, but the illiterate and barely literate contingent still constituted slightly over 50 per cent of the non-national labor force by 1985. As the illiterate/barely literate contingent of the non-national labor force declined in terms of percentage, the middle-level education group increased. Non-national labor force members attaining education levels of Primary Certificate to Secondary Certificate tended to find middle to lower-middle occupations in the private sector if Asian, and to some extent, in the public sector if non-U.A.E. Arabs. Non-national labor force members at this education level also tended to find employment in clerical, sales, or some technical positions. The changes in the U.A.E. economy described above generally correlated with an increase in the demand for employees educated at the mid-level.

The non-national labor force also contained a minority contingent with higher education, or university or post-graduate degrees. This contingent increased as a percentage of the non-national labor force during the 1975-1985 period.
However, Table 15.7 also shows that the percentage of the non-national labor force that had attained higher education degrees remained small.

The percentage of members of the non-national labor force who attained higher education increased during this period to accommodate certain basic needs within the U.A.E. Firstly, the U.A.E.'s university at Al 'Ain, opened in 1976, needed professors. In addition, expanding manufacturing, banking, insurance, and services needed managers, and thirdly, the U.A.E. was seeking additional professionals such as physicians.

**TABLE 15.7**

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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literate</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Cert.</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prep. Cert.</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second. Cert.</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below Univ.</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. Degree</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Graduate</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Labor Force (No.)** 45,474 250,868 54,915 505,028 68,312 615,334

Table 15.8 will provide more information about the employment categories in which members of the U.A.E.'s national and non-national labor force tended to work. Table 15.8 shows the occupation categories in which members of the U.A.E.'s national and non-national labor force tended to be employed by percentage. However, before analyzing the figures provided, it is necessary to point out that because the non-national labor force was so numerous, numerically more of its members than those of the national labor force were bound to be working in any given employment category. The total number of persons in both the national and non-national labor forces is given at the bottom of Table 15.8 for 1975 and 1980.

It is possible to divide the U.A.E.'s national and non-national labor force into three general levels—upper, middle and lower—in relation to occupation category. This table shows that for both years, only a small percentage of the national or non-national labor force was employed at the upper level, consisting of the administrative/managerial and the professional/technical categories. The percentage for both the national and the non-national labor force increased somewhat for employment at the middle level, which included the clerical and sales categories. The lower level, consisting of the service, agriculture/fisheries and production categories, employed the greatest percentage of both the national and non-national labor force for 1975 and
1980. This is explained by the above-demonstrated high level of illiteracy and minimal literacy in both the national and non-national labor force.

The expansion of the U.A.E.'s economy during the 1970s, covered in Chapter Fourteen, is reflected in the general changes in the percentages of the national and non-national labor force that occupied each employment category. For example, the percentage of the national and non-national labor force employed in the administrative/managerial, professional and technical, clerical and services categories increased. By contrast, the decline in the percentage of the national and non-national labor force employed in the agriculture/fisheries and production (including construction) categories reflects the economy's trend toward services, and the decline in the construction and agricultural/ fishery sectors.

Despite the vast number of non-national employees in relation to national ones, trends can be observed concerning the employment patterns of the national and non-national labor forces in relation to each other in 1975 and 1980, by employment category level, and in terms of each specific category. Within the upper level categories for both years, a greater percentage of the national than the non-national labor force was employed in administrative/managerial positions, and this percentage increased between 1975 and 1980. Most appointments to administrative and managerial
positions took place within the Ministries and the emirate governments. For these positions, these governments tended to appoint nationals, on the basis of their citizenship, and on the basis of the fact that most government business was conducted in Arabic. The factors of education level, nisab, and emirate of residence usually intersected with citizenship as criteria for appointment. The percentage of the national labor force that the administrative/managerial category employed largely increased because of expansion of the federal and emirate governments. This governmental expansion correlated with the general increase in population, the spread of education in the U.A.E., the increase in the national labor force, and the expansion of the economy, as mentioned earlier.

In contrast to the administrative and managerial category, the professional/technical category employed a greater percentage of the non-national than the national labor force for both years, with the employed percentage of both the national and non-national labor forces increasing. The large percentage of the non-national labor force, in comparison to the national, that this category employed is explained by the fact that higher education facilities, hospitals, expanding industries, etc needed professors, physicians, technicians, engineers and other professionals. Very few nationals had been educated in these capacities by 1975-1980 period, because under the British colonial administration, the Trucial Oman
governments had not developed higher education institutions, and as discussed before, the Trucial Oman governments had only instituted education at lower levels toward the end of the colonial period. During the 1975-1980 period, the U.A.E. was still in the process of developing higher education institutions. The Al-‘Ain University itself, the country’s first, had only been opened in 1976.

**TABLE 15.8**

U.A.E. LABOR FORCE, NATIONAL AND NON-NATIONAL,
BY OCCUPATION CATEGORY 1975-1980
(Workers 15 years of age or older, by percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin &amp; Managerial</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profes. &amp; Technical</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric &amp; Fisheries</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total L.F.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in 000’s)</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>251.0</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>505.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Within the middle level, the clerical category employed
a greater percentage of the national labor force than it did the non-national labor force during 1975 and 1980, but the percentages of both labor forces that it employed increased between the two years. These developments are traceable to the expansion of the U.A.E.’s public and private sectors. Both of these sectors needed clerical staff, secretaries, accountants, etc. as they expanded, and in the public sector, nationals who had obtained a middle-level education tended to be chosen because they knew Arabic, while in the private sector, non-nationals with a middle-level education tended to be employed. Asians were often employed because they knew English. Some non-national Arabs with a middle-level education also found employment in the expanding U.A.E. government sectors because of their knowledge of Arabic.

On the lower level, the services sector employed a far greater percentage of the national labor force than it did the non-national labor force during both years, but the percentages of both labor forces that it employed increased slightly between 1975 and 1980. The high percentage of the national labor force that was illiterate or barely literate accounts for the large percentage of the national labor force that this category employed. Specifically, these nationals usually worked as errand personnel in government offices, or as tea and coffee servers. The non-national employees in the service sector were mainly domestic workers or chauffeurs.
Others worked in restaurants and various shops, and as taxi drivers. The rise in the percentage of the non-national labor force that this category employed stemmed from the growth of the U.A.E.'s population during the 1970s, especially the non-national population, in relation to economic expansion.

However, while Table 15.8 above shows that the agricultural/fisheries category employed a greater percentage of the national labor force than the non-national labor force during both 1975 and 1980, this percentage declined over the 1975-1980 period. This was because many nationals who were employed in agriculture and fisheries were leaving this work and taking advantage of employment opportunities in urban areas, especially in the growing service sector. The percentage of the non-national labor force that this category employed, by contrast, rose slightly between the two years. This was because the government-initiated agricultural projects had begun to employ immigrant workers as wage labor during the 1970s.

The production category employed a far greater percentage of the non-national than the national labor force during 1975 and 1980, but the percentages of both labor forces that it employed decreased over the period. While this category also included employees in manufacturing, its largest sector was the construction sector, which largely employed illiterate or semi-literate immigrant workers. Once the
public and private sector-initiated construction projects had been completed, this sector began to employ fewer workers.

In addition to being divided according to education and occupation levels, the U.A.E.'s labor force is divided into three employment status categories: Employer, self-employed, and employee. The two main categories are those of employer and employee. The employers continue to be the investors of capital, and the hirers of labor, while the employees provide the workforce for the larger establishments in exchange for a wage. The self-employed section of the labor force works in family-owned establishments. The self-employed category is differentiated from the employer category in that while investing a limited amount of capital, it does not hire wage labor. It is also differentiated from the employee category because its members are employed by their own establishments, and are not hired for a wage.

Table 15.9 shows the distribution of the national and non-national labor force among the employment status categories. The table shows, firstly, that as an average for the entire U.A.E. labor force, national and non-national, less than 5 per cent fell into the employer category in 1975 or in 1980. Similarly, as an average for the entire labor force, national and non-national, more than 75 per cent fell into the employee category during 1975, and over 80 per cent did so during 1980. For both 1975 and 1980, a markedly greater
percentage of the national than the non-national labor force was self-employed. However, for this category, as well as for the others, it is important to consider the data on a numerical, as well as on a percentage basis for a more complete description and analysis of the employment status of the U.A.E. labor force. This is true because the non-national labor force vastly outnumbered the national labor force in the U.A.E. during the 1975-1980 period, and has continued to do so. Sheer numbers, therefore, have made non-nationals who became employers a key factor in the ongoing introduction of immigrant labor into the U.A.E., and therefore in the growth and reproduction of the immigrant labor force.

The numerical importance of the members of the non-national labor force can be seen in the fact that while the national employer category contained 1,455 persons in 1975, the non-national employer category contained 3,763. For 1980, the numbers were 2,471 and 7,070 persons respectively. The numbers of persons comprising the non-national employer category for 1975 and 1980, and the growth of this category between those two years, both indicate the importance of the role it played in the growth and reproduction of the immigrant labor force. This point is reinforced by the fact that the non-national employer category owned 12,181, or 71.8 per cent of the total 16,997 establishments in the U.A.E. in 1975, and employed 108,298 workers out of a total of 160,672, or 67.4
per cent during that year. National employers, in contrast, owned 4,816 establishments as of that year, employing 52,374 workers. Among non-national employers, 329 established joint-ventures with locals, employing 7,848 workers.

As a breakdown of the distribution of establishments owned by non-nationals among the various ethnic groups, 2,164 establishments were owned by non-national Arabs in 1975, and employed 22,806 workers. Asians owned 8,475 establishments, employing 29,757 workers. Non-nationals from other countries owned 1,213 establishments, employing 47,887 workers.16 (This category establishments held by Japanese, British, or U.S. owners.)

Changes also occurred in the self-employed category of the U.A.E.'s labor force in 1975 and 1980. The national segment of the self-employed category contained 9,040 persons in 1975, and the non-national, 13,044. For 1980, these two segments respectively contained 7,743 and 22,221 persons. Table 15.9 shows that the share of the self-employed category in the national labor force declined from 20.1 per cent in 1975 to 14.1 per cent in 1980. Figures given below show that this decline was numerical as well. Changes in the self-employed category occurred in relation to the continuing growth of the non-national labor force. As immigrant workers

continued to arrive in the U.A.E. over the 1970s and 1980s, they increasingly needed the establishments the non-national self-employed, such as grocery stores, restaurants, tailor shops, laundries, newsstands, bakeries, barber shops etc. The self-employed contingent of the non-national labor force grew to meet this demand as non-national workers who had been able to accumulate some savings from their wages began to establish these businesses. The decline in the percentage of the national labor force that the self-employed category claimed between 1975 and 1980 is explained by the fact that many nationals were leaving the agricultural/fisheries sector, where they owned small farms, or their own fishing boat, for employment in the growing service sector.

At the same time, the employee category’s share of the national labor force increased from 76.1 per cent in 1975 to 81.2 per cent in 1980. This change occurred for two main reasons. The first was that some of the local farmers, fishermen, wholesale merchants, grocers, and tea and coffee shop owners were seeking government civil service positions. Many of these sons, too, were seeking civil service employment after obtaining an education, rather than adopting their fathers’ occupations. The second reason was that the city, itself, was changing in terms of where the different segments of the population lived. By the late 1970s, the central parts of the cities, where the local small merchants had established
their grocery, coffee and tea shops were largely occupied by immigrants, as most of the locals had moved to the suburbs. Immigrant workers now living in these neighborhoods preferred to patronize establishments run by proprietors from their own countries.

**TABLE 15.9**

U.A.E. LABOR FORCE, NATIONAL AND NON-NATIONAL, 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS. (1975-1985 by percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>93.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid worker</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Labor Force (No.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Labor</td>
<td>45,474</td>
<td>250,868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The tables and analysis above has covered the manifestations of differentiation within the U.A.E.'s labor force in terms of occupation, wage level, education level and employment status as related to nationality. This analysis did show differentiation between the national and non-
national groups in terms of occupation, wage level, education level and employment status, but it also demonstrated differentiation within the national and non-national groups themselves in these terms.

The statistics and analysis presented so far have also demonstrated how the U.A.E.'s immigrant labor force has been reproducing itself within the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, and indicate that the differentiation characterizing the U.A.E.'s labor force has been an important factor in the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation's reproduction of itself.

However, this differentiation and segmentation within the U.A.E.'s labor force should also be examined in relation to gender, because gender is the another important aspect of differentiation and segmentation within the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, and in this socio-discursive formation's reproduction of itself.

Stratification: Gender and its Intersection with Nationality

Table 15.10 shows trends in the portion of the U.A.E. labor force that women have comprised between 1975 and 1990, and in their distribution among the sectors of the U.A.E.'s economy during this period. Firstly, this table illustrates the small percentage of the U.A.E.'s labor force for which women have accounted during this period. However, it also
shows noticeable growth in this share. In 1975, for example, there were 9.8 thousand women in the labor force, and these constituted 3.3 per cent of a total of 293.8 persons. This percentage rose to 16.3 per cent in 1990, when 141.4 thousand persons in the labor force were women, out of a total of 866.3.

Several factors explain why women accounted for such a small percentage of the labor force during the 1975-1990 period. Many of these factors are related to socio-economic realities that were developing within the U.A.E.\textsuperscript{17} These socio-economic realities, themselves, must be understood as socially constructed realities of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, since discourses were constructed in relation to them, as will be shown below.

It is important to note that most U.A.E. women in fact were working during the 1975-1990 period, but the work they were doing was domestic. This sort of labor is not counted in censuses simply because it is not paid by wage. Secondly, it was not that women lacked the opportunity to join the labor force between 1975 and 1990. Data about the expansion of both the private and the public sector during this period, plus the statistics about the influx of immigrant labor, show that additional labor was acutely needed during those years.

\textsuperscript{17} Linda Usra Soffan, \textit{The Women of the United Arab Emirates} (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 103.
However, government subsidies and other welfare policies made it just as feasible for women to bear children, and remain home rearing them, instead.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, as the government adopted a policy of providing nationals with housing, an increasing number of U.A.E. citizens began to live in a nuclear, rather than extended, family setting. This meant that as women bore more children in accordance with government policy, they no longer had immediate access to child care assistance from other family members if they went to work outside the home.\textsuperscript{19}

Fourthly, although women of the badia, the agrarian socio-discursive formation, and the urban socio-discursive formation had hitherto been productive workers selling goods and services in the cities, or selling food products and crafts that they had made in the badia or in rural areas, social changes that occurred in Trucial Oman toward the end of the colonial socio-discursive formation, and which continued during the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, rendered these occupations unfunctional.\textsuperscript{20}


\textsuperscript{19} 'Aminah Ghubash, \textit{Al-Taghyir al-Iitima'i wa al-Tansha'ah al-Iitima'iyyah} (Social Change and Social Development) (Beirut: Dar al-Bahar, 1990), p. 58.

\textsuperscript{20} Khawlah Lutah, "'Athar al-Tawdhif al-Silbi li 'A'idat al-Naft 'ala al-Mar'ah fi Mujtama' Dawlat al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah," (Negative Effects of the Use of Oil Revenues on
Fifthly, the influx of immigrant labor caused immigrant male workers to supplant local female workers in certain occupations. For example, some male immigrant workers supplanted local women in farm labor. Other male immigrant workers supplanted fishermen's and farmers' wives who had sold fish and vegetable in urban markets, as well as other local women who itinerently sold clothes among households that they had obtained from warehouses. Immigrant workers replacing these women often opened up clothing outlet stores of their own. Some of the male immigrant workers were merchants, and supplanted local women who were in such occupations. Other immigrant workers made local women who sewed at home for customers redundant by similarly establishing themselves. Immigrant labor also replaced local women from lower urban strata who worked as domestics, and in other occupations. Finally, there were women who simply lacked the financial need to work outside the home as a result of governement subsidies, and the general expansion of employment opportunities for

men.  

On the other hand, there are other factors explain the increase in the number of women employed in the labor force, and the larger percentage of it for which they accounted in 1990, in relation to 1975. Firstly, many women thought of their finding employment outside the home as an activity that would contribute to national development. Others sought employment in order to have more of an income of their own, and to augment those of their husbands. Still others believed that a woman’s social status improved once she became an income earner.  

In many other cases, women sought employment outside of the home in order to prove their own identities.


24 This was the response given to Hind ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qasimi by 25 per cent of the 98 married, working and educated women who were asked to give their reasons for working. In contrast, much smaller percentages of these working women responded that they were working to attain financial independence or to enhance the incomes of their husbands. These 98 women made up half of the sample population comprising 196 women in all. These women came from all seven emirates and were participants in Al-Qasimi’s study about education, work and decision making among U.A.E. women. This study was published as a book entitled Al-Mar‘ah fi al-Imarat:
The increase in education levels among U.A.E. women during the 1970s and 1980s, especially at the higher education level, also led many of them to seek employment outside the home. Finally, the availability of childcare services, mainly from immigrant women workers, helped to enable local women to seek employment. This factor, coupled with the increase in the number of immigrant women who obtained employment as childcare workers, added to the percentage of the labor force for which women accounted in the U.A.E. by 1990.

While women were employed in all sectors of the U.A.E.'s economy during the 1975-1990 period, the greatest numbers were found in the services sector. Employment in this


25 The increase in the number of U.A.E. women seeking higher education can be seen in the changes in female enrollment at the U.A.E.'s university that took place between the academic years 1977/1978 and 1986/1987. During the first year 62 per cent of the students at the U.A.E.'s university were male, while 38 per cent were female. By contrast, female enrollment for the second year, 1986/1987, and increased to 58 per cent of the student body, while male enrollment had dropped to 42 per cent. See Ijlal Isma'il Hilmi, "Al-Wa'i al-Ijtima'i wa Dur al-Ma'rah fi al-Tanmiyyah fi al-Imarat," (Social Consciousness and the Role of Women in Development in the Emirates), Shu'un Ijtima'iyyah, 9, no. 35: 12.

26 Mohammed 'Isa al-Suweidi, "Al-'Amalah al-Wafidah wa Mushkilatiha," (Immigrant Workers and their Problems), Shu'un Ijtima'iyyah, 10, no. 39 (1993): 225-226. This article is based on a study that was conducted by Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs on male and female immigrant domestic workers. Between 1985 and 1993, the number of these workers increased from 41,000 to 150,000.
sector included employment in the government ministries for nationals, and in domestic work for some non-nationals. In 1975, about 7.5 thousand women, out of a total of 9.8, were employed in the services sector, at both government (federal and local) and domestic levels. For 1990, this number was 124.4 out of 141.4

TABLE 15.10

DISTRIBUTION OF U.A.E. LABOR FORCE AMONG THE SECTORS
BY GENDER, 1975-1990*
(Workers 15 years of age and older—in thousands.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agr/Fish</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min/Oil</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuf</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elec/Wat</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole/Ret</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans/Stor</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin/Ins</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>265.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undef/Unstated</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unempl</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL       | 284   | 9.8   | 293.8 |

* Figures, including totals, are rounded, so constituent quantities may not add up to totals.

A third point to be derived from the data in Table 15.10 is that despite their concentration in the services sector, there was also a noticeable, if much smaller, increase in the presence of female employees in relation to males in other sectors. These sectors included manufacturing, wholesale and retail, transportation and storage, and finance/insurance/real estate. In the manufacturing sector, the percentage of women employed rose from .6 to 2.5. In wholesale/retail, the increase was from 1.1 per cent to 5.1 per cent. In transportation/storage, the share of female employees rose from 1.3 per cent to 4.8 percent. In the finance/insurance/real estate sectors, the portion of female employees increased from 8.3 per cent to 13 per cent. The occupations in which members of the U.A.E.'s female labor found employment, and their employment status in relation to the male labor force must also be seen in relation to education level attained to be fully understood.

Illustrations of this relationship are provided in Table 15.11 below. Table 15.11 provides some data about the levels of education that members of the U.A.E.'s female labor force attained in relation to members of the male labor force. One striking pattern that Table 15.11 reveals is that women who were part of the U.A.E. labor force tended to be better educated than their male counterparts at most levels. For
example, during the 1985-1992 period, a noticeably smaller percentage of the female labor force than the male was illiterate, although the illiterate percentage of the male labor force was decreasing. Near the other end of the educational spectrum, at the below university and university degree levels, this pattern was repeated.

**TABLE 15.11**

DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE IN THE U.A.E., MALE AND FEMALE, BY EDUCATION LEVEL REACHED 1985-1992

(Workers 15 years of age or older, by percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literate</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Cert.</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prep. Cert.</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second. Cert.</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below Univ.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. Degree</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Graduate</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Labor Force (No.)** 618,410 65,415 724,856 141,444 778,540 176,410


The figures in Table 15.11 imply that in order to find jobs, it was generally necessary for women to be markedly better educated than men were. This was because aside from domestic work, the employment that women obtained non-manual rather than manual labor, and therefore required literacy. In
the case of female domestic workers, however, figures for 1985 show that during that year, 23 per cent of them were illiterate, while 42 per cent could barely read and write. Eleven per cent of these workers had primary education, and 24 per cent preparatory certificates. Because domestic employment did not require literacy, a greater percentage of the female domestic workers than of the female labor force overall was illiterate or barely literate.

Table 15.12 shows specifically the percentage of the U.A.E.'s female labor force, in relation to the male, that was employed in the government service, or in domestic work. (The domestic work sector is designated by the "without establishment" heading.) This table's figures show that in 1985, 30.7 per cent of the female labor force was employed in the federal or local government, or in the public sector. Another 17.4 per cent, making the total so far 48.1 per cent was employed in the private sector. An additional 48.8 per cent of the female labor force was employed in domestic work. These figures reinforce the previously made point about how women who found employment in the government, public sector, or private sector also generated employment of domestic workers.

It is appropriate to examine the domestic worker stratum a little more closely, in terms of nationality, religion, and wage earned, since this stratum constitutes such
a significant percentage of the female labor force. Figures for 1985 report that 98 per cent of these domestic workers in the U.A.E. came from Asia. In terms of breakdown, this placed 67 per cent as having come from Sri Lanka. Another 23 per cent came from India, and 9 per cent came from the Phillipines. An additional 1 per cent migrated from Bangladesh. In terms of religion, Muslims comprised 47 per cent of the total, with Christians comprising 37 per cent, while Buddhists accounted for 16 per cent.\footnote{Ibid., p. 226.}

Average yearly wage statistics for domestic workers in relation to those of the other female workers, the largest concentration of whom were employed in the government, public and private sectors combined, shows socio-economic differentiation among members of the U.A.E.'s female labor force themselves, and therefore within the gender. Table 15.6 places the average yearly wage for domestic workers at 9.8 thousand Dirhams for 1985.\footnote{Despite the fact that domestic workers earn a lower wage than do most other workers, there is differentiation among them also, in accordance with the income level of the family that employs them, the emirate in which they are employed, the region in which they are employed (urban or rural), their experience, and their education level. A substantial portion of their wages are in kind, in that they are provided with accommodations, food, health care, and a yearly ticket home for visits to relatives. Many have been able to send money home to relatives. The majority of the domestic workers hired for work in the U.A.E. are hired through contracts with recruiting agents, under which the wages they will earn are set. Many workers from Pakistan, the}
annual wage earned in the government sector, which amounted to 98.4 thousand Dirhams. Average annual wages for certain areas of the private sector amounted to 30.5 thousand dirhams for manufacturing, and 77.9 thousand dirhams for finance and insurance.

**TABLE 15.12**

**EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC, PRIVATE OR OTHER SECTORS OF U.A.E LABOR FORCE, BY GENDER, 1985**

(Workers 15 years of age and older, by per cent of male and female labor force)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect. Emp.</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fed. Govt.</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Govt.</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pub. Sect.</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priv. Sect.</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Estab.</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Est</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemp.</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total (%)    | 100.0 | 100.0 |


It is now appropriate to examine the segment of the U.A.E.’s female labor force employed in the federal government, since this segment accounted for a significant

Phillipines, and other Asian countries with large contingents of workers in the U.A.E. and other Gulf countries have been encouraged by their governments to seek work abroad because of the remittances they will send home.
900

percentage of the female labor force in the statistics provided above. Closer examination will reveal the occupations female workers generally obtain, in relation to those of male federal government workers.

Table 15.13 shows a concentration of female federal government employees in two ministries, namely, Education and Health, in 1987. These two ministries also employed the largest concentration of male federal government workers. This was because these ministries were particularly large in terms of the number of persons they employed overall. However, in contrast to the female federal government workers, sizeable percentages of the male federal government employees were also distributed among other, smaller ministries. These others ministries employed very small percentages, usually less than one per cent each, of the female federal government employees.

The federal government's tendency to employ the largest percentage of the female labor force after the domestic work sector is reiterated in a 1987 survey of 600 female university graduates, and their post-graduate employment patterns. Of these 600 graduates, 80.5 per cent found employment in the government sector. Most found employment in the federal government, while others found work in the public sector. Local governments employed 5.1 per cent of the 600 graduates,
and another 3.5 per cent found work in the private sector.  

**TABLE 15.13**

**DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYEES BY GENDER AMONG THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES, DEC, 1987**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>% Min. Emp:</th>
<th>% F and M Fed. Emp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info. &amp; Cult.</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>91.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water/Elect.</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pub. Work/Hous.</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>97.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric. &amp; Fish.</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aff.</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>89.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam. Aff/Awqaf</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor &amp; Soc. Aff</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin. &amp; Indust.</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Affairs</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ &amp; Commerce</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol. &amp; Min.</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime. Min/Dep.</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>96.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sup. Coun. Aff.</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol Dept.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Many of the employees in this Ministry are graduate nationals, who were placed there temporarily pending appointment to another ministry.


---

Female federal government employees, who the Table 15.13 showed were largely concentrated in the Education and Health Ministries, were usually employed as nurses, teachers, pharmacists, and social workers. Among federal government employees in all, only 4 per cent of the ministerial and deputy-ministerial positions were occupied by women. Immediately below that rank, women held only 5 per cent of the First Circle federal government positions.\(^{30}\) These statistics show that despite the tendency of educated women toward employment in the federal government in 1987, as of that year they had not obtained positions at decision making levels in relation to male federal government employees.

The analysis of Table 15.13 mentioned the small percentage of female federal government employees who held positions at decision-making levels. Table 15.14 shows that this held for the entire female labor force during the 1975-1990 period. However, despite, the small percentage of the female labor force employed at the administrative and managerial levels, a sizeable percentage did hold professional and technical positions during this period. As mentioned before, many of these professional workers were teachers, nurses, pharmacists, and social workers employed by the federal government. However, Table 15.14 also shows that as the female labor force grew during this period, the percentage

\(^{30}\) Ibid., pp. 94-97.
of its members employed in professional and technical positions actually decreased. The decrease in the percentage of the female labor force employed in professional and technical positions is related to the general growth of the female labor force, since many of these entering it between 1975 and 1990 were domestic workers. This trend is reflected in the growth of the percentage of the female labor force that the service category took up during this period.

The trends that Table 15.14 show are related to those demonstrated in Table 15.11. Table 15.14 shows that women in the U.A.E. tend to be employed at professional or technical levels on the one hand, or at service levels, which mainly consist of domestic help positions, on the other. Table 15.11 showed that members of the female labor force were clustered at higher and lower education levels, but accounted only for a small percentage of those who had attained middle-range education levels. Taken together, these patterns bring out two points. The first is that there is a correlation between education level attained and work position attained among women in the U.A.E.

The second point about Table 15.14 is that the growth of the percentage of female workers in the services sector is not necessarily traceable to the growth of the number of women attaining professional positions between 1975 and 1990. Rather, this segment of the U.A.E.'s female labor force grew
in percentage in relation to the above-discussed policy of increasing the number of nuclear families, and of encouraging the natural increase in the population, which generated a demand for domestic workers, many of whom were female.

**TABLE 15.14**

U.A.E. LABOR FORCE, MALE AND FEMALE, 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER, BY OCCUPATION CATEGORY  
(1975-1990, by percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Categ.</strong></td>
<td>M.</td>
<td>F.</td>
<td>M.</td>
<td>F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin &amp; Managerial</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profes. &amp; Technical</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric &amp; Fisheries</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemp.*</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total L.F.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Number, 000s)</td>
<td>284.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>531.7</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures for the "Undefined" and "Not Stated" categories are omitted because there are no statistics for 1990.  
Although Table 15.14 showed that a large percentage of the U.A.E.'s female labor force was employed at professional or technical level, Table 15.15 illustrates that larger percentages of the male labor force than the female were employers, or were self-employed between 1975 and 1985. Overwhelmingly, members of the female labor force fell within the employee category. (While this was also true of the majority of the male labor force, it was true of a markedly larger majority of the female labor force. This means that a noticeably larger percentage of the male labor force than the female enjoyed control over production and investment, or at least control over one's own work.)

Table 15.15

U.A.E. LABOR FORCE, MALE AND FEMALE, 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS. (1975-1985 by percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>92.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid worker</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Labor Force (No.) 283,985 9,803 531,693 28,267 618,410 65,415

Table 15.15 also shows that the percentage of the female labor force that was self-employed decreased noticeably between 1975 and 1985, as did the percentage within the employer category. This was because of the overall growth of the female labor force during this period. Most of those females who entered the labor during this period entered it as employees. This decline is also related to the fact that male immigrant workers were supplanting many national women who were self-employed, as discussed earlier.

The tables and analysis given above have demonstrated the manifestations of differentiation and segmentation within U.A.E. society in relation to gender. In these tables, and in related discussion, gender differentiation within the U.A.E. labor force has been analyzed in relation to education level, level, occupation, wage level, occupational status, and nationality. Regarding education, women workers tended to be better educated than were men. However, women workers tended to be clustered within a select few occupations, rather than distributed among them all as men were. Concerning occupation level, very few women in relation to men held decision making, upper-level positions. This was also true of occupations that entailed control over investment, labor, production, or one’s own work (occupational status).

The tables and analysis pertaining to gender also showed segmentation within the female labor force itself.
This manifested itself in education, occupation, wage level, as well in terms of occupational status and nationality. Regarding nationality, this section’s analysis mentioned that many non-national female workers were employed as domestics, whereas many national women workers found employment in government services because of their education levels, and because of their knowledge of Arabic. The gender differentiation demonstrated above, along with the segmentation prevailing within the female labor force, has been an important factor in the contemporary U.A.E.’s socio-discursive formation’s ability to reproduce itself.

The statistics and analysis provided above first demonstrated the differentiation between nationals and nonnationals that exists within U.A.E. society, as well as segmentation among both nationals and nonnationals. Subsequent tables provided statistics which reflected differentiation according to gender, but also revealed differentiation and segmentation within the U.A.E.’s female labor force itself. However, it is equally important to stress that differentiation exists within the U.A.E.’s labor force according to emirate of residence, and segmentation exists within the labor force of each one. The tables below demonstrate this differentiation and segmentation, and its contribution to the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.’s socio-discursive formation.
Stratification by Emirate of Residence and Within Each

Table 14.5, in Chapter Fourteen, showed that Abu Dhabi and Dubai's GDPs made up the bulk of the U.A.E.'s GDP in aggregate. In 1975, the GDPs of these two emirates together amounted to 91.7 per cent of the total. In 1980, these two emirates contributed 92.7 per cent of the total. In 1992, this share only dropped to 85.8 per cent. Underlying the massive share in the U.A.E.'s GDP for which these two emirates accounted are such factors as the amount of capital that has been invested by the public and private sectors, and the role of the labor force. Subsequent tables covering the seven emirates will elaborate on the differentiation among them in terms of sector of employment, occupation category, wage level, and occupation status.

Table 15.16 shows that for the entire 1975-1992 period, the number of persons in the labor forces of Abu Dhabi and Dubai combined accounted for over 70 per cent of the U.A.E.'s total. In addition, this table shows large increments in the populations of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, in relation to those of the other emirates. In all of the years shown in Table 15.16, with the exception of 1985 for Abu-Dhabi, this population increase occurred in relation to the numerical increase in the labor force. The marked differences in the sizes of the different emirates' labor forces is related to the fact that their resources vary. As mentioned in Chapter Fourteen, the
power to dispose of resources resides with the government of each emirate within the U.A.E, rather than with the federal government. Wealthier emirates have had more capital to invest than have the less prosperous ones, and therefore have developed larger labor forces.

**TABLE 15.16**

(Workers over 15 years of age, in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Abu D.</th>
<th>Dubai</th>
<th>Sharq.</th>
<th>Ras al.</th>
<th>Fujai.</th>
<th>Ajman</th>
<th>Umm al.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>267</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>260</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>320</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15.17 shows how the labor force of each emirate is distributed among the U.A.E.’s occupation sectors. Before this data can be analyzed, it is necessary to point out that the labor forces of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and to some extent Sharqah are considerably larger than those of the remaining northern Emirates. It is important to take this fact into account when percentages are given for the distribution of each emirate’s labor force in regard to occupation and occupation status.

Regarding specifics, Table 15.17 shows that the largest percentages of the labor forces of Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah and Umm al-Quwain were employed in the agricultural sector. Sizeable percentages of the Sharqah and Ajman labor forces were also employed in that sector. By contrast, this percentage was very small for Abu Dhabi and even smaller for Dubai. This is significant because as Table 15.6 demonstrated above, the average wages of the agricultural sector were the lowest among all of the occupational sectors for the 1975-1991 period. (In 1991, agricultural average yearly wages were slightly higher than those of the domestic service sector, which before then had ranked second to agriculture in terms of lowness of wages.) These statistics on wages given above also indicate differentiation between urban and rural areas during the 1975-1991 period.


TABLE 15.17

DISTRIBUTION OF THE U.A.E. LABOR FORCE BY OCCUPATIONAL SECTOR IN EACH EMIRATE: 1991
(By percentage; for workers over 15 years of age)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Abu D.</th>
<th>Dubai</th>
<th>Sharq.</th>
<th>Ras al.</th>
<th>Fujair.</th>
<th>Ajman</th>
<th>Umm al.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agr. &amp; Fish.</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil &amp; Mining</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuf.</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elect. &amp; Water</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construct.</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Hotel, Rest.</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transp &amp; Storage, Communic.</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fin. &amp; Ins.</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Est.</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other. Serv.</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Serv.</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domes. Serv.</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Labor Force (No, 000's.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>298.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>212.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>104.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>49.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figures in Table 15.17 indicate that in 1991, the largest percentages of the labor forces of the northern emirates were employed in rural areas, in contrast to the labor forces of Abu Dhabi and Dubai because most of the investment by the private and public sectors in development projects occurred in Abu-Dhabi and Dubai. The fact that larger percentages of the labor forces of the northern emirates than those of Abu Dhabi and Dubai are employed in the lower-paying agricultural sector reinforces differentiation
between Abu Dhabi and Dubai on the one hand, and the northern emirates on the other. This differentiation reproduces itself because the investment that both the private and public sectors initiated in Abu Dhabi and Dubai has led to further investment within these two emirates. Continued investment has enhanced the more extensive resources that these two emirates already had in relation to the northern emirates, and therefore has reinforced this differentiation. This differentiation also reproduces itself because the lower-paid labor forces of the northern emirates have less to spend, and this, in turn, ensures the generation of less capital in the northern emirates to invest.

The oil sector paid the highest average yearly wages during the 1975-1991 period, and the percentage of Abu Dhabi’s labor force employed in that sector was higher than that of the other emirates. (Ras al-Khaimah’s percentage figure for this sector designates workers employed in other mining industries, whose average annual wages were less than one third of those paid by the oil sector during the 1975-1991 period, according to Table 15.6.) A greater percentage of both Abu Dhabi’s and Dubai’s labor force than that of the northern emirates was employed in the finance and insurance sector as well. Table 15.6 shows that the wages of this sector ranked third to those of the oil sector in magnitude, and second to those of the government services sector. The government
services sector of Abu Dhabi claimed a larger percentage of that emirate’s labor force than did the government services sector of the labor forces of the other emirates, and this sector claimed one of the largest percentages of Abu Dhabi’s labor force itself. A lower percentage of Fujairah’s labor force than of any of the other emirates was employed in the government services sector in 1991.

Table 15.18 shows more about the distribution of each emirate’s labor force, this time according to employment in the government, public or private sector. The first important pattern that this table reveals is that in 1985, large percentages of the northern emirates’ labor forces, as well as Abu Dhabi’s, were employed in the federal government. There were three main reasons for this. Firstly, the budgets of the northern emirates were too small for them to employ their own educated citizens in their local governments, which remained small in relation to the local governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Secondly, the above-documented high wages that the federal government paid in relation to other sector tended to attract educated U.A.E. citizens from all seven emirates. Thirdly, the federal government made it a point to extend employment opportunities to educated citizens from the various emirates, since this enabled the federal government to penetrate the civil society of the entire U.A.E. The federal government’s policy of employing the educated from all seven
emirates helped it to reinforce the cohesion of the union, and to reproduce itself. The federal government also employed a large percentage of Abu Dhabi's own labor force. This, too, was because of the high pay that this sector offered, and because of its policy of employing educated citizens. In addition, residents of the federal government seat also tended to seek employment in the many ministries headquartered there.

**TABLE 15.18**

DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE OF EACH EMIRATE AMONG GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS.

1985

(Workers 15 years of age or older, by percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Abu D.</th>
<th>Dubai</th>
<th>Sharq.</th>
<th>Ras al.</th>
<th>Fujair.</th>
<th>Ajman</th>
<th>Umm al.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fed. Gov.</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loc. Gov.</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pub. Sec.</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priv. Sec.</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Est.</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without" 14.7 16.9 19.8 24.0 24.8 18.5 31.1
Abroad .5 .9 .5 .2 .4 .3 .4
Not Stated .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .2 .1
Unemp. .4 .4 .7 .7 .6 .7 .8
TOTAL L.F (in 000's) 297.4 201.0 104.0 36.8 15.1 21.3 8.2


Table 15.18 also brings out several important points about Dubai. The first is the small percentage of its labor force, in comparison to that of the other emirates, that the federal government employed. The reason for this was that
Dubai's local government and more important, Dubai's private sector, employed large percentages of this emirate's labor force. In 1985, as this table indicates, Dubai's private sector employed 56.7 per cent of its labor force. This contrasted with the situation in the other emirates. The development of Dubai's private sector, as well as its strength in both the industrial and trade sectors, has been demonstrated in previous sections. The proximity of both Sharqah and Ajman to Dubai accounts for the sizeable private sectors that they, too, have developed, employing large percentages of their labor forces as well. The development of Sharqah's and Ajman's private sectors occurred in relation to the development upsurge in Dubai during the 1970s and 1980s, because many workers employed in Dubai chose to live in nearby Sharqah and Ajman.  

This generated sufficient demand for the development of grocery stores, barber shops, construction contractors, other retail businesses etc. in these two emirates. In relation to this, privately owned shops, services, and some manufactures employing members of the labor forces of these emirates were established to accommodate the demands of these workers.

Finally, statistics in Table 15.18 reveal that 46.8 per cent, or nearly half, of Abu Dhabi's labor force was employed by the federal or local government, or by the public sector.

---

31 Bilal, Shu' un Ijitima'iyyah 2, no. 5 (1985): 41.
Table 15.6 demonstrated that the government sector ranked second to the petroleum sector in terms of wages paid. This means that in 1985, nearly half of Abu Dhabi's labor force was employed in a sector whose wages were higher than those of all of the other sectors except petroleum. These employees spent their wages on rent and consumer goods in Abu Dhabi, and this helped to reproduce Abu Dhabi's capital for investment, and therefore, its wealth in relation to the other emirates, as shown in the GDP figures for all of the emirates given in Table 14.5.

Table 15.19 provides more data pertaining to the reproduction of both Abu Dhabi's and Dubai's wealth. Since the Abu Dhabi and Dubai labor forces contain substantially greater numbers of workers employed in administrative and managerial, or professional and technical positions than do the labor forces of the other emirates, this meant the greatest number of these employees was also spending high salaries in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, rather than in the other emirates. This enhanced the capital available for investment in both of these emirates, and therefore reproduced their wealth. The greatest number of the U.A.E.'s clerical workers were also employed in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. (Workers employed in these positions also accounted for a greater percentage of Abu Dhabi's and Dubai's labor forces than they did for any other emirate's labor force). These workers, too, played
their role in the reproduction of Abu Dhabi and Dubai’s wealth as consumers of goods and services, and for rent. The data in Table 15.19 below also reiterates that most of the investment by the U.A.E.’s public and private sectors was occurring in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. This generated higher numbers of employees at all levels within these two emirates, in relation to the others.

### TABLE 15.19

**DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE OF EACH EMIRATE, BY OCCUPATION CATEGORY, 1980**

(Workers 15 years of age or older, by percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Abu D.</th>
<th>Dubai</th>
<th>Sharq</th>
<th>Ras al.</th>
<th>Fujai</th>
<th>Ajman</th>
<th>Umm al.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Upper Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin &amp; Manage.</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profes./Tech.</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serv.</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agric. &amp; Fish.</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prod.</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total L.F.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in 000’s)</td>
<td>273.8</td>
<td>147.3</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages do not add up to 100 because such categories as "occupation not defined," "not stated," and "seeking work for first time" were omitted because their numbers are insignificant.*

Table 15.19 also reiterates that the agricultural sector employed a higher percentage of the labor forces of Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah and Umm al-Quwain that it employed of the labor forces of the other emirates. This fact reinforced and helped to reproduce the differentiation between these emirates and Abu Dhabi and Dubai, since it meant that a large percentage of the northern emirates’ labor forces, in relation to those of the others, was employed in one of the U.A.E’s lowest paying sectors. Table 15.19 reflects differentiation within each emirate as well as differentiation among them. The data presented show that in each of the emirates, only a small percentage of the labor force was employed at the upper level. A somewhat larger percentage of each emirate’s labor force was employed at the middle level, and the largest percentages were employed at the lower level.

Table 15.20 provides more data pertaining to the differentiation between Abu Dhabi and Dubai on the one hand, versus the northern emirates on the other. The labor forces of both Abu Dhabi and Dubai contained greater numbers of employers and self-employed than did those of the northern emirates. Table 15.20 also shows that because of the large number of employers found in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the labor forces of these two emirates contained greater numbers of employees than did those of the northern emirates.

Table 15.20 also brings out one important point about
Abu Dhabi and Dubai in relation to each other. Specifically, it reveals that a greater percentage of Dubai's than Abu Dhabi's labor force fell under both the employer and self-employed categories in 1980. This was because of the strength of Dubai's private sector. By contrast, as shown above, nearly half of Abu Dhabi's labor force was employed in the federal and local governments, or in the public sector.

**TABLE 15.20**

**DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE OF EACH EMIRATE**
**BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS 1980**
(By percentage, workers 15 years of age and older)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emp. Status</th>
<th>Abu D.</th>
<th>Dubai Sharq.</th>
<th>Ras al.</th>
<th>Fujairah</th>
<th>Ajman</th>
<th>Umm al.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Employed</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid worker</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total L.F (In 000's)** | 273.8 | 147.3 | 73.7 | 30.9 | 13.9 | 14.7 | 5.6 |


This table also shows that a high percentage of Ras al-Khaimah's, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah's labor forces were self-employed, in relation to those of other emirates in 1980. This situation was partially explained by the fact that much of that self-employed sector was agricultural or in the
fishery sector. Other members of the private sector owned small grocery, barber shops, restaurants, etc.

While Table 15.20 demonstrates differentiation among the seven emirates of the U.A.E., it also demonstrates differentiation within each one. In each emirate, only a small percentage of the labor force fell under the employer category. A somewhat larger percentage was self-employed, but bulk of each emirate’s labor force fell under the employee classification.

Stratification and Reproduction of the Contemporary Socio-Discursive Formation

This chapter’s purpose was to show differentiation and segmentation within the U.A.E.’s labor force in terms of nationality, gender, and within the emirates in relation to each other. Concerning the nationality factor, this chapter showed differentiation between the national and the non-national members of the U.A.E. labor force in terms of education level attained, occupation, wage earned, and occupational status. This chapter also demonstrated that both the non-national and national portions of the U.A.E. labor force were segmented in terms of education level attained, occupation, wage level, and occupational status. Statistics in this chapter also revealed differentiation and segmentation between males and females within the U.A.E. labor force. This differentiation and segmentation was reflected in
data pertaining to education level attained, occupation, wage level, and occupational status. Within the female labor force, data revealed differentiation between national and non-national members of the labor force in terms of education level attained, occupation, wage level and occupational status. This chapter also covered differentiation and segmentation of the labor force according to emirate of residence, again in terms of education level, occupation, wages earned, and occupational status, and showed segmentation within each emirate in relation to these factors as well.

This chapter analyzed the differentiation and segmentation that exists among male and female U.A.E. nationals in relation to each other, and within the national male and female groupings in terms of education level, occupation, wages earned and occupational status. Data presented also indicated differentiation among emirates, and within each one in terms of these factors. However, this differentiation has not prevented the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation from reproducing itself. In fact, this segmentation and differentiation have been central to this socio-discursive formation's reproduction of itself.

The segmentation and differentiation within the U.A.E.'s national labor force, male and female, has contributed to the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation because of the discourses that were
constructed to engender this segmentation and differentiation, and to reinforce them. These discourses are those of male versus female; educated versus non-educated; and employer versus employee. Discourses have also been constructed among the emirates in relation to each other. These discourses have caused these various groupings within the U.A.E.'s labor force to see themselves in relation to each other, instead of viewing themselves as part of a whole labor force.

Members of the national portion of the U.A.E. labor force constructed a discourse in aggregate in relation to the influx of immigrants. Through this discourse, U.A.E. nationals in the labor force constructed an identity for themselves in relation to the immigrant workers. However, this chapter has also analyzed that segmentation and differentiation characterizing the non-national portion of the U.A.E.'s labor force as well.

The constructed discourses among non-national workers include those of ethnicity, occupation, religion, and wage level. Other constructed discourses include those of male versus female; skilled versus unskilled worker, educated versus uneducated worker, and employer versus employee. Still other discourses were constructed among members of the non-national labor force in relation to emirate of residence or employment. In addition to these others, members of the non-national labor force constructed a particularly important
discourse which helped to ensure the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation.

In this discourse, many immigrant workers compared the wage levels, occupations, and occupational status that they held in the U.A.E. to that which they would have held back in their home countries. In so doing, many immigrant workers concluded that they were faring better than were their fellow citizens employed in similar occupations back in their home countries. The free health and educational, and subsidized services such as utilities to which immigrant workers had access in the U.A.E. helped to reinforce this discourse. The new global system also reinforced this discourse because it provided the connections that immigrant workers retained with their home countries. Immigrant workers in the U.A.E. could cross boundaries of time and space that separated them from relatives and friends back home by means of transportation, banking facilities, satellite television, telecommunications, shortwave radio, and the availability of food, newspapers, magazines, videos, and films from home that were available in the U.A.E.

Finally, another factor that was particularly important in the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation was the discourse of consumerism, or the socially constructed desire for consumer goods through advertising, the media, etc. This discourse was contracted in
relation to the availability of a large supply of wage labor, and a large supply of consumer goods. This discourse tied wage laborers to the consumer products, and therefore routinized the laborer’s jobs, and reinforced the hierarchy characterizing these jobs. Thus, on the one hand, this discourse reproduced the work of the labor force for wages and for job mobility, while on the other, it reproduced the influx of consumer products. As demonstrated in the trade section above, the influx of consumer products interlinked the U.A.E.’s contemporary socio-discursive formation, as an importer of consumer products and immigrant labor, and as an exporter and re-exporter of resources and consumer goods, with the new global market.

Another aspect of consumerism, however, has been its relationship to income differentiation, ethnicity, gender, nationality and religion within the U.A.E.’s contemporary socio-discursive formation. Overall, consumer goods are plentiful in the U.A.E., and wage earners have the income with which to purchase them. But at the same time, consumerism is actually a manifestation of socio-economic differentiation among consumers, as well as other characteristics such as ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender, etc. This is because consumer groups of different income levels tend to purchase different versions of a given product (this holds for goods ranging from housing and cars to furniture and smaller
consumer products), or to prefer certain products over others. Consumers of different ethnicities or nationalities, for example are likely to be attracted to varying food products, articles of clothing, etc. Male and female consumers are also inclined to purchase different sets of products.

The next chapter, covering the cultural structure of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation will provide greater detail about the new global system, consumerism, the cultural aspects of the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation, and the contradictions that have arisen within this socio-discursive formation.

Conclusion

The six sections of this chapter demonstrated and analyzed how and why the U.A.E.'s labor force developed and grew, along with its national makeup, ethnic makeup, religious and gender composition, and its distribution among the emirates. These characteristics were analyzed in relation to such stratification indicators as education level, wage level, occupation, and occupational status. In the first section, covering the development of this labor force, the role of the private sector was analyzed, as was that of the public sector. The analysis of this section demonstrated that it was private sector, rather than the public, that had played the leading role in the development of the U.A.E.'s labor force. This
analyze also demonstrated that the U.A.E.'s labor force was self-perpetuating, meaning that the influx of immigrant labor had generated a whole new private stratum, which, in turn, continued to need additional labor. This situation began a spiral process that ensured the ongoing reproduction of the immigrant labor force.

The second section correlated the development of the labor force with the development of the U.A.E.'s economy during the 1970s and 1980. The analysis here demonstrated that it was the labor force that played the key role in the growth of the U.A.E.'s economy, and in the expansion of the government bureaucracy and the institutions of social welfarism. Statistics in this section showed that a large percentage of the U.A.E. labor force was employed in services. This section also demonstrated the continued articulation of strata from previous socio-discursive formations within the present one, as well as the transformations that these strata were undergoing, simultaneously with this articulation.

In the third, fourth, and fifth sections, the stratification of the labor force was analyzed in terms of nationality, gender, and emirate of residence. Specifically, these characteristics were related to education level, wage level, occupation, and occupational status. The statistics and analysis of these sections showed that differentiation and segmentation existed in relation to all of these characteristics
among U.A.E. workers, regardless of gender, nationality, or emirate of residence. In fact, stratification was found within the national, non-national, male and female groupings, and within the labor force of each emirate. However, nationality, gender, and emirate of residence intersected with occupation.

The last section demonstrated that segmentation and differentiation within the U.A.E.'s labor force was actually facilitating the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, because of discourses constructed within the labor force in terms of nationality, gender, ethnicity, emirate of residence, nisab, stratum, education level, skills, etc. Two additional factors, in relation to the U.A.E.'s labor force, are also facilitating the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation. These are consumerism and the new globalism. Consumerism linked members of the labor force to their jobs because they needed wages to purchase consumer goods. This need, in turn, routinized their jobs. New globalism enabled non-national workers to retain their linkages to the civil societies of their home countries, through telecommunications, transportation, short wave radio, satellite television, computerized banking, the postal system, and the availability of products from the home country, such as groceries, films, videos, newspapers, and periodicals in the U.A.E. This
ongoing linkage to civil society back home constructed a discourse wherein non-national workers continued to compare their conditions in the U.A.E. to those that they would face back home. This discourse was reinforced by the benefits to which non-national workers had access in the U.A.E., such as free health care and education, and subsidized utilities. Among other things, the next chapter will build upon this last section, and analyze further consumerism, discourses, localism, and identity in relation to the influx of immigrant labor, and to new globalism.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION: 1971-1995
CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION

Introduction

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section will cover identity formation of different ethnic groups within the contemporary U.A.E. socio-discursive formation in relation to each other. The second section will cover the development of the education system and its role in identity formation among U.A.E. students. The third section will focus on architecture, and art in relation to cultural Islamism, localism and new globalism. The fourth section will focus on the rise of new social movements in the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation.

An examination of the cultural constructions in the contemporary U.A.E. through the discussion in these sections will shed more light on the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, and the continuities of previous periods into the contemporary one, as well as aspects of previous periods that have discontinued.

This chapter will correlate the development of culture structure to the development of the U.A.E.'s political, economic structures, and social stratification. It will also
examine two phenomena that have been developing within the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, new globalism, cultural Islamism and localism. New globalism has manifested itself in many forms, including the immigrant labor influx, the penetration of multinational corporations, and the development of tourism. There are also many examples of cultural Islamism and localism. These include the many activities concerned with the preservation of Islamic and local culture, beliefs, values, etc. In analyzing these two trends, this chapter will focus upon how they were constructed, and will attempt to answer the question of whether globalism has been detracting from, or enhancing, cultural Islamism and localism.

Additionally, this chapter will cover architecture, art, education and new social movements. It will analyze the construction of all of these elements, and attempt to treat the question of whether they are helping the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself, or forming a counter-discourse within it. The significance of this discussion is that it will shed light on how culture, as well as political and economic constructions, have been facilitating the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation.

The importance of this chapter is that it will focus upon the articulation of previous socio-discursive formations
(i.e., the Islamic, the tranformational, and the colonial) within the contemporary one. In so doing it will analyze elements of previous periods that were constructed to serve the contemporary socio-discursive formation, in contrast to those elements that were genuine continuations of previous socio-discursive formations into the contemporary one.

In the first section of this chapter, cultural transformations that have occurred within the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation will be analyzed in relation to the development of the U.A.E.'s labor force, to consumerism, and to new globalism. In the second section, these cultural transformations will be discussed in relation to the development of the U.A.E.'s education system. This section will trace the development of the U.A.E.'s education system from its inception during the Trucial Oman period, and will also discuss the relationship between education and stratification. Section two will also focus upon changes that the U.A.E.'s education system underwent during the contemporary period, and how these changes within the U.A.E.'s education system have impacted the formation of identity among U.A.E. students in relation to new globalism. The third section will focus on the development of art and architecture within the U.A.E., how this development is related to consumerism and new globalism, and if the development of art and architecture has been facilitating the reproduction of the
U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation.

The fourth section will examine the development of new social movements, relate them to previous socio-discursive formations, and analyze their differences and similarities with social movements of previous period. This section will also examine the changes in the contemporary U.A.E.'s political and economic structures in relation to the development of these new social movements.

Ethnicity, Identities and Consumerism

This section will elaborate on some of the points made at the end of Chapter Fifteen in relation to immigrant labor, and socio-economic differentiation within the U.A.E. labor force (national and non-national). This section will also examine the relationship between the national and non-national labor groupings, and their formation of identities in relation to each other. The linkages of these labor groupings to consumerism and to new globalism will also be analyzed. Finally, this section will demonstrate whether the relationship between national and non-national labor groupings, and the relationship of both to consumerism and new globalism are helping the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself.

Concerning the immigrant presence, it was mentioned in Chapter Fifteen that immigrant workers in the U.A.E. remained linked politically, economically and culturally to the civil
societies of their home countries. However, the immigrant workers came to the U.A.E. from different ethnic backgrounds. They were also members of both genders, and came as individuals with different education backgrounds, work experiences, living standards, tastes and preferences. These diversified groups of immigrant workers interacted with each other, and with U.A.E. locals in the market place, in job situations, in homes, and in schools. These groups exchanged food, various recreational activities, and language, thereby impacting each others' cultures. At the same time, however, each immigrant group constructed its own identity in the course of its interaction with, and in relation to, the others, in terms of differences in culinary tastes, clothing, language, religion, and recreation (including the observance of state and religious holidays.)

Several specific factors served to reinforce the cohesion of each immigrant community. Firstly, the members of each community were far from home, and needed to exert efforts to maintain ties there. Secondly, the members of each immigrant community retained interest in the home country. Thirdly, immigrant workers had access to newspapers, satellite television programs, shortwave radio programs, foods, music, films, and clothing from home. This access was reinforced by consumerism and by the realities of the new global system. As shown in Chapter Fifteen. However, immigrant workers in a
given community did not enjoy the same degree of access to media and other consumer goods from home, because of differentiation according to occupation, employment status, income level, education level, and gender.

Diversification and socio-economic differentiation continued within each immigrant community, as it did among U.A.E. locals, according to income level, occupation, employment status, education level, religion, and gender. The diversity among U.A.E. locals was also related to their backgrounds within the U.A.E. (urban, rural, or bedouin), emirate of residence, ethnicity, and gender. Within the urban, rural, and bedouin socio-discursive formations, there was further diversity among U.A.E. citizens. Within the urban socio-discursive formation, there were larger merchants, factory owners, shopkeepers, and workers. Within the rural socio-discursive formation, there were family farmers, managers of government farm projects, and employees. In the tribal socio-discursive formation, there were settled bedouins living in government-provided housing, bedouins who had moved into the cities but retained the culture of the Badia, and unsettled bedouins.

The bedouins who were living in government sponsored housing in Abu Dhabi had moved their under a government program, initiated in 1974 to induce them to settle as cultivators in locations that were close to their old diras.
In this program, the government provided them with parcels of agricultural land, drilled water wells, provided them with seed, and assisted them in procuring agricultural equipment for growing the same seasonal products that they had cultivated in the badia, if they were seasonally agricultural. The Abu-Dhabi government presented settlement to the bedouins as an alternative to migration to the city, where it would be more difficult for them to earn a livelihood by selling their food products and crafts.¹ These government settlements for the bedouins gradually became villages, as people established mosques, small grocery stores, etc. The income level of members of all of these bedouin groupings, and the benefits they obtained from the government, varied according to the emirate in which they lived. Those who lived in emirates with higher G.D.P.‘s, for example, enjoyed more extensive benefits than did those living in emirates with lower ones.

Despite the socio-economic differentiation and segmentation present within the U.A.E. citizen population, they constructed an identity in relation to the large immigrant presence. This identity manifested itself in the

adoption of specific clothing, a certain dialect of Arabic, and certain traditional foods which members of all three socio-discursive formations adopted. U.A.E. locals also expressed their identity in relation to the immigrant presence through the reconstruction of certain traditions of previous periods that came from the urban, rural and nomadic socio-discursive formations in architecture, art, music, etc. (More about this later.) The construction of this identity occurred because U.A.E. citizens as a whole had come to constitute a small minority both within the population and within the labor force, and therefore felt the cultural effects of a large immigrant presence.

This identity that U.A.E. citizens in aggregate constructed in relation to the immigrant presence helped to reproduce the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation in several ways. Firstly U.A.E. citizens benefitted from the immigrant presence in various ways, in relation to their employment status, occupations, income levels, education levels and gender. Merchants and farmers, and industrialists, for example, benefitted from the expanded market for their goods that immigrants provided. Industrialists also benefitted because the demands of the immigrant population generated the establishment of new industries, and also provided a large, low-paid labor force. Other U.A.E. citizens benefitted from the increased number of jobs that educated
locals could obtain because the expanding population necessitated growth in the government bureaucracy, as shown above.

The fact that U.A.E. citizens received government benefits (albeit to greatly varying decrees among the emirates) such as housing subsidies, and other welfare benefits while many immigrants did not, constructed a discourse which enabled many U.A.E. citizens to perceive themselves as better off in relation to many immigrants. This, too, was a factor in the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation.

The immigrant communities, themselves, helped to reproduce the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation in another way besides in relation to the benefits that many U.A.E. citizens gained from their presence. The economic and social benefits that many immigrant workers enjoyed in the U.A.E. in comparison to those which they could obtain in their home countries helped the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself, because many immigrant workers came to perceive themselves as faring better in the U.A.E. than they would have done at home doing similar work. These economic and social benefits included free public health care, public education, and subsidized utilities such as electricity and water.

It is important to emphasize that while both immigrant
groups and U.A.E. citizens were constructing identities in relation to each other in the course of their mutual interaction, in the U.A.E. as a whole, a hybrid culture was being constructed. There was a certain process, related to both consumerism and identity, by which this construction occurred, whereby certain items, such as food, films, or clothing, which had originally been purchased and consumed by members of a specific ethnic community, as an expression of their identity in relation to others, subsequently gained popularity in other communities.

While each ethnic community's preservation of its identity, whether immigrant or local, in relation to the others served consumerism, this very expression of identity through choice of consumer goods subsequently facilitated the diffusion of these consumer goods across ethnic community boundaries. Several consumer items, such as foods, went through this process. Certain Indian foods, for example, were initially sold in restaurants at which workers from the Indian Subcontinent were the main patrons. However, they have since become popular across the U.A.E.'s ethnic communities, including among locals. Certain foods from other parts of the Arab world also underwent this diffusion. Initially, they had been eaten by members of these non-local Arab communities but these foods, too, have become widespread among the U.A.E.'s ethnic communities, including among locals. A third, and
recent, culinary example of the workings of this process is the spread of American and European foods among the U.A.E.'s communities. These foods first met the demands of the U.S. and European communities in the U.A.E, but later spread among locals and among other immigrant groups. Other consumer items, such as clothing, magazines, films, videos, television programs, and radio programs from each ethnic community in the U.A.E. have also spread across ethnic boundaries there.

Consumer goods have also been diffused among the U.A.E.'s different socio-economic strata, in relation to socio-economic differentiation. Consumer items that have spread from higher socio-economic strata to lower ones have included home architecture, home furnishings and decoration, automobiles, vacation travel, and manner of celebrating weddings. Concerning wedding celebrations, during the early 1970s as well as in previous periods, most marriages were celebrated in the bride's house, with the entire community assisting in the food preparation, provision of entertainment, etc. several weeks in advance. However, during the early 1970s, the upper strata had begun to celebrate marriages in hotels, where the food was catered, and entertainment hired. Musical bands hired for weddings now continued to sing traditional songs, but to the accompaniment of contemporary instruments generally used by bands worldwide. During the mid-1970s and early 1980s, the middle strata came to imitate
the upper strata in this respect, so that celebrating weddings in hotels became common. The adoption of this custom contributed to the growth of the hotel sector described above during this period.

The tendency of the middle strata to imitate the customs and tastes of the upper strata was another factor in the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, as the fact that certain items were the preferences of the upper strata stimulated a desire for them within the middle ones. The desire for these consumer items among members of the middle strata attached them to their jobs, since retaining one's job ensured his ability to afford these items, and to maintain a life style that resembled that which everyone else seemed to be achieving. Furthermore, the fact that purchasing many of these items necessitated that consumers borrow from a bank was another factor attaching them to their jobs, and making them less inclined to jeopardise them.

In addition, since many of these consumer items were imports, and since many banks and hotels were also run by multinational firms, consumerism also reproduced the linkage of the contemporary U.A.E. to the new global system, both as an importator of many of these consumer products, and as a facilitator of the spread of multinational corporations and chains to the U.A.E.
Education, Change and Identity Formation

It is now appropriate to examine the role that the education system has had upon the reproduction of the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation. Assessment of the U.A.E.'s education system is also necessary for assessing whether it is at the same time helping to reproduce social stratification in the U.A.E. and to what extent it is engendering counter-discourses within the contemporary socio-discursive formation. It is important to examine education in some detail within the context of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, because this study has demonstrated that the way education was constructed during previous periods had been a key factor in the reproduction of previous socio-discursive formations, as well as in the construction of counter-discourses within them. In addition, it is the education system, as well as one's family, peers, the media, etc. that constructs one's perceptions, attitudes, values, work skills, behavior, and relations with others, as individuals and also as members of genders, economic strata, and ethnic groups. The U.A.E.'s education system specifically has been instrumental in the development of the labor force, in socializing pupils, and in instilling values that have helped to reproduce the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation. However, in order to analyze the contemporary U.A.E.'s education system, it is also necessary to see it in
relation to the educational system of Trucial Oman. This is because many aspects of Trucial Oman’s educational system continued into the initial education system of the contemporary U.A.E. Other aspects have discontinued, and these, too will be analyzed.

During the contemporary period, the U.A.E.’s education system expanded. To understand the significance of this expansion, it is also necessary to review briefly the development of Trucial Oman’s educational system. In the colonial period, the penetration of the initial education system into Trucial Oman’s civil society was modest. During the early 1900s, certain pearl merchants opened schools, as discussed earlier. After the defeat of the Reform Movement in 1939, most of these schools closed both in relation to this defeat, and to the decline of the pearling sector. It was not until the early 1950s that new schools were opened by the governments of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms, with financial assistance from other Arab countries, and with the recruitment of many teachers from there as well.

In addition to the schools established by the government, some Trucial Oman pupils sought education in religious schools, such as the Makatib. There were also a few technical schools that were opened with monies from the above-described Trucial Oman Development Fund. Basically, however, education in Trucial Oman during the colonial period was too
sparse to affect most of the people. The education that did exist, however, did play an important role in constructing counter-discourses to British colonialism during the 1950s and 1960s. As mentioned above, this was both because the curriculum of many of the sheikhdoms' schools was the Kuwaiti curriculum that had been formulated in Egypt, and because many teachers in Trucial Oman had come from Egypt and Palestine, and had brought the discourse of Arab Nationalism into Trucial Oman's educational system with them.

Despite the institutionalization of a formal education system by the sheikhdoms' governments, the establishment of Makatib and some technical schools, and the assistance that Trucial Oman's education system obtained from other Arab governments, Trucial Oman's illiteracy rates during the colonial period remained very high, both among males and females, and among all age groups. As of 1968, 79 per cent of the Trucial Oman's total population was illiterate. In terms of gender, this meant that 71 per cent of all males, and 91 per cent of all females, were illiterate. Broken down by age group, figures showed that 66 per cent of males between fifteen and twenty years of age could not read. This was true of 84 per cent of the females. For males between twenty-one and thirty years of age, those who were illiterate constituted 69 per cent, and for females, this portion amounted to 88 per cent. Among males in the 31 to 40 age group, illiterates
comprised 76 per cent of this grouping, and for females, they comprised 94 per cent. Eighty per cent of the males between forty-one and fifty years of age could not read, and this was true of 97 per cent of the females. Among males between fifty-one and sixty years of age, 84 per cent were illiterate, as were 98 per cent of the females. For the 61 to 75 age group, this illiterate portion amounted to 90 per cent of the males, and 99.4 per cent of the females. For those over seventy five years of age, 95 per cent of the males, and 99.6 per cent of the females, could not read.\(^2\) As mentioned above, however, by 1975, the overall illiteracy rate had dropped to 56.8 per cent, and by 1992, it had fallen to 16.8 per cent. By 1995, the U.A.E.'s overall literacy rate had climbed higher than 90 per cent.\(^3\)

In the contemporary socio-discursive formation, education became a major priority of the federal government, both because of the high illiteracy rates of the previous period that had continued into the early contemporary one, and because education was considered an integral part of the U.A.E.'s economic, political and cultural development. In 1972, fundamental laws were passed making education the sole

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\(^2\) Sadik and Snavely, *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates*, p. 68.

responsibility of the federal government, making it compulsory at the primary level, and free at all levels. Since education was now sponsored and formulated solely by the federal government, it became an important element in the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. Government efforts toward the expansion of education led the total number of U.A.E. pupils to increase from 27,745 in the 1970/1971 school year to 193,633 during the 1983/1984 academic year. By the 1991/1992 school year, the total number of U.A.E. pupils had risen to more than 400,000.\(^4\)

The growth in the U.A.E.'s education system can also be seen in the increase in the number of pupils in government-sponsored and private schools in the U.A.E. between 1972 and 1992. For government-sponsored schools,\(^5\) there were 40,193 pupils enrolled during the 1972/1973 academic year (61 per cent were males, and 39 per cent were females). By the 1980/1981 academic year, this number had risen to 108,842, of which 53 per cent were males, and 47 per cent females. By


\(^5\) The "government-sponsored schools" category includes all schools sponsored by the federal government covering education from the kindergarten level to the end of secondary school. It also includes religious schools, as well as trade, agricultural, industrial and teacher training schools.
1985/1986, this number had again risen to 178,776 pupils (51 per cent were males, and 49 per cent females). In 1991/1992, there were 267,768 pupils enrolled in government sponsored schools. The number of pupils in private schools also rose during this period. During the 1972/1973 academic year, there were 4,460 pupils enrolled in these schools. The number was 30,368 in 1980/1981. By the 1985/1986 academic year, this number had risen to 70,291. By the 1991/1992 academic year, it had risen further to 136,604 pupils.

Concerning higher education, the U.A.E. opened its first university in 1976. Between the 1981/1982 and 1990/1991 academic years, a total of 9,887 students were graduated. Of these 4,138 were male, and 5,739 were female. For the 1981/1982 academic year alone, 503 students were graduated. This number increased to 1,275 for 1985/1986. By the 1990/1991 the number of graduates from the U.A.E.'s university fell slightly to 1,176 students.

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6 Figures for students enrolled in government-sponsored schools by gender were not provided for the 1991/1992 school year. However, for 1988/1989, a total of 225,391 students was enrolled in government sponsored schools. Of these, 50 per cent were male, and 50 per cent female.


This slight decrease was partially related to the fact that several Higher Colleges of Technology in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and al-‘Ain were established between 1984 and the early 1990s. The curricula of these institutions included managerial skills, computer sciences, public administration, and other professional skills demanded by the job market. Other higher education institutions established within the U.A.E. during this period included the Dubai Medical College for Women, Ajman University, and the College of Islamic and Arabic Studies, etc.\textsuperscript{9} Students at the university level were also following courses in the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company’s Career Development Center, the Dubai Aviation College, the Emirates Banking Training Institute, and others.\textsuperscript{10} Total enrollment in other higher education institutions only numbered 177 students in 1984/1984. Of these, 11 were male, and 166 were female. For 1989/1990, total enrollment was 4,954 students, of which 48 per cent were male, and 52 per

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid., p. 94. In 1995, a German company, Establishment for Technical Cooperation, was commissioned to conduct a study about adopting technical education to local market requirements. In addition, six Higher Colleges of Technology (CHT) were established to improve the quality of technical training for U.A.E. nationals, so that they could meet the requirements of a diversifying economy. Business Monitor International, UAE 1995-97, p. 20.

\textsuperscript{10} Ministry of Information and Culture, The United Arab Emirates: 1992, p. 103.
cent were female.\textsuperscript{11}

Figures above have shown that both at the U.A.E. University at Al-‘Ain, and at the other higher education institutions, more females than males were graduated or enrolled. This was related to the fact that many of the U.A.E’s male university-level students were studying abroad. For the 1984/1985 academic year, 1,475 students were studying abroad, of whom 75 per cent were males. For the 1980/1990 academic year, 1,659 students were studying abroad, of whom 74 per cent were male, and 26 per cent female.\textsuperscript{12}

The expansion of the education system demonstrated above, and the fact that it is free at all levels, gives most U.A.E. citizens an opportunity even for higher education. However, in reality, not all U.A.E. citizens are able to take advantage of this opportunity. For example, many from certain strata do not come from families that consider attaining higher education important. Others cannot pursue it because of familial economic needs. Specifically, many U.A.E. citizens coming from the \textit{Badia} or Agrarian socio-discursive formation are not encouraged to pursue higher education because their parents’ formal education was minimal, or nil. Many others from these socio-discursive formations are


\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
attached to the work their fathers did by family tradition or by economic necessity. Consequently, only a few U.A.E. citizens from these two socio-discursive formations actually obtain higher education. Nor does the obtaining of higher education afford a U.A.E. citizen unlimited opportunities for mobility. Once a U.A.E. citizen has completed university education, he or she is faced with the limitations that are related to nisab, gender, emirate of residence, ethnic origin, etc. The social stratification among U.A.E. citizens demonstrated above must be seen not only in education level, gender and emirate residence, but also in relation to family position within a given socio-discursive formation (urban, agrarian, or bedouin), nisab, and ethnic origin. These factors, as well as education, help to reproduce social stratification in the U.A.E.

Gender, nisab, and stratum remain important factors in terms of how much education a U.A.E. citizen obtains, and where he or she is educated, despite the marked expansion that the U.A.E.'s education had undergone at all levels between 1971 and the present. However, it is also important to examine the education system in terms of the discourses and counter discourses it has helped to construct. During the colonial period, as mentioned above, the governments of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms had brought in elementary and secondary school teachers from other Arab countries, since
Trucial Oman lacked teachers of its own. The role that these teachers played in laying the groundwork for the expansion of literacy, and engendering values, discipline, and fundamental work skills in their pupils, as well as their role in bringing the discourse of Arabism into Trucial Oman, has previously been covered. Teachers from other Arab countries had taken up this last role in Trucial Oman because the political realities of their own countries during the 1950s and 1960s had made them anti-colonialists and Arab Nationalists. Therefore, these teachers helped to construct Arab Nationalism as counter-discourse to colonialism in Trucial Oman.

The U.A.E. continued to need teachers from other Arab countries, along with some from other regions, during the contemporary period. During the 1978/1979 academic year, as an example, only 580 of all of schoolteachers hired were nationals. Among the rest, the Ministry of Education recruited 2,494 from Egypt, along with 1,478 from Jordan, 976 from Palestine, 532 from Syria, 189 from Sudan, and 100 from Iraq. The Ministry also recruited additional teachers representing fifteen different nationalities.\(^{13}\)

The teachers that the Ministry had recruited from different Arab countries during the contemporary period, along with some local teachers, continued to incorporate the Arabism

\(^{13}\) Taryam, *The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates*, p. 264.
discourse into the educational system, but this discourse came to be intermixed with that of Islamism and localism, especially after 1980. The Islamism discourse gained strength after 1980 because the cultural and political climate both in the U.A.E., and in the Arab world at large was changing at that time.

Changes during the 1980s in the Kuwaiti curriculum that the U.A.E.'s educational system had hitherto been using also strengthened the discourses of Islamism and localism in U.A.E. schools, while downplaying the Arabism discourse that the Kuwaiti curriculum had featured. This was especially true at the primary and middle schools levels. The curriculum changes pertaining to Islamism reflected the growth of the Islamism discourse among some educated segments of U.A.E.

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civil society. The incorporation of the localism discourse into the amended U.A.E. curriculum reflected the fact that as an independent country, the U.A.E. needed to modify the curriculum it had been using so that it would reflect the U.A.E.'s independence and statehood. Other changes in the school system also reflected the development of localism. These included the fact that pupils now wore Arab dress to school, instead of Western-style uniforms as in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Arabism, Islamism and localism discourses have continued to articulate within the U.A.E.'s educational system, but alongside a growing trend toward technical education. Under this new technocratic discourse, private schools, higher colleges of technology, and other higher education institutions have been established, and growth of enrollment in all of these schools has been shown above, particularly between 1985 and 1992. In these new higher education institutions, English is one of the main languages of instruction, and many of the instructors are non-Arab as well as Arab. The growth of the technocratic discourse in the U.A.E.'s higher education system reflects changes that occurred within the U.A.E's economy, particularly between 1985 and 1992. These changes included the growth of the banking, and insurance sectors, as well as manufactures and other industries. Whereas many educated locals had
hitherto found employment in the government sector, there now emerged a need for them in these other sectors as well.

The strength that the discourse of Islamism wielded in the U.A.E.'s education system is reflected in a study covering primary and secondary identity among 500 randomly chosen students at the U.A.E. University, conducted in the May and June, 1991. Only 399 students or 4 per cent of the total number of students enrolled at the University actually responded to this survey. 86 per cent of those asked if they identified as Muslims primarily or secondarily stated that they did so primarily. By contrast, only 11 per cent of those asked if they identified as Arabs primarily or secondarily named Arabism as their primary identity. Another 10.7 per cent answered that U.A.E. citizenship was their primary identity when similarly asked. The same study asked the respondents where they ranked their interest in the study of Arab history within a range of 1 to 7. Only 7.1 per cent of them ranked that subject first. By contrast, 62 per cent of the respondents, when similarly asked about their interest in the study of Islamic history, ranked that subject first. When asked where they would rank their interest in the study of Gulf history, 24.6 per cent placed that subject first.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{15}\) Jamal A. Al-Sanad, and Shamlan Y. Al-Essa, "Itijahat Talabat Jami'at al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah hawla Azmat al-Khalij," (Attitudes of Students at the University of the United Arab Emirates about the Gulf War), *Journal of the Social Sciences* (Kuwait University) 19, no. 3/4 (1991): 112-
finding of this survey contrasts sharply with the vocal support for Arab Nationalism that existed in Trucial Oman during the 1950s and 1960s, as illustrated above.

However, the strong Islamic identity that the findings of the study conducted at the University of the United Arab Emirates indicate were not only constructed within the education system. The spread of print and non-print media constructed symbolic linkages between certain segments within the contemporary U.A.E.'s civil society and the Islamic period of 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. described above. (The role of the print media is significant, as the study shows that so many respondents registered an interest in studying Islamic history at the university level.) To understand the growth of Islamic identity in the contemporary U.A.E., it is necessary to examine it as both an outgrowth of, and a reaction to, the new global system. However, it is also important to assess the growth of Islamic identity in relation to the contemporary U.A.E.'s internal dynamics.

In the contemporary socio-discursive formation, U.A.E. society had been interacting with the new global system, as shown by the presence of satellite television, shortwave radio, as well as multinational banking, insurance companies, hotel and restaurant chains, and tourism. The education system that emphasized Islam, the print media, the high
literacy rate, have all helped to construct Islamic awareness among students and others. At the same time, interaction with the new global system’s elements, such as tourism, satellite television, the penetration of multinational corporations, etc. has increased popular awareness both of similarities and differences between Islamic culture and other cultures, and has facilitated the construction of an Islamic identity in relation to other cultures and societies.

One important characteristic of the Islamic identity that has been re-asserted in the contemporary U.A.E. is that it has not developed into a new social movement aimed at political or economic transformation in U.A.E.’s contemporary socio-discursive formation. An important reason for this has been government accommodation.\textsuperscript{16} This accommodation has taken the form of the changes in the educational curriculum discussed above, and in other government measures, such as assisting the construction of mosques, and the funding of Islamic associations.

In 1975, there were 795 mosques in the U.A.E. as a whole. In 1991, this number had increased to 2,692.\textsuperscript{17} Some of these mosques were completely built by the government.

\textsuperscript{16} Peck, \textit{The United Arab Emirates}, p. 61.

Others obtained some form of government subsidy for construction. The mosques’ Imams and other members of the Ulema are also on the payroll of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Awqaf. While federal government appropriations to Islamic associations only amounted to 100,000 Dirhams in 1974, these appropriations increased markedly during the early 1980s, amounting to 1,340,000 Dirhams in 1981, 1,440,000 Dirhams in 1982, 1,270,000 Dirhams in 1983, and 1,155,000 in 1984. However, these appropriations had begun to decline during the after 1985, and by 1993, they had fallen to 524,000 Dirhams.\(^{18}\)

Along with assistance to domestic Islamic associations, the resurgence of Islamic identity in the U.A.E. has impacted other government priorities, such as financial assistance to less privileged Islamic countries. In terms of domestic commerce, the re-assertion of Islamic identity can be seen in the recent establishment of Islamic banking institutions. There has also been a resurgence of some commercial practices that existed between 600 and 1500 A.D., including some Commenda arrangements. Contemporary Commenda arrangements have specifically occurred in the form of extensions of capital by some individuals to others for certain private

investment projects in the U.A.E., based on profit sharing. This form of investment, rather than depositing money in a bank for interest, forbidden by the Shari'a, has been the preferred form among certain segments in the U.A.E. Other cultural manifestations of the re-assertion of Islamic identity in the contemporary U.A.E. can be seen in the area of architecture.

**Architecture, Art, Identity and Consumerism**

Architecture has been an important means by which the Islamic discourse articulates within U.A.E. society. Like the reprints of writings from the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. Islamic period that are now widely available to U.A.E. citizens, many mosques in the U.A.E. which were built during the 1980s and early 1990 have served to construct symbolic linkages to the different Islamic socio-discursive formations that developed during the this period. This has occurred because, in constructing new mosques, architects, most of whom are either U.A.E. citizens, come from other Arab, or are from other Muslim societies rather than British, have chosen designs from Islamic Andalusia, Umayyad Damascus, Abbasid Baghdad, and from different Islamic periods in Egypt. However, while the designs of many of these mosques have been borrowed from the past, contemporary materials, as well as traditional ones, are used to build them. In addition, the more recently built and larger mosques have such contemporary additions as electric
lights, air conditioning vents, electric speakers, etc.

In addition to linking the contemporary U.A.E. to the Islamic past, the construction of mosques has also reinforced the Islamic identity of U.A.E. society in relation to other societies. Mosques in the U.A.E. also reflect the income levels of the residents that they serve, depending upon whether they are located in a higher or lower-income area, and upon whether they have been built within the urban, agrarian or bedouin socio-discursive formations. They also reflect the income of the emirate in which they are located.

Islamic architecture has also been used in the designs of residential housing, government offices, shopping malls, hotels, banks, and recreational facilities, albeit for a very different purpose than in the case of mosques. Mosques, after all, are houses of worship, built to serve a spiritual function, as well as to be continuities and re-affirmations of cultural identity. The other buildings, by contrast, have been constructed to serve commercial purposes.

The general re-design of U.A.E. cities so that they feature Islamic architectural themes have not only expressed resurgent Islamic identity in the U.A.E., but have also provided an aesthetically pleasing environment to tourists and investors. This investment has already come in the form of the establishment of manufactures, shopping malls, hotels, banks and tourism. The number of Dubai’s hotel guests, for
example, rose from 373 thousand in 1983 to over one million in 1993.\textsuperscript{19}

In several examples of these shopping malls, hotels and banks, Islamic architectural themes are intermixed both with local and contemporary ones. However, Islamic designs and themes in the architecture of these buildings remain important, both because these themes make the buildings attractive to tourism and investment, and because these themes help to attract local customers, whose reinforced identity makes them more inclined to purchase the goods and services offered in these places. The products sold in these places also attract local customers, since they are often products that transnational firms, firms creating joint ventures with locals, or locally owned firms have manufactured specifically for the U.A.E. market. Tourists are attracted to these shopping malls, hotels, and other recreational facilities that have been constructed according to Islamic architectural themes because they satisfy tourists' desire to visit exotic locations. Some of the products that are sold in these places serve the same function.\textsuperscript{20} However, the appearance of these

\textsuperscript{19} Dubai Commerce and Tourism Promotion Board, June 8, 1994. Source of figures is the U.A.E. Ministry of Planning.

\textsuperscript{20} Many photographs of recently constructed mosques show how their architecture represents different Islamic periods. These photographs can be seen in post cards, and in tourist guides to the U.A.E. such as the Ministry of Information and Culture's \textit{Dawlat al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah} (Abu Dhabi, U.A.E.: Wizarat al-I'alam wa al-Thaqafah, 1993), and
buildings also reflects the income levels of the consumers they serve. Enclosed malls cater to higher-income customers, whereas shopping areas that are simply blocks of stores facing the street usually serve lower-income buyers.

Along with Islamic architecture, a newer style of design reflecting new globalism, and specifically the penetration of new multinational corporations into free zones and the rest of the U.A.E., began to articulate during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Examples of this style include the Communications Buildings in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Aside from functioning as office buildings or in some other capacity, these latest high-rise buildings, particularly in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, have been constructed in relation to the penetration of these multinational corporations, and their design symbolizes the power of these multinational corporations. As part of the overall architectural transformation of Abu Dhabi and Dubai that has been occurring,

these latest buildings themselves are designed to attract onlookers as well as to represent the multinational corporation’s taste and style. The importance of appearance in each of these buildings is reflected in the fact that each one is designed to stand out in relation to every other one, in terms of shape, and in terms of construction materials used (i.e. exterior walls built from tinted glass of different colors.) The uniqueness of each of these buildings is meant to contribute to the overall attractiveness of the city.

The designs of these later high-rises contrasts sharply with buildings constructed during the 1960s and the 1970s. The designs of these buildings reflect the fact that they were functional, and did not serve aesthetic purposes. This could be seen in the fact that the design of each one reflected very little variation in relation to any of the others. It is important to mention that while the new high-rises were being built by multinational corporations and other privileged strata in Abu Dhabi and Dubai during the 1980s and 1990s, other builders were continuing to construct the functional, 1960s-style high rises in the older central parts of these cities. These buildings were constructed as apartment houses to accommodate the low wage immigrant workers who were coming to Abu-Dhabi and Dubai. The differences in the design of these two groups of buildings reflected the discourse of "self" (multinational corporations and privileged strata)
versus "others" (low-wage immigrant workers). This discourse is also reflected in the difference in appearance among shopping areas in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The shopping areas catering to the privileged strata are enclosed malls, containing branch stores of multinational chains that carry expensive consumer products. They feature such amenities as fountains, groves of potted trees and shrugs, cafes, and food courts representing a variety of cuisines, i.e., Chinese fried rice, Mexican tacos, Japanese sushi, Italian pizza, Arabic pita, Indian Tandoori Chicken, American hamburgers, etc.\(^\text{21}\)

The shopping areas catering to low-wage immigrant workers, by contrast, are simply blocks of stores on the ground levels of apartment buildings. The stores face the street, and mainly carry inexpensive consumer goods. Unlike the proprietors of shops in the malls, those in these more inexpensive shopping areas allow buyers to bargain for prices.

Historical preservation is another way in which architecture from the Islamic period, the transformational period, and the colonial period has continued to articulate in the contemporary period. Preserved architectural items have included houses, settlements, mosques, tombs, fortresses, merchants' houses of the early 1900s and buildings from the 1960s. Items such as pottery and jewelry have also been

preserved.  

The above-mentioned 1991 study conducted at the U.A.E. University reflected that U.A.E. citizenship was a weak identity among the students in the sample in relation to Islamic identity. However, U.A.E. citizens did construct localism as an identity despite their above-demonstrated segmentation, in relation to the new global system in general, and to the specific reality of the U.A.E.'s large immigrant population, an outgrowth of this new globalism. Government policies also contributed to the construction of this identity. After independence in 1971, for example, the curriculum in U.A.E. schools was changed, so that for the first time, students were being taught both the history of the contemporary U.A.E., and the history of Trucial Oman. Learning about what had happened in Trucial Oman during the colonial period in the pearl industry, the badia and in agrarian regions linked U.A.E. students together in recognition of a shared history, and especially in recognition of the hardships that members of the urban, agrarian and bedouin socio-discursive formations faced during the colonial period. The awareness of this shared history on the one hand, and the massive influx of immigrant labor on the other, enabled U.A.E. citizens, despite their differences, to form an

22 See, for example, Ministry of Information and Culture, The United Arab Emirates: An Ancient People and a Young Country, pp. 12-17.
integrated identity in relation to the immigrant population. This identity was expressed in terms of dress, food, dialect of Arabic, music, art, and architecture.

Another government policy reinforced the local identity that the change in the school curriculum had helped to construct. This policy was the government financial support extended to popular arts associations, which are involved in preserving the local heritage. By 1993, 29 popular arts associations had been established out of a total of 92 organizations of all kinds that received government financial support, making this association grouping the largest one in the U.A.E. Popular arts associations also obtained the largest aggregate government appropriations in relation to other groupings receiving government financial assistance. In 1993, this appropriation amounted to 2,224,000 Dirhams, out of a total amount 5,384,000 Dirhams.23 Among other things, these associations have sponsored performances of folkloric dances and songs from the coastal areas, the agrarian areas, and the badia at individuals' personal celebrations, and during national festivals. The government also sponsors such performances on television. One popular arts association, the U.A.E. Folk Heritage Association built Heritage Village, a

reproduction of life in the badia and among people who made their living from the sea, as ghawasin or as fishermen, in Trucial Oman. The section of the Village on the badia features camels, wells, tents, and the desert. It also features live depictions of bedouin assemblies in the tents, and of falconry. The section on the coastal areas recreates the sea through the construction of an artificial lake, at the center of which is a reproduction of a pearling vessel.24

The local and federal government bodies have also sponsored camel racing, boat racing, and Arabian horse racing. In 1980, the government established the Cultural Foundation, for promoting awareness of the U.A.E.'s heritage among the public. This Foundation runs a library for assisting researchers seeking information about the U.A.E.'s local cultural heritage. The Center for Documentation and Research, under the jurisdiction of the Cultural Foundation, has collected oral traditions and historic narratives.

These preservational activities reinforce the identity of U.A.E. citizens in relation to other societies with which they are in contact via the new global system, and particularly in relation to the immigrant labor population. Because elements of the bedouin, the mercantile, and the agrarian socio-discursive formations are all depicted, U.A.E.

citizens from all of these socio-discursive formations are included in this cultural identity. The visual reproduction of the U.A.E.'s Trucial Oman past brings that past into the present, and unites contemporary U.A.E. citizens with it in time and space.

These activities of preservation of the cultural heritage facilitate the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation in three main ways. Firstly, by connecting contemporary U.A.E. citizens to the past, preservational activities have made U.A.E. citizens aware of their collective past, and have enabled them construct an identity in the course of their interaction with others.

It is also important to point out that in facilitating the construction of this identity out of the past for contemporary U.A.E. citizens through developments like Heritage Village, the U.A.E. Folk Heritage Association presents the Trucial Oman past without the discourses that characterized it. The implication from such a depiction is that like Trucial Oman before it, the contemporary U.A.E. is also a society without discourses. Secondly, a reconstruction of the past through examples such as Heritage Village is used as a discourse which enables U.A.E. citizens to compare their way of life today with the way of life in the past. Thirdly, all of these reproductions of Trucial Oman's past serve the
pragmatic purpose because they are attractive to tourism and investment, since they satisfy tourists' and investors' desire for constructed, exotic "otherness."

Municipal governments have also extended contracts to local and other sculptors to commemorate U.A.E. history by constructing sculptures in various urban public areas representing the urban, agrarian and bedouin socio-discursive formations. These sculptures have included representations of pearls in their shell, Dallah coffee pots, camels, the sagr (falcon), ships of various types, fortresses, and fish. In addition, buildings have been erected that resemble ships or bedouin tents, and city streets, parks, hotels, and other public areas are lined with date trees.

All of these construction activities are significant because they reinforce the local identity among U.A.E. citizens in relation to others, and because they help the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself. This happens because these construction activities link all three socio-discursive formations together in the cities, and link contemporary U.A.E. citizens to a certain version of past. Specifically, these examples of sculpture, landscaping, and architecture represent a certain aspect of the U.A.E.'s past culture, which both links U.A.E. citizens of the three different socio-discursive formation to the past with pride, but also reminds them of the harshness of life in
the past in relation to today.

There are several examples of this dynamic. The dallah coffee pot sculpture, for instance, signifies traditional bedouin generosity and hospitality. At the same time, people from the badia are reminded of the struggle for survival in the desert during the colonial period. This is true even though the sculpture does not, itself, depict those hardships. Statues of camels signify both the endurance and strength of the people of the badia, and the caravans that contributed to mercantile wealth by linking urban areas themselves, and by linking urban areas to agricultural areas and to the badia. However, sculptures of camels also remind U.A.E. citizens of the years during which the badia, the agrarian and the mercantile socio-discursive formation were being strangulated by colonial monopolies on maritime trade, so that there was very little to carry from one area to another, save wood, dried fish, dates, and some imports that B.I. shipping had brought to Dubai.

Sculptures of the saqr signify alertness, keen-sightedness, and the sportsmanship of the badia. They also signify the economic privilege, political power, and cultural prestige of the local pearl merchant and ruling strata during the years of the pearl industry, since falconry was their leisure sport. Both the saqr and the camel are symbols that re-affirm the place of people of the badia within U.A.E.
society when they are depicted in art. Sculptures of the sagr also carry a message that links both U.A.E. merchants and the ruling strata of today with their counterparts of the pearl industry years, and enables them to view themselves as a continuation of important strata of that period.

The date trees signify the importance of date cultivation to farmers in Trucial Oman, as well as the fact that Trucial Oman continued to export certain agricultural products even after its long-distance mercantile stratum had been destroyed. They also signify the resourcefulness of Trucial Oman's farmers, as they were able build houses and also to craft certain household goods out of different parts of the date tree. Date trees also signify protection from heat.

The pearl shell sculpture depicts the beauty of pearls that were fished during the colonial period. Though it does not describe the harshness of conditions for the ghawasin and siyub, U.A.E. citizens whose forebears did this work are reminded of these conditions. The buildings and sculptures representing ships signify the glories of historic Oman's trade, of Dubai's mercantile heritage, and of course, the wealth and heroism of the Al-Qawasim. Both the boat and the pearl shell sculptures also reiterate the message that the U.A.E.'s contemporary mercantile stratum is a continuation of that of the past.
Sculptures representing fish also symbolize the U.A.E.'s maritime heritage, and the resourcefulness of its people because of their ability use of the sea's products, notably fish, to live on during the period of impoverishment engendered by colonialism. Hence, U.A.E. citizens from the coastal areas are reminded of the impoverishment that colonialism imposed upon agriculture, and its destruction of trade, which made people so highly dependent upon the fish that they could catch for survival.

All of these symbols are firstly constructed to serve the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation by linking the U.A.E. citizens to their past on the one hand, while on the other hand, they are forming an identity in the course of interacting with others. Secondly, these symbols are constructed to serve pragmatic functions, namely those of attracting tourists and investors to the U.A.E., thereby linking the U.A.E. to new globalism. This can be seen in the fact that all of these sculptural, landscape and architectural symbols are located in areas of such cities as Dubai and Abu Dhabi that tourists and potential investors frequent, such as public squares, hotels, golf courses, the corniches or the beaches. At the same time, these tourists and investors find hotels, shopping malls, and other amenities of home in the U.A.E. and this constructed mixture of exotic and contemporary make the U.A.E.'s urban areas attractive to
New Social Movements

Previous chapters have mentioned counter discourses to European penetration that developed in historic Oman during the transformational period, such as the Ya‘arabi movement of the mid 1600s, the Muwahidi movement of the late 1700s, and the Al Qawasim of the early 1800s. They have also covered the Reform Movement that arose in relation to the decline of the pearling industry in the late 1930s, and more recent counter-discourses to colonialism such as Arab Nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s. All of these counter-discourses arose in relation to penetration and occupation by external forces which had affected the entire population and therefore had united it in counter-discourses to the penetration and occupation. The U.A.E.’s contemporary socio-discursive formation, by contrast, is not contending with such external threats at this time. However, within the last twenty years, many fragmented new social movements have developed within the contemporary U.A.E.’s civil society in relation to the increased percentage of educated citizens, the variety of occupations they hold (especially at the middle level), the growth of immigrant labor population, new globalism, and
consumerism. While these new movements do not comprise a consolidated counter-discourse to the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, each one is pursuing a specific agenda related to its interests, as defined by its members in relation to their occupations, their beliefs, their ethnic background, their gender, etc.

Membership in these organizations sometimes crosses the lines of gender, religious belief, occupation and ethnicity. For instance, women and religiously observant individuals may join organizations for holders of given occupations, as well as women's and religious associations. Members of various occupations may also join religious associations or ethnic associations. Members of different local ethnic groups may join both religious and occupation-oriented organizations.

These associations are new social movements which have taken the form of voluntary organizations that have been

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25 The development of these new social movements is a recent phenomenon, whose effects are just now becoming understood. However, certain works have recently appeared that deal with this concept in general. For example, three theoretical articles on the concept of new social movements have appeared in the periodical Social Research 52, no. 4 (Winter, 1985). These are Jean L. Cohen's "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements;" Alain Touraine's "An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements;" and Claus Offe's "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institional Politics." In this study, the term "new social movement" contrasts social movements that have arisen in the contemporary U.A.E. with those that arose during the Islamic, transformational and colonial periods, as counter discourses to the existing socio-discursive formation.
established along these various lines of interest. Despite the fact that each association pursues a limitedly defined set of interests, each one represents a force of social change within the U.A.E.'s civil society, and is therefore making certain changes within the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. In 1991, these associations numbered 163. These voluntary associations were public welfare associations, sports and youth associations, cooperative associations.\textsuperscript{26} In 1993, there were 6 religious associations, 7 womens' associations, 10 professional associations, 29 popular arts associations, 8 cultural services associations, 6 human service associations, 9 theatre associations, and 17 ethnic associations for non-nationals.

Figures for 1992 show many different religious groups which remain active today. Some are close to the Ikhwan in Egypt in their discourse. Others lean toward the Muwahidin discourse. These religious groups share such activities as the performing of charitable works both to meet local needs and those of communities elsewhere in the Islamic world. Their other activities include the organizing the Hajj to Makkah, religious education of children, the holding of panel discussions and lectures, the sponsorship of bookfairs, the

publication of pamphlets, monthly and weekly journals; and the production of video and tape cassettes, as well as compact discs. One of these organizations, Al Islah Association, has established sports, theater and art programs, as well as religious educational programs at all levels and for both sexes. Another, Al-Irshad, offers rental space for marriages and other family gatherings as an alternative to the more expensive hotels, and also has sports, cultural, and educational programs.²７

Womens' associations are divided among the six emirates. They were involved in educational work among women about child care and rearing, family services, and health and hygiene. Other activities included literacy classes, typing classes, craft making for sale and exhibition, and cultural events featuring speakers on matters of interest to women; cultural, religious and social. These associations have also conducted studies to assess the needs of women in the U.A.E., have sponsored travel by women among the emirates for better acquaintance with the nation-wide situation of women, and have held social gatherings for women. In addition to sponsoring cultural events within the U.A.E., these organizations also

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²⁷ More information about the Al-Islah organization is provided in their publications, such as Al-Islah’s pamphlets Al-Nidham al-Asasi (The Basic System) (Dubai, Matba‘at Kadhim: 1974); and Al-Islah, Masirat al-Khair (March of Goodness) (Dubai, U.A.E.: Al-Islah, 1993). More information about Al-Irshad is provided in that organization’s yearly report, Al-Irshad, No. 1, 1994.
send delegations to other events outside of the country.\footnote{Wizarat al-‘Amal wa al-Shu’un al-Ijtima‘iyyah, Al-Tanmiyyah al-Ijtima‘iyyah: Ahdāf-Injazat (Social Development: Goals – Achievements: Part 1, 1979-1981, pp. 4-6, and 13-14.}

Professional associations active in 1992 included a contractors’ association, a lawyers’ association, an authors’ association, a teachers’ association, an engineers’ and architects’ association, a sociologists’ association, an economists’ and merchants’ association, a bankers’ association, and a physicians’ association. Activities of these associations generally have included book and periodical publication; the holding of panel discussions; and defense of the interests and rights of members of the professions represented. These associations retain contact with similar ones both inside and outside of the Arab world, and send delegations to international conferences.

The Sociologists’ Association, in particular, has been very active. Among other things, it publishes the journal Shu’un Ijtima‘iyyah, which is widely read in the Arab World. This association also plays an active role in heightening public awareness of social problems in the U.A.E. by conducting research and publishing reports.\footnote{Jam‘i’at al-Ijtima‘iyin, Al-Nidham al-Asasi (The Basic System) (Dubai: Matb‘at al-Bayan al-Tijariyyah, 1994).} The Lawyers’ Association defends human rights in the U.A.E., both according to the Shari‘a and to international law. The Association’s
members also offer their opinions to the government about laws that it is planning to enact, hold conferences and publish books concerning human rights and other legal matters. The Authors' Association translates books from different languages, publishes a periodical, and offers incentives to local authors by extending yearly rewards for publications. Other associations include the Popular Heritage Association, the Consumer Protection Association, Friends of the Environment, the Association of the Handicapped, and the ethnic associations for non-nationals.

The Consumer Protection association promotes consumer awareness of the market, and helps consumers take action against cheating on the part of vendors. It also educates consumers on harmful products. Friends of the Environment promotes awareness of the environment, dangers of pollution, and ecological problems among the people of the U.A.E. through television programs, conferences, and speakers in schools. In particular, Friends of the Environment has been promoting popular awareness of the scarcity of water, the dangers of oil spillage, and the hazards of industrial pollution. The Association of the Handicapped provides care for the

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handicapped. Its services include health care, psychological counseling, food delivery, and education. The Association also teaches the handicapped skills, helps them find employment, and sponsors public awareness programs about the handicapped and their needs. In addition, the Association obtains help from organizations outside of the U.A.E. in terms of training, equipment, etc.  

The ethnic associations represent immigrants to the U.A.E. from various countries in the Arab World, the Indian Subcontinent, and the rest of Asia. In 1993, seventeen such organizations were officially registered with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, however, there continue to be many more such associations than are actually registered. Some of the ethnic associations also have branches in more than one emirate. The main goal of these associations is to promote cultural cohesion among members of the various ethnic groups they represent by sponsoring cultural events, the celebration of national holidays, etc. These associations have also introduced the culture of immigrant ethnic groups to U.A.E. citizens, have sponsored lectures about events in the countries from which the immigrants they represent come, and have also established their own sports teams.

Among these ethnic associations, those serving the

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Indian community are particularly active, both because of the above-demonstrated size of the Indian community, and because the immigrant Indian community was established in Trucial Oman during the colonial period. In fact, there are many organizations representing the Indian community because of its diversity. The ethnic associations representing immigrants from Arab countries are also active, and their activities are the ones that attract the greatest number of locals. This is because locals share language, culture, religion and history with immigrants who are also Arabs.\textsuperscript{33}

In addition to all of the associations listed above, there were 48 cooperative associations active in the U.A.E. in 1993. They could be found in all seven emirates. There were also fishermen's cooperative associations, and associations concerned with housing.\textsuperscript{34} The cooperative movement formed in

\textsuperscript{33} Wizarat al-'Amal wa al-Shu'um al-Ijtima'iyyah (Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Idarat al-Jama'iyyat dhat al-Naf'a al-'Am: Al-Tagrir al-Sanawi li 'Am 1993 (Department of Public Welfare Associations: Annual Report for the Year 1993, p. 11. Some of the descriptions of the associations mentioned are the result of the author's discussions both with certain staff members and researchers in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and with some members of these associations themselves. For specific information about the number of ethnic associations active in the U.A.E., their goals, their finances, and their relationship with the government, see Dawlat al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah, Wizarat al-'Amal wa al-Shu'um al-Ijtima'iyyah, Al Jama'iyyat dhat al-Naf'a al-'Am, Al-Tagrir al-Sanawi li 'Am 1989 (Annual Report for the Year 1989).

\textsuperscript{34} Wizarat al-'Amal wa al-Shu'um al-Ijtima'iyyah, Idarat al-Ta'awun: al-Ihsa'iyyah al-Sanawiyah lil Harakat al-Ta'awuniyyah fi al-Dawlah li 'Am 1993 (Department of
relation to retail monopolies that private companies developed for the sale of groceries to consumers. To counter these monopolies, and particularly to provide consumers with fairer prices for goods, cooperatives sold shares to consumers who joined, and used that capital to purchase goods directly from local farmers, fishermen, and manufacturers, as well as to engage in direct imports. This enabled the cooperatives to sell goods to member-consumers at lower prices, to share profits with them, to be an outlet for the produce of farmers and local fishermen, and to extend extra monies to the needy, the ill, and to the newly married who were in need of funds. The fishermen’s cooperative associations, active in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharqah, and Ajman in 1991, were established to assist fishermen in selling their catch, and to help small fishermen to secure loans.35

There are two important attributes that all of these organizations share. The first is that they are democratic in their structure, meaning that each one’s leadership is elected

35 Wizarat al-‘Amal wa al-Shu‘un al-Ijtima‘iyyah, 1991, Al Harakat al-Ta‘awuniyyah fi Dawlat al-Imarat al-‘Arabiyyah al-Mutahidah (The Cooperative Movement in the United Arab Emirates, pp. 16, and 39-42. The author also interviewed the head of one of these consumer cooperatives for more information about them.
by its members,\textsuperscript{36} or otherwise chosen with their consent. The second is that they receive government subsidies, along with other funding. However, the magnitude of government funding varies from organization to organization, from year to year, and according to association type. Some organizations obtain as much as half of their monies from government subsidies, while others obtain less than one per cent. For example, in 1992 one religious group, the Dar al-Bir, obtained a mere .1 per cent of its funding from the government, although its revenues were large. It collected 99.9 percent of its income itself through donations, and other means. In contrast, another religious group, Al-Islah wa al-Tawjih al-Ijtima'i, obtained as much as 57.2 per cent of its revenues from government subsidies. The rest of this organization's income came from the sale of books, from membership dues, from donations, etc.\textsuperscript{37}

Among other associations, popular arts groups received the greatest amount of funding for 1993, at 2,204,000 Dirhams. Women's associations ranked second in terms of government allocation, and the appropriations to this group amounted to


\textsuperscript{37} Wizarat al-'Amal wa al-Shu'un al-Ijtima'iyyah, Idarat al-Jama'iyyat dhat al-Naf'a al-'Am, \textit{Al-Tagrir al-Sanawi li 'Am 1993}, table 3, p. 11.
1,090,000 for 1993. Cultural and public services associations received the smallest amount of funding, at 100,00 Dirhams for 1993.\(^\text{38}\)

Although the activities of the local associations described above do impact the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, the fact that many of them are getting substantial government subsidies shows that the government has penetrated them as much as they have impacted it. In fact, local associations that obtain sizeable government subsidies are expected to report to the government about their expenditures.\(^\text{39}\) Thus, the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation legitimizes these associations, and allows them to take responsibility for promoting the interests they espouse, but also expects them to make accountings of themselves before the authorities. This interaction between the local civil society and the U.A.E.'s political structure is another factor that enables the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation to reproduce itself, through consensus rather than coercion.

The local associations described above not only represent the explicit interests, but also reflect three

\(^{38}\) Ibid., pp. 12-13.

discourses that have arisen in the contemporary U.A.E.'s civil society.⁴⁰ The first discourse, reflected in the outlook of many members of the religious associations, and the popular arts associations, emphasizes the importance of maintaining local culture and values. Within this context, members of the religious associations in particular emphasize the importance of reconstructing the Umma. New globalism strengthens this discourse because it enables members of religious associations in the U.A.E. to cross time and space in maintaining contact with fellow Muslims worldwide. This occurs through satellite television, shortwave radio, faxes, magazines, newspapers, and long distance telecommunication.

⁴⁰ The idea of these three discourses is mentioned in many books and articles about the contemporary U.A.E. In his Al-Tanniyayah wa al-Taghyir al-Itima'i fi al-Imarat, Al-Mutawwī cites examples of the conservative, progressive and moderate discourse that he finds operating in the contemporary U.A.E. These examples describe how adherents to these three discourses see women, societal change, the family, etc. In a sixth chapter of his book, Al-Mutawa' summarizes many short stories that have been written by contemporary U.A.E. authors. These short stories depict many forms of resistance to the contemporary socio-discursive formation. These forms of resistance include nostalgia for the past (i.e. the badia, the agricultural, fishing and mercantile life, or Arab Nationalism), rejection of consumerism, rejection of the nuclear family, rejection of social stratification, alienation within society, rejection of study abroad, criticism of misapplication of university education, rejection of status-seeking, rejection of individualism, rejection of ostentatious luxury, rejection of the influx of immigrant labor, rejection of violent television programs, resistance to the impact of domestic workers on children, etc. Yusuf Abd al-Fattah Mohammad, in his "T'aqib," (Comment), in Rashid Mohammed Rashid, Al-Mushkilat al-Itima'iyyah fi al-Imarat, p. 98 also mentions these three discourses, especially in relation to women.
The second discourse contrasts with the first in that it emphasizes the importance of opening up the U.A.E. as much as possible to new globalism. This discourse is reflected in the views of some members of the professional associations, and in members of other associations who want to extend the democracy characterizing the structure of their associations to the political structure of the U.A.E. Advocates of more extensive rights for women, many of whom are critical of the above-mentioned women's associations, also reflect this discourse. However, it is important to emphasize that the holders of these views are a minority in the U.A.E.'s civil society, albeit a growing one during the 1990s. This grouping has been growing during the 1990s in relation to the trend toward technical education, the spread of satellite television, etc.

The third discourse reflects views held by most members of the U.A.E.'s civil society, since it emphasizes maintaining a balance between the preservation of local culture and values, and reinforcing the U.A.E.'s connections to new globalism. As this chapter has demonstrated this has also been the path that the U.A.E.'s policymakers have followed. Examples of this pattern include the fact that

industrialization, technical education, the establishment of free zones, the extension of contracts for immigrant labor, the encouragement of foreign investment and tourism; and the installation of satellite dishes, computerized banking, and a technically oriented educational curriculum have been occurring simultaneously with the construction of mosques; the subsidizing of religious and local heritage preservation groups; the revival of Islamic architecture in the construction of public buildings; and the reconstruction of local culture in sports, music, dance, and sculpture. This policy of balance that U.A.E. policy makers have followed is an important aspect of the U.A.E.’s contemporary socio-discursive formation’s reproduction of itself.

Conclusion

The two chapters before this one which covered the contemporary period have demonstrated that many elements of previous socio-discursive formations have continued into the contemporary one. They have also demonstrated that the U.A.E.’s contemporary socio-discursive has both de-constructed many elements from the past, and constructed many elements of its own, such as political and economic structures, which helped it to reproduce itself.

This chapter analyzed the U.A.E’s cultural structures, and how many elements of the past have continued into them. Chapter Sixteen also demonstrated how the contemporary socio-
discursive formation has de-constructed many cultural elements of the past, so that they became discontinuities. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrated how the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation constructed cultural elements of previous periods symbolically and discursively, to serve the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. The symbolic and discursive construction of these cultural elements of the past took two forms, namely, that of cultural Islamism and that of cultural localism. This construction took these two forms in relation both to new globalism and to the influx of immigrant labor, serving both new globalism and the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation.

Cultural Islamism arose in relation to changes within the region, the spread of literacy, the development of the print media, and changes in the educational curriculum. However, at the same time, U.A.E. society was becoming integrated into new globalism, through the development of communication technologies, the penetration of multinational corporations, and the growth of tourism. In relation to this growing Islamic awareness, segments within the U.A.E.'s civil society constructed a cultural Islamic identity in the course of their interaction with these elements of new globalism. Similarly, the education system, the print media, television, popular culture associations, etc were building awareness
among segments within U.A.E. civil society of their own local history and culture. In the course of their interaction with the immigrant population, these segments within U.A.E. civil society constructed an identity featuring cultural localism.

In considering new social movements as potential counter-discourses within the contemporary socio-discursive formation, Chapter Sixteen demonstrated that in contrast to counter-discourses of previous periods, these new social movements were fragmented, pursuing a circumscribed agenda. That was because these new social movements had arisen in relation to changes within the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation itself, rather than as a counter-discourse to an external threat, or to an unpopular indigenous socio-discursive formation. Rather, these new social movements been bringing a series of small economic, political and cultural changes to U.A.E. society while remaining a part of the contemporary socio-discursive formation.

Chapter Sixteen found three distinct discourses to be operational within these new social movements. The first discourse was the conservative discourse, which emphasized the maintenance of the values, beliefs, and customs of the past. The second, progressive discourse stressed the importance of opening up the U.A.E. further to new globalism, the institution of political demoncracy, women's rights, human rights, etc. However, most segments in U.A.E. civil society
adhere to the moderate discourse, which features maintaining a balance between the preservation of the past culture and accommodating new globalism. By adhering to the moderate discourse, U.A.E. decision makers are in fact accommodating all of these elements, and this is an important aspect of the contemporary socio-discursive formation's reproduction of itself.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

CONCLUSION: SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATIONS, CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES

One of this study's purposes has been to illustrate and analyze continuities and discontinuities of previous socio-discursive formations into the U.A.E.'s contemporary one. Specifically, the aim has been to demonstrate how and why some aspects of previous socio-discursive formations have articulated with the contemporary one in the U.A.E., and how this has helped to ensure the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation's reproduction of itself. This study has also analyzed the reasons for the discontinuities of other aspects of previous socio-discursive formations in relation to the U.A.E.'s contemporary one. However, as a buildup to an analysis of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, this study has analyzed three previous socio-discursive formations, namely the Islamic, (600 A.D. to 1500 A.D.), the transformational (1500-1820) and the colonial (1820-1971). It was necessary to investigate these socio-discursive formations before tackling the contemporary one (1971-1995) because each one had its unique political, economic, and cultural impact upon historic Oman, Trucial Oman, and therefore upon the contemporary U.A.E. In order to understand which elements of each socio-discursive formation
had continued into successor periods, including the contemporary, and which elements became discontinuities, it was necessary to analyze each socio-discursive formation separately.

For the Islamic socio-discursive formation of 600 A.D. to 1500 A.D., it was necessary to cover this socio discursive formation’s construction, as well as the transformations which occurred both within it, and within the global system of the period. The role of the Umma within that global system was given special emphasis. Analysis of the Islamic socio-discursive formation also entailed an investigation of this period’s discourses and counter-discourses alike, as well as its de-construction. This investigation made it possible to see which aspects of an Islamic socio-discursive formation continued to articulate within the transformational socio-discursive formation of 1500 to 1820, which did not, and how and why these elements had continued or discontinued.

The study then moved into the transformational socio-discursive formation, considering this period’s own construction, inner workings, internal transformations, and transformations that were occurring within the global system of that period. Here, emphasis was given to the Indian Ocean and to relationship between the Indian Ocean commercial system and the Umma on the one hand to changes that were occurring in Europe on the other. This study also covered the
transformational period’s discourses and counter-discourses, along with its de-construction, so as to clarify which aspects of the transformational socio-discursive formation had continued into the colonial socio-discursive formation, which had not, and how and why they had continued or discontinued.

This study’s third move was into the colonial socio-discursive formation of 1820-1971. This period, too, was scrutinized in terms of its construction and internal developments, and particularly in terms of the global system under colonial hegemony in which it operated. This analysis covered the discourses and counter-discourses characterizing this period, and analyzed those elements of it which had continued into the contemporary socio-discursive formation, those which had not, and the reasons for their continuity or discontinuity.

This study’s fourth move was into an analysis of the contemporary U.A.E.’s socio-discursive formation thus far (1971-1995). This part of the investigation entailed demonstrating how the contemporary socio-discursive formation was constructed, its inner workings and operations within the new global system dominated by multinational firms, and how it has discursively and symbolically linked itself to previous periods. The contemporary socio-discursive formation was also analyzed in terms of elements of previous periods that had continued into it, other elements that had not, and the
process of and reasons for these continuities or discontinuities. This study also covered the issue of how the contemporary period’s constructions, and continuities and discontinuities from previous periods have contributed to this socio-discursive formation’s reproduction of itself thus far.

The following pages will summarize what specific aspects of previous socio-discursive formations the contemporary socio-discursive formation actively reconstructed from previous ones for its own reproduction; which aspects of previous socio-discursive formations continued into the contemporary one in the process of the contemporary socio-discursive formation’s construction; and what elements the contemporary socio-discursive formation itself has constructed for its own reproduction. This summary will require comparing and contrasting of the Islamic, transformational colonial and contemporary socio-discursive formations.

This study has shown that within the Islamic, transformational, colonial, and contemporary periods there developed in historic Oman, Trucial Oman and the U.A.E. unique, socially constructed power relations (discourses), as well as specific political, economic and cultural structures or social formations. This study also showed how the mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations each reproduced themselves in relation to these discourses, within each period. In addition, this study has illustrated
that each period developed its own, particular identity, both in relation to other periods, and in relation to other regions and civilizations with which historic Oman, Trucial Oman, or the U.A.E. interacted. This study demonstrated how and why the discourses and identities that were constructed during each period enhanced the ability of the socio-discursive formations of each period to reproduce themselves.

This study illustrated how the Islamic, transformational and colonial socio-discursive formations were constructed and how and why each engendered several counter-discourses, which in turn contributed to the replacement of one power relation within the socio-discursive formation with another. The following pages summarize continuities from the Islamic socio-discursive formation into its successors. They also cover those elements of the Islamic socio-discursive formation that discontinued. In the subsection following the one below, the transformational period is similarly treated. A third subsection covers the colonial period in this way, and a fourth one summarizes the contemporary socio-discursive formation.

The Islamic Socio-discursive Formation

Concerning the Islamic socio-discursive formation, for example, this research demonstrated that the Islamic socio-discursive formation developed as a counter-discourse to the pre-Islamic one. This study also showed that Islam rapidly
spread to historic Oman, and gained acceptance there, because of cultural, political and economic connections between the Arabs of historic Oman and those of the rest of the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in relation to Sassanid colonization. In addition, this research showed how and why the spread of Islam to historic Oman engendered transformations within historic Oman itself, and specifically within historic Oman’s agrarian, tribal and mercantile socio-discursive formations. The spread of Islam to historic Oman also brought about the construction of new power relationships (discourses) and new identities in historic Oman, both in relation to the pre-Islamic period and in relation to other, non-Islamic regions.

This research then investigated the Islamic socio-discursive formation further, and showed that during the Islamic period, members of the agrarian, tribal and mercantile socio-discursive formations also developed identities in relation to each other, through the discourses that they constructed, and through the economic, political and cultural structures present within the agrarian, mercantile and tribal socio-discursive formations.

This study also analyzed how and why elements of the Islamic socio-discursive formation (600 A.D. to 1500 A.D.) continued to, or failed to, articulate within the transformational socio-discursive formation (1500-1820). Continuities from the Islamic period occurred, in memories, in
imagery, and in concrete forms despite the discontinuity of the Umma’s existence as a unified polity; it was now divided among Safavid, Ottoman, Mughal (India) and many smaller polities, and despite the fact that the Umma had lost its mercantile primacy in the Indian Ocean to the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the English. This loss had spelled the discontinuity of the strength of historic Oman’s long-distance mercantile stratum. This discontinuity led to additional ones, such as the discontinuity of most of historic Oman’s shipbuilding industry, its navigational strata who were connected to long-distance trade, and of cities such as Hormuz, Suhar, Julfar, Khor Fakkan, etc, as commercial centers. The trade enclaves that merchants from the Umma in general, and historic Oman in particular, had established in cities throughout the Indian Ocean long-distance trade system also discontinued.

However, mercantile, tribal and agricultural strata that had been constructed by, or had already existed at the beginning of, the Islamic socio-discursive formation continued to exist in the transformational one, albeit in altered states. In the badia, for example, this meant that migrations from various parts of the Arabian Peninsula continued, along with migrations among the various bedouin strata (i.e. deep desert, pastoral, and semi-agricultural). Certain members of the tribal socio-discursive formation also continued to migrate into the agricultural, and then into the mercantile
socio-discursive formations. For the mercantile socio-discursive formation, this meant that the regional and long-distance mercantile and shipbuilding strata continued from the Islamic period into the transformational one, despite the challenges that they were facing from the European naval powers which were penetrating the Arabian Gulf during the 1500-1820 period.

One political continuity of the Islamic socio-discursive formation into the transformational that this research illustrated was the employment of Islam by the Ottomans, the Ya'arabi movement, the Muwahidi movement, and the Al-Qawasim as the counter-discourse for resisting European penetration of the Arabian Gulf. A cultural continuity of the Islamic socio-discursive formation into the transformational socio-discursive formation was the continuation of Islam as a way of life in general in historic Oman during the 1500-1820 period. Specifically, this meant that the people of historic Oman continued to adhere to Islamic laws, which governed agriculture, commercial transactions, inter-religious relations, gender relations, and interpersonal relations. Secondly, the various Islamic denominations and Madhahib, or schools of thought, continued to exist. In addition, the cultural influences upon historic Oman that historic Oman’s role in Indian Ocean long-distance trade had engendered under the Islamic socio-discursive formation continued within the
transformational socio-discursive formation, particularly in historic Oman's urban areas. These cultural influences continued to express themselves in music, cuisine, dress, architecture, language, etc.

To some extent, these cultural influences also continued to articulate within the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations, because of the interconnection between these two socio-discursive formations and the mercantile one that continued from the Islamic socio-discursive formation into the transformational one. This interconnection meant that caravan traffic overland continued to some extent, culturally linking historic Oman and the rest of the Peninsula and with the Fertile Crescent.

The most important element of the Islamic socio-discursive formation that did not continue into the transformational one was the strength of historic Oman's mercantile socio-discursive formation. Though this socio-discursive formation continued to exist during the transformational period, it had been weakened by Portuguese ascendancy in the Indian Ocean, despite the fact that the Ya'arabi movement, arising in historic Oman's interior, had been an effective counter-discourse to Portuguese hegemony, expelling the Portuguese from the Arabian Gulf. One of the ironies of the Ya'arabi movement was that this movement found itself employing many Portuguese methods of fighting to do so.
However, it was unable to challenge the other rising European powers in the Indian Ocean, notably, the Dutch, French and English.

This study also analyzed the continuities of the Islamic socio-discursive formation into the colonial one (1820-1971). These continuities included the fact that Trucial Oman continued to have commercial and cultural connections with the rest of the Indian Ocean, and to have mercantile, agricultural and tribal strata, although colonialism had seriously weakened all three of these. However, in relation to the destruction of the long-distance mercantile and shipbuilding strata, with the exception of those segments that were affiliated with the pearl industry, Trucial Oman's commercial connections with the rest of the Indian Ocean mainly now occurred through British India steamer lines at this time. One agricultural element of the Islamic period that continued into the colonial one was the importance of the Aflaj system as the Trucial Oman's main method of irrigation in agriculture. Another was the continued existence of the Bayadir agricultural stratum.

Cultural continuities from the Islamic period into the colonial one included Islam's continuation as a cultural and juridical way of life for the people of Trucial Oman during the colonial period. Specifically, this meant that Trucial Oman's indigenous population continued to be governed by
Islamic law, as interpreted by denomination or Madhab. It also meant that Trucial Oman's indigenous people continued to identify as Muslims, and that Islamic cultural norms of everyday life, and art and architecture, continued. Also, colonialism notwithstanding, Trucial Oman retained its connections through memories, imagery, and in concrete forms with the rest of the now-fragmented Umma. These connections manifested themselves in collections for the Ottoman war effort that were raised in Trucial Oman, the fact that scholars from other parts of the Umma came to Trucial Oman to lecture and teach, and the penetration of magazines from the rest of the Umma.

Politically, Islam continued to be used as a discourse in relation to movements like the Reform Movement of the 1930s. However, other developments within the colonial socio-discursive formation showed the discontinuity of the Islamic political discourse. This was especially true during the 1950s and 1960s. This discontinuity was evidenced by the fact that the counter-discourses to colonialism that arose in Trucial Oman and in the rest of the Arabian Peninsula during these years derived their inspiration from Arab Nationalism, or from Scientific Socialism, rather than from Islam.

Many elements of the Islamic socio-discursive formation have also continued into the contemporary one (1971-1995). These included memories and images of the general Islamic
socio-discursive formation, and symbolic and concrete continuations from the badia and agrarian socio-discursive formations. Some of these elements have continued in altered forms for the purpose of facilitating the reproduction of the contemporary socio-discursive formation. In agriculture, for example, elements of the Islamic socio-discursive formation that have continued into the contemporary include the small, family-owned farms that continue to cultivate, at least for local consumption, certain fruits that were produced in historic Oman during the 600-1500 A.D. period, the continued use of the Aflaj irrigation system. Agricultural strata dating back to the Islamic socio-discursive formation in historic Oman also continue to exist, such as the Bayadir. The agricultural socio-discursive formation of the Islamic period also continues on a symbolic basis in the contemporary period. An example of this kind of continuity is the planting of date palms around tourist hotel swimming pools, on beaches, and along city streets.

In the badia, tribes of bedouins still exist, and many of the customs of the badia continue to articulate within the contemporary socio-discursive formation, although they have been re-constructed to serve the reproduction of the contemporary socio-discursive formation, as will be discussed below. One of these continuities is the institutionalization of nisab. In the 600 A.D.- 1500 A.D., the concept nisab was
used as a discourse to confer political power, and economic privilege, and cultural prestige upon the holder. This continues to apply in the contemporary socio-discursive formation, but the concept has been altered for the purpose of serving the reproduction of the contemporary socio-discursive formation (more about this below). Certain other elements of historic Oman's tribal socio-discursive formation have continued to articulate on a symbolic basis within the contemporary one. These include the continuation of poetry recitation, and the sport of camel and Arabian horse racing. Other symbolic continuities of the badia during the Islamic socio-discursive formation that articulate within the contemporary one include urban sculptures of camels, Dallah coffee pots, falcons, etc. Certain recreational buildings are also built to resemble tents.

Elements of the mercantile socio-discursive formation of the Islamic period that articulate within the contemporary one include the institution of Islamic banking, the revival of commenda arrangements among some segments, the continued importance of Indian Ocean trade for the U.A.E., and the importance that certain mercantile strata retain, and the continuation of ship-building on a small scale. All of these continuities, however, have been modified to fit the contemporary context. Other continuities of the Islamic socio-discursive formation include the impact of historic
Oman's contact with the rest of the Indian ocean upon cuisine, music, and general tastes and preferences within the contemporary U.A.E., despite the fact that these manifestations of Indian Ocean contact have taken altered forms. Some symbolic continuities of the mercantile socio-discursive formation of the 600 A.D.-1500 A.D. period include public roundabouts in U.A.E. cities that contain sculptures of sailing ships from the Islamic mercantile socio-discursive formation, and some recreational buildings that have been designed to resemble sailing ships as well.

Islam had continued as a way of life in the contemporary U.A.E. Specifically, it has continued as a religion, and the Shari'a is retained as one of the legal system governing Muslims in U.A.E. society. Islam remains important as an identity and political force among certain segments, in relation to others. The diversity within Islam in terms of interpretation and denomination that was constructed within the Islamic period also continues in the contemporary period. Other aspects of the general Islamic socio-discursive formation that have continued into the contemporary one include Islamic architecture, art, cuisine, the re-printing of classical Islamic literature, and poetry. However, these elements were altered to accommodate the contemporary socio-discursive formation. Concerning Islamic architecture, mosques that have been constructed during the
contemporary period have represented the architecture of several different Islamic periods and regions, i.e. Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Cordoba, etc.

However, many important elements of the Islamic socio-discursive formation have discontinued, and therefore do not articulate within the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. Within the general Islamic socio-discursive formation, the existence of the *Umma* as a political unit has discontinued, as has the existence of historic Oman. Elements of historic Oman’s Islamic mercantile, agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations have also discontinued. Concerning historic Oman’s mercantile socio-discursive formation of the Islamic period, the existence of all of the strata that were involved in historic Oman’s long-distance trade within the Indian Ocean commercial system has discontinued, as has the existence of the long-distance mercantile stratum itself. These other discontinued strata which were part of the mercantile socio-discursive formation of the Islamic period include the cargo ship builders, the *nawakhadha*, the *Mu‘alimin*, the port officials, accountants, warehouse managers, money lenders, and workers such as ship loaders and unloaders, rope makers, and ship repair personnel.

Other discontinued strata which were part of the long-distance commercial system include the craftspeople who made glassware and other goods for export, miners, processors of
agricultural raw materials, etc. This discontinuity has, in turn meant a discontinuity of the U.A.E.'s contemporary mercantile stratum's direct connection with the Indian Ocean commercial system. The existence of the Indian Ocean commercial system itself has discontinued as well. In relation to the discontinuity of historic Oman's long-distance trade, agriculture for export, and for the production of inputs for historic Oman's industries has also discontinued, as has a major function that the tribal socio-discursive formation served, namely the guidance and assistance to caravans carrying goods overland. Caravan transportation, as part of long-distance trade, has also discontinued.

The Transformational Socio-discursive Formation

In covering historic Oman's transformational socio-discursive formation (1500-1820), its continuities into the contemporary one, and its discontinuities, this study also analyzed the transformational socio-discursive formation's own constructions. This period was a period of forcible penetration of the Indian Ocean by European naval powers, first Portugal, then Holland, and finally, England. All three powers constructed discourses to legitimize their penetration and domination of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf, and all three established administrative hierarchies to facilitate their domination, and suppressed any indigenous force that challenged them.
Historic Oman, itself, fell under Portuguese domination, with the Portuguese destroying many of its mercantile cities during the course of their penetration. The Ya‘arabi movement rose in the mid-1600s in relation to Portuguese domination of historic Oman’s coastal area. This movement succeeded in expelling the Portuguese from the Arabian Gulf and much of the Indian Ocean, but also found itself employing many Portuguese methods of fighting to do so. The Ya‘arabi movement remained unable, however, to challenge the other rising European powers in the Indian Ocean, such as the Dutch, French and English. Other constructions of the transformational socio-discursive formation during the time of the Ya‘arabi polity (1650-1750) included tribal and mercantile groupings, such as the Al-Bu Sa‘idi, the Bani Yas, and the Al-Qawasim, all of whom migrated into historic Oman from another location. The Al-Bu Sa‘idi migrated from the interior of historic Oman to the coast of the Gulf of Oman, and one of their members obtained the position of Wali within the Ya‘arabi polity. The Al-Qawasim were an Arab tribe which had migrated from the Persian littoral of the Arabian Gulf to the Sirr area of historic Oman, which lay along the Arabian littoral. The Bani Yas consisted of several tribal groupings who first migrated from Najd to the Liwa area of Trucial Oman, and then settled in Abu Dhabi during the mid eighteenth century. With the decline of the Ya‘arabi polity, and the
rise of the Al-Bu Sa'id, who became the rulers of Musqat, the Sirr area, in which the Al-Qawasim had settled, obtained autonomy from the new Al-Bu Sa'id polity.

One important change within the transformational period that this research covered was the Dutch decline as a power in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf during the mid-1700s in relation to Mir al-Muhanna's campaign against them, and the corresponding rise of the English. Another construction of the transformational period that this study explained was the rise of the Al-Qawasim, and their formation of an alliance with the newly-arisen Muwahidi movement, which had spread into historic Oman, as a counter-discourse to British hegemony in the Arabian Gulf. In relation both to the Muwahidi movement itself, and to its alliance with the Al-Qawasim, the Al-Bu Sa'id and the Bani Yas confederation formed an alliance of their own.

Coverage of the constructions of the transformational socio-discursive formation permitted analysis of the transformational period's continuities into the colonial period (1820-1971), as well as its discontinuities. Both the Bani Yas and the Al-Qawasim Confederations continued into the colonial socio-discursive formation from the transformational one. The region of settlement for these two confederations continued to be the Sirr area of historic Oman, and this area became Trucial Oman as a result of the British-imposed
treaties of 1820 and afterwards. After 1820, this initial continuity became a discontinuity because, in the course of their penetration of Trucial Oman, the British divided the people of both of these confederations into several segmented sheikhdoms by imposing a series of treaties upon them in 1820 and afterwards.

The Al-Qawasim Confederation, in particular, discontinued as a mercantile power because its destruction by the British in 1820, and the Muwahidi movement discontinued as a political power with aspirations to unify the peninsula as a counter-discourse to British hegemony in the region because the Ottomans defeated it. This research emphasized that Qasimi mercantile power was one of the most important elements of the transformational socio-discursive formation that did not continue into the colonial one, since the British defeat of the Al-Qawasim completed the destruction of historic Oman’s declining long-distance maritime commerce. In relation to this discontinuity, the agrarian and tribal socio-discursive formations suffered further impoverishment and underwent transformations within the colonial socio-discursive formation. Another element of the transformational socio-discursive formation that did not continue into the colonial one was population migration from elsewhere in the Peninsula, and even from the Fertile Crescent, into historic Oman’s badia, agrarian regions, and cities. This element
discontinued in relation to British colonial activities in the Arabian Gulf region. In relation to the British destruction of most of historic Oman's long distance trade, the commenda system also discontinued with the beginning of the colonial period.

One important continuity of the transformational socio-discursive formation into the colonial one that this research analyzed was the discourse and method that the British used to penetrate and dominate the Arabian Gulf. One aspect of this continuity was that British penetration actually represented an expansion and deepening of what the Portuguese had begun in the Arabian Gulf and in the Indian Ocean after 1500, for while the Portuguese were building fortresses in the coastal areas of the Indian Ocean to protect their trade monopoly within the Indian Ocean, the British had developed an interest in the Indian Ocean region's interior lands, as well as in the Indian Ocean's trade routes. Concerning the discourse involved, while the Portuguese discourse had emphasized the "spread of Christianity" to "infidels," the British used a discourse by which they constructed themselves as "forces of civilization," correspondingly constructing the indigenous people as "benighted natives." Both the British and the Portuguese discourse constructed the penetrating powers as "self," in relation to the indigenous peoples of the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf, who were correspondingly constructed as the
"others."

The methods that the British used for penetrating the Indian Ocean/Arabian Gulf region represented another continuity of the transformational socio-discursive formation into the colonial one, since many of the British penetration methods had been those of their Portuguese and Dutch predecessors. These methods included forcibly imposed restrictions on indigenous mercantile shipping. British colonialism also continued to headquarter its administration for the Arabian Gulf in India, albeit in Bombay instead of in Goa. And like the Portuguese administration before it, the British administration was hierarchical.

One cultural continuity of the transformational socio-discursive formation into the colonial one that this research mentioned was the fact that architectural relics of the transformational period remained standing during the colonial period. These included Portuguese fortresses, as well as Portuguese artillery. Also, in the surviving boat building industries in Trucial Oman, craft builders had now adopted the Portuguese method of nailing the boards and beams of the boat together, instead of binding them with cocoanut fibre.

The first important continuity from the transformational period into the contemporary socio-discursive formation (1971-1995) was the continued existence of the Qasimi and Bani Yas tribal groupings, which had been
constructed during the years between the rise and decline of the Ya'àrabi movement, in the Sirr area. Another continuity was the autonomous existence of the Sirr region in relation to the rest of historic Oman since it had gained autonomy from the Al-Bu Sa'idî Sultanate of Musqat and Oman, under the Al-Qawasim. It was the Sirr region that became the U.A.E. in 1971. (The Al-Bu Sa'idî had risen in the mid-1700s, in resistance to Nadir Shah of Persia.)

One of the most significant elements of the transformational socio-discursive formation that continued into the contemporary one was the destruction of the Indian Ocean commercial system, and relatedly, the destruction of historic Oman's long-distance mercantile stratum. The memories of the Portuguese and British penetrations have also continued through narratives and writings. During the contemporary period, neither the U.A.E. nor the Sultanate of Oman regained the mercantile power they had enjoyed prior to the transformational period. Furthermore, despite the departure of British colonial power from the Indian Ocean, the destruction of that Ocean's indigenous commercial system ensured that the Indian Ocean would remain in the hands of external forces. The impact of both the destruction of the Indian Ocean long-distance trade system and historic Oman's mercantile power during the transformational period on historic Oman's agrarian and tribal socio-discursive
formations would also continue from the transformational period into the contemporary one.

This study demonstrated how and why both of these socio-discursive formations declined and lost important functions in relation to the destruction of historic Oman’s long-distance mercantile stratum. The tribal socio-discursive formation, for example, lost its function of guiding, and providing other assistance to overland long-distance caravan trade, and during the transformational period, it was reduced to production of goods for its own consumption. In the contemporary U.A.E., the tribal socio-discursive formation continues to have a marginal existence, but mainly plays a symbolic role. The agricultural socio-discursive formation, for its part, lost its function of producing inputs and exports for historic Oman’s industries and long distance trade strata after the destruction of historic Oman’s mercantile power. In the U.A.E.’s contemporary socio-discursive formation, the agricultural socio-discursive formation has mainly continued to produce for local consumption, although some agricultural exports have recently begun to be significant again.

Another element of the transformational period which continued into the contemporary one was the ongoing role of the Muwhahidi doctrine as a discourse within the U.A.E. (The Muwhahidi doctrine had risen as part of local resistance to
growing British entrenchment in the Arabian Gulf at the end of the transformational period.) Other continuities included the use of the Portuguese method for boat building, and the continued existence of ruins of Portuguese forts, and remnants of Portuguese artillery in some parts of the contemporary U.A.E.

However, several elements of the transformational period did not continue into the contemporary one. The most obvious of these elements is the unity of historic Oman itself, which is no longer a reality. The second of these elements is Portuguese, Dutch and British hegemonic power in the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean, which are also gone. Gone also are the restrictions that they imposed upon historic Oman’s mercantile stratum regarding shipping and general use of the Indian ocean. Qasimi mercantile power was another discontinuity.

The Colonial Socio-discursive Formation

This study also discussed the specific constructions of the colonial socio-discursive formation (1820-1971), as such coverage was necessary for an understanding of elements of this socio-discursive formation that had continued into the contemporary one, along with those that had discontinued. Important constructions of the early colonial socio-discursive formation (1820-1945) included the construction of Trucial Oman itself, its division into several sheikhdoms, and the
construction of British administrative authority over Trucial Oman's government, economy and external affairs. In relation to these developments, this study demonstrated how and why the British-imposed treaties had stripped Trucial Oman of Qasimi mercantile power, its control over its resources, and its own self-representation.

This research also investigated another construction of the early colonial socio-discursive formation, namely the pearling industry. During this period, Trucial Oman's people survived as part of an economy which British colonialism had re-constructed to produce pearls as the single commodity for the global market. This reasearch showed that the pearl industry had been financed by the Banyan mercantile stratum, which had formed a partnership with British colonialism and which consequently enjoyed special privileges under British colonialism. Nor did Trucial Oman's participants in the pearling industry have any voice in terms of how the pearls were packaged, priced, or marketed.

Another construction of the early colonial socio-discursive formation, however, was the indigenous mercantile stratum that developed in relation to the pearl industry. This study demonstrated how the economic strength of these pearl merchants gained them political power and cultural prestige in relation to the ruling stratum, which depended upon local pearl merchants for its revenues. A third important
construction of the early colonial socio-discursive formation that this research treated was another mercantile stratum of the late 1800s and early 1900s, which served to import British semi manufactured, manufactured and processed goods into Trucial Oman, both for internal consumption, and for re-export. Segments of this mercantile grouping had migrated to Trucial Oman from various regions of the Arabian Gulf. Members of this mercantile grouping consequently brought their own architectural, religious, linguistic and artistic elements into the culture of Trucial Oman as well.

In relation to the decline of the pearl industry in the 1930s, the British signed concessions with the rulers of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms for the building of airports and for oil exploration. In this way, the Trucial Oman sheikhs were more closely linked to the British colonial apparatus than with their the declining pearl mercantile stratum. In place of the pearl merchants, the sheikhs became linked to local merchants who were importing goods through British India (B.I.) lines into Trucial Oman for local consumption and for re-export. It was in relation to these developments that the pearl merchant stratum founded the reform movement. This movement, however, was defeated.

This study then continued into an analysis of the constructions peculiar to later colonial period (1945-1971), which came about in relation to the decline of the pearl
sector, the rise of the import and re-export mercantile group in Dubai, the financial and political strengthening of the ruling stratum in relation to civil society, the changing interests of British colonialism, and the colonial socio-discursive formation's changing requirements for reproducing itself. British colonialism's interests and reproductive requirements mainly changed in relation the development of the oil industry in Trucial Oman, but they were also related to the global economic, political and cultural restructuring that took place after World War II.

This study demonstrated the changes that took place in the British colonial discourse in relation to British colonialism's changing interests in Trucial Oman. This research also covered the changes in British colonial administration in Trucial Oman that occurred in relation to Indian/Pakistani independence. Consequently, in order to consolidate its hold on Trucial Oman, British colonialism constructed a new set of administrative bodies, such as the Trucial Oman Scouts. Other developments that occurred during this period, both in relation to Arab Nationalism and in relation to changing British administrative needs included the establishment of the Trucial Oman Council, the Trucial Oman Deliberative Committee, and the Trucial Oman Development Fund.

British colonialism's drawing of boundaries separating Trucial Oman from the rest of the Gulf region, and separating
the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms from each other, was another development that this research analyzed, along with its impact upon Trucial Oman's three socio-discursive formations. One of these was a large out-migration of Trucial Oman's population during the later colonial period. This study also showed how and why Trucial Oman sheikhdoms came to construct distinct economic, political and cultural identities in relation to each other during the later colonial period. In relation to the drawing of boundaries among the sheikhdoms, some of them adopted specific uniforms for their security forces, separate anthems, separate passports, postage stamps and currency. In relation to the consolidation of the British colonial administration, the English language became important.

This research also traced the development of Trucial Oman's oil industry. Like the pearl industry before it, this industry provided Trucial Oman's main export commodity during this part of the colonial period, and was linked to the world market through British companies. It was the officials of these British companies who decided upon the pricing and marketing of crude oil. Another important construction of the post 1945 part of the colonial socio-discursive formation was the series of development projects that the governments of the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms initiated. These development projects were partially a product of recycled oil revenues, and they, in turn, engendered another British stratum in Trucial Oman,
besides the first one which had consisted of administrators, police and military personnel. This second British stratum included of contractors, planners, and construction supervisors. This British stratum strengthened Trucial Oman’s economic linkages with the U.K., and also introduced such cultural changes as British, postwar architecture into Trucial Oman. This architecture provided the design for many of the commercial and residential buildings that were erected in Trucial Oman during the 1960s and early 1970s. This research emphasized that both the crude oil industry and the development contracts were particularly important to the reinforcement of Trucial Oman’s linkages with the U.K., and therefore to British colonialism’s reproduction of itself in Trucial Oman.

Another construction of the post-1945 colonial period that these development contracts generated was a large addition to Trucial Oman’s labor force, which largely came from the Indian sub-continent to carry out these development projects. This addition to the labor force, too, was to impact Trucial Oman culturally, in terms of language, cuisine, dress, and recreation (cinema, music, etc.).

Two other important constructions of the post-1945 colonial period were actually counter-discourses to British colonialism that arose in the Arabian Peninsula, namely, Arab Nationalism and Scientific Socialism. However, in analyzing
these two counter-discourses, this study emphasized that they, too, were at the same time constructions that had arisen within the colonial socio-discursive formation, as they were both based on philosophies that had originated in the West. But this study also demonstrated how instrumental both of these movements were in the departure of British colonialism from the Arabian Peninsula and Trucial Oman, and therefore in the establishment of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) after 1971.

Investigating the constructions of the colonial socio-discursive formation made it possible to identify those elements of this socio-discursive formation that continued into the contemporary one, and those that did not. One element of the colonial socio-discursive formation that continued into the contemporary one is a series of memories of British colonialism from the attacks on the Al-Qawasim to the drawing of the boundaries among the Trucial Oman sheikhdoms. These memories have survived in narratives, and in written works. A concrete continuation has been the residual segmentation of the seven emirates. They are now officially unified as the contemporary U.A.E., but each retains a degree of individual identity in relation to the others. Another aspect of this residual segmentation among the emirates is that each one continues to be an important element in a U.A.E. citizen's identity, as his or her emirate of birth appears on
official documents. Still another aspect of this residual segmentation is another continuation from the colonial period into the contemporary one, namely that each emirate retains its hereditary ruler, although these hereditary rulers are now part of the federal government. Within each emirate, the political power of the ruling stratum in relation to other strata also continues.

At the federal level, the government bodies constructed in Trucial Oman, such as the Trucial Oman Scouts, the Trucial Oman Council, the Trucial Oman Deliberative Committee, and the Trucial Oman Development fund also continue, albeit in reconstructed form, as bodies of the Federal government of the United Arab Emirates. The expansion of the U.A.E.'s government bureaucracy has also continued from the colonial period into the contemporary one. The expansion of the civil service that began in order to accommodate the initial expansion of the educated strata during the late colonial period has continued and intensified during the contemporary one, as has additional expansion of the government bureaucracy in relation to continuing development projects, and to the needs of a growing immigrant population. Through the provision of education and employment, the federal government has been able to penetrate civil society, and thereby to ensure its own reproduction.

Another element of the colonial period that has
continued into the contemporary one is the fact that the boundaries that demarcated Trucial Oman and its neighbors during the colonial period continue to demarcate the contemporary U.A.E. from its neighbors. Another element of the colonial period that had continued into the contemporary is the fact that these interstate boundaries perpetuate the segmentation of the deep desert bedouins. As a result of this segmentation, it has become difficult for them to revive a way of life that featured flexible, moveable diras.

Economic continuities from the colonial socio-discursive formation include the continuing role of mercantile groupings whose function is to import foreign goods into the U.A.E., and to re-export goods on the new global market. However, the role of these mercantile groupings has been altered both in relation to the changes that the contemporary socio-discursive formation generated, and in relation to the new global system. Specifically, they now import goods from all over the world, and also export local goods.

The development projects, which were initiated massively during the 1960s, were a significant continuation from Trucial Oman under the colonial socio-discursive formation to the contemporary one, because they were also being implemented during the 1970s as well. A related continuity was the fact that U.A.E. retained some linkage to the U.K. through these projects because the U.A.E.'s public
and private sectors continued to need British imports, services and technology for the continued expansion, improvement, and maintenance of the infrastructural installations that the British companies had constructed through contracts with the Trucial Oman Sheikdoms, and with the U.A.E.'s public and private sectors. This connection with the U.K. continued because the U.A.E. had not developed its own technological expertise, and neither had its policymakers chosen to explore alternative paths to development. The continuation of this pattern of development from the colonial to the contemporary socio-discursive formation led to another continuation of the colonial period, namely, the importance of foreign labor from the Indian subcontinent for the execution of these projects.

Another element of the colonial socio-discursive formation that has continued into the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation is welfarism. This welfarism developed during the later colonial period as oil revenues began to increase, in relation to the impoverishment that most of the people of Trucial Oman faced after the decline of the pearl industry. In the 1960s, the governments of the Trucial Oman sheikdoms used this policy as a means to penetrate civil society. An outgrowth of this policy was the cohesion it engendered among the sheikdoms because the smaller ones were dependent upon the larger and wealthier ones for welfare and
development funds.

The phenomenon of consumerism also began to develop during the colonial period in relation to the growth of employment occurring in Trucial Oman during the 1960s and the early 1970s. This, in turn, led to an increase in the import of consumer goods both by the new mercantile stratum that was also growing during this period, and by the old one that had continued from the earlier colonial period. The growth in these imports was enhanced both by the infrastructural development projects of the 1960s and early 1970s, and by the presence of immigrant labor. This consumerism has continued into the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, in an altered form that accommodates the contemporary context, including changes which have occurred within the new global system.

Another continuation from the colonial socio-discursive formation into the contemporary one was the alternative employment that employees at various levels of the pearling industry were obliged to find after that industry declined. This alternative employment included work in the ports, in the government bureaucracy, or in the oil industry during the 1950s and 1960s.

Cultural elements of the colonial period that have continued into the contemporary one have included architecture. Specifically, two important styles of
architecture which had been introduced into Trucial Oman during the colonial period have continued into the contemporary socio-discursive formation. These were the houses built by merchants who had migrated to Trucial Oman from the Persian littoral of the Arabian Gulf, and the office and administrative buildings in Trucial Oman that British architects had designed during the 1960s and early 1970s. These two styles of architecture have continued to articulate with newer ones adopted in the contemporary socio-discursive formation. Other cultural continuities from the colonial period include the music, literature, folklore, and mythology of the pearling industry. The songs sung by the ghawasin, their narratives, mythology, and dances, are preserved by the above-mentioned popular arts associations, and are performed at national celebrations and festivals. In addition, U.A.E. cities contain many sculptures that depict the "pearl in the oyster shell" theme. Many aspects of the Trucial Oman’s education system have continued from the late colonial period into the contemporary U.A.E. These include scheduling practices for the school day and academic year, departmentalization of subjects in the curriculum, and the school hierarchy. Although the wearing of Western-style uniforms to school has discontinued among U.A.E. citizens in favor of local Arab dress, some non-local pupils continue to wear western dress.
Many discourses and counter-discourses that were constructed under the colonial socio-discursive formation have also continued into the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation. Discourses that differentiate segments of the labor force from each other by ethnicity, nationality, religion, wage level, emirate of residence and gender have also continued from the colonial socio-discursive formation into the contemporary one. Still other discourses continue from the colonial period among U.A.E. citizens themselves in relation to the improved standards of living today, as contrasted with the period of stagnation of the 1930s and 1940s, following the decline of the pearling industry.

The counter-discourses that were constructed during the 1950s and 1960s in relation to British colonialism, particularly those of Arab Nationalism, have also continued to articulate within the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, and have been influential both in terms of the assistance that the U.A.E. has extended to other Arab countries, and in terms of other foreign policy activities that express identification with the rest of the Arab world.

Many aspects of the colonial socio-discursive formation, however, are now discontinuities. One important discontinuity is British colonialism, which also means that the imposed treaties have become discontinuities. This also means that Trucial Oman, now the U.A.E., can represent itself,
speak for itself, and decide its own political, economic and cultural destiny. The U.A.E.'s independence also spelled an end to most of the British-constructed discourses about the threats that Trucial Oman faced from its neighbors. (The one exception is the ongoing dispute between Iran and the U.A.E. over the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs in the Arabian Gulf.) The relationship between the U.A.E. and Iran, however, remains normal. A related discontinuity from the colonial period is the fact that all other unsettled boundary questions that existed between Trucial Oman and its neighbors during the colonial socio-discursive formation have now been solved, including that between the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia over the Bureimi region.

Another discontinued element of the colonial socio-discursive formation is the political fragmentation that characterized Trucial Oman under the colonial socio-discursive formation. Each of the constructed emirates is now under the jurisdiction of the U.A.E.'s federal Government, and no longer has its own police force, postage stamps, flag, national anthem, and passports.

Another discontinued element of the colonial socio-discursive formation is the British monopoly on the U.A.E.'s oil industry, and on the development contracts. Since 1971, and even before it, oil concessions have been extended to U.S., French, and Japanese companies, and the government of
Abu Dhabi also has a share in the industry and has developed its own oil company. Development contracts have been extended both to companies from various states, and to local ones. In addition, crude petroleum, though still significant, is no longer the sole commodity that the U.A.E. exports, as over the last fifteen years, the export of manufactures has gained importance. Re-exports also remain significant. Nor has the United Kingdom remained the main supplier of U.A.E. import commodities. In fact, U.A.E. merchants have been importing significant portions of their goods from other Indian Ocean nations, such as India, China, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, etc.

The Contemporary Socio-discursive Formation

In covering the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation (1971-1995), this research used the term "contemporary," rather than "post-colonial" because aspects of all of the previous socio-discursive formations discussed in this study, Islamic and transformational as well as colonial, have continued to articulate in some way within the post-1971 socio-discursive formation. Equally significant, this socio-discursive formation has developed its own constructions. The analysis of the articulation of elements of past socio-discursive formations within the contemporary one, in relation both to the contemporary socio-discursive formation's own constructions and to the new global system was more
significant, from the vantage point of this study's purposes, than the mere pullout of British colonialism in 1971.

This research demonstrated that the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation contained elements that had been constructed within previous socio-discursive formations, but which continued, in an altered form, in the contemporary one. The study also analyzed those elements constructed within previous socio-discursive formations that did not continue into the contemporary one. As demonstrated above, aspects of previous socio-discursive formations that continued into the contemporary one in an altered form were political, economic, and cultural.

Political continuities included tribalism, hereditary rule, laws, government bureaucracy, and welfarism. The economic continuities included mercantilism, agriculture, and industrialism. The cultural continuities included elements from the Islamic, transformational and colonial socio-discursive formations. The specific continuities included Islamic beliefs, architecture, art, dress, music, food, customs, language, education, sports, etc.

However, aside from analyzing elements of previous socio-discursive formations that continued into the contemporary, this research stressed that the contemporary socio-discursive formation also had constructions of its own, which were political, economic, and cultural. In analyzing
these constructions, this study demonstrated how and why they had been constructed for the purpose of serving the reproduction of the contemporary socio-discursive formation. In addition, this research has analyzed the new social movements that arose from these constructions, and their role in reproducing the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, or in engendering changes within it. In analyzing the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation, this study placed the U.A.E. within the context of new globalism. New globalism was also examined as a factor in the reproduction of the contemporary socio-discursive formation, as well as in the changes that have occurred within it. Treatment of the contemporary period also focused upon the U.A.E.'s development of an identity as an independent state in relation to other states when it joined the United Nations and through its other interactions with other states. However, the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation also had to foster an identity among the U.A.E.'s internal strata as U.A.E. citizens, in relation to the citizens of other states. The contemporary socio-discursive formation achieved this objective through its political, economic and cultural constructions.

Political constructions of the contemporary socio-discursive formation were different from those of previous one. It is also important to emphasize that these
constructions of the contemporary socio-discursive formation themselves have been changing over the past twenty years. One important political construction of the contemporary period has been the U.A.E.'s federal government as an independent body. The U.A.E.'s federal government, for instance, sets its own foreign policy, and the U.A.E. makes its own economic, political, security and cultural plans through its legislative bodies. The Union also has its own judiciary system for ensuring the rule of law within all of the emirates. The U.A.E.'s federal government also issues its own passports, and has its own flag and national anthem etc. This means that national identity was constructed among the U.A.E.'s people in relation to other peoples and societies, including other Gulf societies. A related construction of the contemporary period has been the cohesion that this identity has brought to the U.A.E., in place of the fragmented identities among the sheikhdoms that British colonialism had engendered.

However, this identity that the U.A.E.'s federal government constructed in relation to other Gulf societies did not de-construct the segmentation that was already arising within the Arabian Gulf region and in the Arab-Islamic Umma during the contemporary period. Concerning the Gulf region specifically, each society joined the United Nations and other international organizations, thereby legitimizing itself in relation to the others, and also had constructed its own
identity in relation to the others, just as the U.A.E. had done. It was in relation to the U.A.E.'s construction of its identity in relation to other societies that this study focused on the U.A.E.'s internal socio-discursive formation, examining how this socio-discursive formation engendered internal identity formation among the contemporary U.A.E's various strata in relation to others within the new global system, and how the construction of this internal identity helped to ensure the reproduction of the social order within the U.A.E.

The most significant economic construction of the contemporary socio-discursive formation is the infrastructural, agricultural and industrial development that has occurred within the U.A.E. over the 1970s and 1980s. Among other things, this development has markedly increased the contribution of the non-oil sectors of the U.A.E.'s economy to the G.D.P. Specific new constructions within this larger one include the agricultural sector, water and electrical works, the industrial sector, the government sector, the services sector, the banking and insurance sector, etc. All of which sectors have expanded in relation to the U.A.E.'s development. Welfarism is another economic and social construction of the contemporary period. This construction includes the education system, the health care system, subsidized services, etc. Aside from improving the
contemporary U.A.E.'s standard of living in relation to Trucial Oman's during the colonial period, these socio-economic constructions have engendered cohesion within the U.A.E., and facilitated the reproduction of the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation.

Diversified trade is another characteristic that the contemporary socio-discursive formation has constructed in relation to Trucial Oman. Specifically, the contemporary U.A.E. exports many commodities other than crude oil. Imports come from all countries of the world, where they had mainly come from the U.K. during the Trucial Oman period. The contemporary socio-discursive formation constructed the U.A.E.'s free zones as a means of linkage to new globalism. However, these free zones have also facilitated the penetration of the U.A.E. by multinational corporations.

Underlying all of these constructions has been another one, namely, the national and local labor force. In the contemporary period, this labor force has constructed new stratifications in relation to the economic development illustrated above. Specifically, the new labor strata that have been constructed include employers in the industrial, agricultural and service sectors, and their employees. These employees include skilled and unskilled, as well as literate and illiterate, workers. This stratification also include an older and more recent group of self-employed workers. The
older group contains old merchants, small farmers, and fishermen. The more recent group includes immigrant restaurant owners, shopkeepers, etc. This labor force has also become diversified because it contains members of both genders, and of several ethnic groups. Another characteristic of the labor force that the contemporary socio-discursive formation has constructed is its linkage to consumerism, through the routinization of work, which is linked to consumption by wages.

The contemporary socio-discursive formation's cultural constructions include the cultural diversity within the contemporary U.A.E. that diversification of the labor force engendered. A related construction is the fact that diversity linked the U.A.E.'s labor force to new globalism through consumerism which expressed that diversity. This dynamic is reproducing the U.A.E.'s linkage to new globalism. The expansion and changes in curriculum that the U.A.E.'s education system has undergone are additional cultural constructions of the contemporary socio-discursive formation. In fact, the U.A.E.'s educational curriculum is still undergoing transformations.

Political, economic and cultural constructions within the U.A.E.'s contemporary socio-discursive formation have all engendered other cultural constructions in the form of the fragmented new social movements that have arisen in relation
to gender, ethnicity, consumerism, profession, environmentalism, religion, etc. These cultural changes have engendered the construction of three discourses in U.A.E. society. These discourses, the conservative, the moderate, and the progressive, reflect the thrusts and aims of these new social movements. The U.A.E. policymakers have been accommodating all three discourses, and this is facilitating the reproduction of the contemporary socio-discursive formation.

This research also examined those elements of previous socio-discursive formations that the contemporary one had selected to articulate within it, and had reconstructed to reproduce power relationships. In addition, the contemporary socio-discursive formation had selected and reconstructed other elements of previous socio-discursive formations in relation to new globalism and to the influx of immigrant labor for the purpose of serving the contemporary socio-discursive formation's own reproduction. Elements of previous socio-discursive formations reconstructed to articulate with the contemporary one for these purposes were political, economic and cultural.

The institutionalization of nisab within the contemporary socio-discursive formation is an example of an element of the Tribal socio-discursive formation within historic Oman which was selected and reconstructed to
articulate within the contemporary socio-discursive formation for the purpose of maintaining the political power, economic privilege and cultural prestige of certain strata in relation to others. Other elements of historic Oman's tribal socio-discursive formation have likewise been selected and reconstructed for discursive use in assisting the reproduction of the contemporary socio-discursive formation, such as camel racing, the recitation of poetry, urban sculptures of camels, as well as sculptures of Dallah coffee pots, falcons, etc. Certain recreational buildings are also built to resemble tents.

Elements of historic Oman's mercantile socio-discursive formation have also been selected and reconstructed to articulate within the contemporary socio-discursive formation, to facilitate its reproduction. Some public roundabouts in cities, for example, contain sculptures of sailing ships from historic Oman's mercantile socio-discursive formation, and some recreational buildings have been designed to resemble sailing ships as well. There have been similar architectural selections and reconstructions from historic Oman's agrarian socio-discursive formation as well. These have included the planting of date palms around tourist hotel swimming pools, on tourist beaches, and along city streets.

Islamic architecture, art, the reprinting of classical Islamic literature and poetry are other aspects of the Islamic
socio-discursive formation that were selected and reconstructed to articulate within the contemporary U.A.E.'s socio-discursive formation. The designs of mosques built in contemporary period, for instance, have been selected from Abbasid Baghdad, Omayyad Damascus, and Mamluk Cairo. However, these elements were altered to accommodate the contemporary socio-discursive formation, in relation to the new globalism.

The contemporary socio-discursive formation has also selected and reconstructed elements of the transformational period for reproducational reasons. In the contemporary period, sculptures have been constructed which resemble the Portuguese forts that had been built during the 1500-1820 period. There have also been sculptures of artillery weapons from this period.

The contemporary socio-discursive formation has also selected and reconstructed certain features of the Trucial Oman period (1820-1971) for its own reproduction. These features include the wind tower, a ventilation device of the early 1900s. Decorative wind towers have been built on some contemporary buildings in shopping malls, and on certain houses. Heritage Village is a reconstruction from the 1820-1945 period in Trucial Oman, selected to 'represent' both the tribal socio-discursive formation and the pearl industry. In addition, contemporary cities contain many sculptures that depict the "pearl in the oyster shell" theme. The music,
literature, folklore, and mythology of the pearling industry has also been selected and reconstructed. The songs sung by the ghawasin, and their dances, are preserved by the above-mentioned popular arts associations, and are performed at national celebrations and festivals.

As demonstrated above, the contemporary socio-discursive formation contains many elements from previous ones. Some of them are continuations, but others are selected reconstructions which are discursively used to serve existing power relations, to help reproduce the contemporary socio-discursive formation, or to construct an identity in relation to contemporary developments such as new globalism.
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